



MONASH University

A Critical Study of What Psychoanalysis is – The Role of Paradox

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Monash University in 2015
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Contents

Contents	i
Abstract.....	iv
Declaration	v
Acknowledgments	vi
Preface.....	1
Introduction.....	5
Aim and Overview of the Data to be Examined.	5
Method	10
Part One.....	17
Chapter One - Freud and Psychoanalysis, Psychoanalysis and Freud.....	17
A. The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis	17
i. Freud's Views.....	18
ii. Breuer's View	19
iii. Strachey's Overview.....	21
iv. The Beginning of Freud's Psychoanalysis	22
v. Free Association	23
vi. Conclusion re the Beginning of Psychoanalysis.....	25
B. Freud and Psychoanalysis.....	27
i. Freud's Statements About What Psychoanalysis Is	29
ii. "On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement" (1914)	34
iii. "An Autobiographical Study" (1925/1924).....	60
iv. "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis" (1940/1938).....	62
a. Summary/Overview of "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis"	86
v. Summary of Freud's Overview Papers re What Psychoanalysis Is.....	88
vi. Addenda to Freud's Overview Papers	90
a. Psychosexuality	90
b. Freud's Self-Analysis	100
Chapter Two - Psychoanalysis in the Views of Other Analysts.	105
Introduction.....	105
A. Step A	109
B. Step B: Wallerstein and His Respondents' Views re What Psychoanalysis Is...	114
i. Wallerstein.....	114
ii. Rangell (1988)	117
iii. Abrams (1989).....	119
iv. Appy (1989).....	120

v.	Aslan (1989).....	122
vi.	Goldberg (1989).....	124
vii.	Le Guen (1989).....	126
viii.	Nunes (1989).....	128
ix.	Green (2005).....	131
x.	Other Respondents	132
xi.	Overview of the Views of the Respondents to Wallerstein’s Ideas About Psychoanalysis.	132
C.	Step C: Contemporary Views About Psychoanalysis.	136
i.	Ferro.....	136
ii.	Jiménez	139
iii.	Poland	143
iv.	Overview of Contemporary Views	145
	Summary of Perspectives on the Dichotomies of Psychoanalysis.....	146
D.	Step D: Further Consideration of the Second Dichotomy of Psychoanalysis.....	149
i.	Friedman (2006).....	149
ii.	Bion (1992/1971) “Cogitations”	153
Part Two: Paradox.....		159
	Introduction	159
	Chapter One - An Examination of Paradox	163
A.	The Philosophical Approach to Paradox	163
B.	Paradox and Psychoanalysis.....	168
C.	A Critical Consideration of Winnicott’s Contribution to Paradox and Psychoanalysis	181
	Discussion:	189
	Chapter Two.....	193
A.	Ogden and the Analytic Third.....	193
B.	Bion	200
i.	An Overview of Bion’s Ideas About What Psychoanalysis Is.....	201
ii.	Bion, Paradox and Psychoanalysis	218
a.	Truth	218
b.	“O”	231
c.	The Grid	234
	Chapter Three - What is Paradox?	241
	Chapter Four - Bollas, Pontalis and Psychoanalysis	245
A.	Bollas (1987, 2006).....	245
B.	Pontalis (1981, 2003)	248
	Summary	251
Part Three		255
	Critical Appraisal	255

Part Four	271
Conclusions.....	271
Incomplete Issues, Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future	
Research.....	277
Conclusion	283
Reference	285

Abstract

The perplexity of the question of what psychoanalysis is challenges analysts who strive for a self-defining priority of view. The consequent conflicts, if open to thought, can contribute to a creative aliveness about psychoanalysis, but, if closed, possibly to its demise. Psychoanalysis' roots are in understanding conflict and this study is initiated and informed by it, i.e. to understand psychoanalysis contributions to its practitioners' conflicts while avoiding involvement in these. To achieve this dual goal, understanding is sought through a focus upon dichotomous realisations of psychoanalysis, both with Freud and in general. This focus reveals paradoxical basis to psychoanalysis manifesting in such dichotomy. Understanding psychoanalysis through paradox is facilitated by Winnicott's (1971) observations of the creative potential of accepted ontological paradox including that basic to psychoanalysis. These ideas re psychoanalysis and paradox are explored through, in particular, Parsons, Ogdon and, especially, Bion and his approach to psychoanalysis as thing-in-itself and the developing understanding of it.

These explorations lead to conclusions that "psychoanalysis" manifests in three interlocked realisations: 1) a process that is both uniquely individual but also one that becomes to general consideration guided by and leading to theoretical conceptualisations about it; 2) an intrinsic psychoanalysis unknown and unknowable but know of: discovered by Freud, its qualities are being explicated; 3) psychoanalysis as the creative product of accepted ontological paradox: this paradox reveal qualities re its constituent elements informing further about the existential/experiential basic of psychoanalysis and contributing to the explication of the qualities of the intrinsic psychoanalysis.

Analysts fight because living with existential uncertainty focused in (and as) psychoanalysis is difficult and the resolution of paradox consequently occurs. The fights are about who has retained analysis' creative qualities and who has not; each antagonist believing that their individual perspective best holds the qualities of the intrinsic, whereas these can only be approached through sustaining paradox.

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Acknowledgments

The kindness, patience and support of my wife Irma and daughter Anna have made the preparation of this thesis possible. That of my supervisor Associate Professor Gavin Ivey, along with his pithy and appropriate comments and criticisms to tame divergent thoughts, has made it worthwhile.

Preface

One aspect of psychoanalysis which has been consistent from its beginnings is that of conflict. Freud identified internal conflict, between competing drives in his topographic scheme of mind, and between competing agencies in his structural scheme, as essential to understanding the human psyche and psychoanalysis. But this has not been the only conceptualization or manifestation of conflict. Internecine conflict between its practitioners, and conflict between its practitioners and the critics of psychoanalysis, have been an essential part of psychoanalysis since the first analysts (Freud, 1914a), and from the time Freud first publically presented his ideas.¹

The conflicts between analysts have maintained a reasonably consistent pattern: these conflicts are generally disputes about what is and is not psychoanalysis. However they often extend to the issue of who determines what psychoanalysis is, and further, a personal quality around the judgment of who is and who is not a psychoanalyst often intrudes. These disputes very often are passionate, deeply personal and bitter; as Blass (2010) notes, “a matter of identity is at stake” (p. 84): potentially creative dialectic collapses into the polemics of vehement certainty.

These conflicts, both intrapsychic and interpersonal, apparent as an essential ongoing quality of psychoanalysis, indicate a tensive aliveness². This tensive aliveness and its conflictual manifestations give psychoanalysis a driven quality: psychoanalysis, or aspects and qualities of it, are continually in the process of becoming: unconscious becomes conscious, Id becomes Ego, unity becomes duality (and then a triadic entity). This dynamism in psychoanalysis reflects the dynamism at the base of human existence, which leads to growth and development of the individual in both psychic and physical senses. Psychoanalysis in its theory and practice expresses this process of becoming, of growth and development.

¹ Freud (1914a) noted of psychoanalysis, “I have long recognised that to stir up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of psycho-analysis” (p. 8).

² This is a term used by Ricoeur (1978) to refer to a quality of metaphor (p. 250), because of its aptness for what is observed about psychoanalysis, the term has been borrowed.

However, the growth and development of psychoanalysis – this becoming - has become the source of concern for a number of prominent analysts from different perspectives. Wallerstein (1988), for example, expressed concern that the pluralism of individual views, determinedly held, threatened the structure of what holds psychoanalysis together, the base of its growth and development. Jiménez (2008) saw that this pluralism had become a plurality that, perhaps, has gone too far to be repaired. Green (2005) observed that the dismissal of Freud's defining conceptualizations of psychoanalysis has led to a democracy of ideas about what psychoanalysis is, a democracy that has eliminated the creativity of the tension-fuelled debates. Friedman (2006), to some extent echoing Green's views, saw that psychoanalysis based upon the essential perspectives of Freud had proved a too radical and disturbing challenge to common sense, and had consequently been smoothed over. Bion (1992) opined that psychoanalysis had lost its impetus for a number of reasons and, by avoiding the disruptive effects of "Curiosity, which might stimulate discovery of the unknown..." (p. 319), had become stagnant.

These different perspectives contain the common impression that the discomforting and disturbing dynamism of psychoanalysis, with its conflictual manifestations, has been mastered, tamed or successfully avoided. The future of psychoanalysis qua psychoanalysis, in these views, is pessimistically regarded.

The goal of this study is to understand what psychoanalysis is, especially with regard to its dynamic qualities, with which its future would arguably seem to lie. Such understanding may contribute to the arrest of psychoanalysis' slide, as perceived by the abovementioned authors, into a safe but stagnant twilight.

To pursue this goal without merely contributing just one more dismissible individual view, a pathway to understanding the dynamic basis of psychoanalysis will be followed. The pathway, I contend, lies in the concept of paradox.

Paradox is understood and approached differently in different paradigms. In philosophy it is understood to be a semantic or logical mistake, erroneously based upon contradictory premises. Resolution or refutation by appropriate

logical or semantic argument is seen as the appropriate approach. In literature paradox is seen to have important creative and revelatory qualities; for example, Colie (1966) writes, “paradox operates across limits, across beginnings, ends, and the boundaries man sets to his knowledge” (p. 308).

In psychoanalysis there would appear three main approaches to paradox: the philosophical one of resolving paradox (e.g. Matte Blanco, 1998); the literary one asserting that paradox, with its enigmatic contradictory properties, captures something important about a particular subject or topic; and a third approach, introduced by Winnicott (1971), about paradoxes being integral to human development, extended by Winnicott and others (e.g. Ogden, 2004; Parsons, 2008; Pizer, 2014) into contemplations of psychoanalysis itself. The approach by Winnicott is one of sustaining the paradox to allow the development of a creative product, especially related to the concept of “transitional phenomena” (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 1-25). This is the approach to be followed in this study.

The role of paradox in psychoanalysis is approached through a number of seemingly dichotomous realisations concerning the nature of psychoanalysis. This approach leads to psychoanalysis being viewed as the creative product of these paradoxes. The implications of this constitutive property of paradox for what psychoanalysis is will comprise the conclusions of this study.

This essential paradoxical quality of psychoanalysis is exemplified in the observation that, although the process of analysis is to establish the constitutive elements of the whole (The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1996), changing the complexity of the whole to the clarity of its basic parts, in psychoanalysis the elements, by their nature, increase the degree of complexity, challenge, and possible unknowing (e.g. the constituent concept of the dynamic unconscious).

Introduction

Aim and Overview of the Data to be Examined.

The goal of this study is to understand what psychoanalysis is. There are, of course, already many understandings about what psychoanalysis is; in fact it would appear from the psychoanalytic literature and discussions between analysts, that the holding of an individual view about psychoanalysis is one aspect of being a psychoanalyst. However, also apparent is the fact that often these individual views contrast with or contradict those held by others, which not only leads to vehement disputations about legitimacy and priority of view, but also obstructs the development of a more comprehensive understanding about what psychoanalysis is¹.

The goal of this study, more specifically, is to seek an understanding of psychoanalysis that may not only avoid succumbing to these disputations, but also contribute to a fuller understanding of what psychoanalysis is. An important part of this will be to understand the basis in psychoanalysis of the conflictual interactions between its practitioners. It is anticipated that this understanding may contribute to a reduction of such bitter and non-creative disputation, allowing for a more collaborative effort in understanding and developing psychoanalysis within creative dialectic.

Lying behind these goals is a second focus, and a corresponding goal with respect to what psychoanalysis is, one that arises from further observation about psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts. This is that there is essential to psychoanalysis a certain “tensive aliveness” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 250, see footnote in the Preface), which transposes “is” in psychoanalysis to one of a restive becoming: id becoming ego, unconscious becoming conscious, unity becoming duality, becoming triadic. However, as noted by Friedman (2006) and Bion (1992/1971), much of this tensive aliveness has gone from psychoanalysis; Bion sees this as psychoanalysis possibly having lost its impetus. This could relate to the pluralism (Wallerstein, 1988) or plurality

¹ Blass (2010) considers the issue of the conflicts between analysts with respect to the definition of what psychoanalysis is and questions the appropriateness of even approaching a definition of psychoanalysis.

(Jiménez, 2008) of the individual views of analysts being held with such certainty that alive and creative debate has been lost, leading to a bewildering democracy of views (Green, 2005) about what psychoanalysis is. Alternatively, it may result in a situation in which psychoanalysis is what a psychoanalyst does which Jiménez (2009) positively describes as a “new beginning” (p. 245).

These observations and hypotheses lead to a further goal of this study, that is to understand why a revivifying approach to understanding psychoanalysis is repeatedly lost: why an alive and potentially creative dialectic collapses into embittered polemics.

These goals confront us with a significant challenge: how to seek such understandings without contributing one more individual view to the pluralism or plurality of those already existing. Wallerstein (1988) started with a similar goal, to define the common ground, i.e. the background defining qualities of what psychoanalysis is that holds it, or has held it, together. Wallerstein’s efforts, as will be seen, were ultimately unsuccessful, and dismissed as one more objectionable individual view. However, Wallerstein’s attempts warrant consideration because they alert us to some inherent difficulties and pitfalls to be avoided in a project of this nature.

An alternative starting point for this study is one based upon the hypothesis that the conflicts and disputes between analysts, and their vehement personal qualities, say something essential about psychoanalysis per se. As proposed, this would appear to refer to the tensive, driven aliveness at the base of psychoanalysis, which anchors these disputes in a dichotomous quality characteristic of psychoanalysis.

In the general disputes the dichotomy manifests as two realisations of psychoanalysis. One is the finite individual perspective, determinedly held and argued to represent what psychoanalysis is. In these arguments the individual refers to the perspective of a psychoanalytic authority with whose views they believe theirs corresponds, represents, or even extends. This approach or realisation is based on the inference that there is a background definitional view

of psychoanalysis that is best represented by the authoritative view, and from which their own individual view gains status. This background definitional view is the one referred to by Wallerstein (1988), the one he mistakenly believed he had represented in his common ground arguments (see Part One, Chapter Two, Section B, i, of this thesis for a detailed account of Wallerstein's position).

This dichotomy therefore involves the finite individual view held determinedly by the individual, supported by arguments of correspondence with the ideas of an analytic authority, believed to represent an overall defining view of what psychoanalysis is. The second realisation of psychoanalysis is the defining background view that all analysts, by virtue of their shared professional analytic identity, believe their view corresponds with and represents, but one that appears enigmatically unrepresentable by any one view or all the individual views collectively.

A second dichotomy about psychoanalysis arises more specifically in the conceptualizations of Freud, best outlined in his 1914 paper "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement". Here Freud outlines a realisation of psychoanalysis that is straightforward, practical and empirically based upon "innumerable findings" (p. 17), especially the facts of transference and resistance. This is a psychoanalysis for all, and the apparent unifying basis of the analytic movement; it is the one Wallerstein refers to as the basis for his common ground arguments.

The second psychoanalysis is one based upon an "essence" (Freud, 1914a, p. 64) constituted of the challenging conceptualizations of infantile sexuality and its role in neurogenesis and the Oedipus complex, dream-analysis, the dynamic unconscious and that of repression. This is Freud's psychoanalysis, one that he outlines when defending it against the challenges of Adler and Jung. This is a psychoanalysis that relates to and has its roots in the alive and disturbing basis of existence².

² Freud (1914a) writes of the diluting qualities of the views of Adler and Jung, "The truth is that these people have picked out a few cultural overtones from the symphony of life and they have once more failed to hear the mighty and primordial melody of the instincts" (p. 62)

Although these dichotomous readings open the possibility of some further understanding about psychoanalysis, which will be considered in this thesis, these further understandings will be seen not to be essentially definitive of psychoanalysis. This author will instead attempt to provide a contribution that will assist in understanding the basis of the conflicts between analysts, rather than perpetuating the disputes and conflicts over what psychoanalysis is.

The possibility of achieving such an understanding is seen to lie with a further observation, one which will be discussed at length. This observation is that the relationship between the realisations in the two dichotomies is of a paradoxical nature. I will contend that there cannot be an individual view about what psychoanalysis is without something awaiting individual conceptualization, and thus already existent, called psychoanalysis; but this extant conceptualization could not be known without the view of the individual. Psychoanalysis both is and is not the individual view, and is and is not the defining view. Although paradox is approached in philosophy as a yet unresolved logical or semantic error, in literature (for example Colie, 1966) and in psychoanalysis, paradox, with its enigmatic contradictory qualities, is seen to offer a creative possibility of generative understanding. In psychoanalysis, a further approach to paradox, one that is particularly relevant to this study, was introduced by Winnicott (1971). Winnicott, writing mainly of the developmental paradoxes confronting the beginning self and its experience of the world of objects (but with reference to psychoanalysis), introduced ideas that have been developed by others (e.g. Kumin, 1978; Ogden, 2004; Parsons, 2008; Pizer, 2014) with direct reference to psychoanalysis. Basic to these ideas is the perspective that a paradox sustained against resolution (and also idealisation) has creative potential, possibly leading to a conceptualization that constitutes a new understanding. In Winnicott's approach this new understanding involved what he called "transitional phenomena" (p. 1-25, 1971). With Ogden (2004) and Parsons (2008), in particular, this new understanding of paradox alludes to something essential about psychoanalysis. This study aims to contribute further to these new understandings through an examination of paradox per se and, more specifically, to how paradox necessarily contributes to what psychoanalysis is. One general aspect of paradox that is particularly important

concerns its tensive aliveness, and it will be questioned how this tensive aliveness of paradox may contribute to that of psychoanalysis.

Method

To understand what psychoanalysis is, qua psychoanalysis, requires a method which is directly relevant to psychoanalysis. As Ricoeur (1970, p. 417) observes, “psychoanalysis is a unique and irreducible form of praxis”, and therefore any investigative method concerning psychoanalysis must arise from within the psychoanalytic paradigm. The procedural method of psychoanalysis in practice is that of free association and corresponding free floating attention in the analyst (Freud, 1923/22). However, it is difficult to envisage how these clinical procedures could be transposed to a research study.

Freud described and defined psychoanalysis and he offers direct procedural guidelines for attaining a general understanding of what psychoanalysis is. However, many of his conceptualizations would appear to have arisen by another procedure, which he followed but apparently did not consider for general use: his intuitive understanding arising from the data gained in clinical practice and his own self-analysis.

His general procedure for defining and describing what psychoanalysis is has two parts: the first is evident in Freud’s (1923/1922) claim that, “the best way of understanding psycho-analysis is still by tracing its origin and development” (p. 235). The second part, complementing the first, is one based on a scientific empiricism, the collection of the data of clinical observation. These two approaches lead to “innumerable findings” (1914a, p. 17), which constitutes the basis of a general understanding of psychoanalysis, particularly important being the “findings” of transference and resistance (1914a, p. 16). Freud (1914a) argues adamantly that these foundational findings are produced by empirical research. But Freud also vehemently argues, in the same 1914 paper (“On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”) for another realisation of psychoanalysis: *his* psychoanalysis, not a general one, which is based upon the constitute elements of an “essence” (p. 64) of psychoanalysis. Freud’s extended understandings were seemingly the product of an intuitive process. Such an intuitive process also underlay the initiation of free association and the conceptualizations of dream-analysis and the dynamic unconscious. These would all seem to be the product of Freud’s creative

intuition evident in the following (1914a) descriptions: “Following a dim presentiment, I decided to replace hypnosis by free association” (p. 19); “I do not know of any outside influence which drew my interests to them [dreams]” (p. 19); “the theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source” (p. 15). Freud however also explicitly criticises the use of intuition, paralleling it with “divination”, the products of which “may safely be reckoned as illusions” (1933/1932, p. 159). Freud’s comments about the use of intuition (and its non-scientific, non-empirical, qualities) would appear to constitute an effort to guard psychoanalysis against drifting into mysticism and the occult. This would be a general directive, one correlated with the dangers of the exploration of the unconscious, and his own personal, creative use of intuition would seem distinct from this and crucial to the development of his psychoanalysis. In fact Bion in an undated entry in his “Cogitations” (1992) poignantly writes:

The real nature of psycho-analytic methodology has never been properly assessed; there is a danger that the successes of the movement will be attributed to the ability of its students to apply conventional scientific method and not always the best examples of it, rather than to the intuitive flair that made it possible for Freud at least to do more” (pp. 238-239).

In this statement Bion emphasises the proposition that Freud’s intuition (“intuitive flair”) played a crucial part in the methodology and the consequent discovery and creation of psychoanalysis¹.

An approach to understanding what psychoanalysis is would, from these observations, require balancing historical perspective with a scientific empiricism, and intuitively extending these². This, essentially, will be the method followed in this study. This will commence with an examination of Freud’s ideas about what psychoanalysis is, from their beginnings, and their development from Freud’s empiricism and his apparently intuitive extension of the findings based on his self-analysis and clinical work.

¹ Nobel Laureate P.B. Medawar (1969) argues for a “hypothetico-deductive scheme” (p. 51) as the most appropriate one for scientific research. Of this “intuition” (part III of his book) is central.

² The place of intuition in scientific method is emphasised by Medawar (1969) who writes, “Intuition takes many forms in science and mathematics...” (p. 57). He then outlines some common properties, the ones most relevant to this study are those of inductive hypothesis (“thinking up or hitting on an hypothesis from which whatever we may wish to explain will follow logically”, p. 56) and “The instant apprehension of analogy” (p. 57).

Because a full consideration of Freud's ideas is practically impossible in this study, there will be several foci. To begin, given the historico/genetic perspective outlined above, the beginnings of psychoanalysis from Freud's (and Breuer's) initial cathartic procedure will be briefly considered. Then Freud's development of his ideas about what constitutes psychoanalysis will be examined in his overview papers (1914a, 1923, 1940/1938) and an encyclopaedia entry (1923/1922) of similar overview quality. Close examination of these papers provides an extensive summary, explanatory and overview perspective on Freud's ideas about what psychoanalysis is.

From an intuitive/hypothetical perspective it will be seen that Freud's outlined ideas about psychoanalysis contain dichotomous qualities. This essentially relates to a general psychoanalysis, mainly for practical use, and his *own* psychoanalysis, one based upon an "essence" (1914a, p. 64). A focus on Freud's ideas about infantile sexuality, in contrast to the opposing ideas of other analysts, emphasises the dichotomous nature of ideas about psychoanalysis in the Freudian context.

Because the source of Freud's intuitive insights would appear to be, at least in part, his self-analysis, the discoveries of his self-analysis and the impact of this process on his theory generation will be considered.

These and associated issues concerning Freud and his views concerning what psychoanalysis is, with a focus upon the apparent dichotomous realisations of psychoanalysis, will constitute the first part of this study (Part One Chapter One).

Following this (Part One Chapter Two) is a close examination of a select sample of the views of other analysts about what psychoanalysis is³. This chapter will also be guided by the three methodological aspects: a developmental perspective, an empirical perspective, and a hypothetical extension of these.

³ It was not possible to examine the individual views of all the analysts about what psychoanalysis is for them. Accordingly a selection process, outlined below, was necessary.

To gain a perspective on the developing views of analysts about what psychoanalysis is, establishing a beginning focus is necessary. The chosen focus is that offered by Wallerstein (1988, 1990, 2005) who, in his concern for the impact of pluralistic views on the future of psychoanalysis, attempted to define this common ground, what held psychoanalysis together as a joint enterprise. Wallerstein's approach has been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, his beginning considerations are similar to those of this study in that he attempted to define what psychoanalysis is by identifying a unifying common ground; secondly, his efforts provoked significant response from other analysts, who proceeded to outline their own views of what psychoanalysis is; thirdly, despite his best intentions, Wallerstein's efforts were ultimately unsuccessful insofar as the result was just another disputed individual view. Wallerstein's failure is instructive and highlights the problems of pursuing an essentialist understanding of what psychoanalysis is. This thesis draws inspiration from Wallerstein's failure, advancing an alternative understanding that avoids his mistakes.

The views of these respondents to Wallerstein offer a useful collective overview of what psychoanalysis is considered to be. Wallerstein's ideas also introduce a dichotomy of realisations about psychoanalysis, involving the views of each individual analyst and a background, enigmatic, definitory realisation which is known of by every analyst but, seemingly, can be outlined by none. This overview of Wallerstein's views and those of his respondents will constitute Part One, Chapter Two, Section B of this study.

Because these views of Wallerstein and his respondents were outlined a number of years ago, to examine how analytic views have developed and to gain a more current picture, a more recent focus on psychoanalysis was sought. This is found in the three key note speakers at the 2009 IPA Congress. These speakers, Ferro, Jiménez and Poland, represent the three sections of the IPA, i.e. Europe, South America and North America, respectively. The consideration of these more current views of psychoanalysis will be Part One, Chapter Two, Section C.

To more fully examine this dichotomous realisation of psychoanalysis, i.e. between the individual view and the background definitory view, two papers sensitive to this dichotomy (Friedman, 2006 and Bion, 1992/1971) will be considered in Part One, Chapter Two, Section D.

Although Part One of this study involves significant critical consideration of what psychoanalysis is from the perspectives of Freud and various contemporary analysts, and while the notion of dichotomies of realisation about what psychoanalysis is may provide a useful interpretive lens, for this study to progress beyond another idiosyncratic contribution to psychoanalytic a further conceptual step is required. This step is based on the observation that the realisations of the dichotomies, especially the individual and background enigmatic realisations, are paradoxically related. This observation points to the original contribution of this thesis, namely that what is being observed in these dichotomies indicates a paradoxical foundation to psychoanalysis. The resulting perspective allows an approach which may offer new insights into what psychoanalysis is. Furthermore, because of the nature of paradox and responses to it, this study offers insights into the difficulties which arise between psychoanalysts when the substantive essence of psychoanalysis is debated.

Part Two involves an exploration of the relationship between paradox and psychoanalysis and what insights may be obtained about psychoanalysis from the perspective of paradox. This exploration begins with a general examination of what paradox is (Part Two, Chapter One), and then a consideration of the contrasting approaches to paradox in philosophy and in literature and psychoanalysis (Part Two, Chapter One, Section A). In this it is observed that the approach of philosophy, which emphasises resolution (or refutation) by appropriate logical argument, is not generally the approach in literature or analysis. In the latter two domains the alternative approach involves creatively capitalising on the enigmatic and generative contradictory qualities of paradox. In this regard Winnicott (1971) proposed and argued for the sustaining of paradox against resolution because paradox sustained may reveal creative possibilities. The focus of his argument was mainly transitional phenomena, located in the developmental process of the self and its experience of the world of objects. Although there is some reference to psychoanalysis in

Winnicott's ideas about paradox, other analysts (Kumin, 1978; Ogden, 2004; Parsons, 2008; Pizer, 2014) have taken Winnicott's ideas and developed them with particular reference to psychoanalysis. Accordingly, the ideas of these other authors will also be considered.

Part Two, Chapter One, Section B accordingly examines the different approaches to paradox in the psychoanalytic literature, using examples from Strachey (1934) and Matte Blanco (1998), before considering Winnicott's ideas and the contributions of those influenced by him.

Winnicott's ideas concerning paradox, and the extension of these by others, introduces further paradoxical dichotomies inherent to psychoanalysis, and complementary to the dichotomies already noted. One particular dichotomy/paradox that has attracted the attention of post-Freudians is that of self and other. To understand one's self as an individual, a separate subjective individual, which is an inherent goal of psychoanalysis, requires interaction with another. This is also a fundamental aspect of the analytic process, a seminal contribution to which is Ogden's (2004) theory of the self being the creative product of subject-object interaction, the "analytic third" in Ogden's considerations. Ogden's ideas, especially with respect to the "analytic third", will constitute Part Two, Chapter Two, Section A.

An extension of these ideas concerning psychoanalysis and the individual is that of the existence of the individual as part of ultimate existence and being. This dichotomy/paradox of finite individual in contrast to, and as part of, the absolute universal of being is considered as an inherent conceptualization in Bion's ideas⁴. While Bion did not explicitly thematize paradox, grasping the implicit paradox at the heart of his work requires an overview of Bion's enigmatic ideas about what psychoanalysis is (Part Two, Chapter Two, Section B, i). A focus on two of Bion's essential concepts, "truth" and "O" and a consideration of his "Grid" will follow (Part Two, Chapter Two, Section B, ii). In these considerations of truth, O and the Grid, the paradoxical relationship between the sense of finite individual existence and absolute

⁴ This will be considered at length around Bion's concepts of "O" and "truth"; e.g. Bion 1965.

universal being will be the focus. The aim here is to address Bion's implicit grasp of something illusively paradoxical that is an essential aspect of psychoanalysis.

Following these considerations about what psychoanalysis is, and the introduction of concepts of dichotomy and paradox in these, the question arises (Part Two, Chapter Three) with respect to what it is about paradox that is so significant in understanding what psychoanalysis is within these various psychoanalytic formulations. Although there are definitions of paradox which refer to its constitutive structure, these do not fully explicate what paradox is. Accordingly a brief examination of what paradox is at a semantic/conceptual level will be carried out, focusing on its potential creative qualities.

To conclude this examination of seminal analysts' considerations of what psychoanalysis is, reference will be made to two analysts (Bollas, 2006; Pontalis, 1991, 2003) who have, each in their own way, provided influential overview statements about psychoanalysis, its origins and its developments by Freud. Their overviews tie together the ideas of Freud and the paradox of the finite and universal of existence. This will be covered in Part Two, Chapter Four, Sections A and B. These overview statements announce the end of the data collected for this thesis.

The third part of this study will draw together the ideas outlined and considered in the first two parts of this study. This will consist of an overview of the ideas considered (Part Three, Chapter One) followed by a critical overview of the collected data (Part Three, Chapter Two), moving towards the conclusions about what psychoanalysis is. This thesis ends with a brief discussion of these conclusions and their relevance to the described challenges facing psychoanalysis.

Part One

Chapter One - Freud and Psychoanalysis, Psychoanalysis and Freud

A. The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis

The term “psychoanalysis”¹ was first used by Freud in two papers he sent for publication on the 5th of February 1896². Because it was published first (March the 30th compared with May the 15th 1896), the French paper, “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neurosis”, contained the first use of the term. Here Freud (1896b) writes;

I owe my results to a new method of psycho-analysis, Josef Breuer’s exploratory procedure; it is a little intricate, but it is irreplaceable, so fertile has it shown itself to be in throwing light upon the obscure paths of ideation (p. 151).

In the German paper Freud is not so generous in his allocation of the authorship to Breuer of the origins of this procedure. Here he (1896a) writes;

In some passages in a book which has appeared by Dr. J. Breuer and myself (*Studies on Hysteria*) I have been able to elucidate, and to illustrate from clinical observations, the sense in which this psychical process of “defence” or “repression” is to be understood. There, too, some information is to be found about the laborious but completely reliable method of psycho-analysis used by me in making those investigations – investigations which also constitute a therapeutic procedure (p. 162, emphasis original).

Therefore, in his first use of the term psychoanalysis, Freud makes a number of points. The first is with respect to the origins (or originator) of the procedure. The second is that it is an explorative and investigative procedure,

¹An hyphenated form – “psycho-analysis” - was used by Strachey in the official translation of Freud’s works into English and has been used by the members of the British Psycho-Analytic Society and, consequently, in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (at least until the beginning of 1999). It is also the form used by the Australian Psycho-Analytic Society, of which I am a member. However, almost all other analytic societies use the single word psychoanalysis (or equivalent). In this study I will use the single word except when referring to the Standard Edition, papers from members of the British Society and the International Journal prior to 1999. This is not just because this is the more common usage, the hyphenated version essentially correlated psychoanalysis with a procedure and as the focus of this study is upon psychoanalysis as more than this – and what it is accordingly – this single word version better corresponds with this intention.

² These papers appear in the third volume of the standard edition and are entitled “L’Hérédité et l’Étiologie des Névroses” (“Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neurosis”) and “Weitere Bemerkungen Über Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen” (“Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence”)

which is also a therapeutic procedure. Thirdly, it is directed towards the dynamics of “unconscious ideation” and also of “defence” or “repression”; in this it is irreplaceable and completely reliable but also intricate and laborious. Fourthly, Freud believes that he has clinical evidence to support his ideas.

The issue of the origins of the process become important because it is implied that the “psychoanalysis” being referred to by Freud is either based and built upon that of Breuer or that Freud has moved on from these origins and developed a new process and new understandings. Accordingly, I will first briefly consider Freud’s and Breuer’s views on this, and then Strachey’s overview.

i. Freud’s Views.

In his “Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” (1910), given in America, Freud begins his first lecture by stating, “If it is merit to have brought psycho-analysis into being, that merit is not mine” (p. 9). Here he grants the merit to Breuer. However, in a footnote (which was added by Freud in 1923), Freud writes:

See, however, in this connection my remarks in “A History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” (1914), where I assumed the entire responsibility for psycho-analysis (p. 9).

In “Psycho-Analysis” (1926/1925), Freud writes:

Freud, who later proceeded with these investigations by himself, made an alteration in their [i.e. Breuer and Freud] technique, by replacing hypnosis by the method of free association. He [i.e. Freud] invented the term “psycho-analysis”, which in the course of time came to have two meanings: 1 a particular method of treating nervous disorders and 2 the science of unconscious mental processes, which has also been appropriately described as “depth-psychology” (p. 264).

Of his collaboration with Breuer, Freud further writes in “An Autobiographical Study” (1925) that, “The development of psycho-analysis afterwards cost me his friendship. It was not easy for me to pay such a price, but I could not escape it” (p. 19).

This development, Freud describes, as “the transition from catharsis to psycho-analysis proper” (1925, p. 22). Of this he writes further concerning “psycho-analysis”:

The theory of repression became the cornerstone of our understanding of the neuroses. A different view was now taken of the task of therapy. Its aim was no longer to “abreact” an affect which has got on the wrong lines but to uncover repressions and replace them by acts of judgment which might result either in accepting or in the condemning of what had formally been repudiated. I showed my new recognition of this new situation by no longer calling my method of investigation and treatment *catharsis* but *psycho-analysis* (p. 30, Freud’s emphasis).

In this Freud points out that psychoanalysis began in the hypnotic/cathartic work of Breuer and himself but that psychoanalysis proper began when he replaced hypnosis with free association (based upon the theory of repression) as the investigative, explorative procedure. However, he indicates further that this step led to significant consequences. Not only did he lose Breuer’s friendship, he found himself subject to intense criticism because there is something about psychoanalysis which provokes criticism, contradictions and bitterness (1914a). And, further, even though psychoanalysis is seen by him as the cause of such reactions, he writes as though he became the focus of these, as if there was (is) an identification of psychoanalysis with himself.

ii. Breuer’s View

With respect to Breuer’s role in the beginning of psychoanalysis, in 1907 Breuer, in response to a request by Auguste Forel, gave his view of the beginnings of psychoanalysis (Cranefield, 1958). In his response, Breuer outlines what he saw as his contribution:

“What follows immediately from the case Anna O is mine – that is to say, the aetiological significances of affective ideas, deprived of their normal reaction which operate permanently like psychical foreign bodies; “retention hysteria”; the realisation of the importance of hypnoid states in the development of hysteria; analytic therapy” (Breuer quoted in Cranefield, p. 320).

Cranefield notes (p. 320) that Breuer first wrote “psycho-analytic therapy” but then changed this to “analytic therapy”, leaving us to speculate why.

Of Freud's contribution, Breuer notes that in the "analysis of severe cases of hysteria" the analysis "led us further back in to childhood" and that "this...was entirely Freud's contribution" (Breuer quoted in Cranefield, p. 320).

Breuer adds further that

"Freud is wholly responsible for the "conversion of affective excitations", for the theory of the "neurosis of defence" and for the enormous importance of "defence" in the formation of "ideational complexes "inadmissible to consciousness" in which the splitting of the psyche...arises". In comparison with this the pathological effect of the "hypnoid states" seems to him negligible – which was not, I think, to the benefit of his theory" (Breuer quoted in Cranefield, p. 320).

Breuer also notes their joint contribution;

"together with Freud I was also able to observe the prominent place assumed by sexuality..., and I can give an assurance that this arose from no inclination towards finding the subject but from the finding – to a large extent most unexpected – of our medical experience" (Breuer quoted in Cranefield, p. 320).

Breuer finishes his response by stating that even though he and Freud had suffered a painful separation, "I still regard Freud's work as magnificent: built upon the most laborious study in his private practice and of the greatest importance..." (Breuer quoted in Cranefield, p. 320).

Breuer's contribution to the beginnings of psychoanalysis would seem to mainly lie (by his letter) with the idea of the role of "affective ideas" in the development of neurotic symptoms (as "psychical foreign bodies"). As Cranefield proposes, this would seem to point to the correlation between neurotic symptoms and "unconscious processes" (Cranefield, p. 320). Secondly, Breuer would seem to have also contributed the idea "that neurotic symptoms disappear when the unconscious processes become conscious" (Cranefield, p. 321). Breuer also notes their common finding about the aetiological role of sexuality, in spite of his, or their, non-anticipation of the idea, and also Freud's emphasis of the splitting of the psyche (i.e. defence) over his (Breuer's) concept of the pathological role of the hypnoid states. The difference between Breuer's and Freud's perspectives would seem to become particularly apparent with regard to this last point, and thus had significant relevance for the beginnings of Freud's psychoanalysis. Freud's focus on the splitting of the ego

– essentially the basis of ego defence – opens the possibility of a procedure. This leads to the psychoanalysis that Freud outlines, rather than the mere abreaction of affects.

iii. Strachey's Overview.

This issue of Freud and Breuer and the beginnings of psychoanalysis (and therefore of what it is) is also addressed by Strachey, especially in his long introduction to the joint publication of Freud and Breuer: “Studies on Hysteria” (1893-1895). Here Strachey questions whether or not the publication should be considered to be “the starting point of psycho-analysis” (p. XVI), and if so, exactly what this means. With respect to this, Strachey points out the procedures developed were not just developed to address obstacles already known, but also to address obstacles that were discovered as part of the process. These obstacles were the amnesia of the hysteric, “the patients’ “resistance” to the treatment” (p. XVII) and “the “transference”” (p. XVIII). With regard to the first of these, as Strachey discusses, the amnesia pointed to unconscious mental processes that needed to be addressed, and that the logical instrument for this seemed to be hypnotic suggestion. However, as Strachey proposes, because Freud was “far from being an adept at hypnotism” (p. XVII), he had to, instead, resort to putting his patient “into a state of “concentration”” (p. XVII). But this then led to the second major obstacle, that of resistance. Freud, Strachey writes, adopted a particular approach to this; that is, Freud saw it, “like other mental phenomena, simply to be investigated” (p. XVII). Strachey comments further that Freud’s approach “led him directly into the uncharted world which he was to spend his whole life in exploring” (p. XVII).

Strachey adds that following on from the *Studies*, Freud “came to rely more and more upon the patient’s flow of “free associations”” (p. XVIII) which enabled him to begin his analysis of dreams, both the patients’ and his own. Dream-analysis offered Freud more understandings about the working of the mind that allowed him “a new technical device – that of “interpretation”” (p. XVIII).

Also Strachey indicates, with respect to transference, that Freud had begun to see this not just as an obstacle, “but also [as] another major instrument of psycho-analytic technique” (p. XVIII).

In these issues, Strachey points out Freud’s moving on from the cathartic method with an extension to treating neurosis beyond hysteria, the “establishment of the motive of “defence”” (p. XXVII) and Freud’s “insistence on a sexual aetiology” (p. XXVII).

In summary: “Psychoanalysis” would seem to have begun as the investigatory procedure of unconscious mental processes³, having therapeutic effects via catharsis once the unconscious quality of the “affective ideas” has been discovered. This would seem to correspond with Freud’s first published use of the term (i.e. in the French paper). In this process the obstacle of repression is overcome by hypnosis (hypnotic suggestion).

iv. The Beginning of Freud’s Psychoanalysis

In Freud’s second published (1896a) use of the term (in the German paper), he directs towards an investigation of the “psychical process of “defence” or “repression”” (p. 162). Rather than these only being seen as obstacles to be overcome, they become the subject of study for Freud, as Strachey and Breuer describe, and this is in essence where psychoanalysis, his psychoanalysis, began. This step of studying the dynamics of the mind, as well as the repressed content, led (as also described by Strachey) on to dream-analysis, Freud’s own self-analysis, interpretation, the transference, and so on.

However, it would appear that Freud did not fully disengage from his beginnings with Breuer. Even though he took the dynamics of the mind, beginning with the nature and function of defence, as his focus, he also was seen to have sustained the therapeutic aim of making the unconscious

³ The term “unconscious” with respect to Breuer’s ideas would seem ambiguous, both descriptive and alluding to a dynamic state in which “affective ideas” become disengaged from their normal affectivity and become unconscious in this process. The recovery of this affectivity would seem to be the essence of the cathartic method.

conscious, which is inherent to his topographic model of the mind⁴. There is also a second perspective on the beginnings of psychoanalysis, i.e. as emphasised by Freud and Strachey: psychoanalysis can be seen to have begun when Freud replaced the procedure of hypnotic suggestion and catharsis with free association⁵. Jones (1972), in his biography of Freud, writes of “the all-important matter of the transition from the cathartic method to the “free association” method from which psycho-analysis dates” (volume 1, p. 265).

Because of its significance as a defining quality for psychoanalysis, the question arises, why free association – why and how did Freud come upon this as the defining procedure of psychoanalysis?

v. *Free Association*

Of free association, Jones writes that, “the devising of this method was one of the great deeds in Freud’s scientific life, the other being the self-analysis...” (volume 1, p. 265). With respect to how and why Freud developed this process there would seem to be (at least) two sources. One would seem to lie with Freud’s experience of a patient, as he outlines in the “Studies on Hysteria” (1893-1895). Here Freud notes of his patient (Frau Emmy Von N);

Nor is her conversation...so aimless as would appear. On the contrary, it contains a fairly complete reproduction of the memories and new impressions which have affected her since our last talk, and it often leads on, in a quite unexpected way, to pathogenic reminiscences of which she unburdens herself without being asked to. It is as though she had adopted my procedure and was making use of our conversation, apparently unconstrained and guided by chance... (p. 56).

The patient would seem to have been guided by Freud to talk freely, as if under the influence of hypnosis, and responded in a way that surprised and interested Freud because of the potential to negate the need for hypnosis⁶.

⁴ This perspective is particularly relevant to ideas Freud outlines in “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” (1914b), see particularly page 151.

⁵ Free association is the process to be followed by the patient and one to be matched by the analyst with “evenly suspended attention” as described by Freud in his “Two Encyclopaedia Articles” (1923/1922, pp. 237-239).

⁶ Strachey in a footnote on this page (p. 56) notes that “this is perhaps the earliest appearance of what later became the method of free association”.

A second perspective is, as noted by Jones, that Freud suggested that he was following “an obscure intuition” (Jones, volume 1, p. 270) when he developed the process of free association. This “obscure intuition”, Freud (1920a) explains, related to a book of essays that he had read by Ludwig Börne, when he was an adolescent. Of this book, Freud (1920a), writes (writing in the third person);

He said that when he was 14 he had been given Börne’s works as a present, that he still possessed the book now, 50 years later, and it was the only one that had survived from his childhood. Börne, he said, had been the first author into whose writings he had penetrated deeply (p. 265).

Among these essays was one that directed, by essentially a process of free association, ““The Art of Becoming an Original Writer in Three Days””, by writing ““without fabrication or hypocrisy, everything that comes into your head”” (p. 265).

In reflecting on the possible influence of Börne’s ideas, Freud notes that the statements made by Börne about having the courage to overcome self-censorship and to give honest expression of one’s views in spite of the opposition (p. 265) had been or had become an essential aspect of Freud’s approach to life. Of these issues Freud (1920a) writes;

Thus it seems not impossible that this hint may have brought to life the fragment of cryptomnesia which in so many cases may be suspected to lie behind apparent originality (p. 265).

The question of how and why Freud adopted a process of free association, seen by him and others as the beginning of the procedure of psychoanalysis, would seem to come down to several factors, following Freud’s outline (and, to some extent, Breuer’s). These were that Freud, influenced by Breuer’s ideas, adopted his (Breuer’s) investigative and therapeutic method. However, rather than following through with the concepts of overcoming the obstacle to remembering which lay in the unconscious-binding of the affective quality of events, Freud became focused instead on understanding and exploring the dynamics of the defensive processes (early on called “repression”). To do this he needed a procedure different from hypnotic suggestion. It would seem by Freud’s description that this came about by two fortunate circumstances, the first being the revelatory communications of “Frau

Emmy Von N”, which Freud astutely saw pointed to a possible exploratory process independent of hypnosis. The second was the possible influence of an author read in Freud’s adolescence, one who may have had significant influence upon Freud’s approach to thought, communication and life.

Within these ideas about free association and the beginnings of psychoanalysis and the role of fortunate circumstance, Freud is putting forward a picture of psychoanalysis coming about as a matter of chance, influenced by his astute orientation towards understanding psychic events. This self-depiction by Freud concerns a fortunate individual who happened to be in the right place, at the right time, with the right frame of mind. Freud would appear to be portraying psychoanalysis as waiting to be discovered and him being the fortunate individual, albeit one astute enough, to do this. As will be seen this is not always Freud’s perspective. It is also one challenged by Lacan (1977). With respect to the discovery of the technique of free association in the analytic situation, Lacan proposes that this is viewed as “the result of a lucky accident” (p. 163) by those who wish to see it that way. However, Lacan proposes that Freud’s understanding of the unconscious and the beginning technique of free association are directly correlated; of this Lacan (1977) writes;

A return to Freud’s text shows on the contrary the absolute coherence between his technique and his discovery, and at the same time this coherence allows us to put all his procedures in their proper place (p. 163)

Lacan’s view points towards a balance of creative discovery and intuitive understanding in Freud’s ideas. However, this does not explain why Freud offered the opportunity for an alternative view, one that invited, and was taken up, by others to see themselves as his equal with respect to analytic conceptualization, particularly given the problems this caused for him and psychoanalysis.

vi. Conclusion re the Beginning of Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis, as seen by Freud after his initial homage to Breuer as its originator, appears to have begun through the convergence of a number of factors. Important in these are Freud’s conceptualization of the alteration in the

ego corresponding with defence, i.e. the obstacle to remembering linked to “affective ideas”, and his orientation towards understanding the dynamics of this. To do this required a procedure other than hypnotism, and free association constituted that procedure. The initiation of this free associative process is seen by Freud and others as the beginning of psychoanalysis. How and why this process was initiated by Freud would seem to have two explanations. One is that it was an event of fortunate chance involving several factors coming together, i.e. a patient’s revelatory and creative communications, the unconscious influence of an important author of Freud’s childhood, and Freud’s intuition. The other perspective, put forward by Lacan, is that Freud had creatively conceptualized the unconscious and free association was the procedure he developed to explore this further.

This ambiguity of perspective points towards an important issue about psychoanalysis, and Freud and psychoanalysis, namely that Freud seemed drawn to subtly creating a conceptualization of two psychoanalyses, one straightforward and for all; and another, more complex creation, alluded to as his psychoanalysis.

To further consider these beginning ideas about what psychoanalysis is and how these developed and evolved, Freud’s ideas about psychoanalysis will be examined.

B. Freud and Psychoanalysis.

On a number of occasions, throughout his writings, Freud outlined in mainly procedural, but also theoretical terms, either together or alternately, his views about what psychoanalysis is. Some of the statements by Freud will be briefly outlined below. The selection will attempt to give an overview of the varying perspectives put forward by Freud.

As the term “psychoanalysis” would seem to have straightforward descriptive and/or referential qualities (Freud used a word combining two terms that are in common usage, part of the lexicon), Freud’s statements about what psychoanalysis is should adequately answer the question what psychoanalysis is. However, as Freud’s statements vary in focus, the answer could possibly be found in his most comprehensive statement, or in his last statement (assuming a developing perspective of ideas), or by a collection and collation of his views, or perhaps by another approach. However, Freud’s statements about what psychoanalysis is leave a sense that what it is for Freud, and for all subsequent analysts, cannot be fully embraced by any of these approaches. The fact that it cannot be fully explicated by Freud in this way may indicate something enigmatic about what psychoanalysis is. This enigmatic quality would seem related to the approach taken by Freud in describing what was, for him, psychoanalysis, i.e. he tried to embrace the enigma or perhaps created it (or both) by his approach; an approach that indicated that he may have held two peripherally related views about what psychoanalysis is. Seemingly one view, the straight-forward view, the view reflected in (most of) his statements, is a view that he put forward with the goal of achieving acceptance for psychoanalysis as the product of his (and others’) research. The other view, his own personal view, complex and more intuitive, was essentially the basis of psychoanalysis as his creation.

This view of there possibly being two psychoanalyses, at two different levels of complexity and empirical evidence, is a key focus of this study and will be explored in the following consideration of Freud’s papers in which he overviews his perspectives of psychoanalysis.

There are three papers by Freud, in particular, that fulfil this function; i.e. overview papers giving a perspective on psychoanalysis by considering its origin and development¹. These papers are, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” (1914a), “An Autobiographical Study” (1925/1924), and “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis” (1940/1938).

The first of these was written by Freud to clarify what psychoanalysis is in order to deal with the challenges of Jung and Adler and their followers, and their claims that their ideas extended and/or revised Freud’s ideas about what psychoanalysis is. The particular importance of this paper, as will be considered, is that it not only compels Freud to fully (or almost fully) explicate his ideas, but also draws out, or at least alludes to, Freud’s two psychoanalyses and what these are. Accordingly, this paper will be considered at some length.

In “An Autobiographical Study” (1925/1924), as Strachey points out, Freud

was inevitably going over much of the ground which he had already traversed in his paper “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”...some ten years before (S.E. XX, pp. 4-5).

Freud’s ideas in this paper will be considered in less detail than those in the earlier paper.

In the third of these papers, “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis”, Freud begins by stating;

The aim of this brief work is to bring together the tenets of psycho-analysis and to state them, as it were, dogmatically – in the most concise form and the most unequivocal terms (p. 144).

This was Freud’s last major paper, written in the shadow of his imminent death. It therefore has a directness about it that is not as apparent in his other papers. Of this paper, Strachey in his introduction writes;

at the age of 82 Freud still possessed an astonishing gift for making a fresh approach to what might have seemed well-worn topics (S.E. XXIII, p. 143).

¹ Freud (1923/1922) writes that, “The best way of understanding psycho-analysis is still by tracing its origin and development” (p. 235).

In essence the work is unfinished because, as described by Strachey, Freud's work on it was interrupted by a major operation, and he did not return to it. However, because of its nature and the time and place in Freud's life, the paper, like the 1914 paper, gives an important outline of Freud's views on what psychoanalysis is.

However, before proceeding with an examination of Freud's ideas about psychoanalysis in these overview papers, a number of Freud's statements about what psychoanalysis is will be outlined, essentially as a starting point for the more detailed consideration of his ideas in these overview papers.

i. Freud's Statements About What Psychoanalysis Is

- (i) Possibly the best known statement by Freud is his tripartite statement, which provides the basis of most dictionary definitions of "psychoanalysis"

Here Freud (1923/1922) states that

Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline (p. 235).

This definition is quite straightforward and unambiguous in its clear account of what "psycho-analysis" means. It denotes a hierarchy of conceptualizations beginning with that of the investigative procedure with its focus on mental processes. However, the concept of mental processes "almost inaccessible in any other way" (p. 235), seems to refer to the concept of the dynamic unconscious in psychoanalytic theory. If this is the focus of the investigative procedure, then the hierarchy of conceptualizations begins to be undermined because here a product of the investigative procedure also becomes a guiding concept. If the hierarchy is to be maintained, as it would seem Freud intends here, then the concept of the dynamic unconscious as a starting point for the procedure points to a source outside of the investigative procedure. This infers two perspectives on psychoanalysis in Freud's writings: one that he outlines here as a hierarchy of procedural concepts leading to an

empirically-based psychological science. This procedure and scientific hierarchy of concepts is based upon that of unconscious processes, and is one that is to be followed by those who wish to practice psychoanalysis. The second perspective, which would involve the exploration of the mind at another level leading to the fundamental and guiding concepts of the general perspective (the dynamic unconscious and others as will be outlined), is seemingly unique to Freud, i.e. not for general use. As will be shown this second process involves Freud's intuitive creative understanding of the findings of his own self-analysis as well as those of his patients.

(ii) In the same article (1923/1922) Freud again addresses these issues of what psychoanalysis is under the heading, "The Corner-Stones of Psycho-Analytic Theory" (p. 247). Here he emphatically writes;

The assumption that there are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of resistance and repression, the appreciation of the importance of sexuality and the Oedipus complex – these constitute the principal subject-matter of psycho-analysis and the foundations of its theory. No one who cannot accept them all should count himself a psycho-analyst (p. 247).

Here Freud puts forward a series of ideas, theories and hypotheses as the basis of psychoanalytic theory. In this, Freud fosters ambiguity: some of these conceptualizations are part of the developing science, findings of the procedure, whereas others, (e.g. "the assumption" re the unconscious) would seem to have another origin. As noted above, the conceptualization of unconscious mental process would not seem to correlate with such findings of the research, at least because they are an essential part, the focus, of the starting point of the research.

These two statements about what psychoanalysis is (i.e. i and ii), point towards an ambiguity of perspective with respect to what psychoanalysis is. Taken at the level of its direct hierarchical signification, a first psychoanalysis is a general one in that, beginning with an acceptance of Freud's ideas re the dynamic unconscious, it is constituted mainly of a procedure and developing ideas, the product of the research (i.e. the investigative procedure). A second

psychoanalysis (i.e. ii), involves complex (and, as will be seen, paradoxical) conceptualizations some of which, seemingly are the products of another, related, procedure, possibly Freud's self-analysis and intuitive understanding of his patients.

(iii) A third statement about psychoanalysis was given by Freud in 1926: here he writes that psychoanalysis

in the course of time came to have two meanings: (1) a particular method of treating nervous disorders and (2) the science of unconscious mental processes, which has also been appropriately described as "depth-psychology" (p. 264).

He adds in this paper;

The future will probably attribute far greater importance to psycho-analysis as a science of the unconscious than as a therapeutic procedure (p. 265)².

In this statement Freud differentiates psychoanalysis into two "meanings". One, the therapeutic method and the other a scientifically based body of knowledge. Again Freud would seem to put the study of the key hypothesis concerning unconscious processes, initiated in his work with Breuer, as central, and this becomes the dominant focus of psychoanalysis. In Freud's tripartite definition, these unconscious processes are the background issue, the foreground focus is on the exploratory procedure needed to apprehend "inaccessible" mental processes. Here, however, they are for Freud, the key issue and they again cannot be seen as a product of the procedure or only as part of the accumulating knowledge. For Freud, in this statement, psychoanalysis is based upon his hypothesis concerning unconscious processes: one that has to be accepted to be a psychoanalyst.

² The issue about the scientific status of Freud's depth-psychology is an important and challenging issue. Its focus upon the conceptualisation of unconscious processes introduces a particular challenge because the central focus of this conceptualisation is, by definition, not available for empirical scrutiny. But, as Freud (1925/1924) states, "my opponents regarded psycho-analysis as a product of my speculative imagination and were unwilling to believe in the long, patient and unbiased work which had gone into its making" (p. 50). He is arguing that his depth-psychology is the product of disciplined scientific endeavour. Although this issue is not directly relevant to this study, it is not completely separate from it either, and it will inevitably be considered as necessary in the process of this enquiry.

(iv) As will be fully considered when the paper “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” is studied, Freud puts forward several statements which seem to compound this dichotomous view of one psychoanalysis which is straight-forward and for all, and the other which is complex and contains certain conceptualizations which have to be accepted to legitimately claim the status of psychoanalyst.

I will list these statements that Freud makes concerning psychoanalysis in his 1914 paper:

- a. It may thus be said that the theory of psycho-analysis is an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected facts of observation which emerge whenever an attempt is made to trace the symptoms of a neurotic back to their sources in his past life: the facts of transference and resistance. Any line of investigation which recognises these two facts and takes them as the starting point of its work has the right to call itself psycho-analysis, even though it arrives at results other than my own (p. 16).

Freud argues further here that “repression and resistance” (p. 16) are “findings” and not “premisses” (p. 17, Freud’s emphasis).

- b. The first task confronting psycho-analysis was to explain the neuroses; it used the two facts of resistance and transference as starting-points, and, taking into consideration the third fact of amnesia, accounted for them with its theories of repression, of the sexual motive forces of neurosis and of the unconscious (p. 50)
- c. the other new factors which were added to the cathartic procedure as a result of my work and which transformed it into psycho-analysis, I may mention in particular the theory of repression and resistance, the recognition of infantile sexuality, and the interpreting and exploiting of dreams as a source of knowledge of the unconscious (p. 15).

Here Freud indicates that if one accepts the *findings* of transference and resistance and repression and begins from there, one is practising “psychoanalysis”. However, Freud writes later that he survived professional rejection, rejection of his psychoanalysis, and avoided bitterness by consoling himself with the veracity his ideas. Of this he writes;

for psycho-analytic theory enabled me to understand this attitude in my contemporaries and to see it as a necessary consequence of fundamental

analytic premisses. If it was true that the set of facts I had discovered were kept from the knowledge of patients themselves by internal resistances of an affective kind, then these resistances would be bound to appear in healthy people too... (p. 23).

