Policing in Indonesia: Exploring ways in which the legitimacy of the police may effect economic development and the prosperity of the Indonesian state Photo taken by Forward & Ackn...

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Policing in Indonesia:

Exploring ways in which the legitimacy of the police may effect economic development and the prosperity of the Indonesian state

Photo taken by Sharyn Graham Davies

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Forward & Acknowledgments

This report is the product of an NZAID-funded research project entitled *Policing in Indonesia: Exploring ways in which the legitimacy of the police may effect economic development and the prosperity of the Indonesian state*. The report examines this specific topic of research.

The funding provided by NZAID has enabled the development of a foundation for research on policing in Indonesia, a topic that has been ignored in the academic literature. We are extending this project to look more specifically at police and corruption, media coverage of police in Indonesia, and at gender and policing. Please contact Sharyn Davies if you would like any further information on this report. sharyn.davies@aut.ac.nz

Contents

Introduction

This report is based on research conducted for an NZAID funded project entitled '*Policing in Indonesia: Exploring ways in which the legitimacy of the police may effect economic development and the prosperity of the Indonesian state.*'

A competent and cohesive police force forms the backbone of all successful democratic nations. As the world's second largest democracy, and New Zealand's most populous neighbour, Indonesia's ability to support a capable police force is integral not only to the nation's well-being, but also to the security of the region. While there are half a million members of Indonesia's police force, there is a paucity of research on all matters pertaining to this institution. Indeed, aside from a number of articles by this research team, there are few in-depth, or critical, publications in either Bahasa Indonesia or English on policing in Indonesia. Recognising this gap in the literature, and appreciating that in order to foster the development of a corruption-free and effective police force data needs to be collected and analysed, this project had the long term goal of conducting extensive research that would culminate in the generation of knowledge and theory regarding policing not only in Indonesia, but globally. Funding provided through MFAT has enabled us to go part way to achieving these ambitious aims, and put us in good stead for securing further funding to extend our examination of policing in Indonesia.

Background to the research

Tragic incidents such as the suicide bombings of the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta in 2009 (Bell, 2009) can have a negative effect on the economic development of Indonesia. For example, in 2002 Indonesia suffered from a particularly deadly terrorist attack when the bombing of two Bali nightclubs left nearly 200 people dead (Malley, 2003). After the Bali bombings there was a noticable decline in tourism (Pambudi, McCaughey, & Smyth, 2009). Given that it is important that tourists feel safe when choosing the destination for their vacations, any moral panics in regards to serious crimes of violence can be economically problematic. Since the end of Suharto's regime, the oppressive and brutal New Order era that lasted from 1965 until 1998 (Farid, 2005), Indonesia has become an aspiring social democracy seeking the economic growth and social well being so often associated with Western style societies. According to Tadjoeddin and Murshed the economic development of Indonesia can be linked to an overall reduction in violence between 1994-2003 in Java (Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007). The evidence indicates a strong link between the state's ability to control crime and provide security for its citizens and success with economic and social development. Central to the provison of security is the need for a system of democratic policing.

Hinton and Newburn describe how social commentators argued that the end of the Cold War also marked the 'end of history' (Hinton & Newburn, 2006). Hyperbole aside, these events were seen by many as the triumph of Western liberal democracy over its main alternative: communism. While these claims are overexaggerated, it is notable that throughout the developing world many countries are attempting to install new democracies and social orders often from the shells of old despotic state mechanisms left over from previous dictatorships. Moreover, it is often deemed by the donor nations that police reform is the essential means of furthering the goals of an emergent state with democratic aspirations. The police provide an important service to the state.

In addition to upholding due process, freedom of speech and assembly, and managing public gatherings and demonstrations, a well-functioning police force that enjoys civic trust affords society the degree of order, predictability, and accountability needed for the functioning of a market economy in a democratic system (Hinton & Newburn, 2006).

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a modern democratic state without some form of stongly established police organisation and how this is utilised can often be a reflection of a society's political order (Reiner, 2000). Therefore, the treatment people receive from the police is often perceived as a reflection of the fairness of the government and state institutions that make up the criminal justice system (Tyler, 1990). If citizens have faith in state law and the criminal justice sytem, then voluntary compliance to the wishes of the police is more likely to become a regular occurrence. In short, the legitimacy of any given police organisation can be viewed as a barometer with which to measure the strength of the state's political institutions, and the economic and social well being of citizens.

Despite the move towards democracy, Indonesia is still plagued by politically motivated violence (Wilson, 2006) and like many emergent democracies, Indonesia's criminal justice system is facing enormous pressures. Traditionalised expectations, poorly structured institutions, and a lack of accountability are hindering the economic and social development of Indonesia. In many respects Indonesia's police force is perceived as ineffectual and often unnecessarily coercive (Davis, Triwahyuono, & Alexander, 2009). This misuse of power is problematic for building public trust in policing organisations (Buttle, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010). Many human rights activists consider the Indonesian police to be just another compromised organisation in a state that is ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (BBC, 2009). Moreover, courtroom processes lack requisite human rights considerations and prison conditions are poor. All of these factors have led to a general withdrawal of public support for the police who are the gatekeepers to the criminal justice system.

There is international and national support for a better criminal justice system in Indonesia, and New Zealand is able to help influence how the criminal justice system is conceptualised by policy makers and how it should be governed. Yet there is a need first to understand how international influence can be maintained in a manner that sustains the progress of reform within the Indonesian criminal justice system. The project explored these national and international influences, and how they can be used as a positive contribution to better criminal justice policy in Indonesia.

As New Zealand's well-being is contingent upon the welfare and security of the region, it is in New Zealand's interest to play an active role in faciliating both the economic development of Indonesia and the establishment of good policing and criminal justice policy. Given such concerns, the aim of this project was to explore policing in Indonesia with a view to understanding how an effective and efficient police service could increase economic prosperity. We found that New Zealand takes a particularly sensitive approach to supporting police reform in Indoneisa, and through the New Zealand police liasion and other New Zealand policing personnel, there is a real focus on culturally appropriate programs aimed at supporting Indonesia's efforts at police reform.

Indonesia's police reform

To understand the effect that policy transfer funded by international donors has had on policing in Indonesia it is important to consider moves by the Indonesian police (Polri) towards democratisation within its historical context. Meliala (2001b) indicates that the Indonesian police first came into being just after the Declaration of Independence in 1945. The police were formed to help the Indonesian army fight against Dutch and Japanese occupations during the period of 1945-1948. Moves were made ensuring that the police were neutral and removed from political influence, and they enjoyed operational and administrative autonomy with equal status to the armed forces. After Suharto's regime took power the police were amalgamated with the armed forces. By 1968 Polri were little more than a paramilitary wing of the armed forces that suppressed dissent against Suharto's regime. As is often the case, a police force organized along military lines perceives the public as an enemy and utilizes more brutal and often fatal forms of extralegal violence (Jefferson, 1990). These actions will then cause the public to mistrust the police. Even the presence of paramilitary equipment can have a negative impact on the public perception of the police (Buttle, 2003).

Since the fall of the Suharto regime Polri have undergone a number of reforms. Meliala (2002) indicates that in 1999 the police were separated from the military and greater autonomy from political influence was restored. This was helped by a decentralization of state governance to local administrations (Djani, 2009), which resulted in greater autonomy for provincial policing and loosened state control over the police (Stein and Lambang, 2005). However, Polri would often abuse their power and were perceived by the public as untrustworthy (Meliala, 2002). As a means of promoting police legitimacy in the eyes of the public Meliala (2001c) advocated the notion of sensitivity in policing and suggested that there were three dimensions to police sensitivity: individual police officers needed to be sensitive in their interactions with the public; socialize police culture in ways that promote sensitivity to the public; ensure that the organizational dynamics of Polri promote a sensitive approach to policing. Meliala advocated a community-orientated approach to policing Indonesia. With the support of the international community Polri moved away from the paramilitary understanding of law enforcement towards a community-policing model (Prasetyo and Marzuki, 2005). This should be deemed a considerable improvement from how the country was policed by the military during the Suharto regime. However, how fully Polri have taken on community policing values and how effective they have become is debatable. Evidence suggests that effective policing requires the cooperation of citizens (Alpert, Dunham and Piquero, 1998). This move toward community policing is in many ways dependent on creating the impression that the police are part of the community (Hawdon and Ryan, 2003). Therefore, effective community policing has much to do with building positive public perceptions about police trustworthiness (Tyler and Huo 2002).

In Indonesia the evidence of how successfully the police have adopted a community orientated approach to policing is ambiguous. Many studies highlight the potential for community policing (Meliala 2001b, 2001c), and even tentatively support its effectiveness, especially when dealing with regional conflict (Prasetyo and Marzuki, 2005). Unfortunately, community policing depends on the good will of the public to be effective and it is acknowledged that police corruption has eroded community support for Polri (Meliala, 2002). Indeed corruption is a notable barrier to community policing (Pino and Johnson, 2011). For community policing to be successful in Indonesia, international donors may need to focus further attention on aspects of policing that directly or indirectly challenge or inhibit policing corruption.

