

**THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SHAPING
OF AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC POLICY 1900-1991**

by

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Abstract

In the nineteenth century knowledge of Antarctica was gained through the reports of whalers and scientific expeditions. Their reports of a hostile environment and limited economic potential did nothing to attract the involvement of colonial governments.

At the start of the twentieth century a connection was fostered by British sponsored expeditions which called at Australian ports en route to Antarctica and sought personnel and financial support. Several Australian scientific adventurers joined these expeditions, but although greater awareness of Antarctica was gained, especially through the deeds of Douglas Mawson, Phillip Law and Richard Casey, Antarctica remained a territory of minor interest to Australian governments.

This thesis seeks to explain how Antarctica, generally accorded very low priority in the estimation of government, could at times occupy the attention of Ministers, occasionally of the Prime Minister. It is argued that in the absence of economic interest explanation requires recognition of the role of highly motivated individuals for whom Antarctica became a ruling obsession in their lives. This study, while not downplaying the occasional role of international political concerns, focuses on the role of eight individuals, from diverse backgrounds, who it is argued played key roles in the development of Australian Antarctic policy in the twentieth century. It presents a fresh contribution to understanding the factors behind Antarctic policy from 1900 to 1991.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis seeks to further the understanding of Australian Antarctic policy by detailed examination of the roles of key individuals in the shaping of policy. 'Antarctic policy' in this thesis is defined as the deliberate pursuit of specific and consciously articulated Australian government goals with regard to Antarctica.

The thesis contends that between 1901 and the signing of the Environmental Protection Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 individuals significantly shaped the development of Australian Antarctic Policy. The thesis argues that for much of the period considered Antarctica was not of major economic or strategic significance for Australia; in this context there was scope for a range of different policies to be adopted, including the minimization of Australian involvement with Antarctica. It is argued that on a number of occasions policy outcomes resulted from the influence and advocacy of powerfully placed individuals.

Although the history of early Australian Antarctic perception is reviewed, the starting point for this study is the development of national policy following Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901. The importance of Antarctica in Australian policy fluctuated over the twentieth century, with the key moments being the Australian Antarctic Territorial claim in 1936, the signing of the Antarctic treaty in 1959 and the Madrid Environmental Protection Protocol of 1991. The thesis concludes with the 1991 Protocol, which marked the beginning of more stability in policy, in producing cohesion amongst Antarctic Treaty nations. In large measure it resolved conflict between environmentalists and administrators as well as making superfluous a comprehensive review of the Antarctic Treaty. The global acceptance of the Protocol also resolved issues, which had been raised within the United Nations, over the future management of the Antarctic and heralded a very significant Australian Antarctic policy shift. While the Protocol provides a logically coherent termination point for this study, comparison of policies before and after 1991 could well form the basis for further study.

The criteria for selection of the individuals in this thesis relates to demonstrated ability to make a significant impact on the establishment or development of Australian Antarctic policy. This includes persons who had been active on the ground in Antarctica, were in

associated support roles in Australia, played key roles in government or represented Australia in international forums. Firstly, those individuals operating independently outside the formal government are considered, then those who worked within the federal government. The thesis thus considers individuals both outside and within government, with selection determined by consideration of direct, and at times indirect, impact on policy.

Over a period of ninety years there have been substantial changes in domestic and international policy, and in the nature of involvement with Antarctica. Despite these changes, one common linkage between individuals operating from both within and outside government is evident: the individuals included in this study evidenced a burning desire, and even passion, to further Australia's role in the Antarctic continent.

While all individuals selected were influential, the nature and length of their involvement varied and not all had an equal impact on policy. Consequently the depth of examination of individuals varies. It is argued that of particular significance is the extended role of Sir Douglas Mawson's (over a period of fifty years), Lord Richard Casey and Phillip Law. The influence of others, such as Prime Minister Robert Hawke and Richard Woolcott, was felt at key moments but does not match the ongoing role of others. Robert Dovers is considered more briefly, to indicate the essential role (and indirect influence) of individuals in the field.

1.1 The Nature of Antarctica

Antarctica is a frozen white continent, far away from Australia, but still closer to Hobart than Perth is to Melbourne. It is a tough place. James Cook was the first to note its hostility in 1775; when describing his exploration success in discovering sub Antarctic islands and the Antarctic continent at the bottom of the world, he summarised the region as:

Lands doomed by nature to perpetual frigidnefs; never to yield to the warmth of the fun's rays; whofe horrible and favage affect I have not words to defcribe, Such are the lands we have difcovered; what then may we expect thofe to be ,which lie ftill farther to the South? ...If anyone fhould have resolution and perfeverance to clear up this point by

proceeding farther than I have done, I shall not envy him the honour of the discovery,
but I will be bold to say that the world will not be benefited by it.¹

More than one hundred years later in 1912 another wave of explorers, who pushed yet further south and onto the Antarctic icecap, commented in a similar colorful manner:

‘Great God, this is an awful place’ - *R.F. Scott 1912*

‘Polar exploration is at once the cleanest and most isolated way of having a bad time which has yet been devised.’ - *Aspley Cherry-Garrard 1912*

‘We had discovered an accursed country.’ - *Douglas Mawson 1912*

When Australians returned to Antarctica 42 years later, even the hardest of men pondered:

I found all this interesting, but why do men go on expeditions to such a barren, worthless and inhospitable land. It is a legitimate question, but difficult to answer... Antarctica is a cold, indifferent and most times cruel mistress towards her lovers. She gives little and demands much both in effort and endurance
*Robert Dovers 1957*²

Why then did Australia want to become associated with such a hostile place?

1. 2. Australian involvement in Antarctica

Much has been written about Australian activity in Antarctica and this can be characterised as: expedition accounts; geographical descriptions; biographies; academic research documents; scientific reports; and field exploration records³. A review of this material shows that Australia was indeed very slow to become involved with such a ‘hostile place’. To gain an understanding of this involvement, its history is best addressed in terms of four specific periods:

¹ James Cook et al., *A Voyage Towards the South Pole, and Round the World : Performed in His Majesty's Ships the Resolution and Adventure, in the Years, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775 ... In Which Is Included Captain Furneaux's Narrative of His Proceedings in the Adventure During the Separation of the Ships*, 2 vols., Australian Facsimile Editions ; No. 191 (Adelaide: Libraries Board of South Australia, 1970), p. 243

² Robert Dovers, *Huskies* (London: Bell and Sons, 1957), p. 216

³ This material includes the Mawson papers held at the University of Adelaide, the Law papers at the National Library, the David papers at the Mitchell library, the diaries of the Dovers family at the Mitchell Library, the field reports of Robert Dovers at Australian Antarctic Division, the Mosley oral history interviews at the National Library, the papers of Richard Casey and published biographies of Richard Woolcott and Robert Hawke.

1. The expedition era;
2. The Territorial Claim era;
3. The Phillip Law era; and
4. The Antarctic Treaty management era.

1.2.1 The Expedition era.

The early twentieth century Australian Antarctic publications highlight the heroic activities of polar explorers in a harsh alien world. This era is dominated by works from expedition narratives which can be grouped principally as:

- Publications arising from British Antarctic expeditions;
- Mawson's Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE) and his British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE); and later
- Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) activities from 1947.

These are supplemented by biographies of leading individuals, such as Edgeworth David, Douglas Mawson and Phillip Law, which highlight their experiences on the continent. There is little policy analysis, although a general history of Australia's involvement prior to the Antarctic Treaty is described by Swan (1961) in 'Australia in Antarctica' and the narrative of the first 50 years of ANARE is provided in colourful accounts assembled by Bowden (1997) in 'The Silence Calling.'⁴

Swan suggests that Australia initially became aware of the harsh nature of Antarctica, in the early nineteenth century, through accounts of distant sightings brought back by adventurous seafarers using Australian ports for succour, such as by Bellinghausen in 1819⁵ and John Biscoe in 1831⁶. Cumpston⁷ (1968) shows that these accounts were supplemented by other reports from hunters seeking profit from sealing and whaling in the

⁴ R.A. Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1961; Tim Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97* (St. Leonards : Allen & Unwin, 1999)

⁵ Bellinghausen's expedition wintered in Sydney in 1819 and was feted by Governor Macquarie as described in the translation of his report by Frank Debenham, *The Voyage of Captain Bellinghausen to the Antarctic Seas 1819-1821* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1945)

⁶ *Hobart Town Courier* 17 September 1831 cites the desperate condition of the crew 'that the crew was unable get the bodies of two crew members up to be thrown overboard for several days'.

⁷ Such as the explorer/whalers from the whaling firm of Enderby Brothers and their involvement in the developing seal and whale oil industry described in J. S. Cumpston, *Macquarie Island* (Melbourne: Australia Dept. of External Affairs, Antarctic Division, 1968); J.S. Cumpston, *First Visitors to Bass Strait* (Canberra: Roebuck Society, 1973)

vast Southern Ocean, such as in conjunction with American sealers in 1820 as described by Pearson⁸ (2008) Hains⁹ (1998) speculates that the Australian public's fascination with survival stories in the hostile environment of Antarctica grew through the frontier ideal of 'wonderful adventures that made light of the difficulties' in both Australia and Antarctica. This interest grew to expressions being made in the press that it was Australia's duty to explore and administer East Antarctica to further the interests of the British Empire¹⁰.

Swan (1961)¹¹ describes attempts by key Australian individuals¹² and several committees, to gain government support for Antarctic expeditions. He provides a narrative overview and briefly notes the policy directions of early Australian Governments. Swan also examines the pre twentieth century situation in Melbourne, when two of Melbourne's learned societies formed the first Antarctic Exploration Committee in 1884. This committee tried to persuade the Victorian Government to support Australia Antarctic expeditions, which necessitated seeking support from the British government. He identifies the political shortcomings of these proposals as; failing to 'aim high enough' with the proposed expedition, whilst planning to defray costs by 'engaging in commercial activity as well as scientific research'.¹³ This section of Swan's research is further examined by Cole (1990)¹⁴ who uses primary material from the Victorian Royal Society minutes to reappraise the individual proposals and the efforts of the committee.

Cole concludes that Swan's criticism of the Antarctic Exploration Committee and the individuals involved¹⁵ is unjustified, as politically, the divided control over foreign policy between the Colonies and the Imperial Government made the situation virtually impossible to coordinate. She argues that the practicalities arising from a lack of polar experience within the Antarctic Exploration Committee when preparing a suitable detailed plan for the

⁸ A. Pearson 'Nineteenth century sealing sites on Rugged Island South Shetland islands' in *Polar Record* 42 (2008), pp. 335-47.

⁹ Brigid Hains, 'the Last of Lands, and the First', *Renewing the Frontier Ideal in Antarctica and Inland Australia*. (Phd Thesis : Monash University, 1998).

¹⁰ For example David Harrison, 'Australians must bestir themselves. It is part of our destiny to explore these southern solitudes', *Melbourne Leader*, 10 January 1885.

¹¹ R.A Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 26-41.

¹² The Victorian scientist Baron Von Mueller stressed Antarctica's vast importance for science as well as commerce in *Proceeding of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia*, Victorian Branch vol.1 (1883-84), pp.111-12

¹³ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 41-59.

¹⁴ Lynette Cole, *Proposals for the First Australian Antarctic Expedition : An Appraisal and Reappraisal of the Proposals and Efforts of a Joint Committee Formed by Two of Melbourne's Learned Societies During the 1880's* (Melbourne: Dept. of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash University, 1990)

¹⁵ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 59-60

Imperial Government and lack of available funds from the Victorian government in a time of an economic depression were more likely the reasons for its failure to mount an expedition.¹⁶ While such proposals were unsuccessful in influencing the Victorian government, public interest in and awareness of Antarctica was generated, as indicated by supportive articles in the *Argus* newspaper at that time.¹⁷

Swan (1961)¹⁸ reports that Mawson's decision to breakaway from British expeditions and organise his own expedition had far reaching impact on the extent of a future Australian Antarctic Territorial Claim. Ayres in his biography of Mawson describes the tribulations of raising funds from the public to mount the expedition, with very little government support.¹⁹ He describes how Mawson set about fund raising, stressing the importance of Antarctica to Britain and Australia.²⁰ The *Argus* in its support for the venture commented that the area proposed for the expedition is the nearest part to Australia and it should be 'Australia's special duty and her obligation to contribute to the world at large whatever store of secrets this land holds'.²¹

Mawson overcame these fund raising difficulties to achieve the Australian Antarctic expedition (AAE) in 1911-13. It was the subsequent popular publications arising from Mawson's dramatic expedition which indelibly captured the Australian public interest in Antarctica. Much later, the colourful and emotional account by Bickel (1977) reinforced the drama of Mawson's personal survival to the public. The heroic nature of Antarctic exploration captured the Australian public's general interest. Writers of this period portrayed a beguiling aura of adventure to the general public and provided rich examples of the pioneering character of Australians overcoming adversity in a harsh land. This frontier approach was again highlighted by Hains (1998) in comparing attitudes between Mawson of Antarctica and Flynn of the inland.

¹⁶ Lynette Cole, *Proposals for the First Australian Antarctic Expedition*, p. 55

¹⁷ *The Argus* 19 April 1884 reported favourably on the inaugural meeting of the committee and expressed the hope that some adventurous explorer with a steam vessel might attempt a summer's dash into our Antarctic regions.

¹⁸ At his pivotal address to the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science in January 1911 Mawson estimated that the expedition would cost about 40 000 pounds', cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 129.

¹⁹ P. J. Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999), pp. 43-59.

²⁰ Mawson also sought funds from England and presented his plans the Royal Geographical society in London as reported in *The Geographical Journal* 37 (1911), pp. 609-20.

²¹ *The Argus*, 14, 17 and 25 June 1910.

It was a time of heroic explorers in the field and Mawson's great leadership was recognised when he received a knighthood in 1914. However, after this honour was bestowed and despite the personal drama of Mawson's tragic survival, Hurley's brilliant photography and the movie films of the AAE and publicity from Shackleton's subsequent *Endurance* expedition (Hurley, 2001)²², virtually nothing was achieved in establishing a strong government policy towards Antarctica. The government's attention was immediately distracted from Antarctica at this time by the Great War. Government and public attention in Australia and Britain then concentrated on economic and social recovery from the effects of the war.

With the tragedy and heroism of the first World War, the bubble of public interest in Antarctica had burst and government attention moved on to things of more immediate importance, to improve the local economic situation. Apart from the slow compilation and release of scientific reports from the AAE and occasional comments by Mawson in the newspapers, the flow of Australian Antarctic publications ebbed and lacked the stimulus of new Antarctic activity until Sir Hubert Wilkins entered the polar scene and became the first Antarctic aviator in 1928.

1.2.2 The Territorial claim era

Ayres (1991)²³ describes how Mawson's continued personal lobbying over the decade after the First World War met with little success and how government's direct attention to Antarctic policy was not achieved until France claimed a sector of Antarctica as French territory in 1924. Ayres reports that Mawson then lobbied strongly against Australia accepting that claim, over land which he had first explored,²⁴ but Britain, which controlled Australian foreign policy, quickly accepted the French claim, much to Mawson's chagrin²⁵. However, the French Territorial declaration and the ongoing whaling activities of the Norwegians in Antarctic waters raised serious concern for British Empire territorial ambitions in Antarctica. Swan describes how the status of British Antarctic discoveries

²² Frank Hurley, *South with Endurance : Shackleton's Antarctic Expedition 1914-1917* (Ringwood: Penguin, 2001)

²³ Details of this period are given in Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, pp. 123-139.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁵ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 170-1.

south of Australia was reviewed during the 1926 Imperial Conference in London²⁶. Ayres discusses how further lobbying in Australia and Britain resulted in Mawson being invited to lead the BANZARE 1929-30 and 1930-31 summer expeditions to chart the east Antarctic coastline.²⁷ Price (1962)²⁸ explains that this coastal exploration was a prerequisite for Britain and Australia in order to make a territorial claim on the Antarctic continent. These expeditions had some success in charting the coastline from the edge of the pack ice, although diaries and publications²⁹ describing the two voyages show that they suffered internal problems from divided command and shortage of coal as fuel for the expedition ship, *Discovery*.

Swan (1961) notes that the Norwegian whaling fleet had been very successful in operation, since the introduction of factory ships to Antarctica in 1905. It had paid Britain some £437,221 in duties between 1919 and 1928 for whalers operating in the Falkland Islands³⁰. Christensen (1935) describes the Norwegian explorations seeking to find new whaling grounds outside of British control and how he sent his whalers towards Enderby Land in 1930. Jacka and Jacka (1988)³¹ use Mawson's diaries of the BANZARE voyages to give details of Mawson's meetings with the Norwegian whalers, as these had an impact on Australian Antarctic territorial policy ambitions. Both Swan and Ayres discuss the meeting held on 14 January 1930 on board the *Discovery* between the Norwegian and Australian expeditions. At that meeting Captain Riiser-Larsen explained that despite his landing on sea ice near Amundsen Bay on 22 December 1929, where he had made a territorial claim over Enderby Land for Norway, he had been advised by Lars Christensen on 10 January 1930 that the Norwegian government recognised Enderby Land as British and that he should only occupy and claim land to the west of that Land. Swan reports that Riiser-Larsen and Mawson then agreed to a de facto boundary at 45° east longitude between their explorations and pending territorial claims.³²

²⁶ Imperial Conference, 'Summary of Proceedings/1926 Imperial Conference,' (Melbourne : Commonwealth of Australia, 1927)

²⁷ Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, pp. 161.

²⁸ Archibald Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica : Mawson's Banzare Voyages, 1929-31, Based on the Mawson Papers* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1962)

²⁹ Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, pp. 83-84; Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, pp. 189-190. and H. O. Fletcher, *Antarctic Days with Mawson : A Personal Account of the British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition of 1929-31*, (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1984), p. 228.

³⁰ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 184.

³¹ Douglas Mawson, Fred Jacka, and Eleanor Jacka eds., *Mawson's Antarctic Diaries* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988)

³² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

Some of the details in Mawson's published geographical accounts from the BANZARE have been criticised by Norwegian historians (Bogen ,1957)³³ producing a heated controversy over prior discovery naming rights for features and the decision to accept the 45° east longitude boundary as the limit to Norwegian claims. Both Bogen and Christensen³⁴ argue that the reason for the Norwegian claim to coastal territory in Dronning Maud Land was to protect their industry and was not linked to Amundsen's inland journey to the South Pole. Christensen contended that Norwegian whalers had operated in rich Antarctic whaling fields along the coast for several years, much further to the east than that the agreed regional boundary and this area should not be included in an Australian Territorial Claim based on prior discovery. However, Price (1962) contends that the outcome from BANZARE, in identifying the existence of a continuous land continent in East Antarctica, was a significant one for Britain and Australia and sufficient to proceed with a territorial claim³⁵.

The BANZARE expeditions had a very significant impact on Australian Government policy on Antarctica. A strong commitment to Antarctic policy can be seen in the presentations to parliament by ministers John Latham and Richard Casey in introducing and supporting the Australian Antarctic Acceptance Act 1933³⁶. In endorsing the transfer of the British claim to Australia, these parliamentary policy speeches recalled historical events from Australian involvement on the continent and flagged a growing interest of government in its territorial ambition in Antarctica.

Interest in Antarctica was also fuelled by the activity of two other Australians in the field of Antarctic exploration through the 1930s. The colourful activities of Sir Hubert Wilkins, the inaugural polar aviator, are described in his own accounts in the *Geographical Journals* and in biographies by Andrews (2011), Thomas (1963) Grierson (1960) and Nasht (2005) Nasht tells how the enigmatic Wilkins made several territorial possession claims for Britain in his Antarctic expeditions in the Antarctic Peninsula from 1928-31 as well as for Australia with his landings in the Vestfold Hills in 1938/39.³⁷ Both Swan and Ayres describe how, in 1939, Wilkins tried to influence the Australian government to occupy the

³³ Hans Bogen, 'The Main Events in the History of Antarctic Exploration,' *The Norwegian Whaling Gazette* 1957, p. 66, cited in Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 168.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21,164-173.

³⁵ Statement by Minister Casey cited in Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. v.

³⁶ Comm.Parl.Deb.(1933), p. 1949-56; Comm. Parl.Deb.(senate) (1933), pp. 2017-24.

³⁷ Simon Nasht, *The Last Explorer : Hubert Wilkins Australia's Unknown Hero* (Sydney: Hodder, 2005), pp. 271-2

Australian Antarctic Territory with a network of meteorological stations for better weather prediction.³⁸ However, the economic depression and impending world war politically diluted his attempts and he moved on to a war career with America.

Another Australian, John Rymill, was leader of the successful 1934-37 British Antarctic Peninsula Expedition³⁹. This venture won world wide acclaim as a model expedition, as reported in the Readers Digest Atlas of Antarctica (1985)⁴⁰ John Bechervaise presents Rymill's activities in Greenland and Antarctica in a detailed biography mainly focused on his field exploits.⁴¹ Rymill returned to Australia to manage his family property holdings at Penola in South Australia and did not continue his polar career.

In the 1920s and 1930s scientific reports of the AAE⁴² continued to be published, as secondary material to the territorial objective of the expedition, but little other Australian Antarctic material was published between the World Wars. An exception was the excellent 1939 topographic map of Antarctica prepared by John Cumpston (Department of External Affairs) and Edward Bayliss (Department of the Interior) in 1939 to show the territorial claims.⁴³ This was an outstanding cartographic product; the result of some ten years compilation by these government departments using primary information from expedition reports. Issued with an explanatory handbook⁴⁴ containing separate introductions by both Ministers, it can be seen as an expression of Australian government interest in the Antarctic continent at that time. The publication is a tribute to the persistence and expertise of both individuals. At the time it demonstrated Australia's interest in the continent and promoted the territorial claim.

1.2.3 The Phillip Law era.

³⁸ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp.354-355; Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, pp. 228-9.

³⁹ Expedition is described in John Rymill, A. Stephenson, and Hugh Robert Mill, *Southern Lights; the Official Account of the British Graham Land Expedition, 1934-1937* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938)

⁴⁰ Readers Digest, *Antarctica :Great Stories from the Frozen Continent* (Sydney: Readers Digest Services, 1985)

⁴¹ John Bechervaise, *The Will and the Way of John Rymill* (Huntingdon: Bluntisham Books, 2008)

⁴² For example, Douglas Mawson, 'Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14 : Scientific Reports. Series B,' (Sydney: NSW Government printing office 1925)

⁴³ Published in two versions at scales of 1:5 Million and 1:10 million of the whole of Antarctica, it was very well researched and was by far the best map available of the whole continent until the late 1940s

⁴⁴ E.P.Bayliss and J.S. Cumpston, *Handbook and Index to Accompany a Map of Antarctica*, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia , Department of External Affairs, 1939), pp. 1-90.

The material published in the post The Second World War period, 1947 to 1966, emphasised the focus on getting an Australian presence established on the Antarctic continent and publicised its importance within government. Burke (1993)⁴⁵, in describing the history of Australian aviation in Antarctic in this period, reflects that the Australian government's decision to send an expedition to Antarctica was prompted by post-war concerns about security in the Southern Ocean. Swan (1961) records that the decision to establish an Australian station on the continent was supported by the creation of the Antarctic Division, within the Department of External affairs and describes subsequent events leading to the formation of the Australian Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE)⁴⁶ Law (1983)⁴⁷ further describes the establishment of sub Antarctic stations on Heard and Macquarie islands as stepping stones within the government's overall policy to eventually occupy the Australian Antarctic Territory.

The history of Macquarie Island is carefully documented by Cumpston (1968) where he also chronicles death and shipwreck amongst earlier sealers who occupied the island and the death of Scoble, an ANARE expeditioner in 1948. The physical hardships encountered in the occupation of Heard island in 1948, are described by Scholes (1949)⁴⁸ and the loss of two expeditioners on Heard island in 1952 is recorded by Lancaster Brown (1957)⁴⁹. These accounts show how difficult the hostile environment of Heard Island proved to be, but they also demonstrate its importance as a training pathway to Antarctica.

In 1957 Law and Bechervaise published 'ANARE Australia's Antarctic Outposts' a popular account of early ANARE activities in. This focused on early exploration and science at Heard Island, Macquarie Island and the continental stations of Davis and Mawson. Following his third ANARE winter in 1959 Bechervaise published several books on Antarctic expedition life (Bechervaise, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1979) These accounts dealt with successful expedition events, aimed at providing information to the public rather than influencing, or reporting on, national policy. In 1957, Robert Dovers also published an account of his 1952 winter on the Antarctic continent with a French expedition at Point

⁴⁵ David Burke, *Moments of Terror: The Story of Antarctic Aviation*. (Kensington : NSW University Press, 1993)

⁴⁶ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 239-42.

⁴⁷ P. G. Law, *Antarctic Odyssey* (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1983); P.G. Law, *The Antarctic Voyage of Hmas Wyatt Earp* (Sydney: Allen and Irwin, 1995) pp. 4-11.

⁴⁸ Arthur Scholes *Fourteen Men : The Story of the Australian Antarctic Expedition to Heard Island* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1949)

⁴⁹ Peter Lancaster Brown, *Twelve Came Back* (London: Hale, 1957)

Geologie. In this book, which is primarily focused on the working dog teams, Dovers gives an insight into his own character as an Australian explorer in Antarctica and he played a very important role in building a new Australian tradition in harsh Antarctic work (Dovers,1957)⁵⁰.

Law's personal approach, with details of his leadership and dedication to further Australia's interest on the continent, is discussed at length in two biographical accounts by Ralston (1991 and 1993) The first deals with the early life of Phillip Law, his time as head of the Antarctic Division and his leadership of the expedition to establish Mawson station in 1954. The second concentrates on Law's role in exploration activities from 1954 to 1966. These two books show his great drive and administrative skill within a public service environment in implementing policy, despite Antarctic matters having a low level of importance to Government. Ralston notes that the confirmation of Law in 1949⁵¹ as a permanent officer with Antarctic Division was an important event, producing a stable period of administration. Law's activity as a prolific publicist of Antarctic matters is notable in this period and his presentations and books have added richness to the literature⁵². In this era, his works principally focused on the field exploration aspects and gained a considerable public following. They show that Law was primarily focused on gaining the allocation of resources for Antarctic activities rather than creation of new policy initiatives.⁵³ However, careful research on this material indicates that he had little direct impact on new foreign policy directions within the Department of External Affairs. It shows that his prime mission was the implementation of existing Australian Government Antarctic policy in the establishment of Australian Antarctic bases with their associated science activity

Law, as Director of the Antarctic Division, strongly promoted Antarctica as a place worthy of Australian Government attention. This can be seen as a catalyst in Australia's growing

⁵⁰ Robert Dovers, *Huskies*.

⁵¹ On 1 January 1949 Law was appointed acting Officer-in-Charge with responsibility as leader of ANARE, in Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica*, p. 107 .

⁵² Such as Phillip Law and John Mayston Bechervaise, *ANARE : Australia's Antarctic Outposts*. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1957); P. G. Law, *Australia and the Antarctic* (St. Lucia,: University of Queensland Press, 1962); P.G. Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*; P. G. Law, 'The Antarctic Wilderness-a Wild Idea.' (paper presented at the Antarctica's Future;Continuity or Change?, Hobart, 1990); P.G. Law, *You Have to Be Lucky-Antarctica and Other Adventures* (Melbourne: Kangaroo Press, 1995);P. G. Law, *Antarctica - 1984*, Sir John Morris Memorial Lecture, 1964 (Hobart: Adult Education Board of Tasmania, 1964)

⁵³ Law kept a secret personal diary of his frustration with the Commonwealth Treasury Department (in box 24 in the Law papers at NL)

acceptance of Antarctica as a worthwhile scientific laboratory, if not as an economic asset. The aura of Antarctica being just a 'hostile place' with no benefit at all was being replaced as ANARE reported on its ability to successfully carry out scientific research on the continent (ANARE Scientific Reports Series) Ralston (1993) shows that Law, in frustration with the Canberra bureaucracy resigned in 1966 after nearly twenty years as Director of the Antarctic Division. Bowden (1997) in his review of the first 50 years of ANARE (1947-1997), comments that a successor was not appointed until late in 1970. The Australian Antarctic Division then suffered from internal divisions and personality conflicts. It was shifted, through four departments with multiple Directors and Ministers. Bowden describes this turbulent period in the history of Antarctic Division as going 'from pillar to post'.⁵⁴

Science became the shopfront reason for Australian Antarctic activities when in 1974 The Australian Government established an Advisory Committee on Antarctic Programs under Sir Frederick White, to report to the Minister for Science on the status of the Antarctic science programs. This resulted in Hon. W. Morrison publishing a green paper on Antarctic activities in 1975 which itemised 'New Perspectives for Australian Research in Antarctica'.⁵⁵ Thus the nature of Australian Antarctic literature changed from stirring accounts of field exploration activities, to a focus on Antarctic Science programs. However, with no external individual leadership figure active in bringing it to the public's notice or inciting a government focus, Antarctic policy remained peripheral to the government's main attention and policy development was left to the government bureaucracy in Canberra.

1.2.4 The Antarctic Treaty era (1959-1991)

When the Antarctic Treaty was signed by Australia in 1959, it put aside its prime territorial ambition to secure non-militarisation in the southern region. The Treaty carried an option for review after an initial period of 30 years from its ratification in 1961. As the decade of the 1980s progressed the Federal government began to encourage public discussions and conferences on possible future policy directions for Australia concerning Antarctica in anticipation of the Treaty review, which was expected in 1991. In that time conferences

⁵⁴ Tim Bowden, *The Silence Calling*, pp. 281-300.

⁵⁵ Green paper issued by Minister for Science –*Towards New Perspectives for Australian Antarctic Research*. 26th February 1975, File 75/36 ,(NAA, Hobart), p. 3

arranged by leading academics, such as at ANU by Harris in 1984, Handmer in 1989 and Herr in Hobart in 1990. These showed that individuals were beginning to make independent statements on Antarctic Policy and it became academically fashionable for comment (Suter, 1980, 1991), (Beck, 1987, 1988), (Millar, 1986)⁵⁶ on a future role for Australia in Antarctica. Legal academics in Australia such as Rothwell⁵⁷, and Triggs⁵⁸ also began to address policy options on the state and future of the Treaty from an international law viewpoint. These publications portray a rather unsettled period with growing domestic pressure to discuss Australia's future role in the Antarctic Treaty. Uncertainty about the future of the Treaty was also the case internationally when Malaysia raised the issue of Antarctica in the United Nations and attacked the whole Antarctic Treaty system as being elitist⁵⁹.

As the end of the 1980s approached the focus in the literature reporting on Antarctic policy research shifted to environmental debates, initially to facilitate mining and then seeking support for wider comprehensive environmental protection. Public conferences escalated discussion on science policy to the broader horizon of the nature of Australia's role in Antarctica⁶⁰. Environmentalists: Mosley, Doyle and later Kellows published their views⁶¹, but the debate was also continued in face to face interviews and discussions, as recorded by the media at that time. Slowly and even painfully, pressure from the 'green' movement built up and began to have an influence on Australian Antarctic environmental policy.

⁵⁶ Such as Keith D. Suter, *Antarctica : Private Property or Public Heritage?* (Leichhardt, : Pluto Press Australia, 1991); Keith Suter, ed. *World Law and the Last Wilderness*, 2nd rev. (Leura: Friends of the Earth, Second Back Row Press, 1980); Jim Beasel, 'An Australian Perspective,' in *Australia, Britain and Antarctica*, ed. T.B Millar (London: University of London, 1986); P.J Beck, 'Another Sterile Ritual ? The United Nations and Antarctica 1987,' *Polar Record* 24 (1988); A. Bergin, 'The Politics of Antarctic Minerals : The Greening of White Australia,' *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1991); P. G. Quilty, W. F. Budd, and Antarctic Science Advisory Committee (Australia), *The Role of Australian Antarctic Scientific Activities and Priorities for the Scientific Program : A Discussion Paper* (Canberra: Dept. of Science, 1986)

⁵⁷ Donald Rothwell, *A World Park for Antarctica? : Foundations, Developments and the Future*. (Hobart: Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, 1990)

⁵⁸ Gillian Triggs, *International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica*. (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986) ; Gillian Triggs, ed. *The Antarctic Treaty Regime : Law, Environment and Resources*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

⁵⁹ Richard Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings* (Pymble : Harper Collins , 2003), p.17

⁶⁰ Such as Lyn Goldsworthy, 'World Park Antarctica : An Environmentalist Vision,' in *Antarctica's Future : Continuity or Change* (Hobart: Tasmanian Government Printer, 1990); T. B. Millar, ed. *Australia, Britain, and Antarctica : Papers of a Conference Held at the Australian Studies Centre, 4 June 1986* (London: Australian Studies Centre, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1986); Grahame Cook, ed. *The Future of Antarctica : Exploitation Versus Preservation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990)

⁶¹ Timothy Doyle, and Aynsley Kellows., *Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia*. (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995)

The literature shows that this environmental debate reached a climax in the dramatic events of 1988 and 1989, when Prime Minister R.J. Hawke reversed the Australian policy stance of support for limited Antarctic minerals exploitation, to the total exclusion of mining and promotion of environmental protection in Antarctica. This rich period in the literature is well described by Lorraine Elliott (1992)⁶² in her PhD thesis ‘the politics of the Antarctic: a case study of the environment in international relations’ and her subsequent publications on this environmental theme. Elliott examines the circumstances of the change in government policy and draws extensively on government papers from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, together with press releases and statements from the Prime Minister, as well as Australian working papers submitted to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative meetings.⁶³ Bowden (1997)⁶⁴ in his published history of ANARE describes this as a volatile period, highlighted by a debate between strong pro-mining government ministers supported by their important government departments and the environmental lobby outside of government, supported by strong anti-mining ministers. Research shows Foreign Affairs Minister Evans undertook a policy reversal, firstly providing support for the mineral convention,⁶⁵ and then strongly supporting the contrary viewpoint of extensive protection and a ban on mining⁶⁶. Following this policy reversal, the government actively sought public and global endorsement on this new stance and promoted public debate in Australia and overseas in conferences such as those arranged in London by Cook (1990)⁶⁷ and by Millar (1986)⁶⁸ Elliott (1991) details the subsequent events over the next two years at the international meetings primarily associated with the Antarctic Treaty system and the work of the Australian delegation expertly led by Alan Brown. This achieved consensus

⁶² L.M. Elliott, ‘The Politics of the Antarctic: A Case Study of the Environment in International Relations.’ (Phd Thesis : Australian National University, 1992)

⁶³ For example PREP/WP/14 *concerning a comprehensive scheme of protection for the Antarctic Environment* submitted by delegation of Australia, 11 May 1989.

⁶⁴ Bowden interviewed with politicians on Antarctica included: Keating 3 June 1996 , Graham Richardson, 16 April 1996 and Bob Hawke 9 May 1996, as described in Bowden, *The Silence Calling*, p. 558-559.

⁶⁵ Gareth Evans, and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations; in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991); Gareth Evans, Antarctic Minerals convention news statement *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 59 no.11 November 1988, p. 50 ; Gareth Evans, Australian foreign policy : priorities in a changing world *Australian Outlook*, 43 2 August 1998, pp. 1-15; Gareth Evans, Antarctica :An international win for Australia *Ministerial document service*, October 1998 no. 65/91-92.

⁶⁶ Joint statement, R.J.L.Hawke, Senator Gareth Evans and Senator Graham Richardson ‘Protection of the Antarctic Environment, 22 May 1989.

⁶⁷ The papers from this conference in London in 1990 were published in Grahame Cook, ed. *The Future of Antarctica :Exploitation Versus Preservation*.(Manchester: Manchester University press,1990)

⁶⁸ Millar,ed. *Australia, Britain, and Antarctica : Papers of a Conference Held at the Australian Studies Centre, 4 June 1986*,(London: London University press,1986)

endorsement by all Antarctic Treaty Nations as well as widespread global support for the Australian anti-mining approach and the adoption of the Environmental Protection Protocol under the Antarctic Treaty in Madrid in 1991.⁶⁹

In 1989 Tim Bowden (1991), as a journalist with the ABC Social History Unit, joined an ANARE resupply voyage to Davis and Mawson stations to produce radio programs about expedition activities.⁷⁰ He then published a popular written account of this trip and returned to Antarctica again in 1994 and 1995 to film ABC documentaries on Australians working in Antarctica. This led to him being commissioned to chronicle a 50 year history of ANARE from 1947 to 1997. This major literary work involved considerable research and recording of oral histories from many persons who had been expeditioners since 1947. In his introduction he summarises his research as:

ANARE's history is a chronicle of life on a frontier, not only an important Australian frontier but a significant international one... But Antarctica, far removed from broad brimmed hats and sunburned faces, remains unfamiliar to most Australians. Mawson in his balaclava still seems an uncharacteristically alien image.

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To portray life in Antarctica Bowden documented many expeditioner's accounts and colourful anecdotes about heroic events. To gather this information he audio recorded a number of interviews with key private individuals outside the government, public servants, scientists and politicians. While there is a strong and interesting narrative of events in Antarctica in his work, Bowden also makes comment on the management situation within Antarctic government administration in Australia. His interviews with former Prime Minister Paul Keating and senior Minister Graham Richardson give an insight into the inner working of Cabinet in relation to the Hawke Government's reversal of environmental policy.⁷² While these are informative and based on colourful personal recollections, the definitive minutes of the Cabinet meetings 1988-91, which would provide additional documented evidence on the policy reversal decision, are still to be released.

⁶⁹ Elliott, *Protecting the Environment*, (1993) chapter III 'Implementation', p. 46-70

⁷⁰ Tim Bowden and Australian Broadcasting Corporation, *Antarctica and Back in Sixty Days* (St Leonards : Allen & Unwin, 1999), distributed as an ABC spoken word Cassette.

⁷¹ Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*, p. xiii.

⁷² These interviews by Bowden in *the Silence calling*, are referenced sequentially in the endnotes, pp. 542-562, Details of these interviews and relevant correspondence are held at the Australian Antarctic Division , Hobart

In 1997 the Antarctic Division arranged a Jubilee Science Symposium to celebrate 50 years of science endeavour in Antarctica. This was part of wider celebrations of the first 50 years of ANARE held in Hobart from 20 to 24 July. Key scientists presented addresses and contributed chapters to a major compendium of Australian Antarctic Science. This publication contains a summary of the science work carried out by ANARE in the period 1947-97 with comments on possible future directions for each individual discipline.⁷³ While the symposium and the publication can be viewed as celebratory events, they, also provide a carefully documented history of the science undertaken during this period.

1.3 Antarctic policy making

This section provides a background for understanding the nature of policy decision making by reviewing works that focus on Australian Antarctic policy development. Little has been written on Antarctic policy making, but Swan (1961) attempts to explain the government's decisions in the first half of the twentieth century, which he sees as mainly arising as a response to Mawson's continued lobbying. When discussing Prime Minister Bruce announcement of the BANZARE in Parliament in February 1929,⁷⁴ Swan comments, 'For the first time Australian politicians saw the Antarctic as the source of something other than ice, whales, seals and penguins.'⁷⁵ Ayres in his Mawson biography describes the latter's lobbying of government as being primarily aimed at Prime Ministers. However, he does not dwell on further interpreting how policy decisions were made in government by Prime Ministers between the wars, or later by the Ministers for External Affairs, when that department was activated after the Second World War.

In this post Second World War period Ralston records Law's frustration with the government bureaucracy in Canberra and describes Law's unyielding approach in attempting to influence government policy for greater allocation of resources for Antarctic work⁷⁶. Again, rather than addressing the government decision making process, she highlights the personality conflicts Law encountered with senior Departmental Secretaries

⁷³Such as John Manning, 'ANARE Mapping and Geodesy', in *Australian Antarctic Science*, Marchant, H., Lugg, D., Quilty, P., eds, (Hobart: Australian Antarctic Division, 2002), pp. 541-561.

⁷⁴Commonwealth Parl. Debate, xix (1929), pp. 461-3, pp. 1747-9 and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 February 1929.

⁷⁵Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 187

⁷⁶Kathleen Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica: The Early Life of Phillip Law*. (South Melbourne: Hyland House, 1993)

of the Department of External Affairs and the Treasury, who did not share his unbridled vision. As an example, Ralston quotes a reflective letter from Sir Arthur Tange, former Head of Department of External Affairs, which comments on Law's blunt approaches to government seeking to secure a better outcome for Antarctic funding:

Everybody who needs government money has to be a petitioner... He (Law) was pretty blunt with me about what he wanted... he naturally tended to see things from the point of view of the Antarctic Division and Antarctic expeditions. That's the sort of enthusiasm that gets people places. It sometimes has to be curbed because of other prior claims for money and staff⁷⁷

In 1979 Lovering and Prescott published a geographically based perspective on Australian involvement in Antarctica and media publications began expressing concern over Australia's current and future role in Antarctica⁷⁸. This concern was taken up by academia in the 1980s when Bruce Davis, from the Department of Political Science at the University of Tasmania, began to raise the lack of information available on Antarctic policy issues. He criticised the historical texts in the Australian literature on Antarctic exploration for conveying little, if any, of the detail from policy debates which must have occurred within Government. With the relocation of the Antarctic Division to Hobart in 1981, conferences became popular as conduits providing an interface between academics and government policy officers from the Department of External Affairs. The first in a series of conferences where the government encouraged public input and discussion on Australia future participation in Antarctica was organised by the Tasmanian political commentator Richard Herr, with Bruce Davis and Rob Hall from the University of Tasmania in Hobart in 1982.⁷⁹ This was followed by a significant landmark conference on 'Antarctic Policy Options' at the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies (CRES), in Canberra with conference papers published in 1984. Stuart Harris, as Director of CRES, introduced this conference by saying that with the current debate on whether or not to permit minerals exploitation in Antarctica, the prime purpose of the conference was:

⁷⁷ Letter Tange to Ralston 6 July 1990 in Ralston, *Phillip Law* (1998), p. 176

⁷⁸ J.F. Lovering and J.R.V Prescott, *Last of Lands ... Antarctica*. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1979)

⁷⁹ D.E. Caro, The role of science in Australian Antarctic policy. in R.A. Herr, R. Hall and B.W. Davis, eds. *Issues in Australia's Marine and Antarctic Policies*, Public Policy Monograph, (Hobart: Department of Political Science, University of Tasmania, 1982), pp. 139–150.

To stimulate greater interaction between various areas of expertise and experience and to direct them towards an analysis of Australia's policies, their objectives and their underlying assumptions.⁸⁰

This conference saw open discussions between participants, of government and private attitudes and made suggestions on Australia's future role in the management of the Antarctic Treaty. In his paper at the Canberra conference, Bruce Davis attempted to analyse how Australian Antarctic policy had been formulated and implemented in the past, being 'more concerned with policy process than policy content'. This heralded a fresh approach in Antarctic research and increased public participation in the previously closed world of government Antarctic decision-making. Davis had argued for such wider participation saying:

In an era when governments are under increasing pressure to widen policy forums and justify policy stances we need to identify more precisely the individuals and institutions involved in decision making, the mode of interactions amongst protagonists and which interests are excluded from deliberations.⁸¹

Thus in the early 1980s Associate Professor Bruce Davis,⁸² was at the forefront of voices calling for greater transparency and public involvement in Antarctic Policy. Today his work is still relevant to understanding the formation of Antarctic policy as it addressed the broader situation of how such policy decision-making was carried out in government. Davis sought a simple methodology to study formation of Antarctic policy which adequately showed how Antarctic policy was developed over a long period of time. In 1982 he examined three methodological approaches to the study of Australian Antarctic Policy.⁸³

1. Historical-descriptive treatment of past events to explain the situation;

⁸⁰ Stuart Harris, ed. *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, Cres Monograph: 11 (Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University, 1984), p.vii

⁸¹ Bruce Davis, 'Australia and Antarctica : Aspects of Policy Process,' in *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, ed. S. Harris (Canberra: Australian National University, 1982) pp. 339-354.

⁸² B.W Davis, 'Background to the Present Situation,' in *Australia, Britain and Antarctica* ed. T.B Millar (London: University of London, 1982); Bruce Davis, 'The Role of Social Scientists in Australian Antarctic Research,' *Search* 14, no. 7-8 (1983)

⁸³ Bruce Davis in Harris, *Australia's Antarctic Policy options*, pp. 339-54.

2. A behavioural interpretation derived from interviews with participants in the policy process; and
3. A conceptual framework based on policy theories to explain inter-relationships and outcomes.

In examining the above methodologies to see if these could be used to further study the development of Antarctic policy, he concluded that despite significant advances in policy theory and implementation analysis during the past decade:

No particular approach was superior to another and it is intuitively feasible, although not easily defensible, to adopt an amalgam of all three methodologies in examining the Antarctic situation... as there is no conceptual model of the policy process which has a priori precedence as the central paradigm.⁸⁴

In 2012, thirty years on, Davis' conclusion warrants further examination in the context of more recent literature concerning methods used to study Antarctic policy development in Australia. For that purpose the approach used here will be to incorporate all three elements identified by Davis in his study. The historical/descriptive element will be used in reviewing the significance of the tradition of ANARE expeditioners who risked their lives in pushing forward the frontiers of understanding of an unknown continent and how these events influenced the Australian public's perception of the worth of Antarctica⁸⁵. The second element of the study will be addressed by the close examination of personal papers and writings of key individuals and by studying content of secondary interviews and oral histories.⁸⁶ The third element examines the decision making process within government in order to bring a distinctive conceptual framework to the subject based on a new approach to appraising issues of relatively minor significance in the overall scheme of government decision making.

1. 4. The nature of government policy decision making

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 341.

⁸⁵ There have now been six deaths at the Australian Antarctic bases, surprisingly no one has been killed in remote field work operations.

⁸⁶ Such as the ABC audio and video tapes by Bowden 'Australians in Antarctica'; the oral history audio tapes of Geoff Mosley by Greg Borschmann and the Law interviews by Ian Toohill, *Dr Phillip Garth Law ;His Extraordinary Life and Times* (Melbourne: Royal Societes of Australia, 2009)

This study primarily focuses on the impact of individuals on the Antarctic policy of the federal Australian Government, not the detail of the processes in policy decision-making. However, as a step to understanding how Antarctic policy was formed in Australia, it is necessary to examine the general nature of decision making within government. While broad definitions of public policy development in the literature vary and sponsor academic debate over its wording, policy can be defined as an instrument of governmental governance resulting from competition between, or a combination of: concepts; ideas; values; business interests; economic resources; and political pressures. These input elements are then differentially highlighted or downplayed in importance in the policy decision-making process by policy makers within the wider government political agenda.

The Australian policy making system can be considered to have been influenced by British and American policy making approaches⁸⁷, but it is differentiated from those by its federalist structure, leading to similarities with Canadian policy making.⁸⁸ As a result, the Australian hybrid system based on the British Westminster system of ministerial responsibility for government action also encompasses some elements of the American senate system, which politically influences government policy by direct lobbying.

The general nature of policy making in Australia is described in several ways in the current literature. These range from description of rational processes, power associations and policy cycles to interactional approaches. Each approach attempts to breakdown the complex relationships involved in decision making into manageable blocks to more easily understand their holistic relationships. One approach is to use economic production themes and view policies as economic products, such as advocated by Burch and Woods.⁸⁹ This approach is an adaptation of the classical economic supply and demand process. It likens government to a corporation where the market demands are said to drive the need for resources such as labour and capital. In turn this produces a managed response from government to regulate access to, or encourage, the supply of goods though the creation of

⁸⁷ Jerri Cockerel, *Public policy making in America* (University of Kentucky Cooperative extension service 2007), online <http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/pubs/ip19.pdf> accessed 28 November 2007 also in UK governmental white paper (1999) on line <http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/moderngov/whtpaper/summary.htm>, accessed November 2007.

⁸⁸ Such as described in R. Simeon, 'Studying Public Policy,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 9 (1976); G. Doern and R. Phidd, *Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process* (London: Methuen, 1992)

⁸⁹ M. Burch and Bruce Woods, *Political Planning in Great Britain* (Oxford: Robinson, 1983) and Burch & Woods 1989 cited in Bridgman and Davis, p. 25 .

preferred policies. The resultant policy outcome is then monitored to assess the impact which this policy has on the community. In classical economic theory this evaluation in turn triggers a response from the general public to create a new or amended demand for the supply of resources. As Antarctica does not produce tangible products of economic value which can be used to input to such an approach, economic models of policy making are not considered further in relation to understanding Antarctic policy development.

Rather than adopting a 'pure goods and services economic approach', Glynn Davis⁹⁰ describes key components in policy making in the Australian federalist system in a 'power association' approach. This defines government's principal role in policy making as coordination across each of political, policy setting and administrative domains⁹¹. The Prime Minister and his department are seen as the primary interactive linkage between these domains. This approach offers a conceptual overview of policy making between three spheres of government which are viewed as:

- Cabinet ;
- Government Ministers and staff; and
- Government departmental bureaucracy.

Another approach which analyses long term interactions between government and key interest groups is described by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier in 1993⁹² and further developed by Sabatier in 1999.⁹³ The interaction between interest groups, policy brokers and political institutions is described as producing a setting which develops a shared understanding of the issues, which then leads to a solution. Environmental policy is given as an appropriate example for this approach, which encourages a robust interaction between 'green' and 'industry' groups through consultative government committees. This relationship approach has been extended by Haward et al ⁹⁴ to emphasize the wide growth of the Australian Antarctic Policy community in the late 1980s, as environmental issues gained prominence. In describing the key interest groups relevant to Antarctic policy in this paradigm, Haward argues that by 2007 there was a marked increase in the number of groups seeking to

⁹⁰ Glynn Davis, 'Consultation public participation and the integration of multiple interests into policy making' *Report for OECD Paris*, May 1996.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 28.

⁹² Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change And Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (Boulder; Westview Press, 1993)

⁹³ Paul Sabatier, *Theories of the Policy Process*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999)

⁹⁴ M. G. Haward, R.Hall,R.,and A.Kellows, 'Australian Antarctic Policy' in *Looking South* (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007)

influence policy, rather than as a pure political model which focused only on internal governmental decision-making processes. Haward portrays a general but complex relational positioning between key groups and the governmental bureaucracy and uses a subdivision of four categories of participants to suggest an ordered approach to identifying policy interests:

- International attentive public ;
- Attentive Australian public;
- Administration (sub government); and
- The executive core of government.

The international community is defined as interested foreign governments, the international science community and self regulating commercial groups, such as the tourist and fishing industry bodies. The Australian public group mainly encompasses environmentalist groups while the sub government sector primarily consists of government departments with Antarctic interests, such as Foreign Affairs and Trade, Customs, Defence and the Environmental Departments. The executive core is seen as the Prime Minister's Department and the Cabinet executive.

Haward sees the interactions between the key groups providing input to policymaking as a fluid approach, as against a more classical, complex and rigid process. However, there is no strong coordinating mechanism presented and as these diverse groups identified by Haward cannot act in isolation, groupings can sometimes become counter productive through internal competition. In addressing the need for effective interaction, both Metcalfe (1994)⁹⁵ and M. Keating (1996)⁹⁶ correctly stress the vital role of coordination between groups as a key element of the Australian policy process. Mosley⁹⁷ explains that there was a real issue in gaining coordination between environmental movement groups to provide a strong unified voice to influence Australia's Antarctic policy. While this paradigm of having a shared vision between lobbying groups is seen as having relevance in explaining Antarctic policy development at one particular time (with the environmental

⁹⁵ L. Metcalfe, 'International Policy Coordination and Public Management Reform' *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 60, (1994): 271-90.

⁹⁶ M. Keating, 'Defining the Policy Advising Function' In *Evaluating Policy Advice: Learning from Commonwealth Experience*, ed. J. Uhr. and K. Mackay. (Canberra: Australian National University, 1996)

⁹⁷ J.G. Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness : The Pivotal Role in Its Complete Protection* (Sydney: Environbook, 2009)

issue in the late 1980s), it cannot be accepted as the main explanation of how Antarctic policy was progressed throughout the twentieth century.

Considine (1994)⁹⁸ and Stone (1988)⁹⁹ argue that there is a classical view of policy as an object, with Colebatch describing his approach in terms of a 'rational choice' model.¹⁰⁰ This defines a logical sequence, from issue identification, through analysis of alternatives, to decision, implementation and review. This rational, linear sequential process approach to policymaking is often characterized as a policy 'cycle'. It is a common approach that appears widely in the policy making literature and is derived from systems theory which attempts to quantify the process as a scientific methodology.¹⁰¹ Colebatch conceptualizes policy formation as an endless cycle of policy decisions, implementation and performance evaluation.¹⁰² This approach is elaborated by others, such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984)¹⁰³ and by Howlett and Ramesh (1995)¹⁰⁴.

The normative Australian policy-making cycle concept is well promoted by Bridgman and Davis (2004)¹⁰⁵ as an eight-step approach. The steps are defined as:

1. Issue identification;
2. Policy analysis;
3. Policy instruments;
4. Consultation;
5. Coordination;
6. Decision;
7. Evaluation; and
8. Review.

⁹⁸ M. Considine, *Public Policy: A Critical Approach* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1994)

⁹⁹ D.A.Stone, *Policy Paradox and Political Reason* (London: Harper Collins, 1988)

¹⁰⁰ H.K. Colebatch, *Policy* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 102,108.

¹⁰¹ Easton was the first to use systems theory to attempt to explain political processes see D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs,: Prentice-Hall, 1965)

¹⁰² Colebatch, *Policy*, p. 110.

¹⁰³ B.W. Hogwood and Lewis Gunn, *Policy Analysis for the Real World*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)

¹⁰⁴ M. Howlett, and M. Ramesh, *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Sub Systems* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995)

¹⁰⁵ Peter Bridgman & Glyn Davis, *The Australian Policy Handbook* (Sydney: Allen &Unwin, 2004), p. 26. (Now with Catherine Althaus in its 4th edition) .

This sequential policy cycle is then described by its authors ¹⁰⁶ as heuristic and iterative in nature. It has been widely used in Australia as a methodology for review of government policy by policy analysis practitioners. Edwards (2001)¹⁰⁷ for example applies the policy cycle to a range of national policies but qualifies its use, concluding that in policy-making, best practice varies from problem to problem. Edwards further cautions regarding the complexity of policy-making with the policy cycle model and notes the following reservations:

- Policy processes are non linear; they can move backwards and forwards and stages might occur in a different order to that of the model;
- Organisational structures will influence the process;
- Players and networks operating in the process influence policy outcomes.¹⁰⁸

Connery (2010) in his review of 'Crisis Policymaking in an Australian Defence setting', uses the policy cycle approach and refers to policy making 'as the process of providing advice to Ministers and implementing their decisions.'¹⁰⁹ Some analysts challenge cyclical models as being unresponsive and unrealistic, preferring systemic or even more complex approaches. They consider that a broader horizon is needed which encompasses civil society organisations, the media, intellectual groups, sponsors, consultation groups, corporations and even lobbyists.

Everett (2003)¹¹⁰ robustly attacked the Australian Policy Cycle model by Bridgman and Davis because it stipulates process and not content and thus misses the political input of policy making, noting that some issues are decided through political pressures rather than bureaucratic process. This invoked a strong defence by Bridgman and Davis in the Australian Journal of Public Administration. They argued that extensive consultation is included in their model.¹¹¹ However the rigid policy cycle is not appropriate to the study of Antarctic policy making; it fails in that it lacks a defined interaction between government and non government individuals and adds a complex and unwieldy process which bogs down when more than one government department is involved. Australian Antarctic policy

¹⁰⁶ Peter and Glyn Davis Bridgman, 'What Use Is a Policy Cycle? Plenty, If the Aim Is Clear,' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 62, no. 3 (2003)

¹⁰⁷ Meredith Edwards, *Social Policy: From Problem to Practice* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2001)

¹⁰⁸ Meredith Edwards, 'Social Science Research and Public Policy: Narrowing the Divide' (Canberra: Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 2004)

¹⁰⁹ David Connery, *Crisis Policy Making* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p.2

¹¹⁰ Sophia Everett, 'The Policy Cycle: Democratic process or Rational Paradigm Revisted,' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 62, no. 2 (2003)

¹¹¹ Bridgman and Davis *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 62, no. 3 (2003), pp. 98-102.

development can also be seen to be influenced by external events and circumstances, rather than purely through a process of rational choice using clearly identified sequential steps to reach defined goals. For that reason the cyclical model is considered here only as an idealistic theory, which attempts to bring order to the, often irrational, world of government politics and does not represent what really happens in Antarctic policy development.

Following its popularity in the United Kingdom, an evidence-based approach to policy-making was invoked by the Rudd Labor government in 2007. Evidence-based policy is a public policy approach based on rigorous and objective evidence. It was reported as being traceable back to the fourteenth century and the time of the despotic kings in England who used a similar approach in an attempt to add discipline to their ‘whimsical decision making’.¹¹² This approach was popularized by the Blair Labour government over a decade from 1997. It was presented to the U.K. parliament in 1999 in a ‘white paper’ on Modernizing Government, which sought to end ideological-based policy decision-making.¹¹³ When the Australian Labor party formed government in 2007 it picked up on the Blair government’s experience and adopted a similar approach. In 2008 Prime Minister Rudd declared it to be a central element of the Government’s reform agenda for the Public Service. He argued that policy-making must be based on evidence and not on rhetoric or other biases. In a follow up monograph by the Public Service Commission, Gary Banks, the Chairman of the Productivity Commission, explained why an evidence-based approach to public policy-making is needed and discussed what he considered the essential ingredients for building an effective evidence base of information for policy decision-making. Banks argued that an evidence-based approach requires a policy-making process that is principally receptive to evidence; ‘a process that begins with a question rather than an answer and which has institutions to support such inquiry.’¹¹⁴

The rationality of this evidence-based approach is strong in its purpose to provide clear, relevant, information on which a policy can be built. However, as Banks points out, it requires to be placed within an overall receptive policy-making process. Fundamentally, by

¹¹² Gary Banks, ‘Evidence Based Policy Making: What Is It? How Do We Get It,’ in *ANZOG*, 4 February, ANU Public Lecture Series (Canberra: Productivity Commission, 2009)

¹¹³ Tony Blair and Jack Cunningham, *Modernising Government*. White paper presented to U.K. parliament

¹¹⁴ Gary Banks, ed ‘Contemporary Government Challenges : Challenges of Evidence-Based Policy-Making’, (Canberra: Public Service Commission AGPS, 2009), p.79

itself it fails to highlight the other human factors which can influence the decision process, such a lobbying or consideration of the importance or significance of the issue to Government. An example of this can be seen when the Department of Supply administration of the Antarctic Division activities decided to consolidate all the science and logistics for Antarctica in a new location in South Melbourne. This policy decision required moving several scientists from Tasmania to join the consolidated group in Melbourne. However, this policy was later overturned by clever political lobbying, which resulted in the whole Antarctic Division operations being moved to Hobart. This was at considerable cost to the human expertise within the Division with the loss of nearly 70% of staff. This illustrates that the neglect of people in the policy- making process and lack of appreciation of the significance of the issue, especially for issues of low level importance, is a flaw in the purely rational approach to analysis of policy decision-making.

The evidence-based approach alone is not considered a suitable methodology for explaining Antarctic policy making, as Antarctica was a low policy priority issue for much of the twentieth century. The model does not work well in relation to Antarctic policy as it does not explain how individuals influenced Antarctic policy and does not include consideration of the relevance of the issue to government. Neither the policy cycle nor the evidence based approach is suitable to be applied to Antarctic policy as they do not adequately include the role of the committed individual operating within or outside the government and consequently each fall short of applicability to Antarctic policy.

1.4.1 The approach to policy making used in this thesis

The conclusion drawn by Davis¹¹⁵ in 1982 that no single paradigm ‘adequately describes the development of Antarctic policy’ is reinforced by examination of the recent research literature. It has been found that there still is no satisfactory single approach described in the literature which completely explains the significance of the issue to government or considers the role of key individuals in driving Antarctic policy forward. Rather, as Davis pointed out, elements of the various input approaches can be used at different times to

¹¹⁵ Bruce Davis, ‘Background to the Present Situation.’ in *Australia, Britain and Antarctica*, T.B Millar, ed. (London: Australian Studies Centre, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1982), pp. 4-18; Bruce Davis, ‘The Role of Social Scientists in Australian Antarctic Research.’ *Search* 14, no. 7-8 (1983), pp. 197-201.

explain the situation, but cannot be applied as a blanket approach. However, these different approaches may be useful for understanding decision making at times of high priority such as when Antarctica approached a higher level of importance to government, after the Second World War, in the 1950s and in the late 1980s. At these times of relatively high levels of priority, Antarctica gained attention and a received a reactive policy response by government, but for the bulk of the twentieth century Antarctic policy languished in a lower priority rating and the identified normal policy making models did not apply. In this circumstance no specific published approach was found to be applicable to explain how it was then brought into government's focus for processing. Rather an approach is needed which adequately considers the wider involvement of impassioned individuals and their impact on a policy area often only at a low level of importance within government's overall attention. This thesis then seeks to understand how individuals became more influential at particular times rather than at others. Relevant factors which need to be considered in this context are:

- The international context;
- The national or domestic context;
- Where the individual was located in the power structure;
- The importance status of Antarctica to the public at that time;
- The ability and capacity of the individual to work the government to achieve a required outcome.

These are relevant for understanding the role of pressure groups and individual lobbying on government. Antarctic policy is subject to both external events outside of Australia's control, as well as domestic events. Government attention is coloured by the perceived ranking of importance of the issues to government and how they are presented. Further, the influence of the individual on Antarctic Policy development can be considered to have had four main approaches, which have been used to affect Antarctic policy at different times:

- Direct personal input to the Prime Minister for Cabinet consideration;
- Direct personal input to other politicians;
- Indirect input to politicians through associations such as scientific bodies or lobby groups;
- Direct power of a Minister with appropriate responsibility.

The normal high level decision point for significant policy-making is Cabinet and is where general Antarctic policy was usually created or endorsed. However, for less significant actions within the scope of a set cabinet decision, variations to policy were at times made by the Prime Minister and, after The Second World War, by the Minister for External Affairs. An example of this ministerial prerogative can be seen in the way Antarctic policy was implemented. In 1947 the Federal government cabinet approved a policy to send an expedition to establish a permanent base in Antarctica in the summer of 1947/48. This was not physically or administratively possible at that time and the Minister for External Affairs varied the way this cabinet decision was implemented. In order to achieve the objective of an Australian occupation on the Antarctic continent, bases were then established on sub-Antarctic islands for seven years to gain experience before the real objective of the policy was attempted.

1. 5. The significance of issues to government

In regard to Antarctic policy decision-making in the twentieth century, government interest ranged from the euphoria of Mawson's Antarctic expeditions, to indifference, when compared to concerns generated by the World Wars or economic depression issues. Antarctica only gained more attention for short times such as, the territorial claim proclamation issues in the early 1930s and the concern of national security in the Southern Ocean after The Second World War. In the late 1980s it again caught government's attention, this time as an environmental issue. However, for most of the twentieth century Antarctica was a low issue of importance to government and raises the question of how such lower priority issues gained government's attention.

The significance of issues to government can be ranked into a hierarchical structure of importance. In the normal processes of government there are key areas of policy importance which cannot be ignored and require immediate attention; for example, security and national emergency issues and the state of the national economy. However, there are other areas which can be temporarily put on hold or even ignored. These include relationships with other countries, scientific research for future benefit and regional infrastructure expansion. The importance of issues to government which require policy consideration can thus be grouped in four levels:

1. Issues requiring decisions to be made immediately;
2. Major issues which do not need immediate government action but need to be dealt with in the short term;
3. General issues which can be deferred but will need attention later;
4. Issues which can be ignored.

Decisions relating to Antarctica were usually placed in the lower spectrum of importance to government policy. As a peripheral issue it was not of central importance and could be temporarily set aside rather than demanding priority attention. Very few Antarctic policy issues in the twentieth century qualified as requiring immediate consideration or action as a top tier item. Indeed, rarely did an Antarctic issue move even from the third or fourth tier level to the second tier of importance. However, on two occasions early in the twentieth century issues did reach the top tier and required urgent action on humanitarian grounds to rescue Australians cut off in Antarctica. The first was when Mawson was forced to stay another year in Antarctic in 1912 after his dramatic survival march back to base (only to see the expedition ship departing) The Federal government then allocated £5,000 pounds for a further relief ship in 1913 to rescue him. The second was again a rescue mission to retrieve Australian members of the Shackleton Expedition's Ross Sea party in 1916. This was at the specific request from the British government. Whilst both these events prompted immediate government action on humanitarian grounds, both requests were also championed to government by a key individual, Professor Edgeworth David, who then arranged for the successful relief expeditions.

The issue of a formal Australian Antarctic territorial claim was raised as an issue to government by Mawson following the declaration of a French claim over Terre Adelie in 1924. At that time Mawson raised its importance to a level one issue advocating that Australia refute the French claim and make its own claim over that section of the continent which the AAE had traversed and mapped. While Mawson was unsuccessful in his appeal, Australia then raised the question of Antarctic territorial ownership with the Imperial Government as an issue of importance. This eventually led to the charting of the east coast of Antarctica by the BANZARE and the transfer of the ensuing British claim to Australia in 1933. However, as an issue of importance the Antarctic was put aside for more pressing matters leading up to the Second World War.

After the Second World War, three other Antarctic policy issues were elevated to the second tier of Government attention. These were international events which Australia could not ignore. The first arose from security concerns in the southern ocean over hostile shipping activities during The Second World War. This consideration was accentuated by the developing 'Cold War' and pressure from both the USA and the UK to exclude the Soviet Union from securing a foothold in the Antarctic region. These security issues prompted the Labor Cabinet in 1946 to approve the establishment of an occupying presence in the Australian Antarctic Territory as had been suggested in 1933 in connection with making the territorial claim.

A second instance where Antarctica became important to government was in 1982 when Malaysia attacked the management of the Antarctic Treaty in the United Nations (Woolcott 2003)¹¹⁶. Elliott (1992)¹¹⁷ shows that this had its origin in the International Law of the Sea Conferences from the 1980s. These defined access rights to the results of exploitation of resources in the open ocean and the argument flowed onto ownership of potential gains from extraction of Antarctic minerals. Malaysia and the Third World group of countries objected to Antarctic Treaty nations proposing to exploit Antarctic minerals and argued that a majority share of any profit arising from Antarctic mineral extraction should go to them. This raised the Antarctic issue to a level two tier of importance and generated a strong diplomatic defence of Australia's position to keep the management of Antarctica outside the United Nations system and to preserve Australia's dormant territorial claim.

A third interrelated issue which also elevated the importance of Antarctica to the second tier occurred seven years later in 1989 when a crisis in the environmental management of the Antarctic Treaty System arose concerning an agreement to allow mining in Antarctica. Whilst a low level issue, government approval had been given to proceed with negotiations to allow low-level mining to proceed with some environmental restrictions. However, the level of its previous minor importance to government was raised through a shift in public opinion caused by the actions of the environmental lobby. This subsequently created a division within the Federal government executive as environmental issues gained importance within Parliament and in the public arena. This triggered Bob Hawke, then

¹¹⁶ Richard Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, (Pymble : Harper Collins 2003)

¹¹⁷ L.M. Elliott, 'The Politics of the Antarctic: A Case Study of the Environment in International Relations' (Canberra : Australian National University, 1992)

Prime Minister, to lift the importance of the issue from the fourth tier to at least level two when he dramatically reversed the previous policy approach to support mining in favour of full environmental protection.

For practically all other policy issues the Antarctic remained as a minor third or fourth tier issue of little or no importance to government. This raises the question of how then did Antarctic policy issues, positioned at level three or level four get resolved or at least brought to government attention as an issue of importance. The common approaches used to explain policy making do not make allowances for the significance of an issue to government, nor do they consider the role of the interested individual as a key influence on policy. These gaps give rise to the central question explored in this thesis: 'how did individuals play a key role in raising the significance of Antarctic policy?'

In researching this question, there is consideration of key individuals who might influence policy making within government and from diverse areas outside government. To do this a broad approach is needed in the consideration of the role of key persons championing Australia's involvement in Antarctica. The discussion is primarily based on individual diaries, collections of papers held at major libraries and in Australian Archives files.

This research uses biographical material concerning key individuals including:

Louis Bernacchi - Biography by Janet Crawford (2008);
Edgeworth David - Biographies by Mary Edgeworth David and by David Branagan;
Douglas Mawson - Biographies by Paquita Mawson and by Philip Ayres;
Hubert Wilkins - Biographies by Lowell Thomas, Malcolm Andrews and by Simon Nasht;
Phillip Law - Biography by Ralston;
Richard Casey - Biography by W.J.Hudson.

In addition it also draws on primary material from a number of sources, including:

- Diaries from Antarctic expedition members (held in Mitchell Library, National Library and the Mawson Institute):
 - Mawson;
 - Edgeworth David;
 - Hurley;
 - MacLean;
 - George Dovers;
 - Law;
 - Robert Dovers;
 - John Bechervaise;

- Bob Summers.
- Archived papers:
 - Mawson's collection of papers at the Adelaide university;
 - Edgeworth David's collection of papers at the national Library;
 - Law's collection of papers at the National Library (NLA 327833);
 - Government records and files at the Australian Archives Canberra;
 - ANARE reports held at the Australian Antarctic Division;
 - Government reviews, Foreign Affairs Record, Parliamentary papers.
- Autobiographical and personal accounts:
 - Louis Bernacchi - Personal expedition accounts of his two Antarctic expeditions 'To the south polar regions' and 'Saga of the *Discovery*' ;
 - Edgeworth David - Chapters in the expedition account of the Shackleton 1907-09 expedition 'The Heart of the Antarctic' ;
 - Mawson - Published Diaries by Jacka and Jacka; The Home of the Blizzard
 - Wilkins - Geographic Journals
 - Law - personal accounts and published books by Law, 'Antarctic Odyssey', 'and The Wyatt Earp expedition' ;
 - Casey - The diaries of R.G.Casey edited by T.B.Millar and Casey's letters to prime minister Bruce 1924-29, published as 'My Dear P.M.' by Hudson and North;
 - Bechervaise - Semi descriptive books, 'The Far South' and 'Antarctica: the last horizon' and his personal account of the 1959 expedition published as 'Blizzard and Fire' ;
 - Woolcott - personal biographical account of his work as a diplomat 'The Hot Seat' ;
 - Mosley - Published descriptive books from Australian Conservation Foundation concerning Antarctica such as :
 - J.G.Mosley, 'Saving the Antarctic Wilderness: The Pivotal Role in Its Complete Protection'. Sydney: Environbook, 2009; and
 - The 12 tape ABC oral history interviews by Greg Borschmann.

The introductory Chapter presents an outline of the research approach taken in studying the influences of key individuals on the development of Australian Government Antarctic policy in the twentieth century. It examines how general policy was formed within the government policy- making process, finding that the normal methods of studying government decision-making were not directly applicable to Antarctic policy making, as they tended to ignore the special significance of such issues to the Australian government. These models also overlook the persuasive role of impassioned individuals who raise the importance of issues to government. This role of the individual was also seen to be important at times even when Antarctic policy was considered only as a minor item of importance to government

1.7 Thesis structure

The body of this study is presented in two main parts, followed by a concluding chapter.

Part A: The Historical Context

Part A examines the reasons of why and how Australia became involved in Antarctica through individual actions and how they influenced the subsequent formation and implementation of its policies. It researches the historical circumstances of major events in specific time periods in order to identify the key individuals who had input to Antarctic policy in these periods. The impact of external events and individuals involved is summarized starting with the pre-twentieth century historical influence. In the twentieth century three more time periods are then studied in order to identify the role of key individuals with influence on Antarctic policy. However, the establishment of Mawson Station in 1954 warrants its own specific examination as it was an important event with far reaching consequences for the development of further Antarctic policy. The chapters in Part A are:

- Chapter 2 : The pre 20th century historical influence;
- Chapter 3: 1900-1945;
- Chapter 4 : 1945-1959;
- Chapter 5 : The 1954 expedition;
- Chapter 6: 1959-1991

The criteria used for selection of the individuals for further analysis was their demonstrated ability to make a significant contribution to the development of Australian Antarctic Policy and being able to influence the direction of a national strategic policy. This identification of key individuals sets the context for Part B, which is the central focus for this thesis.

Part B: Key individuals and their influence

Part B focuses on the role of the eight individuals identified in Part A as having exerted a significant influence on the development of Antarctic policy. Those selected were from diverse backgrounds, but each has had a significant influence on the development of Antarctic policy at times in the period from 1900 through to the creation of the Madrid Environmental Protocol in 1991. Part B examines their influences to show how such

outstanding individuals were able to make a significant difference in the formulation of an Australian policy in the twentieth century. These individuals have been broadly grouped into two categories: those individuals placed outside the government environment and those placed within the government. Part B has the following structure:

Individuals with influence outside the Government

- Chapter 7: Edgeworth David;
- Chapter 8: Douglas Mawson;
- Chapter 9: Geoffrey Mosley;

Individuals with influence working within Government

- Chapter 10: Richard Casey;
- Chapter 11: Phillip Garth Law;
- Chapter 12: Robert Dovers;
- Chapter 13: Richard Woolcott;
- Chapter 14: Robert Hawke;

Part C: Conclusion

- Chapter 15 The nature of policy influence

This concluding chapter presents an analysis of the roles and approaches of these key individuals in the development of Australian Antarctic policy, set against internal and external events of differing importance to government. The different approaches used by those operating outside the machinery of government are examined and the transposition of Law and Mawson from one operating environment to the other is analysed. This provides a fresh contribution to understanding the human factors behind the development of Australia Antarctic policy from 1900 to 1991.

Part A: The historical context

Part A contains five chapters which research the Australian involvement in Antarctic up to the signing of the Madrid protocol in 1991. It identifies the major events and in turn indicates the key individuals who at different times had an influential role in the development of Antarctic policy. The criteria for selection of the individuals who influenced Antarctic policy were their demonstrated positive contributions to the establishment or development of a national Antarctic Policy, in support of Australian activity in Antarctica. The scope included persons who had been active on the ground in Antarctica, were in associated support roles in Australia, or represented Australia in international forums. The selection of the individuals for further study was not whether they were within or outside the government but what impact they had on government policy at that time.