Resistance, in this context, is one of the analytic premisses.

Although this may reasonably be seen as Freud being inconsistent, it may also be indicative of a contrast between two psychoanalyses: one based upon the acceptance of transference, resistance and repression as findings (findings of Freud's work), and the other involving the acceptance and understanding of interwoven findings and premises related to concepts of transference, resistance, repression, infantile sexuality, dream-analysis, and the concept of the dynamic-unconscious - seemingly Freud's psychoanalysis.

The issue of differentiation into two psychoanalyses and Freud's views about these, as introduced in these statements, will now be considered in an examination of his overview papers.

ii. “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” (1914)

Strachey introduces this (1914a) paper by proposing that Freud’s aim

was to state clearly the fundamental postulates and hypotheses of psychoanalysis, to show that the theories of Adler and Jung were totally incompatible with them, and to draw the inference that it would lead to nothing but general confusion if these contradictory sets of views were all given the same name (S.E. XIV, p. 4).

This introduction by Strachey points towards an opportunity to access a clear outline by Freud with respect to what psychoanalysis is, at least for Freud at that point in time. However, Strachey’s introduction also implies that only Freud can truly know what psychoanalysis is and that the ideas of others, even his erstwhile followers, Adler and Jung, would be “totally incompatible” with a true representation of what psychoanalysis is. Freud and his ideas constitute the boundary of the paradigm, and beyond this lies confusion. Although this perspective would appear unreasonably absolute, it is not entirely incompatible with the history of psychoanalysis since Freud’s death¹.

However, these issues raise questions about what psychoanalysis is that will be considered with a closer examination of this paper. The most important issue relates to the claim that only Freud, the originator, can truly know what psychoanalysis is. If he outlines and informs us of his understandings of what psychoanalysis is, then surely we too can know, so why would chaos and confusion ensue without Freud’s hegemony? Is it that something in Freud’s understanding escapes us, and, if so, why? Is Freud not telling us something, or is it too difficult for us to comprehend and, if so, why?

In approaching these issues and what they tell us about what psychoanalysis is, a beginning point is one in Strachey’s introduction, namely Freud’s belligerence. This belligerence manifests in his attacks not only upon the ideas of Adler and Jung but also upon their character, which are seen by Freud to underlie the distorting and diluting attacks upon his psychoanalysis. This approach by Freud, the attacks upon the characters of Adler (in particular)

¹ For example, Aslan (1989) observes of the interactions between analysts, “we find ourselves in a psychoanalytic Babel where: 1 the same words name different concepts; 2 the same concepts are named by different words; 3 there are a number of words only validated within the contexts of a given frame of reference” (p. 13).

and Jung, is an extension of a perspective he introduces at the beginning of the paper, the linking or interweaving of what psychoanalysis is with his own being. Freud appears to conflate what psychoanalysis is with the discipline's originator, namely himself. In this, as Freud makes clear, there can only be one true psychoanalysis, the one that he has created, discovered and defined, and which is essentially an extension of his own character. Any dilution or distortion of his pronouncements about psychoanalysis is a personal attack upon him, to which he responds in kind.

In this (1914a) paper, although Freud does indicate that Adler's conceptualization of repression is in error, and that Jung negates the transference, it is not, essentially, their aberrations at this level that is the main problem. It is at another level of conceptualization of what psychoanalysis is that the problems arise. This is around the "essence" (p. 64) of Freud's psychoanalysis, which he is drawn to defend against the dilution and distortions of the ideas of Adler and Jung. And, further, at this level there is a tying together of what psychoanalysis is and the person arguing this. Because the essence of their personhood is bound up with the validity of their professional views, their very identity is at stake in these professional disputes (Blass, 2010). In the disputes between contemporary analysts, they are apparently repeating Freud's perspective, i.e. there is a narcissistic investment in the claims about what psychoanalysis is, and so their sense of professional (analytic) self appears threatened by opposing viewpoints.

Strachey's introduction does not fully account for the nature and force of Freud's communication: for example, why is he belligerent (as Strachey sees it), what is he doing, both consciously and unconsciously? In this Strachey writes of Freud's perceived belligerence that "in view of his experiences during the preceding three or four years this unusual mood cannot be considered surprising" (1914a p. 4). However this would seem an inadequate and apologetic explanation. A more straightforward explanation would be that this reflected aspects of Freud's character and his intolerance to challenges to his authority. Although the history of psychoanalysis and its central characters would support such a view what is being sought for in this study is an understanding not of Freud's evident neurosis but of what it was that he

discovered and created and around which his neurotic issues manifested. This takes us back to the question of what it is about psychoanalysis (and not just Freud) that leads Freud to behave in this way and leads to this mode of communication about what psychoanalysis is for him. That is, instead of a simple outline of the development of psychoanalysis, and then a demonstration of why and how the ideas of Adler and Jung are totally incompatible with this (when in fact they are not), Freud is seemingly putting forward a skilled explication of what psychoanalysis is, and Adler's and Jung's perceived distortions or dilutions are used to rhetorical effect by Freud as part of that explication. His apparent method of communicating the issue of what psychoanalysis is potentially says something about psychoanalysis beyond what is directly communicated in the words.

For example, these enigmatic issues about what psychoanalysis is are alluded to in the essential structure of this paper, which has the qualities of a three act drama, with the undertones of a parable. The first part begins with a dramatic statement about the bind between the main character and the basis of the drama, psychoanalysis, that which disturbs the sleep of the world. Freud then settles into an outline of the development of psychoanalysis, from his naive beginnings with Breuer, moving on to his own discoveries by research and intuition. He writes then of the magnitude of his discoveries, how he suffered the crushing rejection of his person and his ideas, and how he heroically sustained himself during these bleak and pessimistic times. The second part describes the emergence of himself and his ideas, but not at the level of the world-disturbing that he saw as their true nature. A movement is established, with all that this involves: leader, followers, new branches, committees, new journals, conferences, etc. This is approached in a rather bland way in Freud's outline, but with a quiet background building of tension, that flows into the third part. There Freud abruptly changes tone and the quality of the drama returns as he begins to address the question of "secessions" (p. 48). Freud, ironically, writes of this;

It is no easy or enviable task to write the history of these two secessions, partly because I am without any strong personal motive for doing so..." (p. 49).

He describes how he is reluctantly drawn towards discussing these secessions;

I now see myself compelled to take up arms against its former followers or people who still like to call themselves its followers. I have no choice in this matter, however; only indolence or cowardice could lead one to keep silence, and silence would cause more harm than a frank revelation of the harms that already exist (p. 49).

He then adds;

Anyone who has followed the growth of other scientific movements will know that the same upheavals and dissensions commonly occur in them as well. It may be that elsewhere they are more carefully concealed; but psycho-analysis, which repudiates so many conventional ideals, is more honest in these matters too (p. 49).

Having dramatically outlined his reluctant but choiceless perspective, denying any possible personal motive save trying to avoid further harm being done, and proposing that the issues involved are common to any developing science, Freud then begins a significant attack upon Adler and Jung and their ideas. I draw attention to this paper as a dramatic outline of Freud and psychoanalysis to address directly what it is about psychoanalysis that leads Freud to behave in this way². Or, more pertinently, what is being communicated by Freud about what psychoanalysis is in this dramatic manner?

From this outline Freud alludes to a certain set of ideas which would, in part, explain his manner of presentation. As will be observed Freud, after his separation from Breuer, both through his research and also from his intuitive understandings (presumably from, at least in part, his self-analysis), came upon ideas about issues key to understanding the essence of human existence that he believed were earth-shaking. However, he found that people did not want to know; it was not yet the right time, and he felt deflated. At the level of the findings of his research, compared with the true profundity of his understandings, he drew followers. However, because of the democratic nature of his ideas at that level, it was inevitable that others believed that they knew as well as Freud about the basis of human behaviour and that they could validly

² The issues about Freud and his personality, the enigma of where and how psychoanalysis developed from Freud, has been the subject of biographies and films and will not be directly considered here. However the focus on what psychoanalysis is and the entanglement of this with his character, makes comment about Freud and his behaviour unavoidable.

propose their own ideas about what psychoanalysis is. As Freud proposes, in a developing science this is inevitable and is fact necessary to further growth of the science. An understanding of these comments, and his apparently inconsistent or contradictory behaviour, would be that Freud feared that the important discoveries he had made would be lost as the ideas of Adler and Jung changed and diluted the essential quality of his own ideas. Therefore, seemingly, this was not only the beginning of a developing science, but also of something different and new.

These ideas about Freud and psychoanalysis will be considered further in an overview of Freud's (1914a) paper, which Freud begins with the proposal that

No one need be surprised at the subjective character of the contribution I propose to make here to the history of the psycho-analytic movement (p. 7).

This dramatic and attention grabbing statement – why would we not be surprised – is followed by one with a rich, ironic ambiguity, “for psycho-analysis is my creation” (p. 7). In this Freud introduces what will be a description of the interweaving of two ontologies, that of psychoanalysis and that of Freud, creating a mutually interdependent identity for each: there can be no psychoanalysis without Freud and no Freud without psychoanalysis. As the paper's apparent intention is to successfully dismiss the claims of Adler and Jung that they have replaced or extended Freud's ideas with their own, Freud begins with great skill to establish a basis from which to launch an attack upon their claims from the authoritative position of one who knows. He, accordingly, follows this initial establishment of the bind between himself and psychoanalysis by stating, “I consider myself justified in maintaining that even today no one can know better than I do what psycho-analysis is” (p. 7). The rhetorical skill in Freud's writing is evident in the words, “even today”, which adds a quality of timelessness to his authority in terms of being the one who knows what psychoanalysis is.

After beginning with provocative statements which link psychoanalysis with himself, Freud revises and dismisses the ideas that psychoanalysis is really Breuer's creation. In this, Freud alludes to one quality of what

psychoanalysis is when he states, “As I have long recognised that to stir up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of psycho-analysis...” (p. 8); in this he links the reactions to psychoanalysis to reactions against him and his ideas, again emphasising the inextricable connection between himself and psychoanalysis. Apart from again raising the question of how Freud sees the fate of psychoanalysis as entwined with his own, this also raises that question of what psychoanalysis is such that it has this effect, an effect that is certainly not restricted to the opponents of psychoanalysis, as Freud proceeds to demonstrate in his attacks upon Adler and Jung.

Freud then settles to give an outline of the development of psychoanalysis from the beginning in “Breuer’s discoveries” (p. 8) and how he (Freud) was drawn into collaborative work with Breuer because he, Freud, “had at that time a strong motive for helping people suffering from nervous affections or at least wishing to understand something about their states” (p. 9). In his work with Breuer, Freud notes that;

The patient’s associations moved back from the scene which we were trying to elucidate to earlier experiences, and compelled the analysis, which was supposed to correct the present, to occupy itself with the past (p. 10).

The latter led in fact “back into the years of childhood which had hitherto been inaccessible to any kind of exploration” (p. 10). Another discovery was the “sexual motivation of the transference” (p. 12). Of this Freud writes;

The fact of the emergence of the transference in its crudely sexual form, whether affectionate or hostile, in every treatment of a neurosis, although this in neither desired nor induced by either doctor or patient, has always seemed to me the most irrefragable proof that the source of the driving forces of neurosis lies in sexual life (p. 12).

This, for Freud, was seemingly the decisive argument about the aetiological role of sexuality in neuroses. In this regard, Freud also notes how this issue of the role of sexuality in the transference of neurotics led Breuer to be

the first to show the reaction of distaste and repudiation which was later to become familiar to me, but which at that time I had not yet learnt to recognize as my inevitable fate (p. 12):

Freud is again linking his person to the entity of psychoanalysis.

Freud notes two categories of conceptualization from his research: one is that the origins of neurotic problems lie in the past, going back into childhood, and that these involve issues of a sexual nature which manifest in the transference, i.e. the past and the present meet over issues of sexuality through the transference. The second category is that there is something in the individual which wishes to repudiate or withdraw from these ideas, as exemplified by Breuer's (countertransference) reaction.

However, there is something more to Freud's perspective on these issues, something which relates to the question of what psychoanalysis is. This relates to Freud's observation that if he does not collude with the denial or repudiation of sexuality, its role in neurogenesis and its beginnings in childhood, then there will be an extension of the reaction against these ideas to psychoanalysis and to Freud himself as the originator of the method of investigation. What Freud discovered about sexuality, what he perceived would disturb the sleep of the world, apparently affects people in a way that leads to a confounding of idea, emotion, process and individual. These ideas will be examined further later in this study.

Following Freud's (1914a) idea that psychoanalysis began "with my discarding the hypnotic technique and introducing free associations" (p. 8) and the discoveries about sexuality, the issues of sexuality and what psychoanalysis is would seem tied, possibly by more than coincidence. An essential part of what sexuality is for Freud, what constitutes a world-shaking discovery about human existence, is seemingly woven into psychoanalysis. What this could be will be part of the further considerations of this study.

Freud proceeds from these observations about the origin and dynamic source of neurosis, onto apparent further research findings. These are;

the theory of repression and resistance...and the interpreting and exploiting of dreams as a source of knowledge of the unconscious (p. 15).

Although Freud is quite adamant that repression, resistance and, later the transference, are findings of his research - he even proposes re resistance and repression that if anyone suggested that they were "premisses" rather than "findings", he would "oppose him most emphatically" (1914a, p. 17) - the

situation would seem to be more ambiguous than Freud indicates in this statement. For example, with respect to resistance, Freud writes a few pages later that the theory of resistance was one of the “fundamental analytic premisses” (p. 23) that he used to explain the reactions against him and his psychoanalysis, to console himself against rejection of him and psychoanalysis.

With respect to repression this ambiguity of conceptualization would also seem to be present. Of repression, Freud makes several comments:

The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source...for a long time I imagined it to be entirely original (p. 15);

The theory of repression is a corner-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests...yet it is nothing but a theoretical formulation of a phenomenon... (p. 16);

the theory of repression is a product of psycho-analytic work, a theoretical inference legitimately drawn from innumerable observations (p. 17).

In “An Autobiographical Study” (1925/1924), Freud writes of repression, “it was a novelty, and nothing like it had ever before been recognised in mental life” (p. 30). In these overview comments (Freud wrote a paper on “Repression” (1915a) which is essentially focused upon the dynamics of the process of repression) Freud appears to be tying together a finding of his research with a conceptualization about this which would seem also to be a product of his theorising, that is, his creation. Repression, like resistance, would appear to be the product both of observation and Freud’s creative thought, essentially both of “findings” and “premisses”.

Following Freud in this outline (1914a) of the development of psychoanalysis, there appear to be two different sources for these key concepts. One source is that of “innumerable observations” (p. 17) and the other is Freud’s creative thought, creating new theoretical conceptualizations or new perspectives, in which Freud’s intuition would seem to play an important part. This issue of two sources in fact appears to be apparent in all of the conceptualizations he is putting forward as the basis of what psychoanalysis is. For example, even with the issue of discovery of the role of sexuality, “infantile

sexuality”³, in neurogenesis, which Freud, and also Breuer, argue was somewhat forced upon them by its repeated manifestation in the transference (at least), and hence would seem the product of their research, has a speculative or intuitive quality to it. Freud (1914a) writes of “the hypothesis of infantile sexuality” (p. 17) deduced from their repeated observations, but there is an apparent speculative quality when Freud writes of hysterics;

the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in *phantasy*, and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside practical reality. This reflection was soon followed by the discovery that these phantasies were intended to cover up the autoerotic activity of the first years of childhood...(pp. 17-18, Freud’s emphasis).

In spite of Freud’s language of certainty related to findings, i.e. “fact”, “precisely”, “discovery”, the notion that the phantasies were intended to cover the autoerotic activity of early childhood must by its very nature be speculative and intuitive.

With respect to dream-analysis, the other of the basic elements of psychoanalysis described by Freud in this section (pp. 18-19), there would again seem to be a balance between speculation and the findings of research. Freud describes how;

My desire for knowledge had not at the start been directed towards understanding dreams. I do not know of any outside influence which drew my interest to them or inspired me with any helpful expectations (p. 19).

He indicates that, as Breuer and he concluded their relationship, “I only just had time to tell him in a simple sentence that I now understood how to translate dreams” (p. 19). This implies that, as with sexuality, Freud’s dream-analysis would seem to be tied to the beginnings of *his* psychoanalysis. This intuitive beginning re dream-analysis is supplemented by Freud’s readings of others, for example Scherner, Stekel and J. Popper (1914a).

³ Why Freud refers to “infantile sexuality” is not made clear by him in his writings. In his key paper on sexuality, “Three Essays On Sexuality” (1905), the second essay is entitled “Infantile Sexuality” and this includes a subsection entitled “Infantile Amnesia”. However, throughout the paper Freud refers to “childhood” as he does also in his other writings and not to infancy. Possible in this he is referring to aspects of our experience of which we cannot speak (*infans*) but this is speculative only. However, in this study the Freudian terminology – “infantile sexuality” – will be followed.

Each of these essentials of psychoanalysis therefore appears to have a dual basis, a balance between Freud's creative speculation, intuitive theorising, and the results of the research, the "innumerable observations" stemming from his investigative procedure. However, Freud appears to emphasise the empirical qualities of these conceptualizations for much of the first part of this paper. This is particularly so when Freud puts forward his (quoted) statement about psychoanalysis and its basis in findings (p. 16)⁴.

Freud emphatically proposes that psychoanalysis is determined in a theoretical and practical sense by taking the two "findings" ("transference" and "resistance", p. 16) as the starting point of its work. Importantly, Freud is so emphatic that he even proposes that he will concede his hegemony, at least with respect to "results". Freud adds to this statement:

But anyone who takes up other sides of the problem while avoiding these two hypotheses will hardly escape a charge of misappropriation of property by attempted impersonation, if he persists in calling himself a psycho-analyst (p. 16).

In this, the facts of observation have become "hypotheses". However putting what may be more than a semantic issue aside Freud is putting forward a straight forward statement about what psychoanalysis is and how this is decided. This, as has been noted, is taken by Wallerstein (1988) as the key to establishing the common ground of psychoanalysis, i.e. shared conceptions of psychoanalysis that hold analysts together as a united (but disharmonious) group.

In this (1914a) paper, with Freud preparing his attacks upon Adler and Jung and their ideas, at this point he appears to be establishing for himself a common ground, one with which all analysts can ally themselves and claim to be analysts.

⁴ Freud (1914a) states: "It may thus be said that the theory of psycho-analysis is an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected facts of observation which emerge whenever an attempt is made to trace the symptoms of the neurotic back to their sources in his past life: the facts of transference and of resistance. Any line of investigation which recognises these two facts and takes them as the starting-point of its work has a right to call itself psycho-analysis, even though it arrives at results other than my own" (p. 16).

Freud proceeds from here to draw attention to how he, and his psychoanalysis, were treated with indifference or rejection when he began to put forward his ideas, especially to do with the role of sexuality in neurogenesis. He points out, in this, how he saw his future;

I should probably succeed in maintaining myself by means of the therapeutic success of the new procedure, but science would ignore me entirely during my lifetime; some decades later, someone else would infallibly come upon the same things – for which the time was now ripe – would achieve recognition for them and bring me honour as a forerunner whose failure had been inevitable (p. 22).

Freud indicates that he consoled himself with his belief in his interpretations of dreams⁵ and through the fact that “psycho-analytic theory enabled me to understand this attitude in my contemporaries” (1914a, p. 23). In these comments, about his perspective on his future and his capacity to console himself, Freud alludes to several points. The first is that, at one level, the level of his procedure of investigation which is also the therapeutic method, he envisages that he would be recognised and would sustain a successful practice, and gain some status and recognition. However, at another level, he is before his time with regard to *his* psychoanalysis, the level of his discoveries and understandings about human experience and behaviour. Eventually recognition would come to him at this other level, but not till some process of social and conceptual evolution transpired. In the interim, he would console himself with his understandings and conceptualizations, that is that his psychoanalysis is not just ahead of its time, promoting the rejections he has suffered by confronting man with these new understandings, it is also something to keep to himself as his solace.

He ends this part on of this (1914a) paper with the statement;

It was hardly to be expected, however, that during the years when I alone represented psycho-analysis I should develop any particular respect for the world's opinion or any bias towards intellectual appeasement (p. 24).

He learnt that he could not expect, at least in his life-time, for his ideas, understandings and discoveries, his psychoanalysis, to be appropriately

⁵ Freud (1914a) writes, “The interpretation of dreams became a solace and support for me in those arduous first years of analysis...At that period I was completely isolated” (p. 20).

acknowledged and understood. Instead he was doomed to isolation, and his consequent attitude towards the world would seem clearly expressed in the statement with which he ends this first part of this paper. It would seem important for Freud to make quite clear his thoughts and feelings about his experiences when he had put forward his psychoanalysis, and the rejections and slights he suffered as a result. The apparent reason for doing this is a subtle introduction to what he proposes in Part 2 of this paper. He begins Part 2 of this paper by writing:

From the year 1902 onwards, a number of young doctors gathered round me with the express intention of learning, practising and spreading the knowledge of psycho-analysis (p. 25).

Clearly he identifies a movement beginning.

This contrast between Freud's perspective on the rejection of him, and his psychoanalysis, which he had envisaged would be his life-long fate, and this beginning of the movement can be read to mean that, following his initial isolation and pessimism, times have now changed. This would be one reading of what Freud is writing, but I feel this reading overlooks the emphasis he places on his feelings about his psychoanalysis and the rejection of this by the world at the end of the first part of this paper. In other words, times really have not changed for Freud and his psychoanalysis, but he is taking a different approach. Although he is still, presumably, bitter and dismissive towards the world and its opinions, he is re-presenting himself and his ideas in a conciliatory way, and as a result a movement is beginning. To consider this speculation about Freud, his motives and behaviour I will briefly refer to some commentaries on Freud by his biographers.

One perspective is that of Breger (2000) who writes of Freud and his experiences around his early publications;

In these accounts, Freud made himself out to be the misunderstood genius-hero who persevered against a world of enemies and ultimately triumphed. But none of this was true (p. 148).

Breger writes of the response to Freud's papers on hysteria as having drawn interest and praise as well as scepticism (p. 148) from his colleagues, but that Freud "had turned away from them, and even threw the supportive Breuer

away, because they did not completely affirm his theories” (p. 148). Breger constructs a picture of Freud as narcissist and the hysteric, with these traits being revealed at this point of time when he did not gain the recognition that he felt he was due, and at the level he felt this should occur.

This view of Freud as a hysteric and/or narcissist is not generally supported by those who knew him (for example, Jones in his biography of Freud). Sachs (1945) comments that;

In the early days...tremendous forces of resistance threatened his work from every side. Instead of encouragement, he received nothing but violent protests and derision from his contemporaries (pp. 91-92).

Adding that;

His indifference to popular acclaim and admiration was as complete as it had been in former days to detraction and slander (p. 129).

These comments by Jones and Sachs, who knew Freud well, would appear to contradict Breger’s construct of Freud as personality disordered (narcissistic and hysterical). However they do not address the issue of Freud’s behaviour towards his followers, e.g. the belligerent attacks upon Adler and Jung certainly not limited to their ideas⁶. It would appear in this that Freud did demonstrate hysterical and narcissistic character traits; for example in his apparent hollow denial of personal motives for his vindictive personal attacks upon Adler. However Freud’s approach to, and development of, profound understandings about the human mind would demonstrate counter-balancing remarkable and admirable qualities of courage and insightfulness. These characteristics would appear to cancel out major character flaws leaving an enigma about Freud and his character and his behaviour. A number of authors (e.g. Roazen, 1974; Clark, 1980; Reik, 1989) have approached this enigma by acknowledging Freud’s neurosis but at the same time acknowledging his character strengths. For example Reik describes Freud’s agoraphobia, but also

⁶ Rudnytsky (1991) notes that “Freud looked upon his potential heirs with an ineradicable duality. He at once loved them as extensions of himself and as a means of obtaining immortality and hated them as his replacements and the harbingers of death” (page 40).

how there are elements in Freud's character which led him to be able to achieve his remarkable understandings about the mind⁷.

Gay (1988) puts forward ideas about Freud and his "The Interpretation of Dreams" that are relevant to the issue of Freud's reactions and attitudes. Gay writes, "whatever hope he harboured for a quick and wide acceptance proved unrealistic" (p. 4). The ideas proposed by Gay are that Freud would seem to believe that if he could communicate his ideas in a certain manner, in a certain style, then he would obtain the notice, the recognition, so important to him (p. 105). But if he did not, then he would have to deal with the ordinary and unimaginative who would believe his ideas were nonsense (p. 105). Pessimistically, Freud believed that he had not achieved this wished for stylistic quality, so the creative essence of his ideas would be unrecognised. As Gay proposes, he was angry and sensitive because of this (p. 105). If this perspective is taken to Breger's observations about Freud, i.e. Freud's rejection of others because they "did not completely affirm his thoughts" (Breger, p. 148), then what Breger is describing would not so much be Freud's character issues (as Breger infers). Rather, this relates to a sense of disappointment in Freud that he had not achieved the result that he hoped for, that the uniqueness of his ideas would be recognised by those who mattered (to him). With the emphasis placed upon the recognition of the ideas, rather than on Freud, with respect to Freud's intentions and desires, this implies that Freud truly believed that he had discovered and created ideas which he anticipated could only truly be recognised by those with exceptional qualities. To achieve this he had to present his ideas in a certain way, with a certain quality of explication. However, he discovered, as so many analytic writers after him, that the communication of such ideas ended up in "'convoluted sentences...squinting at ideas and strutting with the oblique words'" (Freud, in Gay, p. 105). And when the response to "The Interpretation of Dreams", which Freud saw as such an important work⁸, was so lukewarm, Freud must have assumed he had failed in

⁷ For further comments about Freud's neurotic difficulties see footnote 4 of Part One, Chapter One, B, vi of this thesis.

⁸ As Gay (p. 4) notes; "In 1931, in his preface to the 3rd English edition, Freud again paid the dream book his considered homage. "It contains, even according to my present day judgment,

his undertaking to communicate his discoveries and insights about human experience in a way that others would understand them. Instead Freud found indifference, was ignored, or, with respect to his theories about sexuality, perhaps perceived he had instead moved the forces of hell against himself. He seemingly fell into hurt withdrawal where, as he indicated, he could have remained for the rest of his life, buoyed by his own understandings and discoveries but shunned or ignored by those whose acceptance was so important to him. However Part 2 of his “On the History of the Analytic Movement” begins, as noted, by indicating that this was not, in fact, the path followed by Freud. The beginning recognition of his ideas from his publications and the lectures he gave began to draw interest, but were these the respondents he was seeking? Obviously not, because the notion of a beginning movement around his ideas would indicate recognition by followers but not by the “gods” (Gay, 1988, p. 105) as he was hoping and seeking.

Gay (1988, p. 104) notes further that Freud was in his writing “a self-conscious stylist”. This perspective is exemplified through Freud’s apparent agitated concern about his writing style in the “Interpretation of Dreams” (Gay p. 105), and presumably he put as much care into all his writing⁹. Therefore, from his choice of a motto from Virgil¹⁰ through to his manner of presentation in the “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”, presumably Freud has chosen his words carefully with self-critical concern to ensure the clarity of his message (messages). “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”, accordingly, would not be the belligerent outpourings of a wounded Freud, as Strachey infers, but a carefully constructed paper with a deliberate message.

The paper has so far outlined two parallel ideas about psychoanalysis, as I have endeavoured to highlight. One is the creative product of Freud

the most valuable of the discoveries it has been my good fortune to make. Insights such as this fall to one’s lot but once in a lifetime” (no reference provided).

⁹ Freud was awarded the Goethe Prize for Literature in 1930.

¹⁰ Freud (1900) chose his motto from the seventh book of Virgil’s Aeneid for the “Interpretation of Dreams”. This is : “Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo” (cover page). Gay translates this as “If I cannot bend the higher powers I will then move the infernal regions” (p. 105). An alternative translation would take up on the central force in the quotation, the verb ‘movebo’ – I will move. If Freud cannot prevail upon the gods then he will move the Acheron, the river that runs through the underworld. This would not be stirring up hell, as Freud may have wished to do, but instead creating a movement, as he did.

through the drawing together of the findings of his research with his intuitive understandings derived from these. These, Freud believed, would wake the sleep of the world, a perspective with which he was personally bound as if it was a part of him and vice-versa. Consequently, his perceived rejection was painful. The second psychoanalysis, one based upon findings, was straightforward and related mainly to procedural issues, ones that could be followed and found by anyone who began with the findings and adopted a certain belief in the underlying theoretical issues. From this a movement began.

This is where the second part of the paper begins, the part in which Freud writes mainly of the events and factors involved in the beginning of and establishment of the movement.

Within this outline of the facts and the mechanics of the establishment of the movement, Freud comments about those drawn to him and his ideas. These comments have an apparent quiet, reserved quality. He (1914a) comments;

On the whole I could tell myself that it was hardly inferior, in wealth and variety of talent, to the staff of any clinical teacher one could think of (p. 25).

Such comment is balanced by a more negative tone when he writes;

There were only two inauspicious circumstances which at last estranged me inwardly from the group. I could not succeed in establishing among its members the friendly relations that ought to obtain between men who are engaged upon the same difficult work; nor was I able to stifle the disputes about priority for which there were so many opportunities under these conditions... (p. 25).

It would seem that, in these observations, Freud was noting what would certainly be familiar to any psychoanalyst today. But, importantly, Freud did not intervene and/or assert his authority. He writes of this;

I myself did not venture to put forward a still unfinished technique and a theory still in the making with an authority which would probably have enabled the others to avoid some wrong turnings and ultimate disasters (p. 26).

Freud explains his approach further;

In view of the courage displayed by their devotion to a subject so much frowned upon and so poor in prospects, I was disposed to tolerate much among its members to which I should otherwise make objection (p. 26).

These explanations given by Freud for why he did not exert his authority do not seem to fully explain his position. Seemingly he was promoting a democracy of analytic view, possibly to help promote the beginning of and development of a movement, and possibly to avoid further disparagement of his own personal views. But this is unclear. However, there does appear to be an inference that this psychoanalysis was one which the members felt was conceptually available to them. If Freud had summoned his authority, presumably this would have pointed to a psychoanalysis beyond the grasp of these ordinary members. He chose not to do this and hence, possibly, initiated the development of two paths of analytic understanding, which eventually led to his difficulties with Adler and Jung. He began a movement based upon his ideas, seemingly at a certain level of conceptualization (one available to all), while sustaining his own personal and idiosyncratic ideas, considered beyond the ken of others. When Adler and Jung challenged his authority of view re what psychoanalysis is, he then put forward *his* views; this is the central aspect of the third part of this paper.

The third part of the paper begins with Freud continuing his overview of the development of the movement, but now with a focus upon the challenges, of a general sort, that confronted it. Freud saw the basis of the movement in Vienna as being a problem and saw Zurich as preferable. He also saw that he, himself, constituted a problem for the movement. He explains that this was because he was either idealised or abused; “I was either compared to Columbus, Darwin and Kepler, or abused as a general paralytic” (p. 47). Because of this view of the leader of the movement and its place of origin (with him), Freud argues that he should step aside, “withdraw into the background” (p. 43). He also argues that his age (he was 54) was a problem;

I felt oppressed by the thought that the duty of being a leader should fall to me so late in my life (p. 43).

He proposes, therefore, that “an authority” should be established that could “instruct and admonish” (p. 43) so that he could withdraw. This authority was/is

the I.P.A.¹¹ and Freud proposed, with respect to this point of its development (he is still describing past events), that Jung should be its head. This did eventuate and Freud then proceeds to describe the problems that followed.

This section changes abruptly and Freud again makes himself central to his discussion. This content relates to “two secessions”, although whether they were “secessions” from the association or from Freud’s hegemony, or both, is unclear.

Freud begins his discussion of this issue of “secessions” by referring back to analytic theory and the roles of resistance and repression opposing psychoanalytic understanding in patients, and his learning that “the very same thing can happen with psycho-analysts as with patients in analysis” (p. 49). He also notes that in “scientific movements” “upheavals and dissensions commonly occur” (p. 49). Freud, therefore, at one level, understood that these issues with Adler and Jung could be explained within the contexts of analytic theory and the natural history of scientific movements, but he none-the-less felt drawn to deal with the challenges of Adler and Jung and their ideas to his psychoanalysis.

He begins his defence of his psychoanalysis by outlining his goals in taking up arms against the challenges and challengers;

I wish merely to show that these theories controvert the fundamental principles of analysis (and on what points they controvert them) and that for this reason they should not be known by the name of analysis (p. 50).

He then, importantly, outlines these principles:

The first task confronting psycho-analysis was to explain the neuroses; it used the two facts of resistance and transference as starting-points, and, taking into consideration the third fact of amnesia, accounted for them with the theories of repression, of the sexual motive forces in neurosis and of the unconscious (p. 50).

The question arises with respect to how the theories of Adler and Jung “controvert” these fundamental principles? Freud directs his initial comments to Adler’s behaviour noting

¹¹ The I.P.A. is the International Psychoanalytic Association the overseeing and organising association for psychoanalysis.

the profusion of petty outbursts of malice which disfigure his writings and by the indications they contain of an uncontrolled craving for priority (p. 51).

In this Freud would seem to be, once again, describing the familiar pattern of behaviour of analysts from his first group through to the present. Beyond these observations about Adler, and also his apparent envy of Freud, Freud proceeds to consider Adler's ideas. Of these Freud critically writes;

it was intended to prove that psycho-analysis was wrong in everything and that it had only attributed so much importance to the sexual motive forces because of its credulity in accepting the assertions of neurotics (p. 51).

Freud indicates that Adler may have taken the patients' material at face value. Freud parallels this with what occurs when "dream-material" is subjected to waking thought (p. 52). Of this Freud writes re the "dream-material";

this is then viewed purely from the standpoint of the ego, reduced to the categories with which the ego is familiar, translated, twisted and – exactly as happens in dream-formation – is misunderstood (p. 52).

Further to these general criticisms of Adler's approach, Freud categorises the problems with Adler's ideas into three groups. Of these he writes that;

the Adlerian system is categorised less by what it asserts than by what it denies, so that it consists of three sorts of elements of quite dissimilar value: useful contributions to the psychology of the ego, superfluous but admissible translations of analytic facts into the new "jargon", and distortions and perversions of these facts when they do not comply with the requirements of the ego" (p. 52).

Freud then proceeds to appraise these "three sorts of elements".

Of the first, Freud notes that psychoanalytic understanding indicates that "every ego-trend contains libidinal components" (p. 52), and that the "Adlerian theory emphasises the counterpart to this, the egoistic constituent in libidinal instinctual impulses" (p. 52). Freud proposes that this could be an interesting contribution to analytic theory but that Adler, "on every occasion" (p. 52), used his observations "to deny the libidinal impulses" (p. 52). Freud sees Adler's actions in this and the promotion of the egoistic instincts in the stead of sexual as an example of "*rationalisation*" (p. 52, Freud's italics). But Freud also goes further in his comments to note the "monstrous notion" (p. 53) that Adler proposes is that the "strongest motive force in the sexual act is a man's

intention of showing himself master of the woman” (p. 53). There is an implication in Freud that Adler’s characters, his ideas, the process of rationalisation, and his “monstrous notions” about sexuality are correlated.

The second “sort of element” in Adler’s ideas Freud dismisses as being

nothing else than psycho-analytic knowledge which that author [Adler] extracted from sources open to anyone during ten years of work in common and which he has now labelled as his by a change in nomenclature (p. 53).

The third “sort of element” in the Adlerian perspective, Freud considers as “the twisted interpretations and distortions of the disagreeable facts of analysis...” (p. 54). Freud, following this observation, critically appraises Adler’s important concept of “the masculine protest” (pp. 54-55). Freud writes of the “masculine protest”:

the Adlerian motive force, is nothing else, however, but repression detached from its psychological mechanism and, moreover, sexualised in addition – which ill accords with the vaunted ejection of sexuality from its place in mental life (p. 54).

And Freud writes further of Adler’s ideas;

Adler has so merged himself in the jealous narrowness of the ego that he takes account only of those instinctual impulses which are agreeable to the ego and are encouraged by it; the situation in neurosis, in which the impulses are *opposed* to the ego, is precisely the one that lies beyond his horizon (p. 55, Freud’s emphasis).

To this point Freud has emphasised that for theoretical, and possible character, reasons, Adler has negated the key role of sexual impulses in both ego function in general and in neuroses in particular. He then proceeds to note further about Adler’s controversion of the fundamental hypotheses of psychoanalysis;

he has consistently declared that it is a matter of indifference to him whether an idea is conscious or unconscious. Adler has never from the first shown any understanding of repression (p. 56).

Adler therefore negates these two fundamentals of psychoanalysis and Freud proposes another when he writes, “Everything that Adler has to say about dreams, the shibboleth of psycho-analysis, is equally empty and unmeaning” (p. 57).

Freud therefore is outlining both the fundamental ideas of psychoanalysis and how Adler's ideas do not correlate with these; in fact controverts them. These fundamentals are the role of sexual impulses in ego function and neurosis, the understanding of the unconscious and its processes, the role of repression, and the understanding of dream-psychology.

In his consideration of Jung's ideas, Freud draws a parallel with those of Adler and writes;

These two retrograde movements away from psycho-analysis...show another point in common: for they both court a favourable opinion by putting forward certain lofty ideas, which view things, as it were, *sub specie aeternitatis*¹² (p. 58).

Freud is particularly critical of Jung's ideas because of what he sees to be their inconsistency. Of this Freud writes;

When one thinks of the inconsistencies displayed in the various public and private pronouncements made by the Jungian movement, one is bound to ask oneself how much of this is due to lack of clearness and how much to a lack of sincerity (p. 60).

This latter issue, a lack of sincerity, would seem to refer to a point about Jung that Freud has already made, and the essence of psychoanalysis. Of this Freud writes;

In 1912 Jung boasted...that his modifications of psycho-analysis had overcome the resistance of many people who had hitherto refused to have anything to do with it. I replied that it was nothing to boast of, and that the more he sacrificed of the hard-won truths of psycho-analysis the more would he see resistances vanishing (p. 58).

In this there may be some irony or inconsistency by Freud, because the increased popularity of his psychoanalysis may also be due to modifications to how he presented the truths of psychoanalysis, the truths that he is outlining. In this, there would seem to be indicated an important point about what psychoanalysis is. This is that the essential discoveries of psychoanalysis about the bases of human existence and being, Freud's "truths", are responded

¹² This translates as "From the perspective of eternity" certainly corresponding with "lofty ideas". But it also directs back to Freud's ideas and perspectives i.e. his allusions to psychogenesis (as will be considered). The term *aeternitatis* also translates as "immortality" an allusion to the undercurrent of the instincts.

to, in Freud's view, by inevitable resistance. People are interested in the process of psychoanalysis, and also the findings, provided that they are presented in a certain way, i.e. with certain key ideas and understandings not fully explicated. The response, otherwise, is what Freud had experienced (i.e. negative and disparaging). Seemingly, Freud is observing that Jung, in his quest for popularity (at least for his ideas), is presenting psychoanalysis at the level which will be accepted, the level that excludes the fundamental understandings to which the popular response is inevitably rejection and negation.

Of Jung's ideas Freud proceeds to observe that;

They are now disputing things which they themselves formerly upheld, and they are doing so, moreover, not on the grounds of fresh observations which might have taught them something further, but in consequence of fresh interpretations which make the things they see look different to them now from what they did before. For this reason they are unwilling to give up their correlation with psycho-analysis...and prefer to give it out that psycho-analysis has changed (p. 60).

In Freud's view, therefore, the problem with the ideas of the Jungians is that they have reinterpreted the basic ideas, his basic ideas, about and from psychoanalysis, and have accordingly re-presented psychoanalysis in a more acceptable form.

Freud, however, also concedes that both Adler and Jung gave psychoanalysis new understandings, and of these he writes;

Just as Adler's investigation brought something new to psycho-analysis – a contribution to the psychology of the ego – and then expected us to pay too high a price for this gift by throwing over all the fundamental theories of analysis, so in the same way Jung and his followers paved the way for their fight against psycho-analysis by presenting it with a new acquisition (p. 61).

Of this "new acquisition" Freud writes;

They traced in detail...the way in which the material of sexual ideas belonging to the family-complex and incestuous object-choice is made use of in representing the highest ethical and religious interests of man (p. 61).

Of this, Freud adds that;

they have illuminated an important instance of the sublimation of the erotic instinctual forces and their transformation into trends which can no longer be called erotic (p. 61).

Freud comments about these ideas of the roles of sexuality and sublimation in the basis of ethics and religion, that “This was in complete harmony with all the expectations of psycho-analysis” (p. 61), adding that it

would have agreed very well with the view that in dreams and neurosis a regressive dissolution of this sublimation...becomes visible (p. 61).

But Freud adds that if this latter step had been taken, revealing the sexual underpinnings of ethics and religion, “the world would have risen in indignation and protested that ethics and religion were being sexualised” (p. 61). Freud considers that “these discoverers were not equal to meeting such a storm of indignation” (p. 61), hence their avoidance of fully embracing the essence of their discovery.

In these comments, Freud indicates that there are two levels to these considerations about the basis of human phenomena, such as ethics and religion. At one level there is the intellectual, and acceptable, consideration that they are underpinned by the sublimation of sexual impulses. At the other level there is a *demonstration* of these underpinnings in these conceptualizations, which is the level that arouses protest and indignation. In these ideas Freud may also be alluding to issues about psychoanalysis and himself. One level of psychoanalysis involves Freud and his followers putting forward new ideas about human being that are agreeable because they preserve the defensive structure against true understanding and experiencing, sublimation is to be found in the theory and in the practice. At the other level, a true (or more direct) understanding about human being is to be found, but without the defensive cover, and this would appear unacceptable and threatening, mobilising the defensive act of resistance. Freud is proposing that what differentiates him and his psychoanalysis from the Jungians and their reduction of his psychoanalysis is that his psychoanalysis sustains the discomforting ideas, and he is stoically willing and able to bear the pain of the reactions which inevitably follow. Freud, in this, is inferring several issues about himself and his psychoanalysis, and about that of Jung (and his followers). His is directed towards and based upon the “truths”, provokes significant discomfort and reactions against him and his ideas. Because of the belief he has in his ideas and his commitment to uncovering the truth, he is willing and able to live with this. In contrast, he sees

the Jungians in their innovations diluting the ideas of his psychoanalysis to make them more acceptable, not only to promote popularity of their ideas and their views, but to also avoid reactions against them, which Freud proposes they may not have the strength of character to withstand.

About these ideas of Freud's views of Jung and how he (Jung) wishes to change psychoanalysis to make it more acceptable, Freud comments in an overview manner, stating;

All the changes that Jung has proposed to make in psycho-analysis flow from his intention to eliminate what is objectionable in the family-complexes, so as not to find it again in religion and ethics. For sexual libido an abstract concept has been substituted...The Oedipus complex has merely "symbolic" meaning: the mother in it means the unobtainable, which must be renounced in the interest of civilisation; the father who is killed in the Oedipus myth is the "inner father", from whom one must set oneself free in order to become independent (p. 62).

Of this, overall and including Adler's view, Freud writes;

The truth is that these people have picked out a few cultural overtones from the symphony of life and have once more failed to hear the mighty and primordial melody of the instincts (p. 62).

After these emphatic statements, Freud critically notes of Jung and his ideas that;

In order to preserve this system intact it was necessary to turn entirely away from observation and from the technique of psycho-analysis (pp. 62-63).

Freud, at this point, is particularly critical of Jung's dismissal of the central place of the Oedipus complex in neurosis, proposing that Jung sought anthropological evidence for his ideas and avoided both direct observation of individuals and the tracing of the symptoms back to the beginnings in the "prehistory" of the individual (p. 63). With respect to turning away from the technique of psychoanalysis, Freud introduces anecdotal evidence, a quotation from an unidentified person, to support this view with respect to practise especially with regard to the role of transference. Freud quotes this person as stating, "not a trace of attention was given to the past or to the transference" (p. 63).

As Adler has negated the finding of repression, Jung has apparently negated that of the transference: the two basic starting points of psychoanalysis, as stated by Freud earlier in this paper (p. 16).

Freud then puts forward an important overview of what psychoanalysis is and how Adler and Jung's ideas do not correlate with this, and hence cannot be considered psychoanalytic. Freud writes;

The total incapability of this new movement with psycho-analysis shows itself...in Jung's treatment of repression, which is hardly mentioned nowadays in his writings, in his misunderstanding of dreams, which, like Adler..., in complete disregard of dream-psychology, he confuses with the latent dreams-thoughts, and in his loss of all understanding of the unconscious – in short, in all the points which I should regard as the essence of psycho-analysis (p. 64).

Not only does this statement indicate why Jung's ideas (and Adler's) should not be considered as psychoanalytic, Freud also states what is the essence of psychoanalysis, his psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysis which is the basis upon which the ideas of others are to be built in order to establish their psychoanalytic legitimacy. The essence, the basic constituents of this psychoanalysis, as outlined by Freud in his arguments against Adler and Jung, is based upon the central place of the sexual drives in normal (e.g. ethical and religious) and neurotic thoughts, and the place of the Oedipus complex, repression, dream-psychology and the concept of the dynamic unconscious, and the practical role of the transference as the manifestation of these.

Freud finishes this paper by arguing that he does not share a sense of apprehension with respect to what these secessions mean for the future of psychoanalysis, opening the question as to why he would not be concerned in the face of major dissension (in his view) by two of his key followers. Although this unconcerned perspective may be to demonstrate to others, or even to himself, that this dissent is a minor issue compared with the profundity of his discovery/creation, his psychoanalysis, it may also reflect Freud again adopting the position of holding to himself a perspective on psychoanalysis that is separate and distinct from the general one that will be subject to such disputes. It is only when his psychoanalysis becomes challenged that he is drawn to deal

with the dissention and seemingly – but the issue of denial cannot be overlooked – he feels confident that his psychoanalysis has been preserved.

Overall Freud's perspective on psychoanalysis in this paper creates an ambiguity which appears to be significant for the difficulties that have followed with respect to disputes about what psychoanalysis is. Freud both establishes himself as the authority who know – psychoanalysis is his creation – but also indicates that he will forgo this authority for practical reasons leading to a sense that all analysts have equal authority to state what psychoanalysis is. However, when Adler and Jung take up on this democratisation of view they evoke Freud vehement reestablishment of his authority as the one who knows. For analysts which message do they take from this ambiguity? Do they take up on the democratic perspective introduced by Freud, i.e. one of an equality of views as long as they work within the established empiricism (and embrace Freud's ideas re the "essence")? Or do they see Freud as the final arbiter of what is and is not psychoanalysis and that their view is only valid as long as it reflects Freud's views no matter what they may achieve with respect to their personal understandings re psychoanalysis? Freud's outline in this paper would indicate that both perspectives are correct. Rather than deciding between the two, the orientation of this study is to note this ambiguity and the corresponding dichotomy of perspective re what psychoanalysis is generated within Freud's approach.

iii. “An Autobiographical Study” (1925/1924).

As has been introduced, this is the second of Freud’s overview papers. Because, as indicated by Freud and Strachey, it covers much the same ground as “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” (1914a), it will only be briefly considered.

The title of the paper suggests that it may correlate with an autobiographical outline by Freud, but Strachey explains that this is one of a series of papers about;

the recent history of medical science from the pens of those who played a chief part in making it. Thus Freud’s study is essentially an account of his personal share in the development of psycho-analysis (S.E. XX, p. 4).

Strachey’s perspective seems in error when Freud, after a brief introduction, begins by stating, “I was born on May the 6th, 1856 at Freiberg in Moravia...” (p. 7). However, even though the direct reference to his own life falls away, Freud, as in “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”, weaves together his life and the life and development of psychoanalysis; in essence it is an autobiographical study (as was the 1914a paper).

After his outline of historical stages and steps in the development of psychoanalysis, and himself, Freud states what psychoanalysis is:

The theories of resistance and of repression, of the unconscious, of the aetiological significance of sexual life and of the importance of infantile experiences – these form the principle constituents of the theoretical structure of psycho-analysis (p. 40).

Freud adds to this list the place of dream-analysis in psychoanalysis. Of this he makes a number of points including;

I have given the name of *dream-work* to the process which, with the cooperation of the censorship, converts the latent thoughts into the manifest content of the dream. It consists of a peculiar way of treating the preconscious material of thought, so that its component parts become *condensed*, its psychical emphasis becomes *displaced*, and the whole of it is translated into visual images or *dramatised*, and completed by a descriptive *secondary revision* (p. 45, Freud’s italics).

Of this “dream-work” Freud writes further;

The dream-work is an excellent example of the processes occurring in the deeper, unconscious layers of the mind, which differ considerably from the normal processes of thought (p. 45).

And then he notes further;

But when it came to dreams, it [psycho-analysis] was no longer dealing with a pathological symptom, but with a phenomenon of normal mental life which might occur in any healthy person. If dreams turned out to be constructed like symptoms, if their explanation required the same assumptions – the repression of impulses, substitutive formation, compromise-formation, the dividing of the conscious and unconscious into various psychical systems – then psycho-analysis was no longer an auxiliary science in the field of psychopathology, it was rather the starting-point of a new and deeper science of the mind which would be equally indispensable for the understanding of the normal (p. 47).

This descriptive focus on the nature and importance of dream-analysis in terms of understanding normal psychic formation and its place as part of the essence of his psychoanalysis is in contrast to the occasional reference to it in Freud's 1914 paper. A possible explanation for this may lie with the different focus of the two papers. In the 1914 paper Freud was describing the development of a movement, apparently by establishing a perspective on psychoanalysis that could be taken up by others. However, in contrast, there would seem to be a second psychoanalysis, his, that is more obscure, complex and which provokes significant negative response. In this second paper, in which Freud is being more straightforward with respect to what psychoanalysis is, he may also be being more candid regarding the most solid link between himself and his psychoanalysis, his dream-analysis. In keeping with this in his "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (1933/1932), Freud writes of "the theory of dreams" (p. 7) that;

it occupies a special place in the history of psycho-analysis and marks a turning point; it is with it that analysis took the step from being a psychotherapeutic procedure to being a depth-psychology (p. 7).

This would certainly indicate that his dream-theory was of particular importance to Freud and his psychoanalysis.

Beyond these observations I will not consider this (1925/1924) paper further, for the reasons given. Instead I will examine Freud's other overview paper, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis" (1940/1938).

iv. “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis” (1940/1938)

As introduced, this is Freud’s last major paper, mainly written after leaving Vienna for London, and under the shadow of his imminent death. It is also incomplete because of interruption caused by having a major operation.

As Freud’s last major paper it could be anticipated to be both summary and conclusion of his ideas in general about what psychoanalysis is. As he must have been aware of the imminence of his death, it may be anticipated that Freud would be more open and candid re his own personal perspective on what psychoanalysis is. As will be seen this expectation is not fulfilled. This paper is not full of revelations, it is more an overview of ideas already given significant expression, but there are some foci that give indications of the basis of Freud’s ideas.

Freud begins with a brief preface, in fact a confronting position statement:

The teachings of psycho-analysis are based on an incalculable number of observations and experiences, and only someone who has repeated those observations on himself and on others is in a position to arrive at a judgment of his own upon it (p. 144).

Freud’s confronting statement would seem to be alluding to something that binds psychoanalysis to the being of the individual; the essence of what psychoanalysis is is to be found in a personal encounter with the unconscious essence of one’s own being.

Having put forward this confronting statement, Freud begins his “Outline” under the heading of “Part One (the Mind and its Workings), Chapter I The Psychical Apparatus” (p. 144, Freud’s brackets). He begins this first chapter with another statement;

Psycho-analysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which is reserved to philosophical thought but the justification of which lies in its results (p. 144).

Unfortunately (overall and for this study), what this basic assumption is is not clear in what Freud proceeds to write. However, from what Freud has written prior to this paper, and has been referred to in this study, the basic assumption

of psychoanalysis is that of unconscious mental processes, i.e. the focus of the investigative procedure. But Freud does not clarify this here, however he notes two things which are known about psychic life; its neurological basis and consciousness, but points out that there is no direct link between the two, leaving an unknown with respect to what lies between. The implication is that a focus of psychoanalysis is upon this unknown relationship between neurology and the psychology of consciousness. Freud indicates that there are two hypotheses which “start out from these two ends or beginnings of our knowledge” (p. 145), i.e. of the unknown link between neurology and psychology of consciousness. How these hypotheses correlate with “the basic assumption” is not made clear.

The first hypothesis of psychoanalysis is that

mental life is a function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions... (p. 145).

He then proceeds to describe these “portions” – the id, ego and super ego – and their characteristics. These ideas are a summary reiteration of what he has outlined previously mainly in “The Ego and Id” (1923).

The second hypothesis is not outlined for a number of pages. In between, “Chapter Two” contains an outline of the theory of the id and of the “instincts” (p. 148). In this Freud writes;

After long hesitations and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of two basic instincts, *Eros* and *the destructive instinct*. (The contrast between the instincts of self-preservation and the preservation of the species, as well as the contrast between ego-love and object-love, fall within Eros).” (p. 148, Freud’s emphasis).

The contrast between the two instincts, Freud explains, is that the first (Eros) is to bind together, to “establish ever greater unities” (p. 148), whereas the destructive instinct is to “undo connections” (p. 148). Freud acknowledges in this that his instinct theory has a theoretical problem, because he sees that the aim of an instinct is to return “to an earlier state” (p. 149), but that it is difficult to correlate this with the aim of Eros, but does not address this conceptual problem here.

Freud also proposes that the instincts either “operate against each other”, or can “combine with each other” (p. 149).

His next chapter outlines the “Development of the Sexual Function”. This, like the preceding chapters, is essentially an overview of ideas he has considered at length previously. The following chapter (IV) is entitled “Psychical Qualities”. Freud points out that in his outline so far, the “structure of the psychical apparatus” (p. 157), and the driving forces do not direct to what is the “peculiar characteristic of what is psychical” (p. 157). What is, in contrast, “uniquely characteristic of what is psychical” is consciousness (p. 157). Of this Freud notes;

Many people, both inside and outside (psychological) science are satisfied with the assumption that consciousness alone is psychical; in that case nothing remains for psychology but to discriminate among psychical phenomena between perceptions, feelings, thought-processes, and volitions (p. 157).

But Freud adds to this that;

It is generally agreed, however, that these conscious processes do not form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves; there would thus be no alternative left to assuming there are physical or somatic processes which are concomitant with the psychical ones and which we should necessarily have to recognise as more complete than the psychical sequences, since some of them would have conscious processes parallel to them but others would not (p. 157).

In which case, Freud argues, one would see in these “somatic processes” “the true essence of what is psychical” (p. 157), but that this brings about the problem of accepting what is psychical as “unconscious” (p. 158).

Freud follows these ideas about the question of what is psychical to point out the second fundamental hypothesis of psychoanalysis, “the supposedly somatic concomitant phenomena as being what is truly psychical” (p. 158). Freud proceeds with this argument to emphasise the point of seeing that “the psychical is unconscious in itself” (p. 158) and that this “enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other” (p. 158).

Of this status for psychoanalysis as a natural science based upon the hypothesis of what is psychical as being unconscious, Freud writes;

Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since *our* science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here (p. 159, Freud's italics).

This raises the question of whether or not psychoanalysis is a science in Freud's opinion, and what Freud means by "the analogy ends here"? He explains;

We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual apparatus, precisely with the help of the breaks in the sequence of "psychical" events (p. 159).

He then adds that;

we fill in what is omitted by making plausible inferences and translating it into conscious material. In this way we construct, as it were, a sequence of conscious events complementary to the unconscious psychical processes (p. 159).

In anticipation of appropriate doubt about the validity of such activity, i.e. "making plausible inferences", Freud writes;

The relative certainty of our psychical science is based on the binding force of these inferences. Anyone who enters deeply into our work will find that our technique holds its ground against any criticism (p. 159).

The idea of "the binding force of these inferences" remains unexplained by Freud and is therefore unclear. And this is crucial to the credibility of his view of psychoanalysis being a science, analogous to those whose empirical data constitute a more solid base than inference.

Freud does not explain this any further; however, what he is possibly indicating is that the inferences have to have an origin, they are not random ideas without base, and their origin will be unconscious. In self-analysis the unconscious will be the basis of the inference that arises to fill the gaps in consciousness, and in an analysis the unconscious of the patient and that of the analyst (attuned to that of patient) via free association, will be the source of the inferences. This perspective, i.e. the basis of the inference in the unconscious, points towards a sense of particular creativity in Freud's approach to what is psychoanalysis and its scientific basis, but it is only inferred here.

In Freud's "Outline", the second part (Part II) is entitled "The Practical Task". This Freud approaches in two chapters in "The Technique of Psycho-Analysis" and "An Example of Psycho-Analytic Work".

The "technique" to which Freud is referring (and describes) is the therapeutic method; the investigative procedure per se is not the subject of his outline. And further to this, his discussion of the therapeutic method is that of his ego psychology introduced in "The Ego and the Id" (1923). Accordingly he (1940/1938) writes;

We already know a number of things preliminary to such an undertaking. According to our hypothesis it is the ego's task to meet the demands raised by its three dependent relations – to reality, to the id and to the super-ego – and nevertheless at the same time to preserve its own organisation and maintain its own autonomy. The necessary precondition of the pathological states under discussion can only be a relative or absolute weakening of the ego which makes the fulfilment of its tasks impossible (p. 172).

