Ethical Leadership as a Mode-of-Being: A Heideggerian Perspective

Alice McCance Gibson

Bachelor of Arts with Honours
Monash University

Bachelor of Business (Management)
Monash University

Masters of Arts (Applied Ethics)
Utrecht University

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to uncover the rich context of meaning embedded in people's experiences of ethical leadership. To explore ethical leadership through this 'lived experience' perspective is to explore it through a phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology seeks to understand the structures of our experience. Heidegger (1962) identifies various 'ontological structures' to explain how we experience the world in its integrated totality—whereby we are absorbed in the world as we go about our everyday life—rather than seeking to understand the world from the perspective of breaking a phenomenon down into different properties. For Heidegger, a phenomenon like ethical leadership 'is' how it is understood by those who experience it in a shared world of understanding; it is not something that exists objectively 'out there' in the world that is separate from those experiencing it. This leads to the research question '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*

I explore my research question using a methodology based on Heidegger, a 'hermeneutic phenomenology'. I took a two-stage approach. In Stage One, I undertook 22 semi-structured, conversational interviews. These involved 11 people from the energy sector, 5 people from the government sector, and 6 people from the built environment sector. The focus was on their liv*ed* experience. In Stage Two, I focused on the liv*ing* experience, via my novel approach of combining the benefits of an interview and diary in what I call a 'living interview-diary'. In Stage Two, I undertook short (15–30 minute) semi-structured conversational interviews every day for a week with a participant from each of the three sectors.

My key findings focus on seven themes from a thematic analysis of the interview and interview-diary data. I call these 'seven aspects of ethical leadership'. The seven aspects are: 1) ethical leadership is in the hard decisions; 2) ethical leadership is in the everyday; 3) ethical leadership is leading the way; 4) ethical leadership is self-responsibility; 5) ethical leadership is acting for the benefit others; 6) ethical leadership is guided by somatic references; and 7) ethical leadership is role modelling.

I utilise Heideggerian 'ontological structures' that have been recognised in the organisational behaviour literature (see, for instance, Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Reedy & Learmonth, 2011; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015) as sensitising lenses to understand the seven aspects of ethical leadership. The 'mapping' of these ontological structures and aspects together sheds light on what I call an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being grasps that others are the same kind of Being as ourselves; therefore, a good way to be in the world is with 'positive solicitude' towards others. This facilitates the opportunity for others to 'choose their own selves' and become authentic (Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being encourages a focus not on right action, but on the 'right relation' towards the other, in a way which seeks to accommodate both one's own values and response to a situation, as well as others' values and response to that situation (Ladkin, 2006).

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Name: Alice McCance Gibson

Date: 24 January, 2022

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This thesis is dedicated to the people who have demonstrated ethical leadership, *particularly* when that was hard to do, and it would have been easier to just follow the crowd or take an easier path. We need more of you in the world – I salute you. As it happens, this includes the participants of this study. While I did not choose participants that were *a priori* ethical leaders (rather, I was interested in their lived experience of the phenomenon) nevertheless they all shared stories of their own experience of ethical leadership when that was hard to do. I therefore salute you specifically. I also thank you for your time and insights; the thesis is built on the insights of your lived experience. In particular, I want to thank the participants known in the thesis as Jacqueline, Kassandra and Russ. You were particularly generous with your time during an already stressful and busy COVID-19 lockdown period. As Russ put it, it felt like I was talking not with a 'research participant', but with colleagues, discussing an issue that was important to us both.

Most importantly, I want to thank my supervisors, Associate Professor Michelle Greenwood, Professor Julie Wolfram Cox, and Associate Professor Justin Oakley. I am conscious that I am very lucky to have found three(!) supervisors that were not only supportive of exploring ethical leadership from an ontological perspective, but understood what this entails from both a management and philosophical perspective. What I loved about this thesis was combining the ontological (and seemingly esoteric) insights of Heidegger's—let's face it, dense—philosophical theory, with people's organisational worlds as they experienced them. They were patient while I worked my way through Heidegger's *Being and Time* in my "mornings with Martin" (as Julie called them). Michelle and Julie then kept me on track with entwining the insights from the philosophical literature with the management/organisational literature; while Justin threw in pertinent philosophical questions and checked in with my well-being along the way. I thank all three of you for the substantial time and effort you put into our regular meetings and reviewing drafts, over the course of this thesis.

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For those who have done it, you'll know that writing a PhD can be a bit of a lonely process at times; and there were also times I didn't know what the hell I was doing and found myself going in circles. I am indebted to my 'PhD friends' for saving me from myself in those times. I am grateful for Octavio Barrientos, Peter Collins, Jennifer Dam, Adela Drozdibob, Qudsia Iftikhar, Adamina Ivcovici,

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I am also indebted to my dear friend Kelsey Moir for helping me to design the graphics. She managed to convert our intense Zoom brainstorming session into the wonderful graphics you see in this thesis. This is no small feat for someone who had never heard of 'ontology', or 'hermeneutic phenomenology' before that session. It's testimony to her skill in careful listening and creative magic. Thanks Kelse.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

I was sitting at my desk, responding to the daily flow of emails, when the phone rang. It was a time when one still had landline phones on the desk. I answered with my usual jolly work greeting. There was a very senior government official from another country on the other end of the line; let me call him Carl. I used to manage my organisation's engagement with Carl and his department, but, due to a re-structure about a year prior, I no longer had a direct working relationship with him. However, given our previous good rapport, Carl felt comfortable explaining to me that he, and the government organisation he was representing, had a significant concern about the engagement (or, to be more precise, the lack of engagement) with the person within my organisation now responsible for managing the relationship. Let me call that person Liam. It appeared to Carl—and others within his organisation—that Liam did not care about the relationship with them and therefore neglected the engagement with projects and services that our organisation was supposed to be providing. Carl had raised his concerns with Liam directly, but without success. Carl was looking to improve the situation. However, he wanted to do so in a way that maintained goodwill between our organisations. Making a more formal complaint would no doubt strain the relationship even further. Carl therefore rang me, hoping that I had influence with senior management in Head Office—particularly the CEO—and could perhaps raise the subject delicately. He hoped this might work toward a discrete, diplomatic solution, rather than sullying the relationship through a more formal approach. As he started to describe the situation, my stomach dropped, and I felt adrenaline start to pump throughout my body.

I agreed that Carl's concerns were valid. However, I couldn't admit or agree to any bad behaviour on the part of Liam, who was more senior to me in my organisation. That would not, I thought, be appropriate. Part of my adrenaline response was anger at Liam's behaviour. I knew something of the situation already through internal channels. I agreed with Carl that their organisation was not being treated as they could reasonably, or decently, expect. Yet I really did not have quite the kind of internal influence that Carl rather hoped I had. This put me in a very uncomfortable situation; literally, I felt uncomfortable. I knew the 'right thing to do' was to raise Carl's concerns with senior management within my organisation. It was the least I could do to try and address the situation, given it was a person in my organisation who was behaving badly. The easier thing to do was to politely point out it was no longer my role. However, Carl had come to me for help to find a diplomatic way forward, and I wanted to help. Carl and his organisation deserved to be given the same degree of attention and respect as other organisations we engaged with. It had taken me years to build the relationship and the projects associated with it in the first place, in my previous role. However, I also knew that Carl's concerns would not be welcomed by senior management, and I would not be thanked for raising them (which was, indeed, part of the problem). Nevertheless, I told Carol I would raise the issue as delicately as I could. It was the least I could do.

If I was going to raise the concerns, I felt it was appropriate for me to do so with my senior manager in the first instance. Let me call her Olivia. I often felt attacked by Oliva when I raised anything difficult, negative, or simply something with which she didn't agree. What should have been routine issues to be discussed and thought through were regularly met with hostility. This was a major reason for the adrenaline pumping through my body. No matter how sensitively I couched this situation, I knew it was going to end in an attack. The adrenaline I felt was a pre-emptive, visceral response.

After hanging up the phone with Carl, I found myself shaking slightly. I tried to breathe deeply. I steeled myself and walked into Oliva's office about 15 minutes later. I didn't want to put it off and delay the inevitable. A bit like ripping off a Band-Aid, it's sometimes better to get something unpleasant over and done with quickly, before backing out. My head felt a bit sluggish; perhaps this was because the blood had left my brain and was pumping into my arms and legs, in preparation for flight or fight. As calmly as I could, trying not to let my voice quiver and betray my inner fear of her response, I explained the situation to Oliva. Sure enough, the verbal harangue came immediately. "What are they doing ringing you in the first place?!' *('Isn't it good that they felt comfortable doing so?' I thought, though I did not say this.)* "How dare you say anything, that's not your place!" *('What would you have me say?' I didn't think it would help to say this either.)* "You should have told them to speak to Liam." *('As I pointed out, they did, but the problem is, he is essentially their problem.' I did try to convey this aspect of the dilemma to Olivia, which seemed self-evident to me, but apparently not to her.) So it went on. The situation got messier, and my stress levels higher, before a couple of weeks later I could at least report back to Carl that I had indeed raised the issue with senior management, and hoped this would result in at least a small improvement. Whether or not it did, I nevertheless felt a great sense of relief that I had at least tried to do the right thing as I saw it; I hadn't just taken the easy option. In doing so, I hope it conveyed to Carl that someone in our organisation did care about the relationship with him, his colleagues, and the organisation they represented.*

* * * *

I sketch the anecdote above as an example of when I believe I displayed ethical leadership. I therefore start as I intend to continue—with lived experience. I believed Carl was right; he and his organisation deserved better from my organisation. However, it would have been far less stressful for me to evade Carl's concerns with a bureaucratic response. I could have easily advised him that, since I no longer managed the relationship with his organisation, he needed to take up his concerns with Liam, or perhaps even the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) directly. Clearly this is the path Oliva would have preferred I had taken, so she did not have to become involved in questioning the behaviour of one of her colleagues. Despite my immediate and visceral stress response, the 'right thing to do' was immediately obvious to me: I ought to advocate for Carl as best I could. As it turns out, I am not the only person to experience this type of situation as one of ethical leadership. My vague, implicit understanding of why this is an example of ethical leadership will be made more explicit in the course of this thesis, by drawing on both the lived and living experiences of research participants.

'Ethical leadership' is a growing catchphrase in corporate circles and leadership and management books, perhaps in response to the ethical failures we hear about almost daily on the news, or read about on our phones and in the newspapers. These ethical failures range from sexual harassment scandals to corruption, human rights abuses, and the impacts of climate change or environmental damage. While ethical leadership can (arguably) help avoid these ethical failures, my anecdote above suggests that ethical leadership is at play not just in these 'big issues' but also in the minutia of our everyday involvement with others.

I presume as a starting point that many people, like me, want to work in organisations which move beyond just avoiding ethical failures, to seeking a 'higher standard' by striving towards ethical leadership. In short, if ethical leadership is 'good', then it would be good to encourage it. In our striving toward ethical leadership, it is tempting to start by asking what ethical leadership 'is'. That seems a logical and usual place to start. It is a *know-what* question. However, in asking 'what is ethical leadership?' we already have some understanding of it, a "pre-understanding" (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2021, p. 2) or a 'primordial knowing' (Heidegger, 1962). Such a pre-understanding—or knowing—is necessary in order to ask an intelligible question in the first place. The question already has meaning, which is why it is an intelligible question. This pre-understanding comes from a *knowing-how* to 'be-in-the-world' (Heidegger, 1962), before we label a phenomenon 'as' something, and seek its definition.

There is already wisdom and insight in this pre-understanding—wisdom or insight that is further uncovered, or made more explicit, when we "shed light" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 403, S352) on the phenomenon, as I aim to do in this thesis. I do this not from the more dominant *a priori*, hypo deductive research approach, but rather by focusing on uncovering the rich contexts of meaning already embedded in people's pre-understanding of the anecdotes of their own experiences of ethical leadership. In this thesis, I therefore offer an alternative perspective. This can help us further understand the phenomenon, in order to ultimately encourage ethical leadership.

The dominant way the organisational literature 'sheds light' on the ethical leadership phenomenon is through a moral leadership theory lens. Ethical Leadership, Servant Leadership and Authentic Leadership[1] are particularly prominent examples (Lemoine, Hartnell, & Leroy, 2019) of leadership theories with a core moral/ethical component. Indeed, much of the literature associated with these moral/ethical leadership theories seeks to understand the phenomenon through know-what questions. They seek to define what ethical leadership 'is' and/or to identify the behaviours, traits, or individual, situational, organisational or dependent variables, and/or associated mediators or moderators which 'define it' (see for example, Den Hartog, 2015; Lemoine et al., 2019). There is also an emphasis on delineating one ethical/moral leadership theory from another (see for example, Den Hartog, 2015; Lemoine et al., 2019; Treviño & Brown, 2018; Yukl, Mahsud, Hassan, & Prussia, 2011) and making ever more nuanced conclusions about what moderators impact which variables (see for example, Bedi, Alpaslan, & Green, 2015; Liao, Lee, Johnson, & Lin, 2021; Wong & Laschinger, 2013). Much of the organisational literature on ethical leadership therefore sits firmly in the *a priori*, hypo deductive, (neo)positivist domain.

Positivist approaches to social science assume there is an objective world 'out there' separate to us, and this world can be reduced into its component parts and quantifiably measured. Building on this ontological basis, such approaches epistemologically assume 'knowledge' and 'truth' are found in the correspondence between some (so-called) objective reality 'out there' in the world and its representational agreement with 'what is in my head'. In assuming this, positivist approaches seek to find objective, universal, and/or context-free factors, attributes, features, or cues which can be reduced to underlying laws or programs, used to inform or predict behaviour (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 5). Given this aim, much of the ethical leadership research tends to be quantitative, and often utilises 'statistically validated' questionnaires (see for example, Barbuto Jr & Wheeler, 2006; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008). The practical implication or response, when traits and behavioural characteristics of an individual leader are focused on, often becomes a procedural response (Bohl, 2019), such as a call by Pitre and Claiborne (2021) for more corporate ethical training.

As a practitioner in the public service and then the energy sector, I was simply not aware of the latest moral/ethical leadership theories. I was not aware of the subtle nuances between them, and what behaviours or traits one consisted of compared to the other. I was therefore not aware of what type of 'leader' I was or should seek to be. Nor would I have cared too much if I was deemed an 'Authentic Leader' compared to an 'Ethical Leader' or a 'Servant Leader'—a view shared by several participants in this study. The focus on defining and delineation is not what matters to me about ethical leadership.

[1]I use a capital letter to denote reference to these leadership constructs. I do this primarily to distinguish them from when I use the terms 'ethical leadership' or 'authenticity', topics I am exploring in my thesis, but, as I go on to explain, do not come from the same perspective as these leadership theories.

I am not arguing that the dominant positivist approach to exploring ethical leadership is not useful, valuable, or insightful. Rather, I am suggesting that the dominant positivist approach misses something important; something about the wisdom and insight that comes from how ethical leadership is experienced in its messy totality rather than in its constituent parts. As my anecdote at the beginning is intended to demonstrate, ethical leadership was not experienced by me as a list of behaviours, traits, or individual, situational, organisational, or dependent variables, nor associated mediators or moderators. Positivist approaches offer but one perspective. My own "pre-understanding" of ethical leadership was a "source of inspiration", one that prompted me to "think differently" compared to the dominant way moral/ethical leadership is usually explored and understood (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2021, p. 2).

To explore 'ethical leadership' through a lived perspective is to explore it through a phenomenological perspective. I explore ethical leadership through a phenomenological perspective at both a methodological and theoretical level—in two hermeneutical 'layers of understanding'. I do so by drawing on (arguably) "the most comprehensive and consistent ontological alternative to scientific rationality", which is Martin Heidegger's theory of Being as he presents it in his seminal work *Being and Time* (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2016, p. 186). Heidegger's (1962) theory of Being informs my methodological approach through my use of a methodology that is based on his theory. This methodology is called a hermeneutical phenomenology. The phenomenological methodology (which leads to my empirical findings) is therefore the first hermeneutic layer of understanding. In line with calls from the phenomenological research literature (Gullick & West, 2020; Horrigan-Kelly, Millar, & Dowling, 2016), the phenomenological perspective also informs my theoretical (ontological) analysis of my empirical findings. This is the second hermeneutic layer of understanding. In line with a call from Scott Taylor (2018), it is a return to the lost metaphysics of leadership.

In pursing this perspective, I make four contributions to the literature, listed below in the order they are discussed in the thesis. The first more modest contribution is methodological. It is my exploration of the phenomenon of ethical leadership from a phenomenological approach. This approach has been used to explore leadership more broadly (Ladkin, 2010). However, I am unaware of it being used to explore ethical leadership. The value it adds as a methodological approach is it seeks to get closer to the 'inside' perspective, as opposed to the dominant third-person approach taken in much of the ethical leadership literature. As such, this methodological approach "generates knowledge that previous, traditional methods didn't (or couldn't)" as a key requirement identified by Bartunek, Bobko, and Venkatraman (1993, p. 1363) for methodological contributions. My project's second contribution is also methodological. Stage One of my research explores the liv*ed* experience of 22 participants from three industry sectors, while Stage Two of my research explores the liv*ing* experience. In response to the 2020 COVID-19 Australian lock-down conditions, I developed a novel approach by combining the interview and the diary research methods to arrive at what I have called the 'living interview-diary'

research method. I undertook these using on-line video-conferencing software (Zoom) to interview three participants, one from each sector, every day for a week. The third contribution of my research is a new empirical understanding of ethical leadership, what I have called 'seven aspects of ethical leadership' (which I outline in Section 1.1 below). My fourth—and main—contribution is my theoretical contribution. I interpret the seven aspects of ethical leadership through Heidegger's ontological structures to arrive at an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. This is an ontological understanding of ethical leadership. When one is *Being* an ethical leader, it is my contention that one is in this ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being.

In the remainder of this Introduction, I explain how I have made these four contributions by exploring ethical leadership via a hermeneutical phenomenological methodology, and arriving at an ontological (Heideggerian) perspective of the phenomenon. I do this via an overview of each chapter, providing an outline of the key tenets of my thesis.

1.1 Overview of Chapters

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: The 'Ontological Problem'

The 'ontological problem' with the dominant positivist approach to ethical/moral leadership theories is that it comes from a mode-of-Being that does not describe how we are in the world first and foremost in our lived experience. Heidegger (1962) proposes that we are in the world in different modes-of-Being. The two most important modes he describes are 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-to-hand'. Heidegger famously uses obscure terminology, and does so on purpose to "free himself from traditional assumptions" (Dreyfus, 2005) of how we are in-the-world. More intuitively, I often refer to ready-to-hand as "absorbed coping" (Dreyfus, 2005) and present-to-hand as (what I call) an 'objects-with-properties perspective'. Much of the moral/ethical leadership literature views the world in a present-to-hand/objects-with-properties way. As the label is intended to suggest, this approach seeks to understand an entity or a social phenomenon by focusing on its properties (and a positivist approach assumes these properties are objective, universal, and/or context-free factors). I critique the three most prominent moral/ethical leadership theories—Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership—from this mode-of-Being perspective.

I am not suggesting it is wrong to explore a phenomenon from a present-to-hand/objects-with-properties way; that is not the ontological problem. Instead, a Heideggerian perspective would deny any properties of ethical leadership are objective, universal, and context-free. Heidegger (1962) argues that before we are in the world in a present-to-hand/objects-with-properties way, we are in the world in an entirely taken for granted, ready-to-hand/absorbed-coping way. This is a *know-how* to be-in-the-world way, embedded in our "pre-understanding" (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2021, p. 2) or 'primordial knowing' (Heidegger, 1962). It is therefore from this perspective that I explore ethical leadership.

To explore 'ethical leadership' through a ready-to-hand perspective—in contrast to the more dominant present-to-hand/objects-with-properties—is to explore it from a phenomenological perspective. Instead of approaching the phenomenon of ethical leadership in terms of seeking to break it down into constituent parts aligned with an objects-with-properties perspective, the phenomenological approach seeks to understand how one experiences the phenomenon holistically, as lived, in its messy totality. Heidegger maintains it is a mistake to approach an understanding of Being-in-the-world[2] through a formal logic with a 'scientific method'; this kind of logic "limps along after" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 30, S10) our lived understanding. While we might indeed display certain traits and behaviours when we demonstrate ethical leadership (e.g., honesty and kindness), we first act honestly and kindly (in a ready-to-hand way) and *then* identify those behaviours as honest and kind (in a present-to-hand way). A phenomenological approach recognises the central role of meaning in a social phenomenon like leadership—or, in this case, ethical leadership: "Shared meanings allow human beings to collaborate and live together in productive and potentially harmonious ways…they are socially constructed, developed over time through culture, historical events and meaning-making systems of interpretation and dissemination across generations" (Ladkin, 2010, p. 19).

Heidegger defines phenomenology as "to the things themselves!" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. p50, S28). By this he means: to "shed light" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 403, S352) on a phenomenon in question as we already understand it from the perspective of our everyday experience. My task is therefore not to identify some 'objective truth' about ethical leadership as a phenomenon, but to shed light on it, and thereby understand how it is understood through the lived experience. Exploring ethical leadership from this phenomenological perspective can be thus captured in the research question: *'how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*

Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework: Ontological Structures

Heidegger (1962) provides a comprehensive but complex theoretical explanation of how we are in-the-world in a ready-to-hand way, through various 'ontological structures'. When explored in this way, the phenomenological perspective is also an ontological perspective. In Chapter 3, I describe these ontological structures and their link to 'ethics' and 'leadership'. In recognition of the insight that Heidegger's phenomenological perspective can provide in understanding a phenomenon rather than defining it, there is a small body of literature in organisation studies that uses a Heideggerian perspective to explore organisational phenomena, including leadership (see for instance, Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Ladkin, 2006; Reedy & Learmonth, 2011; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). In Chapter 3, I outline important ontological structures that have been utilised in this organisational literature. I use these ontological

[2] Heidegger uses hyphenated terms in order to indicate a single phenomenon, not one or two or more separate phenomena experienced together. For example, 'Being-in-the-world' is a single phenomenon; we are not first 'Beings', that are then in a separate world in a spatial way. Although, we may well be in the world in a spatial way, this is not the phenomenon that Heidegger is wishing to indicate with the hyphenated reference. In keeping with Heidegger, I also use hyphenated terms in this thesis.

structures as sensitising lenses to understand ethical leadership from an ontological (Heideggerian) perspective. The following are the Heideggerian ontological structures (in italics) I utilise and discuss in this thesis: *Dasein*, *positive solicitude*, *the-they*, and *inauthenticity*, *authenticity*, and its link with *resolute action* and the *call of conscience*, and *care.*

Heidegger does not propose an ethical theory, nor a theory of leadership. Nevertheless, social scientists and philosophers have recognised the ethical implications of Heidegger's ontological theory. Their literature gives a central role to Heidegger's concepts of *authenticity* and *positive solicitude* (see for instance, Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Reedy & Learmonth, 2011; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). The "ethical moment" (Sorial, 2005) of Heidegger's ontological theory is when *Dasein* (Heidegger's term for a human-Being) takes full responsibility for its own Being.

Heidegger (1962) implies that 'Being-authentic' is an ontologically 'good' way to be in-the-world. However, one always and necessarily appropriates one's Self from what he calls the *inauthentic* self.[3] He argues that—besides 'existence' as our grounding, and contrary to much of the Authentic Leadership literature (for instance, Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Walumbwa et al., 2008)—there is no essential, pre-given, unchanging 'core self' that is influenced by cultural/social practices. There is no 'one-self' that one is true to. Rather, we are constituted by our social practices. Given we are literally constituted by our social practices, we cannot help but conform to them. We thus have a tendency to act as 'one' acts in a particular social practice—i.e., according what Heidegger calls '*the-they'*.[4] This is useful in order to cooperate successfully together. It is the basis of intelligibility of our world/s. However, this conformity can also be a 'leveling down'. It is this that Heidegger calls *inauthenticity*. Despite being literally constituted by our social practices, Heidegger argues we can appropriate ourselves from this inauthentic self and be authentic.

Things and people necessarily show up in our world as mattering to us somehow. This is Dasein's *care* structure. Tangible things (what Heidegger calls equipment) can matter because of how we use them, and people (other Dasein) can also matter—either positively or negatively. This 'care' is not an emotional feeling, like honesty or kindness. Rather, emotions are predicated on our ontological care-structure. The type of care we have for people is what Heidegger calls 'solicitude'. If Being-authentic is a good way to be in the world for our Being, it is also a good way for others (other Dasein, who are the same kind of Being as us) to be in the world. It is therefore a good way to be in the world to facilitate other people's authenticity through *positive solicitude*. This positive solicitude does not have to be active. It might be a 'letting be' or an 'allowing'. It is, as Ladkin (2006) argues, less about

[3] In accordance with Heidegger when I use a capital letter for 'Self' I am seeking to point to the Self as existence. This is opposed to the ordinary experience of 'self'. As I hope will become clearer, for Heidegger, it is the Self that is grounding for self.

[4] The use of the term 'we' here (and elsewhere in this thesis) is itself a good example of 'the-they'; in so far as I assume that the context of the use is implicitly intelligible by the reader as part of the social practice of referring collectively to people in general.

the right action (the interest and focus of deontological and utilitarianism approaches to ethics), and more about the 'right relation'. This right relation encourages "comporting oneself in a way that expresses care for the other and their worldview, and engaging actively with full resource to one's subjective experience" (Ladkin, 2006, p. 96). When we are authentic, we heed our *call of our conscience*. The call of conscience alerts us to what matters to us in one's care structure. When we act on this, we act *resolutely* (even though a resolute action might be no action at all).

While Heidegger does not propose a leadership theory, a Heideggerian perspective of leadership shares something with other leadership theories. The moral/ethical leadership theories that have a core moral/ethical component (Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership) understand 'leadership' as role-modelling (see for instance, Brown et al., 2005; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Saleem-Tanner, 2018). Leadership according to these theories can essentially be understood as the leader-individual being an exemplar of a particular behaviour, and therefore leading by example, as a role-model.

A Heideggerian perspective of leadership also suggests a perspective of modelling a mode-of-Being that exemplifies a good way to be in the world—that is, a 'good' way to be in the world which is authentic and faciliates or empowers other's authenticity through positive solicitude (Krentz & Malloy, 2005). However, contrary to the moral/ethical leadership theories, the leadership aspect from a Heideggerian perspective is not predicated on the formal leader/follower model. From an ontological perspective, the focus is not on what leadership looks like from an outsider's perspective—with its associated focus on behaviours and traits that can be measured by a questionnaire filled out by others. Rather, it is from an insider's perspective, a type of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015).

Chapter 4 - Methodology: Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Given the 'lived experience' perspective of ethical leadership is a phenomenological perspective, I utilise a phenomenological methodology that is based specifically on Heidegger (Gill, 2014) to explore the research question: '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*. This methodology is called a hermeneutic phenomenology. Its approach focuses on exploring rich descriptions of ethical leadership from lived and living experiences, for the purpose of explicating and interpreting the meaning of those experiences. It is rooted in an ontological inquiry of the way we are in, and understand, the world. Meaning and understanding necessarily involve interpretation: participants' interpretation of ethical leadership (based on their own experiences) and then my interpretation of their interpretation. The interpretation is hermeneutic, or circular, moving from the whole to the parts, to re-interpret and understand the whole.

The research method I utilised was the 'semi-structured interview'. The form of semi-structured interview I adopted was the 'conversational interview' (van Manen, 2016). In line with Heidegger's ontological theory, the conversational interview itself is therefore hermeneutic, and meaning emerges

from a shared understanding. Anecdotes that my participants thought exemplified the ethical leadership phenomenon tended to prompt reflective exploration of the meaning of the phenomenon, which elicited further reflection on their lived experience. In Stage One of my research, I undertook 22 interviews with people from the energy sector (11 people), the government sector (5 people), and the built environment sector (6 people). Our focus was on the liv*ed* experience. In Stage Two, I focused on the liv*ing* experience, via my novel approach of combining the benefits of an interview and diary in an 'interview-diary'. In Stage Two, I undertook short (15–30 minute) semi-structured conversational interviews every day for a week, with one participant from each of the three sectors (three people in total).

Chapter 5 - Findings: Ethical leadership as 'Seen'

From a thematic analysis of my interview and interview-diary data, I focus on 'seven aspects of ethical leadership' in the first 'hermeneutic' layer of interpretation. In my findings chapters (5 and 6), I describe these seven themes. They are my interpretation of participants' interpretation of ethical leadership. I selected these seven aspects because they were either the most prominent themes referenced and/or were particularly theoretically relevant, given my interest in exploring the phenomenon from an ontological perspective. In answer to my research question, these 'seven aspects of ethical leadership' are an empirical contribution of my thesis—a new way of understanding ethical leadership based on my methodological approach of lived experience.

I call these themes key 'aspects' because they invoke a looking perspective: depending on which way one looks at a phenomenon, one will see different aspects. The aspects may come across as conceptually separate, however, in participants' lived experience these aspects are often entwined in a messy totality. I label the following three aspects, discussed in Chapter 5, in ethical leadership as 'seen'. This is because they are aspects that are evident to others in some type of action or conduct.

Ethical leadership is in the hard decisions

Many participants understood ethical leadership as having 'good' intentions and then taking action according to their principles or 'what they thought was right', even when that was difficult or uncomfortable to do. The difficulty in making those decisions relates to unwanted social ramifications. My anecdote at the beginning of this thesis is an example of ethical leadership in the hard decisions.

Ethical leadership in the everyday

Leadership in 'the everyday' includes activities or practices of one's role which are implemented or utilised on a day-to-day basis. This can encompass comprehensive and inclusive decision making, accountable systems, a thoughtful process, or creative problem solving. It also includes how one conducts oneself—for example, with perseverance, respect, and care. Underpinning 'ethics in the everyday' *as* ethical leadership is a moral purpose or values of 'what is right', which guide one's day-to-day actions and conduct.

Ethical leadership is leading the way

'Leading the way' is—as one participant described it—being at the vanguard: setting an ethical example for the community by being innovative and trail blazing a way forward.

Chapter 6 - Findings: Ethical leadership that is 'Mine'

In this second findings chapter, I describe the following four aspects of ethical leadership. I label these as ethical leadership qualities that are 'mine'—a term I borrow from Heidegger—on the basis that these aspects are ways that participants understood ethical leadership from the 'inside', from a perspective that is 'mine'.

Ethical leadership is self-responsibility

A key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by my participants in their lived experience is 'self-responsibility'. Responsibility starts with the Self (i.e., within). However, it extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for things that are in our sphere of influence, including other people.

Ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others

Participants understood an aspect of ethical leadership to be 'acting for the benefit of others'—not for their own personal or selfish interest, or in the narrow (e.g., financial) or short-term interests of the organisation. 'For the benefit of others' emerged as a fundamental aspect (arguably the most fundamental aspect) of how my participants understood acting 'ethically'.

Ethical leadership is guided by somatic references

Ethical leadership in the lived experience is, at some level, 'felt' by many participants. This sense—which I term 'somatic references'—often showed up as implicit references. However, in some cases, my participants were very explicit that these somatic references were guides to what they saw as their ethical behaviour (or 'the right thing to do') underpinning ethical leadership. With no implication that these somatic references are static, or unequivocally 'right', they nevertheless matter. They are the way one experiences oneself in the world "first and foremost" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. p232, S187) before one categorises why.

Ethical leadership is role modelling

A key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience was role modelling the behaviours that are (variously described) as acceptable, desirable, or good. This was understood by some participants as the 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership.

Chapter 7 - Discussion: Ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being

In this chapter, I undertake the second hermeneutic layer of interpretation. I do this through an ontological analysis, whereby I discuss how the seven aspects of ethical leadership are the "average everyday" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. p296, S251) lived experience of the ontological structures relevant to ethical leadership. This sheds light on an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. In seeking to understand the ethical leadership phenomenon through these structures, I contribute to a theoretical understanding of the ethical leadership phenomenon through providing an ontological perspective. An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being, from a Heideggerian perspective, emerges as *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience*. However, as ontological structures of the way we are in-the-world, they are not specific to ethical leadership. The seven aspects of ethical leadership (the average, everyday lived experience) can therefore help us to understand these structures as they pertain specifically to ethical leadership. In this analysis I discuss how:

- 'ethical leadership is self-responsibility' can be understood as an everyday experience of authenticity;
- 'ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others' can be understood as an everyday experience of positive solicitude;
- 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions, in the everyday, and is in leading the way' can be understood as an everyday experience of resolute action;
- 'ethical leadership is guided by somatic references' can be understood as an everyday experience of the 'call of conscience';
- 'ethical leadership is role modelling' can be understood as an everyday experience of modelling an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being, which can help constitute others either inauthentically or authentically.

An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being is first and foremost an inner phenomenon, a kind of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015) regardless of where one is on the organisational hierarchy. From this perspective, it is not measurable from a quantitively derived questionnaire, like the Ethical, Authentic, or Servant Leadership Questionaries. Rather, the focus for an ethical leader is on the concrete situation at hand and 'choosing to choose yourself' authentically—from which emerges resolute action. As a ready-to-hand mode-of-Being, this can operate below cognitive awareness. An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being grasps that others are (ontologically) the same kind of Being as ourselves. Therefore, a good way to be in the world is with positive solicitude towards others, which facilitates the opportunity for others to 'choose their own selves' and become authentic (Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being encourages a focus not on the right action, but on the 'right relation' towards the other, in a way which seeks to accommodate both one's own values and responses to a situation, as well as others' values and responses (Ladkin, 2006).

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

This chapter summaries my contributions to various literatures, and identifies important limitations and opportunities for future research that can build upon this hermeneutic phenomenological approach. In doing so, I summarise an understanding of ethical leadership from a phenomenological, ontological perspective, in order to answer my research question. In short, *the lived experience of ethical leadership is understood* through the seven aspects of ethical leadership, which are underpinned by the ontological structures of authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience. When these ontological structures are experienced in-practice, one is in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being.

I finish the thesis by returning to the anecdote I started with: speaking up for Carl. In accordance with Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy, my initial pre-understanding of the ethical leadership phenomenon outlined in the anecdote has been enriched by shedding light on ethical leadership through this enquiry. This "'new' and more complete understanding" has the potential to provide "a new pre-understanding when it guides further investigation" (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2021, p. 3), whether this further investigation be theoretical or practical.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: The 'Ontological Problem'

Given my interest in shedding light on the ethical leadership phenomenon, I started with exploring how other scholars and researchers have understood ethical leadership. There are indeed several leadership theories that have an implicit or explicit moral or ethical component (in this thesis, 'moral' and 'ethical' are terms I use interchangeably). Researchers often point to three of these theories as particularly prominent examples of moral/ethical leadership theories. The three are: Ethical Leadership, Authentic Leadership, and Servant Leadership (Eva, Robin, Sendjaya, van Dierendonck, & Liden, 2019; Lemoine et al., 2019; Magalhães, dos Santos, & Pais, 2019; Yukl et al., 2011). These leadership theories may provide useful and valid ways of inquiring into, or understanding, ethical leadership. However, the 'ontological problem' is that the ways in which these theories are predominantly researched are not how we (human Beings) experience the world "first and foremost" (p. 232, S187)[5]. These ethical leadership theories come from a what Heidegger calls a 'present-to-hand' mode-of-Being in the world—what I more intuitively call an 'objects-with-properties' mode-of-Being. Before we are in the world in this objects-with-properties mode-of-Being, we are in the world in what Heidegger calls a 'ready-to-hand' mode-of-Being. This can more intuitively be understood as an "absorbed-coping" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 44) mode-of-Being. After 'setting the scene' in the first (2.1) section of this chapter, the second (2.2) section explains these different modes-of-being. Thirdly, in Section 2.3, I go on to critique the leadership literature on Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership from this mode-of-Being perspective. My overarching critique is that the dominant research perspective comes from an objects-with-properties perspective (aligned with a positivist research approach). This perspective aims to define and delineate: define the theory and delineate between the theories based on a set of identifiable properties, antecedents, moderators, behaviours, and outcomes. The associated epistemological assumption is that this represents 'truth' and 'knowledge'. What this perspective forgets is the absorbed-coping mode of Being-in-the-world.

While an objects-with-properties approach (aligned as it is with a positivist approach) dominates the moral/ethical leadership research, there are additional 'troubling tensions'. These underscore the ontological problem of forgetting that we are in the world first and foremost in a ready-to-hand way. In the fourth (2.4) section of this chapter, I outline key ontological tensions associated with Ethical Leadership, Authentic Leadership, and Servant Leadership, respectively. In seeking to address this ontological problem (of forgetting that we are in the world in a ready-to-hand/absorbed-

[5] All references to Heidegger in this thesis (unless otherwise stated) are from *Being and Time* (1962). Given the significant number of references from Heidegger, going forward I will simply reference the page and section number from *Being and Time* (1962) without adding 'Heidegger' as the author, which is in keeping with common practice in philosophy texts.

coping way), I end this chapter (Section 2.5) by identifying my research question that seeks to understand ethical leadership from this ready-to-hand perspective. The ready-to-hand perspective is a phenomenological perspective, and my research question is therefore focused on accessing the lived experience that is central to the phenomenological perspective: '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?*'.

2.1 Setting the Scene: Moral/Ethical Leadership Theories

There a number of leadership theories that have an implicit or explicit moral component, sometimes referred to as 'moral leadership' (Solinger, Jansen, & Cornelissen, 2020), 'morally-based leadership' (Lemoine et al., 2019), or 'ethics-related leadership' (Foley, 2021). These theories include, for instance, Ethical Leadership, Authentic Leadership, Servant Leadership, Transformational Leadership, Adaptive Leadership (McManus, Ward, & Perry, 2018), Spiritual Leadership (Fry, 2003), Benevolent Leadership, Responsible Leadership, Empowering Leadership (Foley, 2021), or Values-based Leadership (Gingerich, 2020).[6] As noted above, researchers often point to three of these theories as particularly prominent examples of moral/ethical leadership theories: Ethical Leadership, Authentic Leadership, and Servant Leadership (Eva et al., 2019; Lemoine et al., 2019; Magalhães et al., 2019; Yukl et al., 2011). In regards to terminology, there is sometimes a distinction made between 'ethical' and 'moral' (see for instance, Beerel, 2021). Morality is sometimes associated with social norms, and etymologically derives from the Latin word *mores* (broadly meaning customs). Ethics, however, etymologically derives from the Greek word *ethos* (broadly meaning character) and are concerned with how one 'ought' to behave based on values or principles. Nevertheless, for the most part, philosophy (Singer, 2021) and organisational behaviour literature (see for instance, Lemoine et al., 2019) tend not to make a distinction between the terms, and neither do I. Therefore, morally based leadership theories are all forms of ethically based leadership theories. Hence, my reference to 'moral/ethical' leadership theories is interested in the social phenomenon of ethical leadership.

The moral/ethical leadership theories approach is the dominant approach to exploring the ethical leadership phenomenon in the organisational behaviour literature, and therefore the one which I focus on in this thesis. However, I acknowledge that there is relevant overlapping literature. For instance, there is a body of business ethics literature that engages more directly with the 'moral ought' aspect. If one is acting as one 'ought to' in an organisation, then this arguably overlaps with ethical leadership if one is an exemplar of the moral behaviour. This body of literature uses moral theories to suggest an ethical approach within business or organisational contexts—whether this moral theory is a Kantian approach (Clarke & Holt, 2010) or a virtue ethics approach (Newstead, Dawkins, Macklin, & Martin, 2019; Solomon, 2003; Whetstone, 2001). It is relevant to note that Heidegger specifically

[6] Values-Based Leadership is sometimes considered an umbrella term of its own (Gingerich, 2020), rather than a distinct leadership theory.

targets both Kant and Aristotle in his analysis in *Being and Time* (see, for instance, p. 251, S208). An important point Heidegger wishes to draw out in his analysis of these influential philosophers is how they have missed Being-in-the-world in a ready-to-hand/absorbed-coping way.

There is also arguably an overlap between ethical leadership and ethical decision-making frameworks (Agarwal & Cruise Malloy, 2000; Dittmar, 2021; McDevitt, Giapponi, & Tromley, 2007; Park, 2012; Trevino, 1986), in so far as ethical leadership could be underpinned, or demonstrated, by 'good' ethical decision-making. In addition, there is a relationship between ethical leadership and avoiding ethical failures. Bandura (1991) and Gentilin (2016), for instance, outline some of the psychological mechanisms why good people do what is clearly the wrong thing (even by their own standards). Being alert to, and avoiding, the 'traps' of ethical failures is fertile ground for striving toward ethical leadership.

Ethical leadership, ethical theory, ethical decision-making, and avoiding ethical failures are all important aspects in their own right. The intersection between them is therefore also important. However, given that my focus is ethical leadership specifically, this chapter concentrates on the three prominent examples of the moral/ethical leadership literature (Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership), rather than literature that sits within business ethics more broadly. Nevertheless, the core of my ontological critique in this chapter of these three moral/ethical leadership theories is to highlight how they come from a present-to-hand perspective. This perspective forgets that, before we move into this objects-with-properties mode-of-Being, we are in the world with 'absorbed coping'. Therefore, an Heideggerian inquiry into this this broader business ethics literature—on ethical theory, ethical decision-making, and/or ethical failures—could also utilise a mode-of-Being perspective as the basis of critique. In the next section, I utilise this mode-of-Being perspective to critique the three prominent moral/ethical leadership theories.

2.2 Modes-of-Being

In his seminal work *Being and Time*, Heidegger proposes that we are in the world in different 'modes-of-Being'. The two most important modes he describes are 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-to-hand'. As flagged in the Introduction, Dreyfus (2005, p. 44) more intuitively refers to ready-to-hand as "absorbed coping", and I refer to present-to-hand more intuitively as an objects-with-properties perspective. Much of the moral leadership literature views the world in a present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) way. However, Heidegger argues that before we are in the world in a present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) way, we are in the world in an entirely taken for granted (absorbed coping) way. In the following sub-sections, I explain these modes of Being-in-the-world.

2.2.1 Present-to-hand (Objects-with-properties) Mode-of-Being

A present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) perspective comes from an entrenched philosophical view that all things, including humans, are a particular type of object with properties that define what it 'is'. These properties are usually considered to be 'objective' and 'universal'—i.e., present wherever and whenever the entity or phenomenon appears. For most organisational researchers, this defines our very ontology, our Being-in-the-world, and is the ontological underpinning of positivism. Its philosophical roots can be traced back to Plato and his idea that there is a "real and perfect realm, populated by entities (called "forms" or "ideas") that are eternal, changeless, and in some sense paradigmatic for the structure and character of the world presented to our senses" (Kraut, 2017). This is an 'essentialist' philosophical view: i.e., a view which holds that there is some universal, essential properties/s that makes a thing or a phenomenon what it 'is' out there in the world, separate to us. Heidegger would not disagree that we can and do step back and view the world with a detached kind of interest. When we do this, however, we move into a present-to-hand mode-of-Being. We move into this mode when there is some sort of break-down in our usual flow of moving about the world more seamlessly. Heidegger is clear that this present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) understanding of our Being is the perspective taken by the sciences such as anthropology, psychology, and biology. However, he argues such an understanding misses something important, and this perspective needs to 'be attacked in new ways':

> Our distinctions will necessarily be inadequate from the standpoint of 'scientific theory' simply because the scientific structure of the above-mentioned disciplines (not, indeed, the 'scientific attitude' of those who work to advance them) is today thoroughly questionable and needs to be attacked in new ways which must have their source in ontological problematics. (S45, p. 71)

An objects-with-properties mode-of-Being in the world is aligned with a particular mode of thinking. In their article, Krentz and Malloy (2005) discuss Heidegger's concept of 'calculative thinking' from his *Discourse on Thinking.* As the name implies, this type of thinking "consists in our human capacity to reckon, count, measure, compute, and control things and people" (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 26). While this is useful and needed, Heidegger warns about a danger of becoming so captivated and bewitched that we accept it as "the only way of thinking" (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 27), or the only way of Being-in-the world. Heidegger argues that, before we are in the world in this objects-with-properties mode of Being, we are in the world first and foremost in a ready-to-hand (absorbed-coping) way.

2.2.2 Ready-to-hand (Absorbed-coping) Mode-of-Being

A ready-to-hand (absorbed-coping) mode of Being means that we are in the world in an entirely taken-for-granted way. That is why this mode-of-Being in the world usually goes unnoticed, even by great thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant (philosophers who Heidegger positions

himself as responding to). Descartes, for instance, famously asked, 'how do I know I exist?', and famously answered 'I think therefore I am' (Descartes, 2013). For Descartes, it is because 'I think' that I have to exist in order to be thinking. He concludes that I am therefore fundamentally a 'thinking thing'. Heidegger's response to this is that by the time I have asked 'how do I know that I exist?', I already know I exist, which is why I have asked the question in the first place. I know I exist because I have already experienced my existence in some way. Not in some theoretical way, but in an 'average everyday' way: *"But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact"* (p. 25, S5, italics original). It is this fact that Heidegger thinks traditional ontology has overlooked for thousands of years.

> Occurrent entities are the entities we discover when we abstract from our practical engagement with the world and take up a reflective or theoretical or scientific attitude toward it [in a present-to-hand mode]. Then we find entities that are defined not by the roles they play in our world but by their inherent physical [or psychological or biological etc.] properties. Heidegger argues that traditional ontology has focused on occurrentness and erroneously attempted to interpret all entities as occurrent. (Wrathall & Murphey, 2013, p. 5)

This quotation emphasises what is important when we engage with entities in a ready-to-hand mode: it is not their physical properties but the role they play for us. Another way to explain the ready-to-hand/absorbed-coping mode is that we are in the world 'understandingly'; we are absorbed in a world of shared practices and we already operate in it with understanding. An example is a useful way to grasp this concept. When I walk down the street, I am not thinking about walking, I have no cognitive content around walking. Nor do I have any cognitive content regarding what side of the street I am walking on, or how I hold my handbag as I walk. Similarly, I did not think about why I put on my shoes before I went for the walk, etc. These elements just play a particular role for me that I already pre-reflexively understand. Contrary to more typical psychological explanations, there is no 'intentionality' about how I walk down the street. My intention in walking down the street might be to get a coffee, and I might be thinking about what I am going to have for dinner. I understand how to walk down the street without thinking (without having any cognitive-content) about it. The simple act of walking exists in what Heidegger calls a 'totality-of-involvements'.[7]

[7] There are critical theorists that seek to understand and explain this interrelated 'totality-of-involvements' as it pertains to the phenomenon of leadership. This includes exploring leadership as a relational phenomenon, not just a set of relationships between discrete entities (Uhl-Bien, 2006); as a process (Barker, 2001); or a practice (Nicolini, 2012). These are perspectives that recognise that the 'leadership' may not reside in an individual person *per se*. Many of these constructionist perspectives borrow either directly, or indirectly, from Heidegger's ontological theory, given it is, arguably, "the most comprehensive and consistent ontological alternative to scientific rationality" (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2016, p. 186). The ready-to-hand persective I am taking has a focus on how a person experiences themsevles in-the-world. However, it recognises that any one person's experiences are constituted by socially shared practices—by a totality-of-involvements. Our experiences are neither totally objective nor totally subjective.

In my example, the totality of interrelated things/involvements includes shoes, handbags, direction, footpaths, coffee shops, motivations, desires for coffee, etc. It is possible to examine or turn my attention to these constitutive aspects individually (in which case, I move into a present-to-hand mode). However, first and foremost, I experience the world as an integrated whole, in a ready-to-hand way. Chia and Holt (2006, p. 637) explore an organisational example of how strategic action can emerge from "culturally mediated modus operandi", as opposed to strategy necessarily being the outcome of "intention, purposefulness, goal-orientation" action: i.e., strategy from a ready-to-hand rather than a present-to-hand mode-of-Being. Ladkin (2010, p. 45) recognises that, in this completely absorbed way of being in the world, 'things' in the world—such as complex phenomena like leadership—disappear, i.e., they operate below our awareness. That is, when we turn our cognitive attention to these complex phenomena (such as ethical leadership), we automatically move from an absorbed-coping to an objects-with-properties mode, forgetting that we already understand it in our lived experience—which is the reason why we are interested in asking questions about the phenomena.

2.3 Critique of Moral/Ethical Leadership Theories

In this section, I draw on the distinction between the two modes-of-Being I have explained in the previous section. I do this to critique the literature of the three prominent leadership theories with a core moral/ethical component: Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership. My aim in doing so is to demonstrate the dominance of an objects-with-properties (present-to-hand) perspective in the leadership research and literature associated with these theories. This objects-with-properties perspective is evident in how this research and associated literature focuses on breaking down and identifying constituent parts of the leadership construct, and seeks to delineate one theory from another. As I go on to highlight, the use of questionnaires which use a Likert Scale underpins much of this objects-with-properties research. I demonstrate, by use of an example, that these questionnaires are constituted by questions that are imbued with meaning. The meaning within each question comprising these questionnaires is very likely to differ between one research participant and the next. Despite layers of meaning, participants in research utilising these questionnaires can only respond to each question by ticking one box on the Likert Scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, etc. Alternatively, a ready-to-hand perspective puts the 'imbued meaning' at the heart of the research, which is what my research seeks to do.

2.3.1 Dominance of Present-to-hand Approach

Literature reviews of the three prominent moral/ethical theories (Bedi et al., 2015; Den Hartog, 2015; Eva et al., 2019; Iszatt-White & Kempster, 2019) highlight that the dominant approach to understanding the theory in question is to seek to break it down into various properties, and/or to study the relationship between these properties. As discussed, this objects-with-properties perspective aligns with a positivist research approach. As such, these 'properties' are usually categorised into antecedents,

moderators, behaviours, traits, variables, or outcomes. For example, Den Hartog (2015) developed **Figure 1** below, which captures what she sees as the relationship between these properties for Ethical Leadership specifically.

Figure 1: Summary of Ethical Leadership research to date



Abbreviations: CMD – cognitive moral development; LMX – leader–member exchange; OCB – organizational citizenship behavior.

Source: Den Hartog (2015, p. 420)

While **Figure 1** focuses on Ethical Leadership, research for both Authentic and Servant Leadership follow a similar path. Iszatt-White and Kempster (2019, p. 361) state in their review of Authentic Leadership articles that, from 2000 to 2017, all of the 61 empirical papers reviewed adopted "a generally accepted definition of the construct based on positive psychological roots, accompanied by a parallel psychometric (Walumbwa et al., 2008) for its measurement". The hidden positivist assumption in this approach is that a psychometric questionnaire is 'objective' and can reliably 'measure' how a person 'is'.[8] Similarly, for Servant Leadership, the Eva et al. (2019) review categorises the Servant Leadership literature into three phases. The last two phases (which focus on articles spanning 20 years from 1998–2018) have a similar emphasis on identifying these component properties and their measurement. The first phase focused on the conceptual development, particularly by the theory's originator, Robert K. Greenleaf, and his colleague Larry Spear, who was the Executive Director of The Robert K. Greenleaf Center for Servant-Leadership (Spears, 1996). Eva et al. (2019) categorise

[8] In their review article I note that Iszatt-White and Kempster (2019) themselves are critiquing this dominant approach, which they attribute to an absence of practice-based, qualitative research, and they seek a return to more existentialist notions of authenticity; which is the approach I am taking.

the second phase as the 'measurement phase', which focused on the development of Servant Leadership measurement questionnaires. The third phase is what they call the 'model development phase', "where more sophisticated research designs are being utilized to go beyond simple relationship with outcomes to understand the antecedents, mediating mechanisms, and boundary conditions of servant leadership" (Eva et al., 2019, p. 112). In line with the trend seen for both Ethical and Authentic Leadership literature, the majority of the Servant Leadership research reviewed was quantitative, with 156 manuscripts, compared to 28 qualitative and eight mixed methods manuscripts (Eva et al., 2019, p. 117).

2.3.2 Focus on Delineation Among Theories

A consistent theme in review articles is the lament that there is significant overlap between different moral/ethical leadership theories (see for example Bedi et al., 2015; Lemoine et al., 2019), and therefore a 'need' for more delineation among the theories. The call is usually for more research to untangle the conceptual confusion between the different constructs and/or the relationship between the different antecedents, moderators, behaviours, variables, and outcomes (see for example Den Hartog, 2015; Eva et al., 2019; Treviño & Brown, 2018; Yukl et al., 2011). For instance, Lemoine et al. (2019, p. 148) claim that their "differentiation among moral approaches to leadership [through an alignment of moral leadership theories with different ethical theories] delineates avenues for future research that promise to build complementary rather than redundant knowledge". This quotation highlights several questionable assumptions. It assumes that more delineation is not only what is needed, but is also possible and meaningful. If phenomena like Ethical, Authentic, or Servant Leadership are not fixed and stable, then it may not even be possible to completely delineate one from the other. The edges may always remain blurry. The quotation also assumes that the theoretical overlap is 'redundant' and that theoretical delineation is what defines 'knowledge'. However, it makes sense to me that moral/ethical leadership theories should share something in common, by virtue of all being moral/ethical leadership theories. They share something at the ready-to-hand (absorbed-coping) level.

2.3.3 Measurement Tool Questionnaires

The dominant approach to seeking to explore the various properties (e.g., antecedents, moderators, behaviours, traits, variables, or outcomes) and/or the relationship between them is by utilising 'measurement tools'—specifically, questionnaires. By far the most utilised Ethical Leadership measurement tool is that developed by Brown et al. (2005), which utilises a 10 item Ethical Leadership Scale (Den Hartog, 2015). However, De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) also developed a questionnaire to measure Ethical Leadership, which they went on to revise and extend in their later research (Kalshoven, Den Hartog, & De Hoogh, 2011). They call this the Ethical Leadership Work Questionnaire, and it has 38 items rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Yukl et al. (2011) then developed what they call an improved measure of Ethical Leadership, the Ethical Leadership Questionnaire, which consists of 15 questions to be rated on a six point Likert scale. Langlois, Lapointe, Valois, and de Leeuw

(2014) developed yet another Ethical Leadership Questionnaire, with 23 questions and a six-point Likert scale, focused on what they consider to be the three interdependent dimensions of ethics in an organisation: justice, critique, and care. More recently, another two Ethical Leadership measurement tools have been added to the list: the first developed by Mitropoulou, Tsaousis, Xanthopoulou, and Petrides (2019) and the second by Shakeel, Kruyen, and Thiel (2020).

