The Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan

Media strategy and operations in the age of mediatized war

Sean V.W. Childs

Bachelor of Science, Macquarie University

Master of Arts, University of New South Wales

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at

Monash University in 2020

Faculty of Arts

Film, Media & Communications Graduate Research

Ad majorem dei gloriam

Abstract

This thesis argues that the power of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in modern war is shackled because its media operations diminish its ability to communicate and perform. It contends that the ADF does not effectively embrace the media as a tool of war. This case is supported by examining the political, cultural and organisational factors that impede the ADF's ability to make use of the media's affordances in war. To reveal and unravel these factors, the thesis focuses on the ADF's engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017. Through this case study, it investigates the changed character of modern war, the media's role in it and the ADF's media strategy for war. The thesis identifies the existence of a 'closed-loop' media management system, which stifles the ADF's capacity to effectively utilise the power and properties of the media.

The commitment of the ADF to Afghanistan by successive Australian governments in support of the US alliance is Australia's longest involvement in war. No study prior to this research has accessed the range of senior ADF commanders responsible for the planning and conduct of war, and the national journalists who report on the ADF. It is argued that the ADF was not adequately prepared for modern war and the media's role in it, and is arguably still not prepared.

Using mediatized conflict as its conceptual framework, the research draws its original evidence from semi-structured interviews and document analysis of Australian government and Defence Department official documents. The thesis finds that because the ADF has no media strategy for war, it cannot effectively undertake media operations in war. There are two main reasons for this. First, the ADF has failed to effectively harness the power of the media's positive, active and performative role in war. Second, the ADF does not recognise that media audiences now need to be addressed as dynamic, intuitive, participatory witnesses to war. The thesis concludes that it is in Australia's national interest for the ADF to modernise and evolve its understanding of modern war and the media's role in it.

Acknowledgements

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Sean V.W. Childs
6 June 2020

Contents

List of tables and figures

Tables

Figures

Glossary

The main military and relevant terms, and their definitions as used in this thesis.

one-star The fourth highest rank in the ADF. Either a Commodore (Navy), Brigadier (Army) or Air Commodore (Air Force).

two-star The third highest rank in the ADF. Either a Rear Admiral (Navy), Major General (Army) or Air Vice-Marshal (Air Force).

three-star The second highest ADF rank. Either a Vice Admiral (Navy), Lieutenant General (Army) or Air Marshal (Air Force).

four-star The highest ADF rank. Either an Admiral (Navy), General (Army) or Air Chief Marshal (Air Force).

administrative authority/control Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Australian Defence Force (ADF) Commanded by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), the ADF comprises three services: the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force (including Reserves). Each service is commanded by a Service Chief (Three-Star) (Chief of Navy, Chief of Army, and Chief of Air Force).

Blue Force Friendly forces and their related media.

Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) The four-star responsible for the command of the ADF under the direction of the Minister for Defence. The CDF is the principal military adviser to the minister and provides advice on matters that relate to military activity, including military operations.

Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) The three-star responsible for ADF operations and joint exercises, both domestically and internationally as directed by CDF to achieve government strategic priorities.

Command The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Command and Control (C2) The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.

Control The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Decision Brief A brief by a staff officer for a Commander that allows for the Commander to make an informed decision. The brief provides a summary of the relevant facts, evidence, options, recommendations, and reasons for recommending a decision.

Defence A portfolio comprising the ADF and the Department of Defence.

Department of Defence A department of state, headed by the Secretary of the Department of Defence responsible for supporting the defence of Australia and its national interests.

Forward defence For the ADF, a military strategy that seeks to deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and her national interests.

Headquarters (HQ) The physical location occupied by a military commander and the commander's staff.

ISAF The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization/US-led International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan.

J06 The principal HQ specialist staff officer responsible for the provision of legal advice to the commander about their force and its actions.

J07 The principal HQ specialist staff officer responsible for the provision of medical advice to the commander about their force.

J08 The principal HQ specialist staff officer responsible for the provision of chaplaincy advice to the commander about their force.

J09 The principal HQ specialist staff officer responsible for the provision of public affairs advice (and advice relating to the media) to the commander about their force and its actions.

J1 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of personnel advice to the commander.

J2 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of intelligence advice to the commander.

J3 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of operational advice to the commander.

J4 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of logistics advice to the commander.

J5 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of operational planning and targeting advice to the commander.

J6 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of communication/signals advice to the commander.

J7 The principal HQ staff officer responsible for the provision of engineering advice to the Commander.

Joint Operations Command (JOC) Plans, controls and conducts military campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities in order to meet Australia's national objectives.

Joint operations/exercises/activities Operations/exercises/activities conducted by a combination of two or more arms of the ADF (Navy, Army, Air Force). Because of the size and capability of the ADF, operations/exercises/activities are generally joint.

Joint Task Force 633 (JTF 633) The ADF established HQ JTF633 in 2002 at Camp Victory in Baghdad, Iraq. It comprised the force elements for the ADF's Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) that included Afghanistan. In late 2008 they moved from Camp Victory to the Al Minhad Air Base (AMAB) in the United Arab Emirates. From 2014

the MEAO became known as the Middle East region (MER). The Commander of JTF633 exercises command and control of deployed ADF units in the MER.

MECC Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication Division (formerly known as PACC) (Australian Department of Defence).

Minister for Defence Responsible for the oversight of all aspects of the Department of Defence ranging from the budget, strategic policy and international policy through to ADF operations, force structure, capability requirements and force posture.

Mission command A philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of their intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are enunciated. However, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) loop A method of decision making that applies deductive and inductive reasoning to reduce uncertainty in war. It attempts to speedily order and verify as well as possible war's always disorderly information to obtain advantage and survive.

Operation A designated military activity using lethal and/or non-lethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes following national legal obligations and constraints.

Operations Security (OPSEC) The protection of friendly force life through the denial of enemy access to information.

PACC Public Affairs and Corporate Communication Division (became MECC) (Australian Department of Defence).

Red force Enemy or hostile forces and their related media.

Technical control The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces. Technical control is exercised by capability managers, or by designated authorities through the capability manager. Where it directly affects operations only, CJOPS exercises technical control for forces assigned to operations. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors.

Theatre Command The authority given by CDF to CJOPS to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

White Force Forces used as umpires in military exercises and forces used in a public relations function external to the exercise to promote the exercise.

Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) The three-star responsible for the ADF's joint force integration, interoperability, designing the future force, preparedness and military strategy in his role as the Joint Force Authority. The Joint Force Authority is responsible for ensuring the current and future joint force meets the capability requirements directed by Government and preparedness requirements directed by the CDF. The VCDF is also the deputy to the CDF. In the absence of the CDF the VCDF assumes the role under the standing acting arrangements.

Prologue: the context to the ADF's commitment to a war in Afghanistan (2001-present).[1]

This short prologue assists with the reading of this thesis by contextualising why and how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) found itself committed to war in Afghanistan. It briefly describes Afghanistan's conflict history and the US led International Coalition's operations for war in Afghanistan from 2001. Appendix 6 should be referred to for an understanding of the ADF's operations in Afghanistan, its timeline, arrangements, and it's broad command and control (C2) relationships within the International Coalition.

A quirk of historical fate saw the then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, in Washington on Tuesday, September 11, 2001 (9/11). He was there to meet for the first time the then recently elected US President, George W. Bush, and amongst other things, mark the September 2001 50th anniversary of the signing of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US [ANZUS] (Howard 2010). On that day al-Qaeda attacked the US's mainland.[2] Because of the attack, six days later back in Australia, and in an address to the Australian Parliament (without consulting his Cabinet), for the first time in its history Howard on behalf of his government invoked the ANZUS treaty's provisions. The invocation committed the ADF to the US-led international 'nation building' and 'counter-terrorism' effort in Afghanistan, and what has become Australia's 'longest war' (Dobell 2014a).

Since the fall of British Singapore to Japan in February 1942, Australian government support for the alliance with, and commitment to the US, has been central to its foreign and security policy (Maley 2015). Consequently, the Australian government's 2001 activation of the ANZUS treaty enjoyed bipartisan support[3] (Dobell 2014b). Importantly, that bipartisan support for the military commitment to Afghanistan has been maintained throughout, despite the gradual rise in Australian casualties, scholarly and journalistic criticism, and the steady fall in public support (Foster 2013).

The numerous ethnic tribes and clans of the lands that make up what is now called the nation-state of Afghanistan have known conflict or war in one form or another for millennia (Dupree

---

[1] At the time of writing.

[2] For a detailed account, see Kean & Hamilton's (2004) *The 9/11 Commission Report*.

[3] Since at least 1909 the Australian Federal political system has operated on a 'two-party' basis (Moore et al 1998).

1973).[4] In more modern times, following its relatively brief period of peace from 1929–78, Afghanistan plunged again into a period of conflict and bloodshed that has continued now for around 40 years. The 40 years of bloodshed includes the April 1978 communist coup, Russia's occupation and the Mujahedeen's resistance (1979–89), the ensuing periods of civil war (~ 1989–96), and the ruling Taliban's rise and fall (1994–2001) (Maley 2002).

It was through Osama Bin Laden's al‑Qaeda that the Taliban became the focus of a power and military might unimaginable to them, when the US emphatically responded to the event of 9/11 (Maley 2002). Afghanistan's ruling Taliban had made the catastrophic error of affording refuge to and hosting al‑Qaeda's founder and figurehead, Bin Laden,[5,] from where he and others planned the 9/11 attack (Kean & Hamilton 2004).

On 07 October 2001 the US launched 'Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF), a war designed to target al‑Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan and remove by force the Taliban regime.[6] Within nine weeks of OEF's commencement Bin Laden and al-Qaeda were on the run, the Taliban removed from power and dispersed, and the Bonn Agreement of 05 December 2001 in place. That agreement set the foundation for the International Coalition's (including Australia) installation of an interim Afghan Administration and the establishment of, via *UNSC Resolution 1386*, the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Bowen 2009). The mission, supported by the United Nations, came to be known as 'nation-building' (Katzman 2014). ISAF's initial mission was to provide security to Kabul and its surrounds while local Afghan security structures were dismantled. In the meantime, plans were being enacted to build a democratic Afghan central government while developing Afghanistan's economy (Katzman 2014).

---

[4]   Historically, Afghanistan's strategic position has attracted conflict, not least because of its proximity to the Silk Road between China and Europe (Maley 2002). It has been the subject of struggles between empires ranging from the ancient Median (~ 1500–550 BC) and Achaemenian dynasties (~ 550–330 BC) through to the expanding British and Russian empires (~ 1839–1919) (Dupree 1973). For more detailed discussions see Dupree (1973) and Maley (2002).

[5]   In 1996 the US's Central Intelligence Agency's 'Bin Laden unit' had been established. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda's significance as a threat was corroborated by its August 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The July 1999 US Presidential Executive Order 13129 declared the Taliban a state sponsor of terrorism. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/06/01/2011-13581/taliban-afghanistan-sanctions-regulations (accessed 12 December 2017). In August 1999, al Qaeda was designated by the US Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (accessed 12 December 2017).

[6]   For the two instruments that directed OEF see the 12 September 2001 unanimously adopted *United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1368* and the *US Congress S.J. Resolution 23*.

The October 2003 *UNSC Resolution 1510* expanded ISAF's mission, making multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) central to its strategy. Through the provision of area security and advice to the Afghan government on strengthening institutions, the PRTs sought to enable reconstruction and development efforts throughout Afghanistan. By October 2006 ISAF's mission spanned the entirety of Afghanistan. By 2009 a resurgent and belligerent Taliban intensified the war. Relatedly, the US-led International Coalition changed its policy for military operations in Afghanistan. The policy change resulted in a change to ISAF (and by default ADF) strategy. The strategy shift, from a 'nation-building' and 'counter-terrorism' focus to a 'counter-insurgency' focus required an increase in troop numbers and a greater physical presence among the local population. The result of this was increased contacts with the enemy, hence an increase in ISAF (and ADF) deaths.

Introduction: Modern war and the ADF's media strategy and operations

> Warfare is increasingly embedded in and penetrated by media, such that to plan, wage, legitimize, assuage, historicize, remember, and to imagine war requires attention to that media and its uses. (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015, p. 1323)

This thesis contends that the power of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in modern war is shackled because its media operations reduce its ability to communicate and perform. It asserts that the ADF does not successfully adopt the media[7] as a tool of war. The thesis investigates the political, cultural and organisational factors that hamper the ADF's ability to make use of the media's affordances in war. To uncover and untangle these factors, it focuses on the ADF's engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017. It explores the changed character of modern war, the media's role in it and the ADF's media strategy for war.

Simon Cottle's (2007, p. 9) definition of mediatized conflict states that the media now have an 'active performative involvement and constitutive role' in the conduct of war. The media not only report and represent war, but enact and perform it. This means that the media catalyse changes in modes of interaction between the military and the media, and changes in the character, function and structure of the military (Hjarvard 2013). The media in modern societies are central to war.[8] Maltby (2013) posits that not only do the media now shape war, but militaries now design war through and for the media. The entangled processes of mediatization and globalisation have had ontological ramifications for the conduct of war and the media's role in warfare (Eskjær et al. 2015). This thesis argues that the military, the phenomenon of war and the media are now dependent and inseparable. The characterisation of modern war means that a media strategy and media operations must now be central to war's conduct.

The character of modern war, where the informational and physical battles converge, means that the ADF, and militaries in general, are less able to control information in times of war. War is now also conducted and performed in, through and by the media. In modern war, the

---

[7]   As will be discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis uses the term 'the media' in the plural form to refer to 'news' (or noteworthy information) published through the mediums of print, radio and television and online, and/or through social media. In Chapter 2, cinefilm is also included. The key definitions and terminology are described in Chapter 2.

[8]   The changed character of modern war is detailed in Chapter 2.

media are the centre of gravity.[9] Once, militaries managed the media by denying or controlling their access to war zones. Governments censored and controlled information proposed for communication. The useable and shareable character of information across digital media platforms now means it flows unpredictably and at speed. Today, any number of actors can produce digital content. 'News' and information from any 'battle-space' is available. It is within this context that I analyse the bond between Australian military media relations and Australian military media management in war. Using the ADF's 16-year (2001–17) commitment[10] in Afghanistan as a case study, this project's principal research question asks:

> *In modern war, why and how does the ADF manage the media; and how does this affect its media operations for war?*

A resulting subsidiary question asks:

> *Who does the ADF perceive its audience(s) to be?*

My thesis contends that the absence of a media strategy for war stifles the ADF's media operations for war. There are two main reasons for this. First, the ADF fails to effectively harness the media's power to construct meaning and so construct positive relations of power. These self-reinforcing attributes are the media's power in modern war because they intensify their agency and make them an active and performative communicative resource. Second, the ADF does not recognise that its audiences – friendly and hostile – are now dynamic, participatory, intuitive witnesses to war. The ADF's media operations in Afghanistan have been focused on and defined by casualties, crises or scandals. When combined with its prevailing approach to operations security (OPSEC), the friendly media were regarded as virtually indistinguishable from the hostile media. Positive ideational framing opportunities are missed or squandered. The ADF makes little use of the compelling events, content, products and practices characterised as news to promote its military operations in war. It thus denies itself the ability to frame its participation in war effectively, and so limits its ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media. This results in an inhibited, or at worst ineffectual, attempt to legitimise the ADF's aims in war, and to create or maintain public

---

[9]   For more on information warfare, see Alberts & Hayes (2003), Rid (2007), Rid & Hecker (2009), Johanson (2017), Lewis (2018), Mansted (2018), Morgan & Thompson (2018) and Austin (2019).

[10] The 16 years represents the research period. At the time of writing, the ADF's commitment in Afghanistan continues.

support through a narrative. By failing to embrace the media as a tool of war, the ADF's ability to communicate and act is diminished and its power in war is shackled.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 provides an historical account of the ADF's dysfunctional relationship with the media and how its failure to harness its power has led to the research questions under investigation here. From the Boer War to modern war, the Australian military's policy for the media has been constrained, resulting in the restriction of the media's access to areas of operations, strained military–media relations and Draconian control and censorship of information. It identifies that the Australian military's default hostility to the media is because of the military's historical political, organisational and cultural characteristics.

Chapter 2, the literature review, establishes key realities and the thesis's key terms, introduces its conceptual framework and surveys the scholarly literature relevant to the research project. It pinpoints that mediatization has conditioned, and is still conditioning, the behaviour of those involved in war, and that those parties must accommodate the media's logic as it pertains to warfare. Mediatization has changed the character of war. It also examines the material on Australian military media relations and Australian military media management.

Chapter 3 details the project's theoretical and conceptual frameworks. It describes the qualitative research approach, data (comprising the interviews, media releases and policy), and analysis of that data. The synchronous, historiographic qualitative approach produces unique, rich and revealing data by capturing the lived experiences of personnel responsible for the ADF's media management during the case study's timeframe. The semi‑structured interviews produce insights into the sense of purpose, the ways of thinking and the beliefs of those personnel. The interviews serve dual purposes: in part they support the historical evidence presented in Chapter 1, and are a core source of the inductively derived evidence found in Chapters 4 to 6. The document analysis of the media releases reveals the ADF's dominant ideational framing in its official narrative for the war in Afghanistan, while the policy analysis affords the comparison of the evidence from the interview data with the ADF's organisational knowledge, processes and procedures. The approach taken in the analysis unveils specific instances of the ADF's restrained power in war, its limiting media management approach and its stifled media operations, while illustrating their effects on individual action and group performance. The chapter also considers the importance of my 'insider' subject position as a member of the ADF, and the role of ethics in the conduct of this study.

Chapters 4 to 6 examine the three parts of the main research question and the one subsiduary question. Chapter 4 establishes that the ADF regards the Australian government as its primary audience, and that the reason why the ADF manages the media is because it imagines that the Australian government directs it to do so. The chapter considers how this realisation determines the function and goals of the ADF's management of the media, and what the consequences of this are.

Chapter 5 examines the details and consequences of the ADF's cultural view of and relations with the media, and the ADF's application of 'technical control' for the management of the media. It then considers the effects of the ADF's constrained resources and the ADF's media management methods.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how and why the ADF stifles its media operations. The chapter finds that the ADF has no media strategy for war. It argues that the ADF is limited or denied the ability to exploit the power of the media and the audience in modern war.

The conclusion provides a recapitulation of the purpose and importance of my research and my key findings. It describes my scholarly contribution and considers some of the implications of my key findings.

Chapter 1
From the crimson tinge to modern war:
A brief history of the Australian military's management of the media in war

This chapter introduces the historical political, organisational and cultural characteristics of the Australian military's management of the media during its operations for war. Knowledge of these factors is foundational to understanding why the ADF has failed to make use of the media's affordances in modern war, and why it has no effective media strategy and media operations for war. The chapter provides an overview of the development of the Australian military's management of the media during war prior to its operations in Afghanistan. It focuses on the Boer War (1899–1902), World War I (1914–18), World War II (1939–45) and the war in Vietnam (1962–75).[11] Here the focus is the Australian military's media management for war. However, it is important to note that Australia's received history springs from the history of British colonial global expansion between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. The expansion necessarily led to frontier conflicts, including 'frontier warfare' between Australia's First Peoples and white 'settlers' (Grey 2008; McKernan & Browne 1988; Reynolds 2006). That conflict began in 1788 when elements of the British military first arrived on 'Terra Australis Incognita', defining the Indigenous peoples' land as 'terra nullius', and from 1839 to at least 1928 continued between the First Peoples, and the 'settlers' and civilian police (Connor 2002). The groups and clans of the First Peoples knew, understood and engaged in warfare (Connor 2002). They saw the settlers as invaders.[12]

The chapter then moves to a brief analysis of the six official re-evaluations of Australian military media management since 1918. The analysis focuses on the Australian government's rejection, in June 2001, of the ADF's desire to maintain its own direct and immediate

---

[11]   It does not provide an overview of the ADF's management of the media during its operations in East Timor (1999–2000) because those operations were not for war. The Boer War, World War I, World War II and the war in Vietnam were Australia's longest commitments to war prior to Afghanistan. They are also the wars that caused the greatest loss of Australian military lives – Boer War: 588; World War I: 61,548; World War II: 39,655 and Vietnam War: 521. These statistics contrast with the figures for the Malay Emergency: 39; Korean War: 340; Gulf War: 0; Iraq War: 2; and war in Afghanistan: 42. For an account of Australia's military commitments in Malaya (Malayan Emergency: 1948–60), Korea (Korean War: 1950–53), East Timor (1999–2000) and Iraq (Gulf War: 1990–91 and Iraq War 2003–13), see Anderson & Trembath (2011), where the elements that constitute Australia's military media management can be extracted.

[12]   It is estimated that some 20-thousand First Peoples died during the 'frontier wars' (Reynolds 2006).

operational release of information to the media, as and when required, without the need for ministerial approval. That desire stemmed from the ADF's media 'lessons learnt' during its security and peace mission to East Timor (1999–2000). This rejection and its enduring organisational legacy influence and inform the ADF's media operations. This history set the political, organisational and cultural conditions for the ADF's management of the media during its operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017.

The crimson tinge

The history of Australian military media management for war begins from the 1901 federation of the Australian (British) colonies. Federation created an Australian military shaped by the crimson tinge[13] of British eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture. In 1889, the father of Australian federation, Sir Henry Parkes, described Australia as tied to Britain through a 'crimson thread of kinship' (Souter 1992, p. 21, in Evans 2005, p. 13). An inspection and report on the Australian colonies' armed forces by the British Major General J. Bevan Edwards gave impetus for Parkes' call for a Federated Australia. Edwards made eight recommendations, which included '1. Federation of the forces … [and] … 3. A uniform system of organisation and armament, and a common Defence Act' (*The Argus*, Melbourne, 15 October 1889).[14] Thus, by way of its heritage, Australia's armed forces – particularly the officers – adopted a mostly British military culture: 'The new Australia was British, a part of the Empire' (Millar 1978, p. 69). The British dictated Australia's approach to managing the press during the Boer War, World War I and for the first years of World War II because Britain commanded and controlled Australia's forces. The British military's style of active press censorship suited successive Australian governments that, in the wake of federation, were keen on building and protecting fledgling domestic political power. As Millar (1978, p. 70) states, 'This was not a case of liberty reinforcing the bonds of empire, but rather habits of empire softening the resolve of liberty.'

For around its first 40 years, Australian military culture mirrored the British military's management and relations with the print media during the Boer War (1899–1902), print and radio during World War I (1914–18), and print, radio and cinefilm up until 1942 during World War II (1939–45). The Australian military's approach during these years was directed by the British. Japan's December 1941 entry into World War II and defeat of the British at Singapore

---

13   The crimson tinge is a reference to the 'red coats' worn by the British Army from the mid-seventeenth century through to the late-nineteenth century.

14   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/8560537 (Accessed 9 May 2018).

(15 February 1942) saw the Australian military align its approach to that of the US military.[15] Other than Australia's military commitment to the British-led operations during the Malay Emergency (1948–60), the US influence remained throughout the Australian military's commitment to the US-led war in Korea (1950–53). However, for the US-led war in Vietnam (1962–75), the Australian approach to media management provides a striking point of contrast between two national approaches to media relations. It was not until the late 1960s, during the Vietnam war, that the Australian Department of the Army sought to create a public relations steering committee that would pave the way for a more proactive Australian military approach to media management (Gorman 2008). In the 60 years and more since then, in a shifting media ecology, there have only been four formal attempts to modernise the Australian military's approach to media operations.[16]

To understand the history of the Australian military's approach to media management, it is important to appreciate that Australia has never unilaterally committed itself to war.[17] The relatively small size of its military forces and their limited power preclude it from doing so. Australia has only entered war as either part of the larger British Empire (Boer War, World War I, World War II) or as a smaller alliance partner to America (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan). In all those contributions, the leading power influenced and informed the Australian military's actions (Dennis 2008). Notably, that influence did not extend to the Australian military's actions towards the media for the wars in Vietnam or in Afghanistan.

The wars in which the Australian military has participated are categorised as either 'total wars' (World War I and World War II) or 'limited wars' (Boer War, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan). Total war is an 'an all embracing imperialist war, waged by all manner of means, not only against enemy armed forces, but against the entire population of a nation, with a view to its complete destruction' (Alger 1985, pp. 1–2). Australia's total societal mobilisation characterised the total wars. They were wars that were perceived at the time by Australia to be

---

[15] With the fall of British Singapore to Japan, ostensibly Australia was left to defend herself. Unable to do so, her reliance for defence meant a turn away from Britain to a closer alliance with the United States (Millar 1978). That reliance remains to this day.

[16] (1) The Buchan review of 1999, (2) The Department of Defence Public Affairs and Corporate Communication (PACC) Division's year 2000 report, 'A Military Public Affairs Capability for the 21st Century (3) The Hannan review of 2003 and (4) The Australian Defence Force 2016 Crane report, 'Joint Military Public Affairs review'.

[17] An important distinction is required here. The British-led Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and the Australian-led East Timor 'intervention' are not classified as wars. In Malaya, the conflict was a 'counter-insurgency' effort. East Timor (1999–2000) was a 'stability operation'. For a nuanced explanation, see *The Cambridge History of War: Volume 4: War and the Modern World* (Langewiesche et al. 2013).

battles of survival or destruction. In keeping with total societal mobilisation, total media control was also required (Anderson & Trembath 2011). Via legislative decree, the military exercised discretionary power in their granting of media access, and control and censorship of the media. That approach was consistent with Australia's intensification of a British 'national interest' tradition, which held that a more liberal release of official information worked against the preservation of the creed of ministerial responsibility (Campbell 1973). The Australian military's version of that tradition was the over-identification of national interest with its own political, cultural and organisational interests (Ball 1979).

In contrast, limited war seeks 'to exact good behavior or to oblige discontinuance of mischief, not to destroy the subject altogether' (Doughty 1996, p. 913).[18] Limited wars are grounded in ideologies where, compared with total war, there is an equal if not greater propaganda contest to justify to the domestic public the engagement in military conflict (Langewiesche et al. 2013). In limited wars, total discretionary powers are 'limited'. Aside from military attempts at obstruction, there is little to prevent an inquisitorial news media from gaining access to the area of operations, other than their own perceived physical risk, their motivation to be present or accessibility.[19] Nor is there a legal instrument for governments to impose censorship. The Afghan War under investigation here is a limted war.

Boer War (1899–1902)

Straddling Australia's 1901 federation, the British-led Boer War in South Africa was the first war in which Australia took part as an independent nation. The federated Australia did not have the means, let alone the inclination, to adopt its own policy for managing the press during the war. Because its original and continued commitment of military forces as a Dominion was tied to the Queen and the Empire, British policy and practice were entrenched (Millar 1978). Censorship was central to the British military's press relations and management policy (Hills 2006). British authorities instructed censors in Aden and Durban to prohibit the transmission of all 'uncleared' telegrams (whether private, coded or ciphered) (Hills 2006). Central to the military's censorship of the press was the rationale that the enemy had access to the telegraph

---

[18]   With the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the onset of the Cold War the US presidential administrations of Truman and Johnson were wary that any war risked global nuclear annihilation, hence a limited warfare strategy was developed.

[19]   Here accessibility encompasses the physically hard to get to and the barriers actively erected by powers opposed to open scrutiny, – for example, Saudi Arabia's efforts to dissuade unilateral reporting during the Gulf War (1991).

and newspapers, fear of espionage and the inadvertent transmission of information to the enemy (Anderson & Trembath 2011).

At the same time as the British, the Australian press witnessed and wrote about the war. At this time, there was a degree of positive interaction between the newspapers and the Australian participants (Morgan 2002). The British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, triggered the interaction. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80), Roberts marched his British Army from Kabul to Kandahar to secure victory at the Battle of Kandahar. The celebration and promotion of the victory established Roberts' 'media friendly' disposition during the Boer War (Morgan 2002, p. 6).

The Boer War is an example of the British military's early recognition of the media's role in limited wars (Wilcox 1999). The war's conduct coincided with British political and social developments that overlapped with the development of mass media technology. Access to the area of operations by the press was allowed by the British Army, governed by news correspondent accreditation and general rules of conduct (Wilcox 1999).

The management of the press followed the established British pattern. Control of the means of communications enforced censorship. Journalists who failed to comply with military directions were disciplined (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Wilcox 1999; Young 1996). Despite concerns about the level of military-endorsed propaganda that was reaching the British and Australian press in the form of purportedly objective independent reporting, and that served to foster support for what Liberals saw as an unjust war (Wilcox 1999), press reporting later in the war did serve to inspire anti-war sentiment (Morgan 2002). Limited in their ability to report objectively, and in the absence of actual news to report, the media turned to reporting on themselves. For example, under the headline 'Press Criticism', Western Australia's *Inquirer and Commercial News* wrote: '*The St James Gazette*, re-echoing the opinion expressed in *The Times*, states that the Government is not making adequate efforts to end the war. The *Pall Mall Gazette* takes a similar view' (*The Inquirer and Commercial News*, Perth, 10 May 1901).[20] The supposed negative effect on public sentiment of the press's criticism of military strategy during the Boer War laid the foundations for the management of the media during World War I (Farrar 1998).

---

[20]   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/67075848 (Accessed 31 August 2018).

World War I (1914–18)

There was no doubt in the minds of Australia's political leaders and the press of the day that Britain's 4 August 1914 declaration of war on Germany meant that Australia too was at war. An Australian federal election was underway at the time. Then Prime Minister Joseph Cook and Opposition Leader Andrew Fisher supported the assumption that a British declaration of war necessarily included Australia. Australia's soon-to-be Prime Minister Fisher affirmed that 'Australia will stand beside our own to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling' (*The Argus*, Melbourne, 3 August 1914).[21] Under unquestioned British command, the long reach of colonial censorship and control, solidified by the crimson tinge, mandated the Australian military's management of the press throughout World War I.

Ten years before Britain's declaration of war, the British Government had decided the why and how of Australian press management in the event of war (McCallum & Putnis 2008). In April 1904, Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttleton, informed the Australian government of the intended system of censorship. On 30 July 1914, at the behest of Britain's Secretary of Defence, the Australian Secretary of the Postmaster-General's Department enacted the censorship regime: 'Cable and wireless censorship was formally introduced in Australia on 3 August 1914 by an order in Council passed by the Federal Government' (Fewster 1980, in McCallum & Putnis 2008, p. 19). It was not until 28 October 1914 that censorship became law in Australia, with the enactment of the *War Precautions Act 1914*. The Act directed the establishment of the Censor's Office, which was to be run by the Australian Army,[22] with the Chief Censor in London and the Deputy Chief Censor in Melbourne (Cain 1993). Through the vested authority of Australia's Department of Defence, censors and 'press escort officers'[23] were chosen from the military ranks (Scott 1921). Regardless of its practical application by the

---

[21]   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/10800051 (Accessed 9 May 2018).

[22]   For the sake of simplicity and understanding, this chapter uses the term the 'Australian Army'. Historically, following Australia's federation, the merged colonial armies became the Citizen Military Force (CMF), which then became known as the Australian Military Forces (AMF). The two Australian volunteer forces for World War I and World War II were known as the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). After World War II, the AMF were reorganised – the Australian Regular Army was formed in 1947 and it was not until 1980 that the 'Australian Army' became its official name. For a more comprehensive understanding of the Australian military's structure, see https://www.awm.gov.au/learn/understanding-military-structure (Accessed 3 March 2020).

[23]   'The Japanese [during their 1904–05 war with Russia] 'devised the concept of escort officers, a concept … that was adopted with alacrity by the Australian Army and has remained in consistent practice ever since' (Denis Warner, lecture, c.1980s, Denis Warner Papers, MS 9489, Series 11, Box 68, National Library of Australia, Canberra (in Anderson & Trembath 2011.)

Australian Army, the scheme remained British. For its duration, the notion of total war guided relations with and the management of the press.

From the outset, the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Commander of the British Expeditionary Force meant the abandonment of any British plans for an inclusive approach to managing the press during the war. The contempt that Kitchener displayed for the press before the 1898 Battle of Omdurman – 'get out of my way, you drunken swabs!' – framed his hostile relations with them (Hastings 1985).[24] From the beginning, press accreditation was denied to all (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Young 1996). However, in terms of Australia's presence in the Middle East and Gallipoli, 'General Sir Ian Hamilton, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force … consciously strove to foster amiable relations' (Bean & Fewster 2007, p.6). This meant that, at least for Australia's official war correspondent Charles (C.E.W.) Bean, access to Australian troops in action at Gallipoli was possible.

Despite Hamilton's conciliatory overtures, the Australian government and British authorities curtailed access to all of Australia's areas of operations. At the direction of the British Army Council, the Australian government and military were permitted only one 'official' war correspondent (C.E.W. Bean) to cover the battlefields of World War I (Bean & Fewster 2007; Murdoch 2010). This did not always translate into amiable relations:

> [Bean] had hardly mentioned the 4th in his articles … Monash took the opportunity to complain that the 4th was not getting its due [for its actions at Gallipoli] in press coverage. He grew heated when Bean demonstrated that he knew very little of the Brigade's hard work. (Perry 2004, p. 206)[25]

From the military's perspective, the rationale for restricting access was that any additional 'eyewitness' reportage would create too much journalistic competition, thus compromising security (Bean & Fewster 2007; King et al. 2005; Murdoch 2010). Infamously, under the title of 'Eyewitness', the majority of the content that reached the press in English for publication from the battlefields of France was penned by a Royal Engineers Colonel, Ernest Dunlop Swinton. Swinton's focused efforts were framed by the ever-present adversary and the need for unbridled propaganda regardless of the truth:

---

[24]   Kitchener had assumed command of British forces engaged in the Anglo-Sudan War of 1881–99.

[25]   The Australian, General Sir John Monash, was at the time the Commander (Brigadier General) of the Australian Imperial Forces' 4th Brigade. There is a deeper nefarious reality behind the relationship between Monash and Bean. Bean was anti Monash and actively sought to undermine him. For a detailed account see Perry's (2004) *Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War*.

The principle which guided me in my work was above all to avoid helping the enemy. This appeared to me even more important than the purveyance of news to our own people … For home consumption … I essayed to tell as much of the truth as was compatible with safety, to guard against depression and pessimism, and to check unjustified optimism which might lead to a relaxation of effort. (Swinton 1932, p. 53)[26]

In response to US political pressure and mounting domestic pressure, the British government allowed a small number of accredited correspondents to cover the Western Front from June 1915. The US President Woodrow Wilson was concerned the news that was reaching the American public was mostly German propaganda (Farrar 1998). Of the plentiful pool of Australian correspondents available to cover the war, just two photographers and 11 journalists covered it from its three fronts, and only C.E.W. Bean for its duration (Anderson & Trembath 2011).

The British military did not trust the press, particularly its ability to report the truth – not that 'official' military reporting contained much truth. As a result, control of the press and censorship of their work were harsh and absolute (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Farrar 1998; Williams 1999). Because of this system, a reality gap opened between the Australian public and those who experienced World War I's carnage (Farrar 1998). The British 'soldier poets' of World War I also grasped this sentiment with their realisation that belief in noble patriotism and sacrifice was the unjustified optimism. On his imminent return to the Western Front after a four-month convalescence in Britain, Siegfried Sassoon diarised on 27 December 1917 that:

My absurd decoration is the only thing that gives me any sense of responsibility at all. And the thought of death is horrible, where last year it was a noble and inevitable dream. And nothing left but to watch the last flare-up, and try to dodge through to the end, 'the victory that is more terrible than defeat' – exhaustion, and blind men with medals, and everyone trying to clear up their lives, like children whose little make-believes have been smashed and ruined in the night. (Sassoon 1917, in Bruccoli et al. 1998, p. 45)

The disinformation was the consequence of the British and Australian Army's official censorship, censorship in Britain and Australia, journalistic self-censorship and the Australian

---

[26]   https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_correspondents (Accessed 19 September 2019).

public's influence on the editorial decision-making process because of its own inability to stomach the truth (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Bean & Fewster 2007; Farrar 1998):

> [Bean] said it was difficult to simply write the plain truth about their [Australian] battles [at Gallipoli] because 'the tender Australian public, which only tolerates flattery and that in its cheapest form, would howl me out of existence'. (King et al. 2005, p. 206)

Despite an attempt by the Australian journalist Keith Murdoch[27] to expose the reality of the Gallipoli fiasco, which resulted in his arrest by the British military in 1915, few members of the press ever endeavoured to report the useless slaughter and inept military leadership (Bean & Fewster 2007; Hutchinson 2005). Even after the war's conclusion, 'post-war voices of criticism … in Australia were … muted, perhaps non-existent' (Williams 1999, p. 263). In the wake of World War I and widespread awareness of its colossal carnage, the press understood that its readership had lost confidence in its ability to report the truth. A more inclusive military–media relationship was established during World War II (Williams 1999), although it was still far from ideal.

World War II (1939–45)

Australia's crimson tinge continued into World War II: upon its outbreak, the three Chiefs of the Services were British (Millar 1978).[28] Australia's political leadership understood that Britain determined Australia's destiny in war. Any declaration of war by the British would once again mean that Australia too was at war. The radio broadcast of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies on 3 September 1939 reinforced the crimson thread of kinship:

> It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that, in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war. (*The Argus*, Melbourne, 4 September 1939)[29]

In contrast to World War I, where the Australian Army was responsible for censorship, in World War II the Australian Government made the civilian Department of Information

---

[27] Father of Rupert Murdoch, founder and chairman of multinational media conglomerate News Corporation.

[28] The three Services of the Australian Military Forces were the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force.

[29] https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/11250356 (Accessed 10 May 2018)

responsible for the screening and censorship of journalistic output (Sekuless 2008). As with World War I, given that this was a total war, total media control was paramount. Under National Security Regulations, the Department regulated print, radio and cinefilm reporting while monitoring war correspondents (Darian-Smith 1990). For the Australian military, their public relations function was to liaise with the media and control information to protect operations security (Fitch 2016). From the beginning, relations between the Australian military and the Department were stressed (Sekuless 2008):

> The Army and Navy were reluctant to furnish the Department with current background information on military conditions, however necessary, for propaganda. (Hilvert 1984, p. 23)

It was not until April 1942, with Australia's turn to a closer American alliance, that the Directorate of Public Relations was established. The establishment of the Directorate in the Department of the Army and not the Department of Information demonstrated that the military did not trust civilians with its information. As a Colonel, the Director General of Public Relations, Errol Knox,[30] worked 'in close association with General MacArthur and the principal officers of the United States forces in Australia' (*The Age*, Melbourne 8 April 1942).[31] His position also reflected the Army's determination to tighten its control of information, and the government's desire to improve the strained relations between the Australian military and the media (Torney-Parlicki 2000).

Despite Royle's (1987, p. 148) claim that 'authorities regarded the war correspondents as vital cogs in the allied war effort and went to great lengths to provide them with up-to-the-minute information', the scholarly consensus is that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the relationship (Foster 2011; Hutchinson 2005; Torney-Parlicki 2000; Young 1996). Tensions remained even after the then Australian Labor Prime Minister John Curtin created the Press Censorship Advisory Committee (PCAC) in April 1942. This committee was supposed to enable a negotiation between the military, government and the press to avoid quarrels between censors and correspondents. Tensions culminated as late as 1944 with the 21 February resignation of Kenneth Slessor, the Australian Official War Correspondent, due to frictions between himself and Army authorities (Hutchinson 2005; Slessor & Semmler 1987; Torney-Parlicki 2000). Slessor, who worked for the Department of Information said he deplored

---

[30]   The civilian and managing director of the *Argus* and *Australasian* newspapers.

[31]   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/205285481 (Accessed 10 May 2018).

the readiness with which certain Army authorities assume that correspondents are always endeavouring to belittle or 'libel' men for whom they have the deepest admiration, or that they are seeking to aggrandize themselves. This hyper-sensitive and hair-splitting reaction to the work of responsible newspapermen … does much to widen the breach which already apparently exists between certain sections of the Army and the representatives of the Australian people at home. (Slessor, in Slessor & Semmler 1987, p. 461)

Instigated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey, pursued by the Australian Army's newly appointed Director General of Public Relations, Colonel John Rasmussen[32] and supported by Prime Minister Curtin, Slessor's accreditation was to be withdrawn because he was 'considered to be a danger in an operational area. He is regarded as irresponsible, and unsuitable' (Rasmussen, in Slessor & Semmler 1987, p. 463).[33] Slessor, seeing that the political knives had been drawn, resigned before there was a chance for his 'official dismissal'. Meanwhile, an independent Member of Parliament called on Prime Minister Curtin 'to stay further action until such time as a civilian, and not an Army officer, had an opportunity to determine whether Slessor was being prejudiced and treated unjustly by Army Officers' (*Burnie Advocate*, Tasmania, 25 February 1944).[34] The Slessor affair reflected not only the Australian military's distrust of the Department of Information, but also its distrust of the news media.

Despite strained relations, war correspondents accessed Australian military personnel in the field, particularly on the front lines of New Guinea (Royle 1987; Torney-Parlicki 2000). However, access was not completely open. A public relations officer's written permission or presence were required, and political matters were off limits (Torney-Parlicki 2000). General

---

[32]   The Acting Director General of Public Relations, Lieutenant Colonel Rasmussen (who had been the Deputy Director), replaced the Director General of Public Relations, Colonel Errol Knox, in February 1944. Knox had apparently retired from the position due to poor health; however, his retirement date is suspiciously close to the February Slessor affair. On his retirement, Knox was given the honorary rank of Brigadier. Rasmussen was promoted to the rank of Colonel in line with the Director General of Public Relations position: see https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/11818417 (Accessed 19 March 2020).