To this he adds;

Our plan of cure is based on these discoveries. The ego is weakened by the internal conflict and we must go to its help (p. 173).

Freud writes further of this;

Our knowledge is to make up for his ignorance and to give his ego back its mastery over lost provinces of his mental life. This pact constitutes the analytic situation (p. 173).

In these ideas there would seem to be a significant change from the ideas in his tripartite definition (1923/1922). There the investigative procedure of the unconscious is, de facto, the therapeutic method for the neuroses. Now Freud is proposing that the analytic situation is constituted of a pact between the analyst and the patient's ego. The struggle of the patient's ego to deal with the demands of the id, super-ego and reality will emphasize weaknesses in the ego and the analyst's task is to aid, through their knowledge, this weakened ego. This has the quality of a pedagogic activity.

Freud does not completely negate or overlook the role of the transference. But even here there is the proposal that the positive transference may aid in helping the patient in a manner akin to suggestion. Freud also discusses the challenges involved in handling the negative transference, but not

its use in understanding. These ideas are further confirmed when Freud (1940/1938) writes, “The method by which we strengthen the weakened ego has as a starting-point an extending of its self-knowledge” (p. 177), and further;

Accordingly, the first part of the help we have to offer is intellectual work on our side and encouragement to the patient to collaborate in it (p. 173).

These comments of Freud constitute rather surprising ideas in which he would seem to negate the fundamentals of his previous outlines of the praxis of psychoanalysis, i.e. resistance, repression and the transference. The question also arises as to where the analyst gathers the basis of their ideas to aid the patient; of this Freud writes;

We gather the material for our work from a variety of sources – from what is conveyed to us by the information given us by the patient and by his free associations, from what he shows us in his transferences, from what we arrive at by interpreting his dreams and from what he betrays by his slips or *parapraxes*. All this material helps us to make constructions about what happened to him and has been forgotten as well as what is happening in him now without his understanding it. But in all this we never fail to make a strict distinction between *our* knowledge and *his* knowledge (pp. 177-178, Freud italics).

This last statement undoes, somewhat, the picture of a pedagogic exercise that had seemed Freud’s inference preceding this. The issue of resistance is in fact formally addressed by Freud when he writes;

The overcoming of resistances is the part of our work that requires the most time and the greatest trouble. It is worthwhile, however, for it brings about an advantageous alteration of the ego which will be maintained independently of the transference and will hold good in life (p. 179).

Although it is not spelt out clearly, this approach to resistance has the quality of where Freud began with Breuer. Resistance is no longer to be understood and worked through in and via the transference, it is now to be overcome.

Freud finishes this section on technique by stating;

We serve the patient in various functions, as an authority and as a substitute for his parents, as a teacher and educator; and we have done the best for him if, as analysts, we raise the mental processes in his ego to a normal level, transform what has been unconscious and repressed into preconscious material and thus return it once more to the possession of his ego (p. 181).

Although these comments of Freud about the technique of psychoanalysis are essentially ambiguous, with a counterbalancing of ideas about understanding repressed experiences with that of ego support and strengthening, the overall impression given by Freud is that he considers the role of the analyst as a supportive pedagogue for the patient's ego. Considering much of what he had written previously, excluding his ideas in "The Ego and The Id", this essentially final technical statement comes as a surprise, leading to a questioning of Freud's intentions. Of possible relevance is the pessimism re analytic therapeutic effectiveness conveyed by Freud just prior in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937).

One possible explanation, in keeping with the ideas about Freud's ideal perspective on psychoanalysis, is that Freud saw that the technical and the therapeutic process of psychoanalysis, that which was going to be followed by most analysts, should be a fundamental and straightforward one; albeit one with limited therapeutic possibilities. The profound qualities of his depth psychology were to be reserved for a few brave explorers. That even though his psychoanalysis may have progressed a great deal from its beginnings in pedagogy and suggestion, the general acceptance of, or even capacity to accept, the challenging profundity of his ideas had not changed much and his legacy was to offer some general guidelines as to how patients may be assisted by analysts in general. It may be wondered if this is the pessimism of a dying old man or pragmatism.

The next chapter, entitled "An Example of Psycho-Analytic Work" (p. 183), is also quite surprising because the substance of this chapter would seem to have little direct correlation with its title. Freud, in fact, instead, explains at length the sexual source and nature of the neuroses.

Freud begins his outline of the link between sexuality and neurosis in a general manner by noting that it is the "reciprocation between innate dispositions and accidental experiences" (p. 183) that determines the breakdown into illness. He proposes further that this indicates, "weak points" in a normal organisation" (p. 184) and further, that these weak points are acquired

during a certain “period of life” (p. 184). Of this period of life he writes that “with a fair degree of certainty” (p. 184) it can be proposed that;

neuroses are acquired only in early childhood (up to the age of six), even though their symptoms may not make their appearance till much later (p. 184).

He excludes the traumatic neuroses from this. He then proceeds to explain the aetiology of neurosis as being:

In these circumstances [the challenges to the immature ego] instinctual demands from within, no less than excitations from the external world, operate as “traumas”, particularly if they are met halfway by certain innate dispositions. The helpless ego fends them off by means of attempts at flight (*repressions*)... (p. 185, Freud’s italics).

In this, Freud proposes that no human being escapes from the influence of repression upon mental experience and adds also the idea of the influence of the super-ego in the “setting up of repressions” (p. 185).

To this outline of the basis of neurosis, Freud adds the role of the instincts. Of this he writes;

our observation shows us invariably, so far as we can judge, that the excitations that play this pathogenic part arise from the component instincts of sexual life (p. 186).

However this is not clear cut, as he observes, because

most of the urges of sexual life are not of a purely erotic nature but have arisen from alloys of the erotic instinct with portions of the destructive instinct (p. 186).

Freud then proceeds to propose why the sexual instinct plays the prominent role in the aetiology of the neuroses; of this he writes;

the weak point in the ego’s organisation seems to lie in its attitude to the sexual function, as though the biological antithesis between self-preservation and the preservation of the species had found a psychological expression at that point (p. 186).

Freud, here, importantly, appears to be observing that the basis of neurosis lies in the conflict between one’s individual existence and one’s place in the overall of the existence of the species and perhaps life itself. And this plays out in the issue of one’s sexuality: the essences of existence, those of life and death, of individual and absolute and, of finite and infinite, find psychological expression

in one's sexuality. In this there is a profound quality that may direct to what Freud believes to be earth-shaking in his discoveries.

Freud follows his ideas about sexuality and neurosis further, but with an initial return to the straightforward (possible) causes of difficulties; for example sexual seductions, abuse, and exposure to the parents' sexual activity. But then he returns to the more profound issue concerning the universal challenge of the Oedipus complex. With regard to this Freud writes of

a situation which every child is destined to pass through and which follows inevitably from the factor of the prolonged period during which a child is cared for by other people and lives with his parents (p. 187).

This reference to the Oedipus complex by Freud, although directed towards the issue of a challenging "situation" with regard to the child's developing psychosexuality, also directs towards psychosocial and interpersonal issues. The inference is that the Oedipus complex is constituted of the coming together of three issues, that is, the psychosexual with the psychosocial and the interpersonal.

Freud then proceeds to discuss the psychosexual issues for the boy with particular emphasis on castration anxiety and its role in the Oedipus complex. However, as a basis for this discussion he outlines in a particularly evocative way the beginnings of psychosexual development for all children. He begins by stating;

A child's first erotic object is the mother's breast that nourishes it; love has its origin in attachment to the satisfied need for nourishment (p. 188).

He adds to that;

There is no doubt that, to begin with, the child does not distinguish between the breast and its own body; when the breast has to be separated from the body and shifted to the "*outside*" because the child so often finds it absent, it carries with it as an "*object*" a part of the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis. This first object is later completed into the person of the child's mother, who not only nourishes it but also looks after it and thus arouses in it a number of physical sensations, pleasurable and unpleasurable (p. 188, Freud's italics).

He then adds to this the remarkable statement that, "By her care of the child's body she becomes its first seducer" (p. 188).

Although these statements are written as an, apparent, outline of the beginning development of psychosexuality, as an introduction to the issues of castration anxiety and the Oedipus complex (the discussion of which, for the boy, follows on from this), Freud is stating more than this. A list of the ideas contained in the statement would include: (a) Eros underlies the first object relation – to the breast; (b) Freud correlates this erotic object choice with love, and love with “satisfied need for nourishment”; (c) the beginning of the recognition of an external world of objects separate from one’s self – “*outside*” – lies with the breast being seen initially as part of the self, but because of its absence, it is conceptualized as an object outside of the self – the beginning of object relations at an interpersonal level lies with the frustration of absence; (d) because of these origins, there will be a carry over to the breast/mother of “the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis”; (e) the external object, the breast, becomes the whole person of the mother; (f) this external object – the mother – effects, in pleasurable and unpleasurable ways, the child’s inner experience; (g) Freud sees that the nature of the mother’s care of the child’s body is seductive, i.e. the child’s body is an erotic object for the mother, or does Freud mean that this is the child’s experience and interpretation, or both?

These ideas are essentially just presented by Freud. There is no explanation of their source, i.e. do they derive from his analysis of patients, or from his self-analysis, or from other innumerable observations? In essence he is proposing that from the beginning there is a balance established between life and death¹, between Eros and bodily need for nourishment, which, if not satisfied, will lead to the death of the infant from within. The weighting of the balance towards Eros is brought about by the nourishment brought by the mother’s breast, which initially is perceived as a part of the self, based in Eros, that triumphs over the threat of death based in one’s physiology. However, frustration, elicited by the object’s absence, will direct back towards death and stimulates the recognition of the separate existence of the object. In this, the object, the breast, then the mother, becomes linked into the issue of the

¹ Freud, at this point of his “Outline”, is not directly discussing the issue of life and death drives, only the essential role of Eros in development; this discussion here of the role of the life and death drives is an extension of Freud’s discussion of Eros to those of life and death drives as seems necessary to fully explicate his ideas.

balance between life and death. The mother's perceived or actual seductive care of the child's body (and needs) balances the issue back to that of Eros, as does the child's investment in the relationship with the mother through its narcissistic libidinal cathexis, its erotic investment in the self. Freud, within these ideas, possibly alludes to the balance between life and death being the basis of all relations with the self and with the other. And further, he is alluding to the importance of Eros and the mother's seduction of the child into the world of objects, not only because of its sexual basis, but also because of its opposition to the threat of death manifesting in one's physiology, i.e. life brings with it the presence of death from the beginning and Eros, seen to manifest in sexuality, is a basis of one's continued existence arising from within the self and also from the outside world. In this is a possible explanation of why Freud saw sexuality and its manifestations, for example in the transference, as so important in understanding the basis of human being.

Although, as indicated, the place of this statement by Freud in this paper is an introduction to the concepts of castration anxiety and the Oedipus complex, taking its profound reference to the basis of human relations (intrapsychic and interpersonal), it is also relevant to issues about psychoanalysis. It specifically relates to the "essence" of what it is (1914a, p. 64) and accounts for why Adler's and Jung's ideas should not be considered psychoanalytic at this level of conceptualization. Freud, in this statement under consideration, seemingly is outlining the importance of sexuality (the key issue in his dispute with the ideas of Adler and Jung) in human relations (with self and with others), and, by extension, why it is so important in the understanding of what psychoanalysis is.

Freud immediately follows this involved statement by writing;

In these two relations lies the root of a mother's importance, unique, without parallel, established unalterably for a whole lifetime as the first and strongest love-object and as a prototype of all other love-relations – for both sexes (1940/1938, p. 188).

It is not readily apparent what are the "two relations" to which Freud refers. One, seemingly, is the mother's perceived seduction and, possibly, the other would be the meeting of the child's nutritional needs.

Freud follows this by writing;

And for however long it is fed at its mother's breast, it will always be left with a conviction after it has been weaned that its feeding was too short and too little. (p. 189).

Although Freud is moving in these statements to his discussion of the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety, and later to penis envy, these statements are of particular importance in themselves. Although this last statement would appear to be a simple observation (based on what evidence and from where is not clear), it is also centrally important in understanding human experience and, accordingly, psychoanalysis. In the context of the life and death instincts, Freud is observing that, as effective as the mother's "two relations" may be in helping the child to go on being and establishing relations outside of the self, the struggle between life and death continues, and cannot be won by Eros, no matter how caring the mother may be at psychosomatic and psychosexual levels.

Of these ideas and their introduction of the Oedipus complex, Freud states that, "This preface is not superfluous, for it can heighten our realisation of the intensity of the Oedipus complex" (p. 189). It may be wondered why Freud would write this, i.e. superfluous to what? One understanding would be that Freud would be concerned that the profound nature of these accounts of the beginnings of psychic and interpersonal life may distract from the importance of the ideas he is about to put forward. This would emphasise the importance of the Oedipus complex for Freud, such that it trumps the importance of these other ideas about the basis of human being. But it also introduces the possibility of ambiguity of emphasis, not only for Freud's understandings but also, by extension, for psychoanalysis. Is psychoanalysis focused on the basis of human being in relation to these issues of life and death played out in the beginning of psychic and interpersonal life, as Freud describes, or is it focused more upon issues of the Oedipus complex, and the complexity for the ego in dealing with issues of an interpsychic, interpersonal and social nature?

This issue of the ambiguity of focus becomes emphasised as Freud, having just described the existential perplexity of early development and possible despair over loss of the loved/erotic/seductive object, the mother, at

weaning, jumps in his description to the boy of “two or three” (p. 189). Freud describes how the boy, having discovered (or rediscovered) the erotic object now as his phallus, approaches his mother with an exhibition of this. From what Freud writes, it would seem to follow that the boy is attempting to undo the despair of object loss, of the mother during weaning, by his focus upon his phallus as the lost object, and is now seductively approaching his mother as she previously approached him. However, Freud does not outline this perspective; instead he describes in interpersonal terms how the boy has apparently understood that the loss was caused by the presence of a rival, the father, and that the child is now seeking to supplant this rival and establish himself once again as the focus of his mother’s desires. In this, Freud perceives an interpersonal triangle.

The mother in this situation, according to Freud, “has understood quite well that his sexual excitement relates to herself” (p. 189) and that, “sooner or later” (p. 189) she decides to take steps with respect to his behaviour and forbids “him to handle his genital organ” (p. 189). As this does not have any effect (according to Freud), she then “adopts the severest of measures” (p. 189) and

she threatens to take away from him the thing he is defying her with. Usually, in order to make the threat more frightening and more credible, she delegates its execution to the boy’s father, saying that she will tell him and that he will cut the penis off (p. 189).

Freud proposes that the boy’s reaction to this is incredulity, that it is “too inconceivable that such a thing could happen” (pp. 189-190).

Following Freud’s ideas we gain the impression that he believes that the mother understands the boy’s behaviour as sexual, with her as the love/erotic/desired object, and that her first reaction is one of prohibition. He does not explain why the mother perceives issues in this way or reacts in this way. Following Freud’s ideas as they unfold on this page (p. 189), the boy may be seen to be attempting to undo the loss at weaning by re-presenting a special part of its body, with its associated pleasurable feelings, as an object his mother may, once again, desire. If Freud’s movement to triangulation is followed, even here the boy would seem to be attempting to replace his father by

means which seem relevant, i.e. to undo to loss of the love-object to another. However, Freud proposes that the mother only sees the sexual intention and puts a prohibition in place, but without explaining why such a prohibition would be necessary. Obviously it does not work on the boy, but the mother is seen to be doing something to contain the perceived sexual situation.

Freud then proposes that the mother takes the next step: she threatens to once again deprive the child of the special object, in this case the phallus, and she proposes that the boy's rival will do this. Freud contends that the boy cannot conceive of such a possibility, but why not? This also remains unclear in Freud's text. It could be anticipated that having been weaned by the mother, a threat of deprivation of the loved and desired object would be credible. But according to Freud this is not so. Freud proceeds to point out that another factor has to be added to make the threat effective. This extra factor is in the boy's recollection at the time of

the appearance of female genitals or if shortly afterwards he had sight of them – of genitals, that is to say, which really lack this supremely valued part, then he takes what he has heard seriously and, coming under the influence of the *castration complex*, experiences the severest trauma of his young life (p. 190, Freud's italics).

This observation may possibly be based upon Freud's personal experience, revealed in his self-analysis, hence its importance as an explanatory concept². Freud proceeds to explore its importance, writing that;

The results of the threat of castration are multifarious and incalculable, they affect the whole of the boy's relations with his mother and father and subsequently with men and women in general (p. 190).

From Freud's outline and his perception of the powerful effect of the "castration complex", it is apparent why he sees this as so important in the understanding of neurotic issues. But there seems to be something missing in Freud's outline. Why does the absence of the phallus, seem to confirm the perceived reality of the threat, have such a powerful effect upon the boy, why is it so traumatic? Again Freud does not explain, as if, for him, it is self-evident.

² Freud's allocation to, and perceived confirmations of, the basis of these ideas in the case of "Little Hans" (1909 S.E. X) will be considered later in this part of this study.

Of these issues Freud writes further that the boy is compelled to give up his masturbatory activities but the fantasies accompanying these are sustained. Of these Freud writes further that;

Derivatives and modified products of these early masturbatory phantasies usually make their way into his later ego and play a part in the formation of his character (p. 190).

And with respect to the boy's relationship with his father, the boy's masculinity withdraws, as it were, into a defiant attitude towards his father, which will dominate his later behaviour in society in a compulsive fashion. And with respect to his mother:

A residue of his erotic fixation to his mother is often left in a form of an excessive dependence on her, and this persists as a kind of bondage to women. He no longer ventures to love his mother, but cannot risk not being loved by her (p. 191).

These issues about the profound effect upon the boy of the castration complex, as described by Freud, raise significant questions. Mainly, why does this experience have such a profound and ongoing effect upon the boy?³ But also, if it is that Freud's ideas about the castration complex are put forward with such certainty because they are, possibly, a product of (at least) his self-analysis, how have the ideas he describes played a part in his development of his psychoanalysis, i.e. how much is psychoanalysis Freud's attempt to overcome his sense of castration when confronted by the unknown and unfamiliar? Because of the apparent incompleteness of these issues and the questions they raise, compounded by Freud's sense of certainty, they will be put aside to be returned to later.

Following Freud's outline further, he now directs his attention to the girl. He writes of the castration issues that, "The effects of the castration complex in little girls are more uniform and less profound" (p. 193). Of this Freud writes further;

From the very first she envies boys its possession [i.e. of the phallus]; her whole development may be said to take place under the colours of envy for the penis. She begins by making vain attempts to do the same as boys

³ In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937) Freud describes castration anxiety as constituting the "bedrock" of analytic activity, i.e. it cannot be resolved (p. 252).

and later, with greater success, makes efforts to compensate for her defect – efforts which may lead in the end to a normal female attitude (p. 193).

Freud would seem quite certain in his perspective that the girl envies the possessor of the penis.

Of the situation for the girl Freud writes further:

the daughter, under the influence of her envy for the penis, cannot forgive her mother for having sent her into the world so insufficiently equipped. In her resentment over this she gives up her mother and puts someone else in her place as the object of her love – her father (p. 193).

Again, as with the castration complex and its effect on boys and their character structure and relations to others, Freud is writing with equal adamant certainty for the girl. But, as with the boy, there seems to be missing from this the key issues of how and why is Freud so adamant and, also, why the girl is so profoundly affected? Further, it would seem unlikely that Freud's views would or could be based upon innumerable observations (empirical evidence). Accordingly Freud is emphasising concepts around the conceptualisation of the Oedipus complex with uncertain scientific basis but which are central to (a part of the "essence" of) his psychoanalysis. With the boy it is possible that the significant source of Freud's ideas and apparent certainty lies with his self-analysis and his intuitive understanding derived from this. However, his ideas about the girl would raise further questions about the source and also the sense of certainty about these.

The essential importance of these issues, and their correlation with the Oedipus complex, for psychoanalysis is indicated when Freud writes:

I venture to say that if psycho-analysis could boast of no other achievement than the discovery of the repressed Oedipus complex, that alone would give it claim to be included among the precious new acquisitions of mankind (pp. 192-193).

That is, that although one would be struck by the profundity of his ideas of earliest psychic and interpersonal development, especially around issues of Eros and the contribution to the ongoing issues of psychosexuality, and would seek for explanations of these issues being described for boys and girls through an extension of this, for Freud this was only a preface to the main event. The

description of this discovery of the Oedipus complex for Freud is seemingly of greater value. But why?

Freud outlines and overviews his points by stating;

It is an interesting thing that the relation between the Oedipus complex and the castration complex should take such a different shape – an opposite one, in fact – in the case of females as compared with males. In males...the threat of castration brings the Oedipus complex to an end; in females we find that, on the contrary, it is their lack of a penis that forces them into their Oedipal complex” (p. 194)⁴.

In Freud’s outline these are essentially his last words on the subject of the Oedipus complex. The next part and chapter of his outline he writes looking back on these issues;

All of the general discoveries and hypotheses which I brought forward in the first chapter were, of course, arrived at by laborious and patient detailed work of the kind of which I have given an example in the previous chapter (p. 195).

The conceptualizations of castration anxiety, penis envy and the Oedipus complex are, accordingly, the products of “discoveries and hypotheses” derived from “laborious and patient detailed” (p. 195) work which is purportedly exemplified in the chapter just considered. This idea does not seem consistent with the manner of Freud’s presentation in this chapter, with apparent intuitive speculation also playing an important part. In this chapter the basis of Freud’s ideas about the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety and penis envy issues would seem so contradictory to common sense and the observations of others (especially with respect to female sexuality), as will be considered later in this study, that the source would seem to lie with Freud’s hypotheses, i.e. his creative and intuitive understandings.

”Part III” of Freud’s ‘Outline’ is entitled “The Theoretical Yield” and this part, the last part, is constructed of two chapters, “The Psychological Apparatus and The External World” and “The Internal World”.

As quoted Freud begins chapter VIII, the first chapter of part III, with his statement about “discoveries and hypotheses” and “laborious and patient

⁴ As with the castration complex for males, Freud in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937) sees that penis envy constitutes the same “bedrock” in and for analysis (p. 252)

detailed work” (p. 195). He then proceeds to point out that psychoanalysis, importantly, found that a line cannot be drawn between the normal and the abnormal at a psychical level. And of this, Freud writes;

We have thus established a right to arrive at an understanding of the normal life of the mind from a study of its disorders – which would not be admissible if these pathological states, neuroses and psychoses, had specific causes operating in the manner of foreign bodies (p. 195).

This indicates that psychoanalysis, which began as a procedure to treat the neuroses through an understanding of the unconscious mental processes underlying them, has become a process for understanding the mind in general. And, further, that there is no dividing line at a psychic level between the mental processes involved in normal and abnormal situations. The normal can be studied through the abnormal and, presumably, the abnormal through the normal. An understanding about psychic functioning overall can be initiated by the study of those with symptoms.

However the procedure to pursue such understandings is confronted with a significant technical and theoretical challenge. This Freud outlines;

In our science as in the others [Freud refers to physics in particular] the problem is the same: behind the attributes (qualities) of the object under examination which are presented directly to our perception, we have to discover something else which is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the real state of affairs. We have no hope of being able to reach the latter itself, since it is evident that everything new that we have inferred must nevertheless be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which it is simply impossible for us to free ourselves (p. 196).

Further to this, Freud observes that “Reality will always remain “unknowable”” (p. 196), i.e. impossible to directly conceptualize through our perceptual apparatus needed to apprehend phenomena extended in space and (finite) time. Freud proposes that psychoanalysis attempts to approach these unknowable issues by a focus upon “the gaps in the phenomena of our consciousness” (pp. 196-197) by inference. Of this Freud writes;

Our justification for making such inferences and interpolations and the degree of certainty attaching to them of course remain open to criticism in each individual instance... (p. 197).

But then he proposes, “The novelty of the problem is to blame for this” (p. 197), by which he means that in psychoanalysis, unlike other sciences, “we are not always concerned with things which can only arouse a cool scientific interest” (p. 197). This would seem to not fully address the issue of the criticisms and concerns about such an approach to the unknown and unknowable of reality that is the focus of psychoanalysis.

Freud’s approach here to this issue, crucial for psychoanalysis, is surprising. The beginning and essentially definitory focus for psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud’s tripartite definition, 1923/1922) is upon the dynamic unconscious and the exploratory procedure of free association (in patient and analyst). Here Freud addresses the confronting challenge of this focus (on the unconscious) from a new and limited perspective. In this he explains that the essence of existential and psychic realities are unavailable to our perception (and “the language of our perception”) and this limits how we can proceed as if the creative brilliance of free association has been dismissed or forgotten. Instead he proposes that the manifestations of the unknowable essences of our reality (related to the dynamic unconscious) are to be conceived of in a negative sense, i.e. their presence is to be found in the absence between words and conscious thoughts – the absence represents the presence of the unknowable. These gaps are to be filled by inference, i.e. “we infer a number of processes which are themselves “unknowable” and interpolate those that are conscious to us” (p. 197). This technique of inference would appear to hark back to the process of intellectualisation in which Freud saw (some of) Adler’s failings.

This challenging issue of the unknowable essences of experience and existence, and a creative approach upon an understanding of them, is what distinguishes psychoanalysis (e.g. Poland, Part One, Chapter Two, C, iii; Friedman, Part One, Chapter Two, D, i of this study). This issue is inherent to Bion’s concept of “O” and its correlation with the unknowable aspects of existence captured in Kant’s concept of noumena and these will be discussed further in this study (in Part 2, Chapter 2, B). However Freud discusses it no further here.

From here, instead, Freud proceeds to discuss “the psychical apparatus and its activities” (p. 197). This involves an outline of the structure and dynamics of the psychic apparatus, the anxieties involved, symptom formation, defences, etc. This is essentially an overview of his ideas from earlier in this paper and in general. What would appear to be new in this is Freud’s discussion of the “splitting of the ego” leading to “two contrary and independent attitudes” (p. 204). He notes that in neurosis “one of these attitudes belongs to the ego and the contrary one, which is repressed, belongs to the id” (p. 204). He notes further of this that;

The outcome [of the splitting process] always lies in two contrary attitudes, of which the defeated, weaker one, no less than the other, leads to psychical complications...it is only necessary to point out how little of all these processes becomes known to us through our conscious perception (p. 204).

Although Freud does not correlate the ideas of filling in the missing spaces in the consciousness with inference and interpolation with ideas about the splitting of the ego and unconscious processes, he is, at this point, proposing a dynamic process that correlates with issues of conscious and unconscious qualities. This dynamic process of splitting possibly offers an approach to what is conscious and unconscious that has a more solid theoretical base than that of inference and interpolation. However, Freud does not consider this here.

The last chapter of this paper, chapter IX “The Internal World”, is brief and has a quality of incompleteness to it – it ends abruptly. It is a chapter focused upon the discussion of the super-ego.

Freud opines that from “about the age of 5” (p. 205), an important change takes place in the psychic structure of the child. He explains that;

A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead, by identification, been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. This new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which had hitherto been performed by the people [the abandoned objects] in the external world... (p. 205, brackets original).

This new agency Freud has called the “super-ego”. Freud notes that in its functions the super-ego is “exactly like the parents whose place it has taken” (p.

205). Although this is straightforward, i.e. the child incorporates the function and role of the parents - but without fully integrating this into the ego - establishing an internal guide and critic of the ego, this is not the whole story.

Of the super-ego Freud proceeds to write;

It is a remarkable thing that the super-ego often displays a severity for which no model has been provided by the real parents, and moreover that it calls the ego to account not only for its deeds but equally for its thoughts and unexecuted intentions, of which the super-ego seems to have knowledge (p. 205).

The super-ego, by Freud's observation, becomes more than the incorporated, but functionally separate representation and replication of the parental authority. By this last observation of Freud, there must be another source for at least part and some of the super-ego functions. This must be the ego itself. Freud does not explain this but instead puts forward a proposition that leaves the source and mechanism of the super-ego somewhat unclear. He writes;

The super-ego is in fact the heir to the Oedipus complex and is only established after that complex has been disposed of. For that reason its excessive severity does not follow a real model but corresponds to the strength of the defence used against the temptation of the Oedipus complex (pp. 205-206).

Freud does not explain this further leaving open the question of the how, and possibly the why, of the severity of the super-ego⁵. Also, in this correlation between the super-ego and Oedipus complex, Freud indicates that the super-ego arises as a consequence of the "disposal" of the Oedipus complex, but that its severity is, seemingly, necessary to control the temptation of the Oedipus complex. This does not make sense because Freud has made it clear in this paper that castration anxiety and penis envy, which are essentially tied to the Oedipus complex, have an ongoing character-determining impact in a universal sense (for the relevant sex). In other words, the Oedipus complex is not

⁵ Klein (1933) has proposed that, "The super-ego of the child does not coincide with the picture represented by its real parents, but is created out of imaginary pictures or imagos of them which it has taken into itself" (in 1985, p. 249). The child, in Klein's view, creates a picture of its parents from its own primitive perspective of the world and this is what gives the super-ego its harsh and unrealistic view. Freud, presumably, would have known of Klein's view but sustained his own view the understanding of which is being sought here.

disposed of but is the central defining complex of life beyond early childhood around issues of the super-ego, the castration complex and penis envy, at least.

Freud has discussed these issues (about the end of the Oedipus complex and the super-ego) in other papers, and I will briefly discuss his ideas from one of these relevant papers, “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (1924). In this (1924) paper, Freud proposes that the Oedipus complex “succumbs to repression” (p. 173) and that “the Oedipus complex would go to its destruction by lack of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility” (p. 173).

However, Freud (1924) also proposes that we move on from the Oedipus complex, as if it was one more developmental step:

Although the majority of human beings go through the Oedipus complex as an individual experience, it is nevertheless a phenomenon which is determined and laid down by heredity and which is bound to pass away according to programme when the next pre-ordained phase of development sets in (p. 174).

Later in this (1924) paper, Freud discusses his use of the term “repression” with respect to the end of the Oedipus complex (p. 177). He has described how under the threat of castration, possibly stimulated by loss in weaning and the giving up of bowel contents, and definitely brought into place by viewing the genitals of “a little girl” (p. 176), the male child gives up object-cathexes and replaces these with identifications. This development is what prompts the formation of the super-ego. But Freud notes the essential correlation between repression and the role of the super-ego, “which in this case is only just being formed” (p. 177). He argues that more than repression is at work to destroy the complex and that if repression is the mechanism used to resolve the complex then “the latter persists in an unconscious state in the id and will later manifest its pathological effect” (p. 177). Freud would seem to be arguing here that although the role of the super-ego via repression, possible its defensive role referred to in his “Outline”, is important in the resolution of the Oedipus complex, other factors also play an important role. And, in fact, if repression plays too dominant a part, this will lead to a pathological effect.

However Freud (1940/1938) would seem to be, in fact, proposing a paradoxical situation in which the super-ego is the product of the disposal of the Oedipus complex but also plays a central part in its disposal.

Freud's ideas about the splitting of the ego, discussed just prior to this last section (of the Outline), would also, possibly, be pertinent to these ideas about the ego and the super-ego. In Freud's ideas about the severity of the super-ego there is an implication that the super-ego is a split off part of the ego, focused upon identifications with the parents combined with parts of the ego, and its (the ego's) fears and impulses are being used in a defensive manner.

These ideas, implied by Freud, and hypothesised in this study, are not explicitly considered by him. Whether they would have been if the circumstances had been different remains unknown. Instead Freud brings this section to an end (of sorts) by writing;

Thus the super-ego takes up a kind of intermediate position between the id and the external world; it unites in itself the influences of the present and the past. In the establishment of the super-ego we have before us, as it were, an example of the way of which the present is changed into the past... (p. 207, the indicated incompleteness of the statement is in the text).

This appears as another enigmatic statement by Freud, again leaving us to ponder what he means, and again establishing a perspective of another level of his thought that requires (further) clarification by him. For example, what does he mean that the super-ego is in an intermediate position between the id and the outside world? He explains this in part by noting that the id "with its inherited trends, represents the organic past" (p. 206) and the super-ego in this

represents more than anything the cultural past, which a child has, as it were, to repeat as an after-experience during the few years of his early life (p. 206).

He then says that these ideas cannot be "universally correct" (p. 206). He balances these by proposing the sum of the "cultural acquisitions" (p. 206) would have left behind in the id "a precipitate" (p. 206) and that the super-ego's contribution "will awaken an echo in the id" (p. 206), and that "the child's new experiences will be intensified because they are repetitions of some primaeval phylogenetic experience" (p. 207).

Although these ideas clarify, a little, Freud's closing statement again accentuates an enigmatic quality about Freud's thought. These ideas certainly seem to go beyond those developed from innumerable observations, i.e. Freud at this more complex, enigmatic, level of thought would seem to be contributing ideas from another source – apparently his intuitive understanding.

a. Summary/Overview of “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis”

As noted, this paper ends in enigmatic complexity, indicating thoughts and perspectives that Freud holds at that time that require further explication. However most of the paper is not like this. Much of it is an outline of ideas Freud has put forward and discussed elsewhere, particularly to do with issues of the structural perspective of the psyche and the drives. If, as proposed, this paper was anticipated to be revelatory of Freud’s thoughts about psychoanalysis unbridled by his (proposed) concerns about acceptance of himself and his ideas, then such an anticipation, overall, would be disappointed. However, in parts, this paper is still surprising.

Such surprises relate to Freud’s discussion of the development of psychosexuality. This is important because it was primarily around the issues of their theories about psychosexuality that Freud focused his arguments against Adler and Jung and their claims to have replaced or extended his ideas about psychoanalysis, i.e. psychosexuality, in this, has a crucial place in what psychoanalysis is.

In this paper (in chapter VII), Freud outlines the beginnings of individual psychic existence in the struggle between life and death focused on the sexualised qualities of Eros, arising in the infant but especially brought by the mother. The inevitable incompleteness leaves the child with a sense of loss and need, and also an unbreakable attachment to its mother which profoundly influences all other later (love, at least) object choices. However, as noted, the profundity of these ideas is pushed aside by Freud as a preface and prelude to the issues of the Oedipus complex, castration anxiety and penis envy. Why the Oedipus complex and its adjunctive concepts is seen by Freud as more important than these early defining issues is not really made clear, but possibly relates to the central issues of Freud’s self-analysis.

Other important ideas that Freud (briefly) introduces are splitting of the ego and the end discussion of the super-ego. Of note in this last discussion is Freud’s complex discussion of the super-ego and the Oedipus complex, and

also Freud's return to phylogeny at this last moment in his last theoretical outline¹.

¹ In "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924) Freud writes, "There is room for the ontogenetic view side by side with the more far-reaching phylogenetic one" (p. 174).

v. *Summary of Freud's Overview Papers re What Psychoanalysis Is*

These papers were considered to gain a substantive understanding about how Freud viewed psychoanalysis. This consideration was directed by a hypothesis that there are two conceptualizations, representations or realisations of what psychoanalysis is. This hypothesis re two psychoanalyses would seem to be supported by Freud's approach in his "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement": one psychoanalysis for all, based on clinical-empirical findings, and one psychoanalysis, his psychoanalysis, based on essential but non-empirical claims. This essence is spelt out by Freud as being constituted by the concepts of psychosexuality, with correlated concepts of the Oedipus complex and infantile sexuality, the dynamic unconscious, his dream-psychology, and the concept of repression. Of these, the major focus of his attacks on the ideas of Adler and Jung (and them personally) is over their handling of the understanding of psychosexuality.

In "An Autobiographical Study" there were further indications of the holding of two views, two levels of conceptualization, about psychoanalysis by Freud. In this second overview paper Freud gives a more involved discussion of one of the essential constituents of psychoanalysis, dream-analysis, than occurred in the first paper and, importantly, how his dream-analysis opened consideration by and through analysis of normal psychic functioning. Via dream-analysis psychoanalysis became a depth psychology with respect to understanding and explaining human being overall.

"An Outline of Psycho-Analysis" does not directly open a consideration of two psychoanalyses; much of it is a reiteration of previous ideas, especially about psychic structure, the instincts and conflict. However, there are brief considerations of ideas which may be correlated with the more complex view of psychoanalysis.

These issues considered by Freud include the importance of the development of psychosexuality, the development of the self and the differentiation between self and other, inside and outside, and the role of the mother in this. As has been commented upon, the importance of these ideas is reduced by Freud's emphasis on the development of the Oedipus complex with

its associated ideas about castration anxiety and penis envy. In the seeking of understanding of what psychoanalysis is, which has become directed to an understanding of the two conceptualisations of psychoanalysis inherent in Freud's ideas, particularly pertinent is Freud's focus on psychosexuality with its effects in character terms i.e. around issues of castration anxiety, penis envy, the Oedipus complex (including the link to the super-ego). These are obviously important in terms of understanding aspects of human experience and behaviour by why their importance is paramount is not clear. One understanding of the source and importance of these issues would be that they are ideas derived from Freud's self-analysis. Accordingly a brief consideration of Freud's ideas about psychosexuality, followed by a consideration of Freud's self-analysis, will be carried out before the study moves on to consider the ideas of others about what psychoanalysis is.

vi. *Addenda to Freud's Overview Papers*

In Freud's overview papers the role of psychosexuality would seem to have a special place, at least in the 1914 and 1940/1938 papers. In the 1914 paper it constitutes the essential basis of Freud's disputes with and dismissal of the challenges to his psychoanalysis by Adler and Jung. In the 1940/1938 paper it is a particular focus, especially with respect to the role of the Oedipus complex and character development. Also, in this last paper Freud draws attention to the importance of sexuality as the weak-point of the ego, explaining that this was because in the issue of sexuality the conflict between the individual's individual and overall existences (that of personal history versus species universality) is manifested.

Psychosexuality, one constituent of Freud's essence of what psychoanalysis is, accordingly is an important aspect and will be considered in more detail below.

a. Psychosexuality

Freud's views about psychosexuality are centred by a developmental perspective: i.e. Freud refers to the outlined aspects of psychosexuality by the tracing of the origin of the core concepts and the developing challenges that ensue. Two of his papers will be the focus of considered attention: one that refers to the normal development concepts – “On the Sexual Theories of Children” (1908) – and one more focused on the neurotic unfolding of psychosexual issues – “Analysis of a Phobic in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909).

He proposes in the 1908 paper that the basis for his views comes from the direct observation of children, what they “say and do” (1908, p. 209) and from the material obtained from neurotics in analysis.

Interestingly, Freud proposes in this (1908) paper that a child does not take the sexual difference between its parents as a starting point for its “researches into sexual problems” (p. 210). This is because the parents' place and role has been there from the beginning as mother and father. Freud proposes instead that;

A child's desire for knowledge on this point [sexual differences] does not in fact awaken spontaneously, prompted perhaps by some inborn need for established causes; it is aroused under the goad of the self-seeking instincts which dominate him, when – perhaps after the end of his second year – he is confronted with the arrival of a new baby (p. 212).

This would seem an interesting concept considering Freud's background, i.e. his own experience and what may have emerged in his self-analysis. As Gay (1988) notes in his biography of Freud, Freud's sexual curiosity and anxiety may have been stimulated by the birth of his sister, Anna, when he was two-and-a-half years old. This curiosity, Gay proposes, may have been aggravated by the situation in the home, with Freud's half-brothers being of similar age to his mother, and the issue of the sexual roles of the "parents" certainly being different from what Freud proposes a child would simply accept. But more importantly, and mentioned only briefly by Gay, Freud's brother Julius was born when Freud was only sixteen months old, and died when he was twenty three months old. How much, for Freud at least, the "goad of the...instincts" concerning the balance between life and death, played out in the focus upon sexuality, remains unclear. The place of death in life was not formally discussed by Freud until "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920b).

Freud (1908), with respect to the effect of the birth of a sibling or a birth in other families at this time in the child's development, proposes that it is related to the issue of

The loss of the parents' care, which he actually experiences or justly fears, and the presentiment that from now on he must for evermore share all his possessions with the newcomer, have the effect of awakening his emotions and sharpening his capacities for thought (p. 212).

The irretrievable loss, or fear of such, will stimulate a developmental step in the young child and this will lead him (or her) to the enigmatic questions about sex, Freud proposes. Why not equally relevant existential ones Freud does not address. As with Freud's ideas about weaning, the child is seen to seek an understanding, perhaps resolution, of the loss by turning to the sexual; this time inquisitive, voyeuristic and intellectual, rather than exhibitionistic, as outlined in his 1940/1938 paper.

Freud proposes that the child will ask questions of the parents and will know that the answers are incorrect, but will intuitively grasp that his questions

are at fault, that they are unacceptable to the parents. According to Freud, the essential question where babies come from, when met with the parents' standard answer (e.g. the stork), puts a child in a difficult situation of wishing to believe their parents but knowing from its research that this answer is incorrect because "babies grow inside their mother's body" (p. 215). The child, the boy in Freud's discussion, struggles to understand how the baby gets in there but knows that the penis must play a part. However, this confuses the situation further because, according to Freud, the boy believes that the mother must have a penis as he does, apparently because this is his basic picture of the world. This unresolved and seemingly unresolvable dilemma has profound affects upon the boy, according to Freud. Freud (1908) notes that;

This brooding and doubting...becomes the prototype of all later intellectual work directed towards the solution of problems, and the first failure has a crippling effect on the child's whole future (p. 219).

Where and how this may relate to Freud and psychoanalysis is an interesting question, but not one for this study because of the question's more biographic orientation.

Freud indicates that this perplexity persists until "about their tenth or eleventh year" (p. 224), when children who have grown up "in a comparatively uninhibited social atmosphere" will inform others of their knowledge about sexual matters. This helps the child to understand about the vagina (p. 224) but leaves it perplexed, still unknowing of the role of semen, until learning of such things in adolescence.

In his outline of these theories Freud (1908) proposes that "the analysis of a five-year-old boy" (p. 214), ("Little Hans", 1909¹), "has given me irrefutable proof of the correctness" (p. 214) of his views. This "analysis" was actually carried out by the boy's father, with Freud in the background interpreting the information brought to him by the father, and directing the father's interpretations and other actions towards his son. Freud argues (1909) that the analysis could not have been conducted by anybody other than the father. How much this case provides new information about the sexual ideas of a child, and

¹ "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" S.E. X

how much the ideas are confirmatory of Freud's already developed ideas ("irrefutable proof"), will be considered.

The case history begins when Hans is three years old and continues until he is five. The early reports are directed towards Hans' preoccupation with his "widdler" (1909, p. 7). It is noted that the boy asks his mother whether she "has a widdler too?" (p. 7), to which she responds, "Of course. Why?" (p. 7). Hans answers, "I was only just thinking" (p. 7). Of this Freud proposes that;

Even these first observations begin to rouse an expectation that much, if not most, of what little Hans shows us will turn out to be typical of the sexual development of children in general (p. 7)

i.e. Freud's ideas about the sexual theories of children are, or will be, confirmed. This pushing towards confirmation of his existing theories is further exemplified when Hans, seeming perplexed at seeing milk come from a cow's teat, states "there's milk coming out of its widdler" (p. 7). This attempt to work out the plumbing, is seen by Freud as a sexual reference from which Freud discusses fellatio (p. 7).

Further confirmatory evidence for Freud and his theories, but seemingly still pointing more to the level of the plumbing (and micturition, therefore) for the boy, arises when Hans' mother threatens to have "Doctor A" (p. 8) cut off the boy's penis because of his handling of it. When the mother asks the boy what he will then widdle with, he replies, "With my bottom" (pp. 7-8). Freud sees in this the boy "acquiring the "castration complex"" (p. 8).

The introduction by Freud to this case depicts a curious but rather lonely little boy who shares his parents' bedroom until displaced by the birth of his sister when he was three and a half. During this prodromal time of his life Hans occasionally expressed curiosity about "widdlers", those of his parents', his sister's and then animals'. But then Hans began to suffer from phobic anxiety.

At Four and three quarter years he began to suffer from separation anxiety concerning his mother, and this evolved into a fear that prevented him from being able to go out of the house even with his mother because he was afraid that a horse would bite him.

Freud directed the father to interpret issues of castration anxiety related to the Oedipus complex. This was interspersed with the suggestion that the father should educate the boy about issues of sexuality.

Freud addresses an objection that;

an analysis of a child conducted by a father, who went to work instilled with *my* theoretical views and infected with *my* prejudices, must be entirely devoid of any objective worth (pp. 101-102, Freud's italics).

In response to this quite reasonable perspective, he writes;

It is true that during the analysis Hans had to be told many things that he could not say himself, that he had to be presented with thoughts which he had so far shown no signs of possessing, and that his attention had to be turned in the direction from which his father was expecting something to come. This detracts from the evidential value of the analysis; but this procedure is the same in every case (p. 104).

He explains and justifies this rather surprising statement by stating;

For a psycho-analysis is not an impartial scientific investigation, but a therapeutic measure. Its essence is not to prove anything, but merely to alter something (p. 104).

This again is a rather surprising statement which points to two perspectives on psychoanalysis. One, described here, is that of a therapeutic procedure, carried out by directing the patient's thinking under the analyst's pedagogic influence. The other, alluded to, is a source of such ideas. As with Little Hans, Freud seems to be proposing that the role of the analyst (like Hans' father), is to seek to bring about change by imposing and introducing ideas derived from elsewhere, presumably from Freud and his psychoanalysis.

Later in the paper, Freud makes these ideas less blunt and confronting by writing;

But, after all, the information which the physician gives his patient is itself derived in its turn from analytic experience; and indeed it is sufficiently convincing if, at the cost of this intervention by the physician, we are enabled to discover the structure of pathogenic material and simultaneously dissipate it (pp. 104-105).

In the "analysis" itself, Hans' phobic anxiety did resolve – Hans seeing it as "the time when I had my nonsense" (p. 100). This was a number of months after the onset (January to May); he was aged five at the time of resolution. His

father notes that Hans, at this time, was perplexed about what the father has to do with the creation of the child.

Freud notes that an important indicator of the resolution of “the anxiety which arose from his castration complex” (p. 100) was that in Hans’ fantasy he envisaged a plumber coming and taking away his “widdler” and “behind” (p. 98). The father interpreted that the plumber replaced it with a bigger one, more like his (i.e. the father’s), and the boy was relieved and possibly excited by this idea of loss and reparation through the replacement with a bigger phallus like his father’s.

Freud is putting forward the case of Little Hans as proof of his conceptualizations about childhood sexuality, its issues and anxieties. Hans’ anxiety symptoms and their apparent basis in his ideas about “widdlers”, etc. would seem to offer support for Freud’s ideas. But an alternative formulation about separation issues, the child’s projected hostility, feeling threatened by issues of unknowing about his body, could as easily explain the development of the symptoms. The presence and attention of the knowing father (the father and the presence of Freud in the background), as much as the content of the interpretations, could also be seen as the therapeutic agent. These issues, the putative alternative explanation for the symptoms and the therapeutic agent, could both be argued in terms of Freud’s Oedipal theory (e.g. the projection of hostility) and against this. Such arguments could become an exemplar of the difficulties which arise over theoretical perspectives. Rather than entering into such arguments, in keeping with the orientation of this study, instead the possibility of significant alternative views (as exemplified below) is raised to focus the question of the basis of Freud’s certainty.

It would seem, therefore, that Freud creates ambiguity with the reference to this case. Does he provide proof of his conceptualizations by observing them in their development, or is he imposing upon the situation his ideas derived from elsewhere? Certainly the latter would have much to support it.

However Freud would appear to have unshakable certainty about his ideas about the child’s psychosexual development. If Little Hans is not the original source, as would seem to be the case, then the question remains how

did Freud develop his ideas held with such certainty? This would point towards his self-analysis. However, before considering his self-analysis further, his ideas about psychosexuality will be briefly considered with respect to the reactions of others to them.

Freud, in “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes” (1925), writes;

In the valuable and comprehensive studies on the masculinity and castration complexes in women by Abraham (1921), Horney (1923) and Helene Deutsch (1925) there is much that touches closely on what I have written but nothing that coincides with it completely, so that here again I feel justified in publishing this paper (p. 258).

This statement by Freud would indicate that there was some diversity of view but mainly agreement with his ideas. This perspective would not seem consistent with the response of female analysts to Freud’s ideas outlined about the viewpoint of the girl (at least) with respect to their developing sexuality. I will briefly consider some of these views to contrast them with Freud’s, the goal being to direct back to how and why Freud was so certain to the end about his views. He could not have been unaware of the dissenting views, so his certainty must have had a solid basis. But what is the substance of this?

Mayer (1985) writes that;

The concept of primary femininity has been invoked with increasing frequency as an important basis on which Freud’s views of female development require challenge (p. 331).

Mayer gives an example to support her view; she writes;

Emily, a bright little girl of twenty months, for the first time commented on the matter of sexual differences to her mother with the following series of remarks. “Mummy”, she began, *Mummy* has a bottom...and Mummy, *Daddy* has a bottom...and Mummy, *Emily* has a bottom”. Emily’s mother assented to each of these observations and Emily thoughtfully continued, “and *Mummy* has a vulva...and *Emily* has a vulva...but Mummy, *Daddy* has something *funny* in his vulva!” (p. 331, italics original).

These observations by this young girl indicate that the penis was “funny”, presumably meaning unexpected, out of place, and the term “vulva” indicates the presence of something as her focus, rather than an absence, as suggested by Freud.

Further, Mayer writes of penis envy as a defensive conceptualization:

wishing for something which one hasn't may become a convenient defence again worrying about what one *has*, particularly if that loss is imagined as the threatened outcome of one's own impulses" (p. 342, italics in the original).

In this Mayer also refers to Horney's (1926) description of the defensive function of penis envy.

Tyson (1982) proposes that penis envy is a pathological state consequent to a disturbance in the mother/daughter relationship. She writes that;

Where the mother-child relationship has been poor, penis envy as a developmental metaphor (Grossman and Stewart, 1976) comes to represent a general sense of worthlessness, narcissistic vulnerability, inadequacy, deprivation, and damage (p. 74).

If the situation is better, then the child may have a "greater confidence in her sense of her own body and increased feminine identification with her own mother" (p. 74).

Tyson extends and summarises her view by proposing that penis envy may be considered as a "developmental organiser" (p. 77) for the masculine aspects of the girl's developing sexual identity, but that the girl's identification with her mother represents for the girl "the greater portion of the feminine personality organisation" (p. 77).

Hoffman (a male analyst) (1999) proposes another view concerning these issues about female sexuality. Hoffman writes that;

The difficulty of *fully accepting* and understanding aggression as normative in women may account for why feminine sexuality is so often treated as the unknown continent (p. 1158, Hoffman's italics).

Hoffman proposes about these ideas concerning aggression and sexuality that both male and female fantasies about women's sexual drives and desires are directed towards destructive drives, but that;

In order to protect themselves from these purported dangers, both men and women have avoided full exploration of the powerful feelings involved (p. 1158).

Hoffman's proposition, apparently, is that aggression plays a significant part in female sexuality, but because of the need to avoid the recognition of this, there is a negation of this essential aspect of female sexuality. These ideas lead to an interesting consideration of the link between aggression, sexuality and penis envy, but Hoffman's paper does not go that far.

Gediman (2005) also proposes a primary femininity, an idea that contradicts Freud's ideas about the primacy of the phallus. Gediman writes that;

There is a primary femininity; there are primary genital sexual anxieties typical for girls that are not built on the anlagen of the male's castration anxieties. Although subsequent female sexual identity as simply "lack" may be the case in certain pathological developmental outcomes, such as extreme penis envy, a woman developing normally is not simply a man manqué (p. 1062).

She also writes that, "the girl's identity is not based upon an absence and "lack" but on presence as positively feminine" (p. 1063).

Rees (1987) discusses the apparent contradictory nature of Freud's theoretical formulations about what she calls "the crucial organiser" (p. 500) in terms of a woman's sexual identity. Of this, Rees writes;

Freud's subsequent writings on early female development seem to have moved away from the identificatory processes [with the mother] and to have focused too exclusively on the shock value of the "sight of anatomical differences" as the crucial organiser (p. 500).

Rees, in her comments, notes how Freud generally considers development as "multi-layered and multi-determined, with one phase shaping the next" (p. 500), but with his perspective on female sexuality and identity he is not following this normal Freudian mode of understanding. In this the concepts of castration anxiety and penis envy would seem to represent the products of radical steps; rather than those of building upon previous understandings. This would certainly seem a valid criticism of Freud because, as has been considered in this study, if Freud followed on from his notions of the development of the beginnings of a sense of self (and other) in his "Outline", it is likely that the boy's noted presentation of himself and his phallus could be understood in other terms – e.g. separation issues, confusion and unknowing about the world

especially his mother and her treatment of him². However, as all these authors challenge in different ways, Freud's ideas about castration anxiety and penis envy would seem to be theoretical impositions by Freud upon what could be interpreted otherwise by following the evidence in a sequential way. Eschewing the possibility of alternative understanding Freud remains adamant to the end.

With respect to Freud's certainty of views, in this case with respect to "masculine primacy and feminine inferiority" (Tyson 1989, p. 1051), Tyson (1989) writes that they are;

incomplete and inaccurate because of their overemphasis on sexuality and sexual anatomy *per se*, and also because of their relative neglect of the roles of object relations, ego and superego functioning, and aggression in personality development, conflict and character formation (p. 1051).

Tyson's point, apparently, is that Freud emphasises the sexual as personality defining, exclusive of other factors inherent in development.

The ideas of these analysts around the issues of penis envy, castration anxiety and gender or genital perspectives are each and overall a significant challenge to, and contradiction of, Freud's ideas. Although they were written well after Freud's death, none of them is so original or so astounding, or even contrary to straight-forward observation, that the ideas involved would not have been considered during Freud's life by his female analysands and female analysts (at least)³. But, as indicated, Freud wrote with unerring certainty about his ideas concerning castration anxiety, penis envy and the Oedipus complex. This is difficult to understand as Freud, in his brief reference to others, appears to believe that there is an agreement to a large degree with his ideas.

These ideas of Freud about the involved issues in and around sexuality do not seem to have adequate support in innumerable observations. The major source of evidence to which Freud refers, the case of "Little Hans", would seem

² As indicated this consideration of views which challenge Freud's adamantly-held ideas is not to establish a debate about who is right and who is wrong, although this would seem to be the spirit of the authors being considered, including Freud. Instead the intention is to focus upon Freud's sense of certainty in the face of such apparent contradiction and to question its origin.

³ For example: Gay (1988) notes that, "In 1922, Horney valiantly stood up at the international congress of psychoanalysts in Berlin, with Freud in the chair, and suggested a revised version of penis envy" (p. 519)

more interpreted by pre-existing ideas, than to be a situation of discovery. This raises again the question of the sources of Freud's ideas. It would appear that a major source must have been his self-analysis and, accordingly, I will finish off this part of the study about Freud and his ideas by a brief consideration of the issue of his self-analysis.

b. Freud's Self-Analysis

With respect to the issues of Freud's self-analysis, Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) write;

Freud never devoted a text to the question of self-analysis but he alluded to it several times, especially with reference to his own self-experience (p. 413).

Freud (1914a) writes;

I soon saw the necessity of carrying out a self-analysis, and this I did with the help of a series of my own dreams which led me back through all the events of my childhood... (p. 20).

However this seemingly positive position of Freud in terms of the effectiveness and worth of his self-analysis is countered by what Laplanche and Pontalis note as "a very cautious position" (p. 413), and that Freud's position towards self-analysis "seems to have been definitely downgraded as compared to analysis proper" (p. 413). In fact, in a letter to Fliess (1950, Letter 75), Freud writes;

"My self-analysis is still interrupted and I have realised the reason. I can only analyse myself with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider). Genuine self-analysis is impossible..." (quoted in 1914a, pp. 20-21, editor's footnote).

Freud also states (1935);

"In self-analysis the danger of incompleteness is particularly great. One is too soon satisfied with a part explanation, behind which resistance may easily be keeping back something that is more important" (quoted in 1914a, p. 21, editor's footnote).

In spite of these realistic and appropriate reservations, it would seem the Freud did push on with his self-analysis. Of this Laplanche and Pontalis write:

As for Freud's self-analysis, he is clearly unique in that it had a hand in the discovery of psycho-analysis and did not involve the application of prior knowledge (p. 413).

They would seem to hold the view that Freud may have surmounted some of the basis of these realistic reservations and referred-to restrictions. Pontalis (1981) writes in this vein of Freud's self-analysis;

It is common knowledge today that Freud accomplished his *Selbstanalyse* by a methodically and continually decoding his dreams... (p. 26, Pontalis' italics).

Pontalis states further of Freud that;

he committed incest with the *body of his dreams*, penetrated their secret and wrote the book that made him conqueror and possessor of the *terra incognita* (p. 27, Pontalis' italics).

Pontalis is, apparently, proposing that Freud's self-analysis involved a complex interaction with his dreams; with these being not only other to, or of, Freud, but also having the unconscious status of the unknown maternal corpus. Freud's self-analysis, therefore, becomes the conquest of the unknown in the form of the maternal body – in which one is created, and from which comes the initial self-defining (in Freud's view) seductions, etc. As Pontalis also emphasises, Freud did not find confirmation of theoretical constructs through his self-analysis via his dreams, he conquered and became "possessor" of the unknown. These concepts, e.g. the "Oedipal conflict", would therefore be products of Freud's conquest of (some of) the unknown qualities and mysteries of eternity to be found in the body of his dreams.

