MONASH University

An Empire of Obedience?
The Interests of Rome's Italian Allies and their Motivations for Compliance in the Third and Second Centuries BCE

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Abstract

Rome rose to dominance over the Italian peninsula largely through its network of Italian allies. This thesis explores the interests of those allies and their motivations for compliance or resistance to Rome in the Third and Second centuries BCE. Since there are indicators that some allies were dissatisfied with Roman control, such as rebellion, it is worth assessing what factors compelled them to remain compliant. In order to address such a question, I evaluate Roman–allied affairs through the lens of power relationships. More specifically, I apply the Sociologist Dennis Wrong's typology of power to identify what forms of power influenced allied decision making. The results of such an approach support the widespread modern acknowledgment that fear and rewards—coercion and inducements in Wrong's terms—had a strong impact on maintaining allied compliance. More importantly, this thesis finds that legitimacy, i.e. the agreed perception of power-holders and subordinates that the hierarchy is valid and proper, likely played a key role in keeping allies complaint to Roman demands, which is underappreciated in modern scholarship.

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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
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Topographic data for all maps is from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, via the USGS.

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Elevation (m asl)
High : 4453
Low : -19

100 50 0   100 Kilometres

N

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Saticula
Caudium
Capua
C a m p a n i a
Pontiae
Nola
Neapolis
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Legend

🔴 Roman Citizen
⚪ Latin Colony
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— Major Rivers

Elevation (m asl)
High : 4453
Low : -19

40 20 0 40 Kilometres

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Map 3: Central Italy

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Introduction

During the Third and Second centuries BCE,[1] Rome went from prominence in its native region of Latium in west-central Italy (modern Lazio) to dominance over the entire Italian peninsula, before going on to conquer Greece, Spain and Northern Africa. A key factor in Rome's astonishing success was her ability to draw upon the Italian allies for support. These Italian allies, by which I mean those Italians under Roman control without any form of Roman citizenship, gave Rome access to a vast number of troops—one of the most decisive factors in military conflicts of the ancient world—and access to cities which could serve as fortresses, granaries and ports. This study investigates both the obligations that the Romans imposed on their allies in the Third and Second centuries and how the allies responded to them, in order to ascertain the interests of the allies. One of the central aims of this research is to discuss the compliance of the allies, the most common response to Roman control, and to analyse why this was the case.[2]

How any group manages to bind others to them, especially on their own terms, is a matter worthy of serious inquiry. During Rome's conquest of Italy, it was confronted with incorporating a heterogeneous group of Italians and compelling them to remain faithful. What is remarkable is that Rome managed to keep its network of allies—a group who outnumbered the Romans—intact over centuries and through serious challenges. For instance, Rome and its network survived Hannibal the Carthaginian, who campaigned throughout Italy during the Second Punic War, often deliberately trying to entice the allies to defect from Rome. That said, the history of Roman-allied relations is not without turmoil and the occurrences of rebellion suggests that compliance was sometimes against the wishes of some allies, rendering the question of Rome's success far more interesting. Compliance to authority has had far reaching impacts on human affairs and the lessons drawn from Rome's ally network are no less significant.

In order to determine the motivations for the compliance of Rome's Italian allies, this study focuses on the nature of Roman power.[3] Power, as a sociological concept, has been debated and the details vary among theorists. In the context of this study, power is the "capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others" (Wrong 1995, 2). Notably, power cannot be said to be possessed by

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[1] All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.

[2] Generally, I prefer the term compliance to loyalty for its neutral value. Though not always the case, loyalty can connote a sense of willingness or belief in the system. As an example, Livy (30.19) says that Hannibal left some towns garrisoned in Bruttium and that they were being held "rather by fear than by loyalty," implying that loyalty was separate to merely being held under one's control. In other words, according to Livy, fear implies compulsion whereas loyalty implies voluntary commitment. Throughout this paper use of the terms such as 'loyalty,' 'acquiescence' and 'obedience,' should be taken synonymously with the term 'compliance.' That is, as signifying the fulfilment of imposed demands without implying the level of enthusiasm.

[3] Henceforth, all references to Roman 'control,' 'domination,' 'rule' and 'sway,' are to be taken as synonymous with Roman 'power' as it is defined in this paper.

someone without relating it to the person or group they have power over (Dornbusch and Scott 1975, 32; Wrong 1995, 2). It encompasses, then, a quality of the relationship, rather than just an attribute of a master. For this very reason, it is necessary to explore Rome's means but also the interests of the allies. This involves establishing as much clarity as possible about what Rome expected of the allies and how the allies responded in turn. The connection between allied interests and compliance is demonstrated, for example, in the works of Keller (2007) and Fronda (2010). Indeed, as Keller (2007, 45, 54) argues, elite Romans and elite Italian allies had different interests and that relations between them broke down when these interests conflicted. Fronda (2010, 280-1) claims that, during the Second Punic War, local rivalries between allied cities influenced decision-making, including the decision to remain under Roman control or not. At certain moments in Rome's history, as during the Second Punic War, Rome was not the only group capable of holding power over allies. Certainly, at times Hannibal had power over the allies and, in addition, more prominent Italian allies had power over smaller allies. Though, as Fronda's study suggests, multiple power relations existed, often simultaneously, I focus on the power that Rome held over the allies. Before expanding further, it is first necessary to review other assessments on compliance, in order to get a sense of how allied loyalty has been understood.

Since power relations and the common response of acquiescence have been such an important and pervasive feature of human affairs, it is no surprise that the compliance of Rome's allies has been addressed for two millennia. Indeed, ancient and modern authors alike have attempted to explain allied loyalty, with varying reasons offered. The ancient sources, principally Roman, tend to promulgate the idea that loyalty was achieved through fair and moderate rule (Livy 22.13.11; Diod. Sic. 22.2.3-4; cf. Kapust 2011, 103, 108), which may be didactic rather than illustrative of the political realities.[4] Livy (23.15.7 – 16.1), especially, records numerous events that demonstrate the role of kindness in attaining compliance. For instance, Livy (22.13.11) wrote that, in 217 BCE, when Hannibal's Numidian allies were raiding the Falernian countryside, the allies remained loyal to Rome "assuredly because the rule under which they were governed was just and temperate...". According to Livy, moreover, the Nolan citizen Lucius Bantius, a distinguished cavalryman, had considered betraying Nola to the Carthaginians because of the kind treatment he had received from Hannibal and was only deterred when the Roman Marcellus demonstrated his appreciation of Bantius with his own kindness and gifts. Likewise, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who attended an Aetolian council in 211, is recorded as emphasising the good treatment of allies, adding that some preferred their own favoured position to being granted Roman citizenship (Livy 26.24.1-3).[5] Sempronius, consul of 218, believed that defending allies was the most

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[4] Citations of ancient authors throughout this work follow the abbreviations outlined in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary,* 4th edition. Julius Obsequens, not included in the OCD, is abbreviated here as Obseq. All translations, with little variation, come from the *Loeb Classical Library.*

[5] This claim is supported by the instances where allies did indeed choose to keep their own citizenship (Cic. Bal. 21; Livy 23.20.2-3). While allies did on occasion choose their citizenship over Rome's, the underlying reasons for doing so are still unknown. Marcus Valerius Laevinus presents their choice as a result of them enjoying good treatment, as opposed to the possibility that they wanted to protect their own institutions. Either view is plausible.

effective way to keep "the allies to their obligations," again, according to Livy (21.52.8). A senatorial deliberation, concerning the fate of the rebellious Privernates, acknowledged that peace made on favourable terms ensured allegiance, whereas forced terms would lead to precarious loyalty (Livy 8.21.4-7). Miscellaneous Roman conduct toward the allies, while not recorded as reasons for allied loyalty, certainly strengthens the representation of Rome as considerate of allied wellbeing. M. Valerius Falto, the new *propraetor* of Sardinia, was authorized to enlist an army, choosing from among the allies those "who had served the shortest periods" (Livy 31.8.10). Rewards also promote the notion that Rome was kind to allies. Land confiscated from Gauls and Ligurians was parcelled out to citizens, but also to allies, albeit at a reduced rate (Livy 52.4.4). Finally, spoils generated from war were shared with the allies (Rosenstein 2012a, 85).[6] Kindness may have indeed played a role—perhaps illustrated by such things as the commander of the Roman garrison at Locri being secretly let free, presumably by the Locrians (Livy 24.1.9)—but what is important to establish here is that ancient reports consider kind and just rule an indicator for allied loyalty.

While the ancient authors acknowledge that kindness was key to achieving allied compliance, they did also recognize the role played by fear. In a period of uncertainty, according to Livy (7.25.7), the Senate resorted to fear as a way of keeping allies loyal. Similarly, fear was likely behind why a Roman presence among the Celts deterred the chances of a Gallic rebellion (Polyb. 3.60.11-12; Lazenby 1978, 52). Fear was not, however, a compelling factor unique to Rome. For instance, Livy (24.1.1) recorded that some Greek cities resisted Carthaginian overtures due to Carthage's association with the Bruttians, people that many Greeks disliked and feared. In addition, many Bruttians who had spent time aiding Carthage, are said to have remained with Hannibal because they were scared to withdraw their support (Livy 30.20.5). What set the fear of Rome apart from fear of other powers in Italy was the virtual certainty of punishment, an important aspect of influencing behaviour (cf. Wrong 1995, 44). Every defection in the late Fourth century and the Third century was met, without fail, by Roman reprisal and reincorporation into Roman control. The sheer futility of resisting Rome (cf. Rosenstein 2012b, 79) was presumably influential. Nevertheless, Livy (26.49.8-9) has Scipio tell Spanish hostages from New Carthage not to be dismayed for Rome prefers to bind other nations by favour not fear.[7]

While this is beginning to change (cf. page 15; Tan 2020, 52-53, 75), modern scholarship, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been influenced by the ancient tendency to emphasise Roman goodwill and its role in keeping allies to their obligations. As Fronda and Gauthier (2017, 308) note, many earlier scholars regarded Roman control as benevolent. Theodor Mommsen (1894 II, 57-8), for example, wrote that Roman dominance was sustainable because is afforded its allies autonomy, "a shadow of

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[6] This plunder was most commonly distributed equally among Roman and allied soldiers (Toynbee 1965a, 255; Rosenstein 2012a, 85; cf. Livy 40.43.7; *contra* Salmon 1982, 126). The allies receiving less booty from Claudius Pulcher's campaign in 177 (Livy 41.13.7-8) was irregular (Harris 1984, 97).

[7] Briscoe (1989, 77) disagrees, writing that Roman policy was to maintain compliance through coercion, rather than humane treatment.

independence," a part of Roman military success and, notably, it did not tax them. Mommsen characterised Roman rule as a "magnanimity perhaps unparalleled in history." This view is not without merit and certainly, Rome did not intervene in her allies' affairs the way other Mediterranean powers had, but the relative benefits, as we shall see, do not fully explain allied compliance. Along similar lines, Reid (1915, 95) expressed surprise that Tarentum defected from Rome (in 212) because "the Romans had in no way oppressed the people of Tarentum." Badian (1958, 144-6) wrote that cases where allies asked Rome for help were a demonstration that the allies had a "willingness to accept Roman control." For Badian, the allied submission was voluntary and based on things like fear, habit and the wish to be protected. In addition, Toynbee (1965a, 272-3) maintained that Rome was generous to the allies, asking little and demanding less than other Mediterranean powers tended to. Keaveney (2005, 4) reasoned that, if Rome's Italian subjects resembled Praeneste, which had refused Rome's offer of citizenship, that they were therefore "content with the state of affairs." Keaveney continued to say that the allies had been "happy to be subordinate." For Cornell (1989, 387-8) the allies were surprisingly compliant and remained consistently loyal, which, in his opinion, is likely due to Rome being supported by the allied upper class and the spoils that allies received. Momigliano (1975, 45-6) also held this notion, writing that Roman control operated through the support of the allied ruling class and the financial opportunities afforded to ordinary allies. Much of this earlier literature, though not all, gives the impression that the Italian allies of Rome who remained compliant did so because they were enjoying or benefitting from their position under Rome or simply that Roman control was not heavy handed.

Recent scholarship, to a lesser degree, likewise emphasizes a sense of benefit for the allies and the role this played in allied compliance. First, Keller (2007, 50) characterizes Rome's alliance with the Italians as an "apparently balanced system of mutual services and trust, and, especially, of coinciding interests" Forsythe (2005, 286) reinforces this by pointing out that "many of Rome's Italian allies likewise possessed a well-established military tradition, so that the profitability of successful warfare (slaves and booty) bound the Roman elite, the Roman adult male population, and Rome's allies together into a common interest of waging wars." Sage (2008, 128) agrees, emphasising the links between elite Romans and allies: "until the outbreak of the Social War in 90 we hear of few revolts by allied communities. This may in part have been due to the overwhelming military power of Rome, but the most significant factor was surely the mutually beneficial ties established between the Roman elite and those of allied communities." Rosenstein (2012b, 77) reaffirms the infrequency of allied revolts and writes that part of the reason for this stemmed from "the fact that it [Roman control] offered real benefits to the *socii*," pointing out the opportunities for spoils and military recognition. To this Rosenstein (2012b, 78) adds that Rome's military force played a role in maintaining compliance. Roselaar (2012, 155, 158) claims that Rome's system only worked while the advantages of Roman control were greater than the drawbacks and, moreover, wrote that Rome's allies indeed "enjoyed considerable benefits"

such as material profit, which fostered loyalty. Scopacasa (2016, 45) largely agrees with Cornell, writing that the allies tended to comply with Roman demands because they profited by receiving spoils and the backing of the allied upper class. In general, then, modern scholarship highlights the beneficial nature of Roman control, commonly citing the opportunity for spoils and the ties between Romans and allied elites.

While this appears to be the prevailing view, it is not universal. Salmon (1982, 126), for example, catalogues the benefits afforded to Roman citizens, which were denied to allies. Furthermore, he points out that the overseas provinces became the domain of Roman influence, where Rome could dictate the indemnities and only Rome received them. Finally, Salmon recognises the occasional gifts Rome donated to allied cities, but he sums it up as Rome tossing "them an item or two as a lordly and condescending act of grace." That said, Salmon (1982, 72) considers the protection granted by Rome as a benefit to the allies. More recently, others have emphasised the negative aspect of the allied condition. Mouritsen's (1998, 173) revision of the Italian question (and the historiography underlying it) characterized the relationship between Rome and the allies as "a conflict between dominated peoples and a foreign oppressor." Likewise, Pobjoy (2000, 194) referred to the allies' condition as a "degrading subservience," which contributed to their rebellion in the early first century. Kent (2018, 266), recognised that allies received benefits, but characterised the allied situation as one of subordination, outlining numerous areas where allies were disadvantaged. Fronda (2010, 21, 28) argues against the idea that Romans and allies were particularly unified. Instead, using the Second Punic War as a case study, he found that self-interest still occupied allied pursuits. When Hannibal invaded, local rivalries between allied cities influenced decision making, including the decision to remain under Roman control or not (Fronda 2010, 280-1).

Clearly the benefits outlined would apply most strongly to the elites of the allied cities, as they were the primary decision makers of each city.[8] Along with Romans and their allies serving together on campaign, elite ties served as one of the focal points of interaction. Many allied cities, for example, sought the aid of Scipio Aemilianus in response to the Gracchan land reforms (App. *B Civ.* 1.19). Along these lines, there are cases of Roman individuals, like Scipio, having bonds with particular allied cities, such as Fabricius Luscinus being a patron to numerous Samnite cities (Val. Max. 4.3.6), and this occasionally involved the Roman counterpart remaining interested in or acting as benefactors for certain allied cities (Patterson 2006a, 143-5).[9] In addition, Livy's (6.13.7) judgement that high-ranking Latins and Hernici found amongst the treacherous Volsci were "clear proof" of Latin and Hernici allegiance suggests that elite members of a city carried significant weight in determining a city's loyalty. The elite

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[8] Although the spoils distributed to allied soldiers could benefit non-elite allies, along with the incidental advantages to living under prosperous elites.

[9] On the topic of Roman individuals relating to allied settlements, see: Badian 1958, 154-5; Patterson 2006a, 143-7; David 1996, 127-135.

members of allied cities were instrumental in making sure the population of their city adhered to Roman demands, for the gathering of citizens to serve in Rome's armies would have needed organising at the local level. An important feature of elite ties is the personal relationships made between Romans and allies. Some of these relationships include things such as intermarriage (*connubium*) and guest-friendship (*hospitium*). The genuine, personal connections emerging from these relationships could contribute to allied obedience. As will be discussed later, valuing another's personal qualities can be an incentive to serve them.

In my view, the modern evaluations of compliance are correct on many points. They address both Rome's means for compelling others and allied interests, and they highlight elite ties, which I agree are significant. Regardless, due to the general lack of studies wholly committed to a sustained investigation of allied compliance, the strength of those insights is unsatisfying. In many of the works mentioned above, allied loyalty is but one of the numerous questions addressed in a much larger discussion and therefore does not receive the full attention it merits.[10] Likewise, some of these works, given the relative scarcity of available evidence, are necessarily speculative. As Harris (1984, 96) pointed out, questions such as subjective allied reactions to Roman military requests are to some degree impossible to answer. I cannot hope to be any less speculative, but I believe applying a theoretical framework to the Roman-allied dynamic could help explain Rome's obtainment and maintenance of power over the allies across two centuries. In my view, such a framework could add structure to this discussion, where each motivating factor, and its compelling power, can consolidate evaluations of allied compliance in a methodical way. Scholarship in the field of sociology has long addressed the phenomenon of acquiescence to power, which has the potential to provide such a framework for explaining Roman power. The sociologist Dennis Wrong developed a framework to delineate the forms of power, which I adopt in order to clarify Rome's power over the Italian allies. Power, as previously discussed, is not a property of a person or group but of a relationship (Dornbusch and Scott 1975, 32). With this in mind, the forms of power identified by Wrong simultaneously represent both the power-holder's means for compelling and the subject's reason for complying. The form referred to as coercion, to illustrate, is thus both the power-holder's means to threaten and the subordinate's consequent fear. From the outset, it is important to note that categories of power do not always neatly correspond to actual realities. Nevertheless, they aid our conceptualisation of Roman power and have explanatory power when combined to elucidate the overall system of control.

The late Dennis Wrong was a distinguished sociologist who spent his long career teaching out of Brown University and New York University. Wrong's work engaged with some of the chief sociologists of recent history, such as Max Weber and Talcott Parsons and his early 60s paper "the Oversocialized Conception of Man," published in The American Sociological Review, became one of the journal's

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[10] Exceptions include Fronda's *Between Rome and Carthage*.

most widely cited (Roberts, 2018). Wrong's book *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses* (1995), from which the taxonomy of power is drawn, was well received. Indeed, reviews of the first edition praised Wrong's discussion of the forms of power (e.g. Braybrooke 1981, 437; Luckenbill 1981, 851; Mann 1983, 1030-1; Barnes 1990, 119). The selection rationale for Wrong's taxonomy of power over other theorists' rests on Wrong's comprehensiveness and clarity in distinguishing the forms, agreement with some key distinctions he made (e.g. not conflating legitimacy with authority but recognising legitimacy as one form of authority), and the applicability of such forms to individual relations, which is conducive to analysing an ancient society. While Wrong never devised his taxonomy explicitly for the purpose of examining the ancient world, his taxonomy nevertheless provides a sound framework to understand the motivations and actions of Rome's Italian allies.

Specifically, as mentioned, Wrong's framework clearly delineates the factors that motivate compliance. These factors—or forms of power, as Wrong names them—are divided into four broad categories: Force, Manipulation, Persuasion and Authority. For reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 4, Manipulation and Persuasion are not discussed in this work. Force and Authority, however, were key to keeping Rome's allies compliant. Briefly, force is the actual application of violence, exemplified by such things, in the Roman context, as besieging a city or carrying out executions. Authority, the other form of power discussed in this study, was the most significant motivating factor for Rome's allies. This involves following another's orders based on their status. As we will see, a relationship of authority developed between Rome and her allies. Indeed, Rome was viewed by many of the allies as an authority, an authority being anyone "who is regularly obeyed" (Easton 1958, 182). In Wrong's formulation, the reasons for obeying an authority can be further divided into five defined categories: coercion, inducements, legitimacy, competence and personal. Coercion and inducements, respectively, represent the authority's ability to punish disobedience and reward subordinates for remaining compliant. Legitimacy refers to how each actor in the power hierarchy regards the authority's validity to issue demands. Specifically, legitimate authority involves the power holder regarding their right to issue demands as valid and, most essentially, it requires the subordinate acknowledging the authority's demands as proper and legitimate. The fourth reason for obeying an authority, competence, involves a subordinate following demands because the subordinate considers the authority an expert or more superior. Finally, personal authority signified someone obeying another from feelings of admiration or a wish to please said other. As we will see, arranging Roman-allied relations according to Wrong's framework helps us understand why Rome's allies remained compliant.

Before discussing the allied interests that will be adduced in chapter three, I want to first establish those interests I accept *a priori* and those I accept on the basis of previous scholarship. From the outset, it is clear that Rome's Italian allies, generally, would have valued the full panoply of human concerns including survival and the wellbeing of their loved ones. This I take as a basic postulate and one requiring no sustained defence. Keller's (2007) study, citing the widespread trade networks of goods

between allied communities and overseas settlements, such as metal, wool and wine, has confirmed that the interests of allied nobles included business pursuits and financial success. Connected to this, is the value for high social status. According to Gabba (1976, 76), the Italian traders at Delos had a habit of remaining connected to their home city and increased their social standing at home. For the allies, local political life was competitive, where displays of wealth were common (Lomas 2004, 212). Owing to the lack of state provisions, public works were typically furnished by the benefaction of these allied elites (Lomas 2004, 212-3). So, the leading allies took an interest in commerce and their social status but even the poorer allies, presumably, had some investment in the efforts of the elites, as it would be linked to the prosperity of their city overall. Finally, the allies were no less belligerent than Rome (cf. Beard 2016, 162) and it is likely that elite status was connected to military achievements along with financial success.

Regarding the chronological scope, I have largely refined my discussion to the Third and Second centuries BCE, which roughly corresponds to the Middle Republican Period. The rationale for the selected period stems from the fact that it includes many important developments in Roman-allied relations. During this period, we largely witness the consolidation of the Italian communities under Roman power, a supreme test to this system by the challenge of Hannibal and then relative stability in the Second century, which offers a glimpse of Roman control without numerous exemplary displays of coercion. This study deliberately ends before the Social War because I want to investigate the relationship between the Romans and the allies in the context prior to the Social War without treating the interactions as mere pre-cursors to it, which would risk becoming teleological. Allied conditions in the Fourth century (especially prior to 338) and earlier are far less systematic and, importantly, much of Italy was still independent from Rome.