Chapter 2: Pre 20th century historical influences on early Australian Antarctic Policy

2.1 Introduction

This chapter researches how and why Australia became involved in Antarctica up to the end of the nineteenth century as a background to understanding the formation of initial Australian Antarctic policies. While colonial governments were indifferent to Antarctica in this period an emotive public attachment to Antarctica slowly developed which in turn later produced a historical influence on Antarctic policy. To understand the growth of the historical influences on Australian Antarctic policy from the time of first European settlement in 1788, it is necessary to examine the origin of the Australian public perception of Antarctica. This perception evolved slowly and was to have a major influence on development of Australian Antarctic policy only later after the turn of the century. The historical connection can be viewed as having several phases: firstly through whaling and sealing in the southern ocean, which slowly transformed to geographic curiosity and the romance of heroic adventures on the Antarctic continent in the British era of Antarctic exploration.

2.2 Early Whaling and Sealing Activities in Australia

The geophysical land connection between Australia with Antarctica goes back beyond one hundred million years, when both continents formed part of the Gondwanaland super continent. Since that geological time, the continents have drifted apart at some six centimetres per year. A slender thread of human association between Australia and Antarctica began with the exploratory voyages of discovery of James Cook in the 1770s. These voyages chartered the eastern limits of Terra Australis and solved the remaining puzzle in the search for a great southern land by defining the geographic limits of the Antarctic continent. Cook was continually blocked by sea ice in a difficult high latitude circum navigation of Antarctica and while he did not claim to have sighted Antarctica he ended the great southern land hypothesis started by the Greeks 2,000 years before. His explorations showed that there was a vast ocean separating Australia and the ice-blocked world of Antarctica and proved conclusively that there was no massive southern land extending across the pacific as claimed by his rival, the British Hydrographer Dalrymple, who had instigated the exploration voyages. Cook described Antarctica as an icy hostile place with no potential value, but his discoveries of sub Antarctic Islands nevertheless triggered a valuable whaling and sealing industry in the Southern Ocean. His reports of whales and large numbers of seals quickly drew ruthless hunters from many parts of the world with a number of sealing gangs working these sub Antarctic islands on the western side of Antarctica by 1784, (Bertrand, 1971)¹¹⁸.

To the north of the Southern Ocean, Cook's favourable report on Botany Bay also prompted the British colonisation in Australia, leading to a settlement in nearby Sydney Cove in 1788. This soon provided a base for whalers and sealers, which in turn promoted a public perception of potential benefit to be gained from the ocean south of Australia. Although the British whaling ship *Emilia* was reported to be active in the Southern Ocean near Australia before 1790, the prime policy interest within the fledging penal colony in Sydney cove was survival through agriculture and fishing, with no thought of Antarctic exploration or colonisation. At that time the Antarctic was a distant icy and mysterious, region of unknown nature. While Europeans considered the very nature of it to be the last great global geographic secret, it was of no immediate concern to the embryonic settlement in Sydney Cove. A connection leading to Antarctic waters through the Southern Ocean by

¹¹⁸ Kenneth J. Bertrand, *Americans in Antarctica, 1775-1948* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1971)

ships from the early colonies slowly developed through the importance of whaling and sealing, as these industries moved southwards looking for new exploitable fields.

With the failure of early agricultural crops and delays in supplies coming from England, such as by the loss of the supply ship *Guardian* when it hit an iceberg off South Africa in 1789.¹¹⁹ Dunbabin (1925) argued that the survival of the embryonic colony initially relied more on the 'whale and seal's back than on the sheep's back'.¹²⁰ The struggling agriculture-based penal colony in Sydney understandably looked to the sea for supplementary sustenance and this soon became the basis for bay whaling and coastal sealing activities along the south coast of New South Wales. The first successful ocean whaling activities were reported in 1791, following the arrival of the third fleet, when one of its ships under Captain Melville hunted sperm whales south of Sydney¹²¹. When the British/Spanish war was declared in 1796, some areas of the Pacific Ocean became unsafe for British whalers and in 1798 the East India Company sent whalers to the politically safer Australian waters. Whaling soon had a positive influence on the trading policies of the early Australian colonies.

As whaling and sealing provided the first export commodities, they were vital activities for the colonies. However, the British Colonial Office in London set both internal and external trade policies for the early Australian settlements and this circumstance had an ongoing impact on how Australian policies towards Antarctic were shaped. Through the nineteenth century the official trade policy of the colonies was constrained by the autocratic decrees of the British Colonial Office, administered by a colonial Governor on its behalf. Importantly, the commercial interests of the powerful East India Company influenced the British Government's policy for trade. This company held the trade licenses of the Sydney settlement and they posed a considerable restriction on the settlement's initial ability to trade with other countries. The British government's policy instructions given to Governor Phillip before he sailed prohibited trade between the Sydney colony and other settlements of the British East India Company, except for limited transactions with the Pacific islands

¹¹⁹ *Trans.Roy.Geographical Society Australasia* (Victorian Branch) 1885-6, pp. 158-61, cited in Swan *Australia in Antarctica*, p.6.

¹²⁰ The historian Dunbabin describes Australia as being 'carried on the whale's back...though the unfortunate seal should receive some credit for carrying such a burden' *J. Proc.Roy.Aust. Hist. Soc.*,x1 (1925), p. 1.

¹²¹ Melville's report to his employers, Enderby and Son, dated 22 November 1791 describes this hunt as 'in less than two hours we had seven whales killed but unfortunately a heavy gale came on from the south west... and we could only fetch two' cited in Swan *Australia in the Antarctic* (Melbourne University Press 1961), pp. 19-20.

to provide resources for the colony. The policy identified allowable trade items such as 'livestock, flax and women'.¹²²

Bay whaling progressed southwards along the eastern coastline with more ships and improved technical expertise, but at the same time there was a growing industry in exploitation of seals. Within four years of settlement a sealing industry had been established in Sydney with sealskins and sea elephant oil being amongst the first commodities produced for export. Initially, these seal hunters used local boats and operated from sheltered coastal waters, but increasingly ventured south along the coast in search of new grounds as ships from Britain and America began to arrive for trade, refit, water and provisions. With better ships available, local sealing gradually extended out from coastal estuaries and across Bass Strait to Tasmania. Prompted by Cook's earlier New Zealand discoveries and his reports of seal numbers at Dusky Sound on its South West Coast, the plundering of seal colonies in New Zealand began as early as 1792 with sealing gangs operating out of Sydney¹²³.

Reports of large numbers of seals, sea elephants and whales soon nurtured an influx of whalers and sealers operating in Bass Strait and other southern waters. By 1800 there were fourteen ships, operating out of Sydney and the value of the catch that year was reported as £190,000¹²⁴. American sealers became active in Bass Strait in the early 1800s, despite local efforts to discourage them activity and the seal population suffered heavily. In 1802 Sydney based firms were reported as employing 200 men in the Bass Strait area alone¹²⁵. Although the whalers and sealers operating from Sydney cove were the first commercial activities to produce export commodities, they operated under trade restriction from the East India Company, with all supply ships obligated to go via China to pick up tea and other goods on their return voyage to England

The British government's early prohibition policy on direct free trade, with East India Company controlled ports and a local shortage of cash, imposed barriers to be worked around and opportunities were taken to barter with other visiting foreign ships in Sydney, who in turn could take goods on to China for unrestricted trade. This prohibition policy on the direct export of seal skins to China led to the surgeon/explorer George Bass amassing a

¹²² Ibid., p. 18.

¹²³ Cumpston, *First Visitors to Bass Strait*, p.18

¹²⁴ J.T. Jenkins, *History of the Whale Fisheries, from the Basque Fisheries of the Tenth Century to the Hunting of the Finner Whale at the Present Date*, (London: Witherby, 1921)

¹²⁵ *Journal Proceedings Royal Australian Historical Society* XI (1925), p. 4.

mixed cargo on the ship *Venus*, which he owned in partnership with a British syndicate and in February 1803 sailing to the Pacific islands and South America for trade. Bass, being unable to trade freely in the Asia region, carried a letter of bona fides from Governor King to cover his Pacific Ocean activities. His plan was to go to Tahiti, which he had visited the previous year and then on to the Spanish colonies on the coast of Chile. There he planned to trade and buy provisions to bring back to Sydney for profit, as allowed within the foreign trade policy. However, at this time England was at war with Spain and Bass was arrested by Spanish authorities as a smuggler and reportedly died a prisoner in silver mine in Chile. This example illustrates the impact of the colonial policy ties to Britain, which constrained independent trade development and which was reflected later as an impediment slowing the development of an independent Australian policy on the Antarctic.

While government policy supported the locally based sealing industry it was tempered by concern, as expressed by Governor King in May 1803 when he reported in a letter to Lord Nepean that ‘Whaling and sealing was the only staple available to the colony, however, uncontrolled slaughter would ruin the industry’.¹²⁶ Despite this official concern the savage killings continued unabated with fierce competition between rival sealers and as the rich resources of coastal seal populations were depleted, fresh sites were continually sought.¹²⁷ The hunters ventured further and further south searching for sealing grounds, firstly for fur seals and then for elephant seals. This led to the discovery of sub-Antarctic islands in the Southern Ocean and a step towards contact with the Antarctic continent itself.

2.3. Hunters of the Southern Ocean

Sailing out of Sydney in the brig *Perseverance*, the adventurous whaling/sealing Captain Frederick Hasselburg discovered Campbell Island in 1809 and Macquarie Island in 1810 while searching for new sealing grounds, as seal numbers were decreasing in the Auckland Islands. The location of Campbell Island after its discovery was public knowledge and the island was quickly occupied by a number of sealing firms. However, the location of Macquarie Island was a guarded secret and caused intrigue, when news of Hasselburg’s return from the discovery voyage was published in the Sydney Gazette. Hasselburg quickly set out for Macquarie Island with sealing crews, but unfortunately was drowned during a longboat landing at Campbell Island in November 1810. However, before he left on his

¹²⁶ Letter, Governor King to Lord Nepean 1804, cited in Cumpston, *Macquarie Island*.

¹²⁷ Swan, *Australia in Antarctica*, p. 22.

final voyage, subterfuge had been used to obtain information about Macquarie Island's location. One competitor reportedly tricked Hasselburg into revealing the location of Macquarie Island during a drinking party in Sydney and another obtained this information by bribery of a *Perseverance* crew member in New Zealand¹²⁸. Such was the perceived trading value of the site to Sydney and New Zealand sealing firms of the day, both these location information incidents resulted in court cases in Sydney in 1812. Macquarie Island, claimed for Britain by Hasselburg, was acknowledged as important to Australia and became part of the Shire of Esperance in Tasmania, whilst Campbell Island became New Zealand territory. Both lured marine hunters towards Antarctica.

The policy restriction on trade in sealskins was gradually circumvented by the influx of American sealers and the East India Company finally lifted this prohibition in 1813. Whaling and sealing in the first two decades of the nineteenth century brought a continual flow of whaling ships through Hobart and Sydney, but shore based sealing soon declined through over exploitation of animals on accessible sites. To offset this downturn in profit, Australian based whaling and sealing ships extended their operations further afield and in 1820 were working alongside American sealers in the sub-Antarctic islands on the western side of the Antarctic continent.¹²⁹ In 1822 a number of Australian based sealing gangs were also reported to be working in the South Shetland Islands¹³⁰. When Tasmania separated from the parent colony of New South Wales in 1824, this newly independent Australian colony had its own sub-Antarctic possession of Macquarie Island, within the British imperialist system. Whaling and sealing continued to be encouraged by the Tasmanian government as a deliberate policy to develop a local economy and by 1845 there were 45 vessels operating from Hobart and in 1851 their value of exports was reported as £1,200,000¹³¹.

2.4. Beyond Whaling: the Lure of Science

Trade from marine animals was of immense immediate value to the colonies and was supported by colonial policies, over time the initial importance of whaling and sealing was decreasing, as colonies became more self-sufficient from successes with agriculture,

¹²⁸ Cumpston, *First Visitors to Bass Strait* (1968), p. 21.

¹²⁹ A. Pearson, 'Century Sealing Sites on Rugged Island South Shetland Islands,' *Polar Record* 42 (2008) pp. 335-47.

¹³⁰ Bertrand, *Americans in Antarctica, 1775-1948*, p. 67.

¹³¹ Swan, *Australia in Antarctica*, p. 21.

scientific and geographical interest in Antarctica gradually developed when exploring expeditions began to visit Australian ports. In 1820 the Russian Naval expedition led by Admiral Fabians Gottlieb von Bellinghausen spent several winter months resting in Sydney after his first venture to explore Antarctica, which had resulted in reporting the first official sighting of that continent. Governor Macquarie, who had previously travelled through Russia, feted him in Sydney and Bellinghausen commented in his reports¹³² on the warm reception given to that expedition during his winter stay in Sydney. This official interaction and interest in Antarctic exploration can be seen in Governor Macquarie's diaries at the time of the visit¹³³. For example Bellinghausen had arrived in his flagship Vostok on 11 April 1820 and eight days later his separated, second ship the Mirnyi, was sighted approaching the heads during an official social outing to South Head lighthouse¹³⁴. This interaction with an Antarctic expedition provided the public with images of extreme adventure and the mystery of the unseen ice world of Antarctica. After reprovisioning Bellinghausen continued south on to complete the second high latitude circum navigation of Antarctica, carefully complementing the voyages of Cook. This was the first official connection of the colony with a purely scientific exploration in the Antarctic region.

Australian colonial interest in the Antarctic region continued to build through the 1820s by enterprising Australian ships captains. When the whaling/sealing captain Samuel Harvey sailed from Hobart in 1831, in the barque *Venus*, he found Macquarie Island to be 'cut out' of seals and continued whaling south as far as latitude 72° south, searching for new grounds, before returning with a good cargo of whales and seals¹³⁵. In the 1830s the British whaling firm of Charles Enderby, who had earlier been sealing master on Campbell Island, sponsored joint whaling/ exploring voyages to the southern ocean in the search for whales and new sealing grounds. These were largely unsuccessful economically but were rich in geographic exploration, sighting new islands and the eastern fringe of the Antarctic continent. The adventurous Enderby ships of Balleny, Biscoe and that of Kemp were

¹³² Debenham, *The Voyage of Captain Bellinghausen to the Antarctic Seas 1819-1821* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1945)

¹³³ *Governor Macquarie's diaries*, Mitchell Library, April 1820.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, May 1820.

¹³⁵ Voyage reported in *the Australian*, 6 January 1832 and 3 May 1833 and in a letter Harvey to Kelly of Hobart Town, 23 January 1832 (Kelly correspondence, Mitchell library) cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 22. [Ross used the route of this remarkable voyage ten years later when he sailed from Hobart seeking the south magnetic pole].

welcomed when they limped into Australian and New Zealand ports¹³⁶. They came with daring tales of icebergs and hardship and used the ports for recovery and supplies.

An example of Antarctic exploration and hardship activity was highlighted when John Biscoe master of the brig *Tula* and the cutter *Lively* sighted and named Enderby Land in East Antarctica in March 1831. After severe problems with pack ice and scurvy the *Tula* reached Hobart on 10 May that year with the remaining four crew members barely alive. He wintered there before the *Lively* limped into port five months later. Regrouping, Biscoe undertook local whaling before sailing south again to discover new islands near the Antarctic Peninsula as part of the third Antarctic circum- navigation. Biscoe's visit to Hobart roused local interest in the Antarctic particularly the extreme adventures of the cutter *Lively*, which was subsequently wrecked on the Falkland Islands during the second voyage¹³⁷. These visits added to the public's perception of mystery and romantic adventure in icy Antarctic regions.

During the 1830s a wave of interest in science in Europe sparked new interest in the southern geographic region. Europe had entered a peaceful period without wars and learned societies were being formed. It is argued that this interest in science flowed into the Australian colonies through former European residents and initiated a shift in community interest in regard to southern latitudes, from commercial hunting of marine mammals to scientific enquiry and geographic exploration. This new approach was to eventually overtake whaling and sealing as the prime driver of Australian colonial interest in the Antarctic. This heightened interest in Antarctica can be considered to have started in Europe when the German Scientists Von Humboldt and Carl Gauss developed a mathematical model showing magnetic compass variations from true north across the globe. He predicted locations for both north and south magnetic dip poles, both offset from the earth's geographical axis. This triggered a hunt to find the actual location of these magnetic poles by observation and occupation. James Clark Ross achieved fame by reaching the site of North Magnetic Pole in 1829, but the site of the South Magnetic Pole remained a complete mystery and was to generate a fresh Australian connection with

¹³⁶ J. Biscoe, 'Voyage of the *Tula* to the South Pole,' *Royal Geographical Society of London* 3 (1833) John Balleny, 'Discoveries in the Antarctic Ocean, in February 1839, Communicated by Charles Enderby,' *Royal Geographical Society of London* ix (1839), p. 26. ; Kemp's voyage is described in Douglas Mawson, 'Some Historical Features of the Discovery of Enderby Land and Kemp Land,' *The Geographical Journal* 86 (1935)

¹³⁷ *Hobart Town Courier*, 19 September 1831; Biscoe, pp. 105-112.

Antarctica. This quest for the southern magnetic pole inspired three national naval expeditions from France, America and Britain. All used Australian ports for supplies and crew replacement in their ventures in the late 1830s and their explorations and discoveries were to later have a significant impact on Australian Antarctic policy.

The French Naval expedition was the first to sail, under the command of Admiral Dumont d'Urville. He had earlier helped establish the Paris Geographical Society and was instrumental in France acquiring the Venus De Milo statue that he discovered on the Greek island Milos during a botanical expedition¹³⁸. The d'Urville Antarctic expedition's instruction from the newly crowned King Louis Philippe was to first attempt to follow in the tracks of British whalers in the Weddell Sea to find new territory for France. It then was to move onto a secondary objective of reaching the South magnetic pole. However, the expedition was stopped by sea ice in the Weddell Sea in early 1838 without finding new lands or evidence of the south magnetic pole. It headed north along South America before making a circuitous route across the Pacific to Indonesia, during the austral winter, to Australia. The expedition arrived in Hobart in October 1838 and sought local recruits to replace his crew after suffering the loss of more than 20 crewmembers. Admiral Dumont D'Urville reprovisioned the expedition there before leaving Hobart on 2 January 1840¹³⁹. On 19th January he sighted coastal rocks in ice-covered land in East Antarctica, south of Australia. Landing on an islet close to the Antarctic ice sheet on 21 January 1840, he took possession for France, naming the region Terre Adelie after his wife. Dumont d'Urville returned to Hobart in February 1840 to much local acclaim.¹⁴⁰ This voyage was to have a significant impact on future Australian claims as the subsequent French territorial claim 84 years later broke the imperial vision of a totally British Antarctic continent.

The second expedition was the American Navy Antarctic Exploring Expedition under the command of Charles Wilkes. It had been poorly equipped by the United States Government. It sailed south to the Antarctic Peninsula from Tierra del Fuego in February 1839, along the route used by American sealers for the previous 20 years. After an unproductive summer exploring in the Antarctic Peninsula area, the expedition spent seven

¹³⁸ Readers Digest, *Antarctica :Great Stories from the Frozen Continent* (Sydney: Readers Digest, 1985) pp. xliii and 303.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁴⁰ *Hobart Town Courier* 28 February 1840 and in H. Rosenman, *Two voyages to the south seas*, 2 Volume. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1987), p. xliii.

winter months in the South Pacific before arriving in Sydney in November 1839¹⁴¹, whilst Dumont d'Urville was still in Hobart. This controversial Wilkes expedition departed again from Sydney on 26th December 1839. Sailing south it also reported sighting ice covered land and a d'Urville expedition ship on 19th January in the vicinity of Terre Adelie. It returned to Sydney in February 1840 after sailing well out to sea along an unknown icy stretch of the east Antarctic coastline for nearly 1000 kms (Wilkes, 1845)¹⁴². Although no landings were made and the claimed sightings of land controversial, Wilkes' charts were the first to include the term 'continent' for Antarctica, to link between earlier substantive sightings. Wilkes in the spirit of cooperative science and probably to also register his prior discovery rights, sent the British expedition, then in Hobart, a précis of his voyages and a tracing of his chart. However, Wilkes discoveries were soon disputed by the British expedition and were never supported by American policy as a basis for national claims. The USA always preferred not to make, or recognise, any territorial claim on Antarctica. This also had a later impact on Australian policy, as it was unable to get American support for its massive territorial claim.

The third expedition in the magnetic pole trilogy was the British expedition, led by the very experienced and capable James Clark Ross. This well-equipped naval expedition sailed with full support from the British Government. It arrived in Hobart in August 1840 after establishing magnetic observations stations en route. With the assistance of the Tasmanian Governor, John Franklin, Ross established the Rossbank observatory in Hobart. This was part of a series of global magnetic observations made to better define the earth's magnetic field before attempting to reach the Gauss calculation of the position of the south magnetic pole. Having track information from the two previous expeditions, Ross sailed south on 16th November 1840 choosing a different route to Wilkes and d'Urville, but similar to that of Samuel Harvey from Hobart who had ventured through Antarctic pack ice in 1831. This British expedition proved to be very significant in Antarctic exploration. It penetrated to the Ross Sea through pack ice in the search for the magnetic pole, before being stopped at the latitude of 77° south by the barrier of the Ross Ice Shelf. Ross made landings claiming the territory for Britain and sailed over much of the land area of Wilkes poorly charted sightings along the coast of East Antarctica¹⁴³. Although the magnetic pole

¹⁴¹ *Sydney Herald*, 2 December 1839.

¹⁴² C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838-1842* (London: Whitaker, 1845)

¹⁴³ J.C. Ross, *Voyage of Discovery and Research*. (John Murray: London 1847) Vol.1, p. 22.

was not reachable by ship, its predicted location was upgraded from the expedition's magnetic observations and re-calculated by the British magnetician Sabine from Ross's observation to be a thousand kilometres inland.¹⁴⁴

None of these national expeditions succeeded in their attempts to attain the magnetic pole, as they were blocked by the icy perimeter of the Antarctic continent. However, the results of their voyages, when added to existing sightings, resulted in the first declaration of an ice covered continent and the rough charting of sections of the Antarctic coastline immediately south of Australia. The explorers were feted by the local population on their visits to Australian and New Zealand ports and created interest in Antarctic exploration amongst the Australian colonies. The close connection between Sir John Franklin the Arctic explorer and popular Lieutenant Governor of Tasmania and James Clark Ross encouraged that colony to look towards science, initially through studies of global magnetism and meteorology as being important applications, for the colonies.¹⁴⁵

The subsequent disappearance of Sir John Franklin in the Arctic in 1845 on his fourth expedition in search for a Northwest Passage (Cookman 2000)¹⁴⁶ turned attention of the British government and its institutional societies, away from Antarctica for nearly 50 years as they searched for the lost expedition. However, the Rossbank observatory in Hobart continued to make regular magnetic and meteorological observations for science until 1850. Australian colonial interest in Antarctica created by the magnetic pole expeditions waned after this period but astronomy and magnetism continued to be seen as important sciences for colonies that relied on the best navigation of sailing ships.

2.5. Early Australian Scientific Interest in Antarctica

The nineteenth century also saw the political devolution of the former Australian penal colonies and the convict free South Australia settlement, into self-governed individual colonies with parliamentary institutions. However, external policy was still controlled by the British Colonial Office. While separate colonial governments accepted local policy

¹⁴⁴G.A. Mawer, *South by Northwest: The magnetic crusade and the contest for Antarctica*, (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 2006), pp.150-151.

¹⁴⁵ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 January 1840; 20 August 1841 cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 20

¹⁴⁶ S. Cookman, *Ice Blink : The Mysterious Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition* (New York: Wiley, 2000)

responsibility for development of the infrastructure, transport and primary production, foreign policymaking remained the prerogative of the British Government. The business activity of the colonial governments was primarily driven by immediate economic agendas with the objective to further develop the settlements through social liberalism. The major parliamentary policy debates in the colonies at that time were dominated by elected representatives, who as landowners and businessmen were local stakeholders and focused on what assistance should be given to industries within the colonies. Concern for issues outside of that agenda was of minor importance and treated as an unnecessary diversion. No policies were developed regarding Antarctica and no figure championing Antarctica emerged to influence colonial government agendas in the first part of the century.

In the second half of the nineteenth century a few individuals and societies made attempts to influence colonial governments to develop a positive approach to funding Antarctic exploration. Although these were unsuccessful in the short term, they eventually had an impact on development of Australian Antarctic policy through public awareness.

In 1852 The German scientist Georg Von Neumayer, visited Melbourne on the *Reiherstieg*. When the crew deserted for the gold fields, he took the opportunity to also tour Victoria before returning to Germany. Gaining financial support from King Maxmillan II of Bavaria and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, he returned to Melbourne five years later to establish a geophysical observatory. Arriving in Melbourne in January 1857 on the *La Rochelle*, with free transport for all the observatory equipment provided by the Hamburg senator Johann Godffrey, he established the Melbourne Geophysical Observatory for astronomy, magnetism and nautical science¹⁴⁷. As Director of the Melbourne Observatory he was an influential figure in its operation and its subsequent move to the present location in the Melbourne Botanical gardens. Von Neumayer strongly supported the development of science and geophysical exploration in Victoria. He was a leading figure on the Royal Society's Burke and Wills expedition board and supported the selection of the Burke as expedition leader over a Prussian candidate. As a strong advocate for further exploration of Antarctica he was instrumental in raising awareness of weather and shipping in the Southern Ocean and the public perception of Antarctic within Melbourne society.

¹⁴⁷ *German speakers in Australia –Australian Dictionary of Biography* on line edition, adb online.anu.edu.au, accessed 20 September 2009; Georg von Neumayer biography URL www.teachers.ash.org.au, accessed September 2009.

Another individual who made an impact on navigation in the Southern Ocean for Australian bound shipping was the American Hydrographer Maury. He published sailing directions for ships in the 1850s, which advocated the use of a high latitude great circle route from the Cape of Good Hope to Australia. This led to the rediscovery of Heard Island in 1849 and a number of other independent sightings over the next five years¹⁴⁸. The subsequent exploitation of a new sealing ground there in 1855 sparked fresh activities amongst American sealers. The American monopoly of sealing on Heard Island was broken by Dr. Crowther from Hobart when in 1858 he sponsored Captain James Robinson for whaling and sealing voyage to the island. Captain Robinson's wife and children accompanied him and a son James Kerguelen Robinson was born in the sub Antarctic waters of Kerguelen Island.¹⁴⁹ Although the Tasmanian government supported the venture for its economic potential, it was not repeated. America did not press a territorial claim for Heard Island based on its discovery or occupation by sealers and it eventually became accepted as Australian external territory and later was important as a stepping stone for Australia to Antarctica.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, European countries had been active in the field of Arctic research, particularly in the establishment of meteorological and astronomical observation stations. However, attempts to extend these interests towards Antarctica had been slow to take root. Despite Georg von Neumayer's influence on the Victorian community and his championing of science in the 1850s, he could not gain local financial support for Antarctic scientific exploration. Returning to Europe in 1864 he continued to press for Antarctic science, becoming chairman of the International Polar Year in 1882/83. Although this was generally successful on a global scale the only Antarctic observations in the project were made, at a temporary station on South Georgia by a German expedition. Later, as Director of the German Hydrographical Office, von Neumayer established the German Commission for South polar Studies¹⁵⁰. He was influential in advocating Antarctic exploration at the Royal Geographical Society international meeting in London in 1895 and subsequently in arranging the German

¹⁴⁸ J. Manning, *The Environmental Management of Heard and McDonald islands*, (unpublished Masters Thesis, Monash University, 1982), appendix A. , pp.149-159

¹⁴⁹ W.E.L. Crowther 'Captain J.W. Robinson's Narrative of a Sealing Voyage to Heard Island 1858-1860,' *Polar Record* 15, no. 96 (1970), p. 301-327..

¹⁵⁰ R.A.Swan, 'Neumayer, Georg Balthasar Von (1826-1909) ' in *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), Vol 5, pp. 329-331.

Drygalski expedition, which wintered in 1904 in Kaiser Wilhelm Land, in East Antarctica, south of Australia. This was a significant scientific expedition and laid the basis for a potential territorial claim by Germany in East Antarctica.

After the tragedy of the lost Franklin expedition of 1845 and the subsequent searches in Canada for a northwest passage for more than three decades, Britain was slow to refocus its interest in the southern region of the globe. Eventually this commenced with the scientific voyages of the auxiliary steamship *Challenger* over four years from 1873 to undertake oceanography across the Southern Ocean. Although the Antarctic continent was not sighted on these voyages, the evidence amassed from geological dredging indicated the landmass nature of the continent. The Royal Society of Victoria had direct contact with this polar exploration in 1874, when Challenger visited Melbourne, soon after it had crossed the Antarctic Circle near what is now known as Princess Elizabeth Land in East Antarctica. Science papers were presented to the Royal Society of Victoria¹⁵¹. Professor Wyville Thompson, the scientific leader of the expedition, was made an honorary life member of the Society and a set of the proceedings donated to the library of the expedition.

As the Australian colonies became more economically stable and culturally richer an interest in science developed, this included, geography, meteorology and magnetism. Colonial governments began to consider policies to support trade and exploration outside of Australia. German and other European scientists resident in Australia influenced these considerations and led to the formation of local scientific bodies such as the Royal Society of Victoria in 1857 and later the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia. Both attempted to influence government policy towards Antarctica. At the first meeting of the Victorian branch of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia in 1884, Baron Von Mueller broadly addressed exploration yet to be done and referred to the Antarctic as an area, which promised ‘... the grandest results for geographic science’. Victoria then became the foremost colony in proposing Antarctic expeditions, with the press reporting favourably on a role for Victoria and Australia in Antarctic exploration¹⁵². The Age newspaper advocated Antarctic activity and made an important point in an article referring to the Imperial Government in saying ‘... England would join in supporting any well-

¹⁵¹ R.T.M. Pescott, ‘The Royal Society of Victoria from Then, 1854 to Now, 1959,’ *Proceedings of The Royal Society of Victoria* 73, no. 7 (1961)

¹⁵² *Melbourne Leader*, 10 January 1885.

directed scheme formulated by the Australian colonies for Antarctic discovery'¹⁵³. The local politics relating to Antarctica at this time are well researched by Cole (1990)¹⁵⁴ who examines this period in detail from minute books and records of the Geographical Society of Australasia and the Royal Society of Victoria. This study shows the complexities of a British colony separately proposing international ventures, but bound by the necessity to firstly involve the Imperial Government in London in a policy approval process in order to secure shared imperial government funding for any colonial proposal.

Despite the advocacy of Von Mueller the difficulty faced by institutions in gaining a clear policy direction from a colonial government for international activity was also highlighted in Victoria when in November 1885 the Honourable J. Duffy moved a motion in the legislative Assembly that '... the time has arrived when the colony of Victoria ... Should undertake the task of exploration and discovery in the Antarctic regions'.¹⁵⁵ Swan, comments that the proposal was ridiculed in the Victorian parliament for suggesting that the government should sponsor an Antarctic expedition and was subsequently withdrawn on 9 December 1885¹⁵⁶, even though the local press supported it.

Notwithstanding the rebuff of the Duffy submission to the Victorian government in 1885, Baron Von Mueller continued in Melbourne scientific societies to press for Antarctic exploration, proposing steam driven vessels. Although some years had elapsed since the ill-fated Burke and Wills expedition, no strong move within the Geographical Society had been made for further exploration until an Antarctic Exploration Committee was formally set up by the Royal Society in association with the Geographical Society of Australasia in 1886. Its brief was to determine how best it could initiate Antarctic exploration and research. The committee argued that, as it was over 50 years since the last expedition was despatched to Antarctica, another scientific expedition was long overdue. The activities of the Antarctic Exploration Committee at that time are well described in the history of the Royal Society and show that the committee felt that there could be financial spin offs, 'while the harvest of scientific results that could be reaped by such an expedition would

¹⁵³ *The Age*, 20 November 1885, p. 6.

¹⁵⁴ Lynette Cole, *Proposals for the First Australian Antarctic Expedition*, p. 20.

¹⁵⁵ *The Age*, 20 November 1885; Parliamentary debates, legislative council & legislative assembly 1885, 6, pp. 2344-2345.

¹⁵⁶ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 47.

most probably be high, a substantial advantage of a commercial nature might well be secured.¹⁵⁷

An ambitious series of 23 recommendations were constructed and forwarded to the Premier of Victoria on 26 March 1887 for his consideration¹⁵⁸. Duncan Gillies, then Premier of Victoria forwarded this 'Memorandum of Recommendations' to all Australian governments. It was also sent to the Agent-General in London who circulated it to possible interested sources throughout Europe. Five of the recommendations in the letter are given below to illustrate their tone:

- That a sum of £10,000 be placed upon the estimates to provide for the amount of the bonuses and for the expenses of the equipment and the staff.
- That the Government invite tenders from shipowners willing to perform the duties involved.
- The chartered ships will earn a special bonus upon their entering at the Customs House a cargo of 100 tons of oil, being the produce of fish caught south of 60°S.
- The services desired are—a flying survey of any coastlines lying within the Antarctic Circle, the discovery of new waterways towards the South Pole and the discovery of commercial products.
- That in case of any difficulty arising in England between the Agent-General and the contractor, it shall be referred to the British Antarctic Committee for decision¹⁵⁹.

Pure science alone was not seen as sufficient grounds for individual Australian colonial governments to redirect money away from local investment. The proposals from the Antarctic Exploration Committee to the Victorian government were then widened to include a commercial return from a mixed scientific /whaling venture. However, being in a time of economic downturn, these proposals were also unsuccessful in gaining funding for a standalone Victorian expedition. At the time Victoria was operating within the British system and foreign investment policy was tightly tied to the imperial government and events in England, The Government of Victoria sought a contribution from Britain towards a properly equipped joint expedition to Antarctica. Despite initial promising responses from the British Antarctic committee, the Imperial Treasury turned down the request for £5,000 pounds¹⁶⁰. The colonial proposals had failed to achieve not only essential support from within the British Government, but also from associated learned societies based in

¹⁵⁷ R.T.M. Pescott, 'The Royal Society of Victoria from Then, 1854 to Now, 1959,' *Proceedings of The Royal Society of Victoria* 73, no. 7 (1961)

¹⁵⁸ Lynette Cole, appendix 2, p.31

¹⁵⁹ *Royal Society of Victoria history 1854-1959*, <http://www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au/smv/035.html> accessed 22 September 2010.

¹⁶⁰ *Argus*, 21 January 1888; *the Age*, 21 January 1888.

London, who were planning their own British controlled expeditions. The British Association for the Advancement of Science had formed a separate Antarctic Exploration sub committee in 1885, with Admiral Sir Erasmus Ommanney as secretary.¹⁶¹ The concerns expressed publicly from the Agent-General in London to the Australian committee were that the proposals from Victoria were insufficiently detailed and as it included a commercial whaling element and the value of the proposed scientific research was not seen as significant. This proposal from Victoria appeared to cut across British whaling interests and those of the separate British Antarctic Committee who wanted complete British control of any expedition. This was classic case of bureaucratic paper passing between distant institutions and Governments¹⁶². It dampened interest and frustrated colonial entrepreneurs who favoured the Australian science expedition.

Although little concrete interest was generated within Australia the circulated correspondence from the Agent-General in London to interested Europeans drew a response from Sweden. A definite offer was received from Baron Nordenskjold and his sponsor Baron Oscar Dickson to send a Swedish ship to the Antarctic, provided that Australia contributed £5,000 as half the cost of a purely scientific expedition. The Antarctic Exploration committee gladly accepted the offer and public subscriptions were called to raise sufficient funds to allow the expedition to be dispatched during the summer of 1891. The Royal Society headed the subscription list by voting £100 towards the expedition but was unable to raise the necessary funds by public subscription or from government sources¹⁶³. The offer lapsed with Nordenskjold eventually leading a dramatic Swedish expedition, to the Weddell Sea coast of the Antarctic Peninsula ten years later, where the expedition ship *Antarctic* was crushed by sea ice.

The Sixth International Geographical Congress was held in London in 1895. This event had a major Antarctic theme with strong support voiced from the president of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Clements Markham. This landmark congress also included a number of key participants in polar exploration at that time including Amundsen, Bull, Nordenskjold and Borchgrevink. Markham and von Neumayer discussed simultaneous expeditions with Nordenskjold to different sides of the Antarctic continent mounted by

¹⁶¹ The sub committee was appointed 'for the purpose of drawing attention to the desirability of further research in the Antarctic regions' cited in W.Potter, '*Brief survey of Antarctic exploration (Melbourne :Transactions of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia ,Victorian branch,1896)*, p. 126

¹⁶² Letter from Sir Graham Berry, agent general for Victoria, to Duncan Gilles premier of Victoria 18th January 1888, cited in Cole, appendix 4(b), pp. 62.

¹⁶³ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 5

Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom. To encourage Antarctic exploration a key resolution from the congress stated:¹⁶⁴

The exploration of Antarctic Regions is the greatest piece of geographical exploration yet to be undertaken ...The congress recommends that the scientific societies of the world should urge, in whatever way seems to them to be the most effective, that this work should be undertaken before the close of the century ¹⁶⁴.

This resolution had no positive impact on Australian Antarctic policy. Despite the best intention of the influential Melbournians and the popular support of the community in Victoria, there was no overarching unity or preparedness by any single colony to take a long-term view of the potential benefits from Antarctic outlays, as the local short-term economic situation was the dominant consideration. The conference of State Premiers in 1898 again declined to give aid to Antarctic exploration¹⁶⁵. Opportunities for Australia to take a major part in Antarctic adventure were not taken up, as the focus of the colonial governments was on internal infrastructure and economic development within Australia and offshore considerations were referred to the British Colonial Office.

2. 6. Australians in new Antarctic venture at the turn of the century

Whilst the European entrepreneurs, Nordenskjöld, Markham and Von Neumayer, were seeking support for national expeditions to Antarctica from their respective governments in the 1890s, Henry Bull, a Norwegian resident in Melbourne tried unsuccessfully to obtain support in Australia for a whaling reconnaissance voyage to the Ross Sea to search for the right whales reported by Ross. Failing to gain Victorian government support he subsequently received funding in 1894 by Sven Foyn, a legendary whaling magnate from Norway. Few whales were found but the first landing on the Antarctic continent outside the peninsula region was made at Cape Adare and this sparked a revival of interest in Antarctica.

A second Norwegian Melbourne resident, Carsten Borchgrevink, who had sailed with Bull on the previous voyage and had landed at Cape Adare, then proposed the first wintering

¹⁶⁴ American Geographical Society, 'Report of the Sixth International Geographical Congress, Held in London, 1895,' *Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York*, 28, no. 3 (1896)

¹⁶⁵ Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch 1988 *presidential address session*, p.11

expedition on the continent, but like Bull, he had to get funding from overseas. The 1898 - 1900 *Southern Cross* wintering expedition went ahead at Cape Adare, with funding from the British newspaper magnate Lord Newnes and included a Tasmanian scientist Louis Bernacchi. This British Antarctic Expedition also set a new furthest south record by later sledging towards the pole on the Ross Ice Shelf, but its success cut across the Markham promotional fund raising activities for the British National Antarctic Expedition 1901-94 under Robert Falcon Scott (known as the *Discovery* expedition) The Borchgrevink expedition was received well in Australia, but criticised in London, mostly due to the character of the fame seeking leader and the importance of his expedition was not recognised there for 30 years. However, the science work of Bernacchi was well respected in Britain and he was asked to join Scott's *Discovery* expedition as chief scientist, where he played a significant role, being the only member of the 1901-04 expedition with Antarctic experience.

2.7. Conclusion

The history of early Australian connections with Antarctica in the nineteenth century provides the background that influenced subsequent Australian Antarctic policy developments. It shows how the Australian public slowly developed an awareness of the Antarctic continent as seafarers became active in the southern ocean, which led them onwards to the Antarctic continent. Australian involvement in the southern ocean and Antarctica was thus prompted by expectation of commercial gain from whaling and sealing. With the decline of these industries late in the nineteenth century the nature of this interest changed, with the lure of the unknown and the emergence of science becoming the main drivers of exploration. However, attempts by leading scientists in Melbourne such as Von Mueller and Von Neumayer had failed to demonstrate the importance of Antarctica to the Victorian Government. The Norwegian emigrants Bull and Borchgrevink in the 1890s had also failed to gain financial support as the Antarctic was not seen as a viable area to invest resources on its perceived economic potential.

Thus although an Antarctic Committee had been formed in the latter part of the nineteenth century by scientists, no key individuals emerged who had been able to influence separate colonial government policies to support Antarctic exploration. This was soon to change in the early 20th Century with the Federation of the colonial states and the arrival of British

funded, 'heroic' expeditions to Antarctica. This new period then saw the emergence of key individuals with influence who were more able to successfully take Antarctic issues to government.

Chapter 3: Events of the early twentieth century 1900 -1945

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the significant international influences on Australian Antarctic policy, arising from events as they occurred since the beginning of the 20th century up to the end of the Second World War. In doing so it identifies key individuals who had a passion for Australia's involvement in Antarctica. As a precursor to understanding events in this period Australia's early foreign policy relationship with Imperial Britain is examined, as it influenced the local perception of Australia's isolation and vulnerability to invasion. It is argued that this influence also stilted Australia's independent development of its own Antarctic policy until the Second World War.

3.2 Australia's concern for security

Australia's long term concern over isolation from Europe led to an inherent fear of invasion. Examination of this fear provides a background and insight to the later development of Antarctic policy as part of a regional security strategy. However, to understand this connection with Antarctica it is necessary to firstly analyze how such a concern over national security developed. This can be seen to stem right from the time of the first settlement, when the need to pre-empt French colonial expansion into a new land was a major reason for Britain establishing the penal colony in Sydney. These concerns persisted in the Australian colonies through the nineteenth century with sequential fears of French, Russian and German invasions and prompting colonial settlements in Victoria, Tasmania, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia.

The early perception of invasion threats by European powers had its origin in Australia's geographic isolation from Britain. This concern was later transferred to a threat of invasion from large Asian populations to the north, enhanced by the British imperialistic strategy to maintain a white racial policy for Australia. These factors combined to produce a local feeling of vulnerable isolation and the need to rely on a powerful nation for physical protection. The regional historian Burchill (1994)¹⁶⁶ for example, examines this deep

¹⁶⁶ Scott Burchill, *Australia's International Relations* (Melbourne: Australian Institute of International affairs, 1994)

seated 'threat mentality' and summarizes that in relation to Australia; 'The historical record would suggest that few states, which history has shown to be actually secure, have consistently felt so insecure'.¹⁶⁷ In a hindsight study Gareth Evans (1991)¹⁶⁸ as a government minister when commenting on the development of Australian foreign policy, supports the assertion that insecurity was a key cultural component in Australia's search for an international identity. Camilleri (1976) also in analyzing early Australian foreign policy looks beyond identity and comments: 'that the Australia sense of vulnerability to external forces has something more than a cultural and psychological foundation; there is an important economic component'.¹⁶⁹

It is argued here that Australia's geographic isolation and its consequential economic reliance on shipping routes to export its raw products, was the major influence in this perceived need for protection. This focus on regional security in turn was always a factor in any policy concerning the Southern Ocean. This became a considerable influence on Antarctic policy after the Second World War, when the government sought to deny a hostile power a place on the Antarctic continent to the south of Australia and lifted the minor importance of Antarctic policy to a major issue of importance.

3.3. Influence of British Imperial Policy

From the time of the first settlement, Australia was controlled by British foreign policy and this had a bearing on Australia's later approach to Antarctica. The traditional Imperial defence links with the 'home country' saw Australia sending troops overseas in support of Britain and the Empire, in order to invoke an insurance guarantee of future defence support from Imperial forces. Australian volunteers had enlisted to support Britain against Russia in the Crimean war of 1854 and the colonial states received captured Russian cannons as tribute in proportion to their financial contributions to the war. New South Wales dispatched a contingent of 770 troops to the British campaign in the Sudan to relieve Khartoum in the 1880s and Australia sent eight battalions to the Boer war from 1899. This

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

¹⁶⁸ Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *'Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s'* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991)

¹⁶⁹ J.A. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, 3rd Edition* (Milton: Jacaranda, 1976), p. 17.

'blood policy' of support for Britain and the Empire continued with the deaths of over 60,000 Australians in the First World War¹⁷⁰.

Whilst concern about the threat of Asian invasion from the north did not immediately develop at the time of the Victorian gold rush boom, despite a huge influx of Chinese (from the 1850s), a distrust of Russia had commenced and continued as a carry over from Australia's involvement in the Crimean War of 1854 and with the visits of Russian ships to Sydney. It surfaced again as a threat late in the nineteenth century, when a series of forts were built along the eastern seaboard from Queensland to Victoria as protection against Russian invasion. The source of the threat was temporarily transferred to Japan, following its massive defeat of the Russian fleet in 1905, but was to reappear forty years later, through growing concern over communist ideology. Although a general threat to the Australian continent from regional expansion by Japan and Germany in the Pacific and New Guinea did not eventuate at the end of the nineteenth century, there was local concern in Queensland over Britain holding foreign policy responsibilities.¹⁷¹ In 1883 Queensland moved to annex New Guinea but this policy move was blocked by Britain who then negotiated separately in 1886 with Germany. It is argued below that this situation of remote foreign policy control also had a bearing on why Australia did not proceed with independent Antarctic activities after World War 1.

This nature of the control over Australian colonial foreign policy began to change with the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, one hundred and twenty three years after the arrival of the first fleet. Both the Federation of Australian colonies and the Australian constitution needed endorsement by the British parliament. Although section 51 of the constitution listed external affairs as an item to be exercised by the new nation, the right to form foreign policy was ambiguous. However, as Gareth Evans, later Minister for External Affairs points out in examining the history of Australia's Foreign policy 'the reality was that the Commonwealth Government, rather than the state governments now had responsibility for reporting to the British Government and implementing British foreign policy',¹⁷² and it was not legally free to make its own independent foreign

¹⁷⁰ Australian War Memorial url www.awm.gov.au/atwar/ww1.aspx.

¹⁷¹ Another local objection was made about the French military build up in New Caledonia but this was also ignored by Britain.

¹⁷² G. Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations; in the world of the 1990s* (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press 1991), p.12.

policy.¹⁷³ Within the new Federation context some private individuals in the States initially continued their interest in southern exploration, but the Australian Commonwealth Government soon began to consider its participation in Antarctic exploration expeditions as part of a broader British Empire vision. However, Australia's independent interest in Antarctica was still tempered by traditional imperialist considerations, with Britain controlling the agenda.

In Australia, the policy of furthering the British Empire was considered in the best interest of the Australian public for trade and security¹⁷⁴. Being mostly of British descent, the emotional link of the population to 'home' was strengthened through the dramatic and stirring accounts of the heroic age of British Antarctic exploration. This brought a change in the dynamics of the Australian Antarctic policy as commercial interest for short-term profits, such as whaling, started to disappear from the policy making mix. The expansion of the British Empire became the major influence in policy making at a time when Australia looked for opportunities to demonstrate its independent national character to the world. Whilst Australian involvement in the Boer War had shown allegiance to the British Imperial system, the British expeditions to Antarctica were good opportunities for Australia to show the strength of its colonial character both at the scientific and physical levels. Although individual proposals to separate colonial governments within Australia had previously been unsuccessful in gaining state government support to mount an Antarctic expedition, the new Federal government began to consider support further British expeditions. However the first approach was unsuccessful. Despite a deputation to the Prime Minister Barton in Canberra 12 November 1901 by Bernacchi, no federal funds were made available to support Scott's 1901-04 *Discovery* expedition. In contrast the Australian Antarctic Exploration Committee contributed £250 and the Queensland State Government £1,000.

Following Bernacchi's participation in the Borchgrevink 1898-1900 expedition and his departure for Antarctica on 29 November 1901 with Scott's expedition, support for British Antarctic expeditions was taken up by local doyens of science, who began to raise the importance of Antarctica to Australia. This led to a breakthrough in the new Federal

¹⁷³ Joan Beaumont, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901-1945*, Occasional Paper (Geelong: School of Social Sciences, Deakin University, 1989)

¹⁷⁴ See J. M. Powell, *Environmental Management in Australia, 1788-1914: Guardians, Improvers and Profit* (Melbourne, OUP, 1976) ; and J. M. Powell, *A Historical Geography of Modern Australia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 72-73.

Government when Edgeworth David successfully recommended that a grant of £5000 be made towards the cost of the Shackleton 1907 expedition. Edgeworth David stressed the expedition's relevance to the scientific study of the Australian climate and later decided to go himself as chief scientific officer. He further enlisted a number of his protégés: Armytage, Mawson and Cotton to sail with him. The scientific results from that expedition were highlighted by the brilliant 1909 sledge journey of Edgeworth David, Mackay and Mawson to the region of the south magnetic pole. This reinforced the capable image of the national character and promoted Antarctica to the Australian community. The publicity also consolidated Antarctica's consciousness within the Commonwealth Government, which had provided financial support to an Antarctic expedition for the first time. Riding on the success of the 1907-09 Shackleton expedition, the Commonwealth Government also granted the sum of £2500 towards the Scott 1910-12 Terra Nova expedition and in doing so again made reference to the importance of Antarctica to Australian climatology¹⁷⁵. The Australian community provided key personnel to Scott's 1901-04 expedition, his subsequent 1910-12 expedition, as well as Shackleton's 1907-09 and 1914-16 expeditions. To a man the physically strong colonial members proved to be staunch expeditioners, even if they were a little independent in nature. In turn the dramatic outcomes of these British expeditions demonstrated the application of the Australian frontier philosophy of coping with extreme conditions and Antarctica became more widely known to the public through heroic accounts of the Australian participants in these British expeditions.

During what has been termed this 'heroic age' of British Antarctic exploration, the agenda on the Antarctic continent had been set and controlled by Britain, which then invited piecemeal colonial involvement and financial support from both Australia and New Zealand. In 1908 Britain, as a means to license the whaling industries, established the Falklands Island Dependency¹⁷⁶ and claimed a western sector of the Antarctic continent covering 60 degrees of longitude with its apex at the south geographic pole. At this time Britain was still the major controller in Australia's foreign policy which included only a distant vision of Antarctica. It is argued that a reluctance to make a definitive break from Britain¹⁷⁷ and take independent responsibility for its own foreign policy inhibited the

¹⁷⁵ Commonwealth parliamentary debates LVIII (1910), p. 4593.

¹⁷⁶ Letters patent: 21 July 1908: Falklands islands Gazette 1 September 1908 and corrected entry, Letter patent 28 March 1917, Falkland Islands Gazette 2 July 1917.

¹⁷⁷ Both Prime Minister Bruce and Menzies strongly favoured close connections with Britain and considered a formal legal separation was unnecessary and not in Australia's best interest to encourage close trade relations.

development of a separate Australian Antarctic Policy. As Australia gradually emerged from under the British foreign policy umbrella, the significant issues relating to Antarctica were translated into an increasingly independent policy. It is argued that from a policy viewpoint this commenced with Mawson's Antarctic Expedition (AAE) On return from that dramatic expedition he was knighted and feted both in Britain and Australia, but the governmental focus on Antarctic in both countries was soon overwhelmed by the tragedies of the World War One. The war had a significant negative influence on the development of an embryonic Australian Antarctic policy and burst the public's euphoria for romantic exploration In Antarctica. The world was concerned with post war rebuilding, not more Antarctic adventures and Mawson was unable to rekindle any separate internal interest in Australia or Britain in financing a further expedition to Antarctica.

3.4. The Australian Antarctic Territory Claim

It was the commercial returns from whaling after the First World War, which renewed international interest in Antarctic waters in the 1920s. With whaling activities being extended from the South Georgia and the Antarctic Peninsula areas, South American countries also signaled their long-term interest in Antarctic territory. In 1923 Britain claimed more Antarctic territory when it established the Ross Dependency and transferred responsibilities for revenues in that area from Norwegian whaling licenses to the New Zealand government¹⁷⁸. The following year, in 1924, France claimed a narrow sector in East Antarctica south of Australia which dented the vision of total British Empire ownership of the continent. Mawson publicly opposed Australia recognizing the claim and pressed for Australia to assert its own claim south of Australia. The reluctance of the Australian government to take independent action in Antarctica was evidenced when Prime Minister Stanley Bruce told a deputation from the Australian Research Council in 1925 that the Australian and British governments were studying the matter 'through the proper channels'. Britain however quickly accepted the French claim to Terre Adelie. At that time Norway continued its profitable whaling activities in Antarctica under British license in the Antarctic Peninsula region, but began to extend these whaling activities towards east Antarctica where no royalties were necessary. Pressure from the growing international scramble for Antarctic territories and the profit from Norwegian whaling, was of concern

¹⁷⁸ British Order in Council 30 July 1923; New Zealand Gazette, 16 August 1923.

to Britain and the question of Antarctic territorial claims was placed on the agenda for the 1926 Imperial Conference in London.

Australia at that time was still confident about its place within the British Empire for both trade and protection and was not keen to break the link from British foreign policy, even when the opportunity arose from the 1926 Imperial Conference to redefine the British/Dominions relationship within the British Empire. This was despite the opportunity being taken up by Canada and New Zealand. The British Government subsequently passed the Statute of Westminster in 1931 relinquishing its law making powers to the Commonwealth Dominions, which included the right to develop independent foreign policy and their own diplomatic channels. In the following decade Australian conservative governments were reluctant to enact the powers contained in the Westminster Statute, preferring to stay close as possible to the British system to preserve strong cultural ties, but the prime practical reasons were to preserve trade with Britain and the perceived need for assistance with defence of Australia.

The strong Australian delegation to the 1926 conference included several government Ministers and the Prime Minister, who headed a special Antarctic committee¹⁷⁹. This was tasked to report on the identification of areas in East Antarctica previously sighted by Mawson, Davis, Ross and British whalers, which might justifiably be annexed by the British Government. The objective was to widen the British Empire's influence over East Antarctica and pass regional responsibility to Australia and New Zealand as empire custodians.

Although a further expedition was not specified in the committee's report at the 1926 Imperial conference, Mawson in a subsequent diplomatic shuffle with Casey in London and Federal Ministers in Australia was eventually able to influence a policy breakthrough gaining endorsement for an expedition backed by the British and Australian governments.¹⁸⁰ This combination of external influences and internal lobbying to governments in Britain and Australia saw Dr Walter Henderson, the Director of the Australian Department of External Affairs, announce in October 1928 support for

¹⁷⁹ Imperial Conference, 'Summary of Proceedings/1926 Imperial Conference,' (Melbourne : Commonwealth of Australia, 1927)

¹⁸⁰ Ayres, *Mawson: A life*, pp. 155-161.

Australian involvement in a ship borne expedition to Antarctica¹⁸¹. This would be tasked with the consolidation of the widely separated British sightings with the previous work of the AAE, although considerable funds would also need to be raised from private sponsors. This joint funding was a curious policy approach. Both governments had much to gain from the results in defining and claiming such a large expanse of continent, but did not take responsibility for fully funding or organising the expedition, preferring to work through a separate Antarctic Planning Committee. Mawson by hard work and fund raising from both government and private sectors was able to arrange and lead two coastal voyages over the austral summers of 1929/30 and 1930/31 as a semi private expedition, with the Australian Federal Government cautiously providing only £5,000 in support.¹⁸²

Despite the expedition being organised privately, the political objective of the voyages was clearly to consolidate imperial territorial interests and generally chart the East Antarctic coastline between earlier British continental sightings. So after a gap of seventeen years Australian expeditioners returned to Commonwealth bay to raise the British Union Jack flag and proclaim sovereignty for the King. Three other brief landings were made on the Antarctic continent to take possession for Britain. The outcome was that the East Antarctic coastline was mapped sufficiently well enough to form the basis for a territorial claim. An initial map had been requested by External affairs to give best information for the BANZARE voyages but information was so poor and erroneous it was not until 1939 that an outstanding map was produced by Bayliss and Cumpston. Details of the map are described by Manning (1989 and 2010)¹⁸³ In February 1933, the British government consolidated its claim in East Antarctica with a British Order in Council. This claim covering 42% of the ice continent was transferred to Australia, pending appropriate legislation. This was enacted with the passing of the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act in 1933 and its formal proclamation in 1936¹⁸⁴ within the British system. Australia thus ultimately had made a Territorial claim, but thought it necessary to do so

¹⁸¹ Interview report with Walter Henderson by John Cumpston NLA cat-vn 2310767

¹⁸² Commonwealth Parl. Deb., lx (1911), pp. 423-4 cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*.

¹⁸³ John Manning, Exploration and Cartography in East Antarctica, *Cartography* Vol 18, no.2 December 1989, pp.1-14 ; John Manning 'The 1939 Australian Map of Antarctica', *The Globe*, number 65, 2010, pp. 19-27.; E.P. Bayliss and J.S. Cumpston. *Handbook and Index to Accompany a Map of Antarctica* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Affairs, 1939)

¹⁸⁴ Commonwealth Gazette 24th August 1936. A good analysis is also given in Donald R. Rothwell and S. Scott, *Flexing Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica: Pushing Antarctic Treaty Limits in the National Interest*. in Lorne Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan Hemmings, eds. in *Looking South*. (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007)

through Britain. A definite analysis of the legal circumstances of the territorial claim over time is given in Triggs (1986) and also by Rothwell and Scott (2007)

The parliamentary speeches in both the House of Representatives and in the Senate provided a good illustration of the Australian Government policy to Antarctica at this time as a response to the international situation. The Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Bill was introduced by the Minister of External Affairs, the Hon John Latham,¹⁸⁵ who had previously participated in Antarctic discussions at the Imperial Conference in 1926 and worked with arranging the territorial claim transfer in London. The record of ensuing parliamentary discussion shows that Australian policy towards Antarctica was still driven by British Empire aspirations, but they also summarise the reasons for Australia taking responsibility. Alluding to whaling, which from the time of first settlement had been supported as an Australian policy, Minister Latham stated that the need for authority over the area had arisen because of the technological development of the whaling industry and the need for regulation. He further stated that 'it has considerable actual and potential economic importance' and that 'embarrassing circumstances would arise if any other nation assumed the control and administration of the area'. In addition he mentioned its importance for science, particularly for meteorology research. The Bill was strongly supported by R.G. Casey, then Assistant Treasurer, who, drawing on his past experience of Antarctic policy, emphasised three aspects of importance regarding Australian acceptance of the claim. The first was territorial, the second economic potential and the third its potential value for long range weather forecasting. During the subsequent passage of the Bill through the senate, the Defence Minister, Hon. Sir George Pearce again made reference to revenue to be gained for whaling licences summarising 'it will be a matter for Parliament to decide' the rate of revenue and 'how much if any of the revenue will be spent on research',¹⁸⁶.

These statements show that the government policy was clearly focussed on potential economic return and was not dominated by security concerns over hostile shipping in the Southern Ocean or strongly driven by science considerations. However, declaration of the intention to proceed with claiming a large section of Antarctica, even when voiced in parliament, is only part of a government policy. It required an overall supporting

¹⁸⁵ Commonwealth Parl. Deb., (1933) May 1949-56, *Argus*, 29 May 1933 cited in Swan, p. 208

¹⁸⁶ Comm.Parl.Deb., (1933) Senate June 1933 140, pp. 2017-24 .

framework and implementation strategy to make it reality. This implementation was slow to develop even after the Australian Territorial Claim Proclamation in 1936, as through the rest of the 1930s decade the government was seriously focused on recovery from a great economic depression. However, other international activity continued in Antarctica. Various nations were active, with a number of private expeditions in the late 1920s and 1930s by the Americans Richard Byrd¹⁸⁷ and Lincoln Ellsworth¹⁸⁸, the Australian aviator Hubert Wilkins and the extensive whaling expeditions of the Norwegian magnate Christensen (which include the first landing by a woman in Antarctica) Another Australian, John Rymill, also won international acclaim when he led the very successful British Graham Land expedition 1934-37 to the Antarctic Peninsula.

The issue of territorial claims re-surfaced again with the Norwegians, concerned over whaling rights, made a territorial claim over Dronning Maud Land on 14th January 1939. Germany responded quickly to the Norwegian claim and sent an expedition in that summer to map and prepare a counter claim to that area.¹⁸⁹ But Australia foreign policy was more concerned with the growing political problems in Europe at the end of the decade than Antarctica

3.5. Strengthening of Australian Foreign Policy

The international events in the late 1930s did not raise the importance of Antarctica to Australia and it was slow to take action to send an expedition to occupy its claimed territory. The proposals for expeditions to Australian Antarctic Territory put forward by Mawson and Wilkins in 1937 and 1939 did not have sufficient supporters within government or private business to gain approval. Even with the Antarctic supporter Richard Casey as Treasurer, the cautious Menzies government postponed Antarctic action and focused its attention on the economic depression and darkening war clouds to the

¹⁸⁷ Byrd led three expeditions to Antarctica in this period, all based at 'Little America'. He made Territorial claims for America, during his expeditions in 1928-30, 1933-35 and 1939-41 but which were not followed up formally within the U.S. government.

¹⁸⁸ Ellsworth made the first trans-Antarctic continent flight in 1935 and an inland return flight in a second expedition in 1938-39 with Hubert Wilkins as coordinator. Ellsworth dropped flags and proclamations during his flights but these claims were never ratified by America.

¹⁸⁹ The German '*schwabenland*' expedition was commissioned by Hitler and Goering and used Luftwaffe flying boats from 19 January 1939 to 3 February 1939 to fly extensive aerial photography. They dropped proclamation darts to claim territory of 'New Schwabenland' for Germany, as a counter to the Norwegian claim. This German territorial claim ambition lapsed in the Second World War peace settlement.

north. When the Menzies government established Australia's first diplomatic posts, in Tokyo and Washington in 1939, Latham was appointed to Tokyo, removing one Antarctic policy supporter from the Australian scene. Casey was asked to head the diplomatic legation in Washington, resulting in another Antarctic policy supporter being sidelined. Casey resigned from parliament on 30 January 1940 and over the next two years developed sound relationships with the US president Roosevelt and senior American politicians, which were to endure through the war and beyond and had a bearing on future Antarctic policy, which had been put aside for that period.

The Second World War again saw many Australian troops participating in the Middle East and Europe in defence of the Empire and Britain, before the direct regional threat eventuated with the fall of Singapore, the invasion of New Guinea and bombing raids on the Australian continent. Australia's foreign policy had traditionally been tied to Britain but under the wartime Labor Government it began to distance itself from this control. With Curtin's realization that the British Empire was unable to defend Australia, alignment with the USA for protection was considerably strengthened. In 1941 Curtin made the policy break with Britain, pulling out Australian troops from British war theatres for the direct defence of Australia, rather than being used as components of Imperial forces by Britain¹⁹⁰. In 1942 Australia adopted the 1931 Statute of Westminster¹⁹¹, formally signaling a substantive break from British foreign policy. This contributed to the Labor government's strong focus on defence at the end of the war, which changed the dynamics of the elements in the Antarctic policy-making framework, as security of the southern coastline and denying other countries base sites in the Antarctic became more of a consideration.

With the war in Europe drawing to a close, the allied forces pushed towards Berlin from both east and the west. Differences of opinion on how to limit the territory being taken by the Russian Army surfaced between Montgomery, as head of the British Army and the generals of the separate American armies, even though Eisenhower was the supreme commander of all allied forces. Montgomery wanted to take all of Berlin before the Soviet forces reached there. However, the separative 'iron curtain' outcome produced a messy split of occupational management of Berlin which highlighted the hostile collision of rival

¹⁹⁰ Australian War memorial reports nearly 40,000 killed in action.
(www.en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/World_war_casualties)

¹⁹¹ The Westminster Statutes were a redefinition of the interface between Britain and the dominions within the British Empire. They were quickly embraced by Canada and New Zealand but Australia did not execute the necessary legal provisions for them to be applied for over ten years.

ideologies of socialism and capitalism. This was a time of distrust and fear of world domination between the major powers, the USA and the UK on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. The fallout in Europe progressed to a 'cold war' in world politics with the United States and the Soviet Union vying for world power supremacy. Although the Antarctic was a largely unknown and undeveloped region far away from Europe, it was still part of the global geographic map and the threat of global domination from Russia was to have an impact on the future of Antarctica and Australian policy management of the Australian Antarctic Territory.

3.6 Conclusion

Australia's interest in Antarctica in this period 1900-1945 can be described as developing from casual indifference and private individual participation in British expeditions, to a territorial ambition with Australia taking over the British claim based on discovery and registering its own claim over 42% of Antarctic continent. For the most of this whole period, Antarctica was only a minor element of importance within overall Australian policy, which was constrained by certain subservience to British Foreign Policy. Antarctica's gradual, increase in importance within Australian policy was primarily due to the efforts of Douglas Mawson in breaking away from participation in British expeditions to firstly lead the AAE in 1911, then the BANZARE summer expeditions 1929-31. The Australian Antarctic Territorial claim was gazette in 1936 amid statements of the potential for economic return, but growing concerns in Europe stalled further territorial ambition and this claim was not vigorously pursued before the Second World War due to major economic depression and growing concern about the impact of global conflicts on Australia.

This period saw the initial advances in the development of Australian Antarctic national policy principally arising from the influence of two key individuals of Edgeworth David and Douglas Mawson in gaining attention and raising the potential importance of Antarctica to government. Both were individuals operating outside the Government who cultivated support from the Science community and lobbied politicians within government to get support for an ongoing policy commitment to Antarctica to allocate to Antarctic activity. Edgeworth David was the initial breakthrough advocate and the early key figurehead and spokesperson to government on questions of Antarctica but this prime role

was taken subsumed by Mawson at the time of the AAE. Over the whole period Mawson continued to lobby public opinion through the press and directly to government, through a scientific body support channel for Australia to become further involved on the Antarctic continent. He continued to do this, even in times of government indifference to his cause. However, the period also saw the emerging interests and influence by Richard Casey as the figure within government that from 1924 carried the importance of Antarctic to government firstly behind the scenes with direct interaction with Prime Minister Bruce to achieve a government commitment to Antarctic. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1931 then as a Minister in the Lyons government he facilitated the passage of Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance act in 1933.

Chapter 4: The scramble for Antarctic Territory 1945 -1959

4.1. Introduction

Britain had made claims to the Antarctic Peninsula area as early as 1908; this claim was reinforced and extended to the South Pole in 1917. This triggered a reaction and overlapping counter claims from Chile and Argentina. Further in 1920 the British Government stated 'that it was desirable that the whole of Antarctica should ultimately be included in the British Empire'¹⁹². However, this was further impacted by the French Claim to Terre Adelie in 1924 which was then recognized by Britain. In 1936 Australia formally gazetted its claim to east Antarctica and Norway claimed the coastal areas of Dronning Maud Land in 1939 as the clouds of war gathered in Europe.

After the Second World War, Australia became more directly involved in Antarctica. Its stated policy at that time was to seek formal recognition of the Australian Antarctic Territory, as proclaimed in 1936. To do that it sought acknowledgement of the claim by the international community, in particular from other Antarctic claimant nations and the non-claimant United States of America. However, recognition was not readily forthcoming as it was the time of conflict between the major global powers and this added an extra uncertainty to Antarctic international politics. This was demonstrated when Australia and other nations sought to exclude the Soviet Union and non-claimant nations from any involvement in Antarctica¹⁹³. Australian policy continued to evolve through the 1950s as a deliberate reaction to events and activities, which occurred both on the Antarctic continent and in the international arena

The immediate threat to Australia of physical invasion from the north changed with the end of the Second World War and was replaced by the ideological threat from communism, which quickly developed as a major strategic concern for Australia's foreign policy. This centred on the threat from the 'red tide' and its potential 'domino effect' on developing Asian nations to the north, but was also to have an input to Australian Antarctic policy to the south. This period also saw a change in territorial aspirations of other nations and the

¹⁹² Letter from colonial Secretary to the Governor General of Australia, 6 February 1920, cited in Bush, *Antarctica and International Law*, vol. 2, p. 204

¹⁹³ Statement by Foreign Minister to House of Representatives, 25 October 1949 and Comm. Parl. Debates, House of Representatives 205, p. 1899.

Australian government attitude towards Antarctic initially through security concerns in the southern ocean. This post war period resulted in a strengthening of policy towards Antarctic territorial claims with the creation of a government agencies and the establishment of permanent scientific bases in Antarctica. To gain a perspective on the change in attitude of Antarctic nations in the post war period and its impact on the development of Australian Antarctic policy, the global political scene at that time is reviewed as a precursor to the entry of the Soviet Union into Antarctic politics and its subsequent influence on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

4.2. The approach of the United States of America

The post war period saw a change in Antarctic exploration from individual private ventures to national funded expeditions supported by government agencies; this completely altered the pre war approach to nations now seeking territory or control over the Antarctic continent. Whilst America had dispatched an US Navy expedition to East Antarctica under Lieutenant Wilkes in 1837, it had not followed this with further expedition activities there or made a claim over any areas reportedly discovered by the Wilkes. Nearly a century later the private expeditions of Richard Byrd to Little America, in the Bay of Whales in 1928 and 1938, discovered new lands but resulted in no official claims being made. However, Australia was wary of the possibility of a new claim being consolidated using Ellsworth activities in 1938/39, which might encroach on the Australian claim.

At the close of the Second World War, the Americans, influenced by the enthusiasm of Admiral Byrd, their decorated polar explorer, took the opportunity to use the Antarctic region as a cold weather training area for their military forces, in preparation for future world conflict. Byrd proposed to the American congress that the next war would be fought with the Soviets across the Arctic roof of the world and that sending an expedition to Antarctica would test the suitability of the men and equipment of the US forces in a polar arena. He summarized that ‘ men who have sailed ships, flown planes, or carried out any sort of military operations south of the Antarctic Circle will find nothing to baffle them in the far north’.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Byrd’s 1945 address to the US congress is referred to in David Burke, *Moments of Terror: The Story of Antarctic Aviation* (Kensington: NSW University Press, 1993), p.176.

In August 1946 Truman, President of the USA, gave approval for the US Naval Atlantic fleet to raise a task force and undertake the 'Operation Highjump' expedition to Antarctica in the 1946/47 austral summer. Employing nearly 5,000 men, 13 ships and 23 aircraft in a massive onslaught, it not only undertook testing of equipment and training of servicemen in polar techniques but also extended United States options for making a territorial claim over the largest area of the Antarctic continent.¹⁹⁵

The announcement of this official American Services expedition was reported to Australia by the Australian ambassador to the United States as a potential concern for the Australian Antarctic Territorial claim. Correspondence files from the Australian Department of External Affairs show that the volume of Australian diplomatic dialogue with the United States increased at this time to discourage it from making a claim over any part of the Australian Antarctic Territory based on the grounds of American discoveries in east Antarctica.¹⁹⁶ During that contact Australia was continually disappointed by the long term view of the United States that at all times had refused to recognize any territorial claims over Antarctica, or to make a claim itself to the area in West Antarctica which had been tactfully reserved for it. It is noted that the USA policy had continually refrained from making territorial declarations based on activities of its own American explorers on the Antarctic continent, such as Wilkes in 1839 and Lincoln Ellsworth, almost a century later in 1938.

4.3 . Australia presses its territorial claim

News of the Byrd post war American services expedition invoked a wartime memory of foreign ships operating in the southern ocean, using sub Antarctic islands as bases and was viewed with some concern by the Australian Labor Government. With defence of the southern coastline in mind, following the German raider wartime activities and aware of Casey's support for Mawson's continued thrust for expeditions¹⁹⁷, Dr H.V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, initiated an interdepartmental committee to formulate recommendations to cabinet on 'the development and use of the Australian Antarctic Territory and 'greater continuity of effective occupation'. Mawson attended the first

¹⁹⁵W. Sullivan, *Quest for a Continent* (New York: McGrath-Hill, 1957), pp. 173-74.

¹⁹⁶ Cabled telegram from Ambassador to Minister Department External affairs July 1946 Department of External Affairs correspondence file 57/4829 (A1209)

¹⁹⁷ *Argus* , 24 October 1945.

meeting of that preliminary committee, in Melbourne on 2 December 1946 and again the next one 24th January 1947. Cabinet quickly approved the recommendations from this meeting, to send an expedition to the Australian Antarctic Territory.¹⁹⁸

It is argued that the key elements that prompted this action by the Labor government were the security concern, which arose with the wartime activities of the German raiders *Komet*, *Pinguin* and *Kormorant* in the Southern Ocean as in Burke¹⁹⁹ and the break with the imperial British protectionist culture. Security concerns had temporarily replaced economic considerations as the main force in the policy making mix. This security impediment lifted Antarctica's importance in Australian foreign policy and government's deliberate policy intention to go south was implemented. The new Antarctic policy strategy included plans for an expedition with summer and wintering components to go ahead in the 1947/48 summer.²⁰⁰ The establishment of a committee within the government at long last moved Australian Antarctic policy from consideration of proposals to an implementation phase. The next meeting of the Australian Antarctic Executive Committee in May 1947 was chaired by Minister Evatt. Due to uncertainty about where a suitable base could be located, a less ambitious program was approved for the next summer as a reconnaissance to locate a suitable site for a wintering base. The intention was to proceed with a full wintering expedition the next year in 1948/49²⁰¹. These events also signalled a strengthening of independent Australian foreign policy in relation to the southern ocean and security of Australia's southern coastline and Antarctica.

The formation of an Antarctic Planning committee in 1947 also signalled an important policy milestone. It comprised personnel from government departments, with Mawson and John King Davis as advisers. Whilst the intention of Australian Antarctic policy had been well presented in Parliament through bi-partisan speeches at the passing of the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act in 1933, this policy had never been implemented. Sympathetic voices within the policy making framework, such as Minister Casey, had been unable to progress it to overcome financial restrictions and inertia within Government before the Second World War. However, with a Government agency established to

¹⁹⁸ Minutes of Australian Antarctic Executive Committee on Exploration and exploitation 24th January 1947, in MAC, 1 ANR

¹⁹⁹ Burke, David. *Moments of Terror*, pp.172-175

²⁰⁰ Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*, p. 241.

²⁰¹ Minutes of Australian Antarctic Executive Committee on Exploration and Exploitation meeting 5 May 1947, in MAC, 1 ANR cited in Ayres, p. 287.