Although not discussed by Pontalis, there appears a link between these ideas about the "terra incognita" of the maternal corpus and Freud's ideas about the confirmatory nature, re castration, of the boy's view of the female genital and why this should be so disturbing. The female genital, especially for the boy, would be unknown. His perspective on the importance of his phallus and his own importance, correspondingly, and his grasp on the world, would be confronted with a serious confusing and belittling challenge in the form of the female genital. Pontalis' reference to Freud's conquest would direct towards Freud's phallic mastery of the unknown (and, to a large extent, unknowable)

world brought by the enigma of the mother and her sexuality, denoted by her genitals.

Khan (1983) also addresses the issue of Freud's self-analysis, noting that "Freud's genius and courage lay in becoming his own patient" (p. 29). Of this Khan writes;

It was through his self-analysis that Freud discovered the ubiquitous role of infantile sexuality, and the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety in the "modern" human being becoming a person...The climax of Freud's self-analysis and therapeutic work in the late nineties is *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The insights into the dreamwork led Freud to revolutionise man's understanding of his inner psychic and emotional reality (p. 39).

In these ideas, Khan implies that Freud established a dichotomy, a duality in his psychic life. One side of this was Freud the analyst, the other Freud the patient represented in and by the dream. Of this, Khan proposes that Freud, through his self-analysis, via the dream, was able to approach an understanding of the basis of "inner psychic life and emotional reality", not only for himself but for all humankind.

With respect to Freud the analyst and Freud the patient, Khan indicates that this represented Freud establishing in himself a "dialogue with the hysteric" (p. 29). Khan proposes further that Freud "was ideally suited" (p. 29) for this dialogue, implying that hysterical dynamics were part of Freud's character; Khan adds, "He knew his heart and understood the hysteric" (p. 30). The dialogue therefore, following Khan, was between Freud the analyst and Freud the hysteric⁴. This view of Khan proposes a dual perspective on Freud, one hysterical and one not: one neurotic and one able to embrace the neurosis and study it. This perspective indicates an important quality to, and basis for, Freud's self-analysis.

⁴ Freud manifested a number of somatic symptoms that could be seen as having hysterical origins. Pontalis (1981), for example, notes that Freud suffered from, "recurrent migraine, fatigue, intestinal disorder" (p. 187). Schur (1972), who was a psychoanalyst and also Freud's physician at the time of his death, writes that Freud's symptoms were; "nicotine addiction" (p. 48), "headaches...nasal symptoms...some rather vague gastrointestinal symptoms. However the most important by far were his cardiac symptoms" (p. 41). These cardiac symptoms were mainly "angina" (p. 410). Freud also suffered from urinary symptoms – frequency (Schur, p. 255, p. 409). And of the bowel problems, Schur writes that, "they were typical of an irritable, spastic colon" (pp. 409-410).

Khan proposes that the discipline that Freud imposed on himself in his therapeutic dialogue he transposed onto his view of what would help the patient. As Khan writes, his treatment “asks a lot of the patient” (p. 37). Of this, Khan adds that symptoms

could not be understood without the person’s willingness to undertake the responsibility of being their author. And discourse was to be the exclusive instrument of relating between the analyst and the patient (p. 37).

Khan proposes further that, through his self-analysis, Freud discovered “the ubiquitous role of infantile sexuality, the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety” (p. 39). In this Khan indicates his view that the source of Freud’s ideas about these issues began with, or was significantly contributed to by, his self-analysis. This could certainly be consistent with impressions gained in Freud’s discussion of these subjects, for example with the case of “Little Hans”.

Therefore, with respect to Freud’s self-analysis and psychoanalysis, although Freud apparently balanced the realistic challenges of such an enterprise against the possible gains, others saw that Freud’s self-analysis was crucial to the development of the key conceptualizations of psychoanalysis. In fact, following Pontalis’ ideas, Freud’s self-analysis can be seen to have moved psychoanalysis from being an important method of psychotherapy to being a conceptualization which opens possible understanding about the basis of human existence. This is so in the context of the developing understanding about the unknowns of psychic life through the dream and its symbolic qualities of representing the maternal corpus – the basis of life.

In spite of Freud’s, apparent, balanced views about his self-analysis, if the views of others correspond with Freud’s views at another level, that of his creative understandings, then it is understandable that Freud may have believed that he had made discoveries which were world-shaking. These discoveries, through his courageous (following Khan and Pontalis) and ingenious understandings about the essence of existence, would have that quality. Freud seems, apparently, to have concealed the full nature and impact of his discoveries and it now requires Pontalis (for example) to outline these. If this observation about Freud and his ideas is valid, then Freud’s certainty about his ideas can be understood – what is true for him, as one human being, must

be true for others who have not undertaken the discipline of self-analysis. While others were/are arguing about the validity of Freud's ideas about the primacy of the phallus in sexual identity development, at another level, the idealisation (and corresponding envy) of the phallus is to do with its symbolic qualities with respect to the mastery (essentially Freud's mastery) of enigmatic issues about existence (and eternity) represented in the unknown of the mother, her constituent qualities, her motivations, her desires, symbolised by the unknown and unknowable qualities of her body.

Another important aspect of Freud's self-analysis is that, presumably, the concepts derived were not based upon innumerable observations but were the product of Freud's intuitive understandings related to the enigmatic ideas and experiences with which he was confronted. The innumerable observations in this were important because they assisted Freud in seeing in others what he had come to understand in himself. This would direct him to averring that what he had found in himself was implicated in human existence overall. Through his self-analysis, therefore, he could deduce ideas applicable to every human being. By exploring and questioning aspects of his own existence he opened a portal for grasping issues relevant to humanity in total. Again, at this level, it is understandable that he felt his discoveries were of such importance.

Part One

Chapter Two - Psychoanalysis in the Views of Other Analysts.

Introduction

In the first chapter of this study (Part One, Chapter One) an overview of Freud's ideas about what psychoanalysis is was considered. Consistent with the methodology of this study, one directed towards understanding psychoanalysis from within the analytic paradigm, this consideration of Freud's views involved the interactive balance between data collection extended and, to some extent, guided by hypothetical considerations. This examination of Freud's views essentially led to the perspective of there being two psychoanalyses.

As Freud discovered, created and developed these ideas about psychoanalysis, it may be anticipated that his ideas would constitute the defining position with respect to what psychoanalysis is. But two problems militate against this: the first being the issue of Freud's variable positions with respect to what psychoanalysis is. For example, he proposes that the general perspective based upon the empirical "findings" (1914a, p. 16) would be accepted by him as representing what psychoanalysis is, whereas elsewhere he adamantly states that only an acceptance of the constituent theoretical elements of the essence of psychoanalysis (in theory and practice) qualified one to practise psychoanalysis (Freud, 1923/1922).

The second problem with accepting Freud's notions as the defining view of psychoanalysis is the current position of many, or most, analysts to Freud's ideas. This is indicated by Green (2005), when he writes:

Today these minimal conditions [basically Freud's constitutive elements of his essence of what psychoanalysis is] are not even observed. There are books that do away with the unconscious... (p. 630).

These ideas of Green will be considered at length in the following discussion.

These two issues, Freud's at times ambiguous representation of what psychoanalysis is and the dismissal of his defining concepts, would appear to

be correlated. Although Freud was adamant about what psychoanalysis is (at the defining conceptual level), he also offered a second psychoanalysis, one in which all conceptualizations are equal, including his own, as long as the basic findings (of resistance and transference) are taken as the starting place (1914a, p. 16). The dichotomous realisation of psychoanalysis introduced by Freud would seem to have become more emphasised by other analysts taking up the more straightforward and less challenging (and disturbing) psychoanalysis by dismissing or diminishing Freud's conceptualizations, i.e. his psychoanalysis. This leads to the question of how to consider what psychoanalysis is from this extended dichotomous perspective. Is psychoanalysis ultimately constituted by Freud's essential conceptualizations? Or should it now be seen, following the second realisation, as that represented by the views of other analysts who have developed this second realisation at the cost of Freud's conceptually essential perspective? The argument of this study, to be developed later, is that both are valid and necessary.

To examine and develop these ideas further is the aim of this chapter, which involves an examination of the ideas of a selection of analysts about what constitutes psychoanalysis. The focus goal of this examination is to extend the ideas about what psychoanalysis is introduced by Freud. Specifically, the focus will be to further develop the observation of dichotomy introduced in Freud's ideas and the importance of this in understanding psychoanalysis. This involves the consideration of a second dichotomy. This second dichotomy arises in the individual ideas of analysts about what psychoanalysis is and the general overall concept concerning psychoanalysis to which these individual ideas refer; although, as will be seen, they do more than refer to this. The distillation of conceptualization of the second dichotomy will be a step-process. Step A will be the consideration of the dismissal of Freud's ideas and why, B will consider the ideas re psychoanalysis of a representative group of analysts, C involves a more contemporary consideration of such ideas. Within these considerations will be the indicated focus upon the second dichotomy of psychoanalysis. Such considerations will arise from inference and allusion. The last step of this chapter, D, will be the consideration of the ideas of two

analysts (Friedman, 2006; Bion, 1992/1971) who refer more specifically to such dichotomy.

That is the first step (A) will involve the consideration of why and how Freud's views have been dismissed and replaced. Accordingly, the views of Green (2005) and Blass (2010), who both address these issues, and their consequence, will be considered. The second step (B) will explore the views of a number of analysts with respect to what psychoanalysis is for them. The selection of these analysts is based upon the focused approach of Wallerstein (1988, 1990, 2005) to address the challenge of perspectival pluralism about what psychoanalysis is. In this Wallerstein inadvertently introduces the idea of two perceptions of psychoanalysis: firstly, that of each individual analyst that leads to the pluralism of views, and, secondly, that there is a background universal view that identifies the analytic process and unifies the individual views, despite their ostensible differences. Wallerstein's dichotomy of view is the second dichotomy of this study (after that of Freud's views) and, accordingly, becomes a particular focus for the study.

Wallerstein's views also stimulated significant response, and a selection of these responses delineating what psychoanalysis is for the respondents, will be considered.

As these views are dated (with the exception of Green, 2005), more recent views (Ferro, Jiménez and Poland, 2009) about what psychoanalysis is will also be considered. These analysts were the key-note speakers at the 2009 IPA congress and they represented the three component bodies of the IPA (Europe, South America and North America, respectively). Each of these, more particular Ferro and Jiménez, outline their views with respect to what psychoanalysis is. This consideration of their views will constitute Step C of this chapter.

Steps B and C, in particular, examine general views of what psychoanalysis is. From the hypothetical perspective, the dichotomy exposed in these general considerations is that of the finite, individual view of what psychoanalysis is and the general, universal background view to which all of these perspectives refer and are seen by the proponents to represent.

Interpersonal conflict, controversy and bitterness arise because each individual view is held with a sense of personal investment and conviction, which has been the case since Freud. Each perspective is seen by its proponents to correlate with, represent and even extend an authoritative view, which in turn would appear to be seen to represent analysis overall. However, as the individual views challenge and often contradict one another, conflict is inevitable. However, within these conflicts there is the outline of a second analytic dichotomy, the view of the individual and their perspective of an overall view to which they vehemently argue their view corresponds. Of course, an intrinsic disjuncture between the specific personal and the general impersonal background perspective dooms each claim of exclusive analytic fidelity to failure.

To examine this dichotomy more fully the views of two analysts (Friedman, 2006; Bion, 1992/1971) who appear to refer to it, in different ways, will be examined in Part D of this chapter.

A. Step A

This first step in pursuing an overview of the ideas about what psychoanalysis is, is to establish the need for doing so. Freud invented, created and/or discovered psychoanalysis so it could be anticipated that the basis for what psychoanalysis is would be that established by Freud. However, to a large extent, Freud's views would seem to have become one more individual view to be disputed, refined or rejected accordingly. This would seem to be a repeat of the challenge of Adler and Jung to which Freud's (noted) response was to emphasise the essence of psychoanalysis. Not only is Freud not able to do this now, it is at the very level of the essence that Freud's ideas have become revised or replaced.

Wallerstein (1988) describes the effect upon psychoanalysis of the death of Freud and

the burden thereupon thrust upon analysts to have to carry their field beyond the consummate genius of the one man who had so adventurously single-handedly brought it into being on to what now had to become a discipline and a science that, true, built on its past, but rested on the from-now-on independent work of its collectivity (p. 8).

This would imply that the ideas of what psychoanalysis is have been built upon the foundations laid by Freud's genius. However this would not seem to be what has happened in recent years. Green (2005) notes of Freud;

He then defined as a psychoanalyst someone who accepted the existence of repression, the unconscious, the transference, the Oedipus complex and resistance (p. 630).

In other words, Green identifies some of the constituents of the "essence" of psychoanalysis outlined by Freud (1914a, p. 64), but then proceeds to note of contemporary analysts:

Today these minimal conditions are not even observed. There are books that do away with the unconscious, have a substantially different conception of the transference or accord only a minor and even negligible role to the Oedipus complex; as for resistance, it is boldly asserted that there is no resistance other than that of the psychoanalyst (p. 630).

Green proceeds to focus upon the fate of more specific concepts. He writes of;

concepts that are widely disputed, if not rejected altogether: the drive in general; the death drive in particular; the ego's replacement by the *self*...

...that object relations must supplant the other theories; the relegation of castration anxiety far below separation anxiety; the promotion of a theory based upon adaptation; the role of attachment that supposedly replaces infantile sexuality; the conceptions of memory based on neuroscientific findings rather than the repression and so on (p. 630, Green's italics).

Although what Green is observing may correlate with progress in a developing paradigm, this does not seem to be the case, at least in Green's view. He finishes his paper with a question of

how is it that, while expressing all these differences...we can continue to talk about one and the same object?...but I am not certain that we are actually talking about the same object (2005, p. 632).

Green's observations are that Freud's basic ideas about what psychoanalysis is, both at the level of its essence and at the level of the conceptualizations that unfolded and developed from this essence, have been discarded and replaced. He proposes, further, that with these changes at these levels of Freud's conceptualizations, there is the possibility that analysts have lost the core or key "object" (i.e. conceptualization) of what psychoanalysis is. This perspective would raise a number of questions. What is this key or core conceptualization re what psychoanalysis is? Why and how has it been lost (if this is the case)? If it has been lost, what has replaced it – and why?

From Freud's arguments against Adler's and Jung's challenges, these questions would seem to have been answered to a certain level of conceptualization. These arguments have already been considered. Essentially they are that the revelations of the basis of human existence and being which are addressed by psychoanalysis are reacted against by the processes of intellectualisation and rationalisation¹. However, this response does not fully answer the questions, especially with respect to why this is the inevitable response: i.e. although issues of disturbance and consequent anxiety indicate the reasons for such response, this does not fully explain why such revelations have this effect. What is it about the psychoanalysis discovered by Freud that is so disturbing in its essence, and why does it stimulate such a response?

¹ As previously noted, Freud colourfully writes, "The truth is that these people have picked out a few cultural overtones of the symphony of life and have once more failed to hear the mighty and primordial symphony of the instincts" (1914a, p. 62).

These views of Green about the fate of Freud's ideas and the corresponding consequence for psychoanalysis are echoed by Blass (2010). Blass notes that;

when it comes to more specific and meaningful defining features, those that characterise the essence of psychoanalytic theory and practice, sharp differences are found (p. 81).

She continues to observe that;

In part, this is merely a reflection of the sharp differences that exist between different analytic schools on issue of aims, method, epistemology and what constitutes essential tenets of psychoanalytic thinking and practice (Blass, 2003; Sandler and Dreher, 1996). As is well known, finding the common ground of psychoanalysis has always been a very difficult task for the psychoanalytic movement (Wallerstein, 1988) (p. 81).

She then importantly notes that;

On various occasions Freud spoke of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1905, p. 226), the unconscious (Freud, 1923, p. 13) and dream theory (Freud, 1914, p. 57) as "shibboleths that distinguish...the adherents of psychoanalysis from its opponents" (Freud, 1905, p. 226). But today even a concern with these broad concepts no longer defines the identity of many who regard themselves as psychoanalysts (pp. 81-82).

Blass then proceeds to outline revisions or even dismissals of these concepts in contemporary schools of psychoanalysis.

Blass' paper outlines the difficulties of not only currently proposing a definition of "psychoanalysis" but whether or not it is legitimate to do so. She concludes that;

If man's desire for truth is greater than his desire for power, then in the place of imposition one may envision the potential for productive dialogue between opposing views (p. 97).

She continues;

For this dialogue to take place and for psychoanalysis to evolve in a meaningful and enriching way freedom of thought and expression on the definition of psychoanalysis is necessary (p. 97).

She concludes as follows;

It is through such freedom and the deeper understanding of the essence of psychoanalysis that it allows for that being excluded from the definition of psychoanalysis or being included within it can have any meaning at all (p. 98).

Blass' paper thoughtfully outlines the rejecting of and discarding of Freud's essential conceptualizations with respect to what psychoanalysis is and the replacement with argued for concepts in their place. The centre of her paper, however, is about the difficulties that follow, and why, within the resultant definitional statements about psychoanalysis. These difficulties relate to an important observation that Blass makes about the correlation between the sense of self of the analyst and the definition of psychoanalysis, and the acceptance, or otherwise, thereof: "a matter of identity is at stake" (p. 84). What Blass is observing relates back to what Freud introduces in "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" (1914a). Here, as has been observed, Freud presents an entanglement of two ontologies, his and psychoanalysis, leading to a perception of *his* psychoanalysis. This begins with his ambiguous statement "for psycho-analysis is my creation... (1914a, p. 7).²

The difficulties in definition that Blass outlines essentially relate back to the entwining of the self of the analyst and their perception of what is psychoanalysis, as if, as with Freud, there is something about psychoanalysis that is a part of the individual: his or her identity and psychoanalysis are interlocked. What this indicates about what psychoanalysis is, and how it differs essentially from the individual simply identifying him or herself with their chosen profession, will be considered later in this study.

As indicated, both Green and Blass clearly describe the discarding of the essential Freudian conceptualizations of what psychoanalysis is and their replacement with argued-for replacement conceptualizations. This will be demonstrated by way of an example.

The paper chosen to exemplify this is by Jiménez (2008)³ in which he initially extends Wallerstein's ideas about the pluralism of views about what psychoanalysis is with a more pessimistic view that, "What we see in psychoanalysis is in fact not so much pluralism as mere plurality, or, worse still, theoretical fragmentation..." (p. 580). Jiménez, not unlike Wallerstein, outlines

² The ambiguity is that of Freud creating psychoanalysis, or psychoanalysis creating Freud.

³ The paper by Jiménez has been chosen essentially because his ideas about what psychoanalysis is will be formally considered later in this section of the study.

the technical method he feels could address the issues of the “theoretical fragmentation”.

Examples of the replacement of Freud’s ideas in this paper include:

the classical idea of knowledge as a reflection of reality (the reality of the unconscious) must be replaced by a conception in which knowledge is a social and linguistic co-construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst (p. 593);

and also:

The result is a shift from a psychoanalytic model based upon archaeology, whose object is the discovery of the concealed truth, to an *architectural model*, in which the main concern is the construction of a new house (p. 593, Jiménez’ italics).

These issues will not be considered further here, they are put forward as an example of the formal discarding of Freud’s ideas and their replacement by alternative concepts about what psychoanalysis is and why.

To consider these ideas further the ideas about what psychoanalysis is of a number of analysts will be outlined.

The next step, (B), is a consideration of selection of views stimulated by Wallerstein’s discussions about his concerns about the pluralism of perspectives re what psychoanalysis is.

B. Step B: Wallerstein and His Respondents' Views re What Psychoanalysis Is.

i. Wallerstein

Wallerstein, in his 1987 plenary address as President of the IPA, stepped outside the congress theme “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” to address the issue that he indicates is of “sufficient importance for the world-wide psychoanalytic community” (1988, p. 5) to warrant doing this. He addresses two issues in this: that of the pluralism per se; i.e. “of theoretical perspectives, of linguistic and thought conventions, of distinctive regional, cultural, and language emphases” (p. 5). And

what it is, in view of this increasing diversity, that still holds us together as common adherents of shared a psychoanalytic science and profession (1988, p. 5).

This latter perspective became the basis of his “common ground” discussions (1990).

In this first of his series of papers (1988) he initially outlines Freud’s attempts to hold psychoanalysis together “against both destructive and diluting pressures or seductions from without but also against fractious human divisiveness from within” (p. 5). However, with the falling away of Freud’s hegemony there has progressively developed the described diversity of views. Of these Wallerstein proposes “two formidable questions” (p. 12), these are:

The first question is what do these diverse theories all have in common that they are all recognisably psychoanalysis in terms of fundamentally shared assumptions? The second question, perhaps the other side of the same coin, is what differentiates them together from all the other, the unpsychoanalytic theories of mental life... (p. 12).

In this paper and those that follow (1990, 2005), Wallerstein endeavours to answer these questions. He (1988) begins with an overview about Freud and his ideas, making the observation that;

There are any number of way to try to capture in a single statement the central conception of Freud’s revolutionary way of understanding mental life. Certainly though I think that we can all agree that Freud’s fundamental discovery was that human beings have thoughts and feelings that they don’t know they have, and that these constitute an unconscious mental life

expressed in unconscious fantasy and unconscious conflict – and that this set of conceptions is not only contained within but is the distinguishing feature of each and every psychoanalytic psychology of mental life (p. 12).

For Wallerstein, therefore (at least at this point in his paper), the central distinguishing conceptualization of psychoanalysis is that of the dynamic unconscious. As has been considered with reference to the papers of Green (2005) and Blass (2010) this is not a view shared currently with all other analysts, but it certainly is one constituent of the essence of Freud's psychoanalysis.

Wallerstein proceeds to describe the progressive diversification of views re what psychoanalysis is that began during Freud's lifetime with the ideas of Melanie Klein and her followers and has unfolded rapidly following Freud's death. In Wallerstein's view, this diversification followed two different pathways;

either of an even tighter circle of orthodoxy, or required adherence to one mainstream psychoanalytic doctrine, or of an expanding diversity of theory that could ultimately pose bewildering problems of boundaries (p. 9).

Wallerstein proposes that the American societies follow the first of these and the Europeans the latter.

Even though Wallerstein outlines his ideas in a thoughtful and considered way, he does allude to ideas that inevitably lead to the reactions of others to his ideas as one more set of individual views re what psychoanalysis is. That is, he puts forward (for him) the central conceptualization of psychoanalysis and relates it back to authority, Freud, and then proposes that the Americans are the orthodox group and the Europeans are otherwise. As has been noted, this propensity towards certain knowledge and polarisation has been a feature of psychoanalysis from the beginning, and is certainly an unavoidable aspect of current psychoanalysis.

In keeping with the propensity for certainty of view, generally with a reference to authority, Wallerstein then proceeds to put forward what he believes is the essential aspect of psychoanalysis that holds analysts together (i.e. the answer to his second question). Wallerstein believes that this common ground of analysis lies within the clinical work of analysts. He argues that even

though the different analytic groups may have different views on this, i.e. the clinical aspect of psychoanalysis, that these different views represent

the various scientific *metaphors* that we have created in order to satisfy our variously conditioned needs for closure and coherence and overall theoretical understanding (p. 15, Wallerstein's italics).

He argues further that all the analytic schools have the same basis for their clinical work and that this is

the theory of transference and resistance, of conflict and defence, i.e. the original fundamental elements of Freud's 1914 definition of psychoanalysis (p. 15).

In this Wallerstein is referring to Freud's 1914 statement of accepting psychoanalysis to be a process proceeding from the "findings" (Freud, 1914a, p. 16)¹. As has been considered, Freud, at another level of conceptualization includes the concepts of dream-analysis and infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex and the dynamic unconscious in *his* definitions of *his* psychoanalysis (Freud, 1914a, p. 50, p. 64). In his discussion and conclusions, Wallerstein endeavours to approach an understanding a definition of the basis of psychoanalysis at an overall level, i.e. the idea of what psychoanalysis is that backgrounds all the individual views, to which they refer, to which they believe they are adherent, and which they believe their view represents, or is in fact, the true representation. However, Wallerstein demonstrates the problems that arise: the individual view has a narrowing quality to it, the essence of the overall is lost and replaced with a focused perspective seen by its proponent to represent the overall, but, because of the inherent narrowing of perspective, cannot be generally representative.

The views of Wallerstein's respondents will now be considered.

As discussed above, Wallerstein's papers provoked considerable response, in fact the concept of the "common ground" of psychoanalytic theory

¹ Wallerstein quotes this statement at length early in his paper (p. 6).

and practice was the main theme of the 1989 IPA Congress². The editors of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, with respect to the papers in response to Wallerstein's common ground propositions, write:

To many of those who attended the Rome meeting [the IPA Congress] it was apparent that there is still very much room for further discussion of what, if indeed anything at all, does constitute the common ground of psychoanalytic work, especially if the exact meaning attached to particular psychoanalytic ideas and practices is to be explicated and exemplified (1990, p. 1).

They then list a series of "notions", including transference and resistance (p. 1), which in their view "are not always as clear as we might like" (p. 1). They note further that the discussions around these issues "soon become points of fierce debate and controversy" (p. 1), and that "this kind of difficulty often troubles discussion within groups and national psychoanalytic societies as much as between them" (p. 1).

The editors proceed to propose that, "a greater degree of shared understanding of both psychoanalytic controversy and our common ground" (pp. 1-2) would enhance the undoing of the difficulties between analysts. There would seem to have been little progress made in this in spite of the editors' intentions. To proceed, the views of the respondents to Wallerstein will be considered.

ii. Rangell (1988)

Rangell argues that there should be "a "total composite psychoanalytic theory"" (p. 316), and this theory should be built upon the ideas of Freud. However, as Wallerstein notes, "Rangell's view is that ego psychology represents this theoretical paradigm" (Wallerstein 1990, p. 6). In support of his views Rangell writes;

I have pointed out repeatedly that self, object, interpersonal, preoedipal, all elements which have served as nodal points of alternative theories, are included in this total unity theory [ego psychology], whereas the converse is

² The main theme of the Congress was, "Common ground in psychoanalysis: clinical aims and processes".

not true: the other theories, of self, or object, or the Kleinian view, eliminate the variable essentials of the developed, cumulative, psychoanalytic theory” (p. 317).

Rangell is proposing, overall, that psychoanalysis should be represented by a comprehensive, inclusive and constructive theory based upon Freud’s discoveries. However, he then proposes that ego psychology fulfils these requirements and should therefore be seen as representing what psychoanalysis is. In this Rangell would appear to demonstrate the issue central to the problems that arise between analysts, i.e. that the individual view refers back to an authoritative view which is believed to represent, overall, what psychoanalysis is. However, what Rangell does discuss further is his perspective that what psychoanalysis is correlates with the comprehensive (and complex, accordingly) amalgam of Freud’s conceptualizations. Further, he sees that the problems with the competing paradigms are that they reduce, by elimination, aspects of the comprehensive overall view of Freud. Freud saw the whole, others see only the parts (and not all of them).

In these ideas, Rangell is arguing for a retention of Freud’s essential ideas, in a comprehensive way, as best representing what psychoanalysis is, with the inference that these also correspond with the notion of the overall view of psychoanalysis. He also proposes that ego psychology, because of its perceived (by him) overarching, comprehensive and inclusive qualities best corresponds with this authoritative and overall view of psychoanalysis. Rangell’s claims re ego psychology best representing what psychoanalysis is is rejected by the followers of Lacan (Evans, 1996) and of Bion (e.g. Grotstein, 1981).

Rangell, importantly, demonstrates and also, paradoxically, describes how the individual is unable to grasp the whole, the overall, and argues away some parts they cannot embrace; but they are blind to this and accordingly can conceptualize that their view corresponds with, or best represents, psychoanalysis in total. This demonstration (and description) by Rangell alludes to the issue that what psychoanalysis is, related to the essence as described by Freud, cannot be embraced by the individual (or group) and is

accommodated by a process of elimination that reduces it to what can be embraced. This process, furthermore, occurs unbeknown to the individual.

iii. Abrams (1989)

Abrams observes that, “In science an optimal level of ambiguity stimulates productive controversy” (p. 3), but that;

Regrettably, in psychoanalysis, at present, some ambiguity borders on chaos, some controversy on open warfare. Reducing ambiguity to an optimal level should promote the effort to find common ground (p. 3).

In these statements, Abrams indicates that “ambiguity” per se is an important aspect of development and growth within scientific disciplines and paradigms. However, in psychoanalysis this is not the case because of the chaotic and hostile response of psychoanalysts to conceptual ambiguity in their paradigm. Further, he proceeds to propose remedial action which may be applied to reduce ambiguity in psychoanalysis and hence the responses of analysts.

Abrams appears to be stating that ambiguity is basic to creativity but that because of something about ambiguity in psychoanalysis and its effects upon analysts this important creative element needs to be reduced. This would be a serious step with respect to the creative price to be paid but Abrams indicates that this is necessary. Interestingly, he does not identify the source or cause of these problems, i.e. the basic analytic approach (as introduced by Freud) when confronted by such difficulties. Instead he discusses how and where remedial action may be introduced. His focus in this is upon the concepts of “normal development” (p. 3), and “normality” (p. 3) in psychoanalytic theory.

Abrams’ perspective in this becomes focused upon issues of development and possible pathology. He indicates the principle importance of the Oedipus complex in this and he argues back to Freud to support his views.

However, even though he puts forward his own individual perspective with respect to the centrality of the Oedipus complex in normal and abnormal development, Abrams strives to keep open considerations in his area of focus, viz those of “normal development, pathogenesis, the concept of the

psychoanalytic process, and the nature of the therapeutic interaction” (p. 7). His idea is that the challenging ambiguity in these areas, i.e. of “normality”, “classification of disorders”, “concept of process”, “perspectives about the therapeutic relationship” (p. 7), needs to be reduced for psychoanalysis to progress.

iv. Appy (1989)

Appy (1989) begins by stating;

I take it for granted that psychoanalysis begins with the assumption of the existence of the unconscious. This contains the matrix for the unfolding and development of human mental life and is influenced by a wide variety of motivations. This thesis is *the* fundamental prerequisite of psychoanalysis and its applications and distinguishes it from all other, non-analytical psychologies (p. 7, italics in the original).

What distinguishes and differentiates psychoanalysis (one of Wallerstein’s questions) therefore is “the assumption of the existence of the unconscious” in Appy’s view. But, as has been considered above (through reference to Green and Blass), this is not a view held by all analysts.

In this paper Appy turns to psychoanalytic conceptualizations (e.g. “an unconscious group dynamic” and “narcissistic feeling states”, p. 8) to examine the difficulties that emerge between analysts. In this vein Appy writes;

After all, the reality of human systems of thought – including that of psychoanalysis – is determined more by confrontations between pluralistic wishful fantasies about “truth” than by common ground. This pluralism demands an increasing capability for empathy and tolerance, particularly as the unifying trust in an overriding, all-embracing regularity based upon immutable laws has crumbled, having proved to be a relic of narcissistic feeling states from early infancy which, although important for survival, is becoming harder and harder to sustain (p. 8).

With a focus upon psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts, Appy’s view is that analysts as a group may be tied up with infantile narcissistic fantasies, which by necessity had, and possibly still have, survival qualities: wishful fantasies about seeking and finding “truth” and the issue of “immutable laws”. The “common ground” pursuits of Wallerstein may be seen to correlate with this perspective, but Appy does not explicitly state this. However, he does propose that

“empathy and tolerance” (p. 8) are necessary for “pluralism” to survive and, apparently, to be of developmental benefit for psychoanalysis.

Further on in this paper, Appy makes an observation which further explains the core of the difficulties with which psychoanalysis confronts psychoanalysts. Appy writes;

If it is true that all analysts have in common the fact that they work with unconscious processes, then they have also secured for themselves into the bargain the permanent conflict between finitude and infinitude, life and death, renunciation and assertion, transference and countertransference. This conflict becomes more acute the closer it approaches to the sphere of primary process. Psychogenetic reconstructions and theorisations then often become premature bastions of reality-testing, into which the analyst withdraws and protects himself from being overwhelmed. (p. 9).

In this observation Appy appears to be explaining that, through their focus on and work with unconscious processes, analysts are inevitably and unavoidably confronted by essential existential conflicts, and paradoxes, to do with finite and infinite, life and death etc.

Appy outlines that, by the nature of psychoanalytic work, analysts approach unconscious conflicts which manifest in the paradoxical and conflictual existential and experiential issues to which he refers. The more involved in these issues they become, seen as approaching the dynamics of the primary process, then the more disturbing this becomes. Appy implies that, because of this disturbance and the consequent threat to their narcissistic equilibrium, analysts resort to “reconstructions and theorisations” as “bastions” (p. 9).

In these ideas about the challenge of psychoanalysis, Appy implies that the reason for the difficulties between analysts, and also understanding what psychoanalysis is, is due to the defensive erection of theoretical bastions. In this psychoanalysis per se, because of its focus on basic existential issues within unconscious conflicts, is too difficult and disturbing for analysts (an echo of Freud’s 1914a comments about Adler and Jung) and so they determinedly embrace their theories.

v. Aslan (1989)

Aslan begins his paper with a long quotation from Genesis II with reference to “The Tower of Babel”. Following this long quotation Aslan outlines his ideas by drawing the quotation back to psychoanalysis; of this he (1989) writes;

The richness and vitality of current psychoanalysis tells us that we psychoanalysts keep building “our city”. The multiplicity of frames of reference constitutes precisely a demonstration of such richness and vitality (p. 12).

But in Aslan’s view not all analytic “frames of reference” have this constructive quality.

Following on from this essentially optimistic beginning, Aslan proceeds to note that the “diversity of the languages developed by many schools” (p. 12) makes it difficult for psychoanalysts to understand each other. Of this, Aslan states;

We find ourselves in a psychoanalytic Babel where: 1 the same words name different concepts; 2 the same concepts are named by different words; 3 there are a number of words only validated within the context of a given frame of reference (p. 13).

He proposes further that he does not believe that approaching these issues (“of the psychoanalytic Babel”, p. 13) through establishing clinical common ground will be sufficient. He proposes that, “on the contrary it seems not only indispensable but also inevitable to resort to theoretical levels and ideas” (p. 13). He then proceeds to propose where he believes the focus should be with respect to theoretical and clinical ideas. This concerns

an aspect of the early mother-infant relationship where an interchange takes place which produces a structuring effect in the infant’s psyche, an effect generically called *identification* (p. 13, Aslan’s italics).

Aslan then refers to a number of authors (Winnicott, Mahler, Bion, Lacan, Freud), from whose ideas he believes he can establish analytic theoretical common ground through the concept of identification.

By his reference to these analysts, Aslan proposes that psychoanalysis is a clinical practice both focused upon and directed by aspects of regression, transference, and reconstruction, the manifestations of which are approached

by words directed towards bringing about change “to the patient’s psyche” (p. 14). And, in keeping with Wallerstein’s ideas (1988), Aslan contends that from this clinical basis different theories are derived that analysts use to explain the findings of their clinical practice to themselves.

From these ideas, Aslan outlines the points of his common ground, noting three areas in which this common ground may be found. These are, “the psychoanalytic method” (p. 14), “the theoretical aspects” (p. 14), and “psychoanalysts themselves” (p. 15).

Of the psychoanalytic method, Aslan proposes that this involves “invariants which have not changed since Freud invented them” (p. 15); these are “free-floating attention and interpretation on the analyst’s part, free association on the patient’s part” (p. 14).

With respect to the theoretical, Aslan proposes three points that constitute common ground: one is the “existence of unconscious mental processes” (p. 15). The second of these common theoretical points is a historo-genetic perspective: “the assumption of a progression in the shaping and structuring of the unconscious and conscious psyche” (p. 15).

The third basis of the common ground is that of the analysts themselves. Of analysts Aslan writes;

I believe analysts share a certain particular feature of their characterological structure that seems to be the effect of their peculiar training (p. 15).

Aslan proposes further that analysts, because of their training, have, or take, a certain perspective with respect to problems; of this he writes;

It is difficult to define: it mainly consists of an internal and permanent special attitude to take a certain stand on facing problems; it is neither a common ideology nor a Weltanschauung, even though it may share elements from both (p. 15).

Following on from these ideas, Aslan considering the future of psychoanalysis and the related difficulties between analysts, indicates that he believes there is consensus about metapsychology and that

I think that there is consensus among analysts, at least the majority of them, in relation to not giving up metapsychology (p. 16).

But he adds that “there is some scepticism” (p. 16) about unifying the various frames of reference.

vi. Goldberg (1989)

Goldberg proposes that an understanding of the essence of the psychoanalytic interaction between analyst and patient and the theoretical basis of this can be used to understand the interaction between analysts. Of this analyst/patient interaction Goldberg states, “My thesis here is that the analytic process is one that reverses this sequence of sharing, negotiating, and ignoring” (p. 17).

In outlining his ideas, Goldberg begins with “sharing”, the sharing of perspective between patient and analyst, and the construction from this of a mutually achieved picture of the patient’s life and history (p. 17). To achieve this Goldberg proposes that the procedure required is “the exercise of empathy” (p. 17). He writes of this;

It is in the exercise of empathy that all people learn about others’ inner lives; and this is true of each and every analyst no matter what particular theories he may employ (p. 17).

Goldberg then points out that even though an analysis begins with a shared understanding between the analyst and the patient, that it is only a matter of time before misunderstandings begin to occur. Of this he states, “The ensuing work of achieving a new understanding from the misunderstood state is that of negotiation” (p. 17). Of “negotiation” Goldberg writes;

negotiation takes the dominant role in the entire analytic adventure, since analyst and patient are not of one mind, and each attempts to win over the other to his way of thinking: the one by interpretations that lead to insight and the other usually by some form of special pleading (p. 17).

Goldberg notes that the analyst’s position in this negotiating process will be “governed by his analytic theory” (p. 17). He sees that attachment to theories constitutes a problem between analysts and that, “here is where the practice of negotiation between analysts becomes paramount” (p. 18). And that this

is subject to the same sort of negotiating process between analysts as that between patient and analyst albeit in a more cognitive sense (p. 18).

Goldberg focuses this issue between analysts around the issue of the theories of transference, proposing, “I believe we agree that the major tool of our analytic interventions is the awareness and interpretation of transference” (p. 18), and that, “different analytic theories should and do primarily concern themselves with different comprehensions of the transference” (p. 18).

The third focus for Goldberg with respect to the analytic situation (after sharing and negotiation) is that of “ignoring”. He writes of this under the title of “The Unknown” (p. 18). This, apparently, refers to the unknown within mental content because of repression and disavowal (p. 18). He discusses how misunderstandings arise in the transference and that;

The intrusion of unconscious contents, the existence of disavowed material, and the lack of the necessary structure to process this new set of relationships, all lead to misunderstandings (p. 18).

He adds that;

The re-establishment of understanding from misunderstanding by way of a negotiating process allows for the inclusion of the repressed and disavowed and the establishment of a suitable structure for its tolerance and expression (p. 18).

Goldberg overviews his outlined ideas by proposing that;

Psychoanalysis has moved from revelation to negotiation, from the image of a detached analyst enabling unconscious material to emerge, to one of mutuality that demands a new theory to explain how two people affect one other (p. 19).

And further that;

It is the exercise of a willingness to move from certainty to scepticism and to a resultant posture of openness to new insights that is that mark of the analyst that joins hands with his colleagues in the search for common ground (p. 20).

Goldberg’s views indicate he sees that psychoanalysis has moved from Freud into “a new theory to explain how two people affect one other” (p. 19). He argues that psychoanalysis does not involve “revelation” so much as “negotiation”, with the reasons for this being that revelation relates to a closed theoretical system which psychoanalysis can never be (p. 19). Negotiation is

required to address the uniqueness of the patient and each analyst-patient interaction.

vii. Le Guen (1989)

Le Guen observes;

Of all the clinical experiences I have ever had, there is one that never ceases to surprise me; yet I have often had it and shall have it again. I am referring to my encounter with the effects of a different form of psychoanalytic practice (p. 30).

This observation refers to patients who have consulted another analyst but also analytic students who have had supervision with analysts of different orientation from Le Guen's. From this observation, Le Guen proposes that;

Intuition rather than rational argument suggests to me that how a treatment proceeds has much more to do with the "analytic qualities" of those involved than with the virtues of each school's specific techniques (p. 20).

Le Guen, in this, opines that specific qualities about the individual analyst would be more determining of the quality and nature of the work that they do than the theoretical system that they propose they are working within. He then proposes that the answer

to Wallerstein's question "One of more analyses?" is self-evident: there can only be one psychoanalysis whose object is the unconscious workings of the mind, regardless of the diversity of the theories which attempt to understand and explain it (p. 20).

This perspective re the defining qualities of psychoanalysis within an understanding of the unconscious workings of the mind contrasts Goldberg's ideas.

Le Guen discusses that his defining conceptualization of psychoanalysis may have only a loose correlation with the principles of an analyst's practice. He proposes that even though there are number of different practical procedures with different theoretical bases, this would not be a problem if they were all still approaching the same subject of study. For Le Guen this would be the issue of unconscious mental processes. However, as Le Guen's paper

proceeds, it becomes apparent that he is not convinced that this subject of study is consistent between the various analytic schools.

Le Guen also points out a further significant challenge in terms of understanding what psychoanalysis is. As psychoanalysis is a treatment method, it is not just trying to understand its object of study, it is trying to change it. Of this Le Guen writes, “It runs the risk of possibly denaturing the manifestations of that object, even to the extent of obliterating it” (p. 21).

Le Guen proceeds to state that psychoanalytic practice involves “the facilitation of regression by the patient in their treatment” and that this is “a means of ensuring, and a necessary condition for, its efficacy” (p. 21). He adds that this regression must be controlled by the analyst: the analyst is to facilitate this controlled regression in the patient without becoming manipulative and while maintaining analytic neutrality. In this Le Guen seems to approach a procedural paradox when he writes, “the analyst must at one and the same time remain neutral and intervene in order to change something” (p. 22). He adds that;

The analyst constantly risks falling between the two stools of ineffectiveness due to excessive neutrality and conditioning due to abuse of intervention. But the dividing line between control and constraint may be very thin (p. 22).

He proceeds from this therapeutic challenge to discuss the issues of transference and countertransference. Of this he writes;

Everything I have just said shows that the utilisation of the transference/countertransference is at the heart of our practice; it is both the crux of any psychoanalytic technique and the condition of its validity” (p. 22).

He adds that, “All analysts would surely agree on this point” (p. 22). As has been discussed, issues of transference (and counter-transference) would in fact not be points upon which all analysts would agree, as noted by Green (2005).

From these ideas, Le Guen takes a further theoretical step by stating;

It seems to be self-evident that the transference, together with the countertransference that accompanies it..., is organised by the Oedipus complex (p. 22).

Adding;

this also tends to alter the meaning of the Oedipus complex, which is now not only the prime mover which structures the individual...but also the organising process of exchange – an exchange which is asymmetrical (pp. 22-23).

Le Guen proposes that the transference is “a pure product of regression” (p. 23), and the countertransference is

an instrument in the service of the control of regression, while at the same time facilitating this regression and rendering it explicit (p. 23),

and that together they represent, “an excellent criterion for distinguishing between what is psychoanalysis and what is not” (p. 23). And that;

This foundation is one that is common to us all; it is therefore also the criterion of belonging to psychoanalysis (p. 23).

Having established these definitional criteria Le Guen comments;

The more clinical experience I accumulate of other forms of practice the more convinced I become that we are not all psychoanalysts – at least, as understood by Freud (p. 23).

He explains that it is the followers of Lacan to whom he is referring because

the techniques of this school impede the development of free regression and exacerbate control to the point of making it “wild” (p. 23).

viii. Nunes (1989)

Nunes begins by discussing the theory of scientific paradigms and that “if new facts that do not fit in to accepted norms” are not rejected then, “a crisis is generated” (p. 24). Nunes notes that Freud used such situations (i.e. of such crisis) to make new discoveries. Nunes proposes that the discovery of the dynamic unconscious is an example of this.

Nunes overviews Freud’s ideas and their inherent changes and that, “All these changes made by Freud himself, gave the analytic paradigm an enormous opening...” (p. 25). This “opening” is the site of the different models of psychoanalysis that have developed since Freud to fill the gaps left by Freud. These are all, “legitimate and even necessary because they stress certain

aspects that in this way can be better studied” (p. 25); adding that “following any of these models it is possible to practise psychoanalysis” (p. 25).

Nunes addresses a key issue, that Freud’s overarching ideas about what psychoanalysis is remain incomplete. Furthermore that the different ideas of the different schools are to be sited in the conceptual space left by Freud; as such each has its own legitimacy with respect to being psychoanalytic. And even though Nunes proposes that each can represent psychoanalysis in practice, in theory they are only a complement to Freud’s ideas and hence do not represent an overall perspective of what psychoanalysis is. This perspective does not correlate with the discarding and the replacement of Freud’s ideas.

Nunes proposes that, following Freud’s practical definitions of psychoanalysis, many psychoanalytic psychotherapies would be considered to be psychoanalytic also. However, Nunes opines that there remains a difference between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, that psychoanalysis only is characterised in practice, “by the suspension of the privilege we normally concede to the logic of the secondary process” (p. 25). Of this, Nunes writes;

What characterises an analytic session is the regression that permits analyst and patient to stand the confrontation between the secondary and primary processes (p. 25).

Nunes focus the central role of truth and freedom in the analytic endeavor that;

In Freud, truth and freedom are united in an irreversible way. The whole analytic method seeks to leave the patient free so that truth may appear (p. 26).

The interpretation aims to give the patient meaning in the area of the unknown, amplifying their consciousness, and helping them towards being more free.

For Nunes, psychoanalysis aims at a regressive suspension of secondary process thought, and that this facilitates communication at a certain level between patient and analyst. And further, that the analyst’s communications, by way of interpretation, aim towards the facilitation of the

gaining of meaning, leading to an apprehension of the truth and associated increase in freedom for the patient.

Of these issues, Nunes discusses the analyst concealing or revealing real factors about themselves; writing that;

the analyst is more real to the patient, not when he tries to show himself as he really is, but when the patient is able to acquire a better capacity to see him" (p. 26).

This involves the analyst's neutrality but not his or her absence, i.e. deliberately hiding themselves, which blocks "the development of the sense of reality" (p. 26). However, Nunes proposes that, although the patient finds the situation disquieting, it also allows the patient greater freedom: "the analytic encounter is more free and allows greater truth because it is not a spontaneous encounter" (p. 27).

Nunes notes that even though psychoanalysis began as an attempt to discover the aetiological traumatic events of early life, and that Freud "rejected this theory almost a century ago..." (p. 27), psychoanalyses can still take on an endless quality in the search for this elusive issue. Nunes also questions the idea of, "the atemporality of the unconscious" (p. 27), proposing that in dreams the sense of past, present and future are mixed, "but not confounded" (p. 27), and that, surprisingly, in psychoanalysis the issue of the future "is generally denied" (p. 27). This is surprising because, "the theory of psychoanalysis is centred on desire which also has an unequivocal link to the future" (p. 27).

Nunes then discusses the place of the death instinct;

We believe that the most important perspective opened by Freud, with the introduction of the death instinct, has been little used in clinical practice (p. 27).

Nunes discusses "the fantasy of omnipotence" (p. 28) as a defence against the awareness of the limit to individual existence and that, "Human anxiety is, fundamentally, an anticipation of this limit" (p. 28). He finishes his paper by stating that;

To accept the end of all our possibilities makes us all more humble and responsible for our own lives and also more tolerant with other men, our mortal companions of imperfections (p. 28).

ix. Green (2005)

Green's paper is written as response and reaction to Wallerstein's papers about the common ground of analysis (especially Wallerstein, 2005). Of Wallerstein's (2005) paper, Green writes that Wallerstein "wanted to generate a glimmer of hope in a grey sky" (p. 267).

In his paper Green proposes that an essential aliveness has gone from psychoanalysis, "something essential is missing" (p. 627). Of this he outlines some of the bitter but alive interactions between analysts that have occurred;

who can forget the bitterness of the quarrels between Kohut and Kernberg, which ended not because they actually abated but from lack of combatants (p. 628).

Green implies that something essential to psychoanalysis, which manifested in such bitter disputes, has been lost in a step towards conciliation, seen by Green as "superficial" (p. 628). Of this he gives the example of the British Society;

it was no surprise to witness rapprochements at the heart of the British Psychoanalytical Society that deceived no one, as unlikely as they were questionable, between Joseph Sandler and certain Kleinians (p. 628).

Of this "conciliatory" approach Green proposes that the consequences are the poor quality of articles in the International Journal, "pluralistic pseudo-thought" in internet discussions, and "an advanced state of disintegration in psychoanalytic thought" (p. 630). He adds, "In relation to clinical practice, priority is accorded to pragmatism, even if psychoanalytic principles are forgotten in the process" (p. 630). These "psychoanalytic principles" for Green are those of Freud. His statement about these has been considered earlier in this study (Part One, Chapter 2, Step A). Of this situation, as he sees it, Green comments, "In the name of psychoanalytic democracy" (p. 630), psychoanalysis has adopted, "a highbrow miscellany of cognitivism and neuro-science, often poorly understood" (p. 630).

Green's perspective, put forward with a passion that he notes is lacking in psychoanalysis, is that, as a reaction to the passionate and bitter manifestations of disputation with respect to what psychoanalysis is, a pseudo-

democracy of conceptualizations about psychoanalysis has arisen. Green notes that this has led to the dismissal or discarding of the essential conceptualizations of Freud, both singularly and overall, and the replacement of these with conceptualizations based in “cognitivism and neuro-science”. Green does not fully approach reasons for this, i.e. what it is about psychoanalysis that provokes such reactions. However, he does imply that it is because of the failure of Freud to contain the essential disturbing affective qualities of psychoanalytic theory and practice that the dilutions and dismissals and the superficiality of concepts have become necessary. Green expresses his concern for the future of psychoanalysis because of these issues.

x. *Other Respondents*

There were other papers presented at the Rome (1989) Congress that peripherally discussed the issue of Wallerstein’s common ground notions. However, each of these, Hernández (1990), Feldman (1990), and Schafer (1990), used the Congress theme to discuss specific clinical and/or theoretical issues. These papers did not directly address the issue of what psychoanalysis is and will not be discussed here.

xi. *Overview of the Views of the Respondents to Wallerstein’s Ideas About Psychoanalysis.*

There would appear to be a consistent approach within these responses. Most of them refer back to the ideas of Freud with the issue of the unconscious in theory, and transference in practice, being their main focus. However, none of the papers embraces the full essence of Freud’s ideas; each instead focuses on one or some of the constituent elements as the basis of what, for them, is psychoanalysis.

In this, Rangell argues for a “total comprehensive” theory of psychoanalysis, which he sees as represented by ego psychology. He argues that this is because, compared with the other schools of thought, ego

psychology does not eliminate essential definitive conceptualizations about what psychoanalysis is.

Abrams directs towards the issues of insight, the challenge of ambiguity in development, and a particular focus upon the Oedipus complex as the key to understanding psychoanalysis in theory and practice.

Appy's focus is upon the challenge of the handling of the unconscious forces - and the consequences of defensive reactions against these – because of the challenge to issues of narcissism and residual aspects of infantile omnipotence. Appy would seem to see that many difficulties of psychoanalysis (between analysts at least) spring from these issues.

Aslan proposes that he believes there is a common language found within the various analytic schools in the conceptualization of “identification”. Beyond this he also proposes that a commonality in psychoanalysis can be found in the method, the theory, and within the psychoanalysts themselves. Regarding the last, Aslan believes that the training of psychoanalysts leads to a certain perspectival approach to psychoanalysis within analysts.

Goldberg's ideas direct towards an essentially different fundamental perspective from those of the others. For example, the role of the unconscious, emphasised by most of the others, is minimised with respect to the concept of the “real” relationship. Although this perspective is tempered by discussion concerning transference, the focus upon technical procedures presents an ambiguous picture of how Goldberg views the place of unconscious issues (if at all). He eventually points out that there is a need for a new theory to explain how two people influence each other.

Le Guen, in contrast to Goldberg, returns to a determined emphasis of the “unconscious workings of the mind” as central to psychoanalysis. In this he points out that its object of study defines a science and, by extension, this will also be the case for psychoanalysis. However, he points out further that psychoanalysis is different because of its clinical orientation towards changing its object of study. Le Guen also focuses upon the issue of regression as central to analytic practice and the challenging role in this for the analyst, who

must balance facilitation and control. He adds to this the central roles of transference and countertransference in psychoanalytic practice. Le Guen also puts forward the central (for him) position of the Oedipus complex in theory and practice. Le Guen is the only one of these authors who states quite clearly that he believes that “psychoanalytic” ideas and practices do not, from his Freudian perspective, always warrant such a title.

Nunes proposes that Freud’s thinking about psychoanalysis left “an enormous opening”, and that the various schools of analytic thought have developed within this opening. However, he focuses on what he believes to be definitional – the regression that leads to a confrontation between primary and secondary process thought, leading further to issues of insight, truth and freedom. These are played out in the relationship with the analyst at an implied interface between fantasy and reality. Nunes is the only respondent to weave the concept of death instinct into his ideas about psychoanalysis in practice and in theory.

Green, in a more recent paper, overflows with pessimism about the path of psychoanalytic thinking and practice. Key to this would be the issue of the abandonment of core definitional notions and conceptualizations (those from Freud), and their substitution with ideas from parallel paradigms. However, Green also implies this movement is not based upon due consideration and debate of key conceptualizations, but more an avoidance of both discussion and the concepts themselves. Green proposes that the practice of psychoanalysis, based on certain premises, leads to certain theoretical perspectives, again implying that abandonment of these premises has produced the theories that have since developed.

In summary, the dynamic unconscious as central to analytic theory (as would seem to be emphasised by most of the respondents) is the most consistent factor in all the views put forward. However, as evidenced by Goldberg and commented upon by Green, this apparent core conceptualization can be pushed aside. Also concepts such as regression, transference and

countertransference, which are central to psychoanalysis for some of its respondents, become dispensable for others.

Overall, therefore, even though some concepts are consistently central to most of Wallerstein's respondents with respect to their views as to what psychoanalysis is, each would seem to have their own view either based upon one (or more) of Freud's constituent conceptualizations (of his psychoanalysis), or at least their view of such, or upon a revised and correcting view of such. Freud's overall view, an amalgam of the constituent components, of what psychoanalysis is, *has not been fully embraced by any of these analysts*. But each of them writes as if they have embraced a view which represents, overall, what psychoanalysis is.

With respect to this study, the views of these analysts indicate that each of them believes that they know what psychoanalysis is, and they proceed to outline this view and its correspondence with an overall view, generally that of Freud. Each of them gives an incomplete view of Freud's view, taking one, or occasionally more, of his constituent elements, but each argues for the completeness of their view, i.e. that it represents what psychoanalysis is. These different views give some picture of what psychoanalysis is, but a less complete one than Freud's. However, it raises the question about how psychoanalysis could be believed by these analysts to be represented by their views to the extent that they can forcefully argue what is and is not psychoanalysis. Their attachment in their views to an overall view would, in part, seem to explain this. But what it says about what psychoanalysis is, is still to be considered.

C. Step C: Contemporary Views About Psychoanalysis.

As introduced, the views of the respondents to Wallerstein's papers (except those of Green), which were taken as a representative sample of analysts' view about what psychoanalysis is, are not contemporary. Accordingly, more current views are also sought. These are the views of the three key note speakers at the 2009 IPA Congress (Chicago). The speakers were Ferro (from the European section of the IPA), Jiménez (South America) and Poland (North America)¹. The theme of the Congress was "Psychoanalytic Practice: Convergences and Divergences" and, consequently, each of the speakers was drawn to discuss what for them psychoanalysis is.

i. Ferro

Ferro (2009) begins his paper by stating his intention, "to demonstrate on the basis of ample clinical material... the theoretical model that inspires my clinical practice" (p. 209). He proceeds to indicate his position about what constitutes psychoanalysis:

In my view, in order for the term "psychoanalysis" to be used legitimately, three invariants are indispensable: first, the conviction that an unconscious exists (even if it may assume a variety of forms); second, respect for the unvarying elements of the setting; and, third and last, an asymmetry, with the analyst taking full responsibility for what happens in the consulting room (p. 210).

This statement about what psychoanalysis is is extremely broad and seemingly illustrates Green's view of pseudo-democratisation with respect to psychoanalytic identity. Ferro does not explain why he takes such a broad perspective on psychoanalysis, instead he discusses what he sees as the most significant differences between analytic models. He lists six focal differences, which will be briefly considered because they give a perspective on Ferro's

¹ Even though the IPA chose representatives of the three component sections to outline contemporary views about the challenges of psychoanalytic practice, the views of Ferro, Jiménez and Poland are not to be seen to necessarily represent the views of the analytic members of those sections, i.e. as approaching a definitive statement about what is psychoanalysis that would be agreed upon by those in that section. Their views can be anticipated to be as subject to dissent and disagreement as those of any other analyst: in fact, from the personal experience of the author of this study, they are!

views re what psychoanalysis is. These he outlines with respect to a classical view, a revised view, and a possible compromise one.