Along similar lines, the further back into Roman history we examine, the less reliable the sources are (Drummond and Ogilvie 1989, 16; Kent 2012, 74). Fortunately, the sources of our extant literary accounts are traceable to the Third century, sources which presumably themselves had access to records and oral testimony to even earlier periods. Some of these include Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator, who lived during the Second Punic War and wrote a history of it (Lazenby 1978, 262; cf. Livy 1.55.8; 10.37.14), Silenus of Caleacte and Sosylus the Lacedaimonian, who accompanied Hannibal in Italy (Walbank 1957, 28), Timaeus, a Greek writer from the late Fourth century (Drummond and Ogilvie 1989, 2) and Cincius Alimentus, another Roman senator (Fronda 2010, 110). Despite this, the extant literary sources have a glaring weakness: namely, none of them were written by the allies, instead coming from Roman writers (Lomas 2004, 201). As Erskine (2013, 115-6) has already pointed out, it is common to have a greater understanding of the ruler's viewpoint than the ruled. While there are some native sources for how other groups encountered Rome, such as Greek and Jewish accounts, no such extra-Roman sources exists for the Italian allies in this period. Considering that this study investigates allied interests and the motivations behind their compliance to Roman demands, this is highly

problematic. At best ancient assessments for allied compliance are based on conversations between friendly allies and Romans and other Roman inspections, and, at worst, allied obedience is deduced from mere speculation or presented didactically as a result of Roman beneficence.[11] Archaeological evidence offers some relief from this silence, affording a limited insight into allied sentiments. Some examples include friezes, such as the one excavated at Fregellae, depicting Latins and Romans fighting alongside one another, as well as *tesserae hospitales*, inscriptions at Delos and ceramics. Scopacasa (2015a), for example, has investigated Samnite perceptions of integration through the lens of pottery and trade networks. Regardless, the interpretation of this material is highly speculative and written accounts are far more conducive to analysing allied concerns.

If we are forced to take Roman literary sources into account, we must dissect the mere reports about events from the explanations and judgements about why they occurred. Livy's (22.13.11) report about allied loyalty in the Falernian countryside in 217, for instance, includes a statement that the allies remained faithful because they were under "just and temperate" rule. In an account such as this, I am confident in taking the fact of compliance as historical but scrutinize the accompanying assessment. This is far from a certain or scientific dichotomy. Keeping Livy as an example, there is the issue that the differences between his mere reports of an event and his judgements about them are neither distinct nor straightforward. If Livy believed the judgements he made, then this could have influenced his selection of events from his own sources and how he weighed the validity of them against each other and, thus, even his seemingly 'objective' reports are biased. The sheer inextricability of someone's bias from their most dispassionate reports, and the total ubiquity of this problem, renders the issue a non-starter. It is, generally speaking, sufficient for two interlocuters to assume a shared epistemology without having to first identify and defend their own presuppositions. By analogy, I think Livy's implicit biases must be accepted but not obsessed over to derail the possibility of using him to draw conclusions about allied interests. Finally, the merit of applying a sociological model, such as Wrong's, to the allied situation helps alleviate our reliance on Roman sources by considering broad human tendencies as opposed to relying on possible Roman fictions.

Before analysing allied compliance through the lens of Wrong's power framework, I first discuss the identity of the allies and clarify the obligations that Rome imposed on them. Accordingly, Chapter One establishes who I consider the allies to be for the sake of this thesis, looking at the historical categories and then identifying many of individual cities that existed under Roman power in this period. Chapter Two looks at the obligations that Rome imposed on the allies, including what constitutes an obligation and what they were. There is some disagreement about the matter, with Beard (2016, 264) saying that

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[11] It is safe to believe that the Romans had some insight into why allies were behaving in certain ways. As will be discussed in chapter 3, the Romans had ways of ascertaining why allies reneged on certain arrangements, for instance, and there are numerous reports of Romans sending out parties to investigate potential allied outbreaks (cf. Livy 4.30.5.6; 9.26.6-7; 27.21.6-8, 27.24, 28.10.5).

troop provision was the central demand, whereas Baronowski (1984, 249 and n. 7) claimed that allies were to use all their resources, if Rome needed. It is important to establish what the allies were duty-bound to perform (or abstain from) before exploring their reactions. Following this, Chapter Three focuses on rebellious responses to these obligations. Rebellion, notably, lends us a pretty clear insight into allied interests as they were risking their wellbeing to throw off Roman control. Chapter Four continues the investigation of allied responses, but in this case, it is specifically concerned with compliant responses to Roman demands. Compliance is far from straightforward and reasons for complying can be highly varied, especially when we are dealing with a diverse group, such as Rome's Italian allies. In order to help analyse allied obedience, I draw on Wrong's framework of power bases to explore what factors could have maintained the allies under Roman control. These factors—force and authority—will not have applied uniformly to the allies but they have strong explanatory power for why many of the allies will have remained compliant. Lastly, Chapter Five, which takes the Latin colony of Fregellae as a case study, applies the conclusions of Chapter Four to this individual allied city. Collectively, this forms a picture of the motivations for and pressures on allied decision-making. But first, we shall now turn to allied identity.

1. Who Were the Allies?

1.a) Definitions

For a study dedicated to the conditions of Rome's Italian allies and allied interests, it is crucial to specify who classified as an ally and then identify them. By the late Fourth Century, the inhabitants of the Italian peninsula were classified as Roman citizens, Latins or *socii* (Cornell 1995, 365; Lomas 2011, 339; Gargola 2017, 88). Two of these categories, Roman citizens and Latins, emerged most distinctly from the resolution of the Latin War in 338. Following the dissolution of the Latin League, polities were treated in different ways. Many cities from Latium Vetus were incorporated as full Roman citizens (*civitas optimo iure*) while other cities, primarily in Campania, were incorporated as partial Roman citizens (*civitas sine suffragio*) (Livy 8.14; Cornell 1995, 349-351).[12] From 338 onward, Latin status was marked by legal rights and ceased to be based on ethnicity or geography (Cornell 1989, 366). As a part of the settlement of 338, seven pre-existing Latin colonies maintained their Latin status (Salmon 1969, 51)[13] and many colonies established henceforth were reckoned among the Latins (Salmon 1969, 56; Cornell 1889, 367). Notably, the Latins were not limited to the Latin colonists but included the pre-existing cities which maintained Latin status after 338 (Sherwin-White 1973, 96; Howarth 1997, 192).

Where did the *socii* fit in to this scheme? The *socii* were those Italian allies who did not have Latin status (Baronowski 1988, 172; cf. Hoyos 2011, 70). Indeed, these two groups are often distinguished by Livy (using the term *socii Latini nominis*)[14] and Roman documents such as *Lex de provinciis praetoriis*[15]—on the assumption that σύμμαχοι ὀνόματος Λατίνου corresponds to *sociis nominis Latini* (cf. Roselaar 2012, 149)—and the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*.[16] The *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*, for example, reads: *"No man, neither a Roman citizen, one of the Latin name, or any*

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[12] The partial citizens included Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, Pedum, Tusculum, Velitrae and Antium and the full citizens included Accerae, Capua, Cumae, Formiae, Fundi, Privernum and Suessula.

[13] Signia, Norba, Ardea, Circeii, Setia, Sutrium and Nepet.

[14] Undoubtedly, Livy used this phrase on at least some occasions to represent both Latins and the *socii*, as is evident in the passages where he used a conjunction or the enclitic -*que* to distinguish the two groups: 10.26.14, 22.27.11, 22.38.1, 22.57.1, 27.9.1, 27.9.2, 28.32.6, 29.27.2, 31.7.17, 31.10.5, 32.8.7, 32.28.11, 33.26.4, 34.16.7, 34.56.5, 35.7.5, 35.20.5, 35.20.12-13, 35.41.7, 36.3.13, 37.2.6, 37.2.9-10, 37.39.9, 37.50.3, 39.20.3, 40.1.6, 40.18.5-6, 40.28.9, 40.40.13, 41.9.2 and 41.14.11. Despite this, Livy uses the phrases on numerous other occasions without a conjunction and there is disagreement about how this should be taken, with some thinking that is refers to just the Latins (Sherwin-White 1973, 96) and others believing it refers to the Latins and the *socii* (Schmitz 1859, 1050; Harris 1984, 107; Rich 2008, 65). Moreover, while early 20th century Loeb translators of Livy rendered *socii Latini Nominis* and its variants as 'allies of the Latin name,' the new translations, undertaken by Yardley, have presented the phrase as 'allies *and* those of the Latin name.' I tend to follow the view of Schmitz, Harris and Rich and I believe that asyndeton was occurring in many of the cases (For example, in Livy 40.26.7, we find a reference to *sociis Latini nominis* and later (40.28.9) the same exact troops are called *sociis atque nomini Latino*). Finally, even conceding that Livy did sometimes use the phrase to mean just the Latins has no effect on the point because the sections where Livy did demonstrably mean to distinguish the groups proves enough that there was indeed a difference.

[15] SEG 3.378

[16] CIL 1².2.581

of the allies (*socii*) is to be a Bacchanalian."[17] If battle descriptions can be trusted, there is support that the *socii* and Latins were separate groups as both categories were recorded separately at the Battle of Ausculum: "The Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Paeligni, Ferentani, and their other subjects…" (Dion. Hal. 20.1.5). Finally, such a distinction was likely noticeable as Romans and Latins shared very similar language and culture (Williamson 2005, 93), whereas the *socii* were, to the Romans, "foreigners in language and geography" (Sherwin-White 1973, 119). According to some scholars (e.g. Matthaei 1907, 191; Sherwin-White 1973, 119), all *socii* were treaty-bound. In fact, the understanding that *socii* were bound by a treaty is almost universally agreed upon by Roman scholars (Rich 2008, 55).[18] Whether or not all *socii* were in fact treaty bound will be discussed later.

The Romans never had 'allies,' of course, but they did have *socii*, *amici* (outside of Italy), *cives sine suffragio* (citizens without the right to vote) and *Latini Nominis* and all these categories could relate in some fashion to what we today understand as allies. This leaves it to modern scholarship to determine where to draw the line when talking about Roman allies. This study considers Rome's Italian allies to be all non-citizens living in Italy that were tethered to Rome in some fashion, that is, the *socii* and the Latins. It is more appropriate to combine these two groups and to consider them together as Rome's Italian allies due to significant similarities in status between them, such as the requirement to supply Rome with troops and their lack of Roman citizenship. Considering groups in Italy other than *socii* as Rome's Italian allies is a practice already adopted by scholars such as Cornell (1995, 271), Williamson (2005, 93), Sage (2008, 126), Rich (2008, 53) and Roselaar (2012, 141), who all include the Latins in their understandings.

Notably, as mentioned, there was a class of Italians whose position fell somewhere between ally and full citizen, those given the political status of *cives sine suffragio*. Although these partially enfranchised citizens were liable to supply troops to Rome, like the *socii* and Latins, they were nevertheless still incorporated into the Roman state as citizens and, at any rate, those *cives sine suffragio* had to pay a monetary tax to Rome, which is a serious point of departure from the other categories of allies (Tan 2020, 59). It is worth emphasising that they were Roman citizens from Rome's point of view and that their inclusion into modern definitions of Rome's allies is wholly arguable. Staveley (1989, 426), for instance, grouped Latins, allies and *municipia sine suffragio* together as satellites of Rome. Similarly, the citizens *sine suffragio* had parallels to the Latin rights "except that the line of demarcation between Latin and *civis Romanus* was more clearly drawn" (Sherwin-White 1973, 46). Furthermore, many studies are never faced with this challenge because they discuss Rome vis-à-vis the Italians, without specifically using the appellation "allies." I choose to exclude the *cives sine suffragio* on several

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[17] Bacas vir nequis adiese velet ceivis Romanus neve nominus Latini neve socium quisquam.

[18] Technically Rich is discussing Rome's "Italian allies" except the Latin colonies. This is very similar to the definition of *socii* I propose, and, at any rate, he cites historians such as Sherwin-White, who uses the term *socii* in the same fashion as this study. Hence, I feel confident that Rich is largely referring to the *socii* in this case.

grounds. First, I wish to keep my definitional scope limited to the *socii Latini Nominis.* Secondly, many settlements with this status were transferred to full citizenship during the geographical scope of this study. How many exactly, before the Social War, is not recorded but some are noted, such as Cures in 268 (Gargola 2017, 93) and Arpinum, Fundi and Formiae in 188 (Taylor 2013, 93). Lastly, the inclusion of this group raises a host of problems and speculation that cannot be satisfactorily addressed in a study of this magnitude. The function of these *cives* without the right to vote is poorly understood (Mouritsen 2007, 141). For instance, was this form of Roman citizenship a gift or punishment (cf. Toynbee 1965a, 273; Nicolet 1980, 26-7; Howarth 1997, 195 – 197)? It is also difficult to identify them. Did they include the majority of the Latins in the settlement of 338 or were these full citizens? Moreover, the fact that they could be considered to have an in-between status, neither ally and nor full citizen would surely impact their response to Roman imposition (cf. Sonn and Fisher 2003). Their additional duty to pay tax, which constitutes an obligation distinct from those discussed in Chapter 2, no doubt altered their experience of Roman domination. The *cives sine suffragio* deserve a separate study and therefore I have excluded them from my study. To clarify, then, Rome's Italian allies were those who were **(1)** not citizens of Rome in any capacity, **(2)** bound to Rome in some fashion and **(3)**, residing in the Italian peninsula. They include and are limited to the *socii* and the Latins. Henceforth, references to Rome's allies in this study should be taken to refer to those groups which meet these criteria, that is, the *socii* and the Latins.

Ancient literary accounts identify many cities and tribes as allies but taking these accounts at face value can be problematic. One issue highlighted by Matthaei (1907, 186) is that Livy appears to use the terms *socius* and *amicus* interchangeably. This might be more detrimental to identifying allied cities outside Italy, which Matthaei was studying, but it nevertheless affects classification of Italian allies because Livy's terminology was inconsistent (Mouritsen 2007, 155). Capua apparently had the status *civitas sine suffragio* (Livy 8.14; Salmon 1969, 50) and yet Livy (9.6.5) also wrote that the Capuans came out to help the Romans after the Caudine Forks due to a "pity natural to allies (*sociorum*)." Moreover, Livy (9.32.1; Harris 1971, 44), while relaying events in 311, referred to Sutrium, traditionally thought to be a Latin colony, as an *urbs socia*. To add further complexity, when Livy (28.45) catalogued the aid Scipio received for his invasion of Africa, he mentioned helpful cities by name, some of which are known to have previously received citizenship, such as Caere. This is problematic because Livy says that Scipio was allowed to receive aid from the *socii,* thus raising questions about why some citizen states are listed. This imprecision can be overcome by categorising the allies in ways other than merely repeating the allied status that an ancient source gives to a particular city. The distinctions made in inscriptions like the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* (see page 21) and the formulaic phrase *socii Latini Nominis* convey a consistent framework for schematising the allies. Using this framework, it is apparent that non-Latin cities comprise the *socii* and we can use this information to check the inconsistencies. A formulaic understanding is more reliable than a case by case identification given by

an ancient author, which is vulnerable to confusion. Another solution to Livy's apparent imprecision is that *socius* was potentially not always the technical appellation that is sometimes supposed. The term could also be used more loosely for any polity or tribe in relations with Rome.[19] It is possible, then, that *socius* had two meanings and that context determines the meaning. The *socii* proper, as I have argued, were a specific group of non-Latin allies but *socii* more generally could have merely designated any state that entered into formal relations with Rome.[20] Assuming this model, Livy (10.11.7) called the Picentes *socii* in the former sense and he (9.6.5) implied that the Capuans were *socii* in the latter sense. The idea that the *socii* existed in two separate senses has strong explanatory power and resolves the apparent inconsistencies of ancient authors.

We can now proceed to the exact identification of Rome's allies. First, there were the Latins, that is, the cities who were given Latin status (or simply retained it after the Latin War) and the Latin colonies. Secondly, there were the *socii*, the remaining Italian allies, who may or may not have been treaty-bound (*civitates foederatae*). Below the identity of the Latins are discussed.

1.b) Latin colonies

Latin colonies were typically, though not always, established on the site of pre-existing settlements (Salmon 1969, 15; cf. App. *B Civ.* 1.7). It is widely acknowledged that the settlers were largely, though not exclusively, comprised of Romans (Salmon 1955, 65; Sherwin-White 1973, 99; Cornell 1995, 302). On multiple occasions, Livy implied that this was the case. When the Romans were deciding whether to send a colony to Luceria, an unwelcoming and distant location, they were reluctant to condemn "fellow citizens (*civibus*) to an exile so far from home and surrounded by such hostile tribes" (9.26.4). Furthermore, when some colonies failed to give troops in 209, the ambassadors were told to remind their fellow colonists that they were "Romans, sprung from Rome and sent thence into colonies and on land captured in war, to increase their race… All that children owed to their parents they owed, it was said, to the Romans, if there was any filial affection, any memory of their former city" (Livy 27.9). Finally, Cicero (*Caecin.* 98) remarked that "our citizens have often gone to the Latin colonies." The testimony can be supplemented by inference. The sites that the Latin colonies occupied were often on the frontiers, essential to consolidating new claims of territory and, on occasion, were further invested with the significance of being along major arterial roads of Italy. It makes sense, then, that the Romans would entrust these important sites to settlers that they deemed most loyal, that is, citizens.

Cornell (1995, 302) following Beloch (1880, 151-2) believes that at least fifty per cent of the colonists were Romans with the remainder being a combination of Latins and/or Hernicians (who were, at any

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[19] Which it clearly was on occasion, as seen in Livy 28.45 (above) and the catalogue of the allies who defected after Cannae (Livy 22.61.10-13). Indeed, those who rebelled after Cannae included *socii* (e.g. Apulians and Bruttians) and citizens (e.g. Campanians) and Livy refers to the entire group as *socii*, thus indicating that the term could apply generally to cities in relation with Rome that nevertheless had different political statuses.

[20] Matthaei (1907, 188) wrote the *socii* were those treaty-bound (*foederati*), whereas Horn (1930, 11) merely wrote that the *socii* were "alles, was nicht civis und nicht hostis ist…" *Socii*, I think, could apply to both cases.

rate, already possessors of Latin status). Brunt (1971, 29), instead, reckons the number of Romans as being 3/4[ths] of the colonists. Inscriptions attest that Rome and the colonies had similar institutions (Sherwin-White 1973, 99) and the colonies tended to be "Roman in appearance" (Salmon 1969, 27). This view can be overstated; recent scholarship (cf. Stek 2013, 344) has challenged the extent of the similarities between Rome and the Latin colonies, finding a potentially significant amount of indigenous contributions to these sites.

The majority of the first Latin colonies are said to have been established in the first few decades of the Republic. Importantly, some of these early colonies were given Roman citizenship as part of the settlement of the Latin War (338) and are therefore excluded from this study.[21] Another exclusion is Cora, which was considered an independent Latin state, not a colony from 338 (Azfelius 1942, 134; Salmon 1969, n. 60). The practice of founding Latin colonies continued, henceforth wholly under the direction of Rome until 183, when Aquileia signified the last established Latin colony (Yeo 1959, 106; cf. Salmon 1969, 111).[22] Thus, by 300 there were already sixteen colonies[23] and eighteen new colonies were founded between 300 and 183 B.C, giving a total of thirty-four Latin colonies. This is compatible with Livy's (27.9.7) statement that there were thirty colonies by 209. Certainly, only four more colonies were founded, in the early Second century, thus consolidating the total of thirty-four. These were: Signia (495), Norba (492), Ardea (442), Circeii (393), Setia (c. 382), Sutrium (c. 382), Nepet (c. 382), Cales (334), Fregellae (328), Luceria (314), Saticula (313), Suessa Aurunca (313), Pontiae (313), Interamna (312), Sora (303), Alba Fucens (303), Narnia (299), Carseoli (298), Venusia (291), Hadria (289-283), Cosa (273), Paestum (273), Ariminum (268), Beneventum (268), Firmum (264), Aesernia (263), Brundisium (244), Spoletium (241), Placentia (218), Cremona (218), Thurii Copia (193), Vibo Valentia (192), Bononia (189) and Aquileia (183).

1.c) Non-colonial Latins

After the settlement of 338, were there any Latins in Italy that were not occupying Latin colonies? Certainly, there were culturally or linguistically Latin states, but did any of these remain as a legally Latin state, members of the Latin name (*Latini nominis*)? Some of the ancient sources merely gloss over this matter with little detail. Cassius Dio (7.35.10) wrote that the Romans "granted them citizenship" and Diodorus (16.90.2) simply wrote that the Romans defeated the Latins and that they "annexed part

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[21] These were: Fidenae (Dion. Hal. 5.60.4), Velitrae (Livy 2.31.4; Dion. Hal. 6.42-3.1), Antium (Livy 3.1.1-7; Dion. Hal. 9.59.2), Labici (Livy 4.47.6-7), Vitellia (Livy 5.24.4, 5.29.4; Suet. Vitellius 1.3), Satricum (Livy 6.16.6) (Salmon 1969, 110). That colonies such as Setia, Norba and Circeii remained Latin allies is supported by Livy (32.26.18), where the Romans sent a letter around the *nomen Latinum* to keep slaves indoors. In the same chapter, the slaves are mentioned to be residing in Setia, Norba and Circeii.

[22] Roman colonies still continued to be founded past this date.

[23] Pometia, counted as a Latin colony by Livy (2.16.8), is affirmed as such by Cornell (1995, 303) and Forsythe (2005, 191), but not included in Salmon (1969). Salmon (1969, n. 53) says that Livy calling Pometia a colony was a mistake where he was confused about Suessa Aurunca. It should be noted that Livy (2.17) mentions the destruction of Pometia by the Romans. The accuracy of Livy's (27.9.7) claim that there were thirty colonies in 209 seems to rely on the exclusion of Pometia from the category of Latin colonies by that time.

of the territory of the vanquished." Fortunately, Livy (8.14) is more specific, detailing that some Latins were granted citizenship, and some had part of their territory annexed, among other arrangements. Among the Latins, Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum and Pedum were given citizenship (Livy 8.14.2-3; Cornell 1995, 349; Williamson 2005, 92). Those from Tusculum kept their citizenship (Dion. Hal. 14.6; Livy 8.14.4). If we assume, with Cornell (1989, 366), that Livy was carefully distinguishing the different types of political statuses, then the inhabitants of these polities would have been full citizens because Livy, shortly afterwards, names those who were rendered citizens *sine suffragio*. That said, the view that they were full citizens is not completely accepted in modern scholarship. Hermans (2012, 328), for instance, argues that the Lanuvini became citizens *sine suffragio*. Other cities, such as Praeneste and Tibur, were not given citizenship. Both cities are mentioned as having some territory confiscated, partly because they had fraternized with the Gauls (Livy 8.14.9). Livy does not say much else about Tibur's or Praeneste's official status, yet Polybius (6.14.8) explicitly named Praeneste and Tibur as treaty bound states. If they were not given citizenship, how then were they classified? According to Toynbee (1965a, 258) all settlements under Rome, at this juncture, were either Latins or citizens. In addition, there is no precedent for Latin cities having their Latin rights confiscated. Most likely, these two cities remained as Latin settlements (Forsythe 2005, 290; Buchet 2012, 356; cf. Sherwin-White 1973, 34-4).

So, four prominent Latin cities had their inhabitants incorporated as Roman citizens, one maintained its pre-existing Roman citizenship and two remained treaty-bound members of the Latin name. What happened to the remaining ethnically Latin polities? Cassius Dio (7.35.10) wrote that the Romans gave all the Latins citizenship, but he did not specify the status of suffrage. It has been a widespread view of modern scholarship that most Latins were admitted as *full* citizens (Mouritsen 2007, 157). This conclusion assumes, without warrant, that if non-Romanised polities were given partial citizenship, the Latins would have received full citizenship (Mouritsen 2007, 155). The remaining Latin states, such as Fisculea, Crustumerium and Gabii, seem, on the best inference, to be counted among the citizens, as per Cassius Dio's report, but the level of suffrage is speculative.