[33]   The Australian Army (and the political level) were scathing of Slessor's recounting of his experience, during an interview with the Sydney newspaper the *Sunday Sun and Guardian*, of the Australian Army's 9th Division, 20th Brigade's (2/17th and 2/13th Battalions) 22 September 1943 amphibious assault against Japanese forces at Finschhafen, New Guinea. The Army were particularly dismayed by 'such incorrect statements as the allegation that wounded men lay where they were hit for two days, and that men ate biscuits which they picked out of the mud' (Rasmussen in Slessor & Semmler 1987, p. 461). For a detailed account of the Slessor affair see Appendix B of *The war despatches of Kenneth Slessor: official Australian correspondent 1940-1944* (Slessor & Semmler 1987).

[34]   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/68842274 (Accessed 10 May 2018).

Blamey's revocation of the Australian Broadcasting Commission's correspondent Chester Wilmot's accreditation is a case in point. Wilmot, in a script proposed for publication[35] obtained by Prime Minister Curtin, had criticised the Australian high command. Its opening stanza read, 'The situation, which resulted in the Japanese getting to within 35 miles of Port Moresby, appears to be one which should never have arisen if enough troops, adequately trained and equipped, had been sent to New Guinea in time' (Wilmot in McDonald 2016, p. 275). In response, authorities withdrew Wilmot's accreditation in November 1942, accusing him of promoting the wrong image of the Australian war effort through disparaging reports of Australian operations in Papua and New Guinea (Young 1996).

Following on from the World War I journalistic tradition of self-censorship, Australian military commanders in the Middle East preferred to rely on the same approach, with official censorship largely absent (Royal 1987). However, the Wilmot and Slessor affairs demonstrated to correspondents that, in self-censoring, discretion was preferable over openness and sometimes truth.

In the Western Pacific, Australian correspondents felt that the American military's approach to censorship was relaxed compared with that of Australia (Foster 2011). In contrast, the Australian military subjected Australian journalists to the strictest of censorship and hampered their ability to report the reality of the fighting (Royle 1987). Typifying the military's rigorous control and suppression of information was the public reporting of Japan's 19 February 1942 attack on Darwin. The two separate attacks on the city and the port, which marked the first time Japanese bombs to strike Australia's mainland, were not widely reported. The military prevented the three journalists present in Darwin from transmitting their reports (Lockwood 1992; Powell 2007). They were only able to file them two days later from Katherine, over 320 kilometres from Darwin, once they had arrived on an evacuation train. Significantly, before these reports were published by the press months later and with little detail, the Australian government had stated that only two people were killed and 12 wounded.[36] In fact, the figures were closer to 250 killed and 300–400 wounded (Lockwood 1992; McDonald 1998; Powell 2007). Overall, military–media relations during World War II were little improved from those of World War I.

---

[35]   The unpublished script was titled 'Observations on the New Guinea Campaign August – September 1942'.

[36]   https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/159056585 (Accessed 5 May 2020).

Vietnam (1962–75)

The Australian government's initial 1965 commitment of combat forces to the US-led military operations in Vietnam resulted from an offer to the United States.[37] The purpose of the contribution was twofold: first, to demonstrate that Australia was a solid ally to the United States that deserved reciprocal commitment; and second, to invigorate the US commitment to the defence of Australia's South-East Asian area (Millar 1978). In 1966, Prime Minister Harold Holt declared that Australia was 'all the way with LBJ' in Vietnam.[38] Holt's claim – reminiscent of previous Australian prime ministers' zeal for the British – typified Australia's policy of commitment to the United States.

From within the Department of Army and through Army Headquarters, the Directorate of Army Public Relations was responsible for and maintained the Australian military's approach to the management of the media.[39] As with World War I and World War II, the Australian military drew public relations officers from within the military ranks. The Australian military maintained the application of a total war ethos, despite the more liberal approach adopted by the US military, which was the instigator and lead proponent of the limited war.

Relations between the Australian military and the news media in Vietnam were poor. Australian service personnel engaged reluctantly with the Australian media, in part because of their chain of command's discouragement (Lunn 1985; Payne 2007). A telegram from Austforce, Vietnam, to the Department of the Army in Canberra stated that their 'senior officers had been advised … to avoid contact with the press' (Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 237). In 1969, Lieutenant Colonel L.B. Swifte of the Australian Army's Public Relations Unit in Vietnam echoed the reality of this policy when he noted the 'explicit instruction from COMAFV [the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam] – no report of a conversation with a member of the force may be released without it having first been cleared by a PR Officer'.[40] As *Daily Mirror* journalist Donald Wise remarked, the Australian Army's method of public

---

[37] In the context of the US defence relationship the Australian military aided the Republic of (South) Vietnam in the form of: (1) military training instructors in May 1962 (2) an increase in instructors and the inclusion of light transport aircraft in June 1964 (3) the initial infantry battalion in April 1965 and (4) subsequently two more infantry battalions, and naval and air combat elements. The last Australian combat and enabling elements were withdrawn in early 1972 (Millar 1978).

[38] 'All the way with LBJ' was a prominent Democratic Party slogan in the successful Lyndon B. Johnson 1964 US Presidential election campaign.

[39] The Department of Information that had been established in World War II was disbanded in 1950.

[40] Ref: PR 87/84 Papers of LTCOL L.B. Swifte, Army PR Unit, Vietnam. AWM File: 419/101/029 (from folder 1 of 5).

relations was best described as a 'feel free to fuck off' approach (Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 238).

In the American-led war, the Joint United States Public Affairs Office's (JUSPAO) policy in Vietnam was to provide journalists with 'full cooperation and assistance, within the bounds of operational requirements and military security [which meant] access to [military] air, water and ground transportation' (Lunn 1985, p. 6).[41] The Australian government and military did not follow the American approach. They restricted all access for the Australian news media (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Lunn 1985; Payne 2007; Young 1996). Strict guidelines served to dictate the degree of access, as well as setting the standard and style for reporting (Foster 2012). Where the US military's public relations effort sought publicity, the Australian government encouraged its military to guard against media inquiries and not to reveal any facts (Payne 2007).

The fact that the United States and Australia did not officially declare war in Vietnam made official censorship difficult to justify. Regardless, censorship and control of the Australian media occurred (Payne 2007). An attempt at official censorship occurred in October 1968 when then Defence Minister Allen Fairhall sought to implement censorship guidelines. The proposed restrictions called for Australian journalists to 'clear' their copy through military officials in Vietnam if they wanted to quote Australian soldiers (Payne 2007). According to journalist Creighton Burns, 'Australian officers in Vietnam [were] trying to find a means of applying regulations that were written in the Defence Department in Canberra with little apparent regard to whether they were acceptable to commanders in the field – or even workable' (Burns in Payne 2007, p. 4).[42] Self-censorship too continued to be a reality in the reporting of the war in Vietnam (Young 1996; Foster 2012). Most Australian journalists of the time agree that the level of control was inhibiting (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Foster 2012; Payne 2007; Torney-Parlicki 2000).

The six official re-evaluations of Australian military media management

Despite the changes that have occurred in the military, media and geopolitics since 1901, the Australian government and its military have only undertaken six reviews of their approach to military media management over that time. The Participant quotations to follow, which support

---

[41]   This quote is from the wording of the JUSPAO issued press accreditation card.

[42]   Burns' comment comes from his cable to *The Age* that was included in the Australian Ambassador in Saigon, Ralph Harry's letter to the Australian Department of External Affairs.

the description of the ADF reviews, are procured from the same set of interviews that provide the inductively derived evidence found in Chapters 4 to 6.

The 1918 Conference of Editors

Because of falling public support for Australia's involvement in World War I and determined complaints by the Australian press against official censorship,[43] the Australian government convened a conference in Melbourne from 16 to 19 April 1918 to discuss censorship (McCallum & Putnis 2008). The government and the military recognised that press relations needed repairing. From the organisers' perspective, the purpose of the conference was to '[rekindle] once more that spirit of patriotic fervour which carried [Australia] on … a tidal wave at the beginning of this War'.[44] In all, participants[45] agreed that the management of the press would benefit from closer working relationships. The result was the creation of the Press Censorship Advisory Board (PCAB). It met weekly from May 1918 through to the end of the war to grapple with censorship.[46] Though it ceased to function on 11 July 1919, its key realisation – that censorship was more a political tool than a military operation – is a legacy that remains to this day (McCallum & Putnis 2008).

Australian Army 'PR Steering Committee' (1967)[47]

During World War II through to the late 1960s, there was no official attempt by the Australian military to review or update its approach to media management. During the war in Korea and Australia's commitment of combat forces to the war in Vietnam, the Australian military's approach to media management was not a proactive affair (Gorman 2008). That was until 1966 when, in response to negative public sentiment regarding the military's efforts in Vietnam, the Department of Army established a public relations steering committee (Payne 2007). The Army was worried that it was taking a reactive stance to 'civil media requests rather than adopting a

---

[43]   The Australian press were effectively banned by the War Precautions Act 1914 from discussing censorship.

[44]   'Proceedings of the Press Censorship Conference from 16 to 19 April 1918'. Australia, Department of Defence, NAA MP 124/5/5, 1918, p.7 (hereafter referred to as 'Press Censorship Conference Proceedings').

[45]   The Press Censorship Conference Proceedings p. 1 reports the participants as editors from the *Brisbane Courier, Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Standard and Worker; Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, Evening News, Sun, Worker, Sunday Times and Bulletin; Melbourne Argus, Age and Herald; the Adelaide Mail, Advertiser and Herald; West Australian, Westralian Worker, Daily News and Sunday Times* from Perth; *Hobart Mercury*; and the *Launceston Examiner* and *Daily Telegraph*. In addition, each of the State Censors' offices was represented by senior naval and military (non-naval) staff.

[46]   Press Censorship Conference: draft committee report, 17 April 1918. Australia, Department of Defence, 1918, NAA MP367/1 437/1/115 Part 1 & 2, 1.

[47]   The committee was established in 1966 but did not meet until 10 May 1967 (Payne 2007).

positive, promotional approach to the Army and its activities'.[48] The committee's establishment recognised the 'need to improve the capability within the Army … for dealing with media comments and queries'.[49] A Defence Public Affairs Organisation was established, centred on the Army Public Relations Service. Its focus was to publicise the three services of the Australian military and the Department of Defence (Weiland 2003).[50] Moving at a glacial pace, the Directorate of Defence Public Relations established the 1st Media Support Unit in 1984. The Defence Media Advisory Group (DMAG) was created in 1986, performing a similar role to that of the PCAB of 1918 and the PCAC of 1942. DMAG's role was to foster close relations with the news media. It frequently met to advance and deliberate on matters relating to the recently introduced (1985) *Joint Services Publication (JSP) (AS)41 Defence Public Information Policy During Periods of Tension and Conflict* (JSP 41). The DMAG and JSP 41 were defunct by 2002:

> I was *The Age*'s defence correspondent from about 1997 until I became defence editor of *The Australian* and I don't recall any contact with that group [DMAG]. I don't think anything replaced it formally, though from time to time I'd be asked for my views on how effectively Defence dealt with the media and how that could be improved. Any suggestions never seemed to go anywhere. I think it's got significantly worse. (Brendan Nicholson, Participant 20)

Buchan review (1999)

The Buchan review, endorsed by the Defence Executive, found that there was 'the need for a military public affairs capability that is able to operate in "engagement and conflict situations"' (PACC report, 2000, p. 3). In examining the effectiveness of the then Defence Public Affairs Organisation, the review led to its replacement and the establishment in July 2000 of the Defence Public Affairs and Corporate Communication (PACC) Division. The review's establishment of the PACC has had a lasting impact on the ADF's approach to its management of the media. As the ADF's Military Advisor to PACC at that time, Brigadier Gary Bornholt, observed:

---

[48] History of the Army public relations service', Annex C to A85-4178(1), no. 24, 31 August 1985 (in Payne 2007, p.5)

[49] ibid., no. 25 (in Payne 2007, p. 5)

[50] For an insight into the history of the 'inside' workings and the internal Department of Defence political manoeuvrings relating to the control of Australian military public relations in the 1990s and early 2000s, see Chapter 6 of Weiland (2003).

The Buchan report focused largely on corporate communication and actually did nothing on military Public Affairs because it was too hard, and the other problem was he [Buchan] did this review while the East Timor operation was just launching so he had no Public Affairs people or military people who had any idea about what went on. (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4)

The reality was that the newly formed PACC 'didn't want the military to run this Public Affairs organisation' (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4). As we will see, this implicit tension between the ADF and the Department of Defence has had a lasting effect on the ADF's ability to engage with the media during military operations for war. This is because it is the Minister for Defence, through the civilians within the PACC Division (now called the Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication (MECC) Division), who controls the uniformed ADF's interactions with the media.[51]

A Military Public Affairs Capability for the Twenty-First Century report (2000)[52]

Following the ADF's security and peacekeeping operations in East Timor between 1999 and 2000,[53] the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) considered what military lessons had been learned (PACC 2000). From the Australian news media's perspective, their access to the area of operations and the ADF's permissive approach to the control and censorship of information were departures from the historical norm. One of Australia's leading Defence journalists remarked, 'For the first time in my dealings with any military service I [was] told I could interview anyone. There [was] no attempt to direct the interviewees or vet our material' (Chris Masters, in Tiffen 2001, p. 71). The operational commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, was responsible for managing and directly engaging with the media and brought about the deviation. Cosgrove's Chief of Staff at the time, then Brigadier Mark Kelly, observed:

[Cosgrove] very quickly generated his own media profile – it was delegated to us. So 'Cos' was doing a daily media briefing. If he wasn't, I was as the Chief of Staff, and every day either we were getting up really early to go and do a … live cross to Sunrise or Today … or each day we went down … [to] … the Turismo

---

[51] At the time of writing the MECC Division's function is the same as PACC. A new name, but the same role.

[52] Released to the author and publicly by Australia's Department of Defence under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) as FOI Request 466/17/18. See: https://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/466_1718_Documents.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2019).

[53] Operation Stabilise was the Australian led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) operation in East Timor from 1999 to 2000.

hotel … at 9 or 10 am and we had the media conference and we fronted there. We gave updates. The UN mission that was there, which was fledgling still at that point, gave their briefing. We gave ours from … an international force perspective. We answered questions and then our transcript of all that was sent back to Canberra because Canberra then ran one. (Major General (retired) Mark Kelly, Participant 19)

From the ADF's 'lessons learnt' perspective, though, it was not so much the media's access to the area of operations and information that was important, but rather Indonesia's information dominance in the broader regional setting. While the Western and domestic Australian audience received information promptly, Indonesia dominated the broader regional audiences. According to the then Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), Admiral Chris Barrie:

We were outpaced and outgunned on media by Jakarta on almost every occasion … Their media agility meant that anything that happened in East Timor would be their story, out there first, and we would be 12, 15, 20 hours later. And in the entire East Timor operation, we never caught that cycle. (Admiral (retired) Chris Barrie, Participant 26)

Based on the COSC's recommendations as they pertained to the ADF's approach to the media, the PACC Division's *A Military Public Affairs Capability for the 21st Century* report found that 'public affairs planning and support to ADF military operations were inadequate' (PACC report 2000, p. 2). The report recommended a comprehensive modernisation of the ADF's military public affairs capability and the creation of doctrine that would 'deliver a full range of best practice functions to the Government and all command levels of the ADF in peace time *and conflict*' [emphasis added] (PACC report 2000, p. 1). However, according to Barrie, then Minister for Defence Peter Reith rejected the ADF's request to modernise its approach to the media:

We invested a lot of effort in having a look at our media performance and trying to find a way through … It took us a year and a half to do … We went to Government with a proposal to revamp our approach to media handling … We separated facts from opinions. And we tried to say to politicians … you politicians can have opinions but no one in the Defence Force can have an opinion, but we can talk about things … That's what we took to Reith in June of 2001. These are the lessons learnt from East Timor. This is how we need to reframe the way with

media. He didn't care. We tried. The Secretary [for Defence, Alan Hawke] and I spent a lot of hours trying to argue this one. We lost handsomely because Reith was a very politically smart, savvy media operator. And he was intent on controlling every piece of media out of his office. (Admiral (retired) Chris Barrie, Participant 26)

With the ADF's needs rejected by the Minister for Defence, the ADF's approach to the media returned to a model akin to that of World War II. Decisions relating to the release of information to the media were again taken away from the military and placed back into the hands of civilian bureaucrats within the PACC Division: '[The ADF] had no choice … the law is, we act under the directions of the minister and the minister gets the advice and says, "No. It's over"' (Admiral (retired) Chris Barrie, Participant 26). It is a reality to which we will return repeatedly in later chapters.

The *Joint Services Publication 41* disappeared, leaving the military with no clear purpose or aim for the management of the media in war. It was these changes and their legacy that led to the widespread criticism of the Australian military's approach to the management of the media in Afghanistan. The PACC Division (now MECC) defers to the Defence Minister. It ensures the minister's office vets and approves all media interaction. Australian military forces afford the media limited and controlled access. Weiland (2003, p. 262) presaged the outcome of this decision when he wrote:

> It can be strongly argued that what [is] in place is a form of censorship through the withholding of information from one centralised source, which in this case, is the Minister's office … It is within this current environment of information management that the military is losing its ability to be more open in its conduct of operations even when it chooses to do so.

Hannan review (2003)

Instigated by the then CDF (2002–05), General Peter Cosgrove AC MC,[54] the then Director General of Public Affairs, Brigadier Mike Hannan's (Participant 1) review was triggered by the ADF's desire to regain some control of its media management practices. The review and its adopted reforms sought to rebalance PACC's centralised approach. Its key finding was that, through the centralised approach, PACC was excluding itself from the military's core planning

---

[54]   AC: Companion of the Military Division of the Order of Australia; MC: Military Cross.

processes and it could not produce results (Hibbert & Hannan 2006). Hannan notes that it is the military that plans operations and commands the resources required to manage the news media. As a result, in 2004 the Australian military incorporated PACC's public affairs function to make it a military command function (Hibbert & Hannan 2006). Commanders and their subordinates were resourced and held responsible for the public affairs function, which included the management of the media. The ADF's approach to the media in war was still not anchored by any formal military doctrine (Participant 22 – anonymous). Despite the changed model within the military, PACC (now MECC) remained the central conduit for ministerial oversight. Any form of military media management or public comment by the ADF required ministerial approval.

Crane report – Joint Military Public Affairs review (2016)[55]

The author of the ADF's most recent review, the now retired Major General Michael Crane (Participant 8), explained that one purpose of the review was to address the lack of any formal joint military public affairs doctrine. The absence of doctrine (first raised officially 18 years earlier) and the absence of an understanding of the media's power in war highlights that the ADF did not place a high priority on the role of the media in Afghanistan. At the time of writing, around four years since the publication of the report's findings, the ADF had only recently begun the initial drafting of military public affairs doctrine (in late June 2018) (Participant 6 – anonymous). This oversight remains a problem:

> You need doctrine [be]cause then from doctrine you can justify why you have to
> train people to enable them to meet doctrinal, individual and collective objectives.
> (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

The ADF's media strategy and media operations for war in Afghanistan

The difficulty for the ADF is that the media saturates modern warfare. This thesis contends that the ADF's attempts to restrict the media's access to their operations for war are counterproductive, resulting in an uncontrolled loss of information control. The reason for this is the media's ubiquity. Nowadays, almost anyone (civilian, military, friend or foe) on or near a battlefield can quickly and widely disseminate 'news' or noteworthy information from or about it. There is little to be done to control this reality. Were the ADF to allow the friendly

---

[55] Released 'administratively' to the author on 14 March 2019 by the Australian Department of Defence under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) FOI Request 312/18/19.

media relatively open access to its operations for war, this would create an opportunity to control the otherwise uncontrollable. However, the Minster for Defence's power and the bureaucracy's ability to withhold information from the media perpetuate the problem because they deny the ADF's agency in defining and implementing a media strategy and media operations for war. When combined with the ADF's tradition of restricting access to its military operations, and controlling the flow of information to the media, this results in strained relations between the ADF and the media.

The former Foreign Editor of *The Age*, Tom Hyland, recalls his experience researching a story about the ADF in Afghanistan captures a common sentiment held by all the journalists interviewed for this research, and highlights the ADF's miscomprehension of the media's role and power in modern war:

> People in Defence delayed or, from my perspective, obstructed my requests for what I thought was pretty innocuous information … One incident involved a case where I thought I was getting the run-around from Defence on an FOI [Freedom of Information] request I'd submitted. When I complained to the FOI officer who was handling my request, she told me, informally over the phone, that what I regarded as 'innocuous' might in fact be significant when joined up with other pieces of information. The FOI officer said this would allow me to form a 'mosaic' … I complained to [the ADF's Director of Strategic Communication] … about what I thought was ADF obstruction of a reasonable request for information. She replied with words to the effect that what I was engaged in was 'mosaic intelligence'! … I'd never heard of this term before. I thought I was engaged in journalism. Having read a few bits and pieces about 'mosaic intelligence', it seems to me that it can be used to justify the suppression of just about anything, given that all information can be seen to be part of a bigger 'mosaic' … The distinctive Australian culture of obsessively guarding information closely can only work if Australia is the only one holding the information. In the case of a multinational coalition like ISAF in Afghanistan, this practice can't work. Australia mightn't want to say anything about a particular incident, but it can't be sure its allies are similarly tight-lipped. In my experience, I was able to draw on information from the Dutch, the Americans and ISAF to report on incidents where Australia said little, if anything. (Tom Hyland, Participant 13)

Mosaic intelligence is a theory of explanatory collaboration that focuses on an adversary's gathering, merging and collating of pieces of information that on their own are mostly innocuous (Pozen 2005). The theory demands a consideration of the potential mosaics that a document requested under FOI legislation might form, to establish the security risk of releasing that document. It is the mosaic, not the document, that becomes the measure of risk.

The ADF's treatment of Hyland as an adversary speaks to my contention that the ADF often does not differentiate between friendly and hostile media. The ADF's application of the mosaic intelligence concept automatically characterises the media and journalists as the enemy. That characterisation speaks to questions central to the debate about modern war, the media's role in it, and the way the ADF managed the media for its operations in Afghanistan. The characterisation points to the strained relations between the media and the ADF, the isolation of the media by the ADF, and the ADF's reluctance to harness the power of the media that has and will impact on its ability to perform in war. Where once the media simply reported and reflected war, they now enact and perform war (Cottle 2007). The dynamics of the media are their power in war, which means that harnessing that power is pivotal to success. By treating the media as an adversary, the ADF fails to see the media as a useful weapon and thus reduces its own power in war.

Chapter 2
Literature review: Mediatized war and the ADF's media relations and management

This chapter begins by discussing the changed character of modern war and the media's role in it. It introduces the three dynamics of mediatized conflict that constitute the media's power in war. The changed character of war is a problem that confronts the ADF for its media strategy and media operations. The chapter also identifies the characteristic features of modern war to establish its intrinsic concepts, before considering the theoretical application of mediatization to war. It then clarifies key realities while establishing definitions and terminology of the thesis, and describes the relationship between the Australian military and the practice of public relations. The chapter then moves to review the literature relevant to the ADF's management of the media in war, and finally examines the literature on Australian military media relations and military media management in war.

The changed character of modern war: mediatized war

There is a wealth of literature examining war and its relationship to the media (McQuail 2006). Much of it involves the concept of mediation. It concentrates on either political/military propaganda strategies, the news media's coverage of war and the journalistic experience of war reporting. More recently, attention has turned to the military practice of 'embedding' media on operations within war zones, and the implication of this in relation to the military's control of information (Joseph 2014; Maltby 2013; Mortensen 2014). In the Australian frame of reference, there is no research that considers the structure, character, function and consequences of the ADF's management of the media in the context of the changed relationship between warfare, the military and the media, and how that affects the ADF's media operations for war.

The relationship between warfare, the military and the media has radically changed in recent times, and is likely to continue changing because of a range of technological, cultural and social factors (Cottle 2007; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Horten 2011; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Kaempf 2013; Maltby 2013; Mortensen 2014; Shavit 2016). The more recent change in these relations reflects the 'structural shift from a multipolar to a heteropolar global media landscape [where] heteropolarity … refers to the multiplication and simultaneous diversification of structurally

different media actors' (Kaempf 2013, p. 587). Two of the notable effects of this shift are that participants in war (whether state, non-state or individuals) can contest state-sanctioned and controlled narratives and coverage of war, and traditional media platforms have and are merging with digital media platforms (Kaempf 2013).

This process brings into focus how mediatization, through the dynamics of mediatized conflict, has affected the mediation of war. Modelled on Meyrowitz's (1993) three metaphors of media – conduits, languages and environments – Eskjaer et al. (2015) outline the properties detailing the relationship between the military, war and media. As 'conduits', the media *amplify* conflict across the temporal-spatial domain by increasing the speed and reach of a conflict's mediated content. The media influences the scale and significance of communicative interactions (Hjarvard & Lundby 2018). In turn, that influences the level of involvement of the participants and the observers of the conflict. The media as 'languages' serve to *frame* conflict, thus affording social actors the ability to *perform* in certain ways, which creates a *conflict dramaturgy*. Here the media format the relational and mutually reinforcing construction of meaning (Hjarvard & Lundby 2018). The concept of the media as 'environment' relates to the media's *co-structuring* of power relations within a conflict, determined by the conditions that influence the access to and control of media resources. Each of the three dynamics serves to generate, transform, reduce, resolve, intensify or prolong conflict (Eskjær et al. 2015, p. 11). These insights suggest that the ADF must pay even closer regard to the media's effects at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

The entwined processes of mediatization and globalisation have ontological consequences for the conduct of war and the media's role in warfare (Eskjær et al. 2015). By demonstrating the effects of mediatization on media operations and how they seek to influence both adversary and friendly public opinion, Eskjær et al. (2015) reveal that military and media institutions are now 'more interdependent and less separable' (p. 21). Yet at present the ADF seeks to be more independent and separated from the media (Foster 2013; Foster & Pallant 2016).

The reciprocity between media logic[56] (Altheide 2015; Altheide & Snow 1979, 1991) and military logic[57] (Kennedy 2010; Mattox 2008; Sepp 2005; Strachan 2008) has led to increased interdependence and interaction between the military, the media and the conduct of warfare (Cottle 2007; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Maltby 2013; Shavit 2016). Media logic refers to the procedure through which the media convey and communicate information (Altheide & Snow 1979). The 'logic' entails formats which organise, select and present communication to audiences who recognise and use that communicated information. Mediatization asserts that institutions come to accept and internalise the 'logic', which in turn informs social interaction. The outcome is that the media has a power to affect events and social activities, including war. The media/military logic reciprocity is reflected in media practice influencing the planning of military action in war and vice versa (Eskjaer et al. 2015; Horten 2011; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Kaempf 2013; Maltby 2013; Mortensen 2014; Shavit 2016). This planning–practice interface is significant for the ADF's media strategy and media operations for war because the media are the centre of gravity.

Mediatization theory 'tries to capture long-term interrelation processes between media change, on the one hand, and social and cultural change on the other' (Hepp et. al. 2015, p. 318). It provides a lens for analysing and describing the relationship between warfare and the media. It posits that the media is a semi-autonomous institution that alters other social institutions and cultural processes (Hjarvard 2013).

Although others applied the concept of mediatization to fields such as politics (Mazzoleni et al 1999), Hjarvard contended that it was not adequately defined (Hjarvard in Bondebjerg 2004, p. 46). He proposed a definition whereby 'mediatization implies a process through which core elements of a social or cultural activity (like work...) assume media form' (p. 47). By 2008 Hjarvard (2008, p.106) developed his concept to apply an institutional approach to the mediatization process, defining it as how 'social institutions and cultural processes have changed character, function and structure in response to the omnipresence of media'. In his evolved theory of mediatization Hjarvard (2013) asserts that media and social institutions are

---

[56] Generally speaking, media logic is the influence of the media on the representation of reality and the shaping of social order.

[57] Military logic is the reasoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity in the setting of strategy. Strategy is the 'link between political aims and the use of force, or its threat' (Heuser 2010, p. 3). At the state political and military level, strategy is also the unified employment of the mechanisms of national power (e.g. political/diplomatic, psychological, economic, informational and military) in pursuit of national interests (Kennedy 2010).

mutually dependent. Mediatization should not be mistaken for the concept of mediation (Couldry 2008). Mediation relates to the 'concrete act of communication by means of a medium in a specific social context' (Hjarvard 2008, p. 114). Mediatization 'refers to a more long-lasting process, whereby social and cultural institutions and modes of interaction are changed [because of] the growth of the media's influence' (Hjarvard 2008, p. 114).[58]

Tensions in the concept of mediatization range from disagreements over postmodernist interpretations through to criticisms of its holistic nature. Hjarvard distances his theory from Baudrillard's postmodernist understanding of mediatization (Hjarvard 2008). Baudrillard (Baudrillard & Poster 2001, p. 171) argues that through a 'procession of simulacra' the media creates a 'hyper-reality', or a reality replacing the 'real' world. By contrast, Hjarvard argues that mediatization does not replace reality, but rather it affords an expansive reality. Because 'of the opportunities for interaction in virtual spaces' people are able to know the perceived realities of others that occur in once inaccessible 'faraway places' (Hjarvard 2008, p. 111). Hjarvard concludes that the media's influence within society facilitates a changed perception of reality. This is important for the ADF because it means the audiences it might seek to influence through its media operations have a changed understanding of the reality of war.

Other critiques of mediatization focus on its societal meta-process claim (Lunt & Livingstone 2016) and its 'totalizing implications' (Hutchins 2016, p. 423). These debates stem from the assertion that mediatization's two scholarly traditions (the institutionalist approach and the social constructivist approach)[59] result in 'no single definition of mediatization' (Deacon & Stanyer 2014, p. 1033). The debates, that are relevant to my research because of the ADF's socio-cultural interactions in the context of war, relate to the thinking about the causal nature

---

[58] Hjarvard's theory stems from Altheide & Snow's (1979) theoretical construct of media logic, and research by others that includes the application of a concept of mediatization to the areas of political communication, the political process, and the role of the media in social change (Hjarvard 2008).

[59] The institutionalist approach sees mediatization as a process where independent social and cultural institutions must adapt to 'media's rules, aims, production logics, and constraints' (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, p. 249). The social constructivist approach sees mediatization as a process in which changes to information and communication technology propel 'the changing communicative construction of culture and society' (Hepp 2013b, p. 616: see also, and Hepp, 2013). As media develops – different people in different settings will use media in different ways to construct and interpret their worlds differently on an everyday basis (Hepp 2013a).

of the media and its effects and how historical socio-cultural change is understood (Deacon & Stanyer 2014).[60]

The Clausewitzian military strategic and operational logic influences US, Australian and Western military thought to this day (Mattox 2008). Clausewitz's (1909, p. 23) theory holds that 'wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed'.

Modern war is now mediatized war because the media affects war. Its hallmarks are:

- the integral interdependence and interaction that exists between the military, war and the media (Maltby 2013)
- the reciprocity between media logic and military logic (Mattox 2008)
- the media's functional practice, which influences the planning of military action in war, while the military's planned actions simultaneously influence the media's planned practice (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015)
- the centrality of 'strategic narrative' in the conduct of war (Freedman 2014).

Modern mediatized war's hallmarks reflect that the media has altered the military and warfare. The military and warfare have change character, function and structure in response to the media's ubiquity. The military and the media are now mutually dependent.

Mediatized war's essential concepts

I argue that modern war's hallmarks draw attention to its essential concepts: imagined audience[61] and context collapse; intuitiveness and spectatorship; and conflict dramaturgy, ideational framing and narrative. The appreciation and mobilisation of these concepts are important in sustaining public support for and in modern war, and are thus central to successful media strategy and media operations in war.

The advent of the network society and networked digital media means that the production of news content (or noteworthy information), once the domain of print and broadcast news publishers, now extends theoretically to anyone with access to the internet (Castells 2000).

---

[60]   For a detailed debate of the 'Causal processes – power and effects' see Hepp (2013b); Deacon & Stanyer (2014); Hepp & Hasebrink (2014); Hepp et. al. (2015); Deacon & Stanyer (2015) and Hjarvard (2016). For a detailed debate about 'Historical socio-cultural change or transformation?' see Deacon & Stanyer (2014); Hepp et. al. (2015); Lunt & Livingstone (2016).

[61]   An imagined audience includes the audience(s) selected by a military from the media's audiences (Maltby 2013).

Digital content as 'news' and information is shareable across digital media and mobile platforms. Expanding on the thoughts of Marwick and Boyd (2010), those who consume and share that digital content have become 'imagined' audiences. The online world alters the traditional notions of space and place. An audience in the 'digital' sphere is no longer separate or discrete. For the ADF, this means that when print and broadcast media outlets produce 'news' content, it invariably becomes digital content. The outlet's intended audience becomes an imagined one because 'the … audience might be entirely different from the actual readers of a profile, blog post, or tweet' (Marwick and Boyd p. 115). At the same time, the imagined audiences are flattened – otherwise known as 'context collapse' (2010, p. 122).

For militaries, the collapse of context has important effects in modern war. Drawing on the work of Wesch (2009), it is reasonable to assume that the individuals who make up the Australian public (and publics in general) are now an imagined audience confronted by a new mediated aspect of war. The possible contexts of war can be collapsed by the individual to create their own interpretation of an 'ideal type' of war, which in turn influences their support for it. The audience modifies the traditional cultural construction of war and augments it with an individual reflexive context for war (Elliot & Lemert 2006). This means the ADF's publics need to be positioned as active, interpretative imagined audiences that are intuitive and spectatorial.

The way the imagined audience forms knowledge in general has changed. It is accepted that this change is because of the network society's logic of informational flows that results in a shift from linear knowledge formation to non-linear or intuitive formation (Beck 1994; Castells 2000; Han 2010; Lash 2003). It is now easier for imagined audiences to form knowledge, and the formation of that knowledge does not always require conscious reasoning. It is the speed of the informational flow brought about by technology that characterises the intuition. The speed and availability of information have compressed the imagined audience's space and time. This means they can now be more reflexive (or self-reflective) in their formation of their views on war. Imagined audiences can now garner their knowledge and understanding of war, and ultimately their support for or against war, by actively seeking and demanding an experience of war through media consumption and spectatorship to inform the understanding of it. It is here that the transformation of modern warfare rests on the fragmentation of the traditional battlefield (Mieszkowski 2009). War is now conducted in and through the media as well as on physical terrain. How the audience envisages war when deciding to support or reject it is as

important as, and informed by, what they see (Mieszkowski 2009). It is this change in warfare that forms the bond between war, the media and spectatorship, affording deep engagement.

An imagined audience's spectatorial consumption of war may range widely. It can range from searching for and watching 'helmet-cam' vision of combat on YouTube through to contributing to blogs, or publishing comments to online news websites in response to war reporting, and experiencing war through popular first-person shooter digital/online gaming. Knowledge of war can now be separate from the physical personal experience of it, because war's action, interpretations and crisis are externalised by and in media (Han 2010). Audiences can now more readily perceive, interpret and infer the meaning of war without a physical experience of it. Knowledge and practice are now not separated by distance because assumed knowledge no longer requires embodied experience of action (Lash 2001).

Conflict dramaturgy describes the performance of, and performance in, war. The media perform in a variety of ways, including as 'champion', 'advocate' or 'narrator' (Cottle 2005). Emotions exemplified through a narrative concurrently orientated to legitimacy and public support allow militaries and the media to perform war and perform in war (Cottle 2005). It is the engagement of the audience that realises the performance.

Dramaturgy in this setting is the framing of powerful, exciting, emotional or unexpected events that the audience craves (Cottle 2007). Such dramaturgical success stems from 'ideational framing' in communication that draws on multiple compelling and accessible themes that afford the media and the audience as 'spectators' various positions of ideological association (McAdam 1996). Because of their nature, by framing events through the narrative devices of good vs. evil, protagonist vs. antagonist, metaphor, backstory and so on, the media is captivated and the audience(s) can be engaged and motivated.

Framing and dramaturgy focus attention on the need for illocutionary and perlocutionary strength in war (Lloyd 2011). Illocution is communication that results in an intended action – for example, deterrence through the warning of the consequences of military action to ensure logical mutual understanding. Perlocution is communication that indirectly leads to action – for example, persuasion to achieve a strategic goal (Habermas 1989). All these factors point to the centrality of 'strategic narrative' in modern war.

Freedman (2006, p. 19) observes that 'narratives [are] compelling storylines which could explain events convincingly and from which inferences could be drawn'. The possibilities and probabilities of strategic narrative draw on a post-structuralist driven 'narrative turn' and its

nuances (Maan 2018; Paulesc 2019; Polletta et al. 2011). The turn connects with an extension of the breadth and power of narrative. It posits that the formation of meaning from narrative is non-linear rather than linear. This is because of the rhetorical exchange's resources (narration, time, structure, dialogue, etc.), which 'deconstruct' the relationship between the narrative's author and the audience (Phelan in Richter 2018). The narrative turn points to narratives doing more than simply 'explaining' war. A part of a narrative's power is the ability to define actors and events in time and space to create meaning. The power of narrative extends beyond 'conveying ideas' to the formation of ideas in audiences. It is the cognitively formed ideas of the audience(s) that explain events. Effective narratives for war should thus operate on the level of identity and 'ideational framing'. Narratives should co-construct identity, as identity shapes ideas and beliefs, and facilitates action (Freedman 2015; Maan 2015).

Modern war's hallmarks put the battle for people's 'hearts and minds' (friend or foe) at centre stage, with images at the heart of this conflict (Cottle 2007; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Horten 2011; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Kaempf 2013; Maltby 2013; Mortensen 2014; Shavit 2016). Imagined audiences are now dynamic, participatory, intuitive witnesses to war. They are imagined audiences because in the digital sphere they are no longer contained as separate or discrete. Ideas of war are formed via wide dissemination and negotiation of information that is tailored for entertainment (Arnoldi 2007). Audience dynamism coupled with the media's technological capability leads to evolved methods of military control, constrictions and information censorship (Cottle 2007; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Maltby 2013; Shavit 2016). The media now have a penchant for an 'infotainment' style of war content production and scheduling (Cottle 2007; Katz & Liebes 2007; Shavit 2016). This condition is exacerbated by the cultural intricacies of war and the 'subcultural' practices and characteristics of war correspondents (Cottle 2007).

Mediatization and war research

A significant development in the theoretical study of mediatization and war is the realisation that the media contextualises the performance of war while simultaneously influencing the way it is performed (Maltby 2013). The history of the Australian military's restrictive management of the media in war and its predominant and prevailing poor relations with those media necessitates a full understanding of this development. The management of and the relationship with the media has significant consequences for the ADF's media operations. This is because those independent social and cultural institutions (e.g. from governments to families) that are

parties to the conduct of war are conditioned by and must accommodate the media's logic as it pertains to warfare. The changes in media and communication technologies that enable all participants in war to quickly and widely disseminate noteworthy information condition the behaviour of all those concerned. Modern war has and is transforming the extensive and complex relationship between the media, warfare and society. This reality should be central to the development of the ADF's media operations for war because the struggle to define war, and to obtain and control power, is now continually and broadly contested in and through the media.

Mediatization and war's maturation

Cottle's (2007) research helped to lead the theoretical development of mediatization and war. His concept of mediatized conflict is the extension of mediation to include the media's performative involvement in conflicts (2007, p. 9).[62] Through the lens of political process, Cottle considers the mediatization of conflict. Via a mixed method approach, he (2007) posits that the media at once report and reflect conflict while enacting and performing in conflict. Cottle's theorising migrates the notion of a neutral media (one that disseminates information and ideas) to a media that becomes a participant. The media becomes a 'media doing' (2007, p. 9). By viewing the media as an agent in conflict, Cottle makes it possible to view the media as having degrees of 'agency and intentionality, creativity and constraint and [as having] the participatory nature of spectatorship' (Cottle 2005, p. 53). For my research, it is the media's elevated agency in modern war that highlights the requirement to appreciate the importance of its hallmarks, and makes it possible to understand the consequences of the ADF's ineffective use of its related integral dimensions. Calling attention to the media's potency in modern war aids in uncovering, illustrating and understanding the effects of the ADF's shortcomings in its media operations for war.

The works of Maltby (2013), Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015) and Shavit (2016) exemplify a trend in mediatization and war research, acknowledging that modern war's conduct requires an understanding of and adaptation to the media's logic.

Maltby's (2013) *Military Media Management* combines qualitative interviews, ethnographic fieldwork and textual analysis to examine the British military's media management and information management practices during its involvement with the conflicts in Iraq and

---

[62]   The notion of conflict captures a broad category of phenomena ranging from protests to war.

Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. By reapplying Hjarvard's (2008) use of Goffman's (1959, 1969) concepts of impression management and strategic information management, Maltby provides a sociological account of the motivations and methods used in the management of the media during war, which exemplify mediatization processes. Maltby's research moves the theoretical focus to the transformation of the military and the conduct of war. She illustrates the connection between media logic and military logic, the military and the media's strategic interaction in relation to information, and the military's greater dependence on the media's audiences. In recognising the scholarly difficulty of demonstrating the media's influence on audiences, Maltby applies the term 'active imagined audience' to highlight the British military's construction of who it projects its audiences to be. This definition is different from my definition of the 'imagined audience' that draws attention to its fragmented and intuitive character. Maltby contributes to my foregrounding of the character, structure, function and consequences of the ADF's media operations for war in Afghanistan.

Using historiographic and media content analysis methods, Hoskins and O'Loughlin's (2015) 'arrested war' concept presents a paradigm of war and media. The paradigm develops their earlier paradigms of 'broadcast war' and 'diffuse war', each of which accords with a stage of mediatization. Arrested war pertains to 'user-generated content and its chaotic dynamics [being] absorbed and appropriated' by the media (and to a lesser extent the military) (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015, p. 1321). This entails the media's renewal of the gatekeeper function and a regaining of control over agenda setting (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015). The concept of arrested war is a useful prism through which to understand the ADF's reduced agency in its media operations for war, and why the ADF's uptake and use of online and social media during its operations in Afghanistan was both limited and limiting.

Drawing on the work of Cottle (2007), Maltby (2013) and Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015), Shavit's (2016) *Media Strategy and Military Operations in the 21st Century* extends the theoretical field by producing an even deeper understanding of the processes that now constitute the practices of modern war and media operations. Shavit applies a mixed methods research approach to mediatization and war. Using both media content analysis and ethnographic techniques, Shavit highlights the media's socio-cultural impacts on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during its wars between 2000 and 2014. He illustrates the transformations in the IDF's media management strategies by documenting its increased focus on public opinion (and the extension of that to prioritise international audiences), its public

image, the importance of legitimating its military actions, and the connection between media logic and IDF operational logic. He shows that

> the IDF's media management strategies were transformed through the adoption of a cohesive and coherently articulated strategy that subsequently became an integral part of operational military activities and a vital component of strategic military aims and objectives (Shavit 2016, p. 175).

In a similar vein, my research discusses the media's socio-cultural impacts on the ADF during its extended operations in Afghanistan. However, it also shows that in Afghanistan the ADF adopted no such coherent strategy to structure its operations to achieve its strategic military aims and objectives.

So far this chapter has argued that the character of war has changed. Modern war is now mediatized war and the media is the centre of gravity. Audiences have a changed understanding of the reality of war. Mediatized war's four hallmarks mean the ADF must pay attention to its essential concepts because they are indispensible in sustaining public support for and in war, and therefore are essential to successful media strategy and media operations in war. This means that the ADF must embrace the media's logic and its affordances[63], and pay even closer regard to the media's effects at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The final two sections of this chapter link with the argument in its first due to three key realities. First, because of the profound changes in the media landscape that occured simultaneously during the time period of the ADF's commitment to the war in Afghanistan being examined here (2001–17). Secondly, the ADF maintains a focus on public support, and thirdly because military–media relations and military media management are indivisible.

Key realities, definitions and terminology

The media

This project uses the term 'the media' in the plural to refer to 'news' (or noteworthy information) published through the mediums of print, radio and television, online and/or through social media. For example, 'the media' are the commercial and public service organisations that publish news (for example, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, News Corp Australia or Nine Entertainment), as well as social media platforms (for example,

---

[63] Here affordances refers to the media as a technology that, in conjunction with user perceptions and expectations, expedites, inhibits and arranges communication and action (Hjarvard 2013).

YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) that are used to distribute and consume news stories.

In the military setting, 'media operations' describes the military's use of the media for defensive and offensive purposes (Rid 2007). The basic elements of defensive media operations are trust, speed and authority. The basic elements of offensive media operations are deterrence and persuasion. Media operations are determined by a media strategy, the goal of which is to create or maintain public support for military operations.

Terms like 'traditional media' or even 'mainstream media' (MSM) are contested. MSM is problematic in that the phenomenon of media convergence – whether technological, organisational or cultural (McEwen 2017) – means that digital content as 'news' and information is shareable across digital media platforms. The production of news content – once the domain of print and broadcast news publishers – now extends to include potentially anyone with access to the internet. 'Citizen journalism' and 'social news sites' afford 'non-journalists' the ability to participate in the agenda setting process, create meaning and shape perceptions (Goode 2009). This means the notion of media relations and management must consider the media holistically. My evidence establishes that, for its media embed program, the ADF treated the term 'the media' as meaning only the MSM.[64] The ADF's circumscribed understanding of what constitutes the media means that it forgoes the opportunity of harnessing the affordances and power of networked digital media in mediatized war.

Professional and medium-specific (print, radio and television) forms of journalism once considered authoritative are no longer as central to news consumption (Harrington 2014) as they once were. This is because information flow in the network society moves at speed and unpredictably. With the wealth of information that is now available, 'journalism's position within society is more ephemeral and contested by a range of different media outputs' (Harrington 2014, p. 5). In terms of 'news content', the Australian government's 2019 *Digital Platforms Inquiry* found that

> algorithm-driven digital platforms are among the most popular sources of
> journalism for Australian news consumers, with 33 per cent reporting accessing
> news through social media, 25 per cent using search engines to find a particular

---

[64]   When the thesis examines the military concept of media embedding, the term 'news media' is at times used. This is because at the time of writing, it is only producers, journalists, camera operators and photographers of the traditional news organisations who are permitted to 'embed' with the ADF.

news brand, 20 per cent using search engines to find specific news stories, and 12 per cent accessing content through news aggregators. By comparison, 30 per cent of Australian news consumers accessed online news directly from the websites of news media businesses. (ACCC, p. 21)

Compared with the research of Mitchell et al. (2017), which found that around 60 per cent of Australians sourced their news online, further reading of the ACCC report reveals that by 2019, 90 per cent of Australians sourced their news online – a figure that will likely continue to grow. This means that for its media operations for mediatized war, the ADF must expand its understanding of what constitutes the media to include algorithm-driven digital platforms and social media, and the wide range of users and actors accessing them.

Public relations

The term 'public relations' has many meanings, including 'publicity, propaganda, political communication, recruitment campaign to name but a few' (Sheehan 2007, p. 3). Its practice spans the notions of publicity, relationship management, persuasion and the mobilising of public opinion to form consensus (Newsom et al. 2010). The relationship between the Australian military and the practice of public relations predates World War II and the 1942 arrival of the United States' General Douglas MacArthur (Crawford & Macnamarra 2014; Fitch 2016; Gleeson 2012; Sheehan 2007). However, as Sheehan (2007, pp. 19–21) points out, 'it could be argued that the arrival of … MacArthur was the arrival of US style public relations [which has] … continued to dominate'.[65]

Fitch's (2016) analysis of digitised Australian newspapers highlights Australian military public relations efforts during World War II as early as 1941. These efforts focused on 'media liaison and controlling information in order to preserve security' (2016, p. 12). By 1942, those efforts had expanded to include a role in censorship and the building and maintaining of public confidence in all things military (Fitch 2016). With the arrival of General MacArthur in 1942, the established traits of public relations gained momentum with increased attention to building and maintaining public support (Zawawi 2014, p. 29). The ADF retains a strong focus on cultivating and sustaining public support to this day, with examples including the reputation-

---

[65]   See also Hibbert & Denyer-Simmons (2005).

management initiatives of the ADF's Parliamentary Program[66] and the Defence Reserves Support's Employer Engagement Program.[67]

Military media relations and military media management

In my research, there is a difference between 'media relations' and 'media management'. Media relations are the way the ADF and media outlets regard and behave towards each other. Media management comprises the processes the ADF uses to deal with and control media coverage and messages. Those processes range from policies that determine when and how information is released to the media through to the censorship of information.

Military media relations and management can affect strategic aims. For example, a media outlet may not support a military aim; hence its communication of information may detract from the achievement of those aims. Second, the relationship between the ADF and the media is poor (Foster & Pallant 2013, 2016; Leahy 2010) and the ADF's media management is restrictive (Foster 2013). This means the ADF's approach to the media is arguably incompatible with the reality of modern war.

In keeping with the interconnectedness of military media relations and military media management, literature and research tend to blur or meld the definitions. Schleicher's (2016) chapter in *Military, Government, and Media Management in Wartime* moves from the term 'military media management' to discussing the assertion that 'to be more comprehensive in analysing *military media relations* [emphasis added] comparative research is necessary' (2016, p. 77). The research of Foster (2013), Maltby (2013) and Shavit (2016) hints at the association between media relations and media management. For example, while not using the term 'military media management', Foster (2013, p. xv) links 'Australia's history of military–media relations [and] its arrangements for media access to and reporting on the troops in Afghanistan'. In my research, the differentiation between relations and management highlights the link between the ADF's cultural approach to the management of the media in war, its organisational practices and the Australian government's pervasive influence on those practices. The distinction makes it possible to uncover and comprehend the ADF's media operations for war

---

[66]   https://www.defence.gov.au/ADFPP (Accessed 21 February 2020).

[67]   https://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/benefits/get-the-reservist-experience (Accessed 21 February 2020).

and its consequences during the period of the Afghan conflict under scrutiny in this study, that coincide with the radical changes in the media landscape.

There is a paucity of literature dedicated specifically to Australian military media relations and Australian military media management in war. It appears to comprise only three books (Foster 2009, 2011, 2013) and a few peer-reviewed conference papers, journal articles, book chapters and a doctoral thesis, including the works of O'Connor (1991), D'Hagé (1991), Weiland (2003), Badsey (2008), Sekuless (2008), Gorman (2008), Foster (2010, 2012, 2017), Foster & Pallant (2013, 2016) and Leahy (2010).

In contrast, there is a wealth of literature examining relations between the Australian media and the Australian military in war, as shown by the works of Fewster (1980), Lunn (1985), Royle (1987), Tiffen (1990, 2001), Goot & Tiffen (1992), Lockwood (1992), Brennan (1994), Young (1996), Farrar (1998), McDonald (1998), Wilcox (1999), Williams (1999), Torney-Parlicki (2000), Wilson (2004), Hutchinson (2005), King et al. (2005), Trembath (2005), Payne (2007), McCallum & Putnis (2008), Anderson & Trembath (2011), Tapsell (2014) and Coatney (2016). The principal focus of these works is on the news media and they encompass the history of Australian conflict reporting, the role and impact of war correspondents, the influence of censorship and politics on the media and the mass media as a means of persuasion. For the most part, Australian military–media relations and Australian military media management are not a focus in this body of work. However, from this literature I have identified the elements that both constitute and illuminate the bond between Australian military–media relations and Australian military media management – namely, policy, relations, access, and control and censorship of information.

Policy

It is clear that the ADF lacks a formal policy for dealing with the media during times of war.[68] We need to understand why that is the case and what the consequences are. The policy deficiency is a symptom of too much political oversight that impinges on the ADF's freedom, or the need to develop policy, and has resulted in an ill-conceived media strategy. The absence of policy and strategy leaves the ADF vulnerable in its operations for war. Up until 1985, the Australian military operated under 'guidelines' or 'ground rules' relating to how it should regard and behave towards the media (Foster 2012; Torney-Parlicki 2000; Wilcox 1999). It

---

[68] This author's experiences in Afghanistan as an Australian Army Officer and the J09 at Australia's Joint Task Force Headquarters in the Middle East for 2016/17 corroborate that finding.

appears that there was no policy (at least at the 'unclassified' level). Weiland (2003) notes that in 1985 the ADF published the *Joint Services Publication (JSP) (AS)41 Defence Public Information Policy During Periods of Tension and Conflict.* However, as JSP 41's author notes, it was a 'Joint Service reference manual' (Weiland 2003, p. x), not a policy as the title suggests. Weiland also consistently refers to it as 'doctrine'.[69] In contrast, Foster (2012, 2013) finds that in the case of Australia's involvement in Afghanistan, the manual no longer exists, nor does any such policy exist. Where the ADF acknowledges the role that strategic narrative plays in the conduct of war (ADDP 3.13), there is no policy acknowledging the media's role that allows for the harnessing of the media's power and the promotion of such a narrative. Some of the consequences of this lack of policy include the ADF not understanding how the dynamics of mediatized conflict have and are changing the character of war, how those dynamics affect media operations, and why and how to manage a fluid media.

Media relations

Morgan (2002) observes that relatively cordial relations existed between the Australian military and the media during the Boer War (1899–1902). The important relationships were between the journalists, politicians and senior officers, not those of 'other rank' (Wilcox 1999). In World War I (1914–18), Australian journalists – where they could – developed relations with the 'common soldier' that served to propagate and embroider the image of the Australian as an heroic warrior (Williams 1999). The press's front-line despatches fashioned disaster as courageous triumph and transformed failure into success (King 2005). The journalists' relations with the elite and senior officers also revealed the press's power to make or break careers. For example, driven by anti-Semitism, C.E.W. Bean actively lobbied the Australian Prime Minister to remove Brigadier General John Monash's command of the Australian Imperial Forces' 4th Brigade (Perry 2004).[70]

The fear of the media's power continues to influence the ADF's relations with, and management of, the media in war. Royle (1987) asserts that from the outset of World War II (1939–45), Australian authorities considered war correspondents to be essential to the war

---

[69] It is important to note here that there is a material difference between ADF 'policy' or 'instructions' and 'guidelines' or 'manuals' or 'ground rules' or 'doctrine'. Policy and instructions are prescriptive, and carry with them the surety of legal requirement. Policy and instructions must be followed. 'Guidelines', 'manuals', 'ground rules' or 'doctrine' only provide guidance. They do not need to be followed (ADDP 3.13); however the consideration of doctrine is wise.

[70] Bean's efforts were unsuccessful. Monash eventually took command of Australia's 3rd Division in France and is recognised as one of Australia's greatest military commanders.

effort. However, the scholarly consensus is that Australian military–media relations have been consistently poor. (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Foster 2011; Sekuless 2008; Weiland 2003). The poor relations reached a crescendo in 1944, when Australia's former Official War Correspondent, Kenneth Slessor, called for a public inquiry into the military's management of the media (Torney-Parlicki 2000). The inquiry never eventuated, and to this day no equivalent public inquiry has ever been held. The tension in this relationship arises from the ingrained cultural norms of the Australian military and the Australian political class, with each favouring an arm's length relationship with the media (Badsey 2008; Foster 2013; Foster & Pallant 2016; Sekuless 2008; Weiland 2003). Since the war in Vietnam (1962–75), those cultures were reinforced by the now discredited view that television news media lost the war for America (and by default Australia) in Vietnam (Foster 2013; Foster & Pallant 2013, 2016; Gorman 2008; Hallin 1989). In the light of this, Brigadier Adrian D'Hagé (1991), then Director General of ADF Public Information, acknowledged it was important to improve relations with the media and took steps to do so.

Military media relations since 2001 have deteriorated because of the ADF's cynicism towards and mistrust of the media (Dobell 2016; Foster 2013; Leahy 2010). Dobell's (2016) synthesis explains that the deterioration was the result of the ADF failing to follow through on its undertaking to improve relations. In the case of Afghanistan, the Australian Ministers for Defence and the ADF's control of information were 'Draconian'. Fairfax journalist Thom Cookes (2016) observes:

> The ADF's public relations bureaucracy is so risk averse that getting even the most basic information on what was happening in Afghanistan often proved to be impossible. Simply confirming information we already knew either took months, or was deemed to be a 'breach of operational security'. Many of the most enterprising Australian journalists went straight to the Dutch and US forces, who were far more candid and confident in their dealings with the media.[71]

While many are well aware of the effects of these poor relations, we need to understand their origins, as well as the practices and policies that make them possible (Foster & Pallant 2016). My research helps 'explain the ADF's hostility to the media [by focusing] on the culture, values and organisational practices of the military' (Foster & Pallant 2016, p. 105).

---

[71] https://www.theage.com.au/opinion/documentary-afghanistan-inside-australias-war-does-not-tell-the-full-story-20160225-gn32r2.html (Accessed 1 October 2018).

Access

Military media planning for Australia's security and peace mission to East Timor (1999–2000) was an afterthought because the 'lack of a formed unit on the ADF['s] Order of Battle saw operations planners fail to assign a military public affairs capability' (PACC, *A Military Public Affairs Capability for the 21st Century*, p. 4). Between the afterthought and the news media's arrival and coverage of the mission, and without strategic guidance or government agreement, the ADF's public affairs organisation deployed a Media Support Unit detachment to manage the media (Weiland 2003). Journalists in East Timor enjoyed uncontrolled access to ADF operations on the ground (O'Connor 2000). In an Australian military first, Tiffen (2001) notes the ADF allowed journalists to interview anyone without seeking to control or scrutinise material. This was a radical departure from the Australian military's usual approach, in which it restricted access to all areas of operations from the Boer War to Afghanistan (2001–present). Those restrictions governed and continue to govern media accreditation to the area of operations and general rules of conduct (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Bean & Fewster 2007; Dobell 2016; Foster 2013; Frame & Palazzo 2016; Goot & Tiffen 1992; McDonald 1998; Miskin et al. 2003; Payne 2007; Torney-Parlicki 2000; Wilcox 1999).

Control and censorship of information

Military control and censorship of information have been features of almost every modern war fought by a conventional Western military (Tiffen 1990). With the exception of East Timor (which was not a war), the history for Australian forces is no different (Anderson & Trembath 2011; Foster 2011; Weiland 2003).

The military's rationale for the control and censorship of information is to prevent the enemy from knowing its capabilities, capacities, plans and dispositions (Tiffen 1990). There is evidence of variations in the degree of control and censorship over time and between areas of operations. Royle (1987) observes that, following on from a World War I journalistic tradition of self-censorship, World War II Australian military commanders in the Middle East preferred to rely on the same approach with official censorship largely absent. Self-censorship continued in the reporting of the war in Vietnam (Young 1996). However, it must also be recognised that the Australian military's control and censorship of information overwhelmed journalistic goodwill and contributed to strained media relations. While censorship is a standard military practice, the important point here is that for the media covering Australian operations, Australian censorship has been more complete, more pervasive and more restrictive than other

alliance partners. The scholarly consensus is that the Australian military's history of control and censorship of information has inhibited media coverage of Australia in war (Anderson & Trembath 2011). Members of the Australian public are poorly informed about the most basic tactical facts concerning what their troops are doing on operations.

Foster (2009, 2011, 2013) observes that the ADF continued the tradition of attempting to control and/or prevent the media's coverage of its military operations in Afghanistan. Foster (2013) asks why, in Afghanistan, the Australian military limited access to unclassified military information, and why it did not reveal information. Although the media play an integral and increasingly influential role in the conduct of war, the ADF increased its level of information control during the Afghan conflict (Foster 2013). The ADF's failure to embrace the media during its operations for war leaves it isolated in a world where the media's logic and practices now prevail in interactions between institutions, organisations and their audiences.[72]

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the change in the character of modern war and the media's role in it, which is a problem confronting the ADF. It has introduced the dynamics of mediatized conflict that forms the thesis's conceptual framework, and that comprise the media's power in war. Along with considering the theoretical dimension of mediatization in relation to war and clarifying important terms and definitions, the chapter reviewed the literature pertinent to the ADF's management of the media in war. The next chapter explains this study's research methods.

---

[72]   Aside from its 2009 implementation of a curtailed 'media embed' program, the ADF's approach resembles the rules and techniques of 'business' that are adopted to promote corporate brand and manage reputation (Foster 2013).

Chapter 3
Research methods

This chapter explains the choice of a qualitative research methodology for this research project. A synchronous, historiographic research approach affords two benefits. First, it allows an examination of the lived experience of those personnel responsible for the ADF's media management across the 16-year research period. Second, the research design helps to address the challenge of accounting for change. This chapter illustrates my methodological choices by providing a discussion under six broad categories: the approach, the interviews, the media releases and policy, the data analysis, my subject position, and ethics.

Approach

Fields of study

My research draws on the interrelated fields of media and communications studies, history, security studies, war and media studies, and sociology. In the realm of security studies, Western militaries (including the ADF) subscribe to Clausewitz's (1909, p. 23) doctrine that 'war is … chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case'. As Coker (2010, p. 11) observes, the nature of war is constant while its character changes 'culture by culture, and over time'. Concepts of the changed character of war range from guerrilla warfare (Talbott 1978) to War 2.0 (Rid & Hecker 2009) and hybrid warfare (Polese et al. 2016). There is also consensus that the media, more than ever, plays an integral role in contemporary war (Gardner 2008; Rid & Hecker 2009). The corollary to the media's integral role is the centrality of strategic narratives in the conduct of war (Freedman 2014).

Theoretical and conceptual framework

This qualitative study investigates the development of the ADF's media operations for war during its operational deployment to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017. Mediatization theory is relevant to my research because the media are constitutive of modern warfare, and that requires attention to its uses (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015).

Using the conceptual framework of the three dynamics of mediatized conflict (amplification, framing and performative agency, and co-structuring) (Eskjær et al. 2015), this thesis narrows

its analytical focus to the structure, character, function and consequences of the ADF's media operations. That focus incudes its ideational framing in its communication with the media.

Qualitative synchronous historiographic research

The two studies that have principally influenced this study's methodology are Maltby's (2013) *Military Media Management* and Shavit's (2016) *Media Strategy and Military Operations in the 21st Century*. Both use mixed methods approaches that combine differing degrees of qualitative interviews, ethnographic fieldwork and textual analysis. Drawing on their example and adopting it for the purposes of the study, interviews are central to my methodological approach.[73] Qualitative interviews provide insights into the motivations, attitudes and opinions of what the military personnel thought they did (Maltby 2013; May 2001; Shavit 2016). My research uses semi-structured interviews with protagonists in the ADF's management of the media in Afghanistan, and document analysis of ADF policy and Department of Defence ministerial and departmental media releases. The results of the document analysis of ADF policy are used intermittently throughout the thesis and most obviously in Chapter 6.

Elite voices and reflexivity: ADF 'insiders' and language

This research project is an 'elite study' because most of the participants are 'elites' (Mikecz 2012). Sixteen of the 27 project participants are or were high-ranking ADF individuals who 'made or greatly influenced' (2012, p. 485) decisions on the ADF's management of the media that shaped the Australian society's understanding of the war in Afghanistan. The significance of elite studies is that they 'study up' (Hunter 1993). Whereas most social scientific research creates knowledge of the 'masses' for elites, elite studies create knowledge of elites for the masses (Ostrander 1993). Elite studies are rare, and they are characterised by the difficultly of access to the elite participants: 'Elite interviews are very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to repeat' (Mikecz 2012, p. 483). The importance of elite studies is that the knowledge they create for the masses lessens obscurity around the elites (Ostrander, 1993). Their value is their ability to demystify the way the practices of elites are facilitated and/or constrained.

Being a former Australian Army officer, I adopted a reflexive research approach akin to autoethnography (Higate & Cameron 2006). Autoethnography is a style of research and writing that seeks to define and methodically analyse personal experience to recognise cultural

---

[73]   My status as an ADF 'insider' and my use of autoethnography are discussed below.

experience (Ellis et al. 2011). In producing my original knowledge, I am explicit in my research role as a military 'insider' to make clear the links between my identity and the ADF's social structure. The 'issue of the hierarchical and total institutional characteristics of the military' (Higate & Cameron 2006, p. 222) are important here. The issues of power, my identity and subjectivity are relevant. For the 21 interviews with retired or serving ADF members, my rank was inferior to 18 of them, equal to two and superior to one. Hence, as much as possible, I was mindful of 'my presentation of self' to ensure my interview style did not impinge on or shape the data I produced. I was mindful of my subjectivity and the role that memory plays when reflecting on the data and making findings. Nonetheless, my reconstruction of my experience of Afghanistan is critical and reflexive so that my subjectivity becomes useful in the production of knowledge (Higate & Cameron 2006).

From an institutional discourse perspective, language played an important role in the interviews. According to Thornborrow (2014, p. 4), 'Institutional discourse can be described as talk which sets up positions for people to talk from and restricts some speakers' access to certain kinds of discursive actions.' Key to Thornborrow's thesis is that there is a relational power that develops from the interaction 'between participants' locally constructed, discursive identities and their institutional status' (2014, p. 1). The ADF participants viewed me as an 'insider' because of my institutional status as an ADF 'Afghanistan veteran'. They were sometimes more trusting and more willing to, at the very least, participate in my research. During the interviews, I was able to draw on a grammatical structure, shared vocabulary and common cultural 'insider' understanding that was already acknowledged by the participants as occurring from within an established and agreed reciprocity (2014, p. 8).

The interviews were laden with ADF terminology and acronyms that only an 'insider' would understand. For example, during the interviews participants used recurring terms such as 'C2' and 'OODA loop'. To an 'outsider', these terms and others mean little or nothing. To a military 'insider', these are known and important terms.

Semi-structured interviews

The 27 semi-structured interviews were completed with key past and present ADF members, a former Australian Department of Defence bureaucrat, and defence news media journalists who represent the credentialled, professional, paid, working full-time and freelance journalists from known and visible news organisations. The number of interviews enabled a representation of

data from the five key phases of the ADF's involvement in Afghanistan (see Table 1). The approach serves to document the change over time in the ADF's media management.

Table 1: ADF phases in Afghanistan

Phase	Context
1	ADF Special Forces: Oct 2001 to Nov 2002
2	ADF Special Forces: Sep 2005 to Sep 2006
	Conventional force – ADF Reconstruction Task Force: Aug 2006 to Oct 2008
	ADF Special Forces return: from May 2007
3	Conventional force – ADF Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force: Sep 2008 to Feb 2010
	ADF formally structured 'media embedding' begins: from 2009
4	Conventional force – ADF Mentoring Task Force: Feb 2010 to Dec 2012
	Conventional force – ADF Advisory Task Force: Dec 2012 to Dec 2013
	ADF combat operations in Uruzgan end Dec 2013
5	Reduced non-combat ADF presence: Jan 2014 to ongoing (at the time of writing)

Sampling method

My research purpose determined the sampling design, study goal and research objective (Onwuegbuzie & Collins 2007):

- *Research purpose:* To produce findings of utility to the ADF's planning and implementation of media operations for war.

- *Study goal:* (1) to analyse, (2) trace and explain the change in the ADF's media management that are its media operations for war.

- *Research objective:* To describe that change.

Table 1 guided my sampling method to secure interviews with participants involved in the five key phases of the ADF's engagement in Afghanistan.

Although ADF Command and Control (C2) is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, it is necessary to note and understand the ADF's C2 structure for its military operations. The

doctrine of Command and Control (ADDP 00.1)[74] creates three descending levels of command: (1) strategic, (2) operational and (3) tactical. These levels overlap (see Figure 1). The strategic level 'is concerned with the art and science of employing national power in a synchronised fashion to secure national objectives' (p. 4-2). The strategic level consists of the Minister for Defence, the CDF and Headquarters ADF. The operational level exists to 'plan, synchronise and conduct campaigns and operations to achieve strategic objectives' (p. 4-3). The operational level consists of the Chief of Joint Operations and Headquarters Joint Operations Command. The tactical level 'plans and conducts military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives' (p. 4-3). The tactical level, where most force elements conduct operations, consists of a Joint Task Force Commander and a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The range of participants interviewed for my research includes representatives from these different levels of command.

Figure 1: ADF levels of command (ADDP 00.1 p. 4-4)

---

[74] http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP_00_1_Command_and_Control.pdf (Accessed 26 October 2018).

Sample size and structure

Qualitative researchers often rely on limited numbers of interviews to enable detailed findings related to the studied theory, concept or phenomenon. This approach creates intimate understanding and nuanced meaning, as opposed to generalisable findings based on quantitative sampling (Onwuegbuzie & Collins 2007). Creswell (2003) observes that the chosen research tradition, objectives and constraints should determine the sample size. Broadly speaking, Creswell (2003) recommends five to 10 participants for case studies, whereas Adler and Adler (in Baker & Edwards 2012) suggest a sample size of around 30. I opted for Adler and Adler's recommendation, based on their argument that this size sample offered the benefit of moving 'beyond a very small number of people without imposing the hardship of endless data gathering' (2012, p. 9). Shavit (2016) conducted 40 interviews and Maltby (2013) around 20 interviews for their studies. Although Maltby's anonymising of participants has been criticised (Smith 2013), Maltby notes that the interviews served to

> complement the fieldwork data with people of varying ranks and roles within the British Military … None of my interview data was used explicitly in the monograph due to the conditions under which it was collected whereby I agreed not to identify or quote directly the persons concerned. (Personal communication via email, 16 Oct 2018)

No such blanket caveat applies to my research. The potential reasons for this include my being an ADF 'insider', and and the likelihood that some of the participants do not perceive that there will be any repercussions for their careers. Most of the participants were retired ADF members, and all but 11 of the participants were senior enough in rank to be unlikely to experience any potential repercussions.

It was necessary to capture a cross-section of participants accounting for the five phases of the ADF's participation in Afghanistan[75] and the ADF's C2 arrangements. I relied on my 'insider' knowledge to formulate a 'desired' participant list. Of the 48 potential participants approached, only two declined to participate and 20 did not respond, leaving 27 participants.

---

[75] Listed in Table 1.

The participants were:

ADF strategic/operational level

- three ADF Chiefs of the Defence Force from 2001–17

- two ADF Chiefs of Joint Operations from 2001–17, and

- six Director Generals for ADF Strategic Communication from 2001–17.[76]

ADF operational/tactical level

- five ADF Commanders of Joint Task Force 633 from 2001–17[77]

- six ADF Public Affairs Officers.

Journalists

- five prominent 'defence' journalists.

No study of the ADF's involvement in Afghanistan prior to this one has accessed this range of senior ADF commanders responsible for the conduct of war and national journalists who report on it.

Interview protocol

Face-to-face interviews were the main method of data collection. Shaped by my research question and analytical framework, the interview protocol served to guide the participants to capture their lived experience to create meaning (Galletta 2013). A subsequent 'probe questioning' technique enabled the clarification or drawing out of meaning (Galletta 2013).

I adopted Galletta's (2013) 'three-segment' semi-structured interview protocol approach, whereby the interview moved from questions attuned to tangible experiences through to more explicit and theory-driven open-ended questions. I created three sets of questions tailored to the past and present ADF members and journalists. One set was for ADF Senior Command (those who held the rank of Major General or higher). Another set was for ADF Directors General[78] and Public Affairs Officers (those who held a rank from Lieutenant to Brigadier). The third set was used for the journalists. A summary of the questions is provided in Table 2. Each segment of the interview revolved around key questions, supplemented by probing

---

[76] The title ADF Director General Strategic Communication has changed several times over the years – for example, from Director General of Public Information, to Public Affairs, to Strategic Communications, back to Public Affairs, to Military Information and Effects and at the time of writing has been renamed Strategic Effects.

[77] The Commander of Joint Task Force 633 was and is the Commander of all ADF forces in Afghanistan.

[78] During the research timeframe, one Director General (Participant 7 – Brian Humphries) was a Defence Civilian.

questions. I relied on a relaxed conversational style to build rapport to elicit personal and nuanced answers.

Table 2: Summary and examples of interview questions

Interview segment	Question	Probing Question
Opening. • Broad context • Clarify understanding of topic • Probe to clarify	1. What was your ADF role in relation to Afghanistan? 2. What is your view on the relationship between 'media strategy for war' and 'military media management'?	1. If necessary, probe to clarify: when appointed to role, the date range, the major responsibilities of the role, who reported to. 2. Thinking back to the time of your role, was your understanding then the same as it is now?
Middle. • Specifics • Create meaning	1. Do you have an experience of the ADF's management of the media for Afghanistan, and its effect on strategy for war? 2. Is there anything else that you think is important that you want to discuss, or you think that I have missed?	• Probe to create meaning.
Conclusion. • Linking the data to the theory	1. What effect do you think the media had on the way the ADF approached its mission in Afghanistan?	• Probe to understand what changes over time occurred – for example, practices, behaviours.

Interview administration

All but three of the 27 interviews were conducted face-to-face.[79] Of the 27 participants, only five (~18.5%) wished to be anonymous within the research. Of the anonymous interviewees, three were retired ADF members and two were serving ADF members. Significantly, the two

---

[79] Appendix 1 provides a detailed list of participant status (i.e. retired ADF (and rank), serving ADF (and rank), journalist)), identified or anonymous and interview locations and interview durations. Two interviews were conducted via Skype because Participant 7 lived in the United States, and Participant 23 lived in Queensland and was not available during the allotted field-research phase. Participant 27's interviews were conducted via telephone because he was in poor health, which meant time was scarce and precious. Participants received the Monash University and the Departments of Defence and Defence Veterans' Affairs (DDVA) Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) pro-forma consent form, and a detailed personalised explanatory statement. The HREC applications and approvals are discussed below in the Ethics section. The participants were contacted either via publicly accessible email addresses, LinkedIn email or Australia Post mail. The interviews were conducted in 2018, with all consent forms received. Appendix 2 provides an example of a pro-forma consent form, explanatory statement and Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee (DDVA HREC) Guidelines for Volunteers.

former and retired ADF Chiefs of Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie AC (Retd) and His Excellency General the Honourable David Hurley AC DSC (Retd), and (at the time of writing) the current Chief of Defence Force, General Angus Campbell AO DSC, volunteered to be identified.[80]

A digital audio recorder was used to record the interviews. The average interview length was 73 minutes. Although I had planned to keep the interviews to a maximum of 45 minutes, almost all participants were generous with their time. Many commented that the experience was cathartic for them.

All interviews were transcribed. Later on the day of an interview, I listened to each interview recording to refine, add to and flesh out my interview field-notes and daily post-interview notes. With the transcriptions complete, I listened to the interviews once more while reading the transcripts. This highlighted the importance of reflexivity to my research and the need to reflect on my position as an ADF 'insider'.

Media releases and policy

During my analysis of the interview data,[81] an important fact became apparent. None of the participants materially discussed the notion of ideational framing or narrative, or their significance – ideational framing and narrative being elements of one of the hallmarks of modern war. The data extracted from the interviews and the knowledge gained therefore signified the need to identify the ADF's ideational framing for the war in Afghanistan.

The reason for analysing Australian Government Department of Defence ministerial and departmental media releases was to examine the ADF's dominant ideational framing in its official narrative for the war in Afghanistan. Document analysis was conducted on a sample of the over 600 ministerial and departmental media releases of events for Afghanistan from 2001–17. Document analysis 'involves skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and interpretation [that] combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis' (Bowen 2009, p. 32). I used the subjective sampling[82] technique of 'critical case' sampling made possible by my 'insider' status (Black 2012; Etikan & Bala 2017). The critical case method was appropriate since it was my 'insider' status that made it possible to decide

---

[80]   The post nominals referred to are: Companion of the Order of Australia (AC), Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) and Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

[81]   Discussed below in the Data Analysis section.

[82]   Also known as judgemental, selective or non-probability purposive sampling.

what data were relevant and significant when compared with the interview data (Black 2012). This method allowed me to focus on the specific emotive and powerful events raised by participants during the interviews:

- ADF deaths in Afghanistan
- civilian casualties, and
- detainees.

These events signify the ADF's ideational framing in its narrative for the war in Afghanistan, thereby shaping the ADF's communications and the dominant media coverage of the war.

Two sources were used to access the 2001–17 media releases: the National Library of Australia's digital archive, Trove (https://trove.nla.gov.au)[83] for releases from 2000–10 and the Australian Government Department of Defence web page for releases from 2011–17 (https://www.defence.gov.au).[84] I created a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with fields ranging from each media release's date to the title and URL links to the text and examples of the media coverage. Using the fields and my 'insider' knowledge, I assigned one of the three event types and descriptions to each media release. A total of 24 media releases were selected for analysis. Appendix 3 tables the media releases and their assigned fields. The document analysis allowed me to corroborate the evidence discussed in Chapter 6 to establish the ADF's ideational framing for the war in Afghanistan (Bowen 2009).

To compare the evidence from the interview data with the ADF's organisational knowledge, processes and procedures, document analysis was also conducted on the limited number of ADF policy, doctrine, guidelines, manuals and ground rules pertaining to Afghanistan for the period 2001–17 (Bowen 2009).

Data analysis

My choice of interview coding method is informed by Saldana's (2013) suggestion that the procedural method of 'theming the data' is a common and effective approach. In choosing this approach, I was informed by Saldana's key observation about the requirements for 'coding for patterns' (2013, pp. 5-6). I used the qualitative research software NVivo to aid and expedite the analytical process. Broadly, I conducted my analysis in three blocks:[85] first, the semi-

---

structured interviews; second, the critical reading of the transcripts while simultaneously listening to the interview recordings; and third, 'theming the data' and searching for patterns in the data.

Theming the data

Theming the data is a procedural method and a 'standardised' way of coding data (Saldana 2013). It recognises that segments of coded sentences (or themes) can 'capture the essence and essentials of participant meaning' (2013, p. 268). Different to a code, a theme is the sentence, idiom, expression or terminology that captures what a segment of data means. The theme is either observed directly in the data (the manifest level) or identified as underlying the phenomenon (the latent level) (Saldana 2013). My 'insider' status was invaluable for the latent level – for example, the themes might be the narration of behaviour, reasons for why things happen, memorable quotes or 'morals from participant stories' (2013, p. 268). On this basis, my 'theming of the data' created centralising categories that aligned with the three parts of my main research question. Appendix 4 presents the final list of categories and themes.

The occurrence of social life

For the occurrence of social life, Saldana (2013) draws on Lofland (2006), who observes that social life is a result of the confluence of four points, which are 'the intersection of one or more *actors* [participants], engaging in one or more *activities* (behaviours) at a particular *time* in a specific *place*' (Saldana 2013, p.121, emphasis in original). Drawing on Lofland (2006), the major units of social organisation for my research are:

- cultural practices (the ADF's daily routines, occupational tasks, micro-cultural activity, etc.)
- episodes (unanticipated or irregular activities such as ADF deaths in Afghanistan, etc)
- encounters (a temporary interaction between two or more individuals such as an ADF 'media embed')
- roles (Commander, Public Affairs Officer, etc.) and social types (e.g. risk averse, trusting).
- social and personal relationships (Commander and Public Affairs Officer, Sub-Unit Commander, etc.)
- groups and cliques (Infantry Corps, Armoured Corps, Public Relations Corps, MECC, etc.)
- organisations (ADF, NATO, etc.)
- settlements and habitats (Headquarters, Higher Headquarters, Bases, etc.), and

- subcultures and lifestyles (Special Forces, etc.).

Saldana (2013, p. 15) also points out that joining the above units with cognitive, emotional and hierarchical aspects means they form 'topics for study and coding'. Again drawing on Lofland (2006), those aspects for my research include:

- cognitive aspects or meanings (e.g. ideologies, rules, self-concepts, identities)
- emotional aspects or feelings (e.g. distrust of the media), and
- hierarchical aspects or inequalities (e.g. military rank).

Coding for patterns

I structured the coding method around pre-determined categories and themes, as well as producing new themes as they emerged. For example, as described in Chapter 2, the pre-determined categories included the themes of policy, media relations, access, and control and censorship of information.

I 'themed the data' three times. During the first phase, in conjunction with the pre-determined categories and the creation of new themes, I created repeating codes to capture and draw out the repeated 'patterns of action and consistencies in human affairs as documented in the data' (Saldana 2013, p. 5). In the second phase, when searching for and sorting themes in to the pre-determined or newly created categories, I was mindful of 'idiosyncrasy as pattern' because one should expect patterned variation in data (Agar 2008). Themes were grouped based not only on likeness (resemblance) but also on commonality (shared attributes) (Saldana 2013, p. 6). I thus acknowledged that the process of categorisation in qualitative analysis cannot always be neatly bounded. Categories can sometimes only exist amidst 'fuzzy' boundaries (Tesch 1990, pp. 135–8). Drawing on Hatch (2002, p. 155), I thought of 'patterns not just as stable regularities but as varying forms' characterised by:

- similarity (things happen the same way)
- difference (they happen in predictably different ways)
- frequency (they happen often or seldom)
- sequence (they happen in a certain order)
- correspondence (they happen in relation to other activities or events), and
- causation (one appears to cause another).

In the third and final phase, I collected the categories and grouped them under three centralising categories, each of which served to answer the three parts of my main research question. Appendix 5 provides the final code book.

Three block analysis summaries

1   *Semi-structured interviews.* Creswell (2003) observes that qualitative data analysis is an iterative and reflective process. It involves the posing and pondering of analytic questions, and the constant task of note-taking for the duration of the study. Hence, my in-depth analysis began from the first interview. I immersed myself in the data by taking notes during, immediately after and at later stages of revisiting the interview transcripts. This approach afforded me the ability to identify emerging themes and pose the requisite probing questions as the interviews progressed from the first through to the last. By taking this approach, I was able to generally identify and reflect on the aspects of my research, including the concepts, policy, doctrine, guidelines, manuals, practices, processes and procedures, ground rules, events, actions, activities, media access, military censorship and control of the media, opinions and differences of opinion. These aspects were used to interrogate and sort the themes into categories for later placement into their centralising categories.