These are:

- a) The first of these is a contrast between that of “historical reconstruction”, making conscious unconscious phantasies related to issues “of the internal world”, and what Ferro describes as, “expanding the instruments for containing proto-emotions (the container and transforming them (the alpha-function))” (p. 210). In this he proposes that a “possible middle way” between these two approaches would be one in which “the unveiling of the unconscious phantasies”, “become the occasion for and vehicle of development of the container and of the alpha-function” (p. 210).

In this contrast, and “possible middle way” (p. 210), Ferro examines the issue of whether the notion of the unconscious remains central or falls away, or whether a compromise can be achieved such that the unconscious retains (at least some) relevance.

- b) A second point of difference in psychoanalysis for Ferro is “the significance to be assigned to the range of dream-like manifestations in a session” (p. 210). In this Ferro proposes one perspective that “some regard dreams as significant events of the session” (p. 210); in contrast, others focus more on the events in the analyst’s mind with respect to their “reverie” (p. 210), “i.e. the occurrence, in the analyst’s mind, of images connected with what is happening in the analytic relationship” (p. 210).

In this, Ferro proposes a contrast in psychoanalytic practice between a focus on the patient’s manifestations (the recall of their dreams) or on the analyst’s functioning and inner experience. Ferro proposes further than these two foci (upon the patient’s dream, and upon the analyst’s reverie) may be compared with another (compromise) perspective

to consider the entire session as a dream in which case the analyst’s most important activity becomes a process of a *transformation in dreaming* (p. 210, Ferro’s italics).

- c) A third issue is with respect to how much “historico-realistic” (p. 211) reality is given to the patient’s communications. Ferro links this with the issue of the “reality of the patient’s internal world”, which is granted the status of “being just as real as the external world” (p. 211). Ferro contrasts this with a communication that “assumes a zero degree of external reality in any communication by the patient”. This latter approach makes “the session a privileged space and a unique opportunity for transformation of the mental functioning of patient and analyst alike” (p. 211). This perspective is Ferro’s one of seeing each session as a dream analogue.
- d) The fourth difference between different analytic models concerns “the importance to be assigned to the polar opposites of truth and lies and all intermediate states” (p. 211). Ferro briefly discusses how the issue of “truth” may be addressed (and perceived). One perspective is the contrast between “historical truth” and “narrative truth”; another relates to internal truth –the truth of “emotional contact with oneself” (p. 211) or the “truth of the functioning of the internal world” (p. 211).
- e) Ferro then refers to the “different possible interpretive modalities” (p. 211). Within this he lists a number of different interpretive perspectives:

reconstructive interpretations; interpretations of the transference and in the transference; unsaturated or saturated interpretations of the field or in the field; and co-constructed interpretations (p. 211).
- f) The last point addressed by Ferro relates to the focus upon the

concepts of transference (whether as a repetition of what cannot be remembered, or as the projection of phantasies to the outside) and of relationship (p. 212).

With respect to these issues, Ferro refers to “the level of listening and interpretation that we predominantly espouse” (p. 212), and brings in issues of theoretical orientations and whether the interpretive focus is upon content or “the emotional voltage” (p. 212).

To summarise, Ferro begins his paper with an open definition/description of what constitutes psychoanalysis for him. He then tightens this definition by an extensive contrast of the factors which constitute what psychoanalysis is from two different perspectives. In this he is drawing attention to and describing two different perspectives: essentially, a Freudian perspective and one that Ferro constructs from Bion's ideas. Although Ferro does propose an integration of these two different perspectives, through his clinical examples and his conclusions he clearly indicates that his perspective on Bion's ideas is what constitutes psychoanalysis.

ii. Jiménez

Jiménez (2009) begins by noting that the question of unity (or not) in psychoanalytic theory is now also being directed to the question of unity in clinical practice. However, he discusses the difficulties in examining the latter because it is difficult to gain information about what analysts "*really do*" (p. 232, Jiménez's italics) in their clinical work. He proposes that this is "not simply" an issue of deliberate cover-up because of the need to be seen to be supporting a certain theoretical view, or because of "super ego issues" (p. 232), but also because the analyst's views will have an unconscious effect upon how the analyst's sees and reports the data of their clinical work. It would thus seem that Jiménez believes that the analyst may not be able to clearly report on some or much of what they do, and why they do so, because of the unconscious basis of their actions.

He proceeds to point to evidence to support his view that the concept of "pluralism" may under-estimate the diversity of theoretical and practical perspectives in psychoanalysis (p. 232). He explains how he sees the diversity or "plurality" of views has developed. He proposes that analysts alter their basic theories because of the intrusion of "'intrinsic" private preconscious theory" (p. 233), to which analysts turn "to grasp the singularity of their patients subjectivity" (p. 233). The understandings from these private theories may fit well with the individual patient but they fail as general theories, even though analysts propose them as such. Jiménez proposes that, because of the

demands upon the analyst (and patient) in their clinical work to understand the patient at a subjective level, at times being empty of such understanding, they will construct out of “interwoven predictions and validations (or reflections)” (p. 233) such understandings. However, the analyst will then see these understandings as corresponding with generalised theories – leading to the problems which arise between analysts. This plurality may therefore be “a factor of progress” or the destruction of psychoanalysis (p. 233) - Jiménez appears to consider it the latter.

Jiménez proceeds to discuss how therapeutic change in clinical practice is understood to occur. He notes Freud’s link between “gain of knowledge and cure” (p. 238), but that analysts have conceived of this in different ways. He also notes that there has not been “mutual consensus on the objectives or goals of analytic treatment” (p. 238) throughout the history of psychoanalysis. He notes the polarisation of views from “the search for truth about the patient” to that of to “remove or decrease symptoms through more effective and better adapted compromised formations” (p. 238). Of the first, Jiménez states further;

the idea that we need to search for the truth of the unconscious and that the cure will accompany it is a very widespread idea in psychoanalysis... (p. 239).

And with regard to the issue of finding the truth and what it is considered to be, significant differences of view arise. There is also the problem of determining “what the patient’s truth is” (p. 239) and who decides this at any point in time? He notes that this issue leads to different positions, one being that the analyst is the expert who ““knows best” about how the patient’s mind and its unconscious roots function” (p. 239); the other position being that the truth is “co-constructed in the interpersonal and intersubjective interaction between analyst and patient” (p. 239). Jiménez proposes that there is not much phenomenological support for the first of these. From the second perspective, Jiménez notes that the patient’s symptomatic improvement will be seen to be evidential that the truth about them has been successfully achieved; “symptomatic relief thus becomes a guide in searching for the patient’s truth” (p. 239). In this Jiménez is noting these perspectives rather than confirming them.

Jiménez then notes that even though the notion of the search for the truth concerning the patient's unconscious "did prevail for a long time" (p. 239), that recently "'a redefinition of the object of its study [is observed]; that is, the particularly intersubjective figure constituted by the analyst-patient relationship'" (p. 239); in this Jiménez is quoting Canestri (1994), but is seemingly also representing his views. He explains that a search for the truth concerning the patient's unconscious cannot be separated from the interaction of the patient and the analyst; the relation between the two (for Jiménez) becomes a central focus of the analytic work. In this, knowledge is, "a social and linguistic co-construction of intersubjective reality between patient and analyst" (p. 240) and exchanged language becomes central:

Truth is constituted through dialogue and valid knowledge emerges as a result of interpretations and alternative and conflicting possibilities of action, which are discussed, negotiated and discerned in line with the rules of the psychoanalytic method (p. 240).

And further to this, Jiménez proposes that proof of the efficacy of analytic work is considered through the actions involved and the actions which follow. The "mutative locus" (p. 242) in psychoanalysis occurs

when the movement of intersubjective negotiation leads to *moments of meeting* with shared understanding of the implicit mutual relationship, producing in turn a recontextualisation of the patient's implicit relational knowledge (p. 242, Jiménez's italics).

And of this he explains that;

These are moments between patient and analyst of reciprocal recognition of what is in the other's mind concerning the actual nature and state of the mutual relationship (p. 242).

Jiménez proposes that such a process "partially" frees the patient and analyst from "tonalities of the transference-countertransference relation" (p. 242).

Jiménez concludes by putting forward ideas about research and practice, hoping "to liberate practice from theory, so that we can study it on its own merits" (p. 244). However, inherent in what Jiménez writes is the question of what constitutes psychoanalytic practice if it is divorced from a theoretical perspective. In this Jiménez refers to the *Working Party* of the EPF (European

Psychoanalytic Federation) and the idea of a “methodology for collective investigation” (p. 245). This leads to Jiménez’s ideas of;

the fundamental rule: *Psychoanalysis is what psychoanalysts practice* (Sandler, 1982, p. 144), which means that “the presenter in each group is to be considered a psychoanalyst, whatever transpires” (Tuckett, 2007, p. 1051). My own experience as a presenter of clinical material...supports my conviction that we are witnessing *a new beginning* (p. 245, Jiménez’s italics).

Jiménez, in a more formal and detailed way than Ferro (whose arguments are conveyed more by clinical presentation), perceives a duality of perspective overall in psychoanalysis, and is directing towards his perspective by pointing out the failures and deficits on the other side, especially those based on the ideas of Freud. Jiménez argues that the focus in analytic practice upon the exploration of and explication of the truth of the unconscious fantasies of the patient is misguided and misrepresents the reality of what transpires between the analyst and the patient with respect to two real people involved in a complex interaction. For example, Jiménez writes;

To search for the patient’s truth does not happen in a void but in the midst of a relation between two persons... (p. 240),

and

it is not possible to continue to separate exploration of the unconscious from what the patient and analyst are attempting with this search (p. 240).

The essence of Jiménez’s argument would therefore be that the classical perspective of psychoanalysis of the search for the “truth” and understanding about the patient’s unconscious by the matrix of the transference-countertransference interactions is misguided and fails to appreciate the reality, seemingly conscious (or available to consciousness), of the real interaction between the two real protagonists, distinct and separate from issues of fantasy. In this, the conceptualizations of the unconscious and of the transference and countertransference based upon fantastic manifestations of the unconscious is considered misguided; “the truth is constituted through dialogue...” (p. 240), and

knowledge arises as a result of interpretations and alternative and conflicting possibilities of action, which are discussed, negotiated and discerned in line with the rules of the psychoanalytic method (p. 240).

Of course the question would arise as to what “psychoanalytic method” Jiménez has in mind if the analytic method which was developed by Freud around the constituent elements of psychoanalysis as he saw them is being dismissed by Jiménez as fundamentally misguided?

Jiménez moves on to the notion of research into psychoanalytic practice. In this he introduces a movement towards the perspectives of Sandler and Tuckett, essentially, that psychoanalysis becomes anything that the psychoanalyst does (presumably in the name of psychoanalysis). Jiménez is very supportive of such a notion because it (seemingly to Jiménez’s view) leads to a “new beginning”, with the inference that this is a good thing. In other words, a practice devoid of theory seemingly allows for a pragmatic perspective in which psychoanalysts practise psychoanalysis by a fundamental mandate, and this freeing of psychoanalysis from its theoretical foundations, presumably circumventing in this disputations over conceptualizations, allows for psychoanalysis to start again.

iii. Poland

The third of the keynote speakers is Poland (2009). He begins with a series of overview statements about psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts:

despite our difficulties, analytic thinking flourishes. New ideas bloom; our journals grow. However, even as some cross-fertilisation takes place among us, we see diversity bring with it Balkanization, division into smaller and even hostile sects (p. 250).

He also states;

we know that caution in approaching new contributions is particularly prudent because of a problem unique to our field, that is, that our central focus is on unconscious forces, forces that stir unrelenting resistance. Aware of the subtlety with which defenses can mask themselves and knowing the unsophisticated skill of our minds, we appreciate the extra care is called for when new ideas challenge prior analytic knowledge (p. 250).

He continues these comments;

When we look at ourselves with candor, we see something beyond benevolent skepticism. Too often we see polemics and partisanship crowd

out mutual respect, with ridicule at times rearing its malignant specter (p. 250).

From these opening comments Poland asks about psychoanalysis;

can we continue to grow and venture beyond the boundaries of our accustomed ideas and still, as I believe we must, keep central as common to all of us the core concern for unconscious forces, the orientation that distinguishes what is uniquely psychoanalytic from what is broadly psychological (p. 250).

In these Poland is indicating that, in his view, psychoanalytic thinking is “flourishing” but that there remains the omnipresent threat of a formation of hostile sects. He also notes that as “unconscious forces” are the central focus of psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis will continually be confronted with the defensive arts and guile of the analytic mind. He emphasises, in this, that the focus on unconscious forces is what defines the uniqueness of psychoanalysis. It is implied that if these forces and their manifestations are kept as a prime focus, then an analytic perspective is being sustained and that analytic growth and development can ensue, otherwise malignant forces will, presumably, stifle such growth and development. These malevolent forces would either seem to be those of the defensive reactions against an awareness of the unconscious forces referred to by Poland, or aspects of these forces not being recognised but expressed instead, or a combination of the two.

The issue in particular about analysts and analysis that Poland addresses in his paper is that of narcissism which he links to scientific curiosity. He describes a balance between narcissism as a pathological entity to be contained, controlled and/or matured and the creative expression of scientific curiosity. Of this Poland writes;

Behind our convergences and divergences lies a restless marriage between narcissism and scientific curiosity. When our narcissism is secure, or even better, mature, we are free to venture farthest in our inquiries. When our narcissism is threatened, open-minded, outward-looking inquiry deteriorates into a politics of identity (p. 251).

From here Poland continues to discuss “human frailties”, pointing towards those frailties “amenable to mastery” (p. 252). He first designates competitiveness, of which he writes;

When threatened competitively, our mastery of early narcissism regresses and we too quickly return to the hunger for pride of place (p. 253).

However, he adds that, without such narcissistic investment, curiosity would have little motivation. He proposes that “narcissistic intensity needs taming, vanity needs to mature, if ambition is to contribute to progress” (p. 253).

Poland also considers the paradox of individual existence (p. 254); that everyone wishes to be unique but also longs to be recognised and identified as belonging to a group. In this Poland seems to be identifying and defining one of the core agents of the difficulties for psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts.

iv. Overview of Contemporary Views

These three authors have outlined views that differ significantly both in perspective and conclusion – and in doing so exemplify the challenge of approaching agreed understanding of psychoanalysis. The main difference between the three views lies with the focus of their perspective. Ferro, from a Bionian perspective, focuses upon the effect of the patient’s unconscious upon the analyst’s psychic experience. Jiménez adopts the complementary perspective, the intersubjective, with its focus upon understanding of the analyst’s effect upon the patient. Poland alternatively focuses issues of analytic understanding upon the analyst’s experience and struggles with their own unconscious, and in this their relationship with psychoanalysis per se.

Summary of Perspectives on the Dichotomies of Psychoanalysis.

Through the preceding consideration of perspectives on what psychoanalysis is from Freud, the focused views of a number of analysts, and the recent ideas of Ferro, Jiménez and Poland, contrast between two psychoanalyses has been discussed. Although there would appear to be some correlation, two separate dichotomies have been identified. With Freud a main focus has been on the allusion to this in Freud's 1914 paper ("On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement"). As discussed, this contrast is between a perspective on what psychoanalysis is held by Freud, and put forward to deal with the challenges of Adler and Jung, and a more straightforward perspective. In this Freud emphasises the greater depth and complexity, and a willingness to address the challenging basis of existence and being inherent in his ideas, in contrast to the diluting and normalising qualities inherent in the ideas of his challengers.

Freud's psychoanalysis, the perspective he emphasises, is based upon four elements that constitute its "essence". These elements are to be accepted as a package, i.e. they go together to constitute the essence. These direct towards a challenging, confronting and complex approach to understanding issues of human experience and existence.

In contrast, Freud also puts forward a more straight-forward perspective with respect to what psychoanalysis is, which is more focused on practise and essentially based on findings – the findings of his psychoanalysis. This second psychoanalysis is a psychoanalysis for all, but this democratic quality would seem to have contributed in part to the problems that have arisen in and for psychoanalysis. Because of this democratic – or pseudo-democratic – quality, each and every analyst and analytic school can claim authority with respect to knowing what psychoanalysis is. This, as has been noted, would seem to be part of the all too frequent conflicts between analysts over what is and is not psychoanalysis. Also, as with Adler and Jung, it implies that Freud's ideas are as open to challenge and dismissal as those of any other analyst, a situation that continues to today, e.g. as can be noted in Jiménez's paper. However this situation with respect to the dichotomy in Freud's ideas leads on to the second

dichotomy: the perspective of the individual held with certainty to represent what psychoanalysis is contrasting with an overall background definitory view as introduced by Wallerstein. This background definitory view with which each individual believes their view corresponds and represent, seems to be unrepresentable by any or all individual views. The question of the correlations between Freud's complex essential views and this enigmatic overall view will be considered later in this study.

The situation of the second dichotomy is apparent in the views of the respondents to Wallerstein. Inherently, each is proposing that their view best approaches the complexity of the overall or background perspective on what psychoanalysis is

This situation leads to the position surrounding current psychoanalysis. This situation Ferro proposes could be resolved by an amalgam of the old and the new, but essentially by a focus on the new (as he proposes). Jiménez proposes a new start within an absolute democracy but, at the same time, emphasises the intersubjective perspective as superior to the classical Freudian perspective. Poland proposes that the way forward is around a close consideration of issues of narcissism and creativity, with the issue of the unconscious and how this enters into analytic theory and practice being crucial. In this Ferro and Jiménez (more so than Poland) propose a necessary movement on from the ideas re what psychoanalysis is, its theory and practice, as proposed by Freud. Both Ferro and Jiménez, from different perspectives, are proposing that their view, with its basis in a theoretical conceptualization, Bion for Ferro, the intersubjective views, especially of Canestri (1994), for Jiménez, is correct and the views of others are incorrect. They imply that there is an overall, correct, view of what psychoanalysis is and their view best represents this. However, both Ferro and Jiménez, at least in these presentations, try to reduce the confronting nature of their perspective; Ferro by attempting amalgamation, Jiménez by a concept of democracy of thought.

These issues about the views of the analysts considered point overall, as has been considered, towards two dichotomies in perspectives of what psychoanalysis is. These are between the complexity of Freud's

psychoanalysis and a more straight-forward practical one, and between the views of individual analysts and an overall background view with which each individual believes theirs corresponds.

D. Step D: Further Consideration of the Second Dichotomy of Psychoanalysis

To further consider this second dichotomy of psychoanalysis (introduced in Steps B and C) the ideas of two analysts which outline such a dichotomy (Friedman, 2006; Bion, 1992\1971) will be examined.

i. Friedman (2006)

Friedman begins his (2006) paper with a response to the interrogative of his title, "What is Psychoanalysis", first dismissing the question, "a tired old useless question..." (p. 689), and then putting forward narrowing conceptualizations, "what counts for each of us is what we like and value in what we're doing" (p. 689-690), and "for each of our likes, there is an interesting theoretical elaboration these days..." (p. 690). However, Friedman then opens the complexity of the essence of psychoanalysis: he writes;

And yet...and yet...what a shame if something special, strange, and unnatural, something weird and different from other human doings, just disappeared before we fathomed what it meant and what it could do (p. 690).

Friedman sees that the fate of the provocative, creative complexity of psychoanalysis is to "sink reassuringly back in to the peaceful, green foam of common sense" (p. 690).

In these introductory comments, Friedman is establishing a contrast between two psychoanalyses: one that is of narrow conceptualization, comfortable and certain for the individual, supported and endorsed by common sense; and the other psychoanalysis, one that is different and disruptive, one that has something about it that is creative, original and defiant of common sense. The inference in Friedman's ideas is that the creative basis of psychoanalysis lies with its disruption of common sense qualities, and he proceeds to discuss these qualities as he sees them.

Friedman outlines how this second psychoanalysis is an affront to common sense because, although it began within the normal therapeutic sequence of examination, diagnosis and treatment, it "morphed [these three]

into one single thing” (p. 691). Secondly, he describes the unnaturalness of “the analyst’s vision” (p. 696) of the patient and their mind; the analyst seeing an individual whose actions are “meaningful and intentional” (p. 697) but, at the same time, also seeing “a blind organism whose objective parts interact with deterministic, causal force” (p. 697). That is, the analyst’s view is one of inherent contradiction, paradox, with respect to their patient; as Friedman notes, “psychoanalysts see both at once, and that makes them very, very weird indeed” (p. 697), a vertiginous position that Friedman believes could, to a large extent, be resolved by a return to normality.

The third quality about psychoanalysis that makes it challenging to normalcy and common sense in Friedman’s view, relates to the analyst’s role. The analyst began in the roles of the physician, neurologist, hypnotist and “suggestionist”. However, Friedman proposes that the analyst “deliberately shed those recognisable roles and refused to replace them with anything else” (p. 698). Friedman points out the provocative uniqueness of this paradoxical role;

there is no model for this ambiguity in society. Nobody likes it, nobody wants it. And it was bound to wear thin over the years” (p. 699).

The fourth and final quality that focuses the original uniqueness of analysis relates to time, which Friedman describes as “the abnormal part of normal human experience” (p. 700). Friedman especially considers the issue of time as it arises in Freud’s papers on technique, in particular those related to the transference. With respect to “Observations on Transference Love” (1915), Friedman notes that this paper is

the diary of a man painfully feeling his way into a role that has no model: he was an actor inside and outside of a passionate, but nevertheless merely virtual, drama (p. 704).

And of this, and psychoanalysis, Friedman explains further;

What renders the psychoanalytic drama virtual, I think, is this: that it boldly exposes the paradox of the past inside the present. The paradox itself is nothing new, it’s part of our everyday reality. It’s the *exposure* that makes it virtual. Ordinarily, the paradox of the past inside the present is disguised by social responsiveness (p. 704, Friedman’s emphasis).

Friedman therefore is noting and contrasting two psychoanalyses: one is the narrow individual perspective, defined by certain qualities taken from select authors about what psychoanalysis is. This perspective will be determined by issues of normalcy and common sense to undo the vertiginous and wearing effects of the other psychoanalysis. This other psychoanalysis, that Friedman sees as being discovered and championed by Freud, confronts normalcy and common sense with its audacious focus on the more basic elements of human experience and their confronting paradoxes. Friedman focuses on four qualities constitutive of and representative of this other psychoanalysis, these are:

- a. the disruption and distortion of the sequence of normal treatment in the normal treatment situation;
- b. the paradoxical perspective of the patient being seen simultaneously as a self-determining individual and an amalgam of parts, each with their own underlying “causal force” (p. 697);
- c. the analyst’s role being left undefined and ambiguous;
- d. opening the paradox of time and experience such that what is normally concealed “by social responsiveness”, the role of the past (and the future) in the present, is experienced in analysis in a way that make reality “virtual”.

These four qualities of this psychoanalysis are therefore essentially disruptive of the basic qualities of the therapeutic relationship, i.e. around the role of the analyst, the conceptualization of the patient, the treatment process, and the accepted linearity of time. What is therefore lost with the movement to the normalising of this other psychoanalysis is the vertiginous ambiguity of time, place, person and role. This ambiguity correlates with paradox with respect to the conceptualization of the patient and time (as described by Friedman), but also, with respect to the analyst’s role and the treatment process (as alluded to by Friedman).

As Friedman emphasises, the sustaining of such disturbing ambiguity (paradox) is challenging. However, I believe Friedman has not quite fully grasped the implications of what he is outlining. It is not just the vertiginous qualities of the

ambiguity/paradox that are so off-putting, it is also the essence of the paradoxes to which he is referring and that (at least potentially) become alive in analytic situation. These paradoxes, arising and being sustained in the analytic situation, are manifestations of the basic and essential paradoxes of the existence of the individual, i.e. around issues of time, place and person/self. Friedman, therefore, points towards the issue of disturbing paradoxes around the essential issues of existence that arise in the analytic situation, challenging our need for clear-cut perspectives on time, place and self and other. This would seem to be one reason, in particular, for the transition to the secure base of certainty of knowing the facts.

Following Friedman's ideas, seemingly in his efforts to examine the basis of neurosis, Freud discovered a technique, a pathway for exploring issue at the basis of human being. As Friedman writes, this is disorientating and disturbing and reactively dealt with by the move towards definitional certainty. Paradoxically, in his efforts to understand the basis of neurosis in the individual, and presumably particularly himself, Freud (seemingly) found a way to consider the basis of universal existence as this manifests in the individual. The move to definitional certainty loses this essence of the individual, with facts that pertain to everyone and can be safely considered at this general level.

As has been considered, Friedman emphasises that the sustaining of such disturbing ambiguity, correlated with paradox, is particularly challenging, with consequent resolution by the movement to the non-ambiguous facts of simple reality – to where Friedman sees psychoanalysis retreating. In this, what is lost are the paradoxes of time, place, person and process, with their opening of another reality.

The other author to be considered who refers to the contrast between two psychoanalyses is Bion.

ii. Bion (1992/1971) “Cogitations”.

In his thoughts about psychoanalysis, written in his personal (and private) journal, which was published well after his death as “Cogitations”, Bion (February 1971) makes a long statement about psychoanalysis’ future:

It seems reasonable to suppose that our somewhat insignificant specialty, psycho-analysis, has already exhausted its impetus and is ready to disappear into limbo, either because it is a burden too great for us, as we are, to carry, or because it is one more exploration destined to display a blind alley, or because it arouses or will arouse fear of the unknown to a point where the protective mechanisms of the noösphere compel it to destroy the invading ideas for fear that they will cause a catastrophe in which the noösphere disintegrates in to the no-amorph. (pp. 319-320).

In this statement Bion outlines three loosely correlated reasons why psychoanalysis has lost its creative drive and is to become, or has become, irrelevant.

One reason is that there is something about psychoanalysis which makes it too difficult for us to bear.

The second reason for the looming irrelevancy of psychoanalysis Bion directs more towards psychoanalysis per se. It has run into a dead-end in terms of its creative contribution.

The third reason is introduced by Bion in enigmatic language. I will present an understanding of what Bion would seem to be proposing. Bion’s idea appears to be that an established order of thoughts about psychoanalysis and their thinkers (presumably with respect to both its theory and its practice) will, and does, defensively destroy the intrusion of new ideas, brought by curiosity and intuition, because of the fear of their potential to bring about change in, and to, this established order. This fear is (presumably in part) because the change would have the qualities of a catastrophic event and will lead to the disintegration of this structured order into a formless state.

One psychoanalysis, therefore, is that of the established order, a psychoanalysis that has reached a dead-end and is on its way to irrelevance. The other psychoanalysis is alluded to as one which is too great a burden for us, one that is possibly correlated with the disruptive effects of the new idea and relates to possible disintegration into a formless psychic state. To attempt to

clarify what is this second psychoanalysis, the one alluded to, I will consider Bion's enigmatic terms; "catastrophic", "noösphere" and "no-amorph".

The concept of catastrophe, i.e. "catastrophic anxiety", "catastrophic change", is mainly considered by Bion in "Transformations" (1965) and "Attention and Interpretation" (1970). In "Transformations" Bion describes "catastrophic change" (and the correlated issues of "invariance" and "transformation") as it may manifest in the analytic situation. In this he describes a situation similar to an explosion and its shockwaves ("pressure-waves", p. 9), with theories of projective identification, and internal and external objects being important in explaining the events. The situation of the patient's emotional relationship with their internal objects changes suddenly and as Bion describes;

the patient's state of violent emotion sets up reactions in the analyst and others related to the patient in such a way that they also tend to be dominated by their over-stimulated internal objects thus producing a wide externalisation of internal objects: (p. 9).

Bion (1965) notes the qualities of this catastrophic change. He writes;

It is catastrophic in the restrictive sense of an event producing a subversion of the order or system of things; it is catastrophic because it is accompanied by feelings of disaster in the participants, it is catastrophic in the sense that it is sudden and violent in an almost physical way (p. 8).

This last quality Bion indicates depends upon the degree of control of the regression, a "*controlled* breakdown" (p. 8, Bion's italics). Bion also notes that "invariance" (p. 8) is a feature of catastrophic change.

For Bion, therefore, the sense of catastrophe is an experience that is sudden and violent, arising when there is a sudden disruption in the relationship between the analysand and their internal objects. This experience, associated with the sense of disaster, has a flow-on effect. The sense of catastrophe and disaster arise because there has been a "subversion of the order or system of things" (p. 8). At the level of the individual, apparently, this is the consequence of their revised relationship with their internal objects. In the long introductory quotation, it would seem that he also envisages it arising in an external sense of disruptions of established systems of thought. More specifically, Bion is proposing that the sense of catastrophe correlates with an explosive release of

energy, intruding a sense of imminent disaster upon the individual, those around him, and, at a systems level, in the structured order of things – psychoanalysis in Bion’s outline. This energetic explosion would seem to correlate with something essential – an essential force – in the individual, contained by establishing structure but necessary for change and development. Without it, creative stagnation ensues, but with it a sense of imminent catastrophe is experienced.

Grinberg, Sor and di Bianchedi (1985) note that, correlated with his ideas of catastrophic change, Bion describes the transformation of one structure into another “through the stages of disorganisation, pain and frustration” and that “growth will be a function of these vicissitudes” (p. 20). And further, that this transformation will be stimulated by the disruptive force of the new idea (p. 20). They refer to Bion’s observations about catastrophic change when they write of

the facts that Bion links to the term catastrophic change. These are *violence, invariance, and subversion of the system*; and these elements he considers inherent in any situation of growth (p. 20, Grinberg’s emphasis).

With respect to the concept of “catastrophe” as used by Bion, it would seem that this involves a disruptive (“subversion”) of the system accompanied by invariance and a sense of, or actual, violence and disaster. And that it is an inherent part of growth with the disruptive effects of the new idea important in it.

With respect to Bion’s statement about psychoanalysis and its future, it would seem that one psychoanalysis is the one of the establishment, defensively opposed to the disruptive effects of the new idea and the consequent sense of catastrophe and, therefore, growth and change; the other psychoanalysis is open to the new idea, via curiosity and intuition, and it is able to live with the catastrophic consequences as part of the process of growth.

Bion describes the danger of catastrophe as that of disintegration of the “noösphere” into the “no-amorph”. If the second (as proposed) psychoanalysis correlates with living with catastrophe, and therefore with the disintegration into the no-amorph, it raises the question of what this involves – what does Bion mean by this enigmatic statement?

Bion indicates that he has borrowed

for my own purposes the term invented by Teilhard de Chardin, the “noösphere”, supposing it to be included in a “psychosphere”. Analogous to the supposition of a definitory hypothesis of “thoughts without a thinker”, the psychosphere would be without a noösphere. (1992, p. 326).

The concept of a noösphere was proposed by Teilhard (1957), referring to a thinking layer parallel in concept to the physical biosphere of the Earth. This thinking layer was a product of man’s unique capacity for introspection – a place for psychic evolution and development in which man could continue to develop towards an equality with God. This would not seem to be Bion’s intended use of the term. Bion, instead, suggests;

Analogous to the supposition of a definitory hypothesis of “thoughts without a thinker”, the psychosphere would be without a noösphere (p. 326),

Bion seemingly sees that the place and role of the noösphere in the psychosphere is the place of thoughts and their thinkers. He writes of how curiosity “might stimulate discovery of the unknown” (1992, p. 319) and how this “may destroy the establishment, including the established work of the noösphere” (p. 319). Bion would seem to be indicating that for him the noösphere correlates with the established order of thoughts and their thinkers in a secure relationship.

The question arises as to what Bion intends or understands by the term “no-amorph”, and how could the noösphere disintegrate into this? In fact Bion writes very little of the no-amorph, but he does state that;

The two names [noösphere and no-amorph] must not...be regarded as two conflicting theories to which there correspond two conflicting realities, but two conflicting representations of the same reality. In the realm of physics a similar conflict appears in wave and quantum mechanics of light (1992, p. 319).

In Bion’s statement about psychoanalysis (as quoted above) that “reality” is psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is, therefore, represented by the noösphere and by the no-amorph – by the established order of thoughts and their thinkers and by a/the formless psychic state. Using Bion’s analogy with light, psychoanalysis is constituted of the representations noösphere *and* no-amorph. In this regard, to understand what is psychoanalysis requires an understanding of both noösphere and no-amorph and their correlation.

An indication of what Bion may intend by these terms and their relationship, and hence a hint at the reality that is psychoanalysis, occurs when he writes;

I shall suppose a mental multi-dimensional space of unthought and unthinkable extent and characteristics. Within this I shall suppose there to be a domain of thoughts that have no thinker. Separated from each other in time and space and style...is the domain of thoughts that have a thinker. This domain is characterised by constellations of alpha elements. These constellations compose universes of discourse that are characterised by containing and being contained by terms such as, "void", "formless infinite", "god", "infinity". This sphere I shall name... "noösphere" (1992, p. 313).

This is obviously a complex series of conceptualizations not made any easier to understand by Bion's idiosyncratic use of astronomical terms. However, I believe that in it there is the possibility of an understanding of the correlation between the representations noösphere and no-amorph.

The space of unthought and unthinkable extent would possibly correspond with the term no-amorph (not yet used by Bion). In this "space" there is a "domain" of thoughts without thinkers. Further, there is also the "domain" of thoughts that have thinkers, seemingly the noösphere; which is characterised by "constellations" of alpha elements and "universes of discourse". The last part concerning the universes of discourse containing and being contained by terms that refer back to the space of unthought and unthinkable extent would point to a relationship between no-amorph and noösphere. The noösphere is a specific domain with finite qualities – thoughts and their thinkers, alpha elements, discourse – which have distilled out of the formless infinite. How these distil out is not explained. However, with this distillation are terms (and corresponding conceptualizations) that allow a perspective of the formless infinite within which this domain of finite qualities exists, like galaxies in infinite space. The noösphere exists within the no-amorph back into which it may collapse.

The interactive relation between no-amorph and noösphere, which by Bion's comments is essential to the reality of psychoanalysis, is emphasised by the effect of the new idea which will (possibly) lead to the disintegration of the noösphere into the formless infinite. This experience will be associated with a sense of catastrophe as alpha elements fall back into beta elements. However,

out of this presumably new “domains” of thoughts without thinkers and thoughts with their thinkers will emerge.

In these ideas Bion would seem to be putting forward two perspectives on what psychoanalysis is. One perspective correlates with the defensive preservation of the noösphere: seemingly the established order of thoughts about psychoanalysis held with a vehement and defensive sense of certainty. The other psychoanalysis is apparently based upon the two conflicting but seemingly interactive representations: the noösphere and the no-amorph. In this the collapse of the noösphere back into no-amorph and then being re-established would seem to be the creative essence of this other psychoanalysis.

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Part Two: Paradox

Introduction

The first part of this study has addressed the issue of what psychoanalysis is by considering the thoughts of analysts about this. In this, a major focus has been upon Freud's ideas about psychoanalysis, especially as they are outlined in his overview papers. The second focus has been upon the thoughts of some other analysts. As this study could not embrace all relevant published analysts, a pattern of approach and perspective was sought using a selection of analysts possibly representative of analysts generally.

From both foci there appeared guiding conceptualizations re what psychoanalysis is. For Freud this involved two alternative perspectives. The first perspective, his own view, concerns psychoanalysis based upon an essence constituted by four interlocked elements: repression, the dynamic unconscious, dream-analysis, and the role of infantile sexuality as it manifests in neurogenesis and also in the Oedipus complex. For Freud, to be a psychoanalyst, practising psychoanalysis, it was necessary to be adherent in theory and practice to these four elemental conceptualizations.

However, Freud also put forward an alternative perspective in his 1914 paper "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement". The second perspective is one directed mainly towards practice and is one based upon "findings"; seemingly the findings of *his* psychoanalysis, relating to the facts of transference and resistance. The second pragmatic perspective seems to have created the sense of a psychoanalysis for all, allowing for the development of a movement. However in the background to this democratisation of psychoanalytic thinking and practice remains the presence of another perspective, the one that, as referred to by Wallerstein, holds the analytic world together, and allows there to be psychoanalytic journals, conferences, associations and societies. This general, background perspective would seem to be correlated with, but not identical to, Freud's personal perspective, that related to the essence of psychoanalysis he describes.

An observation that readily can be made whenever psychoanalysts meet to discuss what psychoanalysis is, unless specific steps are taken to avert such, is that individual analysts, beginning with Freud, believe that their view corresponds with the background overall view. And they believe this with an invested quality leading to the readily apparent vehement disputes about what psychoanalysis is. To further observation, the central qualities to this vehemence, belief and disputation, rest on the individual conviction that there is a correct, overall view of what psychoanalysis is and is not, and that their view best corresponds with this. Often an analytic authority will be referred to as confirmatory evidence of this correspondence. Their individual view about what psychoanalysis is is seen by them to correspond (at least in part) with the enigmatic background issue of what psychoanalysis is. However, seemingly, there is an unobserved conceptual gap between the view of the individual and the enigmatic background view: something known, felt, believed to exist and to which all issues “psychoanalytic” essentially refer and from which they arise. This raises the question as to the correlation between the two dichotomies of conception re psychoanalysis: that in general and Freud’s. Are they interchangeable, i.e. does Freud’s essential psychoanalysis correspond with the enigmatic background view? Do Freud’s views, therefore, close, or indeed, open this conceptual gap? Or both? Even though the depth and complexity in Freud’s view would seem to offer a perspective on the enigmatic background view of psychoanalysis, a gap remains between the individual view, that of any individual including Freud, and the seemingly ineffable background view¹. Any proposal of direct knowledge of this background view via Freud would be a replication of the observed problematic behaviour re analysts and psychoanalysis.

However this poses the question as to how to proceed further with this study without falling into the same behaviours as those described? This

¹ Bion (1970) writes of Freud and psychoanalysis: “psycho-analysis, the thing-in-itself, existed. It remained for Freud to reveal the formulation embedded in it. Conversely, once formulated by Freud it remains for others (including Freud himself) to discover the meaning of the conjunction bound by his formulation” (p. 117).

question was briefly considered in the introduction to this study and will now be more fully addressed.

This author's proposed solution is based upon a key observation: the relationship between the individual views and the overall view is paradoxical. The paradox, spelled out, is that without the overall view, without the background conceptualization of "psychoanalysis", there could not be any individual view purporting to represent this. However, correspondingly, there would be no conceptualization of an entity called "psychoanalysis" if it was not that individuals, beginning with Freud, conceptualized the existence of such. Even though, seemingly, they cannot clearly and fully conceptualize what it is, they can conceptualize its existence. However, as noted, whenever they attempt to give shape and form to this overall background entity, what they describe is something different from the enigmatic overall to which they are referring. In essence there can be no knowledge of the background, enigmatic conceptualization – "psychoanalysis" – without the foreground views of the individuals, but seemingly none of these foreground views, or even all of them together, can accurately or fully conceptualize what psychoanalysis is. The individual both knows and does not know what psychoanalysis is. Psychoanalysis is, therefore, the product of paradox. The paradox inheres in that it is to be constituted of the background, enigmatic view that is elusive of any individual conceptualization, and also by all of the multiple individual views. It is both indefinable by all the individual views (singly and overall), but also defined by them (otherwise we would not know about it at all)

To proceed further in this study towards the sought for understanding about what psychoanalysis is and not become enmeshed in the referred to difficulties, it is proposed that addressing its paradoxical presentation not only offers an alternative to other approaches it also takes up on one aspect of these difficulties to facilitate further understanding both about the difficulties and about psychoanalysis per se. The first task in this requires consideration of what paradox is and how it informs psychoanalysis.

Part Two

Chapter One - An Examination of Paradox

This examination, as a prelude to the issue of paradox and psychoanalysis, needs to be prefaced by an essential observation. This observation is that the question or issue of paradox is approached very differently in different disciplines (e.g. philosophy, literature and psychoanalysis), as will be described. To draw contrasts and, accordingly, describe how paradox is addressed in psychoanalysis, the philosophical approach will be considered first.

A. The Philosophical Approach to Paradox

“A Dictionary of Philosophy” (1979) writes of paradox:

Paradox. A situation arising when, from a number of premises all generally accepted as true, a conclusion is reached by valid deductive argument that is either an outright contradiction or conflicts with other generally held beliefs. Such a result *is both perplexing and disturbing* because it is not clear which of one's well entrenched beliefs should be rejected, while it is plain that in the interest of consistency some modification must be made. (p. 262, italics added).

This observation describes several factors related to paradox. A paradox is created (or found) by reaching a conclusion based upon valid premises by “valid deductive arguments”. However, this conclusion causes difficulty because it is contradictory in itself or “conflicts with generally held beliefs”. It is noted further that this result is “perplexing and disturbing” and this is because a resolution of the paradox would involve a rejection of “one's well entrenched beliefs”.

“The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy” (1972) provides a logical perspective on paradox:

A paradox, in the original sense of the word, is a statement that goes against generally accepted opinion. In logic the word has taken on a more precise meaning. A logical paradox consists of two contrary, even contradictory, propositions to which we are led by apparently sound arguments. The arguments are considered sound because when used in other contexts they do not seem to create any difficulty. It is only in the particular combination in which the paradox occurs that the arguments lead to a troublesome conclusion. In its most extreme form, a paradox consists

of apparent equivalence of two propositions, one of which is the negative of the other (p. 45).

This would seem to echo ideas already noted. That is, a logical paradox is created (or possibly found) by the coming together of two contradictory propositions, by “apparently sound arguments”. It is the coming together by sound argument of these contradictory premises that creates the paradox and its “troublesome” qualities. These qualities arise because a contradiction to logic (or common sense) is created or found, even though logic and common sense have been followed to get there.

Sainsbury (1996) puts forward in his introduction his understanding of what a paradox is: “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises” (p. 1). He notes further that, “Paradoxes are serious” (p. 1) and that they “are associated with crises in thought and with revolutionary advances” (p. 2).

Particularly noteworthy in Sainsbury’s (introductory) ideas about paradox, is that of reference to an “unacceptable conclusion” and also his emphasis on the potential creative qualities of paradox (“revolutionary advances”).

From this overview of paradox there would seem to be certain qualities consistently identified, namely that of the coming together of premises that are in themselves acceptable to logical reasoning and common sense, but in combination lead to a conclusion (or conclusions) which is contradictory in itself or to common sense. And further, that this is perplexing, or disturbing, because it challenges logic, common sense and one’s perspective on the basis of such. In fact Sainsbury (1996) writes of this disturbing quality (with respect to the “Liar paradox”) that it is said to have “tormented many ancient logicians and caused the premature death of one of them, Philitas of Cos” (p. 1). Sainsbury also proposes that paradox may have a creative quality in that it can direct attention towards “deep philosophical problems” and lead to “revolutionary advances” (p. 1). These qualities constituting the essence of paradox generate a need to identify, define and correct the anticipated, but apparently not always obvious, problem.

These issues will be considered further, beginning with that of the perplexity and the move towards a solution. An example of the perplexity of paradox is put forward by Bertrand Russell in his Autobiography (1985). In his discussion of his major work (written with Whitehead), *Principia Mathematica*, Russell writes;

I thought the work was nearly finished, but in the month of May I had an intellectual setback almost as severe as the emotional setback I had had in February. Cantor had a proof that there is no greatest number, and it seemed to me that the number of all the things in the world ought to be the greatest possible. Accordingly I examined his proof with some minuteness, and endeavoured to apply it to the class of all things there are. This led me to consider those classes which are not members of themselves, and to ask whether the class of such classes is or is not a member of itself. I found that either answer implies its contradictory. At first I supposed that I should be able to overcome the contradiction quite easily, and that probably there was some trivial error in reasoning. Gradually, however, it became clear that this was not the case (p. 150).

In this Russell came upon the paradox that has become known as “Russell’s paradox”. Of this paradox Russell continues to state;

It seemed unworthy of a grown man to spend his time on such trivialities, but what was I to do? There was something wrong, since such contradictions were unavoidable on ordinary premises. Trivial or not, the matter was a challenge. Throughout the latter part of 1901 I supposed the solution would be easy, but by the end of that time I concluded that it was a big job (p. 150).

He then outlines how in 1905 he

discovered my Theory of Descriptions, which was the first step to overcoming the difficulties which had baffled me for some long time...In 1906 I discovered the Theory of Types. After this it only remained to write the book out (p. 155).

In this Russell outlines the process around his being confronted by paradox. First there was the creation of the paradox and the consequent perplexity, then Russell strove towards finding a solution to the paradox. His solution was to address the issue of the premises which led to the paradox by creating a hierarchy of conceptualizations – one premise was seen to be at a different level of conceptualization to the other – the set and the members of the set were seen to be at different levels in Russell’s solution.

However, in keeping with the concept of the creative potential of paradox, Van Heijenoort (1967) notes about paradox and its solution:

no rule could be formulated that would by itself eliminate the paradoxes, and only the paradoxes. Even the notion of circularity could not be given a precise form that would be a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the paradox (p. 49).

And Van Heijenoort writes further about the issue of paradox and its solution;

There is no one problem of the paradoxes. The problems are of different types. They are not due to some infraction of one specific law of logic ("vicious circle"), nor are they simply mistakes to be removed by some *ad hoc* corrective. The paradoxes actually reveal conflicts in our logical intuitions (p. 50).

And further to this Van Heijenoort also states;

Any given paradox rests on a number of definitions, assumptions, and arguments, and we can solve it by questioning any of these... For the important paradoxes, the question is not of solving them by any means but of solving them by means that enlarge and strengthen our logical intuitions (p. 51).

Russell's paradox is a logical paradox. A second category of paradox, more relevant to psychoanalysis, is "semantic paradox" (Sainsbury, 1996), an example of which is the so-called Liar paradox. This paradox is created by the following statement: Epimenides, a Cretan, claims that "All Cretans are liars". This creates a paradox because if he is telling the truth, then, as a Cretan, he must be lying; but if he is lying, then he is telling the truth. Both possibilities lead to contradictions.

Sainsbury proposes a number of solutions to this paradox. Essentially, these are, firstly, that the notion of truth, and the definition of what is true and false, needs to arise outside a statement. Secondly (referring to Tarski, 1937), Sainsbury takes this idea further and proposes that there needs to be a hierarchical system of truth definition, i.e. what is determined as true at one level of language can be brought upon language at another level, but cannot be generated at the same level. The truth of a statement needs to be determined outside of the statement and at another conceptual or semantic level. What is true needs to be determined first, and then what is true (or not) about the statement can be determined.

A further solution proposed by Sainsbury is that of "indexicality" (p. 122). Essentially this refers to the idea that "it is only statements and not sentences

that can properly be said to be true or false" (p. 122). A sentence, of course, can specifically be used to make a statement. A statement can only be true or false at any one time and in any specific context, but by "indexicality" it may express a different perspective, i.e. it may now be false whereas it was true before. If one person says, "I am hungry", it may be true, if another says, "I am hungry", this same statement may now be false. In the Liar paradox the statements are being made in the same context of Epidemides and of Cretans, so it cannot be true and false, it can only be true or false.

These arguments will not be followed further here. They are put forward to indicate the essentials of paradox from a philosophical perspective, that is, paradox confronts with its challenge to logic and common sense, and the response of the philosopher to paradox. This is exemplified by Russell and Sainsbury, who resolve the paradox or refute it by appropriate logical argument. Sainsbury and Van Heijenoort would both seem to be proposing that, within these strivings to resolve or refute the challenge to logic and common sense, in the paradox lies creative potential that may be lost. The paradox confronts with the need to reconsider issues, for example the place of truth statements in sentences and language, and a need to revise considerations of the construction of language.

With regard to the solutions put forward by both Russell and Sainsbury, one point that is important regarding paradox in relation to psychoanalysis: paradox is created by notions that cross hierarchical boundaries. This is basic to Russell's solution to issues with respect to sets and their members, but also it is involved with issues such as hierarchical notions of truth and language, statements and sentences, and undoing the circularity of concepts. In psychoanalysis such issues of logic, common-sense, hierarchical notions etc., are regarded differently because of the centrality of conceptualizations of unconscious dynamics. In this it may be anticipated that the striving to resolve or refute paradoxical concepts and the preservation of the putative creative possibilities may be different.

B. Paradox and Psychoanalysis

Paradox is referred to regularly and often in psychoanalytic writings. The approach to paradox in the psychoanalytic literature is, overall, different from that in philosophy. Generally, the approach to paradox in psychoanalysis is one of emphasising a point by a focus on its enigmatic, contradictory, qualities. For example Lichtenberg (1999) writes;

I end on another form of complexity – a paradox: how can so many differences in approach to listening, understanding and interpreting be reconciled with a degree of commonality of practice and helpful outcome across the wide spectrum we designate “psychoanalysis”? (p. 735)¹

A different approach is introduced by Winnicott, especially in “Playing and Reality” (1971). Here Winnicott emphasises (and argues for) the sustaining of paradox because of its (perceived) creative potential. A sustained paradox has, from this perspective, the creative potential to lead to a new conceptualization and a new understanding. This perspective, as will be discussed, has been taken up by Parsons (2008), Pizer (2014) and Ogden (2004).

The approach to paradox taken in this study begins with the ideas about paradox as outlined by Winnicott. This involves, first, a definition of the paradox(es) and then sustaining the described paradox(es) against resolution, refutation or idealisation. So far in this study two dichotomous perspectives with respect to what psychoanalysis is have been discussed at length. The paradoxical basis of these dichotomies will be discussed further with a specific consideration of the consequent understanding to be derived from these paradoxes about what psychoanalysis is.

As the issue of the place of paradox in psychoanalytic conceptualizations is examined further, further paradoxes will be defined and considered with respect to their creative contribution to the understanding of what psychoanalysis is.

¹ A representative list of references to paradox, of a similar nature, by psychoanalysts include: Loewenstein, 1994; Bégoïn, 1995; Quindoz, 1999; Sass, 2001; Milton, 2001; Friedman, 2005; Selow, 2006).

To approach these considerations of the place and role of paradox in psychoanalytic conceptualizations a general examination of paradox and psychoanalysis will be carried out as a foundation for the more specific considerations to follow.

Freud rarely mentions paradox². However, Brown (1959) refers to the presence of paradox in Freud's writings and, as an example, writes of Freud and his ideas in a way that anticipates Friedman (2006);

It is easy to take one's stand on the traditional notions of morality and rationality and amputate Freud till his is reconciled with common sense – except that there is nothing of Freud left. Freud is paradox or nothing (p. 6).

Brown also writes more specifically about the paradoxes he sees in Freud's ideas:

Since the purport of these purposive expressions is generally unknown to the person whose impulses they express, Freud is driven to embrace the paradox that there are in a human being purposes of which he knows nothing... "unconscious ideas" (p. 4).

And further that;

Thus Freud's first paradox, the existence of a repressed unconscious, necessarily implies the second and even more significant paradox, the universal neurosis of mankind (p. 6).

In these statements Brown directs us towards the central paradoxical nature, as he sees it, of Freud's basic notions about psychoanalysis.

Such reference to paradox is common in analytic writings. This is seen for example in the title of books and papers (e.g. Parsons, 2008; Quinodoz, 2003) and also in conference themes³. As noted, the overall approach to paradox in analytic writings is different from that in philosophy, in which paradox

² Some references (each to "paradoxical") in Freud's writings include: 1912, p. 186; 1915b, p. 177; 1920b, p. 39. Taking this last as an example, Freud writes, "Thus these guardians of life, too, were originally myrmidons of death. Hence arises the paradoxical situation that the living organism struggles most energetically against the events (dangers in fact) which might help it to obtain its life's aims rapidly..." (p. 39).

³ The 2003 EPF Conference had as its title the theme "The Person of the Analyst in the Analytic Cure: the Intapsychic Interpsychic Paradox in Different Psychoanalytic Traditions".

is essentially seen or experienced as a perplexing logical aberration, but this would not seem to correlate with the general analytic approach. To consider what this analytic approach is, several analytic references to paradox will be examined.

One of the first important references to paradox in analytic theory and practice is that of Strachey (1934) in his well-known paper, “The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis”. In this paper Strachey writes;

It is a paradoxical fact that the best way of ensuring that his ego shall be able to distinguish between fantasy and reality is to withhold reality from him as much as possible (p. 147).

It is apparent that Strachey’s observation of a “paradoxical fact” is not a reference to a logical aberration necessitating resolution. His reference to paradox would appear more in keeping with the general analytic use of the term, i.e. for emphatic effect. However there seems more to Strachey’s reference than this. Paradox arises within an inherent enigmatic contradiction of analytic practice which he had outlined in the preceding discussion about the analyst’s role. The enigma is that to increase the awareness of reality (as opposed to fantasy), the input of reality needs to be kept to a minimum. For the patient, in the transference, to be able to best distinguish between the reality of who the analyst is from that of their fantasy view, the analyst needs to maintain, as best he or she can, a position of anonymity. The “paradox” in this arises in the contradictory idea that for the patient to achieve the best possible view of reality of the analyst, it is necessary for the analyst to withhold this reality. If the analyst imposes their reality, this will feed the patient’s fantasy view of them. The contradiction is between fantasy and reality, with the enigma being that the less the reality offered by the analyst the more the reality gained by the patient.

Strachey does not formally discuss the role or place of paradox. However there would appear an implied ambiguity around the role of this paradox in analytic practice. On the one hand, Strachey is implying the necessity of sustaining this paradox as a way of furthering the patient’s development of a distinction between their transference fantasy view of the analyst and its contrast with who the analyst really is, i.e. paradox sustained can

have creative/therapeutic benefits. This would appear expressed when Strachey writes:

It...seems likely that the whole possibility of effecting mutative interpretations may depend upon this fact that in the analytic situation the giver of the interpretation and the object of the id-impulse interpreted are one and the same person (p. 290, footnote).

However the paradox, to fully achieve its creative/therapeutic potential, must also be resolved so the patient can clearly differentiate between the imagos of the projections onto the analyst and the real person. The analyst assists in this therapeutic resolution by their interpretation of the contrast between the two objects.

This implied dual approach to paradox – sustained and eventually resolved – and the inherent creative/therapeutic potential indicates a significant difference in the approach to paradox in psychoanalysis. This analytic approach is more clearly enunciated in the considerations of Winnicott with respect to the paradoxes of development and, by his extension, those of psychoanalysis, and will be discussed below. However as a balance to Winnicott's (and, to some extent, Strachey's) ideas re paradox and psychoanalysis, those of another important analyst – Matte Blanco – will be considered mainly from his book "The Unconscious as Infinite Sets" (1989).

Here Matte Blanco makes a number of references to paradox (e.g. pp. 64, 66, 102, 127, 133, 148, 172, 495). These references vary from that of seeing paradox as a contradiction in need of resolution (i.e. the philosophical perspective), to making thoughtful observations about the enigmatic issues raised by psychoanalytic investigation of paradox, in particular those of Freud's ideas.

Of the former, an example is;

It might be objected that even in Freud's initial conceptions and in spite of what he wrote, the unconscious was not the true psychological reality because, from the beginning, Freud gave to the ego an important place. And it is here that there is a paradox which, as far as I am aware, Freud never resolved, and which needs resolving if we are to have a more coherent image of the mind: the unconscious is for the early Freud the true psychological reality and at *the same time* is only a part of the personality (p. 64, Matte Blanco's emphasis).

With this observation Matte Blanco is proposing that the apparent contradictions, leading to paradox, in Freud's conceptualizations about the unconscious and the ego, could and possibly should, for the sake of coherence, be resolved. He does not see that the apparent confusion and/or contradiction by Freud about the "true psychical reality" being the ego or the unconscious may lead to increased understanding about psychical existence at another level. Instead, Matte Blanco wishes to resolve the apparent paradox.

However later in his book, Matte Blanco refers to paradox with less urgency towards resolution and more intimation of understanding. For example he writes;

The deepening of the concept of layers or levels will also permit us to see the action of the unconscious in a new perspective. I refer, in passing, to the question of repression in layers. Its study (Matte Blanco, 1955) leads to the curious conclusion that, at times, the deepest level is also the most superficial. Paradoxes of this type may be frequently found in clinical reality, if an adequate conceptual equipment to discover them is employed (p. 172).

And also he writes;

Now psycho-analysis has unmistakably shown that every one of us may have various coexisting affects, and here there is a paradox: if affects are metaphorically described as each occupying the whole of a person, it seems inexplicable that there could be so many at the same time. But if described in terms of parts, the description appears inaccurate. (p. 425).

In these last two observations, Matte Blanco would appear to be noting that the paradoxes of human experience, if sustained, possibly lead to increased understanding about that experience, of the individual, and increased understanding about experience overall, i.e. to do with human being. In the first he notes that, paradoxically the deepest layers of repressed experience may be the most superficial in the analytic encounter, i.e. they may come to the surface first in an analysis. But this may not only manifest in an analysis and there is thus the implication that we may be drawn to live out issues, the source of which lies most deeply repressed. The second observation by Matte Blanco is that, although one or other affect would appear to wholly occupy us, we feel that feeling and that feeling only, but psychoanalysis has shown that we may experience mixed feelings, multiple affects, at the same time. He is also proposing that to understand this in terms of psychic parts does not resolve the

issue. We are wholly engulfed by that affect and only that affect, but also not, at the same time. This says something about our individual affective experience: it seems to completely fill us up at one level of experience, this is what we experience, but psychoanalysis has shown that there are other simultaneous levels to our experience.