²²⁰ Anon 'Russian Whaling' *Polar Record* 5 (1960)

implement Cabinet's direction, Antarctic policy was now on a firm footing to proceed to support the Australian Antarctic Territory claim.

The policy decision was also driven by international news of the intentions of other nations with interest in Antarctica beginning to take nationalist approaches, replacing the entrepreneurial private expeditions. Whilst diplomatic interaction with the United States continued in an endeavour to get recognition of the Australian claim, the Soviet Union now entered the Antarctic territorial debate soon after the Second World War. This development was to prove significant as an influence on Australian Antarctic policy. Although the Russian Naval expedition of Admiral Bellinghausen in 1819-21 had briefly sighted and circumnavigated the Antarctic continent, there had been no further interest until Russia signed the International Whaling Convention in 1946 and sent whaling fleets to the Antarctic as the start of an ongoing rich harvest. The Australian government had at this time also attempted to establish a whaling industry by buying factory ships as described by Swan (1961).²⁰² But this initiative was unsuccessful as suitable ships were not available and only a small coastal whaling industry was established, with little impact on whaling in Antarctic waters.

4.4. The Antarctic policy influence of the USA and the USSR

As the 1940s drew to a close, the post war strain in the USA/USSR relations increased both in Europe and globally. At this time the USA also became concerned with the tension between Chile, Argentina and the United Kingdom over conflicting territorial claims in the Antarctic Peninsula region. The USA policy was constrained by a pan-American alliance pact made in 1947, but it also had to consider its strong wartime ties to the United Kingdom²⁰³. In 1948 both the United Kingdom and Argentina sent warships to the Antarctic region and the USA, as a neutral broker, began to explore the possibility of creating a system for shared control over Antarctica to de-escalate tensions.

On 5 September 1948 the US Department of State issued a proposal suggesting that the eight countries actively interested in the region should discuss the Antarctic territorial problems. The objectives were to develop an agreement for some form of

²⁰² Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 236-8.

²⁰³ M.J.Peterson. *Managing the Frozen South* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p.37

internationalization of Antarctica in a commission under the United Nations auspices and to promote stability and scientific research in the area. This drew a mixed response from the countries involved. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr H. V. Evatt in reply advocated a regime, which firstly retained Australian sovereignty²⁰⁴ for the Australian Antarctic Territory, then promoted the further joint development of Antarctica. Further in a response to the American proposal for an Antarctic commission to be set up under the United Nations, Australia suggested that consideration be given to the establishment of an advisory commission along the lines of the South Pacific Commission.²⁰⁵

Australia continued this diplomatic dialogue with the United States but clearly was reluctant to entertain any concept, which backed away from its territorial claim policy, which it saw as a method of denying a military advantage to a foreign power in the southern ocean. As the Australian historian Bill Bush (1991) comments, ‘serious debate continued internally within the USA, with the Department of Interior pressing for a solution which would provide access to Antarctic resources, whilst the US Department of Defense was primarily concerned with a solution which would keep the Soviets out of Antarctica entirely’.²⁰⁶

The Russian naval expedition under admiral Bellinghausen had provided Australia its first human contact with Antarctic exploration in Sydney in the winter of 1819. Whilst this was a very cordial visit, the Crimean war incited concerns for a Russian invasion and this resurface several times later that century and Australia as a nation remained wary of Russia under the USSR regime. Russia however had not followed up on its Antarctic connection in any way from 1819 until 1946 when it entered whaling in the southern ocean and further in 1949 when it asserted its right to claim Antarctic territory and to be consulted on any Antarctic discussions. The policy interaction between Australia and the USA, over Soviet intentions in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean is documented in the USSR policy file of the Department of External Affairs.²⁰⁷ From the viewpoint of the USA, asserting an Antarctic Territorial claim would mean its acceptance of other nation’s rights to make

²⁰⁴ NAA DEA Argentina and Chile policy file 57/4829.

²⁰⁵ Department of External Affairs, Australian Government Archives series A1209 item 1957/1527 , p.

36.

²⁰⁶ W. M. Bush, *Antarctica and International Law : A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1991) and NAA 57/4947 Part 1, p.575 and Part 2, pp. 482-3

²⁰⁷ Department of External affairs ,U.S.S.R. Policy File 57/4947.

claims and giving up its long held position of demanding free access to the whole continent, as its own right.

Peterson (1988)²⁰⁸ studies the foreign policy position existing in each Antarctic country at that time in reviewing the creation and evolution of the Antarctic Treaty system and in particular examines the background of the 1948 USA joint management proposal and subsequent diplomatic negotiations in 1949. She concludes that the failure of the USA to create an Antarctic regime at that time stemmed from a combination of low international interest in the continent and the great differences in outlook between the parties involved. The other claimant nations involved saw no urgency to give up their claims and the cold war was too intense for the USA to consider any option which would open an opportunity for Soviet activity in any part of the world, however geographically remote. The only common point of agreement between all the interested parties at that time was one to exclude the USSR from Antarctica. The USSR was secretive and non-responsive in its dialogue, creating suspicion and distrust and the other Antarctic nations were not ready to proceed to a solution. Australia at that time was becoming more aligned with the US policy and favoured a USA presence in the Southern Ocean, rather than any other foreign powers operating south of its coastline.

While the scramble for Antarctic territory was a major issue in the first half of the 20th century the second half saw a rise in the influence of international science on national policy. The early 1950s had seen a revitalisation and growth, of science bodies in Europe following the end of the Second World War. This interest was to have an impact on Australian policy in seeking to gain international recognition of its Antarctic claim. This post-war science movement generated embryonic proposals for a cooperative scientific study of the Antarctic region. This was to have specific policy implications for all Antarctic nations, including the USSR.

4.5. The impact of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-58

The First International Polar Year in 1882-3 had set a precedent for international scientific cooperation. The premise was that solutions to the fundamental problems of meteorology and geophysics were most likely to be found near the Earth's poles. However, in that

²⁰⁸ M. J. Peterson, *Managing the Frozen South*, pp. 30-66

project nearly all observing sites were located in the Arctic region. Fifty years later the International Meteorological Organization proposed and promoted the Second International Polar Year in (1932–1933) as an effort to investigate the global implications of the newly discovered ‘Jet Stream’ but again no observation sites in Antarctica were included.

After the Second World War, scientists began to make use of rocket technology developed in the war to study the earth’s upper atmosphere. The idea of another Polar Year to use this technology was strongly promoted in America by Lloyd Berkner. This concept was then discussed amongst scientists in the International Council of Scientific Unions and widened into a global International Geophysical year (IGY) with a prime focus in Antarctica. European scientists reviewing the science program proposed for that event argued that, despite the political implications, such a program of science research had to include Soviet participation and the Soviet National Academy of Sciences was subsequently invited to participate.²⁰⁹ This was a turning point in Antarctic politics, as it offered the chance for the USSR to get involved in Antarctic through science objectives, rather than through political force. It resulted in strong Soviet involvement in the International Geophysical Year in 1957-58 and led to its ongoing presence in Antarctica.

A special committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ISCU), which met in Paris in July 1955, planned the IGY. It sought to distance science from political complication in a resolution in which ‘IGY activities were considered to be temporary measures that do not modify the existing status of the Antarctic regarding the relations of the participating countries’. The USSR continued to be excluded from discussions about the future of Antarctica. It placed political pressure on the Antarctic group of interested nations through the United Nations using India that year to threaten to bring the question of Antarctica to the United Nations General Assembly. Australia and the Commonwealth countries were not in favour of Russian involvement in either science or political solutions and continued to support the USSR's exclusion from Antarctic discussions and proposed a meeting in the United Kingdom with that in mind.

Towards the end of 1957, with IGY operating, the Commonwealth countries again commenced dialogue towards securing recognition of their Antarctic territorial claims

²⁰⁹ W. Sullivan, ‘The International Geophysical Year,’ *International Conciliation* (1959), pp. 319-26.

whilst excluding Russia from these discussions. However, this approach proved to be politically quite unsustainable beyond the influence of commonwealth countries, as not all of the interested Antarctic countries agreed to continue to exclude the USSR at the political level, whilst cooperating with them at the scientific level. The anti Soviet tide in Antarctica had turned internationally but it had not ebbed in Australia.

In February 1949 the Soviet Union began expressing direct interest in Antarctica, with the President of the semi-official Geographical Society asserting that the Russians had discovered Antarctica and that this gave the Soviet Union a valid claim to all of Antarctica.²¹⁰ This Soviet Society adopted a resolution which referred to the international discussions taking place at that time, stating that any discussion of Antarctic's future would lack legal standing and that the Soviet Union would be justified in ignoring any agreement that came out of such discussions.²¹¹ This was circulated to all countries involved, but being only a semi-official ploy, was generally ignored.

The other nations with Antarctic interests continued to exclude the USSR on the grounds that the complete lack of Antarctic activity since the Bellinghausen voyage in 1821 had eroded its right to an Antarctic claim and a seat at the discussion table. Failing to be invited to discussions with the eight Antarctic countries, the USSR sent them a formal memorandum on 7 June 1950. Referencing the 1948 US proposal, it refuted national territorial claims and pressed for the right of the Soviet Government to participate in any action to create a management regime for the future of the Antarctic. The note to Australia ended with the words:

The soviet government, for its part is ready to consider any proposals of interested governments both as to the procedure for the consideration of this question and as to the form (which) the disposition of Antarctica might take. It would appreciate the communication of the views of the Australian Government on this question.²¹²

This was a major diplomatic foray into the unresolved question of the future of Antarctica by the Soviets. However, only Argentina and Chile responded to the note. Australian

²¹⁰ Petersen, *Managing the frozen South*, p. 38.

²¹¹ Reported in *Polar Record* 1951 6, pp. 120-21.

²¹² Department of External affairs correspondence files NAA 57/4947, part 2.

policy was to protect its Territorial claim and influence and to exclude the Soviets from Antarctica. This was supported by the Commonwealth nations of UK and New Zealand. The cold war in Europe was at an intensive level, with the Berlin blockades and the 1950-1953 Korean War was in full force. The USA policy was internally divided between the Defense Department and the civilian positions on striving for a claims settlement in Antarctica and a stalemate in direct diplomacy had been reached.

In 1954 Mawson base was established as the first permanent scientific base in Antarctica as part of Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) This establishment and its influence on policy are studied separately in Chapter 5. Following a visit to the first Soviet Antarctic base at Mirny by Dr Law and his ANARE in January 1956, returning from a relief voyage to Mawson base, the Department of External Affairs undertook a secret policy review of the Antarctic situation. This examined future international control possibilities and threats to the Australian Territorial claim. With relation to Australian policy objectives it stated:

Our policy cannot stop short at establishing formal sovereignty over the Australian sector. It needs in addition to develop such safeguards as will ensure that no part of the Antarctic will be used to threaten our security. Under existing conditions this means that the soviet should be denied occupancy or if that objective cannot be met accomplished, any uncontrolled occupancy. This in turn means that we should endeavour to obtain some United States involvement capable of forestalling, or at least neutralising physical Russian intervention in the area.²¹³

This indicated an escalation of the former prime policy objective, which was to obtain recognition of the AAT. The policy now had a stronger security focus as a result of the communist threat. It also indicated that the accepted Australian policy position at that time was to stabilise the situation. In January 1957 Department of External Affairs commissioned Department of Defence's views on the strategic importance of Antarctica. The report to Minister Casey downplayed the threat from soviet bases at the time. However, in relation to the future, this was qualified with the statement that concluded:

²¹³ Department of external affairs review, 18 July 1956, A1209 1957/1527, p. 34.

Although Antarctica is of minor strategic importance, it is never the less desirable that a form of control be devised and established to ensure that no part of the Antarctic can be used in the future to threaten our security.²¹⁴

As the IGY progressed and scientific base locations were identified, it became obvious that the Soviets were investing large resources in explorations all over the Antarctic continent and planned a number of sites in the Australian Antarctic Territory. To Phillip Law, the director of the Australian Antarctic Division and the Minister for External Affairs, Hon R. G. Casey, it was obvious that the Soviets would ignore the protocol of acknowledging Australian territorial administration and occupy parts of the Australian Antarctic Territory in east Antarctica without seeking permission. To avoid the political snubbing of the Australian claim it was decided to invite all IGY participants, including both the United States and the Soviet Union, to place scientific stations within the Australian Antarctic Territory for the duration of the IGY.²¹⁵ The impact of the IGY exploration and science activities of non-claimant nations in turn placed pressure on nations with claims to respond and demonstrate activity to offset these intrusions. This action by international nations prompted the Australian Government to allocate a higher level of funds to ANARE operations for a greater Antarctic activity within the IGY, to counterbalance the impact of the Russian involvement.²¹⁶

The American secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited Australia in March 1957 and the Department of External Affairs officers prepared a significant background paper on Antarctic issues for Minister Casey for his meeting with Dulles. This brief recognised the American opposition to making its own claim and with regard to the future outlook continued:

So much depends on what the Russians do at the end of the IGY and how American policy develops ...we may, whether we like it or not, be compelled in the final analysis to fall back on examining whether some form of

²¹⁴ DEA 1495/3/2/1, pp. 33-37.

²¹⁵ Current notes, December 1956, p. 844.

²¹⁶ Personal communication, P.G. Law to John Manning, Antarctic reunion lunch, Kelvin Club, 2 May 2007.

international regime, with our sovereignty preserved, might not best serve our essential interests.²¹⁷

Whilst it was unrealistic to think that Russian ships or submarines would use bases in Antarctica they could not be restricted from operating in the southern ocean. In this light it was seen that the objective to be pursued was to deny the USSR the benefit of using Antarctic bases for communication to support such activities.

In 1958 another international initiative occurred with the formation of the Scientific Committee for Antarctic research (SCAR) by the International Council Scientific Unions (ICSU) to continue the friendly cooperation between scientists, which had worked very smoothly during the IGY. Despite the cold war being at its height, Australian interaction with Soviet scientists in SCAR were always cordial and Professor Ken Bullen from Australia was elected to the position of vice chair of this new science body, with the USSR a key supporter. Scientific cooperation in Antarctic research had thus been settled in a friendly manner and after IGY it was no longer possible for the US and Australia to exclude the USSR from the either Antarctic science or policy negotiation tables.

Both the Soviets and the Americans were investing large amounts of effort in this activity while at the same time exploring for mineral resources. The USA had established a base at Wilkes on the coast of the Australian Antarctic Territory in 1957 as part of IGY. However, the USSR had built a number of science bases across the continent and undertook over snow vehicle traverses widely over the inland icecap as well as carrying out ground survey and aerial exploration. At the end of the IGY period the USSR pulled back from the occupation of four of their temporary inland bases in Australian Antarctic Territory, such as the one at the Pole of Inaccessibility, but continued to occupy three coastal bases Mirny, Molodezhnaya and Leningradskaya and the remote inland ice cap base of Vostok. As IGY was drawing to a close Australia again reviewed the policy situation, anticipating ongoing occupation and being suspicious of possible Soviet territorial claims arising from this occupation. In October 1958 the Joint Intelligence Committee, for which Minister Casey

²¹⁷ Department of External Affairs correspondence file NAA:A 1495/3/2/1,9 march 1957 cover minute by assistant secretary Charles Kevin, file documents, folios 197 -220.

had responsibility, prepared an analysis on the 'Threat to Australia from Communist Bases in Antarctica up to the end of 1963'. This concluded:

...it was unlikely that Soviet Bloc will develop or use their existing bases or new bases in Antarctica for air or missile attacks against Australia during the period under review. There is however the possibility that they might use communication facilities at existing bases to increase the effectiveness of any operation designed to interfere with Australia's lines of sea communication along the southern trade routes.²¹⁸

Scrutiny of Department of External Affairs' policy correspondence files²¹⁹ at that time shows ongoing dialogue with the USA, on the problem of how to get the USSR out of the Australian Antarctic Territory. Realising that force was not an option Australia explored the possibility of the establishment of more American bases to dilute the impact of the Soviet occupation. Whilst looking at encouraging America to claim territory in Western Antarctica, there was concern that this would likely encourage a large counter claim by the USSR, with a significant impact on the Australian claim. Documents regarding these closed negotiations show that America did not intend to register a claim itself and indeed was under financial pressure from the US Congress to reduce its Antarctic activities²²⁰. This resulted in the USA offering the Wilkes base to Australia in 1959. The Australian government was initially reluctant to finance this expansion but discussions between Philip Law and the Minister Casey²²¹ who obtained cabinet support, led to the Australia agreeing to take over the base, driven by the concern that the USSR would otherwise take over the empty base.

Despite the guarded aspects of official Australian government policy with regard to USSR Antarctic activity, relations with Australian and Soviet scientists were very friendly in Antarctica, with station visits popular and free exchange of synoptic weather information. However, despite personal interactions between counterpart expeditioners, Soviet geographic, geophysical and geological information, which might indicate economic

²¹⁸ Department of External Affairs, *USSR Antarctic policy* file NAA:A series 1209 -57/4947 and 57/1529.

²¹⁹ Department of External Affairs, United States of America – Antarctica –Policy file NAA:A1209/23 ,1957/4829.

²²⁰ Department of External Affairs, *USA Antarctic correspondence file* NAA:A 1209/23.

²²¹ Kathleen Ralston, *Phillip Law, the Antarctic Exploration Years 1954-66*, pp. 16-20

resources, was not readily available to Australian scientists for the Australian Antarctic Territory. Official USSR policy also made it difficult for Soviet counterparts to send scientific material or data out from the USSR, even with the best cooperative intentions. Territorial concerns were involved and regional mapping was viewed as a very good proof of occupation and administration of territory. This produced a competitive edge to field operations as regional survey and Antarctic mapping publication could be viewed as a demonstration of sovereignty.

4.6.The Antarctic Treaty

With IGY drawing to a close, the US returned to the problem of Antarctic territorial claims and the future management of the Antarctic continent. On 3 May 1958, Dwight Eisenhower now the United States President issued an invitation to the eleven other countries involved in IGY 'to confer to seek a means to ensure that Antarctica be only used for peaceful purposes'. This led to a series of meetings over 18 months culminating in a final conference in Washington in October 1959, with the purpose to determine the future of the Antarctic region. The USSR and all other nations with interest in Antarctica were invited to attend. Australia played a major part in the Treaty negotiations to establish a peaceful stable regime in the region. As is examined in detail in Chapter six, Casey as Australian Minister for External Affairs led a strong Australian delegation and, at the opening of the conference, detailed the problems to be addressed. In summary he stressed the need to settle territorial claims and secure the peaceful use of the region, but in line with previous Australian policy towards communists and with the global influences of the cold war showing through, he added:

One of the prime objectives of the treaty must be to eliminate suspicions in the Antarctic ... Only by signing a treaty on the lines at present contemplated can we keep the Antarctic from becoming a breeding ground for suspicion-which is the great corroder.²²²

As discussed later in examining the influence of Richard Casey in this event, the final Antarctic Treaty conference continued for seven weeks and concluded with the signing of the Antarctic treaty on 1 December 1959. Minister Casey made a statement at the conclusion saying that he:

²²² Current Notes, October 1959, 571-4; repeated in *Polar Record*, 9 (1959), pp. 353-5.

... believed that the Treaty would serve 'Australia's interests in achieving its major objectives in securing demilitarization, scientific cooperation and putting aside claims for the duration of the treaty'²²³

The Antarctic Treaty established a system for meeting and negotiating with Antarctic nations and was to play a major part in Australia's consolidation of its position in international Antarctic affairs which had an interactive influence on its Antarctic Policy. Australia had achieved its conference objectives of stability on the continent, while the USSR had become a full Treaty partner. However, the USSR Antarctic policy file of Department of External Affairs shows that concerns remained with Australia about the long-term activities of the USSR in Antarctica²²⁴.

4.7 Conclusion

1945-59 was a vital period for Australian Antarctic policy. While external events during the Second World War caught government's attention from a national security perspective, it was key individuals Mawson, Casey and Law who together with Dovers on the Antarctic continent carried Antarctic policies forward into government action. Casey's interest in lobbying Evatt to proceed with an Antarctic agenda in 1945 was crucial to the establishment of an Antarctic committee to draw up recommendations for Antarctic policy which included Mawson and later John King Davis. 1947 saw the government announcement of an Antarctic policy following Mawson's key input in recommendations to cabinet. That year also heralded the entry of Phillip Law who then had a major role in establishing the Antarctic Division and the implementation of the announced government policy to occupy the Antarctic continent. 1951 saw the appointment of Casey as Minister for external affairs, this was a very significant appointment and his direction, passion and guidance saw the Government's policy move primarily from seeking recognition of the Australia territorial claim, to establishing stability for the region in the Antarctic Treaty. Casey had a major role in carrying this policy to government for resourcing and in facilitating Law's enthusiasm to put Australia in a key role in the future management of the continent. Law, Mawson and Casey can be seen as the key individuals in this period,

²²³ Ibid., p. 574.

²²⁴ Department of External Affairs Antarctic Policy file on USSR NAA:A 1495/2/1 (in several parts)

carrying the importance of Antarctica to government and facilitating the implementation of a set policy. However, to a lesser extent Dovers as the steel hard expedition leader demonstrating and consolidating the Australian presence on the continent can not be overlooked.

Chapter 5: The Policy Impact of the first ANARE Year on the Antarctic continent

5.1. Introduction

The first four chapters of Part A of this thesis have examined the historical background of events which had an impact on Australian Antarctic policy and identify the key individuals who had influenced Antarctic policy. This chapter examines the events of the 1954 wintering expedition on the Antarctic continent as this was to have a long term and indelible impact on Australia's role in Antarctica. While this expedition did not create major new driver for Antarctic policy, the establishment of the foothold in the Australian Antarctic Territory was the culmination of seven years of preparation and experiences on sub Antarctic island bases, from the time the federal government announced its intention to establish an Australian base. The success for this expedition was vital to consolidate existing government policy to occupy its Territorial claim to give it standing in seeking recognition from other Antarctic nations. Domestically it also demonstrated government strategic policy activity and justified the expenditure on Antarctica which had been spent on sub Antarctic islands. Had the expedition failed it would have had a profound negative impact in the consolidation of internal policy on Antarctica, far greater than the failure of the Wyatt Earp expedition in 1947/48.

The activities of the 1954 expedition had a lasting impact on domestic Australian Antarctic policy development, which also extended into the international arena. As well as setting a benchmark tradition for future expeditions, the activities and results of that occupation enabled Australian Antarctic credentials and expertise to be quickly accepted amongst Antarctic nations. This was an important policy advance in the territorial debates and used in embryonic discussions on international scientific programs, which developed quickly in 1955²²⁵. The success of the 1954 occupation also triggered the introduction of legislation in the Federal Parliament to support administrative control for both the Australian occupation and the associated legal position of the sovereignty claim. Although brief descriptions of the activities of the 1954 expedition are given by Law, Ralston and Bowden²²⁶, the literature does not explain the impact these events had on the further carriage of Australian

²²⁵ See section Chapter 4 para 4. 5, International Influences on Policy for discussions on the origins of the International Geophysical Year.

²²⁶ Kathleen Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law* (South Melbourne: Hyland House, 1993); Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*.

policy. This chapter seeks to briefly examine the 1954 field exploration journeys, completed without tragic human cost, in contrast to the Scott expedition in 1911 and that of Mawson in 1912. A minor, but emotive, aspect of policy is also examined as a case study regarding the use of dogs in Antarctica, as this unexpectedly came back to be a quite serious local issue for the Minister responsible for Antarctic policy some 25 years later during an election year.

5.2. Establishment of the Mawson Base

Law's preferred geographical locality for the Australian National Research Expedition base on the Antarctic continent was the coastal edge of the Framnes Mountains in Princess Elizabeth Land. This area had been distantly photographed from the air by Mawson²²⁷ and Christensen²²⁸ in 1931 and then by the American 'High Jump' services expedition in 1946. Using Mawson's sketch maps and Norwegian Hansen charts to assist navigation, Phillip Law, Director of the Antarctic Division, identified a potential site during an aerial reconnaissance in an Auster aircraft flown by Flight Lieutenant Doug Leckie from the expedition ship *Kista Dan*. On 2nd February 1954 Law reported in his diary:

We flew over the fast ice heading for Mt Henderson (named by Mawson in 1931), past a number of small islands until, at the coast, we found the rocky harbour, shaped like a horseshoe, that I had chosen as a possible station site from the operation Highjump photographs.²²⁹

The following day Robert Dovers, with Flight Officer John Seaton as pilot of the Auster aircraft, landed on sea ice near the horseshoe shaped harbour and confirmed that it was a suitable site, provided the ship could force its way through the still frozen sea ice. Attempts to drag sledges over the melting sea ice with 'weasel' tracked vehicles were unsuccessful²³⁰ and, after forcing a passage through the intervening sea ice, the *Kista Dan* eventually anchored in the Horseshoe Harbour, on 11th.February²³¹. Stores from the expedition ship

²²⁷ Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 232.

²²⁸ Lars Christensen, *Such Is the Antarctic*, trans. E Jayne, M.G (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935) .

²²⁹ Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p. 81.

²³⁰ Andre Migot, *The Lonely South* (London: Hart-Davis, 1956)Chapter 8, 'Through the ice' and chapter 9 'The birth of a base', pp. 132-170.

²³¹ See photograph of the *Kista Dan* in the horseshoe harbour as figure 2 in Appendix A.

were unloaded onto the bare rock outcrop²³², where the Australian flag was raised on 13th February 1954 and Law made the following declaration:

In the name of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia I raise this Australian Flag on Australian Antarctic Territory; and I name the site of this new ANARE station 'Mawson' in honour of the great Australian Antarctic explorer and scientist, Sir Douglas Mawson.²³³

Law (1983) reports that lying in his bunk later that night on the ship he was 'suffused with emotion compounded of immense relief and considerable satisfaction' that the establishment had finally commenced:

I thought of Douglas Mawson, whose vision of a permanent Station had been blocked by two world wars and one depression. I thought of Stuart Campbell, disheartened by the unsuitability of the Wyatt Earp and the unavailability of any suitable ship either in Australia or overseas. I recalled our efforts in the Antarctic Division since 1949 to gain experience at Macquarie Island and Heard Island so that we would be prepared for the ultimate attack on the continent, I recalled also our struggle to obtain official government approval and funds for the 1954 expedition.²³⁴

The first year at Mawson base in 1954 saw the reinvention of Australian Antarctic living and travelling skills, in an often dangerous environment. The ten man party included only two with experience on the Antarctic continent (Dovers and Schwartz); both having previously wintered with French Antarctic expeditions in Terre Adelie. The party leader and surveyor, Robert Dovers had previously wintered at Heard Island in 1948 and at Terre Adelie in 1952²³⁵ and spent a summer at Macquarie Island in 1949/50. His father, George Dovers, had wintered with the western party of Mawson's Australasian Antarctic Expedition in 1911. Second in charge, Lem Macey, had wintered with Dovers at Heard Island in 1948 and also spent the 1949/50 summer at Macquarie Island. The diesel mechanic Russell had previously wintered on both Macquarie and Heard Islands and the

²³² See site photograph by Law as figure 4 in Appendix A.

²³³ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law*; Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p. 206.

²³⁴ Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p. 114.

²³⁵ As previously described above in the case study of the expedition leader Robert (Bob) Dovers.

radio operator Storer had spent a year at Macquarie Island. Georges Schwartz had wintered in 1951 with the French expedition in Terre Adelie, as a dog handler.

One of the first buildings erected at the base was a small-prefabricated hut, which had been purchased by the Australian Antarctic Division, together with two Auster aircraft, from the 1952 British Swedish Norwegian Expedition. A second prefabricated hut, built in Melbourne, was also assembled before the *Kista Dan* departed on 23rd February 1954. Law's instructions to the men left at the site were: 'to consolidate the new base by erecting further buildings; to commence an ongoing scientific program; and to explore the continent to the east, west and south, as well as the nearby islands in Holme Bay'.

5.3. Building the ANARE tradition: The first field trip: Fixing the position of Scullin Monolith

The first geographic objective for the 1954 wintering party, once the base was secured, was a coastal exploration to the east in the late autumn, across newly formed sea ice to Scullin Monolith to fix its position for mapping²³⁶. This field journey and its impact is examined here as a case study, as it provides an example of Australia rebuilding its Antarctic field expertise, lost over time since the AAE after a break of forty two years. This journey set a new Australian tradition of field exploration in East Antarctica and had a significant impact on future Australian Antarctic exploration. It is interesting to briefly trace the background reason for the journey and its ongoing mapping significance.

Sir Douglas Mawson had reported sighting rock coastal features, to the east of the future Mawson base site, in aircraft flights from the BANZARE ship *Discovery* on 31 December 1929 and on 5 January 1930²³⁷. The following year, when this land was visible from the ship, he named a massive rock feature Scullin Monolith after James Scullin,²³⁸ the Australian Prime Minister at the time. Scullin had supported Antarctic exploration previously, when in opposition and then, as Prime Minister, endorsed funding for the

²³⁶ both Mawson and Christensen had landed here from their ships, but its position had not been accurately determined

²³⁷ Price in his account of the BANZARE voyages '*The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, cites a letter from Mawson to Cumpston 24 March 1953 'My full account now being written of the 1929/30 cruise will give details of the sightings from the 1929/30 cruise of the sightings from the air of the Mac.Robertson Land coast including the Murray [monolith] and the features mapped later by William [Scoresby]' -he adds the account Mawson mentions cannot now be traced, p.65.

²³⁸ Scullin had given support to the government in the House of Representatives on 21 February 1929 when the Prime Minister Bruce announced the BANZARE 'to complete and crown' the efforts of AAE.

second expedition in 1930-31. On this second voyage Mawson tried unsuccessfully to land at the nearby Murray Monolith and read a proclamation with his oar touching the land to take the 'full sovereignty of the territory which we have discovered for His Majesty King George the Fifth'. Getting ashore briefly at Scullin Monolith later that day on 13 February 1931²³⁹ with a hastily written proclamation, he raised the Union Jack at the base of that Monolith and left the flagpole standing in a small cairn²⁴⁰ to commemorate the event. This was a very important landing needed to support a future sovereignty claim over this area. In his journal, the meteorologist on the expedition, R.G. Simmers gives an excellent account of this most important day which in his opinion 'saved the name of the expedition as we have landed and raised the flag at last'²⁴¹.

Norwegian whalers were also active in the region that 1930/31 summer season and a week earlier, on 6th February 1931, Lars Christensen's in the *Thorshammer* had sighted land and later named a feature Klarius Mikkelsen Mountain, after the captain of the whale catcher *Torlyn*. This duplicated the name for the topographic feature named Scullin Monolith by Mawson. Several whale catchers from the Christensen fleet also reported seeing features in that vicinity that month and the group of features were named the Gustav Bull Mountains. Scullin and Murray Monoliths were the massive coastal sentinels and Church Mountain²⁴² the highest feature in the mountain group. Six years later on 30 January 1937²⁴³, Lars Christensen made his only landing in Antarctica at the base of Scullin Monolith. He placed a small depot of stores, although the actual site has not yet been found. The zoologist George Rayner had also landed on Scullin Monolith a year before from the British oceanographic ship *William Scoresby* in 26th February 1936. He reported climbing up some 800 feet from sea level but did not see any of the inland mountain features.

None of these expeditions had been able to establish an accurate geographic position for the feature and reports of errors of ten miles were stated. Law was keen to rectify this anomaly in the Norwegian charts²⁴⁴ and to provide a fixed location for Australian mapping.

²³⁹ Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 152.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 230. This site was relocated for the first time in February 1974 by the author as shown in the photograph in appendix A

²⁴¹ Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 151.

²⁴² Church Mountain is the translation of the Norwegian '*Kjerka*' name shown on the Hansen charts

²⁴³ Lars Christensen, *My Last Expedition to the Antarctic 1936-37* (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1938)

²⁴⁴ The Norwegian charts were prepared by Captain H. E. Hansen for the Whalers Assurance Society from aerial photography flown by Lars Christensen and published after the war in 1946. They were an excellent production of twelve sheets which were used by Law and Dovers, but they suffered from lack of accurate ground control and field verification of the shape of island features.

When the *Kista Dan* left Mawson on 23rd February 1954, Law's immediate objective was to go to Scullin Monolith to observe an astronomical fix to correct its position and to provide positional control for the strip of aerial photography which had been flown along the coast during the establishment of Mawson station. He twice attempted a motorboat landing at Scullin Monolith but heavy winds and breaking seas prevented him getting ashore, so no astronomical fix was possible. An approximation of the position of the feature as 67° 44'S 66° 43.5' E. was made from the *Kista Dan*, which conflicted with the previous values. Law noted:

Before I left Australia, Mawson had given me the rough position he had obtained for the Monolith from his ship *Discovery* in 1931. This was 67° 46'S, 66°59'E. The Hansen Charts gave the values as 67 °45.5'S, 66° 53'E²⁴⁵.

The unsuccessful attempt by Law to obtain a position for Scullin Monolith, or any of the adjacent features, left the 1954 Mawson team with the challenge to go to Scullin Monolith to accurately determine its geographic position. Following a brief reconnaissance to the Framnes Mountains immediately south of Mawson station, Dovers led a group of three other expeditioners - Stinear, Storer and Harvey - on an exploratory journey across newly formed coastal sea ice to Scullin Monolith to fix its position for mapping. Using two 'Weasel' tracked vehicles and towing plywood caravans mounted on sledges; the party departed Mawson on 17th May as winter approached. The events of the journey are outlined by Dovers in his field trip report²⁴⁶ and summarised by Swan (1961), Law (1983) and Bowden (1997)²⁴⁷, although the latter incorrectly states that Mawson had not been able to land at the Scullin Monolith during his BANZARE voyages in 1929 and 1931.²⁴⁸ Following the death of the geologist Bruce Stinear, his previously unknown diary was discovered by his widow May Stinear²⁴⁹ in 2007. This contains a more detailed description of this very dramatic journey and has been used in this account, with the kind permission of May Stinear.

²⁴⁵ Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p. 135.

²⁴⁶ Robert Dovers, 'Field Trip Report, Eastern Coastal Journey- Mawson 1954.' (Hobart: Australian Antarctic Division, 1954)

²⁴⁷ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p.272 ; P.G. Law, *Antarctic Odyssey* (1983), p.174 and Bowden, *The Silence Calling*, pp. 136-142.

²⁴⁸ Bowden, *ibid.*, p.39; (In 1974 the author landed at Scullin nearby and found the Mawson flagpole and remnants of the 1954 visit) This was the first time they had been seen since 1931, in Manning *Antarctic field report 1974* (Melbourne: Division of National Mapping, 1974)

²⁴⁹ Personal communication with Mrs May Stinear, August 2008.

In the darkness of early winter, the party travelled 160 kilometres eastwards along the coast on sea ice to a bay underneath Scullin Monolith, where they suffered violent gales blasting down the mountain. One Weasel vehicle and a barge caravan were lost when the two foot thick sea ice broke upon 20th May. The party sought a precarious foothold on shore at the base of the mountain and waited until the sea froze again. Dovers reported:

How we managed to cling on there in that merciless wind is a mystery. We saw the manhandled sledge fully loaded flying through the air before crashing into the tide crack near us , narrowly missing Stinear in its trajectory...The second barge caravan was turned completely over in a gust. Then a few minutes later a subsequent gust righted it up again²⁵⁰

Leaving Scullin Monolith on 13th June with the sole Weasel towing the remaining barge caravan and travelling over newly formed sea ice, they arrived back at Mawson base a week later on midwinter's day²⁵¹. This had been a horrific trip. Remarkably no life had been lost, but the drama had another twist when an hour after returning the parked Weasel caught fire.

At 2300 hours just as everyone was settling down to bed, Schwarz burst into the hut reporting that No.1 Weasel was on fire. Despite our best efforts the fire damaged the vehicle beyond repair before it was put out. This was the crowning blow of an ill fated venture.²⁵²

The vehicle, all the papers and other contents were completely destroyed, including Dovers precise positional observations. An approximate position was calculated from Dovers notes²⁵³ but it is interesting that this quest for an accurate positional fix at Scullin Monolith continued to elude ANARE parties for many years, as no repeat venture over the sea ice route was made. The report of this field trip became mandatory reading for all future field parties as a sober warning, before they undertook fieldwork from Mawson base. It also set a benchmark tradition for future field parties of coping with adversity.

²⁵⁰ Robert Dovers, 1954 *Eastern Field report*.

²⁵¹ Diary of Geologist Bruce Stinear June 1954, held by May Stinear.

²⁵² Robert Dovers, 1954 *Eastern Field report*.

²⁵³ *Astronomical summary* A54/1 (Canberra: Division of National Mapping, 1954)

5. 4. Other exploratory fieldwork in 1954

The 1954 autumn sea ice journey to Scullin Monolith set the tone for the adventurous exploration activity carried out during the remainder of that year. It demonstrated that Australia was regaining its Antarctic travel expertise, lost since the AAE in 1912. However, the loss of two Weasels and a barge caravan caused a reconsideration of the approach to other exploratory field work. Rather than risking the sole vehicle on the unknown sea ice, it was decided to undertake an extensive dog sledge spring trip of over 800 km over the coastal sea ice along the west coast towards Enderby Land. This very successful journey to King Edward Gulf by Dovers and Schwarz with two dog teams again demonstrated the suitability of dogs for sea ice travel. In comparison to his account of the autumn journey to Scullin Monolith, Dovers ignored his health discomfort and described the trip as ‘nothing extraordinary except in the smoothness of events’.²⁵⁴

The remaining major field objective was to explore as far to the south as possible. This was over the featureless Antarctic ice cap in search of a dark blur, visible on the edge of the 1946 American coastal aerial trimetrogon photography. With only one vehicle and one good dog team available for transport, a major summer journey was made inland. Leaving Mawson on 13th December, the exploration party consisted of Dovers, the geologist Bruce Stinear and the doctor Bob Summers.

Towards the end of the December a large isolated rock outcrop 300 kilometres inland was sighted and named Depot Peak. Continuing south five small nunataks were sighted and subsequently named Stinear nunataks. On the 28th December the party ascended one of these nunataks and to the south was revealed the start of an extensive mountain range which was named the Prince Charles Mountains. However, the party had reached their limit in this exceptional exploratory journey into the vastness of the Antarctic ice cap. Further exploration of the mountains to the south became the objective of future field expeditions from Mawson²⁵⁵. On the return journey to Mawson, Dovers suffered painful

²⁵⁴ Robert Dovers 1954 *Field Trip report: Western Coastal Journey* (Hobart: Australian Antarctic Division, 1954)

²⁵⁵ Law and Bechervaise, *ANARE : Australia's Antarctic Outposts*, pp. 98-99; John Mayston Bechervaise, *Blizzard and Fire : A Year at Mawson, Antarctica* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1963)

kidney and gallstone ailments²⁵⁶ but his stoic, understated report summarised the journey as: ‘This was a remarkable venture with one vehicle in poor condition and one dog team in reserve’²⁵⁷. However, the diary of Bob Summers, the medical doctor treating Dovers, shows how difficult the return journey to Mawson base had become²⁵⁸ for both doctor and patient. Summers (1994) later commented in the journal of the ANARE Club:

The culmination of my year at Mawson was the southern journey. I found it extremely satisfying putting my big feet down onto territory that one knew no one had ever trod before and wondering what the next day would bring.²⁵⁹

All the field explorations during the first year had been extraordinary and under difficult personal circumstances, the Australian Antarctic field tradition from the 1912 AAE had been revived²⁶⁰. The 1954 field explorations also set the new benchmark for future ANARE field journeys in achieving objectives and coping with adversity.

During the year of 1954 the core Mawson base infrastructure had been established with regular radio transmission to Australia. The science program in meteorology, cosmic rays and geomagnetism had been commenced as well as extensive geological and mapping exploration. The overall success of the expedition gained strong public support in Australia and considerable respect amongst the international Antarctic community, when promoted by Law in conferences for the planning for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) set up a special body the ‘Comite Special de l’Annee Geophysique Internationale’ (CSAGI) to be responsible for organising the IGY program and its coordination. This body held a meeting in Rome in 1954, attended by delegates from national bodies affiliated with ICSU. It recommended a preferred research program in Antarctica and invited as many nations as possible to participate²⁶¹. Ralston in her biographical study of Law, comments on the Australian position at that time:

²⁵⁶ R.Summers, personal diary 28-30 December 1954, (Canberra: National Library)

²⁵⁷ R. Dovers, ‘*Southern Field Trip Report*’ (Hobart: Australian Antarctic Division, 1954)

²⁵⁸ Summers personal diary, 30 December 1954 held in NLA.

²⁵⁹ R Summers, ‘Mawson 1954’ *Aurora*. September (1994)

²⁶⁰ The drama of Mawson’s survival march following the death of his companions has overshadowed the success and expertise of the other sledging parties. Although the technology had changed in 1954 the need to counter the weather and cope with adversity remained unchanged.

²⁶¹ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 275.

Australia was well placed for the IGY and far ahead of the other countries, with Heard Island and Macquarie island stations having been in operation for more than six years and Mawson station now established. Law told the press that ‘if Australia can enter the period on the IGY with these three stations fully manned she will be able to make a splendid contribution to world science.’²⁶²

The expedition success also built a sound foundation for Antarctic Policy within Australia. In July 1954 the first meeting of the Australian National Committee for the IGY (ANTIGAY), established under the auspices of the Australian Academy of Science, was held and in 1955 the Federal Government announced a grant²⁶³ of £67,000 to facilitate university participation in the IGY to build on the success of the Australian Antarctic occupation. Further, in August 1955, Minister Casey announced the establishment of a second research station to be located in the Vestfold Hills to participate in the IGY program. The success of the 1954 expedition had borne fruit in gaining public and governmental support for further expeditions.

5.5. Influences on Policy

The top priority for Australian Antarctic policy in 1954 had been to reinforce its territorial claim by establishing a permanent occupation on the Antarctic continent²⁶⁴. However, discovery and limited occupation alone were not considered sufficient to establish sovereignty in the criteria of international law. It was necessary to demonstrate a nation’s capacity to occupy, legally control and administer a claimed territory. In this regard the 1954 operational field success on the continent needed to be complemented by formal legislation.

Legal responsibility for Heard and McDonald islands had been transferred from Britain in 1951 and an Act providing for the administration of the Territory of Heard and McDonald islands was passed by the Australian government in 1953. However, the Heard Island base was closed the following year to allow for the establishment of Mawson base, within the Antarctic Division's budget allocation. When the foothold on the Antarctic continent was established at Mawson Base in February 1954 it required further administrative policy

²⁶² Ralston, *Phillip Law, the Antarctic Exploration Years 1954-66*, p. 24.

²⁶³ *Current Notes July 1955*, p. 495.

²⁶⁴ *SMH*, 21 March 1954: *Current notes January 1954*, pp. 59-60.

strengthening. An Act was then passed in the Federal Parliament providing for the legal administration of the Australian Antarctic Territory²⁶⁵. The government stance on territorial sovereignty was thus supported by a legal administrative framework as well as by the physical occupation of a site in Antarctica.

Australia with a permanent presence on the Antarctic continent and with the required legal framework in place was now better positioned to seek international acceptance of its Territorial claim. This policy position was summarised in the statement by Minister for External Affairs Casey in *Current Notes* in August 1954²⁶⁶, where he iterated the basis of the Australian claim of discovery, its formal possession assertion and the territorial occupation which was backed by formal administrative arrangements. A similar statement by Casey in October 1954²⁶⁷ again indicated that the Australian government now felt in a more secure position to justify its claim. The statement also politically sought to strengthen the validity of the claim by referring to relevant international law interpretations of occupation of remote territories. This argument was that in remote Polar Regions special criteria were required as occupations were not considered to be self supporting and that bases for scientific research were the only practicable occupations possible in the Antarctic Region. Thus the establishment of Mawson station affected Australian Antarctic Policy by enabling Australia to move more confidently into international debates on claims in Antarctica.

The Australian official statement also addressed the American position on polar claims and previous reservations expressed by Charles Hughes, US Secretary of State²⁶⁸, about application of the sector principle to claims in the Arctic and the Antarctic. Using the sector principle, Canada in 1925, claimed the portion of the Arctic north of its coastline between 60°W and 141°W longitude, extending all the way north to the North Pole. The USSR followed suit claiming the Arctic Ocean north of its coastline in 1926 but the US never accepted the sector principle in either Arctic or Antarctica. In 1924 Hughes had argued that:

²⁶⁵ This was an Act to provide for the Governance of Heard and McDonald Islands, Commonwealth of Australia. Act no.7 of 1953 and to provide for the Governance of The Australian Antarctic Territory, *Commonwealth of Australia*. Act no.42 of 1954; *Polar Record* 6 (1951), pp. 275-6; *Polar Record* 7 (1954), p. 211.

²⁶⁶ Minister Casey in *Current Notes August 1954*, pp. 549-53.

²⁶⁷ *Current Notes October 1954*, p. 747.

²⁶⁸ Letter to the Norwegian minister 2 April 1924, cited in Peterson, *Managing the Frozen South : The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System*, pp. 35-36.

It is the opinion of this department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilisation, even when coupled with a formal taking of possession does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country.²⁶⁹

It was further asserted that, since 'no part of Antarctica could be effectively occupied owing to the harshness of the climate; no state could rightfully claim territory there'. The reference to this American policy in the statement by the Australian minister reflects the Australian government's frustration in failing to gain American recognition of its Antarctic claim, despite its occupation, legal framework and friendly diplomatic relations being in place.

Whilst the American position was disappointing to Australia it was consistent in that, despite territorial assertion claims by American explorers in Antarctica, the United States government always refused to endorse these individual declarations, whether made on the ground or from an aeroplane even when the explorers were specifically instructed to carry out actions to support such claims.²⁷⁰ While the sector principle had been tactfully applied in the Arctic giving the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark foundations for claims extending north from their coastlines, it was not supported for the Antarctic as it would have given Norway, France, USA and Russia no Antarctic territory, as these states did not have a coastline facing the Antarctic continent.

Antarctic claims remained controversial in nature and, although it was agreed that normal sovereignty criteria were not applicable, there was no universal acceptance as to what criteria might be applied. The Antarctic historian Myhre, in a detailed research study of the origins of the development of the Antarctic Treaty²⁷¹, demonstrates the difficulty in

²⁶⁹ Charles Hughes was the US Secretary of State from 1923 to 1925 in that time he strongly maintained the US position that Antarctic claims were not valid unless supported by settlement as expressed in C. Hughes *Digest of International Law*, 1 (1924), p. 399. Further US correspondence is cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 252, and in Peterson, *Managing the frozen continent*, pp. 35-36

²⁷⁰ For example President Roosevelt's letter of instructions to Admiral Byrd dated 25th November 1929 included 'may take appropriate steps such as dropping written claims from airplanes depositing such writing in cairns etc which might assist in supporting a sovereign claim by the United States government', cited in W. Sullivan *Quest for a Continent* (New York: Mc Grath Hill, 1957), pp. 138-9

²⁷¹ J.D. Myhre, 'The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 1961-68 : A Case Study in Cooperation, Compliance and Negotiation in the International System .' (Phd Thesis, University of London, 1983).

obtaining an applicable clear cut ruling in an international court on Antarctic claims, by reviewing three applicable international legal decisions pertaining to unoccupied lands²⁷². He summarises the legal situation as: 'one finds that law on title by occupation to be neither black nor white, but an unsatisfying shade of grey'. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the fact that Australia was now occupying Antarctica gained immediate respect amongst Antarctic nations and ensured that Australia needed to be consulted in the future management of that continent.

With the question of Antarctic territorial claims still unresolved, international science discussions began to take place in 1954 with the International Council for Science (ISCU) community calling for an International Geophysical Year (IGY) to be primarily focused on Antarctica. Australia, with its operational infrastructure in place and its science focus, was immediately in a position to participate and take a lead role in planning the science and field activities of the international program. Previously Australian policy had been based mainly on territorial recognition, cooperation and understanding amongst friendly British Commonwealth nations. However, IGY was now a global science initiative with a wider number of unaligned countries to consider. Australia was then able to demonstrate its expertise and operational ability through its Antarctic base and the science program built up within the Antarctic Division since 1947. Also, through the work of the 1954 expedition, ANARE had demonstrated its capacity to travel on the Antarctic continent with dogs and vehicles and undertake scientific exploration.

5. 6. Conclusion

This examination of the 1954 expedition shows that the activities at Mawson base that year were to have a long term influence on Australian Antarctic policy. The success of the expedition provided a successful demonstration to the Australia public of the implementation of the policy announced in 1947, seven years before, to establish such an ongoing Antarctic presence to strengthen Australia's territorial claim. Its success also justified the government's expenditure for those years. Analysis of the events shows that the base infrastructure had been well established and the exploratory field journeys, although risky, at times provided excellent outcomes and established a tradition of

²⁷² J.D. Myhre, *The Antarctic Treaty System : Politics, Law, and Diplomacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), Chapter 2 Territorial Sovereignty in Antarctica, pp. 7-18.

expectation that, within reason, expeditioners would do whatever was necessary to successfully complete their assignments. Each of the major field trips had a purpose and demonstrated an ability to successfully cope with adversity in dealing with unknown conditions and terrain. It also showed Australia's commitment to develop expertise in polar travel and to undertake science research on the Antarctic continent.

The impact on Australian policy of the establishment of a permanent Antarctic base coupled with the provisions of a legal administrative Act passed in 1954 was that it was now ready to begin asserting an increased influence in the management of Antarctica. Rather than being just a clear political occupation as with the South American countries, the proven objectives of exploration and science, undertaken from the Mawson base soon enabled Australia to be fully accepted as a participant in international negotiations on the future of the Antarctic continent. With the influence of a firm foothold in Antarctica established in 1954, Australia was able to become a key Antarctic nation in the development of the International Geophysical Year in 1955, the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research from 1958 and the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. These international involvements in turn produced a significant policy shift from a prime focus on a territorial claim. Australia with its operational scientific base was able to cooperate widely in internationally managed Antarctic Science programs, by putting its territorial land claim on hold for regional stability and the peaceful use of the ice continent.

The success of the expedition can be considered as vital to the government's strategic Australian Antarctic policy. Had it been a failure by being unable to establish a base on the Antarctic continent²⁷³, or had suffered from tragic losses of human life²⁷⁴, the ongoing development of Antarctic policy would have been in jeopardy. However, the successful outcomes across the scope of the expedition's objectives consolidated the Australian public's appreciation of the Antarctic continent as a source of national pride welcome in the post war development period. While its success can be viewed as an example of the preparation, planning and drive of Phillip Law, Director Antarctic Division in the implementation of a set government policy. Law was strongly supported administratively by Minister Casey; however the actual success on ground on the Antarctic continent can be largely attributed to the immense personal input by the expedition leader Bob Dovers. This

²⁷³ The 1947/48 Wyatt Earp expedition had been unable to reach Antarctica which caused a significant setback to Australia's policy intention to establish a base on the continent.

²⁷⁴ Such as happened in Scott's last expedition and also in the Mawson AAE expedition in 1912.

was not a direct influence in raising the importance of Antarctica to government but the consolidation of a policy path set in 1947 and which enabled Australia to move forward with standing in international negotiations on the management of the Antarctic continent. Whilst careful work on the establishing legal administration was undertaken in the government bureaucracy during the year to establish a firm base for international negotiations it was the individual influence of Robert Dovers in the field which secured this position. In that light the outstanding individuals in the overall period 1945 to 1959 were identified as Law, Casey and Dovers, although Mawson continued to have an ongoing influence in government Antarctic Planning Committees.

Chapter 6: Beyond the Antarctic Treaty 1959-91

6.1 Introduction

This period was an often turbulent era in relation to Antarctic policy development and it resulted in a significant policy change. Initially this was triggered by the realisation and acceptance that Australia could not gain complete international recognition of its territorial claim and that its policy objectives of non-military regional stability would have to be achieved by another approach. With this in mind, Australia through Department of External Affairs became heavily involved in the creation of an Antarctic Treaty, which set aside the question of existing territorial claims without rejecting them outright.

6.2 The Antarctic Treaty System

With the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, Australia in spite of accepting the freezing the territorial claim issue for a minimum of thirty years, achieved its regional policy objectives. It then looked to ensure the management of a peaceful continent and continued stabilisation of the region under the Treaty. The Treaty also crystallised the realisation that the Australian Antarctic Territory was not capable of being self-supporting as an economic asset and science was moved up in importance as the upfront motivator for Australia's ongoing involvement within Antarctica. Building on its standing and contribution to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia was able to take a role of considerable influence in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM). The Australian policy direction was to use its historical connection and current Antarctic expertise, to influence activity on the continent. This was then implemented by cooperation and consensus in the Antarctic Treaty meetings, rather than through the majority vote approach of the United Nations. This approach for consensus management commenced immediately with Australia hosting and chairing the first consultative meeting in Canberra in 1961. It also marked a step a new phase in Australian Antarctic diplomacy after Casey's resignation earlier that year as subsequent ministers did not share Casey's passion for Antarctica. Antarctica was just one foreign policy element of the Australian Department of External Affairs portfolio. With wider range of issues to be addressed in the department

there was not a long continuity of specific personnel involved in Antarctica nor was there any high profile key individuals providing an additional influence on government.

The Antarctic treaty system was developed to have a series of consultative meeting of members initially held every two years²⁷⁵. Although conservation was not explicitly spelt out in the treaty itself it was a continuing important agenda item at all meetings. At the third meeting in 1964 the 'Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora' were adopted as recommendation number VIII to protect endemic and native wildlife and plants. Its Objective is to further international collaboration within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty to promote and achieve the objectives of protection, scientific study and rational use of these fauna and flora. It is part of the Antarctic Treaty System but has been designated no longer 'current' in 2011 having been replaced by other protocols and conventions.²⁷⁶

The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals was adopted as a response to a proposal by Norway to recommence sealing in the Antarctic for Southern elephant seals and Antarctic fur seals which had been reduced to near extinction in the nineteenth century. The Convention provides for any such future activities to be undertaken sustainable, with some species of seals being totally protected and catch limits set for others. These measures were developed to provide a means to regulate commercial sealing, should such an industry ever be resumed.

The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was adopted by Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings in 1980 in response to fears that unregulated fishing for krill, one of the key species in the Antarctic marine food web, might adversely affect whales, seals, penguins and other species that directly or indirectly depend on krill for food. The Convention adopts an 'ecosystem approach' - it provides that krill and all the other living resources of the Southern Ocean are treated as an integrated system where effects on predator, prey and related species are considered and decisions on sustainable harvesting levels are made on the basis of sound scientific advice. Conservation Measures under CCAMLR establish protected species, set catch limits, identify fishing regions,

²⁷⁵ Gillian Triggs, ed. *The Antarctic Treaty Regime :Law,Environment and Resources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

²⁷⁶ Decision 1 (2011) - ATCM XXXIV - CEP XIV, Buenos Aires. *Antarctic Treaty Secretariat*. 1/7/2011. http://www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_listitem.aspx?lang=e&id=491. Accessed 27 January 2012.

regulate when fishing may occur and what fishing methods can be used and establish fisheries inspection procedures.²⁷⁷

Australia's Antarctic policy in the 1960s and 1970s decades was dominated by such external negotiations within the Antarctic Treaty System. However, the underlying concern for Soviet Antarctic occupation in the Australian Antarctic Territory continued to influence government decisions and provided a useful spur for Law to use in gaining funding the operation of the Australian National Research Expedition (ANARE). Despite the Antarctic Treaty and its friendly relations, the shadow of the Soviet influence continued to haunt the growth of Australian Antarctic policy for over twenty years, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While wary of the intention and regional operations of the Soviet Union, Australia's principle approach in the management of the Antarctic continent was concentrated on supporting the Antarctic Treaty system and maintaining consensus on the management of a peaceful and stabilised continent. Australia was primarily represented in these meetings by a rotation of career diplomats from Department of External Affairs. Australian delegations were well respected and Australia took a leading role in most issues and specialist groups.

With the development of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia's participation in the ongoing management system became the prime focus of its Antarctic policy, even though the concerns regarding the USSR as a foreign power on our doorstep still remained as a backdrop issue. An example of this is reflected later in 1964, five years after the Treaty was drawn up when the Antarctic Division Director, P.G. Law, successfully used the threat of increased Soviet activity in Enderby Land in Australian Antarctic Territory as a lever to obtain a greater allocation of funds for Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) operations.²⁷⁸ The Minister for Supply also demonstrated this attitude in his 1969 submission to Cabinet seeking approval for a five-year programme, for the Australian Antarctic Division. In closing this submission the Minister requested the Cabinet to note that it will need 'to give early consideration to the political issues arising from the proposal made by the U.S.S.R. to develop her operations in Australian Antarctic Territory.'²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ CCAMLR website detail from AAD <http://www.antarctica.gov.au/antarctic-law-and-treaty/our-treaty-obligations> accessed July 2012

²⁷⁸ Ralston, *Phillip Law, the Antarctic Exploration years, 1954-66*, p. 246.

²⁷⁹ Prime Minister's Department Future Australian Activities in Antarctica Policy to be followed- A five year programme Cabinet submission 593 in Australian Government Archives file A5868 Volume 28, pp. 6.

Gradually conservation concerns for living resources in Antarctica and the southern ocean became key agenda issues for Antarctic Treaty consultative parties meetings. Australian participated strongly in these treaty meetings and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) came into force in 1982, as part of the Antarctic Treaty System, in pursuance of the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty. It was established mainly in response to concerns that an increase in krill catches in the Southern Ocean could have a serious effect on populations of krill and other marine life; particularly on birds, seals and fish, which mainly depend on krill for food.²⁸⁰ The Convention established a Commission to manage the marine living resources of the area south of the Antarctic convergence and Australia won the right to host the Commission secretariat in Hobart under the renowned biologist Dr Knowles Kerry.

Despite the Antarctic Treaty containing provisions relating to conservation of living resources it does not mention mining or exploitation of non living resources. Following the successful development of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, attention turned to the creation of a similar convention to regulate the exploitation of the non living resources of Antarctica. In 1981, the Treaty nations began work on such a minerals resources arrangement. Australia participated in developing a regime to allow Minerals exploitation on the Antarctic continent within the Treaty System, because it was felt that unregulated exploration and mining would cause serious environmental and political problems for the Treaty management. This complex issue took until 1988 for the Treaty nations to reach a consensus and to recommend the adoption of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) However, by that time there was a major international environmental campaign against minerals exploitation in Antarctica established by global environmental groups such as Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Their view was that all mining should be banned and Antarctica should be declared a 'World Park'.²⁸¹

The Antarctic Treaty system, had achieved political stability, with the region becoming non-militarised and nuclear free, but twenty years after the ratification of the Antarctic

²⁸⁰ CCAMLR web site www.ccamlr.org accessed 4 January 2011. Soviet fishing catches had signaled an alarm over the sustainability of krill as the basic block in the southern ocean living resources food chain

²⁸¹ BAS web site http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/environmental_issues/mining.php accessed 4 January 2011.

Treaty it was subject to an attack by third world countries through the United Nations system in 1982. Significant criticism of the Antarctic Treaty developed within the United Nations through the 1980s, with third world countries expressing dissatisfaction on the closed nature of the Antarctic Treaty System. It was considered not in Australia's interest to have the Antarctic continent opened up for unlimited exploitation and it became heavily involved in rejecting third world proposals which called for demise of the Antarctic Treaty and direct United Nations control²⁸². Malaysia however succeeded in getting the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda of the United Nations Assembly in 1983 as an attack on the Antarctic Treaty System and seeking its termination. This was followed each year by moves from third world countries for the United Nations Assembly to take over the responsibility for Antarctica²⁸³.

This serious attempt to dissolve the Antarctic Treaty was largely thwarted by the expertise of Richard Woolcott the Australian ambassador to the United Nations. Without such an influence on the leadership of the New York group of Antarctic nations it is considered likely that the Treaty would have been reviewed after the 30 year period in 1989 and would have unraveled back into conflict over the dormant territorial claims fuelled by greed over potential profit from mining exploitation. Woolcott returned to Australia to head the newly formed Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He remained a firm supporter of the Antarctic Treaty system and overviewed the work by the respected Diplomat Alan Brown in the creation and adoption of the comprehensive environmental protocol at Madrid in 1991. His work is described in chapter thirteen as an example of a single person influencing the direction of Australian Antarctic policy at a critical time.

Within Australia a growing concern for the environment developed in Australia on a national scale in the 1980s and this concern was then transferred to the Antarctic by domestic pressure in conjunction with the work of global activists. Geoff Mosley as president of the Australian Conservation Foundation was the prime mover in coordinating green organization actions Australia to seek protection for the Antarctic environment and then carrying the importance of the Antarctic environment to the public and to

²⁸² This activity in the United Nations is described more fully in chapter 8 of this work in the role of Richard Woolcott, the Australian Ambassador to the UN.

²⁸³ Gillian D. Triggs, *International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica* (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986) and Gillian D Triggs, 'Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica; Traditional Principles of Territorial Acquisition Versus a 'Common Heritage',' in *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, ed. S. Harris (Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1984), pp. 29-66.

government.²⁸⁴ The proposal by the Antarctic Treaty nations to establish a controlled mining regime within the Antarctic Treaty ended in dramatic fashion with Prime Minister Hawke making the decision in 1989 that Australia would not become a signatory to CRAMRA.²⁸⁵ As ratification was required by all Treaty nations, this meant that the agreement failed to come into force. Australia together with France led the ‘mission impossible’ task to convince Antarctic nations to instead establish a comprehensive environmental protection regime. The resultant Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was signed in Madrid in 1991.

The Antarctic treaty itself has been at times criticized by some Australian and international lawyers, as being too simplistic in legal terms and not sufficiently detailed²⁸⁶ and a review was anticipated after the mandatory thirty year period. However, despite perceived shortcomings, it has proved to be very successful even when viewed from a time distance of fifty years later. It accomplished an interim solution to emotive territorial claims, by putting them aside and provided a flexible base for consensus administration by Antarctic nations rather than through a rigid regime of majority vote. It can be easily said that it has worked extremely well in an often unsettled arena of world politics and has been a major international influence on Australian Antarctic policy.

6.3 Conclusion

The period of 32 years between the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and the signing of the comprehensive environmental Madrid Protocol in 1991 was a very important one for Australian Antarctic policy. It saw a change from Australia seeking ownership of a huge slice of the Antarctic continent to one where it assumed an international leadership role to attain international protection of the Antarctic environment. This change can be identified to principally have had two components:

²⁸⁴ Mosley’s work in coordinating the passion of the ‘Green’ groups is discussed in detail in chapter 14.

²⁸⁵ This reversal is well described in Lorraine M. Elliott, *Protecting the Antarctic Environment : Australia and the Minerals Convention*, Australian Foreign Policy Papers (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993)

²⁸⁶ While not overly critical of the role of the Treaty, the lack of prescribed definition of systems in the Treaty drew some adverse comments see Gillian D Triggs, ed. *The Antarctic Treaty Regime : Law, Environment and Resources*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Gillian Triggs, *International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica*; Keith Suter, *World Law and the Last Wilderness* (Sydney: Friends of the Earth, 1979)

- International events from ATCM meetings
- The growth of environmentalism both nationally and internationally

Within these components the role of key individuals in this period stands out. Firstly in the international arena Casey as Minister had a very active role in the drafting of the Antarctic treaty and getting the associated administration underway before he accepted a seat in the House of Lords in 1961. Secondly, Richard Woolcott as Australian ambassador to the United Nations expertly defused the push by Malaysia to unravel the Antarctic Treaty in the cauldron of the United Nations Assembly in New York.

Thirdly when the concern for the growth in the environmental movement became a political issue for government in Australia and then in Antarctica, the person at the forefront of the movement was Geoff Mosley. He nurtured the growth and coordination of the various green organisations and carried the issue to the public, politicians from both sides of parliament and eventually to the Prime Minister. Hawke then made the dramatic policy reversal and refused to sign the mining convention and instead prosecute a global campaign to establish comprehensive protection for the Antarctic environment. The outstanding individuals in the period 1959 to 1991 were then Casey, Woolcott Mosley and Hawke and they were selected for further study in addition to the four previously identified as Edgeworth David, Douglas Mawson, Phillip Law and Robert Dovers

Summary of Part A

Part A provided the historical context for this thesis. It described events which at times had the potential to increase the level of significance of Antarctica within Australia's policy hierarchy. However, these events needed a conduit to government in order to raise a rather minor policy element to the notice of decision makers amidst competing issues in government and it is argued that these events only had a real impact on policy when the opportunities arising from such events were championed by committed individuals and taken to government which melded them into a strong international policy on Antarctica. In examining the historical periods of events from 1901 to 1991, eight individuals have been identified who clearly had considerable input and influence as conduits to government policy in influencing the development of Australian government's Antarctic policy. The criteria used for selection of the key individuals were their demonstrated ability

to make a positive contribution to Antarctic policy development, in support of Australia's ongoing activity in Antarctica.

In the period 1900 to 1945 two figures stand out as individual with great influence; Sir Edgeworth David for his breakthrough influence in successfully bringing Antarctica as an item of importance to government and repeatedly gaining its support for Australia's involvement in Antarctic expeditions. However the outstanding Australian Antarctic icon was Sir Douglas Mawson who was the most influential individual figure before the Second World War and leader of both the AAE and BANZARE ventures. Sir Richard Casey also was prominent in influencing government policy in this period but he was also to have an increased influence when he became the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1951.

In the period from the Second World War to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty, Mawson again was a prominent and influential figure but Casey as minister responsible for Antarctic policy development was outstanding with a major role in guiding Australia's contribution to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. In the period 1947 to 1966 Phillip Law as director AAD was a key individual with vital task of implementing government policy rather than explicitly involved in creating new government policy. In 1954 the establishment of a base on the continent was vital for Australia to demonstrate its credentials internationally through an effective and ongoing occupation of the AAT. Again while not personally involved directly in setting policy, Robert Dovers influence was as leader of the wintering expedition which secured Australian standing amongst the Antarctic nations, demonstrating national expertise and ability to cope with occupation, exploration and science research on the harsh continent. He reestablished Australian tradition in Antarctic exploration which became a part of Australian Antarctic science policy.

While the Antarctic Treaty temporarily put territorial claims aside in a policy sense, it introduced a new role for Australia in international management within the Antarctic Treaty system. This which was principally handled by career diplomats within the Department of External Affairs and later the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and while quietly successful no single person had a continuing dominate role. In the 1980s concern for exploitation of Antarctic non living resources triggered criticism and threatened the Antarctic treaty itself as the review period of the Antarctic Treaty

approached. Australian Antarctic policy was influenced internationally and domestically in this period. The exceptional skill of Richard Woolcott in the international arena of the United Nations strategically held Australia's preferred policy deflecting adverse criticism of the Antarctic Treaty and demonstrating Australia's support for the Treaty. In this period the growth and feeling for environmental protection was significantly carried to the government by the environmentalist Dr Geoff Mosley. This was to have a major impact on the government and in particular prime minister, Robert Hawke. In turn Hawke reversed the acceptance of the CRAMRA convention to permit mining in Antarctica and personally lead the argument to replace it with a comprehensive protocol for the protection of the Antarctic environment. These then are the key individuals selected as having major individual influences on Australian government Antarctic policy culminating in the very significant Madrid Protocol.

This is not to say that there were not a series of persons actively interested in furthering Australia's role in Antarctica in the study period, they were many who made a lesser contribution but were not considered to have achieved such an influence on government policy, such as :

- Sir Orme Masson, who carried Mawson's intentions to Government through Australian Science committees in the early 20th century.
- John Rymill as a respected leader of British Antarctic expeditions immediately before the Second World War, but who however decided not to become directly involved in ANARE activities after the war.
- Sir Hubert Wilkins the mercurial explorer who made brief proposals to influence the Australian Government, Wilkins operated on the world's stage in both Arctic and Antarctic but was rarely a key influence in Australian Policy being somewhat frozen out by Mawson
- John King Davis' policy contribution is acknowledged in the thesis in his work on government committees later in life, but he was always a secondary figure to Mawson in policy development.
- John Bechervaise never influenced policy other than to support and promote Law.
- Dick Smith was a one off adventurer in his private flights to Antarctica but never became involved in overall policy.

- Lyn Goldsworthy's changing support for overall environmental protection is discussed; however, she was a secondary figure to Mosley at the time of the policy reversal. It is acknowledged that she later made a significant contribution in assisting drafting the Madrid protocol with Henry Burmeister from Attorney Generals Department.
- There were a number of career diplomats who made significant contribution through their careers in foreign affairs, Malcolm Booker for example carried the Australian role for two year in the meetings for the Antarctic Treaty in 1958 and 1959. John Burgess another desk officer with DFAT who participated in ATCM meetings. This capable group handled many other tasks in addition to time on Antarctic matters.
- Alan Brown was a most expert diplomat from DFAT. He was Head of Delegation for negotiations with Indonesia for the territorial boundaries in the area of the 'Timor Gap'. Prior to the Hawke reversal decision Brown presented papers in support of the Mining convention and subsequently he was instrumental in carrying the case for the Madrid protocol against that convention and garnering global support through outstanding diplomacy. This activity leading to the Madrid Protocol is well covered by Dr Lorraine Elliott as referenced. I chose Woolcott instead of Brown as being head of DFAT he was also as a great example of a socio political diplomat with his background as Australian Ambassador to the United Nations and as a working policy visitor to the Antarctic continent.

However it is contended that the eight previously selected were the main persons who through their individual contribution had the most influence in the development of Australian government policy on Antarctica

Part B: Key individuals and their influence on Antarctic Policy

Part B is the core of this thesis. It takes up the role of the key persons identified in Part A and examines their contribution to the development of Australian Antarctic Policy. In doing so it demonstrates how outstanding individuals were able to make a difference in the formulation of Australian Antarctic policy in the 20th century. It examines their inputs, the difficulties encountered and their success at times in having their voice taken up by government. It was the action of these individuals, often over a period of time that produced progression in governmental policy on Antarctica. In some instances the government did not view external events important enough to raise the minor significance ranking of the Antarctica. However, even at these times impassioned individuals were able to position the Antarctic agenda such that when issues did become more significant, they were able to work from a stronger base to alter or create Antarctic policy. While the nature of individual contribution to Antarctic Policy varied with change in circumstance over time through the ninety years of review, these individuals can be conveniently grouped into two broad sections; persons employed and working within the government; and those operating independently outside the government. Of course sometimes there were persons who crossed this categorisation somewhat such as Mawson who after 40 years of lobbying government from outside the government became a key person on Governmental committees for ten years. Phillip Law on the other hand was employed by Antarctic Division for nearly twenty years before retiring and becoming an influence outside of the government. The individuals are here categorised in two sections to help understand the different roles of the individuals. While persons within government sometimes had key roles in implementation of policy such as Richard Casey the influence of outsiders such as Mawson was also quite vital in lubricating and moving government policy forward by asserting influence on the government. They are conveniently addresses in two groups:

- Section1: Individuals operating outside of government employment. (chapters 7 ,8 and 9)
- Section 2: Individuals operating directly within the Government. (Chapters 10 to 14)

There is no intention to balance the length of chapters in a hierarchical ladder of importance; they vary depending on the information available, principally from primary sources, Mawson

of course had nearly 50 years of association with Antarctic policy while Hawke was only directly involved from 1988 to 1991.

Part B Section 1: The Influence of individuals from outside of the government employment system

This section studies the impact of major individuals who were not part of the government but managed to influence the development of Australian Antarctic policy. Within the government is defined as those persons employed by government, working as paid employees, this includes those working within the bureaucracy and those elected as politicians. The persons categorised as outside the government are those operating without direct financial payment from Government. The three most outstanding individuals who were not part of the overall government but who made significant impacts in furthering the development of policy were identified in Part A as:

- The initial impact to influence policy -Sir William Tannatt Edgeworth David
- The long grind as an influence on government- Sir Douglas Mawson
- The impact arising from the environmental journey - Dr Geoff Mosley

The background and contribution of each these three scientists is examined to give a context for understanding their influence on Antarctic Policy. All three can be considered as providing a scientific based voice to government concerning Antarctica and each made a difference to the direction taken by Antarctic policy at the time. The first two were earth scientists while Geoff Mosley can be considered an early environmental scientist.

Chapter 7 : Sir William Tannatt Edgeworth David – *The first successful advocate for Australia's involvement in Antarctica*

7.1. Introduction

In the second half of the nineteenth century two German scientists residing in Melbourne, Georg Neumayer in the 1850s and Baron von Mueller in the 1890s, tried unsuccessfully to gain colonial government support for Australian-based Antarctic expeditions. Further unsuccessful attempts to gain local support were made by two Norwegians residing in Melbourne in the 1890s. The first was Frederick Bull, who, while seeking whales in the Ross Sea made a landing at Cape Adare. The second was Carsten Borchgrevink, who suggested a return expedition to Cape Adare. This expedition did go ahead with overseas funding from Britain but without local Australian financial support. The turn of the century, however, saw the re-entry of British interest in the South Pole mainly through the promotion efforts of Sir Clement Markham in England. British expeditions visited Australia en route to the Antarctic and sought financial support and expedition members on arrival in Australia. However, with federation foremost on their mind, the new Australian government at that time was busy with internal considerations and not prepared to allocate money to external issues.

Before federation it had been scientists in Melbourne who had tried unsuccessfully for twenty years to obtain support from the Victorian government. After 1900 the government power base changed with creation of the new Commonwealth of Australia government. This produced a different social and political structure from that of former individual colonial governments and Edgeworth David was a very well respected figure in Sydney society at that time. When Scott's 1901-04 expedition arrived in Australia, Louis Bernacchi was appointed as Chief Scientist as he had very good credentials being a member of Borchgrevink's first Antarctic continental wintering expedition. The Victorian branch of the Royal Geological Society of Australasia sent a deputation, which included Bernacchi, to see Prime Minister Edmund Barton in Sydney to induce the Australian (Federal) government to provide a grant toward the cost of Scott's expedition. However, despite encouraging words from the Prime Minister²⁸⁷, this initiative was unsuccessful in gaining support from the Victorian or the Australian governments, although some local private financial support for the expedition was generated from other science bodies and from the Government of Queensland.

²⁸⁷ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 104-05.