The dominant 'objects-with-properties' approach to Authentic and Servant Leadership also utilises these questionnaires as measurement tools. Eva et al. (2019) identified 16 measures tools for Servant Leadership in the second phase of Servant Leadership research development. The most widely used Authentic Leadership Questionnaire was developed by Walumbwa et al. (2008). However, there is also the Authentic Leadership Inventory developed by Neider and Schriesheim (2011), and a new Authentic Leadership Integrated Questionnaire has more recently been developed by Levesque-Côté et al. (2018), although it has not yet been utilised empirically (Pioli, Feuerschütte, Tezza, & Cancellier, 2020). Walumbwa et al. (2008, p. 90) go far as to say that, without these measurement tools, it is difficult to hold leaders ethically accountable. This suggests that one's experience of a supervisor's leadership is not enough if it is not somehow measured.

While these questionnaires comprise different questions, they utilise the same question-Likert scale response approach, 'validated' by large samples sizes and various statistical analysis that tests for significance, correlation, construct reliability, factor analysis, etc. These questionnaires (aka measurement tools) ask participants to rate each question according to the Likert-scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, etc., to each question. Alternatively, the Likert scale ranking might be couched as never/rarely/sometimes/often/very-often/always. While these 'validated' questionnaires have the appearance of objectivity, they are imbued with meaning that is contextual—that is, how the questions are understood by participants are necessarily grounded in particular social practices.

2.3.4 Questions Imbued with Meaning

The large sample sizes and various statistical analyses used to validate these moral/ethical leadership measurement tools gloss over the fact that each of the questions comprising these questionnaires are loaded with meaning, and each participant filling out the questionnaire is unlikely to understand a question in the same way. Relatedly, the questionnaire approach provides no room for research participants to express how *they* experience moral/ethical leaderships, as opposed to how it is defined for them in the pre-formulated questions. Below are example questions from four of the Ethical Leadership measurement questionnaires, asking participants to rate their supervisor (or themselves) on a Likert scale:

- Conducts his/her personal life in an ethical manner (Brown et al., 2005)
- Sympathises with me when I have problems (Kalshoven et al., 2011)

- Shows a strong concern for ethical and moral values (Yukl et al., 2011)
- I establish trust in my relationships with others (Langlois et al., 2014).

While these questions may be meaningful and relevant, they are not straightforward. I will use myself in a hypothetical example to draw out some of the possible tensions in just one of the questions. If I were a participant in a study utilising a Brown et al. (2005) questionnaire, and I circled the answer 'Agree' that my supervisor 'conducts her life in an ethical manner', this says nothing about how I experience that ethical manner, or even what 'ethical manner' means for me. Nor does the Likert scale allow me to communicate anything about situations where I think my supervisor does or does not conduct their personal life in an ethical manner. The question also assumes that I know enough about my supervisor's personal circumstances to make any judgements at all about how they conduct their personal life. Indeed, what counts as their personal life? And does this have anything to do with how they behave in an organisation? For instance, I might know that my supervisor is having an affair in their personal life that I may consider unethical. I might also know they are prepared to stand up for what is fair and reasonable for their team in very difficult situations, which I consider to be ethical leadership. Perhaps this is what matters to me when I think about ethical leadership from an organisational perspective. On balance, I may decide to circle 'Agree' on the Likert scale, but, given the complexity I have just hypothetically outlined, this may not be a very meaningful response to the question.

The question and Likert-scale assume that my supervisor's conduct is a fixed and stable behavioural trait that is demonstrated the same way in all—or at least most—situations. The questionnaires do not account for the "burgeoning stream of research [that] has robustly shown that there is a sizable amount of behavioral variation within the same leader across time" (Liao et al., 2021, p. 2). These concerns, as well as other biases and influences, are well known to quantitative researchers. They therefore try to 'control' for them as best they can. They seek 'discriminant validity' in their questionnaires, to try and ensure they are measuring the construct of interest rather than measuring a related construct, which can create conceptual confusion. However, the problem might be from the 'ground up'. That is, the problem might be that 'conducting themselves in an ethical manner' is firstly not a stable trait at all. Secondly, as my hypothetical example was intended to illustrate, it may not be possible to capture the complexity of an answer on a Likert-scale. Thirdly, the very meaning of the question may vary from one participant to the next.

This analysis of the meaning imbued in each of the questions that comprise the moral/ethical leadership measurement tools is a microcosm of broader ontological and epistemological debates in both philosophy and organisational behaviour studies. A fundamental underlying objectivist (aligned with positivist) assumption of a measurement tool approach to exploring social phenomena is that social science, modelling itself on the natural sciences, "should be a value-free enterprise" (Barrett, Powley,

& Pearce, 2011, p. 193). It assumes that there are stable and objective 'facts' to be discovered regarding social phenomena, including ethical leadership, that are independent from how we understand, and value, those 'facts'. Heidegger and other philosophers (notably including Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Foucault) have been influential in challenging these fundamental assumptions. Their theories have been used to inform and build more critical organisational behaviour studies (Barrett et al., 2011). Heidegger argues that we can and do step back to observe and reflect on objects or situations in a present-to-hand way (in a way which seeks to be what we call 'objective' and/or 'unbiased'). However, this is always and necessarily done from a set of background social practices that influence how we know, observe, or reflect on anything. We cannot detach ourselves from these background social practices. A person is never free of a context that underlies the meaning and understanding given to any object or situation. Therefore, even when a social scientist seeks to be objective and unbiased and identify so-called 'value-free facts', this is impossible for them to succeed, according to a Heideggerian perspective, because phenomena (social or scientific) are never context free and therefore never interpretation (value) free.

2.3.5 Placing Imbued Meaning at the Heart of the Research

It is interesting that positivist researchers often use the term 'construct' to refer a social phenomenon under investigation (see for instance Treviño & Brown, 2018). This practice suggests a recognition that the phenomenon is constructed. However, these same researchers go on to study the phenomenon as though it is fixed and stable, as though there are objective 'truths' or properties that exist independently from the people that have constructed the phenomenon. More research is unlikely to untangle the conceptual confusion if there is no 'objective truth' about ethical leadership that exists independently 'out there' in the world to untangle, as a Heideggerian perspective suggests. If Langlois et al. (2014) define Ethical Leadership, for instance, as having three interdependent dimensions of ethics (justice, critique, and care) and ask research participants questions around these aspects, it is unsurprising that these aspects show up in the results. If Brown et al. define Ethical Leadership as being confined to the formal relationship between leader and follower, it is unsurprising that nothing outside that relationship shows up in the results utilising that measurement tool. Indeed, it is unsurprising that when I seek to understand ethical leadership from a Heideggerian perspective, as I do in this research, various Heideggerian ontological structures show up. There might be persuasive reasons to prefer one construct over the other. However, one construct does not represent the definitive truth about ethical leadership.

From a Heideggerian perspective, there *is* truth about ethical leadership. However, that truth does not exist independently of those who understand it. Any truth about ethical leadership is imbued with meaning, yet that meaning is not fixed or immutable. I am therefore not suggesting that the phenomenon of ethical leadership is an empty concept. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003, p. 374) suggest this of leadership more broadly. They suggest that 'leadership' disappears under close scrutiny and becomes "vague or even self-contradictory", and therefore that leadership might be an empty

signifier. However, the fact that we can meaningfully talk about ethical leadership as a phenomenon suggests we do indeed mean something by it. Rather, it is what Kelly (2014, p. 907) calls (in relation to leadership more broadly) an "adaptable signifier". Kelly (2014) makes the case that it might be a mistake to look for 'leadership' (and, by extension, ethical leadership) in positive ontological foundations. This means 'leadership' might not be a discrete object, entity, or even relationship at all. Leadership might be better thought of as an ongoing process of becoming, one in which it is important not to forget "language, meaning, interpretation, and action in the production and maintenance of the leadership concept" (Kelly, 2014, p. 911). However, this does not mean it is not social reality.

I am not suggesting that research utilising this objects-with-properties perspective—strongly aligned as it is with the positivist research approach—does not say anything meaningful about moral/ethical leadership. However, I am suggesting that, despite the use of large sample sizes and statistically validated questionnaires to identify variables, moderators, outcomes, etc., the conclusions of these studies are nevertheless imbued with meaning and interpretation on many levels. They do not produce an impartial reporting of 'objective properties' of ethical leadership that exist 'out there in the world' independent of the people involved in constructing that meaning, as they are often purported to do. I am not the first to level this critique. This criticism has been made of leadership studies more widely (see for instance Meier & Carroll, 2019; S. Taylor & Young, 2017). Indeed, I acknowledge that much of the critical leadership studies literature aims to question and explore the dominant, and often implicit, ontological, epistemological, and political assumptions that underpin leadership research. It also aims to challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions grounded in the positivist tradition (see for instance Alvesson & Spicer, 2014; Barker, 1997; Crevani, Lindgren, & Packendorff, 2010; Ford, 2010; Gemmill & Oakley, 1992; Kelly, 2014; Spicer, Alvesson, & Kärreman, 2009).

The 'ontological problem' I want to highlight is that the dominant, positivist approach assumes from the outset that the proper way to understand ethical leadership is from an objects-with-properties perspective. This forgets that we are in the world in a ready-to-hand way first and foremost. The 'objective properties' of moral/ethical leaderships are, rather, an amalgam of meaning. A process of refinement and analysis to land on an amalgam of meaning is also what I aim to achieve in my research. However, as I discuss in my more detail in Chapter 4, my research does not seek to gloss over this meaning with pre-defined tick-boxes. Rather, I put it at the heart of the research.

2.4 Additional Troubling Tensions

While an objects-with-properties approach dominates the moral/ethical leadership research, I have questioned whether the measurement tools—comprised as they are of questions imbued with layers of meaning—capture something 'objective' about a fixed and stable property of ethical leadership. However, there are additional 'troubling tensions' for these three moral/ethical leadership theories that focus on this objects-with-properties mode-of-Being in the world. In this section, I discuss

these troubling tensions as they pertain to Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership. The first troubling tension is linked to the lack of engagement with ethical theory, especially for a leadership theory that takes the name Ethical Leadership. The second tension—or, more specifically, tension*s*—I wish to draw out is in relation to a central tenet of the Authentic Leadership literature, which is 'being true to one's self'. This central tenet raises several issues. Is it possible to analyse a first-person perspective (of 'being authentic') from the third-person perspective (of followers)? If authenticity and being true to oneself is an inherent good for one's Self (and the ultimate aim of Authentic Leadership) is it then reasonable to focus on the instrumental good to the organisation? These tensions arise from a difference between an 'essentialist' and an 'existential' notion of authenticity. The third troubling tension I highlight in this section is the lack of fit between an objects-with-properties approach and the original conceptualisation of Servant Leadership by Greenleaf (1977). This original conceptualisation is, I contend, ontological.

2.4.1 Ethical Leadership and the Lack of 'Ought'

As discussed, much of the organisational behaviour literature exploring Ethical Leadership uncritically adopts the Brown et al. (2005) definition of ethical leadership and utilises their 10-item Ethical Leadership Scale. Brown et al.'s early research into the phenomenon (2003; 2000) concluded that Ethical Leadership was partly a reputational phenomenon: as well as being a Moral Person, the ethical leader had to be a Moral Manager. This conclusion persisted into their much-used 2005 definition of Ethical Leadership as "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making" (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120). The focus of the phenomenon is on the leader-follower relationship, a two-way relationship dyad that is taken to be central in much of the leadership literature.

The Ethical Leadership literature that utilises the Brown et al. (2005) definition of the phenomenon has been criticised for not engaging in the 'ought' of ethics (Flanigan, 2017; Price, 2017). However, I contend there is a hidden 'ought' in their definition. Essentially, Price (2017) and Flanigan (2017) argue that the Ethical Leadership literature that utilises the Brown et al. (2005) definition is descriptive. Price (2017) and Flanigan (2017) argue that ethics is bound up with the normative question of 'what ought one to do'. Therefore, they are critical of the Ethical Leadership literature that does not actively engage or answer this 'ought' question. Treviño (1999) recognises and defends her 'descriptive' approach to Ethical Leadership. However, Ciulla (1995, p. 6) argues that "ethics is located in the heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage". I understand Ciulla to mean that any definition of leadership is imbued with values and normative assumptions, even if these are not explicit or even noticed. I agree, as per my critique of the moral/ethical leadership questionnaires above. The hidden 'ought' in Brown et al.'s definition of Ethical Leadership is that a leader ought to conform to the socially accepted norms of their followers. However, Price (2017) and Flanigan (2017) argue there

is something theoretically lacking in the 'ethics' of Ethical Leadership conceived of as 'social norms'. Brown et al. (2005) provide no ethical *defence* of why conforming to socially accepted norms is indeed the way I *ought* to act, presumably because they do not conceive of their approach as a normative one. Instead, they see it as 'objectively' descriptive.

However, even if Brown et al. (2005) did acquiesce to Price (2017) and Flanigan's (2017) criticisms of Ethical Leadership, and shift from a descriptive approach to the adoption of an normative ethical theory perspective, this would not necessarily address what I have called the 'ontological problem'. In other words, an ethical theory perspective—at least one based on Plato, Aristotle, and Kant—also ultimately proceeds from an objects-with-properties perspective. Heidegger specifically targets Kant, Aristotle, and Plato in his analysis in *Being and Time*. Essentially, from the meta-ethical perspective of Kant, Aristotle and Plato, humans are a special kind of object with the property of 'rationality'. This objects-with-properties perspective of being a special kind of rational-object (a subject) forgets that we are in the world first and foremost in an absorbed-copying mode-of-Being. While Heidegger does not propose an ethical theory, he does nevertheless imply a 'good' way of Being-in-the-world, is Being-in-the-world authentically. 'Authenticity' is the phenomenon at the heart of Authentic Leadership, the theory to which I now turn.

2.4.2 Authentic Leadership and 'Being True to One's Self'

The popularity of Authentic Leadership has emerged at least partly in response to corporate scandals (Sarkaria, 2018) and ethical failures that are considered to be underpinned by Machiavellianist (the means justify the end) styles of leadership (Sendjaya, Pekerti, Härtel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016).[9] In association with the various Authentic Leadership measurement tools noted above, there are various definitions and conceptualisations of Authentic Leadership. The most utilised one is Walumbwa et al. (2008) four primary measures of Authentic Leadership: self-awareness, balanced processing, internalised moral perspective, and relational transparency. Central to the Authentic Leadership literature (however it is defined or conceptualised) is the idea of authenticity as integrity and of 'being true to oneself' by acting in accordance with one's true self (see for instance Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Walumbwa et al., 2008). Ladkin and Taylor (2010) identify this expression of the true self as one of the three major themes that run through much of the Authentic Leadership literature. The second related theme they identify is that "the leader must be relatively aware of the nature of that self in order to express it authentically". This reference to a true Self that one can express authentically is a profoundly ontological concept. Given that the popularity of Authentic Leadership has emerged at least partly in response to corporate scandals, it is not surprising that that the third theme

[9] A Machiavellian style of leadership is sometimes considered part of the 'dark triad' of leadership personalities – narcissists, machiavellians, and psychopaths (Furtner, Maran, & Rauthmann, 2017). As the name implies these are leadership personalities or traits that are 'dark' or negative, and they are the subject of their own stream of literature.

Ladkin and Taylor (2010, p. 65) identify in the literature is an Authentic Leader is "normatively inclined towards moral virtue from a core of ideas". This underscores the moral aspect of Authentic Leadership by assuming that an authentic leader, in Being authentic, is necessarily acting with moral virtue.

These three Authentic Leadership themes (i.e., being true to oneself, one's awareness of that self, and a self that in being-authentic is morally virtuous) are related to the three tensions I address in this (2.4.2) sub-section. The first tension is: if at its core authenticity is about being true to oneself, is it even possible to analyse a first-person perspective (of 'being authentic') from the third-person perspective (of followers)? The second is: if authenticity and being true to oneself is an inherent good for one's Self (as the very notion of authenticity implies), is it then reasonable to focus on Authentic Leadership as instrumentally good for the organisation? These tensions are rooted in a third tension: the difference between 'essentialist' and 'existential' notions of authenticity. Essentialist notions dominate the Authentic Leadership literature, although there are some examples of existential notions in the literature. However, Heidegger offers one of the most comprehensive accounts of an existential notion of authenticity. I argue it is therefore useful to explore how his theory can help to understand a moral/ethical perspective of leadership.

2.4.2.1 Analysing a first-person perspective from the third-person perspective

The three Authentic Leadership questionnaires noted in Section 2.3 (Levesque-Côté et al., 2018; Neider & Schriesheim, 2011; Walumbwa et al., 2008) are to be filled out by 'followers'. Participants are asked to rate how someone else (usually their supervisor) is true to themselves, via a series of questions. However, this raises a question articulated by Kuhl (2020): is it even possible to analyse a first-person perspective from the third-person perspective? This is a theoretical tension not acknowledged in most of the Authentic Leadership literature, although there are exceptions, (see for instance Ladkin & Taylor, 2010; Liedtka, 2008). Even from this objects-with-properties perspective, it seems self-evident that the first-person is in the best position from which to answer questions about one's own subjectivity. Liedtka (2008, p. 240) is clear about this: "[It] is impossible to calibrate how ''authentic'' any self is in an objective way: authenticity is a subjective sense rather than a fact of our existence". This does not preclude someone being deluded about how they are perceived, providing a major reason and value for third-person questionaries. Nevertheless, the point of the Authentic Leadership theory is that it is not about perception management but congruence with the so-called 'inner core self'—whether one is deluded about how one is perceived or not. Indeed, Avolio et al. 2005 draw a theoretical distinction between Brown et al. (2005) Ethical Leadership construct and their own Authentic Leadership construct. They do this partly because Brown et al. (2005) construct includes the concept of a Moral Manager, which is ultimately about perception management.

While being 'true to oneself' matters to one's self, Ladkin and Taylor (2010) argue that what matters to followers is the way this 'true self' is enacted. The implication is, in line with most of the

Authentic Leadership literature, that follower's perceptions matter most to an organisation. However, this raises another theoretical tension often not acknowledged in the literature—that of authenticity being inherently good for one's self and yet valued instrumentally by the organisation.

2.4.2.2 Tension between good for one's Self and instrumentally good

As discussed in the previous section, a core concept of authenticity within the Authentic Leadership literature is 'being true to yourself'. However, the benefit of Authentic Leadership is usually considered a benefit because it serves the organisation. One's authenticity might serve the organisation through an "increase in commitment, satisfaction, and other positive work outcomes" (Walumbwa et al., 2008, p. 106), or because authenticity ultimately contributes to "the attainment of sustainable and veritable performance" (Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). From this perspective, authenticity is what Flanigan (2015) calls instrumentally good. However, from an ethical perspective, being 'true to yourself' is usually understood as something that is good in and of itself—what Kant would call an end in itself (Kant, 2012). Indeed, as acknowledged above, this is what gives Authentic Leadership its distinctly moral dimension: being authentic is a good way to be. There is therefore an inherent tension here, in so far as 'authenticity' in the hands of most leadership theorists is a means to an end, not an end itself.[10] Flanigan (2015) goes on to argue for authenticity for its own sake. Ford and Harding (2017, p. 464) argue that leaders and followers "sacrificing their subjectivity" to the organisation is the very definition of *in*authentic. From a Heideggerian perspective, simply conforming to an organisational mantra would indeed be inauthentic. However, one may choose to act in accordance with the organisational mantra in a way that does not simply sacrifice one's subjectivity. A Heideggerian interpretation would be interested in how one acts resolutely within that organisational setting, given how the organisational ends are part of the context in which one embedded. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, Heidegger's concept of authenticity is importantly different to the concept of authenticity that lies at the heart of much of the Authentic Leadership literature.

2.4.2.3 'Essential' versus 'existential' Self

The concept of authenticity which is at the heart of much of the Authentic Leadership research can be called an 'essentialist' view of authenticity (Ladkin & Taylor, 2010). This is the view that authenticity is being true to an essential, core self—a self that is born, not made. This self, once found or uncovered, is essentially stable and unchanging, and our aim is to act in accordance with that self. Underlying third-person Authentic Leadership questionnaires is the belief that this integrity between self and action should be evident to others, and shows up as (relatively stable and unchanging)

[10] This tension is mirrored in a broader business ethics debate. It is often argued that 'good ethics is good business'. While this may often be the case (particularly when 'good ethics' are considered over a long-term, reputational horizon), if the motivation for acting ethically is ultimately the bottom line (or some other business measure), then the motivation is necessarily not maximising 'the good' (of ethics). Logically, if they clash, the bottom line will win out.

observable traits and behaviours. Heidegger's concept of authenticity might look 'essential' but is rather 'existential'. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, for Heidegger, authenticity is 'choosing to choose oneself'. However, the more we 'choose ourselves', the more it may look and like we have a core, stable self. Therefore, the two concepts of authenticity are not entirely unrelated. Nevertheless, there is an ontological difference between an 'essentialist' and 'existential' view of authenticity.

This dominant 'essentialist' concept of authenticity within the Authentic Leadership literature tends to take an objects-with-properties view. In other words, an essentialist concept of authenticity is aligned with a present-to-hand mode-of-Being rather than a ready-to-hand mode-of-Being. From a present-to-hand/objects-with-properties perspective, the 'self' is a particular type of object (a subject) that has the psychological properties that make it 'authentic' (for example, awareness, unbiased processing, action, and relational orientation) (Kernis, 2003, p. 13). These psychological properties in turn cause certain traits and behaviours that are observable by followers. For Heidegger, authenticity is first and foremost an experience of oneself; we do not experience ourselves as a category or a trait to be implemented.

Although essentialist concepts of authenticity dominate the Authentic Leadership literature, there are those who do take a more existential perspective. For instance, Spiller (2021) introduces into the Authentic Leadership literature a concept of authenticity from an 'indigenous consciousness' perspective. This concept shares much with a Heideggerian perspective. In her article, she draws attention to an indigenous notion that there is no "'inner authenticity' versus the external 'real world'. We are integral to our world as it is to us and do not exist beyond or apart from it" (Spiller, 2021, p. 2). Heidegger argues for much the same thing. We do not exist first and foremost *in* the world. Rather, we are constituted *by* our world. For Heidegger, the way we move around our world is intrinsically linked to how we understand the world we are constituted by. It is only when we stop and think of ourselves as a subject that we consider ourselves with an 'inside' versus the 'outside' (in a present-to-hand way). Heidegger does not need to deny that there is complex neurobiology, biology, and psychology 'inside' ourselves. However, from a phenomenological perspective, we do not experience our biology and psychology first and foremost, we experience ourselves first and foremost in a ready-to-hand/absorbed-coping way.

In addition to Spiller (2021), there are other more existential (i.e., non-essential) notions of authenticity in the Authentic Leadership literature. However, these remain the exceptions. Sparrowe (2005), for instance, proposes a different way to consider and research Authentic Leadership—one that draws from Ricoeur's hermeneutic philosophy and is based on a narrative self. Given Heidegger's influence on Rioeur's hermeneutic philosophy (Sparrowe, 2005), this narrative methodology and its underpinning philosophy share much with my own Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological approach. However, Sparrowe (2005) himself did not utilise his methodology empirically. In addition, Shamir and Eilam (2005) suggest a very similar narrative approach in the same *The Leadership*

Quarterly journal edition (a special edition on Authentic Leadership which was quite influential in the development of the theory). They call their approach a life-story approach and "argue that authentic leadership rests heavily on the self-relevant meanings the leader attaches to his or her life experiences, and these meanings are captured in the leader's life-story" (Shamir & Eilam, 2005, p. 395). Their approach is interested in authentic leader development. They consider that authentic leader development should be the most relevant focus of research. For Shamir and Eilam (2005, p. 143), this development is not supposed to be measured against some pre-defined set of traits and behaviours that other people rate. Rather, development must come from a first-person perspective for the benefit of the leader's own "self-knowledge, self-clarification, self-presentation, and self-expression".

Despite Shamir and Eilam's (2005) focus on the importance of authentic leadership from a self-development, first-person perspective, they too conceptualise the benefit of the Authentic Leadership as instrumental. They contend that the benefit of Authentic Leadership stems from authentic leaders being more effective for the organisation (Shamir & Eilam, 2005, p. 399). Even for them with their self-development focus, Authentic Leadership is ultimately an instrumental means to organisational ends. Like much of the Authentic Leadership literature, Shamir and Eilam (2005) conceptualise leadership along the classic leader-follower dyad. However, unlike much of the Authentic Leadership literature, they also apply the concept of authenticity to followers. They argue that "authentic leadership includes authentic followership as well, namely followers who follow the leaders for authentic reasons and have an authentic relationship with the leader" (Shamir & Eilam, 2005, p. 401). This implies that, if a 'follower' is authentic in the same way as a 'leader', it is only their place in the formal hierarchy which makes them 'followers' and not 'leaders'. However, from an existential perspective, it is not clear why a person's position in a hierarchy matters if they are an 'authentic leader'. In contrast, a Heideggerian perspective of authentic leadership can be considered a type of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). I discuss this perspective in Chapter 3.

The 'embodied self' is another notable existential notion of the Authentic Leader. Ladkin and Taylor (2010) introduce the notion that an authentic self is an embodied 'self' and therefore a "somatic sense of self contributes to the felt sense of authenticity" (Ladkin & Taylor, 2010, p. 64). Although they do not couch this conceptualisation of authenticity as an existential notion, their explanation of 'a somatic sense of self contributing to authenticity' nevertheless touches on (what Heidegger would call) our Being-in-the-world. This is our experience of ourselves in the world in an absorbed coping way. Drawing on Wilson (1988), Ladkin and Taylor (2010) argue that our somatic experiences underpin the inner-oriented experience of ourselves. Somatic experiences are literally the way we feel ourselves and are enacted with/through our bodies. This includes emotions, butterflies in the stomach, the queasiness of uncertainty, elation, tension, etc. Wilson suggests that "being attentive to these somatic events provides the possibility for 'self-actualisation' (Maslow, 1976) and is crucial for the development of the true self" (in Ladkin & Taylor, 2010, p. 66). How we feel in our inner realm is then expressed

symbolically, in our words and gestures, through our bodies. Our 'inner realm' interacts with what is happening outside our bodies. This somatic felt-sense tells us at the most primordial level who we are. Expressed and shaped by symbolic words and actions through engagement in the world, the felt-sense is organised within our body-unit: "Thus, one's body becomes the nexus of the various experiences that enable him [her] to identify himself as a person of a particular sort" (Ladkin & Taylor, 2010, p. 66).

Heidegger's existential account of authenticity does not provide a well-developed account of what Ladkin and Taylor (2010) call the embodied self. There are phenomenological philosophers that have a more developed theories of the 'embodied self', influenced as they often are by Heidegger, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Nevertheless, Heidegger does touch on aspects of it, particularly in his concept of a 'call of conscience'. He suggests that "the call [of conscience] is understood with an existential [i.e., actual] kind of hearing" (p. 325, S280). By this, Heidegger means the 'call' is experienced in a concrete situation. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, the call of conscience is part of Heidegger's comprehensive account of an existential notion of authenticity, as opposed to the more dominant essentialist accounts identified in much of the Authentic Leadership literature. However, before I describe Heidegger's more existential notion of authenticity, in the next section I discuss the 'troubling tension' with Servant Leadership, which is it has forgotten its ontological roots.

2.4.3 Servant Leadership and its Forgotten Ontological Roots

The third troubling tension I discuss in this section (2.4), is the lack of fit between the dominant objects-with-properties approach to Servant Leadership research and the original conceptualisation of the theory by Greenleaf (1977). This theory is, I contend, more aligned with a ready-to-handy perspective. The more dominant objects-with-properties approach (evident in the 16 Servant Leadership measurement tools and the high proportion of quantitative manuscripts (Eva et al., 2019)) misses something important in the conception and understanding of Servant Leadership as it was originally conceived by Greenleaf. When one reads Greenleaf's work, his writing is imbued with references to how a servant-leader is ideally in-the-world.

In the following subsections, I describe Greenleaf's original conception of Servant Leadership, and its ethical dimension. I go on to outline how Greenleaf resisted defining and confining Servant Leadership, as opposed to the now more dominant approach that seeks preciously to define and delineate the theory. For Greenleaf, wise choices are guided by intuition, which are difficult to pin down and measure. For him, action must respond to the situation. This opposes Servant Leadership actions, which fit a pre-defined Servant Leadership definition or a fixed set of moderators, antecedents, mediators, or outcomes. Greenleaf was happy to sit with the contradictions of the lived experience, which do not fit easily into neat tick-boxes with which one can agree or disagree on a Likert Scale. I finish this section noting that, while Greenleaf never couches it in these terms, his conception of Servant

Leadership is imbued with both existential (and therefore ontological) notions that are not incompatible with some of Heidegger's notions.

2.4.3.1 Greenleaf's original conception of Servant Leadership

Servant Leadership as an organisational leadership theory emerged in a seminal essay by Greenleaf called *The Servant as Leader*, originally published in 1970. However, Greenleaf acknowledges the origins behind the core concept of a leader as a servant, which has its roots in historical and religious philosophies (such as ancient Chinese Confucian teachings, and Jesus Christ in the Christian Bible). Greenleaf himself was inspired by Herman Hesse's novel *Journey to the East*. In this novel, a group of people, including the narrator of the story, sets out on a journey (to the East) sponsored by a spiritual sect called The League. Leo is their servant. In this role, Leo completes menial tasks, but also sustains the party with his caring spirit, good humour, and song. When Leo disappears, the group falls into disarray, and they abandon the journey. Many years later, the narrator finds Leo. He is surprised to learn that Leo is not a menial servant but the noble and esteemed President of The League.

The central thesis of Greenleaf's theory is: "The servant-leader *is* servant first—as Leo was portrayed. It begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 6) This concept differs from someone who is motivated to be a leader by the power, status, or wealth accompanying the position. For Greenleaf, these aspirations for leadership are two extremes, and an individual can fall somewhere between them. Greenleaf goes on to say that "[t]he best test, and one difficult to administer, is: Do those served grow as persons? Do they, *while being served*, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? *And*, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or at least, not be further deprived?" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 6 italics original). The best test is not a list of traits, characteristics, or behaviours. For Greenleaf, a leader is someone who "shows the way", guided by their intuition toward a goal. The goal is not captured by some sort of performance measure, but an "overarching purpose, the big dream, the visionary concept" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 7). The goal guides action. However, the goal is never achieved, it can only ever be strived for.

While Servant Leadership is often considered one of the three most prominent moral/ethical leadership theories, Greenleaf seldom used the term 'ethics' himself. He certainly did not propose a formal code or belief system (Saleem-Tanner, p. 275). Rather, the inherent ethical dimension to Servant Leadership (as Greenleaf proposed it) rests in the altruistic ends of the servant-leader—i.e. serving for the benefit of followers (whether this benefit is their health, wisdom, freedom, or autonomy) and the benefit of the least privileged in society. For Greenleaf, "deep down inside the great ones [i.e., the servant-leaders] have empathy and an unqualified acceptance of the persons of those who go with their leadership" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 10).

This recognition of all people as valuable has deontological overtones. To borrow Immanuel Kant's terminology, people are valuable as ends in themselves (Kant, 2012). Servant Leadership "is at heart a struggle for meaning and significance in individual lives" (Greenleaf, 1996, p. 118). However, making wise, intuitive decisions that act as a role-model for followers to become servant-leaders themselves has Aristotelian (virtue-ethics) overtones. Indeed, some authors have made this link. Sison and Potts (2021, p. 1) propose "an Aristotelian construal of servant leadership. . . as a model for how to lead responsibly. This, [they] argue, entails a conjoining of the forces of practical wisdom and technical competence, directed toward the right ends, so that servant leaders always remain in service to (a) the noble goals of the organization, and (b) the moral development of both themselves and their followers". Interestingly, Lemoine et al. (2019) (in an article where they seek to theoretically distinguish Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership along normative moral theory lines) align Servant Leadership with consequentialist theory. This illustrates a profound misunderstanding of the theory, at least as it was conceptualised by Greenleaf. As Saleem-Tanner (2018, p. 272) puts it, "there is no question of whether the ends justify the means in servant leadership [an essentially consequentialist notion]; in Greenleaf's words, 'means determine ends'".

2.4.3.2 Greenleaf resisted defining and confining Servant Leadership

The object-with-properties approach to Servant Leadership that dominates the literature, which seeks to 'pin it down', misses something important in its understanding of Servant Leadership as it was originally conceived by Greenleaf. When one reads Greenleaf's work directly, his writing is imbued with references about how a servant-leader is ideally in-the-world. However, he resisted defining, and thus confining, Servant Leadership. This is opposed to an objects-with-properties approach, which is interested in providing 'construct clarity' to help define what it 'is' and provide the would-be servant-leader practical guidance. While Greenleaf was a prolific writer on the topic, "he never created a definitive list, model, or typology of servant leadership" (Saleem-Tanner, 2018, p. 274). Greenleaf eschews defining what Servant Leadership 'is' and providing 'practical guidance' because ultimately a Servant-leader 'is' whatever they need to be in the situation. This is guided by their service to others in achieving their overarching purpose, and by their intuition.

2.4.3.3 Choices guided by intuition

Greenleaf's Servant Leadership is ultimately guided by intuitive choice. This might be one reason he resists defining and confining Servant Leadership, compared to those who follow in his footsteps. Greenleaf's Servant Leadership theory was not based on a logical deduction, moving from premise to conclusion. Rather, he acknowledges he arrived at it from his intuitive insights of Hesse's story of Leo (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 5). It is interesting to note that, in Greenleaf's not-quite-but-almost-definition of Servant Leadership, he refers to a 'feeling' that one wants to serve (what Heidegger might call a 'knowing'). What follows is a 'conscious choice' to lead. For Greenleaf, servant-leaders have

faith: "Faith is the choice of the nobler hypothesis" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 6). Greenleaf's reference to faith here does not refer to a religious faith[11]. Rather, he conceptualises a faith that, when one is guided by a noble cause or goal truly in service to others, helps one make the best choice one can in the situation. It might not be *the* best choice; *the* best choice will not necessarily be known for a long time, until history has played out. However, it is a choice one can depend upon, and a choice that comes from within oneself—a profoundly ontological notion.

> William Blake has said, "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything will appear to man as it is, infinite". Those who have gotten their doors of perception open wide often know that this statement of Blake's is not mere poetic exaggeration. (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 14)

The 'infinite perception' Greenleaf refers to in the quote above is perhaps the reason why he is comfortable in accommodating contradictions in experience: an infinite perception can accommodate everything. If one recognises that one is infinite, then, Greenleaf argues, the remedy to any problem starts with a change within oneself, not a change 'out there' in the world. Greenleaf acknowledges how this is a difficult concept for the modern person to get their head around.

2.4.3.4 Contradictions of lived experience

While theories based on deductive logic cannot accommodate contradictions, Greenleaf (1977, p. 5) is quite happy to sit with contradictions and acknowledges many of them in his "perceptual world"—in other words, in his lived experience. Illustrative is his position that: "My good society will have strong individualism amidst community. It will have elitism along with populism. I listen to the old and to the young and find myself baffled and heartened by both. Reason and intuition, each in its own way, both comfort and dismay me" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 5). Presumably the contradictions of the lived experience constitute one reason he never sought to define and confine Servant Leadership. They may also be why a Servant Leadership measurement tool is not well aligned with Greenleaf's own approach. Experience does not fit easily into the neat tick-boxes of questionnaires, no matter how carefully they are statistically validated.

2.4.3.5 Action responds to the situation

Action guided by intuitive choice toward an overarching noble goal is, for Greenleaf, deeply and inextricably rooted in the situation, or a specific context. In his seminal essay (Greenleaf, 1977), Greenleaf gave three examples of Servant Leaders: John Woolman, an eighteenth-century American Quaker who was instrumental in abolishing slavery as an accepted practice within the Quaker religion; Thomas Jefferson, specifically his influence in drafting new principles of law; and Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, who in the nineteenth century introduced the Danish Folk High School, which

[11] Having said that, the concept of 'faith' Greenleaf is using here is not entirely incompatible with religious faith either—as long as one is not referring to religious dogma, but rather embodying the teachings of another Servant Leader, Jesus Christ, or, perhaps, Buddha.

provided education for the peasant population and ultimately helped to propel them out of a feudal system. Greenleaf's point in telling their stories was not to suggest that we should follow their model of Servant Leadership, or be overly concerned with how they specifically achieved their successes (although we might find inspiration in their stories). Rather, he wanted to highlight that these people responded to their unique situation in a way that was fresh and creative (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 19). As I discuss in Chapter 3, Heidegger also places emphasis on responding to the concrete situation that one finds oneself thrown into.

2.4.3.6 Greenleaf's Servant Leadership is imbued with existential notions

Although Greenleaf never couches it in these terms, his conception of Servant Leadership is imbued with both ontological and phenomenological notions to describe how a Servant-leader is ideally-in-the-world. This includes a cultivation of awareness that allows one to see oneself as embedded in a particular social/cultural time and place:

> The cultivation of awareness gives one the basis for detachment, the ability to stand aside and see oneself in perspective in the context of one's own experience, amidst the ever present dangers, threats, and alarms" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 15).

For Greenleaf, this detachment facilitates choice and autonomy. This is not incompatible with Heidegger's notion of authenticity, which is also linked to choice, freedom, understanding, and meaning. For Greenleaf, "Nothing is meaningful until it is related to the hearer's own experience" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 9). We may hear the words someone speaks, but Greenleaf suggests we only understand these abstract language symbols once we have made an imaginative leap from the words and linked them to our personal fund of experience. It is, he contends, part of the Servant-leaders' role to help people make that imaginative leap.

In the book *On Becoming a Servant Leader*, the existential approach to exploring Servant Leadership—compared to the more objectivist (objects-with-properties) approaches—is quite explicit. In this book, there are references to Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path, suggesting the Servant Leader, like a Buddhist, is seeking a path of "right livelihood" (Greenleaf, Frick, & Spears, 1996, p. 118). Greenleaf acknowledges that aspects of Servant Leadership have spiritual overtones that are Buddhist in nature (Greenleaf et al., 1996). This includes the importance of love as an undefinable term that ultimately guides one's service; of joy as something generated inside; and of healing. Greenleaf suggests that self-healing might ultimately be the motivation for servant-leaders—a search for 'wholeness' that is something shared by both those being served and led.

Greenleaf implicitly recognises the importance of this lived experience and of responding to the situation. I too explore ethical leadership from this perspective. However, I do so more explicitly, and by utilising a theoretical understanding of how we are in-the-world in this lived-experience, in a ready-

to-hand way. In the next section, I elaborate on my research perspective and explicate my research question.

2.5 Towards Research from a Ready-to-hand Perspective

In this chapter I have argued the 'ontological problem' with the dominant objects-with-properties approach to ethical leadership forgets that we are in the world first and foremost in a ready-to-hand/absorbed coping mode-of-Being, which raises several ontological problems. A central problem of this dominant approach is the use of measurement tools. This use of these tools is aimed at producing an impartial reporting of 'objective properties' of moral/ethical leadership, and yet they are comprised of questions that are imbued with meaning and interpretation—meaning and interpretation which are simply glossed over. I argue instead that a ready-to-hand perspective puts meaning at the heart of the research.

In addition, I have discussed how the present-to-hand/objects-with-properties approach to exploring moral/ethical leadership raises related troubling tensions. I analysed these in relation to each of the prominent moral/ethical leadership theories in turn. The first troubling tension was a lack of engagement in ethical theory (and/or any justification of why one ought to conform to follower' norms)—something especially troubling for a leadership theory that takes the name Ethical Leadership. I agree with Price (2017) and Flanigan (2017) that is problematic. Nevertheless, even an ethical theory perspective (at least one based on Plato, Aristotle, or Kant) ultimately proceeds from an objects-with-properties perspective. I raised several tensions related to the essentialist concept of authenticity that dominates the Authentic Leadership literature as 'being true to oneself'. Lastly, I highlighted how the ontological underpinnings of much of the Servant Leadership literature do not align with the original conception and ontological underpinnings of Servant Leadership as originally conceived by Greenleaf.

I reiterate that I am not arguing that present-to-hand/objects-with-properties approach to exploring the moral/ethical leadership phenomenon is not useful or insightful. However, I am suggesting that this approach misses something important. It misses something about the wisdom and insight that comes from how ethical leadership is experienced in its messy totality, rather than in its constituent parts. To explore ethical leadership through a ready-to-hand perspective is to explore it from a phenomenological perspective. This perspective can better accommodate these troubling tensions. Instead of approaching the phenomenon of ethical leadership in terms of seeking to break it down into constituent parts aligned with a objects-with-properties perspective, the phenomenological approach seeks to understand how one experiences the phenomenon holistically, as lived, in its messy totality. It seeks to get closer to how we are in-the-world in this absorbed-coping way.

Heidegger defines phenomenology as "to the things themselves!" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. p50, S28). By this he means: to shed light and understanding on a phenomenon in question. The task is not to identify some 'objective truth' about a phenomenon, but to understand it. This aligns with what Ciulla

(1995) argues is more fundamental to the study of leadership more broadly: understanding rather than defining. The 'truth' about a phenomenon is not separate to how we understand it. Rather, the truth of a phenomenon *lies in* how we understand it—or how we make meaning from it. Heidegger argues the 'truth' of a phenomenon does not lie in a representational agreement between 'what is in my head' and 'some property out there in the world'. Instead, our understanding of 'something' (some entity or phenomenon) is grasped directly. Our experience of something directly *is* truth. It is how we experience it. This might sound like a subjective explanation. Simplistically put, what I experience is 'true for me' and is therefore 'true'. This is not what Heidegger means. He maintains we are fundamentally in the world with others, and our *shared* understanding of the world mitigates against this subjective interpretation. For Heidegger, our shared understanding of the world constitutes how we are in the world. That is why, as recognised by Ladkin (2010), our shared meanings enable us to collaborate and live together. A phenomenon is neither purely 'objectivist' (i.e., as something separate from us) nor is it purely 'subjective' (i.e., in a particular person's mind). Rather, our understanding of a phenomenon is grasped by an individual person. However, this is done from a shared world of an inter-related "totality-of-involvements" (p. 231, S186).

A phenomenological perspective of ethical leadership does not therefore ask what ethical leadership 'is', because this implies it is something fixed and immutable. A phenomenological perspective is interested in the lived experience. The question of interest, from a phenomenological perspective, is therefore: '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'* In the next chapter, I explore and discuss the ontological structures that theoretically underpin how we are in-the-world phenomenologically, in a ready-to-hand way.

Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework: Ontological Structures

In the previous chapter, I discussed how prominent moral/ethical leadership theories (Ethical Leadership, Authentic Leadership, and Servant Leadership) tend to be explored in the organisational literature from what Heidegger calls a present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) mode-of-Being. This may be a useful and valid way to explore ethical leadership. However, the ontological problem with this approach is it misses the way we are in the world first and foremost, which is in a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) mode-of-Being. In order to respond to my research question (*'how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*), I explore the phenomenon of ethical leadership from a ready-to-hand (phenomenological) perspective.

In this chapter, I explain the Heideggerian ready-to-hand, ontological structures that I utilise as my theoretical framework. In addition to making the important distinction between how we are in the world in different modes-of-Being, Heidegger's *Being and Time* also provides what he calls an "existential analytic" (p. 33, S13) of how human-Beings are in the world first and foremost. He provides an "elaborate structure" to explain what otherwise might look like a "hopeless tangle" of background practices of how we are in the world in this ready-to-hand/absorbed coping way (Chia & Holt, 2006, p. 639). His analytic goes beyond our everyday experience, to uncover "ontological structures" (p. 76, S51) of how we are in the world.

In utilising these ontological structures as a theoretical framework, I respond to a call in qualitative methodology literature (Gullick & West, 2020; Horrigan-Kelly et al., 2016) to utilise Heidegger's hermeneutic analytic structure to its fullest potential to expose the meaning of everyday human existence. "[W]hile the richness of Heideggerian philosophy is attractive as a . . . research framework, its density means authors rarely utilise its fullest possibilities as an hermeneutic analytic structure" (Gullick & West, 2020, p. 88). In other words, many researchers undertaking phenomenological studies utilise Heidegger as their underpinning philosophy, yet "apply his philosophy loosely" (Horrigan-Kelly et al., 2016, p. 1). Key tenets of Heidegger's philosophy—these ontological structures—can be utilised to theoretically frame the phenomenon under investigation. This approach "can serve to expose the meaning of everyday ordinary human existence as part of conducting interpretative phenomenological research" (Horrigan-Kelly et al., 2016, p. 1). For example, Gullick and West (2020) utilise Heidegger's ontological structure of 'Being-towards-death' to analyse phenomenological studies that explore the experience of living with a potentially life-limiting illness. In doing so, they argue that their meta-analysis of these studies demonstrates how Heidegger's ontological structures can be "used proactively as analytical 'hooks' for data in research claiming a basis in this [Heideggerian] philosophy and/or method" (Gullick & West, 2020, p. 87). Thus, my task

in this chapter is to explain the relevant ontological structures in order to apply them as analytical hooks—which I call interpretative lenses—to my empirical findings of how ethical leadership is understood through the lived experience.

The insight that Heidegger's phenomenological perspective can provide in understanding how we are in-the-world in this ready-to-hand way has been recognised by a small but significant body of literature in leadership studies, specifically, and organisational studies literature, more widely. Authors utilise Heideggerian ontological structures to explain, explore, or analyse specific organisational phenomena. These include: leadership (Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Ladkin, 2006, 2010; Reedy & Learmonth, 2011; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015), strategy (Chia & Holt, 2006; Liedtka, 2008); organisational change (Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2022), sense-making (Introna, 2019), environmental concerns (Painter-Morland & ten Bos, 2016), engaged management (Segal, 2011), socio-material practices (Lamprou, 2017), reducing 'red tape' (Campbell, 2019), the relationship between organisational theory and practice (Zundel & Kokkalis, 2010), and the tendency 'fix' meanings in organisational studies (Holt & Mueller, 2011). This approach has also been utilised in other disciplines and research fields beyond leadership and organisational studies, such as technology (Zovko, 2020), health care (Chesterton & Jack, 2021; Raia, 2020; Suddick, Cross, Vuoskoski, Galvin, & Stew, 2021), and the education sector (Elley-Brown & Pringle, 2019).

I contribute to this small but growing body of organisational studies literature by utilising specific Heideggerian ontological structures as interpretive lenses to shed light on my empirical findings to the research question *'how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'.* As referenced above, various aspects of organisational behaviour (for example leadership, strategy, sense-making, etc.) have been explored utilising Heidegger's ontological structures. However, as far as I am aware, these structures have not been used to understand ethical leadership specifically[12].

In this chapter, I focus on identifying and explaining the ontological structures (referred to here in italics) that have emerged as important in the organisational studies literature. In addition to *ready-to-hand* and *present-to-hand*, discussed in the previous chapter, these ontological structures include *Dasein,* an instance of a human-Being as existence, which is the starting point for Heidegger's ontological philosophy. Dasein is in the world with *care*. Dasein always 'cares' about other people: when this 'care' is positive it is called *positive solicitude*—a structure particularly central for the Heideggerian leadership literature. A fundamental ontological structure includes *inauthenticity*, linked as it is to *the-they*. Inauthenticity and the-they are necessary to properly understand Heidegger's version of *authenticity*, linked as it is to the *call of conscience*. When one is authentic, one takes *resolute action.* I tease out these ontological structures in this chapter. However, it is important to understand that they

[12] I note that Ladkin (2006), however, utilised Heidegger's concept of 'dwelling' to suggest how it could help organisational leaders resolve ethical issues. This has overlap with ethical leadership, and I draw upon her insight of 'right relation' in this thesis.

are all entwined. Part of Heidegger's aim is to shed light on this taken-for-granted—what Lamprou (2017) calls 'enmeshed'—way we are in the world first and foremost, before we move into a present-to-hand mode of Being, where we see the world and the things in it (including ourselves) as objects-with-properties.[13]

My explanation of these ontological structures considers two particularly pertinent questions for my thesis on 'ethical leadership' from a Heideggerian perspective. The first question is, '*where is the 'ethics' in Heidegger?*', and the second question is '*where is the 'leadership' in Heidegger?*' As I explain in Section 3.1, it is important to note up-front that Heidegger has outlined neither a theory of ethics nor a theory of leadership. Rather, Heidegger is interested in explaining ontological structures for how we are in the world first and foremost—whether this is in the world displaying a complex social phenomenon like ethical leadership, or simply walking down the street to get coffee, or hammering a nail. I explain these ontological structures in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, I explore how these structures can inform an understanding of leadership from an ontological perspective. I go on to utilise these ontological structures as interpretive lenses to shed light on my empirical findings that seek to answer the research question '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'.* This 'theoretical flow' is illustrated in **Figure 2** below. I finish this chapter (Section 3.4) with summarising my theoretical framework diagrammatically.

Figure 2: Theoretical flow



[13] It is also important to note that these ontological structures are not the only structures Heidegger describes, or indeed the only structures recognised in the organisational literature; rather they are the most relevant from an ethical and leadership perspective. Other structures not discussed in detail (though I mention some in passing) include dwelling, temporality, space, mood, and a totality-of-involvements (previously referred to).

3.1 'Ethical' and 'Leadership' Modes

Heidegger does not propose an ethical theory, nor does he propose a leadership theory. Nevertheless, as noted above, organisational researchers have recognised the ethical implications of Heidegger's ontological theory. Similarly, philosophy literature has also explored the ethical implications of Heidegger's ontological theory (see for instance George, 2021; Olafson, 1998; Philipse, 1999; Sorial, 2005; White, 1990). Both the organsiational studies and philosophy literature gives a central role to Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and positive solicitude. These structures also emerge as central to the leadership literature from a Heideggerian perspective.

The "ethical moment" (Sorial, 2005, p. 3) of Heidegger's ontological theory is when a human-Being (what he calls a Dasein) takes full responsibility for its own Being. As I explain in this chapter, it takes full responsibility when it appropriates itself from the inauthentic 'the-they' self and becomes authentic. Given Dasein is also ontologically a Being-with-others, this necessarily entails a responsibility to others. A 'good' way to be in the world, one which opens up possibilities-for-Being, is one of 'positive solicitude', where one "leaps forth and liberates" others (Heidegger, 1962, p. 159, S122). Olafson (1998) argues our (ethical) decisions should take into account others and recognise the trust and obligation we have towards others. To not do so would be to deny ourselves (given Others are the same kind of Being as us) and this would be incoherent (Olafson, 1998, p 59).

Therefore, despite not having an ethical theory *per se*, there is an implication in Heidegger's ontological theory that authenticity with positive solicitude is a 'good' way to be in the world. This may be experienced fleetingly, as suggested in Sorial's (2005) 'ethical moment'. When this is experienced as a more sustained, continued experience over a more extended period of time (although not necessarily a long period), it is better conceived of as a 'mode-of-Being'. Ethical here clearly does not mean some directive about 'what one ought do'. This is the usual meta-question of normative ethics and the approach advocated by Price (2017) and Flanigan (2017) in their critiques of Ethical Leadership. Instead, however, from an ontological perspective, ethical is about 'how' one should, or *could*, be-in-the-world in a 'good' way. As noted by Reedy and Learmonth (2011, p. 4), "Heidegger is a particularly appropriate thinker in the task of reconnecting 'what should I do' with the question 'who am I?'". 'Who am I' is how one exists in the world in any moment.

Central to responding to the question 'where is the 'ethics' in Heidegger?' are the ontological structures of authenticity with positive solicitude. These structures are also the important ontological structures for identifying a 'leadership mode' of Heidegger's ontological theory, and responding to the question 'where is the 'leadership' in Heidegger?'[14]. As I discuss in this chapter, in appropriating one's

[14] While I refer to a leadership mode-of-Being, I note Ladkin (2017) refers to a 'leadership moment' in a similar way that Sorial (2005) refers to an 'ethical moment'. Ladkin (2017, p. 393) theorises the leadership moment as "an event which occurs when context, purpose, followers and leaders align"; elements that are all linked by

self from the inauthentic they-self, authenticity can be understood as a kind of self-leadership. When an authentic leader acts with positive solicitude in an organisation, they enable or empower the authenticity of others, and facilitate possibilities-for-Being. Therefore, a Heideggerian perspective of leadership points toward leadership as modelling a good mode-of-Being in the world, one that is authentic and empowers others to grasp their own authenticity.

3.2 Ontological Structures of the Theoretical Framework

In this section, I explain the important ontological structures (identified here in italics) of *authenticity* and *positive solicitude* (underpinned by the structure of *care*). These are central to understanding the 'ethical' and 'leadership' modes in Heidegger. However, they can only be understood as emerging from an *inauthentic 'the-they'* self and various 'triggers' for authenticity, one being the *call of conscience*. These structures necessarily show up in the world as *resolute action*. In order to situate and explain these structures properly, I start where Heidegger does, with the most fundamental 'structure' around which his ontological theory is based. That structure is '*Dasein*[15]', which translates to Being-there, and is his terminology for a human-Being. For Heidegger, "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed" (p. 67, S41).

3.2.1. Dasein

Heidegger is concerned with understanding 'Being'. Social science researchers who utilise Heidegger, including organisational studies researchers specifically, argue that returning to ontological roots can help shed light on specific social phenomena and offer "important insights regarding how research into *becoming* can and should be done" (Painter-Morland, 2011, p. 36) or "important applications to the dynamics of work" (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 26). It is therefore important to start with the ontological root for Heidegger, which is Being. 'Being' is not an entity, nor is it a characteristic of an entity (p. 23, S4). The concept of 'Being' as a characteristic or property of an entity has been the dominant conception of ontology since Plato. Reinforced during the Enlightenment, it continues to underpin the positivist scientific method today (Painter-Morland, 2011). According to Heidegger, however, Being (or *existence*) is the grounding for all entities: "'Being' cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones" (p. 23, S4). According to Heidegger, Being cannot be properly understood through reducing it into constituent parts, as Descartes did, for instance, in proposing 'I think therefore I am' (Descartes, 2013). Heidegger maintains that the

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perception. A leadership mode-of-Being – as I am referring to it in this thesis – focuses on a mode-of-Being of a particular person (what Heidegger calls a Dasein). A person's mode-of-Being is inextricably entwined in a messy totality that includes elements such as context, purpose and being-constituted by others; this is what Heidegger calls a "totality of involvements" (p. 231, S186). While I do not focus on this 'totality of involvements' in this thesis, nevertheless the entwined nature of a person's mode-of-Being will be discussed in this chapter.