The Latin name was also applied to peoples who were not traditionally Latin. The Hernicians, for example, became members of the Latin name. This group included the cities of Alletrium, Verulae, Ferentinum and originally Anagnia, though the latter's revolt in 307/6 meant that it was instead incorporated *sine suffragio* (Livy 34.42; Toynbee 1965a, 251). With this in mind, the Latin name came to comprise about thirty-nine cities—namely, the thirty-four colonies, Tibur and Praeneste, and the Hernician states – Alletrium, Verulae and Ferentinum.

1.d) Socii

The *socii*, as mentioned, were the allies without Latin status. At the outbreak of the Second Punic War, this group represented the largest portion of Italy's inhabitants.[24] They were a diverse group, speaking a variety of languages such as Greek, Oscan and Umbrian and occupying different geographic regions. The *socii* shared only one thing: their relationship to Rome. Unlike the Latins, who were largely bound to Rome by their colonial foundation charters, the *socii* became obligated to Rome in two main ways. A city could either submit to Rome with an official surrender (*deditio*) or establish a treaty (*foedus*) with Rome, both of which included the conditions to remain loyal henceforth and to supply troops. In certain cases, a city became a *socius* of Rome through both, whereby surrender was formalised with a treaty (Dahlheim 1968, 69-71).

By 300, Rome was still in the process of expansion across the peninsula. A more common date to mark the completion of Roman control of the Italian *socii* is 264, the eve of the First Punic War.[25] In 338, Rome only had varying degrees of control over Latium and Campania, having just recently won the First Samnite War (343-341) and the Latin War (340-338). Following the post-war settlement of 338, Latium was inhabited entirely by Roman citizens and Latins. Many occupants of Campanian settlements, such as Capua, Suessula and Cumae, had likewise been given Roman citizenship. In the conquests discussed below, it is important to note that many of the allies were not immediately compliant and often had to be reincorporated through force. For the sake of clarity, it is worth dividing Rome's wars into northward expansion and southward expansion, dealing with the latter first.

Between 338 and 264, the major wars in the south were the Second Samnite War (326-304), the Third Samnite War (298-290) and the Pyrrhic War (280 – 275). Most of the tribes between the Apennines and the Adriatic coast—the Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Frentani (in 304 – Livy 9.45.18) and Vestini (in 302 - Livy 10.3.1)—had all joined Rome as allies, following Rome's success against the Aequians and Samnites (Forsythe 2005, 310). South of these central Italian tribes were the regions of Samnium, Apulia, Lucania, Bruttium, and Calabria (which corresponds to the modern Sallentine peninsula). Samnium was largely taken as a result of the Third Samnite War but had to be subdued again as the Samnites defected to Pyrrhus (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh.* 17.5) and revolted again in 269 (Dion. Hal. 20.17). Likewise, the Lucanians and Apulians joined Rome's allied network in the late fourth century (Livy 8.25.3; 9.15.2) but both had to be subdued after they joined Pyrrhus (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh.* 17.5). The Bruttians, inhabitants of Bruttium (modern Calabria), first fought against Rome in 282 (Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; Val. Max. 1.8.6; Cappelletti 2018, 324). This conflict arose because both the Lucanians and Bruttians had attacked Thurii, which caused the Thurians to appeal to Rome for help (Mommsen 1894

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[24] Polybius (2.24; cf. Brunt 1971, 44-45) reported that they were about 273,000 citizens, 85,000 Latins and 276,000 allies in 225. Notably, Polybius' figures do not include the Bruttians and Greeks, who would have substantially increased the final tally of the *socii*.

[25] Take for instance: "By 264, the Roman conquest of peninsular Italy was complete" (Cornell 1989, 381), see also Staveley (1989, 425) and Forsythe (2005, 363).

II, 9-10; Cornell 1995, 363; Forsythe 2005, 350). The Bruttians, along with the Lucanians and Samnites, continued to be a problem for Rome between 282-272, as the *fasti* record numerous triumphs over these groups, until they were eventually subdued (Cornell 1989, 381).

The Greeks of Italy, who inhabited numerous regions of central and Southern Italy, came under Roman control under varying circumstances. The first Greek city to become allied with Rome was Neapolis (Naples), which was given a treaty in 326 (Livy 8.26.6; cf. Cic. *Balb*. 21).[26] Moving southward, Thurii entered into relations with Rome, being garrisoned in 285 as a result of its call for aid against Lucanians and Bruttians. Tarentum, a powerful city in ancient Calabria, disliked Rome's growing influence in Southern Italy and, as a result, the Tarentines expelled the Roman garrison from Thurii and invited Pyrrhus into Italy (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh*. 13.2). Nevertheless, Tarentum was subdued in 272 following the departure of Pyrrhus from Italy (Livy *Per*. 15). Similarly, Thurii returned to Roman control. Before Pyrrhus' arrival in Italy, Rhegium, Croton and Locri all sided with Rome (Franke 1989, 467; Lomas 1993, 49), presumably of their own volition (Toynbee 1965a, 260; cf. Polyb. 1.7.6, who says that Rhegium begged Rome for a garrison). After the battle of Heraclea, however, Croton and Locri joined Pyrrhus, verified by the Romans (i.e. Cornelius Rufinus) recapturing Croton in 277 (Zonar. 8.377; Broughton 1951, 194) and Locri having a garrison from Pyrrhus (App. *Sam.* 12.1).

Moving on from Southern Italy, Italy north of Rome had two major regions: Etruria and Umbria. Rome's first expansionistic pursuit into Etruria was the defeat of Veii in 396 (Ceccarelli 2016, 28). Following this, Rome and Etruria spent over a century engaged in sporadic warfare and truces. Finally, the Romans defeated the Etruscans at the battle of Vadimon (283) (Polyb. 2.20.2). Repeated attempts by the Etruscans to rebuke Rome were unsuccessful and in 265 Volsinii was destroyed (Flor. 1.21; Livy *Per*. 16; Forsythe 2005, 359). Concerning Umbria, Livy (9.36) first notes Roman contact with the Umbrians in his coverage of the year 310, when a Roman army traversed the Ciminian Forest and wound up at the Umbrian city of Camerinum, whose residents were friendly to them. The Umbrians did not remain friendly indefinitely, for those Umbrians neighbouring Etruria joined forces with the Etruscans and planned to fight alongside the Etruscans, Gauls and Samnites at Sentinum (295) but were drawn away by simultaneous Roman raids (Forsythe 2005, 330). Umbrian resistance continued, with a triumph over Sarsina recorded in 266 (Degrassi 1954, 99) and it is around this time that Livy (*Per*. 15) records that Umbria was conquered.

Whether they lived in Southern Italy or Northern Italy, these tribes and cities became attached to Rome, with some exception, through the process of warfare and force.[27] The ancient narratives, for the most

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[26] Technically, Livy named this city as Palaepolis but Livy (8.22.5) recorded that "There was a city called Palaepolis, not far from the spot where Neapolis is now, and the two cities were inhabited by one people." Cornell (1989, 369) refers to this event as a war committed by Naples and suggests that Livy was confused. Dionysius (15.5) refers to this city by its inhabitants, calling them Νεαπολίτας (Neapolitans).

[27] For a different view, see Terrenato (2019, 109-154, 159).

part, present Rome as reactionary and drawn into disputes rather than self-involving. While this may be true for some events, Rome capitalised on her success. The plantation of colonies in enemy territory or the confiscation of territory, for instance, demonstrates that Rome was not impartial or willing to stay within her own bounds. Once Rome had become domineeringly involved with other tribes it became characteristic for some of those Italic tribes to seek allies, sometimes inviting powers from outside Italy, to restore their ability to pursue their own policies. The overarching commonality of wavering loyalty suggests that many of these cities and tribes, in the beginning, did not want Roman rule but, that they favoured their independence. Against the backdrop of this allied resistance to Rome, the question of allied compliance becomes more interesting. At any rate, it is clear that Rome managed to establish permanent control over these *socii*, primarily through conquest, and therefore had won the right, from their point of view, to dictate certain terms to them. The *socii* were obligated to obey the same orders as the Latins, which is the subject of the following chapter.

2. Obligations

2.a) What determines an obligation?

Now that the allies have been identified and classified, we can turn to the obligations that the Romans imposed on them. Since Romans and allies exchanged goods and services, it is worth identifying what constitutes an obligation, from the Roman point of view. For the purpose of this study, I take the obligations to be those that Rome assumed would be complied with and had a basis to enforce. Obligations are determined by affirmative evidence of the fact, such as the allies acting in accordance to the agreed formula (*ex formula accipiendos*). Another, yet less accurate indicator is the Roman response to requests that were not heeded. When the allies acted in a certain manner and the Romans tended to react in a consistent way, it lends an insight into what the allies were obligated to do. The Romans, for instance, usually executed the ringleaders of revolt, thus suggesting that the Romans expected them to remain loyal. As a note, this last criterion cannot be used in reverse. For example, the ex-consul Gnaeus Octavius was murdered while in Syria on an investigation and the Romans, as far as we know and against our expectations, never retaliated (Gruen 1984a, 128). To generalize from this lack of Roman intervention would, if taken on its own, lead to the conclusion that allies were allowed to kill Romans, an obvious falsehood. From both direct attestation and consistent Roman responses, at least two obligations are evident; the allies had to **(1)** remain loyal (i.e. remain under Roman control and forsake their own foreign policy) and **(2)** provide troops to Rome when requested. These conditions will be defended as obligatory later.

Was there anything else Rome could legally demand from the allies? According to Toynbee (1965b, 106) the allies were required only to keep the peace and to forsake their foreign policy for Rome's and, additionally, to supply troops or warships. For Beard (2016, 164) the only lasting obligation was the supply of soldiers (and their upkeep). This would mean that many other allied contributions were done so in addition to their obligations and therefore, perhaps voluntarily. Consider, for instance, the many contributions that the allies provided to Rome when Scipio planned to invade Africa. As Livy (28.45) tells us, the Etruscans gave many provisions: Populonium furnished iron, Volaterrae supplied grain and fittings for ships and Tarquinii provided linen for sails. Moreover, Arretium:

> Promised three thousand shields, an equal number of helmets; and that they would furnish a total of fifty thousand javelins, short spears and lances, with an equal proportion of each type; also axes, shovels, sickles, baskets and hand-mills, as many were needed for forty war-ships.

Arretium also promised to give "a hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat" and would "contribute allowances for petty officers and oarsmen." Perusia, Clusium and Rusellae pledged fir for shipbuilding and grain. The Umbrians promised soldiers and Marsians, Paelignians and Marrucini volunteered for the fleet. Camerinum gave six hundred men.

According to Toynbee (1965a, 265), the aid provided by these tribes was "beyond their legal obligations to Rome." In this context, Livy (28.45.13) does say that Scipio was given permission to seek volunteers (*voluntarios*), which provides positive evidence that the allies were indeed acting of their own volition. The only concern, however, is to what degree Livy understood the nature of compulsion and whether he wanted to represent the allies as eager to supply Rome willingly. Furthermore, Polybius (6.12.5-6), perhaps with a little exaggeration,[28] wrote that in "preparation for war and the general conduct of operations in the field" the consuls have almost unlimited power and that they are authorized "to make what demands they choose on the allies." Baronowski (1984, 249 and n. 7) believed that the allies were treaty-bound "to assist Rome with all their resources," which would suggest that this aid was not voluntary. This is based off such templates as the *Foedus Cassianum* and extra-Italian treaties which had these provisions. The issue with Baronowski's view is that the *Foedus Cassianum* and the extra-Italian treaties were produced under different circumstances from the treaties that the Italian allies would have struck, and do not, therefore, shed any reliable insight into the contents of Italian treaties. Though the aid given to Scipio was likely voluntary, this is not to say that the allies did not feel compelled in some fashion. Every ally that gave supplies for Scipio's expedition was located in Etruria and Umbria, areas where Hannibal had been absent for almost a decade. As opposed to the regions of Southern Italy, which had demonstrated wavering loyalty and, in some cases, were still in revolt, it makes sense that Scipio would press upon the Etruscans and Umbrians for help. With this in mind, the singling-out of these allies could have made it more difficult for them to refuse and Scipio could have relied on this in his appeals to them.

There were other requests by Rome, the legal status of which is unclear. These include miscellaneous prohibitions, quartering of troops, and allowing Rome to construct roads through their territory (cf. Kendall 2012, 119). In 186, for example, the Romans issued a prohibition to the allies (as well as Roman citizens), outlawing the Bacchanalia, unless an exception was granted (Livy 39.8 – 18; CIL I² 581). On numerous occasions, allies were asked by Rome to house Roman prisoners (Livy 32.26.5; 45.43.9-10; Paus. 7.10.11; Kendall 2012, 119).[29] It may very well be that the original stipulations from treaties and surrender conditions did not include these later requests but that, as Rome's ambitions grew over time, the Romans began to ask the allies for additional support despite the lack of legal basis. The key point is that the allies were consistently faced by two Roman obligations which became a constant feature of allied life: namely, loyalty to Rome and supply of manpower. The obligatory fashion of these conditions will be discussed below.

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[28] As an example, Scipio, as consul for 205, had not been granted permission to hold a levy (Livy 28.45.13).

[29] Toynbee (1965a, 255) takes Spoletium's refusal to house King Gentius, requested by senatorial decree (Livy 45.43.9), as evidence of remaining Latin independence. If by independence he meant that Rome could not legally force them to, it must be recalled that a lack of Roman response cannot guarantee such a conclusion, which could otherwise be construed as an *argumentum ex silentio*.

2.b) Loyalty

That the Romans would expect loyalty from their allies is somewhat obvious and seemingly axiomatic of any military alliance. The idea that allied polities could not pursue their own foreign policy or provide aid to non-Romans was antithetical to Rome's allies who were theoretically "independent and self-governing" (Fronda and Gauthier 2017, 308). Loyalty, to the Romans, meant that an ally could not recede from Roman control and could not pursue its own foreign policy, even if that foreign policy was not directly (or even indirectly) harmful to Rome. To be clear, the foreign policy curtailed by Rome involved the allies' ability to determine their own allies and enemies. This restriction is best reflected by what the Senate asked of the Aetolians, that is, "to have the same friends and enemies as the Roman people" (cf. Livy 37.49.4). In other aspects, as mentioned, the allies were self-governing, and their autonomy was left virtually undisturbed. Moreover, the allies were largely free to maintain trade relations with other communities as they saw fit. Regardless, Rome eliminating the allies' capacity to regulate their own allegiances was unwelcome for some, as we will see in Chapter 3.

In the early Fifth century, when the Latins independently retaliated against belligerent Volscians, Romans likewise went out against the Volsci. Livy (2.53.5) assessed this situation saying: "The precedent, I suppose, of allies waging wars, without a Roman commander and army, by means of their own forces and their own strategies, was not welcome." Given Rome's power at the time, this assessment can hardly illustrate actual Roman expectations in the Fifth century, at least officially. Livy's assessment may be the result of expectations that he encountered in later centuries and then retrojected back when formulating his narratives of the Fifth century.

That loyalty was obligatory is best reinforced by how Rome reacted. The penalty for disloyal allies was often death, but usually for the ringleaders only, a punishment repeated throughout Livy's narrative. For instance, those responsible for the revolts at Ardea (Livy 4.10.6) and Nepete (Livy 6.10.5) were all killed accordingly. When Sora killed the Roman colonists there in 315 and defected to the Samnites, Sora was retaken, and 225 instigators of the revolt were taken to Rome and beheaded (Livy 9.24.15). During the Second Punic War, there was a conspiracy at Nola, where some of the inhabitants planned to admit Hannibal into the city. The plan was prevented by the arrival of Marcellus who investigated the ringleaders and beheaded over seventy people who had been condemned as traitors (Livy 23.17.1-2). Likewise, when three towns of the Hirpini—Vercellium, Vescellium and Sicilinum—were forcibly returned to Rome's side, the *auctores defectionis* were beheaded (Livy 23.37.12-13). This policy extended into Sicily where, when Rome recaptured Agrigentum, those responsible were beheaded (Livy 26.40.13). Citizens *sine suffragio* also were beholden to this obligation. When Satricum defected and was subsequently retaken, the guilty party were beheaded (Livy 9.16.10). This is not far removed from how Rome dealt with 300 disobedient Roman soldiers who had taken control of Rhegium during their garrison duty. As a result, the soldiers were beheaded and, as Polybius (1.7.12) tells us, this punishment was meted out according to "custom" (ἔθος). Indeed, the Twelve Tables (cf. *Digest* 48.4.3) stipulated

that capital punishment was the penalty for anyone who stirred up an enemy or delivered a citizen to him.

Although the way Rome's conditions were outlined, such as treaties and/or surrender conditions, are now lost, presumably they did contain this obligation in writing. For us, this can only be deduced from Rome's consistent penalising of allied defection. Even if this obligation had not been codified in any manner, Rome's use of exemplary violence would have promulgated the lesson to remain loyal. Livy (26.40.14) states that after Agrigentum was recaptured, the rest of Sicily was partial to Rome, perhaps reinforcing the effect that this event could have, though it is impossible to separate this particular punishment from the wider context of Rome forcibly taking possession of the city. Clearly, Rome intended the beheading to be exemplary as the beheadings were at least sometimes conducted in public (cf. Livy 9.24.15; 26.15.7; Dion. Hal. 20.16).

2.c) Soldiers

It is indisputable that the Romans expected their allies to supply soldiers—or ships, depending on the ally—for Rome's wars. First, the mention of allied troops to be levied is ubiquitous in ancient literary accounts.[30] Moreover, they gathered to join the expeditions abroad: to Macedon (Livy 32.8), to Spain (Livy 32.43; 38.36; 39.38), to Greece (Livy 37.2) and to Asia (Livy 38.36). In addition to the enumerations of soldiers requisitioned, the point is supported by the frequent references to allies present on Roman campaigns and at Roman battles. Allies fought at Trebia (Livy 21.55.4) and Cannae (Livy 22.49.15; Polyb. 3.113, 3.117), where about twenty thousand allies are counted among those slain. The following year, twenty-five thousand allies are said to have been in the army (Livy 23.32.2). The allies also fought at the battles of Metaurus (27.49) and Ilipa (28.14-15). Likewise, allies were reported as present at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 (Livy 37.39.7-12). According to Livy (37.39.7-12) there were two Roman legions and two legions made up of *socii* and Latins.

Given the clear attestation in ancient sources, it is understandable that the literature on the subject accepts this obligation as historical. As early as 1907, Matthaei (191) felt secure enough to call this practice "obvious." The requestioning of allied troops by the Romans has been widely recognised by modern scholarship.[31] The obligatory nature of the practice is demonstrated by the Roman response to defaulting Latin colonies (Livy 27.9-10) by and Polybius's description:

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[30] Throughout Livy, the number of allied troops to accompany the legions is enumerated: 6000 infantry and 800 cavalry (26.17), 5000 infantry (31.8), 15000 infantry and 800 cavalry (35.20), 20,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (35.41), 15,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry (38.35), 20,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (39.20), 15,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (40.1), 15,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (40.26). Polybius (2.24) outlines the number of Italian allies in the field in 225 and the remaining soldiers that were available to Rome. Sallust (*Jug.* 39.2) mentioned how the "consul Albinus…raised recruits for the army, sent for auxiliaries to the allies and Latins, and made general preparations for war."

[31] Sherwin-White (1973, 127); Gruen (1984a, 15); Staveley (1989, 426); Cornell (1995, 366); Roth (1999, 16); Rich (2008, 53); Sage (2008, 125); Hoyos (2011, 70); Kendall (2012, 114); Fronda and Gauthier (2017, 311).

the consuls send their orders to the allied cities in Italy which they want to contribute troops, stating the numbers required and the day and place at which those men selected must present themselves (6.21.4).

To this we can add Livy's words (34.56.5): "He [the consul] sent notice to the allies and Latins, that is, to their magistrates and ambassadors, who ought (*debebant*) to give troops."

This obligation is traditionally thought to be formalised by treaties between Rome and the *socii*. Rich (2008, 55) points out that the conflation between *socii*[32] and *civitates foederatae* (treaty-bound states) is the prevailing view, citing such proponents as Mommsen, Beloch, Sherwin-White, Toynbee, Harris, Ilari and Cornell. To this list of influential supporters of the view we can add: Matthaei (1907, 191), Roth (1999, 16), Sage (2008, 125); Kendall (2012, 114), Fronda and Gauthier (2017, 311). The view is so pervasive as to mislead translators. According to Foster (1929, 387), Livy 22.57.10 reported the Senate having taken over allies' soldiers "as by treaty provided." Despite this, the original, "*ex formula accipiendos,*" is better rendered 'as by the agreed regulation,' as *foedus* is not strictly mentioned. In contrast to the overwhelming modern support, the evidence that all *socii* had treaties is not as satisfactory. First, except for the *Foedus Cassianum*, a treaty far too old to have any relevance on Third and Second century relations, there are no treaties from Italy (Lomas 2011, 341; Kent 2012, 77). Secondly, from an estimated 125 allied settlements and tribes, only twenty-two states can be attested as possessing a treaty, fourteen of which are secure (Rich 2008, 69-70). Having only about 18% of allied states being explicitly tied to treaties does not necessarily mean that they were not all treaty-bound states (cf. Fronda 2010, n. 51, who is not entirely convinced by Rich), but it is worth considering alternative mechanisms.

The alternatives are largely explored by Rich (2008, 62, 70), who points out the possibility that after the Italian allies surrendered (*deditio*) and had their freedom returned, they were then under the sway (*dicio*) of the Romans and therefore at the mercy of Roman demands. In this case, such demands would have been for allied soldiers. *Deditio*—i.e. unconditional surrender—would certainly have afforded the Romans access to soldiers of the newly surrendered state. The misunderstanding between the Romans and the Aetolians, about a case of *deditio*, show that the Romans were prepared to impose a travel ban, seize an insurgent king and then possibly imprison Aetolians (Polyb. 20.10). Though apparently harsh in that case, *deditio* was often accompanied by Rome's good faith (*fides*), where a polity could reasonably anticipate mercy (Gruen 1982, 53-4), a consistent occurrence (Gruen 1982, n. 9). This phenomenon is referred to as surrendering into the faith (*deditio in fidem*). Instances of surrender (*deditio*) from *socii* are reported. During the Second Samnite War, some of the Umbrians surrendered

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[32] Technically Rich is discussing Rome's "non-colonial Italian allies." Depending on how some cities should be classified after 338, such as Tibur and Praeneste, "non-colonial Italian allies" are virtually tantamount to *socii*. Furthermore, Rich cites historians such as Sherwin-White, who was explicitly referring to the term *socii* in the cited passage.

(*deduntur*) (Livy 9.41.20) and later, the Umbrians and Sallentini surrendered (*in deditionem accepti*) (Livy *Per.* 15; Rich 2008, 71-2).

It may be better, then, to think of the *socii* as relinquishing soldiers as a result of different mechanisms. Some supplied soldiers on the basis of a treaty, while others did so as part of the conditions of surrender or both. The Latins, depending on whether they were colonial or non-colonial states, may have relinquished troops to Rome on varying foundations. As mentioned earlier, Praeneste and Tibur are both recorded as possessing treaties with Rome (Polyb. 6.14.8) and this could have formalised the requirement to supply troops, if not merely having Latin status. Notably, the Latin War, was ended in 338 by the storming of enemy cities or by surrender (Livy 8.13.8). The colonial Latins had no treaties but, rather, had to fulfil obligations on the basis of the colony's founding charters (Toynbee 1965a, 261, *n.* 7; Brunt 1971, 545; Sage 2008, 126). Unfortunately, it is not possible to know exactly how the obligations were formalized and therefore how the allies encountered the demands in daily life, although, fortunately, the conditions are more or less known to us.

So, Rome undoubtedly expected troops from the allies, but how many? For the year 225, somewhat close to the chronological middle of the period of inquiry, Polybius gave a detailed breakdown of how many men were theoretically available to Rome. By the year 225, Polybius (2.24) said that Rome could gather 443,000 allies.[33] Brunt (1971, 45) has amended the numbers, on good inference, to equal about 361,000 allies. Rosenstein (2012a, 86) claims that, if allied age restrictions existed like they did for Roman citizens, then the number is likely closer to 243,000 men. These numbers alone do not demonstrate the level of pressure the allies may have experienced. According to Polybius (3.107.12; 6.26.7) the allies provided one infantryman for every Roman and three times the amount of cavalry than the Romans fielded.[34] Appian (*Hann.* 8) mentioned that, after the Romans lost the Battle of Trebia, they raised a new army and they called for double the number of allies than citizens. Velleius Paterculus (2.15.2; Rosenstein 2012a, 86) remarked that the allies had continually been supplying double the amount of cavalry and infantry than the Romans. Brunt's (1971, 677 – 686) detailed assessment of these figures demonstrates that the ratios cannot be used to represent the makeup of Rome's armies generally and that the ratios instead varied. In 218, for instance, Sempronius' and Scipio's armies both had allied and Roman infantry at a 2:1 rate but the proportion of allied soldiers to Roman soldiers decreased during the Second Punic War and increased afterwards (Brunt 1971, 687). Velleius Paterculus' remark, however, does seem to reflect the ratio for the late Second century.

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[33] By allies, I exclude Polybius' enumerations of the Romans and Campanians, who were citizens in some capacity. Brunt's revision likewise separated the allies from the Romans and Campanians. This figure could be reduced, perhaps by thousands, as Polybius combined the Etruscan manpower with the Sabines and the Sabines, at this point, were *cives sine suffragio* (Vell. Pat. 1.14.6), and thus excluded from this study.

[34] One-third of these cavalry serve among the *extraordinarii*, the elite units (Polyb. 6.30.1-2).

Given Polybius' tally for 225, if we assume that the ratio of allies to Romans was 1:1, the allied contribution could have been anywhere from twenty-two percent to eleven per cent of their available manpower, depending on the length of service (Rosenstein 2012a, 86-7). If the ratio was 2:1, allied to Roman, then between half and a quarter of the available manpower would have had to serve, again, depending on length of service (Rosenstein 2012a, 87). If Rosenstein's age adjustment is not applied then the burden would be less because the total amount would have increased.[35] That said, these estimates do not demonstrate the burden cities felt at the individual level and there would be differences due to factors such as city size, migration and, presumably, location of conflict. There is evidence that Rome attempted to be proportional in troop recruitment. Indeed, the number of troops to be supplied is thought to have been mediated by the *Formula togatorum*, a list for regulating the military aid from the allies, which is still today not fully understood (Rosenstein 2012a, 85). Was it a list enumerating the total soldiers Rome was permitted to demand, as Beloch and Toynbee argued, or the number of men actually demanded, as Brunt and Salmon claimed (Baronowski 1984, 248)? The lack of details reflects the lack of evidence. The principal source is the *lex Agraria* (CIL[2] 2.585 21 and 50): "whichever Roman citizen or ally or member of the Latin name, from whom they are accustomed to demand troops in the land of Italy, according to the list of the togati" (Bispham 2007, 61). The other main sources for the *Formula togatorum* are gathered and discussed by Baronowski (1984). Out of all the other sources cited,[36] only three explicitly reference a formula, which could have referred to other arrangements. That said, modern sources, probably rightly, have assumed that "formula" in these contexts are in fact references to the *Formula togatorum* (Such as Ilari 1974, 57).[37] What is clear is that Rome was informed about how many men of military age the allies had (Livy 29.15, 29.37.7; Polyb. 2.23.9), possibly at least by the mid-Third century (cf. Erdkamp 2011, 122-3), and that the Romans requisitioned troops in proportion to this number (Livy 34.56.6-7; Rosenstein 2012b, 76). In sum, the allies were obligated to give up soldiers to Rome, as stipulated in their treaties, surrender conditions and/or colony foundation charter. The number of soldiers could be quite high, comprising high percentages of available manpower and, although Rome seems to have requisitioned troops on a proportional basis, the burden nevertheless became overwhelming on occasion, as will be discussed later.

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[35] Rosenstein does not address Polybius' omission of the Bruttians and Greeks. If this was an oversight by Polybius, and they were an available source of manpower for the year 225, then this would have reduced the burden further. Obviously, however, the Bruttians and some Greeks were largely unavailable to the Romans during a sizable portion of the Second Punic War. It is also important to note that, even though the allied soldiers outnumbered Roman (citizen) soldiers, the allies potentially noticing that they were giving more soldiers than Rome, largely for Rome's benefit, might have made the burden that much more unbearable.

[36] Livy 22.57.9-10; Livy 27.9; Livy 27.1-.2-4; Livy 34.56.3-7; Polyb. 6.21.4-5; Polyb. 2.23.9; Livy 29.15; Livy 29.37.7; Livy 41.8.6-8.

[37] "confermata da alcuni passi di Livio in cui compaiono le espressioni milites *ex formula* (sc. *Togatorum*) imperare, parare, accipere."

3. Rebellious Responses

As Chapter One discussed, there were two key obligations that Rome's Italian allies were responsible for carrying out: loyalty and troop provision. In this chapter, we turn to analysing the responses of the allies to those obligations. These responses can fall into two broad categories: rebellion or compliance (Bulhan 1985, 55). Rebellion is usually a sound indicator of displeasure toward the ruling power, especially because it involves taking a great risk to sever control. By at least the Second Punic War, no ally would be ignorant of the outcome of a failed rebellion. Considering this, rebellion should be taken as an accurate sign that cities were seriously dissatisfied and motivated enough to seek change. The other response is compliance, which is far more open to interpretation. A supressed community could, of course, be content with the *status quo* under Rome and therefore their apparent acceptance is indeed demonstrative of their willingness to meet Rome's obligations. On the other hand, a supressed community could operate under the imposed conditions reluctantly but be deterred from challenging their ruler on grounds of inability or fear and therefore appearing to accept what they privately resent. The two following chapters consider each type of response in turn, beginning with rebellious responses.

3.a) Rebellious Responses to the request for Loyalty

Throughout the Republican period, numerous *socii*[38] attempted to secede from Rome's network of allies and to pursue their own foreign policy. Many Etruscan cities, for instance, made repeated attempts at conducting themselves contrary to Roman wishes. Similarly, many Italian communities south of Rome had to be subjugated more than once until they stopped explicitly trying to fight for independence. The most tumultuous periods include the time between the Latin War and the First Punic War, which involved reoccurring revolts (Kent 2012, 75) and the Second Punic War, which saw a fresh wave of defections. For the century following that war, rebellion became markedly less common. The change in frequency of rebellion between centuries is indicative of certain political realities. First, the period between the Latin War and the First Punic War was a time where, for most of Italy's inhabitants, Rome was still an emerging power and one which would seem possible to refuse. Secondly, both this period and the Second Punic War involved the support of foreign invaders who offered an alternative to Roman rule. In addition, by the Second century, Roman rule in Italy had been consolidated and had survived the great challenge of Hannibal. The endurance of Roman control likely rendered their power (implied at the very least) more prominent and therefore resistance would have seemed even more futile. Finally, Rome's wars had shifted out of Italy so that many allies were now serving outside of Italy and Rome's

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[38] The revolts of the Latins occur at a far lower rate. The Latin War, of course, demonstrates an instance in which Rome's Latin allies sought independence from Roman control. Regarding the colonies, the amount of rebellions is quite small. Only the years 209 and 125 involved Latin colonies challenging their obligations to Rome. Finally, the Ligurian city of Clastidium was handed over to Hannibal by the city's garrison commander, Dasius, a Latin from Brundisium (Livy 21.48.9; Lazenby 1978, 55).

opponents, who could have provided military support to any allies if they were to rebel, never invaded the peninsula.

This section investigates the Second Punic War as a case study for allied rebellion. The frequency and magnitude of allied defections between the Latin War and the First Punic War are briefly catalogued in the section on *socii* identity. It is worth discussing which allies wound up on the side of Carthage during the Second Punic War and attempting to surmise why. When Hannibal first entered the peninsula, he only had the aid of Gauls, and it was not until after Hannibal was victorious at Cannae (216) that many of Rome's other allies revolted (Rawlings 2011, 300). According to Livy (22.61.11-12) the following allies revolted from Rome after Cannae: the Campanians, the Hirpini, some of the Apulians, part of the Samnites, all the Bruttians and Lucanians and many Greeks including those from Tarentum, Metapontum, Croton and Locri. Polybius (3.118. 3) corroborates this to some degree by writing that Tarentum immediately surrendered and that Argyrippa (i.e. Arpi, a city in Apulia) and some towns of Campania sided with Hannibal. Moreover, Polybius (15.7.3) reported that, in conversation with Scipio, Hannibal once said how after the battle of Cannae he "became master of almost the whole of Italy…" Despite the ancient testimony, it has been demonstrated that both Polybius and Livy exaggerated the immediate aftermath of Cannae (Reid 1915, 94). This exaggeration applies largely to when allies defected, not who defected, as the allies listed did eventually wind up on the Hannibal's side. Finally, since the Gauls are excluded, no Italian allies north of Rome ever defected to Hannibal.

A significant factor to be kept in mind when discussing the relationship between the Romans and the allies is factionalism and the reality that each faction, and its individual members, could have different views about Rome. Can Compsa be considered a pro-Carthaginian city because Statius Trebius (a high-ranking Compsan) invited Hannibal in? The variety of opinions held by different factions is true for Romans as well. How does Cato's (*FRHist* Cato 88) consideration for allied interests compare to Fabius Maximus' and Fulvius Flaccus' unwillingness to respect the protests of twelve allied colonies in 209?[39] For the allied cities, it is evident that factionalism was a factor in whether a city remained with Rome or rebelled. On numerous occasions, sources such as Livy and Polybius report that an allied city was divided in its commitment to Rome.[40] According to Livy (24.2.8-9), the upper class tended to prefer

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[39] Specifically, when defending allied support for Perseus, Cato tried to understand their point of view, saying: "…I am inclined to think that some of them did not wish us success, not in order that we might be disgraced, but because they feared that if there was no one of whom we stood in dread, we would do whatsoever we chose."

[40] Cf. Livy 23.1, where Compsa, a Samnite city of the Hirpini was torn between Statius Trebius, a pro-Carthaginian and the Mopsii, who were "a family made powerful by the favour of the Romans." At Tarentum, likewise, there was enough division that some inhabitants admitted Hannibal to the city (Livy 24.13.1-2; Polyb. 8.24) and others, once Tarentum had been stormed, preferred to remain with the Romans in the citadel (Polyb. 8.31.2-3). Notably, the Tarentines who had turned the city over to Carthage roamed the city, telling the other inhabitants to be of good courage about Hannibal's intentions, implying that varied dispositions were likely held among the townsfolk (Polyb. 8.31.1). Polybius (and therefore Livy who utilised him) used Sosylus the Lacedaimonian and perhaps Silenus of Caleacte as sources (Walbank 1957, 28). Both these writers accompanied Hannibal in Italy and probably were privy to the events occurring in the cities of Southern Italy (Fronda 2010, 11). When the Romans

Rome, whereas the people were often inclined to Carthage. An apparent revolt in Lucania was suppressed "with the hearty approval of the optimates" (Livy 10.18.8). Similarly, the Senate and leading men of Nola resisted Hannibal's overtures whereas the people "as usual" preferred Hannibal (Livy 23.14.7). Whether the preferences concerning Roman rule were divided among class to the degree that Livy claimed is debatable (cf. Livy 24.47.6). Certainly, some modern scholars have accepted the Roman proclivity to favour the rich, upper classes (Toynbee 1965a, 266; Cornell 1995, 363).[41] On the subject, one final note is necessary. The existence of a so-called pro-Roman faction does not guarantee that the faction preferred Rome on uncoerced grounds. If one faction was pro-Roman it could simply mean that they remained under Roman control for any reason, as we will see, not necessarily happiness or willingness. It may very well have been that one party was willing to risk breaking from Rome and the other, the so called pro-Roman faction, was unwilling due motivating pressures such as fear.

Over the course of the Second Punic War, but not necessarily as a result of Cannae, many of the polities and regions of Italy joined Hannibal, including, Arpi, Aecae, Herdonia, Salapia, Compsa, Compulteria, Telesia, Vercellium, Vescellium, Sicilinum, all the Bruttians, the Lucanians, Uzentum, Manduria, other Sallentini, Tarentum, Locri, Croton, Caulonia, Heraclea, Metapontum, and Thurii. Arpi, a chief city in Apulia (Strabo 6.3.9), joined Hannibal immediately after Cannae (Polyb. 3.118.3; Livy 22.61.11) and Polybius' account suggests that Arpi's revolt was voluntary, as they invited him. Hannibal controlled other Apulian cities too, such as Aecae, since it was besieged by the Romans in 214 (Livy 24.2.6), Herdonia (Livy 27.1.4) and Salapia, since Hannibal wintered there in 214 (Livy 24.20.15) and had held a garrison of Numidians (Livy 26.38.11-12). Arpi had its own expansionist interests, adduced from the fact that other cities—linked to Arpi traditionally and economically—defected to Hannibal after Arpi had done so (Fronda 2010, 56). After Cannae, Hannibal left Apulia when he was invited by a high-ranking occupant of Compsa in Samnium (Livy 23.1.1-2). Other Samnite cities—Compulteria, Sicilinum, Telesia, Vercellium and Vescillium—came to Hannibal's side, as implied by Livy (23.37.12-13; 24.20.5). The Samnites fought numerous direct wars against Rome, and once they had been subdued, they revolted twice again in 280 (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh.* 17.5) and 269 (Dion. Hal. 20.17; Forsythe 2005, 358). Joining Hannibal, therefore, continued a pattern of resistance to Rome. Although Livy (23.1.2) mentions that there was a faction in Compsa made powerful by the Romans, this Samnite city at the very least must have been enthusiastic about its support for Carthage to make Hannibal entrust his baggage and booty to the city (Livy 23.1.4).

Like the Apulians and Samnites, many Bruttians defected after Cannae (Livy 22.61.11). Livy (23.11.7-8) mentions that, following Cannae, Hannibal's brother organised the revolting Bruttians. While the

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retook Arpi, the Arpini pleaded ignorance, saying that the leading citizens were responsible and that they had been overpowered (Livy 24.47.6).

[41] Although Cornell's additional remark that the upper classes in turn saw Rome as "a natural ally" should not be accepted *prima facie*.

majority of the Bruttians rebelled at this time, two notable Bruttian cities, Petelia and Consentia, resisted Hannibal. Petelia was captured by one of Hannibal's officers after a long siege (Livy 23.30.1-2; Polyb. 7.1.3). Interestingly, the Bruttians joined the Carthaginians in their attack on Petelia because the Petelians had not joined them in revolt (Livy 23.20.4). Consentia surrendered soon after without such a long struggle (Livy 23.30.5). Considering the history of the Bruttians, it is not surprising that Rome's imposition on their foreign policy was both a burden and a restriction that many Bruttians wanted removed. According to Diodorus (16.15.1-2), the Bruttians emerged from Lucania as raiders who then consolidated themselves and went on to capture Terina, Hipponium, Thurii and many other cities. On occasion, the Bruttians were a target for foreign invaders, including Alexander of Epirus (Livy 8.24.4-6) and Agathocles (Diod. Sic. 21.8.1). As Diodorus writes, Agathocles managed to subdue the Bruttians and obtained 600 hostages from them but, when Agathocles left, the Bruttians crushed the remaining Syracusans and recovered their hostages. Most notably, Justin (*Epit*. 23.1.3-4) relays that Agathocles first attacked the Bruttians because they seemed "the bravest and most powerful people of the country, and to have been extremely ready to attack their neighbours; for they had driven the inhabitants of many of the Greek cities from Italy." This bellicosity of the Bruttians is supported by other literary references, such as Diodorus (19.3.3; cf. Mommsen 1894, I, 466), who records that the Bruttians besieged Croton in about 325. Similarly, as mentioned, the Bruttians attacked Thurii in 282, resulting in Roman intervention (Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; Val. Max. 1.8.6). These attacks on Greek cities perhaps served as the foundation for Livy's (24.1.1-2) assessment that the Greeks of Magna Graecia were later reluctant to join the Carthaginians because the Carthaginians had allied with the Bruttians. In line with their typical behaviour, the Bruttians also reacted to Rome's aid of Thurii by joining Pyrrhus, demonstrating their dissatisfaction with Rome.

Given the Bruttians' history of using their free conduct to assault neighbouring cities and to violently rebuff imposition into their sphere of interest, their behaviour in the Second Punic War is unsurprising. Certainly, the Bruttians were one of the first to defect to Hannibal once he had won an astonishing victory in Southern Italy (Cappelleti 2018, 324). Their attitude about Greek cities is revealing. It is reported by Livy (24.2.1-2) that the Bruttians were annoyed when the Greek city of Locri allied to Carthage because the Bruttians had hoped to plunder the city. Subsequently, the Bruttians, now acting on their own accord, besieged Croton (Livy 23.11; 24.2.2-3) with the vague hope that they themselves would control the city (Livy 24.2.3-7). The consistent behaviour of the Bruttians, in the absence of Roman control, could not be clearer and it is easy to see, therefore, why the Bruttians would have preferred to rid themselves of Roman rule once the opportunity arose. Petelia's and Consentia's continued compliance with Roman power is surprising, given the points addressed above, but was likely a result of the power bases discussed below in Chapter 4.

The Locrians were not initially receptive to Carthage. When the Carthaginians turned their attention to the Greek cities of Magna Graecia, some Locrians prepared for a siege, while others fled (Livy 24.1.2-

3). Whilst the Locrians were under pressure, Livy (24.1.7) mentioned that there were those Locrians who wanted political change. Once Locri had struck a treaty with the Carthaginians, the Locrians had, seemingly on their own accord but with Hanno's agreement, mediated the disagreement between the Bruttians and Croton (Livy 24.3.14-15), an action that would have been impossible while under Rome. Like many cities in Italy, Locri had participated freely and independently in foreign affairs such as establishing Hipponium and Medma (and attempting to keep them), conquering Temesa, sustaining a friendship with Dionysius I, and potentially influencing Caulonia (Fronda 2010, 169-170; cf. Strabo 6.1.5; Diod. Sic. 14.106.3). The Locrians did not immediately join Hannibal, and the Roman garrison may have impacted this (Livy 24.1.9), but they revolted after they were pressured. The traditional conduct of the Locrians may have been the motivation for the pro-rebellion faction and at least one instance of Locrian conduct in the wake of rebellion—the arbitration between Bruttians and Croton—supports this.

Many of the remaining Greek cities in Italy remained compliant to Rome until 212, when Tarentum defected, somewhat voluntarily. Concerning Tarentum's revolt, there was a faction in Tarentum eager to escape from Roman control and the Carthaginian invasion presented a firm opportunity to rebuff Rome. Two faction leaders, Nico and Philemenus, approached Hannibal's camp and they came to an arrangement where Hannibal would free Tarentum and, importantly, not demand any kind of tribute "nor impose any burdens on them" (Polyb. 8.25.1-2).[42] As a result of this agreement, Hannibal was able to eventually enter Tarentum and take control of the city, except the citadel (Livy 25.10-11). Livy (25.7.11-8.4) wrote that Tarentum's betrayal to Hannibal was connected to Rome's recent execution of Tarentine hostages. Certainly, this may have contributed to Tarentum eventually changing sides, but inhabitants from Tarentum had approached Hannibal earlier, before the hostages were executed (Livy 24.13.1-4).[43] A more influential factor was Tarentum's position as a historical city of importance and the limitations that Rome set upon it. There were those still alive who, or whose parents, could recall Tarentum's past sovereignty in their memory (cf. Caven 1980, 165) and ancient authors have commented on the prominence of Tarentum (Livy 25.8.1; Strabo 6.3.1, 6.3.4).[44] Tarentum had a remarkable past, involving, at one stage, the management of the Italiote League and the organization of numerous Italian invasions, conducted by Alexander of Epirus and Pyrrhus, among others. The scale of

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[42] It is worth restating here that Polybius had access to sources such as Sosylus the Lacedaimonian and perhaps Silenus of Caleacte (Walbank 1957, 28), writers who accompanied Hannibal in Italy and therefore it is reasonable to suppose that Polybius could have known about negotiations in Hannibal's camp.

[43] As impactful as the executions were themselves, the other aspect was that Rome had finally lost one of their bargaining chips. Once the Tarentine hostages were dead, that specific coercive power over the Tarentines had vanished.

[44] Livy (25.8.1) refers to Tarentum as one of two key Greek cities in Italy. Strabo (6.3.1) comments on the size of Tarentum as a city and Strabo (6.3.4) writes: "At one time the Tarantini were exceedingly powerful, that is, when they enjoyed a democratic government; for they not only had acquired the largest fleet of all peoples in that part of the world but were wont to send forth an army of thirty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and one thousand commanders of cavalry."

these achievements is dwarfed by Rome's, especially later, but nevertheless Tarentum had been one of the most influential cities in the peninsula. Specifically, as mentioned, Tarentum had become the leader of the Italiote League (Lomas 1993, 34),[45] which potentially afforded Tarentum a degree of influence over many Greek cities in Italy (Rosenstein 2012b, 39).[46]

Between the First and Second Samnite War, Alexander of Epirus entered Italy on the invitation of Tarentum (Just. *Epit*. 12.2) and fought against the Messapians, Lucanians and the Bruttians (Livy 8.17.9; 8.24.4-5), traditional enemies of the Tarentines. At this stage, Tarentum's sphere of concern, while large, was contained to its surrounding neighbours (excluding its overseas trade). This changed when Neapolis struck a treaty with Rome in 326, which the Tarentines took as a revolt from them and which made them displeased with Rome (Livy 8.25.6-26.3; cf. Dion. Hal. 15.5.2-3). In addition, the recent alliance between Rome and both Lucania and Apulia made Tarentum feel threatened. Tarentum responded by bribing some prominent Lucanians to lacerate themselves and advertise their wounds, saying that they were done by the Romans. This episode, if it can be believed, caused other Lucanians to reject Rome and renew their alliance with the Samnites (Livy 8.27). Tarentine influence in Lucania did not last, however, because Tarentum was fighting against the Lucanians around 302, resulting in the Tarentines seeking the aid of Cleonymus of Sparta (20.104.1-3) until the Lucanians were pacified. Rome and Tarentum became far more entangled when Thurii requested a Roman garrison for protection against the Lucanians (Cappelletti 2018, 324; cf. Dion. Hal. 19.13.1 and Val. Max 1.8.6). The Tarentines expelled this garrison (App. *Sam*. 7.1)[47] and attacked Roman ships, perceiving Rome as transgressing an earlier agreement (App. *Sam*. 7.1; Livy *Per*. 12; cf. Franke 1989, 457 and Forsythe 2005, 350-1). Following their previous pattern of behaviour, the Tarentines invited overseas aid and this time it was Pyrrhus who fought for Tarentum (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh*. 13.2). This brief sketch of Tarentum's past shows that the city had traditionally been a prominent one, leading the Italiote League and initiating numerous wars to protect its spheres of interest. Given this backdrop, Tarentum's revolt from Rome in 212 appears as no surprise. Rome's imposition was resisted until the Tarentines could no longer endure. Hannibal's invasion presented the first real opportunity to rebuff Roman control and to restore independence. The last obstacle was the hostages imprisoned at Rome but, once they had been executed, those brave enough to risk Roman wrath sought out Hannibal and arranged the revolt of Tarentum.