2   *Critical reading and listening.* Once the final transcript was complete, I imported all the transcripts and their relevant audio files into NVivo. I critically read the transcripts and simultaneously listened to the interview recordings. I did this twice for each participant. The primary purpose of the first pass was to check for the expected 'outsider's' interpretations of military and ADF idioms. The primary purpose of the second pass was to expand my thinking by posing and pondering additional analytic questions. These additional analytic questions and my reflections (which included preliminary theme identification) were added to my 'rolling thoughts' research diary which I started on day one of my PhD.

3   *Theming the data and searching for patterns in the data.* I used the NVivo software package for the detailed data analysis of the semi-structured interviews. Within NVivo, I began by creating: (1) source classifications; (2) cases; and (3) themes (or, as NVivo labels them, 'Nodes').

   a   *Source classifications.* Source classifying is the allocation of metadata to the sources or data (in my case the participant interview transcripts were the sources). For example, for

each interview (or source) I identified the who (e.g. anonymous or identifiable), what and where of each interview. With the interview classifications established, I then assigned attributes to each interview. For example, I identified the participants' rank, roles/positions held, time scales and whether they were retired or serving ADF members.

b   *Cases*. Case creation is the creation of a case classification for each participant (e.g. case 1, 2, 3 etc.). With each case created I then 'coded' from the transcript only the participant's answers. The purpose of the case classification is to interrogate the relevant data/text and not be skewed by my questions.

c   *Nodes (or themes)*. Finally, I created the themes and categories.

With the categories and themes established, I then 'themed the data' in three phases. First, I either coded text to the categories and themes or created new themes as I progressed through the data. Second, I rationalised the newly created themes to either combine them with the existing categories or create new categories. The important process here was the grouping of themes 'based not only on likeness but also based on commonality' (Saldana 2013, p. 6). Third, I created the three centralising categories that served to answer the three parts to my main research question.

Subject position

It is important to return to my subject position for readers to understand my research and its findings. By doing so, I acknowledge my status as an ADF insider and Afghanistan veteran and disclose the personal values that may influence my research.

ADF insider and Afghanistan veteran

Before taking leave from the ADF to pursue my doctoral research, I served for eight years (2010–17) with the Australian Army as an officer.[86] During that time I deployed to Afghanistan as part of the ADF's Operation Slipper on numerous occasions.

I joined the ADF, and specifically the Australian Army, to know the reality of Australia's military commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan. I am proud to have become part of an Australian military institution, which includes its attendant traditions and myths. However,

---

[86]   I operated within the Australian Army's Information, Dominance and Influence (ID&I) Battle Operating System (BOS). That ID&I BOS is one of several BOSs, which include the Command and Control BOS; the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance BOS; the Manoeuvre BOS; the Offensive Support BOS; the Mobility and Survivability BOS; the Air Defence BOS and the Combat Service Support BOS. For more context see the Australian Army's 2017 edition of *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power,* https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/lwd_1_the_fundamentals_of_land_power_full_july_2017.pdf (Accessed 17 Oct 2018).

during my research project I have sought to suspend the comradery and powerful sense of loyalty that develops with military service. Nevertheless, it is vital to note that a sense of loyalty informs my research purpose: to produce findings of utility to the ADF's planning and implementation of media operations for war. In the ugly realm of warfare, only findings that strive for the clearest truth are of value to a military worth fighting for. Anything less is dangerous to the ADF's planning and preparation for war.

Personal values

Within the confines of security studies, I am influenced by the social sciences, which means the definition of 'security' is debatable (Williams 2013). However, for the present I subscribe to the security theory and framework of broad human security. This prioritises people's security and the alleviation of threats to the individual (Altman 2012). This paradigm shifts away from traditional, dominant security studies grounded in realism that places the state at the centre of international relations politicking (Altman 2012; Williams 2013).

Broad human security harnesses the foundational premises of the individual's freedom from fear and want (Camilleri, in Altman 2012). The narrower freedom from fear relates to threats 'posed by physical violence', whereas the broader freedom from wants encapsulates the more complex freedom from 'threats posed by poverty and famine [through] to environmental degradations, humanitarian disasters and state collapse' (2012, p. 17). The shift from the state to the individual is significant. Emphasising the individual focuses security issues on the local micro level and away from the regional and international macro sphere.

Further, I subscribe to Camilleri's categorisation of broad threats as being either direct (coercion/physical violence) and indirect (social, economic, environmental and political). Camilleri's continued classification of these threats as either chronic (hunger, disease) or sudden (war, natural disaster) holds sway (Camilleri, in Altman 2012, p. 19).

That said, the present rise in the geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific sphere worries me. That worry brings with it an inertia that is pulling me back towards the traditional security agenda of realism, an agenda that relates to the Westphalian notion of states and the use of force (Beaulac 2004). Realism places the state at the centre of power relations (Altman 2012; Williams 2013). In the traditionalist sense, the notion of 'just war' first espoused by Saint Augustine of Hippo (~ 354 to ~ 430 AD) informs my thinking (Guthrie 2007), meaning that peace is valued over war. However, I also acknowledge that in extreme circumstances, once

all peaceful efforts have been exhausted and only if it is morally permissible, the use of force is a last resort.

Finally, I hold that an observation by Liddell Hart (1972), an historian and scholarly giant in the field of strategy during the twentieth century, remains important. Inadequate strategy when planning for the threat or use of force is likely to cost more than any errors of execution. A plan based on an ambiguous and/or limited strategy is fraught with danger. With occasional exceptions, history demonstrates that, regardless of tactical competence, strategic performance is contingent on comprehensive strategy (Gray 1999). This means that in the twenty-first century an holistic strategy with a definitive goal and objectives, which includes the omnipresence of media in war, provides the greatest chance of success. Chapter 6 discusses this point, finding that the ADF (at the time of writing) has no media strategy for war. This reality arises from successive Australian governments' desire to closely vet, control and limit the ADF's use of the media and release of public information.

Ethics

In addition to the required Monash Human Research Ethics Committee (Monash HREC) approval, access to present and past ADF members also required Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee (DDVA HREC) approval. Related to this 'two-step' approval process, Chapter 5.3 'Minimising duplication of ethical review' in the Australian Government's May 2015 updated *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (National Research Council et al. 2007) states:

> 5.3.1. Wherever more than one institution has a responsibility to ensure that a human research project is subject to ethical review … each institution has the further responsibility to adopt a review process that eliminates any unnecessary duplication of ethical review.

Despite the statement's clear intent and the Monash HREC's existing approval of this research as 'low risk', the DDVA HREC's Secretariat insisted on vetting this research for a second time. By way of comparison, the Monash HREC submission was a total of 16 pages, took a quarter of a day to complete, and was approved within 20 days. The total of five DDVA HREC

submissions (one submission and four re-submissions) consisted of 75 pages, took over seven days to complete, and took more than 30 days to approve.[87]

Overall, no major ethical concerns eventuated during the conduct of the research. The standard qualitative research ethical issues were present and appropriately addressed through the Monash HREC 'low-risk' approval process. For example, these included the participant choice of anonymity, the research confirmed as being unfunded, and the academic merit of the research project being evaluated, approved and confirmed by a Confirmation of PhD Candidature panel.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the choice of a qualitative research approach to explore the lived experience of those personnel responsible for the ADF's media management for war across a 16-year research period. It has also explained why a qualitative method affords a research design that meets the challenge of accounting for change. The chapters that follow detail why and how the ADF manages the media, and how this affects its media operations for war.

---

[87]   Ultimately, the DDVA HREC did not request any changes to my Monash HREC-approved research project and also approved the research as 'low risk'. I am puzzled by the DDVA HREC's Secretariat's departure from the National Statement's clear intent. On the balance of probabilities, it is likely the result of a desire to manage reputational risk.

Chapter 4
Why the ADF manages the media: 'No one knows why – it's just what we do'

In 2003, the Sydney-based Australian Army Reserve One Commando Company planned a routine training exercise in which its members parachuted into Sydney Harbour. As always, a media release announced the event and generated media interest. An ex-Army photographer working for the *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH) contacted the unit's Public Affairs Officer, Tony Park. Park had spent over 15 years in the Reserves, and had over 20 years of media management experience, which included working as Private Secretary to a state Premier. Park consulted with his commanding officer, who supported the news media's involvement. The next day the SMH ran a half-page story with a picture on page 3. This may have been regarded as a coveted public relations success, but not for Park or the ADF:

> Shortly after I got the biggest arse-kicking of my entire Military career. This went all the way up the chain [of command] to Canberra – the Chief of the Defence Force's office and the Minister for Defence's office because I had not taken the time to inform Mal Brough, the Assistant Minister for Defence in charge of recruiting and local member for Wide Bay in Queensland, that there was going to be an Army Reserve parachute jump in Sydney Harbour that weekend to give him time to attend. (Major (retired) Tony Park, Participant 14)

The negative reaction by the minister's office to the ADF's open and positive management of the media exemplifies why the ADF manages the media. The ADF believes it must do so to ensure the Minster for Defence's continued control of information flow to the media and to align with the minister's media management objectives and plans, which include enhancing the minister's and the government's reputation.

<div align="center">***</div>

The previous chapter detailed that mediatization is this thesis's theoretical framework, the three dynamics of mediatized conflict its conceptual framework, that its qualitative approach derives its evidence from semi-structured interviews and document analysis, and that the direct quotations from the interviews act as exemplars for the inductively derived categories and themes that emerged from the interviews.

This chapter addresses the first part of this study's research question: *Why does the ADF manage the media* and the sub-question *Who does the ADF perceive its audience(s) to be?* The evidence shows that the ADF sees the Australian government as its primary audience, which prevents the media from assuming a co-structuring role. This means the ADF's power in war is impeded because its liberty to communicate and act is diminished. This curtails its ability to maintain public support and produces a range of direct and indirect effects.

Directly, the government guides the function of the ADF's media management because the ADF imagines there is a government policy to do so. This conception is the result of the ADF's organisational and cultural memory. This enables government to influence access to and control of media resources within the ADF's areas of operations, thereby maximising the government's control over its narrative. The imagined policy direction also informs the four goals of the ADF's media management: first, to communicate with a primary specific audience and generalised audiences; second, to maintain public support; third, to eliminate or mitigate and control risk; and fourth, to maintain and enhance the ADF's reputation. The evidence shows that the combined effect of these goals is to control and minimise the media's exposure to the ADF's operations, thereby limiting the media's ability to co-structure power relations with the government.

The chapter also addresses a relevant gap in the knowledge. It considers the effects of the media and media coverage on the cultural subfields of those within the ADF responsible for media management in times of war (Kaun & Fast 2013, p. 47). The chapter examines how these effects are experienced by the research participants responsible for the ADF's media operations.

Imagined Australian government direction

The evidence shows that, for Afghanistan, from the strategic through to the tactical level, the ADF managed the media because it imagined the government required it to do so. According to the available data and my search of ADF documentation, the Australian government did not provide codified policy direction as to why the ADF should manage the media. My findings differ from Maltby's (2013) research on the British military's media management in war and Shavit's (2016) research into the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) media strategy in war. A brief discussion of their research is relevant because of the ADF's historical military ties with Britain and the IDF arguably being at the forefront of modern media strategy in war.

Maltby (2013, p. 16) found that the British government's Information Strategy, which includes Media Operations, directs the British military's interactions with the media. British military doctrine,[88] reflecting the requirements of the strategy, stipulates that the military should foster public and political support for its warlike operations through the media. Within the bounds of operations security (OPSEC),[89] the military caters for the media's needs to ensure that its use of force is proactively communicated to and understood by its identified audiences. To achieve this, the military does not seek to restrict the media's access to information or its areas of operations. Rather, through its Green Book,[90] it clearly defines the facilitation of access.

Shavit's (2016) research finds that the IDF are directed by their government's Protocol 17 and the National Information Directorate (2016, p. 136).[91] In war, the IDF's Spokesperson's Division[92] prioritises 'public diplomacy' under Israeli policy. This means they focus their attention on communication with domestic and international audiences to legitimate the use of military force. As a result, the Division dedicates considerable effort to influencing public opinion through the media which is a pivotal component of the IDF's planning for war. It also means that, within the constraints of OPSEC, the IDF do not restrict the media's access to information and areas of operations. Rather, at the Division's sole discretion and without the need for risk averse strategic level clearance, concise, current visual information is provided quickly and directly to the media and the IDF's audiences.

Unlike the British and Israeli militaries, the ADF operated in a media policy vacuum and reflexively restricted the media's access to information and areas of its operations beyond what would be the case in a circumscribed context. This resulted in the ADF under-utilising the

---

[88] *Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1: media operations*, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/media-operations (Accessed 21 January 2019).

[89] The protection of friendly force life through the denial of enemy access to information.

[90] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-green-book (Accessed 21 January 2019).

[91] It should be noted that the security context in which Israel's military operates is considerably different to that of the ADF. As the then (1996–99) and at the time of writing now (2009–present) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said to the author in 1998, 'We live in a tough neighborhood.' For example, aside from its many and varied ongoing armed conflicts, the state of Israel has been unilaterally involved in eight wars since inception in 1947: Israel's War of Independence (1947–49); The Sinai Campaign (Operation Kadesh – 1956); the Six-Day War (June 1967); the War of Attrition (1968–70); the Yom Kippur War (October 1973); the Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982); the Gulf War (1991); the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the three Gaza wars: Operation Cast Lead (2008–09), Operation Pillar of Defence (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Since the state of Australia's inception in 1901, this is compared to the Australian military's multilateral involvement as a small coalition partner in eight wars.

[92] The Spokesperson's Division is responsible for the IDF's information policy and external media relations.

power of the media's affordances and relying on its military organisational knowledge to manage the media in war.

All seventeen participants at the strategic level between 2001 and 2017, where the government policy/military strategy interface occurs, reported that there was no explicit Australian government policy direction. Brigadier Gary Bornholt, the ADF's Director General for Public Affairs in 2001, recalled in relation to Afghanistan:

> In the lead up there was no guidance. No Minister and no CDF, and no one sat
> down and said, 'This is how I want it to look. Go away and make that happen.'
> (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4)

Bornholt's reference to 'no guidance' indicates that there was no policy. In the military setting, government policy informs military strategy and policy is taken to be the guidance. A military takes policy guidance from the government to plan how it will execute the government's military requirements. In the absence of codified policy, the ADF fell back on its organisational knowledge to manage the media.

Nonaka's (1995, p. 21) theory of organisational knowledge defines knowledge as a 'justified true belief'. Individuals first create knowledge and it becomes organisational knowledge through a process known as the 'spiral of organizational knowledge creation'. There are two dimensions of organisational knowledge creation: epistemological and ontological. For the epistemological there are two knowledge types: tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge stems from intangible individual experience and is difficult to impart, while explicit knowledge is codified and more easily transferable between individuals. The ontological dimension reaches from the individual through the team, group, organisation and outward. 'A spiral emerges when the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge is elevated dynamically from a lower ontological level to higher levels' (Nonaka 1995, p. 57). There are four modes of knowledge conversion to the 'spiral': socialisation (from tacit to tacit knowledge), externalisation (from tacit to explicit knowledge), combination (from explicit to explicit knowledge), and internalisation (from explicit to tacit knowledge).[93]

---

[93]   For an in-depth explication, see Nonaka's (1995) *The Knowledge-creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation*.

The ADF's 1985 manual, JSP 41 (revised in 1993), was defunct by 2002. In the absence of ADF and government policy, the ADF lacked explicit knowledge of why it managed the media: 'No one knows. It's just what we do' (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4).

The ADF's organisational knowledge relied on the 'spiral of knowledge's' socialisation mode of knowledge conversion (from tacit to tacit knowledge).[94] That 'no one knows' why the ADF managed the media illustrates the absence of codified government policy, the absence of ADF doctrine, thus implying the operation and influence of tacit knowledge.[95]

The absence of explicit knowledge about ADF media policy might reflect its existence at a 'restricted' or 'secret' security classification level. This is an inadequate interpretation for two reasons. First, none of the ADF participants spoke of the explicit knowledge being 'restricted' or 'secret'. Second, because the ADF's management of the media occurs publicly, it cannot be 'restricted' or 'secret'. The journalist participants in the study believed that much of the ADF's media management was deliberately covert, designed to keep information away from the public eye.

Historically, the ADF's memory of why it managed the media during wars or conflicts during the twentieth century informs its tacit knowledge. The evidence reveals that because of this tacit knowledge there was no change in the ADF's understanding of the media's role in war. From the strategic down to the tactical level, the ADF thought that the media's primary role was to tell its story. An ADF Public Affairs Officer who deployed to Afghanistan multiple times at the tactical level reflected this officially endorsed perspective:

> My thinking was that the media should be telling the story about what our guys are doing in Afghanistan, and the good work that they were doing. (Participant 2 – anonymous)

Contrary to the scholarly consensus (Cottle 2007; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Horten 2011; Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015; Kaempf 2013; Maltby 2013; Mortensen 2014; Shavit 2016), 'telling the story' demonstrates that the ADF remained impervious to the character of modern war. It also

---

[94] My research does not seek to examine in detail how the ADF creates its organisational knowledge. At the time of writing, in 2018, the ADF had commenced a preliminary draft for consultation of ADF doctrine relating to its Public Affairs function, which includes the management of the media in times of conflict (Participant 22 – anonymous).

[95] The difference between ADF doctrine and policy is that 'policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing, however it provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation' (ADDP 00.1 p. iii).

highlights a failure to understand that the media's role is not to 'do your propaganda' (Karen Middleton, Participant 12) or to funnel the ADF's Public Affairs story. The media have a different understanding of what a 'story' is, and the role they occupy:

> [We] report the news, to report the facts fairly and reasonably … engaging the public … in often complex policy matters. (Chris Masters, Participant 15)

The ADF's misunderstanding of the media's role in war is a result of its failure to sustain close and mutually beneficial relations with the media. The ADF does not grasp the relationship change between the military and the media where the media not only report and represent war, but also enact and perform it (Cottle 2007).

In the twenty-first century, the evidence shows that three political realities, two of which are critical, have influenced the ADF's tacit knowledge about its management of the media: first, in June 2001, the Minister for Defence's centralisation and control over the ADF's release of information to the media; second, the '*Tampa* controversy' of August 2001; and third, the 'Children Overboard' affair of October 2001.

The 2001 '*Tampa* controversy' and the 'Children Overboard' affair were complex political realities that have had a lasting effect on the ADF's management of the media. The August 2001 MV *Tampa* controversy related to the Howard government's use of military force to prevent asylum-seekers aboard the Norwegian-flagged vessel from claiming refuge on the Australian mainland. Subsequently, the government passed through parliament a raft of legislative measures that came to comprise the so-called 'Pacific Solution'.[96]

The October 2001 'Children Overboard' affair occurred in the context of the ADF's Operation Relex (2001–06), and involved the Royal Australian Navy's HMAS *Adelaide*. Relex was a 'border protection' operation aimed at preventing and deterring asylum-seekers and 'people smugglers' from illegally reaching Australia.[97] The *Adelaide* had intercepted a boat carrying asylum-seekers heading for Christmas Island, one of Australia's territories. During its attempts to deter the boat and its passengers from entering Australian waters, the then Howard government's Minister for Defence falsely claimed that asylum-seekers had 'thrown children overboard' to secure rescue by the *Adelaide*, thus ensuring asylum in Australia. Effectively, in

---

[96] They served to preclude asylum-seekers' automatic right for refugee status if they arrived on Australia's mainland or any of its territories/islands from the sea.

[97] https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/maritimeinciden t/report/c02 (Accessed 4 April 2020).

both cases, the ADF had been used as a political tool to bolster public support for the government's policy choices, and ultimately to maintain the government's political power. The events took place in the run-up to the November 2001 federal election. Public opinion polling preceding the events suggested that the Howard government was not likely to win re-election. Following the August '*Tampa* controversy', '9/11' and the October 'Children Overboard' affair, the Howard government was re-elected in November 2001.[98]

The Australian Department of Defence's Director of Strategic Communication from 2000 to 2004, Brian Humphreys, captures the political level's self-serving intent and the effect on the ADF. Following the '*Tampa* controversy' the Department further cemented the government's censorship and control of information to deny the media's access to it. By the time of 'Children Overboard', this meant that the ADF had already lost the ability to control and release its own information to establish fact, and was locked in to enhancing and protecting the Defence Minister's and the government's reputation. After East Timor:

> We linked ourselves more closely with the Minister's office, so they were aware of what we were doing, partly in response to the number of surprises from previous Ministers' offices, and their express concern about their lack of visibility about what public utterances we were making. I think that worked out particularly well with some of our earlier Ministers. I think later Ministers took what was intended to be an open system and put the shutters up and limited it … to no public utterances without prior Ministerial approval. That changed our approach completely … resulting in amongst other things the Children Overboard debacle.
> (Brian Humphreys, Participant 7)

The ADF's twenty-first century tacit knowledge saw it operate strictly by government policy direction. This aligned with the tenets of Western liberal democracies and the accepted paradigm of security studies scholars.[99] Like any professional military, the ADF did what its government told it to do. Seeking to understand why the direction was or was not codified is not within the purview of this research. What is important is that the ADF imagined the direction to exist, and that its socialisation mode of knowledge conversion was instrumental in why the ADF managed the media as it did.

---

[98]   For a nuanced account, see Marr's (2003) *Dark Victory*.

[99]   The tendency of this form of epistemology is to require the ADF to perceive that the direction has been received and remains in force.

The function

Influenced by the imagined reason, the function of the ADF's management of the media was to ensure the Minster for Defence's continued control of information flow to the media. It was also to align with the minister's media-management objectives and plans, which included enhancing the reputation of the Defence Minister and the government.

The reality of ministerial centralisation and control of the ADF's release of information to the media meant that the MECC Division acted as the gatekeeper for the release of information about the ADF's operations. Former Director of Public Affairs at the ADF's Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Colonel Andrew Mayfield, describes the problem as:

> There was never a communication strategy … and that's been more by virtue of the fact that it sat in the hands with the bureaucrats who actually only really understand the Minister … and senior leadership. They actually have little appreciation for what the other 80% of the ADF do on a daily basis … let alone the ADF on Operations. (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

MECC's role as gatekeeper was counter-intuitive to the reality of modern war. One of the themes to emerge from the data is that MECC's role reduced the ADF's agency in the practice of media management at the operational and tactical levels. This reduced agency meant that the ADF did not embrace the media's centrality, nor did they manage it effectively. Recognising the media's centrality would have provided the ADF with the opportunity to harness the media's positive, active and performative power in war.[100]

MECC's purpose was to control all political risk to the Australian Minister for Defence and the Australian government. As a consequence, the release of any information to the media and the public required the Minster for Defence's approval.[101] By 2010 and onwards, with ministerial approval, the ADF began regularly granting select news media representatives limited area- and-time constrained access to its operations in Afghanistan.[102] Nevertheless, MECC continued to control the release of unclassified information to the media.[103]

---

[100] The effect on the ADF's media operations of the ADF's inability to harness the media's active and performative power in war is discussed in Chapter 6.

[101] The ADF 'clearance' process is discussed in Chapter 5.

[102] The ADF 'media embed' program is discussed in Chapter 5.

[103] One might argue that as I was only able to interview one Department of Defence bureaucrat, I have over-stated the influence of MECC on flimsy evidence. However, Humphreys' evidence is strikingly consistent with how the ADF participants saw the role of MECC.

The principal direct effect of how and why the ADF managed the media was that it enabled the government to influence access to and control of media resources within the ADF's areas of operations. This served to limit the media's ability to co-structure power relations. By limiting the media's co-structuring ability, the government was able to maximise its control over its narrative for war.[104]

The ADF's media management goals

The ADF's management of the media was shaped by four goals: first, to communicate with a primary limited audience, and generalised audiences; second, to maintain public support; third, to eliminate or mitigate and control risk; and fourth, to maintain and enhance the ADF's reputation.

Primary limited and generalised audiences

The evidence shows that the ADF conceived its most important audience to be the Minister for Defence, the Minister's office and the Executive government, who are responsible for devising the policy for the threat or use of force. As the ADF's former Director General of Military Information, Brigadier Dan Fortune, points out:

> Probably the one [audience] at senior leadership in the ADF [and] … DG (Director General) level you were always attuned to [was] the Minister and what the Minister's advice was. (Brigadier (retired) Dan Fortune, Participant 9)

The ADF's communication with the most important audience set the parameters for its communication with its generalised audiences. The ADF saw its generalised audiences to be the Australian public, ADF members and their families, the ADF's allies and partners of the Coalition in which it served, and the governments of those allies and partners. The evidence shows there was no change in the ADF's definition of its audiences throughout the research project's 2001–17 timeframe.

Recognising the most important audience, the ADF created for itself a basis on which to construct the themes and associated messages to be communicated to the generalised audiences. In constructing them, and before they were 'transmitted' to the defined audiences, the themes and messages were 'cleared' by MECC and ultimately by the Minister for Defence.

---

[104] Although an aspect of 'narrative' is discussed below under the heading of maintaining public support, the consequences of the government seeking to limit the media's co-structuring ability and hence attempt to control its narrative for war is discussed in Chapter 6.

It was because the ADF identified the minister as its most important audience that the most important function of its information management practices was to protect the minister's and the government's reputation. This afforded the minister control of information flow to the media.

The ADF believed that the principal conduit carrying its 'messages' to the Australian public was 'the traditional news media, the mainstream news media' (Participant 22 – anonymous). In Canberra:

> The media is the Gallery. They're at the centre of the Universe. They're the ones that pull the strings, and they're where a lot of the information goes in and out of … strategic media is about Canberra media, and that's about the Gallery. (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4)

That the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery dominated the ADF's world-view signifies the fact that the ADF was oblivious to the concepts of imagined audience and context collapse. It did not fully appreciate that 'the Gallery's' 'news' became digital content or that its audiences had become active, interpretive, intuitive and interconnected.

Maintaining public support

In the Western construct of war, the concept of public support has a long history that can be traced back to Thucydides' (1830) *The History of the Peloponnesian War* and Aristotle's (1886) *Rhetoric*. More recently, the notion of public support has been defined as the public's neutral, negative or positive opinion towards an issue or policy (Ruelle en Bartels 1998, in Vlassenroot et al. 2006). Taken further, it relates to acceptability, commitment, legitimacy and participation (Goldenbeld 2002, in Vlassenroot et al. 2006). There is a nexus between opinion and support for war – for example, one might have a negative general opinion of war yet support participation in it based on its legitimacy in a specific circumstance. During the commitment to Afghanistan, it was the active interpretive support of the Australian public that the ADF saw as vital:

> The Government strategy, or my interpretation of it, was to maintain broad Australian support for the engagement, to acknowledge what these young men and women are doing but not to have it on the front page and to avoid a circumstance where we start generating an anti-Afghanistan sort of campaign. (Participant 3 – anonymous)

Perhaps counter-intuitively, the ADF was convinced that to maintain public support it needed to avoid front-page exposure. That arose from its belief that the government was averse to negative publicity of the kind generated by generous media access to the area of operations, and that it should therefore strictly control such access. The impact of this was to limit the media's role of co-structuring power relations, which itself influenced public support. The ADF's power in war was shackled, its ability to communicate and act was diminished and its capacity to maintain public support was curtailed. A former Commander of Australia's Joint Task Force 633,[105] Major General Craig Orme, observed that a further consequence of this aversion to publicity was a distorting focus on public opinion:

> Everything is driven by the perception at home, the viability and validity of the operations that have been conducted in order to ensure popular support, and therefore electoral support, or at least not have electoral damage from the operations that are being conducted. (Major General (retired) Craig Orme, Participant 18)

In the years following the ADF's stability operations in East Timor, the Executive has exerted a strong political influence beyond the strategic level down to the operational and tactical level of the ADF's military operations. That influence has meant that the ADF's purpose for its military operations in Afghanistan was to maintain public support for those operations. For this reason, the ADF's public messaging through the 'traditional' media

> emanates from that and a lot of your, in effect, military decisions relate to that …
> such that you start doing things which are politically palatable but may not be the
> best military output. (Major General (retired) Craig Orme, Participant 18)

Major General Orme's observation demonstrates the media's effect on the cultural subfields of those within the ADF responsible for operations and media management and how this in turn impacted the media's access to and coverage of operations. Those journalists granted access to ADF operations in Afghanistan found that their freedom of movement was constrained and that the ADF maintained constant oversight, vetting and examining their copy. The intrusive curtailment of media freedom demonstrated that the ADF regarded the public's right to know,

---

[105]   The commander of Joint Task Force 633 held the national command for all of the Australian Defence Force's operations in Afghanistan.

or even catering to its expectations and assumptions, as less important than serving the needs of the minister.[106]

Security studies ties the maintenance of public support for operations closely to strategic narrative. Here, the narrative operates at a deeper level than as a mere method of communication, explaining or describing the reasons for the ethical threat or use of force. Narrative and its structure operate at the human level of unconscious and conscious thought and identity. As Foster (1999) notes, drawing on MacLachlan (1994), cognitive scientists argue that what humans understand as perception acts are in fact recall acts. The majority of those in the active interpretative Australian public who have not physically experienced war make sense of it, and synthesise its meaning, not simply through perception, identification and organisation of its component features ('bottom-up' processing), 'but also by framing these events and experiences in accordance with expectations, assumptions and prior knowledge ("top-down" processing)' (MacLachlan 1994, p. 70, in Foster 1999, p. 12). The lack of participant discussion of narrative in the evidence indicates that the ADF's understanding of public support does not extend to encompass narrative, despite related doctrine making explicit reference to it.[107] This stems from a belief within the ADF that public support is maintained simply by having the media tell the ADF's story. Drawing on Mann (2018), that approach consigns public support to Information Operations and rudimentary 'messaging' is often described as 'spin' or 'propaganda'.[108]

The elimination, mitigation and control of risk

The ADF's determination to manage the media to eliminate or mitigate and control risk further shaped its approach to the maintenance of public support. By seeking to 'manage risk', the ADF was empowered to control and minimise the media's exposure to its operations and limit the media's co-structuring ability. According to Hubbard (2009), risk is the effect of uncertainty on actions or events. Risk management is the recognition, assessment and prioritising of risk. With risks identified, processes are implemented to reduce, monitor and control the likelihood of the impact of risk events. At the same time, risk management should also seek to enhance the benefits of opportunities. Petersen (2012) points out that within

---

[106]   The consequences of the government seeking to limit the media's co-structuring ability and hence attempt to control its narrative for war is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

[107]   The related doctrine, which is not specific to media operations, is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

[108]   This concept will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

security studies, the full embrace of risk management coincided with the US-led Coalition for the 'global war on terror' following 9/11.

The participant discussions divide the ADF's 'risk management' of the media into four elements: first, the reality of the ADF operating as a junior partner within a larger Coalition; second, the traditional and enduring military premise of OPSEC; third, the risk to the media's own personal safety in the area of operations; and fourth, the intangible risk to the ADF's reputation. The ADF's management of the media pertained more to managing risks than war.

> There is … an understanding of risk in terms of … Australia [in Afghanistan] was part of the International Security Assistance Force. A Coalition of many … So there's a risk footprint of … the Coalition. (Participant 5 – anonymous)

The ADF thought about the management of the media in terms of anticipating action to prevent negative outcomes, monitoring risk to necessitate action as required and avoiding action to circumvent negative outcomes. The ADF premised its management on a need to support the cohesion of the Coalition of which it was a junior member to avoid political friction. The ADF's approach to the media was intended to avoid negative outcomes rather than promoting positive outcomes. Tom Hyland[109] captures the sentiment of how this revelation also had an impact on the media's access and coverage:

> Twice I put my name up [for an ADF media embed]. [They said] 'Yeah, next time I'll think about it … Oh sorry you just missed out' … So I contacted the Dutch Defence Attaché in Canberra – he gave me the contact details of the Public Affairs Officer in the Dutch Army in Uruzgan[110] – very positive – very positive communications going on … I could stay with them as long as I wanted … Somewhere along the line my request to the Dutch ended up in the hands of [an Australian Army Captain Public Affairs officer] … then nothing happened … I got back in touch with the Dutch and they said, 'We've given it to your countrymen' and I thought 'Fuck this' and I rang the Dutch Defence Attaché in

---

[109] Tom Hyland's experience as a journalist and editor spans more than 30 years to include the roles of the Australian Associated Press's Melbourne Bureau Chief; *The Age's* Day News Editor, Foreign Editor, State News Editor and National Editor; and *The Sunday Age's* International Editor.

[110] As part of ISAF's Regional Command – South, from August 2006 to August 2010 the Dutch commanded the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Uruzgan from its main base (Camp Holland) in the province's capital Tarin Kot. During that time the ADF's Reconstruction Task Force was integrated into the Dutch led PRT. Command of ISAF's Regional Command – South alternated between the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and Britain.

Canberra again. I said, 'I don't know what's happening but I'm willing to go' …
He said to me, 'I want you to know that you are very welcome, and I will do
everything I possibly can to get you into Uruzgan and I will talk to … [the ADF's
Director of Public Affairs]' … The next thing I know … [the ADF] emails me
[saying] 'You are invited to join us on a tour to Uruzgan'. (Tom Hyland,
Participant 13)

Such an approach indicates that the ADF did not apprehend the media's active and
performative role in war and the potential benefits the media afforded.[111] The evidence
emphasises that the consequence of 'risk management' to avoid negative outcomes was the
control and minimisation of the media's access and exposure to the ADF's operations.
Typically, participants justified why the ADF managed the media in terms of OPSEC, which
reflected a desire to limit the media's co-structuring ability. The tendency here was that the
'risk management' approach was at once encouraged and reinforced by the military notion of
OPSEC.

Enmeshed in the Coalition's risk footprint was its concern with OPSEC. OPSEC is a necessary
reality in any military operation for war. Principally, it encompasses the orchestration of
techniques and procedures to deny an enemy's access to information.[112] This necessarily
includes the media.[113] According to the evidence, OPSEC was a key reason why the ADF 'risk
managed' the media:[114]

> The reality of life is operational [sic] security saves lives and when you publish
> information that is legitimate public information there is a duty of care … to make
> sure that you are not threatening peoples' lives. So … you don't and shouldn't
> publish until the Commander says that it is safe to publish because there's the risk
> to life. (Participant 5 – anonymous)

It was the Commander who controlled the release of information. The risk 'to the mission' that
the release of information via the Minister for Defence might entail determined its release to

---

[111] The ADF not necessarily apprehending the media's active and performative role in war is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

[112] OPSEC is a systematically applied discernment in any situation that strives for the maximum security of the friendly military force.

[113] Although censorship of the media in modern war has been in effect since at least the British military's promulgation of the first censorship regulations during the Crimean War in 1856 (Knightley 2003).

[114] An effect is a tendency to regard the friendly media as virtually indistinguishable from the hostile media. This effect is discussed in Chapter 6.

the media and the public. In the context of OPSEC, the reason for the protection of information was clear: to minimise the loss of friendly force life. However, the ADF often used OPSEC as an excuse not to release information. Arguably, because its Phase 1 operations[115] involved only Special Forces in combat roles, the nature of their tactical level missions legitimately required a strict OPSEC adherence, which precluded the media's access, and the ADF's release of public information.[116] However, during Phase 2[117] and onwards, the majority of ADF forces employed in the warlike operations were conventional forces. From 2006 through to 2017, those forces were either contributing to the 'reconstruction' of Afghanistan's infrastructures and/or 'mentoring' or 'advising' the Afghan military. Their work was inherently 'public'. Despite that, the ADF guarded against the release of operational information. According to Brendan Nicholson:[118]

> Journalists understand the need for OPSEC but OPSEC gets used as an excuse to cover up, you know, to stop publication of anything the Defence Force thinks might be a bit embarrassing. (Brendan Nicholson, Participant 20)

Nicholson's observation is consistent with those of the other journalists interviewed, and is also consistent with the findings of Leahy (2010), Foster (2013) and Dobell (2016). The reference to 'a bit embarrassing' means embarrassing to the Minister for Defence and the government, as well as the ADF.

In addition to the goal of maintaining the Defence Minister's reputation, the evidence also reveals that the ADF assumed an automatic sense of a duty to protect the lives of the media actors that the minister allowed to access its areas of operations. As a former Joint Task Force 633 Commander, Major General Mark Kelly describes it:

> At the end of the day, our guys felt that they were responsible for their [the media's] security, and so we allowed that to be the call of the tactical commander on the ground. (Major General (retired) Mark Kelly, Participant 19).

---

[115] Phase 1: Oct 2001–Nov 2002: the first ADF Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan.

[116] During Phase 1 the ADF's Special Air Service Regiment primarily performed in a clandestine reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism roles.

[117] Aug 2006–Oct 2008: ADF Reconstruction Task Force.

[118] Brendan Nicholson's journalistic career spans over 40 years, with a considerable amount of that time being dedicated to the specialisation of military and war reporting. He 'went to Afghanistan [with the ADF] about 10 times probably over about 10 years' (Brendan Nicholson, Participant 20). Separate to the ADF, he also 'embedded' with American and British forces in Afghanistan.

The tendency here was that the tactical commander assumed the responsibility for the media's safety through an understanding of risk management enveloped in OPSEC.

The maintaining and enhancing of the ADF's reputation

One theme to emerge from the evidence is that risk was closely linked to the ADF's priority to protect and enhance its reputation. Here the notions of trust and legitimacy are central to military operations in war, where the 'actional' legitimacy of military actions and objectives must support institutional legitimacy (Galloway 2005).

In communication studies, Macnamara (2005) draws our attention to the concept of organisational reputation becoming a 'buzzword' in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. What constitutes reputation is contested; however, it is safe to say there is agreement that it comprises factors ranging from organisational policies and behaviour through to external stakeholder perception. It is 'what the people who matter think about what they think matters' (2005, p. 212). The behaviour of those external to an organisation does not determine reputation; rather, it is imagined in the 'cognitive representations of organisations in the minds of publics' (Grunig & Sung-Un 2005, p. 306). This means that only the controlling of reputational factors manages reputation, because it is arguably impossible to manage people's cognitive processes. For the ADF, in the military and war setting, the reputational factors range from its strategy for war through to the behaviours of its members at the operational and tactical level, and the external perceptions of the Australian Minister for Defence, the Australian government, the Australian Parliament, its Coalition, ADF families, the general public and non-government organisations.

The 'spiral of knowledge's' socialisation mode of knowledge conversion informs the maintaining and enhancing of the ADF's reputation goal. That knowledge is traced to the Australian Army PR Steering Committee's establishment in 1967, based on a realisation that the Australian military in war required a more positive and promotional public relations approach. This goal complements the ADF's function for managing the media because it contributes to it:

> We all work for the Minister but when something negative happens … the Minister typically cops the kick in public by the media … 'why did you? Why didn't you?' type questions and that was felt, you know, within arm's reach by the civilian media managers in at MECC … APS (Australian Public Servants)

sitting directly responsive and focused on the Minister's image and reputation less focused on the ADF … What you have then is you have CJOPS (the ADF's Chief of Joint Operations) fighting to retain the reputation of the ADF deployed on operations and you have the bureaucracy sitting there seeking to protect the reputation of the Minister … When something negative happens down here at the operational level then essentially the people in the middle, MECC, want to kick you because they've just got a kick from the Minister [be]cause the Minister said 'Why is this so? Why am I getting harangued by … the mainstream media and my reputation and that of my Party's been tarnished? How did you let this happen?' And of course, the kick is a very vigorous kick from a group of APS who have little perception of what's actually happened on the ground … Ultimately that's where frustration occurs. (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

As a consequence, the ADF faced a conundrum: how could it maintain and enhance its reputation when its principal responsibility was to defend the reputations of the minister and the government? The problem was that the government influenced access to and control of media resources within the ADF's areas of operations. The conundrum manifested itself when the ADF was confronted by its reputation management task, because it could not effectively harness the positive power of an active and performative media in war to maintain and enhance its reputation. The tight control or exclusion of the media created a vacuum that left room for contending sources of information. The consequence of this was that, in seeking to protect and enhance its intangible reputation, the ADF had to consider what the Minister for Defence and the government thought mattered the most. In doing so, the ADF self-selected, through the lens of risk, what operational and tactical access it granted to the media once the minister had approved the media's overall access. In the absence of the media,[119] the ADF also determined what information it proactively released through the minister to the media and the public via its own Public Affairs apparatus.[120] The decision was informed by the need to ensure the minister's continued control of information flow to the media and to align with the minister's media management objectives and plans, which included enhancing both ministerial reputations and the government's reputation. This in turn informed the construct of the themes

---

[119]   Which is likely, because a direct effect of the ADF's perceived government policy direction affords the government an ability to influence the access to and control of media resources within the ADF's areas of operations.

[120]   The ADF's media resources in warlike operations are discussed in Chapter 5.

and associated messages to be communicated to the imagined audience, which the ADF thought fostered public support. Those themes and messages were 'cleared' by MECC and the minister, which meant ministerial control, and hence control over its narrative for war.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the first part of the research question: *Why does the ADF manage the media?* together with the project's one subsidiary question: *Who does the ADF perceive its audience(s) to be?* The reason the ADF manages the media is because it imagines that the Australian government directs it to do so. The reason influences the function, which includes enhancing ministerial reputations and the government's reputation. In a risk-averse environment, the result is the prevention of the media from assuming a co-structuring role and a restraint of the ADF's power in war. The function dictates the tailoring of the ADF's communicated themes and messages for its most important audience, which is the Minister for Defence, the Minister's office, and the Executive government.