Considering Indonesia's police force is the fifth largest in the world, it is surprising that very little has been written on this institution. Indeed, with the exception of the work of Adrianus Meliala (2001a, 2001b, 2002), and our recent work cited below, there are no substantial publications in either Bahasa Indonesia or English on the topic. Given that policing is essential to the security and the perception of the public safety of any given society, there is a serious need to fill this dearth in the academic literature and provide independent information that can inform policy makers intent on bettering the stability and economic welfare of the Indonesian state.

Despite greater engagement with ideas such as community policing, Polri are still mainly a paramilitary police and their relationship with the public is still strained. Many of the problems that Indonesia has faced with separatist, religious and ethnic violence have been resolved through informal conflict resolution techniques (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson, & Dunn, 2010), rather than through the use of the police or the criminal justice system. Also, the proliferation of vigilante groups, often supported by political interests (Wilson, 2006), challenge the legitimacy of Polri and the criminal justice system.

Therefore, the need to understand how the internationally sponsored reform of Polri has impacted on public perceptions of the police and other aspects of the criminal justice system is important given the dearth of information provided by the academic literature. This study explores evidence that can be used to inform further reforms to improve public trust in the police and secure greater legitimacy for the criminal justice system. Such reform will provide the security needed to enhance the economic and social wellbeing of the Indonesian state.

Key questions explored and addressed

The key questions explored and addressed in this research proposal concerned establishing how sustainable economic development can be fostered through efficient and effective policing. For instance, if there are no checks and balances against corruption, sustainable economic development is less likely to occur. The largest barrier to formulating specific questions for this study was the dearth of literature on the topic of policing in Indonesia. Therefore, an exploratory approach to this study was needed, one that followed a grounded theory approach where research questions were continually reworked as fieldwork was undertaken. However, this does not mean study was without a considered approach. There are three distinct directions that focused our investigation that now forms a larger cohesive understanding of policing in Indonesia.

The first direction established a baseline understanding of how the Indonesian police operate within the context of the wider criminal justice system. This provided much needed understanding of what the issues for policing are in Indonesia; policies on policing; practices of policing; and what are the philosophies that inform these practices.

The second direction involved an investigation of the influence that donor nations have had on police reform in Indonesia. This line of investigation was designed to elicit information that will be useful to donor nations like New Zealand who have spent time and resources providing funds and consultation services for Polri. This also provides information on the current state of police reform in Indonesia and sheds light on the future aspirations of Polri.

The third direction focused on public perceptions of the police and the criminal justice system. This was understood as a measure of public trust in the police and how successful police reform has been. It also looked at how the public viewed the police and what they believe is acceptable for the provision of their security. Such findings will be used to inform future changes in policing.

When taken as a whole these three directions provide considerable understanding of policing in Indonesia. This data will enable the development of policy proposals for ways in which policing in Indonesia can be improved, and it will show how such improvements can directly result in improved sustainable economic development.

Photo 1: Sharyn and John with Police Complaints Commissioners in Jakarta, December 2014.

Lining up from left to right in the above photo is: Commissioner Mohammad Nasser, Commissioner Hamidah Abdurrahman, Dr John Buttle, Commissioner Syafriadi Cut Ali, Associate Professor Sharyn Davies, Commissioner Adrianus Meliala and Commissioner Logan Siagian.

How the Research Progressed

The funding made available through NZAID enabled the researchers to spend considerable time in Indonesia. During this time we were able to meet with high-ranking police personnel, donor nations, and most recently with the Police Complaints Commission.

Through Professor Meliala's contacts, we were able to visit numerous areas of the Indonesian

criminal justice system. One of the first activities we undertook was attending the women and punishment conference at the University of Indonesia. We were also able to meet with most members of staff at the Department of Criminology and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Indonesia. Professor Meliala was additionally able to arrange a visit to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Buttle and Davies also gained access to Cipinang Narcotics Prison and the Headquarters of the National Police. We were also able to visit and meet many personnel from the National Police Commission and the Police College. Photos 2 and 3 show our participation in activities at the police academy. During our visit to the Police College, Dr Buttle and Assoc Prof Davies presented lectures to the students. We visited the headquarters of the mobile brigade and the women's police school. We also met with the New Zealand police liaison officer. We also visited the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Semarang. In addition, Assoc Prof Davies spent 6 months of her sabbatical in Lombok conducting extensive research into policing in this region. The New Zealand ambassador in Indonesia kindly connected Davies with liaison people in Lombok. Through this connection Davies was able to visit the women's refuge centre. They are keen that a number of different research projects be undertaken. One project that is needed is an assessment of the relationship between the women's refuge centre and the police and how this relationship can best be fostered to ensure good outcomes for women who seek assistance there. This is just one of the projects that we will look at further from 2014 onwards. During our trips to Indonesia we visited numerous donor agencies based in Jakarta and held extensive interviews with key personnel. We also visited Semarang training facility and recorded extensive notes. The final substantial activity that we have been able to undertake was cooperation with the Police Complaints Committee and the Police Oversight Committee. These newly established organisations are responsible for overseeing the world's fifth's largest police force, and with a Committee constituted by just six commissioners, their task is great.

One of the most rewarding parts of our research project was meeting with police officers in training at the police academy. It was during discussions with cadets that we got an insight into expectations of officers going into the job and from there were able to assess strengths and weakness of police structure and examine the impact at this level of policing on development.

Photo 2: Presenting guest lectures at Indonesia's Police Academy.

Photo 3: Visiting Indonesia's Police Academy, November 2012

Methodology

Our research was informed by a number of theoretical perspectives. The primary perspective that informed the research stemmed from an interpretivist paradigm (Connell, 1996; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Tolich, 2001). Working from the understanding that social actors influence and are influenced by their socio-cultural locations, interpretivism allows for the recognition that policing institutions in Indonesia, as elsewhere, are embedded in the contexts in which they develop. As such, undertaking an interpretivist approach to researching policing in the nation-state enabled the data to be informed by religious, social, cultural, ethnic, and class influences, as well as incorporate ways in which policing in Indonesia is impacted by modernisation and globalisation. Such an approach assists the development of a sound understanding of policing systems and links to economic development in Indonesia.

A further paradigm that influenced this research was grounded theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Grounded theory was particularly useful for this research due to the project's exploratory nature. The exploratory nature facilitates the research being led by aspects of the participants' understanding of what are the most salient factors to them. As such, researchers and prospective audiences are able to appreciate and explore what participants consider important about their experiences of the policing system in Indonesia. Moreover, using grounded theory allowed the researchers to develop a rich description of the experiences discussed, as the theory emerges from the data. The research was achieved in four stages.

Stage 1
Associate Professor Davies and Dr Buttle spent considerable time cementing the relationship of the research team. Prior to this award, in 2008 funding was obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade as part of the Seriously Asia Initiative to forge stronger institutional and research links with Asian universities. This money was used to finance the visit of Indonesia's leading policing expert Dr Meliala from the University of Indonesia. This time was used to discuss possible research projects that would benefit from a collaborative effort on the part of all three academics. Having maintained contact with Dr Meliala, Associate Professor Davies and Dr Buttle procured university funding from AUT for a further meeting, this time in Indonesia. This visit signified the start of the project. During this visit numerous aspects of the research project were discussed and negotiations took place regarding access to Polri and associated parts of the criminal justice system. At this time the research team worked towards identifying prospective research assistants, and plans were made for procuring ethics approval from the respective universities. Moreover, advice was sought from Dr Meliala in regards to the cultural and political sensitivity of the study.

Stage 2
During this stage the actual fieldwork began. This stage initially involved the collection of written materials (laws, acts, reports, media statements etc) and policy documents that pertain to policing in Indonesia. Information gained from these materials informed some of the questions that were asked in subsequent interviews. These interviews were conducted with police officers from all levels of Polri, from the level of senior management to specialised anti-terrorist units and detectives, as well as street level police officers and community constables. There were some documented differences in the way that policing occurs in urban and rural areas that was also explored (Buttle, 2006). For example, police officers in rural areas are often more isolated than their urban counterparts which necessitates the use of different policing strategies. Also an examination of the gendered differences in policing styles was carried out because it is often the case that female officers resort to different

policing tactics than male officers and that females experience different barriers to promotion than males (Heidensohn & Brown, 2000). Members of Polri were asked about their role in policing and inquiries were made into the current issues facing police officers as well as what types of reform they believe would be beneficial to Polri. Also, questions were asked pertaining to the influence that donor nations have had on police reform in Indonesia. Interviews were conducted with available agencies or representatives of these donor nations in regards to their influence on Indonesian policing. In line with the grounded theory approach to research, interviews were conducted with each group of interest until such a time that no new data emerged or the population was exhausted. While interviewing and the examination of written materials were the main methods of gathering information there were also opportunities to observe the practice of policing and training of the police in various different aspects of their occupation. This stage gave a fuller picture of police culture, police reform, and police perspectives on policy.