[15] In keeping with Heideggerian scholarship, I also refer to 'Dasein'. This serves to remind us that, in this enquiry, we are exploring the Being of a human-Being, and not a 'human being' as a biological or rational entity.

conceptualisation of the human Being as a 'thing' is wrong from the outset. 'Being' is not first and foremost a 'thing' with properties. It is therefore important not to explore it through an objects-with-properties perspective. Being (or existence) is the ground for all things. It is admittedly difficult to grasp this notion of Being, because as soon as we *think* of Being, we (usually unknowingly) move from a ready-to-hand perspective (where we already experience and pre-reflectively grasp Being) to a 'present-to-hand' perspective. In this present-to-hand perspective, we usually conceive of ourselves and others as an occurrent 'thing' which has this property of Being/existence. Recognising that we already experience and pre-reflectively grasp Being before we turn our minds to it, and not passing over this pre-reflective experience in favour of a more 'rational' consideration, is one of Heidegger's significant contributions to ontological philosophy. From this can flow a deeper understanding of social phenomena, such as ethical leadership.

Dasein can be understood as a particular instance of 'Being'. Munday (2009, p. 28) has a useful metaphor to illustrate this idea: "A fragment of a broken mirror is, in terms of its substance, merely part of a greater whole (the whole mirror). Yet in terms of what it reflects, the fragment cannot be differentiated, since the part can potentially reflect the same scene as the whole". Heidegger's approach suggests it is useful to explore 'Being' through understanding a 'fragment' of existence—a Dasein.[16] We are all the same Being (in so far as we all exist) even though we manifest as different instances of existence in the world. It is these different instances of it (not the Being itself) that have different sets of properties or traits (e.g., culture, age, physical features, etc.).

Humans are particular—and special—instances of Being (or instances of existence). We are special or unusual in so far as our Being is an issue for us: we are aware of our own Being and enquire into the nature of our own Being. In fact, this concern for our own Being is a "constitutive state of Dasein's Being" (p. 31, S12). Our concern for our own Being is part of what makes us a human-Being. This constant concern for our own Being makes our existence hermeneutical[17]—that is, our understanding of ourselves is a constant (re)interpretation of ourselves. As Zovko (2020) recognises when he seeks to shed light on our understanding of technology through a Heideggerian perspective, it was Heidegger who transformed hermeneutics from a method of interpretation of text or art to one of ourselves. Taking our cue from Heidegger, when researchers apply this hermeneutical method to a social phenomenon, we move back and forward between understanding Being through these ontological structures and applying this understanding to what is "being asked about Being (the phenomenon of interest)" (Gullick & West, 2020, p. 88). This makes our understanding of the phenomenon of interest

[16] Heidegger recognises that perhaps there are other ways of Being in the world which are different to Dasein, although he does not explore these in *Being and Time* (1962). Trees, for instance, may a have different way of 'Being'. This does not necessarily undermine Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. However, it does imply that an analysis of Dasein is not the last word on Being (as existence).

[17] This 'concern' for our own Being is not necessarily cognitive, or in our awareness, however. It is part of our ontological structure of 'care', which I describe more in the 'care' section below.

(and ourselves) hermeneutical, but never a fixed state. In the context of this thesis, the aim then is not to define and delineate ethical leadership into some fixed state about what it 'is' 'out there' in the world. Rather, my aim is to understand an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being as it is understood through the lived experience of participants.

3.2.2. Care

'Care' has a particular ontological significance for Heidegger, one which always permeates the way we are in the world, in whatever mode that may be. As such, the ontological structure of care has been utilised to understand several organisational phenomena (see, for instance, Elley-Brown & Pringle, 2019; Lamprou, 2017; Segal, 2011; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015; Zovko, 2020). For Heidegger:

> "Dasein's Being reveals itself as care… no sooner has Dasein expressed anything about itself to itself, than it has already interpreted itself as care, even though it has done so only pre-ontologically" (S182, p. 227).

Heidegger does not mean care here in the sense of a loving-care, or good-will, or kindness. Care is not, at least first and foremost, an emotive state. Once again, his terminology (at least as it is translated into English) has a particular connotation that is initially confusing. For Heidegger, 'care' is the way we orientate ourselves in the world. This care is not (necessarily) cognitive. However, our care can and does manifest itself in a more cognitive or reflexive way. In saying Dasein 'reveals itself as care', Heidegger is essentially saying that the way we operate in the world is in a way that things (what he calls equipment) and people show up for us as meaningful, as we act to bring about some future potentiality. We care about equipment and people in some way. Things and people have significance for us—they matter to us in some way. Segal (2011) recognises that our care-structure is one of the aspects that distinguishes a human, a Dasein, from a computer, for example. A computer can compute things, as can a Dasein, but the computer does not care. The question or the outcome of the computing does not 'matter' to the computer. A Dasein always cares in some way. We might experience that way either positively or negatively.

How things and people show-up for us depends on what we 'care' about. Remembering that this ontological-care is not first and foremost cognitive, it shows up in how we understand[18] the world, and move about it with absorbed coping. When we move from a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) mode of Being-in-the-world to a more present-at-hand mode, we tend to think about ourselves spatially. We tend to conceive of ourselves as an object with an 'inside' related to the world that is 'outside'. We conceive of ourselves as this wholly contained person-object moving about 'in' the physical space of the world. Heidegger's ontological care structure suggests that 'Being-in-the-world' is closer to how

[18] For Heidegger, 'understanding' is not a cognitive process. Rather, it is linked to ready-to-hand mode-of-Being and our possibilities-for-Being. He therefore sometimes refers to a "pre-ontological understanding" (p. 33, S13). However, we can and do 'interpret' our (pre-ontological) understanding more cognitively.

we understand the term 'being in love', or 'being in the army'. We dwell in the world or we inhabit our world always in a particular state. "When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other objects in the world… The relation between me and what I inhabit cannot be understood on the model of the relation between subject and object" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 30). Segal (2011) describes how we can never be outside of our world of care or concern:

> The human being never discovers itself outside of a set of concerns. It always finds itself amidst a set of concerns. It is always and already 'in' love or in its worrying or 'in' anger, pain, wonder enjoyment and so on. There is no state of being human before that of being attuned. We find ourselves 'always and already' attuned or absorbed in the world. (Segal, 2011, p. 474)

The world is given to us through the social practices in which we find ourselves thrown, and these orientate our 'always and already' sets of concerns. Care for entities and things—for equipment—is what Heidegger calls *concern*. He calls these phenomena equipment because we understand that we use, or utilise, these things in some way. Similarly, people always matter to us in some way. Heidegger calls the care we have for people 'solicitude': "[Other Dasein] are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude [Fursorge]" (s121, p. 157). This solicitude we have for others may be positive or negative. We are always "with, for, or against" (p. 163, S126) others. Central to our care for (or orientation towards) others is the way we differ from them. We are often interested in how we 'measure up' against others. For instance, we care whether we are some-what equal, whether or not we 'measure up' to others, or whether we think we have some "priority over them" (p. 164, S126) and therefore want to suppress them. Hence, at work, we often act competitively, to have some priority over our colleagues. It is less often we are 'with them' and act with positive solicitude in a more authentic way. As suggested above, both the organisational and philosophical literature gives a central role to 'positive solicitude' as it pertains to an 'ethical' mode-of-Being for Heidegger, and it is to this ontological structure I now turn.

3.2.3. Positive Solicitude

Heidegger's concept of 'positive solicitude' (whether the term is explicitly used or not) emerges as a central concept in much of the leadership literature that utilises a Heideggerian perspective. For instance, Ladkin (2006) uses Heidegger's notions of 'dwelling', 'staying-with', and 'comportment' to offer a different way for leaders to think about ethical concerns. This way of expressing ethics is less about right action (the interest and focus of deontological and utilitarianism approaches to ethics), and more about right relation[19]. This right relation, Ladkin (2006, p. 96) argues, encourages "comporting oneself in a way that expresses care for the other and their worldview, and engaging actively with full

[19] I note that while I utilise Ladkin's interpretation of 'right relation' (2006) in my thesis, she herself draws upon the work of Cheney (2005) to develop this notion.

recourse to one's subjective experience". Thus, dwelling as "care for the other and their worldview" focuses on an ethical orientation to Being-in-the-world, as opposed to understanding 'ethical' through rational decision-making frameworks or meta-ethical theories. This 'dwelling as care' is an expression of Heidegger's concept of positive solicitude, though Ladkin (2006) does not use that term specifically.

The 'art of listening' (Segal, 2011) is, I contend, an important aspect of Ladkin's 'right relation'. Segal (2011, p. 478) argues that an engaged, authentic manager reacts to stress or anxiety about uncertainty in an organisational situation very differently to a disengaged (and inauthentic) manager. An engaged, authentic manager has learnt the art of listening to 'anxiety' in order to learn about what it is that matters to her—what she cares about in a difficult, uncertain situation. Segal (2011) recognises that this art of listening is not necessarily a cognitive process. Rather, it is a state of Being—a state of questioning. By attuning oneself to staying open through the art of listening, this allows one to be open to new possibilities-for-Being. For example, in an uncertain situation, 'new possibilities' might show up as ways for coping effectively. Similar then to Ladkin's (2006) argument, what is ethically important is to stay open in right relation to Others, which can be achieved (at least in part) through the art of listening.

Heidegger outlines two extremes of positive modes of solicitude: leaping-in and leaping-ahead. Tomkins and Simpson (2015) use these two notions to provide a different perspective on 'caring leadership'.[20] "In a Heideggerian view, caring leadership has little to do with compassion, kindness or niceness; it involves and requires a fundamental organization and leadership of self" (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1013). 'Leaping-in' is where a person acts in a seemingly very caring way, when doing things for another. However, in doing so, they might "leap in and dominate" (p. 159, S122), and take away one's freedom to act authentically. The intention might not be to dominate, control, or undermine, but this can end up happening. Tomkins and Simpson (2015, p. 1019) recognise that this leaping-in is often perceived as strong leadership, as this "notion of control seems to underpin our most 'normal' and 'natural' sense of what organizations are all about". Indeed, a well-timed 'leaping-in' by a person with the right expertise and/or authority might provide a welcome intervention. However, if not done sensitively, it can undermine the care-recipient, creating "a fine line between relief and resentment" (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1017).

The other 'positive mode' of solicitude is where one "helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it" (p. 159, S122). This kind of solicitude "leaps forth and liberates" (p. 159, S122) the other person. It facilitates their freedom. Heidegger gives an interesting (and rare) example of this—and it is, in fact, a work example. He says: when two people are doing the

[20] I note that 'caring leadership' is more usually tied to a feminist perspective of leadership. It is often underpinned by a care ethic, and the notion that our most important ethical relationships are deeply rooted in caring relationships. This is often contrasted with impartial ethical theories, which "involve an abstract, universal morality and a distinctively masculine voice" (Tomkins, 2020, p. 16). However, from a Heideggerian perspective, caring relationships are a manifestation of our ontological care structure.

same job, often mistrust or competition thrives. However, when those two people devote themselves to the same task in a mode of positive solicitude, they "become authentically bound together…which frees the Other in his freedom for himself" (p. 159, S122). This means that if people work cooperatively together, this is empowering for them both, and helps them both to realise their own authenticity. Freedom is entwined with authenticity. This freedom is from the 'they-self', and allows a person to appropriate the possibilities in the world and make them their own—that is, to become authentic.

This reference to 'the-they' (or what Heidegger calls *das Man*) is not referring to one specific person, but to people generally. One usually acts as 'they' act. Tomkins and Simpson (2015, p. 1019) suggest that "[i]f we were to crystallize 'leaping-ahead' into a single expression we would probably use the world 'empowerment'"[21]. Krentz and Malloy (2005) and Liedtka (2008) also recognise the importance of positive solicitude in relation to leadership. Krentz and Malloy (2005, p. 25) suggest that a Heideggerian leadership lens would focus on a leader who enables, releases, and empowers their "fellow workers for their authentic individual and communal possibilities in the corporate context". Krentz and Malloy's (2005) conception of a Heideggerian approach to leadership makes a clear link between authenticity and positive solicitude: they suggest leadership is found in authentic leaders enabling or empowering the authenticity of others. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Heidegger's authenticity is not the same as 'being true to oneself', as understood in much of the Authentic Leadership literature.

3.2.4. 'The-They' & Inauthenticity

To understand Heidegger's concept of 'authenticity', it is important to understand his concept of *in*authenticity, which is entwined with this concept of 'the-they'. Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity are useful ontological structures to help understand organisational phenomena. For instance, since uncertainty is often rampant in modern organisations, Segal (2011, p. 471) utilises Heidegger to explain how a leader or manager can move from "an inauthentic to an authentic way of responding to the challenges of uncertainty". Gullick and West (2020) explain how categorising people's experiences as either an authentic or inauthentic positioning-towards-death can help understand the experience of living with a life-threatening illness. Inauthentic and authentic human relationships underpin Krentz and Malloy's (2005) empowering leadership, and Tomkins and Simpson's (2020) caring leadership, which I discussed above.

3.2.4.1 The-they

'The-they' is a central concept for how Dasein experiences itself in the world. 'The-they' is referring to how 'one' (a non-specified person, a collective other) in society acts (p. 164, S126). "We

[21] I want to acknowledge there is extensive literature in organisational behavioural research that focuses on 'empowerment' and has theorised this concept. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the distinction or overlap between 'empowerment' in this literature and 'empowerment' as a way to understand Heidegger's concept of 'positive solicitude'.

take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise, we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find shocking what *they* find shocking" (p. 164, S127). Heidegger is saying that we act (e.g., read, see, judge) as social convention dictates. Dasein always exists in a particular 'world', which Dreyfus more colloquially labels a set of 'social practices' (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 5). One acts in accordance with the social conventions, or social practices, of one's 'world' because one is constituted by those very conventions. When we seek to make sense of our worlds, "every human attempt at framing, is itself already enframed" (Introna, 2019, p. 745). However, when we seek to make sense of some phenomenon, we necessarily do so from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world as we already understand it (hence, we are hermeneutic Beings). Kinlan (2020, p. 5) describes 'the-they' not as a "collective body of individuals, but rather a kind of normative field for which the members of society are both its vehicles and its subjects".

That we are a product of our social practices is not very contentious or radical. However, it is important to note that, for Heidegger, these social practices cannot be reduced to the mental states of individuals. They are not contained in a psychologically based belief system, or a system of categories or representations in the mind. Heidegger essentially proposes an ontological theory that is grounded in social practices. To use a metaphor, from a psychological perspective, we perhaps conceptualise ourselves as a blank canvas (a 'core self') onto which cultural beliefs and practices are 'painted'. This is the essentialist conception of our 'self' that underpins much of the Authentic Leadership literature discussed in the previous chapter. However, from a Heideggerian perspective, our shared cultural beliefs and practices *are* the weave of the canvas. There is no 'core self', no blank canvas. Our cultural practices and beliefs do not just inform or influence us, they literally constitute us. It is therefore quite inevitable that we conform to them.

We grow up in a particular social/cultural world (for instance America, or Japan), and Dasein is necessarily socialised into the practices of that world.[22] These socialised practices constitute the way a particular Dasein understands itself to be. There is no 'essential' (or pre-given) human way to be, however. I *am* how I am socialised. Heidegger does not provide a good, practical example of this, but Dreyfus (2005) does. A Japanese mother cares for her baby by quietly soothing, lulling, carrying, and rocking it. An American mother encourages her baby to crawl around and explore. She keeps her eye on the baby and chats to it constantly. "It is as if the American mother wanted to have a vocal, active baby, and the Japanese mother wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles of caretaking of the mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 14). The hypothetical Japanese baby in the example grows up to understand that what it is to be human is passive,

[22] A 'world' is not necessarily a country but consists of sets of social practices that constitute how we show up in that 'world'. It could be a professional 'world' (for example, the world of the legal profession), or a city or neighbourhood community (for example, the community of Melbourne), or a sport (for example, the world of tennis), and so forth.

contented, gentle, and social. The hypothetical American baby grows up to understand that what it is to be human is to be active, independent, and assertive.

When we are absorbed in our social practices and just go about our day, we exist in our worlds 'understandingly' (without cognitive thought about the world). As discussed in the previous chapter, this is a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) mode of Being. This is a 'know-how' mode. We move about our social worlds with pre-reflexive know-how. It is when we move from this totally taken-for-granted way of being in the world, to a present-at-hand mode, that we understand the world as objects-with-properties: a 'know-what' mode. Given how we are literally constituted by our social practices, we necessarily conform to them as one does, as one of 'the-they'.

The conformity of 'the-they' is essential, it cannot be shed. It is the basis for how we are in the world and, as such, it is the source of one's intelligibility. It is because we share social practices that we understand each other—i.e., that there *is* intelligibility. It is through our shared social practices that we understand anything at all in the world, including each other. It is how we make sense of our world. For example, in Western cultures, we eat with knives and forks, sitting at tables, on chairs, with plates and napkins. This shared practice of eating allows the "referential whole" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 94), or the "totality-of-equipment" (p. 97, S68), to function. One who makes a meal knows to provide knives and forks, to serve the food on a plate, at a table, etc. Dasein appropriates the norms through imitation; they become absorbed coping skills within a particular world. It is not that I have a belief (or some sort of mental state) about a fork, and *then* I pick up the fork and eat with it. I already know the 'for-which' of a fork (or the role of the fork) when I sit down in front of one.

When we seek to understand other cultures (or other worlds), we necessarily do so through our own understanding of the world, which is (necessarily) dictated by the social norms we grew up in. One cannot help thinking that how we do it is the 'right way'. "Our way seems to make intrinsic sense, a sense not captured in the saying: 'this is what we in the West happen to do'" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 96). However, according to Heidegger, there is no 'right' interpretation or intrinsic meaning in the world. Meaning 'is' as 'the-they' understands it to be. Shared practices become the basis of meaning. This is what makes a Dasein also a 'Mitsein'—a Being-with. While we are all an individual instance of Being, we are at the same time constituted by others (through our social practices). It is unveiling this shared meaning that is at the heart of my research methodology.

3.2.4.2 Inauthenticity

Heidegger identifies both the "constitutive conformity" of the-they and also the "evils of conformism" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 94). Heidegger himself tends to conflate the two in his analysis of 'the-they', while Dreyfus (2005) more clearly teases out the positive and negative aspects. As discussed above, 'the-they' is a necessary structure of how Dasein is in the world. In this sense, it is positive: "*The 'they' is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*"

(p. 167, S129, italics original). However, 'the-they' is also a "…levelling down of all possibilities of Being" (p. 165, S127). Instead of 'opening up' possibilities for Dasein's action, we can and often are 'trapped' by our social conventions in a "tranquillized familiarity" (p. 234, S189). We can get "lost in the busyness of everyday living" (Segal, 2011, p. 479).

Examples of inauthenticity (i.e., simply conforming to the-they) are easy to identify in organisational life. In many organisations, we often busy ourselves in the frenetic activity of "getting and spending. . . for purposes of dominance, efficiency, effectiveness, and control", while we relentlessly move "from one project to another" in our "eagerness to fill quotas, devise instrumental means, and reach the short-term goals" (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 26 & 27). Krentz and Malloy (2005) acknowledge that this frenetic activity of getting and spending in our eagerness to fill quotas and reach short-term goals is often necessary in the 'everyday' social and corporate context. This efficiency-driven, command-and-control approach (Segal, 2011, p. 478) is frequently how 'one' is expected to act in organisations. Tomkins and Simpson (2015, p. 1019) also recognise how this "notion of control seems to underpin our most 'normal' and 'natural' sense of what organizations are all about". They go on to note that it is in this controlling, active mode of intervention in organisations that we are most vulnerable to the ways of the-they (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1019). Those of us who have worked in corporate organisations may have experienced the following scenario of 'the-they' approach to sensemaking (in what is a present-to-hand mode) described by Guiette and Vandenbempt (2020, p. 7):

> Detached sensemaking is characterized by brainstorm sessions in which different change avenues are carefully evaluated based on swot-analysis, market forecasts and carefully described "as is" and "to be" situations, with the sole objective of mapping out an X-year change trajectory consisting of N-steps which are represented by key performance indicators, inflection points and monthly progress reports. Quick wins are celebrated through grandiose newsletter announcements, and competitions to be awarded employee of the month for those lucky ones that meet – and preferably exceed – their metrics on the KPI dashboard, closely monitored through automated "templates" and "systems." The objective is to control the outcomes of change, reduce the complexity of organizational life, create a simplistic discourse and eliminate equivocality throughout the change process.

The obsession with efficiency is a symptom of the-they kind of instrumental thinking (or what Heidegger calls calculative thinking) that Painter-Morland and ten Bos (2016) argue only engenders more of itself. In other words, if we only look for opportunities in organisations to 'work better' and more effectively and efficiently (to achieve the designated key performance indicators or growth targets etc.), we will never see anything of non-instrumental value. This could be the non-instrumental value of the environment (the focus of Painter-Morland and ten Bos' article), but it could also be the non-instrumental value of people within organisations. A non-instrumental approach to people requires us not to treat others as a means to an organisational end, but rather to "recognise the mortality of the

other" (Reedy & Learmonth, 2011, p. 9). Painter-Morland and ten Bos (2016) acknowledge that the non-instrumental value of something (e.g., the environment, in their case, but also people) is by its nature is hard to weigh up. This is why we seek to quantify. However, to quantify something is to value it instrumentally, and hence why instrumental/calculative thinking engenders more of itself.

In simply conforming to the-they, we are in-the-world inauthentically. To simply align oneself with 'the-they' is to lose one's Self. Or, it is a failure to stand by one's Self: "In these modes one's way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self" (p. 166, S128). While 'the-they' provides the basis of Dasein's 'intelligibility', Heidegger argues that this is an 'average intelligibility', implying that we can move beyond this 'average intelligibility' towards *authenticity*. Such moving beyond is linked to an understanding that there is no intrinsic (or objective) meaning to the world, that Dasein itself (constituted though it is by the-they) is the ground for all interpretation (and therefore all meaning) in the world. It is because Dasein is the ground for all interpretation that (as per my critique in the previous chapter) it is concerning that present-to-hand research on a social phenomenon like moral/ethical leadership strips research participants of their ability to express what they 'mean' when filling in leadership questionnaires on a Likert scale. It is why my research question and associated methodology puts this meaning at the heart of the research.

In an inauthentic mode-of-Being, we do not make choices as our own. Rather, we make the choice 'one makes' and, therefore, are not really the authors of our own lives. "In purely conformist scenarios, no single individual is ultimately responsible for the behavior of the group. It is not hard to see how this could (and does) lead to various forms of immoral behaviour" (Wrathall & Murphey, 2013, p. 12). Indeed, the reasons for 'ethical failure' (i.e., why people do what is clearly the 'wrong thing') in much of the psychological research point to the tendency for people to 'just conform'—whether to social expectations, norms, or authority (see for instance Bandura, 1991; Gentilin, 2016; Milgram, 1963; Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, 2012; Zimbardo, 2007). 'Ethical failure' research usually comes from a psychological perspective. However, a Heideggerian perspective would argue that ethical failures based on the 'evils of conformism' have psychological explanations *because* they are rooted in the way we are in the world ontologically.

In short, the social practices of the-they are constitutive of intelligibility and our understanding in the world. Yet, at the same time, they can also be used to "cover the essential *un*intelligibility of Dasein itself" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 96). From this basis of the-they (and being-in-the-world inauthenticity), Dasein can seek to 'choose to choose its Self' (p. 324, S270) and appropriate itself *authentically*.

3.2.5. Authenticity

Authenticity is when Dasein chooses itself (or appropriates itself) from the-they self. For Heidegger, authenticity is about one 'owning' what one is and what one does. Acting as 'one does' in

accordance with the-they in an organisation "entails going with the crowd, following rules and scripts without reflecting on how it could be otherwise" (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1018). Authenticity is achieved through a kind of transformation that stops us from living in this inauthentic—what Heidegger sometimes calls a 'fallen' (p. 220, S175)—mode.

When we recognise that our particular norms and shared practices have no intrinsic meaning, we are free to choose what is meaningful to us. When we understand that the way 'one' does something just happens to be the way it has been done in the past, we understand that we have possibilities in the world. Once accepted and grasped, we can choose how we act on these possibilities, free (to a certain extent) of the limitations and expectations of the social practices we happen to be thrown into. However, we always and necessarily act from the constitutive background of our shared social worlds. This is why we appropriate ourselves from the 'they-self'. Krentz and Malloy (2005) highlight the importance of meaning in giving direction to one's individual and collective involvements, specifically in an organisational context. They warn we often "lose sight of the meaning" in our "eagerness to fill quotas, devise instrumental means, and reach the short terms goals" (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 27). Indeed, the major thrust of Krentz and Malloy's (2005) argument of a Heideggerian perspective of leadership is one that 'opens people to possibilities'. While they do not provide a recipe for how one should 'open people to possibilities' in an organisational context (which may be inauthentic), they nevertheless suggest that this could be done through a climate of openness and shared goals:

> These alternative ways [of accessing new possibilities] could be realised by fostering a climate of openness and change in which all [organisational] participants can put forward critical and creative proposals regarding the ends and means for achieving the shared goals in ways that provide meaning and purpose to its members and to the organisation itself. (Krentz & Malloy, 2005, p. 31)

In recognising that others are also the same type of Being as ourselves, we see that others also have their own sense of authenticity and their own sense of what stands out as meaningful to them. Reedy and Learmonth (2011, p. 10) draw upon Heidegger's analysis of death to highlight the importance of such meaning: "a resolute facing up to death confronts each of us with what it means to have a unique, finite life and underscores the need to decide what our lives are for". Death is not something that we can avoid or pass to another, and this realisation enables us to grasp that only we can live our own lives. Reedy and Learmonth (2011) argue this has various implications for organisations, including the idea that individuals should seek (and be afforded) a freedom to question and engage with the purpose of work. This is aligned with Krentz and Malloy's (2005, p. 31) suggestion quoted in the paragraph above. What is usually the domain of executive management decision-making should be opened-up and shared, because what is ultimately important is not achieving instrumental quotas and goals but the meaning and purpose of the organisation to its members. In grasping our possibilities in

life from the-they self, Reedy and Learmonth (2011) underscore the importance of needing to grasp and implement those possibilities in resolute action.

Therefore, authentically appropriating ourselves is choosing what is meaningful to us from the possibilities-for-Being. Other organisational studies researchers also recognise the importance of Heidegger's concept of 'possibilities for Being' and/or remaining open to possibilities (Holt & Mueller, 2011; Introna, 2019; Segal, 2011; Zundel & Kokkalis, 2010). Holt and Mueller (2011) argue the dominant tendency is to 'fix' the meaning of organisational practices and events. This is useful (and inevitable) in so far as it helps us to orientate ourselves in our worlds, including our organisational worlds. However, in the 'fixing' (i.e., defining a phenomenon 'as' something, the dominant approach in moral/ethical leadership literature), this tends to "repress the mystery and richness of our understanding of organizational life" (Holt & Mueller, 2011, p. 68). Here, 'meaning' can get lost in the-they. It can therefore be useful to 'light up' (as Heidegger terms it, p. 393 S343) new ways of seeing. Approaching ethical leadership from an ontological (Heideggerian) perspective entails seeking to 'light up' a new way of seeing.

Heidegger outlines three ways that we achieve this move from an inauthentic to a more authentic mode-of-Being. The first is through 'existential anxiety', whereby we come to understand the so-called objective significance of things is completely lacking (i.e., an existential crisis where one realises there is no inherent meaning in the world). The second is an encounter with the possibility of death, the possible loss of all possibilities. The third way is through the 'call of conscience'. This is where our conscience alerts us that we are not living according to our chosen self, and silently urges us to take up the task of living with resoluteness and full engagement. I outline this in more detail below.

3.2.5.1 Call of conscience

Existential anxiety—what Heidegger describes as an uncanny feeling, an unsettledness about the inherent meaningless of life—opens us up to experiencing what he calls 'existential guilt'. This guilt is 'heard' in the *call of conscience*. Heidegger's call of conscience is mentioned only in passing, if at all, in most of the organisational studies literature that comes from a Heideggerian perspective. Yet it is one of the ways we are ontologically nudged towards a more authentic mode of Being-in-the-world. Since I am ultimately responsible for my own Self, Heidegger argues that I am always 'guilty' for how I am in the world, how I impact the world. In other words, I 'owe a debt' (p. 327, S282). Dasein always has possibilities for how it projects into the world from the position it finds itself thrown into. However, Dasein can only ever appropriate one possibility out of many and is therefore also responsible for the possibilities not taken: "[Dasein] in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is *not* other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection" (p. 331, S287).

In referring to "*Being-guilty"* (p. 327, S281), once again Heidegger uses somewhat confusing terminology that is loaded with connotations which first have to be stripped away in order to access his meaning. The word 'guilty' might imply a Christian guilt (i.e., a sin) or it might imply a court-of-justice balancing of the scales. For Heidegger, Being-guilty is a call back to ourselves and what matters to us, beyond what one's social practices dictate (even though what matters to us is inescapably given by those social practices). The 'guilty' aspect is a (perhaps confusing) way of pointing out that we are responsible for our path chosen and paths not chosen, both of which inevitably have an impact on others. We are responsible for ourselves.

Heidegger conceives of our everyday experience of this existential guilt with the notion that "[o]ne is to give back to the Other something to which the latter has a claim" (p. 327, S281). In other words, we owe other people in some way for the way we are in the world—at least that is how we usually experience our Being-guilty. Our existential guilt calls to us in a call of conscience. The call of conscience "is something that calls one away from one's inauthentic immersion in the homely familiarity of everyday life" (Critchley, 2009). Heidegger is clear that the 'call of conscience' is itself silent of any cognitive 'content'. It calls us back to our Self. Because Dasein is 'care', calling us back to ourselves reminds us of what matters to us, beyond the 'idle chatter' of the-they. While Krentz and Malloy (2005, p. 26) do not discuss the call of conscience directly, they recognise this aspect of authenticity, by noticing that "[a]ppropriating possibilities involves two things—'owing' and 'owning'". They conceive of what we 'owe' in an ethical sense. For them, what we 'owe' is how I/we ought to live and act. In doing so, we 'own' our responsibility and take ownership of our actions.

However, for Heidegger, our existential Being-guilty, heard in the call of conscience, is not itself a moral call in so far as the content of the 'call' may or may not pertain to morally 'good' and 'bad'. Nevertheless, our moral conscience is an average everyday experience of this ontological 'call of conscience'. Gullick and West (2020, p. 101) describe it as being "a gap between our current manner of Being and who we ought to be". I would more specifically describe this as who we *choose* to be. Gullick and West (2020, p. 101) categorise it as being "felt in the gut as an 'ontological guilt'". When we heed the call and act resolutely, we choose some course of action in the world. However, what Heidegger maintains is chosen ontologically is choosing to 'have a conscience'. Choosing to have a conscience *is* the authentic choice, and is reflected in the double signification of 'choosing to choose' (p. 314, S270). In choosing to have a conscience, we *are* choosing ourselves. The content of the call is not what Heidegger is concerned with from an ontological perspective. He is primarily interested in the 'choosing to choose'.

Nevertheless, the 'content' of the call is precisely what any Dasein is concerned about in a concrete situation. I contend this is the link between Heidegger's authenticity and the more dominant concept of authenticity found in much of the Authentic Leadership literature that, as I have discussed, tends to conceptualise authenticity as being true to a core or inner self. For Heidegger, there is no 'core'

or inner self that is pre-given, essential, or unchanging. However, when I choose a specific path in authentic resolute action, based on what is meaningful to me, I am (according to Heidegger) 'choosing to choose myself'. The phenomenological everyday experience of this feels like I am being true to an inner, core self. In a way, I am 'being true to myself'. It is just not an essential, pre-given, unchanging self that represents 'who I am'. Rather, it is a chosen self. It is also a self that is evolving continuously. It is for this reason that Liedtka (2008) argues that it is impossible to have a reliable method of measuring authenticity.

If authenticity is 'choosing to choose oneself', this might seem exceedingly abstract—a strange kind of 'choice' devoid of any specific content. This would be strange especially for a philosopher who is interested in the lived experience. However, this choosing one's Self always manifests in the world in resoluteness. 'Choosing to choose' ourselves, and choosing how we act in a concrete situation, are not separate 'choices'. They are always bound together. It is to 'resolute action' that I now turn.

3.2.5.2 Resolute action

In Being-authentic, one acts resolutely. One takes a stand on who one is, but remembering that this is never fixed, essential, nor a 'whole'. Heidegger suggests that, at some first pre-reflexive level (and then possibly from there a more reflexive level), Dasein comes to grasp that there is no inherent, fixed, or natural way to be. The social practices and conventions I find myself in just happen to be the ones I find myself in. Authentic grasping opens up possibilities-for-Being, which are recognised as important in an organisational context. Dasein must always be in the world in some way—either absorbed in the ways of the-they (inauthentic) or having chosen itself (authentic). What authenticity looks like in practice is resolute action. For Heidegger, "Resoluteness 'exists' only as a resolution" (p. 345, S298). Again, there is something circular here—the resolution determines itself. This might be unsettling for those wishing to get out of the hermeneutic circle. For Heidegger, however, this is why we are always a potentiality, pushing into our future possibilities, never a whole, or complete, self.

Resolute action must necessarily arise in a specific Situation (which Heidegger emphasises with a capital 'S')[23]. This refers to the specific historic time and place that I find myself thrown in to with a specific set of skills, traits, and preferences that constitute me. This specific understanding of the world (what Heidegger calls Disposition) has been constituted first-and-foremost by the-they. Resolute action that arises from authenticity is not just taking up existing inauthentic possibilities and implementing them, it is choosing a responsibility for one's Self. What flows from this, is choosing from the possibilities that are available. All this choosing might sound decidedly cognitive, i.e., in the mind. For Heidegger, while we certainly have thoughts about a Situation, the choosing to choose ourselves happens at what he calls a 'primordial' level. Thus, it is not cognitive (or at least, not necessarily cognitive).

[23] I will continue to refer to a concrete Situation with a capital 'S', in-line with this Heideggerian approach.

Resolute Dasein, according to (Carman, 2005, p. 291), "has a subtle feel for the particular demands of the situation and how to deal with them with intelligence and finesse. Resoluteness thus consists in a kind of focused engagement with things, and with others". Dreyfus (2000) draws a strong alignment between Heidegger's resolute Dasein and Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*. For Aristotle, *phronesis* is a kind of practical wisdom that responds to the unique situation in a way that balances deliberation, emotions, and habituated social skills, leading to action that promotes human flourishing (often translated as happiness) (Kraut, 2018). However, Blattner reminds us that, for Aristotle, a key aspect of phronesis it to deliberate wisely and, as noted, "[Cognitive] Deliberation is a decidedly secondary phenomenon for Heidegger" (Blattner, 2013, p. 332).

Resolute action might imply decisive, bold action. However, Heidegger specifically cautions against this interpretation of resolute action: "As resolute, Dasein is already *taking action*. . . For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly that "activity" will also embrace the passivity of resistance" (p. 347, S300). Meaning, 'activity', or 'action' must be conceived of in the broadest possible terms. It is not necessarily active, goal-orientated action. Indeed, 'resolute action' might emerge in a 'letting be', an allowing, which might not look like no action at all. As an ontological structure, if Dasein chooses to choose itself, this *necessarily* shows up as resoluteness. Therefore, strictly speaking, resoluteness might not be resolute *action* at all, but a type of inaction. Having acknowledged this, I continue refer to this concept as 'resolute action' because it more intuitively points to a response to a concrete Situation. Having described how resolute action is an important ontological structure to properly understand 'authenticity' and 'positive solicitude' as a 'good' way to be in the world, I now respond to the question *'where is the 'leadership' in Heidegger?'*

3.3 Leadership as (Role)Modelling a Mode-of-Being

Heidegger does not propose an ethical theory, nor does he propose a leadership theory or perspective. The moral/ethical leadership theories I critiqued in the previous chapter (Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership) tend to understand 'leadership' as role-modelling. 'Leadership' under these theories can essentially be understood as the leader-individual being an exemplar of a particular behaviour, and therefore leading by example, as a role-model. For instance, according to Brown et al's. (2005) widely adopted definition of Ethical Leadership, the Ethical Leader models conduct that followers consider to be normatively appropriate. This makes the leader a legitimate and credible role model (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120). According to a seminal paper on Authentic Leadership by Luthans and Avolio (2003), the Authentic Leader demonstrates 'positive behaviours' which 'foster self-development' in both themselves and their associates. These behaviours "serve to model the development of associates" (Luthans & Avolio, 2003, p. 243). Similarly, the Servant Leader is a leader because they inspire and empower others to role-model servant behaviour themselves (Saleem-Tanner, 2018, p. 273).

A Heideggerian perspective of leadership also points toward leadership as a type of 'modelling', one in which our mode-of-Being exemplifies a good way to be in the world. It is authentic and empowers others to grasp their own authenticity through positive solicitude (Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). However, contrary to these moral/ethical leadership theories, the leadership aspect from a Heideggerian perspective is not predicated on the formal leader/follower model. Leadership from this perspective is not tied to a hierarchical position. Someone may display ethical leadership who is not in a position of power and has no formal followers. Tomkins and Simpson (2015), in their use of 'positive solicitude' as the basis of caring leadership, also seek to avoid differentiating 'leader' and 'follower' based on hierarchy. From an ontological perspective, the focus is not on what leadership looks like from an outsider's perspective, with its associated focus on behaviours and traits that can be measured by a questionnaire filled out by others (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1025). Rather, they pay attention to what it means 'to be' an ethical leader. This comes from the inside, first, instead of being proscribed from the outside. What is important from an ontological (Heideggerian) perspective is therefore a type of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1025).[24] As per one of the 'troubling tensions' critiqued in the previous chapter, authenticity (as a 'choosing to choose oneself') is not something that can be measured from the outside in any meaningful way.

Since the leadership focus from a Heideggerian perspective is a kind of self-leadership, the focus from this perspective is thus not on how leadership is instrumentally good for the organisation (which is the focus of much of the leadership literature). From an ethical perspective, Being-authentic (with positive solicitude) is something that is good in itself. I am not suggesting that there is no instrumental good that flows to the organisation by Being-authentic. Rather, the 'good' the organisation accrues is not the measure of this good way to be-in-the-world.

3.4 Summary of Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I have explained prominent ontological structures of Heidegger's 'existential analytic' to explain how human-Beings (i.e., Dasein) are in the world in a ready-to-hand way, and how these structures have been utilised in the organisational literature. Specifically, these ontological structures are *Dasein*, *the-they* (linked as it is to *inauthenticity*), and *authenticity*, which is connected to the *call of conscience* and *resolute action*. All of these are recognised in the structure of *care*. A Heideggerian perspective of an 'ethical mode' suggests that Being in the world authentically with positive solicitude is a 'good' way to be in the world. A Heideggerian perspective of the 'leadership mode', which is an ontological perspective, suggests that what is important is a kind of self-leadership

[24] This 'self-leadership' might imply that a Heideggerian perspective of ethical leadership is closely aligned with a kind of ethical subjectivism. However, it is important to remember that Heidegger's ready-to-hand (absorbed-coping) analysis is aimed at dissolving this subject-object characterisation of the world. While we can (and do) think about ourselves in the world in a present-to-hand way, as a special type of object (e.g., a subject which bestows ethical value on the world), we experience the world first and foremost as enmeshed, or absorbed, in it.

first and foremost, through an appropriation of one's own authenticity, and choosing one's own Self. By acting with positive solicitude, this empowers, allows, or enables others to appropriate their own authenticity. It is a kind of (role)modelling of a 'good' way to be in the world. At the start of this chapter, I identified the 'theoretical flow' of the thesis (represented in Figure 2). In **Figure 3**, below, I link this flow to a theoretical framework diagram.

Figure 3: Theoretical framework



Figure 3 seeks to illustrate the important ontological structures for ethical leadership, which emerge as *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience.* When Dasein (represented as the woman on top of the embedded ontological structures that constitute her) is authentic and resolute, with positive solicitude, responding to the call of conscience, she

appropriates herself from an inauthentic background of social practices. Her care structure, what matters to her, is represented in the orange lines that wrap around the ontological structures. These are summarised in the key (or legend) for easy reference in the **Table 1** overleaf. I use these ontological structures as interpretative lenses for shedding light on my empirical findings. In the next chapter, I explain the methodology that underpins those empirical findings.

Table 1: Ontological structures summary

Ontological Structures	Brief Explanation	Example
Dasein	Being is existence. Being is not a property of humans; it is the grounding of everything. A human-Being is an instance of existence; we are all the same existence. These individual instances of existence manifest in different properties, traits and behaviours, which show up in an objects-with-properties mode-of-Being.	As an instance of existence, a person is like a fragment of a broken mirror, the fragment reflects the same as the whole mirror (Mundy, 2009).
Care	Things (equipment) and people always show up in our world as mattering to us somehow. We engage with the world always 'with-which' (some equipment) 'for-the-sake-of-which', to move toward an 'in-order-to'. It is not necessarily care (or mattering) in terms of an emotional feeling (like honesty or kindness). The type of concern we have for other people is called 'solicitude'.	I put on my shoes (equipment) for-the-sake of walking, in-order-to go get a coffee. In this example, getting coffee matters to me. This mundane example highlights the care structure is not necessarily linked to a humanitarian perspective (although, it could be this too).
Positive Solicitude	If authenticity is a good way to be in the world, it is also a good way for Others (other Dasien, who are the same kind of Being as us) to be in the world. It is therefore a good way to be in the world to facilitate other people's authenticity. This does not have to be active, and might be best facilitated by a 'letting be'.	When two people are doing the same job, often mistrust or competition thrives. However, when they work cooperatively together, in a climate of openness, trust, and encouragement, and this can be empowering, or 'freeing' for them both.
The-They and Inauthenticity	We are literally constituted by our social practices, therefore we cannot but help to conform to them. We therefore have a tendency to act as 'one' acts in a particular social practice, according to 'the-they'.	Undertaking a SWOT analysis to map out a X-year change trajectory consisting of N-steps, represented by key performance indicators, closely monitored through automated 'templates' (Guiette and Vandenbempt, 2020) is an example of 'how one usually makes sense' of strategy development in corporate organisations.
Authenticity	Despite being literally constituted by our social practices, i.e. by others, we can appropriate ourselves, and 'choose to choose ourselves' and be authentic. This is a good way to be in the world.	In an interview (Callen, 2012) the professional tennis player Andre Agassi explained he was driven to play tennis to please his father. However, at some point he chose it for himself: "At that moment I said to myself, what if now, for the first time, I choose? What now, if I played tennis, not for my father, not for the pressures of life. Not because I have to, because I find a reason to."
Call of Conscience	When we metaphorically 'hear' our call of conscience, it alerts us to what matters to us.	Gullick and West (2020) describe the call of conscience as being 'felt in the gut'.
Resolute Action	When we act on what matters to us, we act resolutely (or we are in the world resolutely), noting a resolute action might be no physical action at all.	Resolute action might show up, for instance, in someone resigning from a job because their 'call of conscience' made them uncomfortable about the direction the company was taking.

Chapter 4 – Methodology: Hermeneutic Phenomenology

My thesis explores the phenomenon of 'ethical leadership' through a Heideggerian lens. In particular, I utilise his ontological theory described in his seminal work *Being and Time*. As previously outlined, given Heidegger's philosophy is phenomenological, exploring the phenomenon of ethical leadership through this lens leads me to the research question '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?*' I will use Heideggerian 'ontological structures' as interpretative lenses to understand the findings of this empirical research question. This is an 'exegetical analysis' (van Manen, 2016, p. 171) which I describe in this chapter.

In this chapter, I discuss the methodology utilised to address the research question. The research approach I use—a phenomenology—focuses on the lived experience of the ethical leadership phenomenon. In Section 4.1, I begin by acknowledging there are five main methodological approaches to phenomenology. In-line with Heidegger's philosophy, I utilise a 'hermeneutic phenomenological' approach, and follow van Manen (2016) as my 'methodological guide'. In Section 4.2, I justify the use of semi-structured interviews as my research method, and explain the importance of the anecdote in my interviews to help me understand the phenomenon of ethical leadership. I then describe how this research method pertains to the two stages of my research: my Stage One 'one-on-one interviews' look back on the liv*ed* experience, and my Stage Two 'living interview-diaries' explore the phenomenon from the liv*ing* experience. The discussion of Stage One and Stage Two includes an explanation of my sampling strategies and interview questions. In Section 4.3, I outline the approach I take in the analysis and interpretation of my interview data.

I make two methodological contributions in this thesis, discussed in Section 4.4. The first contribution is to explore the phenomenon of ethical leadership from the phenomenological perspective. This perspective contributes an insightful and novel approach to ethical leadership, which has not previously been explored in the literature. I explain how this meets three thematic requirements for new methodological ideas, as identified by Bartunek et al. (1993). My second methodological contribution is to research methods. While interviews are a mainstay of phenomenological research, I have found no examples of other researchers undertaking them in a daily diary-like format, as I do in my Stage Two living interview-diaries. In Section 4.4.1, I focus on identifying the benefits of this methodological contribution. I also discuss the 'truth status' of the data from a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, which sits within a hermeneutic cycle of experience. This includes commenting on my own 'dwelling' within this hermeneutic cycle. I end this chapter in Section 4.5, with an overview of my Ethics Approval. This approval focuses on protecting participants' confidentiality and avoiding conflict of interest. It does not, however, define the limit of ethical considerations.

4.1 Research Approach: Phenomenology

Of the five major methodological approaches to qualitative research (narrative, phenomenological, grounded, ethnographic, and case study), the phenomenological approach has lived experience at its heart (Creswell, 2013, p. 75). Because my research question (arrived at through a Heideggerian ontological perspective) is *'how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?*', my approach is also based on Heidegger and is phenomenological. More specifically, in line with Heidegger's philosophy, as discussed in Chapter 3, mine is a 'hermeneutic phenomenological' approach. The lived experience of the phenomenon is the unit of analysis for this approach. As explained in Section 4.2.1, below, the 'anecdote' is an important mechanism for focusing on the lived experience.

4.1.1 Phenomenological Methodologies

Phenomenology as a research methodology is based on phenomenological philosophies (Dowling, 2007; Gill, 2014; van Manen, 2016). While there are a number of notable phenomenological philosophers (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Sartre, and Gadamer), phenomenological research methodologies tend to draw upon the philosophies of Husserl or Heidegger (Dowling, 2007; Gill, 2014; Laverty, 2003). Gill (2014, p. 119) offers a typology to "classify and contrast five phenomenological methodologies from diverse disciplines". The first, and arguably the most fundamental, is this distinction between the underpinning philosophies of Husserl[25] or Heidegger. Those that draw on Husserl are, in Gill's (2014) typology, 'Sanders' phenomenology' and 'Giorgi's descriptive phenomenological method' (see for example Giorgi, 1985; Sanders, 1982). Those that draw upon Heidegger are 'Benner's interpretive phenomenology' and 'Smith's interpretative phenomenological analysis' (see for example Benner, 1985; Smith & Osborn, 2015). The approach that Gill contends straddles both is 'van Manen's hermeneutic phenomenology'. In addition to their underpinning philosophies, Gill outlines key differences between these five main methodologies. These include differences in sample size, practical steps for analysing the data, and divergences in the key concepts that are emphasised in understanding the aim of the research. However, despite all of that, Gill highlights that "their differences [in sample size, analysis etc.] should not obscure their fundamental similarities" (Gill, 2014, p. 22), which are a focus on lived experience.

Given Heidegger is a key proponent of hermeneutic phenomenology philosophy, I believe 'van Manen's hermeneutic phenomenology' does not straddle both. Instead, it most strongly aligns with Heidegger. While van Manen does use Husserlian terms like 'lifeworld' and 'essence', he does not use

[25] Husserl published his first phenomenological treatise, *Logical Investigations*, in 1901, and continued to refine his approach to what he called 'transcendental phenomenology' through multiple publications until his last major work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, in 1935 (Beyer, 2020). His collected works were published as *Husserliana—Gesammelte Werke* (1950).

them in a strictly Husserlian sense. He rejects Husserl's fundamental claim that we can 'bracket out' our assumptions. In line with Heidegger's philosophy, van Manen's methodological approach is rooted in an ontological inquiry (unlike Husserl's epistemological inquiry) to explore the way we are in the world. Of the five phenomenological typologies, I have therefore chosen van Manan (2016) as my methodological 'guide', drawing on his book *Researching Lived Experience*. Van Manen embraces the concepts of hermeneutics *and* phenomenology, both of which underpin Heidegger's philosophical approach. His goal is to offer an *understanding* of the hermeneutic phenomenological methodology, including its aims, and the different ways it can be explored, rather than offering a methodological procedure. It is an approach that, through fostering an understanding, seeks to facilitate and encourage an authentic interpretation of how one could apply and adapt the methodology within any specific Situation. It is not focused on a specific or fixed procedure, and 'how one does it', which may indeed be inauthentic. Van Manan is interested instead in explaining the purpose of the methodology, so one can appropriate it for one's own use. As explained in Chapter 3, this aligns with the importance of authenticity in Heidegger's philosophy.

4.1.2 Hermeneutic Phenomenology Methodology

> [Hermeneutic phenomenology] is the phenomenological and hermeneutical study of human experience: phenomenology because it is the descriptive study of lived experience (phenomena) in the attempt to enrich lived experience by mining its meaning; hermeneutics because it is the interpretative study of the expressions and objectifications (texts) of lived experience in the attempt to determine the meaning embodied in them (van Manen, 2016, p. 38).

The purpose of hermeneutic phenomenology as a research methodology is to *grasp* the phenomenon of interest—to understand it, to uncover it, to 'let-it-be-seen'. This is not done by measuring it or quantifying it. The methodology comes from the perspective that the way to understand a phenomenon is to understand how people experience it. The focus of the research is to explicate this experience and make it intelligible to others.

From a Heideggerian perspective, we are necessarily 'thrown' into a shared world, and we live in this world (largely inauthentically) as 'one' lives. However, we can and do appropriate ourselves, and therefore take part in shaping and creating our world, to live authentically. Nevertheless, how one experiences the world depends on how one *dwells* in the world. Van Manen (2016) cites an anecdote from van den Berg's 1953 book *Person and World*. In this example, researchers took a "native of the Malayan jungle" (van Manen, 2016, p. 115) through the bustling city of Singapore. At the end of the tour, they asked what stood out most for the native, expecting him to be amazed at the tall buildings, the concrete roads, or perhaps the cars or streetcars. Instead, he said he was impressed by the street vendor, and how many bananas he could move at once using a cart. The buildings, roads and cars were so alien to him, it was almost as though they were not seen or comprehended. We tend to meaningfully

engage with something only if it has meaning for us—meaning which is given to us, at least in the first instance, through our shared cultural norms.

The purpose of literature and poetry is also to explore lived experience through narrative—a presentation of a life or situation that the reader recognises or grasps. However, in literature, the 'knowing' is usually left implicit. In hermeneutic phenomenological research, the aim is to make the implicit explicit: to uncover the hidden, or the taken-for-granted meanings embedded in a lived experience (van Manen, 2016, p. 11).

Meaning and understanding necessarily involve 'interpretation': the participants' interpretation of ethical leadership (based on their own experiences) and then my interpretation of their interpretation (see Section 4.4.3). The interpretation *is* hermeneutic, or circular. It moves from the whole to the parts in order to reinterpret and understand the whole. "Methodologically, the interpretivist perspective may evolve, for example, in a process of interpretation and interaction between the investigator and research participants" (Laverty, 2003, p. 26). Every interpretation can be questioned or improved. However, it is not the case that a particular interpretation therefore has no 'truth':

> Furthermore, because the λόγος [logos] is a letting-something-be-seen, it can *therefore* be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement'. This idea [of truth being an 'agreement' with what is represented 'out there' in the world and 'inside' one's head] is by no means the primary one in the concept of ἀλήθεια [alētheia – i.e., truth]. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 56 S33)

The 'truth' of a phenomenon (according to Heidegger) lies in uncovering an understanding from a 'primordial' (ontological) level. A hermeneutic phenomenological methodology is therefore not concerned with some 'objective' state of affairs in the world, but rather with how a phenomenon is meaningfully experienced. It engages with the cognitive, non-cognitive, gnostic, and pathic ways of 'knowing' or experiencing (van Manen, 2016, p. xiv).

Phenomenological research draws upon a number of experiences of a particular phenomenon—ethical leadership, in this case—in order to develop insights and understanding about the nature of that phenomenon. These insights and understanding will edify in some way our own lifeworlds, as either researchers or readers of the research. "In this sense, human science [phenomenological] research is itself a kind of *Bildung* or *paideia*; it is the curriculum of being and becoming" (van Manen, 2016, p. 7). It is therefore not an analytic science, a case study, or a reflection of a particular researcher. It is not just an example, but nor is it universal (van Manen, 2016, pp. 22-23). This purpose differs from other disciplines, even other social science disciplines:

> And phenomenology differs from other disciplines in that it does not aim to explicate meanings specific to particular cultures (ethnography), to certain social groups (sociology), to historical periods (history), to mental types (psychology), or to an individual's personal life history

(biography). Rather, phenomenology attempts to explicate the meanings as we live them in our everyday existence, our lifeworld (van Manen, 2016, p. 11).

The aim of the methodology is to uncover what is common across experiences, to identify what it is that makes something an example of a particular phenomenon. Van Manen calls this the 'essence'; hermeneutic phenomenology uncovers the 'essence' of a particular phenomenon. "The term essence derives from the verb to be—by definition a profoundly existential notion" (van Manen, 2016, p. xv). This concept of 'essence' is not to be confused with 'essentialism', which is more closely aligned with positivism. I discussed this in regard to the Authentic Leadership literature in Section 2.4.2.3. Essentialism holds that there is an 'objective' truth that is independent of how one experiences a phenomenon. It holds that essence is prior to existence. From this perspective, what something 'is' is static, timeless, and universal, whereas phenomenology holds that practice comes *before* theory, and informs theory. It is people who give meaning to frameworks, schemata, and theories (van Manen, 2016, p. 45) in order to help make sense of their world. The 'essence' of a phenomenon, which helps to explain what that phenomenon is, is not fixed, nor is it timeless or universal. As an example, a Syrian friend of mine once commented in conversation that "self-development is not a thing in Syria". I understood him to mean that the phenomenon of 'self-development' as experienced by people in Melbourne is not a phenomenon that would even be understood, because not experienced, by people in Syria when he grew up. There is a shared understanding of what Melbournians (in this case) mean when they talk about 'self-development', but this phenomenon is not static, timeless, nor universal.

The concept of 'essence' is terminology from Husserl's phenomenology, not Heidegger's (Laverty, 2003). However, in Husserl's hands, an 'essence' refers to something that is more Platonic and universal, closer to the concept of essentialism. This is not the way van Manen intends it. Central to Husserl's phenomenology is 'bracketing out' our assumptions or biases (Laverty, 2003). For van Manen, an essence is something that helps to describe what makes a phenomenon what it is, without the further requirement that this be timeless and universal. While Heidegger does not usually talk about 'essences', it is nevertheless a useful concept to help guide interpretation and analysis of lived experiences. One must keep in mind, however, that, from a Heideggerian perspective, essence does not mean 'essentialism', nor can we 'bracket out' our assumptions or biases as Husserl thinks we can.

The boundaries of an essence can be hard to define or can become blurry. Nonetheless, this does not undermine the notion that there is something that underpins a phenomenon in order for it to be understood *as* a phenomenon. Van Manen (2016, p. xv) refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of a family resemblances of meaning, and Terry Eagleton's description that even a field with uncertain boundaries can still be identified as a field. A positivist approach to research may infer that the blurry edges of phenomenological research indicate that it lacks rigour, is imprecise, or is not rational. Instead, van Manen (2016, p. 16) argues that phenomenological research embodies a broader notion of rationality. It is a 'rationality' that underpins the way we operate in the world, which is not reducible to

deductive logic. It is a rationality that is aimed at making something intelligible to each other. This is not usually done through "deadening abstract concepts" (van Manen, 2016, p. 17), but in the rich descriptions of people's experiences, which highlight insights that resonate with us. It is aligned with Heidegger's absorbed coping (ready-to-hand) way of being in the world.

The aim of hermeneutic phenomenological research is not to solve a problem but rather to understand a phenomenon. This informs the specific use of this word in my research question ('how is ethical leadership *understood* through the lived experience?'). In order to transmit this understanding between research participant, researcher, and reader, we rely on language. However, language itself is constructed and dynamic. It helps us express what we mean, but it seeks to express something that is often felt or thought non-cognitively. Language is useful in that it is shared, but it cannot capture the phenomenon itself. It can only be used to point towards the phenomenon. In fact, as part of the hermeneutic cycle, language also helps to constitute how we understand our world. When we convert our experiences into language, we inevitably move from an absorbed coping (ready-to-hand) experience in-the-world to a more reflective description. Our experiences as told are inevitably mediated—whether through language, time, or reflective consciousness. The description of the experience is exemplary, unlike the thing itself. Nevertheless, the description helps us to grasp the meaning or deeper significance of the thing itself (van Manen, 2016, p. 122).

4.2 Research Method: Semi-structured Interviews

There are a number of research methods that can be utilised to explore lived experience. These include one-on-one interviews, group interviews (which are specifically used in Benner's 'interpretive phenomenology'), observations, literature, biography, diaries or journals, and art (Gill, 2014; van Manen, 2016). The research method I chose is the one-on-one 'semi-structured interview'. I utilised this method for both Stage One (one-on-one interviews) and Stage Two (living interview-diaries with selected participants from Stage One) of my research. There are a number of benefits to utilising semi-structured interviews. This is perhaps why they are often considered "the centrepiece of phenomenological research" (Gill, 2014, p. 9) or "the most widely employed [qualitative] tool for collecting information" (Alsaawi, 2014). I discuss why I selected semi-structured interviews for both Stage One and Stage Two below.

The format of the semi-structured interview I adopted is the 'conversational interview'. The focus of a 'conversational interview', according to van Manen (2016, p. 98), is to either a) gather experiential narrative material, or b) to explore the meaning of an experience with the interview participant in a conversational relation—to become co-investigators of the phenomenon. I did both. In line with Heidegger's ontological theory, the interview itself is hermeneutic. Thus, meaning emerges from a shared understanding. Anecdotes that participants thought exemplified the 'ethical leadership' phenomenon tended to prompt reflective exploration of the meaning of the phenomenon, which incited

further reflection on their lived experience. There were several instances where participants verbalised the realisation of insights as they described their experiences. For example, at one point, Rebecca was exploring what she saw as the blurry boundaries of competitive advantage, and what was acceptable and what was not. As she speaks, she notes: "To be honest, the closer I am with people, the harder I find that line is. I've never really thought about that before" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar).

4.2.1 The Importance of the Anecdote

Central to a focus on the 'lived experience' as the unit of analysis is collecting examples and stories that seek to exemplify how people understand the phenomenon of 'ethical leadership' based on their own experiences. Dutch phenomenologist Buytendijk, has called this approach "the science of examples" (cited in van Manen, 2016, p. 121). My focus in the semi-structured interviews was on collecting a particular type of story: the anecdote. The anecdote is a narrative with a point. The point, in this case, is to illustrate an example of ethical leadership. Anecdotes enable us to access an understanding that may be hard to capture in abstract concepts, principles, or variables. They offer an understanding that may even elude us before its telling. They are "examples of practical theorizing" (van Manen, 2016, p. 120). The anecdote highlights salient points that the participant wishes to make. It is most likely a distillation of key elements as experienced—either distilled in the telling and/or through time or experience. Thus, it will inevitably be a mediated version of a lived experience. However, the point of the anecdote is the point. Anecdotal stories engage us 'pre-reflectively', while at the same time compel the listener or reader to reflect and compare it against our own experiences or understandings (van Manen, 2016, p. 121). Anecdotes go to the heart of the hermeneutic phenomenological approach, which is to shed light on a phenomenon. This is importantly different to the 'status' of empirical data in other research methodologies:

> Anecdotes have enjoyed low status in scholarly writings, since, in contrast to historical accounts or reports, they rest on dubious factual evidence…Of course, it is entirely fallacious to generalize from a case on the basis of mere anecdotal evidence. But empirical generalization is not the aim of phenomenological research. The point that the critics of anecdotes miss is that the anecdote is to be valued for other than factual-empirical or factual-historical reasons. (van Manen, 2016, pp. 118-119).

Anecdotes serve a number of functions which go beyond such factual or historical value. Van Manen (2016, pp. 119-120) outlines five inter-related functions. One: anecdotes have an 'exemplary character'—i.e., they exemplify the phenomenon of interest. Two: they resonate because they are examples of wisdom or insight that spark those 'aha' moments (what Heidegger calls a 'knowing'). Three: they contain an account of 'certain teachings' which may never have been written but are nevertheless known. Four: they are a "counterweight to abstract theoretical thought" (van Manen, 2016,

p. 119). Five: they "express a certain disdain for the alienated and alienating discourse of scholars who have difficulty showing how life and theoretical propositions are connected" (van Manen, 2016, p. 119).

Every anecdotal story is embedded in a particular Situation, from which meanings are derived and interpretation must unfold. For Heidegger, the Situation (with a capital S) refers to a particular time and place that one finds oneself thrown into. The Situation matters for how a particular person (Dasein) makes sense of that particular time and place. Intelligibility is dependent, there is no universal or single way of understanding a Situation. For Heidegger, "Sense-making is always situated in a context of particular things, a particular life and a particular culture or tradition" (Withy, p. 64).

4.2.2 Stage One: One-on-one Interviews

In Stage One of my research, I utilised the semi-structured (conversational) one-on-one interview to undertake 22 interviews with people from the energy sector (11 participants), the government sector (5 participants) and the built environment sector (6 participants). Semi-structured interviews allow significant flexibility to explore a complex phenomenon like ethical leadership. Structured interviews, given their controlled nature, can limit the richness and the degree of in-depth information provided by participants. Unstructured interviews, however, provide participants with the opportunity to take the interview in any direction (Alsaawi, 2014). Semi-structured interviews retain the benefit of the depth and richness of an unstructured interview. At the same time, however, they give me as the researcher an opportunity to explore particular issues through open-ended questions (Alsaawi, 2014).

The use of semi-structured (conversational) interviews in Stage One gave me the ability to mine participants' lived experiences from a lifetime of experiences. Unlike observations, art, diaries, and journals that focus on what is happening at a particular point in time, the interview allowed a participant to identify the most salient examples (anecdotes) of ethical leadership that stood out for them from their whole life-experience. What stood out as salient therefore helped them to identify what the phenomenon of ethical leadership is for them. Further, unlike biographies, literature, and diaries, the interview format allowed me to probe aspects of participants' answers in order to explore more deeply aspects of their answers that stood out as salient to me. The interview format also allowed me to engage with more participants, in the time I had available, compared to other formats, such as ethnographic observations. The participant group of 22 people helped me to distil the 'essence' of the ethical leadership phenomenon from multiple lived perspectives.

Table 2 lists the participants and the pseudonyms I use for them. Please note that I have not provided specific details in order to protect their identity. The sampling size for phenomenological research tends to be small. For instance, in Smith's 'interpretative phenomenological analysis' (one of the five phenomenological research methodologies identified by Gill, discussed above), a sample size of one can be used. However 3–10 people is more usual for the different phenomenological research methodologies (Gill, 2014). The focus is on "rich qualitative accounts over the quantity" (Gill, 2014, p.

21). A sample size of 22 is therefore on the larger side for a phenomenological study (unless one is using Benner's 'interpretive phenomenology'[26]). In order to gauge the appropriate number of research participants in a hermeneutic phenomenology, Alsaawi (2014, p. 152) notes that there is a greater reliance on what is felt as sufficient by the interviewer him/herself. Part of this judgment is linked to "saturation, in which the interviewer begins to hear the same information he/she has already obtained from previous interviewees" (Alsaawi, 2014, p. 152). While I do not think that I have heard all there is to hear about the experience of ethical leadership from the 22 participants, I nevertheless noticed many consistent themes ('essences' in van Manen's sense) across the 22 interviews. The following section describes the strategy I utilised in selecting these 22 participants.

[26] Benner's 'interpretive phenomenology' is unusual in that she uses interpretive teams to facilitate the study of over a hundred participants. The aim of this approach is to keep interviewing until new participants reveal no new findings (Gill, 2014, p. 14).

Table 2: Stage One participant overview

	Pseudonym	*Indicative Position*	*Country of Origin*	*Gender*	*Mode of Interview*	*Interview Length*
	Energy Sector					
1.	Jacqueline	Vice President, clean energy organisation, manufacturer	Australia	Female	Face to face	46mins
2.	Tina	Director for Business Development, energy organisation	Denmark	Female	Face to face	50mins
3.	Liliana	Senior Advisor, clean energy project organisation	Norway	Female	Face to face	23mins
4.	Edith	Global Vice President, international energy company	USA	Female	Face to face	35mins
5.	Rebecca	Founder, consulting business for energy sector	France	Female	Face to face	1hr 21mins
6.	Priscilla	Independent Environmental Economist	Norway	Female	Face to face	37mins
7.	Camellia	CEO, energy organisation	Australia	Female	Face to face	52mins
8.	Tabitha	CEO, clean energy project organisation	Norway	Female	Skype	40mins
9.	Kimberley	CEO and Founder, consultant to energy sector	USA	Female	Skype	1hr 10mins
10.	Samantha	Climate Finance Advisor	USA	Female	Telephone	1hr 12mins
11.	Travis	Director, think-tank organisation; former energy organisation	Australia	Male	Face to face	1hr 10mins

	Government Sector					
1.	Renata	CEO, protection agency, semi-government	Australia	Female	Face to face	1hr 26mins
2.	Kassandra	Manager, State Government Department	Australia	Female	Face to face	1hr 10mins
3.	Stella	Executive Director, State Government Department	Australia	Female	Face to face	1hr 13mins
4.	Christopher	Former State Government Minister	Australia	Male	Skype	1hr 15mins
5.	Simon	Commissioner	Australia	Male	Face to face	1hr 1min
	Built Environment Sector					
6.	Ruth	Urban and regional planner, consultant, lecturer	Australia	Female	Face to face	1hr 14mins
7.	Russ	Founding Director, Architect	Australia	Male	Face to face	1hr 7mins
8.	Charlotte	Executive General Manager, property developer (commercial)	Australia	Female	Face to face	58mins
9.	Roland	Executive Director & Founder, property developer (residential)	Australia	Male	Face to face	1hr 15mins
10.	Larissa	Sustainability Manager, Municipal Government	Brazil	Female	Face to face	1hr 16mins
11.	Melissa	CEO, judicial sector	Australia	Female	Face to face	45mins

4.2.2.1 Stage One sampling strategy

Any lived experience of a phenomenon will contain insights and be capable of being thematically analysed. As Chase (2008, p. 79) observes, "…any narrative is significant because it embodies—and gives us insight into—what is possible and intelligible within a specific social context". However, some people are able to draw on a deeper pool of experiences and/or to provide a richer description. As van Manen (2016, p. 92) notes, "we tend to learn more about life from some people than from others". Therefore, while everyone has a story to tell, I used purposeful sampling to select 22 research participants from the energy, government, and built environment sectors for Stage One (refer to Table 2: Participant overview above). The logic behind purposeful sampling is selecting information-rich cases that provide insight into the phenomenon being explored. There are at least 15 'purposeful sampling strategies' (Palinkas et al., 2015). I used a combination of three of them: intensity, opportunistic, and convenience sampling. These strategies, and my justification for their use, are outlined below.

Intensity sampling

Intensity sampling aims to identify examples that provide information-rich cases that demonstrate insight and illuminate the phenomenon 'intensely'. "Using the logic of intensity sampling, one seeks excellent or rich examples of the phenomenon of interest, but not highly unusual cases" (Patton, 2002, p. 234). It involves some prior judgement in picking the research participants. The people I chose to interview using this sampling approach were selected by myself, or recommended to me, based on the following considerations:

- The *breadth and/or depth of their professional experience* (reflected in years of experience and relative seniority of position), on the basis that this was expected to yield interesting or insightful examples of ethical leadership, especially compared to someone earlier in their career. Essentially, a more experienced person has more experience to draw upon. At the same time, in line with the intensity sampling strategy, it was not expected that the experiences would be highly unusual.
- How *reflective (indeed reflexive) and articulate* they are. Van Manen (2016, p. 133) observes: "what remains beyond one person's linguistic competence may be put into words by another". I expected the people I chose to interview to have the ability to describe and discuss their experiences and the concept of ethical leadership meaningfully, and to be willing to do so during the interview.
- *Their care about ethical leadership*. My pre-interview understanding of my interviewees, or those that recommended them, suggested that ethical leadership (however they understood that, and however I understood that) was important to them. For Heidegger, a person always acts 'for-which' something they care about. While choosing participants who care about ethical leadership may be considered a bias in positivist research, for phenomenological research it is important to engage

with participants for whom ethical leadership matters. It is from these people that I expected to elicit information-rich examples from which to explore the phenomenon.

Opportunistic sampling

This approach takes advantage of opportunities to interview people that emerge during data collection (Patton, 2002, p. 240)—essentially through the recommendations and access of other participants. This is also known as 'snowball sampling'. My decision to take a participant's advice to interview someone they know was based on the same considerations identified above using the intensity case sampling method.

Convenience sampling

This sampling strategy is focused on collecting information from research participants who are accessible to the researcher (Patton, 2002 p241). This strategy complements the above two strategies by interviewing people I have access to through my professional networks (and, in some cases, the networks of those I interviewed) combined with those people who are willing and able to be interviewed.

We are intelligible to each other because we 'share worlds'. The shared worlds of the participants are those of energy, government, and built environment sectors. These are 'worlds' I also share (refer to Section 4.4.3.1, below). Hence, accessing these people for my research was convenient. What might be considered a bias in positivist research becomes a positive attribute in phenomenological research. The worlds I share with participants enable an understanding of their lived experience, which I then in turn (hermeneutically) analyse.

4.2.2.2 Stage One interview questions

Given my research question ('*how can the lived experience help us understand ethical leadership?'*), my questions during the Stage One semi-structured interviews focused explicitly on participants' lived experience of ethical leadership. The questions probed their understanding of examples given. My interviews revolved around the following three questions.

1. *Tell me about a time when you have experienced or demonstrated ethical leadership.*

This question was the lynch pin of my interviews, since this is how I accessed participants' lived experience of the ethical leadership phenomenon. Without exception, I would be given, or would probe for, more than one example/experience. As discussed, central to my approach was the 'anecdote' as an exemplar of the ethical leadership phenomenon.

I usually drew out specific aspects of an anecdote that triggered my interest in follow up questions. This included exploring statements that seemed particularly taken-for-granted. For instance, participants often referred to 'doing the right thing', as if 'the right thing' was self-evident.

2. *What about this experience makes it an example of ethical leadership?*

This question was often answered within the response to the first question. If it was not, or I thought more could be explored, I would ask this question explicitly.

3. *Given we have been discussing examples of ethical leadership for the last x-minutes, if I ask you now, what does ethical leadership mean to you, how would you answer?*

I tended to ask this question towards the end of the interview, in a way that acknowledges that they have probably, in some sense, already answered it. It provided an opportunity for the participants to draw together their ideas and thoughts about their experiences—i.e., their understanding of 'ethical leadership'. Although the term is not used explicitly, it invited people to identify the 'essence' of ethical leadership for them. Occasionally, the question sparked an entirely new thought or idea that, if time permitted, I would explore further. It was also a useful way to draw the interview to a natural close.

Careful listening, and providing space for answers, was central to my interviewing technique. Usually, I would ask a question and let the participant answer until they had said all they wanted to say in response, coming to a natural finish. I tended to interject 'lightly', sometimes to clarify (e.g., "So that was your manager who said that?") or to indicate I understood (e.g., "Hmm, I see."). While a participant was speaking, I tended not to interpret their flow. I would write down my questions and return to them later or, depending on time, not at all. This approach did allow room for some participants to wander away from my specific question/s, which was usually grounded or linked to a specific experience they have had. I saw this 'wandering' as potentially an important part of how they were making sense of 'ethical leadership'. It was only if the wandering got quite far from a) their experience, b) what was clearly important to them, or c) their understanding of ethical leadership, that I would gently bring them back, via a question, to something more closely linked to their experience of ethical leadership. While this was the general blueprint of my interviewing style, there were times when an interview became more abstract or hypothetical. In fact, the participants often tended towards abstraction. They were all highly experienced, educated, influential senior or executive managers in their chosen industry sectors. These individuals were therefore used to communicating in professional environments, where 'the way one usually talks' is to strip away emotion and feelings and focus on issues, topics, facts, and ideas. The focus tended to be on the present-to-hand, categorical approach to thinking about the world. Bringing them back to their experience directly was often a challenge.

4.2.3 Stage Two: Living Interview-Diaries

In contrast with Stage One, which comes from the perspective of reflecting 'back' and drawing upon lived experiences from a lifetime of experiences, Stage Two comes from the perspective of "the thick of lived life" (van Manen, 2016, p. 163), i.e., the liv*ing* experience. In Stage Two, I extended my use of the research method of conversational semi-structured interviews to develop a format of short

15–30 minute 'living interview-diaries'. I undertook these every day for a week with three selected participants from Stage One. I call them 'living interview-diaries' on the basis that the daily interview is a type of interactive diary-entry which captures a living perspective. This research method was developed in response to the Australian 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and its lockdown conditions. I posit that it is a methodological contribution to phenomenological research (see Section 4.4.1). Given this, two weeks after the 'living interview-diary' concluded, I conducted a further interview with the three participants regarding the methodology specifically. I undertook these living interview-diaries virtually, using video-conferencing Zoom software. **Table 3** identifies Stage Two participants.

Table 3: Stage Two participant overview

	Pseudonym	*Indicative Position*	*Country of Origin*	*Gender*	*Mode of Interview*	*Total Length of 5 Interviews*
	Energy Sector					
1.	Jacqueline	Vice President, CEO, clean-energy start-up	Australia	Female	Virtual (Zoom)	2hrs 25 mins
	Government Sector					
2.	Kassandra	Manager, State Government Department	Australia	Female	Virtual (Zoom)	2hrs 12 mins
	Built Environment Sector					
3.	Russ	Founding Director, Architect	Australia	Male	Virtual (Zoom)	2hrs 4mins

4.2.3.1 Stage Two sampling strategy

My Stage Two sampling strategy was still aligned with an 'intensity sampling' approach—i.e., choosing research participants who provided information-rich cases that demonstrate insight and illuminates the phenomenon 'intensely'—from the three industry sectors. This was again combined with a 'convenience sampling' approach. Jorgensen (1989) notes that a minimal condition for the 'convenience sampling' research method is that the researcher is able to gain access to an appropriate setting. With the benefit of the analysis of Stage One, I choose participants for Stage Two who: a) I thought would be willing to devote the time to the living interview-diaries, given they were also managing the COVID-19 pandemic situation in their respective organisations, and b) would be willing to help due to their previously displayed interest in my research. It is important to recognise that I was not seeking a representative selection of participants. Rather, I was seeking participants that would share something representative about the phenomenon of ethical leadership.

4.2.3.2 Stage Two interview questions

The focus on anecdotes drawn from the participants' day remained the focus of the interview-diary for Stage Two, in order to help answer the research question. Anecdotes provide a "*point* or *cogency*" (van Manen, 2016, p. 69) around which to gather data. My Stage Two interviews therefore revolved around the following three questions.

1) *Tell me about what happened today. [What stands out? What were the main things? What were the most challenging aspects?]*

The purpose of this question was to invite participants to discuss what was salient for them, as a way of getting them to reflect on their day. This may or may not include anything they considered related to 'ethical leadership' particularly. Nevertheless, it provided me with aspects to follow-up more specifically.

2) *Is there anything that happened today that you consider is an example of ethical leadership? [Tell me about what happened.]*

This question was again the lynchpin of my interviews, as a way to invite participants to reflect on their lived experience of 'ethical leadership' as a phenomenon, and on what that means to them. They could do so with the benefit of immediacy, which enabled them, and me, to better access not only what happened and why, but also how it felt.

3) *What about this experience makes it an example of ethical leadership?*

If this question was not answered explicitly in response to the previous question, or I thought more could be explored, I would ask for more details regarding their experience and their reflection on it. Within the first couple of days, participants grasped the approach, and would usually reflect briefly before our 'chats'. The process quickly became them telling me about their day through the lens of ethical leadership. This is captured in the following exchange on Day Two of the interview-diary with Jaqueline:

> **Jaqueline**: Let me guess, you want to know how my day was through the lens of ethical leadership? [Laughs.]
> **Alice**: How did you guess? [Laughs.]
> **Jaqueline**: Yeah. Should I just talk, or did you have a change in the-
> **Alice**: No, just talk.
> **Jaqueline:** Okay, cool. I really need to allow myself more time to follow a thought process through, but what I'm actually enjoying about this is that I think for one or two minutes beforehand: what are the topics that have touched this topic? And then I just talk. And then I find my way through the line of thought as I'm talking.

In these living interview-diaries (exercising the benefit of an interview approach compared to a written diary), I would ask more direct follow-up questions. I would often request participants expand their understanding of particular ethical issues or tensions they raised. For example:

> **Jaqueline:**…What we're trying to do is create a template in a way, or pioneer a format of a [for-profit] company that can still have financial concerns and interest and an engine, but it's [the company's] primary objective is not that...
> **Alice:** …You want to change the [capitalist] 'machine', but you're wanting to use the machine to break the machine. Is there a contradiction there?
> **Jaqueline:** I don't think it's a contradiction, but it's a chosen way forward. And the reason is, from what I can see, not doing it that way doesn't get you where you need to get. You're up against those using the machine, right? You can do David and Goliath and come up with your slingshot, and that's basically what we're trying to do. Being a small NGO, non-profit organisation, it just doesn't get the horsepower that it needs…

This probing approach yielded a more nuanced reflection on either what the participants thought were their ethical concerns or understanding, or (particularly in Jaqueline's case) the ethical tensions (discussed further in Section 4.4.2.1). Following the completion of a Stage One interview, and then the completion of the Stage Two living interview-diaries, I then moved to analysis and interpretation of the interview data.

4.3 Analysis and Interpretation

The aim of analysis and interpretation in hermeneutic phenomenological research is to communicate the multilayered meaning of people's lived experienced via texts. This analysis and interpretation should "yield a synthesis of all meaning units into a consistent statement regarding the participant's experience, known as the structure of the experience" (Laverty, 2003, p. 30). Van Manen emphasises that, since the meaning of a phenomenon is communicated via a text, the text should not shy away from a rich description that 'speaks to us'. He finds the interpretation of lived experiences "more accurately a process of insightful invention, discovery or disclosure-grasping" (van Manen, 2016, p. 79), a way of 'seeing'. Hermeneutic phenomenological analysis is based around various ways of interpreting themes. For van Manen, a theme is the imbued meaning or the point of an experience. It aims at "capturing the phenomenon one tries to understand" (2016, p. 87). It tries to distil the essence of the phenomenon. However, one must remember that a theme is always a simplification or a reduction of what is experienced in the world, and is not therefore the experience/phenomenon itself. Nor is it something immutable or universal.

There were three aspects to my analysis of the interview data from both Stage One and Stage Two: thematic coding, identification of theme statements (I communicate both of these in the findings chapters), and exegetical analysis (I communicate this in the discussion chapter). They are described

below as three distinct aspects, and they were initially undertaken in the order presented in early interview analysis. However, as the process progressed, I in fact moved between the three aspects of analysis and re-visited them in a hermeneutic way.

4.3.1 Thematic Coding

With the consent of participants, I had the recording of the interviews professionally transcribed[27]. I then undertook a 'thematic analysis' of each transcript, which is the basis of most qualitative data analysis (Creswell, 2013, p. 183; Roulston, 2014). A summary of my thematic analysis coding can be found in **Appendix A**. However, thematic analysis is itself an umbrella term, and the type of thematic analysis I undertook is closely aligned with what Terry, Hayfield, Clarke, and Braun (2017, p. 848) call a 'reflexive approach'. It is termed this to acknowledge the role of the researcher, who aims to interpret the data to identify meaning-based patterns. "The researcher is a storyteller, actively engaged in interpreting data through the lens of their own cultural membership and social positionings, their theoretical assumptions and ideological commitments, as well as their scholarly knowledge" (Terry et al., 2017, p. 848)[28].

My first step in the thematic analysis was to read each interview transcript carefully, often more than once, in a process Terry et al. (2017, p. 852) calls *familiarisation*. I then moved to *generating codes* (Terry et al., 2017, p. 853) in the margins of the printed transcripts, by identifying topics, concepts, described behaviours, or anecdotes (i.e., any aspect of the interview that jumped out at me as being salient). However, I captured this coding and refined it more systematically using the coding software NVivo. This was largely an inductive process (a 'ground-up' process) where the topics, concepts, etc., emerged from the transcript, rather than one which started with pre-defined codes or concepts. Having said that, I, of course, approached the data already being informed by Heidegger and the moral/ethical leadership literature. Since I was aware of this influence, I sought to recognise when a code concept was specifically informed by the literature. These codes are particularly evident in the descriptor called 'References of interest' in the Thematic Coding Table (Appendix A). Hence, the coding was ultimately an abductive process. As can be seen in Appendix A, I often identified 'sub-code/s' of a broader code. For instance, 'good recruitment processes' was a particular example (a sub-code) of the broader code of 'accountable systems'. As another example, 'caring for people's well-being' was an example (sub-code) of the broader code of 'care'. In the Appendix A table, the large (14-point) bold headings are descriptors under which I have grouped related codes. Specifically, the headings Anecdotes, Aspects of

[27] There was one exception, where a participant asked me to stop recording and withdrew their consent to professional transcription halfway through the interview. In this case, I made detailed notes during and after the interview regarding their experiences and key points.

[28] Refer to Section 4.4.3.1 (Researcher reflexivity: my dwelling) for a brief comment on my cultural membership, social position, and scholarly background.

ethical leadership, Ethical leadership values or principles, Moral/ethical considerations or topics, and References of interest, are all descriptor headings.

4.3.2 Theme Statements

After the initial coding exercise, I then re-read each transcript to identify what van Manen calls 'theme statements'. As the focus of my methodology is on identifying the 'essence' of the ethical leadership phenomenon, this step was explicitly part of that process. 'Theme statements' are sentences which seek to capture the essential point/s that participants have made during their interview regarding their lived experience of ethical leadership. They are a statement that seeks to reveal something about the phenomenon. They underpin an understanding of the 'essence' of the phenomenon. In some instances, I used my own words to distil what I understood to be participants' essential point/s. In other instances, they captured their own essential point/s, and I used their own words. The theme statements are therefore my interpretation of the most important aspects that emerged in the transcripts after careful reading, and re-reading. This task of identifying theme statements is, as van Manen notes, both easy and hard (2016, p. 71). Often the difficulty is in capturing the self-evident nature of a story or a reflection—to uncover the 'taken-for-granted' nature of an experience.

The theme statements do not try to capture every point that participants made. Rather, my interest was in identifying the themes that underpinned their lived experience, the ones which go to the heart of how they understood ethical leadership after discussing it with me. For instance, Jacqueline (who is passionate, outraged, and informed about climate change) spent much of the Stage One interview quoting statistics and lamenting the impacts, and spoke about triple bottom line reporting. She made many interesting points when talking about these aspects of climate change. However, these were not the main points related to her experience, or how she understands, ethical leadership. Nevertheless, these statistics, impacts, and reporting were eventually linked to a theme that *is* fundamental to how she understands ethical leadership, which I captured as the following theme statement: 'An ethical leader takes responsibility to recognise what is going on and has an obligation to take a bigger view than themselves'.

The identification of the theme statements helped me to decide which of the many themes I wanted to focus on in exploring the lived experience of ethical leadership. During the *constructing themes* stage (Terry et al., 2017, p. 855), I grouped codes (and related sub-codes) under more thematic headings. The themes I focus on within the thesis can be identified in the Appendix A table under the bold, italicsised headings. Sometimes a code was "substantial" enough to be "promoted" to a theme (Terry et al., 2017, p. 855). For instance, the 'hard decision' code was 'promoted' to 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions' theme. My two findings chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) focus on seven of the high-level themes identified. I call these 'aspects of ethical leadership' and I discuss why these themes have

been chosen in Chapter 5. These findings chapters do not therefore attempt to describe and discuss all the codes and/or themes identified in this process.

4.3.3 Exegetical Analysis

The third stage of analysis is an "exegetical approach" (van Manen, 2016, p. 171). This stage moves into a discussion and analysis of the findings. The aim of an exegetical approach is to interpret and discusses data through the lens or concepts of a particular phenomenological philosophy. I do this by using those concepts to organise, understand, and structure the data. "...A phenomenological description may be organized by engaging one's writing in a dialogical or exegetical fashion with the thinking of some other phenomenological author—in other words, with the tradition of the field" (van Manen, 2016, p. 172). An exegetical approach is therefore embedded in the theoretical framework I outlined in Chapter 3. The outcome of my exegetical analysis is discussed in Chapter 7.

The exegetical approach is the foundation of my research project, given I am using a Heideggerian lens to explore an understanding of ethical leadership. Hence, this approach is fundamental to how I have used the thematic analysis to ultimately understand the lived experience of ethical leadership and arrive at a "synthesis of meaning" to articulate a statement and structure regarding participants' experience (Laverty, 2003, p. 30). I do this by utilising the Heideggerian ontological structures explained in Chapter 3 as interpretive (or conceptual) lenses to explore people's lived experience of ethical leadership. The themes, theme statements, and exegetical analysis were undertaken on Stage One interview data and Stage Two interview data separately, and then combined across the two stages to explore ethical leadership as lived.

Because the aim of an exegetical approach is to understand a phenomenon through the concepts of a particular phenomenological philosophy, it is an example of 'concepts as method'. Colebrook (2017, p. 654) argues that "concepts are intensive and create orientations for thinking. It is in this respect we might begin to think of *concepts as methods*, precisely because concepts are at once prehuman (emerging from the problems or plane of thinking), but that also reconfigure or reorient the plane precisely by being prompted by a problem" (emphasis added). In this case, I use the concepts of Heidegger's theory of Being (his ontological structures) to understand or interpret the findings as an integral part of the theoretical structure of the research. It is a conscious weaving of concepts into the method to "imbue meaning and life into each other" (Mir & Greenwood, 2022 in press, p. 57). This exegetical analysis is the theoretical contribution of my thesis. It is entwined with the methodological contributions of my thesis, which I discuss in the following section.

4.4 Methodological Contributions

I make two methodological contributions in this thesis. The first (more modest) methodological contribution is exploring ethical leadership through a phenomenological perspective, and is therefore a

contribution at the research approach level. The second contribution is to research methods. Through the novel combination of the interview and diary methods, I arrived at what I have called the 'living interview-diary' research method. I now discuss why these are methodological contributions.

4.4.1 Research Approach: A Phenomenological Perspective of Ethical Leadership

While a phenomenological approach has been utilised to explore leadership more broadly (Ladkin, 2010), I am unaware of this methodological approach being utilised to explore ethical leadership specifically. As I have discussed in some detail in this chapter, this methodological approach seeks to get closer to the 'inside' perspective of the phenomenon as lived, as opposed to the dominant third-person approach taken in much of the ethical leadership (and, indeed, general leadership) literature. A phenomenological perspective does not seek to answer a *know-what* question (e.g., what is ethical leadership?) and/or seek to break it down into its constituent parts in an attempt to identify objective, universal properties of the phenomenon. Rather, a phenomenological perspective seeks to answer a *know-how* question from a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) perspective. For Heidegger, the 'truth' about a phenomenon is not separate to how Dasein understands it. The truth of a phenomenon *lies in* how Dasein understands it, or makes meaning from it. This led to my research question '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*. The emphasis and contribution from a phenomenological perspective is understanding how one experiences the ethical leadership phenomenon holistically, in its messy totality.

I contend that the first application (of which I am aware) of a hermeneutic phenomenology methodology to explore the ethical leadership phenomenon meets three thematic requirements for new methodological ideas, as identified by Bartunek et al. (1993). The first thematic requirement is a 'significant methodological contribution': "This can be accomplished by, for example, showing how a chosen method generates knowledge that previous, traditional methods didn't (or couldn't) or by showing that the choice and use of a particular method helps move knowledge about a particular management content domain further along" (Bartunek et al., 1993, p. 1363). The application of a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology to ethical leadership can generate knowledge or a perspective of ethical leadership that previous, more dominant methods cannot. The application of the methodology is therefore inextricably linked—or entwined—with the empirical findings. The second thematic requirement identified by Bartunek et al. (1993) is 'adequate conceptual grounding'. This theme calls for "[a]rticles that emphasize importing a method from another discipline need to demonstrate an adequate understanding of the complexities of the substantive themes in both the original discipline and management as well as an adequate understanding of the assumptions underlying the techniques" (Bartunek et al., 1993, p. 1364). The third thematic requirement is 'adherence to methodologically sound and accurate strategies', which requires "rationales for the given

methodological innovation being proposed also need to be thoroughly stated". In the discussion of the substantial philosophical underpinning in both this chapter and Chapter 3, I have sought to demonstrate an understanding of the underlying assumptions of the methodological technique and given a rigorous rational for its use. By doing so, I meet Bartunek et al.'s second and third thematic requirements for new methodological ideas.

The second methodological contribution of my thesis is entwined with this phenomenological perspective of ethical leadership, and is more specifically a contribution to research methods. Having outlined my living interview-diary method employed in Stage Two of my research (in Section 4.2.3), I now discuss how this is a methodological contribution to research methods. I also present its link to the philosophical underpinnings of a hermeneutic phenomenology methodology.

4.4.2 Research Method: Living Interview-diaries

The usual research methods for exploring a 'living experience' (as distinct from a backward looking 'lived experience') are observations and participant diaries (van Manen, 2016). As noted above, the Australian lockdown conditions presented by the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., government requirement for no unnecessary face-to-face interactions, which required the majority of Australians to work from home) prevented 'observations' as a viable research method for Stage Two at the time I needed to undertake the research. Solicited written diaries remained an option, however. Morrell-Scott (2018) identifies the benefits of diary as being a contemporaneous way for people to reflect on practice, with the ability "to capture the experience close to the time of its occurrence", in a continuous and evolving way. Thus the temporal aspect of the diary is a significant benefit, enabling a continuous narrative (Kenten, 2010) even if over a short timeframe. A contemporaneous account "reduces the likelihood of feelings and events being forgotten", enables the participant to sequentially order the events, and enables participants to elaborate on matters of personal salience of the living experience (Williamson, Leeming, Lyttle, & Johnson, 2015, p. 20).

There are a number of acknowledged drawbacks in utilising written diaries. These include: a high rate of participant fatigue and therefore data attrition, the assumption of certain skills (particularly the ability to express oneself in writing), and a lack of researcher direction over what participants report (Williamson et al., 2015). I had two main concerns regarding the use of written diaries, given the participants in my study. The first was the time commitment (or perhaps *perceived* time commitment) required by participants to keep a diary. Given the seniority of participants in their respective organisations and their workload, I was concerned that they would lack commitment to writing a diary, and to do so daily. Second, and relatedly, due to this time commitment, there is a risk that participants would gloss over important details in writing a narrative of what happened or how they felt at the end of a busy day. Van Manen (2016, p. 64) notes that many people find writing difficult and are more likely to express their thoughts "with much more ease and eloquence" when talking. I was therefore

also concerned that written diaries would not capture the depth of insights possible from a 'living experience', depth that I knew from Stage One the participants were capable of if probed.

There are novel ways that diaries have been used in research (not necessarily limited to phenomenological research) to overcome some of these drawbacks. These include: online diaries (Lynch & Barnes, 2020), audio-recorded diaries (Williamson et al., 2015), video-recorded diaries (Owens, Beer, Revels, & Levkoff, 2019), the use of a mobile-phone app (Lindgreen, Lomborg, & Clausen, 2018), and photo diaries (Alm & Olsen, 2017). All these methods have their own advantages and disadvantages.

My interview-diary is a contribution to these novel adaptations of the traditional written diary. While interviews are a mainstay of phenomenological research, I have not found an example of undertaking them in a daily diary-like format in the literature[29]. However, it is certainly not uncommon for qualitative researchers who have utilised written diaries to conduct follow-up interviews. Or, alternatively, researchers may conduct interviews first, followed by participant diary-writing (see for instance Evans & Hallett, 2007; Plowman, 2010; Poppleton, Briner, & Kiefer, 2008; Ragsdell & Clayton, 2016). It is also not uncommon for qualitative researchers to write their own observation/reflection diaries in combination with once-off participant interviews as part of their data gathering (see for instance Joyce, 2010).

The significant benefit of the interview-diary approach is it retains the key benefits of a diary (although admittedly not all) and combines these with the benefits of the interview. Key benefits the diary retained were a personal, daily reflection on the lived experience (comprised of events, feelings, observations) that is a contemporaneous record. Key benefits the interview retained included ease of expressing one's lived experience verbally, rather than in writing, and my ability as the researcher to probe aspects that emerge as relevant in relation to themes and concepts that have already emerged. However, there are benefits of the written diary that are not captured by the interview-diary approach. Of particular note is the fact that a written diary is less influenced by the researcher (Morrell-Scott, 2018). This might be more or less important depending on the research question. Given my hermeneutic approach, this 'influence' can be accommodated within my research methodology (discussed further in Section 4.4.3, below). There is a risk that the participant writing a diary may 'gloss over' detail because writing is difficult. Alternatively, writing may enable more personal reflection than an interview with another person (Morrell-Scott, 2018), especially if the participant is used to writing. These are benefits to a written diary, but these are outweighed by the benefit of the interview-diary approach due to the nature of the participants in my study.

[29] I did identify several medical studies that used a daily interview, but the information sought was not focused on the 'lived experience'. Rather, it gathered specific medical information (see for example Kiene, Dove, & Wanyenze, 2018; Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013).

4.4.2.1 Stage One lived vs. Stage Two living example

The 'lived' and 'living' perspectives of Stages One and Two of my research were used to explore my research question ('*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?*'). However, for the purposes of looking at the interview-diary as a methodological contribution to exploring the liv*ing* perspective, it is useful to compare a Stage One and a Stage Two interview. I have chosen Jacqueline's interviews for this purpose. When I first interviewed Jacqueline as part of Stage One, in March 2019, she was the Vice President of an organisation that manufactured infrastructure in the clean energy sector. When I interviewed her as part of Stage Two, in June 2020, she was the CEO of a start-up in the clean energy sector. The start-up environment provided a rich context to explore ethical leadership. Fortuitously for my research, she was facing or deliberating an ethical dilemma or tension every day I spoke to her over our interview-diary week. For instance, during our week, she grappled with issues such as: how she could best help during the COVID-19 crisis; firing co-founders; a fair incentive structure in the Co-Founder Agreement; implementing elements of a Diversity and Inclusion Roadmap (which prompted a reflection on shame associated with racial divides); hiring a developer (which prompted a reflection on the ethics of coding-robots); and what counts as 'trusted action' in the climate change space.

Table 4: Notable themes from Jacqueline's interviews

Stage One Interview *Notable Themes of the Stage One lived experience*	**Stage Two Diary-Interviews** *Notable Themes of the Stage Two living experience*
Ethical topics:	
• Climate change & environmental impact	Climate change & environmental impact
• Gender and youth engagement	Gender and youth engagement • **Diversity vs. bias**
• Incentive structures	Incentive structures • **Fairness vs. productive action** • **Values vs. results**
'Good leadership' equals 'ethical leadership'	
Somatic references	Somatic references
Defining elements of ethical leadership:	
• Not just bottom-line focus	Not just bottom-line focus • **Profit vs. vision** • **Inclusiveness vs. profit** • **Values vs. results**
• Not just legal compliance	

• Care for people	Care for people • **Inclusiveness vs. productive action** • **Fairness vs. productive action** • **Inclusiveness vs. vision** • **Inclusiveness vs. profit**
• Responsibility for self	Responsibility for self
• Motivated by the 'right thing'	Motivated by the 'right thing'
• Not following the trend	Not following the trend • **Privacy vs. efficiency**

Table 4 above identifies notable themes that emerged in Jacqueline's Stage One and Stage Two interviews. It can be seen that many of the themes of Stage One also emerged in Stage Two (e.g., similar ethical topics were of concern, there were somatic references, and Jacqueline remained motivated by care, responsibility, and 'doing the right thing', etc). However, with specific reference to the dot-points in bold, the intention of Table 4 is to highlight that the way these themes emerged in Stage Two presented a far less definitive or static understanding of 'ethical leadership'. The themes emerged as live tensions as Jacqueline reflected on difficult and real decisions she was grappling with during the week. For instance, in the following quote, Jacqueline talks about the tension between 'inclusiveness' and 'productive action'.

> **Jacqueline:** …It's hard in a start-up, right? You're a founding group and everyone has their own views, and you're not really in a hierarchical structure in a way, and I also started out this company to be equality based from the beginning. So even though I've got a CEO title, it's not like I'm the CEO of the arch, follow me. That's not the mantra. But at the same time, when you don't have product and underlying business already rolling, too much equality, too much consensus, too much openness can slow you down. You're not getting ahead. You're just discussing a lot of things. So, I've been very open and inclusive and in almost every way over the last 18 months. And that just wasn't productive, to be perfectly honest, for an early-stage start-up when you don't have that baseline kind of running.

The following quote highlights the tension Jacqueline grapples with between 'values versus results':

> **Jacqueline:** …but the servers that they use for their data processing is Amazon Web Services. And I was like, "Surely it gives you guys just as much as me, an allergic reaction to hear the word 'Amazon'". And then, "Well, what's your alternative? You either use Amazon or you use Microsoft". And I'm like, "Yeah, we can debate the ins and outs of Microsoft versus Amazon", but it comes back to it—a little bit what we've already been talking about – using the machine to beat the machine. If I was to be righteous about it and go, "Well, I'm not using Amazon or Microsoft", then I'd go nowhere. Then I don't have a platform that can do what I'm trying to do.

So you get faced with those kinds of decisions that you kind of hit your head on with your values, but you end up participating in them anyway, because you have to, to get ahead with your chosen strategy.

4.4.2.2 Hermeneutic reflection: experience of the interview-diary experience

In order to explore the methodological contribution of the living interview-diary to phenomenological research, I undertook follow-up interviews with the three Stage Two participants two weeks after finishing the process. I asked them about their experiences of the interview-diary. The participants found it overwhelmingly positive, with no reported downsides (not even the time expenditure). Key themes from these interviews (specific to the experience of the research method) are indicated in italics in the discussion below, and summarised in **Table 5**.

Table 5: Benefits of living interview-diaries

Theme
Captures authentic, genuine responses
Benefit of trust between us
Captures detail of the everyday
Ease of process
Do enough writing
Easier to speak
Virtual interaction less of a barrier
Opportunity to 'get into a groove'
Timing: short and sharp
Like helping, felt valued
Opportunity to reflect
Why do I practice?
What do I stand for?
What's the public value?
Provided a prompt for deeper reflection
Energised and motivated
Check against values
Habit training
Reflexivity
What's truth?
Who am I really?
Similar benefits to sketch diary
Success (of interview-diary) depends on richness of day

Central to participants' positive experience was an appreciation of the *opportunity to reflect*, whether this was on 'why do I practice?' (Russ the architect), 'what's the public value?' (Kassandra the public servant), or 'what do I stand for?' (Jacqueline the entrepreneur). Related to that theme was the appreciated benefit of a *prompt for deeper reflection* in my gently probing questions.

> So for me, the benefit really was for the reminder, the thought process at a time when, when there was a lot of potential conflict going on. And using that- those prompts to kind of recalibrate myself, as opposed to going with crazy tangents that would have been in conflict with my professional view… (Kassandra, interview, 30 June 2020)

Jacqueline found the reflection '*energising and motivating'*. The somatic experience was particularly notable for her. Aligned with the key benefit of a diary, the opportunity (and prompt) for reflection captures the *detail of the everyday:*

> So what this experience gives me, and hopefully everyone else, is that pause and that reflection, on things that maybe you're doing in a micro sense throughout the day... (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020).

Russ noted that the success of the interviews depended in part on the '*richness of the day*' in terms of the participant experiencing the phenomenon of interest in order to share their experiences:

> I don't know, if I had four days locking myself away and writing a big report or something, I'm not sure that it would have been as diverse a conversation. (Russ, interview, 1 July).

Russ also noted a *similarity between diaries*—in his case his sketch-diary and this interview-diary:

> What will I draw [in my sketch-diary]? What is that thing I want to capture in this place, that I think will join the dots for me in my head? That becomes something of an enjoyed routine if you like. I find it [the interview-diary] actually quite similar in that sense. (Russ, interview, 1 July).

Part of the positive experience was that the participants felt like they were *helping* and/or felt *valued*, and a *benefit of trust* had been established between us:

> Look, I think the difference is around trust in a way. We've got to know each other. The discussion is- if you like, I don't feel like I'm sitting down with an academic, just doing a paper now, I feel like I'm sitting down with a colleague, discussing an issue around which we both have an interest. (Russ, interview, 1 July 2020)

Participants also commented on the *ease of the process*. This had a number of aspects: *it is easy to speak*; they do *enough writing*; the *virtual interaction* via Zoom provided a lower barrier to meeting in person; the week provided an opportunity to '*get into a groove'* or 'hit one's stride'; and the *short, sharp timing* (of 15-minute meetings, which would often stretch up to 30 minutes) *was not onerous*.

The conversation with Jacqueline regarding the Zoom interface took a slightly deeper turn. She explained how she considered changing Zoom backgrounds:

> And then I was like, no I'll just go back to my natural landscape because that's more authentic, but that's an interesting reflection because…does the aesthetic actually play a role in the story I'm presenting? . . . Yeah, so it's all part of that question around, what are we staging here [on Zoom], and what are we trying to get across? So this technology medium gives people a chance to present in a certain way, extra little tools. In real life, what you see is what you get, apart from the clothes and maybe hair... (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020).

In-line with sticking with the 'natural background', Jacqueline also discussed how she had changed out of her suit jacket from her previous investor meeting and into her comfortable "Grandpa" jacket for our appointment. At this point in the conversation, Jacqueline was implying that there was 'an authentic self' and a 'truth' that she was trying to convey to me: "…I want you to know that what I'm saying to you is the truth to the best of my ability" (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020). Given the importance of 'authenticity' as a concept in my research, it was interesting that Jacqueline and Kassandra both noted how the process captured '*authentic and genuine responses'*:

> And I think that through this process, I certainly would find that I'm much more impromptu and my thoughts might be less considered, but they're also probably less rehearsed or less framed. So you probably get a more genuine and authentic answer, because I'm just more likely to speak as I'm thinking, as opposed to going back and structuring a piece of work and making it perfect, and sound and sensible. (Kassandra, interview, 30 June 2020)

> Maybe even less [honest], in a written one [diary], you'd be like, this is much more authentic because it's on the fly, you're right there in the moment. Like, you're looking right at me, there's nowhere to hide. But on a piece of paper, I can write whatever story I want to come up with. If it's going to be submitted and shared somewhere, yeah. I know, I think the visual thing of having the video is more accountable, in a way. (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020)

However, having said this, Jacqueline went on to question the portrayal of herself, and whether there are indeed 'versions of ourselves' that we present.

> Because it's also like on this [ethical leadership] topic, who's really going to say that they don't have ethical values? So there's a bunch of maybe bias...where people are portraying versions of themselves that they'd like to be. Maybe I'm even doing that to an extent, I don't know, but that's a risk. . . but then, I don't know, now I'm questioning everything. Now I'm like, am I going to be me, or am I presenting a me? It's interesting, just to even think about this consciously. . . . Was I staging something or not, or… Yeah, poof that's deep. Who are we really? (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020)

4.4.3 Reflexivity and 'Truth'

Jacqueline's reflections on truth, identity, and "moral storytelling" (Alvesson, 2003, p. 21) in the methodological interview (quoted above) raise a number of important reflexive questions regarding the living interview-diaries as a research method, and also regarding the Stage One interviews. What is the 'truth-status' of this data? By asking participants about 'ethical leadership' am I, as Cunliffe (2003, p. 989) asks, "constructing the very features of 'reality' I was studying?". If I asked participants about the importance of governance, for instance, they would presumably have told me about their day (drawing on the very same events) through the lens of governance. Johnson and Duberley (2003, p. 1281) articulate what has been identified as arguably the key unsettling issue for reflexivity: "the inevitable circularity of epistemological and ontological issues. . . This circularity means that we cannot detach ourselves from our metatheoretical commitments so as to reflexively assess those commitments—indeed we would depend upon them in order to undertake the task". However, Heidegger advises, "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. . . In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing" (p. 195, S153). This 'primordial knowing' is what we experience directly and grasp as 'truth'.

Because my hermeneutic phenomenological approach is based on Heidegger's constructivist ontology, it makes sense to consider the 'status of data' from this perspective. This aligns with Cunliffe's (2003, p. 985) call to "recognise our philosophical commitments and enact their internal logic, while opening them to critical questioning so that we expose their situated nature". For Heidegger, truth lies in 'disclosure' (or 'unconcealment'). Disclosure essentially means how we meaningfully *understand* ourselves in the moment. He sometimes calls this kind of truth a 'primordial truth'.[30] For Heidegger, whenever something is articulated (i.e., brought to the fore of our awareness) from our totally taken-for-granted (ready-to-hand) existence in the world, we already understand it. Our 'understanding' has what he calls a 'fore-structure'. Grondin (1997, p. 94) considers this better described as "in and behind" something. By 'fore-structure', Heidegger means that entities and phenomenon are never encountered context free. They always have a grounding, a foreground. We always understand them from our perspective of how we are constituted from our complex world of shared backgrounds and social practices: a "totality-of-involvements" (p. 231, S186). To take a simple example: when I encounter a table, I do not encounter it and *then* (in some second cognitive conscious or unconscious step) understand it as a table. I already understand it as a table as soon as I encounter it. This understanding is constituted from what 'tables' mean in our shared world.

[30] There is not the space here to do justice to a full account of Heidegger's epistemology in *Being and Time*, but it is important to recognise that 'primordial truth' is different to 'propositional truth' and how this relates to, and what counts as, 'knowledge'. 'Primordial truth' is essentially an ontological concept, i.e., truth as it is linked to how-we-are-in-the-world ontologically.

Once an object or phenomenon is grasped in our understanding, we may seek to interpret it. This reverses the usual explanation of hermeneutics, which suggests we interpret something in order to understand it (Grondin, 1997). Heidegger observes that "[i]n interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself" (p. 188, S148). For Heidegger, when we interpret something (in a more present-to-hand way) we unveil what it is we already understand 'primordially'. "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it..." (p. 190-191, S150). When we understand something, it already has some kind of significance for us. In 'interpreting it', we are laying bare to ourselves (and perhaps others) what that signification is. Interpretation has an 'as-structure'; i.e., I interpret something 'as something'. When I encounter a table, I already understand it (it already has significance as something to eat off and sit at). When I interpret it, I interpret it *as* a table. Therefore, when Jacqueline finds her "way through the line of thought as I'm talking" (Jacqueline, 2020, 30 Jun), or Russ asks, "What is that thing I want to capture in this place, that I think will join the dots for me in my head?" (Russ, 2020, interview 1 July), or Kassandra says, "I'm just more likely to speak as I'm thinking" (Kassandra, 2020, 30 June), they are unveiling to themselves (and me) in language an interpretation of what it is they already understand, what they have already grasped.[31] Because 'understanding' (and interpretation) is based on our own grasping of a complex, shared world, it is not static, nor necessarily exclusionary. There can be more than one way to 'understand'. This opposes the long-held, western Platonic notion of truth as universal (and static). Laverty (2003, p. 26) calls this "multiple realities". Indeed, Alvesson (2003) identifies eight 'ways' just one interview could be interpreted, including, for instance, as 'tuning in the subject: identity work' or as a 'talk in the context of interests and power: the interview as political action', to name but two. From a Heideggerian perspective, all these different ways to interpret one interview could reveal truth, or 'multiple realities'.

The 'meaning' of an entity or a phenomenon (like ethical leadership) does not attach to the entity/phenomenon 'out there in the world'. Rather, the 'meaning' is a property of Dasein. 'Meaning' resides in us, the entity or phenomenon has a significance for us. Heidegger argues that this primordial truth is the background condition that underpins our everyday understanding of 'truth as representation', i.e., how we usually understand 'objective truth' where our understanding of entities corresponds with some state of affairs in the world. If people come from a background of shared practices, it is possible to then 'assert' something about that shared world. For instance, I can assert unproblematically that 'the sky is blue' because we all understand what I mean when I say 'sky' and what I mean when I say 'blue'. This might not be true for a bat, because a bat does not share our sense of colour. However, what we cannot do is to "give a detached, objective, theoretical account of our dwelling in the background practices" (Dreyfus, p 165). Any explanation of our background practices, and how we dwell or inhabit

[31] Interpretation can be, but does not necessarily have to be, done 'through' spoken language. We can, and often do, interpret through thinking.

them, will always be dependent on the meaning or signification we give certain things, and that meaning will always be dependent and hermeneutic. This is the point Johnson and Duberley (2003) make about inevitable circularity of epistemological and ontological issues, and is well recognised in the reflexivity literature (see also: Alvesson, 2003; Cunliffe, 2003).

My interpretation of my participant's interpretation of the ethical leadership phenomenon feeds into the 'discourse' on ethical leadership. Discourse, for Heidegger, is a type of communication and is usually articulated in language. However, it can also be expressed in such things as "intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, 'the way of speaking'" (p. 205, S162), and could also be expressed in art or movement. Discourse influences our shared understanding of the world (our shared practices), which is the basis of how we are in the world. I have tried to capture this circular influence in **Figure 4** below.

Figure 4: A hermeneutic cycle of the lived experience



There is no independent standpoint from within the circle. "*But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up*" (p 194, S 153, italics in original).

In understanding that there is a circle, it enables us to get closer to understanding our 'potentiality-for-Being' (p. 184, S144). That "does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference'" (p. 183, S144). That is, it is not the case that a potentiality-for-Being implies that we are not constrained in our possibilities. While we are constituted by our social world, we are also constrained by it (and we conform to it). There are things which are not possible given who you are, or where you are, etc. Who we understand ourselves to be in any given moment is influenced by our past, and it limits our range of possibilities into the future. However, the more transparent Dasein is to itself, and recognises the (inauthentic) constraints of the social world, the freer Dasein is to direct its own potentiality for how it exists. As Grondin (1997, p. 95) notes, Heidegger's hermeneutics show that "we are not blindly at the mercy of this fore-structure of pregiven interpretation nor inescapably imprisoned in our prejudices". The more one is aware of our own fore-structure (one's own embeddedness within a particular social world and how one understands that), the more one is able to "at least partially regulate one's implicit interpretive dispositions" (Grondin, 1997, p. 97). This is freeing.

I return to Cunliffe's (2003, p. 989) question, am I "constructing the very features of 'reality' I was studying?". From a Heideggerian perspective, it is important to note that we are not constructing a reality *if* that implies we are making reality up as we go along, or constructing it from nowhere. The features of 'ethical leadership' identified from a living experience are perhaps better described as an 'unveiling' of how we already understand ourselves in the world at any one moment. But, in understanding (and interpreting) ourselves in the world, this influences how we are in the world in the next moment, and then the next moment, and, in this way, we construct our worlds. Cunliffe (2003, p. 986) argues that "[s]ocial constructionists… construct intersubjectively the very objective realities we think we are studying: we are inventors not representers of realities". However, according to Heidegger, what social constructionists do—or indeed anyone does—is more nuanced. The 'reality' (or truth) about a social phenomenon like ethical leadership is not invented out of nowhere. Nor, however, does it represent some objective reality. In seeking to explain the experience as experienced (in discourse), there is a description. This does have an element of 'representing' (or at least pointing to as best one can) how one-is-in-the-world. Jacqueline, Russ, and Kassandra unveiled (disclosed) to the "best of their ability" (Jacqueline, interview, 30 June 2020) how they were-in-the-world during our interview-diary week. In the 'unveiling' on the first day, it helped construct how they were in the world on the second day. There was an influence about how they went about their day (e.g., by being more mindful of ethical leadership, in order to 'report back' to me). This influenced the possibilities for how they were-in-the-world. In turn, in this thesis, I report back to you, the reader, my interpretation of the participants' interpretation. I will therefore say something about the shared social world I come from—what Heidegger would call 'my dwelling'.

4.4.3.1 Researcher reflexivity: my dwelling

With regards to the social background from which I dwell, I am a white, Anglo-Australian woman, born and raised in Australia. I have worked for the Australian government to mid-managerial level, and also in the clean energy and energy sectors. In these roles, I worked with governments and organisations in over 12 countries. I have also lived abroad on three occasions. My work and life experience therefore have had an international perspective. This happens to be reflected in my interview participants. Both my parents have worked in the built environment sector during their careers, so I have 'referred' knowledge of that sector over many years. This is why the government, energy, and built environment are the sectors that I have drawn my interview participants from; they are 'worlds' that I either share or have shared.

My interest in philosophy and ethics started at school, which is why I choose to study philosophy at university. I did this in addition to what I then perceived as a more job-applicable business management degree. Given this combination, my interest in ethics became focused on business ethics more specifically in my Philosophy Honours and Master of Applied Ethics. My motivation in continuing to explore this broad subject area—with a focus on ethical leadership specifically in this PhD—is, as I noted in the Introduction, helping move organisations towards a 'higher standard' of possibilities-for-Being-in-the-world. As the PhD unfolded, I have attempted to do this by sharing implicit wisdom (inherently grasped in an understanding of ethical leadership) more explicitly. I hope to continue to share this wisdom with contemporary organisations.

This brief description does not attempt to capture my assumptions or background understanding. Nevertheless, it is intended to indicate the social context that I come from. This thesis is an interpretation of my understanding of a participant's interpretation. Therefore, it is important that I acknowledge how my interpretation of the participants' interpretations comes from my perspective as an Anglo-Australian woman, as distinct from, for instance, a Māori woman in Aotearoa. The hermeneutic cycle of my experience can therefore be understood as something like **Figure 5**, below. My experience of ethical leadership is constituted from this background, from which I primordially grasp experiences of ethical leadership, such as the example I outlined in the beginning of this thesis (where advocating for Carl and his organisation as best I could was 'the right thing to do'). At the time, that was an unpleasant experience. Upon reflection, I grasp it 'as' an instance of ethical leadership. It shares something with other participants' experiences and interpretations of ethical leadership, which I can now 'label' (in a present-to-hand way), and which I seek to communicate in writing in this thesis. My project can potentially add to the 'discourse' of ethical leadership and how we understand the phenomenon, which will influence further experiences I will have of ethical leadership.

Figure 5: My hermeneutic cycle of an ethical leadership experience



4.4.3.2 Status of the data

As discussed, according to Heidegger, we all have an existing understanding of a shared world, through which we filter how we understand new or different things we encounter and make meaning from them. Positivism seeks to be 'objective' and come from an unbiased perspective. Such a perspective 'forgets' that meaning is already imbued when we encounter anything, and is impossible to 'shed'. Even Husserl, Heidegger's teacher and mentor, advocated 'bracketing out' existing beliefs. However, according to Heidegger, it is impossible to free ourselves completely of the shared world that both constitutes and constrains us. To borrow a concept from the philosopher Thomas Nagel (Nagel, 1989), there is no 'view from nowhere'. It is always from our understanding of our world that we interpret any of its phenomena. However, we may be able to (to a greater or lesser degree) recognise this is how we 'happen' to understand a phenomenon. Indeed, this is freedom—an important aspect of authenticity.

In summary, then, the 'status of the data' from the living interview-diaries (and, indeed, my Stage One interviews as well) is as follows: participants' responses are an interpretation in discourse (language) of their understanding of the ethical leadership phenomenon 'articulated' (i.e., brought forward from the taken-for-granted background). This understanding is situated in our complex, inter-related, socially constituted world (a totality-of-involvements). This thesis is an interpretation of my understanding of participants' interpretations, coming as it does from my Anglo-Australian background. This thesis is a laying bare (in language) of what I grasp as 'truth'—remembering that 'truth', for Heidegger, lies in a knowing: an 'understanding' which, when interpreted, opens up possibilities-for-Being. The status of the data is not a representation of an objective truth 'out-there', separate to us. While my interpretation of ethical leadership may have 'truth', it need not be the only 'truth'. It is not, nor is it pretending to be, the last word on 'ethical leadership'.[32] 'Truth' based on this ontological model is not representational, nor is it static. The interpretation is of value because it may influence 'discourse', which may in-turn influence (or open up possibilities) in experience.

4.5 Ethics Approval

Ethics approval for Stage One was received from the Monash Human Ethics Committee in January 2019, and for Stage Two in May 2020 (Reference Number: 2019018059-27159). In line with agreed protocols, I sent participants both the signed Explanatory Statement (see **Appendix B**) and the Consent Form (see **Appendix C**) in advance of the interview via email. In the small number of cases where the consent form was not received in advance of the interview, I sought the participant's verbal agreement to record the interview and to have it transcribed. Confidentiality and security requirements were in line with the guidelines of the *Australian Code for Responsible Conduct of Research*. Participants were asked if they would be willing to be contacted again for the research if needed. To this, all gave their permission.

The ethics committee questions focused on avoiding conflicts of interest, avoiding participation risks that caused nothing more than discomfort, managing confidentiality, and ensuring the security of the data. While the *Australian Code for Responsible Conduct of Research* does attempt to be inclusive of all research—whether social-scientific or scientific—the historical roots of the code as responding more specifically to protecting participants in (usually positivist, quantitative) medical research are still evident (Schrag, 2011). These issues are important, but they do not define the limit of ethical considerations. For instance, the confidentiality arrangements in place did, I believe, encourage participants to feel comfortable in sharing candid details which they may not have otherwise shared.

[32] This might sound relativistic, which is why many see the circle as 'vicious'. In some sense it is relativistic, but it enables 'possibilities-for-Being'. However, this is not an 'anything goes' type relativism, or a *purely* subjective 'my truth is the truth for me' type of relativism. Again, while this thesis does not allow the space to elucidate fully, I want to highlight that this type of relativism is avoided by the ability to assert something from within a shared social world, and this has propositional-knowledge implications. As discussed in Chapter 3, openness-to-possibilities is a 'good' way to be in the world, and has ethically normative implications.

However, I did wonder at times whether I had an obligation to let participants know that I would be analysing the data through the lens of what might appear to them as an obscure, philosophical—and perhaps therefore (seemingly) unpractical—lens. This lens is an ontological perspective utilising a philosopher many participants have probably never heard of. However, my perspective evolved over the course of my PhD project, and was not as refined when I was interviewing participants as it now appears in this thesis. This is an unresolved question for me. I did seek to let participants know that I would be taking a qualitative perspective, as a vague way to point towards the fact that I was not intending to come from an 'objective' perspective. To what extent they understood that a qualitative perspective often translates (particularly in my case) into an interpretative perspective, I do not know. It is possible that participants may not necessarily agree with aspects of my interpretation of their (albeit collective[33]) interpretation. All that being said, I nevertheless now turn to describing my interpretation of the data in the next two findings chapters. I discuss the data as it has been collected and analysed according to the process outlined in this chapter.

[33] By 'collective' I intend to highlight that my interpretation draws on the collective weight of all 22 participants (whereas one participant has just their own perspective upon which to draw).

Chapter 5 – Findings: Ethical Leadership as 'Seen'

In this findings chapter and the following one, I address my research question ('*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience'*) by describing key aspects of how participants understood the phenomenon of 'ethical leadership' through their lived experience. This is the first 'hermeneutic' layer of interpretation. I focus on seven themes that emerged from my thematic analysis. As indicated in Chapter 4, a summary table of the thematic coding from the Stage One interviews and Stage Two interview-diaries can be found at Appendix A. I do not attempt to describe and discuss all the themes I identified in this table. Rather, I focus on seven themes, which I call 'seven aspects of ethical leadership'. These are the most prominent themes to emerge, and/or are particularly relevant to an ontological leadership perspective. The seven aspects are a new empirical understanding of ethical leadership, and therefore the third contribution of this thesis. I describe three out of the seven aspects of ethical leadership in the remainder of this chapter. In Section 5.1, I discuss ethical leadership is in the hard decisions. In Section 5.2, I discuss ethical leadership is in the everyday. In Section 5.3, I discuss ethical leadership is leading the way.

I have labelled these ethical leadership themes as 'seen' because they are aspects that are evident to others in some type of action or conduct. In the following chapter, I describe the remaining four out of the seven aspects: ethical leadership is self-responsibility; ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others; ethical leadership is guided by somatic references; and ethical leadership is role modelling. I have labelled these aspects as 'ethical leadership that is 'mine'' because they are ways that participants understood ethical leadership in their lived experience from the 'inside'. **Table 6**, overleaf, provides an overview of the aspects described in this chapter as a useful reference guide.

Table 6: Ethical leadership aspects as 'seen'

Ethical Leadership Aspect	Overview Description
Ethical leadership is in the hard decisions	Many participants understood ethical leadership as having 'good' intentions and acting according to their principles or 'what they thought was right', even when that was difficult or uncomfortable to do. The difficulty in making those decisions relate to unwanted social ramifications.
Ethical leadership is in the everyday	While a prominent aspect of how participants understood ethical leadership in their lived experience was in the 'hard decisions', nevertheless, participants revealed how they understood ethical leadership in 'everyday' practices—including practices that are enacted in practices that can be seen, and those embodied in conduct.
Everyday enacted practices	
Inclusive decision making	An aspect of ethical leadership is decision making with an open mind and is inclusive. This means that the decision-making process gives an opportunity for affected people to be heard. Often, this requires 'really listening', even if not everyone's perspective can be accommodated in a decision or outcome.
Accountable systems	Accountable systems can underpin the integrity of an organisational process and are therefore often linked with good decision-making and a thoughtful process. Accountable systems can help avoid unintended bias, which more expedient decision making might lead to. However, accountable systems should not replace one's own discernment and judgement.
Thoughtful process	A thoughtful process itself can be an example of ethical leadership. While the process and final decision can conceptually be teased apart, in the lived experience, process and decision are entwined. Sometimes the only thing one can do in a difficult situation is to think about its (moral) issues, agonise over it, engage in a thoughtful process, and make a decision one knows is not ideal.
Creative problem solving	Creative problem solving was experienced as an aspect of ethical leadership because it can often achieve a solution without a trade-off between ethical outcomes, and/or values, and/or accommodate a range of perspectives or concerns. Diversity of input is therefore often a part of problem solving, and is often entwined with inclusive decision-making.

Everyday conduct	
Perseverance	Perseverance as an aspect of ethical leadership is doing 'the right thing' (or what participants understand is 'the right thing') even if (or particularly if) that takes a long time to achieve.
Respect	Respect for other people, regardless of who they are or where they are on the organisational hierarchy, was identified as an aspect of ethical leadership. Respect can show up in one's practice by 'doing what you say you'll do'.
Care	Care for other people, simply because they are people, is an aspect of ethical leadership. Care for others can show up in practice by treating other people how you would like to be treated. Care for others includes a type of community, but also includes care for oneself.
Good leadership is ethical leadership	Some participants saw no distinction between the concepts of 'good leadership' and 'ethical leadership'—one encompassed the other. What is important is the lived experience, as opposed to a latest leadership theory label (e.g., ethical leadership, authentic leadership, stakeholder management, collaborative leadership).
Day-to-day actions informed by the 'right thing'	Ethical leadership in the everyday is informed or imbued with what participants understood as 'doing the right thing'. Participants usually associated 'doing the right thing' with their moral purpose (or a good purpose) or their values (which were often entwined with their organisational or professional purpose or values).
Ethical leadership is leading the way	Ethical leadership as leading the way sets an ethical example for a community by being innovative and trail blazing a way forward. The 'community' that is being influenced will differ depending on one's sphere of influence; it could be a business community, an industry sector, or a local or international community.

The seven aspects of ethical leadership I describe in this chapter and the next can be understood as facets, characteristics, or 'essences' (in van Manen's (2016) sense—see Section 4.1.2) of ethical leadership. As described in Chapter 4, an essence is something that helps to describe what makes a phenomenon what it is. I call them aspects because this term invokes a 'looking perspective'. Depending on which way one looks at the phenomenon, one will see different aspects—different aspects will 'show up'. In presenting the aspects in the different sections below, they may come across as conceptually separate (when considered in a present-to-hand way). However, in participants' lived experience these aspects are often interrelated. This is what Heidegger calls a 'totality-of-involvements' and what I call 'entwined' in a messy totality. There are no sharp boundaries between one aspect and another. While I am indeed engaging in a present-to-hand distinction between these aspects in describing them separately, I often draw attention to this entwining, in order to highlight the more ready-to-hand (phenomenological) perspective. This interrelated nature is captured conceptually in **Figure 6** below.

Figure 6: Seven aspects of ethical leadership



As discussed in Section 4.3, my thematic analysis was predominately undertaken from the 'ground up': the themes emerged from the data. Of all the themes identified (refer Appendix A), I have chosen to elaborate on seven. The choice of these seven was sensitised by my Heideggerian/ontological/phenomenological perspective, making the process an abductive one. More specifically, I chose to focus on these seven themes (what I call seven aspects of ethical leadership) for the following three reasons. First, I have elaborated on the most prominent aspects that emerged in participants' anecdotes. These were the aspects most referred to by participants and therefore

highlighted in the theme statements I identified (refer Section 4.3.2). Specifically, these included the aspects that ethical leadership is: in the hard decisions, in the everyday, acting for the benefit of others, and self-responsibility. Second, I elaborate on aspects that are particularly relevant to an ontological perspective. This includes the aspect 'ethical leadership is leading the way', because 'leading the way' and the 'everyday' are superficially contradictory in nature. For example, if ethical leadership is leading the way through innovative 'new' action, then how can it also be in everyday actions? My point in elaborating this aspect is to highlight that lived experience can accommodate seeming contradictions in a way that a more deductive, *a priori* theorisation cannot.[34] I also elaborate on 'ethical leadership is in somatic references' as an important way we experience ourselves in the world. Third, I elaborate on the 'role-modelling' aspect because it explains the most prominent 'leadership' aspect that participants referenced. It is my contention that these seven aspects provide an interesting perspective of ethical leadership from a lived experience. However, they do not attempt to capture all there is to say about ethical leadership. Even my own thematic analysis suggests there is much more to be said and understood about the phenomenon (see Appendix A).

Before I discuss the seven aspects, there are three analytical and stylistic approaches I have taken in describing the findings which are important to note. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, the unit of analysis for the thematic analysis of both the Stage One and Stage Two interviews is the 'lived experience'. I concede a better phrase to capture both the backward-looking perspective of Stage One, and the 'living-now' experience of Stage Two, would be to refer to 'experience as lived'. However, this is an awkward phrase. Therefore, I when I refer to the lived experience, I draw upon the perspectives of both the liv*ed* and liv*ing* experiences articulated in my Stage One and Stage Two interviews (unless otherwise explicitly stated). Second, I present the findings as participants' understanding of ethical leadership. However, as also discussed in Chapter 4, this is more accurately *my* understanding of participants' understanding of ethical leadership as described to me in the interviews and/or living interview-diaries. This double reference (to my understanding of my participants' understanding) is an awkward and bulky phrase and inhibits the flow of describing the findings. Therefore, I instead draw attention to this hermeneutic interpretation up-front. Third, given this is a phenomenological study, I use quotes extensively in order to give voice to participants where possible. Indeed, I lead the explanation of each aspect with a participant's voice. This helps to foreground their interpretation (which I, in turn, interpret). With those stylistic approaches in mind, I now turn to the first of the seven aspects of ethical leadership.

[34] Greenleaf made a similar point (refer to Section 2.4.3.4).

5.1 Ethical Leadership is in the Hard Decisions

I think, to me I associate ethical leadership with something hard. It's not easy.

(Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar)

Many participants' anecdotes revolved around making a 'hard decision'—either their own or one made by someone they experienced displaying 'ethical leadership'. Participants understood ethical leaders as having 'good' intentions and acting according to their principles or 'what they think is right', even when that is difficult or uncomfortable to do. Simon captured this point when he said:

> I think ethical leadership means leading in a way that reflects your underlying moral principles, even where following those principles may not be in your own best financial interests, or interests in terms of promotion, or whatever it happens to be. I don't want to say in your own self-interest because I actually think following your own moral principles is in your own self-interest. (Simon, 2020, interview, 16, Jan)

Simon is referring to a self-interest related to being one's Self. This is an ontological notion, and one which is linked to the ethical leadership aspect of 'self-responsibility'.

This theme was expressed differently in the different anecdotes, but I interpreted them as variations of the same 'hard decision' theme. For instance: as captured in Rebecca's quote above, ethical leadership is "something hard" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar); the "sticking to your guns" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct); the "calling it out" (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct); the "uncomfortable" truth (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov); "pursuing a harder path" (Russ, 2019, interview 25 Nov); it is in "walking away" (Tina, 2019, interview, 25 Mar); the "say no decisions" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar); the "electric fence decisions" (Camellia, 2019, interview, 25 Nov); the "speaking up" (Liliana, 2019, interview, 26 Mar); "fighting for something beyond…the normal…" (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec); "resisting pressure" to act in a certain way (Jacqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar); "what you're tested by" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar); and being "willing to publicly stand up" for what you believe in (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan).

The difficulty in making these hard decisions relates to unwanted social ramifications.[35] Examples that emerged included getting fired, firing someone, getting ridiculed or yelled at, having to leave an organisation, walking away from millions of dollars in stock-options, not getting a promotion, putting one's life in danger, or being excluded from a community. In the examples where it was not

[35] This aspect looks like what some literature calls 'moral courage' (e.g. Osswald, Frey, & Streicher, 2011). Solinger et al. (2020) essentially argue that moral courage is synonymous with moral leadership, in so far as "emergent moral leaders essentially defy an existing moral order and spur change in moral systems over time" (p. 509) and this is done "even in the face of risk" (p. 511). For participants in my study, this was but one aspect.

easy, where one was tested, people felt they enacted most prominently what they understood as ethical leadership. As Edith notes, it is easy to be ethical when all is going well:

> And the reason I'm using these 'saying no' examples, is because there is so much penchant for deal-fever, and hitting financial returns if you are a listed company, operating within quarterly timeframe with investors, that I see more and more of my professional career, now that I'm up in the C-suite, that it's the 'saying no' decisions that test your ethical leadership, not the saying yes, it's easy to say yes. But saying no is what people fail to do. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Edith refers specifically to the pressures in the "C-suite" with its "deal-fever" and responsibility for "hitting financial returns". However, her point is that, whatever one's Situation, it is often easier to go with what is expected and not 'say no'. Samantha gave an example of her experience in a large aid and development organisation, where she saw many people who, "one controversy after the next. . . didn't make any changes when they were tested" (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan) because it was hard to do, and it was easier not to 'rock the boat'. She went on to say: "it affected them. It affected how they were perceived, but more so, it affected them as people… I think it eats them up inside" (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan). The reference to "eats them up inside" is entwined with a somatic reference, which I discuss in Chapter 6 as a separate ethical leadership aspect. Samantha is echoing the same idea as Simon in the quote above: following one's own moral principles is in one's own self-interest because, if you do not, it can 'eat you up inside'.

Ruth's anecdote described in some detail in **Figure 7** is another example of how ethical leadership is in the hard decisions. In this anecdote, Ruth explains why she believes that she and her fellow committee members demonstrated ethical leadership by walking away (a hard decision) from a situation they did not agree with. This resulted in unpleasant political backlash for her personally. She reported that colleagues asked her, "Why didn't you just hang in there?", implying that they did not agree with her approach—that the right thing to do might have been to stay and fight for the changes the Committee were advocating. As a counterexample to walking away, Stella tells the story of a long, hard slog in introducing a competitive pricing model into a renewable energy market that was fair and balanced the best interests of consumers and market players: "And that whole process for the first 18 months that I was there, there wasn't a day that went by that there wasn't some type of internal, I say battle very loosely, but debate or argument" (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec).

Figure 7: Ruth's Anecdote – 'Sacking myself from the Ministerial Committee'

> I was chair in the Ministerial Advisory Committee. . . And we started off great guns. He [the Minister] wanted to be bold, courageous. He wanted us to be frank and fearless, blah, blah, blah, bullshit, bullshit. So it went on. I thought, "Oh, this is terrific. It's a once in a lifetime opportunity, wow". . . And may I say, we did an extensive community

consultation. I don't know how many public meetings, and meetings, and stakeholder consultations I did, but I did a lot. . .

So this project went on, and on and on. And I had a great bunch of people on the Advisory Committee. . .We're at the point, the pointy end where we've got a draft. . . In June he [the Minister] asked us to sit down and sort of present the draft that we'd done. He was there, his Chief of Staff was there, and two of his ministerial advisers. And they basically sat there. . . and berated the work. And we're sitting there going, "But your staff actually helped write this".

A couple of weeks later, the Chief of Staff invites us into his office. . . And he puts this glossy draft on the table. We go, "What's that?" "Oh, that's the strategy, that's the draft." We're going, "I beg your pardon?" "Oh no, don't worry. It includes all your stuff. We haven't changed anything. It includes all your stuff, we've just taken a little step further." Well, for heaven's sakes, they changed quite a number of things. . . including they had taken out all of the social housing and affordable housing stuff. . .They mucked around with the climate change stuff…

So five of the six of us [on the Committee], we'd had enough. . . .we all decided that we would sign a letter to the Minister saying, "Thank you very much for the opportunity. We've looked at the latest piece of work. We don't agree with a number of the directions in the document, and we cannot put our name to the document. . . ." . . . it was ethically wrong. Now, we all understand the politics of planning. But they were actually changing things that were the complete reverse of what we had been advocating publicly, the feedback we were getting from the public consultations which we were then reflecting in the document. . . None of the other Members would say they sacked themselves, but I openly say it. I sacked myself from the job.

(Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct)

In summary, one aspect of how participants understood ethical leadership was in the hard decisions, where one had a strong sense of 'the right thing to do' and acted in accordance with that sense despite strong social pressure not to do so. It is arguable, from a normative ethical standpoint, what the 'right thing to do' is. As illustrated in the example detailed in Figure 7, Ruth chose to walk away, which was not applauded by all. However, participants understood this aspect of ethical leadership based on what they could live with, what they understood was 'right'.

5.2 Ethical Leadership in the Everyday

> I think there's parts of ethical leadership that are in the day-to-day life of an executive, because, by nature of the roles, we're often doing the things that other people can't do, or the other things that people don't want to do. (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov)

As discussed in the previous section, a prominent aspect of how participants understood ethical leadership in their lived experience was in the 'hard decisions'—decisions which are usually required in more exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, many participants (often the same participants) revealed how they understood 'ethical leadership in the everyday'. This is reflected in Charlotte's quote above. Several participants explicitly recognised the role of ethical leadership as something they did every day. For instance, Melissa reported: "I would like to think that I demonstrate ethical leadership

all the time" (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb). Jaqueline noted that "inherently, everything you do is touching ethics, or it should be" (Jacqueline, 2020, interview 15 Jun). She goes on to say: "whether it's in the front of your mind [in what Heidegger would call a present-to-hand way], that's another story. It's like you encounter things and then you – maybe not consciously – are kind of evaluating your stance from an ethical basis" (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 15 Jun). She is referring to everyday actions and conduct that is informed by a pervasive, or underlying, sense of 'what is right', or a moral purpose or moral motivation.

Ethical leadership in the everyday included activities or practices of one's role which were implemented or utilised on a day-to-day basis, such as inclusive decision making, accountable systems, thoughtful processes, and creative problem solving. These are activities or practices that are enacted. Other references showed up in how participants sought to conduct themselves everyday. For example, with perseverance, with respect, and with care. These (sub)aspects are discussed, in turn, below. Also discussed below is how ethical leadership in the everyday is linked to a view, expressed by some, that good leadership *is* ethical leadership. Participants understood ethical leadership in the everyday as being informed by a pervasive sense of 'what is right'—i.e., a morally important purpose, passion, or motivation that imbues or underlies everyday actions. This sense of purpose, passion, or motivation, discussed below, is ultimately for the 'benefit of others' (another aspect of ethical leadership) or something beyond oneself. It is not in one's narrow self-interest, financial interest, or achievement of short-term goals at the expense of the moral purpose.

5.2.1 Everyday 'Enacted' Practices

There were a number of activities and/or practices[36] that participants referenced as aspects of how they understood ethical leadership in their day-to-day lived experience. These activities or practices are what Jaqueline refers to as 'the things you encounter and evaluate from an ethical basis'. They include: inclusive decision making, accountable systems, thoughtful processes, and creative problem solving. They are examples of ethical leadership activities or practices that are enacted, and I discuss each below.

5.2.1.1 Inclusive decision making

> You actually go out and gather information about everybody's interests and requirements. And you throw those into the mix, rather than being single-minded about what your outcome is before you've even started a process. . . The really important ethical thing to do, I think, sort of

[36] The reference to 'activities' here points to participants' actions in the world, while the reference to 'practice' here is intended to suggest that these activities are not discrete and indivisible from activities that are inherently socially entwined. This is recognised and discussed in various practice theories (e.g. Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2003), theories that borrow heavily from Heidegger (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2016). It is my aim to discuss these aspects in Chapter 7 through the lens of Heidegger's ontological structures of Being-in-the-world. However, a Heideggerian perspective could also be utilised to understand this aspect through a practice theory perspective.

> on a day-to-day basis, is to give people an opportunity to be at the table. . . And you might call that stakeholder management, or you might call that sort of collaborative leadership, whatever you want to call it. (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb)

Comprehensive and inclusive decision making often starts, as Melissa understands it in the quote above, with seeking information about people's interests and requirements. In the quote, Melissa does not make a hard distinction between ethical leadership, stakeholder management, or collaborative leadership. These are labels (at a present-at-hand level). Her point is that decision making starts with an open mind and is inclusive and gives an opportunity for people to be heard. This is an important aspect of how she understands ethical leadership in her day-to-day lived experience. Edith makes a similar point regarding the importance of good decision making starting with being inclusive, which requires 'really listening':

> An ethical leader will listen to those who disagrees with you, and you will do that in a way that is not just, oh you know, I'm just going to tick the box. But actually, slowing down and hearing, and asking questions to seek understanding. To try to really hear and listen why someone is raising that concern, and then including that into your [decision] calculus, and then addressing unconscious bias. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Indeed, disagreeing with a manager or hierarchical leader might itself be an example of ethical leadership (a hard decision), and an ethical response might be to 'really listen'.

Participation and consideration were considered important by many participants. This was based on a belief that everyone's perspective matters (by virtue of being a person), even if not everyone's perspective can be accommodated in a decision or outcome. Kassandra articulates this perspective when she says:

> "I would continue to listen to them for as long as it was necessary for them to feel that their views had been heard. Even, often noting I had no power to change what it is was that they were asking for. . . It's like these are genuine, real-life people who've got concerns. Our commitment, our job, is to speak to them and let them vent for as long [as they want], and explain to them, continue to explain to them as much as possible. And often we'd get that feedback back, which was, "Look, I understand you can't actually do anything, but thanks for listening." (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct)

Sometimes what is appreciated is the listening. As Melissa articulated, it is much easier for people to accept an outcome of a decision, even if they do not like it or it disadvantages them, if they have confidence in the integrity of the process by which the decision was made, and they felt they had an opportunity to be genuinely heard (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb).

5.2.1.2 Accountable systems

> I'm mindful of the fact that we are paid by the public purse, and we have to demonstrate value in how we apply that money. And that's about how we purchase services into the organisation, about how we recruit people and so forth. They are compliance issues on the one hand – that can be seen as sort of legal or regulatory compliance issues. For me, they're actually really strongly linked to ethical leadership. (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb)

Accountable systems can underpin the integrity of a process. Thus, some participants, like Melissa in the quote above, identified them as an everyday aspect of how they understood ethical leadership. Accountable systems are therefore often linked with good decision-making and a thoughtful process. Melissa recognises that adhering to accountable systems is a compliance issue, so compliance is part of how she understands ethical leadership. In particular, for the public servants I interviewed, accountable systems help ensure the spending of public money is done to achieve the best value for money on behalf of 'the public' and overcome what might otherwise be an easy or expedient option. The expedient option might be to hire an internal job candidate or re-hire a contractor that has been used before, examples Melissa discussed. Kassandra (another public servant) also entwines the aspects of inclusive participation and accountable systems/processes together in her understanding of this aspect of ethical leadership:

> The way we manage planning scheme amendments and the way we manage Tribunal hearings is by its nature ethical, because there is a set process, where people get to participate. All people get to participate. (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct)

Charlotte also recognises the importance of accountable systems in her corporate organisation, but she cautions against them as an excuse not to utilise one's discernment and judgement:

> This is the first time I've worked in a really large institutional environment where there's lots of process and systems that often ... how do I put it ... are often a disincentive for people to actually think about what they're doing and, instead, just follow our [the organisation's] process. And unless the process includes some of those qualitative considerations, then the filling out a form, and the checking off a list might not actually give you all the information [you need to make a decision]. And as I said, big organisations are particularly reliant on systems and process. So that balance between systems and processes, and allowing people to actually think about 'what's that right answer', I think, is increasingly important. (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov)

Adhering to accountable systems is perhaps the most obvious example of a theme that is seemingly contradictory with 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions'. It may even look like what Heidegger calls conforming with the-they. However, Charlotte's caution—the idea that systems and

processes should provide input into thoughtful, considered decision making, not replace it—is therefore a useful contextualisation to avoid the trap of simply conforming.

5.2.1.3 Thoughtful process

> I've been building assets and infrastructure in the energy space time for a really long time, and generally speaking for every single project, even if you site it in the middle of nowhere, there's somebody who doesn't want it. Always, because it's physical [infrastructure]. There's people out there that think wind turbines are horribly ugly, and they don't want wind turbines – but you can use any example [of physical infrastructure]. So how you balance that, is by trying to make sure you are doing a thorough and thoughtful process, that takes into consideration options, where can you go- making sure that you're genuinely, intellectually open and curious to listen to all concerned. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

While some participants understood ethical leadership as the decision or outcome of the thoughtful process, other participants described the thoughtful process *itself* as the ethical leadership. Edith's quote above is an example from her experience in the energy sector. Edith's point is that decisions about where to locate energy infrastructure projects are never easy (potentially 'hard decisions'), yet a thoughtful process to arrive at any such decision is an example of how she understands ethical leadership. While process and decisions can conceptually be teased apart, they are entwined in the lived experience. One engages in a thoughtful process to arrive at an outcome. However, some participants acknowledged that this outcome might never be perfectly 'right'. There is often no easy answer to difficult situation or an ethical dilemma. That is why it is a dilemma. Sometimes the only thing one can do is to think about it, agonise over it, engage in a thoughtful process, and make a decision one knows is not ideal.

However, a thoughtful process need not always be related to an ethical dilemma or difficult situation. Camellia explained the thoughtful process of developing values at the large energy organisation she was CEO of, as an example of how she understands ethical leadership:

> **Camellia**: What we've done here is we actually developed our values. And when I say, "We did it," they were done by the people who work here. So they're not my values. And they're not imposed top down and there were no consultants involved. . . It was quite an interesting exercise. . .
>
> **Alice**: Can you tell me a little bit more about the process?
>
> **Camellia**: So a team was formed. So across…. I would say cross-functional team, across business team. . . the process was to ask our own people what they thought our values were and what they should be. . .the team was quite- very diverse. Diverse, just to look at them. So visually diverse, diverse in terms of which parts of the business they came from, diverse in terms of hierarchy and responsibility. And they self-managed. . . They ran a whole series of

> focus groups. They [the team] were kind of charged with being the representative of their area and they would come back [with the broader] views. . . Through inquiry [the values were developed]. (Camellia, 2019, interview, 25 Nov)

Camellia notes that "the values are great". Nonetheless, the point of her anecdote was to highlight how the thoughtful process by which the values were developed was the example of ethical leadership. It can be seen in the quote that it was important to Camellia that she did not impose her values, as the CEO, on her organisation. What was important to her (arguably the values she was living) was the diversity and engagement of the people that constituted the organisation. Perhaps, more specifically, the value that underpins a thoughtful process for Camellia is enquiry: "So I think now that I've been working for 40 years, a mark of a good leader is someone that has great skill of enquiry, and asks why. A lot more than someone who tells people what to do and what the answer is" (Camellia, 2019, interview, 25 Nov).

Camellia went on to give examples of how the values were lived in the everyday of the organisation. For instance, the organisation undertakes a significant amount of advocacy with government to feed into energy policy development: energy organisations often have a wealth of information regarding how the industry operates and how policy impacts consumers, information that is not directly available to the government. In providing this advocacy, Camellia said, "we try all the time to start our advocacy from the perspective of what's in the best interest of customers" (Camellia, 2019, interview, 25 Nov). The outcome of the thoughtful process (values creation in this case) has an on-going impact on the everyday activities within the organisation, which informs 'what is right'. In this case 'what is right' in the advocacy example was a value linked to customers being a priority.

There was a recognition by some that a thoughtful process is always situated. It is something that happens within an existing external framework. For Stella and her 'hard fight' in introducing a competitive pricing model into a renewable energy market, she had to work within certain existing regulatory boundaries and laws, etc. These community and institutional frameworks provide standards that are "deemed to be ethical" by those communities and institutions:

> …it's about wider community and institutions that are part of creating some frameworks that are held up as the ethical standard. Doesn't mean they [the frameworks] are always right. But they are the framework within which we have to debate and discuss how to move forward and how to progress fairly. . . the frameworks that set standards and that are either deemed to be ethical, or from a probity perspective the standards we should operate within, of themselves are never perfect. And they should be debated, and considered, and challenged, as well as being a frame of reference for how to operate. That's never going to take away from the fact I'll have my internal reaction to stuff. (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec)

From the quote it is clear she is not suggesting that the frameworks are 'always right', and cannot be challenged and changed. She instead implies that one cannot just depart from them "willy nilly", even if one does not agree with them. One must act from within these frameworks. However, her own "internal reaction" is entwined with her own sense of self-responsibility (another aspect of ethical leadership) and how she acts within those frameworks.

5.2.1.4 Creative problem solving

> For me, leadership is about solving the challenges. The things that are running well and smoothly, I don't have to pay so much attention to. That is actually the hardest part, I think, of being a leader, it will always be challenging, but that's the whole thing about leadership. That's what you're there for, your ability to solve issues that are a bit challenging. Others can deal with every other stuff. (Tabitha, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

A number of participants, like Tabitha, referenced creative problem solving (or some version of creative problem solving) as an aspect of how they understood ethical leadership in their everyday lived experience.[37] This aspect is entwined with inclusive decision-making, since creative problem solving often calls upon a diversity of input. Creative problem solving can frequently accommodate a range of perspectives or concerns—or can achieve a solution without a trade-off between ethical outcomes or values. For Tabitha (who equates ethical leadership with good leadership), solving challenges *is* leadership. Tabitha goes on to say: "I know what I want for my organisation. So it's like making a puzzle, putting people together [to find solutions]". Edith also draws a connection between how she understands an aspect of ethical leadership and problem solving by 'leaning into complexity to find real solutions':

> I've been called upon in certain situations to demonstrate what I think ethical leadership is, and I'll give you my practical commercial definition, which is really doing the right thing no matter what. Meaning, you don't compromise on if you're supposed to make money you still figure out how to solve the real challenging societal, and human, and safety, and all the other aspects without sacrificing commerciality. So in a business setting—which is what we were talking about, ethical leadership in business—in a business setting it is recognising that doing the right thing is often harder and more complex, and so it's leaning into that complexity to find real solutions. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Larissa shared an anecdote of how she equates creative problem solving with ethical leadership; in her case, where the local Council she worked for wanted to extend the street. The proposed extension route required the appropriation of a street-full of people's front lawns. It would have cost close to 18 million dollars of public money for the Council to appropriate the land, and a street full of unhappy

[37] Kalyar, Usta, and Shafique (2020) argue that ethical leadership is a driver of creativity. In the lived experience of participants in my study, creative problem solving was an entwined aspect of ethical leadership.

people. Larissa said, "I'm an architect and I love puzzles, we could solve this" (Larissa, 2020, interview, 25 Feb). She took the engineers to look at the street and find a better way. With some imagination, they came up with a better route. It required less than one million dollars to appropriate the land, from only one household. She understood this as an example of ethical leadership because of the cost saving to the public, and it avoided the need to appropriate people's front lawns (entwined with acting for the benefit of others).

Several participants mentioned diversity as an important input into problem solving. Travis recognises that we often use heuristics. We start to identify patterns of how we understand the world, and "[t]hen we use those patterns to make decisions, and most of the time they're right" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar). However, they can also close us off to other possibilities in the world. Diversity is an important part of recognising what those (new) possibilities might be—an important part of creative problem solving. As Charlotte notes below, diverse input can help in bringing 'impartial decision making' to get to a 'right answer', especially when one has gotten into a difficult situation:

> The propensity of wanting to go outside the normal [ethical] rails, I think, is higher when the organisation is feeling distressed by something or a decision that's being made. Often, where the person who's responsible for the decision that got you into the hole, is then also responsible to get you out of the hole. In that circumstance, typically at a management level, you'd be trying to say they need some more people around that problem to make sure that we're actually bringing in impartial decision making [as] to what the 'right answer' is [in the situation]. (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov)

In this section, I have described the enacted practices that participants identified as aspects of how they understood ethical leadership in their day-to-day lived experience. These practices (inclusive decision making, accountable systems, thoughtful processes, and creative problem solving) are often entwined and the edges between them blur in the lived experience. These enacted practices also share blurry edges with how participants conduct themselves.

5.2.2 Everyday Conduct

In the previous section (5.2.1), I identified four ways participants 'enact' aspects of ethical leadership. In this sub-section, I identify the ways participants 'conduct' themselves when enacting the practices discussed above. In the following sub-sections, I outline three important aspects of day-to-day conduct that emerged in how participants understood ethical leadership through their lived experience: perseverance, respect, and care. In the lived experience, this enacting of practices through conduct is entwined.

5.2.2.1 Perseverance

> We believe that what we were doing was a really good thing and an important thing, and that nobody else had been able to do it before. But we were going to keep going. So every time we got to a block, and we got lots, we would go: "No, we can fix that." (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct)

The quote above is an example of perseverance reported by Kassandra. This is one aspect of how Kassandra understood ethical leadership in her everyday lived experience, when she was managing a government program regarding land rezoning. This was a similar situation to Stella's (previously mentioned) example of introducing a competitive pricing model into a renewable energy market:

> That whole debate, every day, was fairly intense. I mean, intellectually, I've never been through anything as challenging. Not before, not since. You'd sit in rooms with whiteboards and say, "Okay, well, in normal regulatory world, it would work like this, in normal commercial world, it would work like that" and what's the territory in between. (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec)

An important aspect of why Stella deemed this introduction of a competitive pricing model as an example of ethical leadership is because she persevered, every day, for more than 18 months.

5.2.2.2 Respect

> Ethical leadership is not just in the 'grand moments' but in the smaller moments. It's about consistency and integrity. I don't just say yes to something, and then say no later. That is the kind of respect I give on a daily basis. (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

For Kimberley, the respect she gives people on a daily basis is an aspect of how she understands ethical leadership in the everyday, and how she conducts herself. The 'grand moments' Kimberley refers to relate to ethical leadership in the hard decisions—those 'moments' which are more exceptional, and which she has experienced. Like Kimberley, Russ also gave an example of 'doing what you say you'll do' as an example of respect in how you deal with people.

> I suppose at a [architectural] practice level, it [ethical leadership] has often been much more about the discussion of your values as a practice and what will guide what sort of work you do, and how you deal with people. You will first and foremost be accountable for the work you do. You will do the work well. We'll put in a fee for something, for example, and we'll see how much we spent on it and sometimes we'll cry, but we'll always do the work properly rather than say, "Our fee's run out". We're constantly surprised by practices who say their fee's run out. And you go, that's sad but we've got to finish the job. It's surprising to me how many say, "No, our fee's run out." (Russ, 2019, interview 25 Nov)

In Russ' example, respect was about doing the job well for the fee quoted, even if the fee does not cover the whole job. This is entwined with the self-responsibility aspect. Simon was another participant who

shared an anecdote which highlighted how an aspect of ethical leadership in his lived experience was respecting all people's views, regardless of where they are in the hierarchy (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan). Melissa made a similar statement: "treating people with respect regardless of their station in life, or their position in the organisation" is a "demonstration of humanity" and therefore "another aspect of ethical leadership" (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb).

5.2.2.3 Care

> We have to look out for each other, and take care of each other, because we're humans. (Priscilla, 2019, interview, 28 Mar)

A number of participants understood care as an important aspect of ethical leadership. Priscilla, felt that an aspect of ethical leadership in her lived experience was caring for people because they are other people (which is entwined with respect for others). However, care for others was expressed variously. It was sometimes expressed as caring how people are treated. It was also expressed in terms of the importance of treating others how you would like to be treated: "…how would we feel if we were on the receiving end of that? And how would we feel if that was us and we were going to our mother, father, sister, brother, husband, wife, talking about that?" (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov). It was sometimes expressed as caring for the community: "When you finish your [housing development] project, you create a new community, you've got to service it till the end and beyond. You can't just finish it, subdivide it, and then nick off, because your maintenance, your obligation's gone, finished. You must hang around for years…" (Rolland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). Tina conceptualised an aspect of ethical leadership as self-care, by avoiding burn-out and prioritising self-respect (Tina, 2019, interview, 25 Mar). The use of 'care' as conduct as it showed up in participants' comments is aligned with an everyday understanding of care, which is different (but related) to Heidegger's concept of care as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2).

In this section, I have described how perseverance, respect, and care emerged as three important aspects of day-to-day conduct of how participants understood ethical leadership through their lived experience. While these aspects of how ethical leadership is enacted and conducted can be conceptually teased apart (in a present-to-hand way), the quotes demonstrate that the actions and conduct are entwined in participants' lived experience. They are not experienced separately. Ethical leadership in the everyday is linked to a view, expressed by some participants, that good leadership *is* ethical leadership, which I now discuss.

5.2.3 Good Leadership is Ethical Leadership

> I don't really understand the reference to 'ethical leadership'. Ethics is just a part of leadership. It's not a separate part. (Tabitha, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

In this quote, Tabitha most explicitly references this lack of distinction between everyday aspects of leadership and ethical leadership. As noted in Chapter 2, Ciulla (1995, p. 6) was making the same point when she argued that "ethics is located in the heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage". Other participants also expressed that these 'enacted' and 'conducted' aspects of ethical leadership in the everyday are aspects of leadership, not just ethical leadership. For instance, Melissa hinted at this sentiment when she reported she is not concerned with the correct 'label', and whether it is called ethical leadership, stakeholder management, or collaborative leadership.

These sentiments highlight that, for at least some participants, the lines between 'ethical leadership in the everyday' and 'good leadership' either collapse or are blurred. They highlight that, in lived experience, the 'labels' (e.g., good leadership, stakeholder management, collaborative leadership) are less important than what is 'behind' those labels. As Stella reflects, there are trends in "management speak". She suggested that "ethical leadership" or "authentic leadership" might be the latest "vogue word" in this 'management speak' (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec). She goes on to say:

> Lots of different words and terminology can be used in the management field to justify certain approaches and models. I think really what it comes down to me is, what is the difference we're making and can we live with it. (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec)

However, there is something she understands as the phenomenon of 'ethical leadership' (whatever the latest leadership label in vogue is). What it really comes down to is "the difference we're making, and can we live with it?". This is entwined with the self-responsibility aspect. For some, like Tabitha, 'ethical leadership' is just another label. What lies behind the labels is this 'sense of right' or moral purpose (or underlying moral motivation or value) as an important aspect of ethical leadership.

5.2.4 Day-to-day Actions Informed by 'the Right Thing'

> That's what I mean about the ethical in small ways. That made me proud to work there, that everybody was focused on something that had to do with doing the right thing, even if they disagree about it. (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan)

In the quote above, Samantha captures this sentiment of ethical leadership in the everyday being informed or imbued with 'doing the right thing'. Participants often referred to 'doing the right thing', but they usually did not refer to 'the right thing' as an abstract moral (e.g., Kantian or utilitarian) analysis of 'the right thing', arrived at via a detached (present-at-hand) analysis. Rather, they usually associated 'doing the right thing' with what they understood as their moral purpose, or a good purpose, or their values (which were often entwined with their organisational or professional purpose or values).

This good purpose is opposed to when people "get nasty to everybody around them; and then it's every man for himself" (Tina, 2019, interview, 25 Mar). Or "the short term, and the personal gain that. . . outweighs the long-term, bigger picture" (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov). It is not about

"expediency and a single bottom line focus. . . that just sets up a whole multitude of sins" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). In the property development sector, Rolland contrasted his good purpose with other "smaller developers" who are "just making bucks" and are not driven by anything beyond themselves. This, for him, is not ethical leadership:

> There's plenty of smaller developers, some old-time landowners who become developers, and they just don't give a toss. It's all about how much money you can make and just chop it [the land] up and minimise the street trees, and minimise the parks, and minimise everything else to the lowest common denominator. They're not building reputation. They're not interested in a long-term thing. They're just making bucks for them. (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan)

Kassandra's moral purpose, her passion, "is creating public value, which is about making good decisions. It's about good decisions, but it's also recognising that decision making has a value component to it" (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct). During the Stage One interview, she was working through a range of challenges in her current role, but she believed "we will deliver the good outcome and we'll get there in the end. We have to. Or else we've got no purpose for being". This quote referring to her "purpose for being" underscores her strong commitment to the public value (associated with her profession as a public servant), which is entwined with acting for the benefit of others. Kassandra often refers to 'public value' as though it is one thing. However in other quotes, she more explicitly recognises that there is judgement in what is worth valuing. A thoughtful process is one way to consider the different (and sometimes competing) aspects of 'public value'.

The 'right thing to do' for Jaqueline 'boils down to humanity', as she articulates in the following quote:

> You get down to humanity. What's the humane thing? That's the right thing to do. You boil it down to you with this value system that I guess you have, and how you rationalise our participation on the planet and with each other. That's really what it boiled down to for me. (Jacqueline, 2020, interview 10 Jun)

Russ articulated a similar moral motivation: "people matter" and he "wants to make a difference". Russ' understanding of the 'right thing' is also associated with his role and profession. In his role, as an architect in his own practice and on various committees, he sees himself and his team as trustees for the built environment and the people in them:

> You plant trees under which you don't expect shade. . . We are trustees for the built environment in a way, and for the communities that built environment serves, and you just try and do your best to go the extra yards to make each part better. I see that. That's what makes you most proud, I think, of your team. You're not having to ask them to do that. They're out there doing it and advocating it for you when you're around or not around. (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov)

My Stage Two living interview-diaries gave me an insight into how the moral motivations of these three participants (Kassandra, Jaqueline and Russ) were enacted and conducted from a day-to-day perspective, over a week. What became evident in Stage Two was how the strong moral motivation or purpose which these participants articulated in Stage One did seem to be enacted and conducted in their everyday. However, as previously discussed in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4.2.1), the interview-diaries also illuminated the everyday tensions and difficulties in enacting/conducting this underlying moral purpose. It is insightful to touch on the detail of these tensions and difficulties, given the richness of the interview-diary data. I use Kassandra as an example to illustrate both these daily tensions. She also provides an integrated example of 'ethical leadership in the everyday' that illustrates many of the aspects (identified in italics below) discussed in this section.

5.2.4.1 Kassandra's living experience: an integrated example

> Apparently, this is a Chinese proverb: "Crisis is the opportunity chasing a dangerous wind." After I heard that, I was like, "Oh my gosh. That's just so true." And it's so true in government, because often what we see with change, or requests for change, is such a knee-jerk reaction, and as a policy boffin, I really get quite upset when you see these knee jerk reactions that pander to relatively small groups of particular stakeholders, rather than it being a robust policy debate that's evidence-based, and truly contemplate the whole holistic response. (Kassandra, 2020, interview 9 Jun)

This was one of the first things Kassandra said to me on the first day of our interview-diary. In this sub-section, I use data from the living diary-interview with Kassandra as an example of ethical leadership in the everyday. I touch on many of the sub-aspects identified in this section (5.2). Kassandra is motived to do *'the right thing'* as she understands it, which is to deliver public value. She explained to me that she spent much of her time during the COVID-19 pandemic (working from home in lockdown) trying to raise awareness of the unintended consequences of these 'knee-jerk reforms', and "what happens if you don't do the hard work at the front" (Kassandra, 2020, interview 9 Jun).

Kassandra found herself jumping into various meetings, on various projects, along various parts of a policy or project development spectrum. A key message she repeated in various guises was: "'Please don't throw the baby out with the bath water. Please consider an evidence-based approach.' Or, 'What is the real problem here?' Or, 'What is it that we need to be responding to?'" (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 9 Jun). These unintended consequences might be public health and safety issues, cost-blow outs which end up costing the State more than the proposed savings by short-cutting the process, or impacts on the environment. One of the tensions she constantly grapples with in these meetings is the cost versus other (non-instrumental) aspects of public value: "I think one of the challenges in government is that when you're talking about any reform, everything costs money, and there is no more money" (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 9 Jun). It is not that others do not necessarily see the other aspects of public value. Instead, it is usually seen as a trade-off between cost and another value.

Given her constant questioning and cajoling of various colleagues and stakeholders to think about the bigger picture and future impacts, Kassandra felt: "I am becoming a little bit cynical, but the good thing is that I can articulate where the risks are" (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 9 Jun). This was based on her experience in managing the consequences of some of these 'knee-jerk' processes in the past. She recognised that this questioning and input based on her experience is "one of my big value propositions. Maybe I'm just not tired enough yet, but I can't push things back down the line" (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 9 Jun). This is indicative of Kassandra's *perseverance*. Despite her creeping cynicism, her moral commitment to the 'public value' meant she persevered in raising the questions about the 'public value' beyond just the cost question—her conscience calls her to do so.

> One of the biggest difficulties that I've had over particularly the last few weeks is, and it is a bit of an ethical dilemma in some ways, but I've taken on, even though I had a full load, I've actually taken on a heap more work recently and it's really complex reform work. And in doing that work, the thing that's in the back of my mind is if I get this done and I do it well, it will generate jobs directly. (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 10 Jun)

The ethical dilemma to which she refers was that she was aware that, in taking on this extra work, she was role-modelling to her team long hours, and the extra work exacerbated the already blurred lines of work-homelife boundaries. This blurring of boundaries eats into the time she spends with her family and the attention she gives them (something she recognises as not good for her, or them). This concern is an aspect of *respect* for her team, her family, and herself. However, she took on the extra work, despite knowing these negative impacts, because she was motivated by her commitment to the 'public'. In this case, her work could help generate jobs in an economy that she believed would go into recession due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Her empathy and *care* for these people was apparent to me even across the Zoom screen:

> I'm very grateful that I've got a job, and if any of this additional work means that we can create more jobs, it doesn't matter what the impact is to me, because I feel for those people who are not working and who've lost their jobs. So anything we can do to stimulate the economy has to be a priority. In reality, I probably should have cut half my existing workload somehow. (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 10 Jun)

For Kassandra, a *thoughtful process* is one way to consider the different (and sometimes competing) aspects of 'public value'. Like other participants, she also talked about the need to encourage diverse input (i.e., *inclusive decision making*) into a process to *creatively solve problems*, and tries to manage her team to facilitate input. However, she is conscious that this thoughtful process is far from perfect:

> It's interesting looking at the policy development cycle. . . when you go to university and you study policy, you see this lovely circle. You research something, you provide options, you then

> develop them, you implement them, and then you review them, and it's just this continuous circle. In reality, none of that ever happens because it's just this weird linkages and opportunities, and ideas that you push in through there. And sometimes it freaks me out a little bit that, that's the way the policy process actually works. And that the argument that you form, is more an articulation of eloquence, an argument that necessarily isn't about an evidence base or a robust process. (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 15 Jun)

This adds to Kassandra's cynicism. Despite her creeping cynicism, the long hours eating into her precious family time, and her concern regarding role-modelling unsustainable hours to her team, she keeps turning up day after day because of her strong underpinning moral commitment to what she interprets is the 'public value' in any given situation. Kassandra's living experience therefore provides a good example of 'ethical leadership in the everyday' theme. However, ethical leadership was also conceived by some participants as leading the way for others through new and/or innovative initiatives.

5.3 Ethical leadership is Leading the Way

> I also think ethical leadership is proactive leadership. It's not a leadership that does something just because it's the trend, or because they have to... again, that's coming back to, very much like a compliance thing. Leadership is about leading, and being the one in front and being the vanguard, and pushing for positive impact. . . to be an ethical leader, that's when you're actually creating the new ethics as you go. Leaders, I used to say, go barefoot where people haven't walked before, like that's kind of, all right, it's open water, it's ground that hasn't been covered, but like let's go out there and, it's a bit like compass over maps. You kind of know a direction and it hasn't been done, like that's the way to lead and create a path for others to follow as you go. (Jacqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

'Ethical leadership is leading the way' is—as Jaqueline describes it—being the vanguard and setting an example for the community or other people by being innovative and trail blazing a way forward. As discussed in the previous sections, many participants understood an aspect of ethical leadership is 'in the hard decisions': Situations which require adhering to one's moral principles despite unwanted negative social consequences. Ethical leadership has also been understood by many participants as being in the everyday. While this may look like just 'doing your job', it is understood *as* ethical leadership if one's actions and conduct are informed by an underlying moral purpose, passion, or motivation, which informs a 'sense of right'. 'Ethical leadership is leading the way' focuses on opening-up new possibilities for Being in covering 'ground that hasn't been covered'. The 'community' that is being influenced (i.e., the 'others that will follow') will differ depending on one's sphere of influence—it could be a business community, an industry sector, or a local or international community.

There are several anecdotes that stand out as examples where participants understood ethical leadership as leading the way. I understand these anecdotes as examples of ethical leadership as leading

the way because they were not 'hard decisions'. For instance, they were not associated with negative social impacts, and were well received by various stakeholders. They were new initiatives that once conceived, required the mobilisation of many people to be implemented. This seems to go beyond the 'smaller moments' of the everyday. Having said that, as with Jaqueline's start-up, even these grand visions reduce down to actions and conduct in the everyday to be implemented, and are thus entwined with ethical leadership in the everyday.

Jaqueline 'walks her talk'. She left her role as Vice President at a manufacturer of infrastructure in the clean energy space, which she thought was essentially profit-driven at the expense of other important values (such as diversity, energy access for all, and care for remote communities), to seek to "create a path for others to follow" in her own way. She does this through her own start-up organisation in the clean energy space. However, in implementing her vision, ethical leadership then becomes 'ethical leadership in the everyday', despite and including all its tensions and questions.

I also draw a distinction between this 'leading the way' aspect and the 'role-modelling' aspect. The role-modelling aspect (discussed in the next chapter) is often about how one is in the world that then influences others in one's sphere of influence (whether one intended to be influential, a change-agent, or not). In that way, it is a type of self-leadership. Innovative initiatives that 'lead the way' set out to change the way things are done; the influence is intentional. Having said this, in practice, there is an entwining. Whether one is intentionally influencing others to change, or one influences change in others because of the way they are in the world, they both set an example for others.

Renata described in some detail an example of ethical leadership as leading the way, outlined in **Figure 8**. In this example, she explains an innovative process which had not been done before. Her example displayed the highest level of commitment by participating energy companies to put the consumer at the centre of their decision-making. Her initial concern was to ensure the driving motivation of the initiative was not just to avoid a Royal Commission into the sector[38]. Renata went on to describe a rigorous process of how principles were developed, formally signed off, and implemented within the businesses (monitored by an independent review panel). The principles were developed not just by the business that had signed-up to the process. Various advocacy groups were also included. The development of this initiative is therefore also an example of a thoughtful process—an aspect of ethics in the everyday. It is in the implementation of the initiative that it becomes an aspect of the 'everyday', in the sense that there was on-going, day-to-day work to bring the vision to fruition. I asked Renata what about the example made it a case of ethical leadership for her. She replied:

[38] In Australia, a Royal Commission is a formal government inquiry into matters of public importance. They are usually convened to investigate sector-wide misconduct. At the time of my interview with Renata, the *The Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services* Industry was being widely reported in news and media.

> I think it's the movement away from 'my only metric is results for my shareholders', to a more nuanced assessment that 'I need to get good results for my shareholders, but I need to do that through the lens of delivering services that the community value and can afford'. So, it's the direct linking with the consumer outcomes that I think is the ethical leadership. (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July)

Figure 8: Renata's Anecdote – Leading the way with the highest level of commitment

> In the energy sector, happily, a number of businesses have decided that they need to be part of demonstrating ethical leadership. There's an initiative . . . which has got. . . principles, and principles in action. . . Those businesses [involved] are really, really working hard and effectively from what I've seen in the last 12 months, to really make consumer outcomes an important part of their decision making.
>
> It's kind of an interesting case study all by itself. So, one of the business [CEOs] came to me and said, "Look, we know we've got to do something about this [negative social perception of the industry], and there's been a bit of informal chat with three or four CEOs. . . Something's got to give here, but we can't do it by ourselves because nobody will trust us. So, will you [i.e., Renata's organisation] be part of the journey?' . . .
>
> I said, "Yes, I think we will be because we know that consumers are not getting the right outcomes from this sector, and it's an essential services sector. So, that's not a good place for any of us to be in, whether the businesses or the customers." So, I then just started to think, well, how can I de-risk this so that we wind up with an authentic process, which everybody can regard as a proper process, and not one where we're just being suborned in the interests of the businesses to keep a Royal Commission at bay. . .
>
> Anyway, so I said, "All right." The first thing I said is, "I don't really want everybody in the sector to sign up. I really only want the people who are deadly serious about culture change inside their businesses," because there was a moment where people thought, "Oh, we will just get everybody to sign up and that'll be terrific." My own view on that is, if we went that way, we would wind up with the lowest common denominator principles. So, I wanted to keep it at a very high level of real commitment. . .
>
> So, I see it very much as ethical leadership by those companies. I guess I would say also from the consumer groups that have been involved, it's also ethical leadership from them, because the easier thing to do is to just keep throwing grenades and rocks from the sidelines, just saying, "This company's gouging us and rah rah rah." But that doesn't really advance the plot on behalf of the different customer groups they're representing. So, they've put considerable time, and considerable brain power into agreeing the principles, and the examples of action, and thinking about the disclosure process.
>
> So, after we got the principles, the other thing I did was I said, "I need to just make sure that this stays at the level of the CEO with oversight from the Board. I don't want this sinking down into the regulatory team or the stakeholder management team. This has got to be a commitment at the CEO level for it to have any effect, because it's actually about culture change and values inside organisations."
>
> (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July)

What makes it 'ethical' for Renata (in this instance) is the benefit to consumers and the broader community: acting for the benefit of others. It is a separate question whether this initiative was indeed successful in producing cultural change in the participating organisations, or whether others would

agree with Renata that it was a thoughtful process. What is important in Renata's lived experience of ethical leadership is that it was a new initiative that actively sought to benefit the community and not just shareholders.

In summary, 'ethical leadership is leading the way' is, as Jacqueline describes it, being the vanguard and consciously setting an example for the community by being innovative and trail blazing a way forward. It focuses on opening-up new possibilities for Being through new ways of doing something.

This chapter has described three prominent themes (which I call aspects) of how participants understood ethical leadership in their lived experience. These three aspects of ethical leadership are 'seen' by others in action—they show up in practice or conduct. The first aspect was how participants understood ethical leadership to be in the hard decisions, where one had a strong sense of 'the right thing to do' and acted in accordance with that sense despite strong social pressure not to do so. The second aspect was how participants understood ethical leadership to be in the everyday. This included activities or practices such as comprehensive and inclusive decision making, accountable systems, a thoughtful process, or creative problem solving. It also included how one conducts oneself (with perseverance, respect, or care). These everyday activities and conduct are underpinned by a 'sense of right', purpose, passion, or motivation, that is beyond one's self. The third aspect was how participants understood ethical leadership is leading the way by consciously setting an innovative or new example for a way forward.

Chapter 6 – Findings: Ethical Leadership that is 'Mine'

In the last chapter, I described three aspects of ethical leadership that can be 'seen' by others in some type of action or conduct. In this second findings chapter, I discuss four other important aspects of how participants understood ethical leadership through their lived experience. These aspects are, in the order they are discussed: ethical leadership is self-responsibility (Section 6.1), ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others (Section 6.2), ethical leadership is guided by somatic references (Section 6.3), and ethical leadership is role-modelling (Section 6.4). Again, I summarise these aspects in a table, **Table 7**, overleaf, as a useful reference guide. I finish the chapter (Section 6.5) by describing why these seven aspects constitute an empirical contribution to the ethical leadership literature.

I have labelled the aspects I discuss in this chapter as 'ethical leadership that is 'mine''. I borrow this term 'mine' from Heidegger, who states: "Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. *Mineness* belongs to any existent Dasein" (p. 78, S53, italics not original). As discussed in Chapter 3, for Heidegger, my existence is not to be understood as some sort of special 'property'. Nevertheless, Heidegger is suggesting that "I have some sort of exclusive and unique relationship to my existence" (Wrathall & Murphey, 2013, p. 10). The four aspects described in this chapter are not so easily 'seen' in the world by others compared to the action or conduct discussed in the previous chapter. However, these four aspects have shown up as important ways that participants understood ethical leadership in their lived experience from the 'inside', from a perspective that is 'mine'. Despite this inside perspective, it is not the case that Heidegger would couch these as 'subjective' aspects. His theory of how we are constituted in the world by others counts against understanding the phenomena in this dualist way. For Heidegger, we are not in the world first and foremost either objectively or subjectively. Nevertheless, the four aspects discussed in this chapter come from a 'mineness' that belongs to how participants experience ethical leadership, in some sort of unique relationship to their own existence.

Table 7: Ethical leadership aspects that are 'mine'

Ethical Leadership Aspect	Overview Description
Ethical leadership is self-responsibility	Responsibility starts with a responsibility for one's own self. However, it extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for things that are in one's sphere of influence, specifically including other people.
Self-responsibility and authenticity	Participants sometimes referred to authenticity or integrity, as an (sub)aspect of responsibility for self. When they did so, they usually meant an alignment between what they described as their values or beliefs, and their actions. (This differs from authenticity from a Heideggerian perspective.)
Responsibility for sphere of influence	A responsibility for self extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for important things that are in one's sphere of influence. This could include (for example) acting on important issues, speaking up regarding bad behaviour, provision of information, or acting well as a representative of one's profession (entwined with role-modelling).
Responsibility for Others	Many participants specifically evoked other people, or groups of people, who were in their sphere of influence. Depending on one's role, responsibility for others could be to the public, communities, employees, customers, or even those who are not as lucky as oneself.
Ethical leadership is for the benefit of others	Participants understood an aspect of ethical leadership to be 'acting for the benefit of others', not for their own personal or selfish interest, or in the narrow (e.g., financial) or short-term interests of the organisation. 'For the benefit of others' emerged as a fundamental aspect (arguably the most fundamental aspect) of how participants understood acting 'ethically'. *What benefits others?* Participants were sometimes cognisant that *what* it is that is going to benefit the other is a judgement not necessarily shared by all—including some of the very people they are acting to benefit. Therefore, seeking to understand multiple perspectives and ways to accommodate varying perspectives is an important sub-aspect (entwined with inclusive decision making, a thoughtful process, and creative problem solving).
Ethical leadership is guided by somatic references	Ethical leadership in the lived experience is, at some level, 'felt' by many participants. Participants identified, either implicitly or explicitly, somatic guides that influenced what they felt was 'right or wrong'. *Who am I to judge what's right and wrong?* Participants did not suggest that these 'somatic references' were static or unequivocally 'right'. Nevertheless, these somatic references matter to them, and how they felt about themselves (entwined with a responsibility to self).

Ethical leadership is role-modelling	A key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by my participants in their lived experience was role modelling the behaviours that are "acceptable", "desirable", or "good".
Role-modelling as the 'leadership' aspect	This theme was understood by some participants as the main 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership.
Role-modelling does not depend on hierarchy	Several anecdotes revealed that ethical leadership does not depend on one having a formal 'leadership' role in their organisations (and therefore formal 'followers'). Role-modelling ethical leadership is not dependent on one's position in an organisational hierarchy.
Role-modelling authenticity	Some participants indicated that they are not modelling what they understand as the 'right thing' simply in order to set a good (role-modelling) example. What is important is that one is living one's own values, and in doing so they become a role-model. This is entwined with participants understanding of authenticity or integrity (and self-responsibility).
Influence of others	Participants recognised that they themselves are influenced by role-models in their lives.

6.1 Ethical Leadership is Self-Responsibility

> I don't really like that word [ethical] because it's much more than just ethics. It's about trying your best, but you have to try your best for the company, and you have to try the best for the individual, and the organisation. (Tabitha, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

A key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience is self-responsibility. Responsibility starts with a responsibility for one's own self and then extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for things that are in one's sphere of influence. Depending on one's role, this extension outwards includes a responsibility for others which may include responsibility to the public, communities, employees, customers, or other stakeholders.

Responsibility that is owned by one's self (i.e., a responsibility that is mine) was identified by many participants as an important aspect of ethical leadership as they understood it. They conceived of the phenomenon as taking responsibility for one's own conduct, thoughts, decisions, and interactions with others. It was variously explicitly expressed as "trying your best" (as Tabitha describes above); as having "an accountability to myself" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar); as a value, "one of the values is responsibility" (Liliana, 2019, interview, 26 Mar); or as a responsibility for one's actions on the world, "everybody has a voice and a responsibility to. . . leave the world a better and more beautiful place than what we found it" (Russ, 2019, interview 25 Nov). Christopher couched self-responsibility as the need to take accountability for your own decisions and for communicating those decisions:

> My judgment is that if you were making the decision, then you had a responsibility to convey the decision, convey the reasons why, and if there was disappointment or hostility towards it, well, there was disappointment or hostility, but that's what you had to do. (Christopher, 2019, interview, 4 Dec)

Christopher gave several anecdotes regarding how he took responsibility for his own decisions and communicated them. For instance, when he was as a union negotiator, he once accepted the employer advocate's word that they would include the right to an afternoon tea break (an important union demand) without insisting that it was written into the award. The employer did not however, honour his word, and Christopher had to go back to the union members and tell them: "I've been taken for a mug here" (Christopher, 2019, interview, 4 Dec). Although he found this very uncomfortable, and he could have blamed the employer, he took responsibility for his own actions (not insisting it be written into the agreement) and for communicating those actions upfront to the union members.

6.1.1 Responsibility for Self and Authenticity

> When I think about working across a number of different teams and organisations, the only thing that doesn't change in that is me. So my word, and my integrity, is very important to me. (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan)

Self-responsibility is entwined with a number of aspects that emerged in the analysis. Of particular relevance to a Heideggerian perspective is authenticity or integrity. In the quote above, Samantha captures this link between herself (as the unchanging phenomenon in her own world) and integrity. When participants referred to authenticity or integrity, they usually meant, as Samantha does above, an alignment between what they described as their values or beliefs, and their actions. For example, Renata articulates why this link between self-responsibility and integrity is important for her:

> Why didn't I speak up? Why didn't I do the right thing? If I had my time over again, I would have done it differently. So, yes, it's a feeling. It's not just an intellectual, "Oh dear, I missed chapter three". It's a disappointment in self. There's all sorts of explanations, but the fact of the matter is I felt really disappointed after things developed, and I realised that I really should have stood up on that occasion and I didn't. . . When I'm reflecting on it now with you, in this conversation, I don't really feel any better about that. My nice feelings of integrity come from the fact that on every other occasion, I have followed my values and standards in the face of grave aggravation on some occasions, and I feel I just stood firm. (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July)

While authenticity and integrity emerged in a number of anecdotes of how participants understood ethical leadership, as discussed in Section 3.2.5, Heidegger's notion of authenticity is not predicated on 'acting in accordance with your values'. However, for Heidegger, one's authenticity does respond to a call of conscience, and one can 'hear' Renata's conscience calling to her in the quote above. "When I'm reflecting on it now with you, in this conversation, I don't really *feel* any better about that": her conscience is entwined with a somatic reference.

6.1.2 Responsibility for Sphere of Influence

> I believe the leadership of today needs to be able to unlearn, learn, relearn, unlearn, have its eyes open and have a consciousness, an awareness and an obligation, and an acknowledgement, and then a responsibility to act on what they see. It's not a passive observation role, and a smile and nod. It's okay, I am in a position where I can do something. I'm in this supposed leadership position, I have some sort of power. You are responsible to use that power to act on what you see, but you need to see it in the first place. You need to open your eyes in the first place. (Jacqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Jacqueline implies that a self-responsibility (which includes a need to "unlearn, learn, relearn, unlearn", i.e., remain open) extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for important things that are in one's sphere of influence. This is captured when she says a leader (someone who is in a position of power, i.e., someone that has influence) has a responsibility to use that power, to use their influence, to act. Jacqueline's implication is: if one were displaying ethical leadership (in fact, if one were displaying

just leadership[39]), then one has a responsibility to act on important issues. This is linked to the aspect 'leading the way'. She implies it is not an excuse for a leader to recuse themselves of this responsibility by saying they were not aware. For Jacqueline, there is an obligation to be aware. Renata made a related point, which is: 'it's not good enough' to pretend you were not aware of questionable or unethical behaviour. "Turning a blind eye or turning the other cheek and saying, '[w]ell, not in my backyard', is actually not a good enough answer" (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July).

In the quote above, Jaqueline was referring specifically to an obligation to act on climate change. In Stage Two, she again elaborated on this aspect of understanding ethical leadership as a responsibility for your sphere of influence, with reference to the 2020 'Black Lives Matter' protest movement. The essence of her message in this instance was 'silence is violence'. By this she meant: not doing anything is 'wrong'—or, at least, not doing anything is its own kind of violence (or damage).

> …we have to realise that our biases are unconscious, and we need to be aware of them and try to know those moments when you need to do something differently. And actually, it's been quite an interesting, obviously you've been observing and perhaps participating in the Black Lives Matter situation that's going on right now. But there's no right words, right, for this kind of situation, especially coming from the privileged... It doesn't matter what I say right now. I'm going to get it wrong. But silence is violence. Silence is privilege. So parts of me want to just say *something*, and say something no matter what. Start a conversation, because if you don't talk, and you just stay back, then you don't progress. If you can't get it on the table and try to talk it through, then we're not getting anywhere. (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 9 Jun)

Jacqueline advocates that, even if what you end up doing in response to a situation is 'wrong', doing something 'wrong' with good will is better than ignoring an issue. As Larissa reflects: "if we don't recognise that we have a problem, we're never going to go after the solution" (Larissa, 2020, interview, 25 Feb). Trying to find a solution, according to Larissa, is better than not trying; there is a responsibility to act, given one's sphere of influence. This hints at the importance of intention. Intention is important despite the consequences, a view echoed by a number of participants.

The obligation to act with responsibility towards what is within one's sphere of influence was also alluded to in other participants' anecdotes. As described in **Figure 9**, below, Charlotte gave an example of the responsibility of a landlord to their tenants—beyond what is just legal—because the commercial success of a tenant is sometimes within a landlord's sphere of influence.

Figure 9: Charlotte's Anecdote – Responsibility to the 'ice-cream guys'

> [F]rom a retail point of view . . . what responsibilities [does] the landlord have for the long-term health and wellness of its tenants? . . . at one level, you could say, well, buyer beware.

[39] This ties back to the point made by some participants that ethical leadership is synonymous with good leadership.

> A tenant gets to make its own decisions. If he wants to move into the [shopping] centre – let's call it, it's the 'ice cream guys'. It's the ice cream guys in a really obscure spot. We've actually had five ice cream guys before and they've all gone broke within a year. Do you put another ice cream guy in there? Because the data point would suggest that, unless all of them were absolutely terrible businesspeople, there's probably just something fundamentally wrong with that concept of having that type of offer in that location.
>
> So in theory, they're 'a willing not anxious purchaser', willing to sign the lease . . . . That would be one end of the spectrum. From a legal point of view, I'm sure that's technically correct. From a 'is that the right thing', an ethical thing for us to do, if we were sharing all the information with them about what had gone on for the last five years, and then letting them make their decision, that would be very different. But we've got more information by a long shot than they have. And there's some evening up of the information and transparency flow that's fair and reasonable.
>
> (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov)

Rebecca also gave an example regarding one's influence (and a responsibility for that influence) as a representative of a particular profession. This example was of a well-known barrister being disbarred for bringing the legal profession into disrepute.

> A really good example, which was in the papers, is a bunch of lawyers like to celebrate a deal closure and took their client to a strip club. This was in, oh God, I want to say 2008, 2009, in the boom times ... Actually earlier, probably 2006, 2007, yeah, probably just before the Lehman collapse. . . [The lawyer] had paid something like 500 pounds per bottle of wine [in a strip club]. It was an absolute scandal. This lawyer was disbarred . . . He was taken off the roll because it was considered to have brought the profession into disrepute. It's an interesting one, because you go, well, is there an ethical argument there? . . . it was in his outside behaviour [beyond the law court], there was a problem.
>
> I think it's a very positive step, because instead of purely judging him on his professional acumen, it went ... Actually, this . . . influences the debate on ethics. . . It feels like it's a good progression because it makes people responsible across the board for their behaviour, and it leads to greater responsibility, which is positive, especially in today's world. (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar)

The point of Rebecca's anecdote seems to be: it is a good thing that lawyers and barristers have a responsibility for their behaviour outside the court, since she believes their sphere of influence extends beyond the court room.

These anecdotes regarding climate change, race relations, an obligation to one's tenants based on superior information, and good behaviour that does not bring the profession into disrepute, are all specific examples, or topics, of responsibility to act on aspects that are in one's sphere of influence. Other specific topics or issues that emerged in participants' ethical leadership anecdotes included gender diversity, inclusiveness, and health and safety. A thread that runs through the comments and

anecdotes regarding these ethical issues is not just that they *are* ethical issues, but, as articulated most explicitly by Jacqueline, that ethical leadership requires a responsibility to take action on these issues if they are within one's sphere of influence, and not ignore them.

Exactly what should be done, and what is 'right' and 'wrong', is up for debate—hence the difficulty and interest of ethics. This difficulty in identifying the 'right action' was articulated by Travis in considering the balance between gender or racial employment targets (a worthy goal) and employing the best person for the job (another worthy goal).

> An example is, well, giving priorities, gender balance rules, because you could argue I've got one principle: I employ the best person. But another principle, I want to have X-percent female or, X-percent of Muslims or, whatever. Well both [are] reasonable targets. Which one do I choose? And maybe it's about, well at this point in time because there's such an imbalance of gender equality, it's okay to have a target for a while. Fortunately, in many cases, these days, the best person just as easily can be a woman anyway. Provided you open your mind up to it.[40] (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar)

This example highlights that participants are well aware of the tensions and difficulties in identifying and undertaking 'right action'. There is also a tension in that it may not be practically possible to act and give one's attention to every (ethical) issue, even when one's influence can be brought to bear on that issue. For instance, in the interview-diary, Jacqueline reflected on grappling with the tension between 'inclusiveness' and 'productive action'. She realised that 'productive action' can come at the expense of 'inclusiveness', which caused her discomfort. Nevertheless, the essence of this (sub)aspect is captured in Renata's suggestion that "it's not good enough to turn a blind eye" to what does emerge in one's Situation.

6.1.2.1 Responsibility for others

> If I'm an ethical leader, by definition that must mean there's some responsibility for the behaviour of other people, not just myself. (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar)

'Responsibility for others' is a specific instance of a responsibility for what is in one's sphere of influence. Responsibility for others was a prominent sub-aspect of the responsibility theme, and of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience. As the quote above indicates, Travis described it as a defining aspect of ethical leadership. Many participants specifically articulated these 'others' that were in their sphere of responsibility. This aspect is intimately entwined with acting for the benefit of others. The subtle differentiation here is that a responsibility to self extends out to

[40] Travis' quote hints at another ethical issue: bias, or discrimination, and also the possibilities (what Heidegger would call possibilities-for-Being) that emerge by remaining open.

include others, which then manifests in acting for the benefit of others. Having said that, there is no sharp distinction in the lived experience.

Responsibility for others as an aspect of ethical leadership is, for Jaqueline, "an obligation to take a bigger view of [oneself], to look beyond the next KPI [key performance indicator], stock package, or salary increase" (Jacqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). Depending on one's role, responsibility for others showed up as responsibility for the public (particularly evident in government officials' examples), for communities (particularly evident in examples from those who worked in the built environment sector), to employees, to customers, or to other stakeholders (evident in all sectors). For Rebecca, it shows up as a responsibility for those who are not as lucky as herself:

> …I think the wealthy and educated have a responsibility to look after people who aren't as lucky as them, and not to look after themselves. So actually, interestingly to me, the greater good can't be looking after your own. And we are fundamentally in positions of responsibility, power. . . I think, with that power comes responsibility. (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar)

This view that there is a responsibility for the wealthy and educated to look after people who are not as lucky as them was echoed by Roland, for whom philanthropy is important. His organisation gave over $1 million to over 70 charities in 2019. As a developer, Roland also saw part of his role as a creator of communities. He saw his responsibility as a developer as not just to build houses and infrastructure, but to respect the people who lived in those houses. That is why his residential developments have myriad facilities:

> Through these clubs, we have tennis courts, pools, cafés, gyms, function areas, parents' lounges, community gardens, men sheds. Out of that you get swimming groups, walking groups, parents' groups, reading groups, running groups, cycling groups, tennis groups, baby/toddler groups... There's just this myriad of clubs that can start. . . I believe it's our responsibility as developers to create that community, as much as build roads and have a whole lot of motherhood and mission statements of what you should be doing. You've actually got to go and do it. Even though you might spend more money at the time doing it... (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan)

As the quote above highlights, for Roland, it is not just about saying communities are important in a "whole lot of motherhood and mission statements". What is important to him is 'community' is experienced by the residents within the developments he builds. He wants residents in his developments to "[b]e proud to call it home. The two key words are being happy with where you live, and be proud to call it home. The journey into your house, when visitors come to visit your house, they should think, 'Oh wow, this is great. You've got really nice street trees, you've got good parks and community facilities. It's all kept nicely" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). His organisation has won awards for this. He has been asked by the judges of these awards: "How are we going to convince other developers

to do it?" I asked him why he does it, and he answered, "I just want to" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). Building communities, not just houses for his own profit, is inherently important to him.

In summary, a key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience is a responsibility that starts with one's own self and extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for things that are in one's sphere of influence, including a responsibility for other people. This responsibility for other people in one's sphere of influence is entwined with the next aspect: 'ethical leadership is for the benefit of others'.

6.2 Ethical Leadership is for the Benefit of Others

> Ethical leadership is about being honest in what you are trying to achieve for the group's benefit. This requires respect, consistency of communication, working together as a team, not being out just for your own gain. (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

As articulated by Kimberly above, participants understood how an aspect of ethical leadership is found in 'acting for the benefit of others' rather than for their own personal or selfish interest or the narrow (e.g., financial) or short-term interests of the organisation. 'For the benefit of others' emerged as a fundamental aspect—arguably the most fundamental aspect—of how participants understood acting ethically. Roland captured this when he said: "To eloquently express the whole thing, I suppose ethical is: you're doing the right thing by your fellow man" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan).

It is therefore unsurprising that 'ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others' sits behind (or is entwined with) many of the aspects and themes that emerged in my thematic analysis. This includes aspects discussed in the previous chapter. For example, 'hard decisions' were related in some way to 'acting for the benefit of others'. The benefit of others is entwined with ethical leadership in the everyday in that 'for others' often underpins the moral purpose, passion, or motivation and one's sense of right. As discussed in the previous section, responsibility for others that are in one's sphere of influence (a sub-aspect of self-responsibility) is entwined with this theme of 'acting for the benefit of others'.

In some anecdotes, the benefit of others was expressed in concrete terms for a particular person or group of people. For instance, Samantha identified the benefit of the *people you lead*:

> [In a previous example] I said something about having the best interests of the people that you lead at the forefront. . . being driven by the best interest of the collective, as opposed to the best interest of yourself, or your bottom line, or your pocketbook, and that's hard. (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan)

Similar to Rolland (and others in the in the government and built environment sectors) Melissa acts to benefit *communities*:

> We're providing a service to the community. So it's sort of... so if you want to anchor back to something, because you've got to anchor back to something that's sort of a logical place for me. (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb)

Stella, in her example of 'fighting the hard fight' to introduce a competitive pricing model in an electricity market, was acting for the benefit of an unknown '*electricity consumer'*:

> I was fighting. . . on behalf of an unknown consumer that I never meet. I just treated it like it was my own money. I look at the team and say 'every single one of us sitting here are paying power bills that factor in this stuff'. And I suppose the ethical part of it for me, was very much do I put that extra effort into a fight for what I probably know is a better outcome, not just a better outcome for now, but . . . decades worth of impact? Or do I just sit back and say, actually, we've met same standard over here. And that is good enough. (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec)

Stella articulated that a 'good enough standard' that others in the organisation were willing to accept was not good enough for her. She fought the 'hard fight' on behalf of electricity consumers. This for her was an aspect of how she understood ethical leadership, and it is entwined with how she wants to be in the world: "I want to live with myself when I look at the question, 'have I done the utmost possible in those jobs to try and spend money the right way on behalf of consumer, whether they know it or not?' . . I want to feel personally proud, but also feel like I made a difference" (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec).

In other anecdotes 'acting for the benefit of others' was expressed as the more abstract *public*, that benefits from 'good public policy', such as the example below from a former State Minister:

> "Anyway, I made that decision. I told them [the company proponents], I said that, in my view, it's the best public policy position for the State. They were extremely disappointed, they rang the Premier to try and get it changed. The Premier rang me, rather agitated, and said, "Oh Christopher, when you're making these decisions we should talk about it". Well, we didn't talk about it because I wasn't going to be influenced to another point of view. And you know, as Minister with a bit of experience by then, that if you're not going to be influenced to another point of view, make the decisions and make it known, and then no one can change it unless they overrule you, in which case you're out. So I made the decision and it stood, and it's reflected in the State Agreement. So I think in those sort of instances there's some tough calls to be made, when you're trying to operate in an ethical basis, and I think that was the best public policy position. So you have to make those calls, they're tough calls" (Christopher, 2019, interview, 4 Dec).

As a 'tough call', this is an example of a hard decision (and the possibility of being ousted as Minister). It is also an example where a 'thoughtful process' (and discussing it with the Premier) was *not* part of how Christopher saw ethical leadership in this situation. What he thought was needed in this situation

was resolute action. Like Christopher, Kassandra also considers "public value and ethical leadership" to be "really intrinsically linked" (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct).

In an example of what Priscilla saw as ethical leadership displayed by Jens Stoltenberg (a former Norwegian Prime Minister), Priscilla identified the '*greatest number of people'* as the abstract 'others' Stoltenberg was seeking to benefit:

> He [Jens Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister] had a mandate to spend a lot of money on climate change and he did. He asked around . . . 'Where can I put this money? I'm not thinking even about national interests, I'm thinking, since climate change is a global problem, we must think about this globally'. And that's when they came up with, actually, the area that's really underfunded is our forests, and land use. So saving tropical forests will probably [abate] the most CO_2. So he said, 'okay, that's what we'll do'. We will put 3 billion that year into that, and that's continued since. For me, that was ethical . . . I guess, in terms of doing the right thing for the greatest number of people [on the planet], not from special interest, or your own personal, or even political standpoint. (Priscilla, 2019, interview, 28 Mar)

While acting for the benefit of others emerged as an important aspect of how participants understood ethical leadership, these 'others' were sometimes identified as specific people or groups of people—for example, one's team, communities, electricity consumers. Sometimes these 'others' were a more abstract 'public', or 'greatest number of people'. In their article *The Gift of Leadership*, Dunne and Spoelstra (2010) liken leadership to a 'gift'. A true gift is, they argue, phenomenologically difficult to understand through a sociological-economic analysis. An economic analysis ultimately seeks to understand the gift of leadership through the lens of a self-interested exchange theory, which undermines the very concept of a gift. For Dunne and Spoelstra (2010) the recipient of the gift of leadership "becomes an abstract category which, by its very abstract nature, is incapable of returning the gift in any meaningful way" (p 73). This aligns with participants understanding of acting for the benefit of others, insofar as it was often an 'abstract other' that they sought to benefit—an 'other' who was incapable of returning the gift, and, in many cases, would probably never even know it had been given. However, once again, participants often acted as if they understood what would be of benefit to these other people, and this, many acknowledged, was contestable.

6.2.1 What Benefits Others?

> So, I'm deeply committed to community outcomes, good community outcomes. So for me, beyond what's in the policy framework and what's in the risk register, does this [decision or situation] pass the 'pub test' in terms of community standards, is important to me, and not the lowest standards, the highest standard, the way we would all want the community to behave even if on occasion Alice, the community—God love them—don't behave that way. (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July)

Being orientated to 'benefit of others' seems ethically laudable, whether this is, as discussed in the previous section, benefiting known people (such as your team) or an abstract other (such as a community, consumers, or the State). However, participants were sometimes cognisant that *what* it is that is going to benefit the other (rather than *whom*) is a judgement not necessarily shared by all, or even by some of the very people they are acting to benefit. In the quote above, Renata highlights she is committed to benefiting the community, and she refers to "the highest standards" of the community, even though she recognises that, "God love them" they do not always behave according to those highest standards. The 'highest standards' are ultimately her 'highest standards', but standards which she seeks to understand from a community perspective.

Benefiting one sector of the community (or State, or public, for instance) may be perceived by others as negatively impacting another sector. Russ shared an anecdote of a public meeting he attended as the architect for a social housing development. The social housing was for the benefit of vulnerable people in the community, but not all the community agreed it was in the community's benefit:

> It was an extremely heated commencement to the meeting, but it was one where we... I wasn't doing it alone in that case [there were other Council representatives there], but it was one where we had to stand up and just let people express everything from worry to hate; and it was probably quite useful in allowing the vitriol to be extended as well. I mean, subsequent to that meeting, I got hate mail, 'Dear shit for brains...' that person put a stamped, self-addressed envelope wanting a reply from me, 'Now you're sending the scum of the earth to live in my neighbourhood. I bet you, you wouldn't have them living next to you'. (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov)

Sometimes participants understood that not everyone shared their own 'highest standards' or sense of what was of benefit. Their anecdotes indicated that an aspect of ethical leadership is acting in accordance with what they understood will benefit others, which is entwined with their own sense of fairness. Nevertheless, participants often sought to understand multiple perspectives on how people perceived the benefits or impacts of a situation so they could act for the benefit of others. Alternatively, they sought creative ways to accommodate the benefits to others by being open to possibilities, in what we have seen Ladkin (2006) calls 'right relation'. The essence of this is captured in the following exchange with Simon:

> **Simon**: …So two commissioners and they could have very different views about, 'I think this should be the way to go' versus something else. I mean if there are fundamental disagreements...
>
> **Alice**: Let's assume, fundamental, but each coming from a recognisably good place. You know-informed.

Simon: See, if they're actually coming from an informed moral stance, I sort of feel like there should be room for agreement somewhere there.

Often, identifying the benefit for others was the outcome of a thoughtful process, one of enquiry (as a number of participants, including Simon, advocated) and therefore one entwined with ethical leadership is in the everyday. In these thoughtful processes, many participants highlighted the need for good evidence, respect for the laws and systems in place, and a desire to take an unbiased view (to the extent that is possible). Simon reflects that: "I will make a decision on all the evidence. I'm not going to base it on personal biases, to the degree that you can. I mean everybody has personal biases, everybody has personal prejudices, but it's trying to make sure that they don't influence your decision making" (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan). Russ makes a similar point: "It's not acting in a biased way or anything. It's really responding to the evidence in the consultation in a consistent way that once you've collected that, and if you've been charged with delivering an evidence-based solution, then you've got to advocate for it" (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov).

As discussed in Chapter 3, Heidegger argues that the way we are in-the-world always and necessarily emerges from a background of 'the-they' and how one acts. For Heidegger, it is not possible to take an unbiased view. Nevertheless, seeking to understand different perspectives, and taking these different perspectives into consideration, was an important sub-aspect of participants' understanding of acting for the benefit of others. This is compatible with Heidegger's ontological structures: we do have the ability to make informed decisions, and act in a way which recognises the other as the same kind of Being as ourselves. This recognition of others' perspectives, and our acting to benefit others, may, of course (according to an Heideggerian perspective), be more or less authentic.

In summary, a key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience is a responsibility that starts with one's own self and extends outward to accepting that one has responsibility for things that are in one's sphere of influence, including a responsibility for other people. However, exactly what this benefit looks like is a judgement not necessarily shared by all. It is informed by one's own sense of right, and balanced by others' perspectives—often through thoughtful processes. In the previous chapter, I discussed the 'sense of right' as being entwined with moral purpose or value. However, this sense of right can also be guided by somatic references.

6.3 Ethical Leadership is Guided by Somatic References

I just felt really bad. So I had a barometer, if you like, on when I felt bad or when I felt okay. So that was part of it, that I just knew, if I didn't follow through on these matters, that I would have felt bad. That I wouldn't have been true to my own values. So I suppose my courage, and it's that in one sense, Alice, it certainly in part a reaction to just lived experience of feeling that I had let myself down. So, it wasn't a theoretical thing for me. It was a lived experience where I had not in fact done the right thing, and I didn't like the outcome in terms of my own

> assessment of my behaviour against standards that I actually do hold dear. (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July)

Ethical leadership in the lived experience is, at some level, 'felt' by many participants, such as Renata, who articulated, in the quote above, that she used the way she felt about a situation as a barometer. This felt-sense (which I have called somatic references) often showed up as implicit references. However, in some cases, participants were very explicit that these somatic references were guides to what they saw as the ethical behaviour underpinning ethical leadership. This does not necessarily imply that these somatic references are static, or unequivocally 'right'—as Jaqueline asks, "Who am I to judge what's right and wrong?" (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 12 Jun). Nevertheless, these somatic references matter. They suggest a more ontological (what Heidegger sometimes calls a 'primordial') motivation, or 'knowing'. This is the way we experiences ourselves in the world first and foremost, before we categorise why.

When describing their ethical leadership experiences and explaining why they thought a particular experience was an example of ethical leadership, participants often tended towards abstraction. Many talked about adhering to principles, values, integrity, frameworks, etc., which fits with this norm. However, as the quotation above from Renata epitomises, there can be a movement between abstract values and an underlying 'feeling'.

Participants referred variously to when they "feel bad" (Tina, 2019, interview, 25 Mar); to things that "feel very uncomfortable" (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov) or "bring discomfort" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar); to "being comfortable" (Melissa, 2020, interview, 20 Feb); to "when you get a bad feeling in your bones" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct) or "your nose twitches" (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July); to "what smells right" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar) or "passes the mirror test" (Simon, 2020, interview, 16, Jan); to whether you are able to "sleep with yourself at night" (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan); to when telling not-quite-the-truth "was consuming me" (Larissa, 2020, interview 25 Feb); to whether you can "look your children in your eye" (Kassandra, 2019, interview, 21 Oct); and when "it's what you call intuition, and you just *know*" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). These were all implicit somatic references which helps to guide action. They are implicit in the sense that they were referred to by interviewees in passing. Stronger emotions (such as distress, anger, or fear) also guided action in participants' anecdotes.

Larissa referred to an ethical 'felt sense' not (just) toward a particular situation (although she described this as well) but toward a place (in this case Australia) which she compares to her country of birth, Brazil:

> **Larissa**: You're an idiot if you're doing right, if you're being ethical [in Brazil]. . .and that I hate so much. I think I found a much better place in Australia in that sense, because ethics here seem to be. . . [more important]. When I see, for example, in the news the corruption- that

> people are resigning [over the inappropriate expenditure on] a ticket, a plane ticket or something, I keep thinking, 'Oh, my God, that's the dream'. In Brazil, a person steals millions, billions, and nothing happens to the person. People treat them as a hero. I like it here [in Australia]. I see this [resigning for the inappropriate use of public funds] and I think, "Oh, my God, finally I found a place where I fit a little bit".
>
> **Alice**: What does that feel like?
>
> **Larissa**: The opposite of loneliness. I don't know the word for this. (Larissa, 2020, interview 25 Feb)

This was an example of how Larissa experiences herself in the world, despite not being able to quite articulate it in English or Portuguese (her native language).

While many participants referred to somatic references in passing, some participants were more explicit in their acknowledgment that these somatic references are guides to action, such as Edith:

> And so part of the responsibility of ethical leadership is yes, reviewing the data and information, but facts can be so relative and can be so manipulated, that I find more and more, as I get more senior, and as society gets more modern, in many ways I'm stepping back more and more to really go okay, does it feel right? Does it pass the gut check? Does it really compute? Does it cross over into actually doing the right thing for my shareholders, for my customers, for my employees, for the environment, for my community where I live, for the community where the business is operating – and really stepping back and having a common-sense sort of feel about it. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

It is interesting to note that, for Edith, it is data, information, and facts that can be manipulated, while the 'gut check' is trustworthy (it is often considered the reverse in a positivist domain). Edith's 'gut check' is linked to what she sees as her responsibility to others (shareholders, customers, employees, environment, and community) and to act for their benefit. She therefore emphasises the entwined nature of these themes. She goes on to say:

> So many business leaders have lost touch, and business and society has lost touch with honouring what makes us uniquely human, which is our ability to feel, and intuit, and have judgement. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Kimberley makes a similar observation about the importance of 'feeling', and that this importance is often forgotten in many parts of our society:

> I was always taught to think. At school, university, at Business school. I had forgotten to question how I feel. Balancing what I think and what I feel has made me a much better whole person. In work, as a friend, in life. (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov)

Like Edith, Jacqueline also explicitly uses the 'gut test' (what she calls the 'stomach test') in her day-to-day dealings as a guide to action:

> …We started off being, "Oh, we're not going to have any advertising. Everybody hates advertising. We're not going to use anyone's data..." It was really hard-lined, meaning very righteous. But then you just need to get over yourself, because there's one billion people on Instagram, and there's four billion people on Facebook that are just like, "Hey, they shouldn't use our data," but they're just using it anyway. So we've got to find a spot in there that is, that we... I often use the stomach test, to be honest with you. I'm like, "Does this feel right to me?" And like, "who am I to judge what's right and wrong". Well, I guess I feel like my setting, my compass on values is- I don't know. I don't know how to describe it… (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 12 Jun)

Jaqueline did not have the words to describe what 'right' feels like—just as Larissa did not quite know how to describe 'the opposite of loneliness'. Nevertheless, Jacqueline used the 'stomach test' early the following (interview-diary) week when reviewing a legal document:

> It was a standard document that came from one of the major law firms in Denmark. So we were just checking that everything made sense, give it the 'stomach test' kind of thing. If I was on the receiving end of this, would this make sense, and we [another founder] were just sparring with each other. (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 15 Jun)

Whether the references were made in passing, or the references were quite explicit and acknowledged, somatic references emerged as influencing one's 'sense of right' and guiding action.

6.3.1 "Who am I to Judge What's Right and Wrong"

> Who am I to judge what's right and wrong? (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 12 Jun)

Participants often referred to 'doing the right thing' (refer to Section 5.2.4), as if 'the right thing' was self-evident. However, at other times, participants more explicitly recognised that 'the right thing' was influenced by their own judgement based on their purpose or values. As Jacqueline notes in the quote above, despite her strongly held ethical views, she does not have a monopoly on 'what is right'. This is apparent when she asks: 'Who am I to judge what's right and wrong?'. In some anecdotes, it is more evident that 'the right thing' is sometimes better described as one's 'sense of right' and is informed by how one *feels* about the situation. This 'sense of right' can be accessed via somatic references. Travis asked a similar question to Jacqueline:

> For the difficult issues, where do you sit between right and right, and wrong and wrong? And so you've got to make some balanced- you've got to make some judgment decisions and the circumstances will often dictate what's acceptable and what's not. (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar)

Travis articulated that, while we might experience "some discomfort" which can guide action, he thinks this is influenced by our culture and/or the heuristics we develop over time. There is a link between how our felt-senses develop and our context (which might include, but not be limited to, cultural or historical context). For instance, in talking about an international leadership course Travis attended, he was surprised (despite his international work experience) at the different ethical stances between people from different cultural backgrounds, given the same information on a case study. In both hypothetical and real situations he has experienced, when confronted with different ethical practices, Travis thinks this can lead you into "…areas which are quite uncomfortable, because you think you had a reasonably robust [ethical] framework of your own, and you discover it isn't quite as robust as you thought" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar). I understood him to mean that we might believe that what we think and/or feel is morally right is 'right' because it is based on a robust, rational, and defensible moral framework. However, when confronted with other people's practices, and when we can truly appreciate these practices from their perspective, Travis recognises that our own rigid frameworks of 'right and wrong' might not seem "quite as robust". He acknowledges that sometimes we invent reasons for why our way is the 'right way', despite the legitimacy of other people's practices.

Nevertheless, even if we are remaining open-minded, "there are other cases where it becomes a bit difficult" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar) and other people's practices are not acceptable to us, even allowing for these cultural differences. Either way, for Travis, cultural context matters, but different times in history may make a difference as well:

> It's perfectly acceptable and efficient to build up of a series of things [i.e., understandings and heuristics] about the way you think the world works. But I think with that one about different cultural backgrounds and behaviours, or things that emerge over time, I mean, society changes the way the sort of behaviours that were acceptable in the workplace, certainly 30 years ago, versus now is just... it's completely different. . . . and whilst it doesn't justify bad behaviour of 20 years ago, I can sometimes see how that behaviour might have been acceptable, in a social sense. I mean, in the same way that people smoking used to be acceptable, more than acceptable, it was almost encouraged. (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar)

At first glance, this might sound like what some scholars call cultural relativism. Put simply, this is the idea that what is morally right or acceptable is defined by one's culture. However, Travis' point is more subtle than this. His point is: context matters, and we are inevitably influenced by our context. Ruth made a similar point when she said: "Each circumstance is individual. And I think you've got to look at the circumstances" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct). However, ultimately Travis (and Ruth) are suggesting that, within any cultural/historical context, you still have responsibility for your own decisions, and you must be comfortable with those decisions. This highlights the entwining

between somatic reference and self-responsibility. From a Heideggerian perspective it is possible to appropriate oneself authentically from the way one is constituted by one's cultural/historical context.[41]

Travis was once faced with a situation in Asia where he learned of a 'joint marketing meeting' held on the golf course, where heads of departments from different companies within a particular industry got together to decide who got what contracts at what prices. This felt like price-fixing to Travis, and, "It didn't seem to me that could be justified on the basis of, 'Oh, that was just a cultural difference'" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar). There are no easy answers to these situations—"I'm fully aware this is, what I'm saying is gray-*ish*, at least if not gray" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar).

Travis' understanding of the role that culture and historic context plays in our sense of right, and the heuristics we develop over time, is what Heidegger describes as the inauthentic social practices that constitute us. It is from this 'the-they' self that Heidegger argues we need to appropriate our Self authentically. This aligns with Travis' understanding, although he does not use Heideggerian terminology. For Travis, although one should seek to remain open to different cultural practices, there comes a point that one still has responsibility for one's own decisions, and one must be comfortable with those decisions. Some participants indicated that this 'comfort' with decisions was literally felt. As such, these somatic references were guides to what they saw as their ethical behaviour, underpinning ethical leadership. Participants did not claim these somatic references were static, or unequivocally 'right'. Nevertheless, these somatic references mattered to them. They are the way one experiences oneself in the world first and foremost, before one categorises why.

6.4 Ethical Leadership is Role-Modelling

> For me, my sort of everyday professional life in terms of ethics is set an example, and a good example, for your co-workers. (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct)

A key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience is role-modelling the behaviours that were variously described as 'acceptable', 'desirable', or 'good'. Ruth acknowledges that her behaviour sets an example for others (particularly co-workers within her consultancy). Because of this, she seeks to set a good example. Her anecdotes reveal that this 'good example' includes having an open-door policy, ensuring people feel valued, not taking on projects that do not fit with her values of good development, and taking responsibility for her employees' mistakes.

In Sub-section 6.4.1, below, I outline how this 'role-modelling' aspect was understood by some participants as the 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership. While the being, the behaviours, or intention behind those behaviours, was instead often understood as the 'ethical' aspect of ethical leadership. The idea of role-modelling as the key 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership shares something with the

[41] See also Section 4.4.2 on the how a Heideggerian perspective accommodates the circularity of truth, which is often perceived as relativist and therefore 'problematic' by those wishing to escape the hermeneutic circle.

original Old English verb *lǽdan* from which the word 'leadership' is derived in English. "*Lǽdan*, meaning 'to cause [someone] to go with oneself' (*OED*), describes the way in which we human beings will show one another the way—and allow ourselves to be shown or guided" (Case, French, & Simpson, 2011, p. 5).

In Sub-section 6.4.2, I identify how some anecdotes highlighted that role-modelling does not depend on hierarchy and/or a formal leadership role with formal followers. Other anecdotes, discussed in Sub-section 6.4.3, highlighted the importance of role-modelling authenticity or integrity. Both of these aspects are in contrast to Brown et al. (2005) Ethical Leadership construct. Participants that raised the importance of role modelling often acknowledged that their ethics (those that were being role modelled) were influenced by others. They were influenced, for instance by their up bringing or by mentors (Sub-section 6.4.4).

6.4.1 Role-Modelling as the 'Leadership' Aspect

> What I've learnt is: as I'm developing in my career, as a leader you cast a very long shadow, and that I need to be much more reflective of what others see of me. So I've been working really long hours, I need to take a break. . . [I said to a team member], I said to him: "Maybe you need a day off. Maybe you need to just cancel everything for today". But for me I have to be very careful, because I don't do that for myself. I know it, and I'm articulating it. But leading people, it's about showing people what to do and what not to do. . . . And I think that for me, that question around what is a good leader, and what does a good leader do, is really critical in being able to display the behaviours that you think are the acceptable ones. (Kassandra, 2020, interview, 10 June)

In the quote above, Kassandra discusses her realisation that her behaviour in a senior position can "cast a very long shadow" and an aspect of leadership is role-modelling the type of behaviour you want to see in others (not just telling them what they should do). Her quote also underscores the lack of distinction made at times between leadership and ethical leadership (discussed in Section 5.2.3).

Roland also recognised ways he is role-modelling a responsibility to others, such as communities and society (discussed in Section 6.1.2.1). He gave an example of wanting to "pull back" in the business. He "just keeps worrying" about his leadership team, about how "their moral compass and their sense of responsibility and their creativity will get nurtured along" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). In other words, he is worried about who will role-model this responsibility to the community and 'show the way' (thereby demonstrating leadership) when he is gone. He therefore finds it hard to "pull back". Charlotte also highlights the need for role-modelling, so people in the organisation have an awareness of what is considered acceptable by her and the leadership team:

> We [the executive leadership team] can't all be involved in every decision that gets made because that just brings the organisation to a standstill, but you need to have the touch-points

> in place that give people, one awareness of what we're interested in, because, if we're not talking about it and not inquiring about it, then generally people won't perform to that. So they need to see a role-model. They need to see it, intervened when there's an intervention necessarily. They need to see it rewarded when they know this has gone well. (Charlotte, 2019, interview, 21 Nov).

The ethical leadership construct of Brown et al. (2005) posits that ethical leaders model the behaviours that their followers believe to be normatively appropriate. In contrast, however, participants in my study contend that they model what *they* understand is acceptable, desirable, or good. Again, unlike Brown and Trevino's (2005) construct, participants' anecdotes do not depend on having formal followers and therefore being recognised as a 'leader' in the organisational hierarchy. In other words, role-modelling does not depend on hierarchy, as discussed below.

6.4.2 Role-modelling does not Depend on Hierarchy

> It was the final meeting where we were discussing just a convoluted version of these undertakings to be accepted and I can remember it had pretty much gone to the last couple of minutes. "Right, let's decide to accept-" And this person who would have been the most junior person in the room. . . said, "Can I just ask a question? I don't understand why we're doing this.". . . I would have thought, that took a fair bit of courage saying right to the senior group of the [organisation] who were backing this. And that particular comment turned the entire conversation. The meeting went on for an extra 15, 20 minutes and the decision was, "No, we're not accepting the undertakings." (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan)

Several participants' anecdotes revealed that the way they understood ethical leadership does not depend on them having formal 'leadership' roles in their organisations. As an extension, role-modelling ethical leadership also does not depend on one's position in the hierarchy. In Simon's example above, he believed his colleague role-modelled ethical leadership (by speaking up because she did not believe the decision about to made was the right one (a hard decision)) despite being the most junior person in the room.

Rebecca gave an example where she was working as an intern at a designer business. The headquarters held an internal sample sale to clear old stock, open only to employees and their friends. The Sales Manager priced the goods, including a suite of leather handbags. Once these bags had all been sold, during the event, the CEO "lost it" at the Sales Manager because he believed she had under-priced these particular leather handbags. He yelled at her and accused her of "totally devaluing our goods" which is "terrible for the brand" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar). He decided he would fire her and her small team. She (and her team) started crying. Rebecca spoke up and said that was not acceptable behaviour. Rebecca told the CEO: "You've trusted her [the Sales Manager] for over two years to make these decisions. . . even if you're upset with this decision and you don't agree. . . it's one

mistake" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar). He then decided that Rebecca was the one who must have led the Sales Manager astray, because Rebecca was the new person. The next day, the CEO asked to see Rebecca. They had an argument, but, in the end, Rebecca took responsibility for the decision (even though it was not hers). I asked her why. She said: "…at the end of the day, I was an intern, I had a job [in a law firm] to go to" (Rebecca, 2019, interview, 28 Mar). She felt bad for these young women, who did not have other jobs to go to. This example of ethical leadership (taking responsibility for the decision in order to benefit others) underscores the point that ethical leadership can be role-modelled by anyone from any position in an organisational hierarchy—even the intern.