The sequence of unsuccessful attempts to influence policy and gain Australian government support for an Antarctic Expedition was broken in 1907 by the entry of a new advocate who took opportunities arising from the early British based expeditions transiting through Australia. This was the dynamic geologist Professor Edgeworth David who had a twenty year long interest in glacial studies and was considered a world authority in this field. As an expert on glaciological land form he was invited by Shackleton to join the expedition ship *Nimrod* on a summer voyage to Antarctica in 1907. With this spur of direct involvement in the adventure and with his personal standing in Sydney science and political worlds, Edgeworth David was able to exert a significant influence on the government's approach to Antarctica. His breakthrough role in being the first to gain government financial support warrants a closer study of the man and to understand his impact on Australian involvement in Antarctica.

7.2 Background

Sir Tannatt William Edgeworth David, geologist, was born in 1858 at Glamorganshire in Wales, eldest child of the Rev. William David, a fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. At the age of 12 Edgeworth David entered Magdalen College School, Oxford, before proceeding to New College in the university as a classical scholar. In 1878 he gained a first class moderation in classics, but a breakdown in health prevented him from reading for final honours. To convalesce he traveled a round trip in the sailing ship *Yorkshire*, to Canada and then to Melbourne. Back at Oxford, Edgeworth David attended Professor Joseph Prestwich's lectures on geology before graduating B.A. in 1881. The previous year, encouraged by a local naturalist; Edgeworth David began to study evidences of glacial action in his native district in South Wales²⁸⁸. Already an excellent speaker, he presented his first paper for publication in 1881 on the aspects of glaciations in Cardiff²⁸⁹. This was followed in 1882 by a paper read in London on glacial aspects of the Glamorganshire landscape²⁹⁰.

In 1882 Edgeworth David attended Professor J. W. Judd's course in geology at the Royal College of Science, South Kensington. His brilliance led him to be recommended to fill the post of assistant geological surveyor in New South Wales when the former occupant, Lamont H. Young, disappeared in mysterious circumstances while on field-work at Bermagui.

²⁸⁸ David MacMillan, *Edgeworth David* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1936)

²⁸⁹ T.W.E David, Evidence of Glacial Action in the neighborhood of Cardiff. *Cardiff Naturists Society Transactions* (1881), in appendix, pp. 1-19 (NLA MS8890 series 1)

²⁹⁰ T.W.E David, Evidence of Glacial Action in Glamorganshire, *Quarterly journal of the Geology Society of London* vol. 39 (1883), pp. 39-54.

Edgeworth David spent nine years on field work in the State Geological Survey, during which time he made finds of tin bearing ore and was responsible for making extended coal seam discoveries in the Hunter Valley. Edgeworth David's standing as a world class geologist developed quickly on the strength of his geological analysis of the Hunter Valley coal fields and his discovery of the Greta coal seams near Maitland. Edgeworth David's earlier interest in glaciations was also revived while working in the Hunter River district in 1885 and later he devoted much time to the study of the late Paleozoic glacial remains in the Hunter River district and, later, the Pleistocene glaciated country about Mount Kosciusko.

In 1891 he left the State Geological Survey and was appointed Professor of Geography and Geology at Sydney University. Although he only had a staff of four and poor quality rooms, Edgeworth David built this position to one of great influence, both within and outside the growing university. David was not only a good scientist but had a very cultured manner with a sense of humour, great enthusiasm, sympathy and courtesy and these attributes helped him make the most of his new position. His department was housed in a small cottage, its equipment was poor and he had no lecturers or demonstrators; but he gradually obtained better facilities and built up his department. During this period Edgeworth David undertook significant work of the origin of coral in his three expeditions to Tuvalu 1897-99 where he carried out deep drilling to obtain material which supported Darwin's position of the growth of coral reefs. This endorsed his standing as a scientist of note.

7.3. Interest in Antarctic

Edgeworth David's interest in glacial studies extended to Antarctica when he subsequently analyzed the rocks collected by the Bull and Borchgrevink expeditions at Cape Adare, confirming the continental nature of the Antarctic continent, he commented:

The schistose and granitic rocks collected by Borchgrevink are distinctly of continental origin and imply a strong probability of the continuity of Victoria Land with Adelie Land.²⁹¹

In 1897 Edgeworth David's continuing interest in Antarctic was demonstrated in an address to the Linnaean Society of NSW on 'The Survey of existing knowledge of Antarctica'. This included a plea for support for further British exploration on that continent²⁹². By May 1906, David had become an authority on past ice ages and attended an international glacial

²⁹¹ Proc.Roy.soc. NSW, 32 (1897), pp. 221-51.

²⁹² Proc.Roy.soc. NSW, 29 (1895), pp. 278-315 and pp. 461-92.

conference in Mexico where his expertise was applauded. A few months later in 1907, Ernest Shackleton invited Edgeworth David to journey south with his expedition and return in the *Nimrod* at the end of the summer. Edgeworth David was delighted and commented 'I look upon Shackleton's invitation to join the expedition as one of the greatest compliments I have received in my life'²⁹³.

Edgeworth David immediately applied for short term leave and set about supporting the expedition, arranging for Mawson to join him as a physicist and two other students, Bertram Armytage and Leo Cotton, to also sail on the *Nimrod*. Before leaving he had used his influence to secure government grants in aid of the expedition. His standing in Sydney at the time is illustrated by the historian Swan's summary of Edgeworth David's influence at that time.

Professor Edgeworth David was one of the most respected men of science that Australia has had as a citizen. His judgment was held in such esteem by the commonwealth government that when he recommended a grant of £5000 towards the cost of the Shackleton expedition his advice was taken and the grant was made without question.²⁹⁴

David had such a supportive social friendship with politicians and Prime Ministers of the day that the Leader of the Opposition even commented in parliament on his request for funding: 'If Professor David says he wants the money, that ends it'²⁹⁵. However, money was tight and the following year, when the government was attacked in the Senate over its support for the expedition, Senator Best was obliged to make a strong defence of the funding commitment, saying:

It is understood that special attention will be paid to the scientific problems which particularly interest Australia especially those connected with the study of meteorology.²⁹⁶

The support which David was able to draw from the Australian Parliament demonstrates the character of the man and the respect he was held in by society. This allocation of funds also

²⁹³ M.E. David, *Professor David; the Life of Sir Edgeworth David* (London: Edward Arnold, 1937), p. 171.

²⁹⁴ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 17.

²⁹⁵ Comm.Parl.Deb. XLII (1907) pp. 7491-3 and Papers Gen,II (1907-8), pp. 1169-706.

²⁹⁶ Senate Hansard, 6 February 1908, pp. 7849-50.

marks the first successful formal support from the Australian Government for Antarctic activity. Over the next five years David can be seen as playing a pivotal role in solidifying Australian support for Antarctica from the relative new Federal Government and later in spreading his enthusiasm for Antarctica across Australia.

7.4. Participation in the Shackleton 1907-1909 Expedition

Sydney University granted David leave for the summer voyage, however even before the Shackleton 1907-09 expedition had made an Antarctic landfall, David had decided to stay on through the winter and he sent a letter back to the university on a support ship advising of this decision. This meant taking unauthorized leave, but the promise of scientific work and the lure of new adventures were not to be passed up. The expedition set sail in December 1907 and John King Davis of the *Nimrod*, a critical judge of men, praised David highly in his biography of his Antarctic voyages published in 1962, as follows:

None of us will ever forget Professor T.E.W David or 'prof' as we called him and after all these years the memory of his strength and humility, his well stored mind, his courage and his old world courtesy always remain with me. The most thoughtless among us felt a compelling urge to do their best when they were in his presence. He had that rare gift of ennobling all he touched.²⁹⁷

David's fiftieth birthday in March 1908 passed with him leading the first ascent of the active volcano Mount Erebus (3,795 m) His maturity and strength impressed Shackleton who next gave him charge of a major journey the next summer in an attempt to reach the south magnetic Pole. This sledge journey took four months, during which time David, with Mawson and a medical doctor Alistair Forbes Mackay, dragged laden sledges from sea-level up more than 2,200 metres in elevation to their goal on the ice plateau. Covering more than 1,200 km in distance and virtually unsupported, this journey is still recognized as an absolute epic of courage and endurance. Towards the end of the journey and as a contingency suggested by Shackleton, David formally offered Mawson the leadership role of the field party when he thought he was physically failing²⁹⁸, which again shows the character of the man.

²⁹⁷ John King Davis, *High Latitude* (Parkville: Melbourne University Press, 1962), p. 83.

²⁹⁸ David Family papers NLA MS 8890 series 1 folder 20(photo copies of notes from the British Antarctic Expedition 1907-1909)

In the euphoria of celebrations on David's return to Sydney after the expedition, in late March 1909, the question of his unauthorized leave simply disappeared and he was the toast of the University and the Australian scientific community. Shackleton commissioned him to write the account of the South Magnetic Pole journey in the book of the expedition²⁹⁹ as well as the overall geology report, with Raymond Priestley.

To further support Shackleton in raising funds in Australia for publication of the scientific results of the expedition, David embarked on a strenuous lecture tour of all the Australian States, including Western Australia. The character of the man and his flair as a presenter and publicist ensured success for the lecture tour and he was awarded the Mueller Medal by the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) In 1910 David was appointed C.M.G. and took his Antarctic lectures to England for further fund raising for Shackleton and Oxford University conferred on him its honorary D.Sc. in 1911.

7.5. Promotion of Australian Science

The Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was founded in 1888³⁰⁰ by Archibald Liversidge to promote science. It was modeled on the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) which had been formed in 1831. David had attended BAAS conferences presenting Australian science and was elected President to the Australasian body in 1892. Its annual meetings were a popular and influential way of promoting science in Australia and New Zealand.

After the 1907/9 Shackleton expedition and the associated global interest created in Antarctica, David and his colleague Orme Masson advocated bringing the BAAAS meeting to Australia to promote Australian science to the world. This would provide a focus on Southern science, including Antarctica and provide a break from the growing tensions in Europe. However, to succeed required considerable Australian Government backing. David was good at this and set about gaining official support. On 16 December 1909 he led a deputation to Prime Minister Alfred Deakin who enthusiastically offered support for the meeting to be held in Australia, with a funding promise of £10,000³⁰¹. In 1913 the new Prime

²⁹⁹ Ernest Henry Shackleton, Hugh Robert Mill, and T. W. Edgeworth David, *The Heart of the Antarctic; Being the Story of the British Antarctic Expedition 1907-1909*, vol 2 (London: W. Heinemann, 1909), pp. 6-13.

³⁰⁰ In 1930 the name was changed to Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science (ANZAAS)

³⁰¹ ADB vol. 10, pp. 432-35.

Minister Andrew Fisher approved the Australian government grant of £15,000 to cover passages of not less than 150 official representatives. In December David announced the details to the 1913 AAAS conference³⁰² and the meeting was a great success the following year in 1914. The itinerary started from Perth then went to Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, with a side trip to Hobart. The success of this conference was a great credit to David's ability to gain substantial support from government and it assisted in enhancing collaboration between the Sydney and Melbourne based science groups.

7.6. Support for other Antarctic Expeditions

From 1909 David assumed the role of doyen of Australia's involvement in Antarctic expeditions and he took it upon himself to gather local assistance for the Antarctic expeditions of Scott, Mawson, the Japanese Shirase and twice more intervening with the poorly arranged Shackleton Ross Sea party. During this period David lobbied governments to provide administrative support to Scott's British Antarctic Expedition 1910-12 *Terra Nova* expedition. This resulted in the Commonwealth government granting the sum of £2,500 towards the cost of the expedition³⁰³ in October 1910. At that time David also assisted Scott to recruit three geologists for the expedition. These were two of his former students, Griffith Taylor and Frank Debenham and Raymond Priestley who was working for David as a research assistant analyzing the geological results from the Shackleton expedition.

Scott thanked David in a letter from Christchurch for his great help in Sydney:

Only now can I realize what I should have missed had I not met you in Sydney...and secondly the value of the notes you sent me.³⁰⁴

This was followed up by a letter a year later from Scott, from his Antarctic winter base, reporting on the Australian geologists: 'Your protégés are both exceedingly popular with us'³⁰⁵. Another letter was sent to David by Edward Wilson; Scott's Second in Command, also reporting on the success of the Australian contingent, before setting out on his fateful journey to the pole:

³⁰² Edgeworth David Presidential Address AAAS 1913, p. lvii.

³⁰³ Comm. Parl. Deb., lvii (1910), p. 4593.

³⁰⁴ Scott to David, 20 November 1910, ML MS 3022 microfilm CY3810 second reel.

³⁰⁵ Scott to David 20 October 1911, ML MS 3022.

I can assure you we have appreciated your Australian contingent. Taylor is brilliant, Debenham most solid and capable and Priestley is loved by us all....
My dear David I remember our short meeting always with the greatest pleasure.
Hope to meet you again.³⁰⁶

David was devastated by the subsequent news of Scott's death and wrote a series of newspaper articles stressing the value of the expedition's work³⁰⁷. He earlier had supported Amundsen in response to press criticisms and when Amundsen arrived in Sydney in April 1913, after his South Pole success and David arranged dinners and a harbour cruise for him³⁰⁸.

In 1912 David interceded with the public and government over the treatment of the poorly equipped Japanese Antarctic expedition, whose members were considered spies on their arrival in Sydney. David advised the expedition on equipment which was then upgraded from Japan and the expedition were allowed to erect their hut at Parsley Bay which became quite a friendly attraction for the locals. This assistance was so appreciated by their leader, Lieutenant Shirase that he presented David with a beautiful samurai sword apparently a special parting present by the Japanese Emperor, to be planted at the South Pole. This sword is now held in the Australian Museum in Sydney³⁰⁹.

In 1914 David was instrumental in facilitating the dispatch of the Ross Sea party of the Shackleton Trans Antarctic expedition from Sydney, when Andreas Mackintosh, the Ross Sea party leader arrived without a ship or adequate funding from Shackleton. David made personal representations to the Prime Minister Andrew Fisher to secure the use of Mawson's *Aurora* ship and argued that without this support group Shackleton's main party would die for want of the planned advance food depots³¹⁰. This led to a grant to repair the ship, which subsequently required additional funding as the ship was in very poor condition. It required further repair in New Zealand and this funding blow-out caused a rift between the

³⁰⁶ Letter Wilson to David, ML MS 3022.

³⁰⁷ David's commentaries on the Scott tragedy published in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 February 1913, pp.8-10 and 12 February 11, 12-14 and 13 February, pp. 5 and 9-10.

³⁰⁸ David Branagan, *Edgeworth David :A Life*, (Canberra: National Library, 2005), p. 228.

³⁰⁹ David papers NLA MS 8890 folders, pp. 32-36.

³¹⁰ John King Davis, *High Latitude*, p. 258.

government and Shackleton when Australia was subsequently requested by England to send a ship to retrieve the remaining members of the Ross Sea party³¹¹.

7.7 The First World War and Beyond

With the advent of the First World War David enlisted for an active service role, although by then he was aged 58. He was instrumental in establishing the Australian Tunnelling Corps, using his expertise in mine tunnelling and explosives, which was used to blow up German trenches and positions in France and Holland. After the end of the conflict, although incapacitated by a war injury, David continued his scientific research and publication of Geological texts and his reputation as an explorer, writer and lecturer was acknowledged universally. Edgeworth David's appointments at the University of Sydney included Professor of Geology and Physical Geography, 1891-1924, Chairman of the Professorial Board and Dean of the Faculty of Science. His Geological report of the Shackleton expedition was published with Priestley in 1914 and the major Geological map of the Commonwealth of Australia and a volume of Explanatory Notes were published in 1932. He published more than 150 scientific publications and a considerable number of articles in newspapers and journals. The main David Papers with their geological emphasis are held at the University of Sydney³¹², while his family correspondence is held in the Mitchell Library in Sydney and the National Library Canberra³¹³.

David was knighted in 1920 and was honoured on his death with a joint State funeral joint funeral in 1934. The funeral demonstrated the high level of esteem in which he was held, as his biographer Branagan notes:

For two hours prior to the cathedral ceremony citizens of all facets of society filed past Davis's coffin, honoring as the Sydney Morning Herald put it, a fine scholar, a great scientist, a gifted teacher, a distinguished explorer. An ardent patriot, a warm hearted philanthropist a gracious friend and humble minded Christian gentleman.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Lennard Bickel, *Shackleton's Forgotten Argonauts* (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1982); Davis, *High Latitude*.chapter 16, pp. 255-280, and Julie Richards, *Wilderness Survivors* (South Yarra : Macmillan Education, 2002)

³¹² Papers of the Edgeworth David Family (University of Sydney archives, SU P 11)

³¹³ Papers of the David family, Mitchell Library ML MS 3022 and NLA MS 8890.

³¹⁴ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29, 30, 31 Aug 1934.

David's great contribution drew tributes from government and opposition leaders in both houses, with Sir Earle Page citing him as one of the greatest Australians. Two months after the joint NSW/Federal State funeral, both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the Federal Parliament passed unanimous motions of condolence 'at the death of a citizen who had never sat in Parliament and who had never aspired to do so'³¹⁵.

In Antarctica four features are named after him, two from his exploration during the Shackleton expedition and two named by Mawson in his honour in Australian Antarctic Territory. The Edgeworth David summer research station was established by Australia in the Bunger Hills area of Antarctica in 1986. This is an important refueling site for aircraft operational connections between the permanent Australian bases Casey, Davis and Mawson.

7.8 Conclusion -Edgeworth David

Edgeworth David can be considered to be the first of the outstanding individuals who made an impact on Australian Antarctic policy in the first decades of the century, but his pivotal role in initial Antarctic policy is largely overlooked. As an established scientist with great personal character and social standing he can be seen to be the first successful advocate of Australian involvement in Antarctica and provided the first positive Antarctic policy influence on the embryonic federal government. This began when he obtained breakthrough support of the new Commonwealth of Australia Government, for the 1907/09 Shackleton expedition. His personal success on that expedition and the publicity arising from a lecture with Shackleton across Australia subsequently shaped the public's and the government's future interests in Australia's participation in Antarctica. His influence continued as a strong supporter of Douglas Mawson to government promoting the concept of a science based Australasian Antarctic Expedition. Even after the departure of that Mawson led expedition, David's administrative role continued and most of the decisions pertaining to the administration of the expedition were made by David as president of the AAAS, the sponsor body for the expedition. With the tragic death of Ninnis and Mertz and the stranding of Mawson for a second Antarctic winter, David secured a commitment from the Commonwealth government to send a rescue ship to pick up the Mawson party in early 1913 after the dramatic survival journey. David's lasting contribution to the advancement of Australian government Antarctic policy is that he made the breakthrough threshold step in

³¹⁵House of representatives Votes and Proceedings no 1 Tuesday 23 October 1934 (copies in NLA MS 8890 series 1 folder 12) cited in. Branagan , *Edgeworth David :A Life* , p.3

gaining recognition that Australia had a role to play in Antarctic science, even though initially it was in supporting British expeditions. Using his standing in society, his approaches to the young Australian government were quite a watershed in getting Antarctica on the Australian government agenda. This breakthrough was capitalized on by the success of the hands on role as chief scientist on the Shackleton expedition and the manner in which he supported and furthered mentored the young Douglas Mawson firstly from the his work on the expedition and then as a crucial advocate in Britain and Australia to further the AAE which Mawson took over from Shackleton. David always used his scientific standing as a base to present the results of the Antarctic expedition to the world and to the Australian public and to the Australia politicians. While Mawson was in Antarctic on the AAE David mentored and took over the organization of the expedition, necessarily removing the expedition administrator and arranging government funding and the arrangement for the rescue of the stranded 1912 party. His standing and enthusiasm for Australian science in Antarctica continued long after his incapacitating injury in the western front and his standing in the Australian community was mourned at the highest levels.

David can clearly be seen as making the initial policy breakthrough in convincing the Australian Government to support an Australian role in Antarctica and gaining public interest before handing the baton to Douglas Mawson to further influence Australian government policies on Antarctica. His influence was very significant as he actually initialed a government policy response to Antarctica, in effect he broke the drought when individual scientists had tried unsuccessfully to gain support from colonial governments before Federation. He was also very important in mentoring Mawson and providing a back up support for the AAE when arrangements got out of control as well as support for Shackleton's ill fated Ross sea party

Chapter 8. The influences of Sir Douglas Mawson on Australian Antarctica Policy

8.1 Introduction

Whilst Edgeworth David was the first to achieve a significant influence on Antarctic policy he had been quick to promote his protégé and Antarctic colleague Douglas Mawson to both the Australian public and to the science community. Mawson went on to become the quintessential Australian Antarctic icon, who persisted in trying to convince Australia the government and the public to take a major role in Antarctica until his death in 1958. His remarkable resolve and influence on government seeking for Australia to become deeply involved in Antarctica lasted for almost 50 years from his enlistment with the Shackleton 1907-1909 expedition until his death in 1958.

However Mawson's impact on Australian government Antarctic Policy has not been specifically evaluated as much of his independent voice fell on deaf ears in government, or was drowned out by other more imperative noises of world conflict or economic depression. This study examines his input to policy and questions why he was not more successful in getting support from government for his Australian Antarctic vision over such a long period. It answers the question of just how much did Mawson succeed in influencing Australian policy and why it took from 1909 to 1947 for the government to implement a strategy, advocated by Mawson, to occupy the ice continent south of Australia with a scientific base.

Much of Mawson's correspondence in relation to Antarctica is preserved at the Mawson Institute in Adelaide while many of his letters to government are also held at the Australian National Archives in Canberra. He presented many addresses to learned societies and his comments were frequently reported in the popular press, such as *Argus* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* newspapers. Biographies of Mawson by his wife Paquita and by Ayres provide details of his private life, while Jacka and Jacka have edited and published his Antarctic field diaries³¹⁶. These works show his extraordinary physical and mental capacity under hardship. Mawson's own account of the 1911-14 Australasian Antarctic Expedition also reveals much of his expedition character. This is furthered complemented by Grenfell Price's account of the 1929-31 British, Australian and New Zealand Research Expedition

³¹⁶ D. Mawson, *Mawson's Antarctic Diaries* Jacka and Jacka ,eds (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,1988)

(BANZARE) using Mawson's diary notes from the voyages³¹⁷. In comparing 'Mawson of Antarctica' with 'Flynn of the Inland', Hains (2002)³¹⁸ examines his frontier spirit as a national characteristic, while Swan³¹⁹, traces Mawson's contributions to science in coping with the hardest of conditions but concludes it is also the scientific spirit which is important. . The AAE and BANZARE publications and those of his expeditioner colleagues³²⁰ showcase his continued interest in Antarctic for more than 50 years from 1907 to 1958. They show the human side of the explorer and how his personal life became entwined with Antarctica through the success of his field expeditions and the need to publish expedition reports for his scientific standing.

The Ayres biography also shows the wider spectrum of Mawson's interests in non- Antarctic matters, where he endeavoured to make money from a variety of business interests, such as timber and mining, most of which failed. Details of his private life presented by his wife reveal his personal connections with English society before 1920 and his strong integration in Adelaide society after that time, but show little of his achievement with regards to Australian Antarctic policy.

With the eventual creation of the government agency to support the Australian Antarctic National Research Expedition in 1947 and the subsequent establishment of permanent Australian bases in Antarctica, Mawson's role changed from that of an individual person pressing the government to send a scientific expedition to the continent to substantiate a territorial claim, to becoming involved in an operational planning committee inside the government. To fully appreciate his situational change from individually trying to influence policy creation as an outsider to actual policy implementation within government, it is necessary to examine his own personal background and career to give a perspective on how he approached the external factors which he encountered.

8.2. Mawson's Early Antarctic Activities

Mawson was born in Yorkshire in 1882 into the rural middle class and came to Australia when he was only two years old. He attended the Fort Street Model Public School in Sydney

³¹⁷ Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctic* , pp. vii-viii

³¹⁸ Brigid Hains, *The Ice and the Inland: Mawson ,Flynn, and the Myth of the Frontier*.

³¹⁹ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*.

³²⁰ Charles Francis Laseron, *South with Mawson : Reminiscences of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 1911-14*, 2nd edition. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1957)

before studying at Sydney University under Edgeworth David. David continued to encourage Mawson as his protégé after he graduated in 1904. On graduation Mawson's indirect association with the Antarctic ice cap commenced in 1905, when he took up a position as a lecturer in Mineralogy and Petrology, at the University of Adelaide. He then undertook geological fieldwork in the Broken Hill area which later was to earn him a doctoral degree. He was intrigued to encounter signs of old glaciation in the dry landscape around Broken Hill. In late September 1907 while in the field, he learnt that his supervisor and mentor Edgeworth David was to go south with Shackleton to Antarctica. In reporting to Edgeworth David on progress in his field activities, Mawson added that he would 'have dearly loved to have gone myself'³²¹. Later that year Mawson met Shackleton in Adelaide en route to Antarctica and offered his services for the round trip to Antarctica on Shackleton's expedition ship. He wanted to see an ice cap in action so as to better understand the evidence of pre-Cambrian glaciations encountered during his field work near Broken Hill.

Edgeworth David subsequently arranged for Mawson to join the wintering Shackleton expedition as a physicist and later agreed to personally join the expedition as geologist and chief scientist. So with a simple introduction to Shackleton in Adelaide and support from his mentor Edgeworth David, Mawson's Antarctic career and legend commenced in 1907 as a physicist not as a geologist. His almost superhuman activities on the long South Magnetic Pole man-hauling journey during that expedition earned him universal respect amongst scientific and Antarctic peers worldwide. On return to Australia in 1909 Edgeworth David and Mawson, were feted as public heroes by a new nation seeking its own icons.

The Australian public's euphoria for Mawson on his return to Adelaide in March 1909 is shown in the newspaper stories of the day.³²² Although a virtually unknown returning expeditioner, Mawson was given a high profile by Edgeworth David in the Shackleton expedition reports and through David's fund raising public lectures in Australia. However, at this time Mawson, as a junior lecturer, was focused on his own immediate career. It was only when his doctorate was completed later that year in 1909 that he went to England, land of his birth. This was to meet relatives and to seek future career opportunities by meeting important political and scientific figures. Edgeworth David had arranged entree for Mawson to meet eminent geologists and other scientists in England and northern Europe and he quickly made

³²¹ Letter : Mawson to Edgeworth David 28 September 1907 (David Correspondence, Mitchell Library MSS 3022/1)

³²² Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 29; *Sydney Morning Herald* , 31 March 1909.

a good impression. This successful introduction to the British and European science community was then complemented by a lecturing tour with Shackleton, in the United States of America.

His physical and mental capacity, standing and presence resulted in Mawson receiving invitations from both Scott and Shackleton for involvement in their next Antarctic expeditions. Declining Scott's offer, which included an opportunity to participate in the final dash for the South Pole, Mawson agreed in 1909 to become involved as chief scientist in Shackleton's planned second expedition to Antarctica, which would include coastal exploration work near the south magnetic pole. Using his new prominence in English society, Mawson sought to gain support for Shackleton's primarily scientific expedition at a time when Scott was also vying for public and government support in his own quest to reach the South Pole. However, while Mawson was respected and feted in English society, his emergence as a prominent individual in Australia able to influence the Antarctic policy of the new Australian Government, or to gain support from the Australian public, was yet to develop.

Mawson returned to Adelaide University in May 1910 after the high profile lecture tour to the United States. He then gave a series of lectures connected with polar exploration to publicise the forthcoming Shackleton expedition, although Mawson was sensitive to the squabble in London between Shackleton and Scott over fund raising. Later that year when Scott arrived in Australia to make preparations for his second expedition and in October, Mawson advised John King Davis, who was still on staff with Shackleton in London, 'I shall make a public appeal for funds in the later part of November when Scott has gone'³²³.

The turmoil of Shackleton's life at this time, in chasing quick 'get rich' business schemes, is well documented in Shackleton biographies (Mill, 1923)³²⁴ (Huntford, 1986)³²⁵. Mawson became involved in some of these schemes, such as investigating the geology of mines in Hungary for Shackleton, but these were distractions and never produced an economic return. Mawson's personal connection with Shackleton gradually diverged as Shackleton continued to chase similar unsuccessful ventures, while Mawson continued to push for the Antarctic coastal expedition in the vicinity of the south magnetic pole.

³²³ Letter, Mawson to Davis 19 October 1910, Davis papers, Latrobe library (box3270/9)

³²⁴ M.R.Mill,*The Life of Sir Ernest Shackleton* (London: Heinemann, 1923)

³²⁵ Roland Huntford, *Shackleton* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986)

His choice of this area for his expedition needs examination to understand why Mawson had a continuing focus on the Antarctic ice cap region near the south magnetic pole, rather than the south geographic pole. As the physicist on Shackleton 1907-09 expedition he made his considerable reputation as a superhuman explorer when with Edgeworth David and Forbes MacKay he undertook the longest unsupported Antarctic sledging trip of over 2000 kilometres. Mawson was both the scientist and navigator on this immense journey while David was the geologist. The objective of the journey was to define and occupy the location of the south magnetic pole as previously calculated by Sabine and Chetwynd, magneticians with the Ross and Scott expeditions. As they approached the vicinity of the magnetic pole Edgeworth David was reaching the physical limits of his endurance. With associated shortage of food Mawson was under constant stress to reach a dip circle reading which could be interpreted as being within the oscillation footprint of the pole before beginning the long return journey. However, precise determination was difficult with poor instruments; the unknown dynamic nature of the pole; and magnetic storms clouding the nature of the readings. The lack of a properly calibrated dip circle and only an aluminium prismatic compass for determining the weak horizontal component of the magnetic field compounded the problem of location. It required intuition to navigate to a higher magnetic latitude location in a featureless white icecap relying only on the instruments available. Physical conditions were very difficult indeed, but it is surprising that Mawson, as a serious scientist, did not more adequately record his observations at this time, which was contrary to his scientific training. This is an indication of the immense stress he was under.

While closing in on the magnetic pole and sledging on half rations, Mackay, as medical doctor on the 1909 journey argued that they did not have time or food to go further. However, he compromised by agreeing to make a final dash towards the location of the magnetic pole. Surprisingly when they made this last dash forward in February 1909, Mawson did not take the dip circle to record the location of their closest approach. Webb's Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE) report on magnetism was published, with Mawson as editor, sixteen years later in 1925. It comments on Mawson's 1909 observations when close to the magnetic pole:

Furthermore, these latter readings were made after the instrument had been invaded by drift snow as a result of a blizzard a few days before ... the observer's note states

that one end of the needle only was read hurriedly and polarity was not reversed, in addition it is generally accepted by competent observers that a Lloyd-Creak circle tends to give high dips and is a difficult instrument from which to obtain good results under the best conditions...³²⁶

From his diaries it is clear that Mawson found an anomaly in the Chetwynd prediction of the location magnetic pole while sledging towards that point. He then would have realised that they could not now reach the real position of the pole, which was further away than expected (Jacka and Jacka 1988) Mawson optimistically hoped that, with diurnal peregrination in the oscillation position of the magnetic pole area, it would have fluctuated to a position under their furthest camp. Mawer (2006) further discusses this in hindsight in his treatise on the South Magnetic Pole, 'South by Northwest',³²⁷ where the shortcomings of Mawson's observation's are highlighted. Despite these comments it is argued here that such criticism of Mawson's work on this journey is shallow and unjustified considering the conditions and circumstances. However, the sense of an incomplete science project apparently remained with Mawson who took much pride in his scientific approach. When Scott arrived in Hobart in October 1910 he wrote to Mawson seeking information on the planned Shackleton/Mawson expedition. Mawson replied in November with details of the planned exploration of the uncharted coast extending from Cape Adare to Gaussberg. He added, 'Personally I want to make a clean job of the magnetic Pole with a year's reading in the vicinity',³²⁸.

In 1912 Mawson was in Antarctica leading the AAE, in which Webb made further very important observations refining the position of the magnetic pole. At that time a laboratory analysis of the Mawson 1909 observations was completed by the New Zealand magneticians Farr and Skye. Farr advised Edgeworth David in February 1912, that the analysis of the 1909 results showed that the oscillation area of the pole had not been reached³²⁹. Edgeworth David was very concerned and replied in an apologetic manner to excuse Mawson's work as a magnetician and published an article in *Nature*³³⁰ describing the location reached as only a

³²⁶ Webb in D. Mawson, ed. 'Australasian Antarctic Expedition, Scientific Reports' in *terrestrial magnetism* (Sydney: NSW Government Printer 1925), p.52.

³²⁷ G. A. Mawer, *South by Northwest : The Magnetic Crusade and the Contest for Antarctica* (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2006), pp. 179, 206-208.

³²⁸ Letter Mawson to Captain Scott in Paquita Mawson, *Mawson of the Antarctic* (1964), pp. 44.

³²⁹ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p.70, see also Letter David to Farr 1912, (David Correspondence Mitchell library MSS3022/2.)

³³⁰ *Nature*, no.2286, vol.91, (21 August 1913), pp. 651.

‘rough determination’. Edgeworth David as a profound scientist was very sensitive to this criticism and advised Mawson to make a clear statement of the facts surrounding the shortfall. This issue caused a rift in the close relationship with Mawson which took some time to heal. Mawson did eventually reword the ‘Who’s Who’ entry in the 1930s to alter the words ‘discoverers of the south magnetic pole’ to the factual ‘magnetic pole journey 1908’. The criticism of the venture and that by Webb³³¹ seems extraordinary shallow as they certainly reached the vicinity of the magnetic pole which is dynamic in nature and has moved thousands of kilometres since that time with a sizable daily variation.

Thus, there is strong evidence that the quality of the 1909 observational records caused Mawson some embarrassment, as well as producing positional uncertainty concerning the exact position of the Magnetic pole. It is possible that Mawson’s concern over the peer perception of his poor scientific observations and over zealous claims to have reached the Magnetic Pole may have been the reason he did not choose to be further involved in geological exploration associated with the Trans Antarctic Mountains, with their wealth of interesting rock types. Instead he chose to give his attention to an area of featureless ice cap which contained the surface position of the south magnetic pole. Regardless of the reason, once Mawson made the decision to be involved in science exploration on an uncharted coastline, rather than participating with either Scott or Shackleton in the glory of a geographic pole event, it set him aside from that race. However, it also made it more difficult to secure financial sponsors who were willing to place scientific discoveries ahead of national glory.

8.3. Mawson's Early Impact on Australian Government Antarctic Policy

His prime attention on return from Antarctica in the year of 1909 had been in furthering his geological career by fieldwork, research and lecturing. Although participation in the proposed Shackleton second expedition, seeking the geographic pole (if Scott’s second attempt was unsuccessful) was heavily on his mind, he had no supportive base for gathering Australian support for the expedition and consequently had no direct impact on Australian Antarctic policy at this time. After nearly a year of confusion over leadership and content of

³³¹ During the AAE Webb the young expert magnetician was critical of Mawson’s scientific and navigational skill as reported in Jacka and Jacka eds. *Mawson’s Antarctic Diaries*. Mawson apparently in response to this confrontation Mawson appointed the more experienced Bage as leader of the party to sledge to the South Magnetic pole instead of Webb.

the proposed expedition, Shackleton advised Mawson in early December 1910 that he would not go on the expedition and would give Mawson his wholehearted support. Mawson thus emerged at the end of 1910, from the shadow of Shackleton, as a leader of an Antarctic expedition focused on the Antarctic coastline facing Australia. He was now also the entrepreneur and needed to personally raise considerable financial sponsorship for the proposed expedition. Mawson had been much publicised in England by Shackleton through public lectures and although promoted by Edgeworth David in Australia, Mawson was better known in British Antarctic circles in early 1910 than in Australia.

This began to change in 1911 with the occasion of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) meeting in Sydney, where on 11 January Mawson announced his plan for a three base coastal expedition and sought endorsement from that science body. His address included slides and strong supportive arguments citing economic, scientific and nationalistic reasons why Australia should support such an immediate expedition. The expedition would take about 18 months and the results would be presented 'at one of the greatest scientific events in the history of Australia, namely the meeting of the British Association of the Advancement of Science in 1914'.³³²

The AAAS meeting in Sydney in January 1911 became another significant landmark for Australian involvement in Antarctica, with Mawson signalling a breakaway from British led expeditions, even though he emphasised the importance of presentation of results to British scientific meetings. With the endorsement of the meeting and resulting press coverage, Mawson became the figurehead for an Australasian expedition. Importantly, he now had gained a supportive base to take on the task of influencing the Australian state and federal governments and to raise private sponsorship from the public. However, the old allegiance to England was still strong and the AAAS supported Mawson on the proviso that Shackleton 'gave written agreement that Mawson was to be the supreme commander'.³³³ The AAAS immediately established a committee to pursue public sponsorship in Australia and to approach state and federal governments for funds. Taking another six months leave from the University, Mawson departed for London at the end of January, just two weeks after the Sydney meeting and was away until July 1911. The object of the return to England was to ensure Shackleton's promised financial support was still available and to use his society

³³² *Argus*, 6 January 1911, reported the address by Mawson announcing The proposed Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911.

³³³ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 44.

connections to gain public support for the Australian expedition, as distinct from the previous British proposals of Scott and Shackleton to reach the geographic pole.

This strategy shows that the basis of Mawson's financial support for an expedition was still primarily focused in England. London was the centre of British polar exploration and there Mawson vigorously pursued sponsorship to purchase an aeroplane, ship, motor sledges, dogs and polar equipment. However, he tensely waited for news about federal funding in Australia from the Antarctic committee of the AAAS while committing to expedition expenditure on credit. The promotion of the expedition to the Australian governments was through the special Antarctic committee and its chairman, Sir Orme Masson. Mawson had very little direct input to, or impact on the development of Australian Antarctic policy at this time. His prime concern was to gain sponsorship in England, where his previous efforts had been in support of a British expedition led by Shackleton. In attempting to transfer the goodwill previously given in support of the proposed Shackleton led expedition, he also needed to unwind the convoluted relationship with Shackleton's sponsors and redirect them to his own expedition.

Whilst largely successful in England in the first half of 1911, he had some disappointments as substantial moneys promised, or forwarded to Shackleton, had dried up or been used on other ventures. Another disappointment was the news that Scott had landed a second party at Cape Adare, compromising Mawson's plan to be the first to explore the coast of east Antarctica from that point. He addressed the Royal Geographic Society in London on 10 April seeking endorsement and financial support. While primarily promoting the expedition in this address as being scientific, not territorial based, in his summary he added that we 'desire to receive authority to raise the Union Jack and take possession of this land for the British Empire'³³⁴. Gaining support and encouragement from the Royal Geographic Society was important for a purely scientific expedition, even though it drew the comment from one member, Rudmose Brown, 'that there was something undeniably heroic in his programme, in that he has left out the pole; and money would consequently be harder to find'³³⁵. The society however, announced a grant of £500 to the Australian Antarctic Expedition (AAE)

³³⁴ Mawson's address of 10th April to RGS on the Australasian Antarctic Expedition in D. Mawson 'The Australasian Antarctic Expedition,' *Geographical Journal* 40 (1911), pp. 618-20.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 620.

The need to obtain sponsorship money in England was heightened by the serious lack of progress on the requests made to the Australian Government. 1911 was the coronation year of King George V. This gala event had a detrimental impact on Mawson's request for funding of £20,000, as many Federal Cabinet ministers went to England to represent Australia. Subsequently, on 1 April it was announced that Federal Cabinet had deferred consideration of the Antarctic grant till September, after their return from the Coronation³³⁶. This was the first of several twists of fate which worked against Mawson gaining support from the Australian Government for his Antarctic vision. Mawson left England on a passenger ship on 21 June, the day before the Coronation, after nearly 6 months of hectic fund raising and expedition arrangements. Now an entrepreneur deeply in debt he anxiously looked for Australian support. Despite the debt, the expedition went ahead on credit and Captain John King Davis, as second in charge, followed in the expedition ship *Aurora* a month later.

Back at the Adelaide University in 1911, Mawson continued lecturing while attempting through science channels, to get a flow of funds from the state and commonwealth governments. With support from Orme Masson and the scientific committee of AAAS, Mawson at last began to have an impact on the attitudes of Australian Governments towards Antarctica. As a working scientific academic, Mawson was only lobbying in a part-time mode and was outside the core decision making process within government. In analysing this situation, it is evident that Mawson had only a narrow lobbying base, mainly from the science community even though he had gained lifelong personal support from Sir David Orme Masson, the influential AAAS President.

When the AAE expedition sailed from Hobart on 2 December 1911, Mawson was still considerably in debt. Fortunately he had aroused public interest and private business support both in England and Australia and Masson had gained more funds from state governments than the Federal government. This amounted to £7,000 from New South Wales, £5,000 from South Australia, £6,000 from Victoria and £500 from Tasmania. The expedition had much to deliver to the young nation looking for its own heroes, as well as to the mother country, with promises for the expansion of the British Empire. £2,000 was provided from British government, but the long hoped for support of £20,000 from the Commonwealth government

³³⁶ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p.46.

turned out to be only £5,000 (with another £5,000 provided in 1913, when the expedition was delayed at Cape Denison another year)³³⁷.

Mawson's intention was to head west from the 1901 Borchgrevink's expedition point of Cape Adare, along the general ice covered coastline of the Ross expedition and the Wilkes expeditions in 1837-40. This extended to Kaiser Wilhelm Land, which had been visited by the Drygalski 1904 expedition. These end points were the only substantiated landings on the eastern side of the Antarctic³³⁸. It can be considered that one of the main drivers of Mawson in choosing to focus on this new ice covered coastline in the vicinity of the magnetic pole for AAE was to rectify his scientific observation shortcomings in the 1909 sledging trip with Davis and Mackay. It is argued that this decision was to have a significant impact of Australia's subsequent territorial claim. Had Mawson returned to the region of the British core expeditions and the Trans Antarctic Mountains it is likely that the area could have become part of the Australian claim, as well as the region traversed by the BANZARE voyages in 1929-31.

The drama of the AAE expedition is well described by Mawson in the expedition narrative, the scientific reports,³³⁹ expedition diaries³⁴⁰ and the personal accounts by Laseron (1957) and by Legg and Hurley (1966)³⁴¹. It was widely acclaimed as the greatest ever scientific expedition to that time. This was a great tribute to the scientific approach of Mawson who took such a variety of instruments and set up a wide a science program of observations. However despite its science excellence, it failed to secure a strong long-term commitment to Antarctica from either the federal or state governments. Whilst AAE cemented Mawson's place amongst the greatest Antarctic explorers, it left him some £8,000 in debt and with little support to analyse the results the expedition, or to prepare and publish the extensive scientific reports. In their Mawson biographies, Ayres (1999) and Paquita Mawson (1964) describe how the repayment of that debt and the publication of the scientific reports became a heavy burden to Mawson. It consumed him for a number of years, even when the South Australian and NSW governments eventually agreed to support the publication of the AAE reports,

³³⁷ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 134-5.

³³⁸ The French Dumont d'Urville expedition had landed briefly on a small islet in Terre Adelie in 1838

³³⁹ D. Mawson, *Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14 : Scientific Reports. Series A.*

³⁴⁰ Such as Mawson diaries published by Jacka and Jacka and Dr MacLean's detailed diary (Mitchell Library MSS 382/1-2)

³⁴¹ Laseron, *South with Mawson : Reminiscences of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 1911-14*, Frank Legg and Toni Hurley, *Once More on My Adventure* (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1966)

these remained a lifelong burden³⁴² and he was unable at times to get support from the scientists of the expedition to finalise their work on a timely and on a voluntary basis.

After AAE, Mawson's immediate expectation was to use his expedition's success to influence Australian politicians to pursue further science based expeditions towards an Australian territorial claim in Antarctica. However, Mawson's ongoing Antarctic ambitions were dealt a blow at the height of his success by major external factors outside his control. Firstly, Scott's unfortunate death in returning from the South Pole overwhelmed Mawson's own tragic journey with its loss of Ninnis and Mertz. Also, the enforced extra year at Cape Denison put celebrations of the AAE expedition on hold, when the dark clouds of war were gathering. On his return from Antarctica Mawson married Paquita Delprat, daughter of a BHP executive, in Melbourne in March 1914. They went straight to London where he was feted by British society, although perhaps somewhat morbidly in the wake of Captain Scott's demise. Despite the Scott tragedy, or perhaps because of it, Mawson was knighted in London in 29th June 1914, the day after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, which triggered the First World War.

Mawson returned to Adelaide in April 1915 to lecture at the Adelaide University for six months and to work on AAE reports. He increased his standing with the Federal Government and Prime Minister Billy Hughes, when he became secretary of the pro-conscription campaign in South Australia but he never gained favour as the War began in August 1914. Whilst his prime immediate concerns were the outstanding debt from the AAE expedition and the need to publish the scientific reports, he began to seek a suitable wartime position, writing to the Minister of Defence in September 1915. Later that year he went to Melbourne to work on AAE publications and arranged for the Chief of the Australian General Staff, Brigadier Foster, to write to the Chancellor of Adelaide University requesting leave for Mawson to go to England to discuss employment personally with the British War Cabinet³⁴³. Again the university granted him leave and he departed for London in April 1916, to seek useful wartime employment. En route to England he again toured America by train and completed a heavy load of 35 lectures to raise money, to reduce the debt still owing from the AAE, before arriving in London on 10 May. The desire to work in England during the war

³⁴² Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, Chapter 11, pp. 140-149.

³⁴³ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 112.

again illustrates his close identification with English society and the intertwined Antarctic connection with Britain.

Mawson's profile in Britain remained strong and on arrival he was immediately sought as an executive member of the Admiralty Committee for the Shackleton Relief expedition. This committee was established following reports that both the main Shackleton Trans-Antarctic party in the Weddell Sea, as well as the support party in the Ross Sea, needed rescue. His work with this government committee shows the high esteem in which Mawson was held in Britain, following his Antarctic expeditions and knighthood³⁴⁴. The committee made recommendations to parliament on ships and relief arrangements. The frugal Mawson estimated the likely cost as £45,000 but the remainder of the committee decided to ask for £65,000, which was quickly approved. Although a report from Shackleton showed that he and five companions had made a miraculous escape journey by boat to South Georgia, the remainder of the expedition were still at Elephant Island. The *Discovery* was despatched from England, arriving at Montevideo on 11 September to find that the party on Elephant Island had been rescued by the Chilean ship *Yelcho* on 31 August³⁴⁵. The British Admiralty Rescue Committee was subsequently disbanded, with responsibility for the rescue of the Ross Sea support party being passed to the Australian and New Zealand governments, with costs to be shared by the British government. With Davis as captain of the ship *Aurora*, the Ross Sea party was quietly relieved³⁴⁶. Mawson's involvement in the Admiralty Rescue Committee and accepting responsibility for the organisation of the rescue for the Ross Sea party showed that the Australian government was very responsive to a call for funds from the British Government for rescue of a British Antarctic expedition. But even the drama of the crushing of the ship *Endurance* and heroic reports of relief of that expedition was relegated to lesser news in the British press, as the First World War was full of heroic and tragic stories which filled the public's attention. Australia was also caught up in the horrors of war and with the dispatch of troops to Gallipoli in 1915, the Middle East and to the Western Front; Antarctic issues were put aside completely.

Meanwhile, in London, Mawson continued to negotiate with publishers about the editing and publishing of books related to the AAE. However, the market in adventure stories was

³⁴⁴ Paquita Mawson, *Mawson of the Antarctic*, pp. 127-8

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p.131; Ernest Henry Shackleton, *South : The Story of Shackleton's Last Expedition, 1914-1917* (London: W. Heinemann, 1919), p.131.

³⁴⁶ Kelly Tyler-Lewis, *The Lost Men : The Harrowing Saga of Shackleton's Ross Sea Expedition* (New York: Viking, 2006)

overwhelmed by the war raging in Europe and did not offer a useful financial return. In July 1916 he took up the first of several wartime postings in England related to the manufacture and supply of munitions to Russia for the rest of the war. He was joined in England by his wife and in 1917 his daughter Jessica was born. Mawson was due to go to Russia to follow up on his reports for the manufacture of munitions in Russia. However, the Bolshevik revolution made it doubly dangerous, so at the end of the war Mawson was at a loose end. After the armistice he returned to Australia in April 1919 to focus on his private life, possible business ventures and seeking a substantive academic position.

8.4. Mawson's impact on Australian Government Antarctic Policy following the first World War

Adelaide University supported Mawson throughout his career. It is interesting to note the time he was actually at the university, as against the time he was away on leave, in Antarctica or on world tours. He had initially taken up a junior position with Adelaide University in March 1905 lecturing in geology and undertaking investigative geological fieldwork, especially in uranium rich areas. He was then away from the University from December 1907 until March 1909 on leave with the Shackleton expedition in Antarctica before returning in April 1909 for lecturing and fieldwork. He was again on leave from the university for 8 months from November 1909 on being awarded a doctorate degree, before returning to a full term of teaching duties in August 1910. From January 1911 until July 1911 he was in London on leave making expedition arrangements for the AAE and on return to the university he was heavily involved in preparations for AAE. This departed in December 1911 and returned in March 1914. After the AAE he was then effectively on leave until late 1914 for post AAE duties and again on leave in Britain from April 1916 to April 1919. So in eleven years from 1907 to 1918 he spent less than three years at the university. Table 1 summarises his absences up to the end of the First World War.

Jan	a a			XX XX	xx		XX XX XX	a a	xx xx
Feb	a a			XX XX	xx	xx	XX XX XX	a a	xx xx
Mar	a	a	a	XX XX	xx	xx	XX XX xx	a a	xx xx
April	a	a	a	XX a	xx	xx	XX XX xx	a	xx xx xx
May	a	a	a	XX a	xx	xx	XX XX xx	a	xx xx xx
June	a	a	a	XX a	xx	xx	XX XX xx	a	xx xx xx

July	a	a	a	XX	a	xx	xx	XX	XX	xx	a	xx	xx	xx	
Aug	a	a	a	XX	a	a	a	XX	XX	xx	a	xx	xx	xx	
Sept	a	a	a	XX	a	a	a	XX	XX	xx	a	xx	xx	xx	
Oct	a	a	a	XX	a	a	a	XX	XX	xx	a	xx	xx	xx	
Nov	a	a	a	XX	a	a	a	XX	XX	xx	a	xx	xx	xx	
Dec	a	a	XX	XX	XX	a	XX	XX	XX	a	a	xx	xx	xx	
(33)	8					5	4	1			12	3			
year	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
Time at Adelaide university				a	Time away in Antarctica				XX	Time away in Britain, Europe and USA					xx

Table 1 Summary of Mawson's home and away periods at Adelaide University 1905-18

Notwithstanding his absence and minimal scientific publication, on his return in early 1919, Mawson was shocked to learn that Walter Howchin had been appointed as a professor to the Chair of Geology at Adelaide University, rather than himself. Now back in Australia, Antarctica remained on Mawson's mind and publication of the AAE reports were seen as a necessary part of his ongoing credentials as a scientist. He needed these for career advancement, as in the years since 1907 he had published very little. Ayres (1999) reports that in Mawson's subsequent meetings with the Adelaide University Chancellor, Sir George Murray, he was assured that as soon as the scientific work of the AAE was published they would elevate him to the position of Honorary Professor³⁴⁷. Although much of the time since his first Antarctic expedition had been spent outside Australia, Mawson had become an Australian folk hero and also a high profile asset to the university. He was the Antarctic figurehead for the science community, which was seeking to re-establish Australia in Antarctica after the one national expedition of 1911-14. However, while the public equated Antarctica with Mawson; his direct connection with government policy decision-making was intermittent and largely ineffective. His absences and Australia's involvement in the First World War worked against Mawson building a strong power base in Australia from which he could have made a greater impact on Australian Antarctic policy. Although continually promoted by Edgeworth David to the public and respected by his academic peers, Mawson was still only a lecturer, with little influence on the Federal Government concerning Antarctic policy.

³⁴⁷ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 128; Letter Mawson to Paquita Mawson 5 May 1919. (Mawson papers, in Mortlock library PRG523/3)

Immediately on his arrival back in Australia in 1919 in the aftermath of WW1, the Australian press sought to interview him about Antarctica, in the context of the Treaty of Versailles, which dealt with post-war reparations. Mawson was reported in an *Argus* article saying that this treaty should deal with the allocation of territorial interests in Antarctica and that Australia should claim everything between 90° and 180° east longitudes.³⁴⁸ The Treaty of Versailles, with Australia represented by the ebullient William Hughes resulted in the renunciation of the German right to claim any Antarctic territory as part of its overseas territorial rights, even though Gaussberg was clearly discovered and explored by the German Drygalski expedition in 1902³⁴⁹.

In the early post-war period, Mawson established himself as an eminent academic in South Australia and was appointed an executive member of the Australian National Research Council (ANRC) of AAAS, an important position of influence. In 1921 he was appointed Professor of Geology and Mineralogy at the Adelaide University. That year, at the 15th meeting of AAAS, he gave an address as President of the Geography and History section, reviewing developments in world political geography. In regard to Antarctica, he advocated that the coastal area south of Australia should be the subject of a British Claim³⁵⁰. The *Argus* reported that he said that the Australian Government seemed totally uninterested in pressing Antarctic claims and that 'the government should not neglect its duty'³⁵¹ for the British Empire in this regard.

These comments indicate that, although Mawson was well entrenched in the academic world of science and held influential positions on the ANRC, he had little or no direct impact on Australian Government policy. Throughout the 1920s the ANRC argued strongly for an Australian presence in Antarctica. However, the President of ANRC, David Orme Masson, a long time supporter of Australia's involvement in Antarctica, was the direct contact with government, while Mawson was the figure principally sought out by the press for comment on related events, such the rapid increase in whaling activities in Antarctica³⁵². With the transfer of British territorial claim to the Ross Dependency to New Zealand in 1923, for collection of whaling royalties³⁵³, Mawson advocated promoting Australian whaling and

³⁴⁸ anon, 'Allocation of Antarctic Lands,' *the Argus*, 30 April 1919.

³⁴⁹ Part V Treaty of Versailles Germany renounced all rights to territories outside of Europe article 119

³⁵⁰ AAAS Report 15 (1921), pp. 151-159.

³⁵¹ *Argus*, 13 January 1921.

³⁵² *Argus*, 16 February and 4 July 1925; *The Age*, 7 March 1925.

³⁵³ *British, Order in Council* No.79, 30 July 1923.

sealing activities to fund Australian involvement in Antarctica. He publicly opposed the French Antarctic claim made on 29 March 1924, but again his statements to the press had no major impact on Australian policy in a time of economic uncertainty.

In July 1925 Mawson was part of an Australian National Research Council (ANRC) science-based delegation, led by Orme Masson, to Prime Minister Stanley Bruce (the very English gentlemen) suggesting that Australia challenge the French claim and work with Britain to claim the whole area of Antarctica south of Australia, between Gaussberg and Cape Adare. At the meeting with Bruce stated that the Australian and the British governments were studying the matter and that 'the Australian government had no the slightest intention of allowing the splendid exploration carried out by the Australians to be overlooked ...and were being urged were studying the matters 'most strongly through the proper channels'³⁵⁴. The request for Australia to act independently on the French claim was to no avail, as Britain held responsibility for this foreign policy decision and quickly recognised the French Claim. It also showed that although Mawson was able to carry the science voice through the ANRC to the politicians at the highest level, real action to develop and implement an Antarctic policy was dependent on other forces within government itself.

This demonstrated an ongoing situation for Mawson in that, although individual federal politicians personally respected him, when it came to delivering actual financial support to his proposals, funding was continually deferred or refused by Cabinet. He never gained the support base he needed from within the Government bureaucracy to easily carry his proposals forward into government policy. Many of Mawson proposals or requests were for long-term commitments, however, the government tended to look only at the short-term, commitments in times of economic limitations. The country was facing difficult financial times and the new Federal parliamentarians were focused on building infrastructure and financing national development in Australia, rather than funding unrelated ventures

The continuing reluctance of the Australian Government to step forward with a foreign policy independent of Britain was previously examined in Chapter 2. This showed that since Federation consecutive Australian Prime Ministers had primarily advocated a role for Australia within a strongly united British Empire rather than adopting an independent foreign policy. This was the case with Antarctica but following the deputation by Masson and

³⁵⁴ *Argus* 4 July 1925; Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p.171; Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 151.

Mawson to Bruce in 1925, objecting to the French claim and the ‘don’t you worry about that’ response they received, Casey, who was a confidant of the Prime Minister, facilitated Antarctica being placed on the agenda of the 1926 Imperial Conference. This London conference was held from October 19 to November 23 1926. It was very significant for Australian foreign policy, as the conference examined the need for a constitution for the British Empire. Deciding that this was not practical, it then endorsed the Balfour declaration, which defined Anglo-Dominion relationships, replacing the previous hierarchical relationship with Britain. The Balfour declaration stated that the United Kingdom and its Dominions were equal in status and in no way subordinate to one and another in any aspect of their external or domestic affairs, but were united by a common allegiance to the Crown. This declaration at face value changed the emphasis from one constituting an imperial organisation owned by Britain to a more equal relationship between Britain and the dominions. This gave Australia and the other dominions greater freedom in handling its own internal and external affairs. The Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce was appointed chairman of a committee to examine the the status of Antarctic discoveries and their potential for territorial claims.³⁵⁵ Recommendations from the conference were far reaching for Britain and the Australian Government began to take independent action on these matters, producing a change in Australia’s policy approach to the Antarctic.

Mawson was again absent from Adelaide from October 1926 until February 1927. He toured South Africa en route to London and returned home after a lecture circuit in America. At this time the British government sought Australia’s views on the recommendations from the 1926 Imperial Conference. In March 1927 the Prime Minister’s Department in turn sought advice from the ANRC to ‘advise government on how the recommendations of the Imperial conference of 1926 could be implemented’³⁵⁶. Masson replied suggesting renewed Australian activity on the Antarctic coast, south of Australia and recommending that ANRC set up a committee with power to act and advise on the implementation of the decisions of the 1926 conference³⁵⁷. On 10 June Masson, as president of ANRC, with government approval set up such an Antarctic committee, with Mawson and Davis as members. This at last gave Mawson an enhanced route for input to government.

³⁵⁵ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 344; Proceedings Imperial conference, London.xi (1926), p. 22; Foreign Affairs 5 (1927), pp. 508-10.

³⁵⁶ Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 16; Letter Percival Edgar Deane to (Sir) David Orme Masson 21 March 1927 In MAC.34 BZE.

³⁵⁷ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p.182.

In July 1927 the ANRC Antarctic Committee recommended that the Commonwealth Government finance an Antarctic expedition to raise the flag and conduct scientific work. While Masson and the ANRC continued to encourage broader support for an expedition, Mawson became increasingly frustrated with the slowness of the Federal Government to take the initiative and lashed out at the government in the press. On 18th January 1928 and in his AAAS address in Hobart ³⁵⁸ he again advocated an Australian Expedition to the Antarctic to establish British sovereignty over the area south of Australia. His criticism of government inaction drew a response from Prime Minister Bruce who released a statement that action was being taken to preserve Australian rights in the Antarctic and that the Imperial government had been consulted. Mawson replied that he was attempting to help the government and would travel to Britain to try to secure the ship *Discovery* for a future Antarctic expedition. This private approach was not supported by government.

With little sign of further government action towards Antarctica exploration, Mawson left Australia in March 1928 for New Zealand where he was heavily involved in a hydro-electric scheme proposal near Lake Manoupouri, before sailing to London via the Panama Canal. Arriving in London on 9 May he spent the next three months trying to raise capital investment for the New Zealand scheme, before returning to Australia at the end of September.

That year there had been growing interest expressed in the Australian press about whaling and Antarctic expeditions³⁵⁹. Masson had continued lobbying government for action. Mawson was subsequently advised at a meeting with Henderson, the Director of the Department of External Affairs on 10 October 1928, that the government was now supportive of another expedition, but that Prime Minister Bruce would not take any formal action until after the election to be held later that year. For the rest of the year Mawson continued to focus on his non-Antarctic business activities regarding South Australia timber, radium in the Flinders Ranges and leases over aluminate deposits in Western Australia. He also continued to support Australia becoming directly involved in earning money from whaling and was reported in the *Argus* and the *Melbourne Sun* in December 1928, saying ‘that there is no

³⁵⁸ *Argus*, 19 and 20 January 1928; *The Age*, 20 January 1928; Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp.175-6.

³⁵⁹ This included a number of articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Melbourne Argus*, 20 January 1928; *SMH*, 24 April; 2,8,14 June and 26 September 1928.

reason why Australia should not once again, under new conditions, establish a great whaling fleet, a source of wealth and a nursery of hardy seamen'³⁶⁰.

8.5 .The British, Australian and New Zealand Expedition (BANZARE)

1929 saw a significant change in Mawson's influence on Australian Antarctic policy and activity as the outcomes of the 1926 Imperial Conference finally bore fruit. Australian negotiations with the British Government reached an agreement in January 1929 in which Britain would provide the ship *Discovery* free of charge and Australia would despatch a combined expedition to raise the flag on the shoreline between Enderby Land and Oates Land with the understanding that Australia would eventually control the whole area³⁶¹. With this exciting progress Mawson sailed to London in late January 1929 to arrange for outfitting of the expedition ship *Discovery*. When formally advised by Government cable during passage to England, he replied on 4 February accepting leadership of the expedition. His status went from being just a member of an Australian National Research Committee to a man of action in a leadership role, as head of a combined British Australian and New Zealand expedition (BANZARE) However, while these governments were formally supportive and providing seedling money, Mawson was expected to arrange considerable financial sponsorship from the private sector, particularly in Britain and Australia.

On 21 February 1929, Prime Minister Bruce formally announced the expedition under the leadership of Sir Douglas Mawson and a government Antarctic committee was established with Mawson as Chairman. Meanwhile, in London Mawson attended a meeting of the *Discovery* management committee on 29th February, which included the long time Antarctic supporter Major R.G.Casey, then the Australian government liaison officer in England. Using his London contacts and with Casey's immense support and connections, arrangements went smoothly for the fit out and supply of the *Discovery*. News of the proposed expedition was frequently in the press and Mawson was commissioned by the British government to officially take possession of lands for Britain. The British and Australian press supported the expedition expressing great interest in the coastal geography of Antarctica and the potential for commercial whaling³⁶². However, the Sydney Morning Herald of 10 April stated that no country could establish an Antarctic claim under accepted

³⁶⁰ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp.182.

³⁶¹ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 161.

³⁶² *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 February 1929.

international law, as permanent occupation in that region was impossible³⁶³. When Mawson returned from London in May 1929, he and the expedition were very popular with the press, whilst the Antarctic Committee smoothed the interface with government provision of funds and other arrangements.

Mawson departed for Cape Town in September 1929 to join the expedition for the summer of 1929/30, although confusion existed whether the expedition was to be for just one summer or for two summers. The British Government had made the *Discovery* available for two years but the Australia government had funded only one year. The expedition departed Cape Town on 19th October but not before a flurry of discussion in the local press about the Antarctic territorial claims of Norway and Britain. This was brought about by the success in Antarctic waters of the Norwegian whalers, owned by the magnate Lars Christensen. In July 1929 Norway had passed a government decree empowering Christensen to take possession of lands he might discover, which had not been occupied by any other country. On 10th October, the *Daily News* published a statement by Mawson inferring a lack of cooperation from the Norwegians, suggesting that they had no moral rights to claim territory already under British influence³⁶⁴. This drew a response from Christensen saying that Norway had a right to any no-mans-land they discovered. The Christensen expedition, under captain Riiser Larsen, departed Cape Town ahead of the *Discovery* but diplomatic exchanges between Britain and Norway continued over territorial claims over Bouvet Island and Antarctic whaling grounds. This set an international competitive backdrop to the expeditions with Mawson's statements bordering on arguing a unilateral Australian foreign policy, despite the legal dominance of Britain.

The BANZARE sailing instructions precipitated a rift between life long friends on the summer voyage 1929-30. The Australian Antarctic Committee had defined the objectives of the expedition as being 'firstly political, secondly economic and commercial and thirdly, scientific'³⁶⁵. This included making landings and aerial inland surveys and associated scientific studies between longitudes 45 East and 160 East. The expedition was to have divided command, which caused constant argument between Mawson the leader of the expedition and John King Davis the captain of the *Discovery*, regarding how to interpret the objectives of the expedition. The instructions from Prime Minister Bruce were again couched

³⁶³ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 188.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 192

³⁶⁵ Australian Antarctic Committee meeting, 12 march 1929.

in political terms ‘you will plant the British flag wherever practicable ... read the proclamation of annexation,’ Davis believed that the aims were clearly political and primarily territorial, but Mawson as overall commander saw science and oceanography as the priority. He therefore spent much time visiting sub-Antarctic islands and making marine studies. Davis, as the straightforward captain, disagreed with these diversions at a time when Norwegian whalers were ahead of them exploring the same region of the Antarctic coastline. The first aeroplane flight was not made from the *Discovery* until 31 December 1929 over what was subsequently named Mac.Roberston Land, in an area where Norwegian whalers were already active³⁶⁶. This flight followed news that the Norwegian Riiser Larsen expedition had made a claim for Norway to the west of Enderby Land earlier in December 1929. On 13 January 1930 a sole landing was made on Proclamation Island, an island off Enderby Land. At the landing British flag was raised on the summit of the island and a sovereignty claim made over all lands from 47° to 73° East longitude. The hand written proclamation was left in a glass tube alongside a small cairn and was not visited again until 1975 (45 years later) when a geodetic survey station was established there (Manning 1975)³⁶⁷

After the landing on Proclamation Island, Mawson met with Riiser Larsen, captain of the *Norvegia*. In the *Discovery* wardroom on 14th January 1930, they discussed their competing explorations and territorial claims. Both men carried endorsement from their governments, although since their departure from Cape Town, diplomatic discussions in Europe had continued between Britain and Norway. Christensen had subsequently notified Riiser Larsen that the Norwegian government had recognised the British Claim to Enderby Land and that Riiser Larsen could only occupy and claim land between 45° East and 15° West longitude. Mawson made a defacto policy agreement with Riiser Larsen at the operational level that longitude 45°east was the dividing line between the respective claims.

On 25 January 1930 Mawson and Stuart Campbell made a short flight inland over Enderby Land from Proclamation Island and a proclamation was read in flight extending the western edge of the claim previously made at Proclamation Island from 47° East to 45° East. A British flag was then dropped on the icecap. Despite some later grandstanding by Lars Christensen, objecting to Mawson claiming the area explored by his Norwegian whalers, this has stood the test of time, so it can be considered that Mawson had a major impact on the

³⁶⁶ Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, pp. 57.

³⁶⁷ Report by Manning, 1975 and photograph of the proclamation on display at Australian Antarctic Division Hobart.

British/Australian claim at that point. Norway probably received less than fair treatment for the exploration work of the whalers in this area, but was subject to diplomatic pressure from Britain associated with giving recognition of the Norwegian claim to Dronning Maud land, west of Enderby Land and to Bouvet Island in the Indian Ocean, which had been discovered by Britain but was wanted by Norway as a base for whaling.

Mawson returned to Adelaide after the expedition on 31 March 1930 and received much press coverage. However, despite his folk hero standing, he was also subject to criticism over the limited results from the expedition and the scientific diversions. The captain, John King Davis, became the scapegoat in the personality clash and was replaced as captain for the second voyage. Although Mawson talked it up in his report to Parliament, little had really been achieved from a territorial claim viewpoint beyond an in situ agreement with Norway of a claim boundary at 45°East longitude. A broad geographic definition of the long coastline from Gaussberg to Cape Adare was still required³⁶⁸. More geographic results and landings were clearly needed and the Australian government and private supporters were asked to fund a second expedition the following summer.

The world wide financial depression diverted general attention away from further science ventures to Antarctica and the duration of the BANZARE term had not been settled and depended on the success of the first expedition and the availability of funds for the second year. In Australia, the depression triggered government instability and the pro-Antarctic Prime Minister Bruce, who approved the BANZARE in 1929, lost both his seat and government at the October 1929 election, after sending Mawson a message 'the best wishes of the Commonwealth Government and the Australian people for your welfare during the voyage'³⁶⁹. Mawson had departed Cape Town on 19th October 1929 and while the expedition was away the new Scullin Government had been elected and sworn in. Despite support from the new Prime Minister Scullin the government was unsympathetic to funding a second year of an Antarctic expedition in light of the financial situation of the country. However, at that time Norwegian whalers, full of whale oil, berthed in Hobart and swayed government opinion if other funds were available to offset the cost.

³⁶⁸ Parliamentary paper, no.80 of 1930.

³⁶⁹ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p.190; *Polar Record* 2 (1931), pp. 56-60.

Mawson appealed to industrialist MacPherson Robertson who offered another £6,000, providing the government matched this amount and that Mawson endeavoured to get him a knighthood. Mawson spent 1930 teaching in Adelaide and preparing for the next expedition, while the Antarctic Committee continued its lobbying for funding from Government and other benefactors. The New Zealand Government gave an additional grant and MacPherson Robertson accepted a knighthood. Prime Minister Scullin had been personally supportive when previously in opposition and announced in the House of Representatives in May 1930:

The government have decided that the work of the in the Australian Sector of the Antarctic, which is of considerable national interest and importance to the commonwealth from economic, scientific and other points of view, will be continued during the coming Antarctic summer season...³⁷⁰

The sailing directions for the second expedition, dated 30 October 1930, indicated that operations should be concentrated on the region between Adelie Land and Queen Mary Land, with further exploration to be undertaken from Gaussberg to the edge of Mac. Robertson Land, which had been sighted and named during the first expedition. This time the objectives were broadly achieved and while landings with sovereignty proclamations were made at just three locations, these were considered sufficient to forestall pending Norwegian claims as well as any potential American claims arising from the 1837 Wilkes US Naval expedition.

The second voyage ended in March 1931 and with the completion of two summer voyages Mawson was again a national hero and became the figurehead for forces wanting Australia to claim Antarctic territory and establish whaling operations in the southern ocean. The press seized upon the success of the BANZARE and the publicised profits being made from Norwegian and British Antarctic whalers in those two years. However, no direct government action was taken immediately after the BANZARE voyages on either territorial claim or whaling industry³⁷¹.

8.6. Mawson's Post-BANZARE Activities.

³⁷⁰ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 May 1930, vol. 124, pp. 2044.

³⁷¹ Senate Hansard, 18 May 1932.

The Scullin government fell in January 1931 and the replacement Lyons government instituted further severe financial restriction as part of a plan for economic recovery. With the economy in crisis and widespread changes in government personnel, Mawson's connection to government, through Casey, was broken even though he was impatient to consolidate a claim based on the brief BANZARE landings and approximate coastal charting. During the BANZARE voyages Mawson had amassed a wealth of scientific information which now needed to be processed, even though many of the AAE reports from 1912 still remained to be finalised and published. This added to Mawson's heavy burden of the need to publish expedition reports and was consuming Mawson's attention. All through his life he was hounded by these unpublished scientific reports from the AAE and this was exacerbated by the extra scientific oceanographic and marine work of the 1929-31 BANZARE. The fact that the reports from the expeditions remained outstanding at the time of his death in 1958 shows the magnitude of this burden and his inability to obtain suitable resources and manage contributors.

In April 1932 Mawson wrote to the Federal Government saying that he would be 'visiting London with the object inter alia of obtaining recognition of Australian discoveries in the Antarctic'. This drew a quick response from the Secretary of the Department of External affairs³⁷² saying that matters were well in hand, 'in fact the necessary action was initiated as soon as your report was received'. He was also advised that the matter was being handled in the greatest care by the Attorney General, the Hon. John Latham, who was then in London and that should the necessity arise, Mawson could 'rely on being called upon for assistance'. This again shows that at this time Mawson's direct influence on Antarctic policy was not readily appreciated by government officers, even though, with his great public following, he could not be snubbed or ignored.

Mawson continued to lobby Government on Antarctica and whaling and his advocacy against sealing resulted in Macquarie Island being declared a wildlife sanctuary in 1933³⁷³. He again went to London in December 1932 to try to arrange suitable sale of the BANZARE expedition film 'Siege of the South'³⁷⁴ to provide funds for publication of Antarctic reports.

³⁷² Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p.162.

³⁷³ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 206.

³⁷⁴ Hurley made two films in conjunction the first of the 1929/30 voyage was 'Southward Ho! with Mawson'. This was not a great success financially and the second was 'Siege of the South' which covered both voyages. It had a mixed reception in Australia and Mawson had trouble in finding any interest in it in Britain.

Meanwhile, the Lyons government, with Casey now a minister, was moving on developing an Australian Antarctic territorial claim. Whilst Mawson was in London, negotiations between Australia and Britain culminated on 7 February 1933 when the British order-in-council transferred the British sovereignty rights over the Antarctic region from longitudes 45 East to 160 East (excluding the French claim of Terre Adelie) to the Commonwealth of Australia. Enabling legislation was introduced to the Australian parliament in May 1933 and the Bill subsequently became the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933.

Mawson returned to Australia in July 1933, after the Antarctic Territory legislation was passed and was spurred on to continue to make plans for another expedition, although he was still heavily involved in trying to publish scientific results from AAE and BANZARE expeditions. As president of the ANZAAS, his address at the meeting in Melbourne in 1935 was titled 'The Unveiling of Antarctica'. In it he advocated controlled whaling and international administration of the continent. This was his long-term vision and, although this seemed to have little impact on Government policy, he did receive an allocation of £1,000 for the publication of the BANZARE scientific reports.

As the 1930s progressed, other private influential Antarctic exploration figures emerged in the Antarctic limelight alongside Mawson, who previously was the sole Australian figure of Antarctica. The South Australian John Rymill organised and led a very successful British expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula in 1934 –37. The energetic polar explorer Sir Hubert Wilkins, who made the first Antarctic aeroplane flight in 1928 and other Antarctic flights on subsequent expeditions and became the manager for Antarctic expeditions by the American aviator Lincoln Ellsworth. American Richard Byrd was also very active in the press at that time publicising his massive expeditions to his 'Little America' base on the Ross Ice Shelf in a rival newspaper. At the Imperial Conference in London in 1937, where Casey chaired the polar committee, Wilkins suggested that the Australian government establish meteorological stations in Antarctica. This stirred Mawson to also propose expeditions in competition with Wilkins.

En route to Antarctic, Wilkins and Ellsworth met Mawson in 1937 and they proposed the sale of the expedition ship and two aircraft to the Australian government on completion of their expedition to East Antarctica. In early January 1939 Ellsworth and Wilkins cabled from Antarctica seeking confirmation from the Australian Government that the sale would go

ahead. This was referred to Mawson who strongly supported the purchase. In January 1939 the Prime Minister, after receiving Mawson's recommendations, announced that Australia was purchasing the *Wyatt Earp*.³⁷⁵ This was a decisive commitment for Australian Government policy towards Antarctica, which led to rival proposals from both Wilkins and Mawson to make use of this ship for government financed Antarctic activity.

It also signalled Mawson's increased position of influence to government in regard to Antarctica after years of building a base of interest. In February 1939 Mawson received endorsement from the Australian Vice Chancellor's meeting for a combined university expedition to set up a permanent scientific station at Cape Freshfield, before going inland to the South Magnetic Pole. Mawson was 57 years old in 1939 and had been suffering for ill health for a couple of years, which meant he could not physically lead another expedition. But Wilkins was able and offered his own services and submitted a thorough counter plan. This was to set up meteorological stations in East Antarctica, initially in Princess Elizabeth Land and the following year at Cape Freshfield in King George Land, utilising navy or volunteer personal. This proposal of Wilkins was subsequently rejected in August 1939 on 'financial grounds'³⁷⁶. Ayres (1999) records the rivalry between Mawson and Wilkins and it is apparent that this influenced the government decision against involving Wilkins³⁷⁷. At this time with Casey having a prominent position in Government, Mawson had considerable influence on the direction of immediate Antarctic policy and Wilkins suffered from the dominating approach of Mawson³⁷⁸. Mawson lobbied Casey who then announced that a University based expedition was planned. Mawson was appointed as adviser to the expedition, with the responsibility to find a field leader³⁷⁹. Rymill was not available due to his commitment to the family farm at Penola and Mawson did not want to use his rival Wilkins, who was capable and readily available. Australia was on the edge of making arrangements for the ongoing occupation of the Antarctic continent, which Mawson had advocated since 1914. With Casey's assistance, he had gained a direct influence with the Federal Government regarding Antarctic policy, but again the outbreak of a World War, just a month later in September 1939, caused the Australian Government to shelve its plans for Antarctica. The war diverted attention away from Antarctica, primarily to the north and the

³⁷⁵ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 227.

³⁷⁶ *Argus*, 4 August 1939.

³⁷⁷ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, chapter 17, pp. 215-30.

³⁷⁸ Simon Nasht, *The Last Explorer : Hubert Wilkins Australia's Unknown Hero*. p. 174 . Also letter Lady Susan Wilkins to J.K Davis 25 July 1959 (Davis papers Latrobe Library, Melbourne. 3271/7)cited in Ayres, *Mawson, A Life*, pp. 229-230

³⁷⁹ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, pp. 229-30.

shipping lanes to Britain. However, hostile ships mined areas of Australia's southern coastline and the *HMAS Australia* was sent to Iles Kerguelen to search for evidence of German raiders as the government had developed a concern about foreign ships in the southern ocean.

8.7. Mawson's Influence after the Second World War

By the end of the Second World War the Antarctic exploration situation had changed forever, the era of the private expeditions with public funding had passed, with countries now establishing permanent Antarctic agencies within their Government departments. This new national approach to Antarctica conflicted with Mawson's long time vision of private expeditions supported jointly by government and industry. Even the approach of the American Richard Byrd in privately financing massive expeditions before the war was rejected by United States of America in favour of government funded and controlled national ventures. The events of the war with German raiders operating in the southern ocean also raised the advisability of Australian Antarctic occupation, to deny other nations using sites with the potential to support shipping in the southern ocean. Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs was concerned for the ongoing security of the Australian southern coastline and this factor raised the profile of Antarctic matters, which should have worked in Mawson's favour in establishing a commercial whaling industry. However, the lack of a suitable whaling factory made it impossible for Australia to immediately establish the southern ocean whaling industry, which Mawson so desired³⁸⁰.

As soon as the war finished in 1945, Mawson returned to the fray to promote Australian Antarctic expeditions and to get the government to commit to long-term involvement. But his circumstances had changed during the intervening six years and the press reported that, although he was active in organising such an expedition, Mawson would not be able to lead it in the field.³⁸¹ The nature of the Federal Government had also changed. Casey was no longer in parliament and had been governor of Bengal in the later stages of the war. However, Casey remained an advocate of Australia's involvement in Antarctica and he met with Mawson in July 1946 in Adelaide for related discussions. Ayres (1999) suggests that there is no doubt that Casey, on returning to Canberra, used his influence with Evatt, Minister for External

³⁸⁰ Ibid., Chapter 19 'Post war interlude: the revival of whaling', pp. 235-38.

³⁸¹ *Argus*, 24 October 1945.

Affairs to take action³⁸². Additionally, William Dunk a Departmental Secretary in the public service who had worked closely with Casey when he was treasurer in a previous government in 1935, was now Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. On Minister Evatt's advice, Dunk invited Mawson to a meeting of government department representatives in Melbourne on 2 December 1946 to discuss Antarctica. This invitation into the government power circle renewed Mawson's connection with the government bureaucrats, who were in a position to take action and provided the conduit for Mawson to again have his voice heard on Antarctic policy.

The task of this initial meeting in Melbourne was to make recommendations to government on the development and use of Australian Antarctic Territory. Mawson contributed strongly to the recommendations, advocating an expedition be sent to establish a science based station at Cape Freshfield using the *Wyatt Earp*. This was approved by Cabinet on 16th January 1947 and Mawson subsequently wrote to Dunk recommending Stuart Campbell as leader of the expedition³⁸³. Campbell had been the flight lieutenant on the BANZARE voyages and was well respected by Mawson as a man of action. The next meeting of the government inter-departmental executive committee on 'Exploration and Exploitation' was held in Melbourne on 24th January 1947. With Mawson as an invited member, this committee again recommended an Antarctic expedition for the summer of 1947/48 using the *Wyatt Earp*, carrying twin-engine aircraft on deck. The expedition would also include a wintering party of meteorologists and physicists³⁸⁴. At that meeting an Antarctic Executive Planning Committee was established to consider Australia's future role in Antarctic expeditions, beyond the planned expedition. Mawson now had the ear of government and the tide of government indifference to Australia's involvement in Antarctica had turned as the Labor government was concerned with security of Australia's southern coastline. In April 1947 the government announced that the expedition had been approved at a cost of £100,000 with another £50,000 allocated to repair the *Wyatt Earp*³⁸⁵. As interest mounted in Australian government expeditions, the RAAF made several long distance flights to Macquarie Island and the southern ocean, which were considered a very valuable source of weather

³⁸² Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, pp. 241.

³⁸³ Letter Mawson to Dunk 10 December 1946 in MAC,1 ANR.

³⁸⁴, Minutes of Australian Antarctic Executive Committee in MAC,1, ANR on Exploration and Exploitation 24 January 1947.

³⁸⁵ Current notes, June 1947 ; *Sydney Morning Herald* ,7 May 1947 ; The subsequent saga of the 1947/48 voyage is well described by Law, *The Antarctic Voyage of Hmas Wyatt Earp*.

information. Mawson predilection with the coast near the south magnetic pole was again reinforced when a government sponsored Antarctic committee was formed in 1947.

The Hon. Herbert Vere Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs chaired the next meeting of the Antarctic Executive Planning Committee on 5 May 1947. At that meeting Mawson's preferred base site of Cape Freshfield near the magnetic pole was abandoned as a station location for a wintering party, as he could not vouch for the suitability of the site, despite having promoted it for nearly 30 years. A more rational and less ambitious program was then set up with a 1947/48 summer only voyage to locate suitable Antarctic sites for a follow up wintering expedition a year later³⁸⁶. John King Davis was added to the committee and Stuart Campbell was approved as Chief Executive Officer of the expedition, on Mawson's recommendation. Mawson's high standing with the Labor government at that time was demonstrated when Herbert Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, invited him onto a major advisory committee to examine questions related to the post-war settlement with Japan³⁸⁷. Mawson now at the age of 65 was in a more powerful position to influence Antarctic policy than he had ever been; including the two prominent positions he held in 1914 and in 1939. Not only was he now in a position to influence the direction of the Australian positioning of an ongoing permanent Australian station on the Antarctic continent, but he was also able to influence the implementation of Australian Antarctic policy in relation to science objectives and whaling in the southern ocean.

The machinery of government now moved quickly on Antarctica. At a subsequent meeting in August 1947, the expedition was officially named the Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) and a scientific advisory committee was established, with Mawson as chairman, to overview the science elements of future expeditions. His strategy to gain government support was so successful at this time that it overran Mawson's previous concept of privately funded expeditions. This now had gone to a new level, where the government funded, organised and controlled the agenda. With the establishment of a permanent agency and executive planning committees, Mawson now became a part of the government implementation of policy. In doing so, he lost some touch with the mainstream Australian Antarctic Policy creation. He was more involved in lower level bureaucratic implementation of policy than higher level policy creation, at the international level. However, he never

³⁸⁶ Minutes of Australian Antarctic Executive Committee 5 May 1947 MAC,1, ANR.

³⁸⁷ Paquita Mawson, *Mawson of the Antarctic*, pp. 202.

seemed to be able to completely divorce himself from his old preference of privately funded expeditions.

Mawson's involvement in the executive planning committee included a connection with the first year of ANARE operations, when a party in the naval landing craft HMAS *Labuan* landed and set up a new base on Heard Island in December 1947, at Atlas Cove the site of Mawson's BANZARE visit in 1929. This activity was followed up in January 1948 when a wintering party was also established at Macquarie Island, again at a site, which had been occupied by Mawson's 1911-12 AAE. The reconnaissance voyage to Antarctica in the *Wyatt Earp* was delayed and eventually left Melbourne 8 February 1948. While the Heard and Macquarie island expeditions were outstanding successes, the *Wyatt Earp* was unable to meet its objectives and failed to identify a site for a future base on the Antarctic Continent.

The Australian Antarctic Division, a permanent office within the Department of External Affairs was created in May 1948. No longer was an Australian Antarctic expedition tied to private funding for one or two year's occupation, but was part of an ongoing government supported program. This did not exactly meet Mawson's vision of Australian involvement in Antarctica. Whilst much of his own expedition preparation (for AAE and BANZARE) was taken up with soliciting money from government bodies, he came from the Shackleton stable of private funded expeditions supported by government; not expeditions fully funded and controlled by government. All through his Antarctic career Mawson had carried a heavy cross of unpublished scientific reports from his private expeditions and was never able to come to terms with complete government control despite the funding security. However, after the establishment of a permanent agency, Mawson continued to make a strong contribution in government committee roles, although his distaste for government control was evidenced in the minutes for the advisory committee meetings where he often became a critic of liberal on going expenditure.

Mawson, as member of the executive committee, had a major role in giving planning and scientific advice, but the operational Antarctic activity was now squarely in the hands of the officer-in-charge of the Antarctic Division. The new man on the Antarctic scene was Phillip Garth Law. Law had attended his first Executive Planning Meetings in May 1947 as an observer and Mawson was soon placed in a delicate position when the personality conflict between Campbell and Law over ANARE leadership came to a head in 1948. Campbell was

the fearless field person, with little science organization and Law the organised science person, with no proven field record. Mawson had supported Campbell's initial placement as head of the new Antarctic Division; as he had been pilot of the gypsy moth aircraft during the BANZARE and demonstrated strong personal leadership. However, Law, a strong-minded capable administrator with ambition, succeeded in getting Campbell moved back to the Department of Navigation and secured his own promotion to Director Antarctic Division on a science ticket.

Mawson's long time concept of a self funded expedition subsequently came up again at the first Executive Planning Committee meeting which Law chaired on 3 June 1949. As Law reports in the minutes of the meeting, this arose following discussion on the purchase of a suitable ship to get an expedition to Antarctica. Mawson attacked the large taxpayer expenditure as his long held position was that it should be self-funded, paid from associated commercial returns, such as whaling or fishing. Mawson enquired whether the government intended to pursue the current Antarctic research indefinitely. He expressed the opinion that there should be some limits to the activities of ANARE unless it could be made to pay for itself. Pointing out that when he originally proposed the Antarctic expedition to the government he had never contemplated such a large-scale expenditure and that any activity should be allied with a commercial venture, particularly whaling³⁸⁸. This on the surface this sounds like sour grapes, as funding for the future expeditions was now secure, whereas he had battled so hard for so long to get sponsorship for his expeditions. This concern about government expenditure was also evident as a personal trait long before, when as member of the Shackleton Relief Committee in London in 1916 he objected to the recommendation of a large cost estimate going to government to carry out a search and rescue operation for the missing Shackleton expeditions³⁸⁹.

With the change to a conservative government in December 1949 the ANARE Executive Planning Committee was concerned about the new government's attitude, as the new Prime Minister Menzies had never taken any interest at all in Antarctica. Mawson initially had advocated only a two-year expedition, similar to the AAE of 1911-12, which caused Law difficulty in getting continuity of government funding, until Russia established bases on the continent south of Australia later in 1956. Despite Mawson's view, Law forwarded a

³⁸⁸ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica*, p. 126 ; Minutes of ANARE Executive Planning Committee meeting 3 June 1949 MAC1,1 ANR.

³⁸⁹ Paquita Mawson, *Mawson of the Antarctic*, pp. 127-28.

resolution from the Committee to the new government to bring the matter of a permanent station to a head. After the meeting, Mawson importantly changed his view and supported the Law proposal stating, 'It was important to safeguard Australia's territorial rights in Antarctica and that the permanent occupation was the best basis for territorial claims'³⁹⁰. The new government approved this long term view and in 1951 a very important change was made with the long time pro Antarctic champion Richard Casey replacing Sir Percy Spender as Minister for External Affairs.

Through the 1950s, Mawson remained a very serious member of the Science Advisory panel, with direct links to Casey as Minister of External Affairs. Mawson provided also independent ideas in discussions of the Executive Planning Committee. Law, however, as the fulltime Director of Antarctic Division was an able bureaucrat and managed to be appointed chairman and minute taker of the committee meetings and out manoeuvred Mawson on most matters. At the September 1950 Antarctic Executive Planning Committee meeting the matter of the ship again came up again. This time Mawson supported Law and a sub committee including Mawson and Davis was formed to set out specifications for an Antarctic expedition ship. The lack of a suitable ship continued to be of major concern. Law heard of a specialist polar ship being built in 1953, which could be used and together with strong support from Mawson and Davis, Casey successfully argued to government for extra money for an Antarctic station, although Mawson advocated closing the Heard Island station to reduce the costs. When Law arranged a charter of the *Kista Dan* in 1953 to establish a continental station, Mawson initially pushed for Cape Freshfield as the location of the Australian base. This location would have a focus on the south magnetic pole area in preference to regions with their mountain range such as Princess Elizabeth Land, Mac. Robertson Land or Enderby Land. However, Law countered that the proposed site in Mac.Robertson Land was on the auroral magnetic activity oval and much better placed for many other fields of science³⁹¹. Mawson accepted this argument and then worked with Law to give priority to the establishment of a base in Mac.Robertson Land, where Mawson had named coastal mountains after Casey and Masson from the air in 1931, during the BANZARE voyages. The long awaited ANARE station was subsequently established in February 1954 on the coast of Mac.Robertson land and suitably named 'Mawson' in his honour.

³⁹⁰ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica*, p. 143; and Minutes of ANARE Executive Planning Committee meeting 3 June 1949 MAC1,1 ANR.

³⁹¹ Personal communication Law to author, November 2008.

With the establishment of the Australian Antarctic station at Mawson in 1954, the leadership role for expeditions had long passed from Mawson. However, his support for Law to government was still important despite disagreements and occasional criticisms, which were not always valid as his health declined with age. Law developed and used a good relationship with Mawson and his comments on Mawson through this period show his great respect for the man: 'Mawson, to the end was young at heart and young in mind. He was always ready to pick up the new idea, he was never reactionary'³⁹². Working within the Antarctic Executive Planning Committees over a period for ten years, Mawson occasionally raised concerns over his perception of government expenditure and his distaste of bureaucratic control over the field expeditions. However, Mawson always publicly supported ANARE outside the planning meetings and maintained a positive interaction with long time friend Casey as Minister for External Affairs.

In May 1957 at the age of 73 Mawson attended his last ANARE executive meeting, which was chaired by Casey in Canberra. Here he objected to Law's proposal for Australia to take over Wilkes station from the Americans at the end of the International Geophysical Year, on fiscal grounds, despite this station being reasonably close the south magnetic pole. He ignored the wider political implications of Russia taking over the station if Australia did not. Davis on the other hand accepted that it was a purely political decision, supporting Australian territorial claim and endorsed the resolution. Law saw it as essential ANARE expansion and together with Casey successfully fought for future funding to support three continental stations, Mawson, Davis and Wilkes (eventually to be re-sited and named Casey) This was to be Mawson's last meeting but he continued to correspond with Casey on the full range of Antarctic matters until his death the following year.

8.8 Conclusion on Douglas Mawson's influence on government

For almost fifty years Sir Douglas Mawson was the Australian Antarctic icon with great standing both with the Australian public and the global scientific community. Initially he earned an immense survival reputation from his ability and expertise sledging on the Antarctic ice cap. However, also his ongoing work and focus on scientific in Antarctica won him great respect from his peers. Positioned outside the government as an academic based at the University of Adelaide for most of his life, he consistently tried to encourage Australia to

³⁹² Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law*. p. 83.

become involved in Antarctica for science, resource territorial benefit and financial return from whaling. However when operating outside the government Mawson can be considered to be only part time as he had a full academic career outside of Antarctic matters. Consequently in that regard it can be summarised that Mawson throughout his period as the great Australian Antarctic icon struggled to consistently influence the direction and development of Australian Government Antarctic policy at all times or to gain a priority standing for Antarctica in the government's policy hierarchy of importance.

Twists of fate in the timing of the two world wars and the great economic depression conspired against Mawson achieving full government support when he was best positioned to achieve an immediate impact on policy. In leading the AAE he influenced a fresh approach to Antarctica for Australia, breaking away from the British obsession with the south geographic pole and the study of the Trans Antarctic Mountains areas with its potential for mineral resources. Mawson's input and persistence can be viewed as an irritant to government like grit in an oyster, which would eventually produce a pearl. Mawson always had a vision of Australian presence in Antarctic funded by and integrated with private whaling and fishing in the southern Ocean, However for most of his life did not have the political power base to convince government that this was important for Australia.

While Mawson was the Australian Antarctic icon for nearly 50 years, his input approach to Antarctic policy varied considerably over time, from heroic individual explorer status to the leadership of the AAE and BANZARE (and the agonizing slow publication of associated scientific reports) to the representative of the Australian scientific community to government, to the major role on the Antarctic Executive committee focused on policy implementation. As an academic he suffered from being outside the system and despite the long period involved there were not many tangible policy aspects immediately taken up from his representations as he lacked the political power base to directly influence government. However, his presence and his indirect pressure to lift the importance of Antarctica as an issue did bear fruit but it is argued that Mawson only had a direct impact when his influence was taken up by committed individuals in government, with a position of power and who were able to take the issues forward into government policy

While it is hard to see how Australia would have taken on an international management role in Antarctic without the lifelong persistence of this great man attempting to influence

Australian Government Antarctic policy, he was never able to see his vision of a commercially sustainable Antarctic achieved. He had won his battle started in 1911 to re-establish an Australian presence on the ice, but a widely recognized territory, funded from commercial resources had not been achieved.

With the Federal Government decision to establish scientific bases, the baton of furthering international Antarctic policy development had passed from Mawson to key personnel in the Department of External Affairs, notably Richard Casey as Minister from 1950 to 1960. Implementation of this policy was also capably in the hands of Phillip Law supported by an operational agency. Consequently Mawson's passing in 1958 had no effect on Australia's Antarctic policy. However, undeniably Mawson also had a massive indirect impact of Australian Antarctic policy even though he was outside the system and continually frustrated by what he saw as the procrastination by government. He remained an iconic figurehead for nearly 50 years with the Australia public and it is fitting that the first Australian Station established in Antarctica bears his name.

Mawson was an exceptional person initially as a superhuman field person, a public icon, an intense distinguished scientist and as a dominant figure in Australian viewpoint concerning Antarctic. It is hard to envisage Australia's involvement in Antarctica without such an influence as a bridge from the British Heroic era to the modern era of Australian national research expeditions.

Chapter 9: The influence of Dr Geoffrey Mosley on Australian Antarctic environmental policy

9.1. Introduction

The previous two chapters explored the impact of individual scientists on Antarctic Policy principally through the first half of the 20th century. This chapter examines the influence of the environmental issues on Australian Antarctic policy in the second half of the century, after the signing of the Antarctic Treaty which culminated in Australia playing a major role in gaining international acceptance of a comprehensive environmental protection regime for Antarctica. This became a major issue for Australian Antarctic policy and requires in depth examination to understand how it developed and was applied to Antarctica. While the environmental movement was slow to develop in Australia, before broadening its horizon to Antarctic the passion and persistence of one environmental scientist stands out, this was Geoffrey Mosley who played a pivotal role in arguing for the protection of the Antarctic Environment particularly from 1976 to 1991 when the significant Madrid Protocol was signed producing a dramatic watershed in Antarctic policy on a global scale

Australia's Antarctic policy development in this period was subject to internal pressure but was also tempered by its external involvement in the Antarctic Treaty system, which increasingly became dominated by environmental protection issues. Examination of the events leading up to the adoption of the very significant Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) shows that it was the combination of events and people which produced the implementation of an environmental component in Australian Antarctic policy. To gain an understanding of how these influences came together it is necessary to look at both international and domestic processes, which influenced the Government's policy decisions on Antarctica through this period. While the international events are previously examined in Part A, the development of the environmental movement within Australia warrants further examination.

In regard to Antarctic policy Geoffrey Mosley was the foremost individual person working on environmental protection outside of the government for more than three decades from the mid 1960s. In order to put his influence on Antarctic policy in perspective it is necessary to

examine the growth of the environmental movement in Australia as this sets the tone for it to then transcend to an international concern for the Antarctic continent.

The general formulation and implementation of environmental policy in Australia is a complex process which reflects the influence of multiple layers of input as discussed by Mann in 1981. This process includes both the pluralist approach as maintained by Held (1987)³⁹³, together with other informal pressures as highlighted by Doyle (2000)³⁹⁴ when discussing the nature of the Australian environmental movement. Since its inception in 1947, the Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition's objective to occupy the Antarctic continent was primarily based on policies of regional security, territorial claim reinforcement and a potential for commercial resource development. However, as Australia's involvement in Antarctica progressed, by the end of the 1980s the prime element in its Antarctic policy changed from a territorial and resource focus to an overwhelming environmental focus. To understand this change, from Australia which showed little concern for the Antarctic environment in 1954 at the establishment of Mawson base, to it becoming the prime driver in the development of a comprehensive environmental protection regime, requires both research and analysis. To answer the question of how this attitude to the Antarctic environment developed, it is necessary to firstly examine the growth of environmental attitudes within Australia. This provides a backdrop to understanding how the environmental movement within Australia came to have such a significant influence on an external policy.

9.2 Development of Environmentalism in Australia

The general history of the environmental movement in Australia is well covered by Hutton and Connors (1999)³⁹⁵ who used a categorisation of first and second waves, separated by the Second World War. This is a useful, if simplistic approach and others such as Powell (1976)³⁹⁶ saw its development somewhat differently, as a pattern of continuous growth. In the discussion here the first and second wave layers are accepted as a reasonable model to explain events. However, it is argued that whilst the first wave of environmental concern

³⁹³ D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, (London: Policy Press, 1987); see also discussion on the political and economic impact on environmental policy making in D.E. Mann, *Environmental Policy Formation*, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1981)

³⁹⁴ Tim Doyle, *Green Power The environment movement in Australia* (Sydney: UNSW Press 2000)

³⁹⁵ Drew Hutton, and Libby Connors, *A History of the Australian Environmental Movement* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

³⁹⁶ J.M. Powell, *Environmental Management in Australia, 1788-1914 : Guardians, Improvers and Profit* (Melbourne: OUP, 1976)

commenced in the late nineteenth century, it really only gathered momentum in the 1930s and continued beyond the Second World War until the mid 1960s. A second wave then replaced the earlier passive approach with more radical active agendas. This change happened quickly following a realisation of the failure of passive conservation strategies when the environmental battle for Lake Pedder was lost in 1967. But it is useful nevertheless to trace the development of the early approaches to environmental protection.

The days of European settlement in Australia before Federation saw a rural development 'frontier' approach to the environment to clear the land to gain maximum benefit from primary production, at any cost to the natural landscape³⁹⁷. In many cases this could be described as 'mining the environment' rather than 'farming the land'. The over optimistic exploitation of untouched pasture and extravagant hopes of rural expansion in good rain periods, were destroyed by drought cycles and the realization that these dry years were more the climate norm than periods with steady rainfall. Walker (1999)³⁹⁸ in examining the development of Australian environmental policy uses the colourful term 'colonial socialism' to describe the Governmental emphasis on the physical development which was inherently insensitive to the unique and fragile Australian Environment.

However concern for the Australian natural environment arose slowly from a conservation viewpoint towards the end of the nineteenth century, initially for the protection of the natural landscape as place for outdoor recreation, especially for city dwellers. This focus had gathered commenced with the creation of the Royal National Park (south of Sydney) in 1879, only seven years after the world's first National Park had been declared at Yellowstone in the United States of America. By the turn of the century there had been a significant shift in Australian population patterns, from rural to urban areas and several clubs for recreational walking were formed in the major cities. This was the genesis of the first wave of environmentalism.

The Wallaby Club, which is still in operation, was formed in Melbourne 1894 and regarded walking as just a vehicle for serious discussion rather than exploring the bush. The Melbourne Amateur Walking and Touring Club, however was formed four months later for

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ For explanation of the term colonial socialism see K.J. Walker, 'Statist Developmentalism in Australia,' in *Australian Environmental Policy* eds. K.J Walker, and K. Crowley (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999)

both day bushwalking and for overnight treks. Members of this club influenced the later formation of other clubs in Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania and the Warragamba Walking Club was formed in Sydney in 1895. At the turn of the century a number of naturalist clubs and societies were formed in the cities to facilitate the 'outdoor experience', but it is argued that bushwalking clubs best represent the origin of organised groups in the appreciation of the natural environment. These can be considered the genesis of outdoor adventure for residents of the major cities of Sydney and Melbourne, leading to appreciation of the natural environment in its own right.

The first two decades of the 20th century saw the involvement of Australian adventurers and scientists in the British Heroic era of Antarctic exploration. This population of adventurers was supplemented by the return of soldiers from the First World War. This resulted in an influx of persons with a strong appreciation of the natural landscapes from overseas experiences. However, with the failure of optimistic soldier settlement schemes, in marginal lands, to significantly benefit primary production and decentralize the community³⁹⁹ by yeoman soldiers, the population trend away from the outback rural areas to the cities continued.

Myles Dunphy formed the Mountain Trails Club in 1914 for appreciation of rough landscape areas of New South Wales. The natural environment began to be valued and supported in its own right rather than for its potential as a resource for primary production. Dunphy was the first to explore and map many of the rough 'off the track' areas, but by the late 1920s, his focus gradually turned to care for the environment. Under the influence of Myles Dunphy and then his son Milo, this club became an important voice in the creation of National Parks and Reserves and the growth of a conservation movement. For forty years it played a pivotal role in lobbying the government of NSW to preserve the natural environment as wild areas. Bushwalking soon became popular in both Sydney and Melbourne. In 1927, some members of the Mountain Trails Club formed the Sydney Bush Walkers and the Hobart Walking Club became active two years later in 1929.

³⁹⁹ J. M. Powell, Australia's 'Failed' Soldier Settlers, 1914-1923: Towards a Demographic Profile, *Australian Geographer*, 16 (1985); J. M. Powell, *A Historical Geography of Modern Australia The Restive Fringe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 117-18.

In the 1930's in the midst of the great depression, bushwalking boomed and many small clubs emerged. John Chapman (1997)⁴⁰⁰ reports that a radio station at that time promoted club activities in Melbourne and their walks became so popular that they regularly filled a 14-carriage train. One walk in NSW was also reported as attracting 8,000 people. In the early 1930s, nine clubs formed the New South Wales Federation of Walking Clubs to facilitate better representation to government. Similarly in 1934, the Victorian Federation of Walking Clubs was established to present a coordinated voice to the Victorian government. Previously described as the first wave of environmentalist by Hutton and Connors (1999)⁴⁰¹, they presented an orderly, old world, gentlemanly, reasoned approach to government with appeals for rational behaviour in caring for the country.

After the Second World War, more bushwalking clubs were formed and in 1947 the naturalist Caloola Club was formed to promote an understanding of the bushland. Its aim was to inspire and appreciate knowledge of nature and the care of natural areas. These new groups initially blossomed, but their numbers and influence began to decline in the mid 1950s as private motorcars widened people's individual options for outdoor experiences. However, at the time of the establishment of Mawson base in the Antarctic in 1954 there was still a group of people within Australia from the bush walking and naturalist clubs who regularly spoke with government administrators and lobbied for the preservation of areas with outstanding recreational or landscape attributes⁴⁰². Many of the people involved, such as the forester Baldur Byles and his sister Marie Byles, had government or academic positions and, being respected conservationists, had some success in arguing for a widespread creation of national parks. However, the State governments began to concentrate more on economic policy return rather than supporting locking land and resources away in National Parks. Thus a crisis soon occurred in the environmentalist approach. Whilst the lobbying for wilderness areas by bushwalkers had led the way to develop a conservation ethos amongst the Australian community, it gradually drew criticism that it focused too narrowly on passive wilderness conservation and not the full range of environmental protection issues.

⁴⁰⁰ J.Chapman and M. Chapman, *Bushwalking in Australia* (Sydney: Lonely Planet, 1997)

⁴⁰¹ Hutton, *A History of the Australian Environmental Movement* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

⁴⁰² Peter Meredith's Biography of Myles Dunphy and his son Milo is a study of the origins of the conservation movement. Myles and Milo spent their lives fighting to conserve most of the areas now designated as National Parks in Australia in P. Meredith, *Myles and Milo* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000)

In 1955, Tasmanian conservationists succeeded in getting Lake Pedder proclaimed as a National Park, but this was short-lived triumph, which later had a significant impact on the nature of the environmental movement. The National Parks Association was formed in 1957 to promote improvements to National Parks and it later merged with the naturalist Caloola Club in 1963. This new approach caused a divide within the conservation movement. The first wave bushwalker groups had long been involved in passive campaigns and struggled quietly to get more wild areas included in National Parks through letter writing, polite conversation and the 'old boy network'. However, many members of the established movement were both politically and socially conservative. Some of its members held prominent positions and were unhappy with their roles within organizations which were pushing hard to exploit natural resources. Notable examples were the canoeing naturalist Olegas Truchanas and the later the environmentalist, associate professor Bruce Davis; both were from the Tasmanian Hydro Electric Commission and were torn between their love of nature and the pro-development agenda of the government.

While the number of organised bushwalkers declined in the late 1950s as motorcars became more readily available, the 1960s saw the dawn of a new era in the active environmental approach through Jack Mundey and the urban green bans in Sydney⁴⁰³. This widened the horizon of the Australian conservationist's movement and created an opportunity for a much more vigorous active voice to government. This eventually led to a powerful lobby for environmental protection in Australia, as better organized bodies began to become involved in the environmental debate.

The Australian Conservation Foundation was formed in August 1964 with government support, following the suggestion by HRH Prince Phillip, that Australia could become involved in conservation by establishing a branch of the World Wildlife Fund. Following its inauguration meeting, Sir Garfield Barwick, Chief Judge of the High Court, became its first President. Its objectives were to 'further the code, philosophy and practice of conservation', by looking at long-term conservation policies. Over the years, it changed from a government supported, cautious, mainstream lobby group to a radical component of the Green Movement, as it became involved in a wider number of major political issues. Its campaigns and programs were selected predominantly for their capacity to contribute to reforms of

⁴⁰³ R.J. Roddewig, *Green Bans :The Birth of Australian Environmental Politics* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1978).

national significance and these included: Lake Pedder, Franklin Dam, Kakadu National Park, Fraser Island and Ranger Uranium. Its involvement extended nationally across the local, regional, state, national and eventually international levels⁴⁰⁴.

Lake Pedder was drowned by the Gordon dam, despite opposition and a four-year campaign by the conservation movement against the dam. This was a very major blow to the conservation movement and caused much disillusionment in their ranks. The traditionally conservative first wave of the Australian environmental movement suffered a terminal loss of confidence, with the realization that government values had changed and that the 'old boy network' approach had failed and was no longer applicable. In its place a new wave of environmentalist emerged who were prepared to go to extremes to gain public support for their cause. A new era for the environmental movement had begun with a determination to oppose the forces that were turning the state into what the Tasmanian environmentalist Kevin Kiernan called 'Ecocide Isle'. The Wilderness Society for example had its birth in 1976 at a meeting of the South West Action Committee in the lounge room of Bob Brown in Hobart, at that time a member of the United Tasmania Group. This new, more radical approach of the group precipitated a bitter split between those willing to work with the government and those taking a tougher stance against it. The subsequent battle against the Franklin Dam development was won using mass mobilization of protestors for media exposure to gain public support and direct political lobbying during a Federal Government election campaign.

9.3 Geoffrey John Mosley and the Impact of Environmentalism on Antarctic Policy

As described above the environmental movement's influence on Australian Antarctic Policy had its origins in the conservation movement's approach to Australian environmental issues. In that light, the Australian public's transition from conservation awareness to recognition of the value of wild areas can be considered to have begun previously with Myles Dunphy. However, the wilderness concept in Australia was carried further by the environmentalist Dr Geoffrey Mosley in the 1960s and he can be regarded as the key figure influencing Australian domestic policy on wilderness at that time⁴⁰⁵. In the subsequent transfer of these

⁴⁰⁴ J. Warhurst, *The Australian Conservation Foundation: Twenty Five Years of Development*, (Armidale.: Department of Politics, University of New England, 1989)

⁴⁰⁵ Christine Williams, *Green Power: Environmentalists Who Have Changed the Face of Australia*, (Melbourne: Lothian Books, 2006), pp.111-119.

Australian wilderness values to the environmental awareness of Antarctic, it is argued that Mosley was the major force in promoting total protection of the Antarctic environment and facilitating the input of NGO conservation bodies to influence Government policy. For that reason it is important to examine his role in doing this as ultimately the environmental movement lobby had a major influence on Australia's Antarctic Policy.

However, before discussing Mosley's role in influencing this government policy it is useful to firstly gain a perspective how one of Australia's first academically qualified conservationist became involved in Antarctic environmental issues. This examination of his background is warranted, as his role in promoting protection of the total environment and influencing Australian Antarctic Policy is not well documented. To gauge the magnitude of his impact on Antarctic policy as an individual coming from wider environmental community to a specific focus on Antarctica, this study makes extensive use of the unpublished interviews by Greg Borschmann as part of the National Library Environmental Awareness Oral History project,⁴⁰⁶ and the recent publication by Mosley 'Saving the Antarctic Wilderness',⁴⁰⁷.

Geoffrey John Mosley was born into a farming family in the peak district in Derbyshire England in 1931. Always a keen fell and mountain walker, he had developed a major interest in geography before graduating from the University of Nottingham with a Masters Degree in Conservation. Following a period as an educator at RAF training centres in England, he decided on a career change and set off 'to tour the colonies',⁴⁰⁸. After working in outdoor administration and extensively touring in Canada he moved countries and took a job in regional planning with the New Zealand Government in Auckland. In New Zealand he develop considerable bushwalking and mountaineering skills, visiting many mountain areas, before coming to Australia in 1960 to take up a Research Scholar position with the School of Advanced Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. As an extension to his conservation and planning skills he then completed a PhD in the Geography Department on the 'Aspects of the Geography of Recreation in Tasmania' in 1963.⁴⁰⁹ This was one of the first environmental conservation PhD awarded at the Australian National University and possibly Australia.

⁴⁰⁶ Oral History audio tapes of interviews of Geoff Mosley by Greg Borschmann, tape 1, 17 November 1994 NLA bib id 2308227.

⁴⁰⁷ J.G Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness* (Melbourne: Envirobook, 2009)

⁴⁰⁸ Borschmann, *Oral History interview*, 17 November 1994 tape 2

⁴⁰⁹ J.G.Mosley. unpublished PhD thesis (School of Advanced Studies Australia National University Canberra 1963)

Leaving the Australian National University in 1964, Mosley took a position as Research Officer with the Department of National Development for a year working on a National Resources Atlas. This was followed by a Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship with the University of Newcastle for two years, where he lectured in conservation subjects and undertook a research study on NSW national parks. During this study he became associated with leading conservationists, particular Milo Dunphy⁴¹⁰ and the forester Baldur Byles.

Mosley became increasingly involved in park and conservation issues on a national basis. He moved back to Canberra in 1966 to take up a Nuffield research grant on NSW parks and worked as a lecturer in the Geography Department, School of General Studies at Australian National University⁴¹¹. At that time he began to work with the visionary environmentalist Francis Ratcliffe⁴¹² in developing an embryonic Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) along the lines of the American Conservation Foundation. He became full time Assistant Director of the ACF in July 1968⁴¹³.

Dr Alec Costin, alpine ecologist and principal researcher at CSIRO at that time, describes the subsequent advancement of Mosley to the Directorship of the ACF, as follows:

At the next annual general meeting, in the Academy building in Canberra, Garfield Barwick was in the chair and when the time came to elect the next director, he said in his usual autocratic way, 'There'll be no other nominations. Mr. Piesse will be director again.' But Geoff Mosley – who was already assisting Francis and working with Dick Piesse as well – was nominated on the spot and then elected virtually unanimously. I think people realized that he knew about conservation and was one of the leaders in wilderness issues who could really do some good. From that time on, Geoff threw himself into the ACF and made a huge difference to it⁴¹⁴.

Mosley did indeed throw his energy at a wide range of Australian environmental problems including Fraser Island, The Great Barrier Reef, the Myall lakes, Kakadu, Lake Pedder, the proposed Franklin dam, Daintree National Park, Colong Caves, Bungonia Gorge and the

⁴¹⁰ Milo Kanangra Dunphy (son of Myles) audio tape interviews (5 tapes) by Greg Borschmann 15-17 October 1995 NL id 2276056.

⁴¹¹ Mosley-Borschmann oral history tapes 17th November 1994 tape 3 NLA bib id 2308227.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness : The Pivotal Role in Its Complete Protection*.

⁴¹⁴ Dr Alec Costin was interviewed By Greg Borschmann January 5 –March 16, 1996 as part of the *Environmental Awareness Oral History Project*. The corrected transcript of 12 digital audio tapes is held NLA bib Id 2356113 TRC 3398.

Blue Mountains National Park. He achieved major successes with these environmental campaigns, with the exception of the Lake Pedder campaign, which was disabled by complex political maneuvering within Tasmania⁴¹⁵.

Although Antarctica at that time was outside of Mosley's scope in leading the ACF on these Australian issues, it was slowly becoming an international concern. The first ATCM meeting in Canberra in 1961 had set the tone of general rules for the preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica by recommending to their governments that:

They recognize the urgent need for measures to conserve the living resources of the Treaty area and to protect them from uncontrolled destruction or interference by man.⁴¹⁶

This resulted in the 'Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Fauna and Flora' being established in 1964 and the Convention on Antarctic Seals in 1972 under the Antarctic Treaty System. Mosley notes that while this was happening the earliest concerns for conservation of Antarctica outside the Antarctic Treaty System appear to have been made during the First World Conference on National Parks in 1962 by the Australian delegate Robert Carrick⁴¹⁷. Ten years later a suggestion for the protection for the whole of Antarctica was made in a resolution of the Second World Conference on National Parks held in the USA in 1972⁴¹⁸.

However, in Australia there was little public discussion of Antarctic conservation issues and Mosley (2009) states that his first personal contact with Antarctic conservation and protection commenced in early 1974, when he was approached by three scientists from the Australian Antarctic Division in Melbourne about environmental concerns regarding the Antarctic continent⁴¹⁹. This was a watershed meeting and convinced Mosley to become active in regard to environmental protection in Antarctica⁴²⁰. As Director of ACF he established an Antarctic Committee of the ACF Council in May 1974 with Dr Peter Reeves

⁴¹⁵ Mosley interview tapes 4 and 5.

⁴¹⁶) recommendation ATCMI-VIII *Measures for the protection of living resources*. Proceedings First Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Canberra: ATS web site www.ats.aq, 1961)

⁴¹⁷ R. Carrick, 'Conservation in the Antarctic' (paper presented at the Proceedings of the First World Conference on National Parks, Washington, 1962)

⁴¹⁸ Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness : The Pivotal Role in Its Complete Protection*, p.9

⁴¹⁹ The concern over damage near Antarctic bases was raised by Dr Harry Burton, Dr Trevor Tierney and Dr Gavan Johnstone.

⁴²⁰ The move of the Antarctic Division to Hobart had not yet taken place and the meeting with the Melbourne based scientists was held in Mosley's home at Templestowe Victoria.

as convener⁴²¹. In August 1975 the ACF council adopted the Antarctic Committee's recommended comprehensive policy statement on Antarctica. Mosley's influence can be seen in the key points:

- The Antarctic region should be preserved as a wilderness.
- The Foundation believes that Australia has a special responsibility for Antarctica.
- Exploration for and exploitation of, minerals should be excluded from the southern ocean, the Antarctic and the sub Antarctic Islands⁴²².

Through 1977 and 1978 Mosley continued to work on Antarctic conservation publications with members of the ACF Antarctic Committee, particularly Dr Trevor Tierney⁴²³ and Dr Gavan Johnstone, who presented papers at the First Australian National Wilderness conference in 1978.⁴²⁴ Mosley, as ACF Director, continued his active interest in promoting total protection for Antarctica, which resulted in the ACF Council in March 1979 resolving:

To urge the Australian Government to initiate joint action with other Antarctic treaty powers to nominate the entire Antarctic continent as part of the world Natural Heritage⁴²⁵.

Mosley used this endorsement to revise the ACF policy statement later that year, stressing the paramount value of Antarctica as wilderness 'as a solution to the complete protection of the Antarctic continent.'⁴²⁶

Through the 1980s, Mosley became heavily involved both in domestic issues within Australia and internationally in seeking alliances to influence Australian Antarctic policy to gain conservation protection for the Antarctic continent. His strategy was to try to influence the Australian government to agree to environmental protection for the continent and to then take the issue through international alliances to the Antarctic Treaty nations. His major role in promoting Antarctica domestically had been to clearly define and defend the outlook that

⁴²¹ Mosley interview tape 8.

⁴²² Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, 2009, p.13.

⁴²³ Cooperation resulted in a major magazine issue on Antarctica which contained article by T.G Tierney, 'The Last Wild Continent,' *Habitat* 1978.5), p.5.

⁴²⁴ T.J. Tierney and G. Johnstone, *Conserving Australia's Wilderness: Antarctica as a Wilderness*, Proceedings of the First National Wilderness Conference (Canberra Academy of Science, 1978)

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ ACF Policy Statement no. 4 – Antarctica and the southern ocean (The Antarctic Region) original policy 1975, revised 1979, 1984, 1990 and 2005. cited in Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, 2009, p.105

complete environmental protection for the continent was achievable and worth fighting for. However, Mosley had considerable trouble convincing other conservation groups that this was the correct approach and that the objective was achievable. When Mosley began to seek support from other conservation groups he found this to be 'quite a sobering experience' with strong unexpected resistance from groups which were aligned in some form to the government push for mineral exploitation. His stance and that of ACF, is well documented by his latest book 'Saving the Antarctic Wilderness' which traces the problems he encountered in trying to gather their support for the ACF policy. His careful description of events shows the turmoil encountered in attempting the coordination of diverse conservation bodies, each with their own agenda. He comments 'it was not easy to get them on side' and cites Greenpeace as the main obstacle in Australia, although other groups such as Friends of the Earth, World Wild Life Fund and the Fund for Animals 'were not inclined to come on board the ACF campaign for various reasons'. He organized a special Antarctic conference in Sydney to advance coordination between the groups but discussions did not run smoothly and he felt that common ground statement produced was watered down to the lowest common denominator and hence of very little use. However, the discussions cleared the air and it was agreed that in future no one group would try to undercut another. With exception of the Fund for Animals (see below), criticism of the Australian Conservation Foundation's World Park policy by other NGO's ceased after that time.

The key remaining issue of debate was whether to seek full protection of the Antarctic environment or to accept mining in Antarctica within environmental restrictions under the Antarctic Treaty System. Mosley argued for a world park under a United Nations umbrella or an independent commission, however, the other groups felt that the issues were too hard to tackle. Greenpeace in particular did not think that the fight for total protection could be won⁴²⁷. Mosley comments this was 'a tense situation and did not win friends for me'. Following the Sydney meeting which was unsuccessful in getting a coordinated approach, ACF (through the Director) developed its own campaign for the protection of the Antarctic environment to win public support, even though a prickly relationship still existed with other conservation groups. In 1983 the ACF formed an Antarctic Action Group to run the campaign for total protection with big media exposure, publications and films for television. Doyle (1995), a key environmental activist and a member of the group comments:

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

The Antarctic campaign seemed to defy the usual requirements for a key environmental issue. In fact, it reversed the process. It did not reach the pinnacle of the conservation agenda in these organizations because of widespread, grassroots concern among their membership, but because the issues were conceived perceived by a group of expert, professional environmentalists. Out of this process less formal groups such as the ACF's Antarctic Action Group formed. There were attempts to spread this concern to the public but the campaign was dominated by direct lobbying techniques.⁴²⁸

The main target for this direct lobbying on Antarctica protection was the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had responsibility for Australia's role in the Antarctic Treaty. During the Fraser Government (1975-1983), Mosley had meetings with External Affairs Ministers; Street and Peacock, as well as Ministers for Science and the Environment; Webster and Thomson, who had direct administrative control over the activities of the Antarctic Division. His objectives for these meetings were to push for Australia's support for a World Heritage status for Antarctica; and to gain representation on the Australian delegation to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative meetings. These approaches were not wholly successful as the Australian Government Departments were involved with the development of an environmental friendly mining regime. The composition of the delegation lobbying government was rotated between various NGO groups, causing some friction due to the difference of opinion regarding the extent of environmental protection to be sought.⁴²⁹

Mosley records that with the election of the Hawke Government, a potentially more environmentally sympathetic situation had emerged. He had developed a close relationship with Bill Hayden the new Minister for External Affairs. However, at a meeting with Minister Hayden in 1983 it became obvious that his Department's policy was still focused strongly on a minerals regime, not overall protection of the continent. At a key conference at ANU calling for public input to Antarctic policy in 1983 Mosley presented the case for a World Park as the instrument for environmental protection⁴³⁰. This was savagely attacked by Annette Horsler of the Fund for Animals who favoured the governmental approach to mining. Her published comments included: The completion of a minerals regime was

⁴²⁸ Timothy Doyle and Aynsley Kellows, *Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia*, (Melbourne : Macmillan, 1995), p. 252.

⁴²⁹ Mosley interview 1 May 1996 tape 12.

⁴³⁰ J.G Mosley, 'The Natural Option: The Case for an Antarctic World Park,' in *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, ed. s. Harris (Canberra: CRES Australian National University, 1983), pp. 307-327.

inevitable: environmentalists were better off with a minerals regime than without one; and the idea that the minerals negotiations might break down was little more than vain hope.⁴³¹

In May 1985 Horsler gave evidence to the Standing Committee on National Resources enquiring into the natural resources of the Australian Antarctic Territory. She spoke against the world park concept, saying 'the world park was not feasible and that the 'fund for animals' was pressing for a system of reserves',⁴³².

Throughout the 1980s Mosley continued his active campaign to win support from the public on Protection of the Antarctic environment through a number of publications⁴³³. In 1984 following the activities of the Antarctic Action Group, he was again instrumental in revising the ACF's Antarctic policy statement to include a call for the whole Antarctic region to be managed as a World Park under an appropriate agency. Mosley's general strategy on issues was to prepare a policy position, gather support for it within and outside of ACF and then to prepare a policy implementation plan to influence government.⁴³⁴ Mosley explains the then ACF position:

The strategy for implementing the Antarctic policies was seen... to involve several main thrusts: influencing Australian Government policy, both directly and indirectly through pressure from the Australian public... and making contact with other groups around the world and if possible with their help to initiate a world wide campaign for the protection of Antarctica⁴³⁵.

In December 1984 Moseley was invited to a joint summer ANARE changeover on the expedition ship *Icebird*, together with another leading environmentalist, Lyn Goldsworthy, who was to become the key Greenpeace spokesperson in favour of full protection. This

⁴³¹ A. Horsler, 'comments published on the Mosley paper' On the Natural Option: The Case for an Antarctic World Park,' in *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, ed. S. Harris (Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, ANU, 1984)

⁴³² Mosley oral history interview 1 May 1996 tape 1. also Senate Standing Committee on National Resources, 'The Natural Resources of the Australian Antarctic Territory,' (Canberra: 1985)

⁴³³ For example, J.G. Mosley, *The Natural Option: The Case for an Antarctic World Park*, Monograph 11 pp. 307-327 ; J.G Mosley, 'Antarctica :How We Can Save It,' *Habitat* 1983 ;J.G Mosley, 'Antarctica : The Case for an Antarctic World Park,' in *Fighting for Wilderness Papers from the Australian Conservation Foundation's Third National Wilderness Conference* eds. J.G.Mosley and J.Messer (Melbourne: Fontana, 1984); J.G. Mosley, *Antarctica : Our Last Great Wilderness* (Melbourne: Australian Conservation Foundation, 1986)

⁴³⁴ For example ACF Policy Statement no. 4 - Antarctica and the southern ocean (The Antarctic Region) original policy 1975, revised 1979, 1984, 1990 and 2005. cited in Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, 2009 , p.105

⁴³⁵ J.G Mosley, 'Antarctica :How We Can Save It,' *Habitat* 11 (1983), p. 14.

allowed for extensive in-situ discussions between them concerning protection of the Antarctic wilderness.

While actively promoting protection for the Antarctic continent as a wilderness to the Australian Government in the late 1970s, Mosley also sought to find international allies in support of the ACF campaign and to influence Australia to take the lead internationally within the Antarctic Treaty nations. He made contact with a number of international groups and individuals such as the Sierra club and James Barnes of the Centre for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) in Washington. Barnes was co-founder of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) of USA organizations in 1977 and a member of the US State Department's Advisory Committee on Antarctica. The ACF through Mosley joined ASOC as a 'Founder Member'⁴³⁶. Mosley also sought to gain support from the established International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) which first raised protection for Antarctica at its National parks conference in 1972.⁴³⁷ Mosley prepared draft resolutions on Antarctica and whale conservation and gaining ACF council approval, submitted them to the 1981 IUCN conference in Christchurch.

Despite IUCN being well established internationally with both government and non-government bodies in its membership, Mosley met strong, frustrating, resistance to his proposals to protect the Antarctic environment. This was because within the IUCN there were forces strongly aligned to pro-mining activities, particularly delegates from Canada, who advocated exploitation as in their Arctic territories and New Zealand who saw their country as the resource extraction gateway for Antarctica. However, at the conference in Christchurch in 1981 Mosley managed to get the key elements of his submissions included in a comprehensive resolution which was then approved by the General Assembly, although distribution of the resolution was suppressed.⁴³⁸

At the Christchurch conference, Mosley was elected to the IUCN Council to represent the Australasian and Oceania regions; a position he held for seven years. Over these years he continued to encounter resistance to his proposals by the executive arm of the organization. To counter this situation he employed a strategy of getting endorsement for action from each

⁴³⁶ Mosley interview, 17 November 1994, Tape 8.

⁴⁴⁰ International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural resources , *World Conservation Strategy. Living resource Conservation for Sustainable Development* ,(Gland Switzerland : IUCN,1980)

⁴³⁸ Resolution GA15/20 is given in proceedings '15th Session of the IUCN General Assembly and 15th Technical Meeting,Christchurch,11-23 October. 1981 .

General Assembly to instruct the executive to take action.⁴³⁹ But it was hard going against the pro-mining influences and Mosley comments: 'In the second half of the 1980s IUCN appeared to be a lost cause' due to those influences and the 'only safe tactic was to neutralize its influence by pressure on the implementation of the general assembly resolutions'.⁴⁴⁰

The IUCN was well placed to influence the United States and gain world support for Antarctic Environmental protection. However, Mosley was very critical of its role and records that it only joined the approach 'after the battle had been won'.⁴⁴¹ He comments on the role of IUCN between 1987 and 1991, as follows:

IUCN had been dragged by its coat tails to awkwardly support an international conservation initiative which it could have helped design but for ... flaws in its system of governance⁴⁴².

While battles were being fought internationally amongst environmental groups on protection for Antarctica, there was also considerable conflict domestically between conservation groups. Despite the progress made on a number of domestic conservation matters and the head of steam created in relation to Antarctica, this turmoil flowed into the ACF. In 1986 Mosley was moved aside from his position as Director and the lead role of lobbying government Ministers went to the new Director, Phillip Toyne. Mosley resigned from the ACF staff soon after, but continued as a vocal and active member of the ACF Antarctic Action Group.

Mosley's vision of total protection had been personally attacked by members of other conservation groups in the mid 1980s. It was also against the pro-mining strategies of the senior desk officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs at that time, such as Hugh Wyndham, who argued for a minerals exploitation regime at international conferences. Gradually the tide against full protection of the Antarctic environment turned as the decade rolled on and other groups now saw that the ACF (Mosley) campaign had gathered momentum and could possibly succeed. Greenpeace Australia and Greenpeace International now also began arguing for a world park status⁴⁴³. The eventual decision in favour of total

⁴³⁹ Such as above IUCN General Assemblies, in Christchurch 1981, Madrid 1984, Bali 1982, Costa Rica 1988 and Perth 1990.

⁴⁴⁰ Mosley interview tape 12, (1 May 1996)

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Mosley *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, (2009), p.75.

⁴⁴³ Goldsworthy, 'World Park Antarctica :An Environmentalist Vision.'(Greenpeace pamphlet ,1981)

protection, made by the Hawke Government in 1989, can be considered to have been greatly influenced by public opinion (and the potential electoral impact) Mosley comments:

Both Hawke and Keating's decision to oppose CRAMRA [the minerals regime] would have been unlikely if it had not been clear that the Australian people and the environment movement would welcome the use of the veto...In Australia, if the ACF had not resisted the efforts of others [environmental groups] in the movement to persuade us to take the CRAMRA route in 1983-1984 the Hawke Keating initiatives would not have been possible.⁴⁴⁴

Mosley's contributions to preserving wilderness in Australia and Antarctica were acknowledged in 2005 when he was awarded an Order of Australia Medal in the Queen's Birthday Honours. In June, 2008 he was named as the Individual Award winner in the Australia World Environment Day 2008 Awards. In 2008 he became the Australian Director of the Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy. Mosley's role had been pivotal over the fifteen years leading up to the 1989 decision in raising public support for total protection of the pristine Antarctic environment. Thus he can be seen as been an important player in influencing Government Policy in relation to the comprehensive environmental protocol for protection of the Antarctic environment. While this was ultimately embodied in the Madrid Protocol, Mosley's personal long-term vision was not fully satisfied by this protocol under the Antarctic Treaty and he has continued to argue for Antarctica to additionally be given World Heritage status⁴⁴⁵.

Whilst the environmental movement within Australia was able to successfully put its case to the Government, as an influence on an external Antarctic policy issue, other external pressures on Government also needs to be considered in the policy context. It is necessary to analyse the history of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities drawn up by the Antarctic Treaty nations. This was to create a problem for these nations when it prompted debate in the United Nations General Assembly, it was then to have a significant influence on Australian policy and required great diplomatic skill in working though the Convention's completion, adoption, rejection and then replacement by a comprehensive environmental protection regime.

⁴⁴⁴ Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness : The Pivotal Role in Its Complete Protection*, p. 99.

⁴⁴⁵ Reference 2007 publication *J.G Mosley, Antarctica : Securing Its Heritage for the Whole World* (Sydney: *Envirobook*, 2007) and his 2009 book, *J.G.Mosley, Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, p.100.

But firstly the origins of the convention warrant examination. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty included a provision for its review or amendment after an initial period of 30 years, if a consultative partner formally requested this review. As expiry of this period was approaching towards the end of the 1980s there was unrest amongst Treaty nations with uncertainty expressed about the future of Antarctic Treaty. Although concern for the environment had been on the agenda of the Antarctic Treaty countries since its first meeting in Canberra in 1961, the prime focus had been on the conservation of living resources, rather than the protection of non-living resources. Global oriented, non-governmental, organizations had begun to show a heightened interest in Antarctic affairs and the marine resources in the Southern Ocean in the 1960s. Concerns for the Southern Ocean were accentuated by commercial whaling, fishing and krill harvesting initiatives. Non-government organizations such as the World Conservation Union, Greenpeace and the Antarctic Southern Ocean Coalition became increasingly visible and politically active in the development of the Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources or CCLAMR (1980). With that conservation convention finalised, The Antarctic Treaty Nations then began to consider the state of environmental management within the Treaty System. The modus operandi of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative meetings was always by consensus not by majority vote. This created a certain operational atmosphere, needing a careful regard to maintain the treaty objectives of securing a peaceful region without conflict. Decisions were often made through the diplomatic line of least political resistance, rather than to achieve the optimum result, which might have been disruptive to the group dynamics of the consultative parties. Thirty years of these discussions resulted in some 200 recommendations and resolutions being incrementally established. However, the environmental recommendations and meeting resolutions often drew criticism from non-Antarctic countries as being superficial and with no enforcement muscle, especially with regard to waste management and exploitation of living resources.

The need for a legal regime to set controls for potential mining operations in Antarctic had been discussed in the Treaty meetings in the early 1970s and continued as an agenda item until 1981⁴⁴⁶. These discussions raised the concern that if important minerals were found, an unregulated scramble could result with a very damaging impact on the pristine environment. These discussions led to the adoption of Resolution IX-1 in 1977 and Resolution XI-1 in

⁴⁴⁶ L.M. Elliot, *International Environmental Politics; Protecting the Environment*, 1 ed. (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 112.

1981 which called for the development of a regime to control the impact of mining, while at the same time placed a moratorium on such mining activities, until that protective regime was finalised⁴⁴⁷. This posed the difficult question of how to allow commercialism within the Antarctic nations whilst preserving the rights of Territorial claimants, without a negative impact on the Antarctic Treaty. To address that question a special Antarctic Treaty System committee was formed in 1981 to develop a suitable regime for controlled mining similar to that established for living resources in the southern Ocean. This then saw seven years of difficult negotiations amongst Antarctic Treaty consultative partners striving to develop a Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities which would allow mining on the continent whilst protecting the pristine nature of the Antarctic environment.⁴⁴⁸ Australia became deeply involved policy objective of not only protecting the Antarctic environment but preserving the status of its dormant territorial claim and benefiting from any mining activities in that territory⁴⁴⁹.

But the Antarctic Treaty nation's strategy to allow mining also caught the attention and concern of non-governmental organisations previously involved in CCAMLR, to lobby enthusiastically against the development of such a mining regime. Widespread global media campaigns by these non-governmental organizations invoked attention and gained popular support for a ban on mining to preserve the Antarctic wilderness in its pristine state.

9.4 Alternative proposals for environmental protection of Antarctica

As negotiations for an Antarctic Minerals Convention advanced within the Antarctic Treaty system objections continued within the United Nations, two alternative approaches for environmental protection in Antarctica were put forward outside the treaty system. The first, proposed by environmentalist groups, was to replace the Antarctic Treaty System with a global agreement to make the continent an 'Antarctic World Park', whilst the second proposed by third world countries called for adoption of a 'Common Heritage of Mankind' approach to Antarctica under a United Nations management system. Whilst these alternate

⁴⁴⁷ Such as the supporting paper on the proposed mineral regime by New Zealand by Chris Beeby who had been deeply involved in developing the CRAMRA in C.Beeby, 'The Mineral Convention and its future' in Herr, Hall and Haward, eds *Antarctica's future :continuity or change* (Hobart Australian Institute of International Affairs 1990), pp. 47-60.

⁴⁴⁸ B.M Blay.S.K.N. and Tsamenyi, 'Australia and the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Minerals Resource Activities (CARAMRA),' *Polar Record* 26 (1990), 195-202.

⁴⁴⁹ Header, Jeremy, The Australian Government Perspective in Handmer ed. *Antarctica and Policy development* (Canberra : The Australian National University, 1990), pp. 7-11.

approaches to operate outside the Antarctic Treaty system were supported by third world countries and international non-government bodies, they also drew criticisms as being idealistic and unworkable without administrative structure and financial support.⁴⁵⁰ As these concepts were not supported by Australian Antarctic policy, they warrant further examination.

The World Park concept for Antarctica had its origins in the World Conservation Union's Second World Conference of National parks in 1972, which recommended :

That the nations party to the Antarctic Treaty should negotiate to establish the Antarctic continent and the surrounding oceans be established as the first world park, under the auspices of the United Nations.

The concept was later picked up and further promoted by other environmental groups as an alternative to the Treaty system. The Greenpeace vision for a 'World Park Antarctica' called for 'the protection forever of our last great wilderness continent, from all destructive human activities, including all mining activities.'⁴⁵¹ The Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition, which represented more than 200 conservation and environmental organizations in 35 nations, championed the idea that an Antarctic World Park that would safeguard the continent's ecological integrity by banning all mineral exploitation, including fossil fuel extraction. Such a World Park would invoke a wilderness concept protecting Antarctica for its own intrinsic value and for its unique science research opportunities. The objectives for a world park regime would be for Antarctica to be kept as a continent for peace and an independent Environmental Protection Agency would be established to set standards for all human activities in Antarctica including science and tourism.

However, the world environmentalist groups were not united beyond their conceptual approach, in how such a World Park would work. The Australian Conservation Foundation supported the concept with policies and pamphlets and in 1984, the director, Geoff Mosley, presented their case for a World Park, operating within or outside the Antarctic Treaty system, at a conference examining Australia's Antarctic policy options in Hobart in 1990. He focused on wilderness values in the following terms :

⁴⁵⁰ J. Hansom and J. Gordon, *Antarctic Environments and Resources* (Edinburgh: Longman, 1998), p. 271.

⁴⁵¹ such as Goldsworthy in Herr and Haward, *Antarctica's Future : Continuity or Change*, pp. 90-93.

‘the ACF believes that the value of the eternal existence of the Antarctic wilderness far outweighs any potential short term benefit that may be envisaged in the exploitation of known or imagined resources such as minerals or hydrocarbons’.⁴⁵²

This economic cost benefit approach is based on the concept of placing a value on the natural environment in order for it to be including in cost benefit analyses of resource development projects. Mosley argued that mining would be excluded from a World Park but the southern ocean management regime, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources would continue under more stringent conservation measures. Not everyone at the Hobart conference agreed with Mosley and Annette Horsler from the Animal Protection agency of the Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition, aggressively argued that Mosley had been too conservatively diplomatic in considering the possibility of a World Park operating under the Antarctic Treaty System. She argued that approval for the Antarctic mining regime was inevitable and a complete radical change was required. On the other hand Phillip Law, former director of the Australian Antarctic Division, favoured exploitation and presented a case against a closed world park arguing that it was not necessary as the total human impacts on Antarctica from science occupation were negligible; widespread mining was unlikely; and the world would lose the benefits already accrued under the Antarctic Treaty System.⁴⁵³

The establishment of a World Park operating outside the Antarctic Treaty and administered by the United Nations, required a global environmental watchdog with enforcement power to be established. As such, whilst the World Park was the most popular concept favoured by non-governmental organizations, it was considered to be idealistic and extremely difficult to establish or operate, from both a financial and political perspective.⁴⁵⁴ At the end of the 1980s decade, it was argued by the Australian government and most non-government organizations that the only possible implementation of the World Park concept was for it to operate within the Antarctic Treaty System. Mosley was always a strong supporter of the World park concept and continued to argue strongly, but unsuccessfully, for Australia to accept that position.

⁴⁵² Mosley, *The Natural Option: The Case for an Antarctic World Park*, in S. Harris ed., *Australia's Antarctic Policy Options*, pp. 307-327.

⁴⁵³ Law, ‘The Antarctic Wilderness-a Wild Idea.’ in Herr, Hall and Haward eds. *Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change*, pp. 71-80.

⁴⁵⁴ Donald Rothwell, *A World Park for Antarctica? : Foundations, Developments and the Future* (Hobart: Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, 1990)

The second approach to establishing an alternative control framework over Antarctica, which was favoured by third world countries, had its origins in the outcomes of the third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) Conference in 1982. This conference introduced a common heritage for mankind concept to potential resource exploitation of the high seas.⁴⁵⁵ This common heritage of mankind concept was that all countries of the world should benefit from any exploitation of resources beyond accepted territorial boundaries. It was argued that this should also apply to Antarctica, as territorial claims were not universally recognised. Principally it was based on gaining access to exploitation profit from resources and not on environmental preservation grounds. It centred on establishing an open member control organization within the United Nations, with decisions made by majority, using a one state one-vote basis. Conditions would be placed on various activities, with levy charges being placed on exploitation. Revenue returns would be divided amongst member states, according to a formula, which favoured developing countries. With the collapse of the proposed Minerals Convention in 1989, which negated mining in Antarctica, the prime focus of the common heritage argument shifted to gaining control for environmental protection by countries and bodies outside the Antarctic Treaty System.⁴⁵⁶

The 'common heritage of mankind' approach from third world countries carried harsh criticism of the 'exclusive' club nature of the Antarctic Treaty System. However, closer examination of this argument shows that shows that 39 United Nations countries had become parties to the Antarctic Treaty at the time of the Madrid protocol and the number of consultative parties had doubled from the original 12 to 25 in 1988. This is a sizeable population, about one quarter of the total membership of the United Nations. The number of nations acceding to the Treaty was clearly growing at that time and participation as a consultative party was open to any country with a demonstrated interest in Antarctic research. This puts in perspective the 'small club' criticism of third world countries that, despite the opportunities to become involved within the Antarctic Treaty System, preferred to

⁴⁵⁵ Peterson, *Managing the Frozen South : The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System*, pp. 119- 22.

⁴⁵⁶ Gillian Triggs, 'A Comprehensive Environmental Regime for Antarctica: A New Way Forward' in Herr, Hall and Haward eds. *Antarctica's Future :Continuity or Change*. (Hobart: Australian Institute of International Affairs,1990)

stay outside the system and to argue for its complete replacement. This can be viewed as a power based strategy to gain political advantage within the United Nations Assembly.

The 'common heritage of mankind approach' was not embraced by Australian Antarctic policy, which supported Antarctic management by specialist nations and the growth in state membership of the Antarctic Treaty System as the way forward to Antarctic environmental protection. Despite the work of the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations these alternative approaches to the future of Antarctica eventually gained favour in the United Nations in 1989 on the support from minor African nations and a resolution was passed calling for a World Park or Nature Reserve to be created for the benefit of all humanity.⁴⁵⁷

The confused global situation with multi diverse approaches to the use and protection of Antarctica came to a head, when the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties' opinions became polarised over Mining in Antarctica. Despite this general global dissatisfaction from within the United Nations and the non-governmental bodies, over the state of environmental protection in Antarctica, the United States of America and the United Kingdom continued to press strongly for development of a regime to allow mining in Antarctica. This led to the completion of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and its adoption by a Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, in June 1988. This outcome drew immediate criticism from countries outside the Antarctic Treaty System and from within the United Nations as is discussed later in examining the work of Richard Woolcott, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations in chapter 13. Dissatisfaction was voiced about the ability of the Antarctic Treaty System to manage Antarctic affairs and the wider international community increased the call for an Antarctic World Park under the auspices of the United Nations.⁴⁵⁸ It also galvanised widespread popular resistance from non-governmental environmentalists to an Antarctic mining regime. This saw heightened grass roots concerns for the environmental impact of humans on the last great unspoiled continent being picked up in campaigns around the world. In a dramatic turnaround Australia and France announced less than a year later, in early 1989

⁴⁵⁷ Keith Suter, *Antarctica : Private Property or Public Heritage?*; Peter Willenski, *Monthly Record* (Canberra :Dept External Affairs ,October 1989)

⁴⁵⁸ For example see Peter Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); P.J. Beck, 'Antarctica at the United Nations 1985 : The End of Concensus ?,' *Polar Record* 23 (1986); P.J. Beck, 'Another Sterile Ritual ? The United Nations and Antarctica 1987.' *Polar Record* 24, (1988), pp. 207-12.

that they would not ratify the Minerals Convention, although they had previously supported it.

Antarctic environmental policy had thus journeyed from an extremely minor position in Australian policy importance at the time of the establishment of Mawson station in 1954, to become the prime element in Australia's Antarctic policy in 1991 through the monumental milestone of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. This 'Madrid Protocol' has secured comprehensive environmental protection for the Antarctic continent for living and non-living resources. The benchmark procedures from the Madrid Protocol have become a model for all nations to pay attention to in the Antarctic environmental management. The impact on the environment became the culmination of Australian Antarctic Policy at that time.

Australia had played a very major role internationally in the development of the Madrid Protocol and in gaining consensus support from all consultative parties. It demonstrated the success of Australian policy to Antarctica in shaping international outcomes. However, as well as providing guidelines for all Antarctic nations, the Madrid Protocol was a catalyst in shaping and advancing Australia's own environmental policy towards Antarctica. The fact that Australia was successful in promoting its reversed policy to change the pro-mining attitude of the Consultative parties of the Antarctic Treaty System was a very significant international achievement for a nation with a middle level standing in world politics. Whilst the resultant environmental protection outcome was internationally significant, this involvement also provided the platform for Australia to build a sound environmental management framework, for its own ongoing operations in Antarctica.

The Madrid Protocol harmonised a wide range of provisions relating to protection of the Antarctic environment in a comprehensive and legally binding form for implementation. It took many of the safeguard elements developed for mining alone and applied them to the full range of human activities. The Madrid protocol preamble described it as a tool for 'comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and designates Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and Science'. The content and planned implementation process of the Madrid protocol countered widespread environmental criticism of the Antarctic Treaty and the proposed Mineral Convention to permit mining. The procedural rules to change are so tight that it is hard to see

how the prohibition on mining could be lifted in the future under such a regime.⁴⁵⁹ It also provided a better interface to the United Nations, with provision for monitoring environmental impacts and countered non-governmental criticisms of the lack of teeth in past environmental management of the Antarctic Treaty System.

The Madrid Protocol entered into force following the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by all the states, which were Consultative Parties on 4 October 1991. A description of the main points of the Madrid Protocol and its Annexures is presented as Appendix 2. Before ratification each Party was required to enact individual domestic legal requirements before the instruments could be deposited. Australia in turn passed legislation to provide for legally enforcing the provisions of the Madrid Protocol and its annexes. The key Australian legislation to implement the Madrid Protocol received Royal Assent on 11 December 1992 and subsidiary regulations were completed in March 1994 and Australia ratified the Madrid Protocol on 6 April 1994. 1

In opening the 1993 Fenner Conference on the Environment, the Minister for Foreign affairs Senator Gareth Evans supported the protocol as the right decision and summarised :

In fact there is no parallel in any other region of the world for the adoption of a comprehensive environmental protection regime such as that contained in the Protocol and Australia has good reason to be proud of its contribution. The Madrid Protocol was favourably received globally, even by some critics of the Antarctic Treaty System and it enhanced the standing of the Treaty system in the United Nations.⁴⁶⁰

The Madrid Protocol applies only to the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty, that is south of latitude 60 degrees south. It does not apply to sensitive Sub-Antarctic Island habitats or the southern ocean waters extending northwards to the southern convergence boundary, although conservation issues in these areas are separately covered by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources. Whilst the Madrid Protocol drew some

⁴⁵⁹ Further discussion on the legal framework in regard to prohibition on mining is given in , *Antarctic Environmental Protection : A Collection of Australian and International Instruments*, Donald Rothwell and Ruth Davis, eds (Leichhardt : Federation Press, 1997)

⁴⁶⁰ Gareth Evans, preface in 'Protecting Antarctica :An ongoing effort' in J.Handmer and M.Wilder eds. *Towards a Conservation Strategy for the Australian Antarctic Territory* (Canberra: CRES, Australian National University, 1993), p. vii-xi.

criticism for not extending its scope beyond the Antarctic Treaty area to cover the wider geographical region, it is hard to see how this could be done without a change to the Antarctic Treaty. From Australia's viewpoint this leaves the unresolved question of whaling in the southern ocean as a separate policy issue to be tackled within the International Whaling Commission. As some member states within that commission use a very liberal interpretation of scientific research to justify taking whales in Antarctic waters of the southern ocean.⁴⁶¹ This difficult but related issue requires further research, negotiation and diplomacy within the International Whaling Commission especially with Japan and Norway who desire extended access to whales.

The Madrid Protocol was a huge step forward in Antarctic Environmental management; it introduced a very workable addition to the Antarctic Treaty and gathered consensus and commitment from Treaty partners, despite its rocky road through the failed Mineral Convention negotiations. Whilst it was inspirational in its objectives and intentions it was not considered by everyone to be complete in every aspect at the time. Shortcomings in protection of sensitive areas and liability for environmental damage were identified⁴⁶², but the built in strategy allowed for it to be further developed without conflict to the overarching Antarctic Treaty and these were subsequently included as Annexes to the Madrid Protocol.

The change in emphasis from minerals exploitation to complete environmental protection deflected the growing challenge to the Antarctic Treaty System by the developing countries through the United Nations and from non-government organizations. As previously mentioned the primary global debate on Antarctica at that time also shifted from how to label it as a 'continent for science', 'a world park', 'a common heritage for mankind', or 'a pristine wilderness' to one of how the Madrid Protocol could be implemented and how best it would work. Internationally it encouraged convergence of policies from different interest groups to work through consensus, within the existing Antarctic Treaty System, rather than mounting a direct challenge to the existence of the Treaty. With the signing of the Madrid Protocol in October 1991, the review clause option of Antarctic Treaty, after the statutory thirty-year

⁴⁶¹ Donald Rothwell, *The Madrid Protocol and Its Relationship with the Antarctic Treaty System*, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Law and Policy Occasional Paper ; 5 (Hobart: Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, 1992)

⁴⁶² In particular some international Lawyers saw some gaps in the scope of the environmental protocol of the Treaty and less than perfect wordings, see W.M. Bush, 'Means and Methods of Implementation of Antarctic Environmental Regimes and National Environmental Instruments: An Exercise,' in *Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for the Antarctic*, ed. D. Vidas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000)

period was not invoked. The Madrid meetings had revitalised the sagging elements of the Antarctic Treaty System, which had drawn so much criticism. The Antarctic Treaty now remains in force indefinitely, unless a consultative party requests a review meeting or proposes an amendment. The Madrid Antarctic Treaty meeting did much to settle things all around and can be considered a defacto review as the impact of the Madrid Protocol was far reaching and cleared the air on many fronts.

9.5. Conclusions on Geoff Mosley' influence on government policy

The environmental movement's influence of Australian Government policy and the prime minister, resulting in the very far reaching Madrid protocol can be seen to have been considerably influenced by the impassioned work of Geoffrey Mosley. His role was to bring the diverse wild bunch of green organisation to a common line to support the comprehensive environmental protection of Antarctica. One of the first academically qualified environmental scientists he pursued a strong unbending line insisting that the Convention to allow mining in Antarctic could be reversed. This was not without personal cost such as vitriol comments by other groups who sought to support the governmental policy role of advocacy for a mining regime. Mosley was politically deposed from the position of CEO of the Australian Conservation Foundation, but he persisted in his crusade through Antarctic Action Committee which he had previously set up. At the international level he sought to gain support for Environmental protection through the ICUN, but this was not an easy path as environmental nominees were controlled by mining protagonist companies in the United States who opposed full environmental protection. This led to a running political battle between Mosley, with face to face conference support and the more distant executive who refused to take action to support comprehensive protection until the American government factions were politically forced to support the full protection regime of the Madrid protocol. Despite the success of the environmental protection approach under the Antarctic Treaty Mosley remains a strong advocate of Antarctic gaining world heritage status as a stronger outcome, for him the battle continues.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶³ Mosley, *Saving the Antarctic Wilderness*, pp. 98-100.

Part B, Section 2: The Influences of individuals working within Government

Section 1 examined the influences on Antarctic policy from sources outside the government, notably that of Sir Edgeworth David, Sir Douglas Mawson and Dr Geoffrey Mosley. It concluded that these influences only really succeeded in having a significant impact on policy when these connected with sympathetic forces within government which were in a position of power. However, it can be seen that while they provided the groundwork for Antarctic issues, they were most successful when in addition influences from external events there were people positioned with the government who were willing and able to take their input into a policy issue.

Section 2 now addresses those insider forces operating within government, as it was only when these insiders had the interest and inclination to respond to outside pressure that Australian Antarctic policy moved forward. Although parliament sets policy, its creation and implementation relies on persons working within the government. This involves the amalgamation of ideas and pressures from key outside figures, vocal minorities and consideration of reaction from the voting public. These are then taken as input to the preparation of legislation and procedures. Its success also depends on the capacity and drive of bureaucrats and supportive ministers capable of taking the documented proposals to cabinet and parliament, in order to gain acceptance for implementation of a policy direction.

The outstanding individuals working within the government who were able to make significant impact of Australian Antarctic policy in the 20th century can be identified as:

- Casey- The long term Antarctic champion
- Phillip Garth Law- The policy implementer
- Robert Dovers – the exploration tradition starts here
- Richard Woolcott –the master diplomat
- Robert Hawke – three years of political leadership

The relevant background and contribution of each of these individual of different calling and attitude is researched to show how key persons when well positioned can make a unique influence on development of policy.

Chapter 10: Richard Casey – Baron of Berwick

10.1 Introduction.

When the nature of forces within the government is analysed in the context of early Antarctic policy development, the influence of one figure stands out. This was Richard Gardiner Casey (later Baron of Berwick), who played an influential role from the time of the First World War to the signing of the Antarctica Treaty and its ratification in 1961.⁴⁶⁴ Richard Casey became interested in Antarctic while serving on the western front in World War 1 through association with men recently returned polar expeditioners. He continued this interest in Antarctica for nearly fifty years through a number of key placements within government, but his period as Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1961 can be viewed as his most powerful influence on Antarctic policy.

In comparison to Mawson's single-minded passion for the Antarctic⁴⁶⁵, Casey was a man of an incredibly wide range of interests. Antarctica was just one in a spectrum of interests, which included the mechanics of politics, social reform, economics, flying and travel. His prime Australian working career of 55 years, ranged from 1914 to his appointment as Governor General in 1969. This included first hand diplomacy in the international arena ranging from work in Britain, America, India, Pakistan and South East Asia. When set against the wider scope of his career achievements, Antarctica could be viewed as a minor interest, but his influence and personal action in furthering Australian involvement in the Antarctic continent was very significant.

In regard to Antarctica it is argued in this chapter that Casey had a direct and major impact on Antarctic policy development in three separate periods, when he was in a position within government to facilitate policy or take implementation action. The first was 1924 to 1929 when Casey was Prime Minister Bruce's personal liaison in London.⁴⁶⁶ The second was when he was a Minister in the Lyons Government from 1931 to 1939. The third and most

⁴⁶⁴ Casey's long life is reviewed in a biography by W. J. Hudson, *Casey*, (Melbourne Oxford University Press, 1986)

⁴⁶⁵ Mawson's focus on Antarctica is described at a general level in Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*.

⁴⁶⁶ In this 1924-1929 period, Casey wrote personal letters to Bruce mostly weekly, these show a considerable activity on Antarctic by Casey in furthering Australian involvement in Antarctica and the letters are published by W.J.Hudson and Jane North eds. *My Dear P.M.: Casey's Letters to S.M.Bruce 1924-1929* (Canberra : AGPS 1980)

influential period, was as Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1961.⁴⁶⁷ Even outside those periods he continued his interests and contacts to further Australian involvement in Antarctica whilst in Britain or America but also privately when back in Australia.⁴⁶⁸

The reasons for this life long interest in Antarctica and the extent of his impact on Antarctic policy have not previously been studied in detail and this chapter seeks to rectify that void. Casey's personal interest in Antarctica developed without him ever seeing the continent. This immediately raises the question of why he became such a supporter of Australian Antarctic activity both on the icy continent and in the world policy forum. To begin to answer this question it is firstly necessary to briefly examine the background of the man; how he became involved in Antarctic ideology; and why he was so successful in nurturing Australian Antarctic policy and carrying it to the international negotiating table.

10.2. Development of Casey's Interest in Antarctica

Richard Gardiner Casey was born in Brisbane in 1890 into a wealthy rural family, which moved to Melbourne three years later, with his father becoming a company director in a number of mining companies. After a year as an engineering student at Melbourne University in 1909, Richard continued his studies at Trinity College Cambridge, where he graduated in the mechanical sciences tripos, with second class honours and was awarded his B.A. in 1913.

He returned to Australia in May 1914 after extensive touring in the USA, where he visited major industrial plants. His autocratic father, now chairman of the rich Mount Morgan Gold Mine, placed him under strict control, sending him on geological inspection surveys at the Mount Morgan Gold mine and the Laloki Copper mine in New Guinea. When war broke out he enrolled as a lieutenant in the Australian Imperial Force in September 1914 and landed at Gallipoli on 25th April 1915, as aide de camp to Major General Bridges, commander of the 1st Division. He was alongside the commander when Bridges was fatally wounded three weeks later. After six months in Gallipoli as a staff officer he was evacuated to London with enteric fever. He recovered to join the Australian forces on Western Front as a staff officer

⁴⁶⁷ T.B. Millar, ed. *Australian Foreign Minister : The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60* (London: Collins, 1972)

⁴⁶⁸ This interest is shown in some of his diverse publications, such as R.G. Casey, *Australia's Place in the World* (Melbourne: Robertson & Mullens, 1931); R.G. Casey *The Future of the Commonwealth*, (London: Frederick Muller, 1963); R.G. Casey, *Personal Experience 1939-1946*, (London: Constable, 1962) and in Carl Bridge, ed. *A Delicate Mission: The Washington Diaries of R.G. Casey 1940-42*, (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2008)

with General Birdwood at the Somme in 1916. In March 1917 he was promoted to Brigade Major in the 8th Brigade of the Fifth Division.⁴⁶⁹ His dairies show how difficult this period was for him and indicate the basis of his respect for men of action and care for colleagues.

His indirect connection with Antarctica probably commenced in the bleak trenches of the western front in France, as some Antarctic expeditioners returning from British and Australian expeditions were placed in the units at Gallipoli and the Somme, such as the Australians Robert Bage, Edgeworth David, Blake and Eric Webb. In July 1917 two other adventurous Australians with polar experiences joined the staff as photographers to the official war record. These were Frank Hurley and Hubert Wilkins, one from the Antarctic and one from the Arctic. In the course of their work they both made balloon and aerial flights over the battlefield. Information from these 'mad photographers' was continually vetted by the intelligence staff before it was released to the press. Casey at that time was an intelligence staff officer who also flew aerial reconnaissance flights and as he circulated widely amongst the units, it is likely he made further contact with other Australians who had previously been in Antarctica.

After the war Casey was demobilized in England and, was awarded a M.A. degree from Trinity College. He returned to Australia in June 1919, via America. When his father died suddenly that year, he had the opportunity to take over his father's influential position in the mining boardrooms and take control of the family's pastoral interests. While successful in these roles, he harboured visions of developing his own mechanical manufacturing businesses, similar to those he had viewed in America. Through subsequent business dealings and Country Party political connections he developed a close personal friendship with the Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce (later Viscount Bruce) who had served in Gallipoli with the British Army. In 1924 Bruce urged Casey to join the Commonwealth Public Service and go to London as Australia's liaison officer (in effect, as Bruce's political agent) Arriving in London in December 1924 he then provided Bruce with official and personal reports of British government activities and any other matters affecting Australian relations, for the next five years. While his formal official reports and telegrams show the machinery face of government, it is the informal letters and newsy information behind events contained in the letters from Casey to Bruce which give a better insight as to how Australian Antarctic policy developed in the 1920s.

⁴⁶⁹ Hudson, *Casey*, p. 40.

10.3. The first Period of Casey's Involvement in Antarctica

This appointment in London saw Casey's first period of influence on Antarctic matters. Whilst he was as a key person working within the Australian government, he developed a direct interface to the British Government through his placement in the offices of the British Cabinet Secretariat.⁴⁷⁰ Some of Casey's duties for Bruce in London in this period directly involved Antarctic policy and in that role he frequently met with the Australian explorers Mawson and Wilkins in London and was involved in discussions with British ministers over Empire claims in Antarctica. His input to the Australian government in this period, on a wide range of issues, was twofold: firstly interfacing with the British government and reporting through official channels; secondly giving background information and personal suggestions to the Australian Prime Minister on policy. He continually mentioned Antarctica in these activities, not only in official cables and reports but with candor in his informal letters to Bruce which were tagged 'personal and confidential'.⁴⁷¹

After World War 1, British interest in Antarctica declined but was revitalized through British Empire expansion interests in the 1920s following a French Territorial Claim to Terre Adelie and the profit from very successful pelagic whaling seasons by Norwegians in Antarctic waters.⁴⁷² These Norwegian whaling activities also cast doubts on the validity of possible British claims from sightings in east Antarctica and their status was placed on the agenda of the 1926 Imperial Conference in London. At that conference Prime Minister Bruce was appointed head of a committee to review the British Empire Antarctic discoveries and their potential for substantiating territorial claims over that continent.⁴⁷³ This was a breakthrough for Australia's future independent role in Antarctica. As an outcome from that review, Casey

⁴⁷⁰ Casey had two rooms in the offices of Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the British Cabinet, as they were located in Whitehall he had direct access with the machinations of British government and enjoyed greater freedom in his direct reporting, rather than through the line control of the Australian Ambassador located in Australia House.

⁴⁷¹ These letters are held in Canberra at the Australian Archives in Commonwealth record series AA: A1420 they are mainly weekly letters from Casey to Bruce which were held privately by Bruce. In March 1973 Lord Casey authorized their publication by the Department of Foreign Affairs without censure. They are listed in numbered sequence of 214 letters with dates in W.J.Hudson and Jane North, eds. *My Dear P.M. ,R.G.Casey's Letters to S.M.Bruce 1924-1929* (Canberra:AGPS,1980)

⁴⁷² In the years 1919 to 1928 Norwegian whalers paid £437 221 in royalties to the British Falkland Islands Dependencies cited in Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 210.

⁴⁷³ *Proceedings Imperial Conference*, London, (1926), pp. xi, 22; and in *Foreign Affairs* 5 (1927) , pp.508-10.

was constantly involved in negotiations between Britain and Australia for further Antarctic exploration to reinforce and extend British claims and the transfer of responsibility to Australia for the sector south of Australia.

In Australia the Australian National Research Council, with government approval, set up an Antarctic committee on 10 June 1927, to assist the Australian government to implement the recommendations of the 1926 Imperial Conference. On 4 July 1927, Casey temporarily back in Australia on duty, attended a special luncheon meeting of the Antarctic Committee group at the Lyceum club, which was organized by the wife of the Antarctic committee chairman Sir David Orme Masson.⁴⁷⁴ This was a very select group and Casey was introduced as 'a man with strong interest in Antarctic matters'. Returning to London after three months in Australia as head of the External Affairs office (in a rotation with Dr. Walter Henderson), Casey arranged with the British Government for the loan of the polar ship *Discovery* for a joint Antarctic expedition involving Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Both Mawson and Wilkins were frequent visitors to London and in 1928 Wilkins (with Ben Eielson) was the first to fly across the Arctic Ocean and was knighted by King George V. Nasht in researching the biography of Sir Hubert Wilkins notes that when British interests in Antarctica were perceived to be under threat from the pending Byrd Antarctic expedition in 1928, a British intergovernmental meeting was called in London to consider a response to possible territorial claims by the United States. Casey had witnessed first hand Wilkins's courage on the western front and believed Sir Hubert; en route to Antarctica should be encouraged to take claimant action before Byrd.⁴⁷⁵ As a confidant of Wilkins, Casey then played a major part in arranging for Wilkins to drop British flags from his airplane to strengthen British territorial claims in the Antarctic Peninsula area.

As Wilkins was already en route to Antarctica, Casey arranged for him to be commissioned by the British Government to make territorial claims and in this process sent a secret message to the governor of the Falklands islands to be handed to Wilkins on his arrival there on 29 October 1928. This sought to gain his agreement to claim Antarctic lands for Britain. Ellis, the acting governor, reported Wilkins' important response as:

⁴⁷⁴ Letter, Lady Masson to Mawson, 28 June 1927, Mawson papers, Mortlock library PRG523/6 cited in Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 157.

⁴⁷⁵ S. Nasht, *The Last Explorer : Hubert Wilkins Australia's Unknown Hero*, p. 179

Although an internationalist at heart he remained a Britisher and therefore be glad to assist so far as he could in furtherance of the cause of Empire by dropping or planting flags in the manner suggested.⁴⁷⁶

The governor quickly produced British flags for Wilkins who undertook the first flights over the Antarctic Peninsula the next month and made the required British proclamations while dropping the flags over the continent.⁴⁷⁷ This event demonstrated Casey's ability to act quickly in the best interest of the British Empire (or Australia) in relation to Antarctic policy, as a flow on issue from the territorial review of the 1926 Imperial Conference. Wilkins on his major flight over the continent named a significant feature, Casey Strait,⁴⁷⁸ acknowledging his earlier assistance in arrangements for this ground breaking Antarctic venture.⁴⁷⁹

Casey's diplomatic negotiations over Antarctic Territory with the British Government crystallized with the announcement of the BANZARE by the Australian government on 21 February 1929. Mawson immediately sailed to England to arrange for equipment and fit out of the expedition ship and on arrival chaired a meeting of the *Discovery* Management Committee. Casey attended that meeting and represented Mawson at subsequent meetings. He greatly assisted Captain John King Davis in the fit out and dispatch of the expedition ship *Discovery* over the next six months, reporting activities to Bruce in Australia⁴⁸⁰. Throughout 1929 Casey played a key part in facilitating arrangements for the BANZARE and with his contacts in London was a crucial contributor to getting this expedition underway. This expedition was soon to have a major impact on Australian Antarctic policy leading to an Australian Antarctic territorial claim. Typical of his comments to Bruce in letters through this period which show his commitment to Antarctica was:

I will not bother you here with Antarctic matters –other than to say that it would appear that both Byrd (in claiming Marie Byrd Land for the United States and

⁴⁷⁶ Diplomatic cable Ellis to Amery, Director Dominions Office, 21 November 1928 Public records office UK CO 78/182/9 quoted in Nasht, *The Last Explorer: Hubert Wilkins: Australia's Unknown Hero*, pp.180 and 328.

⁴⁷⁷ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 178 summarizes the policy aspect as 'He dropped proclamations from his plane claiming Graham Land area and flew the British flag at various places in that region to try to reinforce the existing claim as part of the Falkland Islands'.

⁴⁷⁸ This name was subsequently changed to Casey Glacier when it was found to be a land based feature, not a marine channel. Described by Fred Alberts in *Geographic Names of the Antarctic* (Reston, US Board on Geographic names, 2nd edition, 1995), p. 122.

⁴⁷⁹ Casey advised Bruce of this naming in letter 166 of 10th January 1929 'you will be amused to hear that Wilkins has named a strait in Graham Land after me' CRS A1420 and quoted in Hudson. and North, *Casey*, p.438

⁴⁸⁰ W.J.Hudson and Jane North W.J.Hudson, eds. *My Dear P.M. R.G.Casey's Letters to S.M.Bruce 1924-1929*.

the *Norvegia* in claiming Peter 1 island for the Norwegians have stolen a march on us. I am sending you a telegram tonight hoping you will agree to make the Antarctic expedition a two years' one. The additional expense would be small (Mawson estimates £10 000 or £ 20 000 at most) and we could get the job done properly instead of cursorily.⁴⁸¹

Casey was heavily involved in sorting out press contracts for the BANZARE and facilitated a wide range of general activities. He reported to Bruce in May 1929:

The Antarctic expedition arrangements are taking me into a new field -press people, solicitors, aeroplane manufacturers, scientific instruments makers and the like. I am not letting my comparative ignorance on a number of these subjects from expressing what I have to say with conviction.⁴⁸²

This again shows Casey's increasing preparedness to take on fundamental tasks left undone by Mawson to get the Australian driven expedition together. Later that month, Casey again comments on his involvement in furthering the implementation of Antarctic policy manifested by the expedition saying 'I won't really be sorry to see the last of the *Discovery* when she leaves the West India Dock in early August'. This work often fell to Casey personally and he added 'I have looked around in vain for someone to shuffle the work off on to and have reluctantly had to do it myself.'⁴⁸³ Casey continued to work hard in his governmental role in facilitating the Mawson BANZARE expedition and frequently made mention to Bruce of his efforts in his letters, for example:

Antarctic expedition business goes on at a great pace. I have been in the office from 9am till 6.30 pm and about four nights a week till 11pm for many weeks..... I shall probably telegraph you shortly asking if I can have two or three weeks' leave starting early in August, as soon as Davis and the *Discovery* depart, as I am beginning to feel the need of it.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸¹ Casey to Bruce, letter number 177 dated 28th February 1929 .

⁴⁸² Casey to Bruce letter no. 199 dated 23 May 1929, NAA:A1420.

⁴⁸³ Casey to Bruce letter no. 200 dated 30 May 1929, NAA:A1420.

⁴⁸⁴ Casey to Bruce letter 202 dated 13 June 1929, NAA:A 1420.

A British Royal Commission was raised at the court of Saint James on 25 July 1929 for Mawson to formally take possession of territories during the expedition.⁴⁸⁵ His letter to Bruce on 1 August that year included a note which shows his relief but also a note about the experience gained:

The Discovery got away this morning, to my great relief. She bumped the dock, but apparently not seriously. I have still a few press contracts to fix up and some clearing up work- but the slavery of the last six months is at last at an end. I have learnt a good deal about making arrangements for an Antarctic expedition- information which is not easy to capitalize on!⁴⁸⁶

As the expedition departure drew closer Casey had expressed his concerns to Bruce about the outcomes of the planned expedition, advocating clear policy instructions to be given to Davis and Mawson lest they have trouble with objectives. This astutely summarized the character and capabilities of the pair and warns Bruce of a potential problem which did eventuate, just as Casey warned:

I will not bother you with the Mawson Expedition business, which still occupies the greater part of my time. I like Davis personally but he is rather difficult as he gets very cranky and perverse when everything doesn't go exactly as he wants it.....I would most strongly suggest to you that you get your Antarctic committee to draw up a comprehensive programme for the expedition's activities setting out the duties and responsibilities of all the members... organization is not a strong point for Mawson or Davis and I fear they will tend to ride out their own particular hobbies and fancies to the detriment of the main objectives.....In addition to these detailed instructions you will no doubt give Mawson written instructions as to the broad objectives of the expedition-the strengthening of our claims to the whole area from Ross Sea to Enderby land to be secured by frequent landings. The scientific work, while most admirable in it, is really a means of bolstering up our claims to the area.⁴⁸⁷

This conflict predicted by Casey did indeed arise over the execution of expedition objectives and ill defined divided leadership roles. Mawson did belatedly receive instructions from

⁴⁸⁵ Text of the Royal Commission is set out in Grenfell Price, *The Winning of Australian Antarctica*, p. 23.

⁴⁸⁶ Casey to Bruce letter no. 210 dated 1st august 1929, NAA: A1420.

⁴⁸⁷ Casey to Bruce letter no. 201 dated 6 June 1929, NAA: A1420.

Bruce dated 12 September and these did mention coaling at Kerguelen Island and included distracting options to visit Crozet Island and Heard Island en route to Antarctica from Cape Town⁴⁸⁸. Davis did not receive clear instructions about his role as ship's captain and fretted about the waste of time on these and other scientific investigations in the southern ocean rather than getting on with territorial charting. Fortunately Casey had also previously argued and won Bruce's support for a second summer voyage for the expedition. This was indeed fortuitous as little of the prime territorial objectives had been achieved on the first voyage. In the conflict of interest, Mawson in his report to parliament after the first voyage was overly critical of Davis, blaming him for lack of contact with the Antarctic continent and Davis was replaced as ships captain on the second voyage.

While Bruce did not sufficiently heed Casey's advice, to put this in perspective it is fair to say that in August 1929, as the *Discovery* sailed from London for a rendezvous in Cape Town, Prime Minister Bruce was deeply involved in an internal political battle over a deteriorating national economy and running strikes. At that time, convinced that a split Federal/State arbitration system was the root of the problem, he sought to dismantle Commonwealth control over industrial relations, passing responsibility and control of the Australian industrial system to the States. The ensuing Bill was defeated and on 12 September (the same day of Mawson's instructions) parliament was dissolved after the speaker refused to give a casting vote to the government. The government lost the subsequent election on 12 October with Bruce also losing his seat.⁴⁸⁹ The *Discovery* left Cape Town a week later on 19 October 1929 with the blessing of the new Prime Minister, Scullin, who had previously supported Bruce's announcement of the expedition when leader of the opposition.⁴⁹⁰

During the 1929-31 voyages Mawson discovered and named a prominent feature, Casey Range, in the Framnes Mountains in recognition of his work in London in arranging the expedition.⁴⁹¹ Casey's assistance in this period in securing the ship the *Discovery* and associated aircraft and equipment was generously acknowledged in a letter from Mawson, to the chairman of the Government's Antarctic committee, Senator J.J. Day:

⁴⁸⁸ Mawson's instructions are reproduced in Grenfell Price, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁸⁹ Hudson and North, *Casey*, p. 560.

⁴⁹⁰ The new prime Minister was James H. Scullin and Mawson named a significant Feature, Scullin Monolith, after him as shown in the expedition account *Polar Record 2* (1931), pp. 56-60.

⁴⁹¹ These features are clearly visible from above Mawson Base as shown in the background in the photograph taken by Law at that time see Appendix A figure 4.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the important part played by Major Casey in LondonMajor Casey's intimate association with the Dominions Office activities in whaling and fisheries have made him indispensable in watching Australia's interests.⁴⁹²

Casey also played a big part in furthering the polar work of Sir Hubert Wilkins and often reported this to Bruce, as he was trying to talk Wilkins out of his intention to sail a submarine under the arctic ice in the 1920s.⁴⁹³ He was impressed by Wilkins, much more than Mawson, although he supported the aspirations of both. In May 1929 he reported Mawson's rivalry with Wilkins to Bruce:

Mawson leaves no stone unturned to decry Wilkins in the most unpleasant and childish way. He started it again with me until I told him that whatever his deficiencies Wilkins was friend of mine and that in regard to his work, it appeared to me that he deserved great consideration for his Arctic flight and his Graham Land effort.⁴⁹⁴

In this first period of political influence in London, Casey had become involved personally in furthering an Australian presence and territorial ambition in the Antarctic. This in turn was an influence on Prime Minister Stanley Bruce, through direct official and personal communication. This was both seen through involvement in British arrangements for Wilkins Antarctic activities and the Mawson driven BANZARE ventures. This close relationship with the Prime Minister was broken when Bruce lost both the 1929 election and his seat in parliament. With the Labor government in power and changes in government arrangements, this era of Casey's insider influence on Antarctic policy came to an end. Casey never enjoyed working with the Labor party and soon decided to return to Australia and enter Federal politics.

10.4. The Second Period of Casey's Involvement in Antarctic Matters

Casey left England in February 1930 and he won the Victorian seat of Corio for the United Australia party in the Federal Election that December. He developed a close relationship with

⁴⁹² Cited in F. White: Biographical Memoirs of deceased fellows :Richard Casey 1890-1976 *Australian Academy of Science* <http://www.asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/aasmemoirs/casey.htm> .2

⁴⁹³ Wilkins later did manage to buy a poor quality US submarine and dive briefly under the Arctic ice cap in August 1931 despite its poor mechanical state and government opposition in Lowell Thomas, *Sir Hubert Wilkins His World of Adventure*. (Melbourne: Readers Book Club 1963), pp. 225-227

⁴⁹⁴ Casey to Bruce letter no. 198 dated 9 May 1929, NAA:A1420,

Prime Minister Lyons and was appointed Assistant-Minister at the Treasury in 1933, the Treasurer in 1935 and Minister for Supply and Development in 1939.

This was Casey's second period as a government insider, who could influence Australian Antarctic policy. The period of influence was quite different to the first period, where Casey had a deal of freedom to act on Australia's behalf without being involved in party machinations or achieving cabinet decisions. Whilst involved at the highest political level in negotiations in London with British ministers and their bureaucracy (with Bruce's blessings) he had played a very significant role in assisting Mawson in implementing both nation's Antarctic policy decisions to raise an expedition to strengthen British Empire (and Australian) claims. However, after the BANZARE 1929-31 voyages Casey's position of influence within the government had changed. He was now part of a central government which had major economic problems and negotiations for external expenditure within a new government took time. Casey was constrained by mainline political and economic problems. No longer was he able to alleviate Mawson's frustration and impatience with immediate Government action to claim Antarctic Territory, or to finance further expeditions to Antarctica. Much to Mawson's chagrin, the government refused his personal offer in late 1932 to go to London and act as intermediary with the British Government to follow up on the BANZARE outcomes and instead sent the Attorney General John Latham to progress Antarctic matters.

The ensuing British Order-in-Council of 7 February 1933 asserted that Britain had sovereign rights over Antarctic territory south of latitude 60°S. between longitudes 45°E. and 160° E., excluding Terre Adelie and placed that region under the control of Australia, pending appropriate legislation in the Australian parliament. This transfer of sovereignty was listed in the Commonwealth Gazette 16 March 1933⁴⁹⁵ and the proposed legislation, 'The Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Bill', was introduced to parliament by the then Minister for External Affairs, Hon J Latham in May 1933. Latham stated that the discovery of the territory had been largely due to Australian exploration and the need for authority had arisen from the need for regulation of the whaling industry in that area.⁴⁹⁶ Casey as Assistant Treasurer spoke strongly and in depth, in support of the Bill showing his amassed knowledge of Antarctic matters. He noted that the Bill: 'was the culmination of twenty years of

⁴⁹⁵ Commonwealth Gazette 16th March 1933, p. 365,

⁴⁹⁶ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates May 1949-56 at that time Hon John Latham was Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs and also responsible for Industry.

continuous and concerted effort on the part of the Australians to consolidate their interests in Antarctica'.⁴⁹⁷

Further he identified three major reasons for Australia accepting control over the Antarctic territory. Firstly was the territorial reason, with possible strategic advantages:

If we do not take this sector and claim sovereignty over it, some other country will and it is undoubtedly to the benefit of Australia to be in possession of this land surface, with its unknown potentialities, so close to our shores.⁴⁹⁸

The second was the economic potential of the area but his words show the economic concerns of the Assistant Treasurer in the grips of an economic depression saying that its resources would be identified 'and exploited when economic stability returned to the world'.⁴⁹⁹ The third reason Casey stressed was Antarctica's potential for long range weather forecasting which would benefit Australian pastoral and agricultural industries.⁵⁰⁰ In this segment he mentioned Sir Hubert Wilkins' long standing desire (from 1925) to set up a global network of meteorological stations including Antarctica.⁵⁰¹ The depth of this address reflects Casey's earlier involvement in Antarctic policy in Britain and also his influence within the Australian government, in securing the identification, transfer and acceptance of an Australian Antarctic Territory. After the reading in the House of Representatives the Bill was passed to the Senate on 29 May 1933 and finally received Royal Assent on 30 June 1933.⁵⁰² It was proclaimed three years later in the Commonwealth Gazette 24 August 1936.

The 1930s were a period of severe economic downturn in Australia and Casey firstly as Assistant Minister and then as Federal Treasurer was very restricted in his ability to help the outsider influences of Mawson and Masson, who were lobbying government for funds for a further Australian Antarctic expedition. However, Casey's personal connection with both Mawson and Wilkins continued, with Wilkins again proposing world wide meteorological stations while he was managing the American Lincoln Ellsworth's expeditions to Antarctica from 1935 to 1939.

⁴⁹⁷ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates May 1933, pp. 1949-56,

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰⁰ *Argus*, 29 May 1933.

⁵⁰¹ Casey developed a long standing friendship with Wilkins in London after WW1 and reported Wilkins proposals to Bruce in his 'My Dear PM' letter of 27th August 1925 NAA:A1420.

⁵⁰² Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, p. 209; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 140 (1933), pp. 2017-24.

Casey was also an important member of the Australian delegation to the 1937 Imperial Conference, which met in London from 14 May to June 15, following the coronation of King George VI.⁵⁰³ Casey, as chairman of the Polar Committee at this Imperial Conference, recommended that the dominions cooperate in setting up meteorological stations in Antarctica,⁵⁰⁴ as had been promoted by Sir Hubert Wilkins for over ten years. Over the next two years, the Australian government received independent proposals from both Mawson and Wilkins seeking funds for the establishment of Australian stations on the Antarctic continent to meet this 1937 Imperial Conference recommendation. Casey was diplomatically gaining insider support from the government for these proposals, but in August 1939 the darkening clouds of war again intervened and war broke out a month later. This was a disappointing end to the decade after Casey's success in getting the Australian territorial claim proclaimed and initiating serious consideration of proposals to establish an Antarctic foothold to reinforce its territorial claim.

The end of the 1930s decade was a period of political tension in Australia and when Prime Minister Lyons died in 1939, Casey again lost his personal influence with a second Prime Minister. He then stood unsuccessfully against Robert Menzies for the leadership of the United Australia Party. This new government, with Menzies as leader, decided to establish Australia's first diplomatic posts, located in Tokyo and Washington. Casey was seen by Menzies as a rival and was appointed Australian Ambassador to the United States of America and resigned from parliament on 30 January 1940. As in London, he proved to have an extraordinary flair for diplomacy. However, again the government changed in October 1941 and Casey was unable to cope on a personal level with H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs in the John Curtin Labor government. Casey subsequently accepted an offer from (Sir) Winston Churchill in March 1942 to become the British Minister of State for the Middle East, resident in Egypt and a member of the British War cabinet. Two years later, in 1944, Churchill appointed him as Governor of Bengal in India, which office he held until February 1946. With the end of the war and the increasing turmoil in India, Casey's thoughts turned to

⁵⁰³ The conference was attended by a large Australian delegation including the Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, Minister for Defence Sir Archdale Parkhill and Casey as treasurer. Briefs forwarded to R.G. Casey are filed as NAA: CP4/3.

⁵⁰⁴ Swan, *Australia in the Antarctic*, 224; *Imperial Conference London 1937 summary of proceedings*, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS, 1937) VI, p. 2249

Australian politics and the task of rebuilding the country and the conservative party, although his past relationship with Menzies remained a concern.⁵⁰⁵

Returning to Australia in early 1946 he was unsuccessful in securing Liberal party endorsement for the next federal election, which was won by Labor. However, although he held no position within government in this period, he retained close political connections. He spent a week in Adelaide and met Mawson on 19 July over cocktails at Government House. Mawson subsequently arranged for him to address the Commonwealth Club on Antarctica⁵⁰⁶. Following these meetings with Mawson in Adelaide, it is apparent that on returning to Canberra, he then used his influence with government ministers and public service personnel to push for the further development of Australia's role in Antarctica. He lobbied H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs and William Dunk, head of that department, to initiate government action on Antarctica.⁵⁰⁷ Dunk had been appointed by Casey to a position within government when he was Federal Treasurer in 1939. Casey maintained contact with Dunk and later nominated him to join the exclusive and influential Melbourne Club. This relationship bore fruit and in December 1946, Dunk, on Evatt's advice, invited Mawson to a meeting in Melbourne to formulate a report to Cabinet on the development and use of the Australian Antarctic Territory.⁵⁰⁸ The subsequent establishment of an Antarctic Planning Committee in early 1947 was a definitive breakthrough in development of Australian Antarctic Policy and Casey's role in nurturing that event, cannot be ignored, even though he was not strictly within the Government at that time.

10.5. Casey's Third Period of Influence on Antarctic Policy

The third period of Casey's direct influence on Antarctic policy, as an insider, commenced when he was elected to parliament in the Menzies government in 1949. He quickly progressed through responsibilities related to rebuilding Australia after the war as Minister

⁵⁰⁵ His letter to Rupert Ryan, 30 October 1945 showed his concern over the attitude of Menzies and the Liberal party then in opposition 'We've got to do more original thinking and be less smugly Conservative than we have been, however I've no reason to believe that Bob would welcome me back. We clashed before and I believe we'd clash again. Apart from matters of policy, Bob's method of conducting Cabinet proceedings throws me into despair. He is the greatest advocate and the clearest expounder that I've ever met, but he's the worst man at getting anything done that I've ever met' in Casey, *Personal Experience 1939-1946*, p.40.

⁵⁰⁶ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 241

⁵⁰⁷ Ayres, *Mawson: A Life* examined the Mawson papers at Mortlock Library PRG 523/3collection and notes 'that although Casey's party was in opposition he had influence with bureaucrats at external affairs in Canberra and there can be no doubt that Mawson asked him to use it'

⁵⁰⁸ Law and Bechervaise, *ANARE : Australia's Antarctic Outposts*, p. xxii.

for Supply and Development and Minister for Works and Housing. In March 1950 he became Minister for National Development, before replacing Sir Percy Spender as Minister for External Affairs in 1951, a portfolio he retained for ten years. Despite his wide range of portfolio responsibilities, Casey took a close interest in both the development and implementation of Australian Antarctic Policy and its international delivery. In 1969 Lord Casey sought the help of Sir Alan Watt in preparing a publication based on the diaries that Casey had kept during his long term as Minister for External Affairs (1951-1960) Watt had other commitments and the historian and political scientist T.B. Millar (Professorial fellow at the Australian National University) then agreed to take on the task of editing the diaries.⁵⁰⁹ These diaries have been used extensively as reference in this chapter.

The External Affairs portfolio and the travel that went with it, allowed Casey a break from tensions with Prime Minister Menzies and domestic politics. While Casey was reported as being a lesser performer up front in parliament and in cabinet, he excelled as a diplomat, courting his overseas counterparts to the point of achieving friendship with many of them.⁵¹⁰ He also took a close interest in the administration of the Department of External Affairs and its overseas offices. In this light he gave the Antarctic Division support and close attention in the implementation of overall Antarctic policy. Taking control of the Antarctic Executive Planning Committee as Chairman, Casey gave political and operational support to Phillip Law, Director Antarctic Division, in representations to the Cabinet and Treasury for the allocation of funds and endorsement of program directions for the science program.

While internal operational aspects of Antarctic policy within government were largely under Casey's control, it was a period of international cold war intrigue, as shown in the Department of External Affairs Antarctic policy correspondence files.⁵¹¹ This time of post war tensions over territorial claims in Antarctica was overlaid by the global influence of the cold war rivalry between America and the Soviet Union. In this circumstance Casey, with his overseas background in America, India, the Middle East and the British war cabinet, has often been classified by historians as 'a cold war warrior' in his diplomacy. He was fervently supportive of Britain and the U.S.A. and deeply hostile towards the Soviet Union and China. This was demonstrated again in his support for the Australian involvement in the 1950-53

⁵⁰⁹ They were published under the title *Australian Foreign Minister* by Collins in 1972.

⁵¹⁰ Casey's official biographer, W.J.Hudson, gives a very balanced account of the man his capabilities and many interests within his politics.

⁵¹¹ see as NAA:A1838 1495/3/2/1 Parts 1 to 21, Antarctica-Australian Antarctic Territory -General Policy; 1495/19/1 Parts 1 to 6 Antarctica -United States Interests, Claims and Policy, NAA: A4940.

Korean War against perceived communist expansion. This attitude also showed in Antarctic policy where he was continually suspicious of Russian activities and intentions and argued strongly for a non military zone over the continent to exclude them.⁵¹²

The internal support that Casey gave to the implementation of the Australian Antarctic program is widely recognized by Phillip Garth Law, who contends that, without Casey, the Antarctic Division would not have been able to make advances on the Antarctic continent.⁵¹³ Law was constantly frustrated by the public service bureaucracy in Canberra and the procedural approach of career diplomats in the Department of External Affairs, who had also to focus on a wide range of other external policies. Law broke this cycle by frequent personal representations to Minister Casey, who had his office nearby in Melbourne. In 1953 Casey announced the government intention to send an occupying expedition to the Antarctic continent at the end of the year and in a major speech to Parliament citing the reasons for this policy. He was supported by the leader of the opposition, Dr H.V. Evatt. In this speech Casey's knowledge, enthusiasm and optimism for the Antarctic stands out. In that address he stressed the existence of mineral and food resources awaiting exploitation as well as the strategic relationship of the continent for long range aviation and weather forecasting as:

In such a vast area there must be great mineral wealth-in fact huge deposits of coal have already been found and many valuable and useful minerals are known to exist.In the future it is possible that aircraft flying between South America or South Africa and Australia will take the short route over the Antarctic Continent.... Great food resources in the form of whales, fish, seals, birds and plankton are awaiting exploitation in the prolific seas which surround Antarctica and the world may soon be forced to turn to this source of supply as a consequence of the continual worsening of the world food position. In short, we cannot afford to neglect it. The Australian Antarctic sector is of vital importance to Australia. For strategic reasons it is important that this area, lying as it does so close to Australia's back door, shall remain in under Australian control. Meteorologically the region is of great value, for weather forecasts in Australia's southern states can be improved by the collection of

⁵¹² NAA: A4940, C2024 Antarctica demilitarization policy.

⁵¹³ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law* ; Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p. 129

this important region, for no one can predict what importance it may assume in the next fifty years.⁵¹⁴

While the resource bonanza suggested in this statement did not eventuate it shows Casey's and the government's policy outlook towards Antarctica and the expectation of long term benefit arising from the expedition. But the euphoria of finally sending an expedition to the Antarctic continent itself was also built on external influences on the government. One of the drivers for Australian Antarctic policy after the Second World War was the concern about the USSR intentions in the Australian Antarctic Territorial claim area. This was always a key issue for Casey as can be seen in his personal diaries. These show his expertise and diplomatic flair in dealings with Russia in developing the Antarctic Treaty, which would stabilize the continent without negating all aspects of the Australian Territorial claim. An example of this was in March 1959 when the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR visited Australia to attend the ECAFE conference, which Casey was to chair at Broadbeach Queensland. Casey took this opportunity to speak with him on Antarctic matters which later was used to loosen up a stalemate point during the final conference to gain Russian acceptance of the Treaty. Casey's diary of 5 March 1959 notes that the Russian had arrived in Australia and wanted to come to Canberra to see Menzies. Casey recommended to Menzies that an RAAF aircraft be used to fly him from Sydney and to take him back the next day'.⁵¹⁵ This did not eventuate but Casey subsequently met with Firubin at Broadbeach on 12 March to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR and on Antarctic matters:

I talked about relatives in the USSR of Russian people being allowed to come to Australia, also about Antarctica. He was clearly out to be friendly and cooperative. He said that at the end that he was glad our talk had gone so well, as he'd been afraid it might not have. He brought some bottles of Vodka and some Caviar.⁵¹⁶

This was a great example of Casey's style of personally developing a rapport with highly placed officials in foreign government. While Casey's background was strongly linked to Imperial Britain, where he had many friends and colleagues, this was balanced considerably

⁵¹⁴ Current Notes, March 1953, p.171.

⁵¹⁵ Millar, *My Dear P.M.*, p. 315.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

by his associations with people within the American political system. This had been developed largely during his posting to Washington and his subsequent visits. He had developed a high level of mutual respect with key American personnel in powerful positions and was constantly in touch through the Australian ambassador in Washington on Antarctic claim issues, as cablegrams in the Department of External Affairs correspondence files show.⁵¹⁷

Casey in his own words indeed had been ‘rolling the pitch’ on an Antarctica Treaty for all his period as Minister for External Affairs, which is demonstrated in the cables between Casey and his ambassadors in London and Washington. The respective Antarctic policy correspondence files of the Department of External Affairs show his personal involvement and control, particular with regard to American policy over Antarctic claims.⁵¹⁸ In 1955 Casey was in Washington in September as part of an overseas trip which involved discussion on gaining recognition of the Australian claim. He prided himself in establishing a personal rapport with senior foreign officials from other countries and was put out when this approach foundered. His diary of 2 October (in London) records such an event:

I had a bit of minor shock lately on getting news of an American initiative in the Antarctic following almost immediately on my meeting with all the top men in the State department on the Antarctic⁵¹⁹.

This meeting had been with Herbert Hoover his and senior officers from the State Department in Washington. Casey had presented the Australian Antarctic position and ‘exposed our view and proposals with frankness to Mr. Hoover’. In return however he was not advised of any long or short range proposals of imminent American activity in the Australian sector. His follow up telegram to Sir Percy Spender (the previous minister and now Australian Ambassador in Washington) dated 3 October 1955 diplomatically instructed The Ambassador to take this matter up with the deputy secretary of state. This shows Casey’s personal impatience with what he saw as a fragmented approach by US government officials and his displeasure at not being correctly advised by senior State Department staff at the Washington meeting.

⁵¹⁷ NAA: A1838, 1495/3/2/1 Part 2.

⁵¹⁸ Casey’s control and direct interest shows in Departmental External Affairs files labeled secret. for example :Antarctica United States interests –Claims and Policy NAA:1838 , 1495/19/1/ Parts 1 and 2 .

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

Would you please let them know that I have to admit to some little surprise at hearing from New Zealand about imminent American plans for substantial American air activity in the Australian sector.⁵²⁰

Casey's expertise and influence on Australian Antarctic policy development was later amply demonstrated in the Antarctic Treaty negotiations in Washington in 1959, particularly in relation to Chile, France and the USSR, which at times severely threatened its outcome. Law as director of the Antarctic Division was in Washington for a Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) meeting at that time and attended sessions of the Treaty meeting as an observer. Law validates Casey's diplomacy in action at the conference as:

The French got themselves out on limb... and it looked as though they would pack it in and go home and if they had done that, the whole conference would have collapsed. Casey went and had long talks with them and smoothed them out and then invented a formula of words to allow them to retreat with dignity from the position that they'd taken up.⁵²¹

This incident is more fully recorded in Casey's diary entry of 13 October which notes a preparatory meeting two days before the start of the full conference. It shows that he was not averse to taking a hard line approach in support of Australian policy:

Charpentier (French ambassador and delegate to the conference) came in and we had an active hour discussing the devastating French decision not to agree with article IV (freezing of claims to sovereignty) I made no attempt to hide my feelings on this. He had (so he said) firm instructions, I suspect it is a De Gaulle decision. I went so far to say that, if the decision was an unalterable one, it would destroy the conference and the treaty.⁵²²

Casey using his previous personal connection then sent a long telegram to the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Paris expressing his concern on the French position and

⁵²⁰ NAA.A1838, 1495/19/1 Part 2 folio 64: Spender from Casey. Note Herbert Clark Hoover Junior was the powerful undersecretary of state appointed by Eisenhower in 1954 (and son of the former President Herbert Clark Hoover) with John Foster Dulles being the Secretary of State at that time.

⁵²¹ Law diary entry is quoted in Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica*, p. 138.

⁵²² Millar, *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60*, p. 330.

pointing out that ‘the article would provide the principal safeguard against soviet claims to Antarctic territory in any sector including the French.’⁵²³ Importantly he added that Australia ‘could not sign a treaty which did not include such a provision’. Three days later Charpentier advised Casey that he had received a telegram response from Couve de Murville agreeing to Article IV. Subsequently, Casey’s diary entry of 5 November notes this breakthrough at the conference as ‘Charpentier announced dramatically that France accepted Article IV....Good news .One major difficulty overcome.’⁵²⁴ This is a good example of Casey’s strategy of appealing, at a personal level, to a known higher placed person to achieve an outcome, as he had done earlier with the Russians.

But later that day another crisis loomed which used his personal diplomatic skill to quickly defuse. In the afternoon session the Chilean delegation vigorously proposed a provision enabling a country to withdraw from the treaty on two years notice, after a period of ten years. Casey’s diary notes his immediate diplomatic reaction which massed support against this proposal: ‘During the coffee break I lobbied hard amongst the others in an effort to get everyone to express themselves against the Chilean proposal’.⁵²⁵ This was successful and delegates spoke for a treaty of indefinite length, with no provision for denunciation and the Chilean proposal was lost.

Casey summarized the conference from his viewpoint of personal involvement as ‘The Antarctic conference was an outstanding example of the possibility of compromise being achieved between diverse interests.’⁵²⁶ He stressed that progress was more fruitful in the Heads of Delegation meetings, with only twelve present, than the full conference with an audience of nearly one hundred. He was in his element in dealing directly with high level foreign delegates, where he showed great skill and comments that ‘actually most of the results emerged from the unrestricted Heads of Delegation meetings’.⁵²⁷

Casey’s performance overall across the full portfolio, as Minister for External Affairs has sometime been criticized by historians. Beaumont⁵²⁸ studied the career of major figures in Department of External Affairs and compares his performance to that of contemporary ministers who had responsibility for the Department of External Affairs. Beaumont,

⁵²³ Ibid., p. 331.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., p. 333.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., p. 334.

⁵²⁶ Ibid., p. 334.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p. 335.

⁵²⁸ Joan Beaumont Director, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University

considered Casey to be somewhat limited in innovative policy making by comparison with Sir Percy Spender and Sir Garfield Barwick and argues that he did not live up to the promise of his credentials⁵²⁹. While this argument can be accepted to a degree, Casey's real strength was his ability to personally communicate with people; foreign diplomats or with Department of External Affairs officers in Australia or posted overseas. In Casey's biographical memoirs for the Academy of Science Sir Frederick White stresses his optimism and his ability to undertake a hands-on role in Antarctic policy administration, giving both stimulation and support.⁵³⁰ In this sense Casey was an outstanding performer and his continuing interest in Antarctica demonstrates his tenacity and persistence in achieving outcomes in the national interest independent of British or American stances. The Australian political scientist T.B.Millar (1978)⁵³¹ and the American Antarctic lawyer Deborah Shapley (1985),⁵³² give him great credit for both his preparatory diplomacy and performance at the final Antarctic Treaty conference. Shapley cites his previous interaction with Dulles and Hoover on Antarctica as being important in encouraging America to 'do something about the Antarctic political situation' in 1955.

In 1994 Robert Hall, an Antarctic historian from the University of Tasmania, questions Casey's role in the Antarctic Treaty in a PhD thesis on the origin of the Antarctic Treaty⁵³³. He praises Casey for his diplomacy with the Russians in the lead up years, but is somewhat dismissive of his role at the actual Antarctic Treaty conference, stressing that he only stayed for 23 of the 48 days of the final session. Hall compared this attendance to another key Australian negotiator, Malcolm Booker a career diplomat from External Affairs, who was a long time member of the international working party over much of 1958 and 1959. While not belittling the great work by Booker this can be considered as overly critical, as Casey did an immense job of strategically managing and guiding the Australian delegation both before and during the conference. He introduced the Australian expectations of the Treaty during the

⁵²⁹ Joan Beaumont, et al, *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats : Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969* (Carlton :Melbourne University Publishing, 2003)

⁵³⁰ F.W.G.White, 'Biographical Memoirs Richard Gardiner Casey 1890- 1976,' *Records of the Australian Academy of Science* 3, no. 3/4 (1977) Sir Frederick White, head of CSIRO has been an influential member of the Antarctic Planning Committee.

⁵³¹ T.B.Millar, *Australia in Peace and War*, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1978) and also T.B.Millar, *Australian Foreign Minister :The Diaries of R.G.Casey 1951-60,1972*, p.31

⁵³² D. Shapley, *The Seventh Continent :Antarctica in a Resources Age* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p.89.

⁵³³ Robert Hall, *International Regime Formation and Leadership: The origins of the Antarctic Treaty*, (PhD Dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1994)

opening of the final conference in October 1959⁵³⁴ and remarkably as a busy Minister was able to stay for 23 days with so many other pressing commitments.⁵³⁵ It is not valid to critically compare the respective roles of Booker and Casey in the Antarctic Treaty both was successful but they were quite different with Casey having the overall responsibility.

Hall (2002), in a subsequent conference on Antarctica in Hobart and in a magazine article on Casey's role at the Treaty conference, which is published on the Antarctic Division web site⁵³⁶, skims Casey's onsite Antarctic Treaty conference diplomacy. Critically he states 'there is no evidence to suggest that he played a significant role in shaping the provisions of the treaty or in overcoming the obstacles on the path towards agreement.' However he applauds Casey's involvement in relation to the Russian diplomatic interface as:

In sum, Casey's general contribution to the formal negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty was constructive but limited. However, his role in March 1959 in persuading the Soviet Union about the merit of draft article IV - thereby breaching a serious impasse at the preparatory meetings - was clearly very important. Indeed, the substance of this draft provision remains today as the 'keystone' of the Antarctic Treaty. This breakthrough did not happen at the negotiations in Washington, but half-way around the world from there at Broadbeach, Queensland, when Casey met the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin.⁵³⁷

Hall does not explore the fuller aspects of Casey's actual diplomacy at the conference in out-of-session bilateral meetings, which he used to avoid stalemates arising from Russian, French and Chilean positions. Casey's diary notes show sufficient details to indicate that indeed he was a major force in overcoming the obstacles from France, Chile and the USSR on claims issues. Nor does Hall adequately explain that the reason for Casey to leave once agreement was reached was to attend to matters on the Asian Colombo plan. Casey was heavily involved at the Treaty conference until agreement was reached on all sticking points and the

⁵³⁴ *Current notes*, October 1959, pp. 571-4.

⁵³⁵ Casey's diary for the period shows that he was managing many issues at the time and was particularly concerned about the situation in south east Asia.

⁵³⁶ Robert. H. Hall, *Casey and the Negotiations of the Antarctic Treaty*, eds. M. Haward and J. Jabour-Green, Research Report 28 : The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future (Hobart: Antarctic CRC, University of Tasmania, 2002) See also R.H. Hall, *Casey and the Antarctic treaty negotiations*, (Hobart: Australian Antarctic Magazine, Australian Antarctic Division, 2001) and AAD website www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid2016 , accessed 23 February 2010.

⁵³⁷ Robert Hall, 'Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty,' in the *Antarctic: Past, Present and Future*, pp. 27-33. ISBN 1 875796 24X (2001)

outline framework was well secured. Leaving the conference, before the final words were drafted, he went to Indonesia via London and met his representative McIntyre in Djakarta. McIntyre reported that Casey's absence had been questioned by Indonesian President Sukarno who critically had asked 'if the Antarctic was more important than Asia'.⁵³⁸ This gives a perspective on Casey's many commitments and responsibilities as a Minister.

In 1957 John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, had appointed retired ambassador Paul Daniels as a special Departmental advisor on Antarctica to lead the US input to create a peaceful solution over Antarctica. Daniels was a vigorous leader and a very capable diplomat who nurtured the best interests of the United States in his approach. He is considered the principal force in drafting the Antarctic treaty. Casey was very watchful of Daniels, who often put an approach favouring America into action before obtaining a consensus from the delegates. This was particularly highlighted in dealings with the Russians in seeking to gain their acceptance of the American wording of the Treaty. On these issues Casey took a different approach to Daniels, wanting to see a more open discussion, rather than a unilateral approach. Casey objected to Daniels' overriding approach, although Casey himself can be seen as an expert at unilateral discussions, which he would then take into an open forum. In one case, Australia through Casey's private connection submitted an independent wording to the Russian delegation and was somewhat put out by the parallel secret approach by Daniels, who was trying to get Russian agreement to US wording on issues.⁵³⁹

One critical meeting with Tunkin, the Russian official delegate was on the subject of exchange of scientific data, which was referred back to Firubin in Moscow before bearing fruit. An example of Casey's diplomatic expertise in dealing with the USSR is shown in his diary notes of 22 October 1959:

I had a private talk with Tunkin in the coffee room. I reminded him in civil terms, that we never had any acknowledgement of our invitation to the Russians when we became aware that they wanted to put a post at Mirny over two years ago. I thought some civil form of words might have been appropriate in the circumstances we had every wish to get on well with Russians but people had

⁵³⁸ T. B. Millar, *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60*, p. 335.

⁵³⁹ USSR Foreign Policy –Antarctic claims NAA: A1838, 69/1/1/17.

feelings which had to be taken into account He took this quite well and ended up by asking me to lunch.⁵⁴⁰

Casey and the Australian delegation, principally Malcolm Booker as a senior official at the Australian embassy in Washington and the Australian Ambassador, Howard Beale, succeeded in gaining the desired Australia policy outcome in the treaty document wording to secure stability in the southern region. Casey's work at the conference can be considered outstanding in developing policy and achieving international endorsement of the treaty. This included hard-nosed diplomacy with French and Russian delegations,⁵⁴¹ when the process stalled and the proposed treaty threatened to collapse on the issue of territorial claims.⁵⁴² It established a strong base for Australia's participation in the ongoing management of Antarctica within an international regime. This was a great example of Australia as a middle power being able to affect the result by astute diplomacy and persistence in its objectives. Although only 12 countries were involved, this was a valuable experience for Australian foreign policy on a mini world stage.

Throughout his period as a Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1960, Casey was well supported by career diplomats working inside the government, notably Sir Alan Watt, Malcolm Booker, Sir Arthur Tange, Charles Kevin and Sir William Plimsoll. All of these were experts in international relations who played an important role in developing and creating Australian Policy under Casey's overall direction. In particular, Malcolm Booker took a major role in the preparatory and finalization of the Antarctic Treaty. However, as career diplomats, the Antarctic was just one of their many topics to be handled professionally, without generating an obsessive passion for the continent. Whilst their volume of work clearly shows in the Department of External Affairs policy files,⁵⁴³ their memoirs and biographical publications scarcely mention Antarctica. They were carrying out their role in a clinical professional manner without a deep emotional attachment to

⁵⁴⁰ Millar, *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60*, p. 331.

⁵⁴¹ Casey fortuitously had prior meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin in March 1959 with an outcome of receiving advice that the soviet position had been changed and the soviet union would agree to the Australian position, Department of External Affairs general Antarctic policy file NAA:A 1838/2 item 1495/3/2/1 part 17.

⁵⁴² At the conference the French delegate declared that his instructions were that under no circumstances was France to agree to article IV (freezing claims) Casey personal diary 13 October 1959 MS 6150 cited in Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*, p. 185.

⁵⁴³ Department of External Affairs Antarctic Policy Correspondence files series NAA 1495/2/1 Parts 1-9.

Antarctica. Casey though had a much deeper personal commitment for Australia in Antarctica even though he never visited the continent.

Casey's direct involvement with Antarctic policy led to a research station and five geographical features in Antarctica being named after him. The first, Casey Channel was named by Wilkins in November 1928 in his inaugural aircraft flight, in recognition of the great assistance Casey gave to him in London when arranging his expedition. This feature was subsequently renamed Casey glacier by the Australian John Rymill ten years later when it was found to be a transverse glacier of the Antarctic Peninsula. In 1929 Sir Douglas Mawson named Casey Range in the Framnes Mountains during the 1929-1931 BANZARE voyages. In 1947 Casey Cape in the Antarctic Peninsula area was named by the British Falkland Island Dependency Survey in recognition of Casey's work as an Australian member of the British War Cabinet in the Second World War. The same year the ice filled, Casey Inlet, at the termination of the Casey Glacier, was named during Falkland Island Dependency Survey aerial photography mapping of the peninsula area. In 1956 the significant coastal feature at the western end of the AAT was named Casey Bay, after the then Minister for External Affairs, during exploratory aircraft flights from Mawson in 1956. In 1969 the third major Australian scientific base was named Casey Base in recognition of his role in Antarctic policy and securing the transfer of the nearby US Wilkes station to Australia.

In January 1960 Casey was made a life peer on the recommendation of the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and next month he resigned from the ministry and parliament to take up his seat in the British Upper house. His direct involvement with Antarctic policy as a government insider had finished but he left a considerable legacy which established how Antarctic policy was approached in the international arena.

10. 6. Diplomatic influences after Casey

The signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and its ratification in 1961, soon after his term as Minister for External Affairs, was a tribute to Casey's diplomacy. However, following Casey's resignation, there was a change in the level of ministerial personal interest in Antarctica. Prime Minister Robert Menzies took over the role of External Affairs Minister on Casey's departure and hosted the first meeting of Antarctic Treaty Countries in Canberra in 1961, but never became personally involved. A new phase had begun, but much had been

achieved within the treaty, in making Antarctica a non-militarized area and even declaring it a nuclear free zone. Most importantly, the tension over territory had been stabilized, with the territorial claims being put aside for the life of the Antarctic Treaty. The ratification of the treaty in 1961 produced a quiet period in Antarctic policy activity. Sir Douglas Mawson had died three years before and there were little other influences on policy, other than Phillip Law who, as Director of the Antarctic Division, was more concerned with vigorously pursuing Australian activities on the continent than changing Australian foreign policy.

Australian participation in the treaty system for the next twenty years after Casey resigned was principally left to government insiders in the form of career diplomats in the Department of External Affairs. These government personnel dealt with international interaction between countries within the Antarctic Treaty and developed a respectful working relationship with personnel from other Antarctic nations. Antarctic foreign policy was quietly handled by these career diplomats who took on the subject as part of their day to day jobs. Apart from Richard Woolcott⁵⁴⁴ who listed his work in the UN on Antarctic as a career highlight, the memoirs and personal publications of such men as Peter Henderson, Alan Brown, John Burgess, Stuart Harris and Hugh Wyndham, rarely highlighted Antarctica, as this involvement was only a small part of their overall career achievements. This same approach is noted in the memoirs and biographies of the sequence of powerful heads of the Department of External Affairs, particularly Watt, Tange and Dunk,⁵⁴⁵ who provided the guiding hand for the bureaucracy and the interface with different ministers. Thus Australian Antarctic Policy within the Antarctic Treaty system was progressed in an orderly manner by insiders within government until environmental issues began to be raised in the early 1980s.

10.7 Conclusion

Australian Antarctic policy developed slowly though the first half of the 20th century and only stepped ahead when insiders, in positions of power within the government turned a sympathetic ear to hear the voices of outside lobbyists. The lynch pin in this aspect from 1924 to 1960 was clearly the career of Richard Gardiner Casey. His influential periods were

⁵⁴⁴ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings* ; Peter Henderson, Harris Stuart , and Richard Woolcott., *Managing Australia's Diplomacy : Three Views from the Top*, Occasional Paper ; No. 2 (Geelong: Deakin University, 1989)

⁵⁴⁵ A. Watt, *Australian diplomat / memoirs of Sir Alan Watt*. (Sydney :Angus and Robertson, 1972); A. Tange, *Defence policy-making: a close-up view, 1950-1980: a personal memoir*, ed P.G.Edwards (Canberra : ANU E Press 2008); P. G. Edwards, *Arthur Tange: last of the Mandarins* (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2006)

in London as liaison and close confidant to the Prime Minister (1924 -31), as government minister (1931 -1939) and as Minister for External Affairs (1951-1960) He also was indirectly influential from 1946 to 1949, when Evatt was Minister for External Affairs. However, his major work in the development of Australian Antarctic policy was as a government minister firstly from 1930 to 1939, but principally as Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1961.

In summary Casey made a great contribution to steering the development of Antarctic Policy over a period of more than 30 years and established a diplomatic legacy for Australian in the international management of Antarctica. His particular contribution can be seen in progressing the formulation of the Australian Antarctic Territory claim, the drafting of the Antarctic Treaty and supporting the establishment of the Australian bases on the Antarctic continent.

Chapter 11: The work and influences of Phillip Garth Law

11.1.Introduction

In reviewing the nature of Australia's involvement in Antarctica after the Second World War period it is impossible not to recognize the importance of Phillip Garth Law as an administrator, manager and visionary in organizing expeditions to Antarctica from 1947 to 1966. While Law had a vital role in implementing a set government policy, he also had a significant impact in opening up the internal transparency of Antarctica policy and its administration, to the Australian public. After his retirement from Antarctic Division in 1966 such an involvement was to prove to be pivotal in its effect with far reaching consequences for the domestic administration of that policy. However, before studying this outcome it is appropriate to examine Law's specific contributions to the Australian presence in Antarctica in a case study which focuses on his overall influence on Australian Antarctic policy

11.2.The impact of Law as Director Australian Antarctic Division

The public perception of Antarctica within Australia in the first half of the 20th century up to the Second World War centred on the single heroic figure of Sir Douglas Mawson, who attempted to influence government on Antarctic policy from his academic position at Adelaide university⁵⁴⁶. To some extent this persistence finally took root 1947 when the government announced its policy to send an expedition to Antarctica during the summer 1947/48⁵⁴⁷ and to establish a government agency to undertake that task. Implementation of this policy then took a further step forward with appointment of Group Captain Stuart Campbell in May 1947⁵⁴⁸ as Chief executive officer of the expedition and in July 1947 Law was offered a one year position as Senior Scientific Officer 'to coordinate the scientific programs and to carry out cosmic ray observations during the *Wyatt Earp's* proposed voyage to the Antarctic'⁵⁴⁹. This appointment was to significantly impact Australia's future involvement in Antarctica turning policy ideas into physical reality with establishment of a

⁵⁴⁶ The impact of Mawson's policy influence is previously analyzed in Chapter Two.

⁵⁴⁷ Announcement by H.V.Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, February 1947, following cabinet decision 1275A of 16 January, *SMH*, 4 February 1947.

⁵⁴⁸ Cabinet decision 1275 May 12 1947, NAA A1838 1495/3/2/1 pt 2.

⁵⁴⁹ Kathleen Ralston, 'Antarctic Leader and Administrator, the Early Life of P.G. Law,' p. 77.

structured unit supporting the establishment of scientific bases on the Antarctic continent. His unique combination of personality traits and capabilities warrant further study.

Born in Tallangatta Victoria in 1912 Law gained a Master of Science award in 1941 at Melbourne University and he lectured there in Physics until he joined the newly established Australian Antarctic Division in Melbourne in July 1947. Though greatly respected as an individual, Mawson had lobbied Government from outside the system and on a part time basis over many years Law on the other hand when appointed, was in his prime; vocal, articulate and confident. Antarctica became his passion as well as his full-time vocation. Additionally he was working within the Government with advantages and restrictions beyond Mawson's reach. Following a personality clash with Campbell when the Antarctic Division was created in 1948, Law succeeded in getting him moved aside⁵⁵⁰ and was appointed as acting officer in charge in January 1949; and two years later Director of the Antarctic Division of the Department of External Affairs. It was responsible for the carriage of the Australian National Antarctic Expeditions (ANARE), it provided logistic support and employed some specialist scientists but the majority of scientists were contributed by government departments or universities. As the Director, Law made a deliberate transition from a university lecturer and part time scientist, to become an outstanding administrator. However, it is not easy to understand how he made this transition until his character is further examined.⁵⁵¹

Earlier in his life in Tallangatta his grandfather John James Law had run and owned *The Upper Murray and Mitta Herald*⁵⁵² newspaper. Phillip had a very close relationship with him,⁵⁵³ and developed an understanding of the importance of disseminating public information. With this background Law worked tirelessly to publicise Antarctica to the general public when at Antarctic Division. Despite being the Director of an operative division within a closed policy department he was highly successful in the implementation of Australian Antarctic policy on a domestic basis. It is very difficult to see how anyone else in

⁵⁵⁰ This was a bitter battle between Campbell and Law as chronicled in NAA A1838/245 item 1251 /819 part 1 and NAA: A1838 T173, item 1256/226/22. It showed Law's tenacity and ability to confront anyone and argue his case strongly.

⁵⁵¹ Law's personal upbringing and time as physics demonstrator is very well presented in Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica: The Early Life of Phillip Law*. Chapter 4: 'A University man 1939-1947', pp. 59-79.

⁵⁵² The *Upper Murray and Mitta Herald* operated from 1885 to 1974, (Australian Libraries Id 12230664) Hardcopy held State Library of Victoria NMR Tallangatta, extracts in papers of Phillip Law (NL MS9458 Box 4 scrapbook series), pp. 12-20.

⁵⁵³ Ralston, *A man for Antarctica: The early life of Phillip Law*, p. 13.

the world could have achieved so much in building Australia's presence and international reputation in its Antarctic activities as he did in nineteen years from 1947 to 1966. The Department of External Affairs did not readily open its business operations to the general public and this constantly produced friction with Law, as he was always trying to capture media publicity for his Antarctic operations. This became a personal battle with departmental secretaries in Canberra over his desire to undertake direct publicity, without departmental screening.

Law was an inter University boxing champion and sportsman. He was always a busy, energetic but extremely well organised person. His fundamental strengths were organisation and detailed planning and he was an ideal person at the time to lead a new organisation towards the goal of a permanent Australian base on the Antarctic continent. With charisma and energy he provided an egocentric, even irritable, input to the respective federal government Minister for External Affairs and especially to the departmental bureaucracy in Canberra. He had a tremendous personal impact at Antarctic Division in planning and organising preparations for the expeditions each year. During a nineteen year period he also made seventeen relief voyages as ship borne expedition leader⁵⁵⁴. Law was hard working, very confident, attentive to detail, a good choice of men and unlimited in the scope of his vision. His enthusiasm for the southern ocean had been somewhat tempered by his personal bad experiences on the unsuitable ships *Wyatt Earp* and the *HMAS Labuan* in 1948 and 1949 and he continually sought a more appropriate ship for Antarctic operations. While Law gained Cabinet approval for the building of a suitable Australian ship in 1950⁵⁵⁵ he was unable to convince the government treasury to spend the funds to build the ship. It then took him another three years before he found and arranged a charter of a suitable ice strengthened ship to be able to mount an expedition to approach the Antarctic continent.

Law was always meticulous in recording his exploits and correspondence in official files while Director of the Antarctic Division and this clear approach to detail highlighted his orderly managerial style⁵⁵⁶. He also amassed a huge collection of private papers and diaries and in his later years ensured that this material was securely stored, such as in the twenty four

⁵⁵⁴ Personal diaries NLA MS 9458 series 2 1947-1966.

⁵⁵⁵ Cabinet decision July 13 1950 stated 'that in order to establish a permanent Antarctic Station, a new ship should be built' A1838 1495/3/2/1/pt 1. However this did not proceed any further.

⁵⁵⁶ Kathleen Ralston, 'Antarctic Leader and Administrator the Early Life of P.G. Law,(unpublished PhD thesis Monash University ,1991)

boxes of his papers catalogued at the National Library in Canberra.⁵⁵⁷ He published three autobiographical and narrative accounts as books⁵⁵⁸ from extensive diary entries, as well as publishing numerous journal papers and delivering addresses at conferences. In addition two biographical books and a PhD dissertation on his Antarctic activities were prepared by Kathleen Ralston⁵⁵⁹ with his enthusiastic involvement. The Australian Antarctic exploration during his period at Antarctic Division is portrayed in the illustrated large format map produced by Division of National Mapping.⁵⁶⁰ In addition there is a mass of material relating to his work at Antarctic Division with oral histories, audio and video taped interviews for television program covering his expedition activities⁵⁶¹. His exploration work in leading ship borne expeditions to Antarctica has also been well documented by Ralston (1998) and Bowden (1997)⁵⁶² and does not require re-examination here in detail, as it was primarily the implementation of an established policy.

Law explains his administrative survival strategy, as Director of Antarctic Division, in the bureaucratic environment of External Affairs as being through his direct personal contact with Minister Casey and summarises his career as having fortunate timing in his book 'You Have to be Lucky'⁵⁶³. He attributes it to 'being in the right place at the right time' which included having an office close to the Minister Casey in Melbourne while the rest of the Department was in Canberra. Minister Casey was an 'old school' diplomat with a strong department staffed by experienced public servants, led by a powerful secretary Sir Arthur Tange. Law always tried to report directly to the Minister or at least to Tange, the head of the Department. However, being at a lower standing within the Department of External Affairs bureaucracy he had to report through assistant secretaries such as Keith Waller and Charles Kevin, which continually frustrated him. His attitude is shown in the following letter to Tange.

⁵⁵⁷ Papers of Phillip Law 1870-2010 NLA Manuscript MS9458. These include the Law collection of diaries personal papers, photographs, correspondence video tapes. These were catalogued in a major work by Helen Morgan and Gavan McCarthy.

⁵⁵⁸ P.G.Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*; P.G.Law, *The Antarctic Voyage of Hmas Wyatt Earp*; P.G.Law, *You Have to Be Lucky-Antarctica and Other Adventures*.

⁵⁵⁹ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law*, Ralston, *Phillip Law, the Antarctic Exploration Years 1954-66*; K. Ralston, 'Antarctic Leader and Administrator the Early Life of P.G. Law.' (Phd thesis, Monash University 1998)

⁵⁶⁰ *Map of ANARE explorations 1947 to 1966* J.Manning, Cartographic project leader. (Australian Surveying and Land information Group 1988 Canberra)

⁵⁶¹ For example Ian Toothill video interviews and published as a transcript in 2009 as Toothill, *Dr Phillip Garth Law ;His Extraordinary Life and Times*.

⁵⁶² Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*. Bowden interviews are held as unpublished typescripts at Australian Antarctic Division Library Kingston Hobart.

⁵⁶³ Law, *You Have to Be Lucky-Antarctica and Other Adventures*.

Dear Mr Tange, I had a talk with Evan Collings about my reclassification as you suggested. According to him the question is not so much one of whether my job is scientific or administrative but rather if the job is scientific (and he is prepared to admit that it is), whether it would not be more appropriate for the Division to be attached to a Department in which there are scientific activities.....He feels the that the salary structure of external affairs of external affairs with assistant secretary levels tied tightly into the general scheme, makes it extremely difficult to make just a settlement of my claim for reclassification.⁵⁶⁴

This shows his frustration with both the Divisional placement and the structure within the Department. It is an example of Law's confrontational head-on approach to problems and his preparedness to stand up for what he sees as correct way of getting things done in the implementation of a government policy. In the letter to Tange, strategically sent when he was not directly contactable, he continues to argue that his activities were far removed from the normal international diplomatic functions of the Department of External Affairs and presses his case for an alternative arrangement as:

To transfer the Division to another department, or better still to attach it separately to a minister either in the way of a Commission is attached ,or to a Department with direct approach to a minister, as the Department of War service homes....I have always felt that a mistake was made in not following this approach⁵⁶⁵

Whilst Law as Director was often belligerent in his upward reporting within the Government, he was a different person in his downward administration, readily delegating to able staff and gaining immense loyalty by his supportive managerial style.⁵⁶⁶ He attempted to assume the role of a quasi-independent Director of the Antarctic Division, free from control by the Canberra bureaucracy. As Ralston recalls in her biography of Law: 'There was never any doubt in Law's mind that an Australian presence had to be supported by ongoing scientific endeavour'.⁵⁶⁷ To make this happen Law always took time to convince scientific expeditions to undertake worthwhile Antarctic research and then argued for resources to carry out the

⁵⁶⁴ Draft letter Law to Tange , 27 April 1955, Law papers NLA MS 9458 series 7.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Ralston, *A man for Antarctica*, p.175.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., p.177.

work as a frontline justification for the Australian presence in Antarctica. This disparity in approach is shown in a letter from Assistant Secretary Waller on Law's return from the 1954/55 summer voyage:

As soon as you have had a chance to get your breath I should like to talk to you about the 5 years plan. You will recall that we discussed the general plan and objectives of our Antarctic work shortly before you left and that you felt there was a marked difference of emphasis in our approach which should be ironed out as soon as possible.... As you know I do not think of our Antarctic effort as a scientific expedition. To me the scientific work is secondary to the political consideration of maintaining our claim to this territory⁵⁶⁸

Traditionally the Department of External Affairs was a policy Department, focused almost exclusively on international diplomacy and deliberately did not involve the Australian public in policy development or encourage open debates on decision making. This need for secrecy was seen as particularly important while sensitive international negotiations were taking place such as in regard to Antarctic territorial recognition and the drafting of the Antarctic Treaty. While foreign policy was paramount in the Department's operation, arguing for funding for Antarctic operational aspects and justifying a non-policy science program was not the department's strength. Indeed domestic public input or free wheeling publicity on current topics, or Antarctic adventures were frowned upon.

Despite his personality clashes on this stance with highly placed officers within Department of External Affairs in Canberra Law made great progress in implementing the set government policy to occupy bases in Antarctica. However, it was not an easy task and it took him time to rebuild Australian Antarctic expertise and gain funding support from Treasury for ongoing Antarctic expeditions. This ongoing financial situation had always been a concern in the Antarctic Executive Planning Meetings where Law had used to his advantage by becoming chairman and minute taker. An example of this arose early in 1949 when he had just been appointed as acting head of the Antarctic division. Chairing his first Executive Planning Committee Law raised the issue of the purchase of a new ship as a carry

⁵⁶⁸ Air mail express letter Waller to Law March 24 1955 on return from the 1954 establishment voyage,(Law papers NLA MS9458,)

over agenda item.⁵⁶⁹ At this point Mawson questioned the government's long term commitment to Antarctic research, as his philosophy was that there should be some limit placed on the activities of ANARE unless it could be made to pay for itself from private resource exploitation.⁵⁷⁰ Dr White representing CSIRO supported this approach and pressed for a reply to resolution at the previous meeting which had requested:

Direction from the government as to its future policy on the exploration and development of the Antarctic...as (this committee) does not consider that scientific work alone could justify the dispatch of an expedition⁵⁷¹

This was a severe personal test for a new chairman and Law, as that chairman, expertly side stepped these issues of cost and program duration and the associated issue of whaling raised by Mawson, by saying that these were matters for his Department only and it was not the role of the committee. This blocked the issue of economic viability necessary to justify the expedition which would have been disastrous in seeking funds from Treasury. The minutes of the meeting, as written by Law show his ability to take control of the hostile meeting and to use the meeting to his advantage⁵⁷².

Although Law had developed international connections with key persons of other Antarctic nations at the operative science level, scrutiny of Departmental policy files show he was often not included in international discussion within the Department of External Affairs on Antarctica.⁵⁷³ This demonstrated a departmental differentiation between foreign policy making on Antarctic and the domestic implementation of that policy. Law however had more than a full time job to administer and steer the establishment of an Antarctic base as well as securing ongoing funds and resources to ensure on time departure of relief operations for the Antarctic expeditions each year. It is in this activity that he is very favourably regarded domestically and internationally as being outstandingly successful rather than policy development.

⁵⁶⁹ Ralston, *A man for Antarctica :the early life of Phillip Law*, p. 126

⁵⁷⁰ MAC,1 ANR Adelaide cited in Ayres, *Mawson : A Life*. pp. 244-245.

⁵⁷¹ Minutes ANARE Executive Planning Committee meeting June 3 1949 (Hobart : Australian Antarctic Division)

⁵⁷² Ralston *A Man for Antarctica :the early life of Phillip Law*, p. 127

⁵⁷³ Examination of DEA policy files of the time such as the USSR Foreign Policy-Antarctic Claims A1838 69/1/17 .1949-1975 and Soviet IGY bases in Antarctica A4940/1 1955-1956 and also the US - Antarctic Policy C1479 do not show any mention of Law being consulted in regard to foreign policy issues.

As well as his great achievements as Director of Antarctic Division his quest for publicity continued and led to a notable change in the administration of Antarctic policy. This raises the question of how did this eventuate. While at AAD, Law always sought promotion of events arising from his Antarctic activities in relief voyages. This brought him into conflict with departmental secretaries. All official and personal reports from Antarctica were sent by Morse code and Law was constantly annoyed when his adventurous and colourful reports of activity were restricted or heavily edited. Law's wife, Nel, kept him advised by telegram of what publicity which was being released such as in regard to the release from Mawson station and suggestions on content sent him feedback such as : 'Articles excellent headlines send more length stop suggest news direct nelson also.'⁵⁷⁴

Law attempted to glamorise the implementation of Australian Antarctic policy through ANARE activities and popularise the science being undertaken through a plethora of publicity. However, this never appeared to really capture the minds of politicians, perhaps reminiscent of Mawson attempts to influence the creation and development of Australian Antarctic policy in the first half of the century. Even while Law was sending press messages from the site of the Mawson station, concern over Law's activities and managerial style were raised with the Department of External Affairs such as in the memo Waller to Minister Casey:

I share your perturbations about control of our Antarctic Activities and Mawson's view of the inadequacy of the Antarctic Committee ... Law should give an account of his stewardship to this committee instead of developing far reaching plans without adequate supervision. I am convinced that Law has been blinding the Department with science and the scientists with politics. He talks to me about ionospheric reports (which are above my head) or protein in plankton whilst if the scientists attempt to thwart him he claims that his activities are essential on political grounds.⁵⁷⁵

The comments show that Law was a skilful manipulator, using words and evidence to his best advantage to get support for his ideas. Law continually argued for science to be a major

⁵⁷⁴ Radio Telegram Nel Law to Phillip Law via the *Kista Dan* February 1954 (NLA Law papers MS 9458 series 7), (Nelson was newspaper friend)

⁵⁷⁵ Memo Waller to Casey, 17 February 1954 NAA:A1838/2461251/X P.G.Law.

part of Antarctic activities arguing that occupation alone was not sufficient to justify the occupation. This brought him into conflict with Department of External Affairs which had no role for science in its responsibility. Despite the close checking departmental culture restricting media exposure, Law continued to publicise Antarctic activities for himself and for the Antarctic Division through direct media promotion and public interaction, instead of clearing releases through the public service bureaucracy. On completion of the 1954 establishment voyage Law did a live radio interview, this brought a departmental censure in a telegram, initially from Waller:

Regulation 34 provides that an officer shall not use for any purposes other than the discharge of official duties information gained by or conveyed to him through his connection with the service. If members of the department make speeches or broadcasts they should in theory only do this with prior departmental approval. We would like to have your script on record so that it cannot be said that we had no knowledge of it.⁵⁷⁶

Law objected strongly in a memo saying that in a live interview there was no prior script.

I have received your teleprinter and can only surmise that you are under some misapprehension concerning the lecturing activities undertaken by this Division. When I first came to be Director I was encouraged to do all I could to publicise the work of the Division and in 1950 was actually criticised for not achieving sufficient publicity. ... I have been most cautious in all I have written and said. In over five years of such public relations of such public relations I have only once has the Department had occasion to complain, when I was misrepresented by a journalist who attended a lunch time meeting.⁵⁷⁷

In turn this brought a full page letter from the head of the department Sir Arthur Tange trying to smooth things down by gently repeating the need for prior advice in his government machinery role:

Your official memorandum of 7th may reached me this morning and I am answering it personally as I feel that you are distressing yourself needlessly over

⁵⁷⁶ Department of External Affairs outward teleprinter message 7 May 1954: Waller (in Canberra) to Law (in Melbourne) NAA:A 1838/ 1495/3/2/1.

⁵⁷⁷ Memo to the secretary External Affairs May7 1954 NAA A1838 1251 /81 /x P.G.Law

the question of lecturing on Antarctic subjects... so far as general publicity is concerned I feel that we should continue to stick here to the ordinary Public service practice that in almost all cases press statements should be in the Ministers name.⁵⁷⁸

In his years as Director, Law had established a firm link with local newspapers offering to have Antarctic articles ready whenever they had space to fill in their papers. Law also supported public events through outside organisations, such as at the Royal Society of Victoria when in 1956 the Duke of Edinburgh presented Polar medals to early ANARE expeditioners. Law's attitude of refusing to be constrained by bureaucracy continually produced personal conflict with senior officials in Canberra. This brought repeated censures from secretaries of the Department of External Affairs, such as Sir Alan Watt, Sir Keith Waller, Sir Arthur Tange, Sir James Plimsoll, Sir Laurence McIntyre and Charles Kevin, who demanded Departmental vetting of any releases to the media. It has been argued that this conflict with the department over Law's direct personal media promotion was the reason Law was not nominated for a knighthood at the time he was nominating his own staff for OBE awards in 1959. Law was later awarded a CBE in the 1961 New Years Eve honours list, however, as Ralston (1998) states in Law's biography, 'everybody thought he should get a knighthood'.⁵⁷⁹ Law was later awarded a Polar Medal for his work in 1965 but refused the award on personal grounds as he objected to the ruling that some of his nominations for this award had been turned down.⁵⁸⁰ This was taken up diplomatically by External Affairs at the ATCM meeting in Santiago in 1966⁵⁸¹ and may have led to the criteria being revised as Don Styles, a non wintering person and acting Director Antarctic Division received the polar medal a few years later.⁵⁸²

When Law sent a radio telegram reporting activities from the Antarctic in 1954 he requested that this be forwarded to the Queen and Mawson⁵⁸³. The Departmental bureaucracy refused

⁵⁷⁸ Tange, letter to Law 10 May 1954 Law papers NLA MS9458 series 7.

⁵⁷⁹ Law had nominated Dick Thompson, a key assistant and Captain Hans Petersen for the polar medal but they were not eligible under the strict criteria as at that time, it was compulsory to have spent a winter, which disqualified Law as well. Details in Ralston (1998), p. 149.

⁵⁸⁰ Ralston, *A man for Antarctica, The early life of Phillip Law*, pp. 86,141.

⁵⁸¹ John Lavett made representation to the British delegate Brian Roberts who followed up in London ; Lavett letter to Bowden 23 March 1994, p. 4 (unpublished typescript Australian Antarctic Division Library)

⁵⁸² J.A.L. Myres and N.W.Poulsom, *British Polar Exploration and Research: A Historical and Medallic Record with Biographies 1818-1999* (London: Savannah Publications, 2000)

⁵⁸³ Law papers NLA MS9458 series 7.

to send this on to the Queen as it was not considered important enough. Law was furious and knowing from other sources that the request had not been followed up responded angrily which drew an explanation from the Department.

R056 I greatly regret if you feel we have been in anyway discourteous such was not the department's intention. Decision on message to Mawson and to the Queen was taken only after consultation with minister who is ultimately authority in these matters.⁵⁸⁴

Law immediately responded with a telegram which ended curtly:

Concerning the queen's message this was done at the request of men who knowing Queen is patron of British Greenland expedition and interested in polar exploration thought they would like to send a loyal signal. In this case as in Mawson's it would have been courteous to have informed me that message was not being forwarded.⁵⁸⁵

In the relief voyage to Mawson station in 1955, the National Information Bureau (NIB) of Department of Interior sent a journalist and a photographer on the *Kista Dan*. On return Tom Hungerford, the journalist, complained bitterly about Law's leadership style in handling men and organising ship borne activities as well as editing his reports and Laws approach of sending news items independently. Waller followed up and interviewed Hungerford, reporting to the minister on 29th March:

Hungerford the NIB journalist came to see me this morning and complained that not only were his despatches had been censored by Law but they had been completely rewritten in a form which bore virtually no relation to the original. He was highly critical of Law's personality and leadership⁵⁸⁶

And two days later Waller again reported on the matter:

⁵⁸⁴ Teleprinter from Waller to Law relayed through Antarctic Division 2/3/54.

⁵⁸⁵ Teleprinter message 2/3/54 to Waller from Law, NAA:A1838/246 1251.

⁵⁸⁶ Waller memo to Minister Casey and the DEA secretary, 29 march 1954 NAA:A 1838, 1251 245 X P.G.Law.

Murphy⁵⁸⁷ sent George Lowe the NIB photographer who went with the Antarctic expedition, to see me today. Lowe is entirely different type to Hungerford-quieter, more reflective and more disciplined, but the story he told me was substantially the same as Hungerford's. Lowe had served for 8 ½ years in the RAAF starting from the ranks and working up to a commission and his general comment was that in all his years both in and out of the service he had never seen anyone who handled men as badly as Law does.⁵⁸⁸

Their dissatisfaction was supported by the NIB agency to Department of External Affairs and prompted a confidential inquiry into Law's leadership when Murphy followed up with a letter on 4 April which noted 'In the case of Mr Hungerford it would seem that the interference he suffered stultified our purpose in attaching a literary specialist to the party.'⁵⁸⁹

These complaints were taken seriously by Waller and the Department. Mawson was consulted and also the Minister suggested that Dovers be asked to provide an independent view on Law's leadership (as discussed in Dovers case study in Chapter 5) At that time Law had applied to be appointed to lead the Australian IGY field activities planned for 1957/58. Law was not told of this inquiry into his leadership, which resulted in him being told discreetly that he could not be spared from his administration job to take on the field leadership during the IGY⁵⁹⁰. However, the incident blew over following Dovers strong support for Law.⁵⁹¹

In mid 1956 the departmental senior officers were reorganised and Charles Kevin took over line administration responsibility from Keith Waller. Despite the skirmishes with Waller, Law considered him the most competent of all the Departmental assistant secretaries he dealt with. However, was heavily critical of Kevin who he found to be negative and not supportive of science or publicity and Law 'had to hammer the hell out of him to try to get him to do something',⁵⁹²

⁵⁸⁷ Kevin Murphy was Director of NIB Department of Interior.

⁵⁸⁸ Memo Waller to Minister Casey and the DEA secretary 31 March 1954 NAA:A 1838 1251 245 X P.G.Law.

⁵⁸⁹ Correspondence NIB to DEA, Kevin Murphy Director NIB to Waller, External Affairs, NLA MS9458 series 12.

⁵⁹⁰ In researching papers for Law's biography, Ralston was told by Law that he had never seen Hungerford's report or the file entries and was amazed as he considered he had good relations with the persons concerned especially the photographer Lowe, cited In Ralston, *Phillip Law*, (1998), p.54

⁵⁹¹ NAA: A1838 1251/246 pt 2 see also chapter 5 in Dovers Case study.

⁵⁹² NAA: MP10002/1 (1947-66) Law quoted in Ralston, *Phillip Law*, p. 82.

These examples show Law's strong personality and how publicity was often foremost in his mind is shown in a personal letter sent to Tange (deliberately bypassing Kevin) before sailing in December 1956. In the letter Law again raised the 'vexed question of publicity for our expedition' and said he was not happy with Kevin, the Assistant Secretary, having the sole right to revise or reject despatches because Kevin had a complete lack of understanding of 'the basic principles of public relations work'.⁵⁹³ Tange responded predictably:

You express criticism of the handling by another officer of one of your responsibilities. I am afraid I cannot treat representations by another senior officer of this kind on a personal basis. In any event the best procedure for you is to come to see me in Canberra if you consider it necessary to express yourself in such strong terms.⁵⁹⁴

At the end of the voyage Law visited Casey but did not raise the subject of publicity. Casey however had been briefed on the subject and placed a note on a file indicates his potential reaction 'I would have also have said that his information on which we compiled such releases was mostly too thin to use'. A further endorsement on the file from Waller to Kevin then reads 'I think this should go on Law's confidential file. This subject is a perennial one and needs documentation'.⁵⁹⁵

The publicity and media release problems continued with Law estimating that he had given some 500 lectures on Antarctica in the past five years⁵⁹⁶. In October 1956, as a guard against further Department of External Affairs censure Law asked the Public Service Inspector 'official approval to write articles on ANARE Matters'. This was approved for one year 'provided that this is performed in your own time and does not interfere with your official duties'.⁵⁹⁷ A month later Law released a story to the ABC which carried information which was to be released in a ministerial statement. Waller show his disapproval and explained to Casey 'I am afraid that Law has beaten us to the gun again'.⁵⁹⁸ Three days later Law advised Waller at 4.25pm of an interview which was to be broadcast that night. Again Waller advised

⁵⁹³ Law to Tange 17 December 1956 AA:VICRO MP 1002/1 (1947-66)

⁵⁹⁴ Tange to Law, 21 March 1957 AA:VICRO MP 1002/1 (1947-66)

⁵⁹⁵ NAA:A1838/246.1251/X, P.G. Law papers.

⁵⁹⁶ Law to Athol Pike, Brighton Grammar School, AA VICRO,MP1002/1, (1947-66)

⁵⁹⁷ Public service inspector Spratt to Law, 2 October 1955, NAAA1838/245, 1251/819 Pt2.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.Waller to Casey, 15 November 1956.

Tange 'I have tried not to be too officious on these matters since the publicity we get is valuable. I think however that we are entitled to rather more notice adequate notice than this'.⁵⁹⁹

With the IGY starting 1957-58 both Law and Casey were aware of the world wide media publicity focus on Fuchs and Hilary and their Trans Antarctic crossing. Law was finding getting publicity coverage even more difficult and Casey proposed that a private journalist from the newspaper council should be recruited through the Australian Newspapers Council.⁶⁰⁰ Osmar White was the journalist selected and he worked very effectively with Law, who approved all his despatches and this proved a good solution to the publicity issues.

Law continued his push for publicity throughout his period as Director and when he took his wife on the 1960/61 relief voyage it caused a furore within Department of External Affairs . This was overcome by a last minute meeting with Senator John Gorton in the leader's cabin on the *Magga Dan* at the Fremantle wharf on the eve of departure. After Minister Casey resigned in 1961 Law faced a frustrating period for the next five years and became increasingly disenchanted with Department of External Affairs bureaucracy. Law suffered from bureaucratic restrictions and interference in his autocratic style of operations. He continually fought to upgrade the science position classifications for his staff and himself and increasingly became under scrutinise also from the Department of Supply and the Department of Science over his perceived management style. His attitude led to Canberra becoming increasingly unhappy with his managerial style and requiring Law to write 'endless reports' defending his operations. The Law collection papers at the national library contain documentation of his frustration with officers from Department of External Affairs but a perspective on him can be gained from a little recorded perception of Law which gives a reflective insight into the department view of Law at that time.

John Lavett formerly a sub lieutenant on the *HMAS Labuan* during the establishment voyages to Heard Island and Macquarie in 1947 was a desk officer at Department of External Affairs in charge of the Southern Section which was responsible for formulating Antarctic Policy in the final year of Law's term at Antarctic Division. As well as having expeditioner experience, Lavett had been involved in Antarctic policy when as second level secretary he

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., Waller to Tange, 18 November 1956.

⁶⁰⁰ EPC meeting minutes, 25 November 1957 (Australian Antarctic Division Hobart)

had been the designated assistant to the chairmen John Gorton at the first Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting in Canberra in 1961. Following service in Japan and Egypt, Lavett was posted back to Canberra in April 1965 to take over the Southern Section desk at Department of External Affairs. He describes his role as:

This job was really rather unique in style at that time in that one was working pretty much as a separate entity , with just about everything relating to Antarctica crossing one's desk for attention.⁶⁰¹

In regard to the department's view of Law at that time he writes:

Phil was of course still very much in charge of Melbourne... had always been jealous of his prerogatives and responsibilities and plainly detested bureaucratic arrangements which tied him to Canberra's apron strings. Actually there was no doubt that he did an injustice to External Affairs : people in my experience , did honestly want to help but there were very many things beyond the power of the department to change and which frustrated people in the department just about as much as they did Phil.⁶⁰²

Lavett certainly admired Law's achievements and saw him very similar to Shackelton 'capable driving, courageous, even charismatic but absolutely intolerant of bureaucracy'. Perhaps referring to his professional relationship with Law, Lavett said he had no doubt that Law 'had support in principle for what he was trying to do from people in the department'. Lavett continues to describe the general feeling:

'..He never really understood this or took particular trouble to assist them to support him, in realistic terms'... Phil then did project a somewhat difficult image in the bureaucratic world, as well as to Ministers and their staff. That is, I am afraid that Phil tended to be regarded as something of a b....y nuisance. However, here it suffices for me to say that there was an ingrained distrust of Phil in too many quarters for the Antarctic Division's own good ... one way and another, Phil

⁶⁰¹ letter Lavett to Bowden, 23 March 1994,(unpublished typescript Australian Antarctic Division Library)

⁶⁰² Ibid.

had managed by 1966 to engender a good deal of irritation in Canberra at many levels.⁶⁰³

However despite his frustrations with bureaucracy in Canberra Law effectively screened the expeditions from these events and on the Antarctic continent the Australian science and exploration flourished and was held in high regard internationally by the SCAR. Law left Antarctic division in April 1966 to take up a position as deputy director of the Victorian Institute of Colleges but he continued his passionate interest in Antarctic matters. At the time of his death in February 2010 the Australian Antarctic division web site describes some of Law's achievements from his period with Antarctic Division as:

Law capitalised on the experiences of the pioneers and, with the benefit of better ships and modern technology, under his leadership ANARE achieved in a short time what would have been inconceivable to the early explorers. It was Law whose leadership led to the establishment of Mawson, the first permanent station on the continent.


By the time of Law's retirement from the Antarctic Division in 1966 he had established an indelible record of achievement in Antarctic exploration.

- As an Antarctic explorer in less than 20 years, Law made 28 voyages to Antarctic and subantarctic regions - most of them as expedition leader.
- He made 28 landings at previously unvisited sites.
- Under his direction over 5000 kilometres of AAT coastline was accurately charted for the first time.
- He established 2 stations on the continent, Mawson and Davis and took over control of Wilkes from the United States after IGY. Under his leadership, Australia administered 4 stations.
- Winter parties working inland from the stations during this time extended the total area mapped to more than one million square kilometres.

The Australian Antarctic program owes a substantial debt to Phillip Law.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰³ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁶⁰⁴ Australian Antarctic Division web site URL accessed 24th April 2010.



Office Director (photo Campbell Drury)

Ship Leader (photo G. Lowe 1955)⁶⁰⁵

Faces of Phillip Garth Law

11.3. Law the policy change agent

It is argued here that Law's impact on Australian Antarctic policy went beyond his time as Director when he triggered a chain of events which led to the opening up of Australian Antarctic policy to public scrutiny, comment and invited input. This action had far reaching unforeseen consequences but its significance remains virtually unnoticed in Australian Antarctic literature. As such this section seeks to infill this gap by tracing the chain of events resulting in public input by researching subsequent events which arose from his passion for publicity. This sought to gain greater recognition for Antarctic activities with the Australian public (and the politicians controlling allocation of funds) but was the trigger in the widening of scrutiny of Antarctic operations and policy to the general public. Ultimately this resulted in a circumstance which saw a change in Australia Antarctic foreign policy being heavily influenced domestically by public input leading to the signing of Environmental protocol of the Antarctic Treaty in Madrid in 1991.

This watershed role of Law in opening up of Australian Antarctic policy is not generally known or widely accepted in the literature and warrants particular examination. It only came

⁶⁰⁵ Photograph from Australian Encyclopaedia of Science on line
<http://www.eoas.info/biogs/P001333b.htm>.

to light in the personal research carried out by Tim Bowden in his commissioned history of the first fifty years of ANARE⁶⁰⁶. Bowden cites that during his research in 1994 he undertook interviews with a retired John Lavett.⁶⁰⁷ However further investigation reveals that the interviews cited by Bowden were actually letters from Lavett which are currently archived in the Antarctic Division Library in Hobart⁶⁰⁸. This study makes use of those letters in relation to Antarctica to show the Ministerial reaction to events from a perspective of a key person within Department of External Affairs at that time.

As often happens in the government when a doyen retires after a long period of autocratic rule it takes time for the area to move ahead. In two years since Law's departure little had changed within the Division's structure within Department of External Affairs and he had not been replaced as Director. In retirement his circumstance changed from being an insider in the government with its benefits and restrictions to an individual outside the government without direct restrictions although due to his long standing in the subject of Antarctica Law remained on some Antarctic committees⁶⁰⁹. Additionally he was sought by the media for comment and continued to be involved in Antarctic articles and his thirst for publicity was to have an on going impact on Antarctic policy.

In August 1967 Sir Laurence McIntyre deputy secretary Department of External Affairs arranged for a scientific 'audit' to be undertaken by the Academy of Science through Sir Frederick White. This was completed in August 1967 and praised the logistic support work of Antarctic Division and 'finding that the scientific program have been well conceived and excellently carried out'.⁶¹⁰ Department of External Affairs also initiated an internal review as transport to Antarctica using shipping and aircraft in different combinations had become a live media issue. Lavett headed this departmental review on the future on transport to Antarctica in support of the ANARE expeditions.

Lavett had progressed the shipping aspects of the review, costing the construction of an Australian ice strengthened ship to carry 56 passengers and capable of oceanographic work.

⁶⁰⁶ Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 555

⁶⁰⁸ Letters Lavett to Bowden 25 February, 21,23,26,29 March 1994; 5 May 1994 (unpublished typescripts Australian Antarctic Division library Hobart)

⁶⁰⁹ Law was chairman of the Australian national Committee for Antarctic research and chairman of the Antarctic Place names Committee for many years.

⁶¹⁰ White, 'Scientific Research in the Antarctic.', Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*. Chapter 16 : From Pillar to Post, pp. 279-300.

He considered that the Australian nation should have its own ship which could be manned by the Lighthouse section of the Department of Transport⁶¹¹. Whilst his concept of an Australian ship was not supported by Defence he had good support from other departments. The second part was to review the aviation aspects and he was developing a plan for aircraft which could be used to fly scientists quickly in and out for summer programs. This would also reduce pressure on a supply ship⁶¹². The results of the review had been informally discussed with Prime Minister Holt by the secretary of external affairs Sir James Plimsoll before his death in December 1967 and ‘apparently Holt responded in a very positive way.’⁶¹³

In gathering information for his review Lavett consulted widely seeking ‘informed opinion wherever I could find it’ and received conflicting advice:

The Division of course had to be my primary source, though as I have said, we did come to suspect their judgement on basic issue taking the practicalities into account. However, in addition I spoke at particular length to Phil Law in Melbourne, who obviously had the best grip by far at the kind of level at which I was attempting to operate.⁶¹⁴

Antarctic division told Lavett that they wanted two Australian Hercules aircraft and were happy with current shipping charter arrangement⁶¹⁵ but he found that found RAAF ‘were not all that enthusiastic’ to take on the extra responsibility and expense and did not readily support this approach⁶¹⁶. Lavett had discussions with Paul Siple US scientific attaché in Canberra who had very considerable Antarctic experience. Siple advised him that the US would probably be able to fly a small number of Australian scientist into McMurdo from Christchurch and then to Australian bases during the summer flying program. Lavett then had confidential talks with Qantas to explore how Qantas could get ANARE scientist to McMurdo. In the course of these enquiries about the use of aircraft support for the science program Lavett had discussed the review in depth with Phillip Law. At that time Lavett

⁶¹¹ Such an arrangement was successfully used by Division of National Mapping for the 1980 expedition to Heard and McDonald Islands and offshore Bathymetric mapping around Australia.

⁶¹² Letter Lavett –Bowden 26 March 1994 (unpublished typescripts held at Antarctic Division)

⁶¹³ Ibid., Letter Lavett –Bowden 29 March, p. 3

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., p. 8

⁶¹⁵ Letter from Acting Antarctic Division Director Styles to Lavett and Lavett to Bowden March 29 1994.

⁶¹⁶ Lavett to Bowden 26 march 1994, p. 8

reported that Minister Hasluck was wary of the charter of a non Australian ship of an aviation approach in case it would bring adverse publicity.

In late October 1967 the *Australian* published a series of three articles stressing the need for proper air support in the Antarctic.’. Lavett explained:

At this point...a very alarming and in the long term a disastrous thing happened, that is the Australian published a series of three substantial articles on the need for a review to be carried out of our effort with particular emphasis on the need for proper air support . The most extraordinary thing about this the articles were that they were in effect tracking the course of my review with absolute accuracy⁶¹⁷

Hasluck Minister for External Affairs was ‘furious’ and carpeted Lavett accusing him of leaking the review to the press, Lavett describes the meeting:

... Hasluck said that he had noticed the articles and that he would simply not accept a situation where a public servant –by implication me – was trying to bring pressure on the government by leaking material to the press... giving the direction that we were not to take any further action about aviation in Antarctica. This disastrous decision of course spelt the end of a great deal of work-and more importantly of the outcome of that work.

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Lavett’s whole career was on the line and he quickly went to see Law about the articles:

Urged on by the attack on my probity I stepped up my efforts to find out just where the leakages had come from ... so I took off urgently for Melbourne to tax Phil Law with it. Phil readily agreed that it was indeed he who had made the leak and that he had done it to bring pressure on the Government. The possibility that this could have disastrously opposite results never occurred to him; and disastrous they were.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁷ Ibid. unpublished typescript held at Antarctic Division.

⁶¹⁸ Letter Lavett –Bowden 26 March 1994, unpublished typescript Antarctic Division library

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

Lavett let Hasluck know but the damage had been done and although he went back to work on the review to prepare a submission for a ship for Hasluck, to continue to pursue the aviation option was out of the question. On reflection Lavett assessed the situation as:

The Australian articles in particular were a disaster and it is no avail to ignore that. I think indeed that they were probably the last straw so far as external affairs were concerned and so far as the review aimed at updating our effort was concerned because they outraged the Minister for External Affairs.⁶²⁰

With Holt's death in December 1967 the liberal party suffered a period of turmoil and John Gorton was appointed Prime Minister in January 1968. Lavett recalls that during this period the Minister was increasingly irritated by Antarctic Division matters and the Minister clearly had lost faith with the Department's involvement in the southern continent preferring to concentrate on his pet region of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. Lavett recalls that while working on the Antarctic Transport review on, which he was planning to present the review to Hasluck in six weeks when McIntyre telephoned him a Sunday afternoon in March 1968 that:

He had received a phone call from Hasluck who said that following a discussion between him and Prime Minister Gorton it had been decided to transfer the Antarctic Division to the Department of Supply and the transfer was to take place the next day Monday.... I put my pen down and went home. It was the end of the submission and of some quite high hopes⁶²¹

Although the transfer took some time to transact the die had been irrevocably cast. Law's action had triggered an unforeseen chain of events. Law continued to be an icon to the Australian public particularly in Melbourne. He continued to attend conference and presented papers supporting the development and greater use of Antarctic resources, against the locking up of the continent in a world park. While he took time to foster good relations with politicians such as Barry Jones when he was Minister for Science⁶²² he had been marginalised by events and had no ongoing influence. He belatedly accepted a British Polar

⁶²⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶²¹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶²² Barry Jones was Minister for Science 1983-1990 and was personally very interested in Antarctica during that time, visiting the American base at McMurdo.

Medal In 1996 and a highest level Order of Australia award. Law had played his part in inadvertently opening up policy and public comment on Antarctica away from the bureaucratic tight control of Department of External affairs line officers.

11.4. Conclusion

Law's lasting contribution to Australian policy in Antarctic can thus be viewed in two forms:

- As the high achieving long term Director within government with responsibility for planning; organising and nurturing Australian Antarctic Division expeditions, particularly the establishment of Mawson base in 1954 and building a culture of scientific research in Antarctica from 1947 to 1966
- His post retirement involvement as an outsider to the government in a particular incident which led to the opening up of Australian Antarctic activities and initiating policy input from the wider public when he leaked government review information to the press.

Phillip Garth Law was an outstanding administrator who became the public face of Australian activity in Antarctica. His survival within the government and role in the Antarctic Policy can be attributed to his friendship with the Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey who was based in St Kilda in Melbourne, close to Antarctic Division's headquarters. Despite Law's immense success in getting Australia well established on the Antarctic continent, often on a shoestring budget, he was often overlooked by the Department of External Affairs executive from fully participating in international policy development on Antarctic matters.

Despite his lack of field experience on the inland of the continent Law nevertheless led seventeen Australian National Research Expedition summer voyages to establish and maintain three Australian scientific bases and undertake extensive ship and aircraft based coastal exploration of the Australian Antarctic Territory. Always an able publicist he carried Antarctic stories reports to the Australian public which caused conflict with departmental secretaries who required all publicity to be cleared by them to protect their minister from

adverse reaction. Following Mawson's death in 1958 Law took over the mantle of Mr. Antarctica⁶²³, which continued until his own death in 2010.

Law's relationship with media was again used by him after his retirement when any mention of Antarctic was referred by the press to Law for comment. This situation resulted in Law leaking significant information and provoked a reaction from the Minister for External Affairs to move the Antarctic Division from the powerful Department of External Affairs to the lowly ranked Department of Supply. This however was the start of Antarctic policy becoming progressively opened up for public scrutiny and public input. In summary he was a great Australian and held in great esteem for his work at Antarctic Division from 1947 to 1966. His role in accidentally moving Antarctic Division from the closed policy doors of External Affairs, initially to Department of supply and then three other departments is however not recognised in the existing literature.

⁶²³ Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law*, Chapter 7, pp. 131-170.

Chapter 12: The impact of Robert Dovers leadership on Antarctic Policy

12.1 Introduction

The events leading to the establishment of Mawson station in 1954 have been described previously in Chapter Five. Its success that year was vital Australia for Australian ongoing Antarctic Policy. Failure or loss of life or would have had a severe impact on continuation of support for Antarctic Policy espoused seven years earlier. It was essential to show Australia was capable of occupying the claimed Australian Antarctic Territory to advance its standing amongst other Antarctic nations

Whilst the success of the expedition depended on many factors such as the work of Phillip Law in planning and providing stores and equipment and a suitable ship, it also was very largely dependant on the skill and fortitude of the expeditioners who established the base during the winter and undertook first time explorations in difficult conditions. However, much of the success of the expedition relied heavily on the leader of that wintering expedition. Robert Dovers used his prior Antarctic experience to single mindedly hold the expedition together and drive expedition members to achieve their objectives.

Robert Dovers was the ideal person at that time to take on the leadership role, it is hard to see how anyone else could have achieved so much as a field surveyor exploring and mapping the unknown whilst also taking on the role of base leader. His success was important to Australia's future involvement in Antarctica and demonstrated how the committed individual was able to provide a significant base platform for furthering Australian Antarctic policy in the international arena. His background and performance during the expedition shows how the individual made a difference by stabilizing Australia's re-emergence as an expeditionary force on the Antarctic continent.

Robert George (Bob) Dovers was the expedition leader and his contribution was in the realization of the federal government policy announced by Minister Evatt, seven years before in 1947⁶²⁴. This was to send an expedition to the Antarctic continent and also to create an administrative cell within the Department of External Affairs to organize that expedition. Minister Casey refreshed this government policy in August 1953 by announcing the charter

⁶²⁴ Announcement by Minister for External Affairs, *SMH*, 20 December 1946.

of the new polar ship *Kista Dan* which would enable the establishment of an Australian base on the Antarctic continent.⁶²⁵

Philip Law, Director of the Antarctic Division had proved to be an expert administrator over the previous six years since joining in 1947.⁶²⁶ He implemented a staged strategy to establishing a base in Antarctica, using sub Antarctic islands as stepping stones. However, it was vital that the announced plans for an Antarctic station were successfully executed. Had the 1954 expedition failed to penetrate the Antarctic ice pack as the *Wyatt Earp* did in 1948,⁶²⁷ or had it not been able to establish a secure base without drama and loss of life as in the AAE⁶²⁸ 1911-14, the future of Australia's involvement on the continent might have been completely different. This could have even extended to pulling back from the intention to occupy the Australian territorial claim with a permanent presence.

Law was certainly important in creating the opportunity for the expedition and its preparation in Australia, but it was Dovers who made it happen in Antarctica. Dovers was an energetic leader and great field man with immense toughness who set the ANARE tradition, especially for the surveyors, (one of the challenging field roles in early expeditions) His strength of character went a long way to ensuring the success of the 1954 expedition in firmly establishing the first Australian permanent base, which at that time was the only occupation in Antarctica outside the Antarctic Peninsula region. It is now the longest continually occupied base on the Antarctic continent.

This case study of the expedition leader examines how Bob Dovers, a high achiever with pride in his physical and technical abilities, was able to make the often dangerous 1954 expedition an outstanding success. This gave Law as director of the Antarctic Division the impetus he needed in Australia to secure on-going funding at the domestic level for a continuing science based occupation program on the Antarctic continent. It also provided the spur at the political level for the government to introduce controlling legislation to administer the Australian Antarctic Territory. Whilst Law was the program administrator and

⁶²⁵ Current Notes, March 1953 p. 271; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 1953.

⁶²⁶ Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, p.18.

⁶²⁷ Law, *The Antarctic Voyage of Hmas Wyatt Earp*.

⁶²⁸ Mawson's account of the AAE on his return to the base hut in 1912 following the death Ninnis and Mertz, only to see the *Aurora* departing was: 'well what matter! The long journey was at an end – a terrible chapter in my life was finished!' in Douglas Mawson, *The Home of the Blizzard : A True Story of Antarctic Survival*, 1st St. Martin's ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Douglas Mawson, *Mawson's Antarctic Diaries* eds Jacka, and Jacka .

organizational planner, Dovers was the man of action who made it happen in the field. Dovers already had a proven ability to cope with difficult situations and to inspire a group with his energetic drive and personal capability from his war service and previous ANARE experience. The character difference between Law and Dovers warrants further comment as both played a major role in establishing the Australian base in Antarctica. Law's contribution to Australian Antarctic policy over a wider span is further described in Chapter eleven, but as Dovers was to play an important role in the 1954 expedition, his background and reasons to take on the expedition leadership on the Antarctic continent role warrant specific examination, to understand his contribution.

12. 2. Bob Dover's Pre-1954 Background

Bob Dovers' connection with Antarctica can be seen as starting with his father George Dovers, who came from a typical pioneering Australian country family. The inherent 'frontier' attitude of pioneering families saw persons with this background volunteering for adventure as members of British Antarctic expeditions in the earlier part of the 20th century. Hains (1998) explains how this 'frontier philosophy' was equally applicable to Antarctica as well as the Australian outback.⁶²⁹

George Dovers was single and was completing his term for qualification as a Licensed Surveyor in the service of the Commonwealth Government when he joined the Mawson AAE in 1912. He was stationed with the Western Party (Queen Mary Land)⁶³⁰. Whilst previously working as a government surveyor in the Australian bush George Dovers had suffered depression in his posting to a remote survey camp in northern NSW and was recalled to Sydney. He can be seen to have then joined the Mawson AAE to prove himself in an extreme environment. With this background his suitability for such an expedition could be questioned and his letters to his sister Peg from the expedition ship *Aurora* indeed show his own uncertainty as to 'how he would cope' with the remote harshness of Antarctica.⁶³¹. But his final letter home is full of enthusiasm, once the expedition reached Antarctica and the

⁶²⁹ This was done using diaries of the AAE personnel, particularly those of Mawson and Maclean to compare 'frontier' attitudes with John Flynn of the Australian outback by Brigid Hains in 'the Last of Lands, and the First', *Renewing the Frontier Ideal in Antarctica and Inland Australia*.

⁶³⁰ Douglas Mawson *Narrative and Cartography*, ed. D Mawson Australian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14 Scientific Reports Series a Vol 1 (Sydney: Government printing Office, 1942)

⁶³¹ This uncertainty shows in George Dovers letter to sister Peg from the *Aurora* Dovers papers (Mitchell library MS 3812/1)

western party base on the Shackelton Ice Shelf had been established⁶³². He subsequently proved himself to be a very capable expeditioner and participated in a significant man hauling sledge journey (as surveyor) over the Antarctic ice cap to the extinct Gaussberg volcano⁶³³. This established an important cartographic link with the exploration of the German Drygalski expedition which had reached that feature ten years before.

George had two sons and forty three years later, when son Bob was leading the 1954 expedition, he wrote to Sir Douglas Mawson, who had just suffered a heart attack. George Dovers mentions how his experience with AAE had been passed onto his two sons:

I do not think there is any doubt that the experience and example we had as young men under your command had a most tremendous effect for good on our characters and through us to our children⁶³⁴

Both sons were competitive high achievers and underlying sibling rivalry no doubt existed⁶³⁵ between the high achieving brothers. The eldest, William, joined the Australian navy and rose to the rank of Rear Admiral, while Bob was to receive the award of Polar Medal and clasp in recognition of his Antarctic work. William's naval career is summarized as:

Bill Dovers was a Royal Australian Navy officer who commanded many ships with much respect during his 43-year career. His service ranged from wartime service in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian and the Pacific, to Korea, the Malayan Emergency and the Malaysian Confrontation.⁶³⁶

Bob Dovers was born in 1922 and can be seen to have been groomed for a role in Antarctica while assisting in his father's survey business. Interrupting his surveying studies in July 1941 to enlist with the Australian Military Forces, Bob Dovers saw service in the Middle East and the Pacific theatres, firstly in artillery and then in a commando unit in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. A corporal when wounded in action by shrapnel in 1943 in the Middle East he was discharged as an engineer officer in July 1946.⁶³⁷ Physically and mentality hardened

⁶³² George Dovers Letter to sister Peg, February 1912 (Mitchell Library MS 3812/1b)

⁶³³ Mawson, *The Home of the Blizzard : Being the Story of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 1911-1914*. Report of the western sledge journey Mawson *Narrative and Cartography*, pp. 205-274.

⁶³⁴ Letter George Dovers to Mawson 20 July 1954 in MAC, 49 DM.

⁶³⁵ L.E.Macey, personal communication at Mawson station, February 1975, also in his papers in NL MSS5343

⁶³⁶ Obituary of Bill Dovers by Michael Fogarty 'Bill Dovers 1918-2007 -Loyal leader earned respect' Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 2007

⁶³⁷ Robert Dovers service record NX38115 (AWM)

by war experiences, his almost superhuman capacity of energy was coupled together with a deeper, more reflective side. Examination of this more philosophical side to his character gives an insight to his motivation in seeking further adventure in the Antarctic and then subsequently taking on the mantle of leadership in the 1954 expedition. He set a high level benchmark of field performance which can be seen as emulating his father's experiences with Mawson AAE in 1911.

On demobilization Bob Dovers rejoined his father's surveying business before being selected as surveyor and second in charge to the inaugural Heard Island Expedition 1947-48.⁶³⁸



Figure 1 Big Ben is the central mountain on Heard Island.⁶³⁹

Heard Island is an ice covered active volcano, it has difficult terrain and an extreme climate of wind, rain, ice and snow. Travel on the island requires expertise with skis, snow shoes, man hauling sledges, glacier travel, crevasses and survival skills in bad weather. Arthur Scholes, radio operator with the expedition, describes in detail the work of the 1948 inaugural ANARE party in establishing a base and undertaking field work⁶⁴⁰. Dovers, as surveyor, together with field assistant 'Swampy' Compton was given the very difficult assignment to produce a map of the island, in tough conditions, with very little equipment or manpower support. This necessitated making tents and living off the land from seals and

⁶³⁸ newspaper announcement *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 November 1947

⁶³⁹ Photograph by A.J. Graff, Antarctic Division from
www.skimountaineer.com/ROF/ROF.php?name=BigBen

⁶⁴⁰ Scholes *Fourteen Men : The Story of the Australian Antarctic Expedition to Heard Island*.

penguins during extended field surveys. Compton's field diary typically reports on the conditions as:

Clouds were very low with heavy rain making work impossible .We retired to the tent after picking some Kerguelen Cabbage and killing a Gentoo penguin. We cut the meat into small cubes and cooked it for twenty minutes - a very tasty meal.⁶⁴¹



Figure 2: Chief surveyor views a cold morning after a night on the Jacka Glacier Heard Island⁶⁴²

After failure of the supplied army tents, Dovers' diary of April 14 1948, reported: 'spent the best part of the morning in sleeping bags and decided to return to base to make a new tent'⁶⁴³. On return his sleeping bag weighed an additional 8 pounds, having absorbed nearly a gallon of water. His survey diary continues:

April 14-22 - this week spent entirely in the construction of a new tent which was square base pyramidal tent in shape made up of a Birkmere canvas hand sown...the

⁶⁴¹ Compton field diary entry, 14 May 1948 in Scholes, *Fourteen Men*, p. 169.

⁶⁴² Photograph by Allen Campbell Drury radio operator and photographer 1947/48 NLA pic-vn3766101.

⁶⁴³ R.G, Dovers *Heard Island- survey diary* entry 14 April 1948 (Canberra : Division of National Mapping Report 16321)

general design was copied from a photograph of some of Scott's tents, the total weight (with poles) was 36 pounds.⁶⁴⁴

Another diary excerpt in relation to boots demonstrates the ingenuity and tenacity of the man:

The only boots which showed any wearing qualities at all were the Australian Army type. These however usually broke after a month in the field. They can be made very serviceable by attaching a full length additional sole of motor tyre ...one pair of boots treated this way have remained serviceable from early September until January about camp and in the field.⁶⁴⁵




Figure 3 Map of Heard Island based on the work of the 1948/48 expedition⁶⁴⁶

After winter the survey team crossed a number of crevassed glaciers, hauling a loaded sledge before reaching the other end of the island at Spit Point, but Compton feeling the extreme isolation of the situation notes in his diary:

Confined to camp all day by snow flurries and cold winds. Bob was sick, myself not feeling the best. Tried to coax Bob to put something in his stomach, but it was

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., April 22, p. 12.

⁶⁴⁵ R.G. Dovers 'Report on Equipment and clothing' *Survey Log*, (Division of National Mapping, 1948)

⁶⁴⁶ 1:50,000 scale *Topographic map of Heard Island* (Canberra: Division of National Mapping, 1963)

no go. Considerably worried about him. We are a bit too far out to have trouble now.⁶⁴⁷

Dovers recovered and they were able to carry the survey south to Scarlet Hill from where they could fix the position of the long spit feature, at the south east extremity of the island and the surrounding shoals. The distinguished Australian Antarctic surveyor/explorer S.L. Kirby, who had wintered three times at Mawson, when later visiting the Antarctic peninsula region as a tour guide, drew a parallel between Heard Island and South Georgia commenting:

I suppose South Georgia is more or less the equivalent of Heard Island, in latitude and distance south of the Antarctic Convergence (Antarctic Polar Front) and is also a high, largely ice-covered land with great glaciers fringing its central plateau. Somehow, though, it doesn't seem to me to have the brooding menace of Heard, which is a pretty tough place. I've always thought that one of the great and greatly under acclaimed, ANARE endeavors was Bob Dovers and his helpers tramping round Heard to survey and map it, back in 1948.⁶⁴⁸

Working in these difficult conditions necessitated Dovers quickly gaining expertise in the use of snow shoes, skis, sledges, ice axes and crampons for glacier travel. Certainly his survey work was outstanding, as was confirmed when a number of his survey trig points were later reoccupied by National Mapping in a geodetic survey in 1980 to establish reference points for an offshore boundary with the French territory of Kerguelen and to publish a new comprehensive map of the island (Manning and Veenstra 1982)⁶⁴⁹. The nature of Heard Island makes it a very difficult place for a surveyor to undertake field work, even with modern technology and equipment⁶⁵⁰.

Dovers' daily work diary refers to these difficulties, as the party had started with little ice or snow experience. As Scholes describes it, 'the field men suffered for their inexperience, but learnt to live in the mountain country by the hard process of trial and error'⁶⁵¹. However, this necessity to overcome such challenges strengthened Dovers character and honed his ability to

⁶⁴⁷ Compton diary, 19 November 1948.

⁶⁴⁸ S.L.Kirkby 'ANARE', *Queensland Journal*, May 2006.

⁶⁴⁹ J. Manning and C. Veenstra *the 1980 National mapping Expedition to Heard Island* Technical report 27 (Canberra: Division of National Mapping, 1981)

⁶⁵⁰ J. Manning, *The Environmental Management of Heard and McDonald Islands* (Melbourne: Monash University: 1982), microform.

⁶⁵¹ Scholes, *Fourteen Men*, p. 133.

cope with extreme elements to achieve success. This diary gives some indication of the difficulties and opportunities for learning:

November 28 - Made Saddle Point in a blizzard, if we had been wise we would have camped in Mechanics Bay area overnight but pulling sledge into a howling gale seemed infinitely preferable to stopping moving and making a camp. For example I was leading and led across a crevasse bridge which collapsed. Fortunately Compton and sledge had not reached the weak section and my snow shoes held just long enough for me to get clear. Nothing serious happened and we made camp at Saddle Point that night. However, this was not due to any good judgment on our part, just plain luck. All our experience on this island has taught us that these do- or- die dashes are more liable to land one in the latter part of the prospectus.⁶⁵²

Immediately following this year at Heard Island, Dovers undertook a stint of nearly six months at Macquarie Island to observe an accurate astronomical position for the island and to survey the isthmus camp area⁶⁵³. Following his work on Macquarie Island, Dovers next posting was wintering with the French Antarctic expedition to Terre Adelie. Phillip Law had previously developed close ties with great French explorer Paul Emile Victor⁶⁵⁴ and arranged for Dovers to further his expedition experience with a winter at the newly established French base at Port Martin as a surveyor/cartographer. This posting provided a challenge right from the start when the base was totally destroyed by fire during the ship unloading. However, showing determination, seven men (including Dovers) volunteered to stay for the winter. When the main base had to be abandoned, they built a small (6m x4m) hut outstation 80km away on Isles des Petrels, near the emperor penguin rookery in the vicinity of Point Geologie⁶⁵⁵.

As an addition to survey and survival skills developed on foot at Heard Island, Dovers now gained valuable experience in handling dog teams and using over-snow Weasel vehicles on field trips to the eastern and western boundaries of Terre Adelie, the French Antarctic

⁶⁵² Dovers 1948 survey diary, p. 41.

⁶⁵³ Division of National Mapping *Astronomical control station summary* - Macquarie island 1948; NL map isthmus area bib ID 4493362

⁶⁵⁴ Law traveled to Britain and Europe in 1950 to gather information applicable to Antarctic expeditions and established a rapport with this great French explorer who gave law assistance with information of the Weasel over snow vehicles which the French used at Terre Adelie and assistance from the French base at Kerguelen in Law, *Antarctic Odyssey*, pp. 249-250.

⁶⁵⁵ Dovers, *Huskies*.

Territorial Claim. His character, dedication and ability received tributes from the leader of the party, Mario Marret despite the humdrum life in a crowded hut of French speakers being hard for him to cope at times. Marret describes Dovers in his personal account of the expedition:

Now and again he would fall into fits of depression and nervous irritability, but they never affected his work and everything he did was well done... I think it struck him as dull by comparison with exploits of Scott Amundsen, Mawson, Ninnis and Mertz and it certainly was!⁶⁵⁶

Marret described Dovers 'as a man cut out for adventure'⁶⁵⁷; the expedition doctor and scientist Rivolier also had a good relationship with him and good naturedly referred to Dovers as 'Scott of the Antarctic and himself as Dr Wilson'⁶⁵⁸ (Scott's close friend) The French expedition doctor from Kerguelen André Migot (1956), who shared a cabin with Dovers onboard the *Kista Dan* (as an invited observer), commented: 'he [Dovers] is the perfect type of polar explorer - courageous, efficient and extremely tough.'⁶⁵⁹

Dover's personal entries in the survey diaries of his activities on Heard Island were mostly work related, whereas the philosophical side of his character shows through in passages in his autobiographical book covering his period with the 1952 French expedition. These demonstrate a certain cynicism about aspects of the post Second World War society, such as in this reflection:

On the highest level we see the suppression of truth for political reasons everywhere. The black evil of Nazism that shadowed the world left one of its more unloving offspring to grow in nature after the explosive demise of the parent, propaganda, which is so more powerful than the truth⁶⁶⁰

This trait is again visible in a reflective summary which suggests that one of Dovers' reasons to continue his life as an explorer was a form of escapism. In this role, he was more comfortable in facing the challenges of extreme weather and difficult situations in Antarctica than in facing the challenges of modern society at home.

⁶⁵⁶ Mario Marret, *Antarctic Venture : Seven Men Amongst the Penguins* (London: William Kimber, 1955), p. 87.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

⁶⁵⁸ J. Rivolier, *Emperor Penguins* (London: Elek books, 1956), p. 65.

⁶⁵⁹ Migot, *The Lonely South*, p. 125.

⁶⁶⁰ Robert Dovers, *Huskies*, p. 218.

One comes away from the near hopelessness of modern life, with this half hearted battling against intangible evils, to a clean fight against worthy opponents, the elements of wind, cold and ice. It is a struggle within the dignity of man as an individual.... Here one can find a sense of values, truer, I dare to say (think) than those which obsess us in the walls of civilization. If this is escapism then a considerable part of the motivation behind the polar explorer must be that. For to the explorer the real goal is to further man's knowledge of this planet and the forces that govern it. He uses promises of commercial possibilities only half believing in them to gain backing for his enterprise. His ultimate aim is to seek, to find and, in doing so, to understand... In a way this is also a sort of escapism. There seems to have been a marked deterioration of moral standards at all levels ranging from international behavior to that of the ordinary individual... the individual is being gradually sacrificed to the State even among democracies⁶⁶¹.

His views on leadership are straight forward. After praising the leadership of Mario Marret, he adds this comment in the 'finale' chapter of his book:

What is leadership? Some men assume its mantle easily, on others it sits uncomfortably, but also ungracefully. All claim its privileges on the least pretext, but only those who are born to lead shoulder its responsibilities squarely⁶⁶²

Dover closes his book with a philosophical summary in the final two paragraphs

The most comforting thought I have derived from this work and incidentally from the beastliness of war, is a realization that within the most ordinary of men; that given the right stimulus are capable of the finest of deeds; that the great deeds are not the prerogative of a selected few, but are within the potentialities of every man.

If for nothing else such work is well worth while⁶⁶³.

These passages reveal much about why Dovers took on the responsibility and challenges of leadership to establish the Australian scientific station at Mawson two years later in 1954.

⁶⁶¹ Dovers, *Huskies*, pp. 217-18.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

Rather than merely having a patriotic zeal for Australia to claim Antarctic territory, his desire was to push the frontiers of knowledge forward in this unknown region. In one passage he eulogizes on mankind's overall approach in a search for knowledge:

Men explore the frozen wastes for a variety of reasons, some worthy, some not so much so. However, in all their efforts there is one driving force, that being to push the frontiers of man's knowledge of the vast unknown of which he is part, just a little further.⁶⁶⁴

Dovers' journey from the 'beastliness of war' to the clean struggle against nature led him from personal adventure into a role of a professional high achiever with many demanding consequences. It was this inner force which enabled him to approach the 1954 expedition with confidence after his experiences in coping with dire situations in Heard Island and in Terre Adelie. These had prepared him physically and mentally for the challenges of the 1954 expedition. With this practical experience of survival Bob Dovers was chosen by Law to lead the establishment party to set up the Australia scientific base in Antarctica and begin to explore the region with field journeys for mapping⁶⁶⁵.

12. 3. Dovers' Role in the 1954 Expedition

The strong character of Dovers at times clashed with that of Law over control of the expedition even before leaving Australia. Law said: 'D[overs] is exceptionally egotistical and has always resented my control. No doubt the publicity I have had lately has irked him considerably'.⁶⁶⁶ This friction between two strong egotistical leaders continued to some extent during the establishment of the base as both had strong views on the management of the unloading activities⁶⁶⁷. Although Law, as Director of the Antarctic Division reserved the right to overall direction, as stipulated in the guidance manual for the expedition⁶⁶⁸, once the ship departed Law supported Dovers' autonomy and allowed him free reign on station leadership of the expedition. The only communication possible with Law for the year (once the ship left) was by radio telegram transmitted by Morse code, with occasional voice transmission during favourable conditions.

⁶⁶⁴ Dovers, *Huskies*, p. 218.

⁶⁶⁵ P.G. Law *Antarctic odyssey* Melbourne, p. 191 and NL MS 9458 series 1.

⁶⁶⁶ Law diary entry 5th February 1954 (Law papers NL MS9458 series 2, Voyages diaries.)

⁶⁶⁷ Law quoted in Ralston 1993 Ralston, *A Man for Antarctica : The Early Life of Phillip Law*, p. 196

⁶⁶⁸ P.G.Law *ANARE Operations Manual-Antarctic Continent Section*, p. 26. Mawson had objected to the nominal control over the field leader see Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 247

In a letter of advice to Dovers before the expedition, Mawson shows his concern over fully funded government expeditions. He had never been able to achieve such support for his expeditions but he was also conscious of the difference to his preferred private expedition approach saying:

I suspect that being in charge of a government expedition as you will be, is not quite the same as would be the case if it was private undertaking. There will be limits and restrictions. When things go wrong you alone will be the loser⁶⁶⁹.

Mawson also objected to the nominal control over the field leader expressed in the Operational Manual drawn up by Law, but when a weasel and valuable equipment were lost in a journey to Scullin Monolith he again criticized Law for sending Dovers to the dangerous area which he considered unnecessary.⁶⁷⁰

Dovers was a tireless force throughout the expedition. While he had support from all the expedition men, particularly Bob Summers the doctor and Lem Macey the giant second-in-charge technical officer, responsibility for the success of the expedition rested mainly on the shoulders of Bob Dovers. In August 1954 Dovers became ill with a complaint which was diagnosed as gall bladder colic which inflicted a great deal of pain and required careful diet⁶⁷¹. This was a crisis for the exploration. Field trips from base had been made more difficult by the loss of two weasels during the Scullin Monolith trip. Dovers was under considerable stress, as his participation was crucial, but the heavy fat content of the food, particularly the field staple, pemmican, caused problems. However, after weighing the situation carefully, the planned exploration ventures went ahead under his leadership.

Over the next five months, the diary of the expedition doctor shows constant concern over Dovers' physical condition. However, Dovers continued to push himself to the extreme, with little rest. He required increasing amounts of painkillers, such as ephedrine and then morphine, to cope with the pain. This was a real worry for the doctor, who lacking the facilities of a hospital, was prepared but reluctant to operate, unless an intestine blockage occurred.

⁶⁶⁹ Letter Mawson to Robert Dovers MAC23 DM quoted in Ayres, *Mawson: A Life*, p. 244

⁶⁷⁰ Letter, Mawson to Law, September 1954 MAC DM.

⁶⁷¹ Bob Summers, Diary, August 14 1954 NL MS 9158.

The medical report by Dr Summers on the southern journey seeks to explain the situation with respect to Dovers' illness:

Southern Journey 14/12/54- 7/1/55

This trip again proved my previous statement that no man should go on a field journey unless in perfect health at the time of departure. Only in special circumstances should this rule be waived; this trip I consider was a case in point.

Bob Dovers participation was essential from the cartographic point of view, he had come back from the Western Journey with only slight deterioration in his general condition and had apparently suffered no severe colic and since his return had suffered only one severe bout of pain, which only required salicylamide and Codeine to settle it, also this journey was to be undertaken by Weasel which is less severe on men and meant that we would not have to eat field rations entirely. Hence I felt it was justifiable for him to go.

From the medical point of view all went well till 23/12/54 when for the next two days Bob suffered from a very severe bilious colic which I felt sure was due to his passing a stone, it was also at this time that we were experiencing a great trouble with the Weasel fuel system and Bob was of the opinion that we should take dogs on from here.

However as the danger of bilinary obstruction was now a definite and unpredictable possibility I told Bob that medically it was unwise to proceed beyond seven days travel from base and further that dogs sledging should not be contemplated except in an emergency and that if we could not get the weasel going properly we should turn back. However, with the Weasel going we could then proceed to the S. Mountains, even this was trying our luck a bit, but I felt that the risk was responsible.

As from the 24/12/54 Bob was never entirely free from pain and required analgesics in the form of Salicylamide and Codeine most days and Physeptone with Someryl at night.

Even though we had tinned foods us it was virtually impossible to give a fat free diet and consequently every meal tended to exacerbate his condition and hence the fortnight was an anxious one from then and our return could not come soon enough.

Under no circumstances would I have considered proceeding further justifiable⁶⁷².

It was an immense test of character for Dovers to decide whether to abandon the exploration duties or to continue them at a great personal pain and danger to himself. Despite these difficulties, the exploration and survey work continued unabated, as is shown in the volume and quality of results (as discussed later) The exploration of the region from the base was an integral part of showing national administration of a territory by occupation and science

⁶⁷² 1954 Draft Medical report from papers of Dr Bob Summers, NL MS 9158.

research. The excursions also demonstrated the Australian expeditioner's ability to cope with life and travel in the Antarctic continent in the memories of Mawson's expertise.

A year later, during the relief changeover inspection of the station with the new party leader, John Bechervaise⁶⁷³, Law comments on the excellent state of the base site, giving due credit to Dovers⁶⁷⁴:

Dovers, Bechervaise and I made an inspection of the station, which I found in immaculate condition-orderly, clean, attractively laid out. I could imagine few new stations at the end of their first year being up to the standard of this one. Everywhere was evidence of hard work and the experience gained at Heard Island and Macquarie islands. I was delighted and warmly congratulated Dovers and his party⁶⁷⁵

Law's report of the expedition continued:

Dovers was far from well. The strain of the various field journeys and of his responsibilities at the station had told heavily on him and he had been under treatment for some time for a chronic gall bladder. All told he had driven himself without respite for months⁶⁷⁶

Dovers had indeed pushed himself unmercifully and also his men, throughout the year, which at times caused friction. Summers comments in his diary that Dovers is 'a driver not a leader' and again:

Bob is far from the ideal leader and rather bull headed about things and lacks any semblance of delicacy of touch but nevertheless he usually gets his way.⁶⁷⁷

When the relief ship arrived, Dovers was suffering with illness and possible exhaustion. Law comments: 'That evening he had an acute attack of gall bladder trouble and was put to bed with injections of morphia'⁶⁷⁸. Law's diary shows his concern that Dovers was exhausted and he took him off duties to recover on the ship: 'he won't like it but he must have a rest'. At

⁶⁷³ Papers and diaries of John Bechervaise, 1910-1998, NL MS 7972.

⁶⁷⁴ Law diary 15th February 1955 in Law papers, NL MS9458.

⁶⁷⁵ Law's report of the voyage of the *Kista Dan*, NL MS9458.

⁶⁷⁶ Law's diary 15th February 1955, NL MS 9458.

⁶⁷⁷ Summers diary 30 June 1954 NL MS 9158.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid. 13th February 1955 also referred to in Ralston, *Phillip Law, The Antarctic Exploration years*, p. 46.

the personal level, Law notes his relief that Dovers 'would not be buzzing around everywhere and taking control of the shore changeover activities'. At the time Law assessed that in a couple of days 'Dovers will be back to his ebullient self'⁶⁷⁹. Dovers was referred to the incoming doctor, Bob Allison, who had met Dovers on Heard Island, when he was the incoming leader to run the base in 1949. Allison advised Dovers that he had a neurosis brought on by stress. Law reports that 'Dovers was shattered' as he took great pride in his physical ability. Law then organized the ship unloading without Dovers, although at times he himself just got in the way. Eric Macklin a long time friend and Radio operator with 1955 party, describes the situation at Mawson at the time of unloading and Phillip Law's leadership style:

We were all exhausted and Phil was running around all the time pushing things. Everything was well organized. Phil organized everybody into different groups, doing hut building or unloading or distribution of stores, this sort of thing. And by the end of the whole changeover, everybody had had him⁶⁸⁰

The success of the expedition was no doubt due to the careful planning beforehand, ensuring suitable equipment and excellent administration. This was tribute to Law. Even so, the forces of nature are extreme and tested the integrity of the party in Antarctica when adverse events did happen. However, Dovers had the experience, judgment and leadership to cope. His role was vital to the overall success of the expedition and his years on Heard Island and on the Antarctic continent in Terre Adelie had not been wasted and proved to be of great value. Dovers experienced constant illness throughout the second half of 1954, which makes his performance as the driving expedition leader even more remarkable. The success of the expedition on the continent enabled the complimentary Antarctic Territory Administration Act to have meaning when it carried through parliament in 1954. This provided the international law legal basis proof of administration of a Territory

Back in Australia in March 1955, Minister Casey wrote to Dovers congratulating him on the award of the Polar Medal. Dovers replied:

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank both you and the secretary for the interest you have shown in our doings during the year past. Your occasional

⁶⁷⁹ Law's diary 6 February 1955 cited in Ralston *Phillip Law, The Antarctic Exploration years*, p. 48.

⁶⁸⁰ Macklin to Ralston, 4 May 1989 quoted in Ralston, *Phillip Law, The Antarctic Exploration years*, p. 50.

cables helped reassure the men that the work they were doing was part of the national effort and so were doubly valuable...Unfortunately my personal affairs preclude me from continuing on with Antarctic division but I need not assure you that I will always take a warm interest in Australia's Antarctic effort.⁶⁸¹

Both Law and Dovers were at times hard drivers of men and clashed in the limited leadership space during their times together during the 1954 expedition. However, a respectful relationship between the two continued for some time after the expedition. Dovers respect was demonstrated a year later when Law was under an inquiry about his lack of field leadership skill. This had arisen when Tom Hungerford, a journalist sent by Department of Interior to prepare media coverage (and no doubt to attempt to curb Law's personal glory releases), heavily criticized Law's leadership and his comments were taken seriously by senior bureaucrats in Department of External Affairs in Canberra. These accusations were supported by cited examples and also by the photographer George Lowe who had been sent as an official photographer for both cine and still photographs.⁶⁸²

On Minister Casey's suggestion, Dovers was summoned by assistant secretary Waller: 'to have a talk with you on the Mawson station. In the course of such a talk I expect you would be able to get some reflection on the Law business by careful and discreet handling'⁶⁸³. Dovers was very supportive of Law in the meeting and he did not criticize the Antarctic Division's Director at all. Waller reported to Casey that Dovers said:

Law has done a magnificent job in organizing the Antarctic division and the various expeditions. He thinks Law would be a good leader for the IGY team. Law tends to drive the men too hard during the landing operations but the whole exercise is a race against time and this is perhaps not a bad fault.⁶⁸⁴

At the same time Mawson had been approached by the Department of External affairs over Law's leadership and he queried Dovers, who he always saw as excellent field leader. Mawson always saw a distinction between the autonomy of the field leader and the role of Law, who he saw as a controlling government official. In reply to Mawson's query, Dovers strongly defended Law as an administrator. His response is balanced and shows something of Dovers himself in not overstating Law's lack of hard field experience but praising Law's

⁶⁸¹ Letter Dovers to Casey March 1955 NAA: A46/26/1.

⁶⁸² Ralston, *Phillip Law, the exploration years 1954-66*, pp. 52-4.

⁶⁸³ Letter, Casey to Waller from Melbourne office, 4 April 1955.

⁶⁸⁴ Correspondence Waller to Casey 26th May 1955 NAA: A 1838 /245 1252, folio 25.

ability to stay enthusiastic rather than falling victim to depression, which Dovers himself had experienced:

I feel that you expect a little too much of Mr. Law. He is without doubt an excellent organizer and has considerable experience particularly in ship work. He lacks experience in certain directions but on my own experience, learns very rapidly. Perhaps his greatest misfortune is that he has had excellent fortune in all his ventures and as a result rates the Antarctic a little too lightly. He is always enthusiastic and that is a hard thing to be over a long period. I do not think it is fair that you expect also of him to be a highly experienced traveler as well. I should think it would be very difficult to find anyone to replace him.⁶⁸⁵

Had the expedition failed as in 1947/48, when the unsuitable ship (the *Wyatt Earp*) had been dispatched at the wrong time of year, to the wrong place and had been unable to penetrate the Antarctic pack ice to locate a future base site⁶⁸⁶, the public perception of the outcome would have been quite different. Had there been similar loss of life as in the 1912 AAE⁶⁸⁷, when Ninnis and Mertz had died in dramatic circumstances and with Mawson needing to be rescued the following year, an adverse public response would have inevitably developed. As it was the new permanent base had been established and the exploring expertise on the Antarctic continent had been reactivated after the last field experience of 1911-12 during the AAE. Although using quite different technology, Dovers had established himself as the outstanding Antarctic surveyor of the era from a technical viewpoint, as well the strong expedition leader able to ensure success.

Minister Casey and the career desk officers from the Department of External Affairs were able to carry the news of the Australian base activities to the international community to push for wider recognition of the territorial claim. The ability to undertake a scientific program as well as exploration of an unknown landscape balanced the narrow based scramble for territorial claims by other nations and the Mawson base was put forward by Australia as a model for both science and exploration.

12. 4 Conclusion

⁶⁸⁵ Letter, Robert Dovers to Mawson 14 May 1955, in MAC, 23 DM.

⁶⁸⁶ Law was only a cosmic ray scientist on this voyage and he describes this disappointment with the expedition in his account in P.G. Law, *The Antarctic Voyage of Hmas Wyatt Earp*.

⁶⁸⁷ Mawson, *The Home of the Blizzard : Being the Story of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 1911-1914*.

Dovers' great contribution to the 1954 expedition resulted from his Antarctic field experience and his leadership ability. The success of the expedition, under his leadership, also had very significant implications for Antarctic policy, domestically and internationally. While perhaps Dovers could be considered an escapist, he was in the Antarctic for adventure, to push the boundaries of mankind's knowledge and to consolidate Australian Antarctic Policy centred on the claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory. Although a hard driver of himself and his men, under his leadership Australia achieved a firm foundation for its ongoing Antarctic policy. It can be argued that it was his energy, experience and personal effort, which carried the expedition to a successful outcome albeit at considerable cost to his health. This demonstrated the role of the individual being involved at the right time, providing an input into the development of Australian policy item.

Chapter 13 : The Antarctic policy role of Richard Woolcott at the United Nations

13.1 Introduction

Twenty years after the 1961 ratification of the Antarctic Treaty a serious attack on the Treaty system was made by third world countries through the United Nations system. This group of countries were unhappy with the closed systems of management of the Antarctic continent by the Antarctic Treaty nations and became increasingly concerned about the potential for profit from exploitation of resources on the Antarctic continent. Australia had been a significant contributor to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty system, which had achieved political stability, with the region becoming non-militarised and nuclear free. It was consequently not in Australia's interest to have the continent opened up for unlimited exploitation and it became involved in rejecting third world proposals which called for demise of the Antarctic Treaty and direct United Nations control.

In the 1980s Richard Woolcott had a notable role in furthering Antarctic policy as a diplomat and later as Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Prior to that appointment he served in a number of overseas diplomatic posts, within the Department of External affairs. However, in relation to Australian Antarctic policy, it was his role in New York as the Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1982 to 1988 that was vital. This was the time when Malaysia was pressing for the United Nations to take international control of the Antarctic continent away from the Antarctic Treaty nations. This approach seriously threatened the stability of the Antarctic Treaty itself. Woolcott's role at the United Nations in countering the Malaysian initiative was important to the development and representation of Australian Antarctic policy in the international arena. However, to understand the depth of his diplomatic expertise, which he brought to bear at the United Nations in support of Australian Antarctic Policy, warrants a brief examination of his background.

13. 2. Woolcott's Background

Having studied the Russian language at Melbourne University Richard Woolcott was selected as a diplomatic trainee with the Department of External Affairs in 1950. He then commenced his diplomatic career with a two year posting to the Australian Embassy in

Moscow in August in 1952 until the Embassy staff was expelled in 1954, as retaliation for the Petrov affair in Australia. This period in Russia was followed by a posting to the Australian High Commission in South Africa, before returning to Moscow to reopen the Australian Embassy in 1959. He then served a period as Deputy High commissioner in Malaysia before being sequentially appointed Commissioner in Singapore, High Commissioner in Ghana, Ambassador to the Philippines, Ambassador to Indonesia and then Deputy to the High Commissioner in Malaysia.

With this wide range of experience, Woolcott was then appointed Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1982, a position he held for six years. During that time he represented Australia on the UN Security Council for two years, before returning to Canberra in 1988 to head the new Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade⁶⁸⁸. In 2003 Woolcott published a personal autobiography titled 'The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings'⁶⁸⁹. This was followed by another book mainly on the lighter side of his posting activities titled 'Undiplomatic Activities' in 2007⁶⁹⁰.

13.3. Antarctic Treaty Debate at UN

At the time of his appointment as the Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, challenges to the Antarctic treaty, were being mounted in the United Nations by third world countries following the completion of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982. At its conclusion, the final communiqué of the 1982 summit meeting of the non-aligned countries in New Delhi included a statement on Antarctica pressing for UN action to change the Antarctic Treaty arrangements:

....in view of the increasing international interest in Antarctica, considered that the United Nations at the 38th session should undertake a comprehensive study on Antarctica...including the Antarctic Treaty with a view to widening international cooperation in the area⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁸ As reported in the personal accounts in Henderson, *Managing Australia's Diplomacy : Three Views from the Top*.

⁶⁸⁹ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*.

⁶⁹⁰ Richard Woolcott, *Undiplomatic Activities* (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2007)

⁶⁹¹ UN non aligned document NAC/CONF.7/INF.11.SectionXVIII para 87, Environmental Policy .

The following year in 1983 Malaysia duly moved proposals against the Antarctic Treaty in the United Nations objecting to the 'self appointed club of Antarctic of nations' and seeking to get the 'Question of Antarctica' on the agenda of the General Assembly. Despite opposition from Australia and other Antarctic Treaty Nations, a compromise resolution was passed asking the Secretary General 'to prepare a study on Antarctica and report back to the 39th session in 1984'⁶⁹². This study was not followed up and the proposal was again put by Malaysia at the next session as the Antarctic treaty nations strategically chose to distance them as far as possible on the issue by non participation in the proposed study.

In considering these Malaysian proposals from an Australian policy viewpoint, Woolcott sought to answer the basic question: Can the United Nations provide a better system than the Antarctic treaty and is it in Australia's interest to support such a change? He explains his attitude as:

When I became Australian ambassador to the United Nations in 1982 I knew less than I should have known about the inner workings of the United Nations system and about the processes of the Antarctic Treaty System, although I was interested in both matters. The fundamental question I had to face was: Can the United Nations provide a practical alternative to the treaty activities, including environmental protection, in Antarctica?

On analysis he concluded that the UN could not provide a better system and summarized his position as:

I came to hold strongly the view that Australia should continue to deal with all issues relating to Antarctica through the established treaty system. My personal experience at the United Nations and in Antarctica itself demonstrated to me that one system - the UN - works less effectively than I had hoped, probably because of its sheer size, while the other system - the Antarctic treaty - works more effectively than I'd expected.⁶⁹³

⁶⁹² General Assembly Resolution 38/77 of 1 December 1983 text in GOAR 38th session supp., pp. 47, 69-70.

⁶⁹³ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, p. 214.

The moves by Malaysia for the United Nations to take over control of Antarctica caused problems for all the Antarctic Treaty nations represented at the United Nations. Woolcott was selected as chairman of a New York Group of Antarctic Treaty parties to coordinate a joint policy response to this Malaysian challenge to the treaty. In that role Woolcott considered that at the time 'It was my task to defend Australia's interests'⁶⁹⁴. However, chairing this large group and getting consensus was not easy as he recalls in his memoirs:

The high level meetings of the New York Group of the Antarctic Treaty Parties provided valuable experience in the cut and thrust of diplomacy as thirty five diverse countries sought, under Australia's chairmanship, to hammer out a common approach to counter the attack on the treaty.⁶⁹⁵ Woolcott, with personal experience in Malaysia as well as in Russia, was well placed to lead this group in debates at the United Nations. Chairing the group was a prestigious role with an opportunity to present Australia's position, but it was also a demanding task for Woolcott as it 'developed into a sharper Australian – Malaysian confrontation'. Woolcott notes that this delicately cut across his previous good diplomatic relations with Malaysian officials established in his previous postings in Malaysia. But contrary to Australia's previous difficult experience in developing the Antarctic Treaty, no problems were encountered with the Russian delegation or the US delegations over Antarctica, despite the 'Cold War' at the time being very much a reality 'Antarctica was one forum where the former Soviet Union and the United States could find common ground'⁶⁹⁶.