Stage 3
This stage focused on public perceptions of the police and issues that influence the level of trust that citizens are willing to give to Polri. The usual way of measuring public trust in police is to conduct a survey using a questionnaire. However, Morgan and Newburn suggest that even the best public opinion surveys are unsophisticated because they require respondents to answer discrete questions, which often fail to reflect the true complexity of people's beliefs (Morgan & Newburn, 1997). Realising this, Loader and Mulcahy (2003) used qualitative interviewing to gather information about public perceptions of the police and from this technique they found that people exhibited different types of trust or mistrust. It was this sort of complexity that was sought by this study. Questions were asked about people's views of the police and their understanding of what policing is as well as their perceptions of crime and risk. Participants were selected from a cross section of the public in order to provide a greater spread of viewpoints. It was at this stage of the study where human rights advocates were interviewed about subjects such as abuses of force and police accountability. Again interviews were conducted with each group of interest until such a time that no new data emerged or the population was exhausted. This provided a deep understanding of how the police are perceived by the public.

Photo 4: Attending police training day, Jakarta, December 2013

Stage 4
While the analysis of the information that emerged from the research was ongoing throughout all four stages, this fourth stage was where the information coalesced. All three researchers and the research assistants were involved in the analysis, which provided for greater reliability. This was the stage where potential publications for publishing the findings were collaboratively indentified, planned and written. The data gathered provides ample opportunities for the publication of journal articles and a book in both English and Bahasa Indonesia.

Reducing Bias
Given that the most obvious critique of qualitative research is one of the personal and methodological biases, this study was designed in a manner to reduce this problem. According to Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht it is good research practise to triangulate whenever possible (Chadwick, Bahr, & Albrecht, 1984). Triangulation involves the collection of data, on the topic being studied, over different times and from different sources (King & Liebling, 2000; King & Wincup, 2000). This multi-method approach provides a solution for the problem of possible bias that may occur if the study relied only on the accounts of police officers. If the interpretation of one set of data could be corroborated with other sources the validity of the findings would be enhanced. This is also applicable to the researcher:

> Research findings are affected by the nature of the research method applied, by the researcher's specific knowledge of that method and how it should be applied, by the personal and professional characteristics of the researcher, including mood,

idiosyncrasies, and perspectives…Triangulation in all its possible varieties permits the researcher to escape some of the variance attributable to these four sources of discrepant observation. (Chadwick et al., 1984, p. 40)

In this study there were a number of triangulations put in place to reduce bias. There was a triangulation of different information gathering methods (written documents, interviews and observations) in order to avoid the bias inherent in any single approach to investigation. Also, the triangulation of perspectives (the police, donor agencies, human rights activists and the general public) about policing in Indonesia provided a wider understanding of the topic. Furthermore, the use of a team of researchers coming from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds to conduct the analysis regulated the assumptions and prejudice of any single person's worldview. This made for a particularly rigorous study.

Team Member Roles
Given the specialist experience of the three primary researchers this team was especially qualified for conducting research on policing in Indonesia. The primary members were Associate Professor Sharyn Graham Davies, Professor Adrianus Meliala, and Dr John Buttle who between them had the appropriate Indonesian cultural expertise and understanding of criminology, more specifically the police, to ensure the success of this project. Indeed, the roles of the primary members were similar and complimentary, yet each researcher offered their own expertise. Associate Professor Davies has conducted research in Indonesia since 1998 and drew particularly on her familiarity with social and cultural systems in Indonesia to contribute to this project. Professor Meliala's background in criminology and intimate knowledge of Indonesian legal systems made him a crucial member of the team. Dr Buttle's major field of study is policing and his international experience added significant depth to the research team. All three members of the team conducted extensive interviews with key stakeholders, conducted literature reviews, and were central figures in the analysis of the data.

The primary team members were supplemented by Indonesian research assistants. The research assistants were selected when the team met first in Indonesia. The research assistants provided essential auxiliary support to the research team. The research assistants helped with the acquisition of material and literature pertinent to the study. The assistants also transcribed interview material and undertook some of the translation. Research assistants were selected in part based on their knowledge of the criminal system in Indonesia. The selection of research assistants was conducted bearing in mind the importance of including researchers at an early stage in their research careers. As such, the research assistants were postgraduate students.

Photo 5: Meeting high-ranking police officers, Police Headquarters, Jakarta, November, 2011.

Policy Transfer

With many countries being renowned for a diverse number of policing expertise, policy transfer is now seen as essential for those policing organisations seeking to understand best practise. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) defined policy transfer as:

> "…a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc., in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or place." (p344)

This definition covers all levels of policy transfer and allows for the notion of a continuum from voluntary to coercive transfers. Jones and Newburn (2002) suggest that where criminal justice policy is concerned there are four differing types of policy transfer.

Emulation
This is a form of voluntary policy transfer that involves the deliberate and conscious imitation of policy development and programs in other jurisdictions. This would involve the utilization of best practice evidence from another jurisdiction and is deliberate drawing of lessons from this source.

Elite-Networking
This concerns the convergence of policy taken from policy transfers through transnational organisations and their members sharing knowledge about a common problem. This sort of policy transfer initially develops outside of formal political institutions and emerges from the development of an international policy culture. When

consensus by these transnational policy groups is reached about a particular problem the participants promote these ideas domestically.

Harmonization
This refers to instances where policy transfer is formally driven by intergovernmental organisations and other structures established as a result of national interdependence.

Penetration
This final form of policy transfer involves a considerable element of coercion. When penetration occurs nation states are forced to conform to the favoured policy developments that are driven by other nations, or external organisations or structures.

Any form of policy transfer is open to a mix of voluntary and coercive pressures. While the first three categories describe what appears like a means of policy transfer that allows for freedom of choice, in reality there are likely to be at least some level of coercive pressure applied. This is especially the case where international donors are funding the reform of the Indonesian police. As such, the first significant theme we explored in our project was the impact of international donors on police reform in Indonesia.

International Donors

When Polri first separated from the army the idea of providing international insight into community policing was a logical means of instilling a police ethic in an organisation that was essentially a standing army. However, the need for dealing with the problem of police corruption was for the most part ignored. In the below sections we explore some of the reasons for this lack of engagement with corruption. While this study involved a large number of international donors we focus on the four most influential: New Zealand, Australia, Japan and the United States (US).

New Zealand
New Zealand Police (NZP) involvement in Indonesian police reform is targeted and sensitive to what the police in Indonesia need. In particular, we found both the previous and current New Zealand police liaisons to be committed to Indonesian police reform, and advocating an approach that was sensitive and appropriate to Indonesia, and which was based on continuous dialogue with Polri. NZP's scope is limited in comparison to the law enforcement agencies of other countries and this means that they have been able to develop a focused approach to assisting with police reform. They have managed to do this despite budget limitations. While New Zealand is committed to assisting in police reform to ensure a better future for Indonesia, New Zealand is also committed to ensuring stability in the region. A stable Indonesian state facilitates the transport of goods to and from New Zealand and sound policing increases trading abilities. The NZP have focused of promoting community policing within Polri. Community policing is a philosophical approach that advocates community values in all aspects of policing. This is a long term project and results are still undergoing analysis. A particularly significant approach taken by NZP is the move to teach community policing values in West Papua. Teaching police to interact respectfully with the citizens and powerful local leaders in order to keep the peace in conflict ridden areas is an appropriate route to follow (see Braithwaite, 2011).

Japan

The Japanese police have a long relationship with Polri and their collaboration has a long term vision. They are also interested in the provision of community policing. The motivation behind their involvement is focused on provision of policing in areas where Japanese citizens and business are centred. The Japanese approach to community policing is a practical one. In Bakasi, and later Bali, the Japanese koban system of community policing has been employed. The koban system involves the placement of a system police boxes in a specific area where access to a police officer by citizens is made easier.

Australia
We conducted a number of interviews with members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) stationed in Indonesia. The AFP has a considerable presence in Indonesia. Their motivation for providing aid to Polri is as a means of providing national security for Australia with a focus is on transnational crime and counter terrorism. This was clearly articulated by a member of the AFP who told us: "We are here specifically to protect the interests of Australia. If Indonesia goes under, and their security fails, we will end up with crime on our doorstep. There will be boat people arriving and terrorism will be unleashed.' The transnational crime focus of the AFP is mostly about people smuggling and they work with Indonesian police on stopping illegal immigrants/asylum seekers from reaching Australia in boats. One of the things the AFP is heavily involved in is a joint training facility known as The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), based in Semarang. JCLEC has a a strong focus on transnational crime. JCLEC does not train forces, but rather trains police personnel on intelligence, forensics, and team management. While the AFP has a large presence in Indonesia, the future of Australian assistance to Indonesia is currently precarious due to the recent Wikileaks scandal in which Australian personnel were caught tapping the phones of the Indonesian President's wife and a number of other politicians. Joint operations are currently on hold as of February 2014.

United States
There are a number of US funded organisations in Indonesia but the focus of our study was on the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP, like JCLEC, is an organisation that openly states on its website that it serves the security interests of its home state. ICITAP focuses on transnational crime and counter terrorism and has in the past supplied equipment for the police and the military. ICITAP have moved away from supplying the Indonesian police with equipment and moved towards providing an experiential learning experience for Polri officers in the US. They have also been involved in producing policing standards in legislation and guidelines that could be adhered to by all of the Indonesian police. The assumption is that once the police have good policy, this will lead them to behave in a way correspondent to the guidelines, leading to a certain amount of accountability and transparency. ICITAP is well funded and worked independently of other donor nations focused on police reform in Indonesia.

There are a number of commonalities that are made apparent when comparing the approaches of these four jurisdictions. All jurisdictions are focussed on facilitating Indonesian police reform but they also acknowledge that police reform in Indonesia is in the best interests of their home nations. These sometimes competing interests may mean that international donors are unable to provide reform assistance as requested by Polri. In our discussions with high ranking police personnel, we have been told that to date no donor funding (be that monetary, training or expertise) has been turned down. It is the case that the type of policy transfer that is occurring in Indonesia is similar to Jones and Newborns' (2002) description of penetration. Importantly, it must be noted that this can make for a piecemeal package that may not have a

coherent direction across all donor nations regarding reform. If the donor nations were able to collaborate with each other, and align with a Government of Indonesia road map for police reform, this would no doubt result in greater steps forward for the Indonesia police, and enhance regional security. Below we look further at barriers to delivering reform to Indonesia's police.

Barriers to Delivering Aid

Indonesia has been incredibly receptive to donor efforts to fund and shape police reform. While there have been many successes (e.g. special forces able to deal with terrorism threats), there are still barriers to delivering reform. One of the barriers, as mentioned above, is the focus of donor nations on concomitantly securing their own security needs. Another barrier is a lack of clarity from Indonesia's police force as to the direction police reform should take. Therefore, it is important to understand the practical implications of initiating and sustaining these aid programs. There is a need to understand what the difficulties and the barriers to success are. These include:

1. Indonesia is a large country and teaching courses cannot be run across the whole archipelago. This means that every intervention can only target a relatively small number of police officers. Therefore, whatever is being taught may only be effective in the local area and will not necessarily impact on the way Polri conduct business across the country in the short term. Some donors realise this and concentrate their efforts on the new and upcoming officers in the hope that as they move through the ranks they will spread what they learn. Police culture is renowned for resisting change and high ranking police officers will not necessarily be supported by street officers. Nevertheless this is an important approach that is to be supported.

2. The short tenure of commanding police officers means that officers are rotated on a regular basis. As such donors have found they need to frequently repeat their ideas to different commanding officers. Different commanders will have differing levels of commitment to any given program and as such the longevity of a program is not always secure.

3. There have been occasions when some programs or the people running them have lacked the cultural sensitivity to achieve change without causing insult to Indonesians. Indonesia has a rich and complex cultural and religious heritage that needs to be considered by those who are there to promote police reform to Polri. Reform will stall if cultural aspects are neglected. It is to be said that NZP and Japan are standout donor nations in this regard as they invest heavily in learning cultural sensitivity and understand the importance of cultural competency.

4. Donor programs may at times replicate one another. This is not necessarily problematic if they are complementary. However, given the variation in global policing methods, if one program contradicts another it leaves police reform without a clear forward direction. Most donor nations do meet and discuss what they are currently doing in order to avoid such overlap, but each donor may still take a singular approach, meaning international aid to Polri is not a coherent as it might otherwise be.

5. Ideally Polri should take control of the coordination of who is going to run what program and where. However, in order to achieve this they will need to have a better understanding of what they want as a police organisation. This lack of a clear model of

police reform makes it harder for them to plan which intervention is appropriate for them. So for the most part Polri accept all interventions, programs and equipment that a donor is willing to provide.

Corruption

The legitimacy of the police can be seen as a measure of how well Indonesia has managed to transform itself from a military run dictatorship into a young and thriving democracy. Unfortunately rates of public support for the police are low. The interviews that were conducted with Indonesian members of the public indicate that citizens lack faith in the ability of the police to solve crimes, and this was linked to the belief that widespread corruption and human rights abuses are an inherent problem. Indonesia is one of the most corrupt societies in the world and the police, as well as the rest of the criminal justice system, account for a large part of this wrongdoing. It is corruption throughout society that is the main barrier for this transition towards democracy and corruption within the police has seriously inhibited reform. Therefore, it is important to consider police corruption and its causes given that this problem is so pervasive.

Defining corruption
Roebuck and Barker (1973) proffer a useful description of what it is for a police officer to be corrupt by suggesting that 'police corruption is any deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behaviour by a police officer' (p 3). Of particular use is their formulation of a typology of police corruption. They posit the following types of police corruption:

1. Corruption of authority is when an officer receives something due to their position but is not actually transgressing the law, such as accepting a free cup of tea or a meal from a restaurant owner.
2. Kickbacks are when an officer accepts payment for referring business to companies or individuals.
3. Opportunistic theft is the theft of materials from those that have been arrested or even victims at the scene of an accident.
4. Shakedowns are when an officer elicits a bribe for not following through with a criminal proceeding.
5. Protection of criminal activity is when an officer is paid to ignore illegal business orientated crimes such as prostitution or drug dealing.
6. The fix is where police officers undermine police investigations or proceedings by ignoring or loosing evidence for a fee.
7. Direct criminal activity is when a police officer commits a crime for personal gain.
8. Internal payoffs refer to when officers barter for privileges such as a change in shifts, promotions and transfers.
9. Flaking/padding involves the planting of evidence in order to gain a conviction.

While this typology is extensive, it is unlikely to cover every expression of police corruption. Therefore, Punch (2000) added a number of categories considered to be missing from Roebuck and Barker's typology, including extreme violence, manipulating evidence, sexual harassment, racism and involvement in drug dealing. The inclusion of violence into what is defined as police corruption is important to the Indonesian situation. Violence and the implicit or explicit threat of its use provide an instrumental means of coercion for corrupt police

officers. This study used the amended typology, but also expressed the importance of historical and social antecedents to police corruption.

The Prevalence of Police Corruption

It is appropriate to consider high profile cases where the police have misused their authority. Djoko Susilo the former head of Polri's traffic police was indicted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for his involvement in corrupt practice while procuring driving simulators for the police, a project worth Rp 200 billion (US $ 20.6 million). He is accused of amassing Rp 32 billion for himself and costing the state Rp 145 billion by marking the price of the simulators up (Amelia, Cahyadi and Setuningsih, 2013). The proceeds of this fraud have benefitted the National Police's Cooperative (Primkoppol) and the police football team. It has been inferred that this web of corruption may stretch as far as Polri Chief and his Deputy (Amelia et al, 2013).

Corruption at high levels in Polri is relatively common. On the 5th November 2009, Commissioner General Susno Duadji, the Chief of Detectives for Polri resigned his position (AFP, 2009). Duadji had been caught on a wiretap accepting bribes and conspiring to falsely imprison anti-corruption investigators, serious allegations for one of the top five commanding officers in Polri (Arnez, 2010). It has been suggested that the majority of the Indonesian public have been victims of corruption from state institutions (Allard, 1010) and the police are often perceived as being the most corrupt (Jansen, 2010). Susno Duadji turned informant on his fellow officers in what has been suggested is an attempt to repair his own public image (Onishi, 2010).

It was in Susno Duadji's attempt to blow the whistle on a number of Polri generals that disclosed a scheme perpetrated by Gayus Tambunan that would become synonymous with Indonesia's reputation as a corrupt state (Siahaan, 2010). In 2009, Gayus Tambunan, a mid-level tax official was found to have Rp 28 billion (approximately US$3 million) in his bank accounts when he was only earning Rp 2 million (US$200) a month. He made a fortune from bribes accepted to help approximately one hundred and forty companies evade tax charges (Andriyanto, 2011). When Gayus Tambunan was taken to court he used his illicit gains to bribe police officers, the prosecutors and a judge to drop the case. When this was discovered he was remanded in custody pending trial for further acts of corruption. During this time Tambunan bribed the guards that imprisoned him so that he could travel to Bali and watch a tennis match. The next day the press published a photograph of him as a spectator (Siahaan, 2010). Tambunan was eventually found guilty of bribing the law enforcement officers and the judge. What is most noticeable about the Gayus Tambunan case is that police corruption is obviously facilitated and supported by a corrupt criminal justice system. This relationship between the police, prosecutors and judges eases the way for a level of profitability that would not be possible if it was just Polri that were corrupt. The police, as gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, are often instrumental in bringing opportunities for corrupt practices into the hands of the judiciary.

Smith et. al. (2003) indicate a strong relationship between illegal logging and entrenched corruption in Indonesia. The police and other forestry officials take bribes to ignore violations of forests laws, to facilitate the export of illegally harvested timber, and legal log shipments are stopped on the road and a toll is paid in order to continue on the journey (Kishor and Damania, 2007). The forestry industry provides opportunities for corrupt police officers to become wealthy. Areas known for forestry such as Kalimantan are seen as desirable places to be posted as an officer because it is far from the regulatory oversight of the central

government in Jakarta, and provides opportunity to amass wealth from illegal gains (International Crisis Group, 2012).

While high profile large-scale cases of police corruption are significant the most disturbing evidence that the problem is pervasive comes from the prevalence of smaller scale corrupt practices. Many low ranking officers are involved in petty corruption such as demanding money and/or free meals from small local businesses, demanding money for ignoring illicit activities such as drug peddling, and demanding money for the police to speed up investigations (International Crisis Group, 2012). Indeed, the public see the police as either crime fighters or traffic police (Suprananto, 2005). It is the latter that provides the widest platform for police and public contact across all sectors of society (Blais and Dupont, 2005). Therefore, it is at this particular nexus that the police interact with the public in a corrupt manner by demanding monies for out-of-date licenses and by pulling over scooter riders for not wearing a helmet (International Crisis Group, 2012). It is these small incidents involving traffic offences that bring police corruption into the general experience of a public who would otherwise have little reason to have contact with the police at all.

Why police corruption occurs
Braithwaite (2011) argued that the regulatory order and norms of Indonesian society had broken down due to the collapse of Suharto's regime and the Asian financial crisis, causing more violence and criminality. It is also assumed that this was the cause of greater levels of corruption. This explanation may be appropriate for the levels of violence expressed at that time but fails as an explanation for corruption in Indonesian society. Corruption has been a part of Indonesian society at least as far back as the Dutch colonial occupation (Scott, 2002: Stein and Muhid, 2006) and has been problematic before Suharto and after much of the violence declined around 2004. This indicates that the problem stems from a long history of corruption firmly embedded in Indonesian society.

When studying police corruption in the Indonesian context this long history of corruption needs to be considered. Oluwanji (2011) indicates that widespread corruption can permeate a county's social fabric and normalizes these practices for citizens. While citizens may disapprove of their own victimization by the police, this does not mean that their understanding of ethical policing transfers to how others are treated by officers or that the public has an adequate understanding of the ethical considerations in the first place. Therefore, it is important to go beyond an examination of occupational culture and include public understandings of policing and police corruption. Any police culture is to some extent a product of the culture it is embedded in, which raises the possibility that police corruption can be influenced by society's cultural imperatives.

The comparative low wealth of Indonesian citizens and the state apparatus may also have some influence on the causes of police corruption. In Indonesia the corruption of state officials appears to be financially based (Stein and Muhid, 2006). Furthermore, Gerber and Mendelson's (2008) theory of predatory policing may provide some explanation of police corruption in Indonesia. Predatory policing is '… where police activities are mainly [not to say exclusively] devoted to the personal enrichment and self-preservation of the police themselves rather than the protection of the public or the systematic repression of subordinating groups' (Gerber and Mendelson, 2008: p 2). This predatory policing occurs when there is widespread corruption and the police serve their own interests rather than that of governing elites. From this perspective poorly paid police officers are more likely to become corrupt than those that are in well-paid jurisdictions (Hinton, 2006). A financial

explanation for police corruption needs consideration given the high levels of Indonesian poverty experienced in this large country with finite resources available for policing.

Predatory Policing

Policing in Indonesia approximates Gerber and Mendelson's (2008) notion of predatory policing; that is, widespread corruption with a financial motive. Predatory policing by Polri is often not as simple as police officers making money to feed their families, however. In Indonesia, police are comparatively well paid (Kepala Kepolisian Republic Indonesia 2012). Yet, while 50 percent of officers surveyed by Tempo (2000) magazine in Jakarta expressed satisfaction with salaries, 83 percent did indicate a need to supplement their income by taking extra work. This need to supplement their income may motivate corrupt practices. Moreover, this satisfaction rating may be different for police in districts outside Jakarta. The budget for outlying police districts has traditionally been collected in cash by sub-precinct police, which '…. means there is a risk of the money being scattered or lost on the way' (Suprananto, 2005:24). It may be then that police officers in outlying districts are paid less as the money is "scattered" and the pot dwindles. As such, the predatory nature of corruption may differently affect officers depending on their posting location.

Much of the problem with police corruption in Indonesia can be explained by the way that the police are funded. Suprananto (2005) indicates that the largest portion of the budget available to Polri goes to finance non-operational activities such as wages (75%) and overhead costs at headquarters and regional offices (5%), leaving only about 20 percent of the budget for operational activities. This of course affects how Polri run the business of policing in Indonesia, as one person we spoke to revealed: 'The problem is how to change the culture? Imagine we have trillions of rupiah, but 60 percent for salary and 20 percent for operations and 20 percent for procurement. How can we change with only 20 percent for the operational budget? The police in Kalimantan for instance have higher transportation costs than the whole police budget. So police have to be creative in how to support their activities. So they take money from other places.'

So in order to do the job of policing, Polri have to find other ways of raising money for the operational costs of providing public security (Jansen, 2008). Therefore, income from corrupt practices is not just used for personal gain but for everything from fuel for patrol cars to running the local police station. It is even the case that a district police chief had to raise off-budget monies to fund reinforcements when an election riot broke out in his jurisdiction in 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2012).

This need to seek external means to fund operational matters makes Polri susceptible to the influence of wealthy individuals and institutions that want to purchase their services. However, there is an easier way for high-ranking police officers to make money than seeking patronage from the wealthy and this is by accepting bribes on a regular basis from their own workforce. It is an open secret in Indonesia that in order to become a police officer a bribe must be paid to ensure the success of the applicant, as one officer we spoke to revealed: 'When you would like to become a police officer there is additional money that has to be paid. That the police have to pay to become cop is bad for their image.'

A similar process is also used when officers want to gain a promotion or be transferred to a different district (International Crisis Group, 2012), as another officer shared with us: 'If you were my supervisor I would have to provide monthly revenue to you if I wanted to get a

promotion. My friend from Papua had to pay protection money of RP80, 000 (US$16) to get a position in Jakarta.'

In response to this problem Polri invited the Indonesian National Police Commission (Kompolnas) and other external parties to observe the strict security measures for the promotion exams, which make cheating difficult, if not impossible. However, it is not cheating on the exam that is considered problematic but the financial provision of patronage by the senior officer who decides who gets to take the exam in the first place. It is possible the security surrounding exam procedure makes little difference where collecting bribes for promotion are concerned.

These levies ensure the police have money to fund police operations, and to line the pockets of senior officers. This means of supplementing the operational funding shortfall is responsible for maintaining corrupt practices. While the funding of the police is arranged in this way, reforms cannot be effective because providing security for the public is actually dependent on the money gained from corruption. In this way, to police in Indonesia is to be corrupt.

Gerber and Mendelson's (2008) notion of predatory policing is useful to explore police corruption in Indonesia. Polri's activities are of a predatory nature where corruption is a widespread means of securing money from the public to enrich the police. While not excusing police corruption, Polri need to police even when budget allocations constrain operational activity. For example, in 2000 a retiring police chief donated twenty-two cars and seventeen motorcycles worth in the region of $US 574,000 to the police, which given his annual wage of $US103,000 demonstrated his ability to raise extra funding from wealthy patrons who benefited from police protection (The Jakarta Post, 2000). While there was a certain amount of speculation over his level of personal wealth, he was also generally praised for his ability to procure these extra funds because without them the police would be unable to fulfil their obligations to the community (The Jakarta Post 2000). Therefore, the funding arrangements that allocate such little money to operational matters ensures that even those reform orientated officers would find themselves in positions where they needed to compromise their honesty in order to serve the community.

Social and Historical Influences on Corruption
It has been noted police culture more or less reflects the values of the society in which the policing organization functions (Hobbs, 1988), and Indonesia is consistently ranked as a highly corrupt country (Martini, 2012). Regardless of this, the Indonesian public express considerable support for the eradication of corruption from its businesses and public offices (Winarta, 2009). Given that Indonesian cultures are historically imbued with corruption (Scott, 2002) it is important to consider how the public feel and conceive of corruption in order to understand its persistence. After all, the police share similar cultural understandings to the public and as such police culture will be influenced by the society being policed.

From the interviews that were conducted with Indonesian members of the public, supported by interviews with policing stakeholders, two things emerged. First, all the participants had either experienced police corruption or knew someone who had. Second, while the Indonesian public express their wish for police corruption to be removed, they are still accepting of bribery as part of their interactions with Polri, as one man shared with us: '…the traffic police stopped me to check my driver's license and a friend of mine that I rode with didn't wear helmet. They asked for Rp50, 000 (US$5) but we told them a white lie and said to them that

we only got Rp10,000. Then they said ok, enough for morning coffee. Imagine, it's really unprofessional.'

