Australia-Indonesia Attitudes Impact Study - Historical

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Abstract

This report analyses data from the 1940s until the present day to determine trends in Australian attitudes towards Indonesia, and the extent to which they affect bilateral relations. It combines polling data with qualitative research from the humanities and social sciences, as well as interviews with key figures, for a holistic analysis of what Australians think about Indonesia, why they hold these attitudes, and how popular perceptions are politically significant in Australian-Indonesian relations.

Executive Summary

Research systematically evaluated Australian popular attitudes to Indonesia since 1945, with a special focus on the period from the 1970s. A range of data sets were examined and methodologies from multiple disciplines applied to provide a holistic evaluation of how Australians have regarded Indonesia in the recent past, and the extent to which these attitudes impact on contemporary foreign policy.

The author acknowledges the financial support of the Australia-Indonesia Centre and the National Centre for Australian Studies in preparing this report.

Key Findings:

- An integrated analysis of popular opinion polling and qualitative/historical research on public attitudes reveals that Australian views about Indonesia are surprisingly stable and function on a dual track, with many Australians expressing a desire for closer relations with Indonesia while simultaneously nurturing a deep suspicion and anxiety that Indonesia poses a threat to Australian security.

- Insecurity about Australia's nationhood and capacity for self-defence is a fundamental driver of anxiety regarding Indonesia.

- Anxiety is compounded by widespread ignorance about Indonesian society and the widespread (false) assumption that Indonesia is militaristic and possibly expansionist. Dominant images were formed at a time when Indonesia was under authoritarian rule, but lack of awareness of Indonesia's democratisation since 1998 means that they continue to hold sway.

- Popular attitudes towards Indonesia are related to deeply ingrained historical anxieties about Asia as Australia's Other. They are affected by depictions in the media and public statements by politicians and policy-making elites, by cultural productions as well as by direct personal contact, particularly through travel and tourism.

- Popular attitudes towards Indonesia have had both direct and indirect influence on Australian foreign policy. Although policy makers deny that they are unduly affected by popular opinion, increasingly vehement expressions of negative attitudes towards Indonesia have affected the government's management of numerous issues, including those relating to Australians caught up in the Indonesian justice system, and the treatment of live cattle exported to Indonesia. Enduring negative opinions also bestow a legacy of tension and ongoing distrust in the bilateral relationship. However, Australian public opinion has also facilitated positive relations, with popular sympathy following the 2004 Asian Tsunami (to take one example) underpinning Australia's subsequent aid package to Indonesia.

Recommendations

1. Indonesia has been a focal point for a deep well of insecurity about Australia's capacity for self-defence. *This report recommends research on the causes of Australians' sense of insecurity, and why it persists despite ongoing peace and stability. Such research should be conducted with the aim of leading to interventions to manage community fears. It is also recommended that political rhetoric that emphasises a narrative of threat or insecurity be muted.*

2. *This report recommends that Australian policy makers are realistic about the nature of Australian public opinion, recognising that popular wariness of Indonesia places limitations on the relationship.* Foreign policy initiatives must be carefully considered and fully explained to the public.

3. Public opinion polls regarding Indonesia have provided consistent results over decades. It is recommended that more resources are dedicated to identifying and analysing the causes and drivers of perceptions, rather than merely repeating polling in the future. *More significant investment for research in history and cultural/media studies is recommended to help explain the drivers of Australian attitudes to Indonesia.*

4. Considering the mediating effect on popular opinion of travel, *it is recommended that programs encouraging travel and people-to-people relations between Australians and Indonesians receive widespread support. To avoid the risk of conflating experiences of Bali with Indonesia, these programs should aim to expose Australians to other parts of Indonesia.*

Background

This report aims to build a more complex understanding of what Australians think about Indonesia, why, and the effect of public attitudes on bilateral relations. It analyses data from the 1940s until the present day, to determine long-term trends in Australian attitudes towards Indonesia, and the extent to which they continue to affect contemporary relations.

Politicians, journalists and other experts have long pointed to the importance of public opinion in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. To take just one example, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono focussed on public opinion as the core issue in an address to Australia's Parliament during his 2010 state visit. Despite the broad range of issues confronting Australia and Indonesia – terrorism, national security and asylum seekers among them – Yudhoyono thought that 'the most persistent problem in our relations is the persistence of age-old stereotypes'.[1] This view is widely shared by politicians, journalists and academics in Australia.

This report aims to establish the nature of Australian popular attitudes towards Indonesia, and how they have changed over the past seventy years. It also aims to determine the key drivers of attitudes. In doing so, it seeks to establish a firm, evidence-based resource for those interested in what Australians think about Indonesia and why, to provide a stable grounding against which future polling and qualitative research can be measured.

Methodology

Analysis took account of multiple data sets and academic disciplines.

Research undertaken:

1) **Collection and analysis of polling data from the 1940s until the present day.** This report analysed a broad range of public opinion polling about Indonesia, triangulating data captured by numerous polling agencies and companies over more than 70 years. Polls analysed are listed in Appendix A.

2) **Collection and analysis of qualitative analyses from the humanities and social sciences.** Scholarship deploying discourse analysis and cultural history methods was thoroughly consulted to gain insights into some of the key drivers of public attitudes towards Indonesia. This scholarship was accessed to overcome some of the limitations of public opinion polling, which are outlined in Parts 1 and 2 of this report.

3) **Analysis of theoretical literature examining the impact of public opinion on foreign policy**. The extent to which popular opinion affects foreign policy has been a topic of scholarly contention for decades. This report examines the key findings of academic literature addressing this question to determine its relevance to the Australia-Indonesia case.

4) **Interviews with key figures in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Lowy Institute for International Relations and academia,** to further assess the extent to which popular opinion affects contemporary policy making below the Ministerial level. Interviews provided further evidence to test the impact of Australian public attitudes on Australia-Indonesia relations.

Part 1: Polling Data

What does public opinion polling reveal about Australians' attitudes to Indonesia, and how they have changed over time?

Australian attitudes to Indonesia have been measured since the 1940s. The Gallup Poll, first launched in the United States in 1935, began operating in Australia (as the Roy Morgan Gallup Poll) in 1941. In the immediate post-war period, Australia's relations with its 'Near North' became a point of widespread interest. The declaration of the Republic of Indonesia was contemporary with the ascent of public opinion polling. The Netherlands did not recognise the Indonesian Revolution of 1945, and the question of sovereignty over the former Dutch East Indies was regarded with keen interest in Australia. Attitudes to Indonesia became one of the major foreign policy issues measured by the Gallup Poll during its early years; this interest was sustained over the following decades.

Tracking polls over time allow us to track the broad contours of mainstream Australian ideas about Indonesia. However, there are limits to what polling can tell us. A public opinion poll cannot be taken at face value. Responses can vary depending on the wording and context of questions, or on how they are asked.[2] Decisions made by polling agencies regarding sampling – that is, who is selected to answer the question and how much they know about the topic – can have drastic impacts on the responses; the tallying of responses can also be dramatically altered simply with the inclusion of a 'don't know' option.[3]

Analysing polls of Australian attitudes towards Indonesia poses additional problems. Many polls were commissioned in response to recurrent crises: independence in East Timor, the Bali bombings, the trial and conviction of Schapelle Corby, and the executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, to name just a few. These issue-driven polls are not included in this report, which attempts to track underlying attitudes towards Indonesia, rather than chart responses to particular crises. However, this does not entirely overcome the problem of timing. To take just one example, interviews for the Lowy Institute Poll, which charts changes in Australian attitudes to a number of countries on an annual basis, have sometimes taken place during a period of heightened tension with Indonesia.[4] Polling also tends to ask about images and issues that are directly political, neglecting to measure views that are based on personal experience. In the polls analysed here, questions were often asked about Indonesia's military, but rarely about personal experiences with Indonesian people, or impressions of Indonesia gained during travel. This fails to account for a core swathe of Australian understanding of Indonesia and its people.[5] Finally, polling rarely acknowledges that Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are often shaped in a broader discursive context, so that ideas about Asia as a whole – or Southeast Asia, the 'developing world' or the 'Arc of Instability' – affect perceptions of Indonesia as a nation.

Polling techniques have been refined over many decades, and polling organisations are now confident of the validity of their results. However, the variability between polls and companies is great, and this is particularly evident in analyses of numerous polls, such as this one. Whilst this report tracks the broad contours of Australian attitudes to Indonesia, it does not make claims to the statistical validity of any of the polls analysed, or its key findings.

Tracking polling data over several decades shows a clear outline of attitudinal shifts. However, it gives little concrete evidence as to the drivers of these attitudes, or insight into the reasons underpinning or causing these attitudes. As Alex Oliver, Director of the Lowy Institute's Polling program noted, "what we're looking at are symptoms", rather than "the causes".[6] Although recently some attempt has been made to poll Australians about the reasons for their attitudes to Indonesia, this research is preliminary and certainly not conclusive.[7] To overcome this, we need to look beyond polling. Recent research suggests that sophisticated analyses of public opinion should utilise multiple data sources.[8] Part 2 of this report turns to qualitative research, particularly in the disciplines of history, media studies and cultural studies to facilitate a more complex understanding of what Australians think about Indonesia, and why.

Results from Polling Data

a) Gallup Polls, 1941-1970

The first Australian Gallup polls were fielded in 1943, at a moment when Australian politicians and intellectuals began to publicly recognise that their nation's security was greatly affected by Asia.[9] This period was also monumental in the history of Indonesia. The Japanese invasion of 1942 destabilised more than 300 years of Dutch colonialism, and the end of the Pacific War provided the context for the declaration of the Republic of Indonesia in August 1945.

Polling on Merdeka, 1945-1949

Opinions were mixed, but most Australians supported a continued Dutch colonial presence as Indonesia decolonised.

The first opinion polls measuring Australian attitudes to Indonesia were published in late 1945, and over the next five years, closely tracked Australian attitudes to the emerging Indonesian Republic. These studies found that Australians were keenly interested in events to their north. A December 1945 Gallup Poll found that 7 out of 10 men, and half of all women, were following the latest developments in Java, a relatively high level of engagement for an international issue at the time.

The December 1945 poll found that 41% of Australians favoured returning the Dutch to govern the Dutch East Indies (as the poll referred to the Indonesian archipelago), while 29% favoured an Independent Indonesia. Small minorities called for a Dutch/Indonesian power sharing arrangement or for the British or United Nations to take over government of the Indonesian islands. Attitudes were affected by domestic politics: only 28% of Labor voters wanted the Dutch to reclaim their former colony, and 43% supported Independence. On the non-Labor side, 56% of voters wanted the Dutch returned and only 14% supported an independent Indonesian Republic.[10]

By September 1947, 81% of men and 64% of women claimed to be following the issue in the news; however the public was undecided on this complex issue.[11] Perceptions wavered in 1947 and again when the issue was next polled in 1949. Support for the Dutch fell (to 23% in 1947 and 28% in 1949), but support for the Indonesians also wavered (at 18% in 1947 and 19% in 1949).[12] At this stage, opinions were mixed, but Australians were open to a range of outcomes in Indonesia.



Figure 1: Australian preferences for government of Indonesia during Merdeka period, 1945-1949 (%).
Source: Australian Gallup Polls, 1942-1949.

Polling on West New Guinea, 1950-1962

Results throughout the period 1950-1962 showed a very low level of support for Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea, and chart a rising discomfort with an expansionist Indonesia. However, polling mechanisms were unbalanced, suggesting that public opinion was being used for political purposes. Rather than measuring public attitudes to an international policy under consideration, public opinion polling was used to radicalise Australian foreign policy on Indonesian issues.

West New Guinea (WNG) was detached from the discussions that secured the Indonesian Republic, and discussions to settle its sovereignty were deferred to a later date. Gallup Polls closely followed Australian attitudes towards the West New Guinea issue, measuring public opinion from early 1950 (at the very genesis of the issue) until its resolution in 1962. At this point, it was among the most intensively measured international issue in Australia.



Figure 2: Australian preferences for government of West New Guinea during period of dispute, 1950-1962 (%).
Source: Australian Gallup Polls, 1950-1962.

In the early 1950s, popular opinion was overwhelmingly in support of Australia taking over West New Guinea. In March 1950, 42% replied that "Australia should govern Dutch New Guinea", followed by 23% support for the Dutch; 16% for the United Nations and only 6% for the Indonesians (with 13% holding no opinion). Domestic politics appeared to play little role in this issue, with Liberal/Country Party voters and Labor Party voters holding similar views.[13] By May 1950, only 4% supported Indonesia's bid for West New Guinea. A strong contingent of 45% thought that "we should try to arrange for Australia to take over from the Dutch", whereas 21% supported the Dutch and 17% hoped for a United Nations administration (with 13% holding no opinion).[14]

By 1956, the constituency backing a United Nations-administered West New Guinea had risen to 28%, but 27% still thought that Australia should take over,

compared to 19% support for Holland and 4% for Indonesia (with 22% holding no opinion).[15]

The situation looked even more dramatic in 1958.[16] By this time, 27% of respondents wanted to see West New Guinea integrated into the Australian state, and a further 20% wanted to see it as an Australian-administered UN Trust Territory (meaning that 47% of respondents wanted to see Australia in control of West New Guinea in some way). Of the rest, 27% wanted the UN in charge; while only 8% wanted Indonesian control and 18% were undecided.

Australia was again preferred in 1960, with 25% supporting Australian control of WNG, followed by the UN (23%) and the Dutch (22%). Indonesian support was at 6%, while 1% nominated 'Other' and 23% admitted they had No Idea.[17] A second poll in October 1960 found similar results.[18]

It was only in 1961/1962 that the Gallup Poll dropped Australia from the list of candidates vying for control of WNG. The question now only left two options – the UN or Indonesia; 64% of respondents backed the UN and only 9% supported Indonesia taking control of WNG.[19] The same question asked in April and again in June 1962 resulted in even stronger support of the UN (71% in June), with only 8% backing Indonesia.[20] As a point of contrast, a 1962 Gallup Poll conducted in in Holland found that most Dutch residents expected Indonesia to take over WNG.

The pattern of responses and 'sample quotes' published alongside statistical results suggests that the Australian public considered the Dutch New Guinea issue a matter of national security rather than one of Indonesian (or New Guinean) sovereignty. During the Pacific War, the Japanese had reached Australian territory in Papua and New Guinea, but the heavy fighting there slowed down the Japanese advance, so that the Australian mainland never faced a sustained campaign. Although the strategic reasons for this are complex, the 'lesson' many Australians took away was that New Guinea (and other islands to Australia's north) were essential to maintaining Australia's defence integrity. The notion that Australia should take over from the Dutch was embedded in wider fears of Asia; however the Dutch New Guinea issue was an early example by which broader fears of Asia were funnelled into an Indonesia-specific issue.

Polling Bias in WNG issue

Australian Gallup Polls about West New Guinea were distinctly unbalanced. The language was biased, with the region referred to as the Dutch East Indies rather than West New Guinea until 1958 and (in some polls) a preamble discussing Indonesian 'propaganda' read out to respondents before questioning began. More problematic still was the inclusion Australia as a potential candidate to take over WNG. This option was never raised in bilateral or multilateral discussions to decide the region's sovereignty. Neither did the Australian government seriously consider the issue.[21]

Rather than measuring public attitudes to an international policy under consideration, public opinion polling was used to radicalise Australian foreign

policy on Indonesian issues. The Gallup Poll's findings had a considerable reach. They were reported (often verbatim) in both metropolitan and regional newspapers. The Brisbane *Courier-Mail* ran the Gallup Poll's findings on WNG on its front page, with the headline 'If it seems that the Dutch may hand over Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia, Australia should try to take it over herself.'[22] After the publication of the March 1950 results, newspapers received letters supporting the proposition that Australia colonise West New Guinea. To cite one example, R. Bedford wrote to the Adelaide *Advertiser* in March 1950 claiming that the 'danger to Australian security of a possible enemy occupation of Dutch New Guinea is obvious'. Moreover, he argued, 'there can be no doubt of Australia's capacity to develop Western New Guinea'.[23] Debate continued: two days later, D.F. Black wrote to the *Advertiser* refuting the proposition, and arguing that 'Australia had no case at all' for the claim to West New Guinea.[24] By suggesting that Australia could potentially take over the sovereignty of West New Guinea, the Gallup Poll served to raise interest and support for a radical proposal, rather than measuring attitudes for existing possibilities.

To what extent did this reflect the views of Roy Morgan, the Director of Australian Public Opinion Polls (The Gallup Method), and the man who funded him, Sir Keith Murdoch? Murray Goot finds that Morgan 'shared most of Murdoch's conservative social, industrial and political views'.[25] APOP conducted polling for the Liberal Party, and was known to pass on unpublished and additional information to Liberal Party politicians. Morgan was also not above manipulating his questions (and even results) for political purposes. During the 1960s, he began to work closely with the United States Information Agency in Australia, and doctored questions on international affairs (specifically the Vietnam War) in order to present Australian public opinion in a favourable light to US interests.[26]

Polling on Konfrontasi, 1963-1965

Polling on Konfrontasi suggested that Australians were increasingly fearful of Indonesia, not only because of its increasing power in Southeast Asia but also because of anxiety about Australian security.

The emergence of the independent state of Malaysia followed the United Kingdom's withdrawal from Asia. In Australia, this caused a good deal of anxiety, which was compounded by growing tension between Indonesia and Malaysia. This tension erupted into armed conflict following President Sukarno's Indonesia determination to "crush" Malaysia.

Gallup Polls regularly tested popular support for Australia's military involvement in Konfrontasi. In total, 6 Gallup Polls were fielded on the issue from 1963 to 1965, taking over from West New Guinea as one of the key issues on which public opinion was tested.[27] Questions were framed in the language of crisis, with Indonesia the aggressor. In May-June 1963, respondents were asked, "If Indonesia attacks Malaya or North Borneo, should Australia fight to defend Malaya, or not?". The majority (53%) thought that Australia should fight, with 22% holding the opposite view and 25% not holding an opinion. The claim "Indonesia is getting away with too much" was seen to be illustrative of majority sentiment.[28] Support for military involvement rose to 58% in September/October 1963 and 62% by the end of the year.[29] By this time, the Gallup Poll's chosen illustrative quotes had brought Australian security into the frame: the "usual comments were: "For our own protection"; "too close to Australia" or "They will be here next".[30] Sentiment was tested three times in the period from August-December 1963; then twice again in October-November 1964 and once in early 1965. The refrain that Australia "would be next" became increasingly common.

'...Usual comments were: "For our own protection"; "too close to Australia" or "They will be here next"...'

"We should help defend Malaysia", *Australian Gallup Polls*, nos 1711-1728, Nov-Dec 1963.

Other issues

Most polling about Indonesia during the 1950s-1960s asked Australians about tense political issues. Polls that avoided the issue of West New Guinea or Konfrontasi were rare, but often found a more measured attitude towards Indonesia.

This is evident in a mid-1963 poll, which asked respondents about the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The question was worded, 'Do you think we should now set up defences to protect that border, or should we first try to arrange with Indonesia to leave both sides of the border undefended?'. 49% of respondents thought that Australia should 'try for undefended border', whilst only 41% demanded the government to 'Defend it now' and 10% held no opinion. Amongst younger respondents (defined as below 30), a clear majority of 57% preferred negotiation over militarisation of the borders.[31] This result complicates the outcomes of polling about Konfrontasi (finding strong public support for military action against Indonesia), which was fielded around the same time. This suggests that Australian attitudes to Indonesia were more nuanced when outside the immediate context of crises.

A preference for cultural engagement is also evident from the early 1960s. In September-October 1963, Australians were asked which languages they thought should be taught in high schools. 53% of the population nominated French and 40% German; perhaps surprisingly, however, 24% nominated Indonesian (the same number as Italian and more than Latin at 20%).[32] The fact that almost one-quarter of all Australians thought that learning Indonesian was vital suggests support for closer engagement.

A strong preference for diplomacy was demonstrated in a number of polls testing Australians' preferences about economic aid to Indonesia. In late 1964, the Gallup Poll asked Australians about their aid program for the first time. Reminding interviewees that 'Australia had given Indonesia £6,000,000, including £600,000 this year, for education and humanitarian help', it went on to ask "Do you think we should, or should not, continue to help Indonesia in this way?" Of the 1800 people interviewed, 47% said, "Continue to help them" whilst only 40% said "Stop it" and 13% were undecided.'[33] The following year, the numbers remained largely unchanged, with a further 1% believing that Australia should 'continue to help Indonesia'; by late 1966, only 24% of Australians believed aid to Indonesia should be reduced.[34] The illustrative comments provided by the Gallup Poll are striking. Whereas those supporting aid thought Australia should 'help poorer nations' and 'be friends with them'; those who opposed aid to Indonesia thought that 'they are almost at war with us'. This comment reminds us of the tense diplomatic context in which this question was asked – 1964/65 was, after all, during the period of Konfrontasi, and questions about Australian aid to Indonesia were sometimes asked in the same questionnaire as ones about military contributions to Malayan defence. Yet, once removed from the language of crisis, Australian popular opinion suggested a diplomatic approach to Indonesia was favoured.

Threat Perception, 1968

In 1968, a Gallup Poll asked Australians whether they thought there were 'any countries which are a threat to Australia's security', and if so, to name them. The majority – 52% - said that 'some countries threatened us', and when probed, the largest proportion (32%) nominated China as the greatest threat to Australia. North Vietnam was nominated by 14% and Russia by 11%, before Indonesia with 6% and America with 3%. A follow up Poll the following year found the situation largely unchanged. Whilst Indonesia continued to evoke negative responses from parts of the Australian population, this negative sentiment was contextualized by the presence of other threats in the Cold War.[35]

b) 1970s – 1990s

The 1970s saw a proliferation in the number of organisations interested in testing Australian public opinion. In addition to Gallup Polls and Roy Morgan (the Gallup Method) polls, newspapers began to conduct in-house polling on major issues. Ironically, the diversification of polling agencies saw less polling conducted on international issues. Many agencies focussed on domestic issues, which were most closely related to voting preferences. Nonetheless, organisations including Roy Morgan, *The Age*, the Saulwick agency and the United States International Communications Agency fielded polls to measure popular opinion regarding Indonesia.

Indonesia and the Cold War
A number of public opinion polls during the 1970s placed Indonesia among the four or five most important nations for Australia.

Throughout the 1970s, 'ordinary' Australians repeatedly nominated Indonesia as a nation with which they wanted to build a closer relationship.

Significantly, the Australian public did not strongly associate Indonesia with Communism. In May 1975, the Australian Gallup Poll tested Australians' views about the spread of Communism. In general, Australians did not think that Communism was spreading. Only 15% suggested that the end of the Vietnam War and the success of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia would spread communism to Thailand, and roughly 12% thought Malaysia and South Korea were at risk. Taiwan (10.6%), Indonesia (10.4%) and the Philippines (10%) were seen to be at even less risk.[36] After ten years of the anti-Communist Suharto regime, Australians were not likely to express concern for Indonesia as a source of Communist influence.

In June 1975, the *Age* sought to plot attitudes towards foreign nations. Respondents were asked to name countries 'whose friendship and goodwill towards Australia is important to us for trade or security reasons'. The top 5 nations were: USA (named by 78.3% of respondents); Japan (74.5%), Britain (63.1%); China (44.3%) and Indonesia (34.6%). When this question was reframed so that respondents indicated which nations they thought were 'not likely to be friendly towards Australia', Indonesia again placed 5th – after North Vietnam, Russia, China and France. However, only 10.5% of Australians nominated Indonesia as a place that was not likely to be positively inclined towards Australia.

Australian public opinion was gauged by **the United States International Communications Agency** throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and this data complements polling conducted by Australian polling companies. Asked, 'with which countries, if any, is it very important for Australia to have close political ties?' Indonesia was mentioned by 24% of Australian respondents in 1975. This made it the 4th most nominated nation after the United States (69.9%), Britain (34.1%) and Japan (24.8%). The question 'Are there any Asian countries with which you would like to see Australia have closer relations with?' reinforced Indonesia's important role in Australian public opinion.

Indonesia was the most commonly nominated nation, named by 28% of respondents. This was followed by Japan (23.7%), China (23.1%), Malaysia (15.9%) and India (8.6%).[37]

Figure 3: Countries with which it is 'very important for Australia to have close political ties', 1975

Ranking	Country	%
1	America	69.9
2	Britain	34.1
3	Japan	24.8
4	Indonesia	24
5	China	18.1

Source: United States International Communications Agency, *Poll of Australian International Political Opinions 1975*, Australian Data Archive, http://ada.edu.au/ada/00378

Figure 4: Asian countries with which 'you would like to see Australia have closer relations with', 1975

Ranking	Country	%
1	Indonesia	28
2	Japan	23.7
3	China	23.1
4	Malaysia	15.9
5	India	8.6

Source: United States International Communications Agency, *Poll of Australian International Political Opinions 1975*, Australian Data Archive, http://ada.edu.au/ada/00378

A specific question asking the extent to which the basic interests of Australia and Indonesia were aligned saw a mixed response. 4.6% of respondents claimed that the interests were very much in alignment; with 41.8% claiming they were fairly well in alignment, 40.2% saying they were rather different, and 13.4% claiming they were very different. This was a picture of indecision, which contrasted with Australian views of the US, UK and Japan (with which most respondents regarded Australia's interests were aligned; or China, which most respondents regarded as having interests that were different from Australia).[38]

Figure 5: 'In your opinion, are the basic interests of Australia and Indonesia…', 1975

Sentiment	%
Very much in agreement	4.6
Fairly well in agreement	41.8
Rather different	40.2
Very different	13.4

Source: United States International Communications Agency, *Poll of Australian International Political Opinions 1975*, Australian Data Archive, http://ada.edu.au/ada/00378

East Timor

It is important to note that the East Timor issue of 1975 did not cause an immediate rupture in poll results regarding Australian perceptions of Indonesia. Gallup polls in February 1976 sought to elicit popular opinion on the East Timor conflict. The questions were deeply loaded, identifying the East Timorese Freitlin Party as "the Chinese-backed Freitlin party" and the Indonesian side as "Indonesian backed anti-communist parties". However, even with such clear markers as to where the East Timorese conflict lay within the broader Cold War, Australians were unsure about which side to support. Only 6.8% of Australians thought that Australia should offer "moral support" to Freitlin; 11.8% thought that this moral support should go to the Indonesian-backed parties. A clear majority of 65.4% wanted to support neither party. This was the result of ignorance or lack of engagement as much as distaste for either side of the cause; 'Don't know' responses to the question of whether respondents approved or disapproved of Freitlin ran over 35%.[39]

Support for East Timor's independence grew as the ramifications of Indonesia's invasion became apparent. Sympathy for the East Timorese people was evident in a December 1979 Gallup Poll testing views about foreign aid funding. A clear majority of 58.6% claimed they would 'personally make additional sacrifices in favour of the people of Kampuchea and East Timor'.[40] By May 1983, an Australian Gallup Poll found that 71.3% of Australians supported independence for East Timor, rather than integration with Indonesia.[41]

Post-1975

Throughout the 1970s, 'ordinary' Australians repeatedly nominated Indonesia as a nation with which it wanted to build a closer relationship. In a July 1976 Gallup Poll, respondents were shown a card with a number of nations listed, and asked to select 'which which of these countries, if any, should Australia do more than in the past to build up friendship?' In descending order, Australians selected the US, China, Japan, Indonesia and Singapore/Malaysia. This is consistent with the trend for Australians to select Indonesia as one of the five nations of greatest significance to Australia in the 1970s.[42]

A March 1977 poll conducted by the *Age* showed respondents a list of countries 'in our part of the world', and asked which they would describe as 'important to Australia'. Japan was clearly considered the most important, nominated by 86.5% of respondents. China was second (51.3%) and PNG was third (49.7%), with Indonesia fourth (nominated by 37.7% of respondents). Significantly, a further question asked respondents which countries they would describe as 'aggressive'. Indonesia was seen as the most aggressive country in the region, selected by 36.3% of Australians. This was ahead of China (33.3%) and Vietnam (26.9%). In further questions, only 6.3% of respondents thought Indonesia was 'trustworthy' (compared to the 31.4% who thought PNG was trustworthy). 34.6% of Australians also thought it was directly 'a threat to Australia' – the second highest response after China (40.7%).[43]

Although reasons for attitudes were not probed, the Indonesian military's brutal suppression of East Timor, along with the disappearance of five Australian journalists at Balibo in 1975, were prominent issues of the time.

Figure 6: Countries in region viewed as 'important to Australia', March 1977

Ranking	Country	%
1	Japan	86.5
2	China	51.3
3	Papua New Guinea	49.7
4	Indonesia	37.7
5	Philippines	19.1

Source: *The Age* poll, March 1977, Australian Data Archive, http://ada.edu.au/ada/00254

Figure 7: Countries in region viewed as 'aggressive', March 1977

Ranking	Country	%
1	Indonesia	36.3
2	China	33.3
3	Vietnam	26.9
4	"None"	20.9
5	Japan	11.1

Source: *The Age* poll, March 1977, Australian Data Archive, http://ada.edu.au/ada/00254

This sense of Indonesia as a cogent threat was confirmed in an August 1977 Gallup Poll, in which Russia, China, Indonesia and Japan were most commonly nominated as nations to which exports of Australian uranium should be barred.[44] It was again confirmed in a May 1979 Gallup Poll, which asked respondents to nominate the nation in 'Southeast Asia and the Far East' that they considered to be the most friendly towards Australia. Japan (nominated by 35.5%) and Singapore (15.2%) were the only nations scoring in double digits; Indonesia was regarded as most friendly by only 5.5% of respondents (the lowest-ranking nation, Pakistan, was selected by only 0.6%). However, when asked which nations Australia should build towards better relations, Indonesia was the third-most commonly selected nation, after China and Japan.[45]

In 1980, in a United States International Communications Agency (USICA) survey, Indonesia was ranked 5th in a list of nations with which 'Australia should cooperate closely on security matters in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean'. It was nominated by 12.9% of respondents, after USA (61.6%), New Zealand and Japan (both 20.3%), and the UK (17.3%).[46]

A Gallup Poll in September 1980 asked 'with which one country would you like Australia to be more friendly?' Indonesia came 5th, mentioned by 7.2% of respondents, after China (27.8%), Russia (22.6%), USA (16.7%) and Japan (12.2%).[47]

A Saulwick/Age Poll in 1988 was significant in asking for relative 'warmth' in feeling about certain nationalities. Although it was only a one-off, this provides an interesting baseline for later Lowy Institute Polls, which tested a similar sentiment. Respondents were asked to 'imagine you are looking at a thermometer, with a hundred degrees at the top and zero at the bottom.' Respondents were then asked to rank how they felt about a number of nationalities. The mode response for Indonesians was 46-54 degrees, or neutral. The second most commonly selected temperature range was 0-5 degrees and the third most selected was 55-64 degrees. Taking out the 46-54 degree bracket, 42.9% of respondents selected somewhere in the 'cold' range; 35.6% responded in the 'warm' range (with 1.5% answering 'don't know'. As a point of comparison, the mode for Americans and British was 75-84 degrees; for Japanese, Chinese and French it was also 46-54.[48]

Threat Perception, 1980s:

An *Age* Poll of 1980 asked Australians whether they thought any nations presented a threat to Australia, and if so, to name those nations. 63.1% of respondents thought that some nations did present a threat, and nominated Russia (63.5%), China (21.2%) and Indonesia (18%) as the top three nations presenting a threat to Australia.[49]

In 1982, a USICA survey found that 17.1% of Australians nominated Indonesia as 'a threat to Australia's security'. This was the second highest score after Russia (25.4% of respondents). China was mentioned by only 6.8% of respondents. The same survey found that Australians felt rather insecure, with only 37.1% feeling that there was 'no threat' to Australia's security.[50]

A similar poll two years later, in May 1984, found a steady response, with 17.5% of respondents nominating Indonesia as a threat to Australia. This time, however, this was enough to make it poll as the largest single threat – only 13.6% nominated Russia as a threat to Australian security. The sense of insecurity had also risen, with only 10.3% believing that no country presented a threat to Australia.[51] A follow up in September 1984 again saw Indonesia nominated as the greatest threat to Australia (16.7%). Significantly, 21.7% of Australians thought that Indonesia would present a military threat to Australia within 5 years, which again was higher than any other nation.[52]

Asked if there were any countries that were a threat to Australia's security in a Saulwick/Age Poll in 1989, 50.3% of respondents answered 'yes'; 40% answered 'No' and 9.7 'Don't know'. Asked to name the countries that did represent a threat, Indonesia was nominated by 23.7% of respondents, far ahead of the second-largest threat – Japan (nominated by 16.6%).[53]

c) Australian Electoral Study 1993-2001

From 1993, the Australian Electoral Study (AES) began to field regular questions concerning voters' perceptions of Australia's security and the nations that threatened it. The AES is a self-completion survey mailed out to electors following Federal Elections. The survey began in 1987, however the 1987 and 1990 surveys did not measure attitudes on defence or foreign policy questions, so they are not relevant to this study.

Of all public opinion polls, the AES has consistently found the most anxiety regarding Indonesia. Findings in the period 1993-2010 suggest Australian regard Indonesia as a military and security threat. In 1993, 55% of respondents thought that Indonesia would present a threat to the security Australia within the next five years and 57% believed it would present a threat to Australian security within 10-15 years. The 1996 AES found a continued and growing sense of threat from Indonesia. 59.5% of Australians thought that Indonesia was likely to pose a threat to Australia over an unspecified period (23.6% thinking it was very likely and 35.9% thinking it was fairly likely). From 1998, the survey asked respondents to indicate which countries they thought were 'likely to pose a threat to Australia's security'. In 1998, 56.5% of respondents selected Indonesia; in 2001 this rose to a high of 73.5% before tapering to 67.1% in 2004, 69.1% in 2007, 62% in 2010 and a low of 52.1% in 2013. The mean score was 61.4%.

This survey points to an ongoing and pervasive concern that Indonesia poses a threat to Australian security. Anxiety about Indonesia was well above the level of anxiety relating to other nations. As Figure 8 shows, the proportion of respondents who nominated China as a threat peaked at 56.5% (in 2010) with a mean of 46.8% while Japan peaked at 31.6% (1993) with a mean of 21.9%.

FIGURE 8: Perceived threat (Very likely + fairly likely – next 5 years or open-ended, total % unweighted).
Data from Australian Electoral Study, 1993-2013.

YEAR	INDONESIA	CHINA	JAPAN	USA
1993	55.2	27.6	31.6	
1996	55.4	54.6	28.9	8.4
1998	56.5	46.9	27.2	6.9
2001	73.5	42	19.7	7.5
2004	67.1	35.1	12.2	12
2007	69.1	41	15.9	9.7
2010	62	56.5	20.9	9.8
2013	52.1	51.4	18.7	10.6
MEAN	**61.4**	**46.8**	**21.9**	**9.3**

FIGURE 9: Perceived threat (Very likely + fairly likely – next 5 years or open-ended, total % unweighted).
Data from Australian Electoral Study, 1993-2013.



From 1996, the AES tested responses to the Security Agreement between Australia and Indonesia, which introduced wide-ranging cooperation between Defence and Military personnel (superseded by the Lombok Treaty of 2006). The survey tested respondents' agreement (on a 5 point scale) with the question 'The security agreement between Australia and Indonesia means that we can trust Indonesia never to be a military threat'. As Figure 10 below shows, there was a strong disagreement with this sentiment, with a clear majority of respondents continuing to distrust Indonesia and considering it a military threat despite the security agreements signed between the two nations.

FIGURE 10: Security Agreement between Australia and Indonesia (Australian Electoral Study, 1996-2007)
"The security agreement between Australia and Indonesia means that we can trust Indonesia never to be a military threat".

Statement	1996 (%)	1998 (%)	2001 (%)	2004 (%)	2007 (%)
Strongly Agree	1.3	1.6	1.2	1	1.4
Agree	6.9	6.9	4.8	6.5	6.3
Neither	29.2	30.2	26	27.9	29.4
Disagree	40.3	42.5	44.4	48.3	48.8
Strongly Disagree	18.2	16.8	23.6	16.2	14.1
TOTAL DISAGREE	**58.5**	**59.3**	**68**	**64.5**	**62.9**

AES also found a general lack of security in Australians' perceptions of their capacity for self-defence. In 1996, only 14.8% of Australians broadly agreed with the statement "Australia would be able to defend itself if it were ever attacked', 20.4% were undecided, and the vast majority (61.8%) thought that Australia was incapable of defending itself. The level of defence insecurity has been gradually falling, with the 2013 results finding that 42.6% of respondents did not think Australia would be able to defend itself it attacked.

FIGURE 11: Australian capacity for self-defence (Australian Electoral Study, 1996)
"Australia would be able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked".

Statement	**1996 (%)**	**1998 (%)**	**2001 (%)**	**2004 (%)**	**2007 (%)**	**2010 (%)**	**2013 (%)**
Strongly Agree	3.2	5.0	3.9	3.0	3.6	5.2	3.6
Agree	10.9	14.1	11.8	15.5	18.4	25.3	24.6
Neither	19.4	19.7	22.2	23.7	27.8	30.1	29.1
Disagree	38.2	39.0	42.0	40.5	35.8	31.4	32.4
Strongly Disagree	23.6	19.5	20.1	13.9	10.6	8.0	10.2
TOTAL DISAGREE	**61.8**	**58.5**	**62.1**	**54.4**	**46.4**	**39.4**	**42.6**

d) 2005 – 2015

The Lowy Institute for International Policy has measured Australian public opinion regarding foreign policy on an annual basis since 2005. A one-off, detailed poll on Australian attitudes towards Indonesia, commissioned by DFAT and conducted by Newspoll, was published in 2013.

A key feature of the Lowy Institute Polls is the 'thermometer ranking', which distils sentiment about foreign nations into a single indicator of warmth. [54] Over the eleven surveys conducted since 2005, the level of 'warmth' Australians feel towards Indonesia has fallen within the range of 46-54 degrees. As a point of comparison, New Zealand (consistently the highest ranked country) scored between 81 and 85 degrees and the United States between 62 and 73 degrees.[55]

LOWY INSTITUTE THERMOMETER RATING
2005: 52°
2006: 50°
2007: 47°
2008: 50°
2009: 49°
2010: 54°
2011: 51°
2012: 54°
2013: 53°
2014: 52°
2015: 46°

2006:

The 2006 Lowy Institute Poll was the first to ask detailed questions specifically measuring opinion about Indonesia.

On the thermometer scale, Australians placed Indonesia exactly halfway, at 50°. Furthermore, 47% of respondents thought that 'our relations were getting worse', 31% thought they were unchanging and only 19% thought they were improving.

Authored by Ivan Cook, the Lowy Institute report's analysis rested on the view that 'Geographically close but otherwise very different, Australia and Indonesia have had a chequered relationship often characterised by misunderstanding on both sides'.[56] Cook diagnosed a 'chronic tension between these two very different countries' and noted that the Lowy Institute's questions were designed to illuminate how much of that tension was driven by 'simple misunderstanding and how much by the exigencies of bilateral and international politics'.[57]

The 2006 poll was notable for highlighting the level of ignorance and/or misconception around Indonesia. As Figure 12 shows, many Australians were unaware that Indonesia was a democracy, believing instead 'that Indonesia was essentially controlled by the military', that 'Indonesia was a dangerous source of Islamic terrorism' and that 'Australia is right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat'.

Figure 12: Statements about Indonesia, Lowy Institute Poll 2006
(First appearing in Cook 2006: 14)



Despite (or because of) their concern, Australians also regarded the Indonesian relationship as a priority. More than 77% said that 'it is very important that Australia and Indonesia work to develop a close relationship', with only 22% believing that 'Australia and Indonesia are too different to develop a close relationship'.

Australian respondents felt that Australia was doing more than Indonesia to build a stable bilateral relationship. Australians strongly believed that 'Indonesia benefits from having Australia as a stable and prosperous neighbour' (7.4/10 average ranking), and that 'Australia has shown itself to be a reliable long term friend of Indonesia (7/10 average ranking).

2007:
Authored by Allan Gyngell, the 2007 Lowy Institute Poll found that sentiment towards Indonesia had fallen slightly. Indonesia scored 47° on the thermometer scale, and was the 'only East Asian country invoking marginally cooler rather than warmer feelings'.[58] However, this came within a broader context: all nations' rankings were lower on the thermometer in 2007 than 2006. This was despite the fact that Australians felt relatively safe: asked about their basis sense of security, 90% of respondents felt either 'very safe' (40%) or safe (50%).

The 2007 poll dug a little deeper into views of several nations, including Indonesia. Respondents were asked 'Using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means you have a very positive view and 5 a very negative view, what is your view of the following countries?' As Figure 13 shows, views about Indonesia were the most negative; far more so than New Zealand, Great Britain, the United States and China.