6.4.3 Role-modelling Authenticity

> I think you've got to say, how do I want to live my life? How do I want to lead? If I have a leadership role in an organisation, what is the benchmark we're setting for what I represent, and can I look people in the eye in the [architectural] practice… (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov)

This quote from Russ highlights how he understands role-modelling as an important aspect of leadership (the 'benchmark' that he is setting). He links role-modelling with an aspect of how he understands authenticity or integrity ("how do I want to live my life?") and an underlying somatic reference ("looking people in the eye") as an indicator of what 'feels right'. Samantha made a similar point in the quote, below, about the importance of role-modelling, which she thinks is inherently important. She also links her integrity with a somatic reference (i.e., how she feels about herself) and links it with how you 'are' and how you 'act' as a responsibility to self.

> Well, modelling good behaviour is always important. Period. And I really don't think I could have been an effective head of the department any longer if I'd stayed [after an incident] anyway. Not just because of what had transpired, but because of the way I would have felt about myself. (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan)

Tina also had an anecdote regarding the link between maintaining integrity (and respecting herself), which she realised is role-modelled to (in this case) the younger women in her organisation. In this anecdote, she agonised about whether it was ethical to leave an organisation and let others, including team members, fend for themselves in a stressful situation. She concluded that, if you cannot change a situation, the right thing to do might be to leave:

> For me, when I left my old job, and that was because if I didn't do that, I wouldn't have any integrity left in the end, because I've taken too much shit basically and bad behaviour that I had a hard time respecting myself. . . Another thing was that, I knew that some of the younger, especially girls were looking up to me because of the position I had. . . .And I didn't want to send that signal [that you should just stay and take it]. (Tina, 2019, interview, 25 Mar)

Tina's quote also highlights the entwining of aspects such as role-modelling, somatic references, and responsibility to the Self. Edith articulated the link between integrity (understood as consistency between one's words and actions) as something you do for yourself but, in doing it for yourself, are a role-model for others.

> Ethical leadership means living these values and principles of honesty and integrity, and doing the right thing, living it, so it's not just words, it's actions and it's consistency in those words and actions, so you are a role-model. So you're doing it for yourself in a leadership role, but you're also an example for others. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

This underscores that participants understand that it is their own values and principles that need to be role-modelled, not those of their followers. In doing so, Edith (and some others) suggests that she is not modelling what she understands is the 'right thing' *in order* to set a good example. What is important to her is that she is living her values, and, in doing so, she (role)models them. This subtle difference (between simply modelling and actively seeking to role-model) aligns with an important aspect of Heidegger's concept of authenticity—in so far as Edith appears to be 'choosing herself'. However, she is conscious that her behaviour does indeed set an example, which aligns with participants' understanding that they have a responsibility for the influence they have on others (discussed in Section 6.1.2). If one is 'owning' what one is and what one does (in a Heideggerian sense), this 'owning' includes how one influences others.

Samantha outlined what kind of motivations and ethical behaviour she articulated should be role-modelled, which ultimately can be summarised as 'being a good person':

> I keep coming back to the question of, who are we? And that's a slightly different conversation, but when I've had that conversation with friends of mine, talking about the politics of the day, it's partly – are we motivated to do good? Are we motivated to be kind? Are we motivated to do the right things? When I think of ethical leadership, I feel like it's aligned with modelling the kinds of behaviour that... I'm trying to be positive and not give you negative examples, but modelling the kinds of behaviour that lifts people up, that inspires people to do the right thing, that takes a position against the wrong things, it takes a position against people being discriminated against, for example. All of those things are almost basic; basic elements of being a good person. (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan)

Like Jacqueline who thinks 'silence is violence', Samantha also highlights in this quote how it is important to be motivated by good intentions and take a position against things that you think are wrong (which can often be manifested in hard decisions).

6.4.4 Influence of Others

> I'm very fortunate that I've worked with some amazing people that have served as great role models for ethical leadership (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

I asked a number of participants where their ethical stances or standards came from, or perhaps how they developed their values or principles, if they used this terminology. Those I asked referenced role-models in their lives. Edith, who, in the quote above, referenced 'the amazing people' she has worked with, also specifically referenced her "mother, who was a business woman, and laid out for me that ethics and business go hand in hand" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). Indeed, most participants who identified role-models identified family members. Larissa referenced "my Grandpa…he is what we call 'kashias' [beautiful and kind], a person who does absolutely nothing wrong" (Larissa, 2020, interview, 25 Feb)[42]. Roland referenced his parents, particularly his mother: "My mother's always been very socially minded" (Roland, 2020, interview, 15 Jan). Ruth acknowledged that "to some degree it's rooted in my upbringing" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct). Stella "grew up the daughter of a nurse, who was always a pragmatist. And always you've got to do the right thing to look after other people. You've got to be careful you don't put yourself at risk in the process" (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec). Stella's quote hints at the entwined nature of responsibility to the Self and responsibility to others. While participants recognised their influence as role-models, they also recognised that role-models shaped who they were, and their own behaviour.

For Heidegger, these (role)models are people who not only influence us but help constitute the way we are in-the-world. Dreyfus (2005) explicitly used an example of parenting (see Section 3.2.4.1) to describe how our social practices can constitute us: "It is as if the American mother wanted to have a vocal, active baby, and the Japanese mother wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles of caretaking of the mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 14). Participants do not conceptualise 'modelling' as helping to constitute others (in the same way Heidegger does). Nevertheless, the average everyday understanding of some participants acknowledged the influence of others, and their influence on others.

In summary, a key aspect of how ethical leadership is understood by participants in their lived experience is role-modelling behaviours that are "acceptable", "desirable", or "good". This was understood by some participants as the 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership. As discussed in Section

[42] In section 6.3.1 above, Travis recognsied that our sense of right and wrong can be guided by our heuristics, which, as he discussed, are influenced by our cultural and historical context. However, this is not to suggest that we are completely bounded by our culture and history. Recall (from section 6.3) that Larissa talked about how Australia feels the 'the opposite of loneliness'; she felt ethics is taken more seriously in Australia compared to Brazil. Here she was suggesting that the influence of her Brazilian Grandpa at least partly explains why she sees the corruption in Brazil as not acceptable, while other Brazilians seem to culturally accept it. While one cannot shed the influence of the-they, nevertheless seeing 'past' the-they of what is culturally and historically acceptable is entwined with a key aspect of a Heideggerian sense of authenticity.

3.3, this aligns with how Ethical, Authentic, and Servant leadership theories also understand 'leadership' as a type of role-modelling for some sort of exemplary behaviour (Brown et al., 2005; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Saleem-Tanner, 2018).

6.5 Empirical Contribution: Seven Aspects of Ethical Leadership

In this chapter and the last, I presented seven themes that emerged as particularly prominent or theoretically relevant, in order to provide an empirical answer to my research question: *how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?*. I have called these 'seven aspects of ethical leadership'. As a new perspective on ethical leadership, it is the empirical contribution of this thesis. Ågerfalk (2014, p. 594) conceives an empirical contribution as the following:

> "[A] novel account of an empirical phenomenon that challenges existing assumptions about the world or reveals something previously undocumented (cf. Rowe, 2011). . . An empirical contribution thus reveals insights into a phenomenon, and does not have to rely explicitly on any *a priori* conceptualizations – although it typically does to some extent (Thomas & James, 2006). Similar to a theoretical contribution, an empirical contribution needs to show both originality and utility, and give rise to implications for both research and practice."

I contend that these 'seven aspects' perspective constitute a novel understanding of the ethical leadership phenomenon—an understanding that reveals insights into the phenomenon from a previously undocumented lived experience perspective. As a lived experience approach, these findings do not rely on an *a priori* conceptualisation. However, the choice of these particular seven aspects, out of the many themes that emerged, has been informed by an interest in the ontological perspective. This perspective (refer to Chapter 3) is aligned with a more absorbed-coping mode of Being-in-the-world, as an alternative to the more dominant objects-with-properties perspective of the moral/ethical leadership literature. The 'seven aspects' perspective is both original and could be utilised on its own (without further theorisation, as I will nevertheless go on to do) as the basis for research or for understanding practice. However, in presenting these seven aspects of how participants understand ethical leadership in their lived experience, and in drawing attention to their entwined nature in a "totality of involvements" (p. 231, S186), I do not suggest that, taken all together, they capture the totality of the ethical leadership phenomenon. Rather, they capture an important perspective of ethical leadership.

When these seven aspects of ethical leadership are considered through the interpretive lenses of Heidegger's ontological structures (in an exegetical analysis), I argue they shine light on the ethical leadership phenomenon from an ontological (theoretical) perspective of how-we-are-in-the-world. It is to this exegetical analysis that I now turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 7 – Discussion: Ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being

In the previous two findings chapters, I identified what I have called 'seven aspects of ethical leadership' to answer my research question: '*how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*. This was the first 'hermeneutic' layer of interpretation, and it is what Heidegger refers to as the "average everyday" (p. 296, S251) lived experience. In this discussion chapter, I utilise the Heideggerian ontological structures identified in Chapter 3 as interpretive lenses to analyse my empirical findings from an ontological perspective. This is the second (theoretical) 'hermeneutic layer' of interpretation in my thesis. This (re)interpretation is what van Manen (2016) calls the exegetical approach, whereby the empirical data of a phenomenological study are interpreted and discussed through the lens of a particular phenomenological philosophy.

In this analysis, my primary aim is to demonstrate how the seven aspects of ethical leadership are the "average everyday" (p. 296, S251) lived experience of the ontological structures that are relevant to ethical leadership. These ontological structures are what sit "in and behind" (Grondin, 1997, p. 94) our ontic/concrete experiences in the world. As discussed in Chapter 3, I identify the important ontological structures for ethical leadership as *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience*. However, as ontological structures of the way we are in-the-world, they do not exclusively underpin ethical leadership. The seven aspects of ethical leadership (the average everyday lived experience) can therefore help us to understand these structures as they pertain specifically to ethical leadership. It is my contention that the 'mapping' of these seven aspects and ontological structures together "sheds light" (p. 403, S352) on what I call an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being.

In seeking to understand the ethical leadership phenomenon through these ontological structures, I therefore contribute to a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. The 'mapping' between the seven aspects of ethical leadership and the ontological structures is summarised in **Table 8**, below. When the ontological structures of *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience* shows up in the world as taking responsibility for self, while acting for the benefit of other through resolute action (either in a hard decision, the everyday, or leading the way), guided by somatic references, this constitutes an 'ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being'. This ontological mode-of-Being provides a model of a way of Being-in-the-world. When this mode-of-Being is recognised by other people *as* ethical leadership in an average everyday way, it becomes a *role*-model for these people.

Table 8: Mapping of ethical leadership aspects and ontological structures

Aspects of Ethical Leadership	Ontological Structures	Mode-of-Being
An average everyday lived experience…	…of how we are ontologically in-the-world	…together leads to
Ethical leadership is self-responsibility	Authenticity	(Role)modelling an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being
Ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others	Positive Solicitude	
Ethical leadership is in the hard decisions	Resolute Action	
Ethical leadership is in the everyday		
Ethical leadership is in leading the way		
Ethical leadership is guided by somatic references	Call of Conscience	

In this chapter, I discuss the 'mapping' (identified in Table 8) of each of the seven aspects of ethical leadership and the related ontological structures in turn. The aim of this discussion is to add depth and insight to this 'mapping'. In each section (from 7.1 to 7.5), I first describe why I interpret the ontological structure under discussion as underpinning the relevant everyday/lived experience aspect of ethical leadership. I then seek to resolve theoretical tensions between the everyday experience and the ontological structure. Where relevant, I link back to the tensions identified in the moral/ethical leadership literature (discussed in Section 2.4). For ease of reference, in Section 7.6, I summarise my theoretical insights in **Table 9**, before finishing the chapter with identifying implications of my analysis.

I argue that, as an absorbed coping (ready-to-hand) mode-of-Being, an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being is integrated in our experience. It is not 'first' a somatic reference felt in the gut (for instance) that *then* leads to 'choosing to choose' one's Self authentically and *then* leads to a resolute action. The ontological structures that sit in and behind the lived experience are experienced in an integrated (absorbed) totality. The difficulty is: in order to point to these ready-to-hand/absorbed-coping ontological structures, it is necessary to move to a present-to-hand explanation. In order to try to preserve the ready-to-hand (integrated) perspective, I refer throughout this chapter to an example. In Section 5.1, I provided an example of Ruth, who 'sacked herself' from the Ministerial Committee (see Figure 7). In this chapter, I refer to Ruth's lived experience as a useful example to help explain this

‘mapping’ between the ontological structures and the relevant ethical leadership aspect. **Figure 10** below is a simplified, diagrammatic example of how the ontological structures ‘show up’ in Ruth’s example. Important (though simplified) elements of the story appear in the speech/thought bubbles associated with the ontological structures. It is important to note, however, that the speech/thought bubbles are not the ontological structures themselves. Rather, they point to the ontic/concrete/everyday realisation of those structures.

Figure 10: Integrated example of an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being

The icons representing the ontological structures from Table 8 (e.g., the thumb-print, the running man, etc.), can be seen in Figure 10, above. The thumb print icon, for instance, links to the ontological structure of ‘authenticity’. In the next section, I explain how the pivotal ontological structure of authenticity shows up in lived experience as ‘ethical leadership is self-responsibility’.

7.1 Authenticity and Self-Responsibility

It is my contention that participants' understanding of 'ethical leadership is self-responsibility' can be understood as an average, everyday experience of Heidegger's ontological structure of authenticity. As described in Section 6.1, 'ethical leadership is self-responsibility' starts with a responsibility for the Self and extends out to one's sphere of influence, which includes a responsibility to others. At its heart, Heidegger's conception of authenticity is also a profound responsibility for the Self—a 'choosing to choose' one's Self, and, in doing so, appropriating oneself from an inauthentic 'the-they' self. For instance, with reference to Figure 10, Ruth outlined how she took responsibility for herself, and acted upon the principles that mattered to her most. She thought it was wrong of the Minister's Office to misrepresent the Committee's draft. In addition, she did not agree with the direction the Minister's Office was taking the policy. She therefore wanted no further involvement. She wanted to distance herself from this process she did not agree with, so she "sacked herself" (as did other Committee Members). Her decision was not applauded by all. The Ministerial Officers and some of her colleagues thought she should have 'hung in there'. That her action was not in accordance with what one usually does (i.e., in accordance with the 'the-they') suggests it is an example of Heidegger's authenticity.

In the rest of this section, I extend the discussion of Heidegger's concept of authenticity (introduced in Section 3.2.5). I first explain what Heidegger means by 'choosing to choose' one's Self. I also explicate why I find this a more accurate explanation of authenticity compared to the 'being true to a core self' conception that dominates the Authentic Leadership literature (and, indeed, is often reflected in participants' discourses). I then revisit a tension raised in Section 2.4.2.2, and argue that Heidegger's notion of authenticity is an experience of one's Self. I therefore posit it cannot be measured by a third-person questionnaire, as the various Authentic Leadership Questionnaires seek to do. Finally, I contend Heidegger's notion of authenticity is better able to accommodate how it is that a person changes over time, and yet remains 'authentic' over time—compared to being true to a fixed, core self. An example from the Stage Two interview-diaries is used to elucidate this explanation.

As described in Section 6.1.1, in referring to this 'responsibility for self', participants often talked about 'integrity', or sometimes even referred to 'authenticity'. This was usually conceived of as being 'true to yourself', and/or aligning this 'true self' with a set of values and/or principles. On the surface, this seems to echo the conception of 'authentic' that emerges in much of the Authentic Leadership literature (see Section 2.4.2). However, this does not align neatly with Heidegger's concept of authenticity. This 'troubling tension' (raised in Section 2.4.2.3) arises from a difference between 'essentialist' and 'existential' notions of authenticity. Despite how participants articulated 'integrity' and 'authenticity', Heidegger's notion of authenticity is not predicated on 'acting in accordance with your values' or 'being true to an inner core self'. Nevertheless, I contend there is a sense that

Heidegger's authenticity *is* 'being true to yourself', yet this self is just not an essential, pre-given, unchanging self. Heidegger argues that, in Being-authentic, we are not choosing some 'true' or 'core' self that lies under an inauthentic self. We are not choosing some "deep self" (Blattner, 2013, p. 332) that Blattner calls the 'expressivist notion' of the self.

This 'deep self' is aligned with the Romantic discourse of 'integrity' represented by thinkers such as Rousseau, Herder, and Goethe (Carman, 2005). "True selfhood, for them, is the achievement of a kind of wholeness or integrity" (Carman, 2005, p. 287). It is from these 'Romantic thinkers' that terminology like 'being true to yourself' emerged (Carman, 2005). For Heidegger, the 'self' is never fixed. We can never be true to the whole self because we are never 'whole'. Instead, we are always a Being-with-possibilities. That is of course, until we die. But, when we are dead, we no longer exist. Heidegger's "phenomenological account of Dasein is owning up wholly—that is, wholeheartedly—to itself in its existence. To own up to oneself in one's existence is to exist authentically" (Carman, 2005, p. 289). This sense of 'owning up wholeheartedly' is a Heideggerian interpretation of participants' lived experience as 'a responsibility for self', and which extends outwards to their sphere of influence and responsibility for others.

As opposed to this Romantic discourse of 'being true to yourself', and the association with an inner, unchanging core self that shows up in the Authentic Leadership literature, Heidegger's authenticity is, in short, a 'choosing to choose yourself' (p. 314, S270). For him, the self that is never 'whole' (so is not a 'core' self), is a self which always pushes into possibilities-for-Being. However, if authenticity is 'choosing to choose yourself', why the double choice? Why not stick with, as Kierkegaard and Sartre do, just one important choice: the "choice of the self" (Han-Pile, 2013, p. 293)? For Heidegger*, the 'choosing to choose' is the choice to take responsibility for one's self from the they-self.* Despite the (once again) confusing terminology, this 'choice' has no cognitive content. However, Dasein does choose a course of action out of all the concrete possibilities available to it based on what matters to it (i.e., to Dasein's care structure). The choosing out of all the possibilities of action (or perhaps inaction) is where the cognitive, reflexive, weighing up of options comes in, based on a concrete Situation. It might appear from this description that Heidegger is suggesting that 'first' we 'choose to choose' ourselves and *then* we make cognitive deliberations about our possibilities-for-Being. However, this is too linear; our authentic choosing to choose as an ontological mode-of-Being already shows up in our cognitive deliberations about a course of action. For example, when Ruth 'sacked herself' from the Ministerial Committee, she did not first choose to choose herself and be authentic and *then* cognitively deliberate about the Minister's Office misrepresentation of the Committee's draft

report. Such thoughts did not lead her to decide to sack herself. Rather, in sacking herself, she had already chosen herself.[43]

The 'choosing to choose' ourselves from the inauthentic-self is grasped in a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) way we are in the world. This is triggered, Heidegger argues, by existential angst, a fear of death or our call of conscience. "Thus the self-ascription of responsibility is not a logical conclusion but a response to an ethical demand, a response that is *necessitated* by nothing but by which Dasein freely owns up to itself" (Han-Pile, 2013, p. 302). In other words, faced with a concrete Situation, it is not logical reason that urges authentic Dasein to take responsibility for its action (as Kantian reasoning, for instance, would suggest). It already will, if it has already owned up to itself (i.e., taken responsibility for itself).

I return now to a tension, raised in Section 2.4.2.1, regarding analysing a first-person phenomenon from a third-person perspective. I have argued here that 'responsibility for self' is the average everyday understanding of the ontological structure of 'authenticity', and, for Heidegger, authenticity is not an alignment between a core self but a choosing to choose oneself. One's authenticity always shows up in the world in its comportment. "Whether Dasein is pre-reflectively aware of its responsibility for itself or not, it is expressed through its comportment, and can thus be observed from the third-person standpoint" (Han-Pile, 2013, p. 310). It is this comportment, or conduct, that the Authentic Leadership questionnaires (Levesque-Côté et al., 2018; Neider & Schriesheim, 2011; Walumbwa et al., 2008) seek to measure. Nevertheless, the slippery aspect to grasp here is that comportment/conduct as observed by another is not the authenticity itself. It is not the choosing to choose. Furthermore, pinning down 'comportment' into specific traits and behaviours that equal 'authenticity' is the kind of present-at-hand perspective that Heidegger is reacting against. Authenticity, "whether Dasein is pre-reflectively aware of its responsibly for itself or not" (Han-Pile, 2013, p. 310), can only be experienced by Dasein, by one's Self. From a Heideggerian perspective, it is not therefore possible to 'measure' authenticity from a third-person perspective.

Heidegger's notion of authenticity is better able to accommodate how it is we can change over time and yet remain authentic. A Heideggerian conception of self is not fixed. Therefore, the Self is not immutable and unchanging, unlike the Romantic discourse of a 'core self'. Kimberley captures this sense when she says: "Once I had accepted that it was okay to be different from what I had done before, then the decision was made easier" (Kimberley, 2019, interview, 19 Nov). A Heideggerian notion of

[43] This is arguably similar to the point of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus' famous quote, "For a lamp he became a thief" (Epictetus, 1925). Performing a certain sort of action can confer a particular attribute upon the actor, such as, in stealing the lamp the man *becomes* a thief. That is, the man becomes a thief through the choice to steal the lamp, rather than through directly or consciously choosing to become a thief. Similarly, in Ruth's anecdote, by sacking herself from the committee she becomes authentic, rather than consciously choosing 'to be authentic' and then sacking herself from the committee as a consequence of making a conscious decision to be authentic.

authenticity is better able to explain the lived experience as described in the Stage Two interview-diaries. In the Stage One interviews, participants recounted anecdotes that already had endings. Therefore, if they choose themselves (or, as understood in the average everyday, 'took responsibility for themselves'), this was already grasped in the telling of the story. However, this was not the case during the interview-diary week, where the Stage Two participants' stories were unfolding day-by-day, and did not yet have endings. During the interview-diary week with Jaqueline, there were times when she struggled with enacting (cognitively held) values. In the quote below, she describes how she grappled with 'inclusiveness' versus 'productive action'.

> So then I had to recentre myself and find the balance of holding to the values I believe in, which are around that inclusiveness and giving people space, and letting people spread their wings, but also having the right fit for where we are in a really early, vulnerable company stage. It is a start-up, so the kumbaya is fine, but if you're not getting anywhere, you need to have a hard look at that. So then I ended up, after that, letting go one of our other founding team members, who was an amazing person, but…(Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 9 Jun)

Jaqueline may not have scored well on an Authentic Leadership Questionnaire according to the Founding Member whom she had to 'let go' from the example above. It is entirely conceivable, based on her description, that this particular Founding Member may have felt Jaqueline's initial 'inclusiveness' and 'giving people space' was indeed inauthentic, and was not displayed when it really came down to it—when there was disagreement about the way forward. However, from a Heideggerian perspective, what is important in Being-authentic is Jacqueline's understanding of her own self and 'choosing to choose herself', not the Founding Member's understanding of her comportment (which is more important to the dominant Authentic Leadership perspective of authenticity).

If we have a core, unchanging self, then the question Jaqueline should have been asking herself was not 'what should I do?' but rather 'what is *really* me?'. The process would be one of trying to 'uncover' what was already there in this core self. However, this is not how she experienced the concrete Situation as reported to me. She experienced the situation as one of genuinely grappling to 'do the right thing', of seeking the best way to 'balance' or 'harmonise' these two values that mattered to her, and of coming to land on a course of resolute action that ultimately favoured 'leading the way' and progressing her vision (another aspect of ethical leadership) over her previously favoured approach of 'inclusiveness and giving people space'. It is arguable from a normative (for example, a consequentialist or deontological) perspective that she did not indeed 'do the right the thing' in letting the Founding Member go. As Greenleaf (1977) contends (discussed in Section 2.4.3.3), it might not be *the* best choice; *the* best choice will not necessarily be known for a long time, until history has played out. What is important from an authenticity perspective is whether it is a choice Jaqueline can (to draw upon one of Greenleaf (1977) notions) depend upon. While I cannot know from my third person perspective if she did indeed choose herself authentically, what was evident to me was she was not shying away from

taking responsibility for herself and her actions (she owned them wholeheartedly). The process she went through to arrive at the resolute action of letting the Founding Member go was not a process of 'uncovering' a self that was already there. Rather, it was a process of grappling to find a path forward. However, while Jaqueline might have been authentic in this situation, an important issue at stake in this situation (particularly from the Founding Members' perspective) was positive solicitude. I now explain how 'ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others' is a concrete (lived experience) aspect of the ontological structure of positive solicitude.

7.2 Positive Solicitude and Benefit of Others

As discussed in Section 6.2, 'acting for the benefit of others' emerged as a notable aspect of how participants understood the 'ethical' in their experience of ethical leadership. Acting for the benefit of others was often understood by participants as 'the right thing to do'. Participants' anecdotes of ethical leadership usually referred to concrete ways in which they were seeking to help others. They also referred to the way they understood ethical leadership in how they conducted themselves towards others: with care, respect, and perseverance. It is interesting that 'care' emerged as a theme, for (as discussed in Section 3.2.2) Heidegger argues Dasein "reveals itself as care" (S182, p. 227). He means we are always orientated in the world with care. Things and people show up as meaningful to us, they necessarily matter to us in some way as we act to bring about some future potentiality. When this care is orientated positively towards other people, Heidegger calls this positive solicitude (refer to Section 3.2.3). In the example highlighted in Figure 10, Ruth is concerned that the amendments that the Ministerial Office made to the Committee's report had removed many of the aspects that were aimed at benefiting others in the long-term. The light-blue thought bubble in Figure 10 refers to social and affordable housing and climate change mitigation measures (and in our interview Ruth also talked about the importance of housing and transport access for future city inhabitants). The removal from the draft report of many of the significant aspects that benefited others in the community was a fundamental reason that Ruth (and other Committee Members) sacked themselves: "We don't agree with a number of the directions in the document, and we cannot put our name to the document. . . it was ethically wrong" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct).

In the remainder of this section, I extend the explanation of positive solicitude (commenced in Section 3.2.3) in light of my findings. Sorial (2005, p. 3) argues the "ethical moment" in Heidegger's ontology is 'authenticity' (when a Dasein takes full responsibility for itself), I argue that positive solicitude is an equally important ontological structure for that 'ethical moment' (or ethical mode when experienced in a more sustained, continuous way). It is positive solicitude, I argue, that is the aspect of authenticity that circumvents what has been recognised in some organisational literature as the 'Hitler problem' (Ciulla, 2020): a visionary 'leader' that might be authentic but does not care for others. Positive solicitude seeks to 'empower' or facilitate the authenticity of another by opening up their

possibilities-for-Being. However, I contend it is not the case that 'positive solicitude' requires that the benefits (or the possibilities-for-Being) must necessarily accrue to the other/s. It is up to the other/s to appropriate their own authenticity. I argue what is important is the orientation towards the other that underpins positive solicitude: Ladkin (2006) calls this 'right relation'. This 'right relation' is similar to acting with good intentions. However, while an 'intention' is a cognitive construct, an orientation is associated with a mode-of-Being.

Although Heidegger does not propose an ethical theory per se, he does imply that Being-in-the-world authentically is a 'good' way to be in the world—a 'better' way to be than Being-in-the-world *in*authentically (see Section 3.1). When Dasein takes full responsibility for its own Being, and appropriates itself from the inauthentic 'they-self', this is freeing and opens up possibilities-for-Being. Similarly, the Authentic Leadership literature identifies authenticity as an inherently good way-to-be. It is often identified as one of the core moral/ethical leadership theories. Indeed, some Authentic Leadership scholars make the claim that 'authenticity' is a root construct of all "positive" leadership theories (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003). Despite this 'good' way to be in the world, it is arguably possible to be authentic (from a Heideggerian perspective) and yet also be tyrannical. As noted above, this is sometimes referred to as the 'Hitler problem' (Ciulla, 2020), on the basis that Hitler was arguably authentic and yet perpetrated some of the most extreme atrocities the world has seen[44]. Steve Jobs, the visionary leader and former CEO of Apple Inc., is another less extreme example of an arguably authentic leader who could be notoriously unkind—even bullying, manipulative, and abusive (Sarkaria, 2018). It is therefore possible for a Dasein, like Steve Jobs, to 'choose to choose themselves' and yet not empower or facilitate this authenticity in others.

It is my contention that when the ontological structure of authenticity is entwined with the ontological structure of positive solicitude, this circumvents the 'Hitler problem'. We are usually in a deficient mode of solicitude towards others, as argued by Krentz and Malloy (2005) and Tomkins and Simpson (2015). However, when we act with positive solicitude that 'leaps forth and liberates' in an organisational setting, this empowers others to be free for their own authenticity and potentiality-for-Being. When one acts with positive solicitude, one pre-reflexively grasps that another person is the same kind of Being as oneself, and is therefore worthy of the same kind of freedom to be authentic. Acting with positive solicitude requires an ontological 'care'. If Dasein 'matters' to its Self (which it will if it is Being-authentic) and recognises other people as the same kind of Being as itself, then Dasein will recognise that these other/s will also 'matter'. These others will matter both to themselves, and they

[44] Heidegger himself, as a member of the Nazi party, aligns Hitler with authenticity (Philipse, 1999). In fact, Heidegger's membership of the Nazi party and its links with his philosophy is a subject of its own debate within philosophy literature. In twist of sad irony, Gardiner (2011) accuses Heidegger himself of being a myopic, uncaring, and therefore an unpopular leader as Rector of Freiburg University. Based on Gardiner's interpretation, despite his ontological insight, it does not sound as if Heidegger comported himself with positive solicitude that 'leaps forth and liberates' as Rector.

will matter to the Dasien (as the same kind of Being as itself). Hence, an authentic-Dasein-with-positive-solicitude (one that pre-reflexively grasps the humanity in another) will act to empower other people's authenticity. These other people could be specific people. Often, however, in an organisational setting, they are the unspecified (or abstract) other—such as consumers, constituents, disadvantaged people, the community, etc.

As discussed in Section 3.2.2., this 'mattering' need not show up necessarily as loving-care, or good-will, or kindness (although it might be this too). Rather it shows up in our everyday lived experience as acting for the benefit of others. If Steve Jobs (for instance) was acting not just authentically, but authentically-with-positive-solicitude, then, while he might not necessarily act kindly (i.e., be warm and loving), it would not be possible for him to act manipulatively and abusively, because these would be deficient modes of solicitude.

It was not the case in participants' examples that the benefits to other people *necessarily* lead to the authenticity of the other. The participant might not be known to those they sought to benefit, especially if participants were seeking to help an unspecified/abstract other, in a 'gift of leadership' (Dunne & Spoelstra, 2010). It is up to the 'other' to appropriate their own authenticity. It is also not the case that participants sought to dictate to others how they should 'be' (by leaping in) through their concrete (ontic) care for others. Rather, the concrete ways participants sought to help others often was intended to provide an environment for others that facilitated the possibility for appropriating their own authenticity and potentiality-for-Being.

What this potentiality-for-Being looks like in any concrete situation is layered with understanding—understanding of an historical epoch, which is situated within an understanding of particular social practices (or culture). This layered understanding is then appropriated by an authentic Dasein. Travis discussed the influence of different cultural practices, and how what is socially morally acceptable can change over time, based on his own experience: "I think there are just things that change over time. It sort of implies there are things about ethics that can change over time as well" (Travis, 2020, interview, 16 Mar). Travis is pointing to what Heidegger understands is "the total web of intricately connected meanings" (George, 2021, p. 6), which is always situated within a particular social/cultural world.

Beneath all the layering of (hermeneutic) interpretation, one arrives at an understanding of what stands out as significant when other people matter in a concrete situation, and what would facilitate these other peoples' potentiality-for-Being. For instance, for Stella, it looked like cheaper electricity prices (because less electricity costs means more money for other potentialities). For Christopher, it looked like a habitable planet (because we need the planet for any potentialities). A participants' understanding of what is important to others (e.g., other consumers, constituents, disadvantage people, the community, etc.) is informed by what is familiar to them in their social worlds. That is, it was what

they understand as important (e.g., cheaper electricity prices, a habitable planet) that informs what they want for others. Stella articulated this when she said: "I was fighting. . . on behalf of an unknown consumer that I never meet. I just treated like it was my own money" (Stella, 2019, interview, 2 Dec).

In this section, I have so far argued that, when authenticity is entwined with positive solicitude, this circumvents the 'Hitler Problem' by empowering others to appropriate their authenticity. Positive solicitude does not necessarily look like loving-care, good-will, or kindness. Rather, in the average everyday lived experience of participants, it looked like acting for the benefit of others. However, what any one person views as a 'benefit to others' is layered with understandings that come from their shared social world.

What 'benefits others' is informed by a participants' understanding of their own shared-world. Thus, it is possible that participants could simply be wrong about what is helpful to others. It was evident that there are differences of opinion between what counts as a 'benefit to others' within any concrete Situation. Heidegger argues that we understand other people's experiences because they are the same kind of Being as ourselves: "So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being" (p. 163, S125). Therefore, we do not need some kind of "ontological bridge from a deworlded, solipsistic self to the separated other" (George, 2021, p. 3). That said, how we understand others always and necessarily comes within our web of shared social meanings. 'Others' are more known when they are familiar to us (more like us) in our social worlds. However, even a stranger is known as a stranger, in reference to our known social worlds (George, 2021, p. 7). What is important to an "ontologico-ethical" meaning of an event from a Heideggerian perspective is less about what ends up being actually helpful/beneficial to others. Rather, a focus is on "…welcoming and caring for the stranger [the other] with openness, and engaging her in reasonable, affective, respectful, and mutually stimulating dialogue, without naively anticipating the happy ending of a perfect resolution of all disagreements" (George, 2021, p. 14). This stimulating dialogue might be a literal conversation (such as Ruth's discussion with the Ministerial Office) or it might be a more imagined conversation. Christopher, for instance, did not ask his constituents directly if they would prefer a habitable planet. This is something he inferred based on his own understanding of the world.

As discussed in Section 3.2.3, this welcoming and caring for the other—with positive solicitude that 'leaps forth and liberates—is less about the 'right action' and more about the 'right relation' (Ladkin, 2006). This can also be conceived as a right orientation to others. When we have this 'right orientation' and two people have a difference of opinion, then, with all the possibilities-for-Being, there is likely to be a way forward. Recall Simon's response to the situation (see Section 6.2.1) if two Commissioners (within his organisation) had fundamentally different starting points on a topic: "[I]f they're coming from an informed moral stance, I sort of feel like there should be room for agreement somewhere there" (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan). Looking for this agreement is why participants understood creative problem solving as an aspect of ethical leadership. From a morally normative

perspective, it might appear that the important part of Simon's sentence is the 'informed moral stance'. However, from an ontologico-ethical perspective, the important focus is on the orientation of 'room for agreement'. In essence, the ontological structure sitting "in and behind" (Grondin, 1997, p. 94) this 'room for agreement' is one of positive solicitude.

It might also be tempting to call this 'orientation' an intention. As Kant argues (Kant, 2012), what counts is good intentions that can then be universalisable as a maxim. Indeed, participants talked about or referred to their intentions. However, an intention is that which is cognitively held in the mind and Kant argues for the importance of intentions based on logic. Positive solicitude is instead an ontological orientation within an authentic mode-of-Being. It is one in which a person is orientated towards 'leaping forth and liberating' others in an absorbed-coping way, a know-how, not a know-what way. For Heidegger, the cognitive-intention comes because of the mode-of-Being, the orientation in the world. When one acts authenticity with the right orientation (i.e., with positive solicitude), this necessarily shows up in the world as resolute action (which could also be no action at all).

7.3 Resolute Action and the Hard Decisions, the Everyday and Leading the Way

As identified in Table 8, ethical leadership is in 'the hard decisions', 'the everyday' and 'leading the way' are, I contend, all everyday lived experiences of the ontological structure of resolute action. In this section, I discuss each of these in turn.

7.3.1 Resolute Action and the Hard Decisions

The ontological structure of authentic resolute action is most easily discernible in 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions'. As discussed in Section 5.1, this aspect is, in short, where participants understood ethical leadership as having 'good' intentions and they acted according to their principles or 'what was right' (or what I argue is closer to their *sense* of right) even when that was difficult or uncomfortable to do. It is the unwanted social ramifications (e.g., being fired, being ostracised, fearing for one's life) that reveal most prominently that in these situations participants were not just acting in accordance with the-they. If one were acting in accordance with what 'one does', then the actions would not offend dominant social conventions and lead to unwanted social ramifications. Even participants' terminology used to describe these hard decision shares something with an average, everyday understanding of resoluteness (e.g. ,"sticking to your guns", "pursuing a harder path", the "say no decisions", "what you're tested by", or "tough calls"). The most prominent aspect of Ruth's story (Figure 10) is her resolute action in 'sacking herself', even though walking away from a Ministerial Committee is not usually 'the done thing'.

In the rest of this (sub)section, I argue that *the-they* provides us with an 'average intelligibility' of our shared social worlds. From this 'average intelligibility', one can develop a 'higher intelligibility'

where one moves from competent acting in the world to a skilful, expert absorbed-coping in the world (Dreyfus, 2000). It is in this mode of a 'higher intelligibility' that one can act with wise, resolute action. This shares something with Aristotle's concept of *phronesis,* where one acts with wise, practical action. However, while Aristotle's *phronesis* is based in conscious deliberation, for Heidegger, authentic, resolute action can stay below our cognitive deliberation.

For Heidegger, the 'average intelligibility' is given by the-they, into which we find ourselves *thrown*. This average intelligibility is how we understand our shared world, because we are literally constituted by the social practices we grew up with. It is how we are socialised. This is a shared intelligibility. It is why the hypothetical Japanese baby (from Section 3.2.4.1) understands that what it is be human is passive, contended, gentle, and social, while the hypothetical American baby grows up to understand what it is to be human is to be active, independent, and assertive.

From this 'average intelligibility' of the-they, we can develop what Dreyfus (2000) calls a 'higher intelligibility'. In this, we move from competent acting in the world to a skilful, expert coping in the world. Heidegger calls this a 'knowing', or "primordial understanding" (p. 212, S168). Dreyfus aligns 'competence' in acting in the world with inauthenticity: we act in accordance with the-they as we follow the socially dictated 'rules'. Heidegger describes thus: "With Dasein's lostness in the "they"", one just follows "the tasks, rules, and standards" in order to be a "solicitous Being-in the-world" (p. 312, S268). In this mode-of-Being, Dasein is irresolute. This does not mean one does not act, or one equivocates. For instance, the Chief of Staff in Ruth's narrative (refer to Figure 10) does not equivocate. However, he appears to be lost in 'the-they'. He responds generically, and not to the nuances of the specific situation: "Oh no, don't worry. It [the draft report] includes all your stuff. We haven't changed anything. It includes all your stuff, we've just taken a little step further" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct). The draft report had been changed by the Ministerial Office, yet they did not own up (i.e., take responsibility) for these changes.

This 'higher intelligibility' is aligned with Heidegger's notion of resolute Dasein. As noted above, it shares something with Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* (wise practical action) (Blattner, 2013; Dreyfus, 2000; Segal, 2011). Dreyfus (2000, p. 157) argues that, given Heidegger's careful analysis of Aristotle, "…we would expect Heidegger to present his own version of the mastery of the cultural practices [i.e., appropriating one's self from the-they self] that, according to Aristotle, enable the *phronimos* [the wise person] to 'straightaway' 'do the appropriate thing at the appropriate time in the appropriate way'". Wise, practical action is not something separate from the average intelligibly of the-they social world. It emerges out of it. It is a type of refinement or a mastery of shared cultural practices (Blattner, 2013; Dreyfus, 2000). It is an appropriation of them, whereby actions are taken on as one's own. However, for Aristotle, *phronesis* involves conscious deliberation. For Heidegger, this primordial knowing stays below our cognitive awareness; it is something that happens in a ready-to-hand way, not a present-to-hand way (Blattner, 2013).

This distinction between authentic resolute action (action from a higher intelligibility), compared to an approach that is lost in the-they, is evident in the following 'say no' hard-decision anecdote from Edith:

> It was a situation where I was asked to basically- this gets into how you can change stuff [like data], so you can set up software, you can set up systems to give you a certain outcome, but that outcome may not actually be real. And so, I was asked to [sell the software which did not provide accurate information]. . . [My boss] was just kind of like "well you know, with software everybody does it, and it's okay", and I said "actually no, it's not okay". . . And so, even if it wasn't for legal testimony, it still [would] be wrong, but the point was, there was true accountability [as compliance software], and so when I realised that my boss was like 'it doesn't matter, we can sell the software cheaper, and whatever the customer does or not is their problem'. I was like, I'm not okay with that. (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Edith was a senior executive in a technology company at the time. She clashed with her boss on the fundamentals of their compliance software product. She ended up resigning, because she thought it was wrong to sell so-called compliance software, that would not stand up to the legal requirements of compliance. In resigning, she walked away from a small fortune of stock-options.

Resolute action is undertaken in ready-to-hand mode-of-Being. It is done 'straightaway' or instinctively. As discussed above in Section 7.1, it is not the case that one appropriates one's self from the-they self (i.e., one chosoes to choose) and *then* acts in accordance with that. According to Heidegger, "Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already *taking action*" (p. 347, S300). In other words, in appropriating one's self authentically, this necessarily 'shows up' in resolute action. In Edith's example, it is not that she did not have cognitive thought about the software situation. She engaged her boss in dialogue and was disappointed in having to give up her "huge stockpile of stock". According to Heidegger, what was 'primordial' was how she already 'straightaway' had a conscience about it: it was wrong. She had already appropriated herself from the-they self in this situation, and acted resolutely from that basis (e.g., first of trying to dissuade her boss, then resigning).

Heidegger's use of a capital 'S' in Situation seeks to distinguish what he calls the "concrete Situation" (p. 349, S302) with what he calls "the general situation" (p. 346, S300). The 'general situation' is one where we act as 'one does': we follow the rules or the standards to get along in the world. This is not necessarily a bad thing. It's helpful to know what side of the road to drive, or what to put out on the table when someone comes over for dinner. Nevertheless, if one "loses oneself" (p. 346, S300) in the general situation, then this closes off possibilities-for-Being. Edith's boss seems to have lost himself in the 'general situation'. Her boss' response was: "everybody does it". What mattered to him was making money. Therefore, "it doesn't matter, we can sell the software cheaper". This

appears as an example of his lostness in the-they and the general situation in the business/technology world. It is a stance based on a diminished responsiveness for his own actions. Being-lost in the general situation is a form of diminished responsiveness, where we have not grasped our responsibility for our Self. In contrast, the concrete Situation is when Dasein responds to the particulars of the context, with "all of its normative subtlety and nuance" (Blattner, 2013, p. 330). As discussed in Section 2.4.3.5, Greenleaf (1977) advocates for essentially the same thing when he argues that people should respond to the unique situation in which they find themselves. In the example above, Edith comes across as taking responsibility for her Self in the specific Situation, and acted resolutely. It felt "wrong" because compliance software should meet the legal standards of compliance. Realising she could not change her boss' mind, she resigned.

In responding to the concrete Situation, not the general situation, resolute action (with positive solicitude) does not show up as a 'my-way-or-the-highway' approach, nor is there only one 'best' way. Rather, authentic, resolute action is an appropriate way that accords with what matters (the care structure) of the resolute person. It is therefore possible that two resolute individuals disagree on the course of action. If this is the case, however, "the choice between the remaining candidates [of productive agreement] is not the arbitrary imposition of power; it is choice between possible wise decisions" (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 169). A way forward can be chosen through the positive solicitude of Simon's "room for agreement" (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan). Finding this wise way forward can often require drawing on aspects that showed up in 'ethical leadership is in the everyday'.

7.3.2 Resolute Action and the Everyday

It may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that, if 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions', then it can also be in the 'everyday'. For ethical leadership in the everyday (which showed up in participants' anecdotes as: inclusive decision making, accountable systems, a thoughtful process, or creative problem solving) is often 'what one does' in organisations these days. Nevertheless, it is my contention that 'ethical leadership in the everyday' is also an average everyday understanding of authentic resolute action. Edith captures this essence when she says: ". . . ethical leadership is alive every single day, and it's moment-by-moment, decision by decision" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar).

In this (sub)section, I argue that—when the conventions of 'what one usually does' in an organisation (e.g., inclusive decision making, accountable systems, a thoughtful process, or creative problem solving) are appropriated as one's own—they move from 'simply conforming' to authentic, resolute action.

The ontological structure of resolute action shines through in the everyday lived experience of 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions' because a 'hard decision' is closer to our ordinary understanding of resolute action. In the hard decisions anecdotes, it was clear that participants were withstanding some kind of social pressure in order to remain loyal to *themselves*, rather than loyal to a

core, unchanging *self* (Blattner, 2013, p. 332). However, Heidegger's authentic resolute action does not *necessarily* require showing up in the world as breaking with social convention, withstanding social pressure, or finding a unique way of doing something. It can, and often does, show up as a choosing to choose what one already does. However, in this case, Blattner (2013) asks: "what [then] is the point of this notion of resoluteness?. . . How does this combat or undermine conformism [of the-they]?" (p. 332).

As discussed in Section 5.2.4.1, what underpins 'ethical leadership in the everyday' *as* ethical leadership (as opposed to just doing one's job) is a sense of right, or of specific moral purpose. This guided or underpinned participants' day-to-day actions and conduct. Jaqueline articulates it like this: "I was never incentivised by money. Like okay, it's been nice, but I always had a bigger ideal, a bigger purpose" (Jaqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). She goes on to position herself against those that appear to her as inauthentic:

> But people like me are not the ones climbing the [corporate] ladder, so to speak. It's a different profile. . . it's a certain type of profile that the corporate incentive structure is fostering to get to the top and it becomes very self-interested. . . Certain leadership [styles] are not really that worried about the rest of the organisation, let alone what's happening outside of the organisation in the broader society and the impact they're having there." (Jaqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar)

Prominent examples of ethical leadership in the everyday emerged, perhaps unsurprisingly, during the Stage Two interview-diaries. Jaqueline's passion for 'climate action' was evident as she grappled with a number of tensions over the interview-diary week. As discussed in Section 5.2.4.1, Kassandra's dedication to considered policy decisions that were in the long-term interests of the public (rather than quick fixes or political expediency) often shone through in her reflections: "Maybe I'm just not tired enough yet, but I can't push things back down the line" (Kassandra, 2020). Her week was peppered with examples where she tried to explain to people that, while the expedient route to development may seem to lower the cost of that development, it often costs more in the long run, or impacts safety: "These are things that are heart and soul, and core" (Kassandra, 2020). This statement elucidates Kassandra's ontological care-structure. Russ' dedication to contributing to something beyond himself was evident in, for instance, taking a 100% pay cut at the start of the COVID-19 lock-down to ensure all the staff could be paid. It was evident in the extra work he put in as an expert member on various charitable Foundations Committees that he attended during the interview-diary week. It was evident in his stance that, as an expert witness on planning tribunal cases, he gives expert advice rather than what his client wants to hear. This reflects his stance that: "We are trustees for the built environment in a way [not the client], and for the communities that built environment serves" (Russ, 2019, interview, 25 Nov).

These everyday small acts of ethical leadership in accordance with one's Self are ready-to-hand. That is, they are not necessarily underpinned by a cognitively deliberative calculation every time one acts. In the interview-diary week, Jaqueline, Kassandra, and Russ acted with absorbed-coping, without needing to consciously refer to the underlying chosen self, and a moral stance, every time they acted. Heidegger argues that, for an authentic Dasein, the Self is 'primordially' (i.e., pre-reflexively) chosen, and resolute action emerges as a consequence. When Jacqueline says, "[i]t's like you encounter things and then you—maybe not consciously—are kind of evaluating your stance from an ethical basis" (Jacqueline, 2020), she is pointing to the same idea, based on her own lived experience. For example, as an expert witness on planning tribunal cases, Russ automatically (described in the previous subsection (7.3.1) as 'straightway') acted as a trustee for the built environment and the communities it serves. He did not need to cognitively remind himself of that goal each time he gave evidence.

What makes 'ethical leadership in the everyday' authentic is in the appropriating one's Self. It is taking a profound responsibility for oneself in 'choosing to choose one's Self'. This shows up in concrete situations as a purpose and as acting resolutely in accordance with it, even in the small things. To return to Blattner's rhetorical question: how does 'resoluteness' undermine the conformism of the-they? "Resoluteness returns Dasein to the everyday, to who it already is, but *with a clear-sighted understanding of the normative demands inherent in who it already is*" (Blattner, 2013, p. 331 italics not original).

Authenticity as it shows up in the 'everyday' is harder to recognise than the 'hard decisions', because it can look like doing just what one does. Carman (2005) articulates the nuance of appropriating 'what one usually does' in this way: "Nor does authenticity consist in simply casting off the shackles of convention altogether, but in taking up a new and different relation to *the one*, which continues to define what will count as normal, proper and intelligible in this milieu..." (p 293). In other words, within the milieu of an organisation, Dasein can still act normally, properly, and intelligibly, according to what makes sense in that organisation. However, the conventions of 'what one does' must be appropriated as one's own, rather than done simply for the sake of what one usually does. Authentic Dasein that shows up as 'ethical leadership in the everyday' acts unobtrusively resolute, in accordance with how one has appropriated itself. This is opposed to the more obvious resolute action of hard decisions, or even of leading the way. Nevertheless, I now discuss how 'ethical leadership is leading the way' is also an example of resolute action.

7.3.3 Resolute Action and Leading the Way

The ontological structure of authentic resolute action also shines through in 'ethical leadership is leading the way'. This ethical leadership aspect is where pushing into the "potentiality-for-Being" (p. 312, S267), as a part of authentic resolute action, is particularly salient in the lived experience. As described in Section 5.3, 'ethical leadership is leading the way' is about spearheading a new way of

doing something. This aspect is captured in Jaqueline's quote: "So you can be ethical by meeting a quota and introducing a quota, but to be an ethical leader, that's when you're actually creating the new ethics as you go" (Jacqueline, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). There were several anecdotes (refer to Section 5.3) that I interpreted as 'ethical leadership is leading the way'. In them, participants articulated how they were motivated by a sense that there must be a better way, or a different way, to the way things have been done. In addition to Jaqueline, who established a technology start-up aimed at helping people to take concrete action in climate change, there were also the three CEOs who approached Renata and sought her help to implement more ethical principles (refer to Figure 8). Another example occurred where Camellia closed the gender pay gap in her organisation by asking the question of her leadership team: "What would it take to close the pay gap? The question hadn't been asked before" (Camellia, 2019, interview, 25 Nov).

In this (sub)section, I argue that 'ethical leadership is leading the way' is aligned with Dreyfus' (2000) idea of the 'cultural master'. This concept goes beyond even the 'higher intelligibility' of an authentic, resolute Dasein. As discussed above, in Section 7.3.1, *the-they* provides us with an 'average intelligibility' of our shared social worlds. From this 'average intelligibility', one can develop a 'higher intelligibility' where one moves from competent acting in the world to a skilful, expert absorbed-coping in the world (Dreyfus, 2000). When one is in this mode of acting in the world, one is authentically resolute (what Dreyfus (2000) calls a 'social virtuoso'). However, when one is a 'cultural master', one is radically innovating and influencing a new and different way things are done.

Resolute Dasein responds to the concrete Situation with a kind of higher intelligibility—a primordial understanding (see Section 7.3.1). This is not separate to the social practices of the-they. Rather, it emerges out of them. Dreyfus articulates it as follows:

> This primordial understanding of the concrete Situation has no special content—no source of intelligibility other than everyday intelligibility—but it, nonetheless, makes possible the social virtuoso's [i.e., authentic, resolute Dasein] successful responses to the most difficult social situations." (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 170)

This authentic, resolute Dasein (what Dreyfus calls, above, the 'social virtuoso') shows up in participants' understanding of ethical leadership in the 'hard decisions' and the 'everyday'. However, Dreyfus goes on to draw out an even 'higher' kind of intelligibility:

> Furthermore, by facing the anxiety of death and so seeing that the issues of his culture and even his own identify could be radically changed, a fully authentic Dasein can manifest an even higher kind of primordial understanding. As a cultural master he can take up marginal possibilities in his culture's past in a way that enables him to change the style of a whole generation and thereby disclose a new world." (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 170)

‘Ethical leadership is leading the way’ is, I contend, the average everyday lived experience of this ‘higher kind of primordial understanding’. In interpreting Heidegger, Dreyfus argues that a person who is resolute can draw on their past experience and ‘see’ a new innovative way forward. In doing so, they take what has been ‘marginal’ (i.e., on the edges of social convention) and position it centre stage to become the new ‘way things are done’ in a culture (or sub-culture). In this way, a person with this ‘higher kind of primordial understanding’ becomes a ‘cultural master’ and ‘discloses a new world’ to others. A ‘cultural master’ is therefore one that is open to possibilities (and new possibilities). This is because they have grasped at a primordial (i.e., not necessarily cognitive) level that the ‘way things are done’ just happens to be the way they are done—and they could be different. “Such an innovator is so radical that he transforms his generation’s understanding of the issue facing the culture and produces a new authentic ‘we’” (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 167). I am not suggesting that Jacqueline’s new start-up, Renata’s ethical principles, or Camellia’s initiative in closing the gender pay in her organisation are so radical that they will change a whole generation. Nevertheless, I am suggesting they are moving in that direction, in so far as they are more innovative, radical resolute actions that might change the ‘way things are done’—at least in their respective organisations.

In summary, as identified in Table 8, ethical leadership is found in ‘the hard decisions’, in ‘the everyday’, and in ‘leading the way’ can be understood as everyday lived experiences of the ontological structure of (authentic) resolute action. We always act from the basis of our (inauthentic) shared social practices (the-they) in what is an ‘average intelligibility’. Nevertheless, we can develop a ‘higher intelligibility’, where we move from competent acting in the world of the-they to a skillful, expert coping in the world (Dreyfus, 2000). It is in this mode of a ‘higher intelligibility’ that we act with wise, resolute action. Such action most obviously shows up in the everyday experience as: ‘ethical leadership is in the hard decisions’. When the everyday conventions of ‘what one usually does’ in an organisation are appropriated as one’s own authentically, they can also move from ‘simply conforming’ to this higher intelligibility and can become wise, resolute action. This is ‘ethical leadership in the everyday’. However, one can move beyond even a ‘higher intelligibility’ to become a cultural master (Dreyfus, 2000). This happens when one recognises how the way things are done just happens to be the way things are done (inauthentically), and therefore radically innovates and influences a new and different way to do things. The everyday experience of this by participants is: ‘ethical leadership is leading the way’. Heidegger argues one’s authentic resolute action is linked to our call of conscience. Thus, it is to this ontological structure I now turn.

7.4 The Call of Conscience and Somatic References

It is my contention that ‘ethical leadership is guided by somatic references’ emerges as an everyday experience of how Heidegger’s ontological structure of the ‘call of conscience’ is ‘heard’. However, in participants’ lived experience, it is not literally ‘heard’, as Heidegger describes, but rather

it is felt. Participants often referred to a 'feeling' or a 'knowing' which guides their action. Examples include Ruth, who 'gets a bad feeling in her bones', and Renata, who had a barometer on when she 'just felt really bad' about a situation. Edith and Jaqueline were two participants who were very explicit in using the 'gut test' to guide their actions. Even when there was difficulty in grasping an experience and putting it into words, it was nevertheless noticed. Larissa referred to how she felt about the Australian attitude towards corruption compared to the Brazilian attitude as: "the opposite of loneliness. I don't know the word for this" (Larissa, 2020, interview, 25 Feb).

In (sub)section 7.4.1, I argue that the call of conscience is a call back to ourselves—a reminder of what really matters to us. Participants' experiences of the somatic references of ethical leadership accord with Ladkin and Taylor (2010) argument that the authentic self is an 'embodied self'. They describe this as a 'felt self'. In (sub)section 7.4.2, I go onto argue that the call of conscience (felt in the lived experience as a somatic reference) can help provide an ontological explanation of our sense of right and wrong, rather than an ethically normative one. This does not mean ethically normative theories have no (interrelated) influence: they can shape the social practices of the-they, or may prick our own inner call of conscience. However, unless they are chosen, or appropriated by Dasein, they do not themselves inspire authentic, resolute action.

7.4.1 Call of Conscience and the Embodied Self

As discussed in Section 3.2.5.1, existential anxiety is what Heidegger describes as that uncanny feeling (an unsettledness) about the inherent meaningless of life. This opens us up to experiencing *existential guilt* and leads us to hear the 'call of conscience'. In short, this is a call back to ourselves—a reminder of what really matters to us. Heidegger suggests that "the call is understood with an existentiell [i.e., ontic] kind of hearing" (p. 325, S280). By this he means the 'call' is experienced in a concrete Situation. However, he does not give a detailed description of how the call of conscience' is 'heard' or experienced. Participants' lived experience provide greater understanding of this. Heidegger maintains what is chosen ontologically (i.e., the link with authenticity) is choosing to 'have a conscience'. Ruth articulates this in her lived experience below:

> **Ruth**: . . .I have had situations with professional colleagues where I may have misjudged them, just as they may have misjudged me. And I probably haven't been as accommodating as I could be, and that's me being a bit hard line, being a bit inflexible and not being prepared to compromise that.
>
> **Alice**: And how have you recognised that?
>
> **Ruth**: I go home at night and I worry about it and I wish I hadn't done it. . . I have a conscience about it. (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct)

Ruth's quote suggests this experience of the 'call of conscience' can call quite loudly at times, and is linked to her ontological 'care' structure. What she cares for, in this case, is her colleagues and their perception of her, as well as her relationship with them. She has solicitude for her colleagues.

Participants' experience of the somatic references of ethical leadership is the felt-sense of an embodied self. As discussed in Section 2.4.2.3, Ladkin and Taylor (2010, p. 64) argue that a "somatic sense of self contributes to the felt sense of authenticity" that underpins our inner-oriented experience of ourselves. How we feel in our inner realm is then expressed symbolically, in our words and gestures, through our bodies. Ladkin and Taylor (2010) argue this inner-oriented experience is an experience of our 'true self'. However, their description of a 'true self' seems aligned with how much of the Authentic Leadership literature understands this 'true self'(i.e., as a core or inner self that suggests this self is pre-given, essential, or unchanging). As discussed earlier (Section 7.1), from a Heideggerian perspective, there is no core, unchanging self: we are never 'whole', we are always pushing into our possibilities-for-Being.

From an ontological perspective, Heidegger is not concerned with the 'content' of the call of conscience. For him this is an 'ontic' concern, which is linked with the details of what is experienced in a concrete Situation. However, it is precisely the 'content' that participants are concerned about in any concrete Situation. It is the content to which their felt-sense (somatic reference) is linked. For instance, Renata referred to 'feeling bad' about not speaking up in a meeting regarding paying appropriate superannuation to casuals in her organisation (she avoided a hard decision). She noted how this "wasn't a theoretical thing for me". Her felt-sense was linked to feeling guilty about not speaking up: "Regret, yes, absolute regret. Why didn't I speak up? Why didn't I do the right thing? If I had my time over again, I would have done it differently. So, yes, it's a feeling. It's not just an intellectual, "Oh dear, I missed chapter three". It's a disappointment in self" (Renata, 2019, interview, 31 July).

There might be a temptation to pass over the somatic references referred to by participants as merely metaphoric. In other words, we might want to argue 'what is really going on' when a participant refers to the 'stomach check' can adequately be explained by biology, or neurology, or psychology. However, to move directly to these present-at-hand (objects-with-properties) theories is to miss how we are in the world in a ready-to-hand way. A Heideggerian perspective asks us to remain open to the contention that an objects-with-properties explanation (i.e., theories that might be based on biology, or neurology, or psychology) always emerges out of a ready-to-hand understanding of the world (a world already imbued with meaning)—not the other way around. Recognising that we are in the world in a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) way is one of Heidegger's key philosophical insights (refer to Section 2.2).

As discussed in Section 3.2.5.1, Heidegger argues our call of conscience is itself not a moral call (in so far as the content of the call could pertain to all sorts of things that show up in our lives).

Nevertheless, our moral conscience is an average everyday experience of this ontological 'call of conscience'—or a particular instance of the 'call'. Our call of conscience felt in somatic references influences our ethical sense of right and wrong. I discuss this below.

7.4.2 Call of Conscience and a Sense of Right and Wrong

One's call of conscience influences one's 'sense of right and wrong' (as discussed in Section 6.3.1). Sometimes participants recognised that their 'call of conscience' is situated within particular social practices. As noted in Section 6.3.1, participants can be cognisant that what they understand to be the 'right thing' is not necessarily going to be shared by all. In his interview, Travis explicitly referenced the historical and cultural context in which ethical decisions are made. Larrissa also recognised that the 'right thing' might be different for each person: "[ethical leadership is] doing the right thing, but then what's the right thing? [That's] kind of different for each person" (Larissa, 2020, interview, 25 Feb). Jacqueline recognised that *her* call of conscience, which was felt and which actively guided her action (through the "stomach test"), did not definitively define what was 'right and wrong': "who am I to judge what's right and wrong?" (Jacqueline, 2020, interview, 12 Jun). Yet Jacqueline had very strong views on what was right and wrong. She left her comfortable, well-paying Vice President job and launched her own start-up business because of these strongly held views.

Heidegger's ontological explanation is that the call of conscience is one's own. It is not a call of conscience that comes from an entity outside of ourselves, such as God, or the State. However, our own call of conscience is necessarily constituted from a shared world of social-practices and the-they self (which might include beliefs about God and the State): this is the hermeneutic circle in play.

The call of conscience (felt in the lived experience as a somatic reference) provides an ontological explanation/perspective of one's 'sense of right and wrong', not an ethically normative explanation. However, participants usually expressed and understood their 'sense of right and wrong' simply (or directly) as 'doing the right thing'. As discussed in Section 5.2.4, participants often used words such as 'purpose' and 'values' to describe their ready-to-hand experience in a more present-to-hand way.

Nevertheless, 'the right thing' is often understood as some 'objective' standard of right and wrong, based on a morally defensible moral theory. Normative ethical theories proceed from a rational interpretation of the world. They therefore provide logical and rational justifications for identifying what one ought to do (according to the moral theory). However, unless they are chosen, or appropriated, by Dasein, they do not themselves inspire resolute action. Heidegger argues that, before we are logical and rational Beings (in a present-to-hand mode), we are first and foremost meaning-making, or sense-making, Beings (in a ready-to-hand mode). Therefore, while moral theories provide logical and rational justifications for action, unless they are appropriated by Dasein—unless they are meaningful to us—they do not inspire a 'good' way to be in the world via authentic, resolute action. It is our call of

conscience (which is less heard and more felt) that calls us to this authentic, resolute action. Renata (2019, interview, 31 July) captures this Heideggerian perspective in her own way, when she says: "There's all sorts of [logical and rational] explanations, but the fact of the matter is I felt really disappointed [in myself]". She is pointing to an experience of herself in the world as she has lived it, in a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) way.

While Heidegger himself does not propose an ethical theory (Philipse, 1999), and argues for the primacy of ontology, I argue—along with others, in their own way (see for instance George, 2021; Olafson, 1998; Philipse, 1999; Sorial, 2005; White, 1990)—that his ontological theory does have ethical implications. I argue that *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude responding to a call of conscience* is inextricably linked to an "ontologico-ethical" (George, 2021, p. 2)[45] mode-of-Being. When this mode-of-Being shows up in the lived experience as one or more of the seven aspects of ethical leadership, this is an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. The ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being can serve as a (role)model to others, just by Being.

7.5 (Role)Modelling an Ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being

As I have argued in this chapter, when the ontological structures of *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience* are entwined with the lived experience of ethical leadership, this elucidates an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being which is then modelled to others. Returning to the integrated example (Figure 10), Ruth sacked herself because she did not want to be associated with the report that mispresented the Committee's advice. In doing so, she was a model to others. She saw sacking herself as a demonstration of her integrity, which itself is an everyday interpretation of 'authenticity' (refer to Section 7.1). "For me it was really important to have integrity, for people to see me, not only my peers but also my clients, that I was a person they could trust, they could respect. . . . They didn't have to agree, but they could value [what I have to say]" (Ruth, 2019, interview, 16 Oct).

In this section, I argue that a mode-of-Being can be modelled (or 'absorbed') by others either authentically or inauthentically. As described in Section 6.4.1, several participants understood the 'leadership' aspect of ethical leadership as essentially role-modelling some sort of desired behaviour. This aligns with much of the moral/ethical leadership literature (see Section 3.3), which explains the leader-individual being an exemplar of a particular behaviour and therefore leading by example as a role-model. Participants often understood that they were (role)modelling what was important to them (not their followers) in a kind of self-leadership. As previously discussed in section 6.4, this self-leadership is therefore contrary to Brown et al. (2005) concept of an Ethical Leader with its focus on a

[45] George (2021) uses the term 'ontologico-ethical' to theorise a Heideggerian conception of empathy with a stranger. As referenced previously in this chapter, I borrow the term here in order to refer to one's ontological Being-in-the-world in a way that necessarily has ethical implications.

Moral Manager. This 'self leadership' perspective does not depend on a leader having a high position in the formal organisational hierarchy, and nor is the (role)modelling limited to those one formally leads.

The exemplary behaviour that participants believed they, or ethical leaders, were role-modelling was variously described as "acceptable", "desirable" or "good". Participants whom I asked specifically recognised the influence of others on what they understood as 'right or wrong' (and therefore what counted as acceptable, desirable, and good). Participants particularly noted the influence of parents, grandparents, and work mentors. For Heidegger, from an ontological perspective, this influence of others would have helped constitute how they are in-the-world: literally, how they understand, and make sense of, the world (i.e., how the world is intelligible to them—refer to Section 3.2.4).

A present-to-hand/objects-with-properties perspective seeks to explain this role-modelling as traits or behaviours. However, from a ready-to-hand (absorbed coping) perspective, what is important is how we are-in-the-world. We are always in the world in a 'mode-of-Being'. A mode-of-Being, such as an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being, can serve as a model either inauthentically or authentically. A person who sees another Dasein modelling an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being might 'absorb' that way of Being-in-the-world inauthentically by understanding (not necessarily cognitively) 'that's the way things are done around here'. This is an 'average intelligibility'. Alternatively, this modelling may inspire another to appropriate their own self authentically, through offering an example of a 'higher intelligibility' (Dreyfus, 2000), as discussed in Section 7.3. It is not the case that authentic, resolute action *necessarily* leads to the authenticity of the other through modelling. Instead, it is up to the other to appropriate their own authenticity. The ontological structure of positive solicitude that 'leaps forth and liberates' is the mode of authenticity that is most likely to engender this in others. It is a mode that enables, allows, or empowers others to appropriate their own authenticity and possibilities-for-Being.

Participants usually understood that they were (role)modelling what was important to them, not their followers. This idea is captured by Edith when she articulates: "So you're doing it for yourself in a leadership role, but you're also an example for others" (Edith, 2019, interview, 26 Mar). This was a sentiment echoed by other participants. It therefore accords with Tomkins and Simpson (2015) idea of authenticity as a kind self-leadership. As discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, this self-leadership is contrary to the concept of an Ethical Leader forwarded by Brown et al. (2005), which includes a focus on the Ethical Leader as a Moral Manager (whereby the Ethical Leaders are concerned with perception management). Furthermore (as discussed in Section 6.4.2) participants' self-leadership was not dependent on hierarchy. Rebecca's anecdote as an intern—taking responsibility for supposedly under-pricing the handbags at an internal sales party, and getting fired for it—and Simon's example of the most junior person in the room speaking up provide good examples of 'leading from the bottom' of the hierarchy. Nor did participants limit their understanding of role-modelling to just those they formally

'lead', such as their teams (although their teams and organisational members were often referred to). Participants understood that their influence could extend to colleagues, to those in the community, to family members, to other members within the industry sector, etc. Although participants often did conceptualise 'leaders' at those with senior positions within organisations, their anecdotes often more implicitly extended this conceptualisation beyond the usual leader-follower dyad required in much of the moral/ethical leadership literature. In the next section, I draw the theoretical threads together from Sections 7.1 to 7.5, to explain the implications of (role)modelling an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being.

7.6 Implications of a Heideggerian Ontological Perspective

In this chapter, my main aim has been to explain how the seven aspects of ethical leadership are the "average everyday" (p. 296, S251) lived experience of the ontological structures that are relevant to ethical leadership—and therefore "shed light" (p. 403, S352) and understanding on an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. In **Figure 11**, below, I update the theoretical framework diagram I introduced in Chapter 3 (refer to Figure 3). This Figure now reflects the mapping between the ontological structures of how we are in-the-world and the seven aspects of the lived experience of ethical leadership, discussed in this chapter. The Dasein at the top of the figure that represents this ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being, can serve as a (role)model to others just by Being.

Figure 11: Updated theoretical framework



In discussing this 'mapping' between the everyday lived experience and ontological structures, I have addressed theoretical tensions between them, as well as tensions in the moral/ethical leadership

literature. These theoretical insights are summarised in **Table 9**, overleaf. For one looking for practical implications, or guidance, on *Being* an ethical leader, one need look no further than the seven aspects of ethical leadership. However, in the rest of this section, I weave together what I see are the ontological implications of this Heideggerian perspective of ethical leadership.

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Table 9: Summary of theoretical insights

Aspects of Ethical Leadership	Ontological Structures	Summary of Key Theoretical Insights	Mode-of-Being Insights
Ethical leadership is responsibility for self	Authenticity	• 'Choosing to choose' oneself is a more accurate explanation of authenticity than 'being true to a core self'. We can never be true to the whole (and therefore core) self, because we are never 'whole'; we are always a Being-with-possibilities. • Heidegger's notion of authenticity cannot be measured by a third-person questionnaire. • Heidegger's notion of authenticity is better able to accommodate how it is that a person changes over time and yet remains 'authentic' over time.	(Role)modelling an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being • When the ontological structures show up in the world as one or more of the seven as aspects of ethical leadership, this leads to an 'ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being'. • This mode-of-Being can be modelled by others either authentically or inauthentically. This is recognised in the everyday as role-modelling. • Participants often understood that they were (role)modelling what was important to them, not their followers—a kind of self-leadership. • This self-leadership does not depend on a leader having a high position in the formal organisational hierarchy, nor is the (role)modelling limited to those a person formally leads.
Ethical leadership is acting for the benefit of others	Positive Solicitude	• Positive solicitude is the aspect of authenticity that circumvents the 'Hitler problem' (Ciulla, 2020) by seeking to empower others and opening up their possibilities-for-Being. • Acting with positive solicitude does not require that the benefit/s to others necessarily accrues to other/s; it is up to the other/s to appropriate their own authenticity. • Positive solicitude is less about 'right action' and more about 'right relation' (Ladkin, 2006). • Right relation (or right orientation) is not the same thing as good intention.	
Ethical leadership is in the hard decisions	Resolute Action	• Resolute action is most evident when it shows up in the world as 'hard decisions'. • From an 'average intelligibility' one can develop a 'higher intelligibility', where we move from competent acting in the world of the-they to a skilful, expert coping in the world (Dreyfus, 2000). It is in this mode of a 'higher intelligibility' that we act with wise, resolute action. • This is similar to Aristotle's *phronesis*, which is wise, practical action. However, while Aristotle's *phronesis* is based in conscious deliberation, authentic resolute action can stay below our cognitive deliberation.	

Ethical leadership is in the everyday		• When the everyday conventions of 'what one usually does' in an organisation (e.g., inclusive decision making, accountable systems, a thoughtful process, or creative problem solving) are appropriated as one's own, they move from 'simply conforming' to authentic, resolute action.	
Ethical leadership is in leading the way		• This aspect of ethical leadership is aligned with being a 'cultural master' (Dreyfus, 2000). This goes beyond even the 'higher intelligibility' of an authentic, resolute Dasein, to one who is radically innovating and influencing a new and different way things are done.	
Ethical leadership is guided by somatic references	Call of Conscience	• The 'call of conscience' (which is a call back to ourselves and what matters to us) is less 'heard' in the lived experience, as Heidegger describes, and more 'felt' in somatic references. This accords with Ladkin and Taylor (2010) argument that the authentic self is an 'embodied self'. • While Heidegger is not concerned with the 'content' of the call of conscience, it is precisely the 'content' that participants are concerned about in a concrete Situation. • The call of conscience (felt in the lived experience as a somatic reference) can help provide an ontological explanation of our sense right and wrong, not an ethically normative one. • Yet, normative ethical theories may prick our own inner call of conscience, and be appropriated by Dasein, which can inspire authentic, resolute action.	

Despite labelling my findings as 'seven aspects of ethical leadership', an ontological perspective of ethical leadership does not lead neatly to a list of the '7 steps of ethical leadership' (or some other procedural approach for effective ethical leadership) that a focus on traits and behavioural characteristics of an individual leader might suggest (Bohl, 2019). Rather, it encourages what Heidegger calls more 'meditative thinking'—but may more intuitively be called 'reflective thinking' (Krentz & Malloy, 2005)—on the meaning that often lies below the frenetic activity of organisational life.

An ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being is first and foremost an experience of one's Self in the world—an experience that is 'mine'. As such, it is a kind of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). This self-leadership *is* the example to others, regardless of where one is on the organisational hierarchy, and regardless of whether one has formal, organisational 'followers'. The focus is not about being a Moral Manager (Brown et al., 2005), interested primarily in how you come across to others and acting in accordance with expectations (which could indeed be inauthentic). While an authentic leader (with positive solicitude) may be an example to others, and may open up possibilities-for-Being for others, it is up to others to authentically appropriate themselves. All human-Beings are ontologically responsible for themselves.

From a mode-of-Being perspective (which is an absorbed coping, phenomenological perspective), ethical leadership is *not* best measured from a quantitively derived questionnaire (although these questionnaires might be useful to know how one is being perceived). Nor is it too important how ethical leadership is defined and delineated between different leadership theories. Rather, the focus for an ethical leader is attending to the concrete Situation at hand, and 'choosing to choose yourself' authentically, as opposed to just doing what 'one does' inauthentically. One's priorities or principles may change over time, since, from a Heideggerian perspective, there is no 'core self'. Nevertheless, one can still remain authentic over time. Resolute action necessarily (or 'automatically') emerges from such 'authentic choosing'.

From a mode-of-Being perspective (a self-leadership perspective) one chooses themselves regardless of the benefit (or lack thereof) to the organisation. The benefit of an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being is not to be understood instrumentally. It is not the case that this mode-of-Being is 'good' because it is good for the organisation in terms of growth, profit or some associated key performance indicator. Instead of authentic Dasein being a means to an organisational end (the dominant perspective of moral/ethical leadership theories), authentic Dasein (which responds to the call of conscience and acts with resolute action with positive solicitude) is an end in itself (i.e., a 'good' way to be in the world). I am not suggesting that organisational benefits of authentic Dasein will not flow—presumably, if one is acting for the benefit of others, they will. Rather, what is primary is the way one is in the world first and foremost. However, a self-leadership perspective is not to be confused with a narrowly defined, self-interested perspective.

In shedding light on an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being in order to strive towards ethical leadership, I hope to have made more explicit the ontological structures that can and do operate below our cognitive awareness. Bringing the implicit to the fore of our understanding can encourage greater reflexivity for the ethical leader. While many of us may think of ourselves as balanced and objective, Heidegger contends that, given we are constituted by our social practices, our view of any concrete situation is *necessarily* understood through those very practices—by our upbringing, our past, the 'way things are done' in our organisations. While we cannot discard the way we are (inauthentically) constituted, we do have the ability to notice our social practices and see past them. We can grasp that we just happen to be thrown into a particular way of doing things, which is different in different cultures. Grasping that the 'way we do things' (either cognitively or, more likely, non-cognitively) just happens to be 'the way we do things', due to how we are socially constituted, can facilitate greater freedom and open up possibilities-for-Being.

When this understanding of potentiality-for-Being becomes part of our skilful, expert coping in the world, one moves from an 'average intelligibility' to a 'higher intelligibility' (Dreyfus, 2000). In this mode, we can withstand the social pressure to act inauthentically. We can act in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being that can show up in the hard decisions, or alternatively it can show up in not just 'going along with crowd'. We can appropriate organisational activities, and take them on as our own. When this is most exemplified in the lived experience, it looks like 'leading the way': innovative, resolute action that can address culturally-systemic, challenging situations. This moves, beyond just 'higher intelligibility', into being a 'cultural master' (Dreyfus, 2000).

Positive solicitude encourages one to recognise that, at an existential level, others are the same type of Being as ourselves, and they also have their own authenticity. A good way to be in the world is with positive solicitude towards others, which facilitates the opportunity for others to 'choose their own selves' and become authentic (Krentz & Malloy, 2005; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). It is therefore positive solicitude that can transform a potentially authentic but uncaring (self)leader into one that is more 'ethical'. In an everyday lived experience, this looks like acting for the benefit of others, which, when done well, is done by "comporting oneself in a way that expresses care for the other and their worldview" (Ladkin, 2006, p. 96). This encourages us to remain open to others and find "room for agreement" (Simon, 2020, interview, 16 Jan) as a way forward. In an ethically challenging situation, this way forward may not be perfect. Nonetheless, if one has heeded their call of conscience, it should at least be action that does not "eat you up inside" (Samantha, 2020, interview, 24 Jan). One can heed this call of conscience by staying attuned to one's somatic references, because an authentic self is an 'embodied self' (Ladkin & Taylor, 2010).

The discussion in this chapter constitutes the second (theoretical) 'hermeneutic layer' of interpretation in my thesis. It is an exegetical analysis (van Manen, 2016), whereby I have interpreted and discussed my empirical data through the lens of Heidegger's ontological structures. In short, *the*

lived experience of ethical leadership can be understood through the seven aspects of ethical leadership. These average everyday aspects are underpinned by the ontological structures of *authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience*. However, as ontological structures of the way we are in-the-world, they are not specific to ethical leadership. Therefore, the seven average everyday aspects of ethical leadership can help one to understand these ontological structures as they pertain specifically to ethical leadership. The 'mapping' of the ontological structures and seven aspects together, discussed in this chapter, sheds light on *Being* an ethical leader in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. By understanding how Heidegger's ontological structures show up in the everyday lived experience of ethical leadership, I have sought to shed light on the *know-how* of the ethical leadership phenomenon. In seeking to understand ethical leadership from this lived experience perspective, I hope to encourage 'more' striving towards ethical leadership. I now turn to the concluding chapter, which summaries the key contributions of this thesis.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

This chapter is divided into three sections, each of which addresses a key task. The first and main task is to summarise the key contributions I have made in this thesis from a methodological, empirical, and theoretical perspective. These contributions provide an answer to the research question: *'how is ethical leadership understood through the lived experience?'*. The second task of this chapter is to acknowledge the limitations of this research and identify potential future research directions that build upon a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective. The ontological perspective of ethical leadership does not pretend to be anything but an interpretation of the findings through Heidegger's ontological structures and the implications of that interpretation. However, this does not mean they have no 'truth'. Rather, they suggest a potentiality-for-Being. Interpretation is not fixed (it never is), and it is open to re-interpretation in another loop of the hermeneutic circle—or a re-interpretation from another perspective within the hermeneutic tradition. I finish the thesis in the third section of this chapter, with a short closing statement where I return to the anecdote with which I started.

8.1 Thesis Contributions

My project has made four contributions to various literatures, discussed below in the order they appear in the thesis. The first two are methodological. The first (more modest) methodological contribution is exploring ethical leadership through a phenomenological approach, thereby providing a perspective that previous methodological approaches to exploring the phenomenon could not provide. The second methodological contribution is to phenomenological research methods. I contribute a method for exploring the 'liv*ing* experience' through the novel combination of the interview and the diary research methods to arrive at the living interview-diary research method. My third contribution is an empirical contribution, and is captured in the seven aspects of ethical leadership. This is a new, undocumented perspective (Ågerfalk, 2014) of ethical leadership based upon my phenomenological approach. My fourth (and most important) contribution is theoretical and is (inevitably) interwoven with the methodological approach and my empirical findings. The theoretical contribution is a Heideggerian perspective of ethical leadership. It comes via an ontological analysis of the seven aspects of ethical leadership and elucidates an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. I summarise these contributions below.

8.1.1 Methodological Contributions

In this section, I summarise my two methodological contributions. The first is to explore ethical leadership through phenomenology. The second is a contribution to phenomenological research methods through the living interview-diary.

8.2.1.1 Exploring ethical leadership through phenomenology

My first methodological contribution is exploring ethical leadership through a phenomenological approach. Specifically, I utilise a methodology based on Heidegger's philosophy: a hermeneutic phenomenology. Bartunek et al. (1993) argue that a key requirement for a methodological contribution is, for example, to show how a chosen method generates knowledge that previous methods did not, or could not. They further argue that the application of the method requires adequate conceptual grounding, and the rationale for the given method needs to be thoroughly stated. I therefore summarise their key arguments for the relevance of this methodological approach. As I argued in Chapter 2, the dominant perspective of ethical leadership comes from a present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) perspective, which is aligned with positivist research approaches. These research approaches usually ask *know-what* questions, and ultimately seek to define what ethical leadership 'is' (as though it is static and universal). They then seek to delineate the phenomenon from other leadership theories. However, before we are in the world as an object (a special type of object called a subject) with particular properties (specific traits and behaviours), we are in the world in what Heidegger calls a ready-to-hand way, or an absorbed coping way (Dreyfus, 2005). This is a *know-how* perspective—that is, we already know-how to be in the world through our everyday living.

To explore 'ethical leadership' through a ready-to-hand perspective is to explore it from a phenomenological perspective, as I have done. I did not approach the phenomenon of ethical leadership in terms of seeking to break it down into constituent parts aligned with a present-to-hand (objects-with-properties) perspective. Instead, I sought to understand how one experiences the phenomenon holistically, in its messy totality. Heidegger argues that the 'truth' about a phenomenon is not separate to how Dasein understands it—the truth of a phenomenon *lies in* how Dasein understands it, or makes meaning from it. Thus, the primordial truth of a phenomenon does not lie in a representational agreement between 'what is in my head' and 'some property out there in the world'. Our understanding of 'something' (some entity or phenomenon) is grasped directly. Our experience of something directly *is* truth. It is how we experience it. My phenomenological perspective of ethical leadership does not therefore respond to the question what ethical leadership 'is'. Rather, it provides an understanding of the phenomenon of interest through the lived experience, situated as it is in this time and place. Hence, this methodology provides distinctive and insightful access to the *know-how* of ethical leadership, compared to the more typical *know-what* of ethical leadership.

8.2.1.2 Research method contribution - living interview-diaries

While interviews are a mainstay of phenomenological research, combining them in a daily, diary-like format, as I did in Stage Two of my research, provides a research method contribution to phenomenological research. Stage One of my data collection comes from the perspective of reflecting 'back' on one's lived experience, whereas Stage Two comes from the perspective of "the thick of lived life" (van Manen, 2016, p. 163), i.e., the livi*ng* experience. I call the Stage Two short, daily semi-

structured, conversational interviews 'living interview-diaries' on the basis that the daily interview is a type of interactive diary-entry. This research methodology was developed in response to the Australian 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown conditions. Interview-diaries were therefore conducted via the 'Zoom' on-line video-conferencing. Given this methodological contribution, I conducted an additional interview with the three Stage Two participants, two weeks after the interview-diary period, to seek their reflections on the experience on the methodology specifically.

The advantage of the interview-diary approach is it retains the key benefits of a diary and combines them with the key benefits of the interview. The key benefits of the diary which were retained, as identified in the methodology literature, were a personal, daily reflection on the lived experience (comprised of events, feelings, observations) which serves as a contemporaneous record (see for example, Kenten, 2010; Morrell-Scott, 2018; Williamson et al., 2015). Participants themselves expressed the following methodological benefits of the daily reflection: it captures authentic and genuine responses; it builds upon trust between researcher and participants; it captures the detail of the everyday; and it has similar benefits to other types of personal diaries (like a sketch diary). However, the success of the interview-diary does depend on the richness of participants' day/s: the participant must first experience the phenomenon of interest in order to share their experiences.

The key benefits of the interview which my new method retained, as identified in the methodology literature, include the ease of expressing one's lived experience verbally rather than in writing (a format less likely to be ignored due to the pressures of the day). An interview also includes the ability of me (as a now-trusted person) to probe aspects that emerge as relevant, in relation to themes and concepts that have already emerged (Morrell-Scott, 2018; van Manen, 2016). This was indicated in participants' reflections on the ease of the process. Interestingly, participants identified personal benefits of the interview-diary process. There was not purely a one-way benefit for me, the researcher. Specifically, they identified: they liked helping and feeling valued; it was an opportunity to reflect; it provided a prompt for deeper reflection than they might otherwise undertake; and this did indeed lead to reflexive insights about their work. This research method could be utilised by other researchers interested in exploring a liv*ing* aspect of a social phenomenon captured with ease and flexibility.

8.1.2 Empirical Contribution

My empirical contribution is the first 'hermeneutic' answer to my phenomenological based research question: *the lived experience of ethical leadership can be understood* through the seven aspects of ethical leadership. That is, ethical leadership occurs: in the hard decisions, in the everyday, in leading the way, in self- responsibility, in acting for the benefit others, in being guided by somatic references, and in role-modelling. This is how ethical leadership can be experienced in the concrete (what Heidegger calls 'ontic') everyday lived experience.

These seven aspects of ethical leadership can be understood as facets, characteristics, or 'essences' (van Manen, 2016) of ethical leadership. This is not the same as an essentialist ontological notion which seeks to identify 'facts' about a phenomenon that are fixed, timeless, and universal. I call these seven features 'key aspects' because this term invokes a looking perspective—depending on which way one looks at the phenomenon, one will see different aspects. The aspects may come across as conceptually separate. However, in participants' lived experience, these aspects are often entwined in different configurations, in a messy totality. This entwining was conceptually captured in Figure 6 (from Chapter 5) and is reproduced below.



8.1.3 Theoretical Contribution

My theoretical contribution is an ontological perspective of ethical leadership. Ontology is primarily interested in a theory of 'Being', or existence. Therefore, when one is *Being* an ethical leader, it is my contention that one is dwelling in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. From a Heideggerian perspective, this means one is in the world with 'authentic, resolute action with positive solicitude that responds to the call of conscience'. However, these ontological structures are not specific to ethical leadership. Rather, they can be applied to Being more holistically, and can therefore show up in other social phenomena. In order to understand these ontological structures as they pertain more specifically to ethical leadership, it is useful to understand how they show up in what Heidegger calls an 'ontic' way (a concrete, lived experience way). I therefore map the ontological structures with the seven aspects of the 'average everyday' lived experience of ethical leadership. Together, this mapping sheds light on an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. This mode-of-Being can be modelled by others either

authentically or inauthentically. This is recognised in the everyday as role-modelling. This mapping of the ontological and the ontic is captured in Figure 11 (from Chapter 7) and is reproduced below.



Authenticity is a core ontological structure for this ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. However, a Heideggerian perspective of authenticity is not predicated on the standard Authentic Leadership literature, which conceives authenticity as 'being true to a core self'. Rather, Heidegger's conception of authenticity is based on 'choosing to choose' ourselves, and on appropriating ourselves from the inauthentic way we are (necessarily) constituted by our shared social practices. As a mode-of-Being, a Heideggerian understanding of 'authenticity' is a first-person phenomenon. It cannot therefore be measured by a third-person, as the Authentic Leadership questionnaires seek to do. Yet, Heidegger's notion of authenticity is better ablet to accommodate how it is we are able to change over time, yet remain 'authentic' over time, compared to a core (unchanging) self.

However, there are examples of leaders who come across as authentic but are nevertheless manipulative, abusive, or, worse still, perpetrate extreme atrocities. This is sometimes called the 'Hitler problem' (Ciulla, 2020). Being-in-the-world with positive solicitude circumvents this problem. If Being-authentic is a 'good' way for us to be-in-the-world, then it is also a 'good' way for other people to be in-the-world, since others are the same kind of Being as ourselves (they are also instances of the same existence). When we grasp this, we act with positive solicitude. This means we act to empower, or facilitate, other people's authenticity. In the lived experience, this looks like acting for the benefit of others. It might not be the case that the envisaged benefits to others actually accrue to those others. Rather, what is important is one acts with the right orientation towards others.

From a Heideggerian perspective, when one is authentic, one necessarily acts resolutely. Resolute action is most discernible in my concept that 'ethical leadership is in the hard decisions'. It can be less obvious when it is 'ethical leadership in the everyday', however. In this mode-of-Being, one does what 'one usually does' in an organisation, but not simply because it is the 'done thing'—instead, one has quietly appropriated these actions (such as inclusive decision making, a thoughtful process, and creative problem solving) as one's own.

When we act in the world competently (based on shared social practices of 'the-they'), we are acting with an 'average intelligibility'. However, when we act with authentic, resolute action, we move from competent acting to a more skilful expert coping in the world. This is a 'higher intelligibility' (Dreyfus, 2000). This idea is similar to Aristotle's *phronesis* (wise, practical action). Nevertheless, while Aristotle's phronesis is based in conscious deliberation, authentic resolute action can stay below our cognitive deliberation (Dreyfus, 2000). It is also possible to move from this 'high intelligibility' to being what Dreyfus (2000) calls a 'cultural master'. This is aligned with 'ethical leadership is leading the way'. It occurs when resolute action is radically innovative and influencing new and different ways things are done—changing the social practices of 'the-they'.

When we act resolutely, we respond to our call of conscience, which alerts us to what matters to us and to what we ontologically 'care' about. The call of conscience is less 'heard', as Heidegger describes, and more *felt* (through somatic references in the embodied Self such as gut instincts, feeling bad or uncomfortable, or not being able to look at yourself in the mirror).

8.1.3.1 Ontological implications for an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being

There are several ontological implications for a person who seeks to dwell in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being. Authenticity from a Heideggerian perspective is an appropriation of one's own Self from the inauthentic 'the-they' self. Thus, authenticity is a kind of self-leadership (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015), regardless of where one is in the organisational hierarchy and how many formal followers one has. As such, authenticity is first and foremost a phenomenon that is 'mine' (an inner phenomenon) and represents a good way to be in the world, aside from any instrumental value that accrues to the organisation.

A person in an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being is attuned to the concrete Situation at hand. They heed their call of conscience in order to act resolutely. This is a mode-of-Being that usually operates below one's cognitive awareness. However, a person can tune into their somatic references (their felt-sense) to alert them to what matters to them, and act on that, even when that is hard to do.

An understanding of inauthenticity and authenticity can help a person to grasp that, at the most fundamental level, the 'way we do things' just happens to be the 'way we do things'. Heidegger argues that, while this inherent meaningless can cause existential anxiety, it can also facilitate a freedom from

(an inauthentic) the-they self and open up possibilities-for-Being. When done 'well', or when exemplified in the everyday lived experience, this looks like leading the way.

An ontological perspective encourages us to recognise that others are the same kind of Being as ourselves. Therefore, a good way to be in the world is to have positive solicitude towards others, and to facilitate the opportunity for others to 'choose their own selves' and become authentic. In an everyday lived experience, this often looks like acting for the benefit of Others. However, more importantly and underlyingly, it means staying open and comporting oneself in a way that finds "room for agreement" (Simon, 2020) as a way forward.

8.2 Limitations & Further Research

The ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being I have proposed in this thesis does not pretend to be anything but a hermeneutic interpretation of my findings through Heidegger's ontological structures and the implications of that interpretation. This interpretation and its implications (summarised above) suggest possibilities-for-Being. However, these possibilities are not fixed. They are open to re-interpretation in another loop of the hermeneutic circle. The limitation of this research is therefore not that it *is* an interpretation. To conceive this as the limitation is to do so against the standard positivist background of seeking for an objective truth, which still seeks to "get out of the circle" (p. 195, S153). It forgets that "Dasein is interpretation all the way down" (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 19), and therefore that our understanding of the world is necessarily just an interpretation. Rather, the limitation is that this research is in no way the limit of understanding ethical leadership. Even the thematic analysis of my own findings suggests there is much more to be said about ethical leadership (see Appendix A). What I have presented in this thesis is but one interpretation. Indeed, it is an interpretation that invites further opening-up, rather than closing-down, in a present-at-hand defining and delineating way.

While this thesis is an interpretation of my understanding of my participants' interpretations of their own understandings, this does not mean it has no 'truth'. As noted above, truth for Heidegger lies in our understanding of a phenomenon, as opposed to being a representation of an objective fact 'out-there' in the world that is separate to us. Truth lies in the uncovering of an insight or an intuition (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018). The truth of the ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being I have proposed emerges from a careful and attentive thematic and ontological analysis based on the understanding of 22 people in either their lived and/or living experience. You, the reader, are either persuaded by my interpretation, filtered as it is through your own (pre)understanding of the world, or you are not: "…this is a logic of argumentation, not a logic of validation" (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018, p. 170).

However, even within the hermeneutic tradition, there are many more ways to shed light and understanding on ethical leadership. There are many more ways to uncover insights through further research that can help striving towards ethical leadership. These ways may contest, confirm, or juxtapose the insights that emerged in this study. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2018) identify nine

approaches to hermeneutic analysis. Within their nine approaches, my analysis goes back to basics. It is what they call an 'existential understanding of situations'. However, ethical leadership could be explored through any one of these other hermeneutic traditions. For instance, ethical leadership could be explored through 'Geertz's Hermeneutic Ethnography', with a focus on 'thick descriptions' of ethical leadership in specific organisational cultures (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018). While the unit of analysis for my study is the lived/living experience, the unit of analysis in such a study would be the culture within an organisation. It would draw more heavily on what Heidegger calls the "totality of involvements" (p. 231, S186), but what Geertz calls the "interworked systems of constructable signs" (Greetz in Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018, p. p161). Such an approach might usefully draw on a practice theory (Nicolini, 2012e.g.; Schatzki, 2003) that focuses on this totality-of-involvements perspective.

Alternatively, ethical leadership could be explored through another of the nine approaches to hermeneutic analysis that Alvesson and Sköldberg (2018) identify. One such approach is 'Poetic Hermeneutics', which has a focus on identifying and analysing metaphor and narrative in order to uncover insights. While my use of the 'anecdote' has a strong element of narrative, a narrative approach could, for instance, focus on deep contextual analysis of biographies of a particular ethical leader. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2018, p. 158) suggest Paul Rioceur's concept of chronological and non-chronological time (i.e., the concept of time that gives events meaning and significance) could be utilised as analytical tools for such an approach.

The ontological perspective of ethical-leadership I propose in this thesis could also be utilised as a starting point for a more normative exploration of ethical leadership case studies. However, such case studies would presumably not draw upon ethical theories that are based on the realist ontologies of Aristotle and Kant (for instance). Instead, they could take a more relational view of ethics, drawing upon Foucault or Levinas to inform such an analysis. Alternatively (and as recognised in Chapter 2), a Heideggerian perspective could be extended to shed light on the intersection between an ethical-leadership-mode-of-Being (as I have described it) and ethical decision-making (or ethical failures) within organisations. This would also focus less on Dasein and have a more contextual focus based on a "totality of involvements" (p. 231, S186).

In short, the main limitation is the Heideggerian perspective of ethical leadership proposed in this thesis is just one perspective on a complex, social phenomenon. Future research on ethical leadership (even within the hermeneutic tradition) could focus on exploring the phenomenon and identifying insights through different interpretive lenses, such as a 'totality-of-involvements' or 'time'. These interpretive lenses could utilise Heidegger or a different philosopher, such as Greetz or Rioceur. Whether future research utilises an ethnography or narrative methodology, it may benefit from insights from the liv*ing* experience, accessed through my methodological contribution of the 'living interview-diaries'.

8.3 Closing Statement

By analysing how Heidegger's ontological structures show up in the everyday lived experience of ethical leadership, I have sought to shed light on the ethical leadership phenomenon. In seeking to understand ethical leadership from this lived experience perspective, I hope to encourage 'more' striving towards ethical leadership. An ontological perspective of ethical leadership invites us not to focus on defining what ethical leadership 'is', nor on delineating it into a particular leadership theory separate to others, in a know-what, present-to-hand mode-of-Being. Rather, an ontological (Heideggerian) perspective invites us to consider ethical leadership from a know-how, ready-to-hand perspective.

I started this thesis with an anecdote of ethical leadership from my own experience. My thematic analysis of other people's experiences of ethical leadership suggests my pre-understanding of ethical leadership shared several aspects with their (pre)understanding. I did have an intuitive sense of why this experience was one of ethical leadership. However, through this research process, I now have a more explicit understanding of why I experienced this anecdote as ethical leadership, in line with other people's experience. My intuitive, implicit sense can now move to explicit insights I can point towards, and communicate to others, as I hope to have done. For instance, my anecdote is an example of how ethical leadership is in the hard decisions (although, admittedly, my decisions were not nearly as hard as those made by others), in so far as it would have been less stressful to tell Carl it was no longer my role to help him seek to resolve the situation. There is an element of ethical leadership in the everyday, in so far as managing the engagement of managers, colleagues, and stakeholders with the right relation is an everyday occurrence. There was an element of taking responsibility for the modicum of influence I did have, and of acting for the benefit of others: in this case, Carl and his colleagues. I was guided by my somatic references. What I saw as the poor behaviour of my colleagues made me feel literally uncomfortable. Perhaps more obviously, the visceral response of adrenaline pumping through my body was telling me this was a 'fight' I had to have with my manager. My body was preparing me for resolute action in response to the loud call of my conscience. I can only hope that my actions (role)modelled to other colleagues to do 'the right thing' and choose to choose yourself (but with 'right relation', in a way that allows other people to choose to choose themselves as well).

My initial pre-understanding of the ethical leadership phenomenon, outlined in the anecdote I started with, led me to reject the more dominant positivist approaches in favour of an approach which engaged more fully with the lived experience. In taking a lived-experience route to exploring ethical leadership, I have sought to enrich our understanding of the phenomenon from a different perspective. My perspective draws upon the rich context of meaning embedded in people's experiences. This "'new' and more complete understanding" has the potential to provide "a new pre-understanding when it guides

further investigation” (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2021, p. 3). Therefore, in accordance with Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy, this thesis has potentially added another loop to the hermeneutic circle.

Appendices

Appendix A: Thematic Coding Table

Anecdotes (Every anecdote was separately coded, noting that anecdotes cut across themes) **Aspects of ethical leadership**
Hard decisions (ethical leadership is in the hard decisions)
Ethics everyday (ethical leadership is in the everyday)
Accountable systems
Good recruitment processes
Thoughtful process
Diversity of thought/scrutiny forces more ethical consideration
Importance of questioning
Really listening
Creative problem solving (finding solutions/creativity)
Bringing negotiation back to the personal
Inclusive decision-making
Decision making as 'automatic response'
Transactional (disappointing) vs. collaborative (motivating)
Decision-making frameworks (that guides day-to-day decisions)
Evidence based decision-making
Diversity of thought in decision making
Investment for growth vs. good policy outcomes
Good decision-making processes as fair and equitable
Good leadership = ethical leadership
What is leadership?
Ethical leadership vs. ethical behaviour
Scrutiny forces more ethical consideration
Care
Being a ‘good human’ (serving humanity)
Charitable action (making an impact)
Public good
Not blaming others for own fault

Care for people's well-being
Care for people as people
Lack of care is unethical
Leadership as care for people
Tensions with care for people
Inclusiveness vs. productive action
Fairness vs. production action
Inclusiveness vs. vision
Inclusiveness vs. profit
Should not impinge on life choice or autonomy of others
Doing right by, or care for 'stakeholders'
Doing right by community
Doing right by customers
Doing right by environment
Doing right by shareholders
Respect
Perseverance/not lazy
Showing-up (performing one's job)
Finding employment
Don't blame others for own fault
Doing the right thing (or motivated by the right thing)
Right and wrong vs wrong and wrong
Explaining yourself
Good and fair (equality)
Fair to company
Fair to other people in the organisation
Fair to individual
Leading the way (ethical leadership is leading the way)
Responsibility for self (ethical leadership is self-responsibility)
Authenticity/integrity/alignment between actions and values
Being a real person
Importance of intention (good intention)
Action vs. credibility
Leading people to understanding

Living with myself
Integrity questioned
Responsibility for self
Good attitude
Responsibility for the bigger picture (sphere of influence)
Responsibility as manager vs friend
Responsibility for others
Responsibility for community
Acting in the group's benefit (ethical leadership is for the benefit of others)
Doing right by:
Community
Customers
Environment
Public
Stakeholders
Stakeholder sentiment
Long-term view
Avoid 'burn out'
Not just bottom line (or profit) focus
Inclusiveness vs. profit
Profit vs. vision
Values vs. results
Short term focus is unethical
Not just legal compliance
‘Could we’ vs. ‘should we’?
Not just risk assessment
Somatic references (ethical leadership is guided by somatic references)
Doing good leads to recognition
Mixed emotions
Moral intuition
Role modelling (ethical leadership is role modelling)
Leadership as role-modeling
Leading at every level (role-modeling does not depend on hierarchy)
Leadership from a junior level

Learning right and wrong (influence of others)
Importance of role models
Up-bringing
Business decisions vs ethical decisions
Ethical leadership vs. ethical behaviour (is there a difference?)
Good ethics is compatible with good business
Incentive structure
Fairness vs. productive action
Values vs. results
Culture
Cultural differences vs. ethical boundaries
Dilemma – prioritizing can drive the opposite behaviour
Professional level vs. practice level ethics
Practice (i.e., firm) level ethics
Professional level ethics
Govt – not serving Ministers but give frank and fearless advice
Need to understand your role
Public and community value as a driver
Situation matters, importance of context, ethics is cultural
Advise on what fits the situation
What incentivises people?
Universal truths
Ethical leadership values or principles
Equity
Honesty
Integrity (or don't compromise ethics)
Kindness
Living your values
Values vs. results
Privacy vs. efficiency
Openness and curiosity
Continuing to learn
Perseverance (work hard)
Progress

Really listening
Respect
Responsibility
Support
Teamwork
Transparency
Trustworthiness/trust
Moral/ethical considerations or topics
Capitalism
Climate change and environmental impact
Greenwashing or 'ethic-washing'
Conflict of interest
Declaring conflict of interest
Small decisions count (corruption starts with coffee)
Consequences
Intentions vs. consequences
Consumer power (consumers want responsible organisations)
COVID response
Disproportionate impact
Government reforms to processes
Importance of managing connections
Design response
Job seeker payment
Political leadership (or lack)
Social protocols
Fiduciary duty
Importance of share price
Firing people (can be ethical)
Health and safety
Human respect or dignity
Lack of respect = poor leadership
Silence is violence
Treating everyone equally
Legal and regulatory considerations

Flawed policy cycle
Opportunity cost of unethical decisions
Shareholder imperative
Social Commitments, campaigns or support
Social license to operate
Tolerating differences and diversity
Gender diversity
Youth engagement/empowerment/diversity
Diversity vs bias
Triple bottom line
Unconscious bias
Work-life balance
Blurred lines of work-life balance (especially during COVID)
Grateful for job (motivated to create jobs)
Lip service to work-life balance
References of interest (i.e., examples that struck me as fitting with constructs that appear in organisational or philosophical literature)
Authenticity references and examples
Call of conscience
Ethical leadership is doing the job because the job is worth doing
Ethical leadership not just following the trend
Privacy vs. efficiency
Positive Solicitude
'Dwelling' examples
Capitalism
Communicating values
Ethical failure references
Unethical creep
Inauthentic references and examples
'Everybody does it'
Justice references
Moral compass references
Purpose and the 'why'
Pop cultural references

Sense-making references
Social license to operate references
Stakeholder references (and stakeholder sentiment)
Top-down morality (senior management sets the tone)
Triple bottom line references

Appendix B: Explanatory Statement

Project ID: 18059

Project title: Living Ethical Leadership

Chief Researcher: Associate Professor Michelle Greenwood	**PhD Researcher:** Alice Gibson
Department: Department of Management	**Department**: Department of Management
Phone: +61 3 99052362	**Phone**: +61 3 99034065 +61 403 84 00 58
Email: Michelle.greenwood@monash.edu.au	**Email**: alice.gibson@monash.edu

You are invited to take part in this study. Please read this Explanatory Statement in full before deciding whether or not to participate in this research. If you would like further information regarding any aspect of this project, you are encouraged to contact the researchers via the phone numbers or email addresses listed above.

What does the research involve?

Alice Gibson, Monash University PhD Candidate, is investigating the question '*what is ethical leadership in practice?*' The aim of the research project is to:

- Explore what 'ethical leadership' means to people in recognised leadership positions, through sharing their stories of ethical leadership.
- How do people make sense of ethical leadership from the perspective of their own 'lived experience'?
- Identify insights from the 'lived experience' of ethical leadership, in order to communicate these insights and help foster ethical leadership more widely.

Ms Gibson would like to interview you to help her investigate the research question. The interviews will be semi-structured, and based around the following questions:

- What does ethical leadership mean to you?
- Can you tell me about a time/s when you've experienced, or demonstrated, ethical leadership?
- What is it about this example/s that makes it a case of ethical leadership?

Further questions will be asked based on your answers, to draw out your experience of ethical leadership in practice. It is anticipated that the interviews will last approximately one hour. If you agree, the interviews will be audio-recorded and transcribed to enable detailed analysis of your responses.

Why were you chosen for this research?

You were chosen for this study because you are in a recognised leadership position in your field. Given your experience, it is anticipated that you will have encountered a range of situations that you can draw upon to inform your views regarding ethical leadership.

Consenting to participate in the project and withdrawing from the research

You will be requested to sign a Consent Form (attached in email) and return it to Ms Gibson at the beginning of the interview. Your consent to audio-record the interview will also be sought. You may choose not to be recorded, in which case, Ms Gibson will take detailed notes during the interview.

You can choose not to answer any question during the interview. You may also withdraw from the process either before or after the interview, and request your data not be included in the research. This can be done up until the time that data analysis has been undertaken. After data analysis has been undertaken, it may not be possible to withdraw your input from the process.

Confidentiality

You may choose to protect your confidentiality or anonymity by the use of a pseudonym for your name and/or organisation in any publicly available information regarding the research, whether this be in the thesis document, presentations or published articles etc. You can request the use of a pseudonym either before, or after the interview has been conducted. You can request this verbally or in writing with Ms Gibson.

The interview may be transcribed by a third party to enable data analysis. If you are concerned about confidential information being heard by a third party transcriber, you may request your interview not be transcribe by a third party; in which case Ms Gibson will transcribe it personally.

Storage of data

The audio-recordings, transcripts and any data analysis documents from the interview will be stored on a password protected computer, which only Ms Gibson will have access to. In line with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, the data will be stored for a minimum of five years from the completion of the project.

Use of data for other purposes

If you agree (as per the Consent Form), the data may be used for additional research at a later time. Any additional research will use a pseudonym to protect the confidentiality or anonymity of your responses.

Results

If you are interested in the outcomes of the research, Ms Gibson would be happy to provide a written summary of the research once it has been finalised; and if it is logistically and economically feasible, a presentation of the research for you, and members of your organisation.

Results will also be available in the finalised PhD thesis, and you may request a copy of the thesis. Results may also be made publicly available through articles and book/book chapters.

Complaints

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the Executive Officer, Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC):

Executive Officer, Monash University

Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC)
Room 111, Chancellery Building D,
26 Sports Walk, Clayton Campus
Research Office
Monash University VIC 3800

Tel: +61 3 9905 2052 Email: muhrec@monash.edu Fax: +61 3 9905 3831

Thank you,

Associate Professor Michelle Greenwood

PhD Candidate, Alice Gibson

Appendix C: Consent Form

Project ID: **18059**

Project title: **Living Ethical Leadership**

Chief Researcher: **Associate Professor Michelle Greenwood**

PhD Researcher: **PhD Candidate, Alice Gibson**

I have been asked to take part in the Monash University research project specified above. I have read and understood the Explanatory Statement and I hereby consent to participate in this project.

I consent to the following:	**Yes**	**No**
To be interviewed regarding my experience of ethical leadership	☐	☐
Audio recording during the interview	☐	☐
Third party transcription of the interview	☐	☐
The data I provide during this research may be used in future research projects (that will use a pseudonym to protect the anonymity of you and any organisations mentioned)	☐	☐

Name of Participant _____

Participant Signature _____ **Date** _____

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