Matte Blanco discusses the specificity of paradox in psychoanalysis in “The Four Antinomies of the Death Instinct” (2005)⁴. Beginning with the perplexity of Freud’s (1920) introduction of the concept of the death instinct, Matte Blanco considers this concept from a paradoxical perspective, using such to introduce concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical logic, and their correlation with unconscious and conscious systems of thought. Of the concept of the death instinct and Freud, Matte Blanco writes:

it seems to me that the *concept of the death instinct was the most important attempt that Freud made to study the relation that exists between the logical structure of the unconscious and the logical structure of the material world* (p. 1468, italics original).

Extending this observation into his own conceptualisations of the logical structures of unconscious and conscious thought (symmetrical and asymmetrical respectively), Matte Blanco first develops the paradoxes (“antinomies”) surrounding Freud’s concept and then proposes a theoretical explanation (essentially a solution). Matte Blanco indicates that if “Freud’s reasoning seems strange and paradoxical: the unexpected presence of the unconscious is at work in it” (p. 1468). Essentially Matte Blanco proposes that the paradox arises when the logic of the unconscious, with its sense of stasis (because of its “atemporality-aspatialness”, p. 1470) which is conflated with the concept of death, is confused with the logic of consciousness, with its endless inevitable sense of movement. In this clear distinction between the two logical systems lies Matte Blanco’s resolution of the identified paradox. Matte Blanco’s apparent reasoning is to further emphasise the “bi-logic” (p. 1473) of thought, however for the focus of this study he is indicating the need, as he sees it, to resolve paradox to achieve his conceptual focus.

⁴ There is a footnote to the title that links antinomy with paradox: i.e. “Antinomy: “a paradox” (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*)”. Whether this is Matte Blanco’s footnote or the translator’s is not made clear.

In summary, with respect to Matte Blanco and paradox: he presents an ambiguous approach. From one perspective, Matte Blanco would appear to adopt the philosophers' approach to paradox – it is a perplexity, contradiction or inconsistency that needs resolving for the sake of coherence (at least). From the other perspective, he refers to paradox in a creative manner with the inherent possibility of developing increased understanding of experience.

The most significant and formal approach in psychoanalysis to paradox arises in Winnicott's conceptualisations about the essential, creative role of paradox in the development and extension of these ideas to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Much of Winnicott's consideration of paradox is outlined in his 1971 book "Playing and Reality". Here Winnicott refers on a number of occasions to paradox (including p. XII, 14, 53, 71, 89, 96, 108, 151). Most of these references address Winnicott's specific approach to paradox, especially regarding the role of paradox in the conceptualization of transitional phenomena.

Winnicott states his position when he writes;

I should like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation of the subject) is *the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox...* (p. 89, Winnicott's emphasis).

He then spells out what he sees this paradox to be:

the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object. I tried to draw attention to this aspect of transitional phenomena by claiming that in the rules of the game we all know that we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did you find it? (p. 89).

At the end of this book, as an emphatic postscript, Winnicott repeats this position-statement as if as overview or reminder. He proposes that the "conception-perception gap provides rich material for study" (p. 151). He then adds;

I postulate an essential paradox, one that we must accept and that is not for resolution. This paradox, which is central to the concept, needs to be allowed and allowed for over a period of time in the care of each baby (p. 151).

Earlier in this book, Winnicott, with regard to the “essential paradox”, writes;

By flight to split-off intellectual functioning, it is possible to resolve the paradox, but the price of this is a loss of the value of the paradox itself (p. XII).

He adds;

The resolution of paradox leads to a defence organisation which in the adult one can encounter as true and false self organisation (p. 14).

In these comments, Winnicott is making several points about paradox. Firstly, that paradox tolerated and sustained has, or can have, creative potential in that it can lead to the creation of new understanding or even new conceptualizations that could not be achieved by intellectual processes. In this case Winnicott is referring to “transitional phenomena” and an “intermediate area of experience”. Of the latter, Winnicott writes that;

This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) experience, constitutes the greater part of the infant’s experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experience that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work (p. 14).

Winnicott adds playing to this list, which is “not *inside*”, “Nor is it *outside*” (p. 41, Winnicott’s emphasis). These ideas about playing/play, intermediate area of experience (“*potential space*”, p. 41, Winnicott’s emphasis) and their basis in paradox Winnicott extends to psychoanalysis when he writes that;

playing facilitates growth and therefore health; playing leads into group relationships; playing can be a form of communication in psychotherapy; and, lastly, psychoanalysis has been developed as a specialised form of playing in the service of communication with oneself and others.

The natural thing is playing, and the highly sophisticated twentieth-century phenomenon is psychoanalysis” (p. 41).

In these comments, Winnicott outlines a paradox as the basis of normal health, development and creativity. This paradox is that the origins of personal experience lie within the paradoxical relationship of one’s inner experience as part of, and also separate from, external experience. This, in Winnicott’s terms, leads to the conceptualization of an intermediate area of experience which is neither purely that of the experience of one’s inner reality nor of external reality.

He notes that such an area of experience is essential to play and its creative possibilities, some of which he outlines. Play, for Winnicott, involves the experience of and expression of the creative possibilities of sustaining the paradoxical relationship between inner and outer realities.

Winnicott is therefore proposing that paradox sustained rather than resolved has creative potential. The difference between acceptance and resolution, following Winnicott, is the difference between living with and within the perplexity and uncertainty, the disorientation of the contradiction of common sense and logical thought, or turning to intellectual processes to resolve or refute the paradox. With regard to the creative potential of transitional phenomena, Winnicott describes this as the difference between fulfilling one's creative potential or developing a false-self structure.

One product of the creativity of sustained, i.e. not resolved, paradox is psychoanalysis itself.

In summary: Winnicott outlines a specific paradox which relates to the issue of the relationship between the experience of one's internal reality and the experience of the facts of external reality as external. Winnicott (1971) writes of this;

From birth...the human being is concerned with the problem of the relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively conceived of... (p. 11).

The paradox to which Winnicott refers, and is the basis of these outlined ideas, arises from the individual's experience of the world of objects as being both objectively perceived and subjectively conceived, i.e. being found in the external world and being created in one's subjective inner world. These objects have the paradoxical quality accordingly of being both me and not me. This sustained paradox of the me/not me nature of objects and the world therefore is seen by Winnicott to lead to the creative product of transitional phenomena, which inhabit a transitional space which is neither internal reality nor external reality. According to Winnicott, psychoanalysis is one of these phenomena. Winnicott does not fully explicate his claim that psychoanalysis, correlated with playing and its creative balance between internal and external realities, is one of

these transitional phenomena. A consideration of this issue, i.e. psychoanalysis being the product of this and other paradoxes will be an essential part of the final parts of this study.

This idea of psychoanalysis as transitional phenomenon has been developed by a number of analysts including Kumin (1978), Parsons (2008), and Pizer (2014), each of whom emphasize both the importance of paradox and the creative potential of sustaining it, as well as how paradox informs their views about what psychoanalysis is.

Kumin (1978) begins with an observation of “the pervasive fear of paradox” and how this fear leads to a “defensive split which attempts to diminish it” (p. 477). Kumin then proceeds to discuss the experience of paradox, which he emphasises is essential to understanding the development and function of “the psychic apparatus” (p. 478). This apparatus Kumin traces back to infantile experience and the paradoxical relationship between infant and mother. He also discusses the dichotomies of me-not-me, inside-outside, being-annihilation, active-passive, and good-bad, which have a paradoxical basis and have to be accepted as part of the living experience. Kumin discusses how these paradoxical challenges may manifest, particularly in/as the Oedipus complex, and become the essence of the psychoanalytic encounter.

Parsons (2008) takes a more focused approach to psychoanalysis and the role of paradox in understanding what psychoanalysis is and what occurs in the analytic encounter. For example, he writes, “The psychoanalytic process is able to take place because of a framework which defines a paradoxical reality” (pp. 4-5). He explains that this concerns, “The reality of the play space in which...things may be real and not real at the same time” (p. 5). This concept of the play space Parsons attributes to the ideas of Winnicott, but adds that it is only one form of the potential space described by Winnicott. Parsons notes that Winnicott, “Was describing an area of experience, intermediate between internal and external reality, which permeates the whole of life.” (p. 5).

Parsons proceeds to describe this potential space as it is created in and as the analytic situation, in particular by the analyst and his or her paradoxical presence as real, in terms of their “steady, unthreatening receptivity” (p. 25), and also as not-real in terms of their absence. These issues are considered by Parsons in a chapter with the enigmatic title, “The other in the self”, which captures the paradoxical sense of the self and other which arises in both analyst and analysand. This paradox (of self in the other and other in the self) Parsons later describes as splitting and uniting, a situation arising in infancy that remains part of the sense of self throughout life. This defines an essential part of the experience in the analytic situation with respect to the analyst’s simultaneous absence and presence. This paradoxical situation (of splitting and unity), experienced and understood through the analytic process, is, from Parsons’ outlined ideas, a crucial part of the analytic process.

Pizer (2014) begins with an observation of Freud’s description of transference love as real and unreal and that he (Freud), without acknowledging it, was noting a paradoxical aspect of analytic experience (p. XI). Pizer proposes that Freud may have avoided a full explication of paradox because, having already been shunned over his concepts about sexuality, he wished to avoid the “confusion and perplexity” inherent in paradox (p. XI). Pizer notes that, following Winnicott’s arguments, paradox “must be tolerated through bridging and bearing the irresolvable” (p. XII). However, in this it would seem that Pizer has not fully grasped Winnicott’s notions concerning paradox. Winnicott’s emphasis is that to tolerate or bear the paradox leads to a creative event occurring within the paradoxical space. This is the concept and experience of the potential space between real and not-real, between inner and outer experiences. Potential space, with the consequent creation of transitional phenomena, is crucial to Winnicott’s account of the unfolding of the creative potential of the individual, one manifestation of which is psychoanalysis. However, Pizer writes of “bridging” which, although not intended by him, arguably negates the creative space of the in between⁵. This impression of

⁵ In the “Hollow Men”, Eliot emphasises the concept of the in between when he writes:
“Between the idea
And the reality

Pizer's approach is outlined throughout his book as a process of "negotiation" of the paradox that he describes with respect to the analytic process. For example, Pizer writes;

I would add that paradox is negotiated continuously throughout the intersubjective dialectic between analyst and analysand and that the straddling of paradox is potentiated by the analytic couple's capacity to dwell in illusion, accept ambiguity..." (p. 28).

Although Pizer emphasises the place of sustaining the paradox real/not-real ("illusion"), it would appear that his analytic perspective of negotiation, based, presumably, within an ego-psychological orientation, leads also (paradoxically) to a resolution of the paradox. Thus Pizer introduces the question of whether the paradox of real/not-real, psychic reality/objective reality, can be sustained within a process of negotiation between two real people. Pizer appears to believe it can be, but this seems doubtful. The doubt is introduced when Pizer writes;

As they negotiate their convergent and divergent interests, their conflicts of purpose and passion, their loves and hates, values and rigidities, both parties will face challenges that disturb and perplex their sense of who they are and who they each might be (p. 198).

And Pizer adds, "They negotiate what is their potential space" (p. 198). In these concluding remarks, Pizer would again be indicating that the potential space, the creative product of sustained paradox between love and hate, is where the creative potential lies. However negotiating it would boundary and close this space.

The concept of the creative potential of paradox, as introduced by Winnicott, appears to lie with the tensive aliveness of sustaining the inherent

Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
For thine is the Kingdom

Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow
Life is very long"

(In Maxwell, 1966, p. 140).

contradiction of paradox. This leads on, in Winnicott's ideas, to the erection of a potential space between the premises, one in which transitional phenomena arise. The process of negotiation, as proposed by Pizer is apparently one of reducing this tension and "bridging" this space, and, in this would appear to reduce the creative potential of sustained paradox.

C. A Critical Consideration of Winnicott's Contribution to Paradox and Psychoanalysis

The original contribution of Winnicott linking existential and experiential paradox to psychic development and health, and extended to the basis of psychoanalysis, is the basis of further development in analytic theory and practice – the examples of Parsons (2008) and Pizer (2014) were briefly considered (and that of Ogden, 2004, will be considered at length in Part Two, Chapter Two, A) – and it is central to the proceeding considerations of this study.

Winnicott's main contribution, with respect to paradox and psychoanalysis, occurs in "Playing and Reality" (1971). This book is comprised of papers developed around the original theme of transitional phenomena. It is a book written specifically for psychoanalysts¹, and it includes papers about development, health and psychoanalysis previously published but developed further by Winnicott with a specific focus on the creative place in development and in psychoanalysis of accepted paradox, subtended by the creative role of transitional phenomena. Of this, as introduction, Winnicott writes;

I am drawing attention to the paradox involved in the use by the infant of what I have called the transitional object. My contribution is to ask for a paradox to be accepted and tolerated and respected, and for it not to be resolved. By flight to split-off intellectual functioning it is possible to resolve the paradox, but the price of this is the loss of the value of the paradox itself (p. xii, first italics Winnicott's, second italics added).

To this Winnicott adds,

This paradox, once accepted and tolerated, has value for every human individual who is not only alive and living in this world but who is also capable of being infinitely enriched by exploitation of the cultural link to the past and with the future (p. xii).

There would seem little doubt that Winnicott sees profound extended value for health and creativity in the acceptance (and non-resolution) of relevant paradox² and consequent transitional phenomena – including psychoanalysis.

¹ The Penguin edition (1980) is foreworded by a note indicating psychoanalysts as the intended readers – no page number.

² Although Winnicott begins and finishes "Playing and Reality" with reference to a specific paradox – i.e. that of the infant's use of (and relations with) the transitional object (as referred to) and that of the "essential paradox" (p. 151) in which the baby is seen to live in a world in

This is the Winnicottian perspective that is relevant to the further investigation of psychoanalysis in this study.

However questions arise about Winnicott's ideas re paradox acceptance and psychic development that are not directly addressed in his works (including in "Playing and Reality") and are important for an understanding of psychoanalysis. These questions begin with and relate to the conceptual/practical issue of paradox acceptance. In Winnicott's outline acceptance of and consequent non-resolution of paradox is crucial to the creative importance of paradox. And this acceptance is, at least in part, an environmental provision, i.e. "we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer..." (1971, p. 89). Extending the ideas of this specific paradox to psychoanalysis (as Winnicott does), the analyst accepts paradox as it arises within the analytic situation. But is this the analyst's only role with respect to paradox or does the analyst eventually resolve the paradox by interpretation as would appear implied, but not directly explicated, in Strachey's (1934) paper?

These issues question the eventual fate of paradox within Winnicott's ideas. Winnicott repeats his emphasis about paradox acceptance and the unfortunate consequence of paradox resolution throughout this publication – both for specific paradoxes and in general with respect to experiential and existential paradox (see references in the footnote below). However whether this acceptance of paradox can be sustained or whether paradox eventually must be resolved, and perhaps needs to be for progressive development to occur, is not absolutely clear in Winnicott's outline. These questions about paradox and development in general extend to psychoanalysis in which a particular example is that of transference interpretation which would inevitably be paradox resolution (as Strachey implies but does not state). So how does Winnicott address this and other implications of apparent paradox resolution in his outline?

which conception and perception are not differentiated –, throughout "Playing and Reality" Winnicott makes frequent reference to the importance of paradox acceptance often in a general way (e.g. pp. 14, 53, 71, 89, 108 (twice), 154).

Specifically with respect to psychoanalysis and interpretation, an uncertainty about the eventual fate of relevant paradox arises in Winnicott's ideas. Winnicott unreservedly demonstrates the use of creative interpretation in his clinical examples as part of the analyst's therapeutic role (e.g. 1975, pp. 67, 73, 114, 180-181, 202-203). However he also expresses a more circumspect perspective about the interpretive process in general when he writes, "I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding" (1971, pp. 96-97). More specifically he is in fact critical of the analyst's use of interpretation with certain patients³ and in certain phases of the analysis. In particular, Winnicott refers to the phase of analysis that replicates that of the development of the capacity for the use of the object: in analysis, the analyst (1971, chapter 6). In this Winnicott writes of interpretation and the capacity of the analyst to "wait for the natural evolution of the transference" (1971, p. 89) before making interpretations. He adds that, "If only we can wait the patient arrives at understanding creatively..." (p. 89). These comments imply that a process of change occurs in the patient's psychic state (re development, understanding and the use of understanding) if the analyst delays interpretation. In fact Winnicott writes, in the context of the capacity for object-use and analysis, that, "The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process, and for the patient can seem like a kind of self-defence" (1971, p. 92). These last comments are an extension of Winnicott's emphasis that, for the patient to develop the capacity for the use of an object in externality, the object must survive the internal omnipotent destruction of it. Winnicott's emphasis includes, within survival, non-retaliation, which implies more than the perception of self-defence in interpretation. Interpretation in this context can become retaliation.

The importance of paradox tolerance for psychoanalysis remains challenged by inferred paradox resolution and this will be considered further.

³ Those who have suffered what Winnicott observes as "premature failure of environmental reliability" (1971, p. 102). With these patients Winnicott notes that, "analysts need to be beware lest they create a feeling of confidence and an intermediate area in which play can take place and then inject into this area or inflate it with interpretations which in effect are from their own creative imaginations" (1971, p. 102), i.e. the interpretation may in fact destroy the patient's creative use of their environmental provisions in the analytic situation.

Although Winnicott punctuates “Playing and Reality” with emphatic statements linking paradox acceptance, creativity, health and psychoanalysis, there is the apparent counter-perspective of the phase-specific nature of paradox and the eventual irrelevance of such paradox (e.g. the deca-thexis of the transitional object) within normal development. Such irrelevance implies resolution – but is this correct, as it would indicate a significant contradiction in Winnicott’s ideas? There appear two concepts that counter arguments for resolution and sustain the consistent focus of Winnicott’s ideas. These concepts are, first, that each phase of development (including that of object-use, as will be discussed) are underpinned by paradox. This involves both confronting experiential enigma and also movement to the next phase as exemplified in the development of and assertion of the capacity for object-use. The second concept is that, not only will the next developmental phase be basically paradoxical, the paradox involved will have qualities indicative of an extension of the preceding paradox. A quality of an essential continuity manifests within proceeding evolutionary development. This is exemplified in the developments on from the deca-thexis of the transitional object, of which Winnicott writes “at this point my subject widens out into that of play, and of artistic creativity and appreciation, and of religious feeling, and dreaming...” (1971, p. 5). The manifestations of the transitional phenomena (with their paradoxical underpinnings) develop and evolve in terms of sophistication, i.e. the metaphysical paradox of religion although a development of/from the play of a child will involve evolved conceptualisations. This is indicated further when Winnicott writes

It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience... which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is “lost” in play (1971, p. 13).

In this Winnicottian observation the ontological paradox of intrapsychic/interpsychic is an ongoing basis of creative development (of abstract complexity).

The ongoing creative importance of transitional phenomena in the individual's life (from beginning to end) is based upon living with paradox. The paradoxical essence of such phenomena must evolve and develop to remain relevant to the individual within the various phases of their life, but in this there is allusion to a basic paradox of which the relevant (to become irrelevant) paradoxes are manifestations. This basic paradox is not directly explicated by Winnicott but is alluded to with respect to that of incomplete reality-acceptance and the paradox of inner and outer realities. As psychoanalysis is viewed by Winnicott as a sophisticated manifestation of the transitional phenomena he describes, and if there is a continuity of underlying ontological paradox, then the described paradox basic to transitional phenomena is that basic to psychoanalysis: the creative basis of psychoanalysis (its tensive aliveness) arises within the ontological paradox that links reality-acceptance with that of the interlocking of inner and outer realities.

Although the question of paradox resolution in Winnicott's ideas would seem to be negated with the concept of the evolved persistence of a basic paradox sustaining the consistence of his ideas, the issue of the development of the capacity for object-use again questions paradox resolution and will accordingly be examined.

In his outline of the transition to object-use (of the real external object) in "The Use of an Object" (chapter 6, "Playing and Reality"), Winnicott begins his argument with a direct reference to his concept of transitional phenomena with an emphasis of the "essential feature" as he sees it: "*the paradox and the acceptance of the paradox*: the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object" (p. 89, Winnicott's emphasis). He follows this direct statement of his understanding of the paradoxical beginnings of object usage by an unexplained conceptual step – "I am now ready to go straight to the statement of my thesis" (p. 89). This is that, "to use an object the subject must have developed a *capacity* to use objects" (p. 89, Winnicott's emphasis). He adds, "this capacity cannot be said to be inborn nor can its development in the individual be taken for granted" (p. 89) – the role of the facilitatory environment being crucial in the development of this capacity.

Winnicott's "statement" implies that, facilitated by the environment, the young child has developed a capacity it is now about to apply. This capacity – that of the use of an object - now involves a developmental movement from the use of a transitional object to an object in external reality, apparently separate from transitional qualities.

Winnicott outlines his "thesis" as to how this capacity for object usage can now involve an external object with independent (i.e. outside the omnipotent control underlying the use of a transitional object) qualities. This thesis involves an experiential sequence that begins with object-relating and ends in object-usage with the crucial step,

between relating and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control; that is, the subject's perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right (p. 89).

The failure of the object to absolutely meet the subject's needs leads to the omnipotent destruction of the object, but the real object survives this destruction and "because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so stands to gain immeasurably" (p. 90).

Winnicott summarises this:

This is a position that can be arrived at by the individual in early stages of emotional growth only through the actual survival of cathected objects that are at the time in the process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed (p. 90).

This outlined conceptual (and experiential) sequence of development from object-relating (based on object-conception) to object-use (object-perception) would appear to constitute a resolution of paradox: the paradox inherent in Winnicott's view of the "task of reality-acceptance... of relating inner and outer reality" (1971, p. 13). The question arises, accordingly, do these ideas therefore contradict Winnicott's ideas about the ongoing creative basis of the paradox involving the ontological dilemma of inner and outer realities – i.e. here the concept of outer-reality perception is emphasised – or are Winnicott's arguments concerning paradox acceptance still relevant – and basic? My answer is that Winnicott's ideas re paradox are still essential to this developmental phase – i.e. paradox acceptance as opposed to paradox

resolution. The paradox is that the object is both destroyed and also survives this destruction and is *found and created* as a real object in external reality; and, by extension, the subject can also find themselves in the external world with (according to Winnicott) immeasurable gain. This “finding externality itself” (p. 91) is an ongoing (i.e. never ending) process based upon destruction of the object in “unconscious fantasy” (p. 90) and the corresponding survival of the object, which places the object outside omnipotent control, i.e. “out in the world” (p. 91). This is a process that Winnicott sees as essential to the analytic process as the patient continually destroys the analyst to find the analyst “outside the area of omnipotent control” (p. 91), as long as the analyst survives this destruction which “includes the idea of the absence of a quality change to retaliation” (p. 91) (as has been considered).

Summarily: these important Winnicottian ideas about psychic development in life and analysis through the development of the capacity for object-use allude to, but do not fully explicate, the essential role of ongoing paradox acceptance; the paradox of the ongoing destruction and survival of destruction of the object. Paradoxically, the object has to be destroyed for its survival to be meaningful.

Inherent to these ideas of Winnicott concerning paradox, development and health is that of the moving on from one developmental phase to the next as a consequence of living with and within the paradox and the facilitatory environmental provision of paradox acceptance. Implicit in these notions is that the creative consequence of paradox sustained is that of a developmental movement: of psychic development towards health. This issue about psychic development (and its paradoxical basis) and health is again raised when Winnicott writes of psychopathology (1975, p. 242) related to transitional phenomena.

Winnicott’s outline of concepts of transitional phenomena in “Playing and Reality” extends ideas he introduced in 1951 (published in “Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis”, 1975). At the end of the 1951 paper, Winnicott summarises the relevant ideas. He repeats this summary in “Playing and Reality” (p. 14) but with a change to the last paragraph. In 1951, the last

paragraph begins with “In psychopathology...” (1975, p. 242). In “Playing and Reality”, with a shift in focus to the central importance of paradox, Winnicott writes,

What emerges from these considerations is the further idea that paradox accepted can have positive value. The resolution of paradox leads to a defence organisation which in the adult one can encounter as true and false self organisation... (p. 14)

In this later version, there is still an allusion to psychopathology (false self organisation) and an emphasis for health of the creative value of paradox accepted. In 1951 Winnicott instead writes:

In psychopathology:

Addiction can be stated in terms of regression to the early stage at which transitional phenomena are unchallenged.

Fetishism can be described in terms of a persistence of a specific object or type of object dating from infantile experience in the transitional field...

Pseudologia fantastica and *thieving* can be described in terms of an individual's unconscious urge to bridge a gap in continuity of experience in respect of a transitional object (1975, p. 242)

Winnicott indicates that environmental provision of paradox acceptance facilitates developmental progress, such that the involved paradox becomes apparently irrelevant to be replaced by the next paradoxical developmental challenge. Without the necessary environmental provision (including paradox acceptance), psychopathology occurs either in the failure to successfully move on to the next developmental challenge (e.g. as in addiction, fetishism) or the development of false self structure. This moving on to the challenge of the next developmental stage apparently occurs (by Winnicott's outline) through the creative qualities of paradox and paradox acceptance that facilitate this development in the individual. In this, Winnicott's ideas about psychopathology emphasises the necessary facilitation of psychic development and consequent health through the creative potentialities of paradox acceptance.

Discussion:

These ideas proposed by Winnicott about the essential creative role of the acceptance of paradox in normal development have been accepted as the basis for further developments in analytical thinking and practice, and also constitute the theoretical basis for the further progress of this enquiry into what psychoanalysis is. Their creative qualities open the possibility of an understanding of psychoanalysis that transcends that of one more individual, and an inevitably contentious, theoretical perspective. The essential role of paradox introduces the possibility of an understanding of the reactive certainty of analytic views. Because of their noted importance for this study and psychoanalysis itself, these outlined Winnicottian ideas will be examined further.

Central to these ideas of Winnicott is that the acceptance of existential and experiential paradox is fundamental to all life. Development, health, creativity and psychoanalysis are initiated in and are evolved from the acceptance of the essential paradox.

The core paradox involves and arises within the individual's experience of inner and outer realities – an experience of intense intimacy with what is simultaneously real and imaginary, and of self and other. This intense experience of early life arises within ontological paradox and becomes a developed and evolved base for creativity and health, which continues within a tensive aliveness and a constant becoming - provided the paradox is accepted and not resolved. This acceptance is both an individual challenge and a challenge for the involved other.

From this emphatic basis in acceptance of the essential paradox, Winnicott's ideas extend to the creative concept of transitional phenomena (transitional between inner and outer realities) which progress from a non-differentiation of self/object, to transitional objects, to more involved transitional phenomena beginning with play and extended to the acme of cultural experience, and also to object-use. In these ideas is that of healthy existence for the individual within and as a consequence of the continuity of these experiences. Essential to these concepts is that of the creative potential (of which these transitional phenomena are manifestations) of acceptance (i.e.

non-resolution) of relevant paradox. This is emphasised by Winnicott as the key factor in such creative existence and experience.

Inherent to these ideas of Winnicott are those of progress and development as necessary components of health (as compared with defined psychopathologies: e.g. fetishism and the development of false self structures). In these ideas of Winnicott, a critical issue arises. Can the emphasised notion of paradox acceptance be sustained through concepts of development and change, or is paradox resolution inevitable and unavoidable (and perhaps necessary) if progress in development is to occur? This question finds a focus in that of analytic interpretation. Winnicott does not directly address this question (concerning interpretation and sustained paradox) and leaves an apparent ambiguity. For example, he gives clinical examples involving interpretation, but also advances perspectives that either give the impression that interpretation is done more for the analyst than patient, or that at certain points in analysis, and with certain patients, interpretation may in fact be potentially harmful. So how does one understand the Winnicottian perspective on accepted paradox and paradox resolution as exemplified by transference interpretation? This apparent incompleteness in Winnicott's ideas can lead to a sense of uncertainty and a consequent adoption of the common-sense notion of paradox resolution. Correlated difficulties with Winnicott's ideas and transitional phenomena are discussed by Rudnytsky (1991) with respect to Winnicott's presentation of his ideas re the development of the capacity of object-use. When Winnicott presented these ideas in New York (November 1968), Rudnytsky notes that "it was sharply criticised by his three discussants" (p. 105). Rudnytsky outlines how the discussants were apparently perplexed by the notion of object destruction leading to object-use, i.e. that of the paradoxical concept underlying Winnicott's ideas. For example, Rudnytsky notes that Jacobson described "as an extreme statement his summary comment – that 'the object is always being destroyed', a destruction which becomes the unconscious back-cloth for love of a real object" (p. 106). Winnicott does not directly address these issues of the controversial notion of emphatic paradox acceptance as compared with the common-sense notion of eventual paradox resolution, leaving doubt in others that he can truly mean that tolerance of

paradox is not only necessary for creativity – including creative analytic work – it is essential. That is, that sustaining paradox against resolution is essential to living a creative life which is enriched by its ongoing paradoxical basis. This involves an ongoing essential paradox that undergoes evolution and revision through developmental change, but also plays a key role in such change: ontological paradox is the creative basis of human beings from the beginning to end, and the creative manifestations of transitional phenomena are products of the paradox. The evolution and change in transitional phenomena and in psychic development and growth are indicative of evolution at the paradox base. This idea is exemplified in Winnicott's emphasis of continuity and creative development with paradox-based transitional phenomena. As psychoanalysis is one of the developed manifestations of these transitional phenomena, these ideas are important for psychoanalysis.

This implies an hypothesis that there is an essential existential/experiential paradox that is the basis of the described transitional phenomena and, accordingly, psychoanalysis. This paradox may variously manifest within and as the different relevant developmental paradoxes, but these are revisions of the core paradox. This core paradox in Winnicott's outline is based on self/object and inner/outer world issues that are directly relevant to the practice of psychoanalysis.

Here in response to the common-sense question about paradox acceptance or resolution of paradox, the answer in his ideas appears to be that Winnicott's emphasis on the acceptance of paradox can be understood to indicate that there is a basic paradox that needs to be sustained for development, creativity, health –and for psychoanalysis -, one that undergoes evolution to relevant manifestations with each developmental phase.

What is this key paradox will be examined further in this study, informed by these Winnicottian beginnings.

Part Two

Chapter Two

A. Ogden and the Analytic Third.

In a number of papers (e.g. 1994, 1996, 1999) Ogden has discussed the concept of “the analytic third” and its essential role in the practice of psychoanalysis. In 2004 he put forward his ideas in a focused manner and these will be considered in relation to paradox, and its role in the issue of what psychoanalysis is.

This (2004) paper is entitled “The Analytic Third: Implications for Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique”, and Ogden begins by explaining that;

The analytic third is a concept that has been for me...an indispensable part of the theory and technique that I rely on in every analytic session (p. 167).

He indicates that his ideas are influenced by Winnicott’s 1960 statement, “There is no such thing as an infant” (Ogden, 2004, p. 168) of which Ogden writes;

He assumes that it will be understood that the idea that there is no such thing as an infant is playfully hyperbolic and represents one element of a larger paradoxical statement. From another perspective (from the point of view of the other pole of the paradox), there is obviously an infant, and a mother, who constitute separate physical and psychological entities. The mother-infant unity coexists in dynamic tension with the mother and infant in their separateness (p. 168).

Ogden is taking an implied paradox in Winnicott’s ideas, about development, and focusing these on the psychoanalytic interaction. In keeping with Winnicott’s emphasis upon sustaining paradox, Ogden writes that;

the task is not to tease apart the elements constituting the relationship in an effort to determine which qualities belong to whom; rather, from the point of view of the interdependence of subject and object, the analytic task involves an attempt to describe the specific nature of the experience of the unconscious interplay of individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity (p. 168).

The analytic task according to Ogden, therefore, is to sustain the paradox of individual subjectivities and “the jointly created unconscious life of the analytic pair” (p. 168). This “unconscious intersubjectivity of the analyst-analysand” (p. 169) is what Ogden refers to as “the analytic third”.

Ogden's ideas, as outlined at this point in his paper, concern Winnicott's developmental paradox being replicated in the analytic situation. In the analytic situation the paradox is constituted of two independent individual subjectivities and a conjoint construct, the analytic third, which is a product of both individual subjectivities but separate from each. As with the developmental paradox, Ogden indicates that sustaining this paradox is essential. His clarification involves both a clinical example and a theoretical outline.

In the clinical example, Ogden focuses upon his own inner experiences to describe the interaction between his individual subjectivity and the joint construct – the analytic third. He discusses his “reverie” which, he proposes

represents symbolic and proto-symbolic (sensation-based) forms given to the unarticulated (and often not yet felt) experience of the analysand as they are taking form in the unconscious intersubjectivity of the analytic pair (i.e. the analytic third) (p. 184).

In this the analyst's reverie is the creative product of the paradox.

In his discussion of the theory of the analytic situation, with his focus on the role of the analytic third, Ogden describes the role of projective identification as central to the theory, and practice. Projective identification, Ogden writes, involves

the creation of unconscious narratives (symbolised both verbally and non-verbally) that involve the fantasy of evacuating a part of oneself into another person (p. 187).

He refers his views back to those of Bion (1962), Rosenfield (1952, 1965) and Pick (1985). Ogden proposes that the reasons for this action (i.e. projective identification) may include protecting oneself against a part of oneself felt to be dangerous, or of safe-guarding a valued part of oneself. Once projected into the other, “who is experienced as only partially differentiated from oneself” (p. 187), the projected parts of the self can be felt to be altered, for example to be less toxic, less endangered, or “deadened or non-persecutory” (p. 187). Ogden emphasises that the unconscious fantasy and “the interpersonal event” (p. 187) are part of the same process, that is, they go together to constitute what is projective identification.

With a focus on the interpersonal event, Ogden proposes that it involves a subversion and alteration of the subjectivity of the recipient, altering their sense of “I-ness”. But it also involves an alteration in the projector, who

has unconsciously entered into a form of negation of himself as a separate “I”, and in so doing has become other-to-himself: he has become, in part, an unconscious being outside of himself (residing in the recipient) who is simultaneously “I” and “not I”. The recipient is and is not oneself (the projector) at a distance (p. 188).

This “I” and “not I” situation is compounded, according to Ogden, because the recipient’s subjectivity will be negated as other and is co-opted as part of the projector’s subjectivity. This leads to the creation of a third subject which Ogden emphasises is “both and neither projector and recipient” (pp. 188-189). This, in the analytic situation, is the analytic third.

In the process of projective identification, that he has outlined, Ogden emphasises that a process of “subjugation” occurs in both projector and recipient and this leads to the creation of the analytic third. He sees this as occurring in the analytic situation, “one in which the (asymmetrical) mutual subjugation... mediates the process of creating the third subjectivity” (p. 189), and that this, “has the effect of profoundly subverting the experience of the analyst and analysand as separate subjects” (p. 189).

Ogden describes how, if the analytic process is successful, the individual subjectivities of the analyst and the analysand will be reappropriated, but that these will have been transformed through the experience of (and in) the creative analytic third. In this, for psychological growth to occur, there must be a superseding of the subjugating third and the consequent establishment of a “more generative dialectic of oneness and twoness, similarity and difference, individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity” (p. 190).

In consideration of this process to the successful outcome described, Ogden discusses projective identification, with a focus on its paradoxical qualities. He writes that;

Projective identification can be thought of as involving a central paradox: the individuals engaged in this form of relatedness unconsciously subjugate themselves to a mutually generated intersubjective third for the purpose of

freeing themselves from the limits of whom they had been to that point (p. 189).

Thoughts and feelings which were only possibilities or potentialities can become thought and experienced through the medium of the mutually created third. Aspects of the individuals' characters which were only potentialities, according to Ogden's perspective, can become realised through this process. The individual can paradoxically experience aspects of themselves as other to themselves as the "other/third/self" (p. 190). This allows the development of a new subjectivity which facilitates development of the individual beyond the restrictions which inhabit individual existence. Of this Ogden writes that in projective identification the two subjects,

unconsciously attempt to overcome (negate) themselves, and in so doing make room for the creation of a novel subjectivity, an experience of I-ness that each individual in isolation could not have created for himself (p. 191).

Ogden is describing a process in which one disengages one from oneself and then one is given back to oneself by the other (the subjugating third in Ogden's outline). Ogden proposes that the self that is returned is a transformed version of oneself, becoming a "more fully human, self-reflective subject for the first time" (p. 192), and freeing the individual from "unending, futile wanderings in their own internal world" (p. 193).

In summary, a successful analytic process involves the creation of the analytic third by a process of mutual projective identification. The individuals are subjugated, at the level of their individual subjectivities, to this created third. However, through this process, they lose themselves as they were and then by a process of "superseding of the unconscious third" (p. 193) and the reappropriation of their transformed individual subjectivities, their potentialities as individuals can be enhanced (e.g. becoming more self-reflective) in ways that could not be achieved by their own individual effort. Ogden proposes that in the analytic setting this process may be enhanced by

an act of mutual recognition that is often mediated by the analyst's interpretation of the transference-countertransference and the analysand's making genuine psychological use of the analyst's interpretations (pp. 193-194).

Ogden writes further of projective identification and its role in this generative process which becomes manifest, as he describes, in psychoanalysis. He notes that;

projective identification...involves the creation of something potentially larger and more generative than either of the participants (in isolation from one another) is capable of generating (p. 190).

Ogden notes further that it is not only the projector in projective identification who gains from this creative experience. He proposes that;

there is never a recipient who is not simultaneously a projector in a projective identificatory experience. The interplay of subjectivities is never entirely one sided: each person is being negated by the other while being newly created in the unique dialectical tension generated by the two (p. 190).

In this proposition Ogden, although not directly referring to it, is implicitly outlining the creative potential of the paradox of projective identification. He proposes that in the interactions between people there lies a creative potential involving both: this creative potential lies in the unique process he is describing. This process, which is an inherent unconscious potential in the individual, involves the individual becoming simultaneously, and paradoxically, I and not-I. This process is facilitated by the presence of and interaction with the unconscious of the other. The interactions of the two unconsciouses leads to the creation of the third as described by Ogden. This creation will be driven by the “unique dialectical tension generated by the two” (p. 190); by the interaction of the two unconsciouses. And, as Ogden describes, this tension leads to, or is related to, the intrapsychic-interpsychic process of an unconscious fantasy of losing (“evacuating”) a part of the self into another and the interpersonal event that involves

a transformation of the subjectivity of the “recipient” in such a way that the separate “I-ness” of the other-as-subject is (for a time and to a degree) subverted (p. 188).

As Ogden observes, this involves an unconscious interplay of subjectivities.

To overview: Ogden explains his understanding, developed apparently by observation and hypothesis, about the analytic situation and process. This understanding begins with the idea that a paradox, described by Winnicott as an essential part of the beginning development of the self in interaction with the other (mother), an intrapsychic/interpsychic process, is applicable to the analytic process. As considered by Ogden, development of the self from within a purely intrapsychic perspective is limited: interaction with another is necessary to facilitate development of the individual self. In Ogden's view, to be creative this interaction is of a specific – paradoxical – nature and the analytic process is based upon and represents this paradoxical interaction.

This process begins with the individual establishing an "I/not-I" internal relation. The not-I is evacuated for several different possible reasons, as Ogden outlines. Ogden does not describe how this process of evacuation occurs but seemingly it involves both intrapsychic and interpersonal dynamics – it is a projection into another, "the recipient", seemingly both in fantasy and in reality, given that the other is affected. The other, the recipient in the interpsychic process, has their "I" subjugated by this "not-I" of the projector. This subjugated I of the recipient and the not-I of the projector together create the "third" described by Ogden, which, is both I and not-I of both individuals.

Ogden describes how the subjectivity of both individuals is affected by its interaction with the third, which has a subverting effect upon them. The next step in the process outlined by Ogden is that the individual subjectivities begin to restore themselves by emerging from the subversion of the third. Though Ogden would not appear to outline such, this process of recovery or reestablishment of the I would involve a return of the not-I and subjugated I from the third, but now changed by the experience.

In his considerations, Ogden is outlining the process underlying the creative potential of the analytic encounter, in which the potential for growth and development is mutual because, although the situation is asymmetrical, each recipient will also (to some extent) be a projector.

Essentially, Ogden proposes that the creative potential of psychoanalysis, the process of growth and development of the individual, is based upon a paradoxical human interaction, best seen in the infant/mother interaction, and living with this paradox, the paradox of I/not-I, self/other, intrapsychic/interpsychic. In this, the basic idea would be that the psychoanalytic situation, encounter and process are underpinned and driven by a creative quality within this essential paradox of human interaction. Growth and development in the individual occur, paradoxically, in their interaction (of a specific kind, as described by Ogden) with an other who they become a part of, but also do not. The psychoanalytic process, as long as the paradox of I/not-I is sustained, focuses this essential (potential) quality of human interaction.

B. Bion

In part 2, chapter 2, section A, the ideas of Ogden (2004) concerning the creative essence of psychoanalysis, involving paradox and its manifestations and the concept of the “analytic third”, was considered. In this section, B, of part 2 chapter 2, the ideas of Bion with respect to what psychoanalysis is, with a focus on the role of paradox, will be considered. However, unlike Ogden who builds upon the solid foundation of the ideas of others (especially Winnicott and paradox, and Bion and projective identification) to achieve his originality, Bion’s ideas about what psychoanalysis is begin with a significant extension of, and even a revision of, these foundation ideas, particularly those of Freud and Klein¹. To consider Bion’s ideas about what psychoanalysis is, and the role and place of paradox in psychoanalysis, it is, accordingly, necessary to first give an overview of the key ideas of Bion about what psychoanalysis is. Following this, some of these ideas will be reconsidered with respect to their paradoxical qualities and, in this, the foundational and constitutive role of paradox in what psychoanalysis is will be considered further.

Bion’s theories about psychoanalysis have been chosen as a major focus for this study because they address the disturbing complexity of the discipline, compared with the safer, accepted views described by Friedman (2006). In other words, Bion’s ideas sustain the dynamism of psychoanalysis, in opposition to the more static views as discussed by Friedman and Green (2005). Also, in keeping with the focus of this part of the study, as will be considered, there is an inherent paradox in some of Bion’s conceptualizations about what psychoanalysis is. This paradox is that of the experience (and existence) of the individual (analyst and patient) as it manifests in the analytic situation as part of psychoanalysis per se, and that of the absolute universal truth of existence and being as this also manifests in, and as part of, the analytic process.

¹ The basis in and development beyond the ideas of Freud and Klein by Bion is discussed for example by Meltzer (1998, pp. 313, 320, 324, 382-386)

These ideas of Bion involve the last dichotomy and the related paradox of this study. To consider these, because of the enigmatic nature of Bion's ideas, an overview of Bion's ideas will first be provided. From this specific conceptualizations will be considered with respect to the issues of dichotomy and paradox and what they tell us about psychoanalysis.

i. An Overview of Bion's Ideas About What Psychoanalysis Is

Bion's ideas about what psychoanalysis is evolve through a series of publications (in particular 1962, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1977 and his "Cogitations", published after his death in 1992). These have provoked significant response in the psychoanalytic literature, not only with respect to journal articles, but also lengthy overviews of Bion's ideas. These include; Grinberg, Sor and de Bianchedi (1985); Grotstein (1981); Bléandonu (1994); J & N Symington (1996); Meltzer (1998). Each of these publications, in their own way, set about clarifying Bion's ideas about what psychoanalysis is because there is an enigmatic quality about Bion's outlines which necessitate such clarifications². Bion partially explains this issue (of the challenge in grasping the meaning of what he communicates) when he writes (1962);

I have kept notes and references down to the minimum; they are essential to thinking the thought rather than merely reading the book. The book is designed to be read straight through once without checking at parts that might be obscure at first. Some obscurities are due to the impossibility of writing without pre-supposing familiarity with some aspect of a problem that is only worked on later. (Introduction to "Learning from Experience", note 4, no page numbers).

These comments about reading his texts is similar to the stance he proposes is necessary to gain understanding in the analytic situation (as will be discussed later). In both analysis and the task of reading Bion, his focus and

² E.g. Souter writes "The work of W R Bion is often described as forbiddingly difficult ..." (2009, p. 795); and Neuman writes that, "despite intensive efforts to elaborate these basic relations, their meaning and ontogenesis remain to a large extent elusive. This difficulty should not be considered the result of poor style or theorisation. Bion's writings, especially the later ones, struggle reflectively with the tension between the introduction of insights... and the recognition that these insights should be presented in a communicative, "digestible" form that would necessarily and tragically undermine their novelty..." (2009, p. 697).

emphasis is upon process and allowing oneself to become part of this process, being at one with it, from which understanding may grow.

The reason for Bion taking this approach towards communicating his ideas about psychoanalysis would appear to be based upon a conceptualization that the essential quality of what psychoanalysis is, is essentially unknowable, an unknowable thing-in-itself.³ Of psychoanalysis as the unknowable thing-in-itself and Bion's ideas, Meltzer (1998) notes;

He [Bion] wishes to treat "psycho-analysis" as a thing-in-itself which existed in the world prior to its discovery by the mystic genius of Freud ... who gave it form" (p. 374).

Bion (1970) writes of this;

I restate the problem thus: psycho-analysis, the thing-in-itself existed. It remained for Freud to reveal the formulation embedded in it. Conversely, once formulated by Freud it remains for others (including Freud himself) to discover the meaning of the conjunction bound by his formulation (p. 117).

Bion therefore indicates that psychoanalysis for him is a "thing-in-itself", unknowable in itself, but that we have come to know of it because Freud was able to reveal aspects of it. Bion's task ("problem") is how to develop further understanding about what it is if, paradoxically, it is essentially unknowable. This is the challenge taken up by Bion in his writings, with a basic reflective of his clinical practice of seeking to be at one with the emerging "analytic object" by following what Keats has called "negative capability".⁴ Adherence to negative capability (as outlined in the footnote on this page) is apparently the essential principle which guides Bion in his investigations, and this approach becoming part of his writings would seem to contribute to their relative obscurity.

³ The concept of an unknowable thing-in-itself, Bion has taken from Kant from the "Critique of Pure Reason" (Bion, 1962, note 22.3.1, p. 105). This concept, central to Bion's ideas about what psychoanalysis is, will be discussed further below.

⁴ Bion (1970) quotes Keats; "it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason" (Bion, p. 125).

From this starting point of seeing psychoanalysis as an essentially unknowable thing-in-itself, of which some manifestations were described by Freud so that we know of it and that a sense of knowing could be further approached through negative capability, Bion's ideas about what psychoanalysis is have unfolded. In this, Bion's focus of investigation is upon the manifestations of psychoanalysis that constitute, and arise in, the analytic session. Of this, the Symingtons (1996) write, "We cannot emphasise enough that Bion's starting points are the phenomena encountered in the analytic session" (p. 2).

To carry out these investigations Bion outlines two concepts/factors. One is Freud's "postulate" (Bion, 1962, p. 53) that consciousness is "the sense-organ of psychic quality" (pp. 53-54). This focus by Bion (via Freud) allows him to begin to build a scheme of the psychical qualities that constitute the analytic encounter, apparently in parallel with the perceptual system, building a scheme of the phenomena of existential reality. Bion (1970) writes of this situation;

The psycho-analyst and his analysand are alike dependent on the senses, but psychical qualities, with which psycho-analysis deals, are not perceived by the senses but, as Freud says, by some mental counterpart of the sense-organs, a function that he attributed to consciousness (p. 28).

The second basic concept about the analytic situation, i.e. the manifestation of psychoanalysis as the analytic encounter - that constitutes Bion's starting point -, is Bion's assumption that the goal of analysis is psychic growth (evolution and increase in abstraction) and that psychic growth occurs by an acceptance of the truth or truth. This assumption, the Symingtons (1996) write, is Bion's, "*only* assumption" (p. 3, the Symingtons' italics). About this they write;

This analysis of the phenomenology [of the analytic encounter] had to be conducted according to some principles; those which Bion selects are the emergence of truth and mental growth (p. 3).

They add that;

The mind grows through exposure to truth. Bion investigates the process through which truth evolves and the process through which truth is blocked (p. 3).

Of this Bion (1965) writes;

Falling back on the analytic experience for a clue, I am reminded that healthy mental growth seems to depend on truth as a living organism depends on food (p. 38).

Bion also writes of how avoidance of truth leads to “mental stagnation” (1965, p. 38) and that the acceptance of the lie instead of truth leads to a poisoning of the mind (e.g. Meltzer 1998).

This “assumption” about the role of truth and mental growth, with its flow on to concepts about the therapeutic orientation of the analytic encounter and the obstruction of this, is, as noted by the Symingtons, central to Bion’s ideas about psychoanalysis. However, as has been considered at length in this study, each and every analyst would appear to have their own view about what psychoanalysis is, what the basic and key elements are. This assumption of Bion, which has the quality of a belief about it, would seem to be of a similar nature. This again directs towards a starting question of this study: what is it about psychoanalysis that manifests as the *belief* about what psychoanalysis is, to be argued so vehemently by individual analysts? To continue to address this question, Bion’s ideas will be considered further.

From these two starting conceptualizations - that consciousness (not sensuous/perceptual experiences) is necessary to consider psychic qualities, and the role of truth in psychic development, with the added guiding concept of negative capability to explore the analytic encounter - Bion uses concepts of “elements”, “factors” and “functions” (i.e. Bion 1962, pp. 1-2; 1963, p. 9, p. 63). Of “factors” and “functions” Bion (1962) writes;

I have deliberately used them [i.e. the terms] because of their association and I wish the ambiguity to remain. I want the reader to be reminded of mathematics, philosophy and common usage (Introduction, point 5).

Bion proposes that if the analyst is able to observe functions and deduce factors from these, then this may allow the development of understanding about the analytic encounter without “the elaboration of new and possibly misguided theories” (1962, p. 2).

Apparently from his observations of the analytic encounter, Bion deduces two functions which are central and essential to his goal of psychic growth (by

the evolution of complexity and abstraction of thought). These are outlined by Meltzer (1998) as:

container-contained ... and a dynamic influence ... paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions in the sense of Melanie Klein, plus selected fact (equivalent, perhaps, to catalyst) in the sense of Poincaré ... (p. 329).

Although Bion (as noted) wishes to observe and describe functions (and factors) to avoid the need for theories, these mental functions have a significant theoretical quality to them. As Meltzer (1998) notes, they are based upon the theoretical model and the theoretical understanding of “the interaction of baby in distress and present breast” (p. 329). Bion (1962) explains his development of the concept of “container-contained”. He refers to Melanie Klein’s observation of “an aspect of projective identification concerned with the modification of infantile fear” (p. 90). Bion explains that the infant is seen to project part of its experience, “the bad feelings”, into what is perceived (apparently by the infant) to be “a good breast” (1962, p. 90). Bion explains further how these feelings are later re-introjected by the infant after they have been modified and made tolerable for the infant by the mother. From this observation/hypothesis Bion proposes to abstract the concept of “a container”, into which an “object” can be projected and the “contained” correlating with that object. From this Bion proposes that the “container-contained” becomes installed in the infant as part of the apparatus of “alpha-function” (to be discussed further below). Bion proposes further that the “growing” (p. 91) of this apparatus of container-contained is a basis of learning from experience, a key aspect of psychic growth.

Bion refers to container-contained as the “first element” (1963, p. 3) of psychoanalysis. He describes three different container-contained functions in general, which may be seen in the analytic situation. These are “commensal, symbiotic, or parasitic” (1970, p. 95). By “commensal” he means “a relationship in which two objects share a third to the advantage of all three” (1970, p. 95). By “symbiotic” he means a relationship in which “one depends on another to mutual advantage” (p. 95); and “parasitic”, a relationship in which “one depends on another to produce a third which is destructive of all three” (p. 95). Bion both applies these observations to the patient’s relationships (e.g. 1970, p. 96),

which will presumably manifest in the transference in the analytic situation, and the analytic interaction generally (e.g. 1963, p. 7).

However, Bion also sees that development from one category to another of the abstractness of thought (as outlined on his Grid: to be discussed), will also be determined by the container-contained function (e.g. 1963).

Bion (1963) describes “the second element” of psychoanalysis as Ps <-> D (p. 3). Of this he writes;

It may be considered as representing approximately (a) the reaction between what Melanie Klein described as the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and (b) the reaction precipitated by what Poincaré described as the discovery of the selected fact (p. 3).

It is important to note that Bion refers to the “reaction between” the two positions because much of the discussion of his element Ps<->D directs towards the movement of Ps to D, as will be discussed.

Of Ps<->D, the Symingtons (1996) observe that Bion

took up the importance of the oscillation between these positions, which he labelled the Ps<->D move... it represented the basic mechanism of thinking (p. 80).

This would infer that the basic mechanism of thinking is the oscillation, the constant movement from dis-integration to integration and back again. The perspective generally taken is that of emphasis of the unidirectional movement, Ps->D. For example, even though the Symingtons comment on the oscillation, they write, that Ps<->D

describes the move from a state of formless chaos to that of coherence which suddenly develops through the operation of the selected fact (1996, p. 80).

They continue to state that;

his [Bion] emphasis is on the integrating capacity of the selected fact resulting in the Ps<->D move to coherence and the spontaneous bleakness of the truth (p. 80).

They write further of this that Bion became aware that thinking

consisted of a move from a formless state where images and ideas are dispersed and chaotic (the PS state of mind) to a state where coherence

becomes manifest and a new understanding is realised (the D state). This means that every understanding takes place through this move (PS <-> D) from incoherence and scattered ideas to a new synthesis (p. 94).

They, thus, would appear to be emphasising that the development of thought is based upon the unidirectional move from chaos to coherence but continue to refer to a bi-directional move.

Others, for example Grinberg (et al) (1985) and Bléandonu (1994) note the oscillation symbolised by PS<->D but do not comment as extensively about the development of thought correlated with it.

Bion (1970), in keeping with the concept of negative capability, explains that ““Patience” should be retained without “irritable reaching after fact and reason” until a pattern “evolves”” (p. 124). Bion explains this further, with respect to the analytic situation and the analyst, by proposing that if the analyst can avoid turning to memory and desire they may become aware of the aspects of the material that, “however familiar they may seem to be, relate to what is unknown both to him and the analysand” (1970, p. 124). He adds that;

Any attempt to cling to what he knows must be resisted for the sake of achieving a state of mind analogous to the paranoid-schizoid position”(p. 124).

In this, Bion would appear to be describing the move from the coherence of knowledge to an approach upon the unknown (and unknowable). He (1970) proceeds to add further;

For this state, I have coined the term “patience” to distinguish it from “paranoid-schizoid position”, which should be left to describe the pathological state for which Melanie Klein used it. I mean the term to retain its association with suffering and tolerance of frustration (p. 124).

Bion proposes further that through the tolerance derived from the state of “patience”, without rushing after knowledge driven by memory and desire, the evolution he refers to may occur. This leads to a state of mind which is the “analogue to what Melanie Klein has called the depressive position” (p. 124).

He calls this state of mind ““security”” (p. 124); adding, “This I mean to leave with its association of safety and diminished anxiety” (p. 124). He comments about these two states:

I consider that no analyst is entitled to believe that he has done the work required to give an interpretation unless he has passed through both phases (p. 124).

In these ideas of Bion, which are the essential elements of the analytic encounter and the development of increasing abstraction of thought, and hence psychic growth, there is reference to the “selected fact”. This is a concept that Bion borrows from the mathematician Poincaré. Of this, Poincaré writes;

If a new result is to have any value, it must unite elements long since known, but till then scattered and seemingly foreign to each other, and suddenly introduce order where the appearance of disorder reigned. Then it enables us to see at a glance each of these elements in the place it occupies in the whole (1952, p. 30).

This observation about mathematical elements legitimately being used to represent psychic elements is assumed, but not discussed, in Bion’s writings.

The Symingtons (1996) draw it into the psychic and write;

The selected fact is such because it is a common meeting for many different hypotheses held about the particular aspect of the psychoanalytic object being considered (p. 95),

and

Although the sudden realisation, occurring when the selected fact precipitates a coming-together of facts, does give the appearance of being caused, these facts are contemporaneous so that time and therefore causation are not involved. The object of the sudden realisation is a *form* which links heretofore disparate elements (p. 95, Symingtons’ italics).

The Symingtons appear to be proposing that psychic elements drawn together by the selected fact are not drawn together because they have a similar causation, because with the element of time removed there can be no such concept. They are drawn together because there is “a form”, presumably meaning something in common to each that links them, even though this had not been seen before.

Beyond these two essential elements involved in the analytic encounter, and the consequent development of thought (and psychic growth), Bion describes other “elements”. These correlate with the “links between psychoanalytic objects” (1963, p. 3). Essentially, Bion is referring to the manner in which such objects may affect each other. Bion proposes three such links, to

“‘love’, ‘hate’, and ‘know’” (p. 3) (L, H and K). He also proposes the negative links between objects, i.e. -L, -H, -K (1963).