Despite this united US-Soviet approach to Antarctica and their support for the Antarctic Treaty, it was considered a serious matter for the Treaty nations to diplomatically reject the Malaysian approach. Woolcott was outstanding in his defence of the Treaty system and spoke on behalf of the Treaty parties in the annual General Assembly debate on the 'Question of Antarctica.' His strategy was to gain unanimous support from the New York group in a joint statement⁶⁹⁷ and then argue that the United Nations involvement in Antarctica, however well intentioned 'would prove less effective in the management of the continent, including protection of its environment than the treaty system did.'⁶⁹⁸ This

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 210.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 211.

⁶⁹⁶ part of oral history 420 minute interview by Brent Farquharson 1996 NL 2783141 TRC 3484 (transcript)

⁶⁹⁷ Such as the statement presented by Australia in UN doc.A/C.1/41/PV.51 of 19 November 1986, pp. 11-21.

⁶⁹⁸ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, p. 217; Remarks of Australian Delegation on behalf of Antarctic States in GAOR 40th session and Remarks of

circumstance continued under Woolcott's leadership over five sessions of the General Assembly from 1983 to 1988⁶⁹⁹.

A fragile consensus achieved by Woolcott to avoid discussion on Antarctica in the 38th and 39th sessions was broken when the issue was raised for the third consecutive time in 1985⁷⁰⁰. The 40th general assembly adopted a series of resolutions calling for a greater role of the UN in the management of Antarctica⁷⁰¹. In response Woolcott used innovation in his diplomacy and in one instance explains that when the issue was forced to a vote he told the assembly that on behalf of the Treaty nations, the New York group would adopt:

A new technique in that we would neither abstain nor vote against the main resolution. I called for a roll call vote and each of the Antarctic treaty nations, by prior arrangement, stated that they were 'not participating' in the vote, thereby standing aside from the process in a new and dramatic way⁷⁰²

In 1985 the Polar Research Board of the US National Research Council invited Woolcott and representatives from 25 countries to attend a conference on the 'Future of Antarctica' in a remote Field Camp on the historic Beardmore Glacier in the Trans Antarctic Mountains.⁷⁰³ This was to give Woolcott a personal connection with Antarctica and he commented on its impact:

Nothing I had ever read or seen prepared me for the awesome beauty of Antarctica. This pristine continent remains a largely untouched wonder of this earth, which one has to experience at first hand to appreciate fully.⁷⁰⁴

But despite his first hand experience of the untouched natural beauty of the pristine environment of Antarctica, Woolcott argued that 'world park' or 'common heritage of

Australian delegate on behalf of the Antarctic Treaty States in GAOR 41st session First committee meeting minutes, (UN DocA/41/688), p. 11.

⁶⁹⁹ Records of debates in GAOR, 40th session and First committee meetings 49th through 55th from 25 November to 2 December 1985 and plenary meeting 16 December 1985, pp. 56-66.

⁷⁰⁰ Olav.schram Stokke, and D.Vidas, eds. *Governing the Antarctic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1996)

⁷⁰¹ See UN doc.A/C.1/40/PV, pp. 48-54

⁷⁰² Woolcott, *The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, p. 212.

⁷⁰³ Proceedings of International conference on the *Future of Antarctica* at the Beardmore South Field Camp, January 1985

⁷⁰⁴ Woolcott *The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, p. 217.

mankind' proposals from third world countries were unworkable. In presenting the unanimous rebuttal to Malaysia proposals for the UN to take over control of Antarctica, he favoured the Australian policy view that controlled mining under the Antarctic Treaty was the best option for stability in Antarctica. This attitude was to stay with him and resurface when he returned to Canberra in 1988.

In 1986 Woolcott visited Malaysia at the Australian government's request to discuss Antarctica with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. This was an attempt to get an agreement in principle to work together towards a consensus resolution on Antarctica in the next General Assembly in 1987. While progress was made in the three meetings with Mahathir, he was blocked at the end of the 42nd session by some minor third world countries such as Antigua and Barbuda 'who had become more catholic than the pope on the issue'⁷⁰⁵. Other African states were irked by the status of South Africa in the Antarctic treaty and called for its expulsion.

Woolcott used a variety of strategies in his work such as concerted non participation in referred committees on the 'Question of Antarctica'; refusing to supply information to the Secretary General; and requesting role calls to register non participation by attendees on related issues. This activity is described by Peterson (1988) in studying the evolution of the Antarctic Treaty system⁷⁰⁶. It led to record levels of non participation of more than 40 states on the general resolution, as treaty nations distanced themselves from agreeing to the resolutions. Throughout this period Woolcott was considered an outstanding Australian diplomat and was instrumental in getting Australia elected to the Security Council in 1984 for a two year term. Bruce Haigh a retired diplomat of twenty years and currently a political commentator comments that Woolcott's individual standing and influence at the UN was reflected when Australia was elected to the Security Council with a record majority.⁷⁰⁷

When he left New York to return to Canberra in 1988 to head the new Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Woolcott remained a staunch supporter of the Antarctic treaty system in saying:

⁷⁰⁵ Woolcott *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings* , p. 213.

⁷⁰⁶ Peterson, *Managing the Frozen South : The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System*, pp. 120-122.

⁷⁰⁷ Interviews with Bruce Haigh 'Woolcott-burns-his-bridges' 8 October 2007 published in *New Matilda* magazine. (online <http://newmatilda.com>).

I believe the treaty will continue to be a valuable international instrument in the twenty-first century and to use the language of the treaty itself will prove to be in the interests of all mankind...For these reasons I'm glad that I've been able to lead a successful defence of the Treaty through five Sessions of the General Assembly. And I treasure a memento presented by my colleagues- A large Steuben glass penguin on a silver base, engraved: 'Ambassador Richard Woolcott, with deep appreciation from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in new York'.⁷⁰⁸

Back in Australia as head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Woolcott continued to influence Antarctic Policy and remained a guiding force on Australia's approach to the issues until they were resolved by the outcome of the Madrid Protocol. Woolcott approved of the mineral resources convention with its strict environmental safeguards which were adopted by Australia and the Antarctic Treaty nations in June 1988. However, he was surprised, as were his department and close cabinet ministers Richardson and Evans, at Prime Minister Hawke's volte-face in subsequently rejecting the mining convention. This brought Woolcott as a Departmental Head and key advisor to government, into direct conflict with the Prime Minister, a disagreement which continued robustly during an overseas visit together to Paris, Washington and London in June 1989. Woolcott made the political observation:

Hawke understandably maintained that this unexpected change was a matter of environmental principle on his part. In my opinion the motive for his belated conversion were essentially political and were related to the green vote in the forthcoming Tasmanian election⁷⁰⁹

Whilst his personal opinion and advice to government was overlooked, as Department Head it was incumbent on him to take up the task to support the new government direction. His department worked hard to diplomatically convince other Antarctic nations and ultimately the UN, to support a comprehensive environmental protection approach for Antarctica. In a remarkable short time frame of two years, with great expertise shown by Alan Brown as

⁷⁰⁸ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*, p. 215.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 214.

leader of the delegation, this was successfully achieved with the signing of the Madrid Protocol⁷¹⁰.

13.4. Conclusion – The significance of Woolcott's role to Antarctic Policy

Australia's leadership through Woolcott on this challenge to the Antarctic Treaty at the United Nations can be considered as significant. Had the issue not been expertly defended it could well have brought down the whole Antarctic Treaty itself. Without the cohesion of the Antarctic Treaty system which had been constructively built since ratification in 1961, it could well have led to a chaotic scramble for control of mining and profit from the exploitation of the non-living resources under an unworkable form of UN control. This would have had far reaching detrimental affects on Australian Antarctic policy, disrupting the whole peaceful and stable administration of the pristine continent

Woolcott can easily be considered Australia most credentialed diplomat of the 1980s and his personal role in coordinating and repulsing the attack from Malaysia and other third world countries on the stability of the Antarctic Treaty can not be underestimated. Without his expertise and diplomacy in the United Nations Assembly the Malaysian challenge could well have been fully supported within the UN with disastrous consequences for the Antarctic Treaty and the inherent stability in the southern region. This would have reopened the question of Territorial Claims on the continent and management of the living resources in the southern ocean. In this period Woolcott contributed to and successfully presented, Australia's policy view on the administration of Antarctica in the United Nations General Assemblies.

While Woolcott was unsuccessful in convincing the Prime Minister to continue supporting the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Resources Activities, he adapted readily to the new Australian Policy direction on Antarctica and was a guiding force in achieving a stabilizing outcome via gaining endorsement for a comprehensive environmental regime for Antarctica. This environmental protection protocol was developed in two years under Australian leadership and in turn completely defused the actions of the third world countries in the United Nations and Malaysia in particular, seeking to dismantle the Antarctic Treaty system of management.

⁷¹⁰Details of meetings are well covered in Elliott, *Protecting the Antarctic Environment : Australia and the Minerals Convention*, pp. 48-70.

Richard Woolcott had a remarkable career as a diplomat and administrator serving seven Prime Ministers from Robert Menzies to John Howard. For his services to diplomacy and distinguished contribution to Australia's international affairs, Richard Woolcott was made an officer of the Order of Australia in 1985 and appointed Companion of the Order in 1993. He made a significant contribution to the evolution of Australian Antarctic Policy and its carriage in the international arena.

Chapter 14 :The influence of Prime Minister Robert Hawke

14.1 Introductory perspective

Prime Ministers, as head of government, can have a most significant influence on Government policies through their role in the cabinet, in parliament and as head of the elected government party. Such was the case for Antarctic policy with Robert Hawke for a three year period 1988 to 1991. However, this was not always the case with previous prime ministers who when taking office showed an initial indifference to Australian involvement in Antarctic considering it to be of minor importance.

The change in attitude by government ministers towards Antarctica warrants examination to understand their key role as government officials in influencing Antarctic policy. Richard Casey was remarkable in his continuing interest and involvement in Antarctica as a government elected representative over more than 30 years, but other Ministers and career public service administrators were often only temporarily involved with Antarctic policy, as their positions or postings changed. However, for those with long term continuity or direct involvement with Antarctic explorers, most government official, over time, became more supportive of Australian Antarctic policy. In studying the development of Antarctic policy by insiders within government it is useful to also examine the role of the influential Prime Ministers who personally endorsed government policy on Antarctica. While Prime Ministers have a strong influence on policy in Cabinet and Parliament it was relatively unusual for them to be personally involved in Antarctic policy, but when they did, it had a major impact.

This was the case of Prime Minister William Hughes when Mawson sought to convince him that Australia should immediately return to the continent after the AAE in 1912. Hughes was not supportive, as other issues were more important to a young government increasingly involved in other British Empire issues. However, Hughes became very vocal on Antarctica at the Versailles peace meeting of the First World War, successfully arguing that Germany should be forced to give up any territorial claim rights to Antarctica based on prior discovery or exploration.

The case of personal attitudinal change towards Australian policy on Antarctica of three of the longest serving Prime Ministers in the 20th century is examined in this chapter: Bruce;

Menzies; and Hawke. While none of these Prime Ministers exhibited a passion for Antarctica when they first came into office, their opinions changed over time. In the case of Hawke this inspired a dramatic change to environmental protection in Antarctica, as his Australian policy was successfully carried to the international arena.

Stanley Melbourne Bruce, who was Prime Minister after the First World War, showed little enthusiasm for Antarctic matters. He was continually lobbied by Mawson and the Academy of Science in the 1920s to fund an Australian Antarctic expedition, but was reluctant to proceed. However, with his close friend Casey in London from 1924-1929, Bruce was drawn into Antarctic matters via Casey's reports and letters. Antarctica was placed on the agenda at the 1926 Imperial Conference and Bruce headed a review committee evaluating British Antarctic discoveries in East Antarctica, with view to reinforcing British Imperial claims. This led to the BANZARE voyages 1929-31 and extensive preparations in England and Australia. Casey (in London) constantly corresponded with Bruce on Antarctic matters in his near weekly letters, whilst sending additional cables and reports for more pressing items concerned with the expedition. The Antarctic expedition was increasingly supported by Bruce on Casey's recommendations, but ironically the Bruce government was defeated a week after the expedition sailed for Antarctica. Mawson however named a significant BANZARE landing in February 1931, Cape Bruce, in recognition of his recent support. As is quite usual in Antarctic geographical nomenclature it is not a Cape but the tip of a small, isolated rocky island outcrop,⁷¹¹ however the name and generic component has been retained and Cape Bruce and is now registered as a Historic Site.

Prime Minister Robert Menzies was totally disinterested in Antarctica when the Liberal Party won office in 1949, but ten years later a change in his appreciation of its importance can be noted. In the late 1950s a series of preliminary meetings on a possible Antarctic Treaty to settle claims and provide stability had been hosted by the American President in Washington in 1958 and 1959. These meetings had been attended by Australian delegations from External Affairs, principally headed by Malcolm Booker, career diplomat from External Affairs and Howard Beale, the Australian Ambassador to America. The next and final meeting of the Antarctic nations to create an Antarctic Treaty (with Australia trying to preserve its position on its claim) was to be held in Washington in early October 1959. This date clashed with an

⁷¹¹ Fred.G. Alberts, *Geographic Names of the Antarctic*, Second Edition (Reston : United States Board on Geographic Names, 1995), p. 98.

important Colombo Plan meeting in Asia and Casey had committed to attend the Asian meeting as a key advocate. Both were important to Australia's foreign policy. Casey, as Minister for External Affairs was responsible for both and personally had been heavily involved in initiating the Colombo Plan. Feeling obligated to the Colombo Plan he made the announcement on 14 September that he would be attending that meeting. Negotiations for an Antarctic Treaty had been going on for some time and all suggested wordings had been vetted and improved by the Attorney General's Department. Considering that Department's involvement, Casey recommended to Prime Minister Menzies that the Attorney General, Garfield Barwick, should go to the Antarctic Treaty meeting in Washington. Prime Minister Menzies considered their relative importance and overruled his minister's recommendation and directed Casey to the Washington meeting to head the diplomatic mission. After the conference Casey traveled to Indonesia to find that Sukarno had questioned the Australian priority for Casey to attend the Antarctic meeting rather than the Asian meeting.

Somewhat in recognition of the work of the Australian delegation in settling the Antarctic Treaty, Australia was invited to hold the initial meeting of the Antarctic Treaty nations. Robert Menzies, as Prime Minister (and also then Minister for External Affairs following Casey's departure) subsequently hosted the first Antarctic Treaty meeting in Canberra in 1961. This demonstrated a developed personal interest in Antarctica by Menzies not apparent when he came into office in 1949. Mount Menzies, the highest and most substantial mountain in the Prince Charles Mountain range was named after the Prime Minister and climbed by an ANARE geological survey team traveling with dog teams in 1961, the same year as the Canberra conference.

14.2 Change in attitude of Robert Hawke

A similar change in Ministerial attitude to Antarctica can be traced twenty two years later when Bob Hawke was Prime Minister. In December 1983, Minister for Science Barry Jones visited the American bases in Antarctica, including the South Pole. In his biography, Jones (2006) explains that, following his enthusiastic report on Antarctica he tried to persuade Prime Minister Bob Hawke to fly down to Antarctica with Barry Cohen and himself. Jones records that Hawke angrily attacked the suggestion and vehemently writes in his book:

'that this was robustly rejected as f***king nonsense, a waste of time and an 'ar**hole' of an idea.'⁷¹²

This showed Hawke's clear indifference to Antarctica as incoming Prime Minister at that time. However, five years later, in a different political climate, in 1989 he took a deliberate stand for environmental protection for Antarctica and against mining. Resigning from parliament in December 1991, Hawke later recants that this protection of the Antarctic environment was one of his three major career achievements. This dramatic change in attitude also drew the comment from Barry Jones in 2006, 'I was delighted that in 2003 he rightly identified his work in securing international agreement to preserve Antarctica from mineral development as one of his greatest achievement.'⁷¹³ This was also iterated by Hawke in hindsight media interviews.⁷¹⁴ The background to Hawke's policy change is further examined as part of the impact of the environmental scientist Geoff Mosley on Australian Antarctic policy. It can be considered strange that despite the major impact that Bob Hawke had on Australian and global, Antarctic Policy there has been no Antarctic topographic feature has been named after him in recognition of this activity.

As described earlier in chapter nine, there was an increasing environmental concern being shown by the Australian public in the 1980s with the rise of the environmental movement. However, it was the political will of the Prime Minister who was the dominant figure in deciding on the future path for Australia's Antarctic Policy in the closing years of the 1980s. In making that decision he weighed the various inputs from domestic forces outside of government, from those within Government; from his political awareness of public opinion and likely effect on election voting.

The concern of the public reaction was demonstrated in the electoral results arising from the Tasmanian environmental campaigns for the Franklin River and the Queensland forests. The Labor party had used these as election issues in the Federal Election in 1983 to come to power⁷¹⁵. Prime Minister Hawke enjoyed acclaim given in his response to these demands and argued that it was in the Labor party's best election interests to be very environmentally

⁷¹² Barry Jones *A Thinking Reed* (Crows Nest :Allen & Unwin, 2006), p. 338.

⁷¹³ Ibid., p. 362

⁷¹⁴ In an interview in 2003 with media presenter Michael Gordon, Bob Hawke recanted on his loves, enduring legacies and life after politics and includes the Antarctic as one of his major achievements. Published in *the Age*, 1 March 2003

⁷¹⁵ See analysis of election results in B. Martin, 'Environmentalism and Electoralism,' *The Ecologist* 14 (1984)

focused⁷¹⁶. This focus on the electoral attitude and its carry through to votes was to have an impact on the Australian environmental policy decision in regard to Antarctica.

Internally the examination of documents from meetings, parliamentary statements⁷¹⁷, press releases, delivered papers, interviews, the biographies of Keating (1996)⁷¹⁸ and Hawke (1994)⁷¹⁹ provide an insight into the policy decision-making processes on these Antarctic issues. However, the secondary personal record available is clouded in reporting the increasing hostility between Hawke and Keating, each with a different perception of events. The picture is also obscured by the 30 year restriction on Cabinet documents. However, drawing on personal interviews and correspondence with politicians Bowden (1997) describes the influences behind the decision on Antarctica at the cabinet meeting in Melbourne in 28 March 1988, which endorsed the mining approach⁷²⁰. At this meeting the Minister for Resources, Peter Cook, argued that it was not in Australia's best interest to encourage a new resource bonanza to compete with Australia's resources world market share. The Treasurer, Paul Keating, raised environmental concerns and supported the Cook argument not to proceed with the mining regime. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans and Graham Richardson, Minister for the Environment, strongly supported the mining regime and recalled the diplomatic effort which Australia had put into developing the convention over the past seven years. The cabinet policy decision was then made for Australia to continue to support the Minerals Convention and subsequently its adoption at the special Antarctic Treaty Consultative meeting in Wellington New Zealand in June 1988. However, the different opinions expressed at this cabinet level showed internal strain between the Ministers and raised the question of further debate developing on this issue. It is illuminating to examine how this eventuated.

14.3 Pressure builds on the Antarctic issues

Following the ATCM meeting in Wellington, Keating made an official visit to France and met the newly elected French Prime Minister Michel Rocard in Paris in September 1988.

⁷¹⁶R.J.Hawke, *The Hawke Memoirs* (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1994)

⁷¹⁷ For example parliament of Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates ,23 November 1988,2580; 24 November 1988,2791-2; 30 November 1988 (senate), p. 3141

⁷¹⁸Paul M. Keating, 'Defining the Policy Advising Function,' in *Evaluating Policy Advice: Learning from Commonwealth Experience*, ed. J.Uhr. and K. Mackay (Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University, 1996)

⁷¹⁹ R.J. Hawke, *The Hawke Memoirs* (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1994)

⁷²⁰ Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*, p. 410.

The Rocard government had just won an election on the 'green' vote and the French environmentalist/scientist Jacques Cousteau had been active in France for some time promoting environmental causes all over the planet. He had lobbied both the French President and the French Prime Minister for rejection of the proposed Antarctic Mining Convention.⁷²¹ Bowden (1997) ⁷²² drawing on details from a personal interview with Keating, describes events during his visit to France, in relation to Antarctica which were to be historically important. During Keating/Rocard discussions to put the diplomatic problems of the French nuclear testing in the Pacific behind them and to do something politically notable for the anniversary of the French Revolution, it was suggested that if France and Australia worked together then the proposed Minerals Convention could be stopped and replaced with a grander comprehensive environmental protection regime for Antarctica. Keating advised Rocard that he was in a minority position on this issue in Australia and suggested how to raise the issue further with Hawke as Australian Prime Minister.

Public resistance within Australia to ratification of the Antarctic Minerals Convention regime was increasing at that time, not only amongst academics and environmentalists but also within the ranks of the Labor government. After a visit to an Australian Antarctic base in early 1989 with four other parliamentarians, Bob Chynoweth, Labor member for Dunkley and Chairman of the Labor Caucus began an active campaign against signing the Minerals Convention. He presented a petition to Federal parliament with more than 30,000 signatures⁷²³ to that effect.

Events progressed quickly over the next month, as resistance to the current policy to support mining was not confined in parliamentary circles to the Labor party. The Australian Democrats initiated a Senate debate on 12 April and called on the government not to sign the Minerals Convention, but to promote an alternative World Park concept. On 20 April the French Prime Minister announced that France would not sign the Mineral Convention, further adding to the debate occurring in Australian parliamentary corridors. Liberal party heavyweight Andrew Peacock, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and some National party members supported the growing move against the Labor government's stance to sign the Minerals Convention. On 2 May, the leader of the opposition, John Howard, announced that

⁷²¹ Letter from Cousteau to president Mitterand, 9 June 1989, See Fondation Cousteau, Pour la Sauvegarde du Miiieu Antarctique: Mission confiee par le President de la Republique, 10 June 1989.

⁷²² Bowden, *The Silence Calling : Australians in Antarctica 1947-97*, pp. 411-412.

⁷²³ Ibid., p. 413.

it was the Coalition policy not to sign and the Labor caucus soon followed by announcing that it was also opposed to signing. The next day, on 3 May, the Senate passed an Australian Democrats motion against signing the Minerals Convention, with support from Liberal and Independent members. A good analysis of the parliamentary record on this issue is given by Elliot⁷²⁴.

Hawke and the Labor party became aware of the changing climate of public opinion in this period and the former mining protagonist, Senator Gareth Evans, showed his political versatility in moving from support for a pro mining stance, which had been endorsed by his department, to acceptance of the contrary view by Hawke and Keating. These issues came to a head at the Labor Cabinet meeting in Canberra on 22 May 1989. At the end of that Cabinet meeting, Senator Richardson, Minister for the Environment reported that it was Keating's arguments and strong personality that ensured that Australia would not sign the Minerals Convention⁷²⁵. Doyle⁷²⁶ makes a case that the environmental movement had the major input to Hawke and the government to change the decision, but it is notable that the reasons Keating strongly opposed the signing of the Minerals Convention arose also from an economic viewpoint than from purely an environmental concern.⁷²⁷

Whilst Mosley domestically and Woolcott internationally had been key persons involved in the unfolding of Australia's position on environmental protection in Antarctica, it was the dominant Prime Minister Hawke who was ultimately the decision maker. While papers from the cabinet meetings in 1988 and 1989 still are restricted access, secondary material from biographies and personal interviews clearly show the impact of domestic, international and political influences but also report the personal political assessment of the situation by the prime minister.

14.4 Hawke's Role in Antarctic policy reversal

⁷²⁴ Elliott, *Protecting the Antarctic Environment : Australia and the Minerals Convention*.

⁷²⁵ Senator Richardson remarks from the cabinet are cited in an interview with Tim Bowden which included the comment 'When it came to the cabinet decision Keating was the key figure- he was the one who turned it ...Keating was in full flight and he did it very, very, well. Hawke ran with Keating. Why wouldn't he?' reported in Bowden, *The Silence Calling*, p. 414.

⁷²⁶ Tim Doyle, 'International Environmental Policy: The Case of Antarctica', in Doyle and Kellows eds. *Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia* (Melbourne :MacMillan,1995)

⁷²⁷ Loraine Elliot cites a letter from Keating as treasurer to Senator Evans saying that the omission of provision for royalties would undermine Australia's sovereignty in the Antarctic, in Elliott, *Protecting the Antarctic Environment : Australia and the Minerals Convention*, p. 29.

The day after the cabinet meeting on 22 May 1988, Bob Hawke, announced that Australia was opposed to mining in Antarctica and would not sign the Minerals Convention. He said the Government believed 'that it was both desirable and possible to seek stronger protection for Antarctica. Australia would therefore work within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System to obtain consensus among Consultative Parties on the establishment of a comprehensive environment protection regime for Antarctica, which prohibited mining',⁷²⁸. This was a dramatic policy turn around. In his memoirs, Hawke (1994) gives an account of the decision, which shows he also politically took into account the public reaction as a vote-winning element.

I felt the public was years ahead of bureaucrats and government in such matters and that we could advance the right case on a rising tide of public opinion which in the end the bureaucrats and their political masters would not be able to withstand.⁷²⁹

The Australian environmental policy on Antarctica had thus been reversed, although to change the course of world events was still seen by many as 'mission impossible'. *The Australian* newspaper editorial on 28th June 1989 advised the prime minister:

...that he should for a moment think beyond the Australian Labor Party's wooing of the green vote and sign the convention before the deadline.⁷³⁰

In August 1989 the French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, paid a return visit to Australia. Following a meeting at the National Press Club in Canberra on 18th, the Prime Ministers jointly announced the next day 'that they considered mining in Antarctica to be incompatible with protection of the Antarctic environment'⁷³¹. Further they considered that the specific role of the Antarctic in monitoring global changes, as well as the region's fragility, called for 'a comprehensive regime to protect the Antarctic environment and associated ecosystems',⁷³². The die had been well and truly cast into the Antarctic Treaty pro-mining forum.

⁷²⁸ Joint press release (22 May 1988)

⁷²⁹ Hawke, *The Hawke Memoirs*, pp. 468-469.

⁷³⁰ 'Hawke's icy reception', *the Australian*, 28th June 1989 'After London and Washington, Mr Hawke should realise just how isolated he is on the issue and just how hopeless he is at tilting at Windmills. He should sign...before the deadline.'

⁷³¹ Transcript of Rocard's meeting at National Press Club, Canberra 18 August 1989.

⁷³² Joint statement on International Environment issues by Prime Ministers Hawke and Rocard: media statement Canberra, 18 August 1989.

14.5 Policy reversal aftermath

An analysis of the key events of this dramatic policy reversal shows that this joint announcement by the Prime Ministers was the culmination of what appeared on the surface to be an unlikely alliance between Australia and France. This was particularly the case considering the sometimes bitter confrontation on environmental grounds over the French Nuclear testing in the Pacific. At its origin, the partnership between France and Australia to derail the Minerals Convention appears to have been driven, in the first place, by personal interactions between key politicians, to make a notable gesture popular with the voting electorate. However, as it progressed, it became aligned with public concern for the natural environment both domestically and in distant places on the planet. The role of the environmentalists was important in lobbying for the natural environment of the Antarctic as a concept wider than just conservation of living resources. It stimulated the public's imagination of a beautiful pristine frozen continent ' - a last great wilderness crying out to be saved from desecration by mining activities'. The role of Jacques Cousteau as the environmental keystone in France cannot be underestimated and he also developed an important personal link with the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke⁷³³.

The timing for the alliance was appropriate for the newly elected governments in both Australia and France to select a 'feel good' far away issue to support. At the time a number of splendid film and television documentaries of Antarctica became widely available to world audiences. These captured the public imagination and engendered an emotional attachment to a beautiful pristine land even though viewers were unlikely to ever have any first hand contact. In Australia, the 'Antarctic Summer' and 'Antarctic Winter' documentaries of the Australian Antarctic Territory produced by David Parer⁷³⁴ for the ABC received very good viewer television ratings and won much public acclaim.

In addition to the public popular reaction, the internal political forces involved within government and the deteriorating United Nations situation, which threatened to erode the stability of the Antarctic treaty, were all factors prompting the change in policy. However, the question then arose, what affect would this Australian policy reversal have on the

⁷³³ In his address to 16th national conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Hobart in 1989, Hawke presented the Australian and French case for environmental protection in Antarctica, but also spoke of the inspiration of Jacques Cousteau who was to present, by satellite video link, later at the conference

⁷³⁴ David Parer, *Antarctic summer* and *Antarctic winter* were award winning films by the ABC living history unit.

Antarctic Treaty group of nations apparently set on the implementation of a mining regime in Antarctica for profit and indeed on the Antarctic Treaty itself. It can be argued that the robust partnership with France made the decision to reject mining sustainable internationally. Without this connection it is likely that Australia's position would have been untenable and the Convention would have continued without Australia as a signatory. This would have placed pressure on the Antarctic Treaty System and led to the unravelling of the whole territorial basis of the Antarctic Treaty causing immense disruption and uncertainty.

Once the high level decision to reject the Mineral Convention had been made, Australian government officials from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, under Richard Woolcott⁷³⁵ such as Alan Brown, entered a difficult diplomatic period to gain support for the new approach amongst consultative partners within the Antarctic Treaty System. This required face-to-face confrontations with previous colleagues and sometimes bitterness between close friends, now instructed to argue against the Minerals Convention, which they had interactively developed over the past seven years. This at times put immense personal pressure on those involved and friendships and respect was lost.

14.6 Carrying Australia's Antarctic Environmental Policy to the world

The new policy thrust was to develop an environmental protection protocol for the Antarctic Treaty to replace the Mineral Convention, which had threatened the Treaty itself. The Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke personally carried the diplomatic campaign against the Mineral Convention at a high level internationally to the leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, such as Thatcher and Bush. In championing this new Australian policy towards protection of the Antarctic environment, the Australian delegations frequently used terms such as wilderness reserve, land of science and nature reserve, during debates on the Minerals Convention⁷³⁶, but Australian policy consistently supported Antarctic environmental management within the Antarctic Treaty System and not as an alternative common heritage or a World Park approach under United Nations control. With international grass roots support from former environmental critics of the Antarctic Treaty System such as Greenpeace, Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition and the World Conservation Union, Australia and France asked for all consultative parties to withdraw

⁷³⁵ Woolcott, *The Hot Seat : Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin's Death to the Bali Bombings*.

⁷³⁶ For example see text in R.J. Hawke, 'Protection of the Antarctic Environment, Prime Minister Press Release 22 May 1989,'

support for the erstwhile Minerals Convention and to support the wider environmental Protocol initiative.

During this period Australia encouraged national and international debate to engender a change of attitude to mineral exploitation in Antarctica. It supported and took a leading role at conferences arguing its case on environmental issues. As an example it sponsored the conference titled 'Antarctica an exploitable resource or too valuable to develop', at the Sir Robert Menzies centre for Australian studies, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.⁷³⁷ The Australian official policy against the mineral convention was well presented there by John Burgess (1990)⁷³⁸, then head of the Antarctic desk at Department of Foreign Affairs. At that sometimes tense conference John Heap⁷³⁹, head of the Polar Regions Section of the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, replied strongly and presented the political case in favour of the Minerals Convention. Kelly Rigg from Greenpeace International presented the environmentalist's perspective on the protection of Antarctica and the case for a World Park at that conference. The edited papers from the conference were published⁷⁴⁰ to encourage further debate and gain support for Australia's policy stance.

At the Fifteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Paris in October 1989, Australia and France formally proposed that consultative partners should consider the implementation of a comprehensive environmental regime for Antarctica, prohibiting mining. After tense debate, support was gained from Italy and New Zealand and Recommendation XV-1 was adopted. This called for consultative parties to develop 'a comprehensive system for the protection of the Antarctic Environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems'. It was agreed to hold a Special Consultative Meeting during 1990 to further consider the proposals for comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment. While there was some support for a wider environmental stance, a split approach was evident, with some parties while agreeing to the concept of a wider environmental framework, wanted to be able to also proceed with mining. This mining approach was strongly supported by the United Kingdom, Japan and United States of America and a second counterbalancing recommendation XV-2

⁷³⁷ J. Burgess, 'Comprehensive Environmental Protection of the Antarctic: New Approaches for New Times,' in *The Future of Antarctica :Exploitation Versus Preservation*, ed. G. Cook (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990)

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

⁷³⁹ J.A. Heap, ed. 'The Political Case for the Minerals Convention,' in G.Cook ed. *The Future of Antarctica. Exploitation Versus Preservation* , pp. 68-80

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

was passed in support of continuing with the Minerals Convention, which had been adopted in Wellington.

The comprehensive environmental protocol was then negotiated in a series of meetings over twelve months. The first of four sessions of the 11th Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting was held in Viña del Mar, Chile, in November/ December 1990⁷⁴¹ but discussion was tense and consensus on the way forward was not reached, as some members still wanted to proceed with the Minerals Convention. Both the United Kingdom and the United States had passed enabling legislation within their countries and continued to support the Minerals Convention. They argued strongly that there should be no permanent prohibition on mining and that the two approaches should work in parallel. It should be remembered here that the Antarctic Treaty modus operandi was by consensus not majority vote so every country needed to be in agreement. The implementation of Australian Antarctic policy faced a big hurdle.

Three further sessions of the Special Consultative were held in Madrid in April, June and October 1991. Throughout this period Australia continued to play a significant part in the global development and implementation of the environmental Protocol through diplomatic discussion, both within and outside the Antarctic Treaty System. At the second session Germany and Japan accepted the concept of a permanent moratorium in favour of the wider environmental regime and the United States of America and the United Kingdom finally agreed to abandon the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activity⁷⁴². In final negotiations for the third session Australia accepted three compromise elements to achieve consensus; to accept a nominal 50 year moratorium term; to remove its sledge dogs from Antarctica; and to agree to a walkway option clause pursued by the United States of America.

Eventually the comprehensive environmental protection Protocol was negotiated, agreed, tabled and adopted by consensus at Madrid on 4 October 1991. It was then signed by all Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties within the year. The previously proposed Minerals Convention now lapsed completely. The Australian policy initiated by Bob Hawke had been successfully carried to the world

⁷⁴¹ P.J. Beck, (1991) 'Viña del mar and the 1990 UN debate' *Polar Record* 27, pp. 211-214.

⁷⁴² Rothwell and Davis, *Antarctic Environmental Protection : A Collection of Australian and International Instruments*.

It had been a remarkably quick turn around from widespread support for the Antarctic Treaty Minerals Convention to its replacement by a comprehensive environmental protection protocol, banning all mining for at least fifty years. It had taken only three years beyond the meeting in Wellington for the environmental protection protocol to be drawn up and successfully negotiated. To better understand this rapid change, it is important to note that while the Minerals Convention allowed the possible mining of resources it had strong environmental protection aspects at the same time which Australia had a hand in developing. Many of the Antarctic Treaty System parties were more concerned with promoting these environmental aspects than maintaining the option for mining. Most, if not all, had no intention of undertaking mining activities in the near future and were open to strong argument to widen the scope to improve the total protection of the environment.

The agreement between parties to hold a series of special meetings in 1990 to progress the issues without bureaucratic delay signalled a strong commitment to move things forward quickly. All parties appeared to have the genuine desire to proceed with discussions to reach consensus and put aside disappointment with the French/Australian stance. However, France and Australia were the essential catalysts for change and with a strong commitment and delicate diplomatic expertise, made the seemingly impossible policy reversal happen in achieving full consensus.

14.7: The Impact of the Madrid Protocol on Australian Antarctic Policy

The Madrid protocol can be clearly seen as the result of the Prime Minister's decision to refuse to sign the regime to allow mining in Antarctica. It had a considerable flow on influence on Australian Antarctic policy. The Australian Antarctic Division was tasked by the Federal Government to implement and manage national activities in Antarctica, including expeditions. While most of these activities focus on the support of scientific research, they do also contribute to the governance and environmental protection of the Antarctic region under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty. The public interest created in Antarctic in the Madrid protocol prompted the federal government to undertake a significant review of its Antarctic operations and linkages with science programs. Australia at that time had considerable work to do to improve its environmental management of its own science programs and its operation of scientific bases. Notable issues were; waste disposal from the scientific stations,

the contamination of soil at Casey Station and the significant environmental problems at the old American Wilkes base.

Government driven review of Antarctic programs set new directions for science with introduction of a Human Impacts program alongside the five other key Antarctic science programs. The former emphasis on earth science exploration in resource identification was curtailed as Australia moved to better understanding of the whole environment. The Antarctic Human Impacts Program was created by Dr Martin Riddle at the Australian Antarctic Division with the objective to carry out the aims of the Madrid Protocol in achieving a comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependant and associated ecosystems. The implementation of the Madrid Protocol thus opened a further opportunity for Australia to show leadership in environmental management in Antarctica. This opportunity has been taken up with vigour successful, resulting in a well documented and strongly managed environmental program which uses the Madrid Protocol as a base foundation to address environmental management. This program in particular has been applied in the vicinity of its science bases and its science research activities.⁷⁴³

14.8 Conclusion: The policy influence of the Prime Minister

The success of the Madrid protocol domestically and internationally can be directly attributed to the personal decision by Prime Minister Hawke. While initially disinterested in Antarctic his attitude changed as he responded to public and associated political pressures within Government to make a dramatic policy reversal decision. He then strongly followed up on this decision advocating environmental protection for Antarctica in the face of international condemnation and secured global support for his stance.

Keating had a role in arguing against a mining regime on economic grounds and initiated discussions with the French Prime Minister for environmental protection. However, it was Hawke who made the cabinet decision not to sign the CRAMRA in the face of opposition from two of his senior Ministers, Evans and Richardson. Hawke role in this issue was a landmark one as was his ongoing support for the creation of a replacement comprehensive environmental protection regime.

⁷⁴³ Australian Antarctic Division Website corporate objectives <http://www.antarcticdivision.au>, accessed October 2010.

It can be argued that had Hawke not taken a stance to reverse the Australian policy of support for a mining regime, Australia would have become part of a complex unwieldy system in Antarctica. This would have raised economic and environment pressure on the solidarity of the Antarctic Treaty and unraveled its record of regional stability and conservative control of both living and non living resources. In summary, Hawke's journey from indifference to Antarctica, to becoming directly involved in changing Antarctic Policy and then taking on an environmental crusade, led to the establishment of the Madrid protocol which solved the growing global criticism of the Antarctic Treaty system and significantly stabilized the management of the region.

PART C : Conclusion

Chapter 15: –the nature of individual policy influences

This thesis presents a contribution to understanding the role key individuals have had in development of Australian Antarctic Policy by showing how a relatively minor item of importance to government was at times able to attract government's attention and achieve support in policy making. Antarctica can be seen as an element of Australian foreign policy, but it was rarely a priority issue which required immediate government attention. For much of the twentieth century it languished as a low-level item of importance to government and there were very few occasions when it was elevated into a higher category of importance. As such, it needed committed supporters to carry its cause into government decision making.

Although the published literature contains many narrative accounts of Antarctic expeditions and their activities on the continent, the impact which certain outstanding individuals have had in the development and implementation of Australian policy concerning Antarctica is not well described. This study seeks to fill that gap by identifying who these individuals were and how they were able to raise the significance of Antarctica to a point which led to government action. When Australian Antarctic policy moved ahead, it was as a result of the influence of key individuals, who for certain periods were able to develop a general interest by government in Antarctica. They were then able influence policy outcomes when external events provided a further impetus to raise the level of importance of Antarctica.

15.1. The periods of Government's general interest in Antarctica

There were five main periods where events generated specific interest in the Antarctic. Within these periods of interest there were particular points where for short times external events further elevated the profile of Antarctica to government. At those points, key individuals were able to influence government to achieve policy outcomes. These general interest periods can be identified as:

- The initial expedition period 1901-1914.
- The territorial ambition period 1924-33.
- The ANARE establishment period 1946-1954.

- The Antarctic Treaty negotiations period 1958-59.
- The period of environmental concern 1982-91.

15.1.1. The initial expedition's period 1901-1914

Antarctica first became of interest to Australia through the arrival of British Antarctic Expeditions in the early twentieth century, but it had never been an important policy issue to the colonial governments before Federation. Previous approaches to the Victorian government seeking support for expeditions in the 1890s were unsuccessful as that government also required complex endorsement from the British government in England. With Federation, the first attempt to influence the new Commonwealth of Australia Government to become involved in Antarctic exploration was made by Louis Bernacchi in early 1901. This occurred on his return from wintering with the British funded *Southern Cross* expedition at Cape Adare in 1899 and before Bernacchi sailed south again as chief scientist in December 1901 with Scott's *Discovery* expedition. Bernacchi was involved with a deputation to the Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, on 11 November 1901 seeking Australian financial support for Scott's first Antarctic venture. While Barton was sympathetic this deputation was unsuccessful in convincing the new Government that Antarctica was an important issue for Australia and one which warranted support. However, this meeting brought the issue to the government's general attention and it aroused public awareness.

Antarctica was first successfully promoted as an issue of importance to government by Edgeworth David in 1907 when he used his standing as a scientist to gain parliamentary support for Australian involvement in Antarctica with a funding grant of £5,000 for the Shackleton 1907-09 expedition. Following the success of that expedition, Antarctica was next raised as a major issue of importance to government by Douglas Mawson in 1910, when he belatedly received £20,000 in government support for his Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-13. While Antarctica became a general issue for consideration on the basis of British expeditions visiting Australia en route to the southern continent, it was the activities of the key individuals David and Mawson which raised its level of importance to Australia as an issue for government interest. However, the impact of the World War then consumed the Australian government's ongoing attention and consequently interest in Antarctic issues diminished.

Without Mawson's passion and his decision to break away from the British area of exploration, the basis for the Australian Antarctic Territorial Claim would have been virtually non-existent. If he had led the AAE back to the British exploration area, Australia may well have only been ceded the sector of the Ross Dependency by Britain, which is now the New Zealand Antarctic Territorial claim.

15.1.2. The territorial ambition period 1924-1933

This period of general interest was centred on Mawson's continued lobbying and it reached highpoints in 1924, 1929 and 1933 when for short periods Antarctica became an item of importance and engaged the attention of the government. But for nearly a decade after he was knighted in 1914, Mawson was unable to raise the level of importance of Antarctica to government sufficiently to gain support for another land-based expedition. However, the peripheral general interest, which he maintained domestically, was advanced when the external issue of Antarctic territorial claims invoked government's attention.

This became an issue on 29 March 1924 when France declared a territorial claim over Terre Adelie. Mawson tried hard to convince Prime Minister Bruce to reject this French claim and proceed with Australia's own territorial claim. He was unsuccessful in a deputation to government for that purpose in July 1925 and Britain, with its foreign policy veto, quickly recognized the French claim, much to Mawson's chagrin. However, Mawson, in bringing the importance of the issue to government's attention, set in train a sequence of events leading to the Prime Minister's policy initiative to support the British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE) in 1929. This expedition resulted in Antarctica becoming a major issue for government and Britain transferred the ensuing British Territorial claim over east Antarctica to Australia on 7 February 1933, pending its acceptance by Australia. This interest in Antarctica was used by Casey, as a Minister in the treasury portfolio in the 1930s, when he facilitated the passage of the Australian Antarctic Territorial Acceptance Act through Federal Parliament in June 1933.

Throughout this 1924-33 period, Mawson can be viewed as the irritant to government who maintained Antarctic as a general interest item. Without Mawson's efforts to generate interest for an Australian territorial claim, on the basis of the AAE and British whaling

sightings, Norway could have extended its territorial claim from 45° degree east to beyond 90° degrees east longitude on the basis of its discovery and whaling operations. Without Mawson's further lobbying for the BANZARE to establish the basis for a British claim and its transfer to Australia, this vast area of Antarctica would have been wide open for claims by the United States or Soviet Union when they expressed renewed interest in Antarctica in 1949. After the proclamation of Australian Antarctic Territory in 1936, Australian government interest in Antarctica waned as priorities shifted to pressing economic matters and Antarctica did not again become an issue of increased importance to government until after the Second World War.

15.1.3. The ANARE establishment years 1946-1954

While Mawson had been unsuccessful in convincing the Australian government to send a land based expedition to occupy the Antarctic continent between the wars, the Second World War itself provided an extra stimulus to government regarding Antarctica. This new interest in Antarctica commenced with the wartime activities of German raiders in the Southern Ocean, which raised future security concerns for Australia. Additional lobbying by Mawson and Casey at the close of the Second World War resulted in the Labor government taking this up as a major issue. This concern was also evident in regard to the possibility of a Japanese Antarctic territorial claim. Scott (1997) traces the process by which Australian diplomacy ensured the inclusion of a specific provision in the Second World War settlement whereby Japan in Article 2(e) of the 1951 Treaty of Peace renounced 'all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area.'⁷⁴⁴ Minister Evatt established a planning committee in late 1946 and in 1947 announced the government's policy intention to establish a permanent base in Antarctica and to create an Antarctic Division within the Department of External Affairs. This Antarctic occupation was intended to strengthen the territorial claim and also discourage other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, from establishing a base to support potentially hostile shipping in the southern ocean. The establishment of ANARE bases on Heard Island and Macquarie Island and the despatch of the *Wyatt Earp* in the summer 1947/48 to the continent, raised public awareness of the policy. However, despite the interest and public enthusiasm arising from the island bases, the failure of the *Wyatt Earp* to cope with Antarctic conditions and to find a suitable base

⁷⁴⁴Scott, S.V. 'Japan's Renunciation of Territorial Rights in Antarctica and Australian Diplomacy.' *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 99-106,

site on the continent, downgraded Antarctica as an issue of immediate importance to government.

Casey returned to government as a Minister in the Menzies government in 1949 and Law then vigorously attempted to generate more interest through ANARE activities to raise the level of importance of Antarctica to government to gain more support. However, it was not seen as a major issue beyond a level of general interest and it took until 1952 before Cabinet approved the charter of a more suitable ship, necessary for to occupy the Antarctic continent. Implementation of this objective was not an easy task and without the vision, tenacity and administrative brilliance of Phillip Law over twenty years in establishing a science-based support agency, it is hard to see how Australia would have developed such an effective support system.

The success of the 1954 Antarctic expedition saw a peak in public interest in Australia. Its importance to government was demonstrated in the passing of legal administrative arrangements through parliament that year. Without the work of key individuals in establishing Australian activity on the Antarctic continent in this period, Australia would not have been able to join discussions a year later on the future of Antarctica when it became an issue of international significance. It was necessary at this time for Australia to have gained international standing by demonstrating its commitment to future activities in Antarctica. This needed a physical presence on the continent with an established science program, supported by an Australian legal administrative framework.

15.1.4. The Antarctic treaty negotiations period 1958-1959

Both Labor and Liberal governments sought to get international recognition of the Australian Antarctic Territory after the Second World War, but despite establishing a continental Antarctic base in 1954, Australia began to realize that it could not gain international recognition of its massive claim to 42% of the continent. Casey, as Minister for External Affairs, was particularly disappointed that he could not get the USA to support the Australian claim. Instead the USA advocated the creation of an international management body bypassing the rights of territorial claimants. This was viewed as an important regional issue for Australia which for two years, 1958 and 1959, became a major policy issue for its government. Minister Casey, with Cabinet approval and government support, made a major

contribution to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. This Treaty successfully put on hold the issue of existing claims and established Antarctica as a non-militarized region and a nuclear free zone.

The treaty negotiations required skilful diplomacy, to avoid the outright rejection of the Australian territorial claim. These were undertaken within the government closed confines of the Departments of External Affairs, Attorney General Department and the offices of the Prime Minister. The work of Casey was very important in the development of Antarctic policy in this period. Without Australia's participation the Antarctic Treaty may well have suffered from irresolvable problems and the direct rejection of Antarctic claims. This would have resulted in a completely different regime lacking non-militarized and nuclear free zones. Further, without Minister Casey's role in the negotiations, in clearing the French and Soviet Union impasses at the preparatory meetings, the Treaty may never have reached fruition at all.

15.1.5. The environmental issue period 1982-1991

After Australian ratification of the Antarctic treaty in 1961, the status of Antarctica reverted to being a low level issue of importance to the Australian government, for the next twenty years. However external issues then began to once again signal an increased importance to Government. In the early 1980s, development of a mining regime for Antarctic minerals extraction became an item for consideration by Antarctic Treaty nations. Australia participated strongly in the Antarctic Treaty system and from 1982 it was involved in drafting and supporting a Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) to allow restricted mining. At this time Malaysia as a response led attacks by third world countries on the Antarctic Treaty system in the United Nations. These countries sought that any profit from mining in Antarctica, 'deemed as a common heritage' site, should go to the developing countries rather than to the 'club' of the Antarctic nations. However, the issue was expertly held out of Assembly discussions by Ambassador Woolcott for six years until the issue of minerals extraction climaxed in 1988 within the Antarctic Treaty discussions. Without the intervention of Richard Woolcott, the Australian ambassador to the United Nations, the diplomatic move by Malaysia in 1982 may well have seen the termination of the Antarctic Treaty.

At the same time the concept of Antarctic mining provoked a strong concern from a growing number of global and Australian environmentalists. In 1988 Antarctic issues such as the direct United Nations management of Antarctica; sharing of profit from mining; the growing domestic and global concerns for the Antarctic environment; and the future of the Antarctic Treaty, came to a head. This then became a major issue for the Australian government in 1989 as support mounted for environmental protection for Antarctica among politicians of all parties, the Federal Parliament, as well as the public and global and local 'green' groups in Australia. This external and internal pressure resulted in Prime Minister Hawke rejecting the recommended minerals extraction regime and instead actively promoting a comprehensive environmental protection solution. As Prime Minister, Hawke accepted the importance of Antarctica to government as a major issue and made a popular domestic political decision, with very little electoral risk.

This action by Prime Minister Hawke, in refusing to adopt the negotiated Minerals Convention, had far reaching and even unforeseen, consequences. With Woolcott's guidance and Hawke's frontline international leadership, Australia gained international consensus acceptance in just two years. This was quite an exceptional achievement. While Hawke's decision was originally politically based, in cognizance of the domestic factors involved, without that decision the whole stability of the peaceful Antarctic Treaty system could have imploded. In reality the decision solved:

- The objections by third world countries;
- The need for review of the Antarctic treaty;
- The concerns of the environmental movement; and
- The need to identify how to share profits from mining in unrecognized territorial claims.

But without the stance by Prime Minister Hawke, regional stability under the Antarctic Treaty may well have unraveled. The reversal of mineral exploitation policy in 1989 and its prosecution in the face of minimal support, or complete hostility, by particular Antarctic Treaty nations led to the global acceptance of comprehensive environmental protection for Antarctica. This excluded mining for at least fifty years.

15. 2. The lean years of government indifference to Antarctica

For periods other than those identified above, the Antarctic was not a major issue for government and for long periods, 1914 to 1926, 1933 to 1946, 1955 to 1959 and 1959 to 1982, it can be said to have languished almost out of sight of government consideration. Without Mawson's influence over fifty years, his personal sacrifices and the promotion of Antarctica to an often indifferent government, Australian Antarctic exploration would not have been seen as an issue of importance to government. With Mawson's death in 1958 and Casey's resignation in 1960 there was no high profile impassioned individual other than Law left. Frustrated by the bureaucracy Law resigned in 1966 and two years later caused a furore when he leaked a government review to the press. Instead of achieving Law's objective of increased awareness of the importance of Antarctica to government and greater resource allocation for Antarctic activities, it annoyed Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs. Hasluck reacted by shifting the Antarctic Division from his Department to the lowly Department of Supply, reducing its standing and perceived importance to government.

The significance and perceived importance to government of issues, which require policy consideration, can be ranked into a hierarchical structure. In the normal processes of government there are key areas of policy importance which cannot be ignored and require immediate attention. These include security and national emergency issues and the state of the national economy, but there are other areas which can be temporarily put on hold or even ignored. These include non-urgent relationships with other countries, scientific research for future benefit and regional infrastructure expansion. The importance of issues to government can thus be grouped in four levels:

1. Issues requiring decisions to be made immediately.
2. Major issues which do not need immediate government attention but need to be dealt with in the short term.
3. General issues which can be deferred but will need attention at a later time.
4. Issues which can be ignored.

Very few Antarctic policy issues in the twentieth century qualified as requiring immediate consideration or action as a level one items. Indeed, rarely did an Antarctic issue move even from the third or fourth tier to the second tier of importance. As has been argued in this

thesis, they were only elevated in standing through the influence of Antarctic advocates both inside and outside government. It was the drive of these key individuals to take action which significantly impacted the evolution of Antarctic policy in Australia. In the lean years of interest, individuals were not able to raise or maintain the significance of Antarctic issues, but it was their continuing activity and passion for Antarctica which kept issues alive, albeit, at a low level of importance to government. This, however, provided a base level of involvement in Antarctica, so that when an issue of international significance arose it could be more readily elevated in government's attention as an issue on importance. Without the commitment of the key individuals it is not likely that Australia would have made a territorial claim over any part of Antarctica.

15. 3. The nature of the Antarctic protagonists

The individuals who had a major influence on Antarctic policy development over the first ninety years of the twentieth century came from quite different backgrounds. They included a distinguished geologist, Antarctic explorers: one with a prominent academic role, a public servant, and a ministerial level politician, an international diplomat, an impassioned environmentalist and a Prime Minister. Why then did these key individuals become such champions of the importance of Antarctica to Australia? To answer this it is necessary to look deeper into their backgrounds and attitudes.

Antarctica, an extreme pristine place, emotionally engaged men who had spent time there and inspired others who closely supported those adventurers and their passion for the harsh world. Four of the key individuals who influenced Antarctic policy, Edgeworth David, Mawson, Law and Dovers, had spent considerable time in Antarctica. This place of beauty and often violent weather produced an experience of life which differed from wartime experience in that it was not a struggle for survival with an enemy. The Antarctic adventure required coming to terms with the power of nature in a strange world far removed from their upbringing. The passion of these four key individuals can be seen to have developed from their success in coping with life-threatening challenges, which also became an expression of achievement of their work in science based exploration. Through these experiences they came to see Antarctica as a frontier of significance in the Australian national interest. Experience of Antarctica remained with them as a formative influence in their later lives. Dovers' outstanding surveying work in the exploratory mapping on the continent in 1954

was an example of this psychological transfer of outlook from adventure, to dedication and pride in work achievement. Edgeworth David wrote the geology discipline chapters for Shackleton's 1907-09 expedition publications. Mawson, the incredible Antarctic survivor in 1912, continued to be passionate about his Antarctic scientific expedition reports and his scientific role in government committees and submissions until his death in 1958.

Two other key individuals who had made a significant contribution to raising the importance of Australia in Antarctica were Richard Woolcott and Geoffrey Mosley. Although both only visited Antarctica for a short time, they reported being touched by the aura of the place, its pristine beauty and rich history of human endeavour. While neither Mosley nor Woolcott were subjected to life-threatening survival challenges in their visits, both were enraptured by the beauty and the vulnerability of the Antarctic environment and developed a passion for the place. Woolcott worked to secure Australia's best interest in Antarctica in both the domestic and international arenas. Mosley, as a key global environmentalist, organized the 'green' movement's domestic campaign for environmental protection for Antarctica, raising its importance to government. He also raised public awareness and pressed government Ministers to take action for protection of the Antarctic environment. Mosley welcomed the Madrid Protocol as a significant step, but still continues twenty years later to strive for even greater protection for Antarctica as a global world park.

Significantly the Antarctic passion of the two key politicians Richard Casey and Robert Hawke was built up from different perspectives and neither showed any desire to visit Antarctica. Casey through his life was impressed by men of action and vision and first encountered such people with polar experience in the First World War. In his three governmental career periods from 1924 to 1961 Casey was always a staunch supporter of Australian endeavor in Antarctica. He personally supported the Antarctic ventures of Wilkins and Mawson and this developed into an advocacy of a national approach Antarctica. Subsequently as Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1961 he nurtured Law's enthusiasm to establish Australia in a key position in Antarctica. Always an Australian nationalist, Casey played a major role in 1958 and 1959 in guiding the Antarctic Treaty through diplomatic impasses and preserving the Australian Antarctic claim. He achieved adoption of Antarctica as a non-militarized region and as a non nuclear zone.

Hawke's appreciation of Antarctica and his attitude towards it was one of indifference in his early period as Prime Minister. He only developed an affinity for Antarctica later as a political consideration. His passion for the place can be seen to have developed from political analysis, not emotional attachment. But once developed he argued strongly and successfully for environmental protection for Antarctica in the international arena. In 1991 the Madrid Protocol achieved a new basis for stability in the Antarctic region, with Australia showing significant international leadership. While Hawke set Australia on this path, its full consequences beyond the protection of the Antarctic environment were probably not fully anticipated. It stabilized and solved virtually all problems arising in the 1980s: the demands of third world countries, the United Nations, the environmentalists, the pressing review of the Antarctic treaty and cohesion within the Antarctic Treaty nations. It was a very significant outcome.

Despite their disparate backgrounds these key individuals each made their own contribution in raising the importance of Antarctica to Australian governments. Without their continued efforts Australia would not have become interested in Antarctica, which was considered a frigid continent of no immediate economic potential at the start of the twentieth century. Australian Antarctic policy was then influenced at specific times over the next ninety years by the contributions of these key individuals with their ongoing passion for Australia to become active in the Antarctic continent. Without Mawson's vision and persistence, Australia may not have been moved to pursue a territorial claim. Without his direct and timely leadership of the BANZARE, it is likely a major part of the claim, where ANARE has worked since 1954 would have become accepted as Norwegian territory. Without Casey's diplomatic skill and Law's effective policy implementation, Australia may not have achieved a strong foothold on Antarctica or stability in the region. Finally without the input of Woolcott and Mosley and without Hawke's dramatic reversal of policy it is likely that the Madrid Protocol for the protection of the Antarctic environment would not have been achieved.

15.4 The individual approaches

In examining the influence of the key individuals with an impact on Antarctic policy it is evident that a major difference in approach exists between those outside of government and those protagonists placed within government. Those outside the formal government relied

on lobbying key persons within government and mobilizing public opinion to also place pressure on government. In contrast, Antarctic advocates within government were in a position to create and implement policy.

The criterion used for selection of each of the individuals who influenced Antarctic policy in this study was their demonstrated ability to make a positive contribution to the establishment or development of Australian policy. The issue was not whether they were within or outside the government, but their impact on policy. While the individuals selected were all influential, the nature of their input varied and not all had an equal impact. Consequently, the depth of examination of their involvement has varied depending on their assessed importance.

Over the study period of ninety years there have been generational changes in aspects of Australian domestic and international policy. Despite these changes in the cultural and operational environment, one common linkage between the individuals operating within or outside government is evident; there was a burning desire and even passion, to further Australia's Antarctic role.

'The outsiders'

The nature of approaches to influence policy used by individuals outside government was necessarily dictated by the need to influence key persons who were in a position to facilitate policy. The individuals loosely termed the 'outsiders' in this study were Sir Douglas Mawson, Sir Edgeworth David and Dr Geoffrey Mosley. All were involved in direct lobbying. Both Mawson and Mosley also sought to raise public awareness of the Antarctic issues, in an attempt to heighten the priority allocated to Antarctica by government.

The principal approach of Edgeworth David was to use his standing and connections within the community, utilising the respect he commanded for his scientific ability and persuasive personality. Supported by his active wife he socially interacted at a high level in community circles in Sydney and in Melbourne, where the Australian government was based, prior to moving to Canberra in 1927. He earned respect from both sides of politics through his powerful personality; his advocacy; the depth of his scientific knowledge; and his achievement in the coal fields. Although seriously injured on active service in World War 1 (at the age of 60), he continued to earn respect from government and the community in

promoting Australia's role in science and the Antarctic. His impact on politicians can be gauged by the massive state funeral given him 1934 and subsequent eulogies given to him in parliament from both sides of the house.

Edgeworth David used his scientific standing to promote Australia internationally. Domestically he argued for government and community support for expeditions of Scott, Shackleton and Shirase, and provided strong support for Mawson's endeavors. Edgeworth David played a significant role after the First World War, but it was the period 1901-1914 that he exercised his principal influence on the direction of Australian Antarctic policy, in gaining initial support from the Federal government for Antarctic expeditions and nurturing its support for Mawson. He was the first person to achieve Federal government support for Antarctic activity.

The 'outsider' approach of Sir Douglas Mawson to influence the development of Antarctic Policy was similar to that employed by Edgeworth David. This was principally to lobby Federal Ministers to provide ongoing support Australian involvement in Antarctica. Whilst Mawson's heroic role in exploration gained him personal respect from Ministers, this did not translate into heightened government support. As an example, despite promises by Prime Minister Fisher in response to a request for funding for the AAE, he only belatedly received a grant of £5000. In addition to lobbying Federal Government Ministers, Mawson used newspapers and key science committee bodies such as those headed by Edgeworth David and Orme Masson as a route to influence. Whilst he received support from the scientific community, at no time in the twentieth century did science command government attention at a level commensurate with defence, social, or economic considerations.

Mawson Antarctic influence spanned almost fifty years and for most of that period he was the iconic private individual who was both an irritant and sounding board to government on Australia's involvement in Antarctica. While he met with politicians in direct lobbying, he used newspapers for building public support and to establish his standing as an authoritative voice on all matters Antarctic. But it is argued that he only achieved progress on Antarctic policy when he was able to win the support of individuals inside the Federal government who shared his vision, such as Richard Casey. Although he managed to gain respect from a number of interested politicians and the public at large, he needed powerful

allies in the government bureaucracy and the government executive to influence policy, and it was rarely the case that he was able to win the level of support that he sought

His remoteness from government changed in 1947 when he was appointed to a new advisory committee on Antarctica set up by the Labor government. This gave him an enhanced voice within government, providing more effective access to politicians and departmental heads. However as a key member on Antarctic Planning Committees he was constrained in his media comments. Being part of the system limited his scope to openly criticize policy. However, he remained an independent voice, albeit through his committee contributions and in his direct ministerial correspondence. Indeed, he was still exercising this avenue in 1958, when even in declining health he wrote to Minister Casey objecting to the Australian takeover of the American Wilkes station. Mawson overall had an influence on Australia's role in Antarctica far beyond his outstanding field work in Antarctica in the period 1909-1914 and his coastal BANZARE voyages. After World War Two he can be considered to have become at least a part time 'insider', mainly involved in implementation of the 1947 policy.

The third 'outsider' with a strong influence on government was the environmentalist Geoff Mosley. However, his goal can be considered narrower than that of Mawson or David. It was to persuade the government to stand aside from the CRAMRA mineral convention and to spearhead a crusade for the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment. To achieve this he firstly needed to bring heterogeneous groups of environmentalists together in a common vision, thus avoiding divisive fragmentation in approaches to government. This provided a solid base to influence public opinion, which coupled with personal lobbying, could in turn be used to influence ministers within government. His strategic approach was to formulate and publicize a preferred national policy within the auspices of the Australian Conservation Foundation before taking it to the public and government. The next step in his strategy was to promote this proposed Australian policy position to international 'green' organizations which he expected would put pressure on the other Antarctic nations and in turn the Australian government. Mosley very capably carried his vision through an often turbulent period, firstly in the coordination of local Australian environmental groups, then the lobbying of government ministers, back-benchers, and opposition parties. His approach to influence policy was deliberate, slow moving and painstaking.

It can be argued that the role of the individuals outside of government was to bring Antarctic issues to the government attention at times they would otherwise have been ignored. These individuals needed the ability to convince people within government to give attention to Antarctic policy. While all three outsiders sought to lobby government, mostly at the ministerial level, they increasingly sought to sway public opinion, in part through the media, to place additional pressure on politicians to act.

‘Insiders’

Examination of the strategies of key individuals within government who influenced the development of Antarctic policy shows that their approaches also varied. The individuals can be further divided between those creating and those implementing policy. Hawke and Casey were clearly involved in policy creation. However, it can be seen that while policy requires annunciation and maintenance over time, it is also vital that the policy be successfully implemented. Hence the influence of those implementing policy can be often considered as generating an indirect, long term contribution to policy development. In that light the key persons contributing significantly to the implementation of initial Antarctic policy they can be seen as also contributing to future development of that policy. This can clearly be seen in the influence of Phillip Law and Robert Dovers, who were key persons in implementation, also in Richard Woolcott who was influential in defending an important international policy initiative and later pursuing and managing a set policy direction to achieve environmental protection in the Madrid Protocol.

Phillip Law was an indomitable Antarctic spirit during the period 1947 to 1966. His influence in Antarctica was principally within government as the director of the Australian Antarctic Division. Law was responsible for the implementation of the 1947 government policy to establish an ongoing presence through occupation of the Australian Antarctic Territory. His role was principally to obtain and utilize the resources necessary to occupy the Australian Antarctic Territory in order to demonstrate Australia’s ability to administer this territory, and undertake world class science on the continent. While this can be considered an immense task, it had only indirect influence on foreign policy.

Dovers, similarly carried out a supportive role, vital to Antarctic policy by demonstrating Australia’s ability to secure a foothold and explore the unknown continent. The success of establishing what is now the longest continuously occupied base in Antarctica gained

immediate standing for Australia in international negotiations in the future global management of the continent by Antarctic nations. Dovers also did much personally to establish a strong tradition of highly competent field activity by Australians in the Antarctic. This augmented pride in the Australia's Antarctic role and hence provided a foundation of public support for Antarctic policy development.

Woolcott, as an upholder of policy rather than a creator of policy, can be seen as a staunch defender of Australian policy in the international arena. He was directly involved at the UN General Assembly defending Australian Antarctic policy: which was to the Antarctic Treaty. His influential approach is somewhat different to that of the other 'insiders' discussed in this thesis. Although not directly setting new policy, as Australian Ambassador to the United Nations he was the link between Australia and the international community. His personal skill was both tested and honed as Chairman of the Antarctic Group of Nations at the UN, where he capably contained the potential impact of third world criticism of the Antarctic Treaty System. Returning to Australia as Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) he led that Department's key role in addressing the difficult task set by Hawke to change the hard line stance of the Antarctic nations who favoured mining. Remarkably, this was achieved in two years gaining consensus support in 1991 for a Comprehensive Environmental Protection Protocol under the Antarctic Treaty.

Naturally the politicians Richard Casey and Robert Hawke were in powerful positions to create or directly further Australian policy in regard to Antarctica. But it is argued that even they were not able to act unilaterally on Antarctic policy development. Casey throughout his long career employed a number of approaches to influence Antarctic policy, depending on his placement, but he was always a staunch supporter of Australia's role. Casey's influence over a long period commenced with an indirect approach through personal communication with Prime Minister Bruce in the 1920s. This was followed by a period of direct influence as Minister through the 1930s in the Lyons government, when he was able to nurture the transfer of the British Territorial claim to east Antarctica to Australia. For a period after the Second World War, when outside government, he lobbied Minister Evatt and the Labor party to take action on Antarctica. He then exercised a major influence on the advancement of Australian Antarctic policy as Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1960. Casey had a major influence on the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. This required a policy change from the previous vision of gaining global territorial recognition for the Australian Antarctic

Territory, to achieving a demilitarized stability for the region. During the creation of the Antarctic Treaty he effectively used his diplomatic skills and personal contacts with foreign ministers, notably of Chile, Russia and France to ensure that Australia played a principal role in the ongoing management of the Treaty. Domestically, his influence on the government's Antarctic policy greatly fostered Law's policy implementation.

Casey had a lasting passion for Australia's role in Antarctica. He achieved a significant influence on Antarctic Policy during his period as Minister in the 1950s, overseeing the establishment of an ongoing Australian presence in Antarctica and establishing a Treaty which has lasted for more than 50 years.

Prime Minister Robert Hawke was effective in winning support for his policies within Cabinet and the Labor caucus, and ultimately in gaining endorsement within the Australian electorate. Unlike Casey, Hawke had no long term passion for Antarctica and his involvement was restricted to one major issue; environmental protection. With his style of listening to gain an understanding of the situation, the way was open for lobbyists inside and outside of government to have significant input into his decisions. Indeed, even within the Labor government, ministers and senior departmental figures argued strongly against him taking a stance on Antarctic environmental protection issues. His dramatic decision to reject the advice to proceed with mining and to listen to the quickly expanding contrary view of the Liberal party, the Greens, his backbenchers, the Labor caucus and the environmental voices within the electorate, can be seen in hindsight as an act of political expediency by an astute politician, but one with major consequence for Australian policy. It took a leader of Hawke's capacity to recognize the shift in opinion that was taking place, to recognize that the previously conflicting voices of parliamentary parties, environmental organizations and the electorate were now coming together to support the same policy direction. Once that decision was made Hawke played an incisive role in personally carrying the policy internationally in face to face meetings with leaders of other Antarctic nations especially to Britain and the United States of America who favoured minerals exploitation.

15.5 Concluding remarks and suggestions for further research

The major contribution of this research was the identification of the key individuals who raised the importance of Antarctica as an issue for consideration by the Australian

Government. Over the ninety year period covered by this thesis, the role of individuals, inside and outside the government was considered. In doing so it produced an insight to the methods by which individuals succeeded in influencing the development of Australian Antarctic policy. The thesis focused on the significance of individuals amongst the factors leading to Australia reversing its policy to allow mining and adopting a strategy for comprehensive environmental protection of Antarctica. In the last twenty years since 1991 the achievements of the Madrid protocol have not been seriously challenged and this has produced stability in international consideration of Antarctic matters through the on going Antarctic Treaty system. The successful introduction of this environmental protocol and its impact on Antarctica is outside the scope of this thesis, but presents a significant opportunity for further research.

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Appendix 1




Figure 2: *Kista Dan* in Horseshoe Harbour 11th February 1954 (Law and Bechervaise p61)




Figure 3: Murray Monolith, Looking East- 13 February 1931 (Grenfell Price, 228)



Figure 4 The site selected for Mawson base, Casey range in background (photo courtesy P.G. Law)

Appendix 2 Summary of the Madrid protocol

The environmental principles of the Madrid Protocol stress that protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica must be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all human activities in Antarctica. The environmental principles also include requirements for prior assessment of the environmental impacts of all activities and regular and effective monitoring to assess predicted impacts and to detect unforeseen impacts. A key issue is the strategy of implementation and management under the Treaty itself is by consensus rather than by an empowered watchdog. To facilitate its implementation an internal expert body, the Committee for Environmental Protections, was established with a role to monitor the implementation of the Madrid Protocol and to report on progress at Treaty meetings, while providing advice to the consultative partners. The Madrid Protocol subjects all activities to prior assessment of their environmental impacts and requires the development of contingency plans to respond to environmental emergencies for peer group scrutiny. An important feature of this provision, under article 8, is for Environmental Impact Assessments to be carried out for all activities such as 'scientific research programs, tourism and all other governmental and non governmental activities'.

The Madrid Protocol succeeded in introducing a comprehensive set of environmental guidelines for monitoring all human activity in Antarctica. In summary it:

- Designates Antarctica as a 'natural reserve, devoted to peace and science'
- Establishes environmental principles for the conduct of all activities
- Prohibits mining
- Subjects all activities to prior assessment of their environmental impacts
- Provides for the establishment of a Committee for Environmental Protection, to advise the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings of implementation of the protocol
- Requires the development of contingency plans to respond to environmental emergencies
- Provides for the elaboration of rules relating to liability for environmental damage.

In addition to the 27 articles, which constitute the provisions of the Madrid Protocol, four annexes, which supplement the Madrid Protocol, were also negotiated at the Madrid meetings. These annexes relate to environmental impact assessment (Annex I),

conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora (Annex II), waste disposal and waste management (Annex III) and prevention of marine pollution (Annex IV)

In line with the flexible ongoing provisions, a further Annex to the Madrid Protocol (Annex V) on the management of protected areas was negotiated at the 16th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Bonn in October 1991 and entered into force on 24 May 2002. Similarly Annex VI, covering liability for environmental emergencies, was finalised at the 28th consultative meeting in Stockholm on 2 June 2005 and will enter into force once it has been formally accepted by all states, which were Consultative Parties at the time of its completion.

The key measures and procedures relating to the management of the environment are given in the Protocol Annexes, which are listed below:

ANNEX I: Environmental impact assessment -- activities are assessed on whether they have a minor or transitory impact on the environment. At the highest level of impact a Comprehensive Environment Evaluation must be prepared and opportunity provided for the Committee for Environmental Protection and other Consultative Parties to comment on the proposal.

ANNEX II: Conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora -- Annex II updates the existing rules relating to protection of animals and plants (requiring a permit for interference with them) and relating to the introduction of non-indigenous organisms.

ANNEX III: Waste disposal and waste management -- this Annex specifies wastes that may be disposed of within Antarctica and wastes that must be removed. It also provides rules relating to the disposal of human waste and the use of incinerators. The Annex requires the development of waste management plans. Particularly harmful products such as PCBs, polystyrene packaging beads and pesticides are prohibited in the Antarctic.

ANNEX IV: Prevention of marine pollution -- the discharge of substances from ships, including oily mixtures and garbage is regulated, as is the disposal of ship-generated sewage. The Annex adopts practices broadly consistent with those applying in the relevant annexes of MARPOL. Disposal at sea of any plastics is prohibited.

ANNEX V: Management of protected areas-- establishes a revised protected area system that integrates the previous categories of protected areas into Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (entry to which requires a permit) and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas. Management plans apply to both categories. The protected area system also provides for the designation of historic sites and monuments, which must not be damaged or removed.

ANNEX VI: Liability for environmental emergencies -- this Annex sets rules governing who is liable for preventing and dealing with environmental emergencies arising from scientific research, tourism and other activities in the Antarctic Treaty area, such as logistic (shipping and aircraft) support. The aim of the Annex is to stipulate – before anything goes wrong – who could be held responsible for cleaning up after an environmental emergency and the legal avenues to respond to disaster. It also allows compensation to be claimed from the polluter if someone else has to clean up.