Figure 13: Views towards selected countries, Lowy Institute Poll 2007
(First appearing in Gyngell 2007: 14)

Australian survey	1 (very positive)	2	3	4	5 (very negative)
New Zealand	**30%**	**40%**	**18%**	**6%**	**4%**
Great Britain	**16%**	**39%**	**30%**	**10%**	**4%**
United States	**8%**	**22%**	**32%**	**19%**	**18%**
China	**5%**	**20%**	**43%**	**18%**	**11%**
Indonesia	**3%**	**12%**	**31%**	**27%**	**25%**

2008:
The Lowy Institute Poll was conducted under the direction of Fergus Hanson from 2008 to 2012. In 2008, the Poll found a thermometer rating of 50°. Whilst the thermometer rating did not suggest a dramatic change over preceding years, the level of optimism regarding the relationship did. 26% of respondents thought that Australian relations with Indonesia were 'improving', up from 19% in 2006; moreover the number who thought hat relations were 'worsening' fell from 47% in 2006 to 16% in 2008. This suggested a significant jump in optimism towards the relationship.[59]

2009:
In 2009, the thermometer rating for Indonesia was 49°. Further questions probed the extent to which Australians trusted a number of countries 'to act responsibly in the world'. Only 6% of Australians trusted Indonesia 'a great deal' and 39% trusted it 'somewhat' (a total of 45% positive responses). 31% of respondents had 'not very much' trust for Indonesia to act responsibly in the world, and 23% trusted it 'not at all'. This was a negative result that placed faith in Indonesia lower than China and Russia; the only nation that fared worse was Iran, which at the time was under sustained criticism for its undeclared nuclear program (Hanson 2009: 22).[60]

Figure 14: Level of trust towards selected countries, Lowy Institute Poll 2009
(First appearing in Hanson 2009: 22)

How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world?

	2009						
	A great deal	Somewhat	**Total: a great deal and somewhat**	Not very much	Not at all	**Total: not very much and not at all**	Don't know
United States	**39%**	**44%**	**83%**	**11%**	**7%**	**18%**	*
Japan	**33%**	**48%**	**81%**	**14%**	**5%**	**19%**	*
India	**10%**	**51%**	**61%**	**26%**	**13%**	**39%**	**1%**
China	**7%**	**52%**	**59%**	**24%**	**16%**	**40%**	**1%**
Russia	**7%**	**52%**	**59%**	**27%**	**13%**	**40%**	**1%**
Indonesia	**6%**	**39%**	**45%**	**31%**	**23%**	**54%**	*
Iran	**2%**	**23%**	**25%**	**36%**	**39%**	**75%**	**1%**

2010:
The 2010 Lowy Institute Poll was conducted following Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's highly-publicised visit to Australia. The Lowy thermometer rating for Indonesia hit a high point of 54°. This placed Indonesia on the same level as China (54°), India (55°) and Russia (55°); however it was still well below countries like New Zealand (84°), Canada (82°), France (70°) and Singapore (69°) (Hanson 2010: 5). In 2010, Australians were asked to provide a separate rating for Bali. This came to 57°, slightly warmer than for Indonesia overall.

This year saw a spike in optimism. 36% of Australians said the relationship with Indonesia was a lot or a little better since the election of the Rudd government in 2007. Older people and men were more likely to see improvement in the relationship. However, misunderstanding and mistrust continued even at this relative highpoint. Asked their views on whether 'Indonesia is more open and democratic, or less open and democratic today compared to say 15 years ago', a majority of 53% said it was either the same or less open; only 41% recognised the great strides of democratisation undergone by Indonesia. This undercurrent of suspicion is evident in responses to the question whether 'Indonesia is more of a threat to Australia or less of a threat than it was 15 years ago'. 33% of Australians thought it was 'more of a threat', 38% thought there was 'no change' and only 27% thought it was 'less of a threat'.[61]

2010 is notable for providing a pre-crisis benchmark for opinions relating to the death penalty in Asia. Polling came after the initial sentencing of Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan, but before the sentence was upheld in 2011. At this juncture, only 31% of Australians nominated 'pushing for the abolition of the death penalty in our region' as a 'very important' foreign policy goal, the lowest rated of 12 possible options fielded.

2011:
The afterglow of SBY's successful visit to Australia was brief, with Australians' temperature rating returning in 2011 to the long-tern norm of 51°. Hanson noted that 'attitudes remain mired in distrust and suspicion'.[62]

A large majority (77% of respondents) agreed with the statement that 'It is very important that Australia and Indonesia work to develop a close relationship', with only 22% believing that 'Australia and Indonesia are too different to develop a close relationship'. This was exactly the same result as the 2006 survey, suggesting a significant level of stability in support for improving relations with Indonesia.

However, Australian respondents expressed concern about Indonesia as a security threat. Respondents agreed that 'Indonesia is essentially controlled by the military' (mean of 6.9); that 'Indonesia is a dangerous source of Islamic terrorism' (mean of 6.5) and that 'Australia is right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat (mean of 6.1 out of 10). This correlates with AES findings for the same period, as outlined in the previous section. Australians were more guarded about the statement that 'Indonesian cooperation with Australia has

been important in helping us contain the terrorist threat in our region' (mean of 5.8) and that 'Indonesia is an emerging democracy' (mean of 5.2). Australians disagreed with the statement that 'Indonesia helps Australia combat people smuggling' (mean of 4.3) (Hanson 2011: 15). Significantly, these responses showed a significant level of continuity with 2006, when these questions were first fielded.[63]

The relative lack of trust in Indonesia was also evident in responses to 'How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world?' When it came to Indonesia, 15% of Australians responded 'not at all' and 38% said 'not very much' (a total of 53% negative); with 41% responding 'somewhat' and only 5% 'a great deal' (total 46% positive responses).

Whilst they were distrustful of Indonesia, respondents felt that Australia been a good neighbour to Indonesia. There was strong agreement with the statements that 'Indonesia benefits from having Australia as a stable and prosperous neighbour (mean of 7.5) and 'Australia has shown itself to be a reliable long-term friend of Indonesia (mean of 7.2). Respondents disagreed that 'Indonesia is right to worry that Australia is seeking to separate the province of West Papua from Indonesia' (mean of 4.8) and 'Australia has a tendency to try to interfere in Indonesia's affairs too much (mean of 4.6).

Although surveys of Indonesian opinion of Australia fall outside the scope of this project and report, it is important to note that Australian opinions are very different from Indonesian views of the relationship. The Lowy Institute published a poll of Indonesian views of Australia in 2012. It found that Indonesians strongly agreed with the statement 'Indonesia is an emerging democracy' (mean of 8.0, compared with Australia's 2011 result of 5.2) but were less confident that 'Indonesia benefits from having Australia as a stable and prosperous neighbour (mean of 5.8, compared with Australia's 2011 result of 7.5). However a similar proportion of Indonesians (70%) as Australians (77%) felt that 'it is very important that Australia and Indonesia work to develop a close relationship'; inversely, 22% of respondents from each nation believed that 'Australia and Indonesia are too different to develop a close relationship'.[64]

2012:
Sentiments towards Indonesia were slightly warmer in 2012, matching the 2010 high of 54°. This is partly explained by a generally more positive sentiment in attitudes that year: all nations with the exception of North Korea enjoyed higher temperatures.

In the wake of the Gillard government's announcement of the 'Australia in the Asian Century' White Paper, the Lowy Institute found that 68% of respondents thought it 'very important' for 'Australia to be seen in a positive light by people from countries in our region'. A further 26% said it was 'somewhat important', with only 6% saying it is 'not important'. This was further supported by results showing 80% broad agreement that it was important to 'do more to get Australia included in Asian political forums'; 70% believing it 'very important' or 'somewhat important' to 'encourage Australians to learn more Asian

languages' and 68% expressing broad agreement that it was important to 'increase the number of Australian diplomats we send to Asia'.[65]

However, views were divided about the importance of Indonesia specifically. Asked 'which country do you personally think will be Australia's most important security partner over the next 10 years?', only 2% of respondents nominated Indonesia, with a further 6% nominating it as the second-most important. By contrast, the United States was nominated as the most important by 74% of respondents; China by 10%; New Zealand by 4% and the United Kingdom by 3%. Whilst fitting into long-term trends that positioned Indonesia within the top 5 significant nations for Australia's international relations, the result was not an overwhelming signal for closer engagement with Indonesia.

2013:
Lowy Institute Poll
The Lowy Institute Poll of 2013 (the first to directed by Alex Oliver) found that 'Australians remain lukewarm about Indonesia', with a thermometer rating of 53°.[66]

The report found that 'Australians have a somewhat lopsided view of the bilateral relationship' in that the vast majority of 84% believed that 'Australia acts as a good neighbour to Indonesia' while only 54% agreed that 'Indonesia acts as a good neighbour to Australia'. The 2013 poll also found that a majority (54%) agreed that 'Australia is right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat' and the same proportion agreed that 'Indonesia is a dangerous source of Islamic terrorism'. The poll also confirmed a low level of factual knowledge about Indonesia, with only 33% of Australians believing that 'Indonesia is a democracy'.

Oliver suggested that 'one cause of this mistrust may be the contentious people-smuggling issue' which was at the forefront of domestic politics during that year.[67] However, this result is in keeping with similar polls dating back several decades.

2014:
The Lowy Institute Poll 2014 found Australian sentiment towards Indonesia at 52° on the thermometer rating. Asked about the status of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, 57% of Australians described it as 'friendly'. However, there was significant concern about its future direction. Only 7% of respondents thought that the relationship was improving, 50% thought it was staying about the same, and 40% of respondents thought that the relationship was worsening, which as Oliver noted, 'is 24 points higher than in 2008, but lower than in 2006, at a time when the Schapelle Corby sentencing and a diplomatic row over Australia granting asylum to Papuans generated headlines'.[68]

The 2014 poll was conducted in the context of a significant diplomatic rift regarding allegations that Australia had spied on Indonesian public figures and their families. The Lowy Institute found Australians unconcerned about

these allegations; indeed, a majority of Australians (62%) thought it was acceptable to spy on Indonesia. 65% thought it was acceptable for Australia to spy on China, 60% on East Timor, 58% on China, 54% on the United States, and 51% thought it was acceptable to spy on New Zealand.

2015:
The 2015 Lowy Institute Poll was conducted in the wake of the execution of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, and the subsequent recall of Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia. The Lowy Institute was concerned to measure popular opinion regarding this issue, taking the unusual step of commissioning 'a series of additional short polls' to test public opinion on the issue. That year, the thermometer rating of Indonesia was 46°, which was 6° lower than the previous year and although representing a substantial fall, is only 8° lower than the highest sentiment (in 2010 and 2012).

Although a high proportion of respondents again noted Indonesia as a nation of key importance to Australia, the poll again found that they did not oppose actions that may be harmful to the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The Lowy Poll found 'a surprisingly high proportion' of the population (42%) supported Australian navy vessels 'entering Indonesian territorial waters without permission, as part of Australia's efforts to turn back asylum seekers'. They also had a low level of understanding: again, only 34% of respondents regarded Indonesia as a democracy and 42% had never heard of recently-elected President Joko Widodo.[69]

DFAT/Newspoll:
Australians desire a close relationship with Indonesia, yet they perceive a vast gulf of difference between the two societies, which stokes anxiety regarding Indonesia as a threat.

Ignorance about Indonesia is high; travel and tourism are key drivers of popular perceptions of Indonesia.

2013 was notable for the public release of a survey commissioned by DFAT and conducted by Newspoll. This was the most detailed publicly released survey on Australian attitudes towards Indonesia to date, which was unique in attempting to probe the reasons motivating public opinion.

The poll found that an overwhelming majority (83% of respondents) agreed that Indonesia was 'an important country in our region', and 94% agreed 'it is at least somewhat important that Australia and Indonesia build close relations'. Within the context of global relations, the DFAT study found that Australians rated it as the fifth most important international relationship, after the USA, China, UK and New Zealand.[70] The poll also found 'a sense of implied threat from Indonesia … permeates the views of some Australians'.[71] Indeed, 44% of Australians felt that Indonesia was 'a threat to Australian national security'.[72]

The DFAT poll found a widespread lack of understanding about Indonesia. Only 70% of Australians were aware that Bali was part of Indonesia. Less than half of respondents knew that Indonesia was democracy, and the majority believed that its laws were made based on Islamic codes.

The DFAT poll correlated with the long-term average of the Lowy Institute's thermometer, with the average warmth towards Indonesia of 51° and the median at 50°. Respondents were asked to elaborate the reasons driving their responses, with the finding that 'those who gave a relatively positive thermometer rating (50+) gave reasons related to tourism, the Indonesian people and the bilateral relationship. Those who gave a relatively negative thermometer rating (<50) gave reasons relating to the Indonesian government and its laws, issues related to safety and security, specific policy concerns (such as people smuggling) and tourism'.[73] The most common reason, nominated by 27% of all respondents and 30% of those giving a positive response, related to tourism.[74]

An important finding was that roughly one in every three Australians had visited Indonesia (predominantly Bali), rising to 56% of all residents of Western Australia. The poll pointed to the significance of this contact, with a clear finding that 'prior travel to Indonesia is associated with higher awareness and understanding of the country and more positive perceptions'.[75]

The DFAT poll asked respondents to nominate the first things that came to mind when thinking about Indonesia. 63% of respondents mentioned a 'negative' aspect, whilst 59% noted a 'positive'. Significantly, while the positive responses were almost all related to the desirability of Bali as a

holiday attraction, negative images were related to ‘a full vernacular of terms around asylum seekers, terrorism and religious extremism, and drugs’ as well as to a general distrust of the Indonesian government and political system. These ‘top of mind’ responses correlated with the reasons given for thermometer ratings.[76]

Probed on specific images, an overwhelming 83% agreed that Indonesia was ‘a poor country’ (38% strongly agree; 43% somewhat agree) and 71% agreed that it was ‘a corrupt country’ (34% strongly agree; 37% somewhat agree). Only 24% agreed that it was ‘a country with a good political system’ (3% strongly agree; 21% somewhat agree).[77]

The survey also found that most Australians ‘think the two countries have few things or nothing in common’.[78] Only 34% of respondents felt that the Australian and Indonesian governments had ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a bit in common’, falling to only 25% of respondents who thought that Australian and Indonesian people had ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a bit in common’. Yet, 69% of respondents broadly agreed that Indonesia was ‘Australia’s friend’ (12% strongly agree; 56% somewhat agree).