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[45] According to Lomas (1993, 34) Tarentum likely gained control over the Italiote League about 390. Croton, the former leader of the league, had been invaded by Dionysius I of Syracuse.

[46] Polybius (2.39.1-7) wrote that the Italiote League was based on the Achaean League, which, theoretically, had a degree of voluntary involvement. Although some decisions, such as inviting Pyrrhus to Italy, had much league cooperation (Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh*. 13.5), the Tarentines did appear to initiate many of their own plans (Lomas 1993, 38).

[47] "They also accused the Thurini of preferring the Romans to the Tarentines although they were Greeks and held them chiefly to blame for the Romans overpassing the limits. Then they expelled the noblest citizens of Thurii, sacked the city and dismissed the Roman garrison under a flag of truce."

Taken together, numerous allies rebelled from Rome at some point during the Third and Second century, though almost every defection occurred in two distinct blocks: the early Third Century and the Second Punic War. Many of these rebellions should be viewed as a reaction to Roman-imposed loyalty and the attendant limitation on foreign policy. In the early Third century, these were the key disadvantages of Roman control and many allies rebelled on numerous occasions, ostensibly of their own volition. In the case of the Second Punic War, many allies returned to their traditional behaviour, where traditional political divisions resurfaced (cf. David 1996, 58). One telling factor is that Hannibal tended to be appealing to cities that had "local or regional hegemonic aspirations" (Fronda 2010, 192). These allies, mainly from among the Greek cities and the Bruttians, had a history of conducting themselves in a fashion that was no longer possible once Rome had dissolved their foreign policy. True, some allies left Rome due to third-party pressures, like in the case of Heraclea, but for many of the allies the choice between Rome and independence was not affected by immediate fear of Hannibal. Cities such as Arpi, Compsa and Tarentum explicitly sought out Hannibal to propose new arrangements.[48] It is important to reiterate that Rome's coercive power (See Chapter 4) was undermined in the aftermath of Cannae, which suggests that, for many of these allies, it had been this coercion that had primarily been keeping them loyal. The general picture here is that many allies, especially those with proud histories, were interested in recovering their self-determination. This should not be surprising. Indeed, although our understanding of the militaristic aspects of Roman culture is greater than that of the allies, are we to suppose that, had Carthage, Capua and Tarentum managed to dismantle Rome's network of allies and impose terms on Rome, some Romans would not be passionate about reclaiming their self-determination, especially given the right opportunity?

3.b) Rebellious Responses to the request for Soldiers

It is difficult to pinpoint rebellious responses from allies to having their troops requisitioned by Rome. The greatest obstacle is isolating the obligation of providing troops as causal in allied dissatisfaction. Presumably, having to supply troops was, at times, burdensome and this might be reflected in the full-scale rebellions discussed above, but identifying troop obligations as a root cause itself remains problematic. The few cases of mutiny while on campaign offer no support either because tying the soldiers' decision back to allied sentiments is challenging, especially when Roman citizens mutinied as well.[49] Harris (1984, 96) claims that determining how the allies were impacted by the obligation of providing troops and their personal responses to this obligation are largely unknowable. Though I agree that the full spectrum of allied responses is lost to us, I believe there are glimpses, such as those in rebellion and there is, in fact, a case that demonstrates a rebellious response specific to giving troops, the case of 209. Indeed, in that year, twelve Latin colonies came to Rome and declared that they were

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[48] Any notion that Arpi approached Hannibal due to fear of him is undermined by the fact that cities much closer to the site of Hannibal's recent victory at Cannae decided to remain steadfast against him (Fronda 2010, 67).

[49] E.g. in Spain in 206 (Polyb. 11.25-30; Livy 28.24-29). The army, again in Spain, were said to be on the brink of revolt in 180 (Livy 40.35.5-7).

unable to supply troops, as they were obligated to do. Among our sources, only Livy's account contains any record of this event. In the other great historian dealing with the Middle Republic in detail, Polybius, there is no mention of this episode.[50] According to Livy (27.9), following the transfer of allied soldiers to Sicily, the allies and Latins began to complain in their meetings about how they had been "exhausted by levies of troops" (Livy 27.9.3) and how long service outside of Italy was tantamount to exile. As we are told, the discussions of the colonies reached the following conclusion: if enough allies denied Rome troops, then Rome would be forced to make peace with Hannibal (Livy 27.9.5-6).

Could these allied colonists have actually furnished soldiers in 209? From the outset, Livy's narrative makes clear that the allies were exhausted from the war and were predicting that things could not continue indefinitely under the current circumstances, so they tried to force Rome into a peace. The question is whether Livy, who called the event an open rebellion (*apertam defectionem*) (27.9.9), was relaying historical truth or merely fabricating a story to absolve Rome from charges of being inconsiderate to her allies. Rome punishing allies who were genuinely unable to give soldiers would have been contrary to the common theme in Roman historiography of Rome as a benevolent protector. This is shown by Livy's report that on one occasion when an ally was unable to prevent their city from being captured by Hannibal, Rome gave them leave to do what was best for them (Livy 23.20.6). There is another possible problem in discussing the allies' refusal in 209—namely, the nature of the story's transmission to Livy. It is understandable that the fact of twelve Latin colonies refusing to give troops would have survived to reach Livy more easily than the specific grievances voiced in allied meetings. While the exact motivations circulating in the allied *concilia* and how they reached Roman ears in the first place are not immediately apparent, the refusal itself clearly left an impression in Rome, with the news being delivered to the consuls, and those allies being absent from military service for five years during a critical time in Rome's struggle against Hannibal.

Nevertheless, while I acknowledge that the allies finding it difficult to keep up their obligations played a role in what followed, I think that there is a good case that the allies were dissatisfied and looking for a solution, thereby deliberately trying to influence Roman foreign policy. The veracity of Livy's account, as I discuss below, is in fact deserving of trust and the surrounding context gives the impression of verisimilitude. According to Livy (27.9.1), the transfer of allied troops to Sicily was the beginning of allied complaints. The troops in question were survivors from the battle of Herdonia, which the Romans lost. They were being sent to reinforce the survivors from Cannae—the *Legiones Cannenses*—who had been in Sicily for years with no hope of return. Specifically, these legions were not allowed to return to Italy until the war had ended (Livy 23.25.7-8; 24.18.9; 25.5.10) and, supposedly, they were barred from active service. As Livy (25.6.21) makes a member and an envoy of the *Legiones Cannenses* say, they had been idle and inactive. The idea that these legions were banned from active service might

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[50] Polybius' treatment of the Second Punic War overall is cursory and so this event, like many others in this war, is omitted.

be rejected, as some scholars propose (Brunt 1971, 652; Pere-Nogues 1997, 125), but what undeniably made the situation hopeless for the *Legiones Cannenses* is that they were prohibited from leaving Sicily and so they were unable to directly bring about the circumstances that would allow them to return home. This condition was alluded to by the complaining Latin colonies. Indeed, they complained that being enlisted by the Romans was tantamount to exile (Livy 27.9.3-4).

It is not evident whether the colonies expected these troops to be returned home immediately after Herdonia but clearly there would have been a process whereby older soldiers were discharged as the newer recruits were enlisted.[51] Reportedly, these colonies complained that: "if the old soldiers should not return to their native places, and fresh soldiers continued to be levied, soon no one would be left" (Livy 27.9.5). Moreover, the number of legions had decreased by four (Brunt 1971, 418) and this apparent relaxation of manpower might have led the colonists to anticipate a return of their citizens, not a continuation of their service. It cannot go unnoticed that the *Legiones Cannenses* were punished for their loss in battle and that the Latins and allies, who were sent to join them, had also recently lost at Herdonia, perhaps emphasising their common hopelessness. Livy clearly stated that the Latins who fought at Herdonia and the *Legiones Cannenses* were both prohibited from wintering in towns and from camping within ten thousand feet of any city (Livy 26.1.10). If this implies that the reverse was possible—that soldiers serving under Roman flags could camp either in or near Italian cities—then these troops were being denied a comfort soldiers might expect, and it further emphasises the similar treatment of the Latins from Herdonia and the *Legiones Cannenses*. The disgrace was now being shared by these troops.

Along with this, there is a contrast with how the Latins and allies were treated by Rome, on the one hand, and by Carthage, on the other, after losing a battle. In some instances, Latins and allies captured by Hannibal were treated well and often returned to their hometowns with no ransom (Livy 22.58.1-2; 24.12.1-2; cf. David 1996, 55-6), whereas under Rome, many Latins and *socii* remained in service under military obligation, even if victorious in battle. I do not think that the colonies ever considered joining Hannibal, but the difference in treatment might have played on their minds more so now that they were being transferred to Sicily just after losing the battle of Herdonia.

The location of the colonies further supports the notion that the allies were facing exhaustion. Every colony that failed to give troops in 209 was located between Cales and Narnia and all were entirely on the western side of the Appennines. In other words, the majority of the failing colonies were all situated within some proximity of one another and they clustered around Rome. Many of the colonies that

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[51] While it is not explicitly stated that the allied soldiers from Herdonia included inhabitants from among these colonies, Livy (27.9.1) does state that the transfer of allies to Sicily (which those from Herdonia were) was the beginning of allied discontent. I feel like this event best makes sense if many of those soldiers who were transferred, were from among the colonies that refused to deliver troops. Otherwise it is not clear why Livy chose to connect these events in the first place.

continued to fulfil their obligations were far more spread out and spearheaded distant regions of Italy. How exactly Rome's military demand was distributed among the Latins colonies is unknown but presumably the location of the colony was influential in determining such things. If there was one enemy in the south of the peninsula, taking 500 soldiers from each of the thirty colonies would make less sense than taking more from the fortified, secure colonies and taking fewer from those that were exposed and in danger of being captured. Many of the earlier colonies had outlived their original purpose of fortifying a distant territory or pass. Colonies in the heart of Italy, closer to Rome, were presumably less likely to be besieged and could thus operate with reduced manpower within the colony and were thus more suited to send soldiers to Rome's armies (Lazenby 1978, 174). Colonies that were further out and isolated were probably more in need of manpower to protect themselves from the higher likelihood of external pressure. Sage (1935, 558) claims that when the Romans were free to choose, the allies closest to the conflict were called upon. This is perhaps reflected in the list of manpower produced in 225 as a result of Gallic hostility, a list which excluded both Bruttians and Greeks, the Italian allies furthest from Gallic territory. In addition, the rebellions in Southern Italy would have put greater military burdens on the remaining compliant allies, such as these colonies (Salmon 1969, 80; Brunt 1971, 680). The knowledge that the majority of the failing colonies was clustered around Rome and supported by neighbouring settlements seems to demonstrate that these colonies could allow for smaller garrisons and thus could have been squeezed for more men. That said, Fregellae, a colony well within this region, assured Rome that they "had soldiers in readiness… and would give more if more were needed" (Livy 27.10.3-4). This implies that some colonies in this region still had a surplus of manpower, even those that were in a region from which it was the most strategic to draw troops from. There is, however, reason to treat Fregellae as an exception (Strabo 5.237; *Ad Herennium* 4.15.22),[52] and it is doubtful that the remaining colonies could indeed provide extra men (Brunt 1971, 680 n.6). It is evident, therefore, that colonies in this region would have experienced a greater military burden.

It is tempting to view the relationship between the foundation date of a given colony and the fact of defection in 209 as telling. Indeed, of the colonies that refused to give troops, six were among the eight oldest colonies established and six were created between 312-298; of the colonies that continued to fulfil their obligation to Rome, twelve were the twelve most recently established, four had been founded between 328-313 and two were the two first ever established. Looking at the chronologies, there is a pattern between date of foundation and whether they gave soldiers in 209. Most interesting is the fact that the twelve most recently established colonies remained compliant to their duties. Concerning the compliance of Latin colonies, it is to be expected that the most recent colonies fulfilled their obligations. At their genesis, the Roman aspect would have been most pronounced, as that first generation of settlers

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[52] Strabo (5.3.10) recorded that Fregellae was once a remarkable (ἀξιόλογος) city. Furthermore, Strabo (5.3.10; cf. Broadhead 2011, 156) mentioned that Fregellae had Privernum, Cora, Suessa, Trapontium, Velitrae and Aletrium as dependent towns (περιοικίς), but this is very much open to doubt.

were largely from Latium and the foundation charter—and its attendant obligations—would have been fresh and an orienting purpose of the settlement itself. No doubt the colonies would have maintained indigenous aspects (Stek 2013, 344), but the guiding ideology, at least in the early phase, would have been Romano-centric. Conversely, the earlier colonies had now been occupied by new generations and the greater length of time presumably allowed for a sense of separate identity to grow more pronounced. Ultimately, however, while the relationship between foundation date and tendency for compliance is a nice idea, the pattern is not perfect, nor is there anything to verify the theory beyond speculation.

It is worth addressing how Livy could have known that these were in fact the grievances voiced in the gatherings of the Latins. First, there is a traceable link between Livy and the event. Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator—who lived during the Second Punic War and wrote a history about it (Lazenby 1978, 262)—is a source Livy explicitly admits to consulting when writing his own accounts (cf. Livy 1.55.8; 10.37.14). Secondly, there are other accounts of allies involved in secret machinations, which were later discovered by the Romans. In the second half of the Fourth century, for instance, the Latins secretly planned to make war on Rome, "yet through certain persons connected by private ties of hospitality and kinship, information of the conspiracy leaked out and was brought to Rome" (Livy 8.3.3-4). Likewise, before the outbreak of the Social War, many allies were sending secret envoys to each other (App. *B Civ.* 1.38). Though unaware initially, the Romans sent around men who were best acquainted with each city where the information was eventually leaked (App. *B Civ.* 1.38; Forsythe 2005, 289). The key grievance of the Latin allies in 209, of course, was voiced directly to Rome but we see here that the private deliberations behind such a grievance could be accessible to Rome more generally and therefore, ultimately, to Livy's eyes. It was not atypical for Rome to show an interest in investigating allied loyalties. There are, for instance, numerous reports of Rome sending out embassies to inspect potential conspiracies (cf. Livy 4.30.5.6; 9.26.6-7; 27.21.6-8, 27.24, 28.10.5). It is likely that Rome would want to determine what had happened in 209. Finally, the complaints that were reportedly discussed by the Latins are all plausible and conform to other incidental parts of Livy's history. The condition of the *Legiones Cannenses* and the fact that Hannibal tried to win over Rome's allies by releasing them ransom-free (Livy 22.58.1-2; 24.12.1-2; App. *Hann.* 10), for example, are circumstances that are noted in other areas of his work. Even if Livy were being somewhat inventive about the content of the gatherings, the grievances were based on actual events that would have understandably caused discontent among the Latins.

There is no evidence that the twelve Latin colonies ever wanted to join Hannibal or break away from Rome. The report that we have makes it clear that the allies were feeling the pressure to keep up with their military obligations and, as a result, tried to reduce them by forcing Rome to make peace with Hannibal. This event is perhaps the only one to demonstrate a rebellious response specifically to Rome's demand for soldiers. What does this indicate about allied interests? This episode, in fact, still leaves room for a degree of speculation but the plausibility of explanations is narrowed. My impression is that

fear of Rome played next to no role in the decision of the colonists. Being unable to provide troops in the future, which some allies might have predicted as incurring punishment, was hardly different to their current report that they were incapable. Instead the consequences of long service away from their homelands emerges as a decisive factor. This could include not only personal deprivation and risk for the soldiers themselves, but the absence felt by many of the families left behind. The low rates of manpower in 212 verifies that many fathers, sons and brothers had marched away from their cities. From the soldiers' side, this entailed leaving their families at the mercy of a demonstrably competent Carthaginian, who had marauded through their territory. The threat this posed was especially pronounced for the Latins forced to remain in Sicily and were therefore neither able to defend their family or actively repel Hannibal. Moreover, the inducements usually received to offset these drawbacks, as we shall see, were not as effective in this situation as the opportunity for spoils was reduced.[53] Finally, these soldiers had to be funded and Livy's account makes it clear that the long service was also taking its toll on the finances of the colonies. These circumstances reveal that the allies had an interest in reducing the burden of long service, which caused absence from family, risk of harm to themselves, their city and their loved ones and financial pressures. For some, this may appear self-evident, but the point is that being under Roman dominion involved a conflict of interest and that compliance, therefore, was not a straightforward matter.

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[53] Similar situations, including long military service and little economic reward, are not a guaranteed causes for disobedience but they are a sufficient one.

4. Compliance

As the discussion so far has demonstrated, the interests of many Italian allies included the ability to conduct their own foreign policy, to avoid long and arduous military service and those interests recognised from the outset but reinforced by the discussion thus far—namely, economic prosperity, political status and concerns for their survival and wellbeing. Despite the fact that Roman demands had a negative impact on many of these interests, such as foreign policy and military service, the commonest response was compliance.[54] Why was this the case? As we have seen, there are numerous ways to connect the dots and venture to explain allied compliance. From one point of view, Roman control entailed very real benefits such as opportunities for spoils and protection, which were clearly of interest to the allies and, from this vantage point, compliance makes better sense. Nevertheless, acknowledging that many of the allies' interests were curtailed by Rome, I explore what power Rome had over the allies to keep them obedient. Throughout this exploration, the identification of some allied interests will be reinforced, and new ones will be revealed. As I have previously indicated, I use Dennis Wrong's ideas of power as a theoretical framework to analyse Rome's relationship with its allies. The power typology that Wrong developed clearly delineates the motivations for complying to demands and the distinctions he drew helps us understand the compliance of Rome's allies. Wrong divides the forms of power into four broad categories: Force, Manipulation, Persuasion and Authority.

Figure 2. The Power Typology in Wrong (1995, 24), with relevant forms in bold.

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[54] Over the course of the two centuries. As noted, the vast majority of revolts were in the third century and even during the Second Punic War, one of the most divisive periods of that century, most allies remained compliant (David 1996, 54; Lomas 2004, 206; Patterson 2006, 610).

For this study, we can do away with manipulation and persuasion. Neither manipulation—the ability to influence a subject without them being aware of your intentions—nor persuasion—the ability to influence a subject based on the content of your exhortations and on the basis of their *uncoerced* evaluations—reflect the character of Roman rule. Indeed, the ancient literature suggests that the allies were largely cognizant of Rome's intentions, with respect to the duties that they were expected to carry out. Persuasion, according to Wrong, involves a free exchange of interlocutors, who can influence one another without concern for punishment or other compelling factors. While some Romans did on occasion attempt to offer legitimating arguments to defend their position, these justifications were often an accessory to coercion and other forms of power, not mere persuasion as Wrong defines it. Rather, force and authority—which stress the primacy of the source of the demand, as opposed to content of the demand—were the pillars that upheld Rome's power over the allies. In addition to these categories, Wrong discusses the effectiveness of each form of power, which is measured in terms of three distinct variables: extensiveness, comprehensiveness and intensity. Specifically, extensiveness concerns the number of subjects that can be controlled, comprehensiveness refers to the variety of demands to be followed and, lastly, intensity denotes how far each demand can be pushed. To illustrate, one of Rome's regular demands was for allied troops, but the intensity varied. While Rome requested troops on a proportionate basis, the demand for 100% of a city's inhabitants might transgress the threshold of what the allies would permit, and this represents the intensity.[55]

4.a) Force

Force, in the context of power, refers to physical intervention that results in limiting the freedom of others. The physical aspect can be further divided into violent and non-violent, the later signifying such things as using one's own body as an obstacle. In particular, this study is concerned with violent force, the physical assault of others, intent on causing pain or death. As Wrong (1995, 26) observes, force is commonly thought to be an unstable basis for power and limited in its ability to gain obedience. Certainly, force is suited to preventing another's actions by confining or harming them in some way yet force alone cannot compel someone to undertake complex tasks or produce elaborate goods. Such would require force to be applied for the entire duration of the task they were required to undertake. By contrast, the threat of force, known as coercion, can compel people to act in such a complex fashion. Specifically, coercion operates between the applications of force and this threat of future force becomes the compelling factor. In the context of Roman affairs, Romans could forcibly imprison people or expel them from land, for example, but they could not sustain direct physical force to make men pick up their

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[55] Consider the 12 Latin colonies of 209, who believed that they could not continue providing troops if conditions did not change and, as a result, decided to disobey.

spears and fight in formation.[56] Force could initiate coercion and reinforce its effectiveness, but its own scope was limited.

Wrong's taxonomy of power, though a non-specific dissection of power relations, is fortunately applicable to the allied situation in Italy. Indeed, force was instrumental to Roman domination. As has been outlined, numerous allies came under Roman sway through Rome attacking them. In Apulia, for example, some surrendered to Rome, but others were conquered (Livy 9.15.2). In addition, Samnites regularly struggled against Rome, even mounting a resistance as late as 269, resulting in the Romans capturing a rebellious city and executing the defectors (Dion. Hal. 20.17). Force was also used to restore the allegiance of long-time allied cities such as Falerii (Zonar. 8.18; CIL I^2 P, 47), Compulteria, Telesia, Compsa (Livy 24.20.5), and the Hirpini cities—Vercellium, Vescellium and Sicilinum—which were "forcibly recovered" (*vi recepta*) (Livy 23.37.12-13), among others. Contrary to Arendt's (1970, 56) remark that violence and power are opposite, force (or violence, in Arendt's words) was a facet of Roman power, that developed into a relationship of authority. For the majority of Roman-allied relations in the Middle Republic, authority was the primary compelling feature yet, in the early Third century, we find many allies joining Rome's network as a reaction to Roman force. Later in that same century, during the Second Punic War, force was again instrumental at reincorporating allies under Roman control. In that century, then, force was predominantly used at the beginning of allied incorporation and again, if necessary, to return any allies who attempted to secede. Moving to the Second century, force is largely absent from Rome's actions (Fregellae's destruction, perhaps, is the main exception), and it is evident that another power mechanism was maintaining allied compliance. Specifically, this mechanism was the authority relationship developed between Rome and the allies over the course of the previous century.

4.b) Coercion

Rome—specifically politically influential Romans and the Senate—were viewed by many of their allies as an authority, an authority being anyone "who is regularly obeyed" (Easton 1958, 182). In authority relationships, the primacy of status is important, where the source of the command takes priority over the content. This emphasis on the source of commands explains why Roman consuls could demand that the allies produce the number of soldiers they wished to recruit and where and when they must appear (cf. Polyb. 6.21.4), even though the actual individuals changed every year. That is, a large factor in why consuls were obeyed is because they were officially recognised Roman representatives. In this scenario, the Romans did not have to rely on force but instead exercised their authority over the allies, which was usually obeyed. Given the relative lack of applied force, especially in the Second century, it is clear that authority played a key role in maintaining allied compliance. Why someone would obey the demands of authority, then, is crucial. In Wrong's formulation, authority can be divided into five different forms,

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[56] Consider the fact that the allies outnumbered Roman citizens. There simply were not enough Romans to physically force every single ally to behave in a particular manner all at once.

or motivating factors from the perspective of the subordinate; these forms are coercive, inducive, legitimate, competent and personal.