The next chapter addresses the second part of the research question: *How does the ADF manage the media?*

Chapter 5
How the ADF manages the media:
'Don't do anything at all and you're pretty right'

For the Australian military, following its 1972–73 withdrawal from Vietnam and South-East Asia, there was a 20-year 'peace' and an operational lull (McKenna & McKay 2015). It was not until 1993, when the ADF deployed a 'peace-keeping' battalion to Somalia,[121] that its operational tempo spiked again. In an historical aberration, from 1991 to 1995 the ADF's relationship with the media reached an unprecedented high, with Brigadier (retired) Adrian D'Hage as the Director General of Public Information acting as the ADF's spokesperson (Weiland 2003). D'Hage's appointment was a success for the ADF because the media respected his ability to build rapport with trusted journalists and because of his 'off the record background briefings'. His appointment as a Brigadier (or 'one-star') also demonstrated the ADF's willingness to take the issue of its relationship with the media seriously. However, the strength and good will of that ADF/media relationship was relatively short lived:

> That was great because you could go to D'Hage and he would use his own judgment to work out whether he could trust you or not and he would be quite forthcoming and I think that really worked quite well … I've always had a sneaking suspicion that the reason that that whole thing foundered was sort of internal jealousy that if you actually control the flow of information and become a bit famous a lot of other people just don't like it. And if that's the case that's a disgrace because that was a system that really did work. And again, if you've got a D'Hage out there … if he says slightly too much to somebody and gets burned then you've [the ADF] got to protect him. You've [the ADF] got to say, 'the journalist was the person at fault there, not the Brigadier … I think that system really did work. (Brendan Nicholson, Participant 20)

Nicholson's observation spotlights what I term the ADF's 'closed-loop media management for war system'. Here the notions of media relations and media management are interrelated – they

---

[121] Operation Solace was commanded by the then Lieutenant Colonel, future Chief of the Defence Force, Governor of New South Wales and now Governor General of Australia, His Excellency General the Honourable David Hurley AC DSC (Retd) (Participant 25), https://www.1rar.org.au/somalia (Accessed 12 February 2019).

are two parts of a closed loop. For example, if relations between groups like the ADF and the friendly media (media relations) are hostile, the hostility of that relationship will influence the processes used by each group to deal with and attempt to control each other (media management). Within this closed loop, media management influences media relations and vice versa. The elements of the ADF's closed-loop system are its policy for the management of the media, its relations with the media, the degree of access to its operations that the ADF grants to the media, and the ADF's control and censorship of information.

In part, Nicholson's observation also lays down a foundation for understanding how the ADF manages the media. It demonstrates how the ADF has moved away from the media relations side of a closed-loop model to a focus on the media management side that has fomented a limited and limiting approach. Contrary to Nicholson's suspicion, this research finds that the central reason the goodwill foundered was the Department of Defence's reviews and reforms of the early 2000s, which reduced the ADF's agency in media management. However, the 'sneaking suspicion' also points to problems with the ADF's cultural approach to the media.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The previous chapter considered why the ADF manages the media in war. This chapter addresses the second part of the research question: *How does the ADF manage the media?* The inertia of the function means that the ADF manages the media with a limited and limiting approach. Two elements are instrumental in this approach: first, the ADF's cultural view of and relations with the media; and second, its 'technical control'. The limiting approach determines the ADF's 'ways and means', constraining and regulating the ADF's resources and methods for managing the media. These resources comprise its doctrine, policy and manuals, its personnel, and the affordances of online media and social media.[122] The ADF's main methods for the management of the media in Afghanistan were the technical control elements of the 'clearance process' and the 'media embed program'.

When viewed through the dynamics of mediatized conflict, the ADF's closed-loop media management for war attenuates[123] the media's and public participation in war across the temporal-spatial domain, decreasing the speed and reach of ADF media content that relates to its operations. This results in bounded and insignificant communicative interactions that in turn

---

[122] The reference here to ADF policy is different to government policy. Government policy relates to the prescribed course of action adopted by the government.

[123] Attenuation is the opposite to the amplification dynamic of mediatized conflict.

reduce the media's and public involvement in the ADF's justification and creation of support for war. Because of the attenuation and constraint of the media's ability to co-structure power relations, the ADF maximises the Australian government's control over its narrative for war.[124]

This chapter also addresses a gap in the knowledge, in that it 'explain[s] the ADF's hostility to the media [by focusing] on the culture, values and organisational practices of the military' (Foster & Pallant 2016, p. 105).

The limiting approach

The ADF's reluctance to engage with the media stemmed from a distrust fixed in place by the more than 40-year-old memory of the Australian military's involvement in Vietnam. This finding is consistent with the views of participants from across the 2001–17 research timeframe, which demonstrates that there was no change:

> We had … a cultural fear of this unknown massive media beast. Probably [be]cause of a bit of a hang-up from Vietnam – the way that media played and the public response to that war. I think we had … a strategic fear driven by our political masters. The media are not going to help necessarily … a cultural fear of what would happen when we started casualties [sic] … (Participant 6 – anonymous)

Contrary to the disproven view that television news media lost the war for America (and, by default, Australia) in Vietnam (Gorman 2008; Hallin 1989), the ADF continued to believe that the media was responsible for the Australian public's negative view of military efforts in Vietnam. Research shows that the media's coverage of Vietnam was generally supportive of the military, only later reflecting the breakdown in political consensus, not a breakdown in public support (Payne 2007). The ADF's mistaken view continued to hamper its relationship with the media because it saw the media as not being 'helpful'. The ADF regarded the media as being of little use for operations in Afghanistan. A natural consequence of that view was that minimal organisational effort was expended on media management-related resources, or on fostering good relations with the media. The result was an intensification of the limiting approach. An additional basis for the ADF's impeded relations with the media is a perceived

---

[124]   How this affects the ADF's own use of media operations and the Australian government's control over its narrative for war is discussed in Chapter 6.

risk to career.[125] Members of the ADF, and more specifically ADF commanders, fear that their military careers will be restricted if their interaction with the media results in negative media coverage:[126]

> I think you find that at the strategic end of business in the military your life is decided by a couple of three-star officers and a minister and so the idea is to try to survive that triumvirate and not do anything wrong. In fact, don't do anything at all and you're pretty right. (Brigadier (retired) Gary Bornholt, Participant 4)

In seeking to avoid potentially negative effects on their careers, ADF personnel avoided or minimised interaction with the media and journalists. This behaviour reinforced an organisational culture that devalued the media's role in war:

> Because we're operators there's an operational culture that despite … growing recognition about the importance of the media … despite that awareness, we did not yet have an operational culture that put the media and information at the centre. It was another consideration after you'd thought about how you're going to out-manoeuvre the enemy and how you're going to support yourself in doing that … on the [Joint Task Force] Headquarters, the J09 was not even at the same level. So here was a Lieutenant Colonel trying to get airtime against, amongst O6s [Colonels]. How do you compete? It says something about how we view the relative importance of your Public Affairs advisor vis-à-vis your lawyer or your doctor or you know what one of the number of other specialists. They weren't viewed as seniority, as being necessarily the same. I mean what you do says a lot about you, not necessarily what you say. And that's a behavioural indicator right there of the importance that we gave to them. (Major General (retired) Michael Crane, Participant 8)

'Public Affairs' refers to the ADF's Public Affairs Officers,[127] who are responsible for the provision of advice to commanders for the management of the media. A significant consequence of the ADF's cultural view is that the media are placed on the periphery of its operations for war. A key power dynamic contributes to this, which is the result of employment

---

[125]   The ADF's command and control (C2) structure is another origin, which is discussed in Chapter 6.

[126]   Participant 6's reference to 'strategic' is not in the traditional security study sense; rather, it refers to 'long-term fear', or a fear of an impediment to long-term career progress and promotion.

[127]   Also referred to as public relations officers.

positions, duties and responsibilities within a joint headquarters. This factor is a credible indicator of the ADF's broader cultural view of the media. 'Because we're operators' is also a reference to the staff officers, who fuse their expertise and knowledge to provide advice to the Joint Task Force Commander.[128] They include the J1 (personnel), J2 (intelligence), J3 (operations), J4 (logistics), J5 (plans and targeting), J6 (communications/IT) and J7 (engineers). 'Specialist' staff officers, which include the J06 (legal), J07 (medical), J08 (chaplaincy) and J09 (Public Affairs) also contribute to the provision of advice. The rhetorical question 'How do you compete?' is an acknowledgement that the J09's lower rank limits the ability to contribute to and influence the overall advice that pertains to the media in war. Advice about how the commander can best use the media's positive, active and performative role in war is limited.[129] For Afghanistan, the J09's agency was lessened, which compounded an already reduced agency in the practice of media management at the operational and tactical levels. A related theme to emerge from the data here was the role of technical control.

Technical control

Technical control is 'the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces' (ADDP 00.1, p. 3-13).[130] Through the ADF's Military Strategic Commitments (MSC) Division, which is in part responsible for strategic communication,[131] the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) is the designated authority that provides specialist and technical advice for the management of the media on operations. My findings are different from those of Maltby (2013) and Shavit (2016). For the British military's media operations, Maltby (2013) finds that within the Ministry of Defence it is the senior bureaucratic position of the Director General of Media and Communications that

---

[128] The Joint Task Force Commander is responsible for the conduct of operations at the tactical/operational level.

[129] As discussed in Chapter 2, the media's active and performative role in war is due to their ability to: (1) influence the scale and significance of communicative interactions; (2) construct meaning; and (3) determine power relations.

[130] For example, technical engineering advice relating to the building of a bridge on an overseas operation might come from a specialist ADF engineering authority in Australia. However, that authority will have no remit to determine where and when the bridge is built. That decision rests solely with the Commander of the operation.

[131] https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/defence/department-defence/vice-chief-defence-force-vcdf/military-strategic-commitments-division (Accessed 12 April 2019).

provides the specialist advice directly to the Permanent Joint Headquarters.[132] For the Israel Defense Force's media operations, Shavit (2016) finds that it is the subordinate specialist Spokesperson's Division that provides the advice. In both cases, the responsible individual is a qualified, career communications specialist. This suggests that the purpose of these roles is to research and provide the best strategic communication advice. In the case of the ADF, the authority for the provision of advice is pushed high in the organisation to a military specialist with no or little media qualification or experience. This arguably reflects an intent to enshrine proximity and responsiveness to political direction.

The ADF's technical control is part of the administrative authority component of its command and control (C2) structure. Since 1997, according to doctrine, the ADF's joint warlike operations[133] have been conducted under the theatre command of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), which holds the administrative authority for assigned forces.[134] Because of the administrative authority, the VCDF exercises technical control through CJOPS. The VCDF's advice 'may not be modified [by CJOPS] but may be rejected in part or in total … in consideration of operational factors' (ADDP 00.1, p. 3-14). According to the evidence, CJOPS did not reject, either in part or in total, the VCDF's specialist advice regarding the ADF's management of the media for its operations in Afghanistan, which compounded the limiting approach. Former CJOPS Lieutenant General Ash Power noted that the specialist advice

> was pretty restricted because the Minister … held things fairly tight. (Lieutenant
> General (retired) Ash Power, Participant 16)

CJOPS' acceptance of the advice adhered to and complemented the ADF's tacit organisational knowledge about why the ADF managed the media. The minister's implied 'restrictive' advice contributed to the ADF's limiting approach because the tendency was to echo the minister's desire for a 'tight hold'. The ADF's technical control and its lowering of the importance of the

---

[132] The British military's Permanent Joint Headquarters is the equivalent to the ADF's Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC). Also see the UK's Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1 Media Operations: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43336/jd p3451.pdf (Accessed 18 March 2019).

[133] For the ADF, 'joint' means operations, activities and organisations where more than one element of the separate services of Navy, Army and Airforce participate.

[134] Strictly speaking, from 1997 the title for the command of the ADF's joint operations has varied. However, the function of the differing titles has remained the same. That is, in 1997 theatre command was held by the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST). In 2004 theatre command was transferred to the VCDF who also acted as CJOPS. In 2007 theatre command was transferred to the newly created role of CJOPS. The ADF's C2 and its relevance to media operations is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

media resulted in a precluded or diminished ability to utilise the media as a 'conduit' for its Afghanistan-related content. This attenuated the media's and public participation in war across the temporal-spatial domain because it decreased the magnitude and significance of media content about the ADF's operations, which in turn reduced the level of involvement in the ADF's concern for war. This meant that the ADF was not able to effectively construct meaning or structure power relations to its advantage.

Ways and means

Means (resources)

The resources for the ADF's management of the media for Afghanistan – its doctrine, policy and manuals, its personnel, and online and social media resources – are constrained. The effect of constrained resources serves to magnify this constraint further. No ADF doctrine relates specifically to media operations for war (Crane 2016):

> No … we don't have doctrine. There is no … doctrinal base … We haven't matured to the extent that other Defence Forces have in terms of the incorporation of media management. (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

A lack of doctrine is remarkable, given that the media play a central role in twenty-first century war. It shows that the ADF had no catalogued, authoritative and proven guidance for the management of the media in war, suggesting that it had no understanding of how the media and their messages might be adapted to suit individual situations.[135] In the absence of doctrine, the ADF relied on policy (instructions) and manuals that related, although were not specific, to the management of the media in war.

With the ADF's JSP 41 manual obsolete by 2002, the *Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) ADMIN 08-1: Public Comment and Dissemination of Official Information by Defence Personnel* came into effect in 2007.[136] However, its purpose was not specific to media management, but rather served to complement the function of why the ADF manages the media. The result was that the ADF *ADMIN 08-1* served as a bureaucratic impediment because

---

[135]   As mentioned in Chapter 4, at the time of writing the ADF had commenced in 2018 a preliminary draft for consultation of ADF doctrine relating to its Public Affairs function. It remains to be seen whether this doctrine will contain Media Operations for war guidance and (1) why and how to manage the media in war and (2) the role and design of a media strategy for war to inform ADF media operations.

[136]   Note the material difference between ADF 'instructions' and 'manuals'. Instructions are prescriptive, and carry with them the surety of legal requirement. Instructions must be followed. In contrast, manuals only provide guidance. The *JSP 41* manual was not required to be followed (ADDP 3.13).

it enabled the Minster for Defence's 'full control of ideas and messages' (Palazzo 2012, p. 11). Importantly, the instruction's focus was not the ADF's joint operations for war, but 'to ensure that Defence's reputation [was] not damaged' (DI(G) *ADMIN 08-1* par. 9 in Buchanan 2015 *Gaynor v CDF* (No. 3) FCA 1370, p. 28).[137] In 2013, an adjunct instruction was introduced, *Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) ADMIN 08-2: Use of Social Media by Defence Personnel*. Its focus was solely on the use of social media where 'such use pose[d] a reputational risk to Defence' (DI(G) *ADMIN 08-2*, p. 1).[138] *ADMIN 08-1* and *08-2* were withdrawn and replaced in December 2016 by the *Defence Communication Manual* (DCM). The DCM, with no material change to its purpose or effect, was replaced in July 2019 by the *Media and Communication Policy* (MCP).[139] The promulgation dates of the Instructions and the DCM (see Table 3) highlight the ADF's delay in responding to the waves of mediatization during the research timeframe (Hepp et al. 2015).

Table 3: ADF instructions and manuals

Introduction of new media platforms	Date	Promulgation dates
Conceptual emergence of Web 2.0	1999–2004	
Facebook	2004	
YouTube	2005	
Twitter	2006	2007: ADMIN 08-1
Instagram	2010	
		2013: ADMIN 08-2
		2016: DCM
		2019: MCP

Like its predecessors, the DCM's focus remained on managing reputational risk to Defence, with little regard for the ADF's operations for war:

---

[137] The primary source document DI(G) *ADMIN 08-1* was not obtainable, hence the Federal Circuit Court of Australia reference, which contains extracts of the instruction.

[138] https://www.defglis.com.au/resources/SocialMediaPolicy.pdf (Accessed 20 March 2019).

[139] The important point to note is that the instructing document changed from a non-binding manual to again become a 'policy' akin to the previous ADMIN Instructions 08-1 and 08-2 – that is, 'policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing' (ADDP 00.1, p. iii).

> About 10% of the DCM focused on the conduct of ADF on Operations … A number of recommendations were provided… that never saw the light of day because the editors … sitting in MECC … had … little understanding of … the ADF on Operations and the resulting document was nothing more than a 'you do things this way'. So it was a Manual and you know from an Operational perspective it was nearly useless. (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

The MECC-'owned' DCM retarded changes in modes of interaction between the military and the media, as well as changes in the character, function and structure of the ADF's closed-loop media management.

In a recognition of the need to review and potentially change the ADF's joint military Public Affairs capability, in 2015 the then VCDF initiated an assessment that resulted in the 2016 Joint Military Public Affairs Review (Crane 2016). The Review's brief was to address 'workforce management'.[140] Among its key findings was that there was a shortage of trained and experienced Public Affairs 'specialists' in the 'joint' operational space. Formed in 2000/01, following operations in East Timor, the 1st Joint Public Affairs Unit (1JPAU), comprises around 30 personnel and is the ADF's only dedicated 'joint' Public Affairs resource.[141] Although sections of 1JPAU deploy on operations as a 'mobile' ADF media production unit,[142] the review does not detail the fact that its 'output' can only be distributed 'publicly' once MECC has 'cleared' the product for release.[143] This inhibits 1JPAU's agency, which further

---

[140] The review was 'conducted in the context of a potential pilot study for a Joint approach to workforce management' (Crane 2016, p. 1). It was the result of the Paper for One Defence Implementation Committee's *Guidance on First Principles Review Intent for 'Develop and Implement the Joint Workforce Management Approach' DEPSEC Defence People and VCDF*, dated October 2015 (p. 1).

[141] 1JPAU is an evolution of the ADF's 1st Media Support Unit formed in 1984/1985. It was responsible for the management of the media, particularly for operations overseas (Weiland 2002). 1JPAU is no larger in size than an Australian Army platoon (or sub-unit) –that is, from 30–60 personnel only. 1JPAU's average posted strength is around 30 personnel. Personnel are drawn from the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. Only Army have full-time dedicated Public Affairs officers (PAOs) and photographers of 'other rank' (OR). Navy's Public Relations officers (PROs) are drawn from its reserve force. Air Force's PROs are qualified full-time or reserve force Administration Officers (ADMINOS). In the full-time ADF, they generally fill the role of a PRO for blocks of two- to three-year periods as a part of their career progression. Thereafter, they return to the specific ADMINO role, acting as a PRO as a 'secondary duty' as and when required. Both the Navy and Air Force's full-time OR photographers are drawn from the 'intelligence' stream.

[142] Aside from the command element (the Officer Commanding, the Sergeant Major, the Operations Officer and the Administration Officer), 1JPAU is made up by Military Camera Teams (MCTs). It is standard for each section/team to have four personnel (one Public Affairs Officer, one Senior Imagery Specialist (video) and two imagery specialists (stills).

[143] The character, structure, function and consequences of the clearance process are discussed below under the Ways (Methods) sections.

compounds the effect of the J09's reduced agency. 1JPAU is not controlled at the operational level by CJOPS, but rather at the strategic level by the VCDF, which contributes to the further curtailment of its potential influence. What this means is that the minister's control of operational information is further assured. As a result, rather than focusing on 'joint' operations, the unit's minimal resources are stretched to also meet the ADF's single service needs (Navy, Army and Air Force). All the while, the VCDF remains responsive to the 'strategic' needs of MECC, which in turn affords the Minister for Defence the ability to influence access to and control of media resources within the ADF's areas of operations.

A lack of training exacerbates the 'joint' Public Affairs resource shortage. A clear training scheme and a 'specialist' career progression does not exist, which leads to an uneven performance from the ADF's Public Affairs practitioners because of irregular preparation and variable levels of skills and experience. The author of the Joint Military Public Affairs Review's report notes:

> We don't assign Public Affairs … at [the] joint level … as much as [sic] a central role as it deserves and we under-invest in it chronically. (Major General (retired) Michael Crane, Participant 8)

Participant 8's observation illustrates the power dynamic and the reduced agency of the ADF's Public Affairs 'specialists'. It also hints at the impact that personality and the specialists' sense of self-worth has on how the ADF manages the media. Based on discussions during my military career, PAOs with operational experience in Iraq (2003–09) and Afghanistan (2001–17) expressed concern about how some others treated them or some of their colleagues. They spoke of the 'dismissive' way that some staff officers in the Joint Task Force headquarters treated them. They spoke of some 'actively working to undermine the J09' and being 'treated like second-class citizens'. They also mentioned issues related to the lack of practical media management experience of those recruited externally to the ADF's Public Affairs and those that had transferred internally.

A consequence is that many of the 'specialists' tasked with managing the media on operations adopt defensive techniques that serve to 'save face', and that help them to distance themselves from a duty seen as culturally inferior. This results in two effects: first, the perpetuation of the ADF's cultural view of the media; and second, the apparent lack of self-worth, which contributes to the shortage of trained and experienced Public Affairs 'specialists'. According to the evidence, at least 15 experienced personnel left the full-time employment of the ADF's

Public Affairs/Public Relations capability between 2015 and 2017 – close to one-third of its workforce.[144]

Online media and social media

For its operations in Afghanistan, the ADF was not permitted to respond effectively to digital and social media because MECC controlled the release of unclassified information to the media. MECC controlled and constrained the ADF's use of the internet to publish content that the media might have found informative. Although it was an early adopter of online and social media, MECC has only allowed the ADF to take up their use incrementally, slowly and in a limiting fashion, resulting in minimal change over the research period's timeframe. Participant 7's observation of the early adoption is penetrating:

> So 2000 when we [the PACC Division] created defence.gov.au, we also created the Defence Image and Video Library … ready access to images and footage … We created a news room on that site and that's where we posted our media releases … we were increasingly [engaging in] … direct communications … via digital media without relying upon the Fourth Estate … we could communicate in our perspective rather than … having to go through a filter of the media … so that … there is a degree of influence over the messaging and certainty and assuredness that the message is as … intended. (Brian Humphreys, Participant 7)

The independent 1999 Buchan Review sheds light on why the PACC Division sought to circumvent the filter of the media. The review led to the Department of Defence adapting its approach to communication. The adaptation meant that for the ADF's operations in Afghanistan, it was forced to shift away 'from managing public affairs to shaping organisational communication' (Humphreys 2002, p. 24). This was an important change because of the difference in approaches. Managing public affairs emphasised the media and stakeholders external to Defence, whereas organisational communication focused on internal communication and improved communication with the government (2002, p. 25). The shift in communication emphasis was because the review criticised the ADF for 'having a media liaison centric public affairs unit' (2002, p. 25). The PACC Division's support of that criticism was likely because of its need to ensure the minister's office continued the vetting and approval of all media interaction. The ADF was obliged to move away from the relations side of the

---

[144]   In 2016 the ADF's Joint Military Public Affairs workforce sat at 41 personnel (Crane 2016).

closed-loop media management model to a focus on the management side, which prioritises the reputations of the Minister for Defence and the government. The shift is an early example of Hoskins and O'Loughlin's (2015) later concept of arrested war. As a consequence of the restructure, the MECC Division controls the content produced by 1JPAU that relates to the ADF's operations. The government, through the Minster for Defence, has attempted to influence the media's gatekeeper function by seeking to regain control over the agenda-setting process (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2015).

The evidence shows that the need to prioritise the Minister for Defence and the government's domestic political considerations limits the ADF's desire to respond to changes in media technologies and practices. The ADF's need to ensure the Minster for Defence's continued control of information flow to the media and to align with the minister's media-management objectives and plans, meant that the ADF did not seek to embrace the affordances of the internet; rather, it sought to adopt only the most rudimentary of its potentials:

> At the strategic level … we dabbled in various mechanisms, social media and other things. But my broad observation on that is we never got much passed in my time from using some new platforms as an alternate means to conduct traditional activities. So just another dissemination methodology but not into the two-way conversational piece … You have a conversation if you're in a position to do so and if you're not then don't try … I think at the lower level certainly domestically in Australia that's come a long way, but it's all about … risk … I think sitting in from the Canberra end of the lens I go back to the 24-hour news cycle and social media and there's lot of skies falling stuff: 'The whole world's going to change. You guys aren't going to be able to cope. What are you going to do?' And a bunch of media types coming in saying, 'You've got to rethink everything' … Well you know it didn't change a great deal … all we really did from what I can see is we understood as best we could what the landscape looked like, how it was changing but then we just applied pretty traditional mechanisms to new platforms so … you might have Twitter handles on various things and you might have Facebook but we're just using it as another means to put out traditional press releases. (Colonel (retired) Jeff Squire, Participant 11)

Participant 11 worked within the ADF's Public Affairs space for the entirety of the research project's period. He worked at the tactical and operational levels, ultimately becoming the

ADF's Director of Information Effects at the strategic level. His statement illustrates an astonishing organisational obstacle and emphasises a form of internet-affordance evasion on two significant levels. First, it emphasises that the ADF mirrored its existing procedures and practices for the management of the media to prioritise the Minister for Defence's needs. Second, the influence of mediation and its relevance limits the ADF's imagining of the power of online and social media. Remarkably, the ADF saw its online and social media platforms as 'traditional mechanisms' that should only support the minister's control of information in line with established media practices (Nagy & Neff 2015). The consequence is that, rather than maximising the media's power in war, the ADF was required to limit change, resulting in a diminution of the media's role in war. For example, the JTF633 Commander, Major General John Cantwell, made a brief foray on YouTube in 2010. The clip's content was little more than a narrated video news release (VNR) akin to a recorded ADF message with overlay.[145] It was not until 2011 that JTF633 created a Facebook page, which occurred around five years after the platform's granting of public subscription. It was not until around June 2013 that JTF633 attempted to use YouTube again. Despite the JTF633 Commander approving a Decision Brief[146] to use the platform, the HQJOC Public Affairs 'desk officer' arbitrarily overruled the decision based on the rationale that 'that is not what we do'. HQJOC itself did not create its *ADF On Operations* Facebook page until September 2014.[147] It was not until October 2016[148] that JTF633 made a concerted effort to harness the affordances of social media, including the eventual creation of JTF633 Twitter and Instagram accounts, and a Commander's and Command Warrant Officer's Twitter and Instagram accounts.[149] The accounts focused on maximising engagement with the media and broader audiences through the use of innovative content.

---

[145]   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jVDCDy4P5_E (Accessed 18 March 2019).

[146]   By this author.

[147]   Through this author's efforts.

[148]   As part of a military operation for war separate to Afghanistan, from July 2015 the ADF created a Twitter profile @Fight_DAESH for 'countering and condemning Daesh [Islamic State] propaganda and enhancing online global anti-terrorism communications'. That account has proved ineffective because the ADF (not this author) believes that for it to be effective it 'does not require followers' (1982 (Cth) as FOI 235/18/19. https://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/235_1819_Documents.pdf (Accessed 16 February 2019). See also Harris & Galloway (2019).

[149]   Due to competing priorities indicative of the devalued importance that the ADF ascribes to the media, this author's HQ JTF633 J09 Decision Brief took an extraordinary long time (around three months) to be passed from the Chief of Staff to the Commander for approval. The JTF633 Twitter and Instagram accounts came to fruition on 18 January 2017 and the Commander's and Command Warrant Officer's Twitter and Instagram accounts on 14 February 2017.

Ways (methods)

Most of the participants described the ADF's clearance of information for release to the media as problematic for the media and the ADF. For operations in Afghanistan it was a controversial and frustrating 'technical control' process. The process existed because it supported the Minister for Defence's control of information flow to the media. It also served to protect the ADF's reputation and lives, while seeking to foster cohesive relations within its broader coalition in operations for war. The clearance process, which is not unique to the ADF, is representative of the desire for and the ability of institutions and organisations in the digital age to control information:

> The clearance process exists to a degree because it can … People want to see things because they can see things. Things can move relatively quickly by email or otherwise … vision and stills and stuff … so that desire to be – one, informed but also minimising risk at every level, that's the primary drive behind the clearance processes … So the desire to not surprise and to a degree manage the message coming out of there [Afghanistan] was pretty high. (Colonel (retired) Jeff Squire, Participant 11)

This observation is indicative of the conditioning of the behaviour of those at the political level. They had control over access and vetting of information gathered by ADF personnel before its release to the media. The clearance process is also indicative of the power of the media as a semi-autonomous institution to influence the ADF's release of information. That influence manifests itself in the structure of the clearance process, which is designed to 'minimise [the] risk at every level':

> What drives the cycle … is the Daily News Summary[150] and that becomes all-important for at least 24 hours … When … you want to put out a media release or clear something, you put that [through] the Public Affairs chain and you know at one stage it was taking I think in my chain of command – I was told this – nine

---

[150]   The *Daily News Summary* was provided by an independent third party (I-Sentia, formerly known as Media Monitors). What 'news snap shots' it contained was determined by the MECC Division. In advance, MECC advised I-Sentia of the key news topics and themes it deemed to be of importance to the ADF and the Department of Defence. I-Sentia then 'monitored the media' daily to create and provide the *Daily News Summary*. In 2019, I-Sentia lost the Defence account and the provision of this product to another service provider, Streem. Its co-founder and CEO is a former Digital Advisor to Australia's Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), https://www.linkedin.com/in/elgar-welch-12b4154b/?originalSubdomain=au (Accessed 21 April 2020). PM&C's role is to 'provide fresh thinking and sound advice to government', https://www.pmc.gov.au (Accessed 21 April 2020).

'one-stars' to clear talking points or a media release before it got to me [as the three-star Chief of Joint Operations]. I mean this is nonsense. So, we don't fight wars at the moment – thankfully – we manage our involvement in conflicts overseas and then through talking points … It's not a conventional way where a Headquarters is agile [so it can make] snap decisions … Not like that at all. (Lieutenant General (retired) Ash Power, Participant 16)

The reference to 'one-stars' reflects the hierarchical structure of the clearance process, where only an officer that held the fourth highest ADF rank (out of 11) had the authority to release information to the media. Although 'nine one-stars' is possibly an overstatement, Participant 16's insights drive to the heart of the frustrations conveyed by the media and those responsible for the ADF's management of the media. The frustrations are a consequence of the risk-averse approach to the clearance and release of information. That approach stepped beyond the requirements of the relevant *Defence Instruction ADMIN 08-1* and its replacement, the *Defence Communication Manual*. They required only a single 'one-star' clearance for the release of either proactive or reactive information to the media. Tom Hyland's experience demonstrates the frustrations of many journalists:

I would talk to correspondents out in the field and I thought that the Defence correspondent in Canberra could just pick up the phone and ring somebody … to ask basic questions and that they would get through to somebody like Adrian D'Hage … I was very frustrated to learn that's not how it worked any more. That basically to find out basic information, the Defence reporter in Canberra would have to send an email to Defence Media … You don't actually talk to anybody. You ring a clerk effectively in [Defence] Media and they say, yeah put your questions in writing, email them to us and we'll get back to you sometime – eventually. So, what I understood about how the ADF interacted with the media was that basically they don't. (Tom Hyland, Participant 13)

The recollections of Participants 11, 16 and 13 draw attention to the fact that the clearance process caused inordinate delays in the ADF's interaction with the media. In turn, those delays limited the ADF's ability and agility to harness the power of the media's dynamic and enactive role. The inordinate delays attenuated the media's and public participation in war by decreasing the speed and reach of mediated ADF content that related to its operations. In not 'surprising'

the Minister's office, the ADF's relations with the media were harmed because the media saw the process as obstructive and officious.

There was a discrepancy between three clearance processes: first, the ADF's ordinary clearance process; second, the process followed by the ADF's force elements in Afghanistan that were under the command of ISAF; and third, the process used by the ADF during the conduct of its media embed program. Ordinarily, facts proposed for public release as information are carefully considered and 'cleared' before their release to the media. In document form, this means information is contained in Communications Packs (Comms Packs) at the strategic and operational level and Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) at the tactical level. The Comms Packs inform the PAGs. Each document conveys two forms of information: first, contextualising background information ('not for public release') that signifies what themes and topics are to be avoided; and second, one-star 'cleared' ('for public release') themes, topics, key messages and talking points to be provided to the media as and when required. The Comms Packs and PAGs are designated as either 'reactive' (in response to a perceived negative event) or as 'proactive' (for use in a positive 'public relations' sense). Regardless of the ADF's 'one-star' clearance, the MECC Division (and if it deems it necessary the Minister for Defence's office), also ordinarily 'clears' content before its release to the media. Often in keeping with the 'risk-averse' approach, stakeholders will also seek the additional clearance of intra departmental and inter-governmental colleagues (for example, the Department of Defence's International Policy Division, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). In practice, this means that from the tactical level a PAG that contains information for release to the media must pass up through the Joint Task Force Headquarters and Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) to MECC and the minister's office for 'clearance'. This results in an inevitable delay in the release of the information to the media because, regardless of a PAG containing already 'cleared' information from a Comms Pack, the MECC Division and the minister's office still require oversight.

The second clearance process was followed by the ADF in Afghanistan at the tactical level when its force elements operated under the command and control (C2) of another lead Coalition nation at the operational level. This meant that, by default, the nation that the ADF operated under determined the release of information to the media.[151] It is clear that there is a

---

[151] See Appendix 6 for an outline of the C2 arrangements for the ADF's operations in Afghanistan during the research project's time frame.

discrepancy in the ADF's ordinary clearance process when under the command of another nation:

> I had an American staff and how could I apply Australian … clearance processes to American staff? I couldn't. That was never going to happen and the Australian force was just one force element within a wider … international force … so I would use my American staff to do some jobs. I'd use Australian staff to do some jobs and they would both report on American and Australian forces and there was no way I was going to be putting those people through an Australian clearance process that would go back to Canberra and 13 layers of clearance and come back 13 days later or two weeks later or weeks later which is often the case just to make some media posting out of ISAF. I could have achieved the same thing the next day going through our actual [American] chain of command so I did that, and I think it worked pretty well. When it came to major Australian things, absolutely we went through the Australian team … (Participant 22 – anonymous)

Participant 22's experience is an example of how cumbersome the ADF's clearance process was compared with the streamlined procedures of other Coalition nations.

It is noteworthy that from August 2010 the ADF circumvented its own cumbersome clearance process. The ADF in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province began using Facebook to publish operations related content in Phase 3.[152] It made use of the Coalition's streamlined clearance procedures. Of note here is Participant 22's observation that 'it worked pretty well'. The expedited release of information to the media and the public without the added burden of political approval did not result in negative effects, damage to the government's reputation or a lessening of political power. The reason for this was because the approved 'cleared for public release' themes, topics, key messages and talking points already existed.

The third discrepancy is the clearance process employed by the ADF during its intermittent media embed program. The discrepancy is that the ADF did not subject the news media's content to the onerous clearance process during its limited access to its operations; rather, the

---

[152] https://www.facebook.com/CombinedTeamUruzgan (Accessed 2 April 2019). The ADF's use of Facebook as part of Combined Team Uruzgan was around 12 months before the ADF's JTF633 and four years before HQJOC's uptake of Facebook. With ISAF's handing over of the responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan National Security Forces (which also coincided with the end of the ADF's combat mission) at the end of December 2013, the Combined Team Uruzgan Facebook page was closed. The ADF's Task Group Afghanistan did not create any new online media presence.

'release' was dependent on the relevant Commander's trust in the 'escorting' PAO, the personality of the PAO, the PAO's trust of the media and, most importantly, the requirement of OPSEC. Again, Participant 22's experience is representative of the evidence from across the research period:

> [By] 2013 … I've got … more experience. My risk management or my risk threshold was perhaps a little more refined. I would ask to review written stories if I thought it needed to from a fact perspective. I may have looked at vision again for the same reason, but it wasn't a rule … I certainly know that Ian McPhedran [of News Corp] never submitted any stories to me. I never asked him to and never did it. And we had some major issues with his particular embed that year because he did some stuff that was a little bit underhanded, I thought. So, from my lived experience, there wasn't a clearance process. There was an awareness process that was up to me to drive. I needed to be there when an interview was conducted so I know what was said and I'd be able to report back to Canberra – this was said, this is what the story is probably going to be like … I know others had different approaches. (Participant 22 – anonymous)

The purpose of the 'awareness' process remained in keeping with the need to afford control of information to the Minister for Defence. It provided the political level with a 'heads up' to manage the consequences of the news media's reporting. The PAO's comment about 'more experience' highlights a commander's trust in a PAO, while 'it wasn't a rule' demonstrates the uncodified reality of the ADF's management of the media in war. Of greater import is the recollection that 'I know others had different approaches'. Other than the well understood parameters of OPSEC, the transmission of content was reliant on a PAO's personality and experience. This resulted in the further, sporadic deterioration in relations between the ADF and the news media over the research period. The former Chief Political Correspondent for Australia's Special Broadcasting Service, Karen Middleton, recalled:

> In 2012 when I went there [for the third time] there were young officers in charge [escorting us] … they were young, inexperienced, we didn't know them. They didn't know us. They'd been told they had a job to do and they were going to do it, Goddam it! … I felt like they put enthusiastic energy into us and all the kind of adult arrangement that we had previously [in 2007 and 2011] went out the window. So, we would film something, and they'd say, 'You're not allowed to

put that to air'. We said, 'Actually, we know that's not protected'. So they were kind of making it up as they went along … Then we got back at TK (Tarin Kot) … [another Public Affairs Officer] … insisted (even though we had an escort officer with us who was also advising us what we could and couldn't do and we were following those instructions) on looking through all of our material – got annoyed that we were being given Go-Pro vision from people, but that's pretty standard you know. And … again we knew what we were not likely to be able to use and we'd ask advice but then we get back to TK and two more officers say they wanted to go through it, and they make us sit down and run through all hours of vision. And we're saying 'People have looked at this already. We knew what we were filming. We haven't filmed anything'. [He said] 'We're going to go through it all' and it created a very bad relationship. It was unnecessary … there should have been an understanding of our personal record on those trips. That this was our third one. That we had never broken any rules. If anything, we'd upheld them more than others had … the [death of Private] Matthew Lambert [2011] … happened on our last day at Marshal and we had been at Mirawais with the same guys that were moving between the two bases … I respected the families' right to be told first, so we didn't report it, and then Channel Seven did, and that was bad and they knew it was bad … and then we were … treated with huge suspicion and everything was vetted, and it made us very angry and it was obstructive, and it slowed down our process and changed the nature of what we did. (Karen Middleton, Participant 12)

Aside from Karen Middleton's obvious frustration with the variability of the clearance process applied during the ADF's media embed program, her testimony lays bare a common ethical concern voiced by the journalists interviewed for my research: the reality that some 'less ethical' journalists contributed to the deterioration of relations between the ADF and the media. Participant 12's recollection, specifically that 'we had never broken any rules. If anything, we'd upheld them more than others', refers to occasions when News Corporation (in 2010) and Channel Seven (in 2011) acted unethically or breached the agreed-to ADF media embed

rules.[153] The consequence was that such conduct served to degrade further the ADF's existing mistrust of the news media.

For the ADF, the clearance process also served to maintain the cohesion of the Coalition of which it was a member:

> Where [the clearance process is] relevant, [is] to allow other Coalition partner nations to be aware of the media report that refers to their people whether it's in good or bad light. Now the reason that matters is if you want to build and sustain a Coalition of, in this case, 50 countries, you need to listen to them, to respect them, to acknowledge their equities and when you don't the Coalition can fray and so ensuring that – a no surprises mindset, that's a healthy thing for the management of a quarter of the countries on the planet who were working together. (General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force, Participant 24)

The notion of coalition cohesion is an often-overlooked positive aspect of the clearance process that is criticised regularly by the media and those ADF Public Affairs Officers at the tactical level. Because coalitions in war are the conglomeration of contrasting cultural, social and political groups, their cohesion is inherently complex, which means the threat of 'fraying' requires measured consideration.

Of importance here is the balance between the liberal democratic concern for the public good and public interest, and the military's desire to restrict or delay the release of information to the media and the public. When is there a need to restrict or delay the release of information? The need only arises in the context of legitimate OPSEC and any credible risk to life. The ADF's present 'clearance' process is premised on the imperative to not risk the Minister for Defence's and the government's reputation, and their maintenance of domestic political power. That necessity does not initiate legitimacy; rather, it confirms a proof of power that diminishes the ideals of democracy (Ellul 1965).

Media embed program

Of the two 'technical control' method themes to emerge from the evidence, the ADF's 'media embed' program for Afghanistan is the most vexed. It is contentious because of its timeline for

---

[153] For representatives of news media organisations to partake in the ADF's media embed program they are required to sign a contract and agree to the 'rules' of participation. The 'rules' include adherence to OPSEC and the non-release of information pertaining to death or injury until 'next of kin' have been informed by Defence.

establishment and its distinctive nature (see Appendix 6 for the timeline).[154] The ADF's 'media embed' program for Afghanistan was first trialled in August 2009 (around nine years after its first deployment there) and officially established in April 2010. Its establishment was over nine years behind the US program (2001) and around five years behind those of the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands (2006) (Logue 2013; Mans et al. 2008; Rid 2007; Wasilow 2017). An ADF officer reveals why the ADF's program was introduced:

> The [Rudd] Government [2007–10] thought [it] could be done relatively easily and it was difficult … to defend, 'well hang on … the US is doing it, the UK is doing it. Why can't the Australians … do it? … Arguably we weren't in some of the dangerous places that … the US and the UK were and that was a difficult line to continue to maintain … So I was told we're going to have an embed and this is how we're going to do it. (Participant 3 – anonymous)

Compared with its historical military partners, the degree of access (or lack thereof) that the ADF afforded the media was near indefensible in the context of the news media's traditional role in liberal democratic systems. Participant 3's revelation highlights the character of the ADF's belatedly implemented program. It symbolises a program that was 'relatively easily' designed to afford ministerial control of information and the maintenance of the government's reputation and political power.