It is not that they were asked to pay a bribe by the officer that is perceived as wrong but that the money was negotiable, indicating that bribery is still seen as acceptable by the public. A long cultural history of using bribery to make problems disappear has ingrained this practice deeply into everyday life and the majority of Indonesians cannot envisage not paying the police a bribe when they are stopped.

Sunshine and Tyler (2003) suggest that the primary antecedent of legitimacy is the procedural fairness employed by the police when interacting with the public. What this means is that trust in the police depends on the even-handed application of the law. In the case above, it is the unfairness of how the public is bribed that is seen as particularly damaging to the reputation of the police rather than the actual inequity of paying the bribe itself. A form of procedural injustice is being advocated where bribing members of the public is fair if there is a set price for the gratuity that the officer expects. It is often the case that members of the public will even be ready to offer money before the officer bribes them, meaning that honest officers may be tempted into corruption by the public. In some instances, officers in favour of reform have hung signs outside of stations stating, "If you want an honest police force then don't offer officers bribes". From this it can be seen that the socio-cultural understandings of what is acceptable behaviour for officers has a constraining influence on the Indonesian police culture, making reform of Polri difficult because public acceptance of corrupt practices facilitates corruption's persistence.

While Indonesia has a notorious international reputation for corruption, it is a fair observation that the average citizen is relatively honest and would prefer to be policed by a corruption-free Polri. It is also the case that there is considerable political rhetoric favouring police reform. However, despite numerous police reforms that have focused on shedding Polri's past militaristic reputation for a more community friendly image, the spectre of corruption continues to cast a shadow over policing in Indonesia.

Public perceptions of police

This study explored public perceptions of police. As such, in 17 one-on-one interviews in Lombok, people were asked to state four words to describe the police. All names of interviewees given below are pseudonyms. The first two words that 15 participants gave were a mix of positive words:

> good (*bagus*); very good (*bagus sekali*); sweet tempered (*ramah*); prestigious (*wibawah*); protective (*menoyomi*); friendly (especially policewomen); and polite (*sopan*, notably only in reference to policewomen).

The last two words people used were largely negative:

> unprofessional (*tidak profesinal*); not prestigious (*tidak berwibawah*); money hungry (*mata duitan*); not decisive (*tidak tegas*); violating regulations (*melanggara regulasi*); unfair (*tidak adil*); biased (*pandang bulu*); greedy (*rakus*); rude (*kasar*); arrogant (*arogan*); and cheating (*membodohi, memeras*).

When asked to elaborate on what they think of the police in Indonesia, all but two of 17 people initially responded by saying something positive. In one interview, a middle-aged man named Salim noted, 'We all feel very safe in our village and this is because of the great performance of police officers. ' A woman named Sari recounted that, 'In the village where I live we have a Bhabinsa (a village-based, non-commissioned police officer), and his presence makes everyone feel very safe (*aman*).' Pak Gus, a 52-year-old Muslim man, talked fondly of a police officer who worked in his area, recounting how the officer was extremely polite and refused to take bribes for doing his job. As a result of not taking bribes, this officer was so poor that he could not afford a motorbike, and so did his job by travelling on public transport.

Of the 15 who initially praised police, all but one quickly went on to add a 'but.' For instance, Rachman, a 26-year-old man initially responded positively before offering a critique: 'In general, I am proud of the police because without police there will be no security or order. But there are a lot of things wrong with the police.' Idham, a Muslim man, similarly asserted, 'The police force is very good … The only thing is that the traffic police are very bad.'

Why did people respond with an initial positive reaction when asked about police but then almost invariably move to a critical stance? There may be two key reasons. First, people may have started their response positively for strategic reasons. In interviews, people might be wary of someone asking questions about the police. Having established themselves as a compliant and supportive citizen, they may then feel able to add that perhaps the police could do better.

Second, people may have responded initially positively because they genuinely feel that overall the Indonesian police do a good job in keeping their society safe and orderly. This sense of Indonesia being a safe country is disseminated through the media and it makes sense that police take some credit. Indeed, people often voice sympathy with police. People see underage youth recklessly driving motorbikes, with no helmets, and under-resourced police trying to enforce the law. Some people personally know police officers and hear first-hand accounts of how hard police work and how dedicated they are to making Indonesia a better place. They also know that to get accepted into the police force candidates have to pay large sums of money; people have some sympathy with police trying to recoup this unofficial fee through bribes. In our research, we have met many officers committed to community development and to providing their society with a safe and secure environment, so it is not without reason that people make initially positive comments about the police. It is important not to lose sight, then, of the many caring and committed officers in Polri who go to great lengths to serve society.

While people may think that overall Indonesian police do a good job, and they have sympathy, when questioned further it becomes clear that police have a lot of leg work to do to create public good will. The most substantive comments were made when discussions moved to negatives. Indeed, speaking with high-ranking government officials, senior police personnel, and everyday Indonesians, it becomes clear that there is wide acknowledgement of systemic problems within Polri.

When asked her views on police, Wulan, a 39-year-old woman, argued that while on the whole police did a decent job, a few rogue cops ruin Polri's reputation:

> For the most part the police are very good and because of the police our country is safe. But what gives the police a bad image in society is *oknum* (rogue cops) who

> violate the law, which police, especially, should not do. Some police even use drugs and some are easy to pay off.

Jero, a 48-year-old Muslim man, had similar thoughts:

> There are some *oknum* who sometimes behave inappropriately. For instance, they commit a crime and this makes society sick because police officers shouldn't do that because their role is to protect society and set a good example.

Aisha, a 37-year-old university graduate, expressed disappointment in police:

> For the most part the police are good. But from time to time the society feels very disappointed (*sangat kecawa*). It is all because of some *oknum* who have no morals (*moralitas*). As a result they do something that is contrary to the regulations. Some of them are easy to bribe (*disuap*). No wonder people say KUHP! You know KUHP is the acronym for Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (The Criminal Code), but people joke that the translation should be '*kasih uang, habis perkara*' (pay up, problem solved).

The problems besetting Polri are, of course, far more systemic than a few rogue cops, which the above three narratives suggest. For Sari, a 32-year-old Muslim woman, police are money hungry:

> The police are good because they protect our society. But some of them do not want to work if there is no money (*duit*), or at least cigarettes. Without these things they will serve us very slowly. They are money hungry (*mata duitan*).

For Bambam, police are so money hungry that they intervene even when unwelcome:

> Even if we sort out a disagreement ourselves, like a traffic accident, police will still intervene because they want to make money out of it. If there is a power failure and the traffic lights don't work then the police never help, but if there is a police raid (*kalau razia polisi*), then suddenly the police have new found energy (*baru semangat*).

It was no surprise that when asked what they think about the police, 15 out of the 17 people interviewed recounted stories specifically involving traffic police (Polantas, **Po**lisi **La**lu Li**ntas**). Santi, a 36-year-old Muslim woman, revealed:

> The only thing that is really disappointing is the traffic police. I have heard from many people that the traffic police don't protect people at all. All they do is look for money. So if public perception is like that, there must be something that has made people disappointed (*sangat kecawa*). What is it?

For Maman, an 18-year-old high school graduate, the traffic police tarnish the reputation of the rest of Polri: 'The most annoying thing is the traffic police. Even by charging someone just Rp10,000 (US$1), they lose their authority/prestige (*wibawah*).' People did not always mind paying police a bribe, especially if it meant they did not have to go to court, but what particularly angered many was the bartering of the bribe, as Suparman, a 39-year-old Muslim man, noted:

> The problem is the traffic police, they always charge us but there is no exact amount of money that we have to pay. It's ridiculous when they charge people Rp200,000 (US$40) or maybe even more, but if we say we don't have that much, they say just pay Rp100,000 (US$20). It's cheaper to go to court really because then it's only Rp45,000 (US$9).

This transactional culture, and the special favours extended to the wealthy, create feelings of contempt for the police, as we see for Rachman, a 26-year-old Muslim man, who argues that the law should not be for sale:

> If the police work professionally then there will be a set fine for not having a licence or registration so how can it be like a market place (*transaksi jual beli*)? At the moment the law can be bought (*hukum bisa dibeli*) and that's not good. And what's more, when police try and charge us, well if we flatter (*merayu*) them they might reduce the amount to whatever we have on us, or even just cigarettes. I have a cop friend and if he stops a woman and she flirts with him he won't give her a ticket. And what really makes me mad is that the rich can afford to buy themselves out of any problem. Look at Gayus Tambunan. He stole more than a trillion rupiah from our society. He was arrested and jailed but he could still travel around (*berkeliharan*) and go to Bali. He must have paid the police officer who is in charge of his prison cell block. I hope in the future the image of the police will improve.

People are often positive about the work of police, acknowledging the difficulties they face and that many officers work hard to keep their communities safe. Yet all participants were critical of the police. While some people thought that there were just a few rouge cops tarnishing the reputation of the entire police service, others believed that there was a destructive culture of money-motivated policing, driven by police needing to repay academy entrance fees and wanting to get rich, both through bribing citizens and by letting the rich off serious offenses if paid enough money. On what experience are people forming these opinions of police?

Experiences with police

In our series of interviews in Lombok, 13 out of 17 people asked recounted direct personal dealings with police; the other four had family members who had direct contact. One of the people, Santi, who had had no direct engagement with police said, 'Alhamdulillah (Praise God), I have had no dealings with the police. If everyone carries the right documentation then the police will not charge you.' Of the 13 direct experiences mentioned, 12 were for traffic offenses. One of these was actually a pleasant experience, as shared by Bambam, a 26-year-old man:

> It was night time, about 9pm and I was riding my motorbike with a friend and we drove the wrong way on the road (*melanggur jalur*). As a result there was a cop who drove a car and stopped in front of us. When he stopped, of course we were shocked and we thought the cop would get mad. But when he got out he asked where we were headed and we said we were going to our friend's house. The cop asked why we crossed the road the wrong way and he told us we were not allowed to do that. The cop then said make sure next time you don't do it again. He was a very senior cop and he just gave us a warning and we were really happy with that. So I do hope other police officers can be like him.

All of the other experiences participants had were with traffic police and these experiences were unpleasant and resulted in a fine, either paid as a bribe or formally at the police station or the court. Maman's experience is typical, especially in the bartering of the fine:

> Yes, I have had experience with the police. The traffic police stopped me to check my driver's license and registration, which weren't valid, and I wasn't wearing a helmet. They asked for Rp50,000 (US$10) but I told a white lie (*berbohong untuk kebaikan*) and said I only had Rp10,000 (US$2). Then they said 'OK , that's enough for morning coffee.' Imagine! It's really unprofessional. The police should be more decisive (*tegas*) in handling cases. For instance, the traffic police, if they really want to charge the people, then charge the people. Don't cheat or extort (*memeras*) money from people.

While Maman is annoyed at the bartering of the fine, he seems to think it is fine to drive an unlicensed bike and wear no helmet. Sari has also had experiences and here recounts something that happened to her brother:

> Two months ago my younger brother was charged as he did not have a driver's license. The police officer asked for Rp500,000 (US$100). My brother didn't have that amount so the cop said 'How about Rp100,000 (US$20)?' It just seems that these rogue cops (*oknum*) charge people according to what they can pay. But if people aren't educated the police can easily cheat them (*membodohi*) them. If you are ignorant you might just pay the police. Eventually, we decided not to pay the cop but take a traffic ticket and two weeks later went to the court and he only had to pay Rp45,000 (US$9).

For both Maman and Sari the most annoying thing was not that they had to pay fine – indeed Sari found the court quick and cheap in comparison. The most distasteful thing was that the police bartered with them. If people knew they could go to court and just pay Rp45,000 then they may not haggle with the police. Interestingly, all participants acknowledged that they were in the wrong, suggesting that they thought a fine was fair; but a just fine that was applied to all.

In dealing with traffic offenses, issues of racism often came to ahead, as Sari recounts:

> The [Hindu] police will see a Hindu on their way to pray, and they have a head dress on so no helmet, and they will not charge them. But that same cop will charge every Muslim without a helmet. I once saw a women being disrespected by a cop in front of daughter and she yelled at cop: 'Why don't you arrest all those Hindu people there without helmets? You just arrest Muslims. Do you want SARA (race) riots to start again?'

The only person to mention direct dealings with police for non-traffic related instances was Tedi:

> In 2008, there was a fight between employees. At first, we wanted to solve the problem through kinship but then the victim's side (*pihak korban*) wanted to take legal action through the police. But after the witness statement (BA, *berita acara permeriksaan*, minutes of investigation) was sent to the attorney we asked the police officer to cancel the charges. The police officer then asked for an exorbitant case

cancellation fee (*uang pembatalan khasus*) of Rp600,000 (US$60). Well we had to pay it but what was that fee for? It's really unfair.

Tedi's experience is of disempowerment – he felt he had no option but to pay this fee, which equates to almost a month's salary for a civil servant. These experiences lead people to form impressions of the police that we saw in the previous section. But informing these impressions they also know what they want in a police service.

Indeed, while politeness was rarely mentioned in response to what people you think of police, when people were asked about personal experiences with police, politeness was of key concern. This is especially the case for Rachman who reveals that, 'They have to use polite language because there are a lot of police who, when we try to protest, just ask 'Do you want to teach me? Who do you think you are (*Kalo mengajar saya? Lu kira lu siapa*). This is very rude.' Rachman elaborates on the importance of politeness when relating direct experience he has with police:

> Yes, I have had to deal with the police. Once when I was going back to my home town I was stopped by the traffic police (*polantas, polisi lalu lintas*). I realized my registration was expired and that the motorbike had no mirrors. I went to sit at the police post to wait but the officer said, 'Do not sit there; it's not a public place.' Because he said that so rudely, I didn't accept it and said, 'In what way do you protect society? You are not professional (*tak profesional*).' And the officer said, 'I don't care. Do you want to teach me? I already have a law degree (*saya sudah S1hukum*).' We had a long quarrel (*cec cok*) then and I decided to go to court. I was really disappointed in that officer. Why didn't he talk politely to me? Even if it is not a public place and I can't sit there, then he should have still talked to me politely (*sopan*). You can imagine when I had that long quarrel with the officer that all the people around were looking at me and wondering what was going on. And I swore (*sumpah serapah*) because I was incredibly mad.

What can we take from this? Dealings with traffic police are common but these are almost the only dealings anyone in Indonesia will have with the police. For most people this engagement is not positive, although it sometimes is. The defining features of positive engagement are that the police are polite, helpful, and no mention is made of money. Of dealings with traffic police, what people rant about are not that they have to pay a fine, but that they have to barter for the fine.

What should the police service be like?
Having explored what people say about the police, and people's experiences with police, we turn now to look at what people in Indonesia want their police service to be like. Six keys aspects were raised when people discussed an ideal police force: protect society by providing order and security; facilitating a partnership with society; police being good role models; police educating citizens; politeness; and the eradication of money-motivated policing.

When asked specifically about the role of a police service, a common response was that Indonesian police should protect (*mengaomi*) society by providing order and security. Order and security is known by the acronym *kamtibmas* (**keam**anan dan keter**tib**an **mas**yarakat, literally, safety and order for society). For Aisha, a university graduate, 'Kamtibmas is needed for all members of society so there is no anxiety (*keresahan*), and so people don't take the law into their own hands (*main hakim sendiri*).' If there is order and security, then for Santi, a 36-

year-old woman, 'This means that we will all feel happy and safe from danger and worry and this will mean that the police have done their job well.'

In doing their role as protectors of society, there was a general understanding that police needed to work in partnership with society. For Maman, a high-school graduate, 'Police should protect society and have a close relationship with citizens.' Indeed having a close relationship with society is part of the policing mantra, as Pak Tedi, a village leader, notes, 'The police must embrace their own slogan (*semboyan*), which is for the police to be a partner of society (*polisi adalah mitra masyarakat*).' Suparman also acknowledged the importance of partnership: 'It will take time for the police to improve their performance and there must be encouragement from members of society. The only way that kamtibmas will be achieved is if both sides work together.' Bambam, a 26-year-old Muslim man, additionally stressed the importance of partnership and acknowledged the time it will take for this to develop:

> The police should be the partner of society. All police officers, with no exception, should have a close relationship with society. If police can have a close relationship with society, I believe this will be a good way to improve the police image. But, of course, this is not as easy as simply turning over one's hand (*tidak semuda membalik telapak tangan*).

In facilitating a partnership, people exhorted the police to be good role models. For Aisha, it is through setting a good example and educating the public about laws, that society will come to work with police:

> Their role is absolutely to protect (*mengaomi*). They should also set a good example. If police set a good example, I believe society will obey them. They should also practice socialisation (*socialisiasi*, e.g. teach people).

As part of being good role models, many people believe that police should take the time to educate the public. Rather than just issuing fines for traffic infringements, Pak Tedi argues that police need to make people aware of the rules:

> Police should protect and teach society so people know not to violate the laws. People don't know about the laws, especially about traffic rules, so police should socialise them.

Pak Salim, a 48-year-old Muslim man, asserts:

> Well, so far so good I guess. But the traffic police just charge people. When we drive on the wrong side of the road they don't let us explain ourselves. When we drive on the wrong side of the road, we don't do it intentionally. Maybe we don't see the traffic sign or perhaps the sign is covered by a tree or something. Do the police really want to protect society? If they do then they should not charge people straight away. They should at least give a warning and tell us not to do that again.

While for people like Pak Tedi and Pak Salim education is clearly important in fostering a good relationship between society and police, many people stopped by the traffic police acknowledge that they are in the wrong; most people know they must wear a helmet when riding a motorbike. Nevertheless, the desire for police to take on board this notion of socialisation is strong and it links well with the findings of Tom Tyler and colleagues (Tyler,

1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Lind, 1992) about procedural justice, in particular politeness.

Politeness is a quality that many people mention when imaging what an ideal police service should look like. For instance, Wulan, a 39-year-old Muslim woman, notes, 'Police should be polite, especially traffic police. I have seen some traffic police who are not polite at all when they stop people.'

As we see in many of the statements, if the police had acted politely, even if they had fined someone, or if they had been unable to solve a case, people were relatively happy with their police experiences. However, if officers were impolite, and solved their case, they were still unhappy.

A final thing that many people commented on was their wish that money-motivated policing be eradicated. Idham said: 'They need to protect us and teach us about rules and how to behave, and set a good example. They also have to be unbiased and not just favour the rich.' By favouring the rich, Idham is suggesting that those who can afford to pay will be let off for an offence, or that officers will only take a case on if the victim can pay. For Sari, the police should fully commit to their role of protecting society without thinking of payment:

> The police should protect (*oyomi*) society, and help society in respect to public order and be responsive to people if they need help. They should work heart and soul (*berkerja sepunuh hati*), without expecting any reward.

We see here the expression of six key themes related to what people in Indonesia want from their police service: protect society by providing order and security; facilitating a partnership with society; police being good role models; police educating citizens; politeness; and the eradication of money-motivated policing. The question now becomes how to get to that point?

If I were Police Chief
To find out how people thought police could achieve these ideals, they were asked what they would do if they were made Police Chief. Drawing specifically on 17 interviews with randomly selected members of the public in Lombok in 2011, we see three broad recommendations for improvement: fair and transparent recruitment processes; regulation of fines; and increasing professional conduct.

When asked what he would do were he suddenly made police chief, Pak Tedi, a 62-year-old Muslim village leader, summed up the thoughts of many when he said he would ensure that only quality candidates became police officers:

> In my opinion, if we want a better police service, then human resources must be improved. If a person is qualified, and if they pass the test, then they can become police officers (*orang polisi*). But if they don't pass, then they shouldn't become officers, no matter how much they pay in bribes. The police service shouldn't accept bribes (*uang uang tambahan*) to let in unsuitable people. Because people buy their way into the police service, well, it's no wonder the public perception of police is so negative.

Pak Tedi draws here not just on anecdotal, but also personal, experience. He has two family members in the police service. His brother-in-law, who is now in charge of a police station in Kalimantan, was able to attend the police academy and graduate as an officer without paying any type of bribe. Pak Tedi's nephew, however, had to pay Rp10 million (US$1000), almost as much as a civil servant's annual salary, to a senior officer before being accepted into the service. This money was paid into the senior officer's private bank account. Pak Tedi believes that paying a fee to get accepted into the police service is not of itself a problem. Indeed, Pak Tedi commented that, 'If someone wants to go to university they have to pay, so it's not unreasonable that if you want to get a job as a police officer you must also pay a fee.' What Pak Tedi sees as unacceptable is forcing excellent candidates, who pass the requisite exams and fitness tests, to pay prohibitive fees, which not infrequently reach Rp100 million (US$10,000), into someone's private bank account. For Pak Tedi, and many other Indonesians, fair and transparent recruitment policies would improve the police's public image.

Another comment people made in terms of how they would improve the police if they were made police chief concerns fine regulation. Perhaps surprisingly, people were not necessarily annoyed that they had to pay bribes to the police if they infringed the law. Rather, what angered people was the fluidity of bribes, as Fitri, as 22-year-old university graduate, explains:

> Before charging people, police need to show us the official amount to be paid for that particular violation. It is ridiculous that police say you must pay Rp200,000 (US$40), and then go down to Rp100,000 (US$20), and then down to Rp50,000 (US$10) when they realise that person doesn't have any money. But people must also insist on going to court rather than paying the fine on the spot. Most importantly, police should not negotiate with people who break that law.

Firti's narrative exhorts empowerment and encourages people to demand an official infringement notice and to then proceed to court. She acknowledges, though, that for many Indonesians court is an intimidating place: 'Ordinary people hear the word 'court' and they believe they have already lost, even before the battle beings' (*orang awam dengar pengadilan sudah takut ibarat kalah sebelum perang*). Indonesia's judicial system is highly flawed and it is no wonder that people worry that if they go to court they will have to pay an exorbitant sum, and that they may even end up in prison. For many people, it appears safer, cheaper, and quicker to pay a bribe to the police on the spot. Police are cognizant of this fear and play on this to try and exhort as much money from perpetrators as possible. Ideally, police reform would involve a public awareness campaign that lets people know the fee for a basic traffic infringement, such as not wearing a helmet (in 2013 this is Rp45,000 (US$9)), and that by going to court this is all they will have to pay, and that they will not go to prison. But even if police could implement a 'fixed bribe', and 'not negotiate with those who break the law,' public opinion of the police would likely improve.

When talking about improving the police, many people suggested aspects that can be included under the umbrella of increasing professional conduct. This encompasses desirable police qualities, such as being a role model, fair, and a partner of society. When asked what he would do if he were made police chief, Idham, a 34-year-old man, said:

> The police need to have a close relationship with society and one way they could do this is by setting a good example. For instance, when police drive on the streets, they

must drive well and this will indirectly teach society to drive well too. Police also need to be professional, unbiased (*tidak pandang bulu*) and fair (*adil*). What the traffic police often do is just pick easy targets (*incaran*). The police often stop those people who look lost and confused riding their motorbikes. The police assume these people are from out-of-town and will be easy targets. This is not fair. The police need to be ready to act and they need to work with society in a partnership. A good friend is one who is always ready to help (*teman yang baik adalah teman yang selalu sipa di saat kita membutuhkannya*).

Many of these thoughts were also expressed by Aisha, a 37-year-old woman:

> If I were police chief, well, I would make sure that the police carried out socialisation (*sosialisasi*) programs so that people learn about the rules of society. People do not know about traffic rules so police have to teach them and they should give people a warning first rather than just fine them straight away. But the police cannot just carry out this socialisation in hotels [i.e. at the scene of the crime]. Also, when police stop a motorbike, they should not kick the driver or chase him/her; they are not allowed to do this. They must be polite. Really, the morality (*moralitas*) of the police needs to improve so that officers do not break the law.

Idham and Aisha both want a police service that educates citizens and provides role models for society. They also want their police service to be fair and unbiased so that regardless of who you are you will be treated like everyone else. Aisha, in particular, was concerned about the morality of the police, noting that if police continue to be abusive towards the people they were supposed to be protecting, there would be no partnership between police and the public, something essential to winning public support for the police.

Through the narratives of Pak Tedi, Fitri, Idham and Aisha were get a sense of what people want from their police service: fair and transparent recruitment processes, a clear and regulated system of fines, and a professional and moral police service that educates citizens and works in partnership with them. While certainly people want a more effective and efficient Indonesian police service, this was not a priority to the people interviewed, neither was a heavily armed force. People do not like police corruption, but eradicating corruption was not cited by anyone as a top priority.

Conclusions

NZAID funding has enabled us to achieve significant progress in understanding the journey towards police reform in Indonesia. More specifically, we have explored ways in which the legitimacy of the police effects economic development and the prosperity of the Indonesian state. In a quantitative sense, this grant has enabled us to produce numerous publications (Buttle, Davies, & Meliala, under review; Davies, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014; S. G. Davies, J. Buttle, & A. Meliala, under review; S. G. Davies, J. W. Buttle, & A. Meliala, under review; Davies, Meliala, & Buttle, 2013a, 2013b). In addition to publications, this grant has enabled us to secure further funding for policing research through various avenues, including Fulbright, University of Indonesia, and Auckland University of Technology. Indeed, Associate Professor Davies will spend the second half of 2014 in the US on a Fulbright award giving guest lectures and attending conferences where she will speak about her MFAT funded project on policing in Indonesia. With such additional funding secured, the research team will

continue its project on policing in Indonesia, and we anticipate that our work will shortly be published in a book entitled *Policing in Indonesia*. As Associate Professor Davies has previously published two monographs with Routledge, it is anticipated that Routledge will be interested in publishing this book.

In a more qualitative sense, our research has been significant. We have trained and worked with seven Indonesian research assistants and we have been able to up-skill them both in terms of research methods, and English translation and interpretation. Our research has also enabled us to form collaborative networks with key policing personnel based in Indonesia, including New Zealand police liaison Neil Banks, US Department of Justice Director Gerald Heuett, and the Asia Foundation. These connections, along with our close association with Police Complaints Commissioner Professor Adrianus Meliala, have helped ensure that our findings are robust.

Policy transfer is an important tool for the international policing community. One way to strengthen this is to ensure that policies are appropriate for recipient nations, and to allow for recipient nations to engage in a meaningful way with policy development. In Indonesia there are a considerable number of significant barriers that make it difficult to implement programs in an effective manner. Given that police corruption is endemic, and is a large barrier to police reform, attention needs to be paid to this. International aid needs to increase ethical policing in Indonesia. Resources directed towards human rights training and ethical policing need to be increased. Furthermore, reform in Indonesia is most effective when donors work together, and work with Polri.

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