Whereas force is the application of violence, coercion, in its authoritative aspect, is the threat of force or some other punishment. Its effectiveness is predicated on the subordinate believing that the authority is both willing and capable of producing force (Wrong 1995, 41). Michener and Burt's (1975, 612) experiment, testing the determinants of compliance, found that coercive power "significantly affect[ed] compliance." In the study, no punishment was ever actually applied, though reminders were given, emphasising the primacy of the threat aspect. Coercion is recognised as a formidable form of power, capable of wide comprehensiveness and extensiveness. Since survival generally stands as the highest priority in nearly every instance, the ability to execute (and to convincingly threaten execution) is a highly effective way of gaining compliance (Lenski 1966, 50). Such a point also illustrates why coercion is capable of great comprehensiveness, as it threatens something valued by most people. Although effective at attaining compliance, coercive authority is vulnerable to being challenged if the credibility of each threat is not occasionally enacted (Boulding 1969, 288). Indeed, the certainty of punishment is more influential than the magnitude (cf. Wrong 1995, 44). Displays of force—which can entail vicarious reminders for even unpunished subordinates—highlight the relation between coercion and force. Force can be used on others, to establish a coercive relation with them, of course, but also to demonstrate the credibility of coercive power.

The Romans held immense coercive power over the allies: they could mete out huge punishments to the allies for failing to comply.[57] These included such things as confiscation of territory, execution of allied citizens and, sometimes, destruction of whole cities. Such punishments also brought with it a resumption of the obligations so that non-conformity would be ultimately futile. On numerous occasions, territory confiscations are noted: Praeneste and Tibur had land mulcted following the Latin War (Livy 8.14) and the Bruttians were forced to relinquish half their mountainous district for siding with Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. 20.15).[58] Likewise, disobedient allies were routinely executed (Livy 4.10.6; 6.20.5; 9.24.15; 23.17.1-2; 23.37.12-13). These executions represent perhaps the largest compelling aspect of coercion, since survival was so highly valued. In addition, Rome's practice of occasionally taking hostages afforded them another effective means of coercion, by hanging the threat of executing hostages over allied populations. Notably, Rome's executions were sometimes carried out publicly, making the punishment exemplary (cf. Livy 9.24.15; 26.15.7; Dion. Hal. 20.16; Val. Max. 2.7.11-14).

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[57] It is worth noting that other powers, at times, could coerce Rome's Italian allies. Hannibal, for instance, killed numerous Italians from Umbria and Picenum (Polyb. 3.86.8-11), burned down Nuceria (Livy 23.15.2-6) and executed numerous Herdonians, who had secretly met with a Roman proconsul (Livy 27.1.14-15). Despite this, Hannibal's power of coercion was dwarfed by Rome's, except for, maybe, during the immediate aftermath of Cannae. In the grand scheme, Roman coercion was far more formidable, and nothing could display this more than Rome reversing Hannibal's successes in Italy and defeating him in battle.

[58] For a comprehensive catalogue of territory confiscated from allies see Toynbee (1965b, 119-121).

Finally, Rome could utterly destroy allied cities, and Fregellae provides the most famous example (Livy *Per.* 60). In addition to these possible penalties, Rome could add even more obligations to a rebellious city such as those imposed in 204 on the twelve Latin colonies that failed to provide troops to Rome in 209. Henceforth, these twelve colonies had to keep Rome informed about their manpower via the census (Livy 29.37.6-7. 29.15.10) and, notably, they were forced to pay an annual tax at the rate of one *as* per thousand *asses* (Livy 29.15.9). These additional burdens, presumably, sent the message to other allies that refusing Roman dictate could negatively impact the whole community. All these punishments rested on Rome's military might, which was unquestionably the most superior in Italy at this time. It was fear of Roman military action that modern scholars recognize as operative in allied decision making (cf. Badian 1958, 145; Sage 2008, 128; Rosenstein 2012b, 78).

As Wrong (1995, 41) points out, coercion is contingent on subjects believing that the power holder is both capable and willing to issue punishment. This can be identified directly in allied motivations. When a revolt by the Etruscans was detected, a consul transferred an army into Etruria, causing the Etruscans to become docile, apparently restrained by fear (Livy 27.21.7-8). Both factors, as far as we can tell, were presumably perceived differently throughout the Middle Republic.[59] In the eyes of Tarentum, for example, Rome in the early Third century was a northern power, which controlled Latium and surrounding areas and whose network of allies was relatively new and therefore of debatable loyalty.[60] In 273, when Rome took control of Tarentum (Livy *Per.* 15; Frontin. 3.3.1), the capability and willingness of Roman force would have been illustrated. Rome had just defeated Pyrrhus, a power in his own right, at the battle of Beneventum, before marching to Tarentum and taking the city by treachery. From Tarentum's perspective in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, it is likely that Rome's capability and willingness for force, and thus their coercive power, was at an unsurpassed high. By the end of the war, Rome had maintained longstanding allies (ensuring the certainty of Roman manpower), had overcome Hannibal, a very significant commander and, most importantly, managed to reincorporate every ally that had revolted, displaying to all that Rome was able and committed to punishing transgressors to compliance.[61] In Wrong's description of coercion, the severity of punishment is less important than the certainty of it (Wrong 1995, 44) and the message that Rome sent by disciplining one hundred percent of rebellious allies would cast a long shadow. The Second century, by contrast, rarely involved Rome punishing allies in Italy. Nevertheless, it did involve numerous campaigns abroad where the allies were constantly exposed to Rome's capability to use force, yet the lack of disciplinary activity directly against Italian allies might have affected the allied perception of

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[59] Livy (23.4.6) believed that part of the reason Capua revolted was because, following Cannae, Rome's power was undermined.

[60] In about 303, Rome and Tarentum had also struck a treaty demarcating their respective spheres of influence (Cornell 1995, 363).

[61] Not all allies were trusted to return to autonomous control right away and those that were not remained under military watch into the early Second Century (Lomas 2004, 206).

Rome's willingness to resort to force against the Italians like they had done in the previous century.[62] Threats had to be realised on occasion to maintain the coercion (Boulding 1969, 288 in Wrong 1995, 43). As mentioned, there were no punishments, with the exception of Fregellae, meted out in the Second century on anything like the scale or severity of those carried out in the Third century. It may very well be that the aftermath of the Second Punic War cemented the futility of resistance to Rome but, also, it might indicate the emergence of other concurrent reasons for obeying Roman authority.

4.c) Inducements

Whereas coercion indicates punishment, reward is signified by another form of authority that Wrong terms inducement. Ostensibly, rewards offered for completing a task (compliance) reflect an exchange that does not necessarily involve a power relation, yet, when those who offer the reward control the means for survival, the element of power is clearly introduced (Wrong 1995, 44). Even when the rewards are not directly linked to the chance of survival, but are still regulated by the power holder, they can nevertheless be of enough interest to compel someone to obey demands. If the rewards are frequent and consistent, they can develop into an expectation, where they become a regular feature of life. From a different perspective, then, the provision of rewards can develop to the point where fear of the reward being withheld becomes the motivation for compliance and thus enters the territory of coercion (Blau 1964, 117; Giddens 1968, 266; Wrong 1995, 45). Regarding their potential to compel, inducements can exhibit wide comprehensiveness and extensiveness (Wrong 1995, 71). Considering that inducements and coercion are closely related, it is not surprising that they share the same capacity for gaining acquiescence.

To what degree did rewards given by Rome affect allied compliance? Undoubtedly, Rome's allies did receive economic gains and protection. First, is it well established that the allied soldiers received an equal share in spoils for their military efforts (Toynbee 1965a, 255; Rosenstein 2012a, 85; cf. Livy 40.43.7). Arguably, allied soldiers were getting financial rewards that they would not have obtained otherwise, but it is certainly possible that at least some allies thought themselves capable of winning such spoils without Roman involvement. On occasion, Rome rewarded allied cities with material wealth such as the spoils given after the Battle of Aquilonia in 293 (Livy 10.46.8) and the Corinthian spoils distributed by the consul Mummius, following the Greek's city destruction (Yarrow 2006, 5; Patterson 2006a, 146). In other circumstances, double pay was a possible prize (Livy 23.20.2). Furthermore, the allies— or just the Latins depending on one's interpretation of *socii Latini Nominis—*could receive land such as the captured Ligurian and Gallic land that had been parcelled out in 173 (Livy 42.4.4-5; Toynbee 1965b, 135). In addition to the material advantages, Roman control afforded the allies a degree of protection. The Romans, for example, answered Thurii's request for help against the Lucanians, lifting

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[62] Perhaps some allies considered that it was themselves too who had the capability for force, seeing as they were fighting alongside the Romans, but the force of a single allied city, of course, was dwarfed by the manpower Rome could call upon.

the siege and installing a defensive garrison (Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; Val. Max. 1.8.6). They also signalled their consideration of protecting allies while abroad, indicated by the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, a law that announced Rome's concern that the Italian allies, among others, may sail in safety (Roselaar 2012, 148-9). The allies utilised this protection, as is demonstrated by numerous allied appeals for help, for instance, those from Ardea (Livy 4.9.1), Clusium (Livy 5.33.1), envoys from the *socii* against Etruscans (Livy 10.45.4-5), Thurii (Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; Cappelletti 2018. 324) and the Petelini (Livy 23.20.4-5). From the allies asking for aid, it is evident that protection was something valued by the allies.

Along the same lines, the allies indirectly profited from Roman control by their association with Rome overseas. For instance, many Italian allies operated as merchants in Greece. Inscriptions from Delos attest to traders from Velia, Petelia, Heraclea, Canusium, Azetium and Fregellae, among others (Hatzfeld 1919, 130). Importantly, the affairs of the allies in Greece were heavily influenced by the Romans. Italian allies had been trading in Greece, to a lesser degree, before Roman involvement there (Gruen 1984, 66), but the immigration of Italians to Delos began to proliferate after 166 (Wilson 1966, 100; Gruen 1984b, 66, 71), when Rome put the island in the control of pro-Roman Athenians. This increase could have been connected to the fact that Rome increased the prosperity of Delos in 167 by rendering it a tax-free harbour (Roselaar 2012, 152). There were other financial benefits of Roman supervision such as the exemption from paying harbour dues with some eastern cities like Ambracia (Livy 38.44.4-5). The military intervention of Rome in Greece, in the Second century, meant that the security of the Italians there was ensured by the Romans, as opposed to potentially hostile Greeks or Macedonians, and the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* provides a strong example of this. According to Gabba (1976, 76), the Italian traders at Delos sometimes returned home to Italy and others had a habit of remaining connected to their home city, increasing their social standing at home. In other words, some allies were financially prospering from a Roman-controlled hub, which in turn had a positive impact on the affected allies' status.

Over time, inducements transform to the point that the benefits develop into expectations (Blau 1964, 117; Wrong 1995, 45). These rewards become coercive, as punishment can involve both the introduction of a negative thing and the withdrawal of a positive thing. Indeed, when Rome failed to live up to its end of the bargain, some allies became dissatisfied. During the Second Punic War, Bruttians from the city of Petelia petitioned Rome to protect them against the invading Carthaginians and other Bruttians. When Rome announced that they were unable to help, many of them proposed to flee and, importantly, others suggested that they switch the city's allegiance to the Bruttians (Livy 23.20.7-10). In the end, Petelia decided to stay with Rome but it is noteworthy that many of them decided to revolt once Rome failed to deliver a usual inducement (in this case, protection). Likewise, there is an account of the Romans wavering from their regular distribution of equal spoils to the allies. Following Claudius Pulcher's campaign in Liguria and Histria in 177, the allies were given half of what the Roman citizens were given, causing discontent among them (Livy 41.13.7-8; Pfeilschifter 2007,

27). These reports may indicate that the allies did in fact come to expect what were originally perceived as rewards and thus the relationship of inducement transformed into one of coercion. The allies valued the benefits of Roman protection and spoils and both their reaction to Rome reneging and their appeals for help illustrate this. It is impossible to prove that these benefits influenced the allies to remain compliant but sheer probability would suggest that they helped some individual allies swallow their situation under Rome. In other words, Roman authority was supported by inducements, which, over time, also contributed to Rome's power of coercion. Rome could affect the financial success of allies so that there were more reasons for obedience. Finally, it is worth noting that the economic benefits given by Rome were not exploitation and they were not directly related to the subsistence of the allies. The economy of Italy, at the time, was predominantly agricultural, with each state receiving a substantial amount of its livelihood from their own territories (Lomas 2004, 213; Roselaar 2018, 177). True, the Romans had the power to destroy crops, but this was atypical, and they certainly did not seize the allies' means for subsistence and ration it back to them in return for compliance.

4.d) Legitimate Authority

One of the most effective forms of authority is "legitimate authority," which achieves compliance through the common belief that the authority is right and valid. Those wielding power consider it proper to issue demands and those subordinate consider it their duty to obey (Wrong 1995, 49). This latter stipulation is essential, as the authority can only be categorised as legitimate when the subject recognizes the validity of the demands (Wolf 1986, 219). Generally, this is brought about or fostered through shared norms. In Weber's assessment, authority can be legitimated by conditions such as tradition (e.g. considered sacred and eternal) and the law (Blau 1970, 150-1), which can help unify and consolidate norms. Though not the actual reason for obeying a legitimate authority, the process of legitimation usually involves arguments and persuasion designed to convince another why they should obey (Wrong 1995, 76-77). This is the rare instance where we encounter persuasion operating in Roman power. As Wrong (1995, 80) points out "persuasion may succeed in creating legitimate authority which then dispenses with the need for it by substituting commands for arguments." This study rarely touches on the role of pure persuasion as a base of power in its own right, instead focussing on how Romans justified their power. After all, legitimating arguments are often presented by authorities who already possess coercive power (Wrong 1995, 79). Legitimate authority is related to coercion, insofar as one form of power can develop to the other form. Indeed, legitimate authority displays a habit of emerging from power relations that were initially coercive (Wrong 1995, 81, cf. 113). On the other hand, legitimacy, once obtained, is not guaranteed and regimes considered legitimate can revert to a state where coercion takes pre-eminence (Wrong 1995, 81). More on the relationship between legitimacy and coercion is discussed later (page 65). Finally, legitimate authority has the capacity for power relations of great comprehensiveness and extensiveness, much like coercion and inducement, yet commands that transgress acknowledged boundaries threaten to invalidate the power holder's

legitimacy (Wrong 1995, 49-50). Most notably, those boundaries can be imprecisely defined, and expectations can vary. Allied attitudes about how many allies should be on military duty or for how long, for example, contribute to whether a power holder's command is regarded as legitimate.

Clearly, the Romans considered their domination of the allies as legitimate. Livy (22.13.11) referred to Roman rule as "just (*iusto*) and temperate." Furthermore, in 193, when the Romans were fighting against the Syrian King Antiochus III, Minnio, an envoy of Antiochus challenged the Romans' right to rule over the Italians (Livy 35.16). Specifically, Minnio announced that it was inconsistent for the Romans to rule over Greek cities in Italy while simultaneously chastising Antiochus for wanting dominion over Greek cities in Turkey. P. Sulpicius Galba, a former consul, defended the Roman position, saying that Rome demanded from the Greek cities in Italy only what they owe from their treaties (*ex foedere debent*). To this, Sulpicius added that their relationship with these Greek cities in Italy had existed "with one unbroken continuity of right" (*uno et perpetuo tenore iuris*) (Livy 35.16.8). According to Sage (1935, 50-1), Sulpicius' response resembled the Roman legal custom of acknowledging the validity of obtaining property by controlling it unchallenged for a certain period of time.[63]

Did the allies likewise view their power relation with Rome as legitimate? The absence of literary sources from the allies themselves renders any conclusion about this matter as ultimately speculative. That said, there are some good reasons to suppose that many allies did come to obey Roman authority because they considered it legitimate. Certainly, legitimation of authority, by those subordinate to it, is a typical response to subordination. As Moore (1978, 96) writes "in real life oppressed groups generally accept in some degree the legitimacy of their oppressors." Members of groups such as African American slaves, women of the nineteenth century and Japanese Americans during WWII, for instance, have all demonstrated tendencies to legitimate their subordinate position to some degree (Wolf 1986, 230). As mentioned, coercive power relations, which occurred in the Roman–allied situation, display a habit of transforming into power relations resembling legitimate authority (Wrong 1995, 81, cf. 113). The tendency to legitimate one's own subordinate status likely stems from psychological pressures (cf. Mosca 1939, 71 cited by Wrong 1995, 104; Wrong 1995, 113). These pressures include the intrinsically unsatisfying nature of being subject to another's authority (Wrong 1995, 115) and the need to believe in the benevolence of the dominating power (Wrong 1995, 111). What is important is that accepting the legitimacy of an authority is a widespread tendency among subjects, usually derived from psychological pressures.

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[63] Minnio and Sulpicius refer explicitly to Rhegium, Naples and Tarentum in their disagreement. Sulpicius, relying on the aspect of continuous control to justify Rome's actions, seems to blatantly ignore the fact that Tarentum broke themselves free from Roman control during the Second Punic War and therefore challenged Rome's right to possess them.

Wolf (1986, 221-2) in discussing the role of legitimation as a response to oppression, identified circumstances or "bases" that predispose subjects to recognise the unequal power structure as proper and legitimate. These bases are **(1)** habituation, **(2)** accommodation and **(3)** dependency relations.

Legitimate Authority

1)Habituation   2)Accommodation   3)Dependency Relations
2a) Relative Advantage
2b) Group Conservatism

Figure 3. The "bases" that predispose subordinate groups to consider the power hierarchy as valid, as identified by Wolf (1986, 221-2).

Habituation occurs through time and routine, both of which normalize the way things are. Lenski (1966, 32) argues that people tend to be habitual and that custom, has a strong impact on human affairs. As he writes, custom brings a sense of inertia to human matters, leading people to accept disadvantages such as unfair distribution. The second base, accommodation, refers to the way people psychologically adapt to their circumstances and this base is reinforced by what Wolf calls **(2a)** relative advantage and **(2b)** group conservatism. Relative advantage is the idea that an oppressed group views itself as doing comparatively better than other oppressed groups. Such a belief is thought to relieve, to some degree, the sense of dispossession (Wolf 1986, 222). Group conservatism, which is the desire to preserve what the oppressed group does have, is illustrated by a reluctance to take risks. The alternative is that if anyone from the oppressed groups does challenge the *status quo*, then they might incite punishment on the entire group. This potential can involve oppressed groups internally vying to prevent anyone protesting. The final pillar, dependency relations, denotes the oppressed group's perception that the dominant power is responsible for their protection. If these bases are present in the relations between the oppressed and oppressor, then legitimation may occur.

The allied condition fits neatly into the social bases that Wolf identifies as predisposing people to consider the oppressive system as valid. The first, habituation, likely impacted allied compliance. From 264, except for the Second Punic War, the allies were fulfilling obligations in a reoccurring and cyclical fashion. In the Second century especially, Livy relates contributions made by the allies year after year. It is highly likely that an allied city's awareness of its place in Rome's network was a regular feature of their community identity. This would be reinforced by allies having to habitually gatherer up their citizens as soldiers, fund them and send them to whatever rally point Rome had indicated. Over time, it stands to reason that the allies became more accustomed to these practices and that the normality of their situation was increased in the Second century. Another facet of habituation is a lack of perceived

alternatives. Tellingly, the most energetic rebellions took place whenever Roman power was challenged, or when a third party could provide support against Rome. Hannibal's Italian invasion, as discussed, involved numerous allies withdrawing from Roman control. The very real alternative to Roman rule offered by Hannibal temporarily disturbed regular allied life and exposed the futility of resistance.[64]

Another determinant identified by Wolf that could have impacted allied compliance is accommodation, which is denoted by relative advantage and group conservatism. Regarding relative advantage, we see that, despite the allies' subordinate position under Rome, their situation was arguably better than others. At times throughout the Middle Republic, Mediterranean powers suffered at the hands of Rome (and her Italian allies). Certainly, Carthage and Antiochus both had to pay huge fines for their wars against Rome, Macedonia had its kingdom broken apart after the battle of Pydna in 168, and both Carthage and Corinth were destroyed in 146. Against this backdrop, the circumstances of the Italian allies appear in a favourable light. They could still return to a secure home, where relative autonomy and chances to prosper existed. In those wars, fighting alongside the Romans was far better than against them. The relative advantage can be identified in other areas too, such as their exemption from some harbour dues, while others were still required to pay them (cf. Livy 38.44.4-5). Among the allies themselves, the Latins were distinguished from the *socii* by rights of *commercium*, *connubium*, and *ius migrandi*. The effect this had on Latin dispositions to Roman power is hard to quantify, but it is useful to recall that Latins revolted at a far lower rate.[65]

Like relative advantage, aspects of group conservatism can be found in allied circumstances. While Rome's punishment was usually reserved for the ringleaders of revolt themselves, there are times when allies were punished as a whole. These include the Bruttians, who had Sila, their mountainous district, confiscated (Dion. Hal. 20.15), Vercellium, Vescellium, and Sicilinum, which were besieged and had their citizens sold (Livy 23.37.12-13; cf. Rawlings 2011, 309) and Fregellae, a Latin colony which was destroyed (Livy *Per.* 60). Clearly, rebellious individuals could incite Roman wrath on their whole community. This phenomenon could play a role in allied compliance. For instance, the nobles of Salapia, an Apulian city that had defected to Hannibal, were conflicted about their city's allegiance, since Rome had withstood the setback at the battle of Cannae. A citizen of Salapia, Blatius, secretly preferred the Romans to Hannibal and when he detected that Rome's power was recovering he decided

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[64] Tarentum's tendency to employ overseas mercenaries in the Fourth and early Third century was ultimately unsuccessful (Fronda 2010, 198) and often these mercenaries, like Acrotatus and Pyrrhus, were difficult to control. For these reasons it is unlikely that Tarentum considered overseas mercenaries as a viable alternative to Rome by the Second Punic War.
[65] Strict differences in allied conditions among the *socii* are not as straightforward. The once typical notion that some treaties were fair (*foedus aequum*) or unfair (*foedus iniquum*) has since been challenged (Gruen 1984a, 14-5).

to settle with his political opponent Dasius, "simply for the sake of their country, lest, if the Romans should take it by force, some irreparable harm should befall it (App. *Hann.* 45).[66]

The dependence of the allies can be seen from the allies petitioning Rome for protection on numerous occasions. In 293, for instance, allies complained to the Senate about Etruscans burning their lands and asked Rome to help them, which Rome agreed to do (Livy 10.45.4-5). Later, during the Second Punic War, the Petelini petitioned Rome to send them a garrison, since they were being attacked by the Carthaginians. Furthermore, Thurii asked Rome for help repelling hostile Lucanians (Dion. Hal. 19.13.1; Cappelletti 2018. 324). For their aid, the inhabitants of Thurii made statues for both Aelius, *tribunus plebis* and Fabricius, a consul, who played pivotal roles in protecting them (Plin. *HN* 34.32). Importantly, dependency relations can involve the subject believing that the dominant power has a responsibility to help them, as a form of reciprocity for their compliance. It is not surprising, then, that the allies typically showed dissatisfaction whenever Rome did not fulfil her protective role. This is demonstrated by the many Petelians who encouraged a defection to Hannibal after Rome did not help them. Similarly, when Romans massacred the inhabitants of Henna in Sicily, "those who till then had wavered went over to the Carthaginians" (Livy 24.39.9-10). Lapses in Rome's protective posture also had consequences. Tarentines formed a conspiracy to betray Tarentum to Hannibal, ostensibly as a response to Rome's execution of Tarentine hostages, who attempted to escape from Rome (Livy 25.7.13-8.1).

Finally, as noted, legitimate authority can involve the dominant power justifying their demands (Wrong 1995, 58, 76-7). Notably, Michener and Burt (1975, 612) found that justification had a considerable effect on compliance, where justification is the reason given behind certain demands. Rome's justification for circumscribing allied foreign policy and requisitioning their troops was usually predicated on the fact that legal structures (e.g. treaties, surrender conditions, colonial foundation charters) gave them the right (cf. Livy 35.16.8). In addition, as discussed above, the Romans sometimes signalled benefits of Roman control, perhaps adding to Rome's ability to justify their demands. In Livy's description (22.32.4-6) of an embassy from Neapolis in 217, there is a clear demonstration of an ally recognising that the Romans were fighting for the allies as well as Rome. The motivation behind Neapolis' gesture, however, is arguable, with possibilities ranging from sincere enthusiasm for Rome's efforts to a general awareness that Rome would value such an offer. If Livy's account accurately reflects historical reality, then it suggests that Neapolis accepted the power structure as valid and one worthy of support. To the Latin colonists who refused to contribute soldiers in 209, the Romans justified their request by pointing out that the colonies had sprung from Rome and were sent to those lands for a

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[66] Considering that this report includes inner motivations for Blatius, this passage may seem dubious, yet Blatius supposedly tried to persuade Dasius, perhaps emphasising the danger of Roman reprisal and Dasius told Hannibal. With this in mind, it is not impossible that this reflects a true motivation and one that Appian could have encountered in his research.

shared purpose (Livy 27.9.10-11). The consuls told the colonists to remind their townsfolk that they owed to Rome what a child owed a parent (Livy 27.9.11-12). So, although we have no access to allied sources referencing the validity of Roman rule, we see that factors in the allies' situation would suggest the possibility of legitimation occurring. Indeed, many subordinate groups naturally come to view their position (and the overall system) as proper, the allied conditions strongly reflect the bases identified by Wolf as predisposing groups to legitimating authority and, to some degree, Rome could justify its control, an influential feature of legitimation. With this in mind, it is not farfetched to suppose that many allies came to view Rome's control over the allies as legitimate.

4.e) Competent Authority

A fourth form of authority, termed "competent authority" by Wrong, is based on expertise. Specifically, it refers to compliance due to the subject's belief in the superiority of the authority's competence and hence their superior judgement in deciding what is best for the subordinate's interests. The subject's belief in superior expertise is the fundamental feature that distinguishes this form of authority from others, especially those that focus on organizational positions that people hold in a hierarchy. Aside from its definitional basis, this form of authority is easily combined with others. Managers, for instance, will often have expertise in their field but they can also possess other means, such as legitimation and coercion, in which case the competence can serve as a supplementary legitimating argument (Wrong 1995, 58). Authority based on competence can achieve wide extensiveness but attain low comprehensiveness and the intensity is restricted to the area of expertise that is acknowledged.

Just as with legitimate authority, it is impossible to conclusively prove that Rome's allies considered Rome an expert in political or military affairs, such that they would have obeyed Roman directives on the basis of competence. This form of authority, as previously discussed, is limited to gaining compliance only in the space in which the power holder has expertise. In the context of the Roman-allied situation, the competence would be related to Rome's ability to direct troops successfully in battle and Rome's ability to ensure the safety of Italy, including keeping the peace and protecting allies. On both fronts, Rome was mostly successful. Regarding Rome's military success, they managed to repel the Carthaginians twice, in the First and Second Punic War, they defeated Philip V and Perseus—Macedonian kings who quarrelled with Rome—and Antiochus III. Despite this, it is not clear that the allies therefore considered the Romans as tactically or strategically superior. In 212, for example, a cohort of allies (from among the Paeligni), disobeyed a Roman consul and took the initiative to attack a Carthaginian camp stationed near Beneventum by throwing their standard into the enemy camp (Livy 25.14.4-6; Rosenstein 2012, 102-3). This manoeuvre led to the capture of the Carthaginians' camp (Livy 25.14.8-10). Along with this, there are examples of Rome failing tactically. Indeed, the disasters such as those at Cannae and Arausio, among others, reflected poorly on Roman competence. Specifically, the high number of deaths at the battle of Arausio, which included allied deaths, was a result of Roman commanders failing to cooperate (Diod. Sic. 36.1.1; Livy *Per.* 67.1-3; Roselaar 2019, 213).

On other occasions, the allies are recorded as performing noteworthy feats in battle. These include the allies being the first to attack at the battle of Pydna and the ally who charged at King Pyrrhus at the battle of Heraclea (Rosenstein 2012, 102). While military operations where ultimately determined by Rome, there were allies who held commanding positions. First, allies were commanded by allied commanders (Pfeilschifter 2007, 31; Terrenato 2019, 162), though these commanders themselves were beholden to outranking Romans. Additionally, there are reports of allies overseeing a city, such as Dasius of Brundisium, who was entrusted to the command of Clastidium. Clearly, the allies were capable of handling themselves in a military capacity.

The role of competence is likewise connected to Rome's ability to make sound judgements concerning allied safety. Rome kept the latter three belligerents out of Italy and succeeded in repelling Hannibal. The problem is, however, that there is no indicator that the allies considered Rome superior in such matters, which is crucial to determining an authority being enabled by competence. It is equally possible that at least some allies thought that it was Rome's mismanagement of foreign affairs that led Hannibal to stampede through Italy and that involvement with Philip and Antiochus was unnecessary. Allied perception is also likely to vary with the circumstances. It is not unreasonable to assume that at the height of the Second Punic War, numerous Italians, especially the citizens of Nuceria and Petelia, as well as the allied farm-owners who saw their crops seized or destroyed, considered Rome incapable of protecting them against Hannibal. At other times, such as following Zama, Rome's military expertise may have appeared unparalleled. Looking at the evidence, we find instances of Romans performing well militarily and examples of them performing poorly. Moreover, we find reports of the allies taking the initiative carrying out noteworthy deeds on the battlefield. With this in mind, it is very plausible that there were allies who regarded themselves as capable as, if not more than, the Romans in war. It is also plausible that some allies admired Roman military achievements. Whether these allies were prepared to accept the power dynamic as a result remains unknown. Ultimately, I am hesitant to conclude that allies obeyed Rome due to some perception that Rome was more competent, though it remains plausible.

4.f) Personal Authority

A final reason for obeying an authority identified by Wrong is "personal authority." This authority involves a subordinate obeying another, wanting to serve them, due to the other's personal attributes (Wrong 1995, 60). It is, then, a power relation where a subordinate would still obey another, even if the latter possessed no capacity to punish or reward in the traditional sense, no specialised expertise or did not occupy any legitimate superiority. Such relations may seem rare and other factors usually contribute to compliance alongside personal authority but what is important to note here is that the personal characteristics of this form are the sole or key compelling feature. As Wrong points out, admiration and friendship are among the foundations of personal authority relations. Weber's notion of charismatic authority, generally involving a leader perceived to be divine or supernatural (Blau 1970, 150), adds another personal reason for obedience. Concerning its effectiveness, personal authority lacks broad

extensiveness but can achieve high levels of comprehensives and intensity. The personal authority can often ask a lot of another, which personality cults verify. Despite this, personal authority is fundamentally unstable as the motivation to obey is invested in a particular person and numerous vulnerabilities, such as death, can terminate compliance. Along with this, personal relations can diminish with sustained contact, suggesting that distance and intervals of non-contact can help safeguard the efficiency of personal authority (Wrong 1995, 81-2).

The elite ties between Romans and allies serve as one aspect of personal authority, as mediated by the relationships between them. Some of these relationships included intermarriage (*connubium*) and guest-friendship (*hospitium*). Intermarriage, though restricted to *cives sine suffragio* and Latins, nevertheless affected compliance. Pacuvius Calavius, a noble from Capua, declared that he would not favour Hannibal as he had married a Roman woman and since his daughter had likewise married a Roman (Livy 23.2.5-7). This is consistent with the later report that many Capuans were reluctant to revolt because many were united with Romans through marriage (Livy 23.4.7-8). During the Social War, the Marsi and Romans prepared to fight each other but "when they came into sight, the soldiers of each army recognized many of their hosts, their comrades, and finally many of those with whom they were bound by family ties" (Diod. Sic. 37.15).

Another formalised relationship was *hospitium*, which involved elite members of different settlements providing each other hospitality. For example, Roman senators "generally had private relations of hospitality, which they generously and courteously cultivated, and their homes at Rome were open to the guests at whose houses they themselves were wont to lodge" (Livy 42.1.9). In addition, a fragment from Cato (*ORF⁴* Cato frg. 56) records that, when citizens from Camerinum visited Rome, they were lodged away with guests and friends. Guest-friendship was not limited to the city of Rome. As Livy (42.17.3) reports, a prominent citizen of Brundisium, Lucius Rammius, "entertained hospitably all Romans, both generals and ambassadors, as well as distinguished personages of foreign states."[67] This relationship was often hereditary, connecting families across generations (Lomas 2012, 202). *Hospitium* relations could be ratified with a *tessera hospitalis* (token of hospitality), such as the one found in Marsi territory (CIL I² 1764). *Hospitium* did not guarantee that descendants of signatories, so to speak, were personally connected. Indeed, because *hospitium* was generational, it is thought that these tokens could help descendants of the relationship recognise each other (Patterson 2006a, 141). The role elite relations played in an allied city's allegiance was clearly decisive. When Capua, at this point an ally, tried to revolt in the late Fourth century, the plot was leaked to Rome through people connected "by private ties of hospitality and kinship" (Livy 8.3.3-4; Patterson 2006a, 148). Furthermore, a passage of Appian (*B Civ.* 1.38; cf. Forsythe 2005, 289) reports that, when Rome suspected a possible rebellion among

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[67] The example is perhaps slightly tainted by the report that Rammius later promised to poison Romans at the behest of Perseus (Livy 42.17.8), though this account could be fictitious slander on Perseus' bellicosity.

numerous Italian allies, "they sent men round to the towns, choosing those who were best acquainted with each, to collect information quietly." Though open to interpretation, it could suggest that Rome used men who they knew had personal sway in those cities to ensure loyalty.

Aside from the connections forged through formalised relationships of friendship (*hospitium*) and marriage, personal authority can be found in other areas of Roman-allied relations. As discussed earlier, the charisma of an individual can contribute to why others might wish to obey them. In a military setting, we hear, for instance, that Papirius Cursor "possessed a power of command which was equally effective with citizens and allies" (Livy 9.16.16-17). The allies, throughout the Republic had been led by great Roman commanders (David 1996, 128) and their charisma had been a compelling force in army recruitment (Kent 2012, 80). As we are told, many were hesitant to go to war in Spain until Scipio volunteered, subsequently increasing his popularity and causing others to now volunteer (Polyb. 35.4; Hoyos 2011, 64). In addition, Roman commanders consciously tried to increase their own popularity by releasing eligible men from service (Livy 43.14.1-10; Feig Vishnia 1996, 150). The Spanish Governor of 180, Q. Fulvius, was able to successfully petition the Senate to allow him to return home much of his army, including both Romans and allies (Livy 40.35-6; Feig Vishnia 1996, 151).

The central point of contact between allies and these charismatic commanders would have been during military service. It is generally agreed that the allies were recruited in distinct ethnic cohorts, that the allies served in separate units on the battlefield and that the allies were stationed separately in camp (cf. Pfeilschifter 2007, 30, 32, 35; Rosenstein 2012a, 95, 100; Roselaar 2019, 50). These circumstances, however, allow for different, but plausible interpretations.[68] Certainly, the answer to the question 'was the Roman army a melting pot?' is unclear. That said, there were opportunities for the allies to interact with the Romans during campaigns. Most importantly, the opportunity for contact was likely greater for elite allies as they served as commanders (cf. Pfeilschifter 2007, 38). It is after all important to remember that the allies served directly under allied commanders (Pfeilschifter 2007, 31; Terrenato 2019, 162), who in turn served under a Roman *praefectus sociorum* (Kent 2018, 262). Where an ally was positioned in the chain of command, in other words, affected the proximity to Roman commanders. The role Roman commanders played in compelling allied obedience, on the basis of their personality, remains plausible yet speculative. I am inclined to think that, given the conditions of warfare and the reliance on others that it necessitates, at least some allies became friendly and receptive to the Roman commanders they served under. What can be said with some confidence is that personal authority influenced allied compliance, at least through the personal relationships that Romans and allies forged.

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[68] Pfeilschifter (2007) argues that, contrary to earlier scholarship, the level of integration was minimal. Rosenstein (2012a, 102) points out that, if integration was essential for good military performance, then the allies were indeed integrated into the Roman army.

These categories make up Wrong's structure for power. Clearly, as we have seen, the various forms of power can overlap or develop from each other, but perhaps the most related pair are coercion and legitimate authority. This has led to a fundamental debate on the relationship between consensus and coercion, with one side emphasising the role of shared values as a uniting principle and the other stressing the irreducibility of coercion in power relations (Wrong 1995, 43, cf. 84 – 91). Those who argue for the primacy of coercion, point out that force is typically employed as a last resort when other means at gaining compliance has failed, thus demonstrating its supremacy. Nevertheless, force and coercion can also be wielded to establish an initial power relation. The shortcomings of coercion, such as the constant need to display one's capability to carry out punishments, pressure power holders to legitimize their control. Certainly, it is possible for originally coercive power relations to become legitimate and, in turn, for legitimate power, once obtained, to break apart and revert to pure coercion. (Wrong 1995, 81, cf. 113; Lenski 1966, 50 -54).

Summarising the applicability of Wrong's typology of power to the allied situation in relation to Rome, numerous forms of power appear to have played a role in allied compliance. First, the violent force committed by the Romans managed to remove the rebellious inhabitants of cities and prevent further revolts (in the case of sacked cities and enslaved populations). Secondly, Roman authority was obeyed for reasons of coercion, inducement, legitimation and personal reasons. Submitting to Roman authority on the basis of perceived competence is impossible to establish. For the role of competence there is a lack of direct testimony and, unlike with the case of legitimacy, there were no additional supportive arguments that could be used to suggest the impact it had on compliance.

4.g) Interrelations

At this juncture it is important to discuss how these forms of power interrelated in Roman-allied relations. The various forms of power are far more effective at maintaining compliance when they exist together, rather than in isolation. Clearly, the *socii* and the Latins formed a highly varied group in terms of their own traditions and motivations. It is, in Wrong's (1995, 73) estimation, to the benefit of a dominant power "confronting a heterogeneous and differentiated aggregate of power subjects (individuals or groups) to be capable of exercising multiple forms of power to control them" and the Romans indeed came to exercise numerous forms. When the allies first fell under Roman power, it is unlikely that all allies considered Roman rule legitimate or were inclined to comply based on some desire to appease Rome.[69] In addition, the advantages of receiving equal spoils or Roman protection probably offered no motivation initially, especially in the cases where Rome was the aggressor. There are possible exceptions to this, such as the Latin colonies and Thurii, the latter of which was grateful for the protection Rome provided (Plin. *HN* 34.32). Nevertheless, it is debatable whether Thurians

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[69] Based on the numerous attempts to break free from Roman control initially.

henceforth considered it legitimate for Rome to permanently requisition its troops and limit their independence in exchange for protection.

For the majority of the allies, force and coercion appear as the early forms of power. Coercion is a very effective form of power (Lenski 1966 50; Wrong 1995, 42), yet it has its limitations. As Rousseau (1999, 48) pointed out, "the strongest party is never strong enough to remain the master for ever, unless he transforms his strength into right and obedience into duty." When Rome's ability to coerce faltered, as it did in some parts of Italy after Cannae, Rome's power was undermined, resulting in the inability to control those allies. For the allies who remained with Rome in the aftermath of Cannae, it is possible that they were motivated by a perception that Rome was still able and willing to forcefully punish those who might defect. The other forms of Roman power were also taking hold. Once allies had served with Rome in war, the financial advantages of plunder were apparent. Moreover, the bases supporting the likelihood of legitimation, such as accommodation and habituation, would have served to make it a real possibility that some allies had come to accept their current circumstance as valid. Certainly, there is a pressure on the dominant power to transform their authority from coercive into legitimate, as it increases the diversity of their power forms (Wrong 1995, 85-6). The consuls, for instance, offered legitimating arguments to the revolting colonies in 209, before threatening punishment, relying therefore on the validity of their demands rather than their (temporarily strained) power of coercion.

Despite the Roman setbacks at Cannae, *inter alia*, Rome's coercive power likely occupied the minds of the allies to some degree for the majority of the Third and Second centuries. It should be recalled that inducements, over time, tend to transform to a form of coercion, thus further underscoring Rome's coercive power. These tendencies reflect the level of allied compliance to Roman imposed obligations across the Middle Republic. The early Third century and the Second Punic War were, as discussed, tumultuous in Roman-allied relations, involving much allied resistance to Roman control. The Second century, by contrast, included little armed resistance from the allies, though tensions were rising toward the end. Such a view is congruent with the notion that, for about half a century following the Second Punic War, Rome had reiterated its coercive power beyond doubt. In addition, the advantages of Roman inducements were appreciable from eastern plunder—and therefore valued enough to become another potential punishment, time had passed enough for Roman-allied relations to consolidate and finally, fulfilling Roman demands had become habitual, following a normative routine that likely contributed to many allies considering Roman authority as legitimate. We see, then, the blend of Roman bases of power. Though difficult to track the precise shifts, it is safe to say that each power form—with the exception of competent authority—contributed to various degrees throughout the Middle Republic. These likely followed what Wrong termed 'tendential laws,' which are the typical developments of one form of power into another, such as inducements evolving into coercion and the tendency for coercion and legitimacy to waver between one another. Out of these forms, coercion, inducements and legitimate authority tend to afford the most effective means of control (Wrong 1995, 71), which reflects the

widespread modern recognition of the roles that benefits and fear played in allied loyalty. Now these insights will be applied to the case of Fregellae and the motivations behind its revolt. Developing

5. The Case of Fregellae

Throughout the course of this study, assessments of allied compliance have been applied to the allied population more generally. This chapter examines the Latin colony of Fregellae (located in Southern Latium, roughly equidistant between Rome and Naples) to bring greater insight into an individual city's interests and motivations for remaining obedient. Fregellae is an interesting case because it was a Latin colony, and the colonies were generally among Rome's most compliant allies. In addition to this, Fregellae is unique among even the Latin colonies, being the only one to be destroyed by Rome (in c.125). Fregellae was established in 328, about 60 miles south of Rome, along the Via Latina. When Fregellae was colonised, it was the southernmost settlement Rome controlled, except for Cales (established a few years previously in Northern Campania). Unfortunately, the number of settlers at this time is not recorded but a minimum of 2,500 appears reasonable. For a start, the colonies founded earlier and later than Fregellae (for examples, Cales [Livy 8.16.13-14] and Luceria [Livy 9.26.1-5], respectively) both received this many and it would be odd that a colony founded in the territory of a recent enemy would receive fewer. In addition, since the site was a recently destroyed city (Livy 9.23.6)—which may have impeded the practice of combining fresh colonists with native occupants—it is possible that Rome had to send 2,500 settlers to adequately populate the colony.

Shortly after the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks, the Samnites took Fregellae (Livy 9.12.5-8). Apparently, those from Fregellae resisted, as they were defending their homes, but to no avail. The Second Samnite War continued, and it was not until 313 that the Romans were able to recapture Fregellae (Livy 9.28.1-6; Diod. Sic. 19.101.3) and more than two hundred "chief men among those who were hostile to the Romans" were imprisoned, taken to Rome and beheaded in the forum (Diod. Sic. 19.101.3). The colony itself had a garrison installed there (Livy 9.28.3), presumably only while the Samnites were a threat. How Fregellae's establishment affected the disposition of the city's inhabitants towards Rome for the following two centuries is difficult, if not impossible to determine. They likely started out, like all Latin colonies, as a majority Roman / ethnic Latin mix, whose principal function had been to extend Roman power. It is expected, then, that they would not be averse to following Roman demands. That some Fregellani defected this early is therefore surprising and, by Mommsen's assessment (1984, I, 475-6), an anti-Roman cabal was there when the Samnites took over and the two hundred who were beheaded were "the chief members of the national party." In any case, Rome had demonstrated its coercive power, to organise its actions according to Wrong's typology, and it is noteworthy that Fregellae remained obedient for the next two hundred years.

Not only did the inhabitants of Fregellae continue to fulfill their duties to Rome but there are events that suggest that perhaps they were particularly loyal. During the Second Punic War, for instance, the

Fregellani hindered Hannibal's march north by destroying the bridge across the Liris river (Livy 26.9.3). A messenger from Fregellae was also sent to Rome, raising the alarm (Livy 26.9.6). As far as we know, Rome's allies were not obligated to help in this way, perhaps indicating an enthusiasm to aid the Roman war effort. Then again, it is worth noting that destroying the bridge would have impeded any attempt Hannibal might have made at Fregellae and, further, the motivation behind alerting Rome could have included protection of Fregellae against Hannibal. In Livy's account of the 209 'rebellion,' some Fregellani were the spokesmen of the compliant group of allies. Specifically, Marcus Sextilius of Fregellae, speaking on behalf of the eighteen colonies, assured Rome that they had the necessary soldiers *ex formula* and were prepared to give more (Livy 27.10.3-4).

For Fregellae, was this a genuine willingness to help, an opportunity to advertise devotion and put loyalty on display or an attempt to appease a power that they feared? There is an indicator that could be taken to show that some of those from Fregellae shared an affinity with Rome. During excavations of a house at Fregellae terracotta friezes were uncovered, which portray Romans at war (Coarelli 1994, 106, Welch 2006, 523-5; Beard 2016, 234-5). Specifically, these scenes show Romans and their allies, probably including the residents of the house where the frieze was found, fighting together in the East (Welch 2006, 525; Patterson 2006b, 610; Beard 2016, 234-5). Although houses in Italy were by no means strictly private and unaccommodating to public display (cf. Hales 2013, 50-51), this frieze demonstrates an affinity with Rome that cannot easily be ascribed to ulterior motives, as is possible with other examples, such as blocking Hannibal and alerting Rome in the Second Punic War. Victory in battle alongside the Romans is something the occupant wanted to display. The occupants would have seen the frieze in their daily lives, and it may well have been visible to guests as well. If the goal was a public display of sycophancy, the interior of a private home is not the most effective venue. Instead it seems to represent an earnest affection for Rome. Why would someone from Fregellae feel this way?

To answer this question, it is important to again turn to Wrong. It is understandable that some Fregellani would be on good terms with Rome, perhaps viewing Roman power as legitimate, and perhaps considering their obedience as part of a transaction. Taking the transaction aspect first, although Fregellae was beholden to Rome's obligations like any other ally, numerous inducements—to use Wrong's terminology—were available to them. First, soldiers from Fregellae had the opportunity, like others, for plunder and the city itself was given booty from the sacked city of Corinth (Yarrow 2006, 63-64).[70] Furthermore, elite Fregellani benefited from trade on Delos, where people from Fregellae are mentioned by name (e.g. Μάαρκος Σέστιος Μαάρκου Φρεγελλανός [Hatzfeld 1912, 130]). Importantly, the affairs on Delos, including the abolition of the tax, were ultimately controlled by Rome. Financial prosperity from trade on Delos and the elevated status at home (cf. Gabba 1976, 76), both clearly within

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[70] Although Fregellani serving in Rome's wars hardly needs verifying, proof is provided by the continued support in 209 (Livy 27.10.3-4), the mention of Fregellani scouting with Rome in the Second Punic War (Livy 27.26.11-12) and the frieze excavated there.

the interests of the allies, contributed to the advantages of being under Roman rule. Alongside this were the extra rights that were afforded to Latins, such as the right to marry a Roman or migrate to Rome and become a Roman citizen.

In addition to the inducements listed above, it is reasonable to suppose that some Fregellani considered Roman rule legitimate. As previously discussed, there are numerous examples of disadvantaged peoples coming to view their subordinate status as legitimate, and factors such as custom, time and dependency relations played a role in fostering the legitimacy mindset. Like other allies, Fregellani had existed long enough to become accustomed to fulfilling Roman demands, such as providing soldiers. To judge from the frieze discussed above, some Fregellani had become accustomed, perhaps even proud, of fighting with Rome. If the messenger from Fregellae alerting Rome to Hannibal's movements was more for self-preservation than an enthusiastic and willing contribution to Rome's war effort, then it serves to demonstrate that inhabitants of Fregellae saw Rome as responsible for their protection. Similarly, it is easy to see how relative advantage, another basis for perceiving a system as legitimate, affected the Fregellani. Since Fregellae's establishment, it witnessed the defeat of Pyrrhus, Antiochus III, Carthage, Macedonia and Corinth, as well as various Italian cities like Tarentum. By comparison, Fregellae's position on the side of the victors would have appeared to be relatively better. Even in Italy, they were among some of the most privileged allies. Indeed, Fregellae appears not to have been overly burdened by military demands (even in times as trying as the Second Punic War) and its inhabitants possessed the Latin rights not available to the majority of the allies. Moreover, when twelve Latin colonies were penalised with a monetary tax for refusing to supply soldiers to Rome in 209, Fregellae's comparatively privileged condition became even more distinguished, by being exempt. Considering the resemblance between Fregellae's situation and the supportive bases for legitimating rule, it is reasonable to suppose that some Fregellani saw Roman power as legitimate and were obedient therefore on that basis. In this light, Marcus Sextilius' decision to reassure Rome might indicate approval of the consuls' critical response to the twelve rebellious colonies.

Regardless, for all the inducements and justifying arguments available, coercion—one of the most effective bases of power—was surely also an influence in Fregellae's compliance. The execution of rebellious ringleaders after the Samnite, Pyrrhic and Punic Wars, the destruction of Falerii in 241 (Polyb. 1.65.2; Livy *Per.* 20; Fronda 2010, 26-7) and the territorial confiscations served as much a deterrence to revolt for Fregellae—as it did to all allies. Rome's capability to punish allied transgressions, however, was not guaranteed across the two centuries. The twelve colonies who denied troops to Rome in 209, for example, went unpenalized for five years. The obedient colonies likely noticed the lack of punishment for failing to supply soldiers and this may have undermined Rome's coercive power, at least temporarily. For those Fregellani who lost confidence in Rome's ability to carry out threats, it illustrates the compelling power of legitimate authority and inducements which surely carried on regardless. At any rate, Rome did eventually punish the recalcitrant colonies, restoring the

message that Roman demands must be complied with. In keeping with the tendential laws, it is also true that the many inducements given to the Fregellani would contribute to Rome's power of coercion. The withholding of spoils, the confiscation of territory and the stripping of Latin rights were reversals of fortune that Rome could enact for disobedience, thus adding to the punishments Rome could threaten.[71]

In 125 Fregellae rebelled from Rome and was consequently destroyed (Livy *Per.* 60; Obseq. 30; Plut. *Vit. C. Gracch.* 3.1). Considering Rome's immense power over Fregellae, what caused Fregellae to defect and what in fact did the Fregellani do? The sources are explicit that Fregellae revolted but it is unclear exactly what form that revolt took.[72] Clearly, Fregellae could be disobedient in regard to two primary obligations: loyalty and soldier provision. If Fregellae merely withheld soldiers from Rome, it is odd that the colony was consequently destroyed. In light of the comparatively mild punishment meted out in 204 to other colonies who denied soldiers, destroying a city for the same failure seems unexpected. The possibility remains that Rome escalated the punishment for troop denial, under the impression that the punishments in 204 were not effective enough in achieving compliance.[73] Indeed, Rome tended to be lenient to transgressors. For instance, though they did not emerge unscathed, Capua survived an outright revolt, so too did numerous Bruttian cities, which had likewise joined Hannibal. It seems likely that Fregellae must have done more than merely deny troops to Rome.

If Fregellae was disloyal, what caused it to be so? To answer this question, it is best to begin by situating the cause of Fregellae's dissatisfaction in the rising antagonisms that occurred in the Second century. Indeed, in the second century, there were many reasons for the allies to be increasingly unsatisfied with their position in Italy under Rome. On numerous occasions the Romans imposed in ways that were insulting and intruded on allied independence. For example, there are recorded cases of individual Romans making demands of allied communities and, sometimes, punishing non-compliance (Kendall 2012, 120-1). For instance, the consul of 173, Postumius Albinus, made various demands of the

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[71] There are some examples of allies being treated in these ways: withholding of spoils (Livy 41.13.7-8), territory confiscations (Livy 8.14.9; Dion. Hal. 20.15) and Capua being stripped of its civic status for rebelling (Roselaar 2019, 101). I'm not aware of Rome directly interfering with allied affairs on Delos but conditions there were ultimately at Rome's mercy (despite them bequeathing control to Athens). What is important is the degree to which the Fregellani considered their position ultimately beholden to Rome's goodwill.

[72] Livy (*Per.* 60) reports that the Fregellani, who rebelled (*qui defecerant*), surrendered and the city was sacked. Similarly, Julius (Obseq. 30) mentions that Fregellae conspired against the Romans (*adversus Romanos coniuraverunt*). Plutarch (*Vit. C. Gracch.* 3.1) implies that Fregellae defected, recording that Gaius Gracchus was charged with causing the allies to revolt (ἀφιστάντι) and being aware of the conspiracy (συνωμοσίας) at Fregellae. Lastly, Numitorius Pullus, an inhabitant of Fregellae who betrayed the colony to the Romans (Hubbell 1949, 273; Shackleton Bailey 2009, 195), had nevertheless earned the hatred of many Romans (Cic. *Fin.* 5.62), implying that he had a hand in revolt.

[73] In addition to this, it is questionable whether the status of Fregellae had an impact on its destruction. Given Fregellae's notable displays of loyalty to Rome during its existence, the city's destruction seems even more poignant. The debate about Numitorius Pullus' fate, a man who lived at Fregellae but also admitted the besieging Romans, demonstrates the tension about how to deal with someone who had both wronged Rome and provided important service to Rome (cf. Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 2.105; Hubbell 1949, 273). On the other hand, the exemplary loyal service of the Fregellani might have worked against them, as Rome might have been more alarmed that a city such as Fregellae would rebel in some way and thus the Romans were eager to send the message that no ally was immune to Roman power, no matter how friendly the relations had become.

Praenestines, such as quarters for his entertainment and transport-animals (Livy 42.1.7-9). In addition, another Roman consul visited Teanum Sidicinum and, during his stay, his wife complained that the town's bathes were not vacated quickly enough nor were they sufficiently clean, as the consul had ordered (Aul. Gell. 10.3.3). consequently, Teanum Sidicinum's quaestor, "the most illustrious man of his city," was led to a stake in town, stripped and whipped with rods. A quaestor at Ferentinum was also beaten for similar reasons. As a result of what happened at Sicinum, the nearby Latin colony Cales passed a decree prohibiting anyone from using baths when Roman magistrate was in town (Aul. Gell. 10.3.3). It is not clear that all these events took place before Fregellae's destruction, but they form a picture of Roman imposition that was no doubt unwelcome. Most tellingly, many of these abuses occurred in towns relatively close to Fregellae and Cale's response indicates that a community need not be directly affected to be troubled by them (cf. Bispham 2007, 157).

The most immediate and significant developments in Roman-allied relations that preceded Fregellae's destruction were the Gracchan reforms, which undoubtedly played a role (Conole 1981, 129). The result of such reform was that rich landowners, both Roman and allied alike, had the public land they were occupying reduced and limited to 500 *iugera*. This newly freed land was then parcelled out to the poor, but importantly, it was given to poor Roman citizens, so that, in effect, Rome's Italian allies had a net loss in land. Indeed, the Italian allies are reported to be the ones who "made the greatest resistance to it" (App. *B Civ*. 1.21). Some proposed that the allies be given Roman citizenship to alleviate the disagreement about land. According to Appian (*B Civ*. 1.21), the allies were prepared to accept this and the consul Fulvius Flaccus in 125, the year of Fregellae's destruction, tried to make this happen but the Senate was resistant. Even though the land redistributions were slowed by the aid of Scipio Aemilianus (App. *B Civ*. 1.19), poor allies were still unable to receive land being parcelled out by the Gracchan reform. Despite all this, there is no proof that elite Fregellani were directly affected by the land redistribution (Conole 1981, 138-9). This is not to say that the Fregellani were not concerned by them. Indeed, these interferences by Rome, along with those listed above, could easily been seen as Rome tightening the noose on allied autonomy but, regardless, their dissatisfaction was likely motivated by something else.

The other major outcome of the Gracchan reforms, the debate about the political status of the allies, became a fresh grievance for the allies. Despite the fact that individual Fregellani were theoretically able to claim Roman citizenship through migration, the denial of wholesale citizenship to the colony played a role in Fregellae's revolt (Mouritsen 1998, 118). Certainly, there were numerous reasons why the allies would want citizenship. First, the allies were taxed by their own communities to fund the troops they supplied to Rome. While Roman citizens no longer had to pay a military tax since 167, the allies continued to carry this financial burden. Secondly, Roman citizens exclusively had the right to bid for public contracts in the provinces, which were important source for greater wealth and control in areas where allies were already trading (Conole 1981, 131; Roselaar 2019, 207). Given the economic

interest of the allies, including of course those from Fregellae, it is understandable that many allies would covet this privilege. Finally, Roman citizenship would allow the allies to influence Roman foreign policy. Where and how Rome fought had an impact on allied economic wellbeing (Roselaar 2019, 208). Considering these points, and the timing of the citizenship debate before Fregellae's revolt, it is likely that those from Fregellae were dissatisfied with conditions that a grant of Roman citizenship could resolve (cf. Conole 1981, 131). Finally, if the introduction of the *civitas per magistratum*—the right for Latin ex-magistrates to become Roman citizens—was indeed introduced around 125-124 (cf. Roselaar 2019, 219), then it may indicate that the Fregellani had indeed been motivated by a wish for citizenship. It makes sense that, following Fregellae's destruction, the Romans would institute legislation to reduce the chance of other similar pressures building up, while still controlling who became a Roman citizen.

Here we return to Wrong's ideas and look at how Rome's power bases could have been undermined. In the mid-late Second Century, the inducements that the Fregellani were receiving were increasingly no longer satisfactory to compel obedience. As it happens, Rome was fighting no significant wars in this period and thus there was a decrease in the financial benefits typical to living under Roman control. As Keller (2007, 50) points out: "This was the case when the whole of the peninsula had been conquered and campaigns in the East were approaching their preliminary conclusion. At this moment of stagnation, the Roman elites could no longer afford to grant to the allies their accustomed spheres of interest." In addition, increasing trade in the East (see page 55) meant that lucrative positions there (e.g. *publicani*) were coveted by the allies. As respected businessmen in the East and comrades in Rome's campaigns, it likely made little sense to a Fregellanus that they were denied the right to profit by securing public contracts. If many Fregellani were gaining wealth by their own trade initiatives, paying taxes to serve in less profitable wars for Rome and being denied the ability to partake in exclusive financial opportunities (e.g. *publicani*), in what way was Rome benefitting them? It is clear, then, that Rome's power to induce was waning.

The subsequent discussion about Roman citizenship called into question Fregellae's position vis-à-vis Rome. As discussed, legitimacy is often maintained by routine and habit. Indeed, "people become accustomed to the way things are; and the life pattern and relations between superior and subordinate come to seem normal" (Wolf 1986, 221). The serious possibility of a citizenship grant, and therefore a fundamental reorientation of Fregellae's position and opportunities is exactly the stimulus to ferment a re-evaluation of the power relationship between Rome and Fregellae. On the assumption that some Fregellani considered Roman rule legitimate, under loosely stable conditions, it is possible that the new state of affairs was regarded as improper and a violation of the relationship (cf. Wrong 1995, 49-50). That is, they provided specific services and Rome rewarded them with certain inducements. As we have seen, in the mid-late second century, Rome's ability to induce Fregellae was wavering. Furthermore,

senatorial resistance to extending the franchise to the allies, which would have had positive financial outcomes for Fregellae, could be viewed as an insult. It is important to recall that the Fregellani had cultivated their own trade in the East (cf. Hatzfeld 1912, 130), where they were respected businessmen (Roselaar 2019, 196), which surely would have affected their self-worth and their place in the world. Against this backdrop, it is understandable that leading Romans disregarding their worth led to them asking the question *what right does Rome have to keep us down?*[74]

And what of Rome's ultimate persuader, her power of coercion? Although the Fregellani likely regarded themselves as competent soldiers,[75] it is nevertheless unlikely that any ally thought it was wise to go against Rome alone (Conole 1981, 135). Others (e.g. Mouritsen 1998, 118/9) write that Fregellae was counting on the support of the other unsatisfied Latins and this too might have influenced the Fregellani's view about Rome's coercive power. At any rate, Wrong makes it clear that coercion is effective when those subordinate perceive that the dominant power is both capable and willing to carry out threats. Rome was still undeniably capable of enforcing punishments and committing violence, but the Fregellani might have underestimated Rome's willingness to do so. Rome had not seriously reprimanded any Latin ally in the better part of a century and the Fregellani likely did not expect retaliation as severe as the destruction of an entire city. Such a punishment was unprecedented and perhaps the most similar precursor for their break with Rome, the denial of troops in 209—a dire outcome in such a threatening war—was met with comparatively mild terms. Whatever Fregellae did precisely, I doubt that its occupants believed that they were risking their city.

If the Fregellani miscalculated the severity of the Roman response, the consequences were disastrous, as the colony was sacked in 125. Clearly, the circumstances for many of the allies, including, of course, the Fregellani, were increasingly less tenable in the mid-late Second Century. In addition, the results of the citizenship debate in the 120s challenged Rome's authority. By focusing on one city and one event, we can see how Wrong's framework of power can help to elucidate the tense network of relations between Rome and its allies. Though points are difficult to substantiate in detail, given the paucity and nature of the sources, the tendency for subordinates to be motivated in these ways and the similarities between supportive conditions—such as those identified by Wolf—and realities occurring in allied lives makes it reasonable to suppose that power forms such as coercion, inducement and legitimacy played a role in Fregellae's compliance. The reduced chance for spoils, the lack of force used on the Latins and, more immediately, the aftermath of the Gracchan reforms undermined these bases of power and resulted in Fregellae and perhaps other Latins becoming disobedient and challenging Roman control.

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[74] Other Latins were indeed disaffected along with Fregellae (Conole 1981, 129; Patterson 2012, 223).
[75] They had enough troops to offer more in 209 when others were struggling, and the frieze demonstrates that the Fregellani had a long experience of serving in Rome's wars.

Conclusion

Considering the discussion thus far, we can return to the two central questions: what were the interests of the allies and for those who were compliant, why was this the case? Regarding the former, it is evident that such a diverse group as Rome's Italian allies would have had various interests and, first, it is worth reiterating those allied interests accepted at the outset of this study. This includes the fundamental premise that all humans, including Rome's allies, value survival. In addition, it has long been acknowledged that allies, especially allied nobles, attached importance to financial prosperity and the contribution this could have on their local status (Keller 2007). Furthermore, many allies were interested in withdrawing from Rome's network of allies, which was clearly demonstrated by the recorded rebellions. Many of those revolting inhabited cities with proud histories of independent conduct and, in some cases, they inhabited cities which had repeatedly attempted to free themselves of Roman interference. The rebellions then should be seen, in part, as the result of the frustrating Roman dictate to abandon any independent foreign policy. It is apparent that Rome's demands for soldiers was another motivating factor behind disobedience. The case of 209 reveals that some of the allies would no longer tolerate the military requirements, affording further insight into allied interests. The contemporaneous conditions included a lack of spoils, less opportunity to end the war (in the case of the survivors from Herdonia), long, arduous service for those liable and financial strain caused by funding troops.

For all the emphasis on allied conspiring, rebellion and the struggle for independence, there is the counterpoint of allied collaboration with Rome, unwavering obedience against foreign threats and performing acts beyond what was expected of them. Evidently, monocausal interpretations cannot do justice to the complexity involved in determining an allied city's allegiance, especially when such a decision had the allies' status, city, family wellbeing and survival at stake. At the heart of all these interactions, no matter how varied, lies a relationship of power. Here, at this nexus, are answers to the question of allied compliance. Applying Wrong's framework to elucidate the factors that undergird Rome's power leads to new insights and the strengthening of previous assessments. Indeed, benefits and punishments—typified by inducements and force/coercion in Wrong's terms—are widely accepted by modern scholarship, with varying emphasis, as important factors in allied compliance. It is significant that modern assessments survive the appraisal of a sociological framework of power.

Based on this research, the role played by legitimacy in allied compliance appears underappreciated in current scholarship. Although the lack of allied literary accounts means that the role of legitimacy cannot be directly verified, several factors that predispose groups to view their position as legitimate— such as habituation, dependency relations, relative advantage and psychological pressures—suggest that some allies considered Rome's rule legitimate. In practice, legitimacy meant that some allies either saw Rome's impositions as valid or their relationship with Rome as rightly transactional, whereby the

allies in question did not necessarily feel suppressed but rather, in agreement about a reciprocal exchange. It is not a straightforward task to determine which allies deemed Roman power as legitimate. Some allies, for example Thurii and Arretium (Terrenato 2019, 143-4) reached out to the Romans early in Rome's expansion across Italy and many other allies, such as the Latin colonies, began with a Romano-centric mission. If we can discount the possibility that Roman sources were being falsely didactic or defensive of their city's actions in recording these settlements, these allies, at some point in time, may have regarded the position of the allies under Rome as legitimate. In the case of Arretium, the restoration of the power of the Cilnii—an Arrentine family—by Roman intervention may have, for a while, caused the family to view the fulfilment of Roman obligations as a proper response for such aid. Similarly, it is easy to see how some Latin colonies could have considered subordination to Rome as legitimate. Though it is impossible to disprove the role of coercion, Fregellae's exemplary support in 209 can easily be interpreted as an example of legitimacy. When Rome criticized fellow Latin colonists, prominent Fregellani decided to reassure Rome, ostensibly supporting the system of Roman acquisition of allied troops (see page 69).

Legitimate authority would only be effective at maintaining allied compliance if Rome's demands fell within an accepted range of demands, whether this range was negotiated officially or unofficially. It is perhaps telling that some episodes of allied disobedience occurred when previously normal circumstances became strained or challenging. Troop provision was a normative expectation for the Romans and allies alike but during the year 209, the intensity of this expectation became so strained as to lead to allied disobedience. The complaints of the allies compared allied circumstances under Roman direction and Carthaginian direction, suggesting that some allies were beginning to see Roman dictates as increasingly improper. It is possible that the affected allies considered manpower requests as valid but not to such a degree. That Fregellae, which was more prominent and therefore presumably less burdened by Roman requests, did not join the complaining allies is consistent with the idea that the intensity of demands might have pushed the boundary of what could be regarded as legitimate. Similarly, the use of *ager publicus* by the allies may have, over time, been perceived as a part of their package of rights in exchange for their service. The Gracchan land redistributions, then, may have been illegitimate according to some, despite no Roman officially saying that allies owned any *ager publicus*. In other words, habit perhaps normalised allied circumstances in this regard where the land redistribution was not, in their eyes, part of the deal and hence illegitimate.

Another element in allied life likely to have influenced their compliance to Rome was the relationships they cultivated with Romans. There are numerous references to elite connections through marriage and guest-friendship (*hospitium*)—between Roman citizens and allies—in the literary record and on surviving *tesserae hospitales*. These relationships represent one likely avenue where personal authority could have operated. Indeed, serving others due to a certain affection for them is complementary to the interactions in marriage and guest-friendship. That said, if these connections were forged for pragmatic

reasons such as wealth transferal or political gains, this basis for authority seems to default to the category of inducements. In any case, the episode of Marsic and Roman forces opposed on the battlefield—where soldiers of each side recognised friends in the opposing ranks, embraced each other and refused to fight—strongly suggests that Italians at this time were influenced by such relationships. Another setting for personal authority to function is the role of exemplary leaders, whose qualities were magnetic and compelling, features that are akin to Weber's concept of charismatic authority. The role played by this last factor on allied compliance, as with competent authority, is difficult to fully substantiate though it remains plausible.

Focussing on Rome's power over the allies, all motivations for compliance, to varying degrees, lie somewhere among these bases identified by Wrong. Certainly, from this perspective, many obedient allies, like Spoletium, Nola and the Etruscans early on in Second Punic War, were influenced in this way. Based on the evaluations advanced in this study, factors of force, coercion, inducements and legitimation appear as identifiable motivations for allied compliance. Tellingly, such motivating factors were singled out by Wrong as effective means for gaining obedience. Certainly, coercion, inducements and legitimacy were recognised by Wrong as exhibiting high comprehensiveness and extensiveness. In other words, these power forms could compel a wide array of subordinates and were able to gain compliance to an assortment of demands (as opposed to one or few). It is, perhaps, no surprise that these forms leave the greatest impression on the historical record, whereas something like competent authority is much harder to identify.

It is worth reinforcing that a central feature of all power relations is the interests of the subordinate. Power over another is only possible when said other is motivated by whatever compelling force is being applied. In the context of Rome's allies, this phenomenon highlights allied agency. Allies were not passive recipients of inducements or blindly compelled by coercion. On many occasions, clearly, Roman attempts to compel allies by these means failed to gain control. Likewise, some allies were active in directing their own future, such as the elite Tarentines, who reached out to Hannibal and brokered a deal. In some instances, too, it might be better to describe at least some Roman-allied relations as collaboration. It is easy to interpret the Fregellae frieze, for example, as a demonstration of pride to be participating in Rome's success. Likewise, the opportunity of social mobility allowed some allies to join Rome's political ranks and influence Roman policy (cf. Terenato 2019, 177).

What are the future directions of study for allied interests and reasons for compliance? It is first worth making clear the limitations of this study. Specifically, I have, for the most part, looked at relations of power between Rome on the one hand and allies on the other. This was not the only type of relation available to allies and indeed other parties, e.g. Hannibal, Pyrrhus, or neighbouring allies, could have influenced allied compliance. Fronda, for example, has made a strong case for the impact of local conditions on allied decision-making. Applying some aspects of Wrong's ideas not just to relations

between Romans and allies but between the allies themselves might yield interesting results, specifically concerning the role of legitimacy. To what degree, if any, did any allies view other allies' conduct as proper or illegitimate? Future avenues of studies should, I think, prioritize the concept of legitimacy. For instance, was the Social War—an outbreak resulting from rising tensions and reassessments of the allies' position—a legitimation crisis?

Assessing allied compliance at the categorical level of "ally" has its issues. Given the wide variability of allies city to city, the further divisions identifiable at the level of factions and the sheer complexity of human motivations, evaluating motivations for compliance—for specific allies—is a challenging task. Regardless, it seems clear that, no matter which ally is focussed on, some combination of coercion, inducement or legitimation played a role in their decision making. It is worth recalling Wrong's point that having a diverse array of power forms is advantageous for trying to gain obedience, especially when the recipients are varied. That Rome was able to command a range of compelling factors, such as the ability to reward, punish and justify its authority—factors which appealed to the interests of their allies—is perhaps the most concise explanation as to why Rome's Italian allies remained largely compliant to Roman demands.

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