The program was not intended to harness the media's power, but rather to assuage criticism while masking the government's desire for control and the maintenance of its reputation and power. The journalists interviewed for this research recognise that the ADF's media embed program was not calculated to facilitate fair, reasonable and accurate reporting, but instead to retard and smother it. What this meant was that journalistic efforts were contradictory to the program's function on two levels. First, the news media fundamentally resisted government and ministerial control because it sought to counterbalance political power. Second, the news media's effort did not match the ADF's belief that the media's primary role is to tell its story. With the combination of the ADF's belief and the Minister for Defence's desire for control, the result was a program structured for advocacy:

---

[154] In an open letter to the Australian Minister for Defence following the ADF's 'media embed trial', one of its participants, Ian McPhedran (2009), identified the frustrations and problems with the trial. These included that 'our movements and access were tightly controlled' (2009, p. 1) and that 'denying access because something might be dangerous defeats the purpose of the exercise' (2009, p. 2).

I think they thought we were just going to be satisfied reporting set piece, set up propaganda stories. That's what they wanted … the Trades Training School [on the base in Tarin Kot] became a joke because every other time I went back there we'd get 'I'm going to show the Trades Training School' and we would laugh … every single time they'd say, 'We'll show you the Trades Training School' and we'd roll our eyes and say, 'Have you still got the same guys doing the apprenticeships who were doing them four years ago, [be]cause we've kind of seen that and we've reported on that already' … there was no concept that that was not a news story. (Karen Middleton, Participant 12)

The program, which was intended to assuage criticism, further strained already tense military media relations and added little to the public's understanding of the war. Participant 12's revelation also debunks the claim in *Herding Cats: The Evolution of the ADF's Media Embedding Program in Operational Areas* (Logue 2013, p. vi) that 'the media embed program is not designed to "create" newsworthy events for journalists in a traditional public relations sense'. This is a contradictory claim itself, given that later in the same report it is revealed that 'embedded media … achieves interaction with ADF personnel through … *planned engagement*' (2013, p. 19, emphasis added).

The ADF's cultural view of the media characterised the media embed program's complementarity with why it managed the media. That view informed the program's distinctive nature when contrasted with its 'traditional comparator militaries' (Foster 2013):

I think organisationally the ADF kind of knew that we don't really want to engage with you, the media, but we know we have to type of thing and we're not necessarily going to … make it super easy for you guys to engage with us, but we will engage with you if you try hard enough. (Participant 2 – anonymous)

The evidence collected for this research reveals important limitations in the ADF's media embed program. Most of the participant Public Affairs Officers who were directly responsible for the ADF's management of the media were cognisant that the program was designed to retard and smother the media's efforts. It facilitated the media's access only begrudgingly and in a tightly controlled fashion. This reality chimes with the experiences of the journalists who participated in the media embed program. The ADF's media embed program was limiting in character. The main difference between the character of the ADF's program and the programs of the nations under whose command the ADF operated was that the ADF limited the media's

access to its operations. The media's movement in Afghanistan with the ADF was severely restricted compared with that afforded to the Dutch, Canadian, British and US media (Foster 2013). The ADF's approach was nothing more than a diminished version of the already abandoned US 'pool system' that it used during its military operations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf (1991). That approach was dropped at the turn of the century because the United States (and others) recognised that it was a failure because it did not account for the already changed and changing media ecology. Rather than harnessing the media's positive power in war, it controlled what the media could see and relied on the method of 'security at the source' (Rid 2007): show the media little and tell them less.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the second part of my research question: *How does the ADF manage the media?* The evidence shows that it is the inertia of the function to protect the minister's and the government's reputation that leads the ADF to manage the media with a limiting approach. Exacerbating the limiting approach are the ADF's cultural view of and relations with the media, and its command notion of 'technical control'. Contributing to the approach are the constrained resources available to the ADF – including its doctrine, policy and manuals, personnel, and the resources of online media and social media. Compounding this approach is the ADF's 'clearance process' and its 'media embed program', which are the main methods for the management of the media. The combined effect of the function's inertia, and the ADF's constrained resources and methods is that the ADF's ability to use the media as a 'conduit' is precluded or diminished. The overall effect is to attenuate the media's and public participation in war.

Chapter 6
The effect on the ADF's media operations for war: Don't give them the news, wait until they give it to you

Until the ADF handed over responsibility for the security of Uruzgan province to the Afghan National Security Force in December 2013, its capital, Tarin Kot, was the ADF's main base in Afghanistan for more than a decade. In September 2016, one of the Taliban's official spokesmen in Afghanistan, Zabiullah Mujahid (@Zabihullah_4), announced via Twitter that the Taliban had 'stormed' Tarin Kot.[155] International and Australian news outlets, including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), reported the Taliban claim. At the time, the ADF's only public comment in response to media questions was that it was 'closely monitoring developments' (Greene 2016). Its effort to counter the Taliban's claim came late, affording its enemy an information victory. The Taliban's success was due to the fact it communicated with verisimilitude and speed. Their story attracted local, regional and international media attention. The effect of the announcement and the media's coverage was to perpetuate the Taliban's narrative and message to the West (and Australia) that, 'You have the watches, but we have the time'.[156] The ADF failed to combat the Taliban's claims because it had no systematised media strategy for war. The ADF's only material public comment regarding the incident came one month later when the Acting Chief of the Defence Force, appearing before a Parliamentary Committee, stated:

> Last month media reports emerged claiming that the Taliban had launched a major attack in the Oruzgan [sic] capital, Tarin Kot. These reports were based on Taliban propaganda … operational reporting confirms that the city was not in danger of being overrun … we should be careful not to judge the progress of Afghan forces on unsubstantiated social media reports.[157]

---

[155] http://www.conflict-news.com/articles/tarin-kowt-close-to-falling-to-taliban 08 September 2016 (Accessed 30 May 2019)

[156] 'You have the watches, but we have the time' is a 2004 quote attributed to a captured Taliban commander that encapsulates the Taliban's strategy (Robichaud 2007; Coombs 2013; Solomon 2017).

[157] http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=COMMITTEES;id=committee s%2Festimate%2F7f958c7f-ab5c-40a0-904e-369c08d35964%2F0002;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Guild%20Dataset%3Aestimate;rec=0;resCo unt=Default (Accessed 30 May 2019)

This episode shows that the Taliban's offensive media operations succeeded and the ADF's defensive media operations failed.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

This chapter addresses the third and final part of the research question: *How is the ADF's use of media operations for war affected by why and how it manages the media?* The chapter examines the reduced agency and the risk-averse approach of the ADF's closed-loop media management system, which contributes to its ineffective use of the media. The reduced agency denies the ADF the ability to frame its participation in war in an effective way. Its risk-averse approach denies or limits its ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media. These factors inhibit or render ineffectual the ADF's attempts to legitimise its aim in war and create or maintain public support through its narratives.

Compounding the ADF's stifled media operations are three structural factors that influence its approach to media operations: the ADF's Information Activities doctrine; its military public affairs planning; and its Command and Control (C2) construct and failure to recognise the media's role in the OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) loop. The second half of this chapter examines the structural factors. The chapter begins by outlining what media operations and a media strategy for war are, looking at their importance and exploring what they should strive to achieve.

This chapter also addresses two gaps in the knowledge. The first, related to but different from Maltby's (2013) identified gap, contributes to a deeper understanding of how the use of the media by the military for legitimation purposes can be constrained, particularly in relation to how the ADF designs its participation in war for the media.[158] The second gap it addresses relates to the causes of the deviation from standard practice that occurred during stability operations in East Timor when the ADF allowed journalists to interview any of its members and made no attempt to control or scrutinise material (Tiffen 2001). It is the political, cultural and organisational elements of these realities that connect the knowledge gaps.

---

[158] Maltby (2013) identifies a need for a deeper understanding of how the transformative effects of mediatization (through which the media shape war, and the use of the media by the military for legitimation purposes) come about, particularly in relation to how militaries design war for the media.

What are media operations for war?

Although the ADF denies that it has media operations for war, its system for the management of the media demonstrates that it does. Media operations are the use of the media by military public affairs for defensive (reactive) and offensive (proactive) ends (Rid 2007; Maltby 2013; Shavit 2016). Guided by legitimate OPSEC, there are three elements to defensive media operations (Rid 2007, p. 124). First, public affairs must maintain credibility through truth to engender trust. Second, it must act with speed to ensure it provides information to the audience(s) before the enemy does. Third, it must dominate by providing large amounts of quality, opportune information that is compelling. As Jamie Shea, the NATO alliance's spokesman during the Kosovo war, put it, 'media management … comprised several elements: quality, quantity and timing of the briefings – they needed to be good, plenty and fast … give them [the journalists] the news before they give you the news' (Shea in Rid 2007, p. 100). Offensively, there are two elements to media operations: (2007, p. 125): first, public affairs must use the media to credibly, speedily and authoritatively communicate to the enemy and any hostile audience(s); second, the information it uses must deter or persuade the adversaries' actions through fear of the ramifications. The media's role in war is crucial because it effects the decision making and behaviour of all parties.

What is a media strategy for war?

A media strategy for war is a plan of action designed to achieve a war's long-term aim using the media. It operates from within an overarching strategy. That strategy emerges from a recognised problem. The strategy has identified plans and directs the military operations and movements. In modern war, a media strategy is the nucleus, which is due to the 'fusion of the media, the military and society' (Shavit 2016, p. 10). This is because the media play an active performative involvement and constitutive role in war. Media now do more than report and reflect on war; they enact and perform war. The media has a degree of instrumentality and deliberateness, inventiveness and control, and is a spectatorial participant in war (Cottle 2005). The intertwined actions of mediatization and globalisation have had ontological effects for the orchestration of war and the media's role in it. More than militaries and media institutions now being 'more interdependent and less separable' (Eskjær et al. 2015, p. 21), militaries and the media in war are now dependent and inseparable. In military parlance, the media is the 'centre of gravity':

> …something that David Petraeus[159] said when I was at CENTCOM[160] … was that what you should be doing is thinking first and foremost about what is the information effect that you want to achieve and then you construct all your operations to achieve that. (Major General (retired) Michael Crane, Participant 8)

The goal of a media strategy should be to prioritise the use of the media to maintain legitimacy, hence through persuasion create or maintain public support (Ellul 1965; Shavit 2016; Taylor 2003). The planning and execution of media operations achieves the goal through the framing and performance of communication and the media's function.

For its military operations in Afghanistan, the ADF never had a codified media strategy. At the time of writing, this remains the case. None of the serving or retired ADF participants spoke of a media strategy existing at a classified level; nor did they decline to discuss the media strategy based on it existing at a classified level:

> Never been a defined strategy and that's probably the key take-away there. There's never been a defined strategy. It's all just been at the whim of an individual and applying a great deal of common sense and seeking to be progressively more transparent. (Colonel (retired) Andrew Mayfield, Participant 10)

The absence of a media strategy stifled the ADF's media operations for Afghanistan by precluding it from successfully harnessing the media's power in war.

Stifled media operations for war

In a media strategy vacuum, the ADF did not effectively use the media as a 'language' to frame its participation in Afghanistan, thus denying it the ability to create meaning through a positive conflict dramaturgy (Eskjær et al. 2015). Conflict dramaturgy is the performance of, and performance in, war.[161]

The ADF's reduced agency in its closed-loop media management is the result of MECC being the gatekeeper of the ADF's media operations. The reduced agency negatively affected the ADF's framing of its involvement in war. Framing in this sense relates to the focusing on any

---

[159] US General David Petraeus was the Commander of US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan from 2010–11.

[160] US Central Command.

[161] Conflict dramaturgy is discussed below in the section Risk Averse Approach: Denied or limited ability to perform and create a conflict dramaturgy.

given issue at hand. Goffman's (1974) theory of framing holds that when an issue is effectively framed and communicated to an audience(s), the audience is likely to be persuaded to think about that issue in the way intended by the communicator. People generally interpret information through their primary framework that they assume is true. Central to Goffman's theory is that in receiving messages people always consciously or subconsciously rely on their framework.

The ADF's 2010 'email controversy' draws attention to the effect of the ADF's inability to effectively frame its participation in war. This controversy arose from a 24 August 2010 ADF/Afghan National Army fighting patrol to clear the village of Derapet in Afghanistan's Tangi Valley (Boss 2011). During the patrol, a single enemy round killed Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney. In the days or weeks following, an unidentified fellow soldier's email made several claims about the patrol (Barker 2010). It claimed that a lack of mortar support resulted in MacKinney's death, that the 'post contact report' contained insufficient detail and that insufficient ammunition was available during the contact with the enemy (Boss 2011). The email found its way to News Corp Australia and its stable of publications, including the high-selling newspapers the *Sunday Telegraph* and *Herald Sun*. They reported on 21 September 2010 that '"that contact would have been over before Jared died if they gave us f------ mortars" the soldier said' (McPhedran 2010).[162] The timing of these events is significant because they occurred in the immediate wake of the 21 August 2010 Australian federal election. The election returned the incumbent Australian Labor Party to power without an absolute majority (Holmes & Fernandes 2012).

The media seized upon the 'email' issue, rapidly moving it from the tactical level directly to the political level. The issue's metamorphosis is akin to the 'strategic corporal' effect that the United States identified in its 'lessons learned' from its 1992/93 Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (Krulak 1999; Stech 1994). The effect relates partly to the media's omnipresence in modern warfare, the speed of information flow and the fact that the actions of the individual at the tactical level can influence the operational and strategic/political level. The 'strategic corporal' effect led the United States to change its doctrinal approach to media operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2003. It resulted in the US military's present approach, which

---

[162] Around three months later, the 6 January 2011 official ADF Inquiry Officer's report into MacKinney's death, which had had its original terms of reference expanded to include the 'email controversy', found that '[The unidentified fellow soldier] when interviewed … described the communication recounted to the media as a form of venting by him as part of the grieving process for his comrade … the comments were therefore not an accurate reflection of observations made in relation to the contact' (Boss 2011).

includes the abandonment of its 'security at the source' and 'denial of access policy'.[163] It also led to the institution of its wide and permanent 'media embed' program at the tactical level, and the merging of information operations and military public affairs (Rid 2007). The effect also saw the Israeli Defence Force discard its 'restrictive media policy' from 2002 (Shavit 2016). The outcome is that within the bounds of legitimate OPSEC, journalists are privy to classified information at the tactical and operational levels (Rid 2007).

The Australian media framed the 'email controversy' as one of contrast. It purportedly illustrated the Australian government's inappropriate policy for Afghanistan, and hence the ADF's inability to prevail in Uruzgan at the tactical level.[164] The subsequent public debate posed an immediate threat to reputations of the Defence Minister and the government. The ADF's then Chief of Joint Operations quickly fronted the media on the same day as the *Herald Sun*'s first report:

> I'm … given two hours to get down from Bungendore to Russell to give the press conference. These timings get brought forward, so I had to pull all this information together. It is brought forward because the minister wants to make a statement, but he wants me to have spoken first. So then my media conference … gets pretty testy. Firstly it's about 'you aren't giving your troops support or it's the wrong support'. I sort of said, 'no, no'. And then it turned into criticism about how tactically [the incident] was managed, which I then said 'you're talking rubbish …' which wasn't well received … By me appearing, that then gave the minister time to think about, 'Well how do we actually manage this? This is in danger of getting out of control politically.' (Lieutenant General (retired) Mark Evans, Participant 23)

---

[163] Used for military operations in Granada (1983), Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf War (1991).

[164] The Australian Labor party held federal power from December 2007 to September 2013, which was during Phase 3 (September 2008–February 2010) and Phase 4 (February 2010–December 2013) of the ADF's operations in Afghanistan. The overlap of Phases 3 and 4 was when the United States 'surged' troops into Afghanistan and ISAF's operations. The surge was the result of a change to the US-led International Coalition's policy for military operations in Afghanistan. The policy change resulted in a change to ISAF (and by default the ADF) strategy. The strategy shift, from a 'nation-building' and 'counter-terrorism' focus to a 'counter-insurgency' focus, required an increase in troop numbers and a greater physical presence among the local population. The result of this was increased contacts with the enemy, and hence an increase in ISAF (and ADF) deaths. For a more nuanced understanding of the policy and strategy change, see Fred Kaplan (2013) *The Insurgents* and Anand Gopal (2017) *Rents, Patronage, and Defection: State-building and Insurgency in Afghanistan*.

The absence of a media strategy led to negative media coverage. The media's absence at the tactical level in Afghanistan meant that the ADF could not effectively employ the defensive tenets of media operations. It lacked the credibility, speed and dominance to frame its participation in war from a tactical perspective. The media's reporting of the 'leaked' email exemplifies the ADF's loss of information control. Had a knowledgeable, embedded journalist been privy to the fighting patrol's planning, they would have been a credible source that engendered trust. They would have known that the patrol's plan was thorough and that mortar support and more were available (Barker 2010). By accompanying the patrol and being privy to the 'post contact report', they would have known that enough ammunition was available and that the tactical commander's decisions were sound (Barker 2010). The unidentified soldier would have had a more knowledgeable and circumspect news media source to vent to as part of the grieving process. If, after all that, the issue did still escalate to the political level unexpectedly, the ADF would have been able to better respond and frame with speed and authority. At the tactical level, the Commander on the ground would have been available to be interviewed by the embedded journalist. The 'email controversy' not only characterises the ADF's inability to apply the tenets of defensive media operations; it also highlights how the ADF's narrative for war is hindered, which impacts its ability to maintain public support:

> What most people saw out of Afghanistan was funerals. The Minister for Defence
> and the Prime Minister at the time would go to funerals of everyone who was
> killed in action. That was the prime source of news on Afghanistan … of course
> that is going to erode public support. It's going to make people question the war
> and it's just wrong. (Major (retired) Tony Park, Participant 14)

This example shows that the dominant frame used by the ADF[165] in its official media during the research period was 'battle casualty'. The majority of media releases pertained to the wounding or death of ADF personnel.

Polling shows that Australian opposition to the government's commitment of the ADF to Afghanistan was high. While the Lowy Institute's steady and credible polling shows that the opposition fell marginally from 2012 to 2013,[166] public support consistently fell from 2007

---

[165]   Or the Department of Defence and the Minister for Defence.

[166]   For 2012 – 65 per cent opposing and 33 per cent supporting; for 2013 – 61 per cent opposing and 35 per cent supporting.

(Foster 2013; Miller 2014; Oliver 2013).[167] It is arguable that the ADF's stifled media operations contributed to the steady decline in public support. The majority and dominant 'battle casualty' framing of its participation in war was negative. The government misdirected its desire to control its narrative for war. In the absence of a media strategy, the ADF was not able to effectively adjust 'the message' to suit its needs or those of its general audiences. It was not able to successfully modify its media tactics and coordinate the media with its military operations. Compounding all this was the ADF's risk-averse approach to its management of the media, which negated its effective use of offensive (or proactive) media operations.

Risk averse approach: Denied or limited ability to perform and create a conflict dramaturgy

The ADF's risk-averse approach to its management of the media meant that it denied or limited its own ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media. Here, the ADF's performance related to and required the media's performance and performativity because conflict dramaturgy is the performance of, and performance in, war.

The ADF denied or limited its success in performance and dramaturgy because of its stifled media operations. As a result, it did not proactively harness the media's positive, active, performative and participatory nature of spectatorship in war. It did not effectively employ the tenets of offensive media operations to utilise the elements of its military operations for war to enable illocutionary and perlocutionary strength.[168] The fundamental elements of its military operations in Afghanistan should have been the script, actors, means of symbolic production, social power, mise-en-scene and audience (Alexander 2008). Rather than offensive, the ADF's media operations were risk-averse and geared for the defensive:

> The only guidance you really get is more around preparation for unfortunate incidents and issues … there's a three day or day training in incident response … 'Here are bad stories that occurred on operations and here's what's been done

---

[167] The most recent significant Australian polling for Australia's public support for the ADF's involvement in the war in Afghanistan was the Lowy Institute's 2013 opinion survey (Oliver 2013). It found that 61 per cent of Australian respondents considered that the Afghanistan war was 'not worth fighting'. Previous polls asked the question 'Should Australia continue to be involved militarily in Afghanistan?'. In 2007, 46 per cent of respondents answered 'yes' and 46 per cent answered 'no'. From 2007 onwards, those answering 'no' consistently outnumbered those answering 'yes': 56–42 per cent in 2008, 51–46 per cent in 2009, 54–43 per cent in 2010, 59–40 per cent in 2011 and 65–33 per cent in 2012.

[168] As discussed in Chapter 2, illocution is communication that affects an intended action – for example, deterrence through the warning of the consequences of military action to ensure logical mutual understanding. Perlocution is communication that indirectly affects action – for example, persuasion to achieve a strategic goal.

with them. So, in case you encounter them, this is how we want you to respond.'
So there's more focusing on how to deal with the negatives: either casualties or
crises or scandals and those sorts of things. That was the focus. (Major General
(retired) Craig Orme, Participant 18)

One result of this approach is a tendency to regard the friendly media as virtually
indistinguishable from the hostile media. The consequence is that 'ideational framing'
opportunities were missed or squandered in Afghanistan. The ADF relinquished the
opportunity to characterise the compelling events, content, products and practices as 'news':

> Most of the [ADF's] digital content … that was coming out … was stuff of
> ministerial and prime ministerial visits to Afghanistan and attendant stories that
> came out of those. When you looked at the consumption and I just judge it by the
> number of hits on YouTube … what people wanted was helmet cam footage …
> it was unauthorised, illegal technically [be]cause we had this strict no camera
> policy which was flouted of course. And you would look at helmet cam footage
> of guys jumping off choppers or getting into a fire fight in Afghanistan … so little
> combat footage that came out of Afghanistan, that's what people wanted … but
> we weren't allowed to show it … There was this … reluctance, fear of showing
> the war … 'we don't want to scare the folks at home' … if we wanted to use the
> media to reach the people of Afghanistan we couldn't do that … we didn't want
> to show … that [the enemy] were being killed or shot … we didn't want to talk
> about operations. (Major (retired) Tony Park, Participant 14)

The ADF did not proactively engage the audience(s) with compelling content to appeal to
public support. The reason for this was because of its need to fulfil its media operations
function, namely ensuring the continued control of information flow to the media by the
Minister for Defence' and the government to protect their reputations and political power.
Restricting the dissemination of 'combat footage' because of the 'fear of showing the war'
resulted in the ineffective exploitation of the ideational framing opportunities indicated by
'what people wanted', which could be realised through a spectatorial media. The effect of not
wanting to 'scare the folks at home' and the inability to 'reach the people of Afghanistan'
diminished the ADF's success in creating the required positive conflict dramaturgy. The
dramaturgy would have established the various positions of ideological association. The ADF
did not appropriately recognise the media's role in modern war, including the power to foster

and maintain public support based on legitimacy stemming from the quick 'on-stage' deployment of information through the media (Castells 2000). The result was a twofold negative effect on the ADF's offensive media operations. First, the ADF's ability to credibly, speedily and authoritatively communicate to the enemy and any hostile audience(s) was diminished or negated. Second, the information it used did not deter its adversaries' actions through fear of the ramifications. The ADF's media operations did not maximise the use of the media as a 'language' to communicate their formidable expertise to create meaning and understanding.

Complicating this situation were three structural factors underlying the ADF's approach: the ADF's Information Activities doctrine; its approach to military public affairs planning; and its C2 construct and the media's actuality in the OODA loop.

Structural factors stifling the ADF's media operations

The ADF has no specific doctrine for media operations. However, the 'unclassified' 2013 third edition of the doctrine, ADDP 3.13 (3.13)[169] pertains to information activities,[170] supporting the 2017 'restricted' third edition of the doctrine ADFP 3.13.1 (3.13.1).[171] The latter's restricted security classification precludes its inclusion in this research. The preclusion is not problematic because it is pitched 'at the application and procedural level', whereas 3.13 is 'pitched at the philosophical and high-application level' (ADDP 3.13, p. iii). ADDP 3.13 is the appropriate doctrine for this research project because this thesis deals with the fundamental nature of the knowledge, reality and existence of the ADF's media operations.

The publication in 2002 of the first edition[172] of ADDP 3.13 was not suited to the ADF's media operations. Its incompatibility was the product of its divergence from the needs of media operations on two levels. First, it de-emphasised the significance of the media, which are alluded to only three times in the doctrine's 52 pages. There is no nuanced understanding and explanation of the media's changed role in war. Second, ADDP 3.13 misunderstands the crucial role of narrative that must apply to media operations.

---

[169] *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.13 Information Activities*.

[170] ADDP 3.13: released publicly by Australia's Department of Defence under The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) as FOI 330/13/14. See: http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/330_1314_Document.pdf (Accessed 25 July 2017).

[171] *Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP) 3.13.1 Information Operations Procedures* (Mansted 2018).

[172] See https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/34337875?q&versionId=42360719 (Accessed 19 June 2019).

116

As discussed in Chapter 2, 'strategic narrative' is an essential element in the conduct of modern war. Despite that fact, the ADF misconstrues the concept of narrative because it applies it to its doctrine in a way that does not acknowledge its conceptual limitations or its value (Freedman 2015, p. 18). Narrative is a central feature of the ADF's 3.1.3 doctrine; however, the ADF misconceives it because it misappropriates out of context the definition that 'a narrative is a compelling story-line *capable of explaining* events convincingly and from which inferences *can* be drawn' (Freedman 2006 in ADDP 3.13, p. 1-8, emphasis added).[173] Compounding the misconception is the addition of a second sentence that claims 'narratives provide *a vehicle for conveying ideas* and supporting collective and common understanding' (ADDP 3.13, p. 1-8, emphasis added). The compounded error here is that ADDP 3.13's conception of narrative errs on three levels. On a basic level, it conflates and then over-simplifies the notion of 'could explain' by changing it to 'capable of explaining'. This changes the emphasis from an indication of a possibility to achieve, to a definite ability to achieve. The ADF's conception of narrative, which appears to draw on a post-structuralist driven 'narrative turn', does not capture its complicated nuances (Maan 2018; Paulesc 2019; Polletta et al. 2011).[174] The assertion that narratives 'convey ideas' will tend to limit the ADF's effort to ineffective messaging, explanation or description, and a sole reliance on the interpretive or symbolic paradigm. ADDP 3.13's 'strategic narrative' for Afghanistan exemplifies the misconception:

> To support global security and Australian national security: Australia is committed to countering international terrorism and supporting efforts to prevent Afghanistan from ever again being used as a safe haven and training ground for global terrorism, including attacks on Australians in our own region and beyond. (ADDP 3.13, p. 1-9)

Rather than a narrative, this is a message or a 'mission statement' that explains the ADF's presence in Afghanistan as part of Australia's 'forward defence' strategy.[175] The problem here is that the ADF's conception of its narrative for Afghanistan only seeks to explain. It does not

---

[173] Freedman wrote that 'narratives [are] compelling storylines which *could* [emphasis added] explain events convincingly and from which inferences *could* [emphasis added] be drawn' (Freedman 2015, p. 19).

[174] See Chapter 2 for the overview of the 'narrative turn'.

[175] Australia's existing 'forward defence' strategy stems from the 1987 *The Defence of Australia White Paper*. The strategy entails (1) securing and holding the 'sea-air-gap' between Australia's north and Southeast Asia and (2) contributing to expeditionary operations to support Allies that support Australia's national interests (Davis 2019).

seek to define actors and events in time and space to create meaning. It does not seek to co-construct identity. Therefore, the ideas and beliefs of imagined audiences,[176] beyond the ADF's narrowly defined audiences, are not likely to be affected:

> I think the problem wasn't so much who was the audience, it was the message. We didn't give … a clear message. (Participant 6 – anonymous)

'Bolt-on' military public affairs planning

The absence of ADF doctrine that relates specifically to media operations[177] has two consequences. First, the ADF's associated planning approach in war is inadequate. Second, its preparedness through 'exercising for war' fails to recognise that militaries and the media in war are now dependent and inseparable.

> From a reactive perspective I think our … process has always been pretty sound … but our ability to be truly strategic and planned has always been constrained. We're good issues managers, we're not great at planning to where we can get ahead of an issue or do something which is more than reactive. (Colonel (retired) Jeff Squire, Participant 11)

According to the evidence, the ADF's approach to media operations planning during the research period did not change. There was little or no organisational effort to identify the enacting of offensive media operations opportunities. The ADF focused on reacting to negative issues and attempting to control the attendant 'messaging'. A limited, inefficient planning approach to media operations resulted in the positive power of the media being left untapped. Planning was

> limited and to the extent that it could reasonably carefully be controlled. So, it was not the main piece of what we were doing, you know almost the anthesis of the Petraeus kind of view. It's something that was … bolted on. It was not something that was central to everything that we did and again I think that reflected in the way that we managed it … I would say that we talked the talk…but we are not very good at doing it. So there would be … but it would be

---

[176] As discussed in Chapter 2, an imagined audience is defined as existing in the 'digital' sphere and that is not contained as separate or discrete because the network society and networked digital media allows information to be quickly and widely shared. This means the traditional notions of space and place have been altered.

[177] That should be the catalogued, authoritative and proven guidance for its the best practice.

very formulaic … the public affairs people have a template … and they go through and fill it in and parts of it may or may not be applicable to what you're actually doing, but first and foremost it was a Public Affairs document. It wasn't an Operations document. It wasn't owned by the J3 or the J5 or the Commander to that extent. It was owned by the Public Affairs people and yes, they had to go and get the J3 and everybody else to sign off on it. They're not thinking of it as an operational document, another lever that they can use in their wider Operational Plan, Campaign Plan and wider strategy. (Major General (retired) Michael Crane, Participant 8)

As a consequence of the 'carefully controlled' planning approach, the ADF showed a limited ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media because it was not 'central to everything they did'. Its attempts to use the media inhibited its ability to legitimise its aim in war and create or maintain public support through a narrative, because the media was not seen as powerful, let alone significant. The ADF does not understand the media to be a tool of war to be deployed in its 'wider Operational Plan, Campaign Plan and wider strategy'. The ADF's design of its participation in war hindered its use of the media for legitimation purposes.

The sub-optimal approach to media operations planning that stems from the ADF's culture, values and practices is also manifested in its military exercises. The ADF's exercises are designed to 'develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes that enable Australia to conduct successful military operations' (ADDP 7.0, p. 1-1). They seek to strengthen the conduct of combined and joint task force operations and enhance combat readiness. However, the evidence shows the ADF's sometimes misdirected efforts to utilise the media. Talisman Sabre, a biennial exercise that involves over 30,000 personnel deployed in Australia, is the exemplar.[178] A former Director of Public Affairs for Headquarters Joint Operations Command and the former Head of Corps for the Australian Army's Public Relations Service, Mike Harris, explains:

It's frustrating because when it comes to Talisman Sabre, we don't prioritise the role of the media in the exercise. Now a part of the problem is that we don't have enough allocated resources to do that … We only simulate the Red Force media [the role of the 'unfriendly' media supporting the enemy], and the Blue Force

---

[178]   http://www.defence.gov.au/Exercises/TS19/ (Accessed 20 June 2019).

> media [the role of the 'friendly' media] is played in a small way by our double-hatted White Force [military public affairs personnel] whose main role is the promotion of the exercise and to deal with any secondary risks that can cause serious damage to reputation. (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Harris, Participant 27)

The ADF's lack of concern about the role the media should play within military exercises stems from its media management function, which encompasses dealing with secondary risks that result from the physical conduct of the exercise and might cause damage to the government's reputation (Power 2007). These risks include accidental deaths, environmental damage, inappropriate exercise participant behaviour and foreign nation-state discernment of the exercise's purpose. The ADF's exercises are not appropriately designed to develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes that enable successful offensive and defensive media operations. An adequate replication would entail a 'live', active and performative hostile and friendly media physically present at the tactical level 'inside' the ADF's exercises. In this way, a meaningful experience will recreate the media's omnipresence in modern warfare, the speed of the media's information flow and its unpredictability. This experience would then hone the knowledge, skills and attitudes required for the difficult task of media operations. The Minister for Defence's media management objectives and plans that are pertinent for 'outside' the exercises should be left to the bureaucracy to allow the ADF to focus on the conduct of war.

ADF C2 and the OODA[179] loop

The ADF employs a system of Command and Control (C2) for operations. Within the system, command 'includes authority and responsibility for using available human and material resources' (ADDP 00.1, p. 1-1). Control is the 'authority exercised by a Commander responsible for implementing orders or directives' (p. 1-1). To best ensure mission success, within defined parameters a Commander can direct (control) the use of resources (command) at their disposal as they see fit. The changes to the ADF's C2 structure from 1997 through to 2007 contributed to its stifled media operations for Afghanistan. This change requires an explanation that also serves to fill a gap in existing knowledge.

For the ADF, it was not until 1988 that the doctrinal notions of the separate yet overlapping strategic, operational and tactical levels of commands came to the fore (Horner 2007). Before 1988,

---

[179] OODA: Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action.

the operational level did not exist.[180] Due to some doctrinal ambiguity, in 1997 'ADF command arrangements were formally restructured to provide for clear separation between the military strategic level and the operational level of command' (ADDP 00.1, p. v). Hence, from 1997, commanders of ADF operations reported to a Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) based in Australia. The COMAST reported to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).

Early in the ADF's peace-keeping operations in East Timor (1999–2000), the then CDF, Admiral Chris Barrie,[181] temporarily changed the C2 arrangement so that the commander of the operation[182] reported directly to him, bypassing the COMAST (Horner 2007). It is this insight that explains why, in an Australian military first, the ADF allowed journalists to interview anyone in East Timor and did not attempt to control or scrutinise the media's material (Tiffen 2001). It also highlights an important central point: that the ADF's media operations problems are organisational as much as they are cultural. According to Admiral Barrie, by delegating authority to the Operational Commander to manage the media at the tactical level, there was no need for political oversight:

> We … enable the people on the ground to tell the factual story immediately. So, if you have a Cosgrove, something goes wrong, you get out there and you talk about and it's a fact. (Admiral (retired) Chris Barrie, Chief of Defence Force, Participant 26)

This meant that for the first and only time in the Australian military's history, the ADF was able to directly harness the media's ability to co-structure power relations because the Defence Public Affairs Organisation was excluded from the process. For a short time, the ADF was the arbiter of its own media operations. The effects of this in the media's coverage of East Timor were both negative and positive: negative for journalism because the Australian media's coverage was seen as jingoistic, chauvinistic and lacking in careful analysis and scepticism

---

[180]   Until 1997, for the history of the Australian military, commanders conducting military operations 'at sea, on the ground, or in the air' reported to and were directed by a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), and eventually a COSC Chairman. The military operations effectively occurred at the 'tactical' level, while the COSC operated at the strategic level. The Australian government and the Minister for Defence provided its policy guidance to the COSC. However, other than for the ADF's stabilisation operation in East Timor the Australian military has only ever conducted operations for war as a junior member of a Coalition – meaning no Australian commander has ever had direct operational command of Australian forces in war. The position of COSC Chairman became the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) in 1976 when the collective Australian military (the three services of the Navy, Army and Air Force) formally became the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The CDFS position became the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) in 1984.

[181]   CDF 1997–2007.

[182]   The then Major General Peter Cosgrove was the ADF-led International Force to East Timor's (INTERFET) Commander.

(O'Connor 2000); positive for the ADF because the media provided a 'local connection' between the Australian military and the Timorese that framed the Australian soldier as the 'local hero' (Nash & Bacon 2004). The result was that the Australian government was returned to a domestic position of authoritative news source for East Timor because of the increased positive 'major' media reports that focused on the ADF. Prior to this, the dominant media frames contested the Australian government's morality for its support for Indonesia, and criticised its failure to oppose the Indonesian government's inaction over the violence in East Timor (Nash & Bacon 2004).

By the commencement of the ADF's 2001 involvement in Afghanistan, the ADF had enshrined in its C2 the descending levels of the strategic, operational and tactical. The C2 construct continued throughout the research period's timeframe and remains at the time of writing. Reflecting the ADF's doctrinal maturation, by 2004 the COMAST's role was taken over by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) who, with the establishment of a developing ADF Joint Operations Command, also became the Chief of Joint Operations.[183] In 2007 the Joint Operations Command became a single integrated headquarters[184] with the VCDF's operational responsibilities handed to the newly created stand-alone position of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).[185]

The C2 concept aligns with the ADF's acceptance of the tenets of manoeuvre warfare[186] and encompasses the notion of mission command. Mission command 'decentralises authority, encouraging initiative and freedom of action for subordinate commanders' to support manoeuvre warfare (ADDP 2002, p. iii). Mission command requires agility and adaptability. A key reason for the ADF's changes to its C2 was acceptance of a 'necessarily closer government interest in military operations with potentially high strategic consequences, and

---

[183]   VCDF also reported directly to the CDF.

[184]   Known as Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)

[185]   CJOPS also reports directly to the CDF. The VCDF's role remains, although it focuses on strategic level business, and supporting the Australian government and the CDF.

[186]   The ADF's notion of manoeuvre warfare 'involves the movement and placement of forces in a favourable position relative to the enemy and the application of firepower such that the physical and psychological effect is sufficient to break an enemy's will to continue fighting or otherwise conclude hostilities on Australia's term' (ADDP 2002, p. 24). The media's power in modern war means it too has 'firepower'. It differs from 'attrition warfare', 'which emphasises the destruction of weapons platforms, personnel, supporting infrastructure and other resources through the application of overwhelming combat power. While attrition warfare may be effective in some situations, it is inefficient, particularly above the tactical level, as it is too personnel – and resource intensive – as a form of warfare for the Australian Defence Force to sustain' (ADDP 2002, p. 24).

the effects of technology on C2 and information management' (ADDP 00.1, p. vi).[187] The evidence shows that this contributed to the ADF's stifled media operations. In addition to the government taking a closer interest, it tightly controlled the ADF's media operations to the detriment of mission command:

> The military culture has misconstrued in some respects what's appropriate to allow the politician to be involved with; and the politicians have misconstrued what they should get involved with. And so you have this sort of non-symbiotic relationship where the military didn't tell the pollies to get out of this business – this is actually the conduct of war, or conduct of operations – and the pollies didn't realise they shouldn't be in that because they weren't equipped to make those sorts of decisions. So, you end up with this sort of unhealthy arrangement where it's not necessarily good advice going to government and it's not necessarily very good direction coming from the government. All because of the risk – continuing to maintain public trust and continuing the legitimacy of the operation. (Major General (retired) Craig Orme, Participant 18)

A disparity existed between mission command and C2 in Afghanistan as a result, in that the ADF limited subordinate commanders' freedom of action, agility and adaptability. This limitation was contrary to the ADF's acknowledgement of the 'command dilemma' that relates to the 'overlap of levels of command [that has] the potential to undermine the C2 and the philosophy of mission command' (ADDP 00.1, p. 4-25). The ADF did not address the 'command dilemma' because it did not properly decentralise the authority for media operations or encourage initiative among and freedom of action for subordinate commanders. The absence of appropriate mission command in the ADF's media operations meant that the ADF was prevented from adequately harnessing the 'firepower' of the media. It is the media's power that was best placed to maintain or create public support because of the imagined audiences' intuitive and spectatorial character.

Intuitiveness and spectatorship

As discussed in Chapter 2, knowledge formation in imagined audiences has changed from a linear to an intuitive formation (Beck 1994; Castells 2000; Han 2010; Lash 2003). Through the

---

[187] For a concise historical overview of the Australian military's change in C2 see Horner's (2007) *The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations*.

media, it is now easier to demand and actively seek an experience and understanding of war through consumption and spectatorship.

