Understanding Skilled Migration: Ukrainians in Germany and Australia

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Abstract

The thesis documents the experiences of skilled Ukrainian migrants, in many cases information technology specialists, in Germany and Australia. It demonstrates the barriers that the migration process imposes on migrants who seek to integrate into the labour markets of big cities. The thesis also examines the role of social networks in the Ukrainian diaspora community that help migrants overcome these barriers to socio-economic and legal integration. Main data for this project were collected through 30 semi-structured qualitative interviews with newcomer migrants and diaspora community activists in Berlin and Melbourne. The transcripts of interviews were analysed thematically.

The theoretical framework of the thesis employs the concepts of 'precariousness,' 'migrant penalty' and 'social capital,' respectively, to describe migrants' experience of insecurity in the receiving country; the legal and economic disadvantages that they encounter there; and the potential of social groups and networks to mitigate such disadvantage.

The thesis examines the crucial role that visa conditions, which create precariousness, play in constraining migrants' socio-economic and legal integration alongside such factors as language requirements, limited access to the social safety net, and gender disadvantage.

The thesis focuses on the issues that have arisen in the specific cases of Ukrainian diaspora communities and in the context of the socio-political and economic challenges faced by Ukraine after the start of the Euromaidan protests in late 2013 and during the ensuing military conflict in eastern Ukraine. The thesis examines the connection between migrants' sense of a Ukrainian national identity and the dynamics of their relationships within diaspora communities in Berlin and Melbourne.

The thesis establishes that skilled migrants experience different degrees of precariousness depending on their visa status, profession, level of education and transferability of formal qualifications. Other factors that affect the efficiency of integration include migrants' socio-economic status in the country of origin, language proficiency and gender. The analysis of the data shows that female spouses of primary applicants for work visas face the most significant difficulties. As a rule, they immigrate without an employment offer or verified language skills. Such 'trailing spouses' are rarely entitled to significant social safety net benefits and, if they are so entitled, rarely know how to use them. They tend to undertake caregiver roles in their families and as a consequence stay out of the labour market for extended periods, even years, despite having a tertiary education.

The research demonstrates that with the help of social capital created in the Ukrainian diaspora communities Ukrainian skilled migrants can improve their well-being and overcome precariousness. Investigation of the sense of Ukrainian national identity that helps build this social capital reveals that it is shared by Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainian migrants, who communicate well with each other and acknowledge each other as equal members of the Ukrainian nation. Such solidarity between these two linguistic groups improved significantly during the Euromaidan protests and the ensuing war in the east of Ukraine.

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature: [redacted]

Olha Shmihelska

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Table of Contents

COPYRIGHT NOTICE **ii**

ABSTRACT **iii**

DECLARATION **iv**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS **v**

Chapter One: Introduction **1**

1.1. Background and impetus for the research project 1

1.2. Aim, research questions and significance of the study 6

1.3. Thesis outline 10

Chapter Two: Integration Barriers for Skilled Migrants, Social Capital and National Identity **14**

Part I. Integration barriers for skilled migrants: contexts and concepts 14

2.1.1. Introduction 14

2.1.2. The connection between rights and the concept of 'integration' 14

2.1.3. Entry and residence conditions and the precariousness experienced by migrants 18

2.1.4. Socio-economic status of migrants 22

2.1.5. Labour market in the global city and the role of skill and education: introducing 'migrant penalty' 25

2.1.6. Language proficiency 34

2.1.7. Skilled migrants' access to the social safety net 37

2.1.8. Gender and family 40

2.1.9. Typical barriers for Ukrainians abroad: legal and economic integration 44

Part II. The role of social networks and a national identity in the Ukrainian context 48

2.2.1. Introduction 48

2.2.2. Theorising social capital 48

2.2.3. History of ‘disrupted’ Ukrainian migration in Berlin 51

2.2.4. Background of the homogeneous Ukrainian diaspora organisations in Melbourne 60

2.2.5. Ukrainian migration in the post-Euromaidan era 63

2.2.6. Reviewing the role of social networks in the context of Ukrainian migration 66

2.2.7. The role of language, political protests, war and national identity in Ukraine 73

2.3. Conclusions 77

Chapter Three: Methodology 81

3.1. Qualitative interviews as the main data collection method 81

3.2. The role of interpretative research design and the positionality of the researcher 84

3.3. Comparative case study 89

Chapter Four: Integration Barriers for Skilled Ukrainian Migrants in Berlin 93

4.1. Introduction 93

4.2. Entry and residence conditions for Ukrainians in Germany and the precariousness of their legal statuses 93

4.2.1. Conditions of entry for the primary applicant 93

4.2.2. Conditions of stay: work and residence rights 99

4.2.3. The requirement to find employment within three months (temporariness) 104

4.2.4. Conditions that regulate access to permanent residency 107

4.2.5. Conditions of entry and stay for spouses 110

4.3. Change of socio-economic statuses of Ukrainian Information Technology (IT) specialists in Berlin 114

4.4. Labour market in the global city of Berlin and the role of skills 118

4.5. Language proficiency: roles of German and English 127

4.6. Social safety net and Ukrainian professionals in Berlin 136

4.7. Gender and family: trailing wives of Ukrainian IT specialists in Berlin 141

4.8. Conclusions 147

Chapter Five: Integration Barriers for Skilled Ukrainian Migrants in Melbourne 150

5.1. Introduction 150

5.2. Entry and residence conditions for Ukrainians in Australia and the precariousness of their legal statuses 151

5.2.1. Types of entry to Australia for Ukrainian skilled migrants 151

5.2.2. Temporariness of immigrant status 153

5.2.3. Precariousness experienced by migrants who enter the labour market without an employment offer 158

5.2.4. Public services in Australia and visa status 160

5.2.5. Risks for family members 163

5.3. Socio-economic characteristics of skilled Ukrainian immigrants in Melbourne and motivations for leaving Ukraine 164

5.4. Migrant penalty and skill recognition barriers: Melbourne 169

5.5. The role of English language proficiency and self-representation for Ukrainian migrants in Melbourne 176

5.6. Skilled migrants’ access to the social safety net in Melbourne 182

5.7. Gender and family in Ukrainian migration to Melbourne 190

5.8. Conclusions 193

Chapter Six: Social Capital and National Identity in Ukrainian Communities in Berlin and Melbourne 199

6.1. Introduction 199

6.2. Push factors for the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian migration 201

6.2.1. Berlin: three types of migrants 201

6.2.2. Melbourne: the absence of a Euromaidan-driven migration 208

6.3. The contemporary status of Ukrainian organisations in diaspora 216

6.3.1. Berlin: multilayeredness of the Ukrainian community and its initiatives 216

6.3.2. Melbourne: merging of new initiatives with the ‘old’ diaspora 219

6.4. Social capital and its elements in the Ukrainian diaspora 222

6.4.1. The potential of the social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin 222

6.4.2. Durability and institutionalisation of Ukrainian networks: contribution to social capital in Melbourne 235

6.5. Language and national identity in the Ukrainian diaspora 242

6.5.1. Berlin: testimonies from a predominantly Russian-speaking community 242

6.5.2. Melbourne: attitudes of the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking ‘old’ diaspora towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians 251

6.6. Conclusions 258

Chapter Seven: Conclusions 264

7.1. Findings 264

7.2. Desiderata for governments and other actors 271

7.3. Some thoughts about future German immigration policies 273

7.4. Some thoughts about future Australian immigration policies 275

7.5. Suggestions for Ukrainian diaspora institutions 279

7.6. Potential for further research 280

REFERENCES 284

APPENDIX ONE **324**

Questions for interviews with Group One

APPENDIX TWO **328**

Questions for interviews with Group Two

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Background and impetus for the research project

This study contributes to the literature on international migration by examining the experiences of skilled Ukrainian migrants in Germany and Australia – specifically, Berlin and Melbourne, often referred to in the literature as global cities – in the years from late 2013 to mid-2017. While the findings of the thesis are not generalisable, they provide important insights that may be useful when looking at other migrant groups, Ukrainian or otherwise. The thesis studies these migrants' experiences of socio-economic integration, the precariousness of their migrant status and the role in their lives of diaspora social networks. Its main focus is on their rights to employment, a social safety net and residence in destination countries. The thesis demonstrates that visa statuses place migrants in precarious conditions, and that diaspora networks constitute one of the legitimate ways of overcoming or at least mitigating such precariousness. While there are many studies that show both positive and negative consequences of social networks for labour market integration, this thesis focuses on the networks constituted by Ukrainian organised and semi-organised diaspora communities and their significance for recent Ukrainian migrants.

Until 1991 Ukraine was not an independent state. In general, Ukrainians in North America, Western Europe and Australia viewed the incorporation of Ukraine into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a denial of Ukraine's rightful sovereignty. They regarded their compatriots in Ukraine, and their culture, as oppressed, and considered the main purpose of their diaspora communities, accordingly, to be advocacy for the rights of Ukraine and Ukrainians, and cultivation of Ukrainian culture unrestricted by Soviet ideology.

Studies on Ukrainian migration to date identify four main waves of exodus from Ukraine: labour (1880-1914), intellectual (1917-1939), political (1945-1953) and economic (from 1991 to the present) (Fedyuk and Kindler 2017; Oleinikova 2016). Some contemporary studies have begun to identify a new wave of Ukrainian migration commencing in late 2013, as a result of the mass protests known as the Euromaidan and the subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia. Others conflate the current wave of exodus with the economic emigration commencing in 1991. There has been little research into the influence of the Euromaidan and subsequent events on the national identity of Ukrainian emigrants (as distinct from their influence on national identity in Ukraine itself).

In November 2013, many Ukrainians began to protest against the ruling regime. The initial reason for these protests was the sudden refusal of the then president Viktor Yanukovych to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). Later, protesters began to express their outrage at the arbitrary use of violence by the police and the level of corruption in the country. The confrontation between protesters and police in February 2014 resulted in more than a hundred deaths. The period between late November 2013 and late February 2014 is designated as the Euromaidan or, as it came to be called later, the Revolution of Dignity. After this grim turning point the president and many pro-government officials, parliamentarians and other politicians who were members of the president's party fled to Russia. An interim government charged with conducting presidential and parliamentary elections created dissatisfaction in Russian governing circles and among pro-Russian elements in Ukraine. As a consequence, in March 2014, the Russian Federation illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula, a region of Ukraine. Inspired by this event, separatists assisted by Russia seized control of part of the territory in the east of Ukraine. Ukrainian military efforts to defeat them were frustrated by Russian troops, weapons and of aid. In mid-2019, at the time of the completion of this thesis, Ukraine remained in a state of armed conflict with deleterious effects for the country's economy and society (Diuk 2014; Düvel and Lapshyna 2015; Yekelchyk 2015).

These events were accompanied by a growing wave of emigration from Ukraine (Jaroszewicz 2016; Fedyuk and Kindler 2017), one component of which was the emigration of skilled workers as labour migrants (Düvel and Lapshyna 2015; Fedyuk and Kindler 2017). This latter category of migrants has been the subject of few studies and merits further investigation. In this dissertation, two destination countries for Ukrainian skilled migrants have been chosen for such an investigation: Germany and Australia. Both are participants in the global race for talent and seek to attract skilled migrants to their markets (Boucher 2016; Docquier and Machado 2016).

During and after the Euromaidan many emigrants expressed solidarity with the people of Ukraine, but it remained unclear whether they supported each other in their efforts to integrate into the economies and societies of their new countries to the same extent as they supported their compatriots in Ukraine – in other words, whether these migrants had developed effective social networks – and whether the events of the Euromaidan have had affected the nature of these social networks. For me, this question arose as a result of my witnessing certain processes within the Ukrainian diaspora community in Germany. For example, in 2014 I travelled from Berlin to Munich with four other Ukrainians who wanted to join a demonstration organised by Ukrainians with the aim of drawing Europeans' attention to the Euromaidan. The target audience comprised the heads of government and foreign ministers who had arrived for the 50th Munich Security Conference, which took place from January 31 to February 2, 2014. The Ukrainian demonstration lasted for the duration of the Security Conference. The highlight of the demonstration was a march of thousands of Ukrainians through the central city streets. It is probable that most of the participants were Ukrainian immigrants. The slogan most frequently visible on the placards carried by the demonstrators was ‘Mit der Ukraine – Solidarität’ [‘Solidarity with Ukraine.’] The experience of participating in the demonstration led me to some of the questions I am asking in this thesis. In particular, at this demonstration I saw a visible manifestation of the demonstrators’ sense of solidarity with their homeland, but realised that I did not know what they might be doing to support each other as migrants working in Germany and, in particular, whether they were doing anything as a group to protect their rights as migrant workers. This prompted me to formulate one of the research questions that I discuss in the next section.

One of the foci of this dissertation is the extent to which migrant social networks operate to facilitate the successful integration of newcomers. In particular, it considers those social networks that help immigrants navigate their socio-economic and legal situations, which are determined to a large extent by labour immigration programs. Attention is drawn to economic, social and some family rights, with a focus on rights that migrants need to have protected immediately upon arrival. Concern about these rights is reflected in social media and in other forms of communication among Ukrainian emigrants. Oleksii, a contributor to a forum titled ‘What is life like in Berlin?’(Kliukin 2014) shared his experiences and opinions on these matters as follows:

> As for as the provision that for obtaining the [EU] Blue Card ‘knowledge of English is enough [i.e., no German is required],’ employees of the Citizens’ Office, Tax Office, and especially the Foreigners Authority […] have most likely never heard about it. If you do not speak German, you are guaranteed five to 50

> minutes of humiliation in each of these ‘remarkable’ institutions. There are also some bizarre stories: my colleague from Serbia was ‘made’ a Catholic at one of the tax offices and was signed on for the church tax, which he then had to go and cancel on another day. There are banks, internet providers, and other services [whose officers] rarely speak good English.

These observations, made public through a social media site, demonstrate the willingness of a Ukrainian migrant in late 2014 to share such information with other Ukrainians who were planning to migrate and had expressed their interest in Berlin, and point to the importance of investigating how the sense of belonging to a Ukrainian community impacts on individuals’ capacity to integrate into the host society. In addition, Oleksii’s comments show that an official language policy which is too lenient impedes the legal integration of EU Blue Card holders (the EU Blue Card being one of the labour immigration programs in Germany). In other words, it puts such migrants into economically disadvantaged positions and makes them vulnerable to downward social mobility or even violations of their rights.

Oleksii also shared his opinions about the economic integration of his spouse (who, due to her visa status, was his dependant) in Berlin:

> They say that the secret to a comfortable European-style life is to have both partners working. There’s a surprise to be had here: to find a job in Berlin is not so easy for non-programmers. You can search for years, especially if you don’t know the language, and only low-paid options will be offered, or temporary work, which is essentially short-term outstaffing. Will your partner want this? German language courses, by the way, cost 250 euros and above (there are

integration courses, but they won't get your German to conversational level).

In focussing on Ukrainian post-Euromaidan migration, the thesis addresses a phenomenon that has been subject to little scholarly inquiry. As well as helping to fill this gap in the research literature, the thesis aims to bring an interdisciplinary approach involving perspectives from sociology, law and national identity research to bear on the study of Ukrainian migrants; to look at the legal frameworks within which Ukrainian labour migrants find themselves in Germany and Australia by examining their experiences and their ability to exercise their rights as migrants in these two places; and to refine understandings of the national identity of diaspora communities that exist in the current literature.

1.2. Aim, research questions and significance of the study

In this thesis I examine how Ukrainian skilled migrants' identities and social networks in diaspora communities influence their socio-economic integration. This socio-economic integration involves migrants' ability to exercise their rights (entitlements) as structured by visa conditions. The empirical aspect of my project therefore aims to describe and help to understand the main barriers to Ukrainian migrants' integration and reflect on this in a descriptive manner. It also aims to contribute to understanding of the relationship between national identity and the sense of belonging that skilled Ukrainian migrants experience in Berlin and Melbourne.

Consideration of relevant theoretical approaches and review of the scholarly literature lead me to formulate the following research questions:

1. How does immigration law limit the rights and opportunities of Ukrainian skilled immigrants in Berlin and Melbourne in relation to socio-economic integration?

This research question is addressed with regard to Berlin and Melbourne separately in Chapters Four and Five respectively. Immigration law involves visa conditions and rules that navigate migrants through their entitlements and restrictions in Germany and Australia. I pay special attention to skilled migrants. Because high-income western countries compete for members of this labour force, it would make sense for visas to grant them a high level of rights and to provide conditions under which they could achieve an acceptable standard of living. Yet, in Chapters Four and Five, in addressing this research question, I find that visa regimes, alongside other factors, complicate the socio-economic integration of migrants. By socio-economic integration I mean the condition which migrants have reached when they have access to public services equally with other members of society and are equally able to utilise their skills in the labour market. Part I of Chapter Two provides definitions of skilled migration, rights and integration.

2. To what extent is the social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora community able to assist recent immigrants in overcoming integration barriers that the migration process imposes on them?

In this thesis I frame the relationships that migrants establish with existing diaspora communities with Bourdieu’s theory of social capital. I define diaspora communities as groups of people of Ukrainian origin, living elsewhere than on Ukrainian territory, whose members communicate with each other on a regular basis. Social capital encompasses the value of social networks and its impact on migrants’ well-being. Part II of Chapter Two provides a discussion of the concept of social capital, while the analysis of empirical information in Chapter Six demonstrates the value of this concept for understanding the situation of Ukrainian migrants in both Berlin and Melbourne.

3. How do Ukrainian skilled migrants understand national identity and how does their sense of belonging to the Ukrainian diaspora community lead them to create and maintain social capital in that community?

This research question is strongly interconnected with Research Question 2: national identity and the sense of belonging to the Ukrainian diaspora community plays a key role in creating and maintaining such communities. A sense of national identity includes one's feeling of belonging to a particular nation that results in feelings of obligation and solidarity with other members of the nation. This is theorised in Part II of Chapter Two and discussed in comparative perspective in Chapter Six, based on data collected through interviews.

This thesis yields new knowledge in a number of ways. First, it documents experiences and opinions of a social group not widely studied hitherto: Ukrainians who migrated after late 2013. This wave of migration from Ukraine, new at the time of writing, displays features which, according to some scholars are not shared by previous waves. It requires thorough discussion and classification.

Second, the thesis draws attention to challenges confronted by even relatively privileged migrants in relatively favourable contexts. The majority of the interviewed migrants possess university degrees, conferred by their birth country, in competitive fields. They all migrated legally and most of them arrived with at least one employment offer per family, which means they were able to provide themselves a minimum standard of living. This makes them special in the broader context of studies of migration, where scholars and practitioners most often research the problems of refugees, undocumented migration or even human trafficking. The latter groups, in contrast to the subjects of my inquiry, encounter situations where their survival is in question.

Third, the thesis brings to light the disconnection that often exists between states of affairs (legal and 'objective' social realities), and the ways in which migrants perceive these states of affairs. For example, some visas were created for particular purposes, such as education. Yet migrants use these student visas as one of the legitimate ways to arrive in a country for work. They abide by all the requirements of this visa, but in some cases they do not even utilise the newly acquired degrees in the destination countries. It is important to record the insights of such migrants into the nature of this pattern of work migration and the reasons behind it.

Fourth, the thesis demonstrates the importance of national identity (the subjective feeling of belonging to a nationally defined group) for migrants as a factor that influences their experiences in the receiving country and, more specifically, the efficiency of their integration into the labour market there. This finding might be surprising for those who assume that migrants, if they aim to achieve professional success, should favour communication with settled members of the host society over interaction with compatriots. For this reason, it was important to study this question in detail in order to provide evidence of positive experiences of the connection between the cultivation of compatriot group identity and integration into the host society. Instances where nurturing such identities had a negative impact on integration were not detected during the interviews.

1.3. Thesis outline

Chapter Two reviews the existing scholarship and debates surrounding the research questions and the key concepts of the dissertation: integration and legal constraints that affect immigrants and define what kind of rights they have; social capital; and national identity, both in general and specifically in the Ukrainian context. This chapter provides theoretical background for the analysis in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

Chapter Two is divided into two parts based on two discrete bodies of literature, one of which deals with socio-legal constraints imposed upon migrants and the another with resources for overcoming these constraints. Part I of Chapter Two provides an overview of legal and socio-economic barriers that have an impact on the labour market integration of skilled migrants globally as well as in relation to diverse migrant groups of various origins in Germany, Australia and other western countries. In particular, it discusses how immigration law puts migrants into precarious positions. In addition, it emphasises the importance of socio-economic status, gender and access to a social safety net as contexts that shape the experience of skilled immigrants in their post-migration lives.

Part II of Chapter Two outlines Bourdieu's theory of social capital that is used in this thesis. It describes in detail the origin of Ukrainian diaspora institutions in Berlin and Melbourne and provides an overview of case studies of the international migration of Ukrainians and of their socio-economic integration in various countries. Following Anthony Smith's explication of communal national identity, the chapter notes its influence on social networks in immigrant communities as well as the impact that historical events can have on motivations for solidarity. It explains how the sense of belonging to a Ukrainian community can influence individuals' abilities to exercise their rights as migrants, in particular at the time when migrants undergo a process of integration into the labour market of the host country.

Chapter Three describes the qualitative method of social inquiry that is employed to investigate the research questions. In particular, it explains the research strategy of interpretivism and presents the interpretive research design of the present project. While situating the project within a framework that involves the concepts of barriers to integration, social capital and national identity, the study employs a comparative case-study method, in which the experiences of migrants from Ukraine – 13 residing in Australia and 17 in Germany – are analysed. The chapter also explains that a desk-based comparative analysis of Australian and German labour immigration programs served as a basis for selecting the cohort of interviewees.

Chapter Four analyses qualitative data gathered in interviews in Berlin in order to describe the integration barriers that the immigration law of Germany imposes on skilled Ukrainian immigrants. In particular, Chapter Four explores economic and social rights, including family-related rights. The sections of this chapter deal with the themes identified in corresponding subsections of Part I of Chapter Two. The chapter demonstrates the kinds of barriers that migrants encounter in relation to immigration policies and shows how their experiences are shaped by factors such as the transformation of socio-economic relations in consequence of international migration, labour market demand in Berlin, and problems of language acquisition and access to the social safety net. The chapter also shows the impact on the gender roles of migrants, especially women, of the status imposed on them as spouses of main applicants for work visas.

Chapter Five provides an analysis of the qualitative data collected in Melbourne. By analogy to the previous chapter, these data include information on the types of integration barriers that skilled migrants refer to with regard to economic, social and family rights in Australia. Also by analogy to Chapter Four, Chapter Five studies statements by Ukrainian community activists and professionals who advise Ukrainian newcomers. In order to identify problems that appear to affect skilled Ukrainian migrants generally, this chapter also draws attention to some similarities and differences between the experiences of the interviewees in Melbourne and their counterparts in Berlin.

One of the themes of Chapter Six is the Euromaidan and its influence on the perceptions of national identity within the Ukrainian emigrant community. The chapter identifies the changes that the Revolution of Dignity brought about in Ukrainian migration processes and in the migrating cohort since the Euromaidan. Data delivered by the present research project are compared with data reported in previous literature. Chapter Six also employs Bourdieu's term 'social capital' to refer to the benefits that individuals derive from their membership of particular social groups. Interviews were analysed in order to understand the sense of solidarity experienced by the interviewees in Berlin and Melbourne. Building on the findings reported in Chapters Four and Five, this chapter answers the question of whether and to what extent involvement in the Ukrainian community assists migrants in overcoming their integration barriers.

Chapter Seven presents a synthesis of the findings of the research project, illuminating the nature of the interplay between the exercise of skilled migrants' rights, social capital and national identity in the course of the process of economic integration. The chapter identifies those findings of the project that might be of importance to stakeholders outside the academic community: policymakers, diaspora organisations, and newcomer or potential migrants. The chapter also discusses the limitations of the present project and makes suggestions for future research.

Chapter Two: Integration Barriers for Skilled Migrants, Social Capital and National Identity

Part I. Integration barriers for skilled migrants: contexts and concepts

2.1.1. Introduction

The goal of Part I of Chapter Two is to review the research on the most common difficulties that the migration process imposes on skilled migrants. The difficulties that migrants themselves during interviews defined as crucial for their socio-economic integration prompted me to search the literature for investigations of the more specific, sometimes unexpected, factors that were encountered in the interviews. In particular, I report on discussions in the research literature on aspects of the social and legal context of migration that come to the fore in the analysis of the interview data and are discussed in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. These aspects include: immigration policy (conditions related to entry, stay, and change of employer); migrants' socio-economic status; demand for skilled migrants in global cities; host-country language skills; elements of the social safety net such as healthcare and unemployment insurance; and gender and family circumstances.

2.1.2. The connection between rights and the concept of 'integration'

The legal perspective from which international migration is often studied serves as a point of departure in this chapter, in particular for the purpose of classifying and defining the nature of legal conditions that structure the lives of migrants. I utilise the term of 'rights' in the sense of rights granted to migrants by national immigration laws and policies, rather than of human rights, which are established by international human rights conventions introduced under the auspices of the United Nations or the Council for Europe. This thesis considers both the rights granted to migrants by immigration laws and policies, and the constraints that these rules impose on migrants. More specifically, the thesis analyses the effect of the various conditions of entry and stay on the ability of migrants to integrate successfully, that is, to access and exercise rights. In this thesis, economic rights are central, and rights pertaining to the family and social rights are also relevant.

The rights granted to migrants and the conditions imposed on them have an effect on their ability to integrate into the host society. The integration of migrants enables them to be equal members of the host society. This perspective is articulated by Castles (2017, 46), who suggests that migrant workers belong to the precarious groups in the labour market due to their incomplete ‘freedom.’ This thesis observes such limitations on migrants’ freedom in the form, for example, of restrictions on their ability to remain in the host country or to change employers. Precariousness will be explained in detail later in this chapter. Castles (2017, 46) points out that in liberal capitalist societies the principle of freedom should be paramount. This principle should allow all people to maximise their opportunities in the market by ensuring that they have equal rights, which in practice has never happened (Castles 2017, 46). In the case of immigrants, states engage them to fill labour shortages and profit from their low maintenance cost (Sassen 1988, 30). Manufacturing the powerlessness of migrants with the help of visa statuses is a distinct feature of international labour supply (Sassen 1988, 37) and contradicts the principle of freedom articulated by Castles (2017, 46). Castles’s position may be seen to concur with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that obliges states to guarantee certain economic and social rights to everyone, including migrants (UN General Assembly 1966).

The concept of ‘integration’ is used by many scholars in slightly different ways. Castles et al. (2002, 112) suggest that the process of integration takes place when immigrants attempt to become part of the receiving society. On the one hand, the process of integration implies a one-way effort by immigrants to adjust to the dominant culture. On the other hand, it might be understood as a two-way process that also covers the intention of a host society to recognise immigrants’ differences and accept them (Castles et al. 2002, 116). The concept of inclusion can also be used to explain particular elements of integration, such as becoming a participant in the education system, the labour market or the welfare system (Castles et al. 2002, 117). In this thesis, I use the term integration to cover all the factors that help migrants to become socio-economically successful. It is particularly important for skilled migrants who are attracted to new destinations to contribute there, but lack of integration leads to downward mobility of their statuses.

Carmel and Paul (2013, 61) suggest on the basis of their consideration of European Union states that there are three policy fields which, by interacting with each other, constitute a national integration regime for immigrants: immigration policy, labour market policy and social welfare policy. Economic rights for migrants, according to Carmel and Paul (2013, 67) encompass three regulatory areas – labour market access, working conditions and labour mobility across the same territories as citizens of host countries.

Economic integration relates primarily to the labour market and the provision of public goods, and can be analysed with reference to income and socio-economic discrepancies between migrants and local citizens (Hübschmann 2015). Niessen (2009, 2) suggests that economic integration is impossible without so-called legal integration involving the immigrants’ legal status, which impacts on their ability to reside and work in a given territory. Equal access to rights, goods, services and resources is a sign of successful economic integration. However, while immigration programs – programs that foresee and regulate the entry of skilled migrants – provide access to employment opportunities by granting rights (Hübschmann 2015, 5), they also restrict certain rights of immigrants, thus complicating their integration. Immigration law and policy may take into consideration integration principles (Szulecka 2017, 52), such as access to employment and public institutions in a non-discriminatory way (Murphy 2008, 161), with the aim of providing support for migrants' adaptation needs. However, the regulations governing labour immigration programs are derived, as Szulecka (2017, 52) adds, from the needs of the labour market.

According to the OECD (2007, n.p.), the labour market integration of immigrants in Germany and Australia involves the following key issues: the state of labour market development of the receiving country at the time of the migrants' arrival; the impact of immigration policy (for example, the skilled selection policy in Australia); the settlement perspective (access to permanent residence status and citizenship, which considerably expand the set of rights), the recognition of foreign qualifications and experience; the waiting period before immigrants become eligible for social benefits; job network services; host-country language fluency (English and German in this case); effectiveness of language training and discrimination. The extent to which all these issues affect the integration of Ukrainian migrants will be explored in this dissertation. The concepts of rights and integration discussed in this section will serve to understand the relationship between migration and accessing employment in this thesis.

2.1.3. Entry and residence conditions and the precariousness experienced by migrants

Conditions of migrant entry and residence are central for this project, because they determine which rights and entitlements are granted to migrants, and which conditions constrain their conduct while in the destination state's territory. In particular, policy regulations impose conditions in relation to entry, length of residence, conditions of movement, family reunion and exclusion from or withdrawal of a permit (Carmel and Paul 2013). Conditions of entry and conditions of stay are directly dependent on immigration law regulations and are strictly defined. These conditions influence employment relations and the residence-related security of migrating individuals (Anderson 2010, 301). In particular, immigration policies create different programs for skilled workers, with the result that they are divided into two categories: those on temporary visas, and those with permanent residency.

In the relevant literature, patterns of migration, settlement and migrant employment are often examined through the lens of the concept of precariousness. In general usage, 'precariousness' means a state of being uncertain about something or dependent on chance. In relation to migrants such uncertainty may relate to length of stay, potential changes to visa status, or one's personal future more generally. Anderson (2010, 303) notes that the term 'precariousness' is used to convey a range of meanings, but above all it captures instability, lack of protection and social or economic vulnerability (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989, 3).

To explain the notion of precarious migrant status, Goldring, Berinstein and Bernhard (2009, 245) borrowed the concept of precariousness from employment-focussed literature. They used elements of a definition of precarious employment to define migrants' precariousness. In this thesis, I analyse migrants' legal status with reference to the concept of precariousness in line with Goldring et al. (2009, 245) and link it to labour market access and socio-economic integration in general. It is useful, therefore, first to explain the meaning of precariousness in the labour-related scholarship.

Vosko (2010, 2) defines 'precarious employment' as a degree of uncertainty that emerges from employment relations and is accompanied by low income, as well as limited social benefits and statutory entitlements. According to Rodgers and Rodgers (1989, 3) dimensions of precariousness include 'uncertainty as to [one's] job's continuing availability, inability to own control over working conditions, wages or the pace of work; inability to access legal protection, through collective organisation or in a way of social security benefits; [and] being immovable from low income jobs if they are associated with poverty and insecure social insertion.'

In other words, precarious work is similar to what McKay et al. (2012, 83) call insecurity. The latter, if projected, following Goldring et al., onto migrant status rather than precarious work, includes uncertainty about future employment and inability to plan it because of the unpredictable duration of work; insufficient income that prevents migrants from making a decent living; and circumstances where migrant status 'excludes workers from the security of welfare or social protection' (McKay et al. 2012, 85).

Standing (2012, 591) goes further, incorporating into the category of the 'precariat' all people who are limited in their exercise of rights and whose well-being suffers in consequence. These rights include some economic rights defined by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – rights that are fully enjoyed by citizens. Standing's examples of precarious groups include 'migrants who have professional qualifications in one country [but] are barred from practicing in another; women who have not practiced a particular profession for several years [and] suddenly find they have been disbarred by arbitrarily imposed "recency-of-practice" tests, ostensibly designed to prevent people working with obsolescent skills or knowledge,' and all 'who lack social rights, with no entitlement to state benefits, either because those benefits are tied to legal residence or because they have forfeited them due to some past pattern of behaviour or sporadic employment.'

Vosko argues that one of the dimensions that shape precarious employment is social location, which depends, first and foremost, on whether one is a citizen or not. Therefore, Vosko argues, migrants are holders of 'partial citizenship': they are included in the polity as workers, but not as full legal members. Fudge (2012, 101), however, argues that it is more precise to talk about the partial belonging of migrants in terms of their migrant status rather than partial citizenship. Accordingly, Fudge emphasises the role of immigration law in creating conditions that prevent migrants from acquiring the full set of rights that citizens have. Anderson (2010, 308) says that immigration control sorts individuals according to their skills, providing them with different sets of entitlements, different conditions of entry and different conditions of stay. Through such sorting processes, states construct different legal statuses and different categories of precarious migrants, and some of these statuses are more precarious than others (Fudge 2012, 102).

Berg (2015) emphasises that 'temporariness' is the strongest constraint that forces skilled migrants to worry about their stay and conditions surrounding work in the host country. Berg claims that the concept of precariousness is best suited to describe the situation of temporary immigrants who are subject both to the employment conditions prevailing in a particular country, and the conditions imposed on them by immigration law. The idea that precariousness results in large part from temporariness is reflected in Velayutham's (2013) description of the position of skilled immigrants who arrived in Australia on 457 temporary work visas as ‘precarious’ due to the temporary nature of their statuses.

If, however, Standing’s (2012, 591) broader definition of precariousness is taken into account it becomes evident that temporary status is only one of the factors that limit a migrant’s security in labour relations. Even though temporariness is considered to be migrants’ biggest and most important concern, any migrant status has limitations. That is, all migrants are somewhat precarious because of their non-citizen status. McKay et al. (2012, 76) describe a range of situations which show that it is possible to identify degrees of precariousness in work situations; by analogy, I propose that different migrants’ statuses impose different degrees of precariousness.

In the global context, responses to the precarious position of migrants in the labour market range from exploitation by unscrupulous employers, to migrants’ anxiety that their wages may be undercut, to fears on the part of migrants that they may be forced to leave the country. (Anderson, 2010, 300). Reasons why migrants may become subject to exploitative conditions or come under psychological pressure include lack of recognition of their qualifications, poor knowledge of the language of the host country, and discrimination (Anderson, 2010, 301). In addition, conditions of entry may create extra hardship for migrants because of the bureaucratic procedures involved in applying for a visa (Nature 2009, 12). Evidence of such bureaucratic excess, for example, is the fact that it was a goal of the European Council, when developing the EU Blue Card program, to establish a fast-track procedure for application that would to reduce such bureaucratic hurdles and speed up the process of bringing skilled labour into the European Union (Council of the European Union 2009, (5)-(7)).

In summary, the restrictions embedded in visa programs, temporary visa programs in particular, are among the major sources of precariousness for migrants. For this reason, attention to the legal status that a temporary migrant has must be a core element of my investigation. The status of permanent residency will be explored in order to highlight the contrast between it and temporary migrant status and, in some rare cases, in order to demonstrate a lesser form of precariousness.

2.1.4. Socio-economic status of migrants

Potential migrants' socio-economic status is highly relevant for their decisions about migration. It helps explain why people leave, why they choose the destinations they do, and why they decide to leave at a particular time. In this thesis the terms 'push factor,' 'pull factor' and 'trigger' will be invoked to indicate different aspects of the causes that propel migration. 'Push factors' encapsulates reasons why people migrate, such as economic and political instability in source countries. For Ukrainian migrants who left their home country in the context of the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests and ensuing war such factors had been accumulating over many years. 'Pull factors,' by contrast, are the reasons why migrants are attracted to particular destinations (Hasmath 2012, 10). The 'trigger' is the final reason that causes migrants actually to migrate at a particular moment or that suddenly intensifies all previous aspirations regarding migration.

The main push and pull factors of migration for tertiary-educated migrants, according to advocates of the theory that economic motives are preeminent factors in migration, is the desire for better economic opportunities (Borjas 1989; Berg 2015, 10). By 'economic opportunities' I understand, first and foremost, opportunities for international migrants and their families to improve their financial prosperity. To understand better how migrants utilise their economic opportunities, light has to be shed on the status of migrants in their native countries.

Socio-economic status of the migrating person influences the choice of destination (Van Hear 2014, 101). In particular, to migrate to some destinations migrants need more economic or other types of capital than to others (Van Hear 2014, 111). For example, for Ukrainians migration to Australia is more expensive than to Germany, because the latter country's geographical position makes it cheaper for Ukrainians move to there with their belongings. Stringent immigration policies also make the migration process more expensive (Schöb and Wildasin 2003, 25; Van Hear 2014, 111). For example, Australian visa fees are more expensive for Ukrainian migrants than German ones. As this thesis examines skilled migration, one may expect that the object of inquiry is the migration of well-educated people from less developed countries to better developed countries. One may further expect these individuals to have a higher than average income in both countries, or at least in the destination country. However, Van Hear (2014, 101, 111) explains that migrants' socio-economic status (as determined, for example, by education and skill levels) involves more than the level of their financial prosperity: it also covers the accumulation of resources from different forms of capital, not only economic, but also social and cultural, among others.

According to Becker (1994, 16) investments in education, training and medical care shape a human being. Individuals' knowledge, skills, health and values become their capital and cannot be separated from them. For this reason, the combination of the results of these investments is termed 'human capital.' Boucher (2016, 22) understands the human capital approach to migration policy as one that is adopted by states in order to create favourable conditions for migrants educated both professionally and linguistically to move to destination countries for work. In countries such as Germany and Australia human capital, especially as acquired through education, is highly appreciated and evidence of its possession is often a requirement for immigration. Yet migration creates precariousness and downward mobility for some educated persons.

Van Hear (2014, 114) makes comments specifically on Ukrainian migrating graduates, relating their socio-economic statuses to the outbreak of the political protests in their country. He argues that a generation of young people in their twenties or thirties, well-educated but underemployed or undervalued, had become drivers of the Euromaidan protests. In general, the drivers of change in the country tend to become potential migrants because their efforts have failed to bring the desired results or because of delays in launching reforms. Van Hear relies on Standing's (2011, n.p.) notion of the 'precariat,' a social group that is unable to live and work in coherent and sustainable ways (Van Hear 2014, 115). In the migration context, this group is generated by the trend toward globalisation and comprises people who are well-educated but cannot find a place in the labour market of their home country. They use migration as a tool of improving their livelihood situation and escaping from the 'precariat,' but encounter the same precariousness in the host countries (Van Hear 2014, 115).

Yakushko (2013, 518) confirms that people who possess a combination of diverse forms of capital (e.g., social, cultural, economic) are more likely to migrate to the most developed countries. However, the fact that they possess these forms of capital does not guarantee them a pathway free of discrimination and poverty in the destination country (Yakushko 2013, 518). Indeed, many experience downward social mobility. As was mentioned previously, downward social mobility may be a consequence of immigration policies. Such policies, as well as socially constructed attitudes of local participants in labour market relations, contribute to the phenomenon of the so-called 'ethnic penalty.' This concept, as well as the concept of 'migrant penalty' that I derive from it, is explained in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

2.1.5. Labour market in the global city and the role of skill and education: introducing 'migrant penalty'

My research questions have led me to inquire into the migration experiences of tertiary-educated people. In only two cases in Germany did I interview migrants who had not completed their tertiary education or whose qualifications were not at least equivalent to a bachelor's degree. The research literature, as well as immigration legislation and the wording of visa rules, uses several terms to describe these people: 'skilled,' 'highly skilled,' 'qualified,' and 'highly qualified.' For example, the term 'highly qualified' is used in the EU Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC to mark tertiary-educated migrants from countries outside the European Union (Council of the European Union 2009). Almost all persons in my sample could be covered by the single term 'highly qualified.' However, not all of them could be so described. For example, according to the Directive 2009/50/EC, Article 2 (g), migrants who are not tertiary-educated but have more than five years of experience in the field can be granted this type of visa alongside those who have a tertiary degree. Although Germany did not accept five years of experience as equivalent to a tertiary diploma, I suggest that this category of migrants fits my study. The term 'skilled migrants' is sufficiently broad to cover the group in question, and I shall use it throughout my thesis.

The term 'skilled migrants' in this thesis, therefore, covers a number of other terms that in the literature are mentioned interchangeably. In the following I shall consider the contributions of authors who work with these alternative terminologies, but are nevertheless helpful in establishing the background for this study and problematising aspects of the migrant experience that are related to integration and social networks. It is also helpful to review the somewhat segmented material on Ukrainian migrants who wish to work in the white-collar sector of the economy and are trained to do so: professionals of the most highly developed fields, managers, trainers, researchers, administrators. I report on explanations of why there is a hunt for these workers at the beginning of the 21st century. This provides a background to the consideration of whether states which compete for these workers do enough to provide them with the most favourable environment.

In this section I also explain the relevance of choosing of Melbourne and Berlin as case studies for the inquiry. Both of these migrant destinations are often classified as 'global cities,' and the choice of them was due to the tendency in the literature to link the processes of migration with globalisation. There are a number of studies that elaborate the circumstances that have conditioned the labour market in global cities and the place of the professionals in them (see, e.g., Sassen 1988; Findlay et al. 1996; Beaverstock and Smith 1996; May et al. 2007).

In an early but fundamental and still important study in this area, Sassen (1988, 31) concludes that international migration is a mechanism of global labour supply. Given that major urban areas in highly developed countries have become centres for rapid structural transformation of labour activities and relations – a development which is due to the shift of manufacturing and routine office work to less developed territories (Sassen 1988, 21) – these global cities also have become centres of management and exportation of advanced services. On one hand, this transformation has resulted in the relocation of manufacturing industries away from these cities. On the other hand, it has created shortages in other occupations and led to the restructuring of labour demand. According to Sassen (1988, 22), labour demand in these global cities has been restructured in two main directions: 1) growth in low-wage service jobs, including those that service (a) the expanding, highly specialised, export-oriented service sector and (b) the high-income lifestyles of the growing top level professional workforce employed in that sector; and (2) expansion of (a) the weakened manufacturing sector of declining industries that need cheap labour for survival, as well as (b) dynamic electronics sectors, some of which can actually be seen as part of the downgraded sector. Immigration is a source of labour that is able to fill these demands. In recent times, according to Sassen, the highly specialised sector has been most dynamic in the economies of high-income countries. Sassen's generalisations are based on research into the situation in the United States, but they apply generally to prosperous western countries, including Germany and Australia. Sassen also observes that even the most dynamic and technologically developed sectors of the economy, such as advanced services and high-technology industries, generate a considerable supply of low-wage jobs with few skill and language proficiency requirements.

Sassen's research makes clear why a study of migration of skilled workers from Ukraine to global cities such as Berlin and Melbourne may contribute to understanding of the western restructuring of labour migration in the era of globalisation. For this reason, I shall elaborate on the notion of skill and the role that skills play in the regulation of immigration policy in developed countries.

There are a number of studies (e.g., Ruhs 2013; Facchini and Lodigiani 2014; Cerna and Chou 2014; Cerna 2016) that review the skilled immigration policies of Australia and Germany. Some of them discuss the importance of attracting skilled migrants as a method of increasing economic activity within the country (e.g., Facchini and Lodigiani 2014; Castles 2016, 393). However, these studies do not provide a detailed qualitative analysis of the barriers that immigrants encounter while entering the country and at the stage of integration. The pull-factors for skilled migrants are at the heart of the skilled international migration process. These include the host country's ability and desire to make use of immigrants' qualifications and talents and satisfy the ambitions of those migrating. Iredale (1986, 41) studies efforts in the post-World War II period to attract the best quality workforce to Australia. Boucher's (2016, 21) research analyses the notion of skill, discussing its connection to human capital through the theoretical framework of neoclassical economics theoretical framework. According to Boucher, skills are an element of a human capital.

Sassen (1988, 37) argued that the form of labour supply that involves migration is designed to manufacture a degree of 'powerlessness' in migrants. Migrants' legal status is a tool that helps control the incoming workforce. This control enables states to extract economic advantages from migrants but not expend resources by providing them with social support. This strategy cannot be applied to the local workforce, which is in a position to refuse to work for low wages, because these wages are equal to social benefits (Sassen 1988, 38-39). While Sassen made these observations in regard to migrants in general, already in 1988 she observed growing trends among states to look for labour to be employed in tertiary sectors (Sassen 1988, 45).

Boucher (2016, 1) has also suggested that skilled migrants cope much better with economic and social integration difficulties that do non-skilled migrants. Boucher (2016, 1) points out that while Australia already had some experience of inviting skilled migrants and bringing them into the country, Germany has developed its skilled immigration programs at the beginning of the 21st century. In this way, both countries have joined the so-called 'global race for talent,' a competition that involves attracting top talent in order to boost a country's economic growth. Designing a labour migration policy that is able to fill occupational shortages is the way that governments facilitate the process of attracting skilled migrants (Cerna and Chou 2014). Offering more permanent residence rights in exchange for talent is a strategy which allows states to attract the most skilled workers in this global competition (Shachar 2006). With the development of technologies in western developed countries, professions related to the Information Technology (IT) industry have come more into demand than others, and international migration schemes have been used to fill this demand (Cornelius and Espenshade 2001, 3; Lowell 2001, 131). Studies (Werner 2002, 321; Shachar 2006, 188; Velayutham 2013; Oleinikova 2015) in Australia and Germany provide evidence that IT workers are among the employees most in demand. However, IT is not the only sector to draw migrants, and government immigration policies are intended to cover a more extended list of occupations. The variety of professions of migrants that come to these countries in practice is explored in Chapters Four and Five.

It is not enough for migrants to have skills acquired in their native countries. They need to have them recognised in their host countries. Non-recognition of qualifications of skilled migrants is another source of their precariousness (McKay 2012, 91). Australia, for example, has designed temporary work visa and permanent residency permit programs which are based on an evaluation of potential migrants' skills before they enter the country. Qualifications of skilled migrants from non-English-speaking countries who arrive without employment offers in their fields tend not to be recognised or to be only partly recognised, as happened to Bosnian refugees and voluntary Croatian migrants in Australia (Colic-Peisker 2002; Colic-Peisker 2003, 13; Colic-Peisker 2005, 629).

The literature also places student migration into the context of the global race for talent (Skeldon 2009; Wildavsky 2010; Hawthorne and To 2014). In recent decades, student migration has become a part of the pattern of labour migration of skilled professionals to western industrialised countries (Mahroum 2001, 29). Hawthorne and To (2014, 1) suggest that the massive growth of student migration to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is caused by a demand for human capital. In particular, universities actively contribute to their countries' efforts in the global race for talent. The advantage to host countries of attracting migrant students lies in these students' ability to be assimilated through the university environment, which is helpful to them at the initial stage of accessing the labour market (Hawthorne and To 2014). Perhaps more importantly, the qualifications that international students obtain in the host country are automatically recognised in that country, as are their language skills. At the same time, quantitative studies of the labour market integration of international students in Australia suggest that many international students encounter problems in economic integration (Hawthorne and To 2014). In particular, former international students are not distinguished as achieving high-level salaries, nor do they always obtain employment according to their formal qualifications. In addition, the level of English skills of former international students often remains unsatisfactory for Australian employers (Hawthorne and To 2014).

Already in the mid-1980s, the Australian government was convinced that the country needed to move toward a high-tech future, resulting in a policy focused on attracting migrants with high levels of skill in this field, and by the late 1980s, migration to Australia had become popular with well-qualified professionals from East European countries (Birrell and Hawthorne 1997, 6-7). The vast majority of these tertiary-trained migrants also received training in Australia. In fact, most of these people received their Australian qualifications on top of their existing overseas qualifications. There is evidence that most of the people who received Australian qualifications were members of a young demographic aged between of 27 and 40 years old (similar to the age of the research participants of the present project). There were several factors which encouraged already qualified migrants to attain another degree in Australia, including the fact that qualifications from their countries of origin were not recognised, that their level of English was low and, finally, that they lacked knowledge of how the Australian labour market works. Acquiring an Australian degree helped them to resolve these three issues. According to Birrell and Hawthorne (1997), the variables of age and English-language capacity are the factors most determinative for employment outcomes. Moreover, on the basis of quantitative data the aforementioned study concluded that those who studied in Australia received a better occupational outcome.

In Australia, there are several conditions placed upon the receipt of permanent residency by skilled immigrants, such as accreditation barriers – forms of licensing which create obstacles for workers seeking integration into the labour market. According to Boyd (2013, 165), one of the major consequences of accreditation barriers for skilled migrants is their downward mobility in the labour market. ‘Brain waste,’ the unrealised potential of migrants lost due to their employment in low-skilled fields that do not use their tertiary skills (Boyd 2013, 166), might be present as a result of the imposition of accreditation requirements on foreign-trained workers. Allowing migrants to enter the country without an employment offer (e.g., under the Australian Independent Skilled visa, subclass 189), or limiting their right to access the social safety net during the first few years of their stay might also eventually contribute to brain waste. The importance of the social safety net for migrants’ integration into the host society is discussed in Section 2.1.7.

I suggest that recognition of skills as a formal procedure but also as labour market requirement can be conceptualised as an instrument of what I call ‘migrant penalty.’ This term is analogous to the term 'ethnic penalty.' The latter was originally applied to minorities identified on the basis of ethnicity, while in this study it is the migrant visa status that is viewed as the key factor determining the extent to which a migrant is subject to disadvantages – a 'penalty.' 'Migrant penalty' is a broader concept than 'ethnic penalty' and can be applied to migrants whether they constitute an identifiable ethnic minority in the destination country or not. For example, ethnic Germans might live their whole life in another country and then migrate to Germany where they may still encounter a penalty in the labour market due to the fact that they are not familiar with local laws and have graduated from foreign institutions.

Given the similarities that migrant penalty bears to ethnic penalty it is appropriate here to report how the latter has been defined. 'Ethnic penalty' is the negative consequence that members of ethnic minorities experience in the labour market of their country of residence (Heath and Cheung 2007, 5; Hasmath 2012). It hinders their occupational outcomes relative to those of similarly educated non-minority contemporaries. As a result of such barriers, Hasmath (2012) argues, members of ethnic minorities typically have lower incomes and higher unemployment rates than is the norm in the society at large. Studies of ethnic penalty generally focus on the so-called 'salariat,' the social group comprising people qualified for professional, managerial and top-managerial positions (Heath and Cheung 2007). According to Hasmath (2012, 69), the major factors that determine the degree of ethnic penalty are discrimination, an individual's social network, the firm's workplace culture, and the extent of social trust in the community to which the individual belongs. Of these factors, social networks will be explored in Chapter Six of this thesis in relation to the role that they play for Ukrainian migrants.

Other reasons why skilled migrants tend to experience downward career mobility include lack of relevant language fluency, which I will discuss below later, and educational mismatch, the situation where the qualifications that migrants obtained in their home countries do not have the same value in the labour market of destination countries. The latter may occur where employers are not able to evaluate immigrants' education certificates or experience, or where regulatory restrictions do not allow migrants to practice until they gain extra qualifications that meet the standards of the destination country (Heath and Cheung 2007, 5).

Hasmath (2012, 83) suggests that 'ethnic penalty' can be explained on the basis of discrimination due to different physical appearance or linguistic traits. Yet he explains that in the employment matching process social trust plays a more important role than either of these factors (Hasmath, 2002, 82). Before an employment relationship is entered into, the prospective employer gauges the prospective employee. What Hasmath calls the 'social network referral' – referral to the potential employer by an individual who has a friendly relationship with the person seeking employment – can be of huge benefit to both parties in this situation, but in the contemporary diverse market which supplied by international labour, it is not always an option. Therefore, the personal interview based on a formal application is often the forum where the prospective employee can prove trustworthiness (Hasmath 2002, 83).

Kislev (2017, 725) attempted to evaluate immigration policies and other policies of state and non-state actors in relation to the extent to which they cause the phenomenon of 'ethnic penalty.' Kislev's quantitative studies demonstrated that this impact is minimal, but they have laid a basis for qualitative research that has helped me to understand the role of the state in the formation of policies that put migrants into disadvantaged positions or at least contribute to doing so. I believe that the social trust that was investigated by Hasmath (2002, 81) can be dependent on something that I call 'state referral' – the state's policy towards migrants and their entitlements. In other words, if the state does not grant full work rights to immigrants or limits their stay by means of temporary visas, employers may interpret these signals as suggestions that migrants seeking employment are untrustworthy. Policies play an important role in constructing social image. This applies to visa requirements which, by favouring some qualifications over others, constitute a state intervention in the recognition process as conducted by professional associations. The workings of such 'state referral' mechanisms are explored in Chapters Four and Five.

To conclude: the evidence presented in the literature reveals the importance of employment skills and qualifications in the migration policies of host countries, as well as the necessity for governments to regulate skilled migration.

2.1.6. Language proficiency

The role of language proficiency in ensuring migrants' integration, including but not limited to labour market integration, is often described as crucial (Esser 2006; Espenshade and Fu 1997). Language skills influence labour market integration and the career advancement of newcomer immigrants in Germany and Australia (OECD 2007). A lack of language proficiency, and even a foreign accent, may evoke discrimination towards international candidates based on xenophobia (OECD 2007; Esser 2006; Colic-Peisker 2002). Boucher (2016, 22) points out that in the literature language is often considered to be a skill and, in consequence, is a form of a human capital. In addition, Esser (2006), as well as Espenshade and Fu (1997), observe that the level to which migrants learn the host country's language and their consequential proficiency depends on the costs of learning relative to the financial situation of the learner, the time available for learning, and the extent to which proficiency is necessary. Motivation may be an additional factor that influences the language acquisition of an individual.

Linguistic integration and the hardship associated with it may also differently affect immigrants from Ukraine and immigrants from countries whose languages are more similar to the language of the host country: for example, speakers of English have an advantage in Germany over speakers of non-Germanic languages (Espenshade and Fu 1997, 290).

Criteria set in immigration policy for the selection of migrants frequently determine the minimum level of language competence of migrants to a particular country. During the immigration application process, migrants and their dependents are assessed on the basis of various criteria. The principal applicants are often considered pre-integrated if they have received an employment offer (OECD 2007). Examination of the situation of skilled migrants in Germany and Australia shows that such pre-integration involves the preparedness of an immigrant to enter a new linguistic environment. Ensuring such linguistic competence through verification is generally the task of the state or the employer.

For example, Australian immigration policy is quite strict regarding language skills. It requires English language proficiency from permanent residency applicants, their spouses, student visa applicants, and temporary work visa applicants (Minister for Citizenship of Australia 2018; AGDHA 2018a). In regard to the latter, the current conditions (in 2018) of the Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa require from the primary applicant a basic level of English proficiency: in the IELTS test an overall band score of at least 5.0 and a score of at least 4.5 in each test component of the IELTS (Minister for Citizenship of Australia 2018). The language requirements for the now-abolished 457-subclass visa that was replaced by the TSS were the same (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection of Australia 2017). It is important to stress that spouses are not required to demonstrate any language skills. Regarding permanent residency, however, one of the types of visas – the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) – requires from the primary applicant a 'competent' level of English, i.e., at least 6 in each of the four test components (speaking, reading, listening and writing) of an IELTS test (AGDHA 2018b), and from the spouse a 'functional' level (an average band score of at least 4.5 across the four test components).

By contrast, in Germany, at the time of entry permanent residency is not possible at all for Ukrainian migrant workers, and the Temporary Work (TW) visa, as well as the newly introduced EU Blue Card program, do not require any formal proof of German language skills for the primary applicant, because it is assumed that they will work in other languages, normally English. Only in the case of a TW visa is a very basic level of German proficiency required of spouses (Blue Card.de 2018). These various levels of requirements generally hinder migrants' labour market integration, simultaneously playing a negative role in migrants' ability to cope with household-related and legal issues, including, as Chapter Four makes clear, their ability to access public institutions and deal with the German bureaucracy.

Based on her research in Australia, Berg (2011) suggested that strict language requirements for immigrants lower a country's ability to attract skilled migrants. She argues that assessment of language skills during admission does not guarantee that the 'best and brightest' will be admitted, as they do not necessarily have the best English skills (Berg, 2011,110). And although for some countries the definition of the 'best and brightest' migrants would include migrants with advanced skills in the languages of the host countries, some scholars disagree. In particular, Rodríguez (2001) suggests that immigrants should be required to demonstrate only a basic knowledge of English (or, more generally, the main language of the host country). Rodríguez expresses the conviction that the inability to speak at a native level should not limit career advancement, because such discrimination would be unjust. In the context of this discussion Chapter Four of this thesis demonstrates that those migrants who arrived with basic language skills mostly were able to perform their work, but experienced some limitations when it came to promotion, changing employers or integration more generally.

It has been observed that destinations with ‘softer’ linguistic requirements and those where English is the main language or is widely used attract more migrants (Adserà and Pytliková 2015). In particular, English as a ‘global language’ (Nunan 2001; Crystal 2003) that is studied throughout the world as a second language is used in global cities such as Berlin as a language for business communication, making such cities especially attractive to skilled migrants.

It is evident that the language assessment prior to migration is an important area of study among scholars and policymakers. Given the emphasis placed on this issue, I suggest that the exploration of the Ukrainian migrants’ experiences with regard to the role of language in labour market integration contributes significant evidence to this field of inquiry.

2.1.7. Skilled migrants’ access to the social safety net

To alleviate poverty, some states offer compensation to their disadvantaged groups in the form of a social safety net (Ivaschenko et al. 2018, 1). The term ‘social safety net’ encompasses state services that provide financial support for single individuals or families that stand at risk of falling into poverty; such services assist in affording healthcare insurance, housing and parenting, and support in case of full or partial unemployment or disability (Barr 1993, 13; Erkulwater 2006; Debus et al. 2012, 690; Gassman-Pines and Hill 2013, 173) However, the social safety net is something that migrants are often allowed to access only in limited ways

(Leontiyeva 2014, 64). States profit from migrants' inability to access services that the citizens of these countries use instead of taking up low-paid, dangerous employment (Sassen 1988, 39). Restrictions on access to benefits influence the economic status of individual migrants and migrant families, often calling into question whether migration is beneficial for the migrant. For example, Yakushko (2013, 8) observes that, because of limited access to social institutions such as public healthcare and education, a migrant family may experience a reduction in income as an outcome of migration. Access to the social safety net for migrants is conditioned by two factors: restrictions imposed by immigration policies and informal difficulties common to many migrants, such as language proficiency and familiarity with local laws and rights (Askola 2012, 348).

Access to public healthcare is an important entitlement that is granted mainly to citizens of the country in the form of free services. Goldring et al. (2009, 241) suggest that if migrants do not possess social citizenship rights such as the right to public education and public health coverage, their status should be defined as precarious. McKay et al. (2012, 97) agree adding that if precariousness is to be avoided, these social rights should include the right to protection during periods of unemployment, as well as rights to housing, education, public healthcare and transport.

Some immigration policies do not grant migrants access to the social safety net. Ruhs (2017, 3) calls this the price for migration. In other words, migrants pay to enjoy the other benefits they have due to the opportunities opened up by international migration. This is in line with the assumptions made by the states that participate in the global race for talent. States expect skilled migrants to be economically beneficial and also self-sufficient and to manage their lives without a social safety net, as discussed above (Sassen 1988, 38-39). However, 'non-income' gaps between skilled immigrants and citizens of destination countries could be diminished by allowing immigrants access to parts of the social safety net such as public childcare and healthcare. This would contribute to persuading immigrants to remain in the receiving countries (Mahroum 2001).

Kofman et al. (2000, 77) observe that since the late 1980s some European theorists have advocated for reducing the gap between the rights of citizens and non-citizen by overcoming exclusionary practices, including discrimination based on ethnicity in the labour market; in their view, international human rights instruments should serve as a tool to achieve this objective. In particular, as has already been mentioned, lack of language proficiency can have a negative impact on access to the social safety net. Newly-arrived migrants are 'unfamiliar with institutional structures' (Kofman et al. 2000, 135) and cannot obtain the information about what access to the social safety net is due to them because of their lack of language competence. Kofman et al. (2000, 136) argue that migrant women are usually more active in the exercise of their social rights, and are more in need of the social safety net, than their male partners. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, this occurs because women are less likely to be employed and usually are primary carers for children. Such situations arise even in cases where women possess market-relevant professions. Members of migrant groups who are excluded from the social safety net, or do not know their entitlements, tend to seek equivalent support from other migrants of the same ethnic background. Women tend to be the mediators in making arrangements between their families and the community in order to provide for their families' welfare needs, and this can lead them to undertake unpaid work (Kofman et al 2000, 136). Another issue that comes to light is that women who migrate might be formally entitled to have access to the social safety net, but not as independent individuals. Their entitlement may exist as a result of their partner's entitlements, increasing women's dependence on their partners

(Askola 2012).

This and the previous sections of Part I of Chapter Two make evident the importance of exploring the impact of visa status on the experiences of skilled migrants, including members of the various subdivisions within this group that are generated by differences in visa statuses and gender, among other differentiating factors. This task is addressed in Chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis, while analysis of the experiences of Ukrainian skilled migrants in Germany and Australia shed light on how the exercise of rights to access the social safety net influence migrants' labour market integration and the purchasing power of families.

2.1.8. Gender and family

McKay et al. (2012, 50) suggest that women are more at risk of being badly affected by downward mobility and of experiencing precariousness than men.

Skilled migrants who intend to stay in host countries for a considerable period of time often migrate with their immediate family. Whether they choose to do so depends, above all, on the age of the migrants and the timing of their marriage in the country of origin. Goldring et al. (2009, 241) suggest that dependent applicants who receive their right to stay in the country due to visa sponsorship of their partners are in a condition of precariousness.

Harvey (1998) examines the international migration of professionals and their spouses through the lens of the discipline of human resource management. In particular, he takes into account the careers of both partners and the difficulties which they encounter due to international migration. Harvey's work is relevant to my study, which involved interviews with many dual career families. Regardless of the gender of the primary migrant who has obtained an employment offer, the situation in which tertiary-educated spouses of the primary migrant find themselves after the move affects both partners and their employability. In the vast majority of the cases that Harvey documents, partners who are not in receipt of an employment offer – 'trailing spouses' – are women. Harvey connects this finding also to the emergence of psychological stress which often accompanies an international move. Trailing spouses often have to deal with the interruption of their career and unemployment, unlike the employment-receiver, who enters a new work environment and assumes greater responsibility for the family's well-being by becoming the main provider of financial security.

Harvey (1998, 312) suggests that the stress which is the consequence of international relocation and which brings pressure to bear upon the family can be reduced by recourse to the existing support infrastructure. He identifies the following factors that influence the quality of such support: the personal interrelationship in the marriage prior the migration; the existence of relevant social networks in the place of destination; the scale of the difference between social support in the country of origin and the destination country; and the willingness of hosts to support the family – for example, by assisting the trailing spouse in sourcing potential employment opportunities (Harvey 1998, 324-325). Harvey suggests that support infrastructure can be put in place by the employer of the main applicant for the work visa; however, this is not exclusively the employer's responsibility, but also that of the state.

Like Harvey, Boucher (2016, 3) documents the fact that women are more likely to migrate as dependent spouses, both in general and to Australia in particular; she argues that such a situation arises due to host countries' immigration policies, which disadvantage women because they fail to take account of their reproductive roles, such as childbearing and nursing.

Moreover, Boucher (2016, 3) finds gender issues to be dependent on a range of factors that are in play in skilled immigration selection: whether points test models are used, or salary thresholds are set; whether the focus is on human capital in general or on particular occupational skills; and whether employers 'wield powers over selection through "demand driven selection models."' Interrupted career trajectories due to the reproductive and social roles of women in migration put them in a disadvantaged position in relation to skills assessment, labour market integration, the granting of residential rights, and such aspects of family dynamics such as financial independence from their husbands. Boucher argues that women are underrepresented in skilled-migration programs and that government policies do not sufficiently take into account the specifics of female life trajectories when doing skills assessment. Such policies, to use Boucher's term, lack 'gender awareness.' In addition to disadvantaging women, I argue that such an approach causes the state in question potentially to lose valuable human capital.

It has been widely observed that migrants are especially prone to fall into stereotypical breadwinner and caregiver roles (McDonald 2000; Pfau-Effinger 2004; Vosko 2010; Boucher 2016). In particular, Vosko (2010, 6-7) explains the concept of 'gender contract' as a social arrangement that distributes paid and unpaid labour between the genders. Social expectations in many states keep women in charge of household-related responsibilities, such as the upbringing of children – future citizens and taxpayers. These expectations also find expression in state policy. Caregivers are at risk of being out of the labour market for a long period of time (Kofman et al. 2000, 137). Despite the fact that after World War II most European welfare states gradually adopted policies to move away from the male breadwinner model by securing women with more independent status, Kofman et al. (2000, 136) suggest that migration can have the effect of reviving and supporting traditional gender roles. Whether this occurs in particular cases depends, however, on specific circumstances – for example, on whether the primary migrant is a man or a woman and whether both have pre-existing careers that survive the move.

In the era of the global race for talent, when it is important to make use of every migrant skill and talent (Colic Peisker 2005, 633), supporting women with immigration policies that favour their employability might be a goal for states seeking to include more women in the labour force. Some states which experience high levels of natural population decrease may be seen to design their migration policies not only to fill their labour shortages, but also to encourage the birth of new generations of citizens. As a result, the gender contract, as an invisible social policy, encourages immigrant women to take care of their offspring while men support their family and the economy of the host country by paying taxes (McDonald 2000, 3). In Germany, for example, according to the OECD (2007, 225), the educational level of migrants who engage in parenting influences the motivation of their children to study better in schools. This might be interpreted as implying an intention on the part of governments to attract educated women but to limit their activity to the bringing up of children.

The ratio of women to men varies from occupation to occupation. As Sassen (1988, 108) points out, there are male and female industries. For example, in IT men greatly outnumber women, although female participation is encouraged by many employers (D’Costa 2008, 49). Other important factors that tend to place women in occupations related to childcare with lower earnings and inferior working conditions (Sinclair 1991, 1) are gender stereotypes inculcated into children at an early age and prejudiced attitudes and behaviours towards working women (Davidson and Cooper 1987, 1).

In the empirical parts of my inquiry I demonstrate that situations corresponding to those described above are experienced to some degree by skilled Ukrainian migrants in both Germany and Australia.

2.1.9. Typical barriers for Ukrainians abroad: legal and economic integration

There is a limited number of studies that focus on the precariousness of Ukrainian skilled migrants. Some aim to clarify the main integration barriers for these migrants and the ways in which they overcome these barriers. For example, Jaroszewicz (2016, 26) argues that one of the biggest contemporary problems that arises for Ukrainian migrants is finding employment in the receiving country. Ukrainians faced this problem in Spain, the Czech Republic and Italy during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. Generally, migrants' rights to work can be limited by their legal status, which may not give them access to social security support, for instance, or to requalification courses (Leontiyeva 2014, 64). Szulecka (2017) suggests that immigration law plays a role in determining whether Ukrainian immigrants are able successfully to exercise their rights in Europe. Restrictions inscribed into visa status affect the way in which migrants can exercise their rights if, for example, they overstay their visas. Fagasiński et al. (2015) state that former holders of temporary visas reported that their wages had been lower and their employment unstable before they were granted residence permits (quoted in Szulecka 2017). Leontiyeva (2014, 74) also observes that workers with permanent status are twice as likely to be employed in occupations where they can use their skills as those with temporary status. In Jaroszewicz's opinion, migrants' difficulties in integrating into the labour market of a receiving country can also be caused by local xenophobia. Such situations arose in Portugal in 1999-2002 and later in the Czech Republic at the time of a large influx of Ukrainians into these countries (Jaroszewicz 2016, 29).

Some sociological studies suggest practical steps that skilled Ukrainian migrants might take to counteract the waste of human capital in receiving countries (Heyse 2009; Leontiyeva 2014). Leontiyeva observes the 'education-employment mismatch' that has evolved as a result of the combination of the high level of education of Ukrainian migrants and legal obstacles to their integration into the labour market. She notes the consequent economic and non-economic disadvantage that these migrants experience – the 'migrant penalty,' as I term it. It is likely that inability to utilise formal skills is most widespread among newcomer migrants. According to Leontiyeva (2014, 65), migrants who stay in the host country for a longer period eventually overcome these difficulties. Harney (2012) states that the practice of meeting employers through connections contributes to security of employment; it is safer to accept employment recommended by a trusted person. Szulecka (2017, 52) discovers that Ukrainian migrants in EU are permitted to change their visa type and in the process to expand their rights: for example, they receive access to the labour market on par with the citizens of the host country.

In addition, when accessing the labour market of a host country, migrants also encounter other types of problems: poor working conditions, wages lower than the national minimum wage, and overwork. All of these issues should be a cause for concern for trade unions. In seeking a solution to such problems, the Association of Ukrainians in Naples developed a good relationship with local trade unions that improved the level of protection of migrants' labour rights (Harney 2012).

Szulecka (2017) points out that illegal employment increases chances of exploitative practices and bad working and living conditions. Szulecka also emphasises that due to the EU and Schengen border control requirements the mobility of Ukrainian migrants is limited and creates incentives for undocumented migration and work (for example, Poland's liberal policy of issuing short-term visas to Ukrainians and tacit tolerance of undocumented work allow Ukrainians to stay and work illegally not only in Poland but also in Germany, since there are no borders between Poland and Germany and Ukrainians can move at any time). The EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (as quoted in Szulecka 2017) found that the main strategy of Ukrainian irregular migrants in cases of sickness or exploitation by an employer is to rely on social networks and rarely on NGOs.

Studying Ukrainian skilled migrants in Germany and Australia I was aware that migrants might undertake illegal employment or employment with conditions that violate their rights. The analysis in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis demonstrates how minimal this situation was in my sample, largely due to the relatively high socio-economic status of the interviewees. But interviewees in many cases said they had met people who were in real danger of violation of their work rights. Following Leontiyeva's study, conducted in the Czech Republic, which revealed that tertiary-educated Ukrainians are very likely to end up in unqualified employment (2014, 76), this thesis also clarifies whether Ukrainians tend to follow similar patterns in Germany and Australia.

In drawing attention to Ukrainian tertiary-educated migrants in the EU, Szulecka (2017) indicates that this group is relatively small. However, she claims that the examination of the legal framework that applies to this cohort is essential. In particular, she suggests clarifying the following questions:

> Whether there are obstacles that prevent well-qualified migrants from taking up jobs in the primary sector; whether discrimination occurs and whether there are

> any measures to prevent it; and whether there are any special schemes that would facilitate the migration of highly skilled migrants and how EU law [as embodied, for example, in the EU Blue Card] has influenced their mobility and economic adaptation. (Szulecka 2017, 65)

These tasks that Szulecka identified helped form my intentions to study Ukrainian migration, locating my inquiry within the international trends in the literature that have been explored above. Szulecka's study is based on published sources and does not take into account the specifics of the situation of Ukrainian migrants in either Germany or Australia. This is gap to be filled in my dissertation.

The review of case studies of Ukrainian migration at the initial stage of my research provided me with a preliminary understanding of the kinds of problems that Ukrainian migrants in Berlin and Melbourne might encounter when they endeavour to integrate into the labour market. The problems include the degradation of qualifications, violation of labour rights, and restrictions imposed as conditions of work permits (e.g., limitation of permissible work hours), all of which influence the financial situation of immigrants and, as a result, their economic integration overall. Additionally, the legal and institutional frameworks which affect Ukrainian migration require attention, as Szulecka (2017) noted. My examination of such frameworks helps understand some characteristics of the migrant cohort that I examine. In this respect I follow Volodko (2014b, 2014d), who initiated this line of inquiry by evaluating the legal statuses of Ukrainian students in Germany and how these statuses influence their financial situation.

Part II. The role of social networks and a national identity in the Ukrainian context

2.2.1. Introduction

Part II of Chapter Two defines the concept of 'social capital' which frames part of the analysis in this thesis. It reviews research on social networks as means for overcoming migrants' integration barriers; on ways in which Ukrainian social networks function in different diaspora communities throughout the world and specifically in Berlin and Melbourne; and on national identity as a component of social capital, especially in the case of Ukrainian migrants.

2.2.2. Theorising social capital

According to Bourdieu (1986, 248) social capital is 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.'

Solidarity, an attribute that is nurtured by national identity, is also a key factor that affects the viability of social capital. For example, Nee and Sanders (2001, 389) indicate that social capital is reflected in the sentiments of obligation and solidarity. Moreover, Koukoutsaki-Monnier (2015) suggests that the power of communication systems and the motivations of social agents, which are the base of social capital, also underlie the formation of national identity. Miller (2000) argues that national identity is a belief by members of a group of people that they constitute a national community and adds that this community's national identity can be maintained only if its members continue to share this belief. Here the idea of national identity also intersects with the theory of social capital: in order to belong to any community, including a national community, its members must conceptualise themselves as a group – a state of affairs that enables intensive social interaction. Solidarity in a community cannot be taken for granted, as Vasta (2013, 204) observes. Parekh (2008, 87), discussing the solidaristic dimension of national identity, argues that solidarity in a community can arise only when there is a sense of interdependence among its members. The mutual dependence that, from this perspective, is the key attribute of solidarity, creates conditions for community well-being.

The sense of belonging, solidarity, is closely intertwined with social cohesion and social unity and, in consequence, with different forms of capital: social, human and cultural. Furthermore, Vasta (2013, 198) observes that the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘social cohesion’ are often utilised as synonyms in academic work; a distinction, as Vasta believes, that may be drawn between them is that the term social cohesion fits better with public and policy discourses. It encompasses meanings of social solidarity, social networks, place attachment, sense of belonging and identity when it refers to a society that has civic culture.

In reflecting on Ukrainian national identity and its rebirth after the Euromaidan, I shall argue that the actions of migrants and other members of the Ukrainian diaspora community fit Bourdieu’s theory of social capital because of their desire for association with that community. I shall consider whether networking with members of pre-existing Ukrainian diaspora communities is beneficial for newcomer migrants, and shall suggest that the sense of obligation on the part of settled migrants to help newcomers arises from a national feeling of solidarity and a desire to acknowledge themselves as Ukrainians. One can argue, with Bourdieu (1986, 249), that the special quality of social capital conditioned by a diasporic maintenance of national identity awakens among members of the diaspora community feelings of obligation to contribute to that community.

Field (2008) explains how social networks function. It is not enough simply to know people in order to ask them for help. These acquaintances need to feel that they are obliged to help. Cooperation with the aim of achieving a common goal is possible where the community shares common values, including ones connected to a particular national identity. Field (2008, 3) argues that the 'membership of networks and a set of shared values' are the true essence of social capital; the more people within the network, and the more common values they share, the more resources they contribute and the more capital they form.

Bourdieu (1986, 249) regards the profits which individuals derive from membership in social networks as a basis of their solidarity. In this thesis, the solidarity under investigation is that which has developed in the Ukrainian emigrant community. Benefits accrue from active membership of this community. By 'active membership' is understood membership that involves intentional contributions into the community. These contributions – or services – become available to other members of the community. However, Bourdieu indicates that the willingness to derive benefits from membership is unlikely to appear deliberately, even from membership in an organisation that is constituted for the very purpose of providing such services.

Julien (2015, 365), too, suggests that social capital arises whenever individuals show willingness to participate in some community as an end in itself. Any practical manifestation of such willingness is a contribution to the community's social capital – a 'fee' for membership. Information can be such a contribution. Information as a basis for action is a resource that can be accessed by members of a community even if the community was established for other purposes than the information sharing that in fact takes place (Coleman 1988, 104). (An example of a benefit derived from the social capital in a community in this way was encountered in the field research for this thesis: immigrant IT professionals in Berlin used social media networks established for communication about IT matters as forums for exchanging advice about visa issues and practical matters of everyday life in a new country.)

The literature invoking social capital theory to explain economic relationships between members of immigrant communities mostly deals with benefits derived by members of the wage-labour class – the ‘poor,’ to use Das’s term (2004). By contrast, this dissertation takes as the object of its empirical research Ukrainian migrants of a different social stratum: skilled labour migrants, whose social status is discussed in Chapters Four (Section 4.3.) and Five Section 5.3.)

2.2.3. History of ‘disrupted’ Ukrainian migration in Berlin

In the literature on the history of Ukrainian migration there is a tendency to regard the exodus of Ukrainians from their country as a chronological sequence of ‘waves.’ The traditional division into four or five waves, beginning in the nineteenth century (Subtelny 1994, 538; Lemekh 2007, 13; Kondrashov 2008; Antony-Newman 2014, 17), while useful for the description of Ukrainian emigration to North America, is not equally applicable to Germany. Moreover, there is a lack of consolidated research on the history of Ukrainian migration to Berlin.

A typical approach to the study of the histories of Ukrainian communities outside Ukraine has focussed on the organisational life of Ukrainian emigrants (Isajiw 1993, 4). On the other hand, according to Isajiw, in a number of other instances the history of the Ukrainian community in a given country has been seen as the sum of significant contributions by individuals, often outstanding representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A case in point is the Ukrainian community in Berlin.

During World War I, in the prisoner-of-war camp in Wünsdorf near Berlin, about 70 people of Ukrainian origin formed their small community. They had a theatre and a library, and organised courses in Ukrainian studies and agriculture (Desiateryk 2012). There are no records indicating that the ethnic Ukrainian population was numerous in Berlin in the interwar period, but scholars highlight the presence there of Ukrainian political émigrés (Golczewski 1993, 232; Subtelny 1994, 552; Kit 2004a), in particular, leading figures of the Ukrainian War of Independence. These included the monarchist Pavlo Skoropadsky (Ohloblyn and Zhukovsky 1993; Kubijovyč 1993; Subtelny 1994, 552) and Yevhen Petrushevych, president of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918-1919. Yevhen Konovalets, a leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, also had his headquarters in interwar Berlin (Subtelny 1994, 552; Yaniv 1989).

After World War II about 2.3 million Ukrainians remained in Germany as former prisoners of war, refugees and *Ostarbeiter* – persons who had been forcibly taken during the war from the territory of German-occupied Ukraine to labour camps in Germany. The majority of them were repatriated to the Soviet Union, many involuntarily (Subtelny 1994, 554). A great exodus from the Displaced Persons camps in Germany to other countries, including the USA, Canada and Australia, followed the end of the war (Subtelny 1994, 566). In Germany there remained a tiny community of displaced persons and political émigrés, including representatives of the

Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, one of whose most prominent leaders, Stepan Bandera, was based in Munich.

Between 1945 and 1990 Berlin was divided into United States, French, British and Soviet occupation zones. At the start of this period the majority of Ukrainians fled Berlin, and the remainder did not flag their presence in the city due to the possibility of repatriation to the Soviet Union and likely persecution there. Information about Ukrainians in Berlin at this time is limited to facts about the activity of a handful of prominent individuals. Among them were Bohdan Osadchuk, a professor at the Free University of Berlin (Hnatiuk 2011; Bohdan Osadchuk 2018) and Petro Verhun, a Greek Catholic priest arrested in 1945 by the Soviet authorities and sent to Siberia as a prisoner (Husar-Struk 1993).

During the Cold War some citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were able to visit the German Democratic Republic and East Berlin, mostly as tourists rewarded for outstanding achievements at work (Kit 2004a). Exit visas for citizens of the USSR were rare and were granted only under special circumstances. Within programs of German-Soviet cultural exchange, Ukrainian music and dance collectives performed in Berlin. Citizens of the German Democratic Republic were able to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine in the ‘Kiew’ [Kyiv] restaurant located in the heart of the city until the 1990s (Kit 2004a).

The influx of significant numbers of migrants from Ukraine into Berlin began in 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Those who migrated at the beginning of this period were mostly repatriated Germans or Jews from the Ukrainian SSR (Kit 2004a). Ethnic Ukrainians began to migrate to Berlin after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Once Ukraine became independent, Ukrainians were not required to receive an exit visa from the state authorities prior to travelling abroad.

Some researchers define those Ukrainians who began to emigrate from Ukraine *en masse* after 1991 as a wave of economic migration. In North America this phenomenon would become known as the fourth wave of Ukrainian immigration. Sociological studies represent Berlin as an educational hub that between the late 1990s and mid-2010s attracted mostly students from the territory of Ukraine (Kit 2004b; Volodko 2014b; Volodko 2014c; Volodko 2014d; Jockenhövel-Schiecke 2017). Another category of Ukrainian migrants came to Berlin under conditions of the Au-pair program (Kit 2004b; Jockenenhövel-Schiecke (2017, 166). This program offered migration opportunities for young men and women aged between 18 and 27 years who wished to learn the language of another country and were prepared to live with a family that required assistance with childcare. Due to the nature of the program, this group comprised mainly women. Usually the program lasted about one year, but holders of the relevant visa tended to stay in Germany by enrolling in German universities. Melnyk et al. (2016) recorded the presence of Ukrainian labourers in Germany who migrated there after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Łada and Bötger documented the sudden rise of Ukrainian institutions in Germany after the Euromaidan protests and during the ensuing war. They interviewed leaders of Ukrainian organisations in Berlin and established that, while some of the institutions existed before the Euromaidan, the majority were created during it or immediately afterwards. These groups have various objectives ranging from facilitating communication and cultural exchange to providing charity. Some are educational NGOs.

Kozachenko attempted to categorise the Ukrainian diaspora community using the terms ‘old’ and ‘new’ diaspora that are applied in many studies. He refers to ‘old diaspora’ as ‘formal diasporic organisations that have existed for a long time and are united by the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC).’ According to Kozachenko, the ‘new’ diaspora was established mainly after 2014 with the outbreak of physical confrontation during the Euromaidan in Kyiv and the following military conflict in the eastern Ukraine. In Kozachenko’s opinion, the organisations which are most frequently created by members of the ‘new’ diaspora are ‘grassroots organisations’ – entities which do not have an affiliation with the UWC, function without establishing a formal structure and do not maintain a separate website about their activities.

I would like to add some rectifications to Kozachenko’s classification. First, representatives of every new wave of Ukrainian migrants tend to highlight their separateness from previous waves and to emphasise the value differences between them and their predecessors. Subtelny (1994, 559), for example, observed that post-World War II immigrants to the United States referred to the previous wave as ‘old’ immigrants. Kozachenko uses the term ‘old diaspora’ in reference to persons who migrated earlier than in 2014. I suggest applying the term ‘old diaspora,’ instead, to those who emigrated before 1991, and ‘new’ diaspora to those who migrated after 1991 because in the first instance this corresponds to common usage: the term ‘old’ diaspora is used in both Berlin and Melbourne by migrants who migrated after 1991 with respect to those who remained in western countries after World War II. Furthermore, the largest temporal gap between waves of Ukrainian migration was between those migrants who settled in western countries after World War II and those who started to migrate after the dissolution of the USSR. It is between these two migrations that the line separating the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Ukrainian diasporas should most logically be drawn. In what follows those who migrated before 1991 will be called the ‘old’ diaspora and those who migrated that year or later will be termed the ‘new’ diaspora.

Second, the line between formal and grassroots organisations must be drawn more explicitly than was done by Kozachenko. Formal organisations are the entities that are registered by state authorities of the territory on which they operate or as representatives of foreign-registered organisations. With regard to Kozachenko’s definition of grassroots organisations, I agree that some initiatives do not document their activity in any way and exist very briefly. There also exist entities that cannot be classified by either of these terms, such as, in the case of Berlin, the Ukrainian Embassy, which is not an organisation, but an arm of the Ukrainian state. Nevertheless, its actions contribute to the establishment of networks in the Ukrainian diaspora community in Berlin. The Ukrainian churches are also long-standing stakeholders in both Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, in particular, has had an impact on the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin. This church operates in Germany on a legal basis similar to that of other churches and is co-funded by taxpayers who voluntarily pay their contributions to the German tax authorities (Preis 2010).

Third, while Kozachenko (2018) classified some organisations under the category of grassroots organisations, a few years later they attained ‘formal’ status. For example, the Ukrainian Cinema Club in Berlin, mentioned as a grassroots initiative by Kozachenko, by November 2018 had its own website providing details of its activities. The site states that the Club was established in 2009 (Ukrainischer Kinoklub in Berlin 2018). The formalisation of previously informal initiatives in the Ukrainian diaspora community was a tendency observed by Melnyk et al. (2016, 6) in 2015.

The website of the Embassy of Ukraine in Germany carries information about the Zentralverband der Ukrainer in Deutschland (CAUG) (Central Association of Ukrainians in Germany 2018). The CAUG was founded in 2007 and holds its Berlin cultural events in the city hall of Charlottenburg. The website 'Ukraine in Deutschland' lists Ukrainian organisations in Germany without specifying whether they are formal institutions or not. Some organisations on the list, such as research institutions, were not created by Ukrainian immigrants, but are German organisations that have German private or public funding.

The 'Ukraine in Deutschland' site lists Ukrainian organisations that have their seat in Berlin. Among them are several that deal with youth and education, such as 'Ukrainische Schule in Berlin' [Ukrainian School in Berlin], a school teaching Ukrainian language and culture on Sundays to children from five to eight years of age. There is no information about the school's legal status. A Facebook-based group is the only way to get more information about this entity. 'Plast' is a Ukrainian scout organisation in Berlin for children from three to eleven years of age. It is also a Facebook-based group. 'Mehr Bewegen' is a project of DRA [German-Russian Exchange] for young Ukrainians in Eastern Europe (Deutsch-Russischer Austausch e.V. 2018). 'Weselka' is a playgroup for children. It has a Facebook-based web page.

Some of listed organisations are religious: Ukrainische Orthodoxe Kirchengemeinde E.V [Ukrainian Orthodox Church Community], founded in 2015, which has a Facebook-based web page, and Ukrainische Griechisch-Katholische (Unierte) Kirche [Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church], for which no digital address is listed.

There are organisations characterised by their cultural vector. '"R.U.T.A" Kulturverein in Berlin I.G.' is an organization for cultural representation. It has a Facebook-based web page.

Deutsch-Ukrainischer Kulturverein 'Berehynja' ['Berehynia' German-Ukrainian Cultural Association] e.V.[1] is an organization that promotes Ukrainian language and culture. No digital address is listed.

Some organisations aim at promoting awareness of Ukraine and Ukrainian issues in Germany: 'Ukraine Verstehen' is a project of the Zentrum Liberale Moderne (Ukraine Verstehen 2018); Kiewer Gespräche' [Kyiv Conversations] is an independent platform for dialogue between Ukraine and Germany (Kyiv Dialogue 2018); and 'Qirimli (Berlin Info-Point Krim)' is a Facebook-based initiative of people from Crimea.

Charity organisations that focussed on helping Ukrainians involved in the war Ukraine's east that commenced in 2014 are Ukrainisch-Deutscher Verein für Kriegsbeschädigte, Familien und Kinder [Ukrainian-German Association for Victims of War, Their Families and Children] e.V., a charity organization that provides help for victims of the Ukrainian-Russian military conflict, families and children (Ukrainisch-Deutscher Verein 2018); and Ukraine-Hilfe Berlin [Ukraine Help Berlin] e.V., founded by Ukrainians in Berlin to help Ukrainians in Ukraine, an organisation that provides medical support for the victims of the war (Ukraine-Hilfe Berlin 2018).

Two organisations promote communication between Ukrainian professionals and scientists in Germany: Deutsch-Ukrainische Akademische Gesellschaft [Ukrainian International Academic Network] e.V., a group of scientists and academics who promote cooperation in higher education, research and science (The Ukrainian International Network, 2018); and the Ukrainian-German Professional Network, which has a Facebook-based web page.

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[1] Eingetragener Verein (German): registered association.

There is also ‘TremBEATs.fm,’ the first Ukrainian radio station in Germany. Its first broadcast took place on 25 July 2018. It has a Facebook-based web page.

Some Ukrainian initiatives in Berlin are not covered by the ‘Ukraine in Deutschland’ website, for example, the Facebook-based initiative ‘Bookcrossing Ukraine Berlin,’ a group for the exchange of Ukrainian works of literature. New grassroots initiatives without formal structures regularly emerge and disappear in Berlin; this process is quite dynamic. An example is the ‘Ukraine Kompetenz Forum’ that Jockenhövel-Schiecke mentions as a ‘former’ centre located in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin (2017,74). According to the Ukrainian-language blog ‘Hata Skraju,’ Ukraine Kompetenz Forum was a working group for the protection of rights of Ukrainian migrants in Germany (Hata Skraju 2018).

Kozachenko, citing Michel Laguerre, refers to immigrant entities that have their main representation in the social media as a ‘digital diaspora’ (92); Nedashkivska supports the view that such technologies merely provide virtual spaces for communication. But it is also the case, as will become evident in analysis of interviews, that such virtual spaces can temporarily or permanently replace physical spaces such as neighbourhoods or churches, the most common venues for establishing diaspora relationships before the rise of social media.

2.2.4. Background of the homogeneous Ukrainian diaspora organisations in Melbourne

The history of Ukrainian organizational life in Melbourne begins with the arrival in the city of Ukrainians from Displaced Persons (DP) camps after World War II (Lysenko 1993, 31; Subtelny 1994, 566). This wave of Ukrainian migration to Australia coincided with analogous movements of Ukrainians from the DP camps to the US and Canada (Subtelny 1994, 538; Lemekh 2007, 13; Kondrashov 2008; Antony-Newman 2014, 17). The preceding major waves of Ukrainian migration to the Americas in the late nineteenth century and after World War I had no Australian counterpart. (Similarly, Ukrainian migration to Berlin does not fit the traditional view of the division of Ukrainian migration into waves: in Berlin the wave of Displaced Persons is poorly represented, not to say altogether absent.)

Evidence of the presence of Ukrainians in Australia before the post-World War II era is limited (Pavlyshyn 2007). It includes information about isolated individuals who lived in different parts of Australia; the earliest report of a Ukrainian near Melbourne is of a 16-year old male in Geelong who settled there in 1854 (Markus 1995, 18). The only mention of any organisational life of Ukrainians in Australia at the beginning of 20th century relates to a conflict within the community of emigrants from the Russian Empire in Brisbane. The leadership of this community refused to purchase subscriptions to Ukrainian newspapers from Europe and America. As a result, Ukrainians established their own small organisation (Markus 1995, 19). This is probably the earliest evidence of the importance of language as a marker for the Ukrainian community in Australia, a phenomenon which will be discussed later in this chapter in the contemporary context.

Organised Ukrainian community activity in Victoria and in particular in Melbourne begins in 1949 with the foundation of the Association of Ukrainians in Victoria (AUV), a body with the task of meeting the secular needs of all immigrants who identified as Ukrainians in that state (Lysenko 1993, 31). Nowadays on Facebook and other social media diaspora activists refer to these events and analogous ones throughout the country as the 'Settlement of Ukrainians in Australia.' The term circulated widely in social and other media in 2018, when the community was preparing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of this settlement. The post-World War II wave of Ukrainian immigrants in Australia (Pavlyshyn 2007, 812), and in Victoria in particular (Lysenko 1993), developed a rich socio-cultural life. This was reflected in the creation of numerous organisations of different kinds: church parishes; generalist community organisations with social and cultural activities concentrated in community halls or 'houses'); Saturday schools; cultural and artistic associations, choirs, dance groups, theatre and musical troupes and literary clubs; political organisations; sports teams; professional associations; organisations of women; scouting and other youth organisations; and associations for scholars and war veterans (Pavlyshyn 2007, 812; Shevchenko Scientific Society in Australia 1966; Lysenko 1993; Markus et al. 1995; Pavlyshyn et al. 1998).

There is a lack of academic studies on the topic, but more journalistic sources, mainly authored by members of the organisations they describe, present the Australian Ukrainian community as homogeneous in its views, values and aspirations. These values include commitment to the idea of an independent Ukraine, readiness to preserve the Ukrainian language and identity, and dedication to working in Ukrainian diaspora organisations (Pavlyshyn 2007, 812). It is possible that Ukrainians who held other views were not numerous enough to constitute the basis for a community with different values or structures. However that may be, it is impossible to track the evolution of mutual help – i.e., of the benefits of social capital – for people of Ukrainian origin in Melbourne outside the framework of these organisations.

According to the definition of the 'old' and the 'new' diaspora provided above, post-World War II Ukrainian migrants to Australia and their descendants are an 'old' diaspora. The majority of the organisations founded in Australia by post-World War II Ukrainian immigrants, such as the scouting organisation 'Plast' or the Ukrainian Women's Association of Australia, are or have been members of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO), which in turn is a member of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) (Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations 2018; Ukrainian World Congress 2018). Affiliation to the UWC, according to Kozachenko (2018), is a marker that distinguishes the 'old' diaspora from the new waves. This notion, whose applicability to the Ukrainian community in Berlin I have already questioned, is equally inapplicable in Melbourne. Cultural and value differences suggest that the line between the 'old' and 'new' diasporas is best drawn between the post-World War II migrants and their descendants on the one hand, and migrants who arrived after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, on the other.

At the time when the new wave of Ukrainian immigrants began to arrive – the beginning of 1990s – many of the institutions founded by post-World War II immigrants still functioned, though some of them had dwindled or ceased to exist (Lysenko 1998, 271-273). Some newcomers joined the organisations of the 'old' diaspora (Lysenko 1998, 273). In 1996, due to the efforts of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO), some 600 Ukrainians came to Victoria. The majority of them were ethnic Ukrainians from former Yugoslavia (Lysenko 1998, 274), many of whom involved themselves in the activities of organisations that were members of the AFUO.

According to Oleinikova (2015, 92), Ukrainian migration to Australia on humanitarian grounds remained significant from the late 1990s until the late 2000s. Oleinikova also conjectured that in the 1990s Ukrainian students were unlikely to come to Australia and remain as immigrants due to poverty in Ukraine in that decade. According to the statistical data provided by Oleinikova, in 2004 skilled migrants from Ukraine who received permanent residency in Australia outnumbered refugees and migrants who arrived on family reunion visas. This stream of skilled migrants consisted of about 100-150 people yearly till 2012. According to Oleinikova, of the Ukrainian migrants who came to New South Wales in 1991-2013, those who settled in suburbs with pre-existing concentrations of Ukrainians were mostly those who migrated to Australia between 1991 to 2004. They had strong Ukrainian identification and expressed connection to established 'old' diaspora organisations. By contrast, those who arrived in Australia between 2004 and 2013 were characterized by cosmopolitan values, felt less attachment to the Ukrainian community and were more successful in their professional development and the adaptation in Australia (Oleinikova 2015, 308-310).

2.2.5. Ukrainian migration in the post-Euromaidan era

The migration of Ukrainians in response to the labour programs of receiving countries has been widely studied. My study focuses on this phenomenon in a specific period that begins with a particular set of events: the protests in Ukraine in November 2013-February 2014 known as the Euromaidan, and the subsequent military conflict in the country's East.

Precise data on the number of Ukrainians departing from Ukraine, their destinations, and the purpose of their leaving are not availiable. Using a forecasting model, a number of research projects estimated that Ukrainian migration flow would continue to increase in future decades. These studies were mainly based on the data span of 2008-2012, just before the Euromaidan (Ducháč, Strielkowski, Matušková 2015; Čajka, Jaroszewicz, Strielkowski 2014). Although Ukrainian migration had indeed been increasing since 1991, in 2008 statistical data showed an unexpected stabilisation and even a decrease in the rate of emigration (Čajka et al. 2014, 13). Fonseca, Pereira and Esteves (2014) conjecture that this may have been triggered by the fact that South European countries, which had been an important destination for Ukrainian migrants for decades, were negatively affected by the Global Financial Crisis, limiting employment opportunities in that part of the EU.

In 2014, after the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and the outbreak of military conflict, Couton (2014) correctly forecast a new exodus from Ukraine (Jaroszewicz 2015). Most of the literature on current Ukrainian migration focuses on debates around the causes of the current wave of emigration and what characterises it. Leontiyeva (2014) conjectured that the humanitarian crisis and the internal displacement of Ukrainians resulting from the conflict in the country's East would have a negative impact on the Ukrainian economy, thus driving more people to wish to emigrate. The Ukrainian economy was, indeed, weak in the post-Euromaidan years (Jaroszewicz 2015).

Düvell and Lapshyna (2015, n.p.) have divided Ukrainian post-Euromaidan migration into three categories: '(1) forced migration of international refugees and internally displaced persons by the war in Donets'k and Luhans'k provinces and due to the Russian annexation of Crimea; (2) migration to avoid military conscription [also noted by Jaroszewicz (2015, 3)]; and (3) varied international migration flows of individuals seeking employment or education, including those with some mixed political and economic motivations.' Kupets (2017) specifies that those who migrate from Ukraine for work purposes aim to improve the living standards of their families; for them, the major factor is low wages in Ukraine.

One of the first studies of Ukrainian migration after the start of the Euromaidan was that of Jaroszewicz (2015). Based on Polish statistics, Jaroszewicz indicates that in 2015 Poland issued 52,000 resident permits to Ukrainian citizens and 400,000 declarations enabling individuals to take up temporary employment in Poland. Jaroszewicz pointed out that there was a noticeable flow of Ukrainian migrants into other countries of the EU, Germany in particular, but indicated that it remained unclear whether Ukrainian migrants' interest in Poland was equal to their interest in other member states of the EU. Jaroszewicz also refrained from predicting whether this migration wave was a temporary reaction to the economic, political and military crisis or whether it might become permanent.

Jaroszewicz (2015) observed that many eastern Ukrainians escaping from the military conflict had sought asylum in the EU, but she speculated that they would eventually abandon this method of getting to the EU. In her opinion, this would be the consequence of the relatively low rate of recognition of such asylum applications from Ukrainians. Instead, people who had initially sought asylum would later try to find other ways of moving to the EU, for example as labour migrants. Jaroszewicz's study thus raised questions about future patterns of labour emigration from Ukraine, answers to which require additional research.

A year later, Jaroszewicz (2016) observed that after the outbreak of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine migrants making the decision to migrate in a rush exposed themselves to risk: Jaroszewicz (2016) argued that after the outbreak of the military conflict in the eastern Ukraine sudden decisions by a large number of people to migrate might cause problems, given the unpreparedness of host countries to accommodate an increasing flow of immigrants. Jaroszewicz stated that there is a need to analyse further the scope of the phenomenon in order to make recommendations about procedures that might reduce the risks associated with such increased labour immigration. Such remedies, she suggested, might include strengthening transnational relationships between intending immigrants and pioneer migrants through diaspora networks, as well as institutions and organisations which are interested in providing help to migrants.

Jaroszewicz (2015, 2) reported that the main trend among Ukrainian migrants before the Euromaidan protests and the outbreak of war in the east of Ukraine was to obtain legal status for themselves in another country; thus, it is likely that they headed for countries where it was easier to obtain legal status. Another strategy observed among Ukrainians who migrated between 1991 and 2013 was to come legally, but overstay their visa (Harney 2012, 8). However, in her 2016 (p. 25) study Jaroszewicz conjectured that post-Euromaidan migrants might prefer to migrate to countries with better earning opportunities. Düvell and Lapshyna (2015, n.p.), likewise, pointed out that post-Euromaidan circumstances have given impetus to changes in Ukrainian migration patterns, including changes in the choice of destination country. Investigating Ukrainian post-Euromaidan migration to Germany and Australia offers opportunities to understand aspects of such changes.

2.2.6. Reviewing the role of social networks in the context of Ukrainian migration

Ukrainian diaspora social networks have long attracted the attention of social scientists (Çağlar and Gereöffy 2008; Heyse 2009; Kubal and Dekker 2014; Couton 2014). There is a lively debate in the scholarly literature on Ukrainian migration about social networks within diaspora communities and whether they achieve the aim of aiding members of the community, or not. The role of already settled migrants is crucial for managing the settlement of newcomers. Kubal and Dekker (2014, 277) consider that the settled migrants, ‘pioneers,’ can be either ‘bridgeheads’ (facilitating the arrival of new migrants and assisting the newcomers’ integration into the host country) or ‘gatekeepers’ (endeavouring to discourage migrants from following in their footsteps in international migration and keeping newcomers at an arm’s length).

Social networks between newcomers and pioneer communities of co-nationals in receiving countries were long considered to be beneficial for social adaptation and labour market integration (Couton 2014). One of the studies of the migration of the so-called economic wave of Ukrainians to Hungary in the 1990s and 2000s demonstrates that social networks based on kinship and acquaintanceship significantly simplified obtaining legal status in Hungary, as well as facilitating social adaptation and labour market integration (Çağlar and Gereöffy 2008). Kinship as a factor of labour market integration was also observed in the Ukrainian community in Naples (Harney 2012). Yet participation in migrant social networks can also be a consequence of limited opportunities in the labour market. As Vianello (2014) argues, the willingness of Ukrainian migrants to participate in migrant community activities tends to be a compensation for the intellectual degradation that accompanies the downgrading of their careers. Such volunteering often brings them the satisfaction that is missing from their working lives.

Toruńczyk-Ruiz (2014, 43) indicates that social ties between co-nationals are more important for recent migrants and temporary migrants than for those who aim to stay in a country for a long time: circular migrants – those who regularly return to Ukraine after periods (usually a few months) of working in Poland – prefer to organise their social networks around the maximisation of employment opportunities, confirming that newcomer migrants are likely to be concerned about economic integration in the first place. According to Toruńczyk-Ruiz (2004, 56), migrants with aspirations to stay more permanently in the host country prefer to build ties with citizens of this country. This thesis, on the other hand, inquires whether ties to other Ukrainians are important for intending long-stay migrants. Oleinikova (2015, 165) observed that in Australia in the 1990s and 2000s some Ukrainians settled in neighbourhoods with existing concentrations of Ukrainians in order to maximise their economic opportunities – mostly by finding low-skilled jobs. Oleinikova (2015) also examined the role of agency and structure as variables in the process of improving migrants' economic life in a recipient country. Her conclusion was that agency by itself is not sufficient for such improvement; structure plays a key role. In this project I elaborate on agency when I consider how individuals take benefits from social networks, and on structure as the limitations created by immigration law and labour market culture in Germany and Australia.

Social networks are often formed through word of mouth (Harney 2012). Harney argues that rumour can play a significant role in labour market integration by transmitting required knowledge when there are no alternatives (Harney 2012, 9). According to Harney, Rumours served Ukrainians in Naples before official institutions had been established. Another of Harney's findings concerns the effective advocacy of organisations of Ukrainians, especially women, in Naples: the Ukrainian community in Naples managed to consolidate itself in order to overcome Italian institutional dysfunction and clientelism. According to Harney (2012, 12), these processes 'fit well with classic migrant self-help, mutual aid associations' and interweave with social entrepreneurship, ethnic solidarity and auto-organisational activity. It is evident from Harney's research that strong migrant networks improve occupational security and protection of migrant rights (2012, 14). This thesis inquires whether similar processes occurred with respect to skilled Ukrainian migrants in Germany and Australia.

Couton (2014) adopts an approach that focuses on organisational structures in order to describe the phenomenon of diaspora support for newcomers' labour market integration. Isajiw (2010) appeals to a psychological factor, arguing that the willingness of people of Ukrainian background in Canada to help Ukrainian newcomers find employment is triggered by the sense of an obligation to help. This feeling of obligation, which arises from people's sense of their national identity, leads to a perception of the diaspora community not merely as a set of volunteering organisations, but also as something akin to an imagined state. The prerequisite for the creation of such an 'imagined community,' to invoke the term that Benedict Anderson (1991) used to convey what he took to be the defining quality of a nation, is geographic separation between the sending and the receiving country (Hosnedlová, Stanek 2014, 102). As Loewen and Friesen (2009) pointed out, 'Ukrainians leveraged their strong sense of communal identity to climb the socio-economic ladder'(quoted in Couton (2014,14); Couton argued that their sense of belonging is reflected in their readiness to found organisations and institutions. Couton's study suggests that a factor contributing to the success of the Canadian Ukrainian diaspora has been the fact that newcomers who actively participate in community activities find advice, help and support there.

Kondrashov (2008, 142-144) agrees that the participation in activities of the Ukrainian diaspora community in Canada has a positive influence on individual migrants, but adds that to improve their integration into Canadian society there is a need to improve social services. In particular, migrants in Winnipeg said that they suffered from a lack of information about training and skills-enhancing programs, and that these were not adequately provided by the Ukrainian community. Kondrashov recommended that the Ukrainian community organisations distribute such information during the events that they organise, at places in the city where Ukrainians regularly meet, and on social media. In addition, he urged Ukrainian organisations to develop ongoing cooperation with Canadian governmental organisations which provide services for migrants (Kondrashov 2008, 143).

Both Kondrashov (2008) and Oleinikova (2015) identified a need for further research to explore the perspective of dependent spouses as labour immigrants and their ability to access aid while overcoming the barriers that migration imposes on them. I have included members of this group among the people interviewed in the course of my fieldwork.

Counter to the view that membership of a diaspora community assists integration, Oleinikova has argued that strong Ukrainian identification accompanied by low recipient country language proficiency creates barriers to successful integration in Australian society. Integration is further hindered by residence in an ethnic neighbourhood which does not contribute to advancing language proficiency. In countries such the USA the existence of ethnic enclaves has engendered debate at a governmental level on whether isolated ethnic enclaves are able ‘to destroy’ the country (Pylynskyi 2009).

A significant contribution to critical appraisal of migrant social networks and institutions has been made by Fonseca, Pereira, and Esteves (2014). They found that Ukrainian migration to Portugal had been organised for many years by so-called migrant job agencies, which often also engaged in fraud and other illegal activities. Such informal approaches to coping with labour market integration are widespread among irregular migrants (Harney 2012). As I mention in Chapter Four and Five traces of these phenomena are reported by some skilled migrants and diaspora activists in Germany and Australia.

Some researchers have found that members of the ‘old’ diaspora and recent Ukrainian migrants seldom communicate and support each other, partly because of the two groups’ different perceptions of Ukrainianness (Jaroszewicz 2016, 30; Kubal and Dekker 2014; Khanenko-Friesen 2015). Contemporary German activists are familiar with this problem as well. In particular, they claim that leaders of the long-established formal organisations of Ukrainians in Germany do not consider the initiatives of their younger co-nationals to be of importance (Łada and Böttger 2016).

Ukraine as a state and its official bodies abroad can also contribute to the formation of social networks for Ukrainian migrants, although the extent to which they do so in most cases is limited. Jaroszewicz and Kaźmierkiewicz (2014), who note the importance of the support that the Ukrainian diaspora provides to newcomers, argue that the Ukrainian state also has responsibilities in this area. Jaroszewicz and Kaźmierkiewicz (2014, 13) suggest that protection of labour and social rights in destination countries can be achieved through consular and diplomatic activity, as well as through bilateral agreements. Legislative amendments in the area of labour migration that would mitigate the disadvantage experienced by migrants might include provisions to avoid double taxation and to facilitate the recognition of diplomas and the transfer of remittances.

The Ukrainian government’s ability to take an interest in Ukrainian migrants’ life was demonstrated in Naples, where a new consulate of Ukraine opened in 2008 in response to requests by members of the local Ukrainian diaspora and efficient action by local migrants’ organisations (Harney 2012). There has been little inquiry into the scope of the actions that embassies can take in order to assist Ukrainian migrants or influence the formation of Ukrainian identity abroad, whether political or cultural.

Germany is the EU leader among the preferred destinations for migrants (Ducháč et al. 2015). There are several studies of Ukrainian migration to Germany, including a study of the social engagement of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany (Łada and Böttger 2016). Volodko's qualitative interviewing of Ukrainians in Berlin in 2014 has shown that Ukrainian migrants regard Germany as a desirable destination (Volodko 2014a, Volodko 2014b, Volodko 2014c, and Volodko 2014d). A feature common to many Ukrainian migrants in Germany is a desire to obtain legal resident status there, even if this requires considerable sacrifices. Volodko found student migration to be a form of economic migration. This phenomenon Volodko saw as an outcome of the opportunity given to Ukrainian students to study in Germany for free and at any age, which led to a situation where migrants chose any course of study in order to get a permit to stay in the country (Volodko 2014b; Volodko 2014c). Volodko (2014d) also addresses the question of the legal status of the students and the attendant labour permit restrictions.

Amelina's (2009) research into the forms and conditions of the support strategies used by Ukrainian migrants in Germany shows that those who are not able to study and those whose Ukrainian diploma is not recognised by Germany tend to take up illegal jobs. Labour market integration takes place with the help of their diasporic comrades and takes the form of circulating information about employment positions among migrants. Amelina's work details the help that new migrants receive from the pre-existing diaspora community and shows connections in the experience of Ukrainian migrants in Germany between social support, gender relations, and inequality formation. Amelina conducted interviews with migrants in Bielefeld, a medium-sized city in western Germany. The patterns of integration and organisation-building in the Ukrainian diaspora community in such a city may significantly differ from patterns of integration in metropoles such as Berlin or Melbourne. A case in point is the importance of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in community communication: in smaller cities, there is a greater chance that people will gather around religion. The role of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the diaspora in networking as well as giving help in finding an employment and offering legal advice has been mentioned in a number of case studies on Ukrainian diaspora activities in the EU (Jaroszewicz and Kaźmierkiewicz 2014; Łada and Böttger 2016). Sometimes the church is the only place where migrants are able to hold their gatherings and to establish social networks with other Ukrainian migrants (Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2014).

My overview of case studies of the effectiveness of social networks in Ukrainian diaspora communities helped me to understand trends in other countries than Germany and Australia, mainly with regard to the so-called economic wave of Ukrainian migration. Chapter Six mainly documents the effectiveness of these networks within the framework of Bourdieu's reflections on social capital and compares earlier trends in Ukrainian migration with post-Euromaidan circumstances.

2.2.7. The role of language, political protests, war and national identity in Ukraine

While there are many definitions of national identity, in this dissertation I take national identity to be a personal identity that includes a sense of belonging to one state or to one nation (Ashmore 2001). However, national identity is also a collective identity. According to Smith (1991), national identity as a collective phenomenon is intrinsic to a nation, and the basis of the latter is ethnicity. Smith identifies several main attributes of an ethnic community (21): a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of common culture; an association with a specific ‘homeland’; and, most importantly, a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.

The last of these attributes – a sense of solidarity – is especially important for this study. Smith (1991,15) observes that ‘solidarity between members of the ethnic community united by shared memories, myths and traditions […] may or may not find expression in states of their own but [is] entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the state’. According to Gold (2004), the strength of migrants’ ethnic identity is reflected in the extent to which it is signalled: as an external reflection of their identity, migrants need to acknowledge themselves as members of migrant networks and, on their own initiative, to be active in community activities.

In reference to the Euromaidan, it is worth mentioning that Vertovec (2005, 3) draws attention to the attachment that members of diasporas feel to their birth country and highlights the intensification of such feelings after such events at home as conflicts and changes of government. Moreover, Brubaker (2002, 171) emphasises the influence of dramatic events in crystallising a potential group, making it more visible, self-aware and determined.

Many scholars look at social processes within immigrant communities through the lens of ‘ethnic identity.’ In this dissertation, however, I endeavour to separate Ukrainian ‘ethnic identity’ from Ukrainian national identity and, as consequence, from the idea of the Ukrainian national solidarity. In doing so I concur with Miller (2000) and others who deny that members of a national community must share a common language or race. Miller observes that they can, but this is not a prerequisite of belonging to a national community. The Ukrainian immigrant community encompasses people of various ethnic backgrounds and cultures; hence I shall refer to it as a national community, not an ethnic one, and the solidarity that exists among members of this community I shall regard as national, not ethnic.

Khanenko-Friesen, for example, discusses the ethnic identity of Ukrainians in Canada. She looks at the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora there and finds them to be directed toward the formation and maintenance of cultural identity (Khanenko-Friesen 2011; Khanenko-Friesen 2015). Ukrainian independence in 1991, political change in 2004 and the current political situation in Ukraine, however, require that this ethnic understanding be reviewed (Shulman 2004). As Arblaster (1995, 198) observes, national identities are sensitive to social and historical transformations and meanings of the term 'national identity' can easily become antiquated. Therefore, it is always reasonable to reconsider these meanings, especially after important political and historical events, and to bear in mind that the meaning of national identity can vary from place to place, depending on the history of the people involved.

Speaking of factors that shape national identities, Renan (1990, 19) suggested that common tragedies unify a people more than glories and the historic national community is 'a community of obligation' (Miller 2000, 29). Tilly (1975) develops this idea: war can mobilise sentiments pertaining to ethnicity or nationality that can become 'a centralising force in the life of the community' (Smith 1991, 27). This assertion implies that the more a nation has experienced traumatic events, the more likely it is to consolidate and act in a united way. Such experiences nurture a sense of mutual responsibility and a readiness by members of a nation to aid and support one another, engendering feelings of national solidarity. Cases in point are the Euromaidan protests and the sense of the unity of the Ukrainian nation against a common enemy that emerged during the military conflict in eastern Ukraine that started in 2014.

The significance of the Euromaidan in shaping Ukrainian national identity has been explored by a number of scholars. Kulyk (2016) argues that the perception of national identity in Ukraine changed after the Euromaidan: a civic perception of national identity has taken root, though Ukrainian identity continues to display ethno-cultural traits. Kulyk argues that most Ukrainians after the Euromaidan have a sense of consolidation with other Ukrainians, in the first instance, on the basis of their shared citizenship, not on the basis of a shared language or a shared canon of national heroes. Shulman (2004, 35) lists the following features of a civic national identity: living on the common territory of a shared nation-state, belief in common political principles embodied in that state, possession of that state's citizenship, representation by a common set of institutions and desire or consent to be a part of the corresponding nation. The last of these is the one most characteristic of an emigrant community (and I shall take it into account when examining Ukrainian migrants' sense of solidarity with, and membership of, a Ukrainian community). Shulman, however, suggests that Ukrainian national identity is based on the combination of civic and ethnic elements.

Kulyk (2016) demonstrates how civic national identity was perceived and explained after the Euromaidan by activists and non-activists in Ukraine. He proves that many ethnic Russians believe themselves to be Ukrainians despite their ethnicity because of their sense of belonging to Ukrainian civil society. Language is also not a critical factor for this kind of national identity – as Kulyk points out, there are persons who proclaim themselves to be Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalists. Carriers of this identity are united around their response to the war, their willingness to help and support the army, and their support for reforms and democratisation processes. By contrast, in 1991, as Kuzio notes, there was as yet no such united political community in Ukraine (quoted in Shekhovtsov 2013, 731), and little civic solidarity among the citizens of Ukraine, especially between the country's Ukrainian and Russian speakers. If national identity is a mobilising sentiment for civil society (Kim 2009), then this kind of mobilisation has happened in the Ukrainian case since the outbreak of military conflict in the eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is plausible – and I examine this for the cases of Berlin and Melbourne – that the events that caused such a transformation in collective Ukrainian national identity have also affected the personal identity of emigrants. A good example of the reconstruction of national identity among members of a Ukrainian diaspora community in response to a significant political event is documented by Kubal and Dekker (2014, 283). According to them, in the few years after 1991, relationships between members of Ukrainian diaspora communities and their relatives in Ukraine intensified. Under the influence of the euphoria ignited by Ukraine's newly acquired independence, Ukrainian migrants in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands of the post-World War II wave started to reconnect with their families in Ukraine. Many such reunions fuelled a new wave of migration, where the main reasons to migrate were economic. Settled migrants were disappointed by what they perceived as the selfish motives of contemporary Ukrainian citizens, who, in their opinion, did not possess a sense of national identity. As a result, the euphoria disappeared and the settled migrants stopped massively issuing visa invitations for Ukrainian citizens and helping them to find employment in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

2.3. Conclusions

In Chapter Two I have reviewed, first, the existing research that suggested the thematic foci for my own inquiry; second, the theoretical reflections that provide tools for my analysis of data gathered through interview; and third, historical accounts of Ukrainian migration, especially to Germany and Australia, which provide background for an understanding of the specificity of the recent Ukrainian migrant experience in the two countries.

Thus, Part I of this chapter listed and discussed what the research literature on migration generally and on Ukrainian migration in particular has found to be important factors structuring skilled migrants' experiences in the course of their migration and economic integration. These factors include immigration law (conditions of entry and stay) and the precariousness that it generates; socio-economic circumstances that influence the purchasing power of immigrants; labour market demand for particular skills, such as IT, in global cities; language proficiency; welfare access for skilled immigrants; and gender and family issues. By elaborating on these factors in my research I aim at placing the experiences of Ukrainian skilled migrants into an international context, highlighting how Ukrainian migration reflects global trends, while keeping in mind particular phenomena that are specific to Ukrainians.

As much of the literature reviewed here shows, the factors listed above have the potential to place migrants in positions of insecurity and to generate feelings of inadequate control over their future. The term 'precariousness' was introduced in this chapter to articulate this situation of uncertainty. The concept of precariousness originated in the literature on labour relations but has also begun to be used in migration studies. It is used predominantly to describe the insecure positions of refugees and temporary workers, unqualified labourers or manual labourers who are at risk of rights violations. However, the concept of precariousness has rarely been used to describe unstable and insecure positions of migrants who cannot get employment or become independent economic actors – independent, for example, of their spouses or of a primary visa applicant. This thesis follows Goldring et al. (2009) in applying the concept of precariousness, originally used in labour studies, to the study of migration, and employs it to contribute to practical understanding on precarious migrant status and its relationship to the exercise of economic, social and family rights. I argue that precariousness may exist in varying degrees and depend on various parameters, including visa status, gender and level of language proficiency. Not everyone experiences precariousness in the same way; the nature and extent of people's precariousness depends on their particular social location.

On the basis of the concept of 'ethnic penalty' I have proposed a new term, 'migrant penalty,' to describe the disadvantage experienced by individuals as a consequence of their being migrants – for example, at the workplace and in the form of restricted occupational outcomes. I see migrant penalty as deriving, among other sources, from provisions of immigration law, notably visa conditions. Migrant penalty is also, as suggested by Hasmath (2002) in regard to ethnic penalty, a consequence of the fact that migrants often lack the social trust that is more readily available to non-migrants in employment situations.

Part II of this chapter introduced conceptual models appropriate to the analysis of the interaction of migrants with other members of their communities: Bourdieu's notion of social capital and, in the case of groups of recent Ukrainian migrants, civic national identity. At the point in the chapter where the conceptual framework of social capital theory was introduced, Part I had already presented, through the findings of previous studies, the kinds of difficulty that migrants encounter. In the course of this exposition it had already been signalled, especially in the discussion of gender and family, that social networks are among the means available to migrants for resolving such difficulties. The overview of academic literature on social networks in the Ukrainian diaspora showed that scholars are often concerned with the relationships that constitute social capital, although they employ various approaches when studying them. Couton, for example, focuses on organisational structures (Couton 2017), Harney reflects on social entrepreneurship, ethnic solidarity and auto-organisational activity

(Harney 2012) and Toruńczyk-Ruiz examines social networks in neighborhoods (Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2014). I suggest that all these approaches can be harmonised with the theory of social capital, and the term 'social capital' will be used throughout my analysis.

Finally, Part II of the chapter reviewed research literature relevant to significant aspects of the historical, social and cultural background against which the experience of Ukrainian post-Euromaidan migrants unfolded. First, an overview of Ukrainian organisations in Berlin and Melbourne, itself a contribution to the literature, demonstrated the extent to which social networks, an important element of social capital, had been institutionalised in the two cities. Second, it surveyed previous conjectures on the motivations of Ukrainians to migrate after the start of the revolutionary events in late 2013, revealing in the process that little was definitively known about the nature of these motivations. Third, it reviewed the literature on national identity and its specific traits in the Ukrainian context, focussing on differences between civic and ethnic national identity and the significance for Ukrainian national identity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, both in general and specifically after the start of the war in Ukraine in 2014. This discussion serves as a background for detailed analysis of language attitudes among Ukrainian migrants in Berlin and Melbourne in Chapter Six.

Chapter Three: Methodology

3.1. Qualitative interviews as the main data collection method

The qualitative approach of social inquiry employed in this study requires gathering information in order to describe a phenomenon deeply and comprehensively (Bryman 2016). The approach allows for numerous perspectives including those from law, sociology and national identity studies that this dissertation involves. The advantage of qualitative research, compared to quantitative research, lies in its ability to provide detailed understanding of the topic studied (Forbes-Mewett 2008, 103).

In order to take into account the situation in two countries, Germany and Australia, the study engaged Ukrainian skilled migrants in Berlin, who arrived after the start of the Euromaidan protests, while the Australian component focused on persons of similar profile in the Ukrainian community in Melbourne (Group One). Pre-observation suggested and the fieldwork confirmed that it would be useful also to conduct interviews with three Ukrainian community activists who were engaged in problem-solving activities in each country (Group Two). Accordingly, the research project involved 14 interviews in Berlin and 10 interviews in Melbourne for recent Ukrainian migrants (Group One) and 3 interviews in each of two the target destinations for Ukrainian community activists (Group Two). The age of migrants from Group One was between 22 and 41 years (the majority were about 26-32 years old) at the time of migration, which defines them as relatively young professionals.

Participants from Group One were asked to answer open-ended questions on the following topics: reasons for migration, integration into the labour market, exercising rights related to immigrant status, and relationship with the Ukrainian immigrant community. Such a division of interview questions by topics was used by Oleinikova (2015, 68). Participants from Group Two were asked to answer questions on their practices when advising newcomer immigrants, about the types and complexity of requests from such clients, and on the reasons why they had decided to be engaged in advising newcomer compatriots. Appendices One and Two list the interview questions.

Based on the literature review and with the intention of exploring the legal statuses of Ukrainian labour immigrants, the following groups of immigrants were approached (for Group 1): in Berlin, those who migrated under the conditions of the EU Blue Card pursuant to Section 19a of the German Residence Act (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2004) and their spouses, as well as qualified workers who received temporary residence permits pursuant to Section 18 of the German Residence Act and their spouses (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2004) after having first received the Temporary Work visa. In Australia, migrants who arrived under visa subclasses comparable to categories created by German immigration programs were chosen, keeping in mind the distinctive attributes of each group. I interviewed immigrants who migrated under the following Australian visa programs: Student visa (subclass 500); Temporary Graduate visa (subclass 485); Temporary Work (Skilled) visa (subclass 457);[2] the Employer Nomination Scheme visa (subclass 186); the Skilled independent visa (subclass 189); and the Skilled Nominated visa (subclass 190) (Migration Regulations 1994). In choosing subjects who came to Germany and Australia under with the abovementioned visas I aimed to identify which of the many channels of global migration are available to Ukrainians who wish to migrate with the purpose of employment: as students and/or researchers, on temporary or permanent residence permits, as business people or self-employed persons, or as skilled or unskilled migrants.

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[2] This subclass was abolished and replaced by the Temporary Skill Shortage [TSS] visa by the Australian government in 2017.

Similar to what Selvaraj (2014) suggests, I accessed the interviewees on the basis of prior observations. Participants were recruited by monitoring and attending diaspora events and institutions, reviewing open-access profile information in social media, and asking existing contacts to pass on information to potential participants (which is known as the snowballing technique [Bryman 2016, 415]). During interviews research participants were asked a series of predetermined questions on their experiences in relation to migration and integration (for Group One), or their public and professional activity (for Group Two). Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009, 57) believe that an interview must not be just a conversation, but a purposive discussion. A qualitative interview has to permit interviewees to tell their own narratives, adhering to a model of conversation where the participant talks and the interviewer listens. However, this does not mean that qualitative interviewing does not require interaction. On the contrary, the inquirer plays the role of a facilitator. It is his or her responsibility to pre-plan encouraging questions, and the most important among them is the first one: it must make clear to the participant what the researcher is looking for. Part of the conversation may be propelled by follow-up questions that arise naturally during a discussion (Morehouse 2012, 71). In other words, the 'in-depth' interview is both open-ended and semi-structured. Accordingly, I allowed the discussion to unfold and occasionally deviated from the questions when the necessity arose.

In the text of this dissertation, immigrants from Berlin are identified with a capital 'B.', and immigrants from Melbourne with a capital 'M.' The numbers following these letters indicated the number of the group (One or Two) and the order according to which the research participant was interviewed. This order assisted the researcher while coding and analysing data. In some cases, when dealing with especially sensitive topics, I thought that even this anonymising system was not sufficient to protect the interviewee's identity. Therefore, in some instances, instead of the identifier 'Immigrant X.X.X.,' I used the words 'research participant' instead.

While reviewing the literature on the history of Ukrainian migration, I observed a lack of information on the current status of organisations in Ukrainian diaspora in the two cities under consideration, Berlin and Melbourne. To supplement the lacking data, I consulted social media content as well as web pages containing information about Ukrainian grassroots initiatives. Such an approach was inspired by Kozachenko (2018), who had already done similar examinations in respect of other Ukrainian diaspora communities including, very briefly, the Berlin community. The data were gathered by entering the keyword 'Ukrainian' in the Ukrainian, English, German and Russian languages into the Facebook and Google search bars and checking whether this led to any web pages of diaspora organisations. Some of these web pages were mentioned during my interviews with diaspora activists and migrants.

3.2. The role of interpretative research design and the positionality of the researcher

As a research strategy, interpretivism aims to appreciate the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman 2016, 26). The term 'interpretivism' is inherited from Weber and his famous notion of Verstehen. Weber's sociology is 'a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects' (Weber 1964, 88; Blaikie 1995, 37; Bryman 2016, 26). Bryman also indicates that interpretivism encompasses the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition and symbolic interactionism. 'Phenomenology is defined as an effort to understand experience as lived […]. As an approach to research, phenomenological inquiry examines conscious experiences of individuals as well as their direct experiences of the world and their interaction in the world […]. The hermeneutic perspective locates the inquirer in the same world as the phenomenon under scrutiny' (Morehouse 2012, 1). The aim of interpretivist is to find the meanings and motives behind human beings' behaviour and their interactions with others in society and culture (Chowdhury 2014, 433). In the context of the hermeneutic debate, empathy is seen as a method 'to allow the first-personal re-experience of the other's original thoughts and intentions' (Kögler and Stueber 2000, 22).

For such empathetic transposition, it is useful if the problem under discussion has a place in the researcher's own background. Indeed, as Creswell (2007, 51) points out, interpretations cannot be separated from the researcher's story, prior experience and understandings. Interpretivism, then, completely fits the circumstances of impetus for this project as explained in Chapter One. In particular, before undertaking this PhD project I, the researcher who conducted this project, lived in Berlin and worked in a company that recruited professionals from Ukraine as an administrator with some of the responsibilities of a human resources officer. The contacts that I established with the Ukrainian diaspora community and the processes that I observed became the impetus for my research project. After arriving in Melbourne I developed a relationship with some Ukrainian diaspora community organisations that helped me to observe the corresponding situation to what I had witnessed in Berlin. Being Ukrainian, speaking Ukrainian and understanding Russian, the native languages of the interviewees, helped me to develop a trusting relationship with them and to conduct more open and detailed discussions. The access I had to this community as a member of it allowed me to recruit participants who were active in diaspora affairs as well as individuals who were less visible in any Ukrainian-related activity. This helped me to represent the voices of immigrants and especially newcomers better than outsiders might have done, and also to fill what was defined by Castles et al. as a methodological gap (2002, 81).

As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, 25) suggest, an impetus for research need not come only from academic literature. Research ideas are likely to arise from personal background and from daily human observations made, for instance (as in my case), in a prior occupation, activity, or migratory integration experience. Later, researchers may to return to the place where they previously worked, lived or studied in order to conduct formal fixation of the phenomenon that interests them. The interpretative approach of qualitative inquiry allows research to begin – without a clear awareness that it is already in progress – when discussing one's own problems with peers, colleagues or legal actors.

I agree with Fiona Cuthill (2015, 68) that 'the "positionality" of the researcher is a key question to consider in the design, execution and presentation of the research.' Interpretation of the responses of interviewees might indeed be influenced by the researcher's own background, and a person without a Ukrainian background might interpret some of the material presented in this thesis differently. In the past, some scholars argued that such a researcher's positionality could influence the 'objectivity' of the inquiry. However, nowadays such positionality is regarded as legitimate and is referred to as 'insider positionality.' As Cutchill (2015, 68) noted, 'the "space between" the researcher and the research participants is always inescapably shaped by gender, culture, identity and history.'

According to Adamson (2014, 6), shared cultural identity with interviewees enables adaptations and alignments to them. It helps to conduct interviews in a trusting environment where participants feel comfortable and relaxed. For example, all their accents, slangs and terminology would be easily understood by the researcher. Not going back for explanations helps to maintain a good flow in interviews. Some of my interviewees remarked on similarities in our personal migrant experiences. Given our common background, the research participants did not always need to explain in detail the processes, concepts or phenomena that they referred to: they would merely say, 'You know what I mean.' For example, one of the interviewees said to me: 'there is in Ukraine a particular term, *druzhyna prohramista* [the wife of an IT professional] – you know what I mean.' Adamson (2014, 7) observed a similar expectation of an unspoken understanding on the part of her interviewees.

Interpretative research tends to use an abductive reasoning (Bryman 2012, 401; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 27). According to Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, abductive reasoning depicts a research design as a puzzle. It anticipates the possibility of surprise (2012, 33) and is a source of tension during the planning of interviews, since it is not obvious at the planning stage what to expect and what to look for. Bryman (2012, 32) explains the idea of interpretivism by reference to practice: while statistical data might suggest particular findings, qualitative research could unfold another reality that is perceived by participants in a situation. Such an alternative understanding could allow the researcher to discover, for example, previously unknown impacts of particular social phenomena or government policies. Bryman (2012, 31) explains that the researcher is in charge of providing 'double interpretation': interpreting what the informant has already subjectively interpreted; such interpretation further is compared to concepts, theories and contexts existing in the literature (Bryman 2012, 31).

The aim of an analysis such as the one proposed is to categorise, theorise and explain the material collected (Spencer and Ritchie 1994, 176). For this purpose, the thematic analysis approach has been applied (Bryman 2012, 578). Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and then translated from Ukrainian and Russian into English. The data from interviews were thematically coded partly with help of the computer program Nvivo (as recommended by Bryman 2016, 479) and partly manually, without using any specific software. The key stage of the analysis was the identification of the main themes of migrants' narratives while reading the transcripts for the first time. These themes then drove the process of reviewing the secondary literature, and many of them were subsequently reflected in the titles of chapters and sections of this thesis.

Social media and web content was analysed to find of the names of Ukrainian diaspora organisations not mentioned in the academic literature. In a few cases qualitative content analysis of documents that were found on these websites or received from diaspora community members was undertaken. Although some scholars may critique this approach as one that would demonstrate the intentions cemented in the protocols of organisations, rather than the real state of affairs, examination of such documents contributes to the researcher's ability to study the underlying reality (Bryman 2012, 555). Such techniques additional to the main method of data collection have been used to reinforce the study by filling information gaps and thus making the researcher's understanding of migrants' narratives more comprehensive. The use of such an approach was not planned at the beginning of the study, but was 'picked up' in the course of the research.

3.3. Comparative case study

Szulecka (2017) emphasises the importance of exploring migrants' perspective for further research on immigration policies. Interviewing Ukrainian migrants for this project did not have as its primary aim the study or evaluation of immigration policies *per se*, as much has already been already written about the respective immigration programs of Australia and Germany (e.g., OECD 2007; Ruhs 2013; Facchini and Lodigiani 2014). Rather, the objective of these interviews was to provide understanding of how particular visa programs shape the profile of immigrants from a low-income country, in this case Ukraine. I also used the interviews to examine how the immigration policies of Germany and Australia function in practice in assisting the socio-economic integration of migrants and guaranteeing their rights. In this sense my study was 'a collective case study' which, as Forbes-Mewett (2008, 101) puts it, is 'one that encompasses a number of cases for the purpose of identifying common characteristics that can contribute to more widely applicable theory.'

The analysis of migrant rights in this dissertation is based on the scrutiny of some of the EU, German and Australian immigration regulations. The use of a cross-country comparative approach is rare in studies on Ukrainian migration. The majority of such studies were considered in the literature review in Chapter Two. Yet observations and interviews carried out in the Ukrainian diaspora communities of at least two different countries can yield recommendations on transnational cooperation among different parts of the Ukrainian diaspora, on other improvements in the practices of diaspora, as well as on migration policies. Such recommendations are made in the concluding chapter, Chapter Seven. A similar 'one group in two contexts' approach had been used for the purpose of examining patterns of cooperation between politically-oriented diaspora organisations in different countries in research on Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands by Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 262).

Germany began to designate itself officially as 'an immigration country' only after the passage of a new citizenship law in 1999 and migration law in 2004 (Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder 2006, 1). In the following years these laws came into force, simplifying the way in which Ukrainian migrants could receive a German work permit. On 1 August 2012 the law that introduced the EU Blue Card provided a new residence permit for skilled workers (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2004). This law extended the scope of legal ways to obtain a work permit in Germany. A temporary standard visa also exists, but it requires more effort on the employer's part. By contrast, Australia has always been a migration country. It has a rich history of successful immigration laws and its immigration policy is much more developed and complicated than Germany's. It employs strategies similar to those which underlie the EU Blue Card to attract skilled workers in shortage occupations like engineers and managers. Cross-country comparison provides more understandings on the strengths and weaknesses of both countries' immigration policies in a descriptive manner. Thus, this work may provide a base for further study leading to policy recommendations.

Comparison of conceptions of national identity and social capital in the Ukrainian communities in Germany and Australia make possible some generalisations about the impact of the Euromaidan events on migration, as well as illuminating general trends which are important both to Ukraine as a sending country and for destination countries and their diaspora communities.

Facchini and Lodigiani (2014) suggest that the drivers of immigration policies in Germany and Australia are slightly different. Germany takes an employer-driven approach according to which a prospective migrant has to be offered a job by the receiving country's employer and must meet skill requirements usually prescribed by the same employer. In Australia an immigrant-driven approach prevails. This implies that an employment offer is not the main focus of immigration policy, and the government defines the set of characteristics that a successful migrant applicant must possess. Nevertheless, Germany and Australia, as advanced economies which are both members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) share similarities that allow their immigration policies to be easily compared. There are a number of similarities between the visa conditions and the procedures for receiving a visa in the two countries. The sets of rights granted under the visa programs of Germany and Australia are similar, and the two countries impose similar restrictions on these rights depending on visa status. For example, in both countries these restrictions include that, for some visa types, the requirement that the visa applicant must have an employment offer; the labour market test (the requirement that a job must be advertised in the local market in the first place); and the provision that migrants relinquish the right to freely to choose and change their employer during the first two years of employment (Ruhs 2013).

The practical reasons why Berlin and Melbourne were chosen was partly the circumstances that surrounded me as a researcher and which I explained in the previous section of this chapter. However, these circumstances were exceptionally convenient for conducting research within the framework of globalisation and migration flows to some of the world's large urban territories. Although there is a debate about which cities can fit the definition of 'global' cities, there is enough evidence that Berlin and Melbourne can be so called (Krätke 2001; Tuli and Hu 2018). At the time of commencing this research project, Ukrainian migration to these two cities had been insufficiently studied. Other large urban territories and their surroundings had been sporadically studied over many decades: Toronto, New York, London, Amsterdam, Naples and others (Satzewich, Isajiw, and Duvalko, 2006; Lemekh 2007; Harney 2012; Kubal and Dekker 2014). The value of this project is in bringing together two communities in two locations that remain to be placed in very similar professional, temporal and social contexts.

Chapter Four: Integration Barriers for Skilled Ukrainian Migrants in Berlin

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses responses from interviewees in Berlin and documents the range and meanings of integration barriers that the migration process imposes on recent Ukrainian immigrants. More specifically, it demonstrates the precariousness of the migrants' statuses that Ukrainians receive upon entry. The responses of interviewees are categorised according to the main themes identified in Part I of Chapter Two. However, all of these topics are tightly intertwined. For example, the section on language proficiency discusses some experiences in which gender issues played a role; likewise, the consideration of women's disadvantage involves reflection upon occupational distribution in global cities.

4.2. Entry and residence conditions for Ukrainians in Germany and the precariousness of their legal statuses

4.2.1. Conditions of entry for the primary applicant

To enter Germany for work and settlement purposes, the Ukrainian migrants interviewed for this research project were required to follow set procedures and apply for a visa to the German Embassy. Visa requirements became the first barrier that migrants encountered on the way to securing their status in Germany. Regardless of the visa type, migrants were required to lodge several documents that confirmed their purpose for entering the country, including identity documents, documents that certified their education or work experience, and language certificates, among others (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2013). Immigrant B.1.4.

commented on his experience as follows:

> When applying for a visa I submitted my resume; I think they verified my identity and checked that my experience set out in the resume was real [...] and I could work there as a software developer. It was also necessary to submit a printout from a website listing various diplomas. My diploma was already recognised (Immigrant B.1.4.)

According to the EU Blue Card Directive (Council of the European Union 2009) third-country nationals –non-citizens of EU member states, including Ukrainians – were entitled to fast-track visa application processing within 90 days. To be eligible for the Blue Card, potential migrants had to possess a tertiary degree. As was discussed in Chapter Two, in this thesis this group of workers is referred to as skilled migrants.

IT professionals have an advantage over other professionals applying for Blue Card in Germany. This explains why, among the interviewees in Berlin, all primary visa applicants were connected to the IT-industry. The reasons behind such a policy are explained in Section 4.4.

Seifert's (1996, 419) longitudinal study of migrants in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in West Germany, including those from East European states, suggested that the legal statuses of migrants, i.e. their visa statuses, had a major impact on their integration into the labour market. The present study suggests that this is the case for Ukrainian skilled workers in Berlin. In particular, the availability of formal qualifications was crucial in determining the initial legal status of skilled migrants in Germany. Formal qualifications defined the extent to which a migrant's status and position in the labour market were precarious. The German Residence Act (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2004) defined two main types of visas that migrant workers could be granted for the purpose of employment in Germany: The Temporary Work (TW) visa (Section 18) and the aforementioned Blue Card (Section 19a). In my fieldwork I discovered that whenever there were difficulties with the recognition of diplomas a TW visa was granted, rather than a Blue Card:

> After I had filed my papers – in about two weeks they told me that I had been refused a visa because they didn't recognise my diploma. In Germany, there are certain criteria for recognising diplomas. That is, they demanded not only that I have a degree in computer science, but also that the university itself had to have some kind of accreditation in Germany. They had applied for the Blue Card for me at first [...]. Then, they contacted me again and said that they had received a visa for me – not a Blue Card, but a working visa. (Immigrant B.1.2.)

The Blue Card brought its holders a wide set of rights and thus made them a relatively privileged group compared to other migrants. Other privileges of the Blue Card included waiver of the labour market test requirement, waiver of the rule requiring the spouse of the main applicant to have a German language skills certificate, freedom to change employers after arrival, fast access to permanent residency (after 31 or 23 months of payments into the national pension system) and access to the EU labour market after 18 months of residence in Germany, among others (Cerna 2008).

There were cases of a Blue Card being refused not only where a degree was not recognised because the university that conferred it lacked the necessary accreditation, but also where the applicant did not have a completed degree. For example, Immigrant B.1.9. did not have a completed higher education, but had the number of years of experience that would have been enough for an EU Blue Card, had Germany implemented the norm that five years of professional experience could substitute for a formal qualifying degree.[3]

The TW visa required more documents and more preparation than the EU Blue Card. The wife of one recipient of the TW visa put it as follows: 'I remember that my husband deliberately resigned from his current work to try and get here. [...] It took about half a year, [...] the processing of the documents' (Immigrant B.1.8.). In particular, TW visa differs from the Blue Card because the application for it requires a labour market test. As Immigrant B.1.9. explained, the employer had to convince German authorities that '[It was] exactly this developer who was very much needed. [The employer] could not find anyone like [him] among German software developers – for this specific technology, this set of tasks.'

The application of Immigrant B.1.11. also went through the process of the labour market test due to his incomplete tertiary qualifications. In order for him to be hired, his German employer indicated in the application that the Ukrainian language was an obligatory skill for the kind of work in question, which gave Immigrant B.1.11. a competitive edge over German workers who could potentially apply for this position. In fact, it is unlikely that Ukrainian language was needed for this type of work. The reason for making the claim was to receive a labour market test certificate.

Nonetheless, according to Immigrant B.1.9. and Immigrant B.1.11., applications which had passed the labour market test were criticised by employees of a German public institution. In particular, according to Immigrant B.1.9., employees of the German Embassy intentionally discouraged applicants for the TW visa from applying for this visa type. They suggested that this visa could not be granted and migrants should bring other documents than a labour market test certificate – meaning tertiary diplomas – and apply for the Blue Card instead. Such conduct on the part of German authorities suggests that they were either not wholly familiar with visa procedures or there was some informal policy of intentionally discouraging migrants from applying for the TW visa. In both cases such behaviour confused potential migrants and put them into precarious positions.

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[3] Germany did not approve this rule, although it was suggested by the EU Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC (Council of the European Union 2009)

Immigrant B 1.11. summarised all the aforementioned obstacles for TW visa holders in his story. His account, aside from illustrating the complexity of a visa process that gives rise to misinterpretations and disinformation on the part of German institutions, confirms that the conditions of entry which excluded from consideration for the Blue Card persons who did not have a degree (even if they had many years of professional experience behind them) created preconditions for weak (precarious) migrant status. According to Immigrant B.1.11., the onerous nature of bureaucratic procedures significantly influenced the length of the actual application process: ‘A year passed before we did this and I went to the Embassy again. It took us – the lawyer and me – that time to collect all the documents.’

For both the TW visa and the Blue Card an applicant was required already to have an employment contract. As Immigrant B.1.2. noted, signing the employment contract was the starting point of the process: ‘I signed this contract and sent it to them. And then the process of obtaining a visa began.’ Sometimes the employer that invited the foreign employee helped to deal with visa application procedures. Yet such conduct by an employer tended to create return commitments on the part of the future employee – not simply to perform their work as well as possible, but also to work overtime and to be reluctant to leave the employer. In other words, visa conditions created preconditions for precarious employment. Examples of such circumstances are discussed below in more detail.

Difficult procedures that migrants needed to go through generated further fears of losing one's employment and, as a consequence, visa (Anderson 2010). For some migrants the daunting experience of applying for a visa created mental barriers that prevented them from negotiating benefits to which they were entitled, such as a salary raise:

> Some time ago I had a conversation about getting a salary raise (this conversation somehow came up), and I was asked: 'And why have you still not asked about a raise? We do it every year. That is, a worker can ask for a pay rise, but you do nothing.' I answered them, 'The company helped me to come here. It was an extraordinary case. So, I just didn't want to demand more. I'm satisfied with everything.' (Immigrant B.1.11.)

Fears on the part of migrants about the termination of an employment relationship are among the characteristic consequences of precarious employment. Fear of leaving an employer may be a reason why migrants sometimes endured without protest unpleasant circumstances at work, such as racial discrimination, as in an incident reported by Immigrant B.1.1.: 'Unfortunately, yes. I wouldn't generalise, but [...] there were some phrases that related to my belonging to the Slavic race [...]: I was called a "typical Russian."'

In addition to discrimination, the complicated process of granting a visa may lead to violations of the Labour Law, an instance of which Diaspora Activist B.2.1. described:

> A person in Ukraine quit his job, bought tickets and paid the hotel, but in the end [his potential employer] refused to sign an employment contract. And he couldn't migrate. And the question was raised about the potential employer being brought to justice. This could be considered a violation of his [worker's] rights.

The above quotation makes clear the need for improved procedures for the entry for immigrants, as well as the need for clarity about these procedures. Otherwise, skilled applicants as well as employers may feel discouraged from participating in the process of migrant employment. Negative consequences such as instances of discrