THE UNITY PARTY AND THE ATTEMPT TO MOBILISE AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR MULTICULTURALISM

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The Unity Party sought to mobilise public electoral support for multiculturalism at the 1998 Federal election. It was largely unsuccessful in this attempt. This article explores the Party's agenda and the reasons for its poor national showing. It also examines voting patterns in the electorate of Fowler in south-western Sydney where Unity scored its greatest success.

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses upon the electoral debut of the Unity Party at the 1998 federal election. This event coincided with the One Nation Party's first federal election campaign after having made significant gains in the Queensland state election earlier that year. The Unity Party was formed with the explicit objective of blocking the rise and influence of One Nation's nationalist and allegedly racist agenda. Central to Unity's objective was an attempt to mobilise migrant Australians in defence of immigration and multiculturalism.

The specific focus of this article is the spatial distribution of voting patterns for the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party and the Unity Party within the federal electorate of Fowler in the south-western suburbs of Sydney. Fowler was the only electorate in NSW in the 1998 federal election which polled a significant proportion of the primary vote for the Unity Party. However, a booth-by-booth examination of polling in Fowler reveals support for Unity was centered on the Cabramatta Indochinese enclave. Support for One Nation, although not as high

overall in Fowler as for Unity, was also relatively high and concentrated in particular neighbourhood clusterings.

That these localities are in close proximity to each other raises important questions about the development of ethnic friction between ethnically-isolated populations within ethnic enclaves, such as Cabramatta, and the surrounding population. Questions are also raised as to the linkages between ethnic-minority enclaving, the influence of ethnic-minority elites, and the utilisation of ethnic-minority identity to advance a globalist political agenda.

Elsewhere in this issue, Jeanette Money argues that the presence of a large migrant population in Australia, and the prospect that this migrant component of the electorate stood to be mobilised as a counter-movement to One Nation, led the Labor and Coalition parties to resist accommodation to the popularity of One Nation's 'xenophobic' and 'racist' rhetoric. It is not my primary purpose here to critique Money's work. Nevertheless, the evidence discussed below does not support her contention that migrants can be readily mobilised around an anti-nationalist political agenda or around the opposite: cosmopolitan globalism. To the contrary, it can be argued that many migrants have a stake in defending nationalist policies, even though they may not necessarily share in a strong nativist sentiment.

First, it is necessary to consider the historical background to the emergence of One Nation and Unity parties.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The period between the launch of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in April 1977 and the 1998 Federal election was one of political and moral anguish for Hanson's

opponents, on both the right and left of the political spectrum.

Free-market advocates of economic globalisation reacted against the economic nationalism of the emerging One Nation agenda. The credibility of the regional middle-level power-brokering role which successive Labor governments had nurtured for Australia in Asia, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, as an advocate and exemplar of multilateral free trade, stood to be undermined by the electoral popularisation in Australia of a more protectionist, anti-globalist policy position. *The Australian Financial Review* in mid 1997, for instance, railed against '...Ms Hanson's poisoned message...' of economic nationalism and warned of the damage such views would do to Australia's economic prospects and 'political capital' in Asia.[1] The AFR dismissed Hanson's views as merely those of a minority within the Australian population.

The concerns of economic globalisers were often complemented by the moral outrage of left-liberal humanitarians at Hanson's questioning, first of special funding for Australian aborigines, and later of multiculturalism and immigration, particularly immigration from Asia. On being elected to federal parliament in 1996, her criticism extended to policy areas which were central to the cosmopolitan, internationalist world view which predominated amongst the left-liberal intelligentsia. One Nation thus represented a direct challenge to the moral authority and political credibility of globalisation advocates.

The convergence of viewpoint between free-market radicals and left-liberal humanitarians against Hanson was neatly encapsulated in the claim that the One Nation Party represented the emergence in Australia of an 'extreme-right'

politics. One result of this claim was that the free-market right-wing, by associating itself with left-liberal attacks on Hanson, was able to, in affect, re-situate itself within the political spectrum, by presenting economic globalisation and denationalisation in more moderate, morally-progressive terms.

Although John Howard had been persistently berated in the mass media for not having expressed the required degree of anti-Hanson outrage, he knew that the Coalition parties' defeat of the Labor Government at the 1996 federal election was due in no small part to a simmering, widespread reaction against the trauma of globalisation, constant structural adjustment, and the social dislocation associated with economic deregulation during the previous decade.

Pollster Rod Cameron, in 1997, reported on survey findings which, he argued, showed that many Australians were suffering from a deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. He identified a set of 'triggers' which continued to exacerbate this insecurity. These 'triggers' included economic efficiency measures which resulted in job shedding, the loss of manufacturing jobs, an over reliance on imported products, and tariff cuts. Cameron also discerned a growing frustration amongst the public at governments which ignored the priorities of the majority of Australians.[2] For Howard, too strong a criticism of Hanson might put the Coalition on the wrong side of this reaction amongst the electorate.

Analyses of Labor's 1996 federal election loss had revealed a significant class-based component to the electoral shift against Labor. Broad sections of Labor's traditional blue collar vote now showed themselves willing to cast their vote differently. A danger for the major political parties now was that the One Nation Party might be able to capitalise on voter disillusionment with established political elites, particularly by appealing to the 'losers' in the national restructuring process.

Indeed, opinion polls were indicating considerable support for Pauline Hanson's policies. As early as November 1996, before the establishment of the One Nation Party, a national poll indicated significant support for her policies. Asked if the Federal Government was too generous in funding aborigines, 55 per cent of the sample agreed. Thirty-one per cent agreed with Hanson that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission should be abolished. On the issue of whether the Asian component of the immigration intake "should be reduced", 53 per cent agreed. Asked whether they agreed with Pauline Hanson that there should be a short-term freeze of immigration in general, 62 per cent agreed. As to the government policy of multiculturalism, 20 per cent agreed with Hanson that it should be abolished. Further, the poll suggested that social class was a determining factor in support for Hanson's policies (using income level as a class indicator). On the issues of Asian immigration intake and of an immigration freeze, there were clear differences of support according to income level. While 67 per cent of persons receiving $15,000 or less per year agreed that the Asian immigration intake should be reduced, 30 per cent of those receiving more than $40,000 agreed.[4]

The development of widespread support for Hanson herself and subsequently the One Nation Party highlighted a basic ideological schism within Australian society between two opposing world views. Evidence suggests that these opposing perspectives coincided with broad differences of class interest. It is

not surprising therefore that hostility to Hanson began to display a distinct class prejudice. John Pasquarelli who worked closely with Hanson notes the insults of this kind which were levelled at Hanson in the mass media; for example '...lumpenproletariat hag...', and '...white trash...'.[5] The frequent allegation of 'populism' against Hanson and the One Nation Party expressed this class hostility in muted terms.

The 1998 federal election would be the first national litmus test as to whether the One Nation Party could function as a coherent and enduring political challenge to the prevailing globalist orthodoxy, whether economic or humanitarian in inspiration. The election would also test the electoral potential of the Unity Party. Could it mobilise anti-Hanson support electorally outside of the mainstream party structure? In terms of socio-economic profile, where might its supporter base come from?

THE UNITY PARTY POLICY PLATFORM AND ITS HISTORICAL LINEAGE

Unity was formed in the wake of the 1998 Queensland state election when One Nation, having received over 22 per cent of the state's primary vote, won 11 of the 89 seats in the legislative assembly. Just as worrying as the extent of One Nation's electoral appeal in Queensland was the degree to which Unity's leaders perceived that mainstream party policies had subsequently accommodated to the popularity of the One Nation policy agenda:

> The racist and divisive policies of One Nation present an unprecedented threat to the very fabric of Australian life.[5]

On the face of it, therefore, the Unity Party platform aimed to bring Australian politics back to a tolerant, open political 'middle ground' that had been lost to the 'xenophobic' politics of 'hate' and division allegedly promoted by Pauline Hanson and One Nation.

A closer examination of the Unity Party platform, however, reveals a pluralist fundamentalism which not only has never had any significant purchase within the Australian population, but which predates the appearance of Hanson on the political scene. The Unity agenda represents the resurrection of an ideologically extreme form of multiculturalism which emerged under the Hawke Labor Government in the late 1980s.

The Unity platform explicitly states its indebtedness to the principles laid down by the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (NAMA), published in 1989.[6] This was a document developed by the Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs, and was initiated by Labor Prime Minister Hawke in 1987 as a conciliatory gesture to ethnic-minority elites. The development of the NAMA policy document, therefore, reflected the growing confidence of migrant elites in a climate where they were buoyed by a supportive relationship with the Labor Government. The NAMA publication was preceded in September 1988 by the discussion paper *Towards a National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (TNAMA).[7] This preliminary paper laid out an ambitious framework for the expansion of multicultural policy across a wide range of governmental and private-sector activity. It prescribed a structural pluralism which reflected the world view of some intellectual elites and ethnic-minority leaders, but which was a far cry from the 'soft' song-and-dance multiculturalism which was more-widely accepted amongst the general public. Admittedly, both of these documents, especially the NAMA, were characterised by a defensive posture.

This was due to the unexpected and embarrassing criticism in the report of the Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies (CAAIP), released in May 1987, concerning the way multicultural and immigration policies appeared to have been manipulated by vested minority interests under the Hawke Labor Government.[8] Further, the CAAIP Report emphasised the widespread suspicion amongst the public that immigration and multicultural policies served the sectional interests of migrant groups rather than the national interest as a whole. Nevertheless, the idea that the universalistic provision of governmental services (and strategic private sector activities) should be comprehensively supplanted by a raft of cultural and ethno-specific provisions remained the defining characteristic of these papers.

By early 1990, with the onset of economic recession, the ascendancy of radical multiculturalism and high-immigration intakes were temporarily put in check by both the Labor and Coalition parties. Critics of immigration and multiculturalism could now speak with more confidence. This expression of unease about high immigration was set against a backdrop of growing dissatisfaction with the social impact of the government's global free-market policy approach.

In spite of this temporary setback for immigration and multicultural advocates, the scene was set for a reformulation and subsequent reassertion of their position. The basic strategy adopted by radical ethnic elites and intellectuals was to align, more closely and explicitly than before, pro-immigration and multicultural arguments with the case for multilateral free trade. The formulation and promotion of this strategy was facilitated by the appointment of Senator Nick Bolkus as Labor immigration minister after the 1993 federal election. Under Bolkus, a new level of interdependence was established between multiculturalism and Labor's global, free-market objectives.

The central concept underpinning this policy synthesis was 'productive diversity', formally adopted by the Federal Labor Government in 1992. Through this concept, it was alleged that the cultural and linguistic diversity which immigration and multiculturalism had introduced into Australian society gave the Australian economy a crucial advantage in the international market place. Any retreat, therefore, from culturally-diverse immigration implied a failure of national nerve and a regression to the alleged economic inefficiencies of the protectionist and 'xenophobic' past. The unbridled forces of the global market were now treated as a progressive engine for change by many quasi-left-wing multicultural and immigration advocates. Free international commerce, it was seen, would not only save Australians from their racist national legacy, but deliver material prosperity.

This reformulation of the case for immigration and multiculturalism provides the basis for the Unity Party platform. This is most clearly seen in Unity's Immigration, Multicultural Affairs, and 'Trade and Globalisation' policies.

The pursuit of 'productive diversity' is declared to be a primary justification of an expanded immigration program:

> The diversity of Australia's immigrants is now one of the engines of Australian enterprise-hence the success of immigrant businesses, their international businesses, their international cultural and business links, the creativity and dynamism that comes from diverse work teams and organisations, the language and cultural skills of the Australian workforce that fit so perfectly with our export objectives. In

a globalising economy, Australia has developed an internationally oriented, multicultural enterprise economy. Australian competitiveness is driven by productive diversity.[9]

Unity's strident claims regarding 'productive diversity' rest on an act of faith rather than sound research findings. Since federal Labor's adoption of the policy in 1992, several serious attempts have been made to substantiate a link between cultural diversity and economic development. These efforts, however, have not produced any strong evidence in favour of such claims. Nevertheless, Unity promotes Australian population growth as a key economic objective and recommends an immediate increase in the migrant intake. Questions about the impact of population growth upon the natural environment are simply dismissed by Unity as a 'global issue', presumably beyond the control or responsibility of national government.

Culturally-diverse immigration is also defended with the claim that it is necessary to avoid a 'denial of our history and our identity'.[10] This claim is a reassertion of the frequently-repeated, but historically inaccurate, slogan of the 1980s and 1990s that Australia 'is a nation of immigrants'. The Unity platform insists that:

> We are an immigrant and settler society, a society of people who have, over the past two centuries, made good by moving to this continent from the different ends of the earth.[11]

The meaning of this at-first obscure statement is that Unity makes virtually no distinction between first-generation, overseas-born Australians and Australians who are of perhaps fifth or sixth-generation descent. The latter are simply identified as 'settlers', to many Australians an offensive misrepresentation of their national and cultural identity:

> Australia is a society of Indigenous people, and a society of settlement ... once we have settled we all become Australians.

and:

> Multiculturalism is about all settlers since 1788, and their relations with Indigenous people.[12]

Implicit here is a denial of any legitimate claim to the existence of a unique national culture and identity which can and should take precedence over migrant cultures of origin. It is precisely this ideal of cultural levelling which underpins Unity's claim to be the political party of 'true' equality and 'a fair go' for all. Further, once Unity applies this principle, not only prescriptively, but retrospectively, Australian history is recast in thoroughly pluralist terms. Accordingly, the inherited cultural mainstream is recharacterised as British cultural imperialism. Consider the following:

> ... Australia has always been a culturally diverse country...

and,

> Multiculturalism rejects the concept that other cultures were or still are inferior to and incompatible with the 'white British' dominant culture in Australia.[13]

Integral to Unity's concept of 'inclusive multiculturalism' which, it is argued, would generate a '... sense of belonging in a locally diverse and globally connected environment', is a virtually uncritical acceptance of the primacy of global free-market relations. This aspect of Unity's platform is most evident in its Trade and Globalisation policy.

Although claiming to cut a path distinct from both protectionist nationalism and economic rationalism, there is little in Unity's Trade and Globalisation policy which economic rationalists would find objectionable.

High on Unity's list of priorities is the endorsement of:

...the objectives of the World Trade Organisation in the development of a regime of global free trade and international economic integration. Protection, on the other hand, invites retaliation.[14]

Foreign investment in the Australian economy is encouraged as are the activities of multinational corporations which, it is argued, create wealth for Australia. The long-standing dilemma, and concern of the traditional left, of asserting even moderate governmental control over multinationals to ensure that national priorities are served is naively dealt with by Unity with the suggestion that:

> ...where such companies are exploiting Australia as a host country...firm steps should be taken to remedy this in co-operation with *international authorities* [my emphasis].[15]

THE DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRO- AND ANTI-HANSON VOTE IN FOWLER

In the 1998 federal election, the Unity Party only fielded candidates in Victoria and NSW for the House of Representatives. Its overall performance was poor, having received one per cent of the Victorian primary vote and 1.6 per cent in NSW. Compared to the other states, the One Nation Party also polled poorly in Victoria, receiving only 3.3 per cent. But, in Queensland and NSW, One Nation polled 14.4 and nine per cent respectively. Polling for the Senate closely reflected that of the House of Representatives. In Victoria and NSW, Unity received 0.7 and 1.6 per cent of the vote, while One Nation received four and 9.3 per cent respectively.

The Unity Party's poor electoral performance probably in part reflected its organisational inexperience and the lack of sufficient personnel to ensure a strong presence at the polling booths. A more fundamental problem was that there was not the groundswell of support in the electorate for the defence of multi-culturalism that Unity expected. By contrast, One Nation was able to tap into a more profound pool of disillusionment. It also needs to be remembered that the 1998 election was One Nation's first election campaign on a national scale as well.

One of the few areas where the Unity Party polled very well was the electorate of Fowler in south-western Sydney, Because of its distinctive ethnic make up it requires closer analysis.

Methodology

The demographic profile of voters within Fowler was compiled from 1996 Census Collector District (CD) level data. Census Collector Districts (300-500 households) were assigned to polling booths on the assumption that the majority of voters cast their vote at the booth closest to their place of residence. Davis and Stimson, in their study of the characteristics of One Nation voters in the 1998 Queensland state election, relied upon this assumption and cited the Australian Electoral Commission to support this approach.[16] In cases where a CD could not be unambiguously assigned to a particular booth the CD was not included in the study. As a result, several CDs were excluded and 123 were included.

Using this approach, polling-booth results were correlated with population characteristics at over 30 locations within Fowler.

Results

Table 1 shows the electorates with the highest Unity vote in NSW in the 1998 federal election. At 10.64 per cent, Fowler has nearly double the Unity vote of the next highest NSW electorate. This

result is more striking when considered against the proportion of the total NSW vote for Unity, which was only 1.56 per cent. By comparison, the vote for Pauline Hanson's One Nation party in Fowler is much more consistent with a state-wide trend. At 7.34 per cent in Fowler, it is only less than two percentage points below the NSW state average of 8.96 per cent.

The exceptional nature of the Unity result in Fowler is further highlighted when the levels of Unity support in comparable areas in both Sydney and Melbourne are considered. As the Cabramatta district within Fowler, where the highest Unity support occurred, is well known as an Indochinese enclave, one might at first expect comparable levels of Unity support in similar enclave areas elsewhere. This was not the case at the 1998 federal election. For example, in the federal electorate of Banks within Sydney, an area of growing Indochinese residential concentration (particularly in Bankstown), Unity faired relatively poorly, receiving 3.07 per cent of the vote. The result was similar in the federal electorates of Gellibrand and Holt in Melbourne, where there are significant concentrations of Indochinese, as well as other migrant groups. The support for Unity in these electorates was 1.41 and 1.26 per cent respectively. Even at booths where there are relatively high concentrations of Indochinese, Unity support nowhere approached the Fowler result.

Table 2 shows the booth-by-booth distribution of Unity and One Nation primary votes within Fowler. The results for Unity and One Nation vary widely at the booth level around each party's average vote for the electorate. Table 2 also shows the primary-vote results at these booths for the 1999 NSW state election.

Table 1: Top ten Unity Party electorates in NSW (per cent of votes), 1998 Federal Election

Electorate	One Nation vote	Unity vote
Fowler	7.3	10.6
Reid	6.3	5.7
Watson	4.7	5.3
Grayndler	3.1	4.8
North Sydney	2.9	4.7
Paramatta	6.3	4.3
Barton	6.9	4.2
Bennelong	4.1	3.9
Lowe	3.7	3.8
Kingsford Smith	5.8	3.8
NSW	9.0	1.6

Source: Australian Electoral Commission results as at 15 October 1998

Although the percentage of the vote for Unity and One Nation declined in the period between these two elections, the spatial pattern in voter differences persisted.

When explored spatially, it appears there is a strong inverse relationship between Unity and One nation support within Fowler. This is most striking in the census collection districts (CDs) which comprise the centre of the Cabramatta Indochinese enclave. Here, where Unity support reached 28.6 per cent, One Nation support was its lowest, at 1.1 per cent. Alternatively, where One Nation support is highest in the Southwest of the electorate, at 12.0 and 12.3 per cent, Unity support is low, at 3.1 per cent.

On the other hand, alongside the tendency for Unity and One Nation support to be concentrated in different localities within Fowler, there is also a tendency, in some of the CDs immediately surrounding the Indochinese-enclave centre, for Unity and One Nation support to spatially coincide. These may be areas into which Indochinese have entered in greater numbers as the enclave has expanded, engendering a hostile reaction within the incumbent population.

Demographic information from the 1996 Census will now be examined to

Table 2: Polling booth level 1998 Federal Election and 1999 NSW State Election results(%) and selected demographic characteristics for the NSW Federal Electorate of Fowler

Polling Booth	One Nation vote		Unity vote		Aust.-born	Parents Aust.-born	China-born	Viet.-born	Lang. at home Viet.	Lang. at home Chin.	Lang. at home Eng.
	1998	1999	1998	1999							
Bonnyrigg	3.2	4.1	13.6	11.9	32.2	9.4	4.4	18.8	21.3	14.7	14.0
Endensor Park	5.5	0.0	5.3	0.0	51.2	17.2	0.9	6.3	7.4	6.1	30.7
Bonnyrigg Heights	3.0	3.1	9.8	10.4	42.5	11.0	2.1	11.4	12.5	10.2	19.9
Bonnyrigg High	5.3	3.9	11.5	13.3	46.0	18.1	1.5	14.2	13.2	10.8	31.1
Cabramatta East	3.7	3.0	17.2	15.7	27.7	7.8	4.8	25.5	21.4	20.8	13.5
Cabramatta High	3.8	2.1	21.6	20.0	25.2	7.9	7.2	36.5	27.2	29.5	14.3
Cabramatta West	7.8	4.6	12.9	12.1	31.9	10.7	4.8	26.9	23.6	21.9	19.7
Cabramatta	1.1	1.8	28.6	24.6	17.8	2.2	9.1	37.4	29.0	35.3	4.8
Canley High	5.3	-	11.2	-	39.6	15.2	8.6	21.9	20.9	17.0	29.5
Canley Vale	3.0	3.8	21.0	21.5	33.1	12.3	5.0	27.1	23.8	23.8	20.4
Harrington St	5.3	4.7	13.7	9.2	40.0	14.7	2.2	19.7	20.3	13.2	24.0
Wakeley/ Humphries Rd	5.4	5.7	8.6	8.9	44.3	15.6	1.6	7.4	6.3	9.7	29.2
Lansvale	7.5	6.8	20.3	15.5	39.1	18.1	5.2	23.7	22.9	15.9	28.7
Mount Pritchard	8.7	8.2	7.4	5.9	54.2	27.3	0.3	9.7	11.6	3.1	43.5
Mt Pritchard East	10.8	9.9	5.1	3.7	53.6	31.7	1.6	10.9	11.8	4.4	47.8
St Johns Park	4.8	3.8	12.0	9.9	44.2	14.8	1.6	15.7	13.8	11.0	23.1
Ashcroft	8.7	9.1	4.3	2.8	60.6	38.9	1.1	5.9	6.9	3.0	53.0
Busby	8.0	9.1	7.3	5.1	55.6	31.1	1.4	4.2	4.8	4.6	44.3
Cartwright	10.0	9.7	4.9	2.7	66.1	48.1	0.5	3.5	3.7	1.0	64.3
Green Valley	5.4	5.0	5.8	4.5	53.8	22.8	1.0	3.5	4.6	3.5	36.3
Heckengerg	8.7	10.0	4.2	3.3	67.6	42.4	0.4	5.3	6.5	1.5	57.7
Hinchinbrook	5.3	6.7	6.8	3.7	52.0	23.2	1.2	3.3	4.5	5.5	36.7
Lansvale East	11.0	11.1	4.1	5.1	54.7	31.5	2.2	18.9	23.0	4.5	48.1
Liverpool/ Liv. Central	7.0	7.8	6.0	4.2	43.4	23.5	1.1	0.0	0.0	2.4	37.4
Liverpool South	4.8	5.1	3.9	6.2	34.5	15.8	2.9	2.2	2.1	4.1	27.6
Liverpool North	6.1	0.0	2.4	0.0	24.4	11.6	1.6	1.9	1.7	4.4	22.5
Liverpool West/ Lunea North	9.0	9.1	9.0	3.9	54.5	30.3	1.5	2.8	3.0	2.6	47.0
Marsden Rd	9.0	9.3	3.7	5.0	48.0	27.7	0.7	3.5	4.2	1.3	40.9
Miller	12.0	7.8	3.1	1.9	67.4	43.1	0.2	4.0	5.5	1.0	58.9
Sadleir	12.3	8.2	3.8	2.9	68.8	43.6	0.5	4.6	6.2	1.5	59.3
Warwick Farm	11.5	9.2	7.2	3.1	57.1	34.7	1.4	7.1	8.6	3.6	49.6
Canley Heights/ Cambridge St	7.5	7.0	12.6	11.5	45.1	21.5	2.5	19.7	20.1	11.2	34.0

Sources: AEC 1998 federal election and 1999 NSW State election results, ABS CDATA96

ascertain which factors best explain the booth concentrations for and against Unity and One Nation within Fowler. Table 3 shows the correlations (Pearson's R) between the percentage of the vote gained by Unity and One Nation respectively in Fowler and a set of variables relating to country of birth, language spoken in the home, and birthplace of parents.

At the booth level, the results show a strong inverse correlation (-0.71) between Unity and One Nation support within Fowler. It also evident that the electoral support for each of the two political parties is closely related to country of birth. One Nation support is strongly correlated spatially with the proportion of the population in each CD which is Australian-born (0.79). In contrast, Unity support is closely linked with the proportion of the population of each CD which is either born in either China or Vietnam, these correlations being 0.81 and 0.89 respectively. Notably, neither support for One Nation nor support for Unity has a significant spatial correlation with persons who were born overseas other than in China or Vietnam.

Table 3: Correlation Co-efficients (Pearson's R) for Unity Party and One Nation Party vote and Selected Demographic Characteristics in NSW Electorate of Fowler

	One Nation vote	Unity vote
One Nation vote	1.00	-0.71
Unity vote	-0.71	1.00
Aust.-born	0.79	-0.73
China-born	-0.62	0.81
Vietnam-born	-0.58	0.89
Language at home English	0.86	-0.74
Language at home Vietnam.	-0.50	0.82
Language at home Chinese	-0.72	0.90
Parents born in NESB country	-0.40	0.14
Parents Aust.-born	0.83	-0.68
Other overseas-born	-0.30	-0.19

Source: AEC 1998 federal election results; ABS CDATA96

Where Chinese is the main language spoken in the home, there is a slightly stronger spatial correlation than there is for country of birth. This may reflect the vote of ethnic Chinese who were born in Vietnam. The correlation of 0.9 between Chinese language in the home and support for Unity is striking given that a correlation of 1.0 would be a perfect fit. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that support for Unity within Fowler is ethno-specific, being centred on the Vietnamese and Chinese communities.

AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENCLAVE POWER BROKERS AND DISAFFECTED INTELLECTUALS

There is some evidence of the involvement of Chinese power brokers in the mobilisation of electoral support for Unity in Fowler. Seven of the fourteen members of the Unity Party Executive are Chinese. One of these, Unity's Treasurer, Andrew Su, stood as Unity's candidate in Fowler. Being a banker, Su was undoubtably a person of standing and influence within the Cabramatta enclave.

Through an appeal to ethnic solidarity, minorities can be encouraged to help get 'their man' into power in the belief that special benefits will be forthcoming. Ethnic power brokers consolidate their standing by demonstrating an ability to mediate with mainstream authorities on behalf of their constituencies. Ethnic-minority power brokers can, therefore, develop an interest in maintaining the relative social and cultural isolation of their respective communities.

The utilisation of minority patronage politics in Fowler for electoral mobilisation would not require that Unity voters be familiar with the Unity platform. Enclave residents are often largely dependent upon their ethnic leaders for information.

Although there is insufficient space to

explore the linkages here, the involvement of ethnic-Chinese elites against Pauline Hanson goes beyond Fowler. Some of the strongest opposition to the registration of the One Nation Party came from the Queensland Chinese Community Voice, which lodged a formal complaint with the Australian Electoral Commission in April 1997.[17]

The Unity Party platform also represents an alliance of interest between Chinese elites and multicultural advocates who fell from favour and influence with the loss of government by the Australian Labor Party in 1996. Academics Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis have played a prominent role in the founding of the Unity Party. Both ran as Unity candidates in the 1998 election. The similarities of the Unity platform with the ideas and writings of Cope and Kalantzis are clear. Bill Cope has been a prominent advocate of 'productive diversity' and was appointed by Immigration Minister Nick Bolkus as Director of the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet shortly before Labor's electoral demise. Bolkus cited Cope's commitment to 'productive diversity' in justification of the appointment. Both Cope and Kalantzis were actively involved in the formulation of the global-market-orientated case for multiculturalism and immigration in the early 1990s.

CONCLUSION

Cognisant of the success of One Nation in the 1998 Queensland state election, an explicit motivation for the formation of the Unity Party was the prospect that One Nation might gain the balance of power in the Australian Federal Parliament. Recognising that One Nation was not a party with merely fringe support, Unity set out to '...counter the influence of Hanson-ism...', with the goal of itself gaining sufficient electoral leverage to redirect the major political parties away from One Nation's influence. Unity's stated strategy was to promote itself as a party neither of the 'right' nor 'left', and as a non-sectarian party made up of people from all sections of the community. Pauline Hanson's alleged racism and xenophobia would be, it was presumed, countered by an appeal to an all-encompassing inclusiveness. Unity's practical plan, however, was to focus upon a specifically migrant appeal. Most of its candidates were fielded in strongly-migrant, urban electorates and many of its candidates were themselves recently arrived migrants.

The evidence from the 1998 federal election shows that, with the exception of Fowler, Unity failed in both its stated and its practical electoral strategy to gain significant political leverage. The association of demographic information and polling results at the local level within Fowler shows that Unity's relative success there was due to the exceptional character of the enclave migrant population. Beyond this, Unity achieved no significant overall electoral support, not even, it appears, amongst the migrant population generally.

The data indicate a deep ethnic hostility within Fowler, predominantly between ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese on the one hand and Australian-born persons on the other, especially the Australian-born of Australian-born parents. The ethnic and political antagonism revealed in the data is expressed spatially. The distinct support bases for Unity and One Nation tend to concentrate in different neighbourhoods in relatively close proximity to each other.

It is of concern that ethnic division of this kind is now closely associated with fundamental differences of political

world view in Australia and that such differences are being structured into the urban environment. It is also of concern that ethnic power brokers, in concert with extremist elements from the mainstream intelligentsia, have attempted to utilise minority ethnic identity to advance an essentially free-market, global agenda of which a large proportion of the main-stream population is suspicious. This in itself may deepen ethnic division.

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