The DFAT poll was exceptional in plotting extent of personal experience and knowledge against attitudes. It found that knowledge was positively correlated with perceptions: ‘that is, the more people know, the more likely they are to be positive about Indonesia’.[79] Data was also cross-tabulated with age and gender, with the finding that older people and women tended to hold more negative perceptions and be less trustful of Indonesia than the average.

Threat Perception

Since 1968, Gallup Polls, *Age* Polls, USICA polls, the Australian Electoral Study and Newspoll/DFAT have tracked the perception of threat from foreign nations. The wording of questions and modes of collection varied over time and between polling agencies, so even more caution than usual must be applied to analysing these responses. However, as Figure 15 shows, plotting these results over time provides some insight into changing threat perceptions.

Viewing polling data in this way reveals that Australians anxiety about Indonesia surged as tensions surrounding the Cold War eased. Russia was considered a strong threat during the early 1980s, but anxiety fell from the mid-late 1980s. At this point, fears about Indonesia as a threat to Australia began to rise. Although this data is not strong enough to allow a conclusive analysis, it does suggest that anxiety about foreign nations are at least partly caused by fundamental insecurities about Australia, rather than/as well as the sense that a particular nation is aggressive or dangerous. As this report goes on to show, scholars using discursive methods including Anthony Burke suggests that many Australians exhibit a high level of anxiety regarding the security of their island nation. According to Burke, this anxiety has been projected onto whichever nation appeared most threatening at any period in time (over time, China, Japan, Russia, Indonesia and China again).[80]

Plotting data in this way reveals that fears of Indonesia also exist in relation with broader fears about Asia. Fears of Japan, and later China, have held currency in the Australian imagination on a part with Indonesia. This supports the findings of historians including David Walker, who has shown that a fear of 'Asia' has been current in Australia since the mid 19th Century.[81]

FIGURE 15: Australian threat perceptions, 1968-2013
Source: Gallup Poll 1968, *Age* Poll 1980, USICA Polls 1983, 1984a and 1984b, Saulwick/*Age* Poll 1989, Australian Electoral Study 1993-2013, Newspoll/DFAT 2013.



Support for Engagement

Polls have consistently found strong support for increased diplomacy and positive engagement with Indonesia. This enthusiasm for engagement comes alongside anxiety about Indonesia as a threat. This dual-track in public opinion is illustrated by a 1975 *Age* Poll, which found that Australian respondents regarded Indonesia to be the fifth-most important nation both in positive (friendship and goodwill in trade and security) and negative (not likely to be friendly) terms.[82] In 1980, an *Age* Poll found that 18% of Australians thought that Indonesia presented a threat to Australia (behind Russia and China); a Gallup Poll of the same year nominated Indonesia as among the top five nations with which Australia should become 'more friendly' (after China, Russia, USA and Japan). The Lowy Institute's polling finds that Australian respondents feel that 'Australia was right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat' but also that 'it was very important that Australia and Indonesia work together to develop a close relationship'.[83]

The co-existence of fear and desire in perceptions of Indonesia echoes broader patterns. From the 1960s, policies of Asian 'engagement' were vigorously pursued partly out of a desire to neutralise Asian criticism of Australia and its policies (particularly the White Australia Policy), and partly out of a growing recognition that Asia would play a growing role in Australia's future economy and politics. For many progressives, 'Asian engagement' became a mantra embodying national progress. The emotive nature of the Australian 'engagement' debate serves to dramatise the cleavage in Australian public opinion.

Conclusions – Polling Data

Public opinion about Indonesia has been measured since the earliest days of polling in Australia. The frequency with which public opinion has been measured, and the level of attention paid to polling data by media and politicians, have rendered 'ordinary' Australians' attitudes to Indonesia into a core component of the bilateral relationship.

The West New Guinea (WNG) issue was significant in shaping Australian public opinion that Indonesia was expansionist, and that its expansion would come at Australia's expense. An overwhelming proportion of Australians opposed Indonesia's claim to WNG throughout the period 1950-1962, and a significant proportion supported the view that Australia should attempt to take possession itself. It is evident that the Australian public considered the West New Guinea issue a matter of Australian national security rather than one of Indonesian (or New Guinean) sovereignty. The WNG issue is significant in that it funnelled broader fears of Asian invasion (widespread since the 1850s) specifically to Indonesia. It is also significant for coming at a time when Australia was renegotiating its place within global systems of power and protection. WNG crystallised Indonesia as a threat to Australia at a historical moment when security arrangements with Britain and the US were being renegotiated, and Australia's defence insecurity widely discussed.

The WNG issue was also important in revealing that ***polling data can be manipulated for political purposes.*** The Gallup Poll dramatized Australian public opinion by gauging levels of support for Australian colonisation of WNG – an issue that was never considered in international negotiations. In effect, the Gallup Poll attempted to manipulate policy-makers by embedding radical political positions and suggesting that they had widespread public support. This points to the political influence attributed to popular opinion regarding Indonesia.

Konfrontasi and Indonesia's suppression of East Timor's independence movement were broadly taken as confirmation that Indonesia was aggressive and expansionist, and entrenched the notion that Indonesia posed a security threat to Australia. Successive polls in 1963-65 found that a majority of Australians supported military action in defence of Malaysia against Indonesia, with support running as high as 62% in late 1963. Common reasons were that a military deployment was "for our own protection"; that Indonesia was "too close to Australia" and so if followed that "They will be here next".[84]

Despite Suharto's declared pro-Western stance, ***fears of Indonesia grew during the 1980s and 1990s. This reflected broader concerns regarding post-Cold War global security as well as anxiety about Indonesia's militaristic approach to regional issues (especially East Timor).*** The bi-polar global system crumbled in the period 1989-1993, leaving many questioning the nature of future security. It is notable that anxiety about Indonesia rose as fear of the USSR fell. This suggests that the end of the Cold War saw the transference of anxiety from the global Cold War to a

regional context. This supports the view that anxiety is caused by Australians' sense of national insecurity, rather than/as much as fears of any particular (potential) threat.

To a significant extent, ***Indonesia is not considered a threat because of anything it does, but simply because Australians are insecure about their capacity for self-defence and Indonesia is the only viable candidate for invasion in an increasingly peaceful world.*** This finding supports previous analyses of Australian public opinion on issues of national security. David Campbell's 1986 analysis found that just over half of Australian respondents 'consistently claim that there is a threat to Australian security'. He found that 'variations in the source of threat exist against a background of a persistent but general perception of the nation's security being threatened. This suggests that there is a historical legacy…of feeling vulnerable and insecure.'[85] Tony Burke has strongly argued that 'security has been a potent, driving imperative throughout Australian history', and has 'been central to the construction of powerful images of national identity and otherness'.[86]

Indonesia has been highly visible to the Australian public during the past twenty years, focussing security anxieties on Indonesia. Indonesia's domestic instability during the 1990s was certainly a factor focussing Australian anxiety. The early 1990s was a period of tension in East Timor, culminating in the Dili massacre of 1991. Australian media actively reported on the East Timor issue and on Australian activism. During the 1994 visit of the Indonesian Vice-President Try Sutrisno, to take just one example, 'demonstrators were out in force in Sydney and Canberra…waving placards that made liberal use of words such as genocide, torture and rape'.[87]The Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the high-profile imprisonments of Schapelle Corby and the Bali Nine on narcotics charges (and the subsequent execution of two of the Bali Nine), and diplomatic crises surrounding live cattle exports and allegations of spying, have kept Indonesia in the media and in the public's eye. The unusual level of emotion in public responses to these issues has been widely noted.[88]

Despite this visibility, there is a great deal of ignorance about Indonesia. Over the past decade, Lowy Institute and Newspoll/DFAT polling has found that many Australians hold misapprehensions about Indonesia. Perceptions are often based on the assumption that Indonesia is very different from Australia, and/or on the basis of previous travel to Bali. As a result, many Australians are ignorant of the very fundamentals of Indonesian society: for instance, a large proportion of Australians are unaware that it is a democracy, believing instead that it is a military dictatorship.

Particularly dramatic expressions of 'popular' sentiment during diplomatic crises have served to entrench the notion that Australians are antagonistic towards Indonesia, and responsive to crises.[89] This assumption has been a core assumption embedded within recent polls. As Director of the Lowy Institute Poll, Ivan Cook noted that 'geographically close but otherwise very different, Australia and Indonesia have had a chequered

relationship often characterised by misunderstanding on both sides'.[90] The current Director of Polling Alex Oliver also states that Australians and Indonesians are 'two different populations that are so different in political, religious, cultural circumstances in almost every imaginable way' and that polling results are 'just a symptom of that, that simply reflects that".[91] These assumptions can potentially distort polling questions and therefore results.

Public responses to crises have sometimes been dramatic, however sentiments revealed in popular polling have been remarkably stable over more than thirty years. A Saulwick/*Age* poll in 1988 found that most Australians placed their feelings between 46-54° - exactly the same span as covered by eleven Lowy Institute polls from 2005 to 2015. Alex Oliver notes that 'opinion on Indonesia doesn't seem to change…it's pretty consistently in that ambivalent range'. Compared with findings on other issues (including climate change, the US alliance or Chinese investment), which track up and down, findings regarding Indonesia are so consistent that Oliver believes 'they're just unshiftable'.[92]

Far from being unstable and lurching from crisis to crisis, Australian attitudes towards Indonesia have been surprisingly stable over more than three decades. Across a range of polling companies and mechanisms, it is evident that Australians balance two parallel (and sometimes conflicting) views about Indonesia: a strong enthusiasm for engagement runs alongside pervasive anxiety about Indonesia as a security threat. However, it must be noted that many of these attitudes arise out of a lack of knowledge or understanding about Indonesia, with consistently high levels of ignorance about Indonesian society or politics.

Whilst polling can reveal the broad contours of these anxieties, qualitative scholarship addressing Australian perceptions of Asia, both today and in the past, is required to fully understand the drivers of popular attitudes.

So if things are stable, why does it seem that there are crises?
A longitudinal analysis of the results of Australian public opinion polling suggests that Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are stable over the long term. Yet, a common assumption holds that Australian public opinion lurches in response to crises.

Why is this the case? First of all, polling companies and commissioning organisations tend to pay more attention to public opinion in the wake of diplomatic events and/or crises. The Lowy Institute Poll, for example, has a number of fixed questions that recur from year to year; other questions are included to coincide with significant calendar events (international meetings, anniversaries) or in response to recent high-profile crises. In order to increase newsworthiness, findings are often linked to the crisis immediately preceding polling, and decontextualised from long-term measures of Australian popular opinion.

As a result, final reports often frame Australians' relatively low opinion of Indonesia as the result of the latest crisis. To take the 2013 Lowy Institute Poll as an example, the Report found that 'Australians have a somewhat lopsided view of the bilateral relationship' in that the vast majority of 84% believed that 'Australia acts as a good neighbour to Indonesia' while only 54% agreed that 'Indonesia acts as a good neighbour to Australia'. Oliver suggested that 'one cause of this mistrust may be the contentious people-smuggling issue' which was at the forefront of domestic politics during that year. However, when viewed in the longer-term, this result is in keeping with similar polls dating back several decades. This is also evident in the 2015 Lowy Institute Poll. The Lowy Institute was concerned to measure opinions in the wake of Indonesia's execution of Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan, commissioning special polls in addition to the main, long-running poll. It found that 'after the executions, Australians' feelings towards Indonesia, which have never been warm and have at times been characterised by wariness and even fear, have fallen to their lowest point in eight years'.[93] That year, the thermometer rating of Indonesia was 46°, which was 6° lower than the previous year and does indeed present a substantial fall. However, it must be noted that this is well within the 8° fluctuation (ranging from 46° to 54°) of attitudes towards Indonesia over the previous decade, a period during which Australian relations with Indonesia experienced notable highs as well as lows.

Moreover, an 8° swing is well within the norm for sentiment towards all countries during this same period, as measured by the Lowy Institute Poll. Attitudes towards the United States varied by 13 degrees (range 60° to 73°), Japan experienced swings within a 7 degree range (63° to 70°) and the United Kingdom saw a swing of 5° (between 74° and 79°) during the same period (Oliver 2015: 29). Of the five nations included in every poll between 2006 and 2015, the lowest range of variance was 7° (India and Japan). Far from wild fluctuations in response to bilateral crises, Australian attitudes to Indonesia have been within the normal range of variability. Based on Lowy Institute polling data, it could be concluded that Australian attitudes to Indonesia are as stable as attitudes towards Japan and more stable than attitudes towards the United States.

Part 2: Qualitative scholarship

What can we learn from the humanities and social sciences about Australians' attitudes to Indonesia, and how they have changed over time?

Scholars working in the social sciences and humanities have long studied Australian attitudes to Asia. Utilising discourse analysis, they have found that Australian perceptions of Indonesia (and Asia more generally) have long been negative or at best, ambivalent. They show that negative perceptions have long roots extending to the White Australia period, when the Australian nation was defined against an Asian Other. Historians and social scientists thus point to the importance of Australian self-perceptions in driving attitudes towards Asia. Their work helps explain the drivers of Australian popular attitudes, and is an essential complement to polling data. Such work suggests that shifting conceptions of Australian nationhood must be part of any attempt to shift Australians' attitudes.

In general, cultural historians make little use of polling data. Polling captures responses to contemporary events, but rarely probes the drivers of attitudes conditioning those responses; and it is these drivers that interest historians Rather than looking to polling, historians searching for a deeper understanding of mainstream attitudes have looked to the discourses that framed perceptions of Asia. Their sources include representations in media, literature, academic study and the arts, as well as in politics. Recent work has highlighted the importance of looking below the level of elite cultural outputs, to investigate 'ordinary' people's views through the prism of travel and tourism.

Asia as Australia's Other

Cultural histories analysing Australian discourses about Indonesia (and Asia more generally) emphasise four core points:

1) Australian ideas about individual Asian nations were mediated through generic and generalised ideas about 'Asia'.
2) Very deeply embedded discourses and stereotypes dominate Australian perceptions of Asia. These discourses and stereotypes were predominantly negative, ascribing Asia as a place of chaos and disorder that required European dominance, however a streak of enthusiasm for Asia ran alongside such views.
3) Attitudes towards Asia are related to views about Australia; insecurity about Australia's capacity for self-defence contributes to negative attitudes towards Asia.
4) Long-held images continue to influence popular opinion in contemporary Australia, but some views and discourses are shifting.

In his seminal *Anxious Nation: Australia and the rise of Asia, 1850-1939* (1999), David Walker argued that the Australian nation was shaped against an Asian Other.[94] Whilst originally developed in response to the 'Chinamen' who had come to Australia during the Gold Rush period, the object of Australian fears was transferred to Japan by the early twentieth century. Walker points to the fact that early Australians regarded 'Asia' as a generic entity, rather than specific nation states. The White Australia Policy was directed at 'Asiatic' migrants, using sweeping racial categories that belied the vast cultural and political diversity of Asia.

In Walker's analysis, 'Asia' provoked ambivalent, though strong, responses in Australia. Most Australians feared 'the rise of Asia', and this trope achieved mainstream usage by the late nineteenth century. However, some admired the long history and aesthetic sensibilities of the 'Orient', and others admired the 'truly feminine' women of the East. Others still hoped to profit from the vast markets of Asia. From this time, a slew of invasion narratives, in which innocent and inattentive Australia is overrun by hordes of Chinese, Japanese or generic 'Asians', thrilled mainstream audiences. The modernisation of Japan's military, and its expansionist aggression during the Pacific War, seemed to confirm previous fears and provided ballast to anti-Asian prejudices. He wrote: 'It is fair to generalize that well into the 1960s, generic Asia was seen by the mainstream media largely in terms of the threats it might pose to Australia's future. The preservation of white Australia in the face of Asia's overwhelming numbers was a recurrent concern'. However, it is important to note that Australian perceptions of Asia were complex: 'Asia was at once a terrible threat and a wonderful opportunity; it was simultaneously capable of annihilating the nation and offering new hope for its future'.[95] In Walker's reading, this complexity only increased Australian concerns. The sense that Australia had much to gain, if only it played its cards right, made Asian engagement appear to be a fraught endeavour. The fear that Australians were not equipped to successfully deal with its region has further compounded anxiety.[96]

Walker did not specifically focus on perceptions of Indonesia, which was still firmly in the Dutch colonial fold throughout the period under consideration. However, his rendering of the importance of generic Asia as a source of Australian fear reminds us that the broader context of Australian perceptions of Asia is essential to understanding attitudes to Indonesia.

This is supported by Adrian Vickers, an eminent Australian historian of Indonesia. Vickers' early work examined Australian perceptions of Southeast Asia, with a specific focus on novels about the Dutch East Indies (colonial Indonesia). Vickers argues that 'Australians had some broad idea of the [Indonesian] islands that rarely broke through to the level of consciousness'. Knowledge of colonial Indonesia 'existed at the level of presupposition, as a kind of pattern on which events and experiences were imposed'. It is because of this unconscious nature of Australian ideas about Indonesia that 'what knowledge that was available was chiefly formed and reflected in…literature.'[97] Vickers regards literature as providing a deep insight into the

'mind-set, the norms and limitations, called upon if and when the Malay islands were raised as an issue'.[98]

He found that Australian novelists characterised colonial Southeast Asia through preconceived notions patched together from British popular literature as well as mainstream prejudice. Rather than being based on specific knowledge of the Dutch East Indies or its constituent islands, the place referred to as the Spice Islands or the Malay Islands was an amalgam of colonial prejudices regarding 'natives' and stereotypes about the exotic Orient. In keeping with colonial-era norms, these images portrayed 'natives' as inferior to Europeans in character and reliability. Vickers notes that 'it is difficult to find any of the popular novels in which the native characters are presented in a consistently positive light. Even the most seemingly positive is revealed to be treacherous, perfidious or simply dangerous.'[99] Southeast Asia was represented as a place of Asian exoticism; yet it was also marked by 'native' chaos that demanded the firm leadership of white colonial power.[100]

Vickers went on to argue that this portrayal had distinct political effects, feeding the 'potentially calamitous view that the Dutch East Indies were best controlled by white powers, and that Australians fitted quite naturally into that set of white powers with influence over the dark-skinned native people of the region'.[101] This culturally-based analysis helps us understand Gallup Polls of the early 1950s, investigated in Part 1 of this report, which consistently suggested that Australia should take over West New Guinea, despite the fact that this was never raised as a possibility.[102] This corresponds with literature on Western perceptions of the East that followed Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Said pointed to the political effects of representation: specifically, he argued that European portrayals of Asia as chaotic and unruly provided a justification for European colonial dominance.[103]

This view has continued into the post-colonial era. At the completion of a history of Australian representations of Asia, Alison Broinowski wrote: 'this study taught me…how powerful images are, and once received, how resistant to change'.[104] James Rush has shown that Australian literature about Indonesia in the twentieth century reflected 'a new awareness and curiosity about the country, and also a new immediacy'. However, he found that negative views continued to dominate, so that 'Indonesia is seen as a dangerous place where things are not as they appear'.[105]

However, perceptions of Asia were not monolithically negative: as Walker and Sobocinska note, 'Australian enthusiasm for Asia is as old as its anxiety'.[106] Positive views have largely focussed around visual arts and aesthetics, tastes and flavours, sex and other pleasurable experiences. Alison Broinowski's 1992 study *The Yellow Lady: Australian impressions of Asia* examined the work of myriad Australian artists who were inspired by Asia.[107] However, whilst individual Australians developed an appreciation of Indonesian art, food and people, these sentiments had limited influence and rarely challenged the dominant, negative framing of Indonesia.

An anxious nation

The previous section pointed out the importance of image and discourse in driving Australian attitudes to Indonesia. The circulation of these images is of obvious significance. Cultural Studies and Media Studies scholars point to the important role played by the media in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Until recently, Australian journalists were generally uninterested in Indonesian domestic issues. As Tapsell shows, even the events of 1965-66 attracted coverage that was 'both limited and distorted'.[108] However, the Australian media were very interested in Indonesia's regional activities. Journalists were determined to report Indonesia's activities in East Timor, and the murder of five reporters at Balibo in 1975 further focussed Australian interest on Indonesia's brutal suppression of East Timor's independence struggle.[109] By the 1990s, their reports found a wide audience: as Hodge as found, the Dili Massacre of 1991 'was given extensive coverage' on Radio Australia.[110]

One of the most sustained analyses of the ways in which images of Indonesia have been conveyed in the Australian media is Simon Philpott's 'Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian national imagination'. Philpott argues that 'fear has been perhaps the dominant factor in shaping Australia's relations and policies towards Asia' and 'a constitutive element of relations with Indonesia'.[111] Analysing recurring themes in Australian representations of Indonesia, Philpott argues that 'seemingly routine and benign descriptions of Indonesia's 200 million plus population, its low levels of political and economic development and its status as the world's largest Muslim nation, all play deeply on white Australian fears of Asia'. He also points to the negative timbre of common metaphors of Indonesia: as a dormant volcano, as threatened by disease or infection, and as an irritant to Australia. Such descriptions pervade the work of academics, journalists and politicians. They depict Indonesia as unpredictable, irrational and volatile, even when the author's intention is to alleviate concerns. In Philpott's view, 'the unrelenting production of difference as the defining characteristic of Australia-Indonesia relations not only promotes the idea that this is somehow unique, but also…the largely unexamined idea of difference is regarded as necessarily a problem, an obstacle to be overcome'.[112]

Philpott argues that 'the juxtaposition of Australian caution, sanity, conciliation and a willingness to negotiate with Indonesian violence, flamboyance, unpredictability and foolishness…highlights the Orientalist epistemology' of Australian constructions, and argues that 'until *we* better understand our own epistemological assumptions, changing the deeply ingrained perception of fear will be profoundly difficult'. He concludes that 'the key to establishing better relations with Indonesia is not a clearer understanding of "them", but an ongoing and thoughtful unpacking of the values and fears that constitute "us".'[113]

This analysis is confirmed by Farida Fozdar's recent work, based on focus groups conducted across Australia in 2014. Fozdar found that 'there was some positivity towards the evolution of Australia's relationship with Asia…and a growing imperative to further develop this relationship, but also a great deal of subtle negativity linked to a sense of threat.'[114] This closely

correlates to findings from polling data, as outlined in this report. Fozdar found that 'When Australians do talk about Asia, it is in relation to a perceived threat' of economic, demographic, environmental or military domination. Fozdar argues that, rather than representing anything about Asia and its intentions towards Indonesia, 'such invasions are a key theme in Australians' conceptualisations of themselves, and of their political rhetoric'.[115]

Travel and tourism are also extremely important in shaping dominant Australian images of Indonesia. Agnieszka Sobocinska has argued that travel and tourism have helped shift Australian attitudes towards Asia in the long-term, as individual preconceptions were re-negotiated through personal contact with Asian destinations and people. Sobocinska's work is particularly relevant to Indonesia. Bali has been a favourite holiday destination for Australians since the 1970s; in 2015 more than 1 million Australians (roughly one in every 23) are expected to visit Bali. This has resulted in the creation of a quasi-Australian atmosphere across swathes of Kuta, which lulled many Australians into feeling 'at home' in Bali. This is important, as it suggested that Australians had begun to feel comfortable in Asia; that 'tourists produced an important counter-narrative to ongoing negative perceptions of Asia'.[116] This work suggests that people-to-people contact can mediate stereotypes and negative discourse at the level of individuals.[117]

Integrating Polling and Discourse Analysis Data:

Australians are enthusiastic about Indonesia as a place to visit and recognise its importance to Australia. However, many Australians hold a deep and lasting suspicion of Indonesia, which is seen as Australia's Other in terms of culture, politics and society. Casual assumptions hold that Indonesia is militaristic and possibly expansionist; in the absence of other direct threats, Indonesia becomes the focal point for a deep well of widespread insecurity about Australia's capacity for self-defence. Australian perceptions of Indonesia are underpinned by a sense of national insecurity.

Yet, since the 1970s, many Australians have also been eager to deepen relations with Indonesia, regarding it as one of the most important nations for Australian engagement. Whilst some wish to engage with Indonesia out of a positive interest, others wish to engage with Indonesia because they are afraid that bad relations and distrust might result in a direct threat to Australia. Many are therefore placed in something a double bind, holding low opinions of Indonesia but also realising that their negativity could be diplomatically damaging.

Taken together, public opinion polling and cultural history/discourse analysis show that, contrary to widespread assumptions, Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are not subject to wild fluctuations. This report has found that Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are remarkably stable over three decades.

Australian opinions do not lurch in response to intermittent diplomatic crises (such as those arising over the imprisonment and execution of Australians on narcotics charges; the treatment of exported live cattle; or over people-smuggling). Rather than causing negative perceptions, diplomatic crises act as a trigger point, seemingly confirming existing mistrust of Indonesia and allowing the expression of latent negative views. The widespread recognition of Indonesia's importance to Indonesia, matched with low levels of trust and high levels of fear, mean that many Australians respond to minor events as if they were harbingers of a wider conflict.

Part 3: Effect of public opinion on foreign policy

a) To what extent does public opinion intersect with foreign policy?

The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has been the subject of rigorous debate over several decades. The majority of scholarly work in this area has been conducted in the United States.

Until the 1970s, a broad consensus held that public opinion had little or no effect on foreign policy. Influential theorists including Walter Lippman, Gabriel Almond and Henry Durant held that foreign policy was crafted by elites, who in turn shaped public opinion. This was largely based on the assumption that 'ordinary' people were only interested in issues that directly affected their lives, and so did not have a great deal of interest in foreign affairs.[118] In the 1970s, theorists began to challenge this assumption. Through extensive evaluation of polling data, Caspary found that the American people were interested and engaged in foreign policy issues.[119]

Subsequent scholarship has largely supported the overturning of the Almond-Lippman consensus.[120] As Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page noted in 1988, 'the difficulty with this appraisal is that it no longer fully fits the evidence – if it ever did'.[121] Scholars have accepted that public opinion and foreign policy are related in a complex manner, with influence going both ways. Tracing specific patterns of cause-and-effect with foreign policy, many have turned to examine mediating factors including partisanship and the role of the media in forming public opinion.[122] Whilst the majority of this scholarship traces the influence of media on popular opinion, other scholarship, notably by Philip Powlick, suggests that the media is used by politicians as a means to access public opinion. This reinforces the view that foreign policy officials are deeply sensitive to shifts in public attitudes, and are constantly watching to ensure that they do not fall behind currents of opinion.

This shift can be traced in research into the Arab-Israeli dispute, which has been seen as a significant case study of the relationship between popular opinion and foreign policy. Early studies sought to reinforce the assumptions of the Almond-Lippman consensus.[123] Steadily, however, the shift in the broader literature was reflected in work on this particular case study. Fouad Moughrabi, in 1986, connected the pro-Israel attitudes of the American public with the pro-Israel policy of the US government. This work was emphatic in linking public opinion to the foreign policy of the United States.[124]

Recent scholarship has integrated increasing levels of complexity, arguing that the general public, elites, interest groups, media and foreign policy practitioners participate in a complex nexus, with information and influence flowing between the various nodes. Powlick, for example, suggests a 'linkage model' that maps the relationship between these various groups into 'paths of linkage'.[125] Other models, such as those proposed by Auerbach and Block-

Elkon, suggest a closer relationship between the ‘elite’ and ‘media’ groupings.[126] The existence of this debate proves that there is not one simple, monolithic model, but rather that foreign policy practitioners are influenced by the public as well as elites; who are in turn influenced by foreign policy precedents and elite views (communicated through the media). The ongoing, cyclical nature of this nexus of influence belies a simplistic modelling of the direction of influence. It also emphasises the importance of sustained scholarly inquiry into the patterns of influence in particular contexts, with particular care to determine the rivers and not just the manifestations of public opinion.

Coming from the social sciences, these studies commonly utilised statistical interpretation of public opinion polling as a key source of evidence. They have shown a clear link between public opinion and foreign policy since at least the 1960s. This is important for all scholars evaluating the recent past, suggesting that political and diplomatic historians need to broaden their analysis beyond that of a small elite. If public opinion is significant to the formation of foreign policy, it is important that policy makers and scholars pay attention to the texture and tone of public opinion. At the juncture of social science and humanities, historians have the opportunity to bring together an analysis of polling data, cultural sources and political decision making to produce a holistic account of foreign policy. This is particularly relevant to the history of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, a bilateral relationship in which has long been heavily influenced by mutual misperceptions.

b) Effect of Australian public opinion on policy relating to Indonesia

i) How has public opinion affected foreign policy towards Indonesia over the past 30 years?

ii) Do contemporary Australian policy makers use public opinion data when determining policy towards Indonesia?

The political science literature outlined in the previous section shows that foreign policy and public opinion are mutually constitutive, and mediated by the media, elite opinions and special interest groups. So how does public opinion, as measured in Parts 1 and 2, affect Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia?

i) How has public opinion affected foreign policy towards Indonesia over the past 30 years?

Analysis of the relationship between Australian public opinion and foreign policy over the past 30 years reveals instances in which the government was profoundly influenced by public attitudes (particularly surrounding the East Timor dispute and in response to the Asian Tsunami of 2004). It also reveals periods during which policy makers attempted to lead popular opinion, with the aim of building closer relations with Indonesia. However, instances of the latter sometimes provoked popular distrust, buttressing theories that a secretive 'Jakarta Lobby' was directing foreign policy against the wishes of the Australian public.

Whitlam and Keating

Gough Whitlam's decision to offer tacit support for Indonesia's suppression of the Independence movement in East Timor in 1975 has been regarded as a clear point when official policy diverged from popular sentiment. Whitlam's decision was based on an assessment of Australia's national interest, and the assumption that providing assistance to East Timor was not worth the risk of provoking Indonesia's displeasure.[127] The Indonesian occupation of East Timor was brutal and bloody. Although polls taken in the aftermath of the invasion did not register an immediate reaction by the Australian populace, the associations between Indonesia and militarism became strengthened.

The Keating government attempted to more closely engage with Asia, and particularly Indonesia; in so doing it went against the negative tenor of public opinion at this time. As outlined in Part 1, by 1993 Australian Electoral Study found that 57% of voters and 38% of federal MPs believed that Indonesia would pose a security threat to Australia within 10 to 15 years. This was a strong statement of Australian popular suspicion of Indonesia, and it garnered significant media attention.[128] In forging closer connections between the Australian government and military, Keating was enacting his own ideology of 'Asian engagement'. He was also acting in accordance with the advice of policy advisors and academics, who recommended that Australia build closer trade and political relations with Indonesia as it became an increasingly powerful global player. However, large swathes of the public continued to regard Indonesia with some suspicion. As we have seen, Indonesia's human rights record, particularly in suppressing secessionist movements in East

Timor and Papua were particular points of concern. Australia's increasing closeness to Indonesia was therefore regarded with some disquiet. As former diplomat Richard Woolcott wrote in 1995,

> 'It seems disturbing…that while the Government and to an increasing extent, business and the academic community in Australia recognise the importance of Indonesia and the opportunities it offers to us, there is still, within the wider community, a negative perception of Indonesia, which is actively nurtured by a relatively small, but vociferous group of persons, some of whom harbour genuine concerns about human rights and media freedom, but others of whom are simply hostile towards Indonesia. This anti-Indonesian lobby seeks deliberately, and sometimes dishonestly, to discredit Indonesia. This group portrays Indonesia in crude terms as a corrupt, expansionist, military dictatorship. Those who purvey these prejudices can damage, deliberately or naively, Australia's wider national and regional interests.'[129]

According to Woolcott, negative popular perceptions of Indonesia served to undermine Australian foreign policy. Woolcott thought that popular opinion had a clear and direct influence on foreign policy, arguing in 1995 that '…there is still a fragility about the relationship because of a negative perception of Indonesia which, even if misconceived, is quite widespread in the community at large in Australia'.[130]

Respected foreign policy commentator Desmond Ball also thought that public opinion had a direct impact on Australian-Indonesian relations in the mid-1990s. In his analysis, negative public opinion about Indonesia 'imposes real (and not always unjustifiable) constraints on the magnitude, profile and character of cooperative activities, and most particularly in the defence and security fields.'[131] He noted that the Australian government was left little room to manoeuvre when a significant element of its own constituency criticised it 'for what is regarded as hypocrisy, implicit endorsement of violations of human rights in Indonesia, and effective encouragement of militarism (and even expansionism) in Indonesia.'[132]

Woolcott's use of the term 'anti-Indonesia lobby' was carefully constructed as a rebuttal of broader accusation that Australian foreign policy was directed by a 'Jakarta Lobby', which sought to appease an increasingly authoritarian Indonesia. The emotive tenor of this debate during the 1990s, and the sense of suspicion towards the policy 'elite' that resulted, points to the potential for discord if foreign policy strays far beyond the boundaries set by popular opinion.

East Timorese Independence

There is some debate surrounding the tensions between the foreign policy elite and public opinion with regards to East Timor during the Howard Years. Clinton Fernandes has posited that a 'Jakarta Lobby', consisting of Australian politicians, bureaucrats, academics and media commentators who supported the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, led the Howard government to

pursue policies that supported Jakarta at the expense of Dili.[133] Although they are careful to avoid emotive terminology, political scientists McDougall and Edney argue that John Howard believed that the role of a leader was to direct, rather than follow, public opinion.[134] However, they argue that East Timor proved to be the exception, as Howard eventually bowed to public pressure by supporting a referendum to decide the future of East Timor, and then strongly backing the decision of the people once they voted for independence.[135]

Howard's decision to support East Timor against Indonesia returned foreign policy back within the boundaries accepted by public opinion. INTERFET peacekeeping forces, led by Australia, were stationed in East Timor during the initial years of independence. Partly as a result of bringing policy and public opinion into harmony, this intervention has been seen as a highpoint in Australian foreign policy, which brought military strength in support of Australian values. The East Timor crisis has since been recognised as a key point at which Australian policy was influenced by public opinion towards Indonesia.

The Asian Tsunami and Schapelle Corby issues

A second point at which the Australian-Indonesian relationship was affected by Australian public opinion was during the arrest and captivity of Schapelle Corby, who was captured attempting to smuggle narcotics into Bali's Ngurah Rai airport. Corby's passionate and direct proclamations of innocence aroused a swathe of public support in Australia. She also received a great deal of sympathetic media coverage in Australia, further feeding public outrage at what was seen to be a false arrest.[136]

The extent of the outrage fostered an unusually emotive political climate, and impacted on John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. A Morgan poll conducted in June 2005 found a clear majority of 58% believed that Howard should make a direct demand for clemency.[137] At the peak of the crisis, several packages containing an unidentified white powder were posted to the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra, sparking a dramatic anthrax scare. However, unlike the East Timor issue, Howard refused to bend to public pressure, and consistent communication with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono helped contain the diplomatic fallout. Nonetheless, the issue remained an irritant in Australian-Indonesian relations for several years.

A final context in which the Howard government was affected by popular opinion was the wave of public sympathy following the Asian Tsunami of December 2004. The Australian public responded to the crisis with donations totalling $260 million, as well as countless hours offered by volunteers. The public response affected the government's aid package. The Australian government initially pledged $10 million in relief funding, before lifting the figure to $35 million and then, as the scale of the disaster became clearer, to $60 million. In the weeks following the tsunami, Australians' donations began to attract as much media and public attention as the disaster itself. The government's effort began to pale in comparison to the scale of private donations. As fundraising continued to dominate public debate, the Federal

government announced a $1 billion tsunami-related aid package to Indonesia on 5 January 2005.[138] The mood for giving grew to such an extent that criticisms of the 'comparatively modest contribution' of other levels of government began to be heard.[139] Partly as a result of the public mood, state governments also pledged significant sums, as did private organisations, including banks and corporations.[140] As Marianne Hanson has noted, this was an 'unprecedentedly magnanimous' reaction that was not matched by any other nation.[141]

Contemporary events

Since 2007, vehement popular opinion has reportedly escalated a number of diplomatic issues with Indonesia. Issues such as the live cattle export trade crisis of 2011 (provoked by an ABC TV report on the treatment of Australian-export cattle in Indonesia) tested the Gillard government, which was relatively inexperienced in dealing with sensitive diplomatic issues. The lobby group Get Up! circulated a petition that received more than 200,000 signatures in a matter of days, and MPs reported significant pressure from their electorate.[142] Within days of the report airing on national television, Gillard suspended all live cattle exports to Indonesia. The media and political commentators widely agreed that Gillard took this swift and radical step because of the strength of public opinion, with the *Sydney Morning Herald* reporting that the Gillard government 'caved in to public and internal party pressure'.[143]

The executions of convicted drug smugglers Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran also brought Australian public opinion to the forefront of diplomacy. Emotive campaigns by media broadcasters placed pressure on Tony Abbott to be seen to be tough in his dealings with Indonesian counterparts. Abbott's strongest statements – including his off-the-cuff suggestion that Indonesian insistence on the executions revealed they were 'ungrateful' for Australia's post-Tsunami support – were directed at a domestic Australian audience. However, the nature of a globalised media meant that his comments were immediately publicised in Indonesia, exacerbating diplomatic tension. Abbott also pointed to the strength of popular sentiment in direct appeals for the Indonesian President to consider clemency. 'Millions of Australians are feeling very, very upset about what may soon happen to two Australians in Indonesia', he noted in a public plea in February 2015.[144] This contributed to the sense that Abbott was participating in 'Megaphone Diplomacy', which was particularly abhorred by the Indonesian diplomatic corps.[145]

These issues were aggravated by the fact that Australian leaders addressed two very different audiences – the Australian public and the Indonesian leadership. Leaders were hyper-aware of the need to retain public support in the context of a fractious domestic political climate, where consistently negative polling had provided the impetus to overthrow three elected Prime Ministers since 2010. In this context, they could not afford to ignore the fact that many Australians were uncertain about Indonesia; unlike the 1990s, accusations that Australian foreign policy ran against public demands could prove politically damaging. Yet, in speaking directly to the public, Gillard and Abbott used strong language that painted Indonesia in negative terms; in so

doing they acted against diplomatic convention and risked offending the Indonesian political leadership.

Theses crises have ongoing effects. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's visit to Indonesia in November 2015, which were interpreted as an attempt to reset Australian-Indonesian relations, saw key Indonesian Minister Luhut Panjaitan give the clear message that 'when we have a problem with Indonesia and Australia it is better not to talk to the media'.[146] Moreover, *The Australian* reported that Turnbull now faced a more difficult diplomatic climate, in which trust was 'in short supply'.[147]

c) Do contemporary Australian policy makers refer to Australian public opinion when determining policy towards Indonesia?

Media and expert analysis, as outlined in the previous section, suggests that Australian policy towards Indonesia is strongly affected by public opinion. *Interviews with key figures within DFAT, the Lowy Institute for International Policy, and academia suggest that, whilst foreign policy is created with an awareness of popular opinion, the relationship is seen to be indirect rather than direct.*

Diana Nelson, Director of the Indonesia Strategic, Political and Governance Section noted that, in the past, public opinion did impact on government policy. However, Nelson claimed that, in terms of contemporary policy, the influence of public opinion was indirect, as 'formulating foreign policy requires a very nuanced and balanced approach, where you're juggling a whole lot of interests against each other, whereas public opinion might be focussed on one issue, but not taking account of all the various interests'. In her view, public opinion is an issue that needs management, rather than a direct driver of policy.

With regards to polling, Nelson noted that DFAT Secretary (Peter Varghese at the time of interview) is conscious of public opinion, as reflected in his use of polling data in major speeches. However, 'the polling…identifies areas that we need to work on, but I wouldn't say its necessarily telling us a lot we don't already know.' Polls indicating that Australians are largely ignorant about Indonesia were particularly noted by DFAT. According to Nelson, this polling 'identifies for us that we have a work to do to build up mutual understanding'.

Nelson cites the lack of reliability of polls as one reason for DFAT's cautious approach to polling. As this report has noted, polling results can be contingent on their timing. Nelson points to the 2015 Lowy Institute Poll, taken at the peak of tension regarding Chan and Sukumaran, positing that 'if you had taken the poll six months before…you might find that indicator might move quite significantly.' She notes that longer-term studies, or those bringing together multiple sources of information (such as this one), may prove more useful in this context. Nelson notes that DFAT does some in-house work to gauge public opinion, including quantitative and qualitative analysis of correspondence addressed to the Minister. This is 'quite a good gauge of public opinion' in that 'it shows you when an issue is really capturing public attention and when people feel very strongly about an issue.'[148] Importantly, Nelson was not aware of academic literature that explored the drivers of Australian anxieties regarding Indonesia (and Asia more broadly), as outlined in Part 2.

Nonetheless, in 2012 DFAT commissioned the DFAT/Newspoll on Australian attitudes to Indonesia. The poll, which was very detailed, was expensive to field and this investment suggests a deeper interest in Australian public opinion. When questioned about this poll, both Nelson and Alison Purnell, then in the Public Diplomacy section (which oversaw the poll), played down its influence on subsequent policy. Nelson noted that it was a one-off and 'the

fact that they haven't commissioned polling since suggests that it doesn't have a real effect on policy'. Beyond noting that it was commissioned around the time of the live cattle export debate, Purnell also suggested that it was fielded without a clear sense of future impact. Instead, it was 'commissioned without really thinking about what they wanted to do with it'. The major take-away from the poll was the level of ignorance about Indonesia in Australia.[149] This reinforced the importance of increasing people-to-people contact between Australia and Indonesia, and according to Nelson, may have added impetus to establish the New Colombo Plan.

Part of the reason why the poll did not lead to more widespread policy action was because of disagreement about whether improving Indonesia's image in Australia was Australia's responsibility. Purnelll points out that 'it's not really the Australian government's role to improve Indonesia's image – it's the role of the Indonesian Embassy'. In interviews, Nelson, Purnell and Bill Farmer (Australian Ambassador to Indonesia from 2005 to 2010) all agreed that a more effective poll would test Indonesian attitudes towards Australia. They encourage future polling to take more account of Indonesian ideas, which could inform the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in building its public diplomacy programs.

Now retired from public life, Bill Farmer disagrees with Nelson and Purnell in that he believes that that public opinion has had a direct impact on foreign policy in the recent past. Farmer argues that the Abbott government's response to the executions of Andrew Chan and Myaran Sukumaran in 2015 'was driven off the rails by public opinion'. Indeed, 'our government started off with a perfectly reasonable and responsible approach', but 'at some stage or other, we stopped being proportional, we stopped being realistic and we stopped being rational about it – and that was because there was, among a certain proportion of the Australian population, a growing hysteria'.[150]

However, Farmer did not recall any instances where Australian public opinion affected his own operations. He notes that, 'sitting in Jakarta, I was less influenced by Australian public opinion than politicians in Australia operating in the daily political environment'.

Farmer's view is echoed by senior personnel at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, who believe that politicians and policy makers pay keen attention to public opinion, as measured in its polling. In an interview, Fergus Hanson, who headed the Polling program from 2008-2012, stated that public opinion has a 'huge impact on policy settings'. In his view, this was particularly the case with Indonesia, where 'the geography and economics of the situation would suggest that it should have a stronger relationship…but because of that [popular] opinion it's very hard to do this.' This was supported by Alex Oliver, Director of the Lowy Institute's Polling Program. Oliver highlights the role played by media coverage of the Lowy Institute Polls. She notes that these are 'the most prominent discussion of foreign policy that Australia has', and that the polls get 'a lot of press attention' on an annual basis. The attention is so sustained that Oliver believes the Poll 'has become a bit of a staple', with media citations on an almost daily basis. The result of

this media coverage is that the Lowy Polls have 'kick-started some conversations' within the media and the general public, which 'informs policy makers'.[151]

Both Hanson and Oliver also point to more direct influence. The Lowy Institute provides briefings for Australian Ministers and their offices as each Lowy Institute Poll is released, and summaries are sent to politicians and relevant people within departments. According to Hanson, DFAT and ONA have shown direct interest; PMO has paid intermittent attention to the polling results depending on the Prime Minister of the time. Oliver declares 'we know that politicians are taking note', as the close connections between the Lowy Institute and Ministers and other politicians mean that 'we regularly get feedback that they're well aware of the poll.' Moreover, as Oliver notes, 'SBY quoted the poll in Parliament, so that's about as good as it gets' as evidence of direct influence. [152]

Moreover, the relatively small size of Australia's foreign policy elite means that individuals often circulate between academia, think tanks and policy making roles, thus transferring knowledge to direct policy impact. Commenting on this circulation of staff and expertise, Oliver notes that 'the more circulation we get in and out of government the better for us.' The career of Allan Gyngell provides a salutary case study. Gyngell was the Executive Director of the Lowy Institute in 2004-2009, before taking up the role of Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), a key intelligence agency with direct access to both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the conclusion of his service at the ONA in 2013, Gyngell entered academia and is currently Adjunct Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University.

As Director of the Lowy Institute, Gyngell was closely involved with its public opinion polling program. In 2006, he clarified his views about the role of public opinion in the formation of foreign policy, noting that "our objective in doing these surveys is not to suggest that Australia's international policies should be determined by referendum…But it would be equally wrong to claim that public opinion should have no role in this process".[153] Gyngell also went on to author the 2007 Lowy Institute Poll Report. Although the nature of ONA means that Gyngell's assessments and advice to policy makers are heavily classified, his career trajectory suggests a sensitivity to Australian popular opinion relating to foreign affairs.

Both Hanson and Oliver agreed that the polling set the parameters for policy settings that governments felt they could take. However, they urged caution in attributing any specific government policy to public opinion polling. This was further confirmed by Dave McRae, an academic and former public servant who contributed to the Lowy Institute Poll from 2011 to 2014. McRae is conservative in attributing policy decisions to measures of public opinion, as revealed through polling. He holds that, although consideration of public opinion may inform general thinking about policy directions, it is not the prime consideration for most policy makers. He points to competing political demands, particularly those from the bureaucracy and the political parties,

and urges caution in attributing government policy to any one factor. That being said, McRae believes that policy makers are influenced by the terms of public debate, as 'none of this policy is made in a vacuum'.[154]

It must be noted that none of the pollsters or policy-makers interviewed for this report accessed research on public opinion apart from Lowy Institute or DFAT polls. When asked, none of the senior DFAT officials, or those conducting polling, had accessed historical or cultural studies analyses such as those outlined in Part 2. This means that, although they are aware of the nature of Australian public opinion towards Indonesia, they have only a limited sense of the long-term drivers of these attitudes (such as long-held anxieties regarding Australia's capacity to defend itself) as outlined in this report.

Appendix A: List of public opinion polls consulted

Australian Gallup Polls, 1945-1970

Australian Gallup Polls, nos 314-326, published Dec 1945 & Jan 1946.
Australian Gallup Polls, Nos 448-458, published Sept 1947.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 569-578, published Feb-March 1949.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 662-676, published March-April 1950.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 677-689, published May-June 1950.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 732-743, published December 1950 & Jan 1951.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 788-799, published Aug-Sept 1951.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1183-1195, published July-August 1956.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1313-1323, published May-June 1958.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1443-1457, published March-April 1960.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1492-1503, published Oct-Dec 1960.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1558-1580, published Nov 1961-Jan 1962.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1592-1604, published March-April 1962.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1605-1620, published May-July 1962.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1676-1687, published May-June 1963.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1688-1697, published June-August 1963.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1698-1710, published Sept-Oct 1963.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1698-1710, published Sept-Oct 1963.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1711-1728, published Nov-Dec 1963.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1789-1803, published Oct-Nov 1964.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1789-1803, published Oct-Nov 1964.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1789-1803, published Oct-Nov 1964.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1745-1762, published April-July 1964.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1804-1819, published Feb-March 1965.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1804-1819, published Feb-March 1965.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1836-1851, published July-Sept 1965.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 1932-1946, published Oct 1966-Jan 1967.
Australian Gallup Polls nos 2087-2104, published Nov 1968-Feb 1969.

Australian Gallup Polls, 1975-1990

Australian Gallup Polls, May 1975
Australian Gallup Polls, September 1975
Australian Gallup Polls, December 1975
Australian Gallup Polls, February 1976
Australian Gallup Polls, July 1976
Australian Gallup Polls, April 1977
Australian Gallup Polls, August 1977
Australian Gallup Polls, May 1979
Australian Gallup Polls, December 1979
Australian Gallup Polls, September 1980
Australian Gallup Polls, May 1983
Australian Gallup Polls, November 1983
Australian Gallup Polls, April 1985
Australian Gallup Polls, August 1985

***The Age* Polls**

Age Poll, February 1972
Age Poll, June 1972
Age Poll, November 1973
Age Poll, September 1974
Age Poll, June 1975
Age Poll, March 1977

Age Poll, November 1979
Age Poll, April 1980

United States Information and Communication Agency/United States Information Service

USICA, 'Attitudes to the Superpowers', 1972
USICA, 'International political economic issues, Australia', 1975
USICA, 'Foreign trade, foreign investment and ANZUS: Australian attitudes', 1978
USICA, 'Foreign Affairs Issues', 1980
USIS, 'ANZUS and Australia's security: Australian attitudes', July 1982
USIS, 'ANZUS and Australia's security: Australian attitudes', October 1982
USIS, 'ANZUS and Australia's security: Australian attitudes', October 1983
USIS, 'ANZUS and Australia's security: Australian attitudes', May 1984
USIS, 'ANZUS and Australia's security: Australian attitudes', September 1984

Saulwick/ Saulwick-*Age*/ Saulwick ABG McNair

Saulwick Poll, 1987
Saulwick Poll, August 1988
Saulwick Poll, May 1989
Saulwick Age Poll, April 1992
Saulwick Age Poll, October 1992
Saulwick Age Poll, September 1993
Saulwick AGB McNair Poll, March 1994
Saulwick AGB McNair Poll, November 1994

Australian Electoral Study

Australian Electoral Study, 1993
Australian Electoral Study, 1996
Australian Electoral Study, 1998
Australian Electoral Study, 2001
Australian Electoral Study, 2004
Australian Electoral Study, 2007
Australian Electoral Study, 2010
Australian Electoral Study, 2013

Lowy Institute for International Policy

Ivan Cook, *Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, 2005.
Ivan Cook, *Australia, Indonesia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2006.
Allan Gyngell, *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2007.
Fergus Hanson, *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2008.
Fergus Hanson, *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2009.
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Fergus Hanson, *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2011.
Fergus Hanson, *Australia and New Zealand in the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2012.
Fergus Hanson, *Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2012.
Alex Oliver, *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,* 2013.
Alex Oliver, *The Lowy Institute Poll*, 2014.
Alex Oliver, *The Lowy Institute Poll*, 2015.

DFAT/Newspoll

DFAT/Newspoll, 'Australian Attitudes towards Indonesia: Report', Newspoll, May 2013.

Appendix B: Interviews

Bill Farmer (Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, 2005-2010).

Fergus Hanson (Director, Polling Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008-2012).

Dave McRae (Senior Research Fellow, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne).

Diana Nelson (Director of the Indonesia Strategic, Political and Governance Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

Alex Oliver (Director, Polling Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013-)

Alison Purnell (Australian Embassy in Jakarta)

David Walker (BHP Billiton Chair in Australian Studies, Peking University).

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[6] Interview with Alex Oliver, Sydney, 20 October 2015.
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[11] 'Australian Indecision on Control in Java', Australian Gallup Polls nos 448-458, published Sept 1947. Question wording: "Who do you think should be in control in Java – the Dutch or the Indonesians?".
[12] 'On Java, Australia says "No Decision" although leaning to Dutch", Australian Gallup Polls nos 448-458, published Sept 1947. Question wording: "Whom do you think should be in control and govern Java – the Dutch or the Indonesians?"
[13] 'We don't want Indonesia in NG', Australian Gallup Polls nos 662-676, published March 1950. Question wording: "Who do you think should govern Dutch New Guinea – the Dutch, the Indonesians, Australia, or the United Nations?"
[14] 'We do not want Indonesia in DNG', Australian Gallup Polls nos 677-689, published May-June 1950. Question wording: "If the Dutch seem likely to hand over Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia, which of the suggestions printed below the map would you favour Australia adopting?"
[15] 'Aust or UN control of W New Guinea', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1183-1195, published May-June 1950. Question wording unknown, reporting: 'Everyone interviewed was then asked who they thought should govern Western New Guinea – the Dutch, the Indonesians, Australia or the United Nations'.
[16] 'Let UN govern West NG', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1313-1323, published May-June 1958. Question wording unknown, reporting: 'People were asked at the end of April whether Australia, the United Nations or Indonesia should govern West New Guinea, if the Dutch should leave it. Those who said "Australia" were asked whether Western New Guinea should become part of Australia, or be a UN trust territory.
[17] 'Indonesia in NG not favored', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1492-1503, published Oct-Dec 1960. Question wording: "Who do you think should govern Western New Guinea – the Dutch, the Indonesians, the United Nations, Australia, or someone else?"
[18] 'Indecision here on W New Guinea', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1443-1457, published March-April 1960. Question wording: "Who do you think should govern Western New Guinea – the Dutch, the Indonesians, the United Nations, Australia, or someone else?"
[19] 'Let UN run W. New Guinea', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1558-1580, published Nov 1961-Jan 1962. Question wording: "If the Dutch leave, who do you think should govern Western New Guinea – the United Nations or Indonesia?"

[20] 'Let UN run W. New Guinea', Australian Gallup Polls nos 1605-1620, published May-July 1962. Question wording: "If the Dutch leave, who do you think should govern West New Guinea – the United Nations, Indonesia or someone else?"
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[22] 'Australians oppose Indies NG claim', Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 13 June 1950, p. 1.
[23] 'Letters to the Editor', Advertiser (Adelaide), 27 March 1950, p .4.
[24] 'Letters to the Editor', Advertiser (Adelaide), 29 March 1950, p .4.
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[54] In 2005, the question was: "When you think about the following countries, groups or regions of the world, do you have positive or negative feelings about them?" ; In 2006, the phrasing was: "Please rate your feelings towards various countries and peoples, using a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100, the higher the number the more favourable your feelings are towards that country or those people. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country or those people, please say so". With minor changes, this phrasing was also used in 2007. From 2008, the question referred to feelings towards countries (rather than countries *and peoples*). The phrasing was: "Please rate your feelings towards some countries, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred: the higher the number the more favourable your feelings are toward that country. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country, please say so".
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[56] Ibid, p. 13
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