The media affects the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. There is little or nothing the military can do to change this reality. Because of the immediacy and proliferation of information that is generated by war through the media, the imagined audience's knowledge and understanding are crucial to media operations. Their 'sense-making is [no longer] interiorized in consciousness but communicative' (Han 2010, p. 206). To foster public support, there is an elevated requirement to ensure the imagined audience's communicative action through the media. The ADF's limiting of the tenets of mission command in its media operations for Afghanistan impeded its ability to ensure that communicative action:

> … the compression of strategic, operational and tactical level. You used to have those three nice diagrammatic bubbles of the levels of war with moderate overlap – well someone got hold of them and pushed them down so that the difference between the three is not as easily discernible anymore: the overlap is far greater. Indeed, there is a point where each level overlaps. And the media are in the mix as well, which compounds the issues … so our ability to generate strategic thoughts in this compressed environment is not as good as it should be … the media flows very fast, it's 24/7 and it works very fast. Their cycles are short. Our cycles are slower and so by the time they have finished their cycle we haven't finished ours and so we are sometimes at a disadvantage … I don't know that we ever penetrated into the general public a set of strategic messages of what was the real value of us being there [Afghanistan]. (Lieutenant General (retired) Mark Evans, Participant 23)

The compression of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war where the 'the media is in the mix' means that to form a knowledge of war, audiences can now move beyond the linear units of meaning, such as narrative and discourse, to the units of information (Han 2010). An audience's formation of its ideas has become 'informational' (Arnoldi 2007). This transformation of 'knowledge' to 'information' is different from the media's once-linear approach to communicating for the audience's understanding. Now, information tailored for entertainment contributes to the formation of the ideas of imagined audiences via wide dissemination and negotiation (Arnoldi 2007). The negotiation is in part the power of the media's active and performative role in war, because it strengthens meaning creation. However,

because of the ADF's limited mission command in its media operations, which meant it did not 'penetrate into the general public', it relinquished the opportunity to harness the media's power and the imagined audience's intuition. The opportunity to embrace the logic of this intuition and facilitate the unencumbered proliferation of the audience's ideas to maintain and foster public support was largely lost (Han 2010), squandering the opportunity for positive meaning creation through spectatorship to maintain or win public support. That is because it is within the imagined audience's spectatorship through the media that public support for war is created, won or lost.

Because modern war is conducted in and through the media as well as on physical terrain, the way the audience looks at and conceptualises war when deciding to support or reject it is as important as what it observes (Mieszkowski 2009). With the media and its imagined audience(s) pervading warfare, they are inside what the military understands as the OODA loop (Figure 2).


Figure 2: The media inside the OODA loop in military operations for war

The ADF's lack of mission command in its media operations complicates this actuality:

> As I say, it's [the media] very centrally controlled and the problem with that is, you're outside the OODA loop. You're not in the OODA loop. (Lieutenant General (retired) Mark Evans, Participant 23)

The OODA loop is a method of decision making developed by the US military and taught by the ADF. At its core is the application of deductive and inductive reasoning to reduce uncertainty in war (Boyd 1976). It is relevant to this research because of the ADF's reduced decision-making capacity (or limited mission command) in its media operations. The OODA loop attempts to speedily order and verify as well as possible war's always disorderly information to obtain advantage and survive. Central to the loop's logic and pertinent to media operations is entropy, where

> the degree of confusion and disorder associated with any … information activity … increases … in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other systems or environments external to itself (Boyd 1976, pp. 5–6).

The purpose of the OODA loop is to support manoeuvre warfare (Henrotin 2016), hence mission command is relevant. All decision making should seek to

> succeed at mastering [war] from the inside, or on the level of its conduct, and not by the deflection that the political level naturally engages in for most [of its] operations, most often giving [politicians] a limited scope (Henrotin 2016, p. 77).

As already discussed, according to the evidence the ADF limits mission command in its media operations, which limits or denies its ability to maintain or create public support. As Participant 23 puts it above, the ADF's media operations are 'outside the OODA loop'. The reason for this is the government's 'very central control' and limiting of the ADF's media operations, which restricts the media and its audience(s) from forming their ideas from widely disseminated and negotiated information tailored for entertainment. The way that intuitive, imagined audiences form ideas is now the 'ordered fashion' of communication that serves to decrease the degree of confusion and disorder. Perhaps most significantly, this meant the ADF was unable to succeed at mastering its media operations for Afghanistan from the inside. Rather, the government through MECC engaged in deflection that resulted in limited scope and a loss of positive meaning-creation. The ADF's attempts to legitimise its aim in war and create or maintain public support through a narrative were impeded or unsuccessful. The ADF's ability to frame its participation in war was limited. That limited its ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the third and final part of my research question: *How is the ADF's use of media operations for war affected by why and how the ADF manages the media?* The evidence shows that in the absence of a systematised media strategy for war, the ADF's media operations are stifled. The combination of the ADF's constraint of the media's co-structuring ability, and its attenuation of the media's and the public participation in war, means that the ADF does not effectively maximise the use of the media as a 'language'. The ADF's reduced agency denies it the ability to frame its participation in war effectively. Its risk-averse approach denies or limits its ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media. The effect is that the ADF's attempts to legitimise its aim in war and create or maintain public support through a narrative are hampered or inept. Complicating this reality is the ADF's related Information Activities doctrine, its approach to military public affairs planning, the ADF's C2 construct and the recognition of the media's actuality in the OODA loop. This makes it possible to see that the ADF is limited or denied the ability to exploit the media's and the imagined audience's power in modern war – a power that hinges on its intuition and spectatorial character.

Conclusion:
The ADF's shackled power in the age of mediatized war

Admiral Chris Barrie (retired), the ADF's Chief of the Defence Force when the Australian government first committed its military forces to the war in Afghanistan, observes that the ADF's appreciation of the media's role in modern war requires serious attention:

> I'm not sure Afghanistan was just unusual. I think if I looked to the future and the likelihood of urban warfare in the next two decades, which I'm out there saying it's much more likely than it should be, I think it is going to look a lot like Afghanistan. It's going to be ugly, horrible, ugly … and we've got to learn how to do that much better than we had, and the media is implicated in that … the media's going to be very important. (Admiral (retired) Chris Barrie, Participant 26)

This research has been about the political, cultural and organisational factors that stifle the ADF's closed-loop media management for war, the changed character of modern war, the media's role in it, and the ADF's media strategy and media operations for war in Afghanistan. Its purpose has been to produce findings of utility to the ADF's planning and implementation of media operations for war. As discussed in Chapter 2, war is now permeated by the media. The media's role in modern war is, as Cottle (2007) notes, an active performative and constitutive one. As Maltby (2013) argues, war's performativity is contextualised and influenced by the media. For the ADF to comprehend and succeed in it requires an attentiveness to the media, its affordances and its conditioning of the behaviour of all those concerned with war. If, as this thesis has argued, it is the dynamic, participatory, intuitive and interpretive witnesses who are crucial to the building and maintaining of public support for war, then the findings of this project show that the ADF is not adequately prepared for modern war. The implication of this is that the ADF is not prepared for war in the future.

The characteristics of the ADF's media operations for Afghanistan symbolise the importance of my research and shed light on crucial conclusions. Network societies and digital media mean that information pertaining to war can no longer be contained. To the contrary, war is now perfused with information. The media and its audiences do not need to rely on the ADF for

128

information to comprehend war, and nor do the ADF's opponents need to rely on the 'traditional media'. The ADF's ability in war to control the flow of information to the media is compromised because it now occurs in a digitised media ecology. The mainstream media, or 'legacy media', which include the Australian Parliamentary Press Gallery, are increasingly peripheral to the news consuming habits of Australians. Online and social media platforms now dominate Australian news consumption (ACCC, p. 21).

The MECC Division curtailed the ADF's use of social media for its military operations from around July 2018. The curtailment included the discontinuance of the JTF633 Commander's and Command Warrant Officer's Instagram accounts.[188] The ADF's only media operations for war-related unit, the 1st Joint Public Affairs Unit, had all its social media presences closed from May 2018.[189] At the time of writing, the ADF's HQJOC has only one social media tool: Facebook. Unlike the equivalent Three-Star Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force, the Three-Star Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) has no social media presence.[190] The ADF's only 'war-like' related Twitter account @Fight_Daesh is ineffective, not least because the ADF believes that its effectiveness 'does not require followers'.[191]

Significantly, in February 2020 during the final drafting of this thesis, the ADF published the unclassified doctrine *ADFP 3.13.2* (3.13.2) *Military Public Affairs*.[192] It is not specific to media operations for war;[193] rather, it is generally about 'the provision of public information and *management of media access* [emphasis added] for Defence "activities"' (ADFP 3.13.2, p. 1-1). Its understanding of the media's role in modern society (let alone modern war) is defunct, failing to appreciate the media's active and performative position. At the application and procedural level, it does not deal with the relevance of a media strategy for war to inform ADF media operations. Worryingly, the doctrine does not emphasise the basic importance of creating and/or maintaining public support. It replicates, perpetuates and in some cases intensifies the shortcomings of existing related doctrine and policy, and previous relevant

---

[188] At the time of writing, https://www.instagram.com/adf.middle.east/?hl=en remains active (Accessed 26 May 2020).

[189] https://www.contactairlandandsea.com/2018/05/03/defence-begins-shutting-down-unit-facebook-pages (Accessed 23 July 2019).

[190] http://www.defence.gov.au/socialmedia (Accessed 26 May 2020).

[191] 1982 (Cth) as FOI 235/18/19 http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/235_1819_Documents.pdf, p. 3. (Accessed 21 August 2019).

[192] Released 'administratively' to the author on 23 March 2020 by the Australian Department of Defence under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) FOI Request 475/19/20.

[193] In its 105 pages there is just one passing mention of media operations.

manuals and guidelines. For example, the policy for a 'clearance' of information for release to the media has become even more restrictive. The level of responsibility for that clearance has been increased from a one-star to a two-star. 3.13.2 demonstrates that the ADF fails to recognise the media's role in modern war and its link to news and noteworthy information consumption:

> Australians seek high quality, credible news information from reputable sources. They trust established commercial news organisations, public broadcasters and print newspapers more than they do other sources of information … *Social media news sources are less important*. (ADDP 3.13.3, p. 5-2, emphasis added)

The doctrine's take on the Australian public's news consumption habits and the way that news is circulated in the network society is incorrect and out of step with reality.[194] The 3 March 2020 announcement of the intended closure of the Australian Associated Press (AAP) newswire service (founded in 1935)[195] by its established commercial news organisation owners (News Corp Australia, Nine Entertainment Australia, *The West Australian* and Australian Community Media) confirms the reality:

> The unprecedented impact of the digital platforms that take other people's content and distribute it for free has led to too many companies choosing to no longer use AAP's professional service … AAP has been providing a newswire to Australian media companies for 85 years but recently the number of companies subscribing to the service has declined to the point that it is no longer viable … the business [is] unsustainable.[196]

Taken together these developments suggest that a concerted internal review is required that should return to the ADF its media operations agency for all of its operations, exercises and operations for war. The ADF, as the expert organisation in the conduct of war, should be the arbiter of its media operations. MECC has no experience or expertise in the conduct of war, and therefore is not the appropriate authority to dictate the ADF's approach to media operations. The volume and speed of digital information and the media now heavily dictate warfare. The proactive and unfettered use of the media by the ADF offers the best means to

---

[194] See Chapter 2 and in particular the 2019 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission's report *Digital Platforms Inquiry*.

[195] Keith Murdoch referred to in Chapter 1 founded the company.

[196] AAP, 3 March 2020 media release: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/aap-nw-aap.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/05101429/Official-AAP-Press-Release.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2020).

avoid war in the future, while also ensuring the service of Australia's national interests. The unfettered use of the media by the ADF means that once the Australian government has provided the ADF with its clear policy, the ADF must then be trusted to make public comment and/or disseminate public information via the media without the prior 'risk-averse' clearance of the Minister for Defence. Just as a minister should not dictate how a professional infantry battalion conducts the defence or attack of a position, nor should the minister dictate how the ADF should harness the power of the media to achieve its approved mission, whatever that may be. This is not an approach that prevails at present.

Related to the Australian government's own report, *Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence – Report on Community Consultations* (Jennings 2015), the ADF should ensure it is inside the OODA loop for media operations to make sure it masters those operations from the inside of war, rather than allowing MECC to 'deflect'. That deflection serves only to prioritise the government and the Minister's day-to-day political 'messaging' communication priorities to maintain domestic political power, not win a modern war. A sure way to lose domestic political power is to have not embraced the media's power in war, and thereby if war was unavoidable, assuring its limitation and speedy conclusion on favourable terms. While consultation is wise, HQJOC's media operations should be independent and free of MECC's influence. This means that the ADF needs to transform its media operations for war, and embrace the media as a tool of war. It also means that an effective media strategy cannot be built on engagement between the military and the 'legacy media' alone.

Key findings

This is the first study to identify and detail the operations and consequences of the ADF's closed-loop media management system. It has examined the ADF's management of the media for its military operations for war in Afghanistan, and how that affected its media operations. The research project's goal was to analyse, measure and explain the ADF's media management and its media operations for war. For the first time, I have documented the degree of change and the impediments to it, revealing the stifled character of the ADF's media operations.

This thesis finds that the ADF's media operations for the war in Afghanistan were stifled because it had no media strategy for war. Because of this reality, the ADF failed to effectively exploit the power of the media's positive, active and performative role in war. The ADF did not identify that friendly and hostile imagined audiences are now dynamic, participatory, intuitive witnesses to war. This misidentification exemplifies the fact that the ADF has missed

the paradigmatic shift to 'diffused war', where 'perpetual connectivity … is the principal mechanism through which media is weaponized, made a tool of warfare' (Hoskins & O'Loughlin 2010, p. 2). Contributing to the stifled media operations is the ADF's constraining of the media's co-structuring ability and the ADF's attenuation of the media's and the public's participation in war. The ADF tends to regard the friendly media as virtually indistinguishable from the hostile media. It thus misses or squanders positive ideational framing opportunities, denying itself the ability to effectively frame its participation in war and limiting its ability to perform and create a positive conflict dramaturgy through the media. As a result, the ADF's attempts to legitimise its aim in war and create or maintain public support through a narrative are inhibited or, at worst, rendered ineffectual. The combination of all of these realities means that the ADF's power in war is shackled because its ability to communicate and perform is diminished.

Implications of findings

Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, with no apparent ADF media strategy for war or dedicated media operations for war doctrine and policy, one can reasonably conclude that the ADF is not adequately prepared for the future of modern war. This deficit requires urgent rectification. As the ADF's former Chief of the Defence Force noted at the start of this conclusion, there is an increased risk that Australia will be drawn into a mid-intensity, high-end armed conflict in the next 20 years. Some argue that that risk could be realised in the Indo-Pacific realm in the next decade. Due to geopolitical tensions in Australia's region and the security concerns surrounding the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, 'conflict in the next decade [is] a real possibility … recourse to war in the twenty-first century is likely to be more rapid than in the last decades of the twentieth century' (Davis 2019, p. 3). It is for this reason that the ADF's planning and preparedness for war requires urgent attention.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Participant list

Participant	Participant type	Retired / Serving	ADF Rank	Interview location	Interview duration (approximate)
Participant 01. Mike Hannan	ADF member	Retired	Brigadier	Brisbane	1 hr 24 m
Participant 02. Anonymous	ADF member	Retired	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	1 hr 21 m
Participant 03. Anonymous	ADF member	Retired	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	1 hr 30 m
Participant 04. Gary Bornholt	ADF member	Retired	Brigadier	Canberra	2 hrs
Participant 05. Anonymous	ADF member	Retired	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	1 hr 30 m
Participant 06. Anonymous	ADF member	Serving	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	2 hrs
Participant 07. Brian Humphreys	Department of Defence	Retired	N/A	Skype (Washington DC)	1 hr 50 m
Participant 08. Michael Crane	ADF member	Retired	Major General	Canberra	1 hr 20 m
Participant 09. Dan Fortune	ADF member	Retired	Brigadier	Canberra	35 m
Participant 10. Andrew Mayfield	ADF member	Retired	Colonel	Canberra	1 hr 30 m
Participant 11. Jeff Squire	ADF member	Retired	Colonel	Canberra	1 hr 10 m
Participant 12. Karen Middleton	Journalist	N/A	N/A	Canberra	1 hr 25 m
Participant 13. Tom Hyland	Journalist	N/A	N/A	Melbourne	1 hr 33 m
Participant 14. Tony Park	ADF member	Retired	Major	Sydney	53 m
Participant 15. Chris Masters	Journalist	N/A	N/A	Sydney	46 m
Participant 16. Ash Power	ADF member	Retired	Major General	Wangaratta	50 m
Participant 17. Peter Leahy	ADF member	Retired	Lieutenant General	Canberra	55 m
Participant 18. Craig Orme	ADF member	Retired	Major General	Canberra	52 m
Participant 19. Mark Kelly	ADF member	Retired	Major General	Canberra	53 m
Participant 20. Brendan Nicholson	Journalist	N/A	N/A	Canberra	55 m
Participant 21. Andrew Greene	Journalist	N/A	N/A	Canberra	1 hr
Participant 22. Anonymous	ADF member	Serving	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	1 hr 18 m
Participant 23. Mark Evans	ADF member	Retired	Lieutenant General	Skype (Brisbane)	1 hr 26 m
Participant 24. Angus Campbell	ADF member	Serving	General	Canberra	1 hr
Participant 25. David Hurley	ADF member	Retired	General	Sydney	1 hr 10 m
Participant 26. Chris Barrie	ADF member	Retired	Admiral	Canberra	50 m
Participant 27. Mike Harris	ADF member	RIP	Lieutenant Colonel	Phone (ACT)	4 x 15 mins

Appendix 2: Consent form, explanatory statement, guidelines for volunteers

<u>**CONSENT FORM**</u>

Monash Project ID: 12194
DDVA HREC Approval # 053-18
Title: Media operations and military operations for war: Mediatization and the Australian Defence Force[197]

A/Prof Kevin Foster	**Sean Childs**
School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics	Phone: 0405 603 933
	email: sean.childs@monash.edu
Phone: 03 9905 5259	
email: Kevin.Foster@monash.edu	

I, ...………………... give my consent to participate in the project mentioned above on the following basis:

- I have had explained to me the aims of this research project, how it will be conducted and my role in it.
- I have received the Explanatory Statement and understand the risks involved as described in the Explanatory Statement.

I am cooperating in this project on condition that:

- the information I provide will be kept confidential if I so choose;
- the information will be used only for this project and its related journal articles and conferences;
- the research results will be made available to me at my request and any published reports of this study will preserve my anonymity if I so choose; and
- I have been given a copy of the *Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee (DDVA HREC) Guidelines for Volunteers*.

I understand that:

- I consent to a digital audio recording during the interview;
- ethics approval to conduct this research expires 06 April 2022;
- there is no obligation to take part in this study;
- I have the option to remain anonymous within the research;
- if I wish to withdraw from the research I can do so at any time and that my existing data will be deleted from the research;
- if I choose not to participate there will be no detriment to my career or future health care (for Defence personnel only);
- I am free to withdraw at any time with no detriment to my career or future health care (for Defence personnel only); and
- I am deemed to be on duty whilst participating in this research (for Defence personnel only);

Should you have any complaints or concerns about the way this project is conducted, please do not hesitate to contact the researchers in person.
Defence personnel may prefer to contact the DDVA HREC at the following address:
Executive Officer
DDVA HREC
Tel: (02) 6266 3807   Email: ddva.hrec@defence.gov.au
Name of Participant: _____

Participant Signature : _____   **Date :** _____

---

[197]   By the time I produced the final draft of my thesis, its titled had changed.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Monash Project ID: 12194
DDVA HREC Protocol # 053-18
Title: Media operations and military operations for war: Mediatization and the Australian Defence Force

A/Prof Kevin Foster
School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics
Phone: 03 9905 5259
email: Kevin.Foster@monash.edu

Sean Childs
Phone: 0405 603 933
email: sean.childs@monash.edu

You are invited to take part in this study. Please read this Explanatory Statement in full before deciding whether to participate in this research. If you would like further information regarding any aspect of this project, you are encouraged to contact the researchers via the phone numbers or email addresses listed above.

What does the research involve?

Using Afghanistan (2001 – 2017) as a case study, the thesis asks: *in the age of mediatized war, why and how does the ADF manage the media; and how does this effect its own media operations for war?* Mediatized war means that today's digital media have an active performative involvement and constitutive role in the conduct of war. The media now not only report and represent war, but crucially, they now enact and perform war. The media's now pervasive nature means it is inherent to war. Some argue that not only does media now shape war, but militaries now design war for media. If amenable, Mr. Childs proposes to visit and conduct an up to 90-minute interview with you at a time and place of your choosing in the 2018 period.
The interview will be recorded on audio only.

Why were you chosen for this research?

Your contact details were obtained via your institution's web site.
You have been approached to participate because you are a member of the ADF who was directly involved with or performed in a role related to the ADF's media operations for Afghanistan. The research seeks to bring your vital perspective to the findings.

Consenting to participate in the project and withdrawing from the research

If you confirm to Mr. Childs your willingness to voluntarily participate, he will then provide you with a consent form to compete, sign and return to him. You have the right to withdraw from participation at any stage. Importantly, if your wish to withdraw is due to being identified within the research, Mr Childs can simply make you 'anonymous', or use an agreed pseudonym – hence providing you with your desired protection.

Possible benefits and risks to participants

The aim of this research is to increase our understanding of military media operations in military operations for war and produce research of benefit to the Australian Defence Force and the Australian people.
Based on the risk assessment, other than your time, there should be no inconvenience or discomfort to you.

Confidentiality and storage of data

Through this research, Mr. Childs will be the sole holder of your raw personal information. Only Mr. Childs will have access to and make use of this data. He will maintain its security in a complex password protected database. He will not share your raw data with others. Once Mr. Childs' research is published in the form of a thesis, it will be available through the Monash university library. Mr. Childs may use his research as a basis for future research e.g. journal articles and conference proceedings.

Results

We expect the research to be published in mid-2020 in the form of a thesis. At that time Mr. Childs will proactively provide you with a free copy of the published thesis.

Complaints

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the Executive Officer, Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC) and the Executive Officer, Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee (DDVA HREC):

Executive Officer
Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC)
Room 111, Chancellery Building D,
26 Sports Walk, Clayton Campus
Research Office
Monash University VIC 3800
Tel: +61 3 9905 2052   Email: muhrec@monash.edu   Fax: +61 3 9905 3831
Executive Officer
DDVA HREC
Tel: (02) 6266 3807   Email: ddva.hrec@defence.gov.au

| DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENCE AND VETERANS' AFFAIRS HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE |
| GUIDELINES FOR VOLUNTEERS |

Thank you for taking part in this research. Your involvement is appreciated. This pamphlet explains your rights as a participant.

What is the Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee?

• The Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee (DDVA HREC) was established on 1 July 2017 and is responsible for ensuring that Defence and the Department of Veterans Affairs comply with accepted guidelines for research involving human beings. Prior to this date, both the Department of Defence and the Department of Veterans' Affairs had their own individual human research ethics committees.

• After World War II (WWII), there was concern around the world about human experimentation. The Declaration of Helsinki was made in 1964, which provided the basic principles to be followed wherever humans were used in research projects.

• The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) in Australia has published the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research*. These guidelines describe how human research should be carried out.

• The DDVA HREC follows both the *Declaration of Helsinki* and other relevant human research guidelines.

What Departments of Defence and Veterans' Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee approval means.

• If you are told that the project has DDVA HREC approval, it means that DDVA HREC has reviewed the research proposal and has agreed that the research is ethical.

• DDVA HREC approval does not guarantee access to funding, information or assistance from Defence or the Department of Veterans' Affairs.

• DDVA HREC approval does not imply any obligation on commanders to order or encourage their Service personnel to participate, or to release personnel from their usual workplace to participate. Within Defence, the use of any particular personnel must have clearance from their commanders but commanders should not use DDVA HREC approval to pressure personnel into volunteering.

Voluntary participation

• As you are a volunteer for this research project, you are under no obligation to participate or continue to participate. You may withdraw from the project at any time.

• At no time must you feel pressured to participate or to continue if you do not wish to do so.

- If you do not wish to continue, it would be useful to the researcher to know why, but you are under no obligation to give reasons for not wanting to continue.

Consent

- Before commencing the project you will have been given an information sheet which explains the project, your role in it and any risks to which you may be exposed.

- You must be sure that you understand the information given to you and that you ask the researchers about anything of which you are not sure.

- Before you participate in the project you should also have been given a consent form to sign. You must be happy that the consent form is easy to understand and spells out what you are agreeing to. Again, you should keep a copy of the signed consent form.

Clinical trials

- Defence requires that the researcher provide a nominal roll of study participants where the study is a clinical trial (e.g. when the researchers are trialling a new treatment or device). For trials conducted by large Defence institutions like the Defence Science and Technology Group, the Submarine and Underwater Medicine Unit, the Army Malaria Institute, or the Institute of Aviation Medicine, this roll is kept by them on Defence's behalf. These records will not be used to consider your medical employment standard or for compensation purposes.

- All DDVA HREC protocol files are securely stored in an electronic filing system which has restricted access. Your contact information will not be passed onto a third party without your permission.

Complaints

- If at any time during your participation in the project you are worried about how the project is being run or how you are being treated, then you should speak to the researchers.

- If you don't feel comfortable doing this, you can contact the Executive Officer of DDVA HREC. Contact details are:
Executive Officer
DDVA HREC
CP3-6-037 PO Box 7912 CANBERRA BC ACT 2610 AUSTRALIA
Tel: (02) 6266 3807
E-mail: ddva.hrec@defence.gov.au

More information
If you would like to read more about the DDVA HREC, please visit the DDVA HREC website at:
http://www.defence.gov.au/Health/HREC/

Appendix 3: Media releases

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
1	22 Jan 2002	Ops update: Press Conference	22 Jan 2002	ADF	Transcript: Australia's contribution to the coalition against terrorism	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/201211 19-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/Department alTpl8268.html?CurrentId=1215	No coverage found
2	16 Feb 2002	ADF death in Afghanistan: Andrew Russell KIA	17 Feb 2002	ADF	Media briefing – Australian fatality in coalition against terrorism	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/201211 19-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/Department alTpl62e2.html?CurrentId=1264	https://www.theage.com.au/natio nal/why-sas-widows-quarrel-is-a-matter-of-honour-20030224-gdv9zf.html
3	10 Aug 2007	Battle: Mosaic intelligence	11 Aug 2007	ADF	Taliban attack successfully repelled by Australian reconstruction task force	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/201211191 04647/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/2 0121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/Department alTpl9813.html	https://www.theage.com.au/natio nal/do-mention-the-war-20070819-ge5mb5.html?page=fullpage#con tentSwap2
4	10 Aug 2007	Battle: Mosaic intelligence	16 Aug 2007	ADF	Construction complete, Taliban repelled	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/201211 19-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/Department alTpl1821.html	No coverage found

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
5	8 Jul 2008	ADF death in Afghanistan: Sean McCarthy KIA	9 Jul 2008	ADF	Transcript: Media conference by the CDF regarding the death of an Australian soldier in Afghanistan	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/SpeechTplfa31.html?CurrentId=7946	https://www.smh.com.au/national/australian-soldier-killed-in-afghanistan-blast-20080709-3c5d.html
6	8 Jul 2008	ADF death in Afghanistan: Sean McCarthy KIA	9 Oct 2008	ADF	Release of the Inquiry Officer's report into the death of Signaller Sean McCarthy	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20121119104626/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/AlertTpl680f.html	https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/delay-not-a-factor-in-diggers-death/news-story/61e2a59c6faa1b6d1bacf300655bec59
7	2 Sep 2008	ADF woundings in Afghanistan: Mark Donaldson VC	3 Sep 2008	ADF	Special operations task group soldiers wounded in Afghanistan	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20121119104701/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTplfc38.html	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-09-03/nine-diggers-wounded-in-afghan-firefight/498238
8	12 Feb 2009	Civilian casualties: 1 Commando Regiment, 5 x children killed	13 Feb 2009	ADF	Incident in Afghanistan	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20121119104659/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpledfd.html	https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/story/interview-angus-houston

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
9	12 Feb 2009	Civilian casualties: 1 Commando Regiment, 5 x children killed	23 Jun 2011	ADF	12 February 2009 Civilian Casualty Incident in Afghanistan	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/12-february-2009-civilian-casualty-incident-afghanistan	https://www.smh.com.au/national/troops-cleared-of-afghan-killings-20110622-1gfig.html
10	27 & 28 Apr 2009	Civilian casualties: Mosaic intelligence	18 Dec 2009	ADF	Inquiry Officer report into April 27-28 incident completed	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl2f0c.html?CurrentId=9854	https://www.smh.com.au/world/the-law-of-instant-death-20100220-oms9.html
11	7 Jun 2010	ADF death in Afghanistan: Jacob Moerland & Darren Smith KIA	8 Jun 2010	ADF	Two Australian soldiers killed in Afghanistan	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20121119104635/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl1d7a.html	http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2921802.htm
12	11 Jun 2010	Battle & wounding: Tizak, Kandahar (Shah Wali Kot)	16 Jun 2010	ADF	Combined Afghan and Australian force targets major insurgent cell	http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl9ea2.html?CurrentId=10438	https://www.sasresourcesfund.org.au/static/uploads/files/citation-broberts-smith-wfxelehacrmc.pdf
13	11 Jun 2010	VC Winner: Tizak, Kandahar (Shah Wali Kot)	23 Jan 2011	ADF	The Chief of the Defence Force congratulates Corporal Benjamin Roberts-Smith, VC, MG	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/chief-defence-force-congratulates-corporal-benjamin-roberts-smith-vc-mg	https://www.upi.com/Australian-soldier-receives-Victoria-Cross/44171295828437/

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
14	2 Aug 2010	Detainees: Take over from Dutch / Hide from media	11 Oct 2011	Minister for Defence	Afghanistan detainee management	https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Detainee%20Management%20afghanistan%20Dataset%3Apressrel;resCount=Default	No coverage found
15	24 Aug 2010	ADF death in Afghanistan: Jared MacKinney KIA (Derapet)	25 Aug 2010	ADF	Australian mentor killed in action in insurgent fire-fight	https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20121119104646/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/137356/20121119-0920/www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl86d5.html	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-25/army-defends-diggers-angry-email-after-mate-killed/2273836
16	24 Aug 2010	ADF death in Afghanistan: Jared MacKinney KIA (Derapet)	2 Feb 2012	ADF	Inquiry Officer report released into the death of Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/inquiry-officer-report-released-death-lance-corporal-jared-mackinney	No coverage found
17	24 Aug 2010	VC Winner: Derapet	1 Nov 2012	ADF	Australian soldier honoured with Victoria Cross	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australian-soldier-honoured-victoria-cross	https://www.smh.com.au/national/victoria-cross-confirms-battles-place-in-history-books-20121101-28m29.html
18	21 Aug 2011	ADF death in Afghanistan: Matthew Lambert KIA	21 Aug 2011	ADF	Australian soldier killed in action in Afghanistan	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australian-soldier-killed-action-afghanistan	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-23/defence-named-soldier-killed-in-afghanistan/2851984

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
19	2 Jul 2012	ADF death in Afghanistan: Blaine Diddams KIA	3 Jul 2012	ADF	Australian soldier killed in action in Afghanistan	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australian-soldier-killed-chorah-valley	https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/sas-veteran-blaine-diddams-dies-on-seventh-tour-of-hell/news-story/067f52b6028253955e39020e147b1a3c?sv=7a3911ae9d10e34623714d5552bf1b3c
20	29 Aug 2012	ADF death in Afghanistan: James Martin, Stjepan Milosevic and Robert Poate KIA	30 Aug 2012	ADF	Three Australian soldiers killed, two wounded in insider attack	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/three-australian-soldiers-killed-two-wounded-insider-attack	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-30/five-aussie-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/4233558
21	30 Aug 2012	ADF death in Afghanistan: Nathanael Galagher & Mervyn McDonald KIA	30 Aug 2012	ADF	Two Australian Commandos killed in Helmand helicopter crash	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/two-australian-commandos-killed-helmand-helicopter-crash	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-30/five-aussie-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/4233558
22	21 Oct 2012	ADF death in Afghanistan: Scott Smith KIA	22 Oct 2012	ADF	Australian Special Operations Soldier Killed in Action	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australian-special-operations-soldier-killed-action	https://www.news.com.au/national/aussie-soldier-killed-in-afghanistan/news-story/6d4f122a5bca83cf1e557c204f9d23a1
23	14 Aug 2013	Ops update: security transition to Afghan authorities	14 Aug 2013	ADF	Long-term commitment to Afghanistan continues	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/long-term-commitment-afghanistan-continues	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-16/australian-soldiers-pull-out-of-uruzgan-province/5159220

	Event date	Event type and description	Release date	Author	Release title	Release URL	Example media coverage URL
24	1 Oct 2013	ADF death in Afghanistan: Hekmatullah and deaths of James Martin, Stjepan Milosevic and Robert Poate	2 Oct 2013	ADF	Former ANA member accused of murdering three Australian soldiers apprehended	https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/former-ana-member-accused-murdering-three-australian-soldiers-apprehended	https://www.news.com.au/world/how-superspies-tracked-down-rogue-afghan-sergeant-hekmatullah/news-story/05a6b28a515bfd0925b211fc63ff88e9

Appendix 4: Research categories and themes

Centralising category	Why does the ADF manage the media?	How does the ADF manage the media?	How does this effect its own use of media operations for war?
Themes	ADF media strategy for war	ADF 'closed-loop' military media management	
	ADF - PACC - MECC tension	ADF culture - view of media	Command and Control (C2)
	ADF Audience	ADF MPA Planning	Dynamics of mediatized conflict
	ADF MPA (crisis management)	ADF Organisational knowledge	Information Operations (IO) v Public Affairs
	Change	Change	Media
	Coalition	Doctrine	OODA loop
	Government	Instructions	Trust (internal and external)
	Information	Journalists	Doctrine
	Media (The)	Media (mediums)	
	The Media's role in war	Personalities	
	Risk (ADF crisis management)	Policy	
	- to OPSEC	Trust (internal and external)	
	- to media actors		
	- to reputation	Events raised by participants	
	- to ability to control	- ADF deaths in Afghanistan	
	- to MINDEF/Govt	- Civilian casualties	
	- to ADF pers	- Detainees	
	- to career		
	- to Coalition		

Appendix 5: Research code book

Folder: Node/Theme name	Description
ADF - PACC - MECC tension	
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\1999–2000 Buchan review	
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\1999 and pre	
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\2002–2003 MPA redesign	This relates to the subsequent ADF Military Public Affairs (MPA) capability on the back of the Buchan review and the PACC Division's report (from Bornholt's day) i.e. the Buchan review didn't look at the MPA capability (see Potted History draft chapter)
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\2002–2003 MPA redesign\Military Face	
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\2010–2011 name change and new role	
ADF - PACC - MECC tension\2016–DCM	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management	For my research there is a difference between media relations and media management. Media relations refers to the way the ADF and media outlets regard and behave towards each other. Media management refers to the processes the ADF uses to deal with and control media coverage and messages. Those processes encompass policies, the degree of access to an area of warlike operations, and control and censorship of information. Here the notions of media relations and media management are interrelated: a closed loop
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Communicated messages	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Consequences	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Disconnect	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Events	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Practices	

ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Processes	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Processes\Access	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Processes\Censorship	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Processes\Control	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Processes\Policies	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Relations (with the media)	
ADF 'closed-loop' military media management\Structure	
ADF Audience	
ADF culture - view of media	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)	Analytical focus – focusing from conceptual framework
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Character	The basic or inherent features of the ADF's media strategy for Afghanistan
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Character\Clearance process	The process of clearing information through the Chain of Command prior to public release of that information
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Character\Clearance process\OPSEC	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Character\Clearance process\Privacy	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Character\Clearance process\Risk	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Consequences	The results or effects of the ADF's media strategy for Afghanistan
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Existence of	Was there a media strategy for AFG?
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Existence of\No	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Existence of\Yes	
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Function	The purpose of the ADF's media strategy for Afghanistan
ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\OODA loop	

ADF media strategy for war (AFG)\Structure   The way the ADF's media strategy for Afghanistan was organised

ADF MPA

ADF MPA\Advisors

ADF MPA\Brand management

ADF MPA\Co-ordinators

ADF MPA\Crisis management

ADF MPA\In Support of Ops

ADF MPA\In Support of Ops\Media access

ADF MPA\In Support of Ops\Propaganda

ADF MPA\In Support of Ops\Reputation management

ADF MPA\Ministerial - government confidence

ADF MPA\Public Support

ADF MPA\Publicity

ADF MPA\Reputation management

ADF MPA Planning

ADF Organisational knowledge

ADF Roles

ADF Roles\CDF

ADF Roles\CJOPS

ADF Roles\CJTF633

ADF Roles\Director General

ADF Roles\Director General\Duty Statement - responsibilities

ADF Roles\Director General\Experience

ADF Roles\HMSC

ADF Roles\HQJOC J09

ADF Roles\Military Advisor to Public Affairs &
Communication

ADF Roles\PAO

ADF Roles\PAO\Duty statement – responsibilities

ADF Roles\PAO\Experience

ADF Roles\PAO Director Ops

Anecdote

Change

Change\Crane Review

Change\Park White Paper

Coalition

Corp Comms

D'Hage

D-Notice

Doctrine

Dynamics of mediatized conflict	Conceptual framework: Each of the three dynamics serve to (1) generate conflict, (2) transform conflict, (3) reduce or resolve conflict, or, (4) intensify or prolong conflict (Eskjær et al. 2015, p. 11)
Dynamics of mediatized conflict\Amplification	Media as 'conduits' amplify conflict across the temporal-spatial domain by increasing the speed and reach of a conflict's mediated content. That in turn influences the level of involvement in the conflict
Dynamics of mediatized conflict\Co-structuring	Media as 'environment' relates to media's co-structuring of power relations within a conflict, which are determined by the conditions which influence the access to and control of media resources
Dynamics of mediatized conflict\Framing and performative agency	Media as 'languages' serve to frame conflict, thus affording social actors the ability to perform in certain ways, which creates a conflict dramaturgy

Government

Government\Tampa - Children Overboard

Information

Instructions

IO v PA

Journalists

Journalists\Confusion

Journalists\Criticism of reporting - media – journos

Journalists\Discussion with ADF

Journalists\Editorial resistance
Journalists\Embed opportunities
Journalists\Newsworthy
Journalists\Sources
Journalists\View on ADF
Main Research Question
Media
Media\Digital media   Webpages, galleries etc
Media\Social media   Twitter, Facebook, Instagram etc
Media\Social media\Prompted reference to
Media\Social media\Unprompted reference to
Media\Traditional media   print, radio, tv
Media role in war
Memorable quotes
News
Personalities
Personalities\Command
Personalities\Journos
Personalities\Middle ranks
Personalities\MINDEF
Personalities\PAOs
Phases   Phases of the ADF mission in AFG broken up in years
Phases\Phase 1a (Web 2.0) Oct 2001 - Dec 2002   The first ADF Special Forces deployment. Includes (1) CDF (Jul 1998 – Jul 2002): Admiral Chris Barrie, AC (retired) (2) DGPA (2001 – 2005): Brigadier Mike Hannan (retired) (2001 - 2005) (3) CJTF633: Brigadier Gary Bornholt, 3.2002 – 11.2002 (4) PAO Tony Park
Phases\Phase 1b (Web 2.0) Sep 2005 – Sep 2006   The second ADF Special Forces deployment
Phases\Phase 2 (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) Aug 2006 -   ADF Reconstruction Task Force
Oct 2008

Phases\Phase 3 (ADF 'media embed' trial) Apr 2007 – Feb 2010	ADF Special Forces redeploy and ADF Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force
Phases\Phase 4 (ADF 'media embed' program) Feb 2010 – Dec 2013	Mentoring Task Force and Advisory Task Force.
Phases\Phase 5 (Combat Ops finished) Jan 2014 – Dec 2017	Much reduced ADF commitment to AFG

Policy

Risk

Risk\OPSEC

Risk\To ability to Control

Risk\To ADF Personnel

Risk\To ADF reputation

Risk\To career

Risk\To Coalition

Risk\To media actors

Risk\To MINDEF-Govt

Role of women

Strategic Communication

Strategic Communication\ADF

Strategic Communication\Defence

Trust (internal and external)

Trust (internal and external) \ADF of media

Trust (internal and external) \Command of MPA

Trust (internal and external) \Command of PAOs

Trust (internal and external) \Command of the 'traditional' media

Trust (internal and external) \Government's trust of ADF

Trust (internal and external) \Media of ADF

Trust (internal and external) \Media of Government

Trust (internal and external) \Politicians of Command

Trust (internal and external) \SF of MPA

Appendix 6: C2 arrangements for the ADF's operations in Afghanistan

Phase	Dates	ADF force elements	Location	C2 'Lead' nation 'on the ground' at the operational/tactical level * ISAF Regional Command – South + NATO Train Advise Assist Command – South
1 (Web 2.0)	Oct 2001–Nov 2002	The first ADF Special Forces deployment	Kandahar	The United States of America
2 (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram)	Sep 2005–Sep 2006	The second ADF Special Forces deployment	Uruzgan	The United States of America * Canada (from Mar 2006) * The Netherlands (from Nov 2006) * Britain (from May 2007) * Canada (from Feb 2008)
	Aug 2006–Oct 2008	ADF Reconstruction Task Force		
	May 2007	The third ADF Special Forces deployment (until Dec 2013)		
3	Sep 2008–Feb 2010	ADF Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force	Uruzgan	* Canada (from Feb 2008) * Britain (from Nov 2009)
4 ADF media embed program	2009	ADF media embed trial	Uruzgan	* The United States of America (from Nov 2010)
	Feb 2010–Dec 2012	ADF Mentoring Task Force		
	Dec 2012–Dec 2013	ADF Advisory Task Force		

| 5 ADF media embed program | Jan 2014–ongoing[198] | ADF Task Group Afghanistan (much reduced ADF 'non-combat' commitment) | Kandahar / Kabul | + The United States of America |

References

ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission). 2019. *Digital Platforms Inquiry*.

ADDP. 2002. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication: The Australian Approach to Warfare*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

ADDP 00.1. 2009. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADDP 00.1 Command and Control.* First edition. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

ADDP 7.0. 2011. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADDP 7.0 Training.* Second edition. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

ADDP 3.13. 2013. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADDP 3.13 Information Activities.* Third edition. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

ADFP 3.13.1. 2017. *Australian Defence Force Publication ADFP 3.13.1 Information Operations Procedures.* Third edition. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

ADFP 3.13.2. 2020. *Australian Defence Force Publication ADFP 3.13.2 Military Public Affairs.* First edition. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

Agar, M. 2008. *The Professional Stranger: An Informal Introduction to Ethnography.* Second edition. Bingley: Emerald.

Alberts, D. S. & Hayes, R. E. 2003. *Power to the Edge. Command ... Control ...in the Information Age.* Washington, DC, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Alexander, J. C. 2008. Power and performance: The 'war on terror' between the sacred and the profane. *Culture & Society*, 5, 7–32.

Alger, J. 1985. *The United States Military History Series: Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art Past and Present,* Wayne, NJ: Avery.

Altheide, D. L. 2015. *Media Edge: Media Logic and Social Reality*, New York : Peter Lang.

Altheide, D. L. & Johnson, J. M. 1994. Criteria for assessing interpretive validity in qualitative research. In: N. K. Denzin, & Y. S. Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Altheide, D. L. & Snow, R. P. 1979. *Media Logic.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Altheide, D. L. & Snow, R. P. 1991. *Media Worlds in the Postjournalism Era.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Altman, D. 2012. *Why Human Security Matters: Rethinking Australian Foreign Policy.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Ambrosio, T. 2016. The rhetoric of irredentism: The Russian Federation's perception management campaign and the annexation of Crimea. *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 27, 467–90.

Ames, K. 2014. 'Citizen journalism', the military and the media. *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 193, 20–25.

Anderson, F. & Trembath, R. 2011. *Witnesses to War: The History of Australian Conflict Reporting.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Aristotle 1886. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle.* London: Macmillan.

Arnoldi, J. 2007. Informational Ideas. *Thesis Eleven,* 89, 58–73.

Asp, K. 1986. *Powerful Mass Media: Studies in Political Opinion Formation.* Stockholm: Akademmilitteratur.

Austin, G. 2019. *Discussion Paper 6: Civil Defence Gaps Under Cyber Blitzkrieg.* Canberra: UNSW Canberra Cyber.

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 1951, *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS].* Australian Treaty Series 1952 No 2. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Senate Estimates. 2016. *19/10/2016 Estimates: Defence Portfolio. Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Legislation Committee.* Canberra: Parliament of Australia.

Badsey, S. 2008. The military and the media: Past and future. In P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds), *The Military and the Media: The 2008 Chief of Army Military History Conference.* Canberra: Australian History Military Publications.

Badsey, S. 2010. Media war and media management. In G. Kassimeris & J. Buckle (eds), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare.* Farnham: Ashgate.

Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. 2012. *How Many Qualitative Interviews is Enough?* National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper. London: ESRC.

Ball, D. 1979. Australian defence decision-making: Actors and process. *Politics,* 14, 183–97.

Barker, G. 2010. The Army's email controversy: The subtext. *Inside Story*, 29 September, http://insidestory.org.au/the-armys-email-controversy-the-subtext (Accessed 9 February 2018).

Baudrillard, J. & Poster, M. 2001. Simulacra and simulations. In *Selected Writings.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bean, C. & Fewster, K. 2007. *Bean's Gallipoli: The Diaries of Australia's Official War Correspondent.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Beaulac, S. 2004. The Westphalian model in defining international law: Challenging the myth. *Australian Journal of Legal History,* 8, 181–213.

Beck, U. 1994. *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Betz, D. 2015. Searching for El Dorado: The legendary golden narrative of the Afghanistan War. In: G. Dimitriu & J. Ringsmose (eds), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War.* New York: Routledge.

Black, K. 2012. *Business Statistics for Contemporary Decision Making,* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Blair, D. 2015. Any time, every place: The networked societies of war fighters in a battlespace of flows. *Air & Space Power Journal,* 29, 15–23.

Blumer, H. 1954. What is wrong with social theory? *American Sociological Review*, 19, 3–10.

Bondebjerg, I. & Golding, P. 2004. *European Culture and the Media.* Bristol: Intellect.

Boss, Colonel 2011. *Inquiry Officer's Report into the Death of Lance Corporal Jared William MacKinney.* Canberra: Australian Defence Force.

Boudon, R. 1991. What middle-range theories are. *Contemporary Sociology,* 20, 519–22.

Bourke, V. 2014. Re-remembering the bombing of Darwin. *The Oral History Association of Australia Journal*, 36, 51–60.

Bowen, G. A. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9, 27–40.

Boyd, J. 1976. *Destruction and Creation.* Fort Leavenworth, KA: US Army Command and General Staff College.

Brangwin, N. & Rann, A. 2010. *Australia's Military Involvement in Afghanistan Since 2001: A Chronology*. Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services.

Brennan, B. 2002. Limited vs. total war. *Armor*, 111, http://www.ysmithcpallen.com/sites/default/files/sites/all/documents/Limited%20Vs%20Total%20War.pdf (Accessed 9 May 2018).

Brennan, N. 1994. *Damien Parer: Cameraman.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Bruccoli, M. J., Clark, C. E. F. Jnr & Layman, R. 1998. *Dictionary of Literary Biography Documentary Series. Volume 18, British Poets of the Great War: Sasson, Graves, Owen*, Detroit, MI: Gale Research.

Buchanan, J. 2015. Federal Circuit Court of Australia Decision: *Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No. 3)* [2015] FCA 1370. Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Butler, J. 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,* New York: Routledge.

Caforio, G. & Nuciari, M. 2003. Social research and the military. In: G. C. A. M. Nuciari (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cain, F. 1993. *The Wobblies at War: A history of the IWW and the Great War in Australia.* Melbourne: Spectrum.

Campbell, E. M. 1973. *Freedom in Australia.* Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Castells, M. 2000. *The Rise of the Network Society.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Chandler, D. & Munday, R. 2011. *A Dictionary of Media and Communications*. London: Oxford University Press.

Childs, P. & Fowler, R. 2006. *The Routledge Dictionary of Literary Terms.* London: Routledge.

Clausewitz, C. V. & Graham, J. J. 1909. *On War,* Champaign, IL: Project Gutenberg.

Clausewitz, C. V. & Maude, F. N. 1908. *On War.* New York: Barnes & Noble.

Coatney, C. 2016. *John Curtin: How He Won Over the Media*. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Coker, C. 2010. *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Connor, J. 2002. *The Australian frontier wars, 1788-1838*, Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press.

Cookes, T. 2016. Afghanistan: The war They Hid for Too Long. *The Age*, 25 February.

Coombs, H. G. 2013. Afghanistan 2010–2011: Counterinsurgency through whole of government. *Canadian Military Journal,* 13, 16–24.

Corman, S. R., Schiefelbein, J., Acheson, K., Goodall, B., McDonald, K. & Trethewey, A. 2006. *Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of Ideas*. New York: Citeseer.

Cottle, S. 2005. Mediatized public crisis and civil society renewal: The racist murder of Stephen Lawrence. *Crime, Media, Culture*, 1, 49–71.

Cottle, S. 2006. Mediatized rituals: beyond manufacturing consent. *Media, Culture & Society,* 28, 411–32.

Cottle, S. 2007. *Mediatized Conflict.* London: McGraw-Hill.

Couldry, N. 2008. Mediatization or mediation? Alternative understanding of the emergent space of digital storytelling. *New Media & Society,* 10, 371–91.

Couldry, N. 2012. *Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice,* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Couldry, N. & Hepp, A. 2013. Conceptualizing mediatization: Contexts, traditions, arguments. *Communication Theory,* 23, 191–202.

Crane, M. 2016. *Brief for Vice Chief of the Defence Force: Joint Military Public Affairs*. Canberra: Australian Defence Force.

Crawford, R. & Macnamara, J. 2014. An agent of change: Public relations in early-twentieth century Australia. In: B. St John III, M. O. Lamme & J. L'Etang (eds), *Pathways to Public Relations: Histories of Practice and Profession.* London: Routledge.

Creswell, J. W. 2003. A framework for design. In J. W. Creswell & J. D. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches.* Second edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Creswell, J. W. & Miller, D. L. 2000. Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into Practice,* 39, 124–30.

D'Hage, A. 1991. The Australian experience. *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 2, 268–75.

Darian-Smith, K. 1990. *On the Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime, 1939–1945.* Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Davis, M. 2019. Forward defence in depth for Australia. *Strategic Insights*, 139, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

De Graaf, B., Dimitriu, G. & Ringsmose, J. 2015. Introduction: Shaping societies for war: strategic narratives and public opinion. In G. Dimitriu & J. Ringsmose (eds), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War.* New York: Routledge.

De Hoop Sceffer, J. 2015. *Preface: Framing the War in Afghanistan – an Introductory Note.* New York: Routledge.

Deacon, D. & Stanyer, J. 2014. Mediatization: Key concept or conceptual bandwagon? *Media, Culture & Society*, 36, 1032–44.

Deacon, D. & Stanyer, J. 2015. 'Mediatization and' or 'mediatization of'? A response to Hepp et al. *Media, Culture & Society,* 37, 655–7.

Dennis, P. 2008. *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History.* Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Dennis, P. & Grey, J. 1996. *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975,* Sydney: Allen and Unwin and Australian War Memorial.

Der Derian, J. 2001. *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Deuze, M. 2011. Media life. *Media, Culture & Society,* 33, 137–48.

Dewey, J. 1929. Existence as precarious and as stable. *Experience and Nature.* New York: WW Norton.

DI(G) ADMIN 08-2. 2013. *Defence Instruction (General) (DI(G)) ADMIN 08-2: Use of Social Media by Defence Personnel.* Canberra: ADF.

Dinucci, D. 1999. Fragmented future. *Design & New Media,* 53, 32 and 221–2.

Dobell, G. 2014a. The alliance echoes and portents of Australia's longest war. *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 68, 386–96.

Dobell, G. 2014b. Great Australian foreign policy speeches: Howard on 9/11 and the US alliance. *The Interpreter*, 15 August, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/great-australian-foreign-policy-speeches-howard-911-and-us-alliance (Accessed 23 November 2017).

Dobell, G. 2016. Oz media and the wrong lessons of Afghanistan. *The Strategist*, 9 May, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/oz-media-and-the-wrong-lessons-of-afghanistan (Accessed 11 November 2017).

Doughty, R. 1996. *Warfare in the Western World: Volume II,* Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Dupree, L. 1973. *Afghanistan,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dupree, N. H. 2002. Cultural heritage and national identity in Afghanistan. *Third World Quarterly,* 23, 977–89.

Ekström, M., Fornäs, J., Jansson, A. & Jerslev, A. 2016. Three tasks for mediatization research: Contributions to an open agenda. *Media, Culture & Society,* 38, 1090–1108.

Elliott, A. & Lemert, C. 2006. The emotional climates of globalisation: The new individualism and its contradictions. *Arena Magazine*, 14 November, 45–48. [This is an edited extract from Elliott, A. & Lemert, C. *The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization* (2006).

Ellis, C., Adams, T. E. & Bochner, A. P. 2011. Autoethnography: An overview. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung,* 36, 273–90.

Ellul, J. 1965. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes.* New York: Knopf.

Eskjær, M. F., Hjarvard, S. & Mortensen, M. 2015. *The Dynamics of Mediatized Conflicts.* New York: Peter Lang.

Etikan, I. & Bala, K. 2017. Sampling and sampling methods. *Biometrics & Biostatistics International Journal,* 5, 215–17.

Evans, M. 2005. *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901–2004,* Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon.

Farrar, M. J. 1998. *News from the Front: War Correspondents on the Western Front, 1914–18.* Stroud: Sutton.

Fewster, K. 1980. Expression and Suppression Aspects of Military Censorship in Australia During the Great War. PhD thesis, University of NSW.

Fitch, K. 2016. Rethinking Australian public relations history in the mid-20th century. *Media International Australia,* 160, 9–19.

Foster, K. D. 1999. *Fighting Fictions: War, Narrative, and National Identity.* London: Pluto Press.

Foster, K. D. 2009. *What are We Doing in Afghanistan? The Military and the Media at War,* Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Foster, K. D. 2010. Embedding control: Australian military's influence on the media. *Overland,* 198, 70–8.

Foster, K. D. 2011. *The Information Battlefield: Representing Australians at War*. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Foster, K. D. 2012. Shadows of Vietnam: Reforming military–media relations in the USA and Australia. *Journal of Australian Studies,* 36, 459–72.

Foster, K. D. 2013. *Don't Mention the War: The Australian Defence Force, the Media and the Afghan Conflict,* Melbourne: Investigating Power.

Foster, K. D. 2017. False memories and professional culture: The Australian Defence Force, the government and the media at war in Afghanistan. In J. Gildersleeve & R. Gehrmann (eds), *Memory and the Wars on Terror: Australian and British Perspectives.* Cham: Springer.

Foster, K. D. & Pallant, J. 2013. Familiarity breeds contempt? What the Australian Defence Force thinks of its coverage in the Australian media, and why. *Media International Australia,* 148, 22–38.

Foster, K. D. & Pallant, J. 2016. More connected, less attached: Factors shaping junior ranks' perceptions of the Australian media's coverage of the Australian Defence Force. *Media International Australia,* 159, 94–107.

Frame, T. R. & Palazzo, A. 2016. *'On Ops': Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army Since East Timor.* Sydney: UNSW Press.

Freedman, L. 2006. Strategic communications. *The Adelphi Papers,* 45, 73–93.

Freedman, L. 2014. Ukraine and the art of crisis management. *Survival,* 56, 7–42.

Freedman, L. 2015. The possibilities and limits of strategic narratives. In B. De Graaf, G. Dimitriu & E. J. Ringsmos (eds), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War.* London: Routledge.

Galletta, A. P. M. 2013. *Mastering the Semi-structured Interview and Beyond from Research Design to Analysis and Publication,* New York: New York University Press.

Galloway, C. 2005. Hot bullets, cool media: The Middle East's high stakes media war. *Journal of Communication Management,* 9, 233–45.

Gardner, N. 2008. *The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world* by Rupert Smith. *Strategic Studies Quarterly,* 2, 143–44.

Garran, R. 2004. *True Believer: John Howard, George Bush and the American Alliance.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Gleeson, D. 2012. George William Sydney Fitzpatrick (1884–1948): An Australian public relations pioneer. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal,* 13, 2–12.

Goffman, E. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,* New York: Doubleday.

Goffman, E. 1969. *Strategic Interaction,* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Goffman, E. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.* New York: Harper & Row.

Goode, L. 2009. Social news, citizen journalism and democracy. *New Media & Society,* 11, 1287–1305.

Goot, M. & Tiffen, R. 1992. *Australia's Gulf War.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Gopal, A. 2017. Rents, Patronage, and Defection: State-building and Insurgency in
Afghanistan. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing,
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D81G0RWX (Accessed 21 June
2020).

Gorman, L. 2008. The Cold War: An Australian perspective, in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds),
The Military and the Media: The 2008 Chief of Army Military History Conference.
Canberra: Australian History Military Publications.

Gray, C. S. 1999. *Modern Strategy,* New York: Oxford University Press.

Gray, J. & Lotz, A. D. 2013. A robust and dynamic field. *Media, Culture & Society,* 35,
1019–22.

Grey, J. 2008. *A military history of Australia.* 3rd ed. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University
Press.

Greene, A. 2016. Taliban fighters target former Australian base of Tarin Kot in Afghanistan.
ABC News, 8 September.

Guha, M. 2010. *Reimagining War in the 21st Century from Clausewitz to Network-centric
Warfare.* London: Routledge.

Gunaratna, R. 2005. Al Qaeda's Ideology. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,* 1, 59–67.

Guthrie, C. 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare.* New York:
Walker & Co.

Habermas, J. 1989. *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hallin, D. C. 1989. *The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam.* Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.

Han, S. 2010. Theorizing new media: Reflexivity, knowledge, and the Web 2.0*.
Sociological Inquiry, 80, 200–13.

Handel, M. 1991. *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and on War Compared,* Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College.

Harrington, S. 2014. *Australian TV News.* Bristol: Intellect.

Harris, R. & Galloway, A. 2019. ADF's epic Twitter fail. *Herald Sun* (Melbourne), 15 February.

Hastings, M. 1985. *The Oxford Book of Military Anecdotes.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hatch, J. A. 2002. *Doing Qualitative Research in Education Settings,* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Heng, Y. 2002. Unravelling the 'war' on terrorism: A risk-management exercise in war clothing? *Security Dialogue,* 33, 227–42.

Henrotin, J. 2016. *The Art of War in the Network Age: Back to the Future.* New York: Wiley.

Hepp, A. 2009. Differentiation: Mediatization and cultural change. In K. Lundby (ed.), *Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences.* New York: Peter Lang.

Hepp, A. 2013a. The communicative figurations of mediatized worlds: Mediatization research in times of the 'mediation of everything'. *European Journal of Communication,* 28, 615–29.

Hepp, A. 2013b. *Cultures of Mediatization.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hepp, A. & Hasebrink, U. 2014. Human interaction and communicative figurations: The transformation of mediatized cultures and societies. In K. Lundby (ed.), *Mediatization of Communication: Handbooks of Communication Science.* Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Hepp, A., Hjarvard, S. & Lundby, K. 2015. Mediatization: Theorizing the interplay between media, culture and society. *Media, Culture & Society,* 37, 314–24.

Hepp, A. & Krotz, F. 2014. *Mediatized Worlds: Culture and Society in a Media Age.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Heuser, B. 2010. *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hibbert, Z. & Denyer-Simmons, P. 2005. War reporting and Australian defence public relations: An exchange. *Prism,* 4, 1–10.

Hibbert, Z. & Hannan, M. 2006. The chain of command model: A case study of one organisation's journey to re-value public affairs. Paper presented at Australia and New Zealand Communication Association International Conference, Adelaide.

Hickey, N. 2002. Access denied. *Columbia Journalism Review,* 40, 26.

Higate, P. & Cameron, A. 2006. Reflexivity and researching the military. *Armed Forces & Society,* 32, 219–33.

Hills, J. 2006. What's new? War, censorship and global transmission: From the telegraph to the internet. *International Communication Gazette,* 68, 195–216.

Hilvert, J. 1984. *Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda in World War Two.* Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Hjarvard, S. 2008. The mediatization of society: A theory of the media as agents of social and cultural change. *Nordicom Review,* 29, 105–34.

Hjarvard, S. 2013. *The Mediatization of Society and Culture*. London: Routledge.

Hjarvard, S. 2014. From mediation to mediatization: The institutionalization of new media. In A. Hepp & F. Krotz (eds), *Mediatized Worlds: Culture and Society in a Media Age.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hjarvard, S. 2016. Dynamics of conflicts in a mediatized world. Paper presented to Communication Between Domination and Emancipation Conference, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Hjarvard, S. & Lundby, K. 2018. Understanding media dynamics. In K. Lundby (ed.), *Contesting Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia*. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter.

Holmes, B. & Fernandes, S. 2012. *2010 Federal Election: A Brief History*. Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia.

Hope, K. W. & Waterman, H. A. 2003. Praiseworthy pragmatism? Validity and action research. *Journal of Advanced Nursing,* 44, 120–7.

Horner, D. 2007. The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations. In R. H. Huisken & M. C. Thatcher (eds), *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy.* Canberra: ANU ePress.

Horten, G. 2011. The mediatization of war: A comparison of the American and German media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. *American Journalism,* 28, 29–53.

Hoskins, A. & O'Loughlin, B. 2010. *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hoskins, A. & O'Loughlin, B. 2015. Arrested war: The third phase of mediatization. *Information, Communication & Society,* 18, 1320–38.

Howard, J. 2010. *Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography.* Sydney: HarperCollins.

Hubbard, D. W. 2009. *The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Humphreys, B. 2002. Restructuring communications at Australia's Defence Department. *Strategic Communication Management*, Feb/Mar, 24–9.

Hunter, A. 1993. Local knowledge and local power: Notes on the ethnography of local community elites. Special Issue: Fieldwork in Elite Settings. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 22, 36.

Hutchins, B. 2016. 'We don't need no stinking smartphones!' Live stadium sports events, mediatization, and the non-use of mobile media. *Media, Culture & Society,* 38, 420–36.

Hutchinson, G. 2005. *Eyewitness: Australians Write from the Front-line,* Melbourne: Black Inc.

Jennings, P. 2015. *Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence. Report on Community Consultations*. Canberra: Australian Department of Defence.

Jensen, K. B. 2013. Definitive and sensitizing conceptualisations of mediatization. *Communication Theory,* 23, 203–22.

Johanson, B. 2017. *Asymetric [sic] Advantage in the Information Age: An Australian Concept for Cyber-Enabled 'Special Information Warfare'.* Discussion Paper 5. Canberra: UNSW Canberra Cyber.

Joscelyn, T. & Roggio, B. 2017. Analysis: CIA releases massive trove of Osama bin Laden's files, Long War Journal, 1 November, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/11/analysis-cia-releases-massive-trove-of-osama-bin-ladens-files.php (Accessed 22 November 2017).

Joseph, T. 2014. Mediating war and peace: Mass media and international conflict. *India Quarterly,* 70, 225–40.

Kaempf, S. 2013. The mediatization of war in a transforming global media landscape. *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 67, 586–604.

Kalb, M. & Saivetz, C. 2007. The Israeli–Hezbollah War of 2006: The media as a weapon in asymmetrical conflict. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics,* 12, 43–66.

Kanihan, S. & Gale, K 2003. Within 3 hours, 97 percent learn about 9/11 attack. *Newspaper Research Journal,* 24, 78–91.

Kaplan, F. 2013. *The Insurgents,* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Katz, E. & Liebes, T. 2007. 'No more peace!' How disaster, terror and war have upstaged media events. *International Journal of Communication*, 1, 157–66.

Katzman, K. & Thomas, C. 2017. *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy.* Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.

Kaun, A. & Fast, K. 2013. *Mediatization of Culture and Everyday Life.* Stockholm: Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences.

Kean, T. H. & Hamilton, L. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

Kennedy, R. 2010. The elements of strategic thinking: A practical guide. In *Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response.* Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute.

King, A. 2010. Understanding the Helmand campaign: British military operations in Afghanistan. *International Affairs,* 86, 311–32.

King, J., Bean, C. E. W., Bowers, M. & Schuler, P. F. E. 2005. *Gallipoli: Untold Stories from War Correspondent Charles Bean and Front-line Anzacs: A 90th Anniversary Tribute.* Sydney:Transworld.

King, L. 2013. *The Media and the Military in Vietnam and Afghanistan.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kirk, P. 2015. Navy Information Warfare: Developing an Information Warfare Strategy for the Royal Australian Navy to Support Contemporary Maritime Operations. Master of Philosophy thesis, University of NSW.

Knightley, P. 2003. *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq.* London: André Deutsch.

Kramer, M. 2005. The United States, NATO and the role of alliances in international politics: Theoretical expectations and the empirical record. *Managerial Law,* 47, 164–71.

Krulak, C. 1999. The strategic corporal: Leadership in the three-block war. *Leatherneck,* 82, 14–17.

Kuhn, T. S. 2009. *Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Langewiesche, D., Chickering, R., Showalter, D. & Van De Ven, H. (eds). 2013. *The Cambridge History of War. Vol: 4. War and the Modern World.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lansford, T. 2012. *Afghanistan at War: From the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century/* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Lash, S. 2001. Technological forms of life. *Theory Culture and Society,* 18, 105–20.

Lash, S. 2003. Reflexivity as non-linearity. *Theory Culture and Society,* 20, 49–57.

Leahy, P. 2010. How do we know when we are at war? *Perspectives*, July, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120114/2010_07_Leahy,%20How%20do%20we%20know_web.pdf (Accessed 21 June 2020).

Lewis, J. A. 2018. *Cognitive Effect and State Conflict in Cyberspace.* Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Li, X., Lindsay, L.F. & Mogensen, K. 2002. Media in a crisis situation involving national interest: A content analysis of the TV networks coverage of the 9/11 incident during the first eight hours. Paper presented to Radio-Television Division at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC). Miami Beach, FL.

Liddell Hart, B. 1972. *Why Don't We Learn from History?* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Livingstone, S. 2009. *On the Mediation of Everything: ICA Presidential Address 2008.* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Lloyd, M. 2011. From linguistic performativity to social performance: The development of a concept. In G. Delanty & S. P. Turner (eds), *Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory.* London: Routledge.

Lockwood, D. 1992. *Australia's Pearl Harbor, Darwin 1942,* Ringwood: Penguin.

Lofland, J. 2006. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis.* Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Logue, J. 2013. *Herding Cats: The Evolution of the ADF's Media Embedding Program in Operational Areas.* Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon.

Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J. & Bracken, C. C. 2002. Content analysis in mass communication: Assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. *Human Communication Research,* 28, 587–604.

Lundby, K. 2014. *Mediatization of Communication,* Berlin: Deutche Nationalbibliothek.

Lunn, H. 1985. *Vietnam: A Reporter's War.* Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Lunt, P. & Livingstone, S. 2016. Is 'mediatization' the new paradigm for our field? A commentary on Deacon and Stanyer (2014, 2015) and Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby (2015). *Media, Culture & Society,* 38, 462–70.

LWD 1. 2017. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power.* Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

Maan, A. 2015. Narratives are about 'meaning', not 'truth'. *Foreign Policy*, 3 December, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/03/narratives-are-about-meaning-not-truth (Accessed 4 October 2018).

Maan, A. 2018. *Narrative Warfare.* Washington, DC: Narrative Strategies.

MacLachlan, G. L. 1994. *Framing and Interpretation.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Macnamara, J. R. 2005. *Jim Macnamara's Public Relations Handbook.* Sydney: Archipelago Press.

Maley, W. 2002. *The Afghanistan Wars,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maley, W. 2015. The war in Afghanistan: Australia's strategic narratives. In: G. Dimitriu & J. Ringsmose (eds), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War.* New York: Routledge.

Maltby, S. 2013. *Military Media Management: Negotiating the 'Front' Line in Mediatized War.* New York: Routledge.

Mans, U., Meindersma, C. & Burema, L. 2008. *Eyes Wide Shut? The Impact of Embedded Journalism on Dutch Newspaper Coverage of Afghanistan.* The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

Mansted, K. 2018. *The Public Square in the Digital Age: Protecting Australia's Democracy from Cyber-enabled Foreign Interference.* Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Marr, D. 2003. *Dark Victory.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Marwick, A. E. & Boyd, D. 2010. I Tweet honestly, I Tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. *New Media & Society,* 13, 114–33.

Mattoni, A. & Treré, E. 2014. Media practices, mediation processes, and mediatization in the study of social movements. *Communication Theory,* 24, 252–71.

Mattox, J. M. 2008. The Clausewitzian trinity in the information age: A just war approach. *Journal of Military Ethics,* 7, 202–14.

May, T. 2001. *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process.* Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Mazzoleni, G. & Schulz, W. 1999. 'Mediatization' of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication,* 16, 247.

McAdam, D. 1996. Movement strategy and dramaturgic framing in democratic states: The case of the American civil rights movement. *Research on Democracy and Society,* 3, 155–76.

McCallum, K. & Putnis, P. 2008. Media management in wartime. *Media History,* 14, 17–34.

McDonald, L. 1998. *Bylines: Memoirs of a War Correspondent.* Sydney: Kangaroo Press.

McDonald, N. A. 2016. *Valiant for Truth: The Life of Chester Wilmot, War Correspondent.* Sydney: New South Publishing.

McEwan, R. W. 2017. Convergence and Radio in New Zealand: Investigating Media Transformation Through the New Zealand Radio Industry. PhD thesis, Monash University.

McKenna, T. M. 2015. *Australia's Joint Approach*. Fishermans Bend, Vic: Joint and Operations Analysis Division, Defence Science and Technology Group.

McKernan, M., Browne, M. & Australian War Memorial, 1988. *Australia, two centuries of war & peace*. Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial in association with Allen & Unwin Australia.

McPhedran, I. 2009. 'Embedding' trial report. Open Letter. *Media Watch*, ABC TV, 9 September, https://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/0935_report.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2019).

McPhedran, I. 2010. Army failed our Diggers. *Herald Sun*, 22 September, https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/opinion/army-failed-our-diggers/news-story/06dd9589c24d69c4d335703f0e7b0646?sv=7d36f9166804e66051760368b63d9bc8 (Accessed 5 June 2019).

McQuail, D. 2006. On the mediatization of war. *International Communication Gazette,* 68, 107–18.

Melnyk, G. 2011. Canada and Afghanistan: Peacemaking as counter-insurgency warfare – a study in political rhetoric. *Peace Research,* 43, 5–29.

Merriam, S. B. 2009. *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Meyrowitz, J. 1993. Images of media: Hidden ferment – and harmony – in the field. *Journal of Communication,* 43, 55–66.

Mieszkowski, J. 2009. Watching war. *PMLA,* 124, 1648–61.

Mikecz, R. 2012. Interviewing elites: Addressing methodological issues. *Qualitative Inquiry,* 18, 482–93.

Millar, T. B. 1978. *Australia in Peace and War: External Relations, 1788–1977*. Canberra: ANU Press.

Miller, C. 2014. Re-examining the Australian public's attitude to military casualties: Post-heroic or defeat-phobic? *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 68, 515–30.

Miskin, S., Rayner, L. & Lalic, M. 2003. *Media Under Fire: Reporting Conflict in Iraq.* Canberra: Parliamentray Library, Parliament of Australia.

Mitchell, A., Simmons, K., Matsa, K. & Silver, L. 2017. Publics globally want unbiased news coverage, but are divided on whether their news media deliver. *Global Attitudes & Trends*, 11 January, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/01/11/publics-globally-want-unbiased-news-coverage-but-are-divided-on-whether-their-news-media-deliver.

Mitchell, W. J. T. 1980. On Narrative. *Critical Inquiry,* 7, 1–236.

Moore, T., Bourke, S. & Maddox, G. 1998. Australia and the emergence of the modern two-party system. *Australian Journal of Politics & History,* 44, 17–31.

Morgan, E. & Thompson, M. 2018. Information warfare: An emergent Australian Defence Force capability. In *Building Allied Interoperability in the Indo-Pacific Region.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & Internatinal Studies.

Morgan, K. O. 2002. The Boer War and the media (1899–1902). *Twentieth Century British History,* 13, 1–16.

Mortensen, M. 2014. *Routledge Research in Journalism: Journalism and Eyewitness Images – Digital Media, Participation, and Conflict.* London: Routledge.

Murdoch, K. A. 2010. *The Gallipoli Letter.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Nagy, P. & Neff, G. 2015. Imagined affordance: Reconstructing a keyword for communication theory. *Social Media + Society,* 1(2), 1–9.

Nash, C. & Bacon, W. 2004. Stories in distress: Three case studies in Australian media coverage of humanitarian crises. *Australian Journalism Review,* 26, 19–39.

National Health and Medical Research Council & Australian Vice-Chancellors. 2007. National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, Canberra.

Newsom, D., Vanslyke Turk, J. & Kruckeberg, D. 2010. *This is PR: The Realities of Public Relations.* Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Nonaka, I. 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. *Organization Science,* 5, 14–37.

Nonaka, I. 1995. *The Knowledge-creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation.* New York: Oxford University Press.

O'Connor, M. 2000. Ignorance is bliss: The media and East Timor. *Institute of Public Affairs Review,* 52, 4.

O'Connor, T. 1991. Personal experiences of Australia's public information in time of war. *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 2, 261–7.

Oliver, A. 2013. *Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Onwuegbuzie, A. J. & Collins, K. M. T. 2007. A typology of mixed methods sampling designs in social science research. *The Qualitative Report,* 12(2): 281–316.

Osinga, F. P. B. 2006. *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd,* London: Routledge.

Ostrander, S. A. 1993. Surely you're not in this just to be helpful: Access, rapport, and interviews in three studies of elites. (Special Issue: Fieldwork in Elite Settings). *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography,* 22, 7.

Palazzo, A. 2012. *The Future of War Debate in Australia: Why Has There Not Been One? Has the Need for One Now Arrived?* Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon.

Paul, C. & Kim, J. J. 2004. *Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in Historical Context,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Paulesc, J. 2019. Government, God and Family: A Multi-modal Analysis of Stories and Storytelling in an Online Social Movement. PhD thesis, Arizona State University, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/21b2/e9befded95be2f7c4349efd70d3af18c5311.pdf

Payne, T. 2007. *War and Words: The Australian Press and the Vietnam War.* Melbourne: RMIT Publishing.

Perry, R. 2004. *Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War*. Sydney: Random House.

Petersen, K. 2012. Risk analysis: A field within security studies? *European Journal of International Relations,* 18, 693–717.

Płudowski, T. 2007. *How the World's News Media Reacted to 9/11: Essays from Around the Globe,* Spokane, WA: Marquette Books.

Polese, A., Kevlihan, R. & Ó Beacháin, D. 2016. Introduction: Hybrid warfare in post-Soviet spaces – is there a logic behind it? *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 27, 361–6.

Polletta, F., Chen, P. C. B., Gardner, B. G. & Motes, A. 2011. The sociology of storytelling. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 37, 109–30.

Porter, P. 2007. Good anthropology, bad history: The cultural turn in studying war. *Parameters*, 37(2), 45–58.

Powell, A. 2007. *The Shadow's Edge: Australia's Northern War.* Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press.

Power, M. 2007. *Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pozen, D. E. 2005. The mosaic theory, national security, and the Freedom of Information Act. *Yale Law Journal*, 115, 630–81.

Public Affairs and Corporate Communication Division. 2000. *A Military Public Affairs Capability for the 21st Century.* Canberra: Australian Department of Defence.

Quinn, P. E. & Gale, G. 2000. *British Poets of the Great War: Brooke, Rosenberg, Thomas – A Documentary Volume*, Detroit, MI: Gale Group.

Radway, J. 1989. Ethnography among elites: Comparing discourses of power. *Journal of Communication Inquiry,* 13, 3–11.

Reynolds, H. 2006. *The other side of the frontier : Aboriginal resistance to the European invasion of Australia*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Richter, D. H. E. 2018. *A Companion to Literary Theory*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Rid, T. 2007. *War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq.* London: Routledge.

Rid, T. & Hecker, M. 2009. *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age.* New York: ABC-CLIO.

Robichaud, C. 2007. Buying time in Afghanistan. *World Policy Journal,* 24, 1–10.

Roos, C. M. 2015. Mediatization theory: What is in it for the philosophy of communication? On Stig Hjarvard's *The Mediatization of Culture and Society. Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication,* 6, 91–103.

Royle, T. 1987. *War Report: The War Correspondent's View of Battle from Crimea to the Falklands.* Edinburgh: Mainstream.

Ryan, M. W. S. 2013. *Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Saldana, J. 2013. *The Doding Manual for Qualitative Researchers.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sarnecky, M. 1990. Historiography: A legitimate research methodology for nursing. *Advances in Nursing Science,* 12, 1–10.

Schleicher, K. 2016. Military, government, and media management in wartime. In A. Schwarz, M. W. Seeger & C. Auer (eds), *The Handbook of International Crisis Communication Research.* Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Schulz, W. 2004. Reconstructing mediatization as an analytical concept. *European Journal of Communication,* 19, 87–101.

Schwandt, T. A. 2007. *The Sage Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry.* London: Sage.

Scott, E. 1921. *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Vol. XI, Australia During the War,* Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Sekuless, P. 2008. 'Everything, in fact, except respect': The military and the media and the Department of Information during the Second World War. In P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds), *The Military and the Media: The 2008 Chief of Army Military History Conference.* Canberra: Australian History Military Publications.

Sepp, K. 2005. Best practices in counterinsurgency. *Military Review,* 85, 8–12.

Shavit, M. 2016. *Media Strategy and Military Operations in the 21st Century,* Milton: Taylor and Francis.

Sheehan, M. 2007. Australian public relations campaigns: A select historical perspective 1899–1950. Paper presented to Australian Media Traditions, Deakin University.

Silverstone, R. 2005. The sociology of mediation and communication. In C. Calhoun, C. Rojek & B. Turner (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Sociology.* London: Sage.

Slessor, K. & Semmler, C. 1987. *The War Despatches of Kenneth Slessor: Official Australian Correspondent 1940–1944.* Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Smith, J. 2013. Military media management: Negotiating the 'front' line in mediatized war. *Journalism History*, 39(2), 129–30.

Snyder, J. B. 2003. *Seeing Through the Conflict: Military–Media Relations.* Washington, DC: US Army War College.

Solomon, E. 2017. Fighting in Afghanistan: 'You have the watches. We have the time'. *Maclean's*, 2 September, https://www.macleans.ca/news/fighting-in-afghanistan-you-have-the-watches-we-have-the-time (Accessed 21 June 2020).

Sondhaus, L. 2006. *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Souter, G. 1992. *Lion & kangaroo : The initiation of Australia*. Sydney: Pan Macmillan

Stech, F. 1994. Winning CNN Wars. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly,* 24, 37–37.

Sterne, J. 2010. Rearranging the files: On interpretation in media history. *The Communication Review,* 13, 75–87.

Strachan, H. 2008. Strategy and the limitation of war. *Survival,* 50, 31–54.

Sung-Un, Y. & Grunig, J. 2005. Decomposing organisational reputation: The effects of organisation–public relationship outcomes on cognitive representations of organisations and evaluations of organisational performance. *Journal of Communication Management,* 9, 305–25.

Swinton, E. 1932. *Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank / by Sir Ernest D. Swinton*. London.

Talbott, J. 1978. Guerrilla, warfare. *The Virginia Quarterly Review,* 54, 351–5.

Tapsell, R. 2014. *By-lines, Balibo, Bali Bombings: Australian Journalists in Indonesia.* Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Tatham, S. 2013. *US Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict.* Carlisle Baracks, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute.

Tatham, S. & Le Page, R. 2014. *NATO Strategic Communication: More to Be Done?,* Riga, Latvia: National Defence Academy of Latvia Centre for Security and Strategic Research.

Taylor, P. M. 2003. *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tesch, R. 1990. *Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools.* New York: Falmer Press.

Thornborrow, J. 2014. *Power talk: Language and Interaction in Institutional Discourse.* London: Routledge.

Thucydides 1830. *The History of the Peloponnesian War.* Oxford: Printed by S. Collingwood, for J. Parker.

Tiffen, R. 1990. The war the media lost: Australian news coverage of Vietnam. In G. Pemberton (ed.), *Vietnam Remembered.* Sydney: Weldon Publishing.

Tiffen, R. 2001. *Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East Timor,* Sydney: UNSW Press.

Torney-Parlicki, P. 2000. *Somewhere in Asia : War, Journalism and Australia's Neighbours 1941–75,* Sydney: UNSW Press.

Trembath, R. 2005. *A Different Sort of War: Australians in Korea 1950–53.* Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Virilio, P. 2000. *War and Cinema.* London: Verso.

Vlassenroot, S., De Mol, J., Brijs, T. & Wets, G. 2006. Defining the public support: What can determine acceptability of road safety measures by a general public? In *Proceedings of the 2006 European Transport Conference*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235770986_Defining_the_public_support_

what_can_determine_acceptability_of_road_safety_measures_by_a_general_public (Accessed 21 June 2020).

Wasilow, S. M. 2017. Contemporary Canadian Military/Media Relations: Embedded Reporting During the Afghanistan War. PhD thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, https://curve.carleton.ca/f9f8773c-e6e4-492b-81d9-c8c63587103f (Accessed 21 June 2020).

Weiland, J. 2003. *The Future of International Media Coverage of Military Operations.* PhD thesis, Griffith University, https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/366372 (Accessed 21 June 2020).

Wesch, M. 2009. YouTube and you: Experiences of self-awareness in the context collapse of the recording webcam. *Explorations in Media Ecology,* 8, 19–34.

Wilcox, C. 1999. *Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899–1914.* London: Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies.

Wilesmith, G. 2011. *Reporting Afghanistan and Iraq: Media, Military and Governments and How They Influence Each Other.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, J. F. 1999. *Anzacs, the Media and the Great War.* Sydney: UNSW Press.

Williams, K. & Harris, J. 2019. *Reporting War and Conflict*. London: Routledge.

Williams, P. D. E. 2013. *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Wilson, P. 2004. *Long Drive Through a Short War: Reporting on the Iraq War.* Melbourne: Hardie Grant Books.

Witschge, T. 2014. Passive accomplice or active disruptor. *Journalism Practice,* 8, 342–56.

Wolf, R. Z. 2003. Exploring the audit trail for qualitative investigations. *Nurse Educator,* 28, 175–8.

Wright, L. 2007. *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda's Road to 9/11.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Young, P. R. 1996. *The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike.* Melbourne: Macmillan.

Yvonne, F. M. 2009. Doing mixed methods research pragmatically: Implications for the rediscovery of pragmatism as a research paradigm. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research,* 4, 6–16.

Zawawi, C. 2014. A history of public relations in Australia. In J. Johnston & C. Zawawi (eds), *Public Relations: Theory and Practice.* Fourth edition. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.