Potentiality and Reconciliation: a Consideration

of Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" and Adorno's "Progress"

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Walter Benjamin's 1921 essay "Critique of Violence" offers a powerful and unique examination of the legal justification of violence and state power. Benjamin contends that a critique of violence requires a "philosophy of its history,"[1] and the model he offers challenges traditional approaches to the question of legal violence: instead of considering the circumstances in which violence may be justified legally, he considers the law itself as a kind of violence, and suggests that modern legal systems struggle to do justice to the violence to which they owe their existence.

In this paper, I will consider the arguments of "Critique of Violence," especially the distinction between mythic violence and divine violence, from the perspective of Adorno's writings on the relationship between nature and progress. I will propose that Adorno's treatment of the notion of *progress*, as outlined in his 1962 lecture on the topic, is a dialectical interpretation of Benjamin's Messianic politics, an interpretation which seeks to tease out the interrelatedness of Benjamin's opposed concepts of mythic and divine violence. This dialectical reading is justified by its source material, as Benjamin's distinction between facticity and potentiality foreshadows Adornos' own brand of negative dialectics. I hope to demonstrate that Benjamin and Adorno's separate projects converge in a concern about the possibility of emancipatory politics, with a shared pessimism regarding the capacity of

revolutionary political programmes to break out of a cycle of domination and oppression. Despite their pessimism, the two writers both leave open the possibility of an emancipatory politics of potentiality, a politics that might do justice to the violence of its eruption.

Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" reveals a deep scepticism regarding the possibility of true justice under *any* legal order. In the essay, violent attempts to institute new social orders are condemned not for their violence, but for the failure of this violence to ever transcend a cycle of state self-interest and oppression. The law is considered as a mechanism of control which rules over the lives of humans with a mythic quality of fatefulness.[2] Its logic of crime and punishment is violent not merely in the sense of actual physical violence, but in the sense that the law, far from giving its subjects the moral tools to determine their own actions responsibly, prefers to constrain, judge and penalize them. This is contrasted with God's commandment against killing, which Benjamin describes as not "a criterion of judgment, but a guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it."[3]

The laws of human governments are not open to interpretation by the subject who must act in accordance with them: their function is not to guide human action but to announce at every step the pre-eminent controlling power of the government itself. It is the government in its juridical function that ultimately determines the guilt or innocence of the actor. In doing so, it attests to its own power and control. It is irrelevant whether the violence of the state is executed for the establishment of laws or for their preservation: both acts attest to the law's inescapability. It is this fateful quality of law that constitutes its true violence. The doomed cycle of repetition in which oppressive regimes replace oppressive regimes leads Benjamin to characterise lawmaking violence as "mythic violence," a violence that is first and foremost a "manifestation of [the] existence" of the regime.[4] This violence is mythic insofar as it imposes itself upon human existence as that which governs and delimits potentiality.

In Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, mythology is a tool used by humans to understand and begin to control nature, and it is this process of domination and control that is carried over into enlightenment rationality, which ostensibly dispels mythological distortion. But if mythology and enlightenment rationality are both attempts to overcome the fatefulness of nature – for example, the arbitrary destruction of extreme weather events – they nonetheless reproduce this fatefulness within their logic of control and domination, remaking nature in their own image. Humankind continues to suffer arbitrary torments, but with the development of

human rationality and technology, the power to torment – alongside an ever increasing capacity for destruction – is exercised more often by humankind against itself and against the earth than by the natural world against humanity. The dialectical discovery of Adorno and Horkheimer's work is that enlightenment rationality and pre-enlightenment mythology are implicated within one another: both are attempts of humanity to subjugate nature that ultimately (if unknowingly) extend the rule of nature over humanity.[5]

What unites Benjamin's concept of mythic violence and Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment is the insight that, in any division between mythology and truth, *modern society is on the side of mythology*. This realisation becomes particularly abhorrent because, as Benjamin puts it, we have secured "victory over the demons": we have liberated ourselves from our former powerlessness in the face of nature's arbitrary manifestations, and yet have reinstituted nature in the form of our juridico-legal institutions.[6] The legal violence that mimics mythic violence is thus a mocking reflection of a historical moment in which mythic violence was truly inescapable.

If all law-positing violence is caught up in the oppressive logic of mythic violence, an exception can be found in Sorel's notion of proletarian strike, which posits no law.[7] What distinguishes the proletarian general strike from other strikes is that its lack of a determinate end other than its own *means* – the refusal to engage in exploitative labour – operates outside the relationship of means and ends traditionally used to justify (legally or otherwise) violence. Indeed, this type of strike serves no purpose other than to undermine the controlling relationship of means and ends which characterizes both law-positing and law-preserving violence.[8] For Benjamin, the importance of such a politics of "pure means" is that the precise absence of *ends* opens a space for the preservation of potentiality, a way out of the fatefulness of mythic violence.

Benjamin's essay culminates in a distinction between mythic violence and *divine* violence, a distinction which appears to form a potential litmus test for a justifiable revolutionary politics:

> Mythic violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake; divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice; the second accepts it.[9]

The distinction made here between "mere life" and "all life" asks what it is that is *at stake* in violent acts of political transformation. It is characteristic of the cycle of mythic violence and its entrenchment of the ever-same of fatefulness that it rules over the "mere life" of bodily life and leaves everything else untouched – indeed, it is only through the forceful imposition of

bloody legal violence on man's body that the law can impose the fateful cycle of the ever-same. Benjamin subsequently condemns any conception of life restricted to "*mere* life" as a falling short of the total conception of humanity:

> Man cannot, at any price, be said to coincide with the mere life in him, any more than it can be said to coincide with any of other of his conditions and qualities, including even the uniqueness of his bodily person. However sacred man is…there is no sacredness in his condition, in his bodily life vulnerable to injury by his fellow men.[10]

By contrast, in "The Task of the Translator" Benjamin appears to provide a definition of *all life*:

> The concept of life is given its due only if everything that has a history of its own, and is not merely the setting for history, is credited with life. In the final analysis, the range of life must be determined by the standpoint of history rather than that of nature, least of al by such tenuous factors as sensation and soul. The philosopher's task consists in comprehending all of natural life through the more encompassing life of history.[11]

Benjamin privileges a conception of life that is historical rather than natural; that is to say, one that is defined by its potential for transformation rather than by an eternal and immutable character or set of properties. When he describes "divine violence" as "pure power over all life," then, he is referring to a power which reorders potentiality, undoing the chains of fate that perpetuate life as we think we know it. Because of this, Benjamin accuses those who consider life itself to be the highest good of accepting the inevitability of the ever-same, where no transformation of the social could ever be possible that would justify acts of revolutionary killing. For Benjamin, such a move constitutes a premature foreclosure of human potential.[12]

A more complete understanding of the relationship between divine violence and potentiality in Benjamin's work can be provided through a consideration of Adorno's treatment of the related issue of progress. In his 1962 lecture, Adorno distinguishes between technical-rational progress and progress for humankind; the distinction opens up a space in which the avoidance of global catastrophe becomes possible but by no means inevitable:

> Today such reflections [on progress] come to a head in contemplation of whether humankind is able to prevent catastrophe. The forms of humankind's own overall social constitution endanger its life insofar as no self-conscious overall subject develops and intervenes.

> The possibility of progress – of averting utmost, total disaster – has devolved to this overall subject alone. All else involving progress must crystallize about it.[13]

Just as Benjamin was concerned to move beyond a consideration of legal violence which from the outset accepted its operation as justifiable, Adorno wishes to expand the debate regarding social progress beyond a mere consideration of society's "skills and knowledge."[14]

Adorno's assessment of Benjamin's position can be understood by reference to Benjamin's pessimism regarding mythic violence: insofar as humankind is ruled by mythic violence, "humankind" in the fullest sense has not begun to exist, and as such cannot be said to progress. For Benjamin, the condition for the establishment of humankind would be the seizure of its redemptive potentiality. In Adorno's reading of Benjamin, this entails the establishment of a *real* humankind in the place of the current "illusory image" of humankind.[15] Insofar as our notions of humankind and society are tied to particular conceptual determinations (in particular, those derived from modern capitalism, such as the principle of exchange), this illusory image is a "false totality," containing within itself a limiting principle that acts so as to foreclose potentiality; our understandings of humankind are delimited by the scope of those conceptual determinations. For Adorno, this potentiality is the potentiality of actual progress.

For Adorno, the danger of a purely secular notion of progress is that it will simply ontologize progress as a function of being itself, when "too little of what is good has power in the world for progress to be ascribed to the world in a predicative judgment."[16] And yet this is not the same as promoting a disbelief in progress, and he warns that such a position is perhaps even more misguided than a naïve belief in progress:

> Those who, since antiquity and with ever new words, make the same wish: that there be no progress, have the most dangerous pretense of all. This pretense lives from the false inference that since no progress has taken place until now, there will never be any. It presents the disconsolate return of the same as the message of Being which must be heard and respected, whereas Being itself, to whose voice this message is imputed, is a cryptogram of the very myth, liberation from which would be a moment of freedom.[17]

If Enlightenment thinking, with its naïve insistence on progress, amounts to an unwitting extension of the cycle of "mythic violence," then a disbelief in progress implies the open celebration and legitimation of that cycle as being our just desserts. Accordingly, it offers no position from which to critique our situation. Here Adorno's criticisms are similar to those Benjamin levels

against Kurt Hiller: just as Benjamin is critical of the position that there is nothing worth killing or dying for, Adorno resists the conclusion that there is no point in attempting to realize progress.

Instead of posing the question of whether progress occurs or not, Adorno focuses on what he considers progress's partiality and incompleteness – its focus on "skills and knowledge" at the expense of humankind itself. This incompleteness is revealed in the illusory belief in the spirit as eternal and ahistorical. Just as Benjamin insists that "all life" must be viewed from the perspective of history rather than nature, Adorno insists that "spirit" is just as implicated within historical development as is "mere life."

The possibility of *real progress* – and it remains a possibility only – would require the adoption of a critical distance from society and its secular notion of progress; a distance which, while not abandoning the category altogether, would recognize that "as society is, it is at times the opposite of progress."[18] In its secular form, "progress" is generally confined to a techno-rationalist conception that emphasizes the accumulation of skills and knowledge at the expense of promoting emancipation from suffering. For Adorno, this techno-rationalist development is in fact the development of strategies of oppression and domination, over the external world of nature, over one's fellow human, and finally over one's own inner nature. A philosophically defensible definition of progress would need to break this link between progress and domination.

In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno establishes this logic of domination as characteristic of conceptual thought, which functions by a process of reducing the nonidentical to the identical. Fred Dallmayr describes nonidentity as "the surplus or excess of being over knowing, especially the excess of social and historical reality over the appropriating grasp of conceptualization."[19] As with mythology and enlightenment in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, conceptualization is a means by which man establishes a level of control over nature, with the result that "the 'conceptual order' absorbs and monopolizes the content of thought."[20] Insofar as this conceptualization of being gives man a level of control over his surroundings, it is a technique of survival that develops out of man's natural state in nature. As such, in the act of dominating nature, man remains compliant with his natural state, and has not fully embraced the emancipatory potential of reason. The oppressive tendencies of instrumental reason thus reveal enslavement to nature in the very moment of man's alleged liberation from nature.

However, this dialectical increase in domination, a dialectic which leads "from the slingshot to the atom bomb," is a contingent rather than pre-ordained development, and in its contingency there exists the possibil-

ity of true progress.[21] The "humankind" that would need to come into existence in order for *true* progress to begin would be one which moves beyond oppressive totalities, totalities established by a mode of thought characterized by the use of concepts to neutralize the diversity of experience, and the tendency to suppress the tension between the conceptual and nonconceptual. True progress, then, is linked to a moment of reconciliation with nature, for only by ceasing to dominate nature can man transcend his own ennatured status:

> Progress means: a coming out of the spell, even out of the spell of progress which is itself nature, when humankind becomes aware of its own indigenousness to nature and halts the mastery which it exerts over nature through which mastery by nature continues. In this respect it could be said that progress only properly occurs where it ends.[22]

In *Negative Dialectics* this moment of reconciliation is described as an acceptance of difference, and an end to the reduction of the nonidentical to the identical:

> The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien. Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the heterogenous and beyond that which is its own.[23]

Adorno does not advocate the full-scale de(con)struction of the subject, as subjectivity remains that which potentially liberates humanity from the enslavement to nature of the animal. Nonetheless he advocates a transformation of subjectivity in the name of a more reconciled relationship with nature. This reconciliation would take the form of an expansion of subjectivity to the point of self-reflection on its partiality:

> The subject has to make good for what it has done to the nonidentical. In doing that it becomes free of the appearance of its absolute being for itself.[24]

By advocating such a reconciliation with the nonidentical, Adorno seeks "to use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity."[25] Adorno chooses his words carefully here: to abandon reason and identity-thinking altogether would be to foreclose the possibility of true progress and justice which these concept entail, however ambiguously, thus inviting unrestrained barbarism and injustice. Adorno insists that identity and non-identity must be thought together. It is for this reason that

Adorno claims that progress can only be redeemed by "making use of the forces of progress itself, but never by restoring the previous situation."[26] In this sense we can postulate that, for Adorno, any "return" to nature requires as its precondition a more complete *emancipation* from nature, with the proviso that by "nature" we are referring to two quite different concepts: in the latter case, nature as a historically produced state of domination and subjugation (Adorno's "natural history" as Benjamin's "mythic violence"), and in the former, a "nature" which involves a reconciliation between man and the world around him, which includes between man and the natural world, between man and woman, between man and fellow man.

Adorno considers reason as a vehicle by which humankind can overhaul nothing less than its relationship to nature, its very subjectivity. For Adorno, the possibility of "redemption" in Benjamin's sense is closely linked to the potential for the radical transformation of subjectivity itself. The necessity of such a transformation forms a limit beyond which *social* transformation cannot properly be thought, for any utopian imagining of society which carries over our pre-existing notion of humanity would be doomed to simply repeat the past in a cycle of Benjaminian *mythic violence*:

> The popular question concerning 'Man,' prevalent still in Marxism of the Lukacsian version, is ideological, because it dictates already in its form the invariancy of a possible answer, even if it were historicity itself. What 'Man' in himself is supposed to be is always only what he was: he is nailed to the rock of the past.[27]

The possibility of overcoming this cycle of mythic violence is considered in terms of reconciliation in Adorno's work, and *redemption* in Benjamin's. To chart the relationship between these two terms, it is necessary to consider the extent to which redemption is, for Benjamin, a realizable possibility. In the theses "On the Concept of History," Benjamin argues that our present potential to achieve happiness enters cognition in the form of past possibilities for happiness that we have missed.[28] The "we" here is a concrete "we" embodied in a particular historical moment, rather than an abstract subject, and correspondingly Benjamin describes these missed chances for happiness by reference to prosaic situations:

> There is happiness such as could arouse envy in us only in the air we have breathed, among people we could have talked to, women who could have given themselves to us.[29]

Benjamin's approach to history is distinct in that it combines discontinuity and continuity: his conception of time is discontinuous because the present is defined as a field of potentiality and the future as a field of unknowable

contingency; and yet, the survival of missed possibilities in the form of new possibilities offers a kind of continuity insofar as the unrealized fulfillment of possibilities in the past leads into the potential for realizing fulfillment in the present.

In Adorno, Benjamin's "theology" of fulfillment is translated into a dialectic of realization: this can be seen in his writings on progress, in which the incompleteness and partiality of our current doctrine of progress is a failure which, in falling short, points us toward the possibility of realizing a complete notion of progress. Just as, for Benjamin, the possibility of happiness is formed out of the non-actualization of previous possibilities, in Adorno's work the chance for reconciliation is made possible through the failure of reconciliation to date. Both writers establish a relationship between historical failure ("permanent catastrophe") and present potentiality ("the possibility to change life"). The particular dialectical edge of Adorno's approach is in his insistence on the way in which the "hardened objects" of reality contain within themselves their own potentiality, which is accessible to the theorist by means of negative dialectics. For Adorno, *progress* forms the paradigmatic example of this inherent potentiality.

However, while it is clear that Adorno's discussion of human progress strongly echoes Benjamin's distinction between mythic violence and divine violence, what remains to be settled is whether Adorno's dialectical approach would allow for the radical separation which Benjamin appears to draw between mythic and divine violence – a separation which is itself a reflection of a similar apparent separation between history and redemption. Consider Benjamin's "Angel of History," which offers a vision of progress both similar and different to Adorno's:

> His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events appears before *us*, *he* sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is *this* storm.[30]

This passage appears to portray historical development (in the form of progress) and redemption as diametrically opposed; this can be distinguished from Adorno's dialectical reading of progress, which establishes secular progress as both the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of real progress. However, Adorno establishes the minimal common

ground between their two understandings of progress when he notes:

> The progress of domination of nature which, according to Benjamin's parable, proceeds in contradiction to that true progress which would have its *telos* in redemption, is still not without all hope. The two concepts of progress communicate with each other not just in the averting of final calamity, but rather in each actual form of the easing of persistent suffering.[31]

The perseverance of the world, of history, and the frail glimmers of progress in the isolated cases of "easing of persistent suffering," both attest to the continually regenerated *potentiality* of redemption, even as progress-as-mythic-violence dissolves potentiality moment by moment and leaves the past in ruins. The possibility of "divine violence" is the possibility of violence that preserves potentiality; as such it would form the *praxis* counterpart to Adorno's theoretical approach. The relationship between mythic violence and divine violence is that of the "hardened object" and its potential, and it is difficult not to conclude that mythic violence contains "a hidden index by which it is referred to redemption." Benjamin formulates this relationship in reverse when he states that "all the eternal forms are open to pure divine violence, which myth bastardized with law."[32] Mythic violence can thus be seen as a *fallen* form of divine violence, insofar as its law, its fatefulness, constrains potentiality.

In his "Theological-Political Fragment," Benjamin states:

> [N]othing that is historical can relate itself, from its own ground, to anything messianic. Therefore, the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal. From the standpoint of history, it is not the goal but the terminus [*Ende*]. Therefore, the secular order cannot be built on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and theocracy has no political but only religious meaning […] To strive for such a passing away – even the passing away of those stages of man that are nature – is the task of world politics, whose method must be called nihilism.[33]

The desire to create the kingdom of God on earth is the desire to bring about the end of history, which for Benjamin means the end of potentiality. It is the desire to found a state of invariance in a world defined by its variability, by its historical logic of decay, and as such is a desire to annihilate the historical world. This quality of nihilism is not limited to just theocracy, but also to all utopian social and political visions which, by their positing of a *telos* – even a *telos* in the name of "those stages of humanity that are nature" – would narrow the field of potentiality for the concrete agents of po-

litical or revolutionary change: "the living." The Kingdom of God is defensible as a religious vision of theocracy, but unsustainable as a political program.

When Benjamin states that divine violence is violence over "all life for the sake of the living," he privileges the actually (presently) living over and above any past or future (utopian) notion of humanity – he does not, for example, argue that divine violence is done for the sake of "our children" or "future generations," let alone "civilization" or "humanity." On the one hand, "the living" are those who currently live, and to act on behalf of the currently living is to acknowledge and respect the openness of the present, acting in accordance with Benjamin's conception of history as a succession of moments infused with potentiality. On the other, "the living" is an irreducibly material notion: the living *live* independent of our ability to conceive of them, whereas future life can never be more than a mere conceptual projection into a future which is yet to be made. Insofar as any revolutionary politics acts on behalf of a *future* subject (for example, the liberated working class), it subordinates the actually existing to a conceptual model. In doing so, it repeats the manoeuvre which Adorno considers constitutive of oppressive rationality, which is the subordination of the non-identical to the identical, of real content to ideal form.

Placing the *ends* of a utopian conception of a future society above the *means* by which this would be achieved – the incitement of the currently living to revolutionary action – is an act of instrumental rationality characteristic of a model of human action which has not advanced beyond the domination/subjugation relationship to nature which Adorno critiques. It is not at all coincidental that the model of legal theory that would best justify such an action is *natural law*. For Benjamin, such justification remains in the realm of mythic violence; at the same time, any *final* guarantee of the justness of ends can be provided only by God. As Benjamin states in "Critique of Violence":

> It is never reason that decides on the justification of means and the justness of ends: fate-imposed violence decides on the former, and God on the latter.[34]

This statement is not an appeal to the primacy of God as arbiter, but a defense of the openness of the present: if it was within our capabilities to *know* that a particular course of action was just, then we would be burdened with the responsibility of executing the sole just course of action. In doing so, we would in effect have created the Kingdom of God on earth. Conversely, it is our inability to finally determine the just that is the condition of possibility for all human freedom, and the space between our actions

and justice is thus the space of potentiality. The pretense at knowing in advance the shape of a just society is a betrayal of our freedom, on the one hand constraining potentiality while on the other hand offering a form of justice that is ultimately masked oppression. Adorno reiterates this insight when he states:

> Humankind can be thought only through [the] extreme of thorough differentiation, individuation, not as a comprehensive master concept. The forbiddance issued by Hegel's and Marx's dialectical theories against depicting utopia smells the betrayal of utopia.[35]

Benjamin can describe the end-less general proletarian strike as "pure means" because it is a strike carried out in the name of those who strike (the living) rather than in the name of some future political goal or vision. This form of "divine violence" embraces the potentiality of the present rather than the teleology of the future, thus liberating present actors from the chains of mythic fatefulness which characterize even the most radical and optimistic utopian political action. His insistence that "the secular order cannot be built on the idea of the Divine Kingdom"[36] does not entail a rejection of the possibility of social improvement, but it maintains that the envisioning of an ideal world is the task of religion rather than politics. Instead, in the fragment "World and Time," Benjamin charges politics with "the fulfillment of an unimproved humanity," a fulfillment that is for him the "definition of politics."[37] A politics of potentiality does not cling to a determinate future, but rather seeks to emphasize the openness of the present.

The characterization of history as a succession of missed possibilities points to the optimistic corollary that each moment is charged with potential. Likewise, Adorno seeks to defend a notion of progress-as-potential by critiquing the twin failings of both those who believe in progress and those who deny its existence: both camps succumb to the temptation of reifying the actual. Like Benjamin, Adorno refuses to give his own conception of progress a determinate content, for to do so would be to offer his own profane version of the Kingdom of God. Rather, Adorno's utopian vision is only embodied negatively, as that which escapes the mythic violence of the actual and embraces potential:

> Good is what rests itself away, the good is woven into history which, without clearly orienting itself toward reconciliation, allows the possibility of progress to flash in the progression of its movement.[38]

For Benjamin, *the good* is that which seizes the possibilities that present themselves with each passing moment, rather than letting them dissolve in abeyance to the rule of fate. For Adorno, Benjamin's "possibilities" are al-

ways *possibilities of progress*, possibilities for good. For both writers, the content of this good is left for *the living* to decide.

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NOTES

[1] Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," trans. Edmund Jephcott, in *Selected Writings* Vol. 1:1913-1926, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,1996), 251.

[2] Julian Roberts, *Walter Benjamin* (London: MacMillan, 1982), 204.

[3] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 250.

[4] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 248.

[5] Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans John Cumming (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 8.

[6] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 242.

[7] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 245-6.

[8] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 246.

[9] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 250.

[10] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 251.

[11] Walter Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator," in *Selected Writings* Vol. 1, 255.

[12] Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 250-1.

[13] Theodor W. Adorno, "Progress," trans Eric Krakauer, *Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics*, ed Gary Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) 84-5.

[14] Adorno, "Progress," 85.

[15] Adorno, "Progress," 86.

[16] Adorno, "Progress," 88.

[17] Adorno, "Progress," 93.

[18] Adorno, "Progress,"89.

[19] Fred Dallmayr, "The Politics of Nonidentity," *Theodor W. Adorno* Vol. 4, ed. Gerard Delanty (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 243.

[20] Dallmayr, "The Politics of Nonidentity," 243.

[21] Shane Phelan, "Interpretation and Domination: Adorno and the Habermas-Lyotard Debate," *Theodor W. Adorno* Vol. 4, 231.

[22] Adorno, "Progress," 90-1.

[23] Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 191.

24 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 145-6.

25 Adorno*, Negative Dialectics*, xx.

26 Adorno, "Progress," 97.

27 Adorno*, Negative Dialectics*, 151.

28 Walter Hamacher, "'Now': Walter Benjamin on Historical Time," *Walter Benjamin and History*, ed Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2005), 38-9.

29 Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," *Selected Writings* Vol. 4*,* ed Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996) 389.

30 Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," 392.

31 Adorno, "Progress," 94-5.

32 Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 252.

33 Walter Benjamin, "Theological-Political Fragment," in *Selected Writings* Vol 3, ed Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002) 305-6.

34 Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 247.

35 Adorno, "Progress," 92.

36 Benjamin, "Theological-Political Fragment," 305.

37 Walter Benjamin, "World and Time," *Selected Writings* Vol. 1, ed Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 226.

38 Adorno, "Progress," 87.