Bion outlines his ideas about the development of thought in the analytic encounter, and the analyst’s contributions to this, in a graphic way, in the form of what he has called “the Grid” (1977). Bion proposes that this “grid” is “an instrument for the use of the practising analyst” (1977, p. 3). Grotstein (1981) notes that the grid was intended to “locate the development, evolution, and transformation of all psychic elements and events” (p. 17) in the analytic encounter. Its purpose was therefore to guide and demonstrate an overview of all that occurred in the analytic encounter. Grotstein also proposes that its apparent “mathematical logic” (p. 17) reflects Bion’s

profound belief in the inadequacy of words, understanding, and sense data in general to apprehend the Truth of psychic objects in the internal world (p. 17).

And further, regarding Bion and the Grid, Grotstein proposes that;

Bion created this grid as a scaffolding device to be used to help the psychoanalyst organise his impressions about a *psychoanalytic object*, his term for the irreducible element of the patient’s analytic experience (p. 19, Grotstein’s emphasis).

The Symingtons (1996), in a more focused way (upon the elements of the encounter), propose that the Grid allows a plotting on the two axes of the nature of the “statements made in the session, either the analyst’s interpretations or the patient’s associations or both” (p. 33). It therefore becomes, “a practical tool for increasing the analyst’s awareness and understanding of what both he and the patient are doing” (p. 33). Bion (1977) also states that “The two axes should... together indicate a category implying a comprehensive range of information about the statement” (p. 3).

Of the axes, Bion (1977) writes, “The horizontal axis is intended to state, approximately, the use to which the statement is being put” (p. 3). Bion (1963) outlines at length the categorisations he chose to use for the horizontal axis (chapter 5). He proposes that if analysts are introspective they will discover that, “the theories they employ are relatively few in number and may fall into the following categories...” (p. 17). The first category is “definition” – a definitory

hypothesis about the basic focus of the patient's communications. The second category relates to the analyst's anxiety and that the analyst may be drawn to make an interpretation to prove to the patient and himself/herself that they are not anxious. The interpretation put forward in this manner will fall into the second category. The next two categories are "notation" and "attention": statements made to build upon the initial hypothesis. These terms and concepts Bion borrows from Freud's, "Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1912).

The fifth category ("inquiry") concerns the analyst making an interpretation

to illuminate material, that would otherwise remain obscure, in order to help the patient to release still further material (1963, p. 9).

Of the sixth category ("action"), Bion (1963) proposes that the analyst's interpretive intention is to "enable the patient to effect solutions of his problems of development" (p. 20), i.e. to change, although what he intends remains rather vague until correlated with the vertical axis.

The vertical axis outlines the development of thought in terms of increasing levels of abstraction, i.e. a genetic compared with schematic classification of the categories (horizontal axis).

Bion begins his outline of the development of thought and thinking (his vertical axis) with reference to the raw and unthinkable experience of the individual of themselves and of their world. He gives these experiences the label of "beta-elements", emphasising by this obscure label the unknowable, unthinkable qualities of the objects on which this experience of the world is based.

Bion refers to these "beta-elements" as "things in themselves" (1962, p. 6), and in a note writes, "the term thing-in- themselves I hold with Kant to refer to objects that are unknowable to mankind" (1962, p. 100). He also calls these elements "sense impressions" (1962, p. 7), and indicates that such are "suited for use in projective identification" (p. 6), and may influence acting out. By doing so, he is indicating that we can know of such elements by the effects they

have and their impression through the emotions (“objects of sense”, p. 6). Bion (1962) proposes, accordingly, that when confronted with phenomena we can know that they have “a counterpart of things in themselves” (p. 6).

On Bion’s vertical axis, the first step is to explain how these things-in-themselves, which we can know of, in the manner outlined by Bion, but which are unknowable in themselves, can be processed by the mind to become phenomena, i.e. have qualities of time and space and are therefore able to be known. All steps in Bion’s vertical axis between the “rows” are essentially carried out by the functions/mechanisms container-contained, $Ps \leftrightarrow D$, and the selected fact (as discussed).

With this first step there is the challenge of how this can occur if the elements involved are unknown and unknowable, and in the infant the thinking apparatus exists as potential only. Bion (1962) proposes a process of development of thinking and thought, from these raw experiential, sensual elements to proto-thoughts, based upon a model of the psychic interaction between an infant and its mother’s thinking apparatus.

Bion (1962) proposes that the infant’s sensual experiences, beta-elements, are projected into the mother. Here they become subject to the mother’s “reverie”. He writes that he wishes in this sense (of mother and infant, at least) to restrict the concept of reverie to that applied to content “suffused with love or hate” (p. 36). He states that

in this restricted sense reverie is that state of mind which is open to the reception of any “objects” from the loved object and is therefore capable of reception of the infant’s projective identification... (p. 36).

He notes that if the reverie is not associated with love for the child, “or its father” (p. 36), that “this fact will be communicated to the infant” (p. 36), even though it cannot be comprehended by the child. In this, Bion proposes that in the interaction between container (the mother’s state of mind) and the infant’s projections of its experience (the contained), aspects of the container’s experience (e.g. the love or otherwise for the father), independent of the infant and its experience, may be projected into the child. Although this will be incomprehensible to the infant, it will still presumably be effective with respect to

the child's emotional state. That is, not all that is being processed on the vertical axis may begin as the individual's raw experiences.

Bion (1962) sees that the mother's reverie is a "factor of the mother's alpha function" (p. 36) and that the experience of this and the processed elements of experience will be introjected by the infant, as will the mechanism itself (1963).

Meltzer (1998) writes of this process:

If the mother is able to receive this [a fear of dying in the infant in Meltzer's discussion] by her concern to contain the baby's projective identifications as its means of communication, her function of reverie, implemented by her own alpha function, will denude the projected part of its distress and be able to return to the infant that part of itself it had projected along with a present-breast... (p. 321).

The "present-breast" correlates with the mother's containment function, which includes her reverie/alpha function.

The concept of the beginning of thinking is, therefore, that of the modification of the infant's experience of the world of things in themselves with the raw feelings that threaten to overwhelm the infant, exemplified by the fear of impending death.

This occurs by an interactive process between container (the mother's state of mind) and the contained (the infant's affective communications that affect the mother's state of mind). This container-contained experience is introjected by the infant and establishes an unknowable psychic function that Bion has labelled alpha function. This function modifies and processes the basic elements of experience into proto-thoughts, which Bion calls alpha elements (row B on the grid). Bion writes of alpha elements;

In so far as alpha-function is successful alpha elements are produced and these elements are suited to storage [i.e. memory] and the requirements of dream thoughts (1962, p. 6).

Presumably (Bion does not outline the proposed mechanism), under the influence of the functions of container-contained and $Ps \leftrightarrow D$ (as has been discussed), these alpha-elements proceed to form essentially visual, affective elements, those of memory and/or of dream, dream thoughts and myths (row C

of the grid). The development of thinking then proceeds as outlined on the grid. This involves the movement and evolution from the visual qualities of row C to the verbal conceptualizations of thinking. The process down the grid involves a progressive increase in abstraction and a progressive disengagement from the sensuous (related to the senses and emotions). The rows are “pre-conception”, “conception”, “concept”, “scientific deductive system”, “algebraic calculus”.

Bion (1967) writes of how

‘Thoughts’ may be classified, according to the nature of their developmental history, as pre-conceptions, conceptions or thoughts, and finally concepts (p. 111).

In this, Bion (1967) writes of the “pre-conception” being analogous to Kant’s “concept of ‘empty thoughts’” (p. 111) and of how the preconception may correlate with “an inborn disposition corresponding to an expectation...” (p. 111). This implies that preconception may represent an inherent, inborn disposition, and this in turn implies that the development of thinking and thought may begin (again) at this level of Bion’s grid. That is, even though the basic essentials of experience processed by an unknown hypothetical mechanism (alpha-function) are proposed as the basis of thinking and consequent thought (through rows B and C as described by Bion), he is here proposing the existence of pre-existing thoughts which he also calls “inborn expectations”, “a priori knowledge” (1967, p. 111). These are apparently of a different source, i.e. not from beta- and alpha-elements. In fact, he continues to outline how these pre-existing thoughts, inborn and inherent, develop into thoughts as we know them, i.e. conceptions and concepts. These ideas will be considered further in the following section on Bion’s ideas and paradox.

Bion (1967) describes that when the preconception “is brought into contact with a realisation that approximates to it” (p. 111), the outcome is a “conception”. Conceptions in turn are processed to become concepts, of which Bion writes, “concepts are named and therefore fixed conceptions or thought” (p. 111).

As indicated, these ideas of Bion, expressed in and through his “Grid” will be considered further in the following section on Bion’s ideas and paradox.

However, before proceeding with this examination, one more significant conceptualization will be considered as part of this overview of Bion's ideas of what psychoanalysis is. This conceptualization is that of "O".

Bion (1965) applies this term to what he regards as the "absolute facts of the [analytic] session" (p. 17). He notes that these absolute facts can never be known. He sees that these can be usefully regarded as corresponding to or correlated with the unknowable "thing-in-itself" as proposed by Kant (Bion, 1965, p. 12). Bion (1970) proposes that, "the analyst must focus his attention on O, the unknown and unknowable" (p. 22). He explains (1970) that all objects and facts "known or knowable" (p. 27) are evolutions of O and that in the analytic situation this "ultimate reality" (p. 27) of the patient's experience, not the evolution that *can* be known, is the focus on the analyst's work. He (1970) writes of this;

the psycho-analyst can know what the patient says, does, and appears to be, but cannot know the O [the ultimate reality] of which the patient is an evolution: he can only "be" it (p. 27).

The analyst's task is to be the reality of which the patient's phenomena are an evolution or transformation. Through this, the analyst can make an interpretation of the basis of the patient's experience such that "the interpretation is an actual event in an evolution of O that is common to analyst and analysand" (1970, p. 27).

Bion's conceptualization appears to be that the essential basis of the patient's experience, the beta-elements, can be seen by the analyst if they can allow themselves to "become O" (1970, p. 27), and through this they can make an interpretation (can know) about the basic reality of the patient at the basis of the patient's phenomena. Bion explains this when he (1965) writes;

The bearing on psycho-analysis and interpretation... is this: The beginning of a session has the configuration already formulated in the concept of the Godhead [one of the perspectives on O]. From this there evolves a pattern and at the same time the analyst seeks to establish contact with the evolving pattern. This is subject to his Transformation and culminates in his interpretation... (p. 171).

Bion explains what he intends by O. He observes that “Verbal expressions intended to represent the ultimate object often appear to be contradictory in themselves” (1965, p. 151), but adds;

there is a surprising degree of agreement, despite differences of background, time and space, in the descriptions offered by mystics who feel they have experienced the ultimate reality, (1965, p. 151).

Bion quotes Milton’s “Paradise Lost” for a perspective on his approach to O:

“The rising world of waters dark and deep

Won from the void and formless infinite” (Bion, 1965, p. 151).

The process by which O becomes known of, Bion parallels with being “Won from the void and formless infinite”, and contrasts this with knowing something (he designates this as K) which has finite (for example, inside and outside) qualities about it. O can be known about and experienced but it cannot be known: it can be “Won from the void and formless infinite” but it cannot, in this, be known.

Bion also proposes other perspectives on O. He (1970) outlines that;

I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by terms such as ultimate reality, ultimate truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself... It is darkness and formlessness but it enters the domain of K [knowing] when it has evolved to a point where it can be known (p. 26).

In this, Bion is putting forward a broad base of possible understandings about what he intends by O. Possibly (as Bion does not make his position clear), his perspective is that the ultimate, unknowable reality of existence will, or can be, conceptualized from different perspectives or “vertices”. Ultimate truth and ultimate reality would seem to pertain to the analytic vertex; the religious, “godhead”; the mathematical, infinite; and the philosophical, “thing-in-itself”. However, Bion does not make such distinctions and this may indicate that he believes that, at the conceptual/experiential level of the ultimate unknowable reality, all these are one. However, this remains an inference. The various vertices would therefore indicate some evolution from the “void and formless infinite”.

However, the apparent focus on various vertices may lead Bion's conceptualizations away from the psychoanalytic encounter. Meltzer (1998) makes an observation that hints at this. He writes;

The failure of the mathematical vertex to contain the violence of emotionality of mental life and the impending explosion of that container or formulation when swollen with this fermenting stuff led to its abandonment in favour of the religious vertex (p. 373).

He notes in this that

the ultimate reality is no longer 'O' but 'God' and the striving to become 'O' is now the striving for direct contact with and fusion with God (p. 373).

Bion proposes that any approach from any vertex that has a sense of "having a base" (1970, p. 88) is inadequate to represent an approach to the "realities with which psychoanalytic science has to deal" (p. 88), as the ultimate reality of the personality, O, is "baseless" (p. 88). Bion includes the religious vertex as being equally baseless as any other; but qualifies "with the possible exception of the religion of the mystic" (p. 89). Bion proposes further that analytic science guided by the approach of the mystic must strive for an "at-one-ment" with the analytic object, O. Bion (1970) writes;

with this [O] he must be at one; with the *evolution* of this he must identify so that he can formulate it in an interpretation (p. 89, Bion's italics).

This perspective leads on to Bion's directions of the necessity of the analyst approaching the analytic session without memory, desire and understanding. It would not seem, in these comments with regard to Meltzer's perspective as quoted above, that Bion is proposing any pursuit of being at one with God, rather the evolutions of O formulated by the analyst are a step towards interpretation. These issues, too, will be examined further in the following section.

This overview of Bion's ideas has been considered as a starting point for the examination of Bion's ideas about paradox and psychoanalysis. Essentially, Bion's ideas, although particularly creative and influential, are one more individual perspective on what psychoanalysis is. Accordingly, with respect to the approach of this study, they have been outlined as a part of the process

towards overall conclusions about what psychoanalysis is, guided by the role and place of paradox.

ii. *Bion, Paradox and Psychoanalysis*

In the preceding section an overview of Bion's ideas about psychoanalysis was outlined. As noted at the end of this section, although Bion's ideas about psychoanalysis (its theory and practice) have been very influential and inform contemporary thinking about psychoanalysis, they are, essentially, one more individual perspective. Accordingly, rather than critically considering Bion's ideas with respect to their representing and defining what psychoanalysis is, in keeping with the approach of this part of study they have been outlined for a consideration with respect to their (possible) paradoxical basis and how this, in turn, may inform about what psychoanalysis is.

It was noted that several of Bion's concepts about psychoanalysis appeared to be ambiguous and, possibly contradictory. It is these qualities which will be examined with respect to the possibility of being constitutive and representative of paradox. The concepts that will be examined are those of "truth", "O" and "the Grid".

a. Truth

The conceptualizations of truth in Bion's writings and its relevance to psychoanalysis will be considered with a focus upon issues relating to the contrast between concepts of the finite, individual, perspective and that of the absolute, ultimate truth. These considerations will proceed to the question of paradox in this and its relevance to psychoanalysis.

In Bion's ideas about psychoanalysis the concept of truth is central. As has been discussed in the preceding section, Bion proposes that there exists an absolute, ultimate truth about objects (including the psychoanalytic object, i.e., what psychoanalysis is) that cannot be known but can be known about. He (1965) proposes further that the work of analysis is for the analyst to pursue at-one-ment with the unknowable truth of the session (of the analytic object), seek the manifestations of this in the transformation and evolution of this truth, and to give an interpretation about the truth of the patient and of the analytic session. In this Bion emphasises that if the patient (and analyst) is orientated towards

modifying frustration and pain, rather than evading it, then this approach to the truth may be the basis of psychic growth, the overall goal of Bion's psychoanalysis.⁵

Bion (1992) also writes of truth, the analytic situation and the analyst's role:

to elucidate the truth about the patient's personality and mental characteristics, and to exhibit them to the patient in a way that makes it possible for him to entertain a reasonable conviction that the statements (propositions) made about him represent facts (p. 114).

He (1992) adds to this, "It follows that psycho-analysis is a joint activity of analysand and analyst to determine the truth..." (p. 114). This represents a different perspective from the preceding one, possibly a contradictory one. From one perspectives truth or the truth was unknown and unknowable but in the second it is a matter of fact. Bion writes further of these issues;

Psycho-analytic procedure pre-supposes that the welfare of the patient demands a constant supply of truth... It further presupposes that discovery of the truth about himself is a precondition of an ability to learn the truth, or at least seek it in his relationship with himself and others (1992/1959, p. 99).

He adds to this;

It is supposed at first that he [the patient] cannot discover the truth about himself without assistance from the analyst and others (p. 99).

These ideas of Bion point to two concepts of truth: one absolute, impersonal, and unknowable in itself, and the other finite, personal, knowable and correlated with ascertainable "facts".

These considerations are extended by Bion in his discussions of truth and lie, where the truth again takes on the quality of the infinite and absolute, while lies are finite and individual. However, in this, seemingly, it is necessary to have a finite, individual sense of the truth to construct the lie as its counterpart: the lie has to have a corresponding truth to be a lie.

⁵Of this Bion (1965) writes, "Falling back on analytic experience for a clue, I am reminded that healthy mental growth seems to depend on truth as a living organism depends on food. If it is lacking or deficient the personality deteriorates" (p. 38).

Of these issues of truth and lie, with respect to psychic growth, Bion (1970) writes;

Whether the thoughts [of the truth] are entertained is of significance to the thinker but not to the truth...The lie depends on the thinker and gains significance through him (p. 103).

This perspective with respect to the absolute quality of the truth (beyond the individual) and the finite individual quality of the lie (the correlation between the individual and a lie) Bion emphasises again when he (1970) writes that;

the difference between a true thought and a lie consists in the fact that a thinker is logically necessary for the lie but not for the true thought. Nobody need think the true thought; it awaits the advent of the thinker... (pp. 102-103).

Bion (1965) makes this understanding about truth and lie, about the absolute and individual, more complex when he writes;

all that I have said [about phenomena and the thing in-itself] is not incompatible with Plato, Kant, Berkeley, Freud and Klein, to name a few, who share the extent to which they believe that a curtain of illusion separates us from reality. Some consciously believe the curtain of illusion to be a protection against truth which is essential to the survival of humanity; the remainder of us believe it unconsciously but no less tenaciously for that (p. 147).

Bion is here proposing that a curtain of illusion (i.e., lie, falsehood) is necessary to protect us from truth and that this essential lie is in turn necessary for the overall survival of "humanity". This approach moves the idea of lie from an individual, finite, evasion of frustration, to that of an absolute, universal imperative.

Bléandonu (1994) comments on Bion's concept of the lie by writing;

Bion tended to characterise lying as a form of human creation and to attribute to it the 'pleasure of creation'. He places it somewhere between a *folie à deux* and artistic collaboration....Unfortunately, his use of paradox does not allow this...to be fully explored (p. 226).

Bléandonu adds that

the reader experiences a conflict... when Bion continues to oscillate between the lie as pathology and the lie as the art of survival (p. 226).

Bléandonu is noting an ambiguity in Bion's ideas about the lie. This ambiguity, in parallel with that concerning the relationship between truth and lie, correlates with an individual, finite perspective and a universal, infinite perspective. That is, the lie can be seen to be the individual's creative effort to avoid the truth because of a need to evade frustration and pain, or the lie can be part of an ongoing overall need to avoid the truth (presumably about issues of existence) as an act of survival of the species.

This apparent ambiguity in Bion's ideas about truth and lie, between individual, finite and universal, absolute, infinite, alludes to paradox and this possibility will be considered further. This consideration is augmented by examining Bion's notions of "hubris" and "arrogance".

These ideas of Bion about truth, hubris and arrogance are introduced when he (1967) writes of the Oedipus myth;

From the point of view which makes the sexual crime a peripheral element of a story in which the central crime is the arrogance of Oedipus in vowing to lay bare the truth at no matter what cost (p. 86).

In this same book ("Second Thoughts"), just two pages later, Bion avers that, "the implicit aim of psycho-analysis to pursue the truth at no matter what cost..." (Bion 1967, p. 88). In spite of the almost identical wording, Bion is not correlating the analytic pursuit of the truth "at no matter what cost" with arrogance or hubris; in fact he proceeds to explain that this approach of psychoanalysis to the truth is the basis of envious attacks upon it.⁶

Bion is contrasting two different approaches to the pursuit of the truth, the hubristic "at no matter what cost", and that of psychoanalysis. With respect to understanding what psychoanalysis is, from Bion's perspective, and the central place of the pursuit of the truth in this, the question of where the difference lies between these two perspective will be considered through the

⁶ Of the contrast between the two perspectives on the pursuit of truth at no matter what cost. Meltzer (1998) writes with respect to Bion and hubris; "the reading of the paper 'On Arrogance' at the Paris congress struck many people as a shocking display of the very 'hubris' Bion was describing" (p. 301).

Oedipal myth. The importance of this to Bion is evident when he writes of Freud;

He recognised, as a scientist, that he was confronted by a problem to the solution of which he would have to apply the Oedipal myth. The result was the discovery, not of the Oedipus complex, but of psycho-analysis... (1992, p. 228)

The myth and subsequent tragedies⁷ begins with Oedipus' ancestor, Cadmus, in his search for his sister, Europa, who has been abducted by Zeus (1995). Cadmus establishes the Greek city of Thebes and in doing so kills a three-headed dragon who is the favourite of the god Ares, who consequently puts the curse upon the rulers of Thebes. He later becomes Cadmus' father-in-law and the wedding gifts he gives become a central ongoing part of the myth beyond Oedipus.

The part of the myth directly relevant to Oedipus begins when his (biological) parents, Laius and Jocasta, learn of the curse fating Laius to be killed by his son, who will then wed his wife. To prevent this fate Laius arranges to have Oedipus killed. By circumstance he is adopted instead by the king and queen of Corinth (Polybus and Merope). Oedipus believes correctly that he is the son of a king, but a casual remark about him having humble beginnings provokes him to seek answers from his adoptive parents. They are evasive (it is unclear how much they know of Oedipus' origins). So determined is he to learn the truth that he seeks this from the Oracle at Delphi. The Oracle tells him;

Shun thy father, ill-omened youth! Shouldst thou meet with him, he will fall by thy hand; then wedding thy own mother, thou wilt have a race destined to fresh crimes and woe (1995, p. 224).

Oedipus, believing that he may be able to evade the curse, leaves Corinth to protect those he believes are his parents (Polybus and Merope).

⁷ The myth would appear reasonably consistently outlined across a number of texts; here the reference will be to "Classical Legends" (1995) by AR Hope Moncrieff, because this author draws together the "Tragedies of Thebes" (chapter 19) which allows the Oedipal myth to be put in an overall context, i.e., that of Oedipus, and the overall context of the myth can be considered.

He then proceeds, unknowingly, to kill his biological father in a confrontation while travelling, and arrives at Thebes, which is cursed by the presence of the Sphinx. Oedipus's uncle Creon (Jocasta's brother), who is ruler in the absence of Laius, proposes that anyone who can dispatch the Sphinx by answering its existential question can marry Jocasta and be king of Thebes. Failure to answer the Sphinx's question would mean instant death. Oedipus took up the challenge because he had nothing to lose, burdened by the curse and believing himself exiled from his home and parents, not because of desire to rule or to marry Jocasta. He answers the Sphinx's riddle, becomes the ruler of Thebes and marries Jocasta and has four children by her. Thebes was peaceful and Oedipus lived an apparently happy and creative life until his children reached adulthood. Then plague and pestilence fell again on Thebes. Creon consults the Oracle who says that this was because of the "unatoned death" of Laius (p. 227). Tiresias, the mystic, is consulted, but refuses to tell Oedipus the truth until Oedipus accuses him of being complicit in the crime. Tiresias, apparently provoked by Oedipus' accusations, says, "'Hear, then, oh King, if thou must learn the truth'" (p. 228). He tells Oedipus that he (Oedipus) killed Laius and adds, "'For thy sake, and no other, this curse has come upon the city'" (p. 228).

Oedipus recalls killing a man on the road but Jocasta rejects the possibility of this being the cause of the ongoing curse, by arguing that her only son by Laius was killed. However, the truth is revealed by the shepherd who refused to kill Oedipus on Laius' instructions. Jocasta hangs herself, the guilty Oedipus blinds himself with her buckle and goes with his daughter Antigone to Athens, and then to Colonus, where he unhappily lives the rest of his life. His children and grandchildren, as foretold by the Oracle, become involved in bloody tragedies until the wedding gifts of Ares to Cadmus are taken to Delphi and the curse upon Cadmus and his heirs is "charmed away" (p. 241).

This sketch of the myth, allows considerations of Oedipus' hubris concerning the truth, and the relevance of this to psychoanalysis.

In the myth Oedipus sought the truth on several occasions: when he asked his adoptive parents, when he consulted the Oracle, and when he

questions Tiresias. If he had been satisfied with the answers (whatever they may have been) given by his adoptive parents then the tragedy would have been averted. However, his determination to know the truth because of a slight (about his birth status, was he the son of a king or not?) led him to the Oracle. Oedipus “heard” the truth, but did not fully comprehend it because he was focused on his personal reality and the relationship with his adoptive parents. Rather than hearing the full essence of what the Oracle had to say about his place in the ongoing issues beyond him, Oedipus focused on the finite issues of himself and his interactions with immediate others, and then set about trying to evade the curse by his finite actions. In this the issue of hubris arises in Oedipus’ belief that ongoing issues, of which he is only a part, can be radically altered by his finite personal and interpersonal actions. The curse has infinite qualities about it, all and forever, and these qualities are added to by the nature of the ongoing issues, issues which are inherent aspects of the ongoing and eternal human interactions. These include the son’s rivalry with the father for the mother’s attention, the mother’s ambivalent relationship with her son, the father’s (Ares’) attachment to his daughter, etc. Freud would appear to have recognised these eternal aspects of human experience within the myth, and used them to define the Oedipus complex and psychoanalysis, according to Bion. Psychoanalysis from this perspective is based on these eternal aspects of human experience and behaviour as alluded to in the myth and the curse.

The Sphinx introduces into the myth something infinite and absolute, viz. the gods. Oedipus dismisses this by solving the riddle with its infinite-finite existential qualities. However, in doing this, although it seemed as though the individual (Oedipus) had triumphed over the gods (with their eternal, absolute qualities), this triumph of Oedipus was just part of the unfolding of the curse as alluded to in the myth, and the curse. The individual seemed to triumph over the eternal facts of life (tied up in the essences of the curse) but this was just part of the ongoing existential issues. In this a sense of hubris would lie with the belief of the individual that they could triumph over issues of life and death, and sexuality i.e. the essential drives of Freud’s psychoanalysis.

Oedipus' apparent triumph over the Sphinx (plague and pestilence return later) leads to the curse being fully realized, i.e., he marries his mother and has children who become tainted by the curse. When he consults Tiresias he insists upon knowing the truth and believes, apparently, that Tiresias has personal motives for withholding the truth, i.e., he sees a finite individual perspective even though he has been informed that he is part of an ongoing curse. Tiresias tells him the truth but also only focuses upon Oedipus and his finite actions, i.e., killing his father and wedding his mother. In this Oedipus experiences a sense of personal shame, but gives no thought to the ongoing curse of which he is only a part, and which will now affect his children.

Oedipus pursued the truth, but only the personal truth about his own actions, which is all he allowed himself to hear. The truth he did not hear was of his place in an ongoing curse, a truth that transcended him, and, in relation to which, he was only one finite part. Accordingly, he believed at a personal level that he could evoke a transcendent and hence impersonal truth. Even when he found out he could not, he still sought to address the matter at the personal level of his own existence, by being preoccupied with his personal guilt and punishing himself. The truth that Oedipus pursued "at not matter what cost" pertained to his circumscribed personal existence and the impact of this upon the individuals around him at that specific point of time: namely his two sets of parents. Overwhelmed by his commission of patricide and incest, he saw only personal truth and responsibility, while being blind to the transpersonal dimension, in which he was merely a part, and which would affect others.

In this, the "insolent pride" (Meltzer, 1998, p. 306) of Oedipus, demonstrated in pursuing the truth at all costs, involved seeing a greater more encompassing truth, the truth brought by the gods, as pertaining only to himself, despite the transpersonal significance having been spelled out to him by the Oracle. His crime or sin of hubris and arrogance is that of seeing the truth as his – and his alone – personal revelation.

Bion, in his reference to Freud and the Oedipus myth and the discovery of psychoanalysis, indicates an important correlation between this myth and psychoanalysis, but does not directly expand upon what this could be. Within

these issues about Oedipus and his hubristic focus upon the truth, the interpersonal, transcendent truth, as his own personal truth, there is drawn a contrast, a dichotomy of individual existence. These issues did in fact effect Oedipus personally, and his singular existence was an essential part of the unfolding tragedy or tragedies. Because of factors beyond himself, (i.e. the ongoing curse, the behaviour of others) Oedipus' life was significantly affected and defined. Oedipus responded by his belief that this encompassing truth of his existence could be contained within the finitude of his own perspective, of his own individual existence. This would appear to be more the basis of his hubris, not specifically his pursuit of the truth at no matter what cost.

These issues about Oedipus allude to an important quality concerning the existence and sense of being for the individual and how the individual deals with issues of the truth about these. In the Oedipus myth the truth about his individual existence was that this was affected, essentially defined, by the wider ongoing issues of which he was, in turn, the essential part. This, rather graphically, dramatically and tragically in the example of Oedipus, points towards a dichotomy of individual existence, as individual being per se, but affecting and also being affected by universal issues of ongoing existence. As has been outlined, Oedipus negated the importance of the encompassing truth of his actions (and existence) and believed it could be contained (and explained) in the finitude of his own individual perspective.

This issue of the dichotomy of individual existence and the individual's response to the truth about their place in ongoing existence and being will be considered below, as one explanation of why this myth (with its dramatic outline of this dichotomy) was so important to Freud as the basis of psychoanalysis.

The issue of hubris and the pursuit of the truth point (from the perspective argued above, at least) towards the issues of finite, individual and infinite, universal, ultimate, that have been discussed with respect to truth and lies. These issues have arisen from a consideration of Bion's ideas about truth and lie which appear to have an inherent ambiguity and/or possible contradiction. The question here is whether this ambiguity is truly paradoxical

and, if so, what is the paradox and how does this paradox inform the fundamental nature of psychoanalysis?

As has been noted in Bion's ideas about psychoanalysis, the concept of truth appears to have two representations. One is that of the ahistorical, ultimate truth which exists absolutely, independent of any object and any mind to think it. The other is the finite, contingent truth of a historical-situated object, the fact which requires an individual mind to think it and know it. Even though the ultimate truth may theoretically exist independent of object or thought, to know of it requires a mind. It has to be thought of to be known of, and in this process there develops the paradoxical concept of a truth, which is both unthinkable and unknowable but, to be known about, has to also have some quality of finite conceptualization. The truth referred to by Bion at this level (of the ultimate), is simultaneously transcendental, absolute, and unknowable, while contingent, historical, and conceivable to the individual.

The finite truth per se would also seem to have paradoxical qualities. The quality of being true of an object or a fact is not a quality only inherent in the object. The quality of truth, becoming the truth about an object, refers to a quality beyond and separate from that object. This is the quality of truth which exists separate and independent of any object. This is not truth, as in absolute truth, but simply the concept of truth, to which the quality of the truth about an object is a representation. In this, the finite truth about the object signifies the fact of the truth about that object but also refers to and represents something beyond that finite truth, i.e., truth overall, as a transcendental conceptualization.

Truth, therefore, would appear to have two paradoxical realizations. The first is the product of the absolute truth and its finite representations. This would appear to be the truth that Bion pursues (in psychoanalysis) as essential to psychic growth. The second paradoxical realization of truth refers to the finite truth about the object, which is based upon the paradox of the contingent truth of an object and the overarching truth, independent of any specific object. This second paradoxical representation, although important in concepts of the truth and the lie, would seem to be of lesser importance overall with respect to psychoanalysis in Bion's writings.

With respect to the specific relevance of what psychoanalysis is, there is the central conceptual place of the role of truth in Bion's psychoanalysis. Truth is the focus of the analytic work: the truth of the psychoanalytic object which is created by analyst and patient in each session is the main perspective in this, with the goal of psychic growth via being at one with this truth. This truth would seem to be that of the paradoxical product of the absolute and the finite conceptualizations of this. The second concept of truth, of the patient, analyst and analytic session, is correlated more with the paradoxical issue of what truth is with respect to the overall concept of truth and the finite representation of it. In the psychoanalytic situation this second concept of truth would seem important in practice, i.e. as a counterbalance to and exposure of the lie and its effects upon psychic growth.

As considered, Bion implies that the lie also has ambiguous status with reference to finite individuals and the human entirety (i.e. with respect to the preservation of "humanity"). The question here is whether or not the lie may also action paradoxical status arising from, or related to, this ambiguity? Drawing a parallel with the paradoxical realizations of truth, the lie cannot have an absolute, ultimate representation. This is because, by definition, the lie is the antithesis of the truth. However, absolute truth cannot have an antithetical lie, it is true absolutely. So there can be no concept of the absolute lie, it has no meaning. The other paradoxical perspective on truth, as discussed, does introduce the possibility of the antithetical lie. The lie about an object is the antithesis of the truth about that object, which is historically contingent and factual. However, the concept of lie overall, like that of the truth overall, requires a conceptualization of the lie separate from and beyond any specific individual representation. In this any lie, like any truth about an object, says something (false) about the object but it also says something more than this if revealed, which is the case in psychoanalysis with the analysis of a defence mechanism such as denial or repression. It says something about falsehood overall and how it pertains to that object as an overall concept (a falsehood).

There is also a further aspect about the lie that requires consideration with respect to paradox. This arises from Bion's (1965) observation about the

lie as an illusion essential for the preservation of humanity. In this, with reference to Kant and Plato (and others), Bion proposes that this lie represents the universal defensive human tendency to create illusions about what is true and what is not. This illusion protects against any knowledge of the overall truth, which implies that of the ultimate, absolute truth of existence. Bion's inference is that knowledge of this truth would be catastrophic for humanity.⁸

Bion infers that an alternative truth, the finite truth about an object, may mistakenly be believed to be the absolute truth about that object. This, seemingly, is the illusion. What this implies is that finite truth about an object is illusory with regard to ultimate truth and, accordingly, correlates with lie, or at least falsehood. In this Bion is proposing that, even though at a finite level truth and lie are ostensibly antithetical, at this level of consideration the truth may in fact be a lie (or at least a falsehood/erroneous belief) with regard to absolute truth. Paradoxically, a truth about an object may be true at a finite level (and therefore can be lied about), but this truth is also a lie if the absolute truth is considered (e.g. the statement that the sun will rise in the east).

In the considerations of the paradoxical status of truth and lie in psychoanalysis, one further concept was discussed, namely arrogance and hubris about the attempt to know of the truth at all costs. As discussed, the pursuit of the truth by Oedipus and by Bion has the similar qualities of "at any cost". However, the difference is of particular importance with respect to truth and psychoanalysis.

Oedipus manifests characteristics in his pursuit of the truth that are antithetical to those displayed by Bion and Freud. This difference lies with the relationship between issues of finite existence and ultimate existence and the truth about these. Oedipus turns to the Oracle, the holder of absolute truth, with respect to a personal issue: is he or is he not of royal birth? The Oracle

⁸Žižek (2006) has referred to the possibility of the revelation of the ultimate truth as in Kant (1993, "Critique of Practical Reason"). Here Kant (1788) writes that if we were aware of this absolute reality of existence, "God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes.... The conduct of man, so long as his nature remained as it is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well, but no life would be found in the figures" (in Žižek, 2006, p. 22).

responds at another level and informs him of his place within the curse; he is informed that his fate is determined by an ongoing curse brought by the gods, a curse symbolic of issues of the overall of existence (e.g. intergenerational rivalries) cast upon individuals. However, Oedipus thinks only in finite individual terms, as if he believes the issues of his own existence can undo or override those pertaining to fated humanity as a whole.

Bion and Freud have both taken antithetical approaches to this, and this would seem to be a key issue with regard to what psychoanalysis is.

As Bion (1992) notes of Freud⁹, Freud began with the Oedipus myth and proceeded to discover issues about “man's psyche” and psychoanalysis. What Bion implies about Freud, and is true of himself, is that the experience of the individual becomes a starting point to explore issues about the human condition and, importantly, that psychoanalysis is tied in with this.

The contrast between the story of Oedipus and Freud and Bion is that Oedipus (apparently) hubristically believed the issues of ongoing existence as they impacted on the individual can be undone by the individual. Freud and Bion take up the issues of individual existence, as they manifest in the analytic situation, as an entry into the understanding of the truth about issues of collective human existence manifesting in individual experience. The Oedipal myth, and its part in the Theban Tragedies, is particularly valuable as a starting point in this, as Freud would appear to have used it (according to Bion, at least). The contrast is therefore between the resolution of the paradox (finite-infinite) by believing that the finite constitutes the truth, and sustaining the paradox. Bion and Freud, in contrast, sustain the paradox by using the finite perspective as the available starting point to explore ultimate truth and reality.

In summary: the issue of truth, paradox, and what they represent with respect to what psychoanalysis is has been considered from several different

⁹ As has been referred to already, Bion (1992) writes concerning Freud; “he recognised, as a scientist, that he was confronted by a problem to the solution of which he would have to apply the Oedipus myth. The result was the discovery, not of the Oedipus complex, but of psychoanalysis. (Or is it man, or man's psyche, that is discovered when these elements are constantly conjoined?)” (p. 228).

perspectives. By contrasting perspectives of finite, individual and universal, absolute qualities of truth were examined. The concept of truth as it manifests in psychoanalysis (at least in Bion's ideas), is seen as potentially the product of the paradox of interlocking premises of finite and absolute with respect to historically contingent and ahistorically transcendent truths. In Bion's perspective on what psychoanalysis is, in theory and practice, these concepts of truth are central. The crucial, central role of the truth in Bion's ideas about psychoanalysis, is contrasted with that of the lie. This again emphasises the issues of the finite mind and the absolute issues of the truth: the lie being the product of the finite mind admitting no paradoxical interlocking of finite and absolute conceptualizations. However, as noted, Bion does introduce the idea of a universal illusion (lie or falsehood) guarding against awareness of the ultimate truth. The creative qualities of the paradox, seemingly related to the interlocking of the issues of the finite, individual, with the absolute and ultimate, correspond with the creative qualities (as manifested in new understanding and psychic growth) of psychoanalysis.

The different approaches, taking the finite as the overall, or moving from the finite to the ultimate, is raised by the issue of hubris, as discussed. In these considerations there arises a perspective on what psychoanalysis is as correlated with the product of the paradox of finite, individual, existence and universal existence, in this case tied up with the issues of the pursuit of truth.

b. "O"

These issues about truth, paradox and psychoanalysis extend to, and can therefore be reconsidered, with respect to Bion's enigmatic concept, "O".

Of his concept of O, Bion (1970) writes:

I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality, represented by terms such as ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing in itself... It cannot be 'known'. It is darkness and formlessness (p. 26).

In this Bion is indicating that O can be considered from a number of vertices, viz. psychoanalytic, religious, mathematical, philosophical and literary. As discussed (pages 215-216 above), it would appear that Bion (1970) intends all these vertices to indicate that this ultimate reality cannot be appropriately approached from any one base; apparently the appropriate approach is from each and all of these vertices.

Further, Bion (1970, p. 26) sees O as central to analytic practice (and theory) with the analytic session directed towards “being at one with”. For example, Bion (1965) writes;

The beginning of a session has the configuration already formulated in the concept of the Godhead [one perspective of O]. From this there evolves a pattern and at the same time the analyst seeks to establish contact with the evolving pattern. This is subject to his Transformation and culminates in his interpretation (p. 171).

In this, Bion is proposing that the ultimate reality (of existence) is present in the analytic session and as the analytic session. The analyst's task is to know of this and endeavour to be at one with it, to *be* it. From this awareness of the transformation of the ultimate reality, the analyst will draw the patient's attention

As with the issues concerning truth discussed above, ultimate reality (O in Bion's terms) is paradoxical. O, the ultimate and absolute nature of all objects, is unknown and unknowable, states Bion (1965) with reference to Kant (and the concept of noumena). At that level of conceptualization, there is, paradoxically, no conceptualization because O cannot be thought or thought about¹⁰. However even though Bion advocates Kant's ideas re noumena (and their relation to his concepts of O), he introduces a perspective that goes beyond the absoluteness of Kant's perspective (see footnote on this page) and, in so doing, also introduces an important perspective on the nature of psychoanalysis' subject matter and its approach to this. Bion proposes that

¹⁰ Kant emphatically writes of noumena: “the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of appearances, all is for us a mere void” (1993, p. 213). He adds to this, “we possess an understanding whose province does *problematically* extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the concept of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given to us” (p. 213, Kant's emphasis). Bion, although informed by these Kantian ideas, does appear to be proposing such an “intuition”.

although O cannot be thought or directly thought about, and accordingly it cannot be known, it can be experienced and known about. Further to this its characteristics can be known of and can be described as in “darkness and formlessness” (1965, p. 162), although these characteristics in themselves would be antithetical to its “known about” potential – introducing the paradox of knowing about the unknowable. However the paradox for psychoanalysis is an extension of this. The paradox that is basic to Bion’s theory and practice of psychoanalysis is that O, which cannot be known, must be realised in each analytic session in order for the essential agent, truth, to be realised.

These issues point towards the concept of O referring to both the unknowable, ultimate reality (of existence), but also to finite (i.e. able to be described in words) representations and realisations of this. In this “O” would appear to be the product of two contradictory but interdependent conceptualizations, i.e. the paradox of the ultimate, unknowable reality being known about by finite representation. In this, O is neither the unknowable nor its finite representation, but the creative product of both. As with the truth, O, as a similar product of infinite and the finite, has a central place in Bion’s ideas about what constitutes the basis of psychoanalysis, in theory and practice.

However, Bion also implies that this unknown (or at least aspects of it) may be known by the mystic. For example, he writes (1992/1978) of the fear of the unknown and unknowable qualities of the future and that this (the future);

may only be known to certain people, described in terms of “genius” or “mystic”, who have a peculiar relationship with reality (p. 373).

Here Bion would appear to be proposing that certain people (mystics and geniuses) can know this unknown, which is confusing because it introduces inconsistency to Bion’s ideas, and would also seem inconsistent also with facts of reality. A possible reason for such comment by Bion is alluded to by Bléandonu (1994), who writes of Bion’s concern “at the prospect of sacrificing mystical genius to burgeoning scholasticism” (p. 212). In other words, to elude the intellectual reduction of his creative intuitions, Bion has emphasised their enigmatic (mystical) qualities.

With respect to the issue of the paradox of ultimate and finite realities represented in Bion's conceptualization of "O", the move to intellectual reduction (in "scholasticism") or the (apparent) counter-move to emphasise mysticism, would both be resolutions of the paradox; an approach contrary to that adopted in this study.

c. The Grid

The third of Bion's conceptualizations to be considered, the Grid, does not refer as directly to what psychoanalysis is as do the issues of truth and O. However, the Grid represents a graphic outline of the analytic session and therefore still refers to what psychoanalysis is.

As Bion points out, the Grid "is an instrument for the use of practising psycho-analysts" (1989, p. 3). Bion (1989) writes of the Grid;

The left-hand vertical column is an indication of categories in which a statement, of whatever kind, should be placed; this category indicates developmental status.

The horizontal axis is intended to state, approximately, the use to which the statement is being put. The two axes should thus together indicate a category implying a comprehensive range of information about the statement (p. 3).

The Symingtons (1996) extend Bion's ideas about the Grid, noting that it outlines the process by which understanding about the psychoanalytic object develops through the analytic session: "The Grid is an attempt to describe the progressive development of thought from concrete to highly abstract levels" (p. 33). They add;

The Grid ... is an attempt to represent elements of thought in the process of development and their use. The function of psychoanalysis is to elucidate this development. Bion said that psychoanalysis was not a perfect instrument to achieve this purpose but that he did not know a better one (p. 33).

From these ideas of Bion and the Symingtons, the Grid depicts the process of the analytic session and, in this, the intended movement towards the understanding of the analytic object (O), as representing ultimate truth and

reality. This representation of the analytic session takes on a finite categorisation based upon two sets of criteria (on the two axes). The vertical axis outlines the “categories”, i.e., the nature of the thought processes involved, that can be applied to elements of the analytic process (mainly by focus on the statements made by patient and analyst), and the horizontal axis depicts the uses to which these elements are “being put”. In this Bion generally refers to “the statement” made by the analyst as that which is categorised, which would appear to be the element that is his prime focus. Of this Bion (1965) writes, “The medium in which the psycho-analyst works is verbalised thoughts. Using the Grid to categorise the verbalised thoughts...” (p. 38).

The Grid therefore serves as an outline, a finite, graphic depiction of the nature and purpose of the analyst’s statements as representative of the process of the analytic session. However, Bion does not intend for this to be the only representation of the elements of the analytic session: the patient’s communications also can be categorised on the Grid. Of this, Bion (1965) writes;

The patient’s contribution is not restricted and may fall in any grid category; the grid categories are intended to be adequate for all the elements and psycho-analytic objects met with in the practice of psychoanalysis (p. 38).

Although Bion intends the Grid to be an “instrument” to assist the practising analyst, its limitations are apparent. Giving graphic representation, a static, finite representation, to a dynamic process is an obvious restriction of its use. Any statement made by either analyst or patient (of whatever kind) will be part of a dynamic process in that the statement will represent, and be the consequence of, preceding events and will be part of and contribute significantly to what follows.

Also, the Grid is restricted by the choice of variables that underlie the categorisation of the statement. The two variables that constitute the analytic process are the patient’s experience and the analyst’s experience, leading to the unique interaction and further experience (in keeping with Ogden’s concept of the “analytic third”). However, without imposing one Grid on another to constitute a third, in order to depict the analyst’s experience, the patient’s experience and that of interaction between the two, the Grid can only represent

the singular experience of the analytic process. However, it may be that Bion believes that the representation of the analyst's experience, as categorised by the statement they make with respect to the use they intend for their statement, and the cognitive quality of the statement, may represent sufficiently the process of the analysis towards the analytic object. This would not seem clear.

Where the Grid does possibly contribute to this study is with respect to the categories that Bion has chosen to give representation to the analytic process. The horizontal axis, the intended use of the statement, outlines how the analyst proceeds to process the data (the essence of the analytic object arising in the analytic session) towards communicating the experience, in a way that captures the patient's understanding of the truth about themselves, via the interpretation.

It is the vertical access, however, that holds more relevance to the issues being considered at this point in this study. Although this axis categorises the level and quality of thought inherent in the analyst's or the patient's communication, it also indicates a developmental scheme of thought as being relevant to the analytic process. Bion proposes a way of understanding the movement towards a conceptualization and experience of O by following the development of thought. At first this appears contradictory, or paradoxical, because Bion's categorisations of the development of thought become more abstract and further from the basic essence of experience, namely "beta-elements". However, a focused consideration of Bion's outline of the genesis of thought indicates a movement from individual proto-experience to thought that belongs to the thought in general. This perspective will be considered with a focus upon the contrast between finite, individual issues (of thought and experience) and those correlated with the ultimate, infinite of existence.

This relates to Bion's theory about how thought is initiated. Raw elements of individual experience (that Bion labelled beta-elements) are projected into a container and are processed by an unknown and unknowable process (which Bion calls alpha-function), and are transformed into proto-thoughts (alpha-elements). These raw elements of experience belong to the individual but involve pre-personal bodily sensations common to all humankind.

They are a genetic clone of the human species based upon the evolution of life from its beginnings. It is the transformation of the beta-elements into alpha-elements that begins the process of the distillation of the sense of individual, finite existence. And this process is that of alpha-function, which is unknown and unknowable. The mother transforms the beta-elements of her child into alpha-elements not by any conscious individual act, but by an intuitive process that defines the human maternal function; it is what mothers do. This experience, according to Bion, is introjected by the infant to become the key function in the process of the infant representing and thinking about raw experience.

In this beginning sense of individual experience being distilled out of the universal, as outlined on Bion's Grid, is the introduction a paradox of individual existence and experience. Are the thoughts of the individual, pertaining to their experience of themselves as individuals, their own individual thoughts or thoughts that are only theirs by virtue of being part of universal existence. However, further to this, for these questions to arise the individual has to seemingly be able to stand separate from their place in the universal of existence to be able to question this. Or, are such questions part of their universal existence, i.e. is this what humans do? These paradoxical issues will be examined further within the further considerations of Bion's Grid.

From alpha-elements arise "dreams, dream-thought and myths" (row C on Bion's Grid). This would appear to represent a direct development of individual thought from the proto-thoughts (alpha-elements). However, it would seem improbable in the development of alpha-function that qualities of the mother's experience will not also be incorporated into the evolution of infantile experience into thoughts. When the alpha-elements are realised in the form of dream, dream-thoughts and myths, the question arises how big a part the mother's experience, played out in the interaction with the infant and the infant's father (Bion 1962), impacts the realisation. In other words, when the individual, child or the adult, processes the elements of their experience into dreams, dream-thoughts and myths, how much of the consequent realisation (e.g., the

dream) is directly the product of the individual's experience and how much does it carry with it the "shadow of the object" (Bollas, 1987)¹¹.

These issues of the role of the universals of existence in the development of the thought of the individual, in this case the possible content, are extended further when Bion discusses "pre-conception" (row D). Of this Grotstein (1981) writes;

The transformed sense data [of rows B and C] then seem to link up with preconceptions, a mental reservoir of inherent (a priori) ideas waiting to be realised... (p. 17).

Grotstein also points out how Bion "changed his focus [i.e. Freud's] from the importance of unconscious instinctual drives to inherent preconceptions (inborn knowledge)" (p. 20).¹²

Bion also refers to the preconception, as "*a priori* knowledge of the individual" (1962, p. 101, note 10.2.2).

Bion's Grid, with respect to its vertical axis, the development of thought, would point towards a complex interaction between the experience of the individual being transformed into thought, and the effects upon this of a universal and pre-personal dimension of existence. The universal effects their early development (through alpha-function and what, possibly, is conveyed through their mother's experience) of their thoughts. Further, in Bion's outline the overall becomes the key element in the developing thought of the individual through preconception representing and being a product of inherent ideas, as noted by Grotstein.

The vertical axis of Bion's Grid, from these observations, appears to represent and tie together the psychic development of the individual by an interaction of idiosyncratic individual experience and generic species-wide

¹¹ Bollas argues that within the dream will be manifestations of the earliest, but unthinkable and unknowable experiences of early maternal care.

¹² Grotstein (1981) also notes, "The paradox is that Bion's conception of inherent preconceptions was the very paradigm that was necessary to make Klein's concepts of early mental life credible" (p. 33), emphasising the importance of the concept of inherent preconceptions (inborn knowledge) in understanding development of early thought of the individual.

innate predispositions (inherent *a priori* thoughts). The vertical axis is part of the finite structuring of the graphic representation of the development of understanding about the analytic object, O, a focus that defines what psychoanalysis is from Bion's perspective. In this, the vertical axis ties together the individual, finite and the ahistorical universal aspects of the species and of existence contextualised in terms of what psychoanalysis is

Part Two

Chapter Three - What is Paradox?

The various definitions of paradox include two essential aspects. One is that a paradox is seen as a conclusion or a statement. Secondly, this statement or conclusion is a product of premises that are contradictory; hence the paradox, constituted of these premises, has an inherent contradictory quality.

Because of the importance this author attributes to paradox in the understanding of what psychoanalysis is, an examination of how paradox is constructed and created is necessary for this study. This examination begins with an example of the interface between paradox and psychoanalysis from Parsons (1999):

The play element is not just an occasional aspect of analysis but functions continuously to sustain a paradoxical reality where things can be real and not real at the same time. This paradox is the frame-work of psychoanalysis (p. 871).

The paradox in this is the sustained juxtaposition of the contradictory concepts of the real and not real, i.e. the reality of the analytic situation and the patient's fantasies about this. Parson's example also indicates an aspect of paradox only referred to occasionally in the dictionary definitions: the contradiction leads not just to a semantic or logical paradox, but also that this paradoxical situation, if sustained, leads to the creation of a conceptualization that is part of, but simultaneously transcends, the constitutive premises. This concept of the creative potential of sustained paradox has been discussed with regard to Winnicott's transitional phenomena as products of paradox, and Ogden's notion of "the analytic third". In this statement by Parsons, which extends Winnicott's ideas, there is a link between the paradoxical (real and not real) play element, and psychoanalysis as the product of sustained paradox.

Another aspect of paradox alluded to in Parsons' statement is that of an aliveness, a tensive aliveness, to paradox. This aliveness and the difficulties it creates are referred to by others. For example Kumin (1978) writes of the "fear" and "flight" stimulated by paradox (p. 475); Pizer (2014) notes that paradox is "bedevillingly difficult" (p. XI); Hoffman (1994) discusses the tension inherent to

“dialectic” and paradox (p. 195); and Parsons (2008) observes that paradox correlates with “a tension that lies at the heart of psychoanalysis” (p. 1).

These aspects of paradox apparently remain unexplained and will be considered here.

As noted an essential aspect of paradox is the inherent contradictory qualities resultant of the semantic and/or logical contradiction between the premises. However, rather than these contradictory qualities nullifying any positive statement, conclusion or conceptualization, they are the basis of such in paradox. The philosophical approach is to pursue the perceived error that allows the continued contradiction. However, the literary approach (exemplified by Colie, 1966¹), and the psychoanalytic approach, seek to maintain the contradiction because of a perceived inherent creativity in so doing.

Beginning a consideration of paradox per se with the central aspect of the role of contradiction, contradiction can be either ‘opposite to’ or ‘opposite of’ with respect to a common element. If there was no common element to the contradiction then the premises would be irrelevant to each other. If the focus is upon the concept of opposite to, then ‘is not’ defines the relationship between the two premises with respect to the common element. For example, if an object is black, it is not white. With respect to the copula of the verb to be, the linking of subject and predicate, the statement is that the object is black; the predicate black says something directly about the object.

However, in the case of ‘opposite of’, the common element both is and is not. The object is not only black, it is also not white. But this implies that it could be white but is not, i.e. it is black and it also is not white. Being black says something about the object, being not white also says something about the object. The quality of being black is not just that of being black, it is also that of being not white; the quality of being black is enhanced and extended by the presence of the opposite of it. And these elements, being black and not being

¹ For example Colie writes, “The rhetorical paradox criticises the limitations and rigidity of argumentation; the logical paradox criticises the limitations and rigidity of logic; the epistemological paradox calls into question the process of human thought, as well as the categories thought out (by human thought) to express human thought.” (p. 7).

white, say something further about the object, i.e. it is not only black but could also be white at some other time, but is not at this time. In the example from Parsons the “real” of play is real *and* not real. This essence of paradox is what stimulates the urge to resolve it by arguing that play cannot be both real and not real; however, in play and the phenomenon of transference, this is what it is.

In paradox the quality of ‘opposite of’ is the essential aspect. The opposite of relates to an ambiguity of predicate leading the subject into the ambiguity of what is and is not with respect to the predicate. The subject is defined by its predicate in the sense of ‘is’, but also by the sense of ‘is not’; so play is both real and not real. Furthermore, in paradox the subject has an equal relationship with the predicates of ‘is’ and of ‘is not’. In fact, it is defined (in paradox) as being both that of ‘is’ and of ‘is not’ together. This state of the subject being both ‘is’ and ‘is not’ of its predicates would seem to be the point of its tensive aliveness. This tensive aliveness, further, seems to relate to the momentary nature of such ambiguity. It exists in the moment before the ‘is’ or the ‘is not’ once again become the defining statement about the subject. For a moment, which becomes ongoing if sustained, the subject is the product of the ‘is’ and the ‘is not’ and this opens an understanding about the object not otherwise available.

The dynamic in this is that of a pulling together what the opposites have in common (about the subject), and therefore can contribute to the subject, and the tension that pushes them apart. The tension is the holding of the moment of equidistance between the coming together and the distancing, where the opposites can say something without being merged and lost, and before they become too far apart to have anything in common, i.e. become only ‘opposite to’².

One perspective on this tension directly relevant to the subject matter of psychoanalysis is that it would appear to arise in a moment of suspension

² Ricoeur (1978) in parallel consideration of metaphor explains the tension which threatens to collapse the metaphor and seemingly eventually does when it becomes cliché. He writes of the “tension between subject and predicate, between literal interpretation and metaphorical interpretation, between identity and difference” (p. 317).

between finite temporality and the infinite. As noted by Matte Blanco (1998), in the dynamics of the infinite opposites do not contradict, a characteristic Freud (1915b) also noted with respect to the dynamics of the unconscious. The finite is enhanced by the introduction of the dynamics of the infinite and the unconscious; a creative moment in which the conscious finite is enhanced by the unconscious infinite. The tension in this, therefore, is that there may be movement to finite certainty (distancing), with the attendant loss of creative enhancement through the dynamics of the unconscious/infinite, or the finite may collapse, merge and become flooded by the dynamics of the unconscious/infinite.

Within these analytic conceptualizations, the central paradox arises within the ongoing moment when the infinite, unconscious dynamics enhance that of finite reality.

Part Two

Chapter Four - Bollas, Pontalis and Psychoanalysis

Before proceeding to the third part of this study in which the preceding considerations of the study are drawn together, the ideas of two other analysts will be briefly considered, namely Bollas (2006) and Pontalis (1981, 2003), whose perspectives on psychoanalysis provide a useful focus for the arguments presented thus far.

A. Bollas (1987, 2006)

Bollas (1987) has contributed significantly to analytic thinking, particularly with respect to the influence of the earliest caregiver(s) upon psychic development, referring in this to the “shadow of the object”. The concept of these early influences being woven into psychic structures and becoming essential to dream formation (Bollas, 1987), corresponds with the ideas about the dichotomy of the individual and the universal, of the species and specific subjective manifestations of existence. That is, the parents introduce their specific structuring care into the child’s world because that is what they are drawn to do as part of their invariant universal roles.

In this section, however, the focus will be on statements Bollas (2006) made about psychoanalysis when interviewed by Bonaminio.

Bonaminio (2006) states;

in some of your most recent work you argue that the arrival of psychoanalysis *itself* is transformative, in so far as the evolution of the western mind is concerned. (p. 133, emphasis in the original).

Bollas responds by making a series of statements about what psychoanalysis is. He begins;

I believe we can describe the beginning of psychoanalysis as the “Freudian Moment”. When Freud discovered the psychoanalytic process - the basic method of the free associating analysand and...the free listening analyst...- he put into place an object relation that had, in my view, been sought for thousands of years. (p. 133).

Bollas then proceeds to discuss the role of the dream and dream-reporting as part of this. He (2006) states:

Dream reporting and dream interpreting may have been essential to the survival of the species at the dawn of civilisation, as it helped early man deal with the terrors of existence. Existence was frightening for many reasons and a single mind was not adequate to think the human condition. (pp. 133-134).

Bollas then draws on these ideas to consider the origins and essence of psychoanalysis:

I think it is possible to state that for thousands of years there has been a preconception of psychoanalysis [Bollas is referring to Bion's concept of preconception]. We – and by we I mean human beings – have been searching for the Freudian moment. This Freudian moment is a realisation of the preconception. When Freud made the dream the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, when he pivoted his process around the reporting of the dream to the other, and when he asked the other to break the manifest content down to its latent mental contents, Freud's technique amounted to the existential realisation of a preconception that had existed for thousands and thousands of years (p. 134).

Of these ideas, Bollas adds that

there has been some failure on all of our parts to recognise fully this extraordinary realisation. Indeed, I am not sure at all that until we think through what we have discovered that we can actually truly claim to have conceptualized psychoanalysis (p. 134).

Applying this specifically to psychoanalysis, Bollas comments:

Psychoanalysis constitutes a profound change in our capacity for human relatedness. It discovers a relationship where the individual mind and the character of the self can be realised and then conceptualized through our relationship (p. 134);

Importantly, though, Bollas notes:

although we are often realising psychoanalysis in our clinical work, I think we are a long way from having a concept of what we have realised (p. 135).

In the interview Bollas proceeds to discuss the conflicts between different analytic groups, the problems posed by analytic theories, and so on. The importance of Bollas' ideas for this study lies in his proposal that psychoanalysis is a realisation of something for which we human beings had been awaiting for a long time, because "existence was frightening for many reasons, and a single mind was not adequate to think the human condition" (p. 134). In other words,

issues of existence are perplexing for a self-conscious, self-reflective human, and that by ourselves, by our best efforts to understand these issues, we can feel overwhelmed. What has been required, and what psychoanalysis is, according to Bollas, is the advent in a specific form of human relatedness that allows us to gain some understanding of these issues. How this is achieved, and what psychoanalysis is in Bollas' outline, is the extension of one's thoughts, especially in the form of one's thoughts about the dream, to another who aids in the conceptualizing of what goes on in the subject's mind: "the individual mind and the character of the self can be realised and then conceptualized" (Bollas, p. 134) through this interaction.

In summary: Bollas proposes that issues of individual existence can be overwhelming for the individual. Through the interaction with another mind, beginning with the communication of the dream, the individual can come to understand (having "realised" and "conceptualized") aspects of their mind. Inherent to this, psychoanalysis, paradoxically, is the interactive method in which one mind can come to grasp issues of individual existence through the interaction with another. Although Bollas does not specify what this means with respect to the other, it would seem that psychoanalysis is defined by the specific role of the other. If the individual is to understand themselves through the interaction with the other, the other's role (the analytic role discovered by Freud) would need to be carefully adjusted to ensure it was the mind of the first individual that is privileged in the interaction. The paradox in this is that people can only find their sense of individual self in an interaction, in a relationship with someone or something 'not-self'. But in order to find themselves in this interaction the paradox needs to be sustained by the other, who allows and accepts themselves as both an extension of the individual and also separate and distinct from them. In this idiosyncratic project of self-discovery, the individual finds themselves, paradoxically, individually and socially, and therefore as individual and also as part of a collective human existence, which simultaneously facilitates and negates individuality. This individual understanding, too difficult and frightening to be achieved by the individual on their own, can be achieved within the paradoxical relationship with the other, though Bollas does not fully explain here how this occurs.

B. Pontalis (1981, 2003)

In 2003 Pontalis writes, “psychoanalysts haven’t really discovered much; without Freud they would simply not exist” (p. 95). He adds;

I happen to think..., as do all analysts, I imagine – and that is very unpleasant for me – that I only go forward on paths already mapped out (p. 95).

Pontalis finished this brief essay by writing;

There is no initial beginning. Freud himself came *after*. Viennese hysterics, little Hans, the Rat Man, his own neurosis taught him psychoanalysis (p. 96, original emphasis).

He paradoxically adds, “In whatever manner, we will always come after and yet we are perpetually starting something” (p. 96).

In these observations Pontalis draws attention to two issues of significance about what psychoanalysis is for him. The first is that “psychoanalysis”, as known and practised by analysts, is based upon that discovered and created by Freud, and that analysts have added little of significance to this, i.e. it is upon the basic concepts of Freud that psychoanalysis is built and maintained.

Pontalis’ second point correlates with that of Winnicott (1971) regarding the paradox of discovery and creation of the object; in this case the object being psychoanalysis. In this the object is both discovered (by Freud) because it already exists, but is created as part of the individual’s individual (subjective) experience. There can be no beginning because of the universal, infinite nature of existence, but there is a new beginning for each individual.

Regarding psychoanalysis’ beginning in Freud’s self-analysis via his dreams, Pontalis (1981) writes:

For a set period, he literally made appointments with his dreams and, even more astonishingly, his dreams kept them...it would be misleading and belittling to attribute them the function of *mediators* allowing Freud “full recognition of the Oedipal conflict”, etc. It was a different matter altogether: To Freud the dream was a displaced maternal body. He committed incest with the *body of his dreams*, penetrated their secret and wrote the book that

made him the conquerer and possessor of the *terra incognita* (pp. 26-27, italics original).

Pontalis adds to this the observation:

Dreaming is above all the attempt to maintain an impossible union with the mother, to preserve an individual whole, to move *in a space prior to time* (p. 29, italics original).

In these comments Pontalis is making several observations about the beginnings of psychoanalysis with Freud's dream interrogation and his self-analysis. Pontalis emphasises that Freud did not discover the basic conceptualizations of psychoanalysis (e.g. the Oedipus conflict) by an analysis of his dreams. Rather, he discovered these through an *interaction* with his dreams; his dreams in this becoming the other of Freud's self similar to the role of the other considered in Bollas' ideas. Pontalis sees this other of Freud as the maternal other whose secrets Freud could discover and master through his interactions with his dreams.

Freud, paradoxically, was in his dreams, which comprised part of his self-analytic experience, but was also able to distance himself sufficiently to study and learn about himself from his dreams. In his dreams he is unconsciously "constructed" as part of the universal whole, of the world beyond, or before, time; but he is also able to discover his unique historical self in order to subject his experience to introspection and understanding.

Freud's approach to the dream, his dream-analysis, is one of the constitutive elements of the essence of his psychoanalysis (Freud, 1914a). And his approach to the dream points to an aspect of experience of and, by extension, to, psychoanalysis: that the dream reveals the individual's existence as part of the universal whole of experience - infinite and therefore timeless. However, by a process of contemplative distancing, the individual can subject this universal experience to an examination that yields a uniquely personal self-understanding and self-elaboration. Freud's originality lay in his discovery of a method to accomplish this. Bollas' perspective is one in which another is necessary to examine the individual's experience in and through the dream. But these perspectives indicate a crucial aspect of psychoanalysis, at least pertaining to Freud's perspective: that psychoanalysis approaches the

experience of the individual as part of the universal whole. It involves, indeed is, a distancing, by means of which, either through self-analysis or the analysis by another, the experience can be subjected to individual contemplation and understanding¹.

¹ Indeed, the distancing involved in self-analysis, which involves identification with an internalised other, means that an other is part of this ostensibly solitary pursuit.

Part Two

Summary

In the first part of this study difficulties in the understandings of what psychoanalysis is were identified and examined by the consideration of the views of a number of analysts. Two key observations were made: firstly that each individual analyst would appear to hold with certainty an individual view about what psychoanalysis is and is not. Each of these views is based upon conceptualizations that refer to an overall, background, inherent view about what psychoanalysis is. Each individual view is believed by that individual to correspond with, represent or extend this background view. The second key observation is that Freud introduced two conceptualizations of what psychoanalysis is. One conceptualization was of a psychoanalysis for all, based upon the clinical practice of psychoanalysis in terms of the technical emphasis on transference and resistance. This was the psychoanalysis that Wallerstein put forward as the answer to his question, "One psychoanalysis or many?" (1988). The other psychoanalysis was one that Freud spelt out as constituting *his* psychoanalysis when his hegemony was challenged by Jung and Adler. The essence of this second psychoanalysis is constituted by the conceptualizations of the dynamic unconscious, dream-analysis, infantile sexuality, repression, and the transference.

Is 'psychoanalysis' to be correlated with a background enigmatic conceptualization or the finite individual conceptualizations, or some combination of the two? And if a combination, what is this combination? Is 'psychoanalysis' to be correlated with the conceptualization based upon the practice, as proposed by Freud? Or alternatively, is there only one psychoanalysis, that based upon the essence outlined and championed by Freud or some other psychoanalytic authority? Is Freud's individual view just one more individual view or does it more successfully approach the overall view than others?

These are important questions in understanding what is psychoanalysis but are defiant of any definitional answer. Efforts to offer such (e.g. Wallerstein in particular has been referred to) lead into further dissent of view. They, and

their background bases, have been outlined in Part One to give a perspective on the perplexity of approaching an understanding of psychoanalysis (and the resultant conflicts and controversies consequent of trying to do this), the need to transcend them if such an understanding is to be achieved, and the possibility of such being derived from the dichotomies inherent in, and arising from, these issues.

Accordingly, to (re)consider what psychoanalysis is, without the assertion of one more individual view, this author proposes a possible alternative that avoids the trap others have inadvertently fallen into. This alternative is based on the observation that the individual views, singularly and collectively, have a paradoxical relation with the overall view and vice versa.

This observation regarding paradox and the question of what psychoanalysis is comprise the second part of this study, including a consideration of the concept of paradox and the different approach to paradox in philosophy and psychoanalysis. In philosophy paradox is seen as essentially a conceptual or logical error, the source of which cannot at first be identified, leading to a contradictory conceptualization. The approach of philosophy is to identify the basis of the apparent error and to resolve or refute it by appropriate logical argument.

In psychoanalysis there are several approaches to paradox noted with respect to the analytic literature. The most general approach is a reference to paradox with regard to its enigmatic qualities to enhance an argument.

A second approach, essentially consistent with a philosophical approach, was adopted by Matte Blanco (1975/1998), although he shifted between seeing paradox as a contradiction in need of resolution, through to considering the creative enigmatic raised by the place of paradox in psychoanalytic ideas (particularly those of Freud).

The third approach, introduced and championed by Winnicott, is one of sustaining the paradox and considering the creative potential of the paradoxical product. This was followed by a specific consideration of psychoanalysis in Ogden's theory of the analytic third. Ogden considers this to be a paradoxical

product of the interactive experience of the two individuals in the analytic situation, which defines what psychoanalysis is. This chapter concluded with a detailed examination of Bion and the role of paradox.

Bion was chosen, after Freud, as the second main focus of this study because he outlined a significant revision of the ideas of Freud and Klein about what psychoanalysis is. This revision led Bion to enigmatic and paradoxical conceptualizations about what psychoanalysis is, framed in this thesis in terms of the concepts: truth, absolute reality (“O”) and the “Grid”. These three conceptualizations, each in different ways, introduce the paradoxical issue of a relationship between the finite, individual, issues of existence and being and those of the ultimate, unknowable issues of existence, and absolute reality, correlated with Kant’s concept of the noumena (as contrasted with the finite, i.e. having qualities of time and space, of phenomena).

Each of these conceptualizations are central to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis from Bion’s perspective. They each introduce a consideration of the paradoxical relationship between the finite, individual and the overall in an existential sense. Both the concepts of truth and absolute reality, as considered by Bion with respect to their roles in analytic theory and practice, would appear to be the conceptual products of paradox (i.e., of the paradox of individual and universal). They introduce into the understanding of what is psychoanalysis the central place of the role of the paradoxical relationship of the individual with that of the universal of existence, the absolute truth. The Grid, in turn, introduces this paradoxical relationship, between the individual and the universal, in the development of thought. It locates a place for this in the developing understanding of the reality of the analytic session, and therefore the reality of the analytic object as a representation of the absolute reality of and about an object.

Part Two concludes with specific considerations of the finite, absolute existential issue (paradox) and its correlations with the basis of psychoanalysis and its beginnings.

Bollas outlines his perspective that the quest for existential understanding by self-conscious man has proven to be overwhelming over the millennia. The Freudian moment, as Bollas sees it, the beginning of psychoanalysis, occurred with Freud's realisation that understanding individual experience and its place in the universal could be achieved by a specific interaction with the other.

Pontalis, in parallel, opines that Freud's self-analysis, an important basis of psychoanalysis, was conducted by Freud's utilisation of his dreams as the other. In this Pontalis also proposes that this use of the other by Freud recapitulated a key universal quality of human experience.

These various observations, conceptualizations and correlated hypotheses will now be drawn together in an effort to approach an understanding of what psychoanalysis is. This is the focus of the third part of this study as a preface to its conclusions.

Part Three

Critical Appraisal

The aim of this study is to contribute to an understanding about what psychoanalysis is with a specific goal of understanding what it is about psychoanalysis that is expressed in a tense aliveness that can become problematic for psychoanalysts, and therefore, for psychoanalysis.

This tension may be a source of the difficulties that arise between analysts as they argue for a priority of view about what psychoanalysis is and is not, including the more personal question of who is and is not a psychoanalyst. This situation militates against a fully open-minded and collaborative striving towards understanding what psychoanalysis is. However, such a collaborative search for understanding can be obstructed, not just by the often very personal conflicts, but also by the withdrawal into camps of certainty about what psychoanalysis is. This is apparent in the consideration of the views of many of the analysts in this study.

Central to this study, therefore, are questions concerning what it is about psychoanalysis that manifests in this tension, and how this affects its practitioners. The answer to these questions has been sought specifically through the observation of four dichotomies in psychoanalysis and, by extension, through a consideration of the role of paradox in these dichotomies and at the heart of psychoanalysis.

To this end, an examination of the ideas of a number of analysts about what psychoanalysis is has been carried out, including specifically the role of paradox in psychoanalytic thinking. In this part, as a prelude to the conclusions, a critical appraisal of my conceptual development is made and the implication for understanding psychoanalysis is considered.

The starting point of such a consideration must be with Freud because he (paradoxically) discovered and created psychoanalysis. Therefore psychoanalysis, as Freud's discovery *and* creation, should be understood in terms of what Freud outlined. But, as has been considered, Freud's statements

about psychoanalysis cannot provide definitive conclusions about his own discovery/creation: this for a number of reasons.

One reason lies with the ambiguity of the discovery-creation relationship, which raises questions regarding precisely what Freud discovered and how he did so at that point in history. This ambiguity implies that there was something called psychoanalysis awaiting discovery, even though it was ostensibly a creation of Freud's genius. Also, the relationship between the concepts of creation and discovery leads to a realisation of paradox, a paradox identical to that of Winnicott's "essential paradox" (1971, p. 151), namely, whether the object, and the associated experience of self, is initially discovered or created. And with paradox comes the difficulties outlined by Winnicott of tolerating and sustaining the paradox to achieve a creative understanding. The paradox inherent in Freud's ideas of discovery and creation may be a further reason for why his ideas have been difficult to sustain.

Further, although an essential part of Freud's creation could be seen to be that of the technique of free association, which replaced Breuer's cathartic technique, it would appear that the elements of Freud's "essence" (1914a, p. 64) (concepts of infantile sexuality, dream-analysis and the dynamic unconscious), were products of his creative, intuitive understandings. The paradox of discovery/creation accepted, as championed by Winnicott, leads to the conceptualization that psychoanalysis, or Freud's psychoanalysis at least, is the creative product of this paradox. A significant question to be addressed is what this means for what psychoanalysis is? This will be considered at the end of this critical overview.

One apparent reason therefore for the question of "what psychoanalysis is" no longer being directly determined by Freud's ideas lies in the difficulties inherent in paradox. This concerns the affective challenge of accepting paradox – instead of resolving or refuting it – to allow the paradoxical product to be. This allows a very different perspective of what psychoanalysis is to emerge. Instead of the notion of 'certainty' arising from the resolution of paradox in the traditional sense, I have argued that by sustaining paradox, a deeper level of creativity can emerge within the analysand for their greater benefit.

A further reason why Freud's ideas no longer directly define what psychoanalysis is follows from Freud introducing a dichotomy with respect to the identity of psychoanalysis. One realisation of this dichotomy is a relatively unobjectionable and practical psychoanalysis that arises when transference and resistance become the focus of understanding in a therapeutic relationship. This is a democratic psychoanalysis that inevitably leads to each analyst coming to their own conclusions about what psychoanalysis is, based on their unique experience of interacting with their patients in a uniquely unfolding analytic process. Freud (1914a) in fact states that he recognised these other variations on his psychoanalysis as legitimate, but then proceeds to contradict himself in the last part of the same paper. Whatever we may think about Freud's democratic concessions to psychoanalytic variability, this does seem to be an origin of the radical pluralism of views about psychoanalysis that stimulated Wallerstein's concerns and attempts to forge a shared psychoanalytic identity.

The other realisation of this dichotomy introduces the complexity of Freud's ideas about what psychoanalysis is. Freud saw that these ideas, constitutive of the "essence" of his psychoanalysis, as bestowing upon him the same status as the other great revolutionary thinkers, all of whom, at least in Freud's estimation, challenge man's perspective of himself and his place in the universe. This discomforting challenge may, along with inherent complexity of Freud's ideas, explain why Freud's radical psychoanalytic theories have been dismissed and/or diminished.

However, this dichotomy of ostensive simplicity and fought for complexity introduces the paradox of how different analysts may all be said to be practising psychoanalysis while disputing the specific challenging ideas of Freud, as well as one another's contemporary theories. The paradox is introduced in Freud's (1914a) ideas, but then apparently resolved by his negation of his earlier democratic technical verdict in favour of theory-driven arguments for his psychoanalysis. It is also, correspondingly, resolved by those who dismiss or diminish the complexity of Freud's ideas in favour of a more common-sense and less ideologically-objectionable psychoanalysis. The sustained paradox, in

contrast, would have the potential to represent psychoanalysis as the creative product of this paradox.

Friedman (2006) and Bion (1992/1971) have discussed this dichotomy of the straightforward and the complex in psychoanalysis, and have proposed that the resolution of the paradox represents a significant threat to the future of psychoanalysis. Similarly, a number of other authors (Kumin, 1987, Ogden, 2004, Parsons, 2008 and Pizer, 2014) have, following Winnicott's arguments, sustained (or attempted to sustain) the paradoxes of psychoanalysis identified by them.

Following the hypothesis that a key to understanding of what psychoanalysis is lies with an understanding of paradox and the essentially paradoxical nature of psychoanalysis, certain of Bion's ideas were examined because they introduce a further dichotomy and paradox about what psychoanalysis is. This relates to the paradox of finite, individual existence in contrast to, and as part of, the absoluteness of infinite being and how this manifests in, and as, the analytic session.

Basic to Bion's (1970) ideas is the concept that psychoanalysis as a thing-in-itself exists and that, even though it cannot be known, it can be known of, and this knowing of can be achieved both in and as the analytic session. The analytic session is a manifestation of what psychoanalysis is under process of transformation, a transformation that extends through the analyst's interpretation based upon their experience of the patient.

To explore these ideas and the observed paradox further, two of Bion's conceptualizations, "truth" and "O", were considered. This examination led to the paradoxes of the finite individual truth of the patient's being at a particular point in time, and that of a universal infinite truth and absolute being. Bion's ideas indicate that the process of psychoanalysis involves being within these paradoxes to facilitate the enrichment of and development of individual truth and experience. This is accomplished by allowing an experience of something universal, and transforming this experience into an experience of self-understanding based on individual experience of such - as Bion (1961) outlines

as the process of the psychoanalytic session. Bion proposes that this is the goal of psychoanalysis, with individual growth and development being the sought for consequence.

Bion seems to indicate that the sustaining of the paradox of individual/universal allows individual growth and development to occur, and that this process is the goal of psychoanalysis.

The paradox of the individual as part of, and separate from, the universal was examined further through Bion's ideas about the development of thought as outlined on the vertical axis of his grid. Here two aspects of the development of individual thought were followed: one is based upon the transformation of the fundamental elements of experience (and existence) into proto-thoughts and into visual cognitive experiences (dreams, dream-thoughts, myths, memories). These basic elements of experience are the individual's but they arise within the somatic constitutional state which is genetically determined, i.e. part of the universal. At that moment of finite time the experiences are those of the individual as part of the experience of their individual being, but also as part of universal existence. That is, they are a constitutive part of the genus of human beings.

Bion claims that in order to experience these experiences as part of individual being, another is required, someone (mother) who has already achieved this capacity. This concept creates a further merging of the universal and the individual. The mother accepts the child's projections because (in Bion's theory at least) that is what infants do (the universal mechanism of projection of experience), and that is what mothers do, i.e. receive these projections. The mother processes these received experiences from the child by an individual/universal process of reverie and projects the processed experience and the mechanism of processing the experience back into the child. Hence the individual experience as the basis of thought (proto-thought through to visual cognition) is centred in the paradox of the individual and the universal as it unfolds in the infant/mother interaction.

Although in this Bion outlines the beginning of individual thought, this mechanism is also a basis of the psychoanalytic interaction between analyst and patient (Bion, 1965) with respect to the analyst receiving the patient's projections of their unthought experience and transforming this through their reverie and interpretation.

Bion's ideas about the individual and the universal and the development of thought in the individual is made more complex by his 1962 notions of pre-conception being independent of a thinker, drawn by realisation into the mind of the individual. The universal pre-conception becomes developed into a concept by the individual whose mind is ready to receive/actualise it.

These ideas about the paradoxical relationship and interaction between the finite individual and their understanding (and growth and development) through universal experience, has significance for what psychoanalysis is for Bion, i.e. part of his realisation of the thing-in-itself discovered by Freud.

These ideas of Bion about the individual/universal paradox and growth and development and psychoanalysis (and Freud), were extended by Bollas (2006) and Pontalis (1981, 2003). Bollas proposes that psychoanalysis, and Freud's discovery of it, were events awaited by and necessary for humanity, but that we have not fully embraced and understood what it was that Freud discovered. Bollas (2006) explains that self-conscious humans can approach an awareness and understanding of the essence of their existence, but that the experience of this can threaten to overwhelm our cognitive and, especially, emotional capacities. From Bollas' perspective Freud discovered and created a way in which this self-understanding could be successfully carried out. This was by examination of the essences of our existence manifest in our dreams, i.e. Freud proposed that the experience of ourselves evident in dreams could allow an understanding of the essence of our existence. This involves the process of telling another of our dreams. This other, the analyst in analysis, helps us to grasp their latent content, the underlying basis of our dreams (and of other thoughts), that informs us about the origins of our individual experience in relation to the universal. Our dreams offer us a window into the reality of our existence as part of absolute being, which may be, or threatens to be,

overwhelming. The role of the other allows us space and perspective that facilitates an understanding of our experience brought to us as our dream. Bollas' ideas imply that such understanding not only allows some mastery of our fears (and our defences against them), but also facilitates individual growth and change.

Pontalis (2003), in contrast to many other analysts considered in this study, emphasises the centrality of Freud's ideas to what psychoanalysis is and claims that the ideas of others are mere extensions of these. Pontalis (1981) also outlines his view regarding Freud's analysed ideas from within Freud's interaction with his dreams. It was not a matter of revelation being developed from the dream, by way of insightful interpretations, but one of revelation arising in, and as part of, the dream: what Freud experienced in his interaction with his dreams led to his understandings. Psychoanalysis is a manifestation of Freud's mastery of his dreams' secrets and their revelations about issues of existence in a universal sense. Pontalis (1981) writes that Freud's relationship with his dreams revealed

an attempt to maintain an impossible union with the mother, to preserve an undivided whole, *to move in a space prior to time* (p. 29, emphasis original).

Psychoanalysis, as a developed manifestation of Freud's relationship with his dreams, would have characteristics of the dream that Pontalis outlines. One would be an attempt to maintain or at least regain the "impossible union" with the universal mother, i.e. to function in a space without boundaries and temporality. This esoteric conceptualization of the dream, and psychoanalysis as an extension of this, implies that psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysis discovered by Freud through his experience of and understandings from the dream, represents something universal.

What do the ideas examined in this study say about "what psychoanalysis is"? The approach adopted has been to follow a development of ideas about psychoanalysis, with a focus on paradox conceptualization. This allows new insight into the understanding of psychoanalysis, one that may have previously been implicit and which I now make explicit. This development of

ideas does not adopt an essentialist stance. Bion long ago pointed out what cannot be known. Bion's understanding was paradox-based and generated consideration of the relevant paradoxes that I have taken up in my discussion.

In summary, my analysis has identified four types of paradox that arise in psychoanalysis and which become central to the very idea of "what psychoanalysis is":

(A) One that involves the ambiguity in Freud's statements about psychoanalysis (mainly in his 1914a paper). That is of a psychoanalysis based upon the findings of resistance and transference,¹ and of psychoanalysis based on the central concepts of infantile sexuality (and its role in neurogenesis and the Oedipus complex), dream-analysis and the dynamic unconscious².

(B) The paradox of the individual perspective of psychoanalysis and the enigmatic definitory background concept of psychoanalysis.

(C) The paradox of the discovery/creation, developed by Winnicott and particularly relevant to the beginnings of psychoanalysis with Freud.

(D) The paradox of individual finite existence that is an expression of universal being.

These paradoxes offer an approach to understanding psychoanalysis that may not only avoid adding to the plurality of views, but also may hold a key to understand the dynamic, tensive nature of psychoanalysis. To achieve this goal requires two particular perspectives on paradox: namely that introduced by Colie's (1966) view that paradox crosses boundaries of extant understandings, and by Winnicott's approach to paradox as a potentially creative, if accepted, dichotomy of contradictory concepts. An understanding of paradox introduced in this study is that paradox is created via the concepts of opposites 'of' in the

¹ How ironic or even cynical Freud was being by emphasising these concepts as the basis for the alternative psychoanalysis is to be wondered at. These were the concepts that Freud used to console himself with respect to the reactions of his passionate critics (1914a).

² The paradoxical qualities of these concepts has not been considered in this study where the focus has been upon the four dichotomies of psychoanalysis per se. However, their paradoxical qualities with respect to the paradox of the finite/universal of existence will be briefly considered in the following.

inherent contradictory premises, rather than opposites 'to'. Opposite 'of' arises from the copula of the verb to be, its linkage of subject and predicate in an 'is/is not' manner. This is/is not creates a simultaneous identical/distancing quality which would appear to give rise to the tensive quality, i.e. there is a constant pull towards and a movement away, with the ongoing threat that the paradox will collapse into one of the opposites.

Of the identified psychoanalytic paradoxes, the one that seems essential to the others is that of finite/infinite. For example, the paradox in Freud's (1914a) dichotomous perspective on psychoanalysis is one of a general, finite, individual view (existing in tension with Freud's essential view), and the latter essentialist view that alludes to universal constituents of human existence. This paradox of finite individual experience and universal being is inherent in his essential concepts. Thus the basis of the concept of infantile sexuality lies in the antithesis of individual experience, which cannot be reduced to biological instincts, and universal instinctual drive-imperatives bound up with the "preservation of the species" (Freud, 1940/1938, p. 186). Dreams, as considered by Bollas and Pontalis, are an experience of the universal of our existence, but personalised by individual history and idiosyncratic compromise formation. The essential characteristics of the dynamic unconscious are indicative of its basis in the universals of the primary repressed (Freud, 1915b) and, later, invariant features of the impersonal id, but which manifest in the distinctly personal unconscious of the individual.

The paradox concerning the adamantly-held individual perspective of what psychoanalysis is, with its perceived correlation with, and as, the universal view, and the universal view elusive of individual expression, represents the paradox finite/infinite in a direct way. That is, the individual view of each and every analyst is seen by them to arise from and to represent the definitive view of what psychoanalysis is. However, the universal view remains unknown and essentially unknowable, correlated with Bion's view of the psychoanalytic object as an unknowable thing-in-itself. But it can be known of (otherwise there would be no concept of psychoanalysis) by the individual. The universal view, the infinite and unknowable, can only be known about by the finite views of

individual which, in turn, only exist because the existence of the thing-in-itself, psychoanalysis.

The paradoxical basis of the observed dichotomies in psychoanalytic thinking, extending to the creative importance of the acceptance of paradox, is a basis of this studies' understanding of what psychoanalysis is. From this basis two perspectives on psychoanalysis become directly apparent: (a) that of psychoanalysis as process with associated concepts, and (b) a psychoanalysis per se, an intrinsic psychoanalysis that determines the process as being "psychoanalytic". These two perspectives lead to a third, that of psychoanalysis as the creative product of the acceptance of paradox.

With regard to psychoanalysis as process, there are two perspectives: a general one and a more specific perspective. The general process of psychoanalysis begins with Freud's adoption of Breuer's cathartic procedure and its theoretical basis in psychic trauma and a dissociative reaction to this. With regard to psychoneurosis both Freud and Breuer were surprised by the role of sexuality in the psychic traumatic experience. Freud, with his intuitive introduction of the procedure of free association and his insistent emphasis on the role of sexuality and conflict at the basis of psychoneurosis, introduced psychoanalysis proper. The conflict confronting the individual, which psychoanalysis addresses, is that of the paradoxical existence of the individual as unique historical subjectivity and as a constituent part of species and eternal existence.

The evolution of Freud's psychoanalysis has followed two paths from this beginning. One pathway, purportedly building upon Freud's ideas, eventually discards them as irrelevant or erroneous, as noted by Friedman (2006) and Green (2005), and exemplified by Jiménez (2009). The second pathway has seen a true building on Freud's ideas, as exemplified by Bion (e.g. 1965³), with his frequent reference to Freud as a basis of his ideas.

The specific process of psychoanalysis is that occurring in each individual analysis, providing a focused personal perspective unique to the

³ For example Bion in "Transformations" (1965) refers directly to Freud on eleven occasions.

individual patient and analytic interaction. A key aspect of this concerns a self-conscious being seeking to understand how something specific to themselves manifests in their idiosyncratic experience of psychic malaise, the aim being hoped for relief and resolution.

Freud's introduction of free association gave the individual a method through which the processes of self-discovery and self-understanding could be achieved. The method of free association begins with the premise that the understanding sought lies within, but is not immediately attainable because the natural but impersonal drive derivatives cannot be fully consciously appropriated⁴. Free association represents a method by which the unknowable aspects of the individual may be communicated to them in a form that is potentially knowable. These ideas relate to the concept of the dynamic unconscious, with its qualities of universal and infinite existence. However, knowledge of this through the process of free association threatens to overwhelm the finite self, as discussed by Bollas (2006), and another factor is required for the process of free association to facilitate the sought for understanding. This factor is the presence of an other in a specific role that constitutes a defining aspect of psychoanalysis. This necessary role of an other in psychoanalysis raises questions about Freud's self-analysis⁵. Pontalis' (1981) description of Freud's objectification and personification of his dreams indicates an intuitively creative use of an other (an other of himself) in his self-analysis, which would appear to address the issue of how self-analysis, though difficult, is possible.

Beyond his own self-analysis, Freud describes psychoanalysis as involving a specific interactive process between patient and analyst. This process involves the patient's free association and analyst's parallel process of "evenly suspended attention" (1923/1922, p. 239). Through this process the

⁴ There is another more specific paradox that arises from these ideas, i.e. the dynamic unconscious involves the defensive (repression) banishing of some self-knowledge, which can be remembered via the analytic process. However, on the other hand, primary repression and the fact that desire never coincides or concludes with a specific experience of gratification, means that self-understanding remains partial, provisional and ultimately unattainable.

⁵ Rieff (1959) writes of Freud's self-analysis, "Psychoanalysis begins with an heroic exception to the rule that the self may not know the self, this subject may not be its own object" (p. 65).

analyst can understand aspects of the patient's unconscious experience by comprehending their own unconscious responsiveness, that affected by the patient's projections. In this the analyst sustains a dual perspective: that of being affected by the patient's unconscious experience but also understanding and using this as a basis of their interpretation by sustaining a capacity to reflect on the induced experience.

This perspective of patient and analyst being involved in an interactive process in which the analyst is ambiguously affected by the patient's experience, and also understands and interprets this as an aspect of the patient's experience, is essential to the ideas of Ogden, Bollas and Bion, as considered at length in this study. According to these analysts the analyst takes an experiential role as an other of the patient. Qualities of the patient's experience that cannot be directly approached though free association are projected both onto and into the analyst: "onto" being the basis of the patient's fantasies about the analyst; "into" being the basis of the analyst's experience of the patient's projected experience. The analyst becomes an other of the patient both in imagination (as part of the patient's fantasy world), but also experientially.

There is another perspective on psychoanalysis that takes the focus back to the patient, in contrast to the focus on the analyst's experience introduced by Bion's seminal reinterpretation of Klein's concept of projective identification. This relates to Parsons' (2004) ideas as an extension of Winnicott's transitional phenomena. The analytic situation is sustained by the analyst such that the paradoxical use of the analyst (and the analytic situation) by the patient as object discovered and object created, and as a real and not-real object, facilitates understanding and development of the patient's self.

In summary, psychoanalysis as process can be viewed in both a general and a specific sense. In the specific sense psychoanalysis involves a self-conscious attempt to understand and attend to one's sense of psychic and existential malaise through a process which links one's finite historical sense of self to one's ahistorical participation in a universal and eternal existence, manifest in a paradoxical dynamic unconscious. The dynamic unconscious is

paradoxical precisely because it defines what is most personal and what is most impersonal about one's psychic life. Because of the daunting challenges for the individual of this process of self-discovery and self-understanding, the interactive use of an other of the self is required. This requires the analyst to sustain a situation in which they become the other of the self through the process of projection onto and into them by the patient⁶. And by simultaneously maintaining a sense of self independent of the patient's projections, the analyst can subject the patient's projected experience to transforming interpretation. A variation of this involves the analyst sustaining the paradoxes inherent in the patient's experience of them as an object both discovered and created by the patient, and in the patient's illusory experience of the analyst as an object who is both real and not-real. These paradoxes arising in the analytic situation are seen to have creative qualities in the development of the patient's sense of self.

This perspective of psychoanalysis as 'process', and the conceptual understandings that both guide and originate from this process, is the one that is the focus of most definitions of psychoanalysis – and is the basis of arguments about what psychoanalysis is. However there is a complementary perspective which focuses on psychoanalysis per se. Although essentially an inferred conceptualisation, one that remains enigmatically unknowable but known of, several authors have proposed perspectives that substantiate its existence (for them). Freud (1914a), Friedman (2005), and Green (2005) have listed qualities which give some indication of the essence of psychoanalysis. Bion, although observing the unknowable – noumenal – qualities of psychoanalysis, also alluded to what lies at the essence of psychoanalysis (1992/1971) and he proposed that it was initially discovered by Freud's genius and its qualities are continuing to be clarified (1992).

⁶ This perspective with its correlation with the perceived mechanism of projective identification may lead to the difficulties trying to be avoided in this study i.e. a narrowing of perspective re what psychoanalysis is based upon the views of analytic authority. The concept of a psychoanalysis based upon the central role of projective identification would be vigorously argued against by some analysts; e.g. by self-psychologists and the followers of Lacan. However, the ideas re psychoanalysis being proposed here follow from the concepts around paradox being examined and, accordingly, will be considered further, mindful of the risk involved.

In spite of these perspectives on this intrinsic psychoanalysis, its essence remains in the background to most thinking about psychoanalysis, shadowed by a sense of certainty of what psychoanalysis is which is based upon the first perspective, i.e. that of process and associated concepts.

Further to these two perspectives on psychoanalysis, another perspective will be proposed. My perspective begins with the observation that the first two perspectives constitute a paradoxical basis to psychoanalysis. One aspect of this paradox is the finite known and knowable perspective, manifest in the process and associated concepts. The other is the intrinsic psychoanalysis, one that is enigmatic, unknowable and of infinite qualities (with respect to time, place and person). Psychoanalysis is constituted of these contradictory qualities. The acceptance of this paradoxical basis to psychoanalysis leads to the third perspective of psychoanalysis, that of the creative product of paradox acceptance. The third perspective is enriched from being the product of ontological paradox that reflects the existential/experiential dilemma of human being. In this thesis, two perspectives about paradox are particularly relevant to the understanding of what psychoanalysis is. One of these perspectives about paradox, well exemplified in the writings of Bion and Bollas, is that of the individual as a uniquely subjective, finite being, simultaneously defined by participation in a reality that is universal, and thus ahistorical and impersonal.

The other paradox central to this study is that arising in Winnicott's ideas extended in different ways by Ogden and Parsons. This paradox concerns the relationship between the self and its objects. The object, necessary for the growth and development of the individual self is, paradoxically, created and discovered, is both internal and external, real and not-real. In this the object is ambiguously other of the self and other to the self. In the process of psychoanalysis described above, the relationship between the self and the object which is other of the self is essential for understanding aspects of the self that could not be apprehended - and would not exist - without this object.

Essentially, therefore, the second paradox is that of the self and the other of the self which lies within the object: the self has a subjective and objective

relationship with itself, and this appears necessary for its growth and development.

Psychoanalysis, as revealed in this study, is the creative product of these two paradoxes. Psychoanalysis links and extends the issues of finite and infinite existence, and that of the subject in, and as part of, the objective world as described.

Part Four

Conclusions

Analysts fight over their views of what psychoanalysis is. Personal esteem achieved through a sense of oneness with the analytic object is at stake. Although such internecine conflict is not unique to psychoanalysis, it potentially facilitates an opening to understanding psychoanalysis beyond that of conflict: one related to psychoanalysis' lived basis in human experience. The aim of this study is to approach such an understanding. This goal is prompted by concern for the future of psychoanalysis because the nature of the conflicts between analysts stifle a creative, cooperative communication between them which embraces psychoanalysis' aliveness.

The strategy to accomplish this goal is to focus upon analytic dichotomy and the place of paradox in dichotomies directly related to the essential nature of psychoanalysis. The necessary acceptance of the uncertainties created by paradox, the tolerance of paradox rather than resolving it - a perspective exemplified by Winnicott - is the approach of this study as a means to grasp the creative basis of psychoanalysis and of transcending the multiple conflictual individual and group views about psychoanalysis.

The conclusions about what psychoanalysis is relate to psychoanalysis as uniquely individual process and as something that, paradoxically, cannot be identified with any specific process manifestations of it. This challenges conclusions about what psychoanalysis is, without losing the essence of the subject (as a uniquely individual process). I believe that this challenge has been met by a general outline of conclusions about psychoanalysis from the data reviewed, leading to a specific focus upon psychoanalysis as understood by the sustaining of the existential/experiential paradox basic to the individual, and basic to psychoanalysis.

The conclusions begin with the general perspective of psychoanalysis as process, leading to a consideration of the concepts associated with the process (guiding and as findings).

As process: psychoanalysis represents self-conscious attempts to understand oneself, a need for self-understanding stimulated by psychic and existential malaise, and a belief that such self-understanding may address the basis of this malaise. This psychoanalysis originated with Freud's introduction of a method specifically directed to such self-understanding: free association. Free association correlates with a certain conceptualization, i.e. that there are aspects of the self that are unknowable in themselves (unconscious) but can be approached through free association. These unknowable aspects of the self correspond to existential issues arising from and relating to the finite individual's self being embedded in a universal and eternal existence. These unknowable qualities of the self are conceptualized in psychoanalysis in terms of the dynamic unconscious (Freud, 1914a) and of the id (Freud, 1940/1938)¹. The correlation of these conceptualizations with the "universal" in the individual is indicated by their qualities (e.g. timelessness, instinctuality).

Such an approach to self-understanding, i.e. understanding how idiosyncratic aspects of one's historically specific internal world relate to and manifest aspects of universal existence, would appear difficult to achieve and necessitates the use of the mind of an other. The difficulty for the individual of approaching self-understanding from "within" is multifactorial. One factor is that of resistance/repression: the individual defending against the disturbing (as described by Friedman, 2006) qualities of finding themselves, ambiguously, as individual and universal: finite, within, and as part, of the infinite. Secondly, the difficulty arises because of the challenge inherent in seeing oneself simultaneously from two vertices, i.e. having two contradictory perspectives on the same subject, the self. An essential aspect of the focus of this study is that this challenge of embracing two contradictory perspectives on the same subject (the self in psychoanalysis) is met through paradox which, if sustained, allows for a creative product that potentially may meet this challenge. However, as noted here, this approach of psychoanalysis to this specific paradox (of the

¹ E.g. Freud (1915b) writes of the qualities of the dynamic unconscious that its nucleus "consists of instinctual representations" (p. 186); and its infinite qualities are indicated by its timelessness and by the mechanisms of displacement and condensation with their essential unboundedness. Of the id Freud (1940/1938) writes, "It contains everything that is inherited that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution – above all, therefore, the instincts...(p. 45).

existence of the individual as individual and as part of the universal) begins with the involvement of the other. Seemingly, Freud found this other by the objectification and personification of his dreams. However, a defining aspect of psychoanalysis is the specific role of the other. The other, the analyst, sustains the situation (of psychoanalysis) in which the patient projects onto and into the analyst an experiential aspect of themselves that they cannot consider alone. In this the analyst becomes the other of the patient's experience. Through a process of self-reflection, described by Freud as evenly suspended attention and by Bion as reverie, the analyst is able to consider and subject the projected aspects of the patient's self to transformative interpretation. In a related context the analyst sustains the paradox of the patient's use of them as a created/discovered, real/not-real object, necessary for the growth and development of the subject of the patient.

An essential quality of this process and associated concepts identifies them as psychoanalytic. This quality defies definition and hence is the source of the endless disputes over the certainty of view that, if open in style, can enhance psychoanalysis' creativity, but if closed could lead to its demise.

The enigmatic quality that bestows "psychoanalysis" upon the general process arises from an intrinsic psychoanalysis. As noted by Bion this, psychoanalysis, as thing-in-itself, is unthinkable and accordingly unknowable. However it can be known of: this knowing of it began with Freud and has extended to the general process of psychoanalysis and its concepts. Bion (1970) opines that Freud discovered this psychoanalysis, but the thing-in-itself existed and awaited such discovery; a view also proposed by Bollas (2006). The capacity asserted by Freud to achieve this discovery is described in Pontalis' (1981) view of Freud's ability, "to move in a space prior to time" (p. 28, *italics original*), and to take intellectual and experiential possession of "the terra incognita" (p. 27, *italics original*). These comments by Pontalis indicate that Freud, to know of this intrinsic psychoanalysis, gave it spatial qualities while living with the atemporality of infinite existence. I believe Pontalis may have reduced the scope of Freud's creative genius in these comments whilst trying to emphasise them, i.e. through the implications of finite spatiality.

Bion (1970) notes that further to his discovery of psychoanalysis, Freud proceeded to define its elements and this task was not completed by Freud (in fact apparently hardly begun because of its challenging complexity) and the continuing task befalls all analysts and is possibly a burden too great for them. How Bion saw himself in this is not absolutely clear. Freud's definition of the elements of his discovery is comprised of the four fundamentals of his essentialist view of psychoanalysis: psychosexuality, dream analysis, the dynamic unconscious and transference.

The place of paradox in Freud's essential elements of psychoanalysis, and the paradoxical quality of many analytic conceptualisations, united with Winnicott's ideas re the creative consequences of sustaining paradox, I see as giving the sought-for opening to understanding psychoanalysis beyond the original perspectives considered. My perspective is that psychoanalysis is the creative product of living with the uncertainty of the described paradox of infinite/finite, extending, in experiential terms, to that of the perplexing uncertainty of inner and outer realities and of self and other.

As exemplified in Ogden's (2006) concept of the "analytic third", the paradoxical product allows a perspective on the constituent aspects of the paradox, which it extends and transforms. Psychoanalysis, as a product of specific existential paradoxes of the self, allows a deepened and expanded perspective on individual existence (e.g. its perceived unconscious basis). Psychoanalysis provides a unique perspective on perennial existential issues, one that allows the individual to understand aspects of their malaise as part of the challenge of the finite/infinite dimensions of their existence, and the necessary objectification of their subjectivity for growth and development.

In summary:

The conclusions of this study are that psychoanalysis is represented by three perspectives of it: a general process, an intrinsic psychoanalysis, and as a product of sustained paradox, with an ever-deepening understanding of the essence of existential malaise. It is a uniquely individual process that

paradoxically relies upon the presence of an other to facilitate the creative experience of the individual beginning to find their place in the universal.

Why do analysts fight? The main reason, from the conclusions of this study, is that living with existential uncertainty in general is challenging, but the focused nature of this, as essential to psychoanalysis, provokes a movement (in individuals and groups) to finite definitional certainty, i.e. paradox resolution. Once the security of this definitional certainty is achieved, challenge to it, by necessity, is passionately dealt with. However, for psychoanalysis, this involves the closure of the creative potential of paradox tolerance. This would seem consistent with the concerns for the future of psychoanalysis expressed by Bion, Friedman, and Green, who were concerned about the potential loss of the creative essence of psychoanalysis.

The goal of my study was to extend understanding about the nature of psychoanalysis. I believe this has been achieved through appreciation of the need to accept paradox and the nature of this paradox. However there remain limits to the full achievement of this. One part of this doubt is the capacity of these conclusions (or any conclusions) to sustain what is uniquely psychoanalytic while trying to understand what it means to be truly analytic. This challenge relates to the paradoxical quality of psychoanalysis being, by necessity, a truly unique process of the individual but one that paradoxically requires an other. However, for the unique analytic process to be sustained in this interaction, the other must be experienced as other of – of the individual – as opposed to other to. The movement to finite definitional statements about psychoanalysis lose the unique individual essence of psychoanalysis and the other involved, by necessity, becomes an other to, i.e. outside the individual process. A study of psychoanalysis such as this one, even with its sympathy for paradox acceptance, inevitably stands outside the analytic process and is therefore restricted in its understanding of psychoanalysis.

A second reason for doubt arises within the essentialist nature of the arguments about what psychoanalysis is – each attempting to corner and challenge the essence of psychoanalysis (as he or she sees it). Although, by definition, any conclusions based upon paradox acceptance eschew essentialist notions (which would constitute a solution of the paradox), Freud's proposal about the essence of psychoanalysis being defined by the elementary conceptualisations (with their basis in finite/infinite paradox) indicates a link between accepted paradox and essentialist definition. This has the Platonic quality of the chaos of the existential unknown, with its timelessness, aspatiality, and boundarylessness (the basis of the Freudian conceptualisation of the unconscious), being structured into essential entities that can be known and form the basis of psychoanalysis, i.e. the essence of psychoanalysis lies with these elements. From here, it is inevitable that others will challenge these definitional entities and enter into essentialist disputes, as occurs between analysts. However, these conceptualisations are transitional (between infinite and finite existences) and therefore cannot define essence. Essence remains beyond them. They can allude to something essential about human being, but they cannot directly explicate the essence of such, because it remains unthinkable and ultimately unknowable. The essentialists' arguments that bedevil psychoanalysis are at the level of allusion but are argued nonetheless about the essence of psychoanalysis. This essence is seen to lie (by the arguments) with an intrinsic psychoanalysis, but this remains unknowable in itself, in spite of the claims of knowledge of it.

The essence of psychoanalysis can be conceptualised as lying within an intrinsic psychoanalysis. But this can only be known of. The acceptance of manifestations of a basic paradox within the ontology of the individual gives a creative window into the essence of existence, but this "essence" will always remain at the level of allusion.

Part Four

Incomplete Issues, Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research.

Although the issue of the difference between Freud's essential view and that of an intrinsic psychoanalysis has been considered in the ongoing development of the thesis, a question was proposed (in the Introduction to Part Two – "Paradox") but the answer was postponed: this question was whether Freud's views about psychoanalysis open or close the conceptual gap between the individual view and the enigmatic overall view of psychoanalysis. Consistent with the paradoxical basis of psychoanalysis and Freud's discovery/creation of it, Freud's views would appear to do both. By proposing a more straight-forward practical perspective, he emphasises the gap between ordinary understanding and his understanding about psychoanalysis; what he understands it to be and what he anticipates others will be able to comprehend. At this moment he is opening the conceptual gap while paradoxically appearing to close it; i.e. psychoanalysis is too difficult to understand in itself, so a restricted version will be offered.

However, when he emphasises the essence of psychoanalysis in the complexity he understands, without simplification, modification or recourse to social theories (e.g. as seen by Freud in Jung's revision of the Oedipus complex) of the essential tenets, he is closing the conceptual gap. That is, by putting forward the complexity of what psychoanalysis is in conceptual terms, available to all who are able to accept and understand them, the conceptual gap will be narrowed.

This question about Freud and the conceptual gap was raised prior to the discussion of the role of paradox in psychoanalysis and introduces the importance of the perspective of this study on paradox in understanding psychoanalysis. That is, while there is an inherent conceptual gap in Freud's views and those of all analysts (although generally not recognised by the individual), there will exist polarised perspectives held and argued about psychoanalysis. The views vehemently argued for by individual analysts will

each increase the conceptual gap through the narrowing of perspective, despite this contradicting their avowed intentions.

To fully embrace an understanding of psychoanalysis means embracing both poles of conceptualization about what it is. Freud may have approached this, although this is not absolutely clear in his writings, i.e. he is endorsing of the practical perspective, that based upon transference and resistance, but then critical of conclusions drawn from it if they do not correspond with his conclusions about psychoanalysis. An alternative to such an endeavor, one attempting to simultaneously embrace both poles of conceptualization, is outlined in the second part of this study. This holds that embracing both poles may be practically impossible because of the conceptual contradiction between finite issues of understanding and concepts of a different basis, i.e. infinite, ahistorical. This alternative approach is to accept such contradiction of conceptualization and instead embrace the paradoxical relationship inherent in such contradiction. Rather than attempting to close the conceptual gap or even to quietly emphasize it, as Freud appears to have done to sustain his hegemony, accepting it and its paradoxical qualities allows for the development of the understanding of psychoanalysis basic to this study.

This study is stimulated by concern about the future of psychoanalysis, with the conceptual difficulties between analysts and their 'solutions' seen as significant factors in this. To avoid being drawn into such, an alternative approach has been sought, that offered by conceptions of paradox and how these might relate to an understanding of the basis of psychoanalysis extended to the difficulties between analysts. There are different conceptions of paradox and one fruitful to the goals of this study has been taken up, that of Winnicott and the sustaining of paradox and its perceived creative potential. None of the other conceptualizations (e.g. that of philosophy or a general literary/psychoanalytic one) would have adequately facilitated the understandings sought for about psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts. However, this involves an acceptance of a perspective on paradox that has proved useful to others – Ogden and Parsons have been considered in

particular – but it still represents a hypothetical basis for this research, one that has been accepted rather than critically examined. However, while ideas about the essence of paradox are mainly focused on its resolution as troublesome contradiction, or its idealizations as a creative challenge to accepted thought, it is difficult to fully examine the merits of Winnicott’s conceptualization re paradox.

For the ideas about psychoanalysis based upon the perspective of the creative qualities of paradox to be examined further, to be the subject of further scholarly research, the issue of what paradox is would need to be more fully explicated. This would possibly follow the model outlined by Ricoeur (1978) in his assessment of metaphor. Such research, as compared with the brief practical description of the basis of paradox in this study, will allow for a more solid conceptual basis for the understanding of paradox. The correlation of paradox with psychoanalysis, both at a basic level and in many of its essential conceptualizations (e.g. those of Freud’s “essence”), would appear straightforward, but it begs further interrogation of paradox’s enigmatic structure and function. Such an explication of paradox may be facilitated by psychoanalysis because analytic understandings about unconscious dynamics would appear particularly relevant to aspects of paradox. In particular, those relating to displacement and the absence of contradiction would potentially facilitate a further understanding of paradox.

In this study there are issues that reflect the limitations of approaching a subject like psychoanalysis which has already been subject to extensive consideration, as evident in the ample literature. This is exemplified in an overview of Freud’s ideas about psychoanalysis and those of other analysts, past and present. Freud wrote extensively about psychoanalysis, using a particular style of beginning each paper as a new topic with little corresponding reference to previously expressed ideas. To circumvent the need to consider all of Freud’s texts, his overview papers were the major focus. However, each of these are burdened by the agenda correlated with their basis. With the 1914 paper Freud was seeking to reestablish his hegemony; the 1925/1924 paper was part of an ongoing series of similar papers on different topics and would

have been written within this genera; and the 1940/1938 paper, although potentially a chance for Freud to fully outline his ideas, did not achieve this for reasons which are not apparent.

However, within each of these papers can be found sufficient detail of Freud's own ideas, in a summary form, to provide the reader with an adequate grasp of Freud's intended meaning.

The extensive literature by others about psychoanalysis necessitated a selection process to narrow the focus, guided in part by the hypotheses about the role of dichotomy in psychoanalysis and its theorisation. But any such limited perspective, unavoidably, can give only a selected view of the ideas held by analysts about psychoanalysis.

Avoiding a comprehensive discussion of what psychoanalysis is from all available perspectives was necessary in order to not perpetuate more endless debate about psychoanalysis. A strategy to avoid this involved eschewing the interrogative "What is psychoanalysis?" in favour of adopting and the alternative "What psychoanalysis is". Further, the perspective of understanding through a consideration of dichotomy was followed as it not only avoided succumbing to the debates but provided a useful vantage point to summarise the debates regarding individual views. An alternative approach, that more directly addresses these views, may have facilitated a different understanding about what psychoanalysis is, but such an approach is very difficult to conceptualize.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the thesis advances an understanding of psychoanalysis by building on and extending the direct and indirect consideration of paradox, i.e. an understanding of psychoanalysis from within its paradoxical basis. The extension of this project to the more philosophical considerations of how psychoanalysis relates to the paradoxical basis of experience and fundamentals of existence awaits further exploration.

The approach to paradox and psychoanalysis per se is an extension of the ideas of Parsons and his appreciation of the analytic situation being a replication of the play situation, described by Winnicott with respect to its creative possibilities, and those of Ogden, who has focused upon one aspect of

such creative possibility. These two authors, building upon Winnicott's ideas about the paradoxes of the developing self, have contributed significantly to the theory of the process of psychoanalysis. However, an inherent aspect of these ideas has been the basis of their explanations in concepts that are not accepted by all analysts, e.g. projective identification, for Ogden. Consequently, their ideas have been taken to exemplify aspects of paradox in psychoanalysis while directing to a more global consideration of paradox and psychoanalysis.

The attempt to avoid controversy of conceptualization, and to approach a more overall view of psychoanalysis and its basis in paradox, is directed towards facilitating an understanding of the links between psychoanalysis and paradox and paradox and the conflictual interactions between analysts as reflective of a common response to paradox. Here the goal is to further facilitate an appreciation of the basis of the conflicts as inherent to psychoanalysis, or at least an essential quality of it. If this can be communicated to analysts then there is the possibility that it will promote more reflection on the conflicts while appreciating, rather than quelling, the tensive aliveness and the part this plays in the vehemence involved in perspectives on psychoanalysis.

It may be hoped that the opening of a pathway to understanding the paradoxical basis of psychoanalysis may lead to others extending the understanding about psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts begun in this study.

Part Four

Conclusion

The question of what psychoanalysis is has been addressed in this study and is answered, firstly, as a paradoxical process of self-discovery through another, the analyst, who functions as an other of the self. Secondly, psychoanalysis per se is seen as a paradoxical product of two existential paradoxes, which it extends by adding insights about individual existence and the growth of the self by its objectification.

The problems between analysts are seen to arise, in part, from the inherent qualities of paradox: its contradictions and tensive aliveness, and the emotional challenge of sustaining paradox in the face of these. However, the specific nature of the salient paradoxes constitutes a challenge for the psychoanalyst, one that necessitates a successful personal analysis and a healthy and supportive analytic milieu. Both of these are not always achievable, hence the reactions of analysts can be seen as narcissistic responses to the existential challenges with which they are confronted and which they defensively attempt to manage on their own, rather than in creative dialogue with their colleagues.

Potential solutions to some of these issues lie with the explication of the paradoxes and the challenges they confront analysts with. However, if paradox is an inevitable secretion of the mind's operation in processing these challenging existential issues, then this constitutes a problem in addressing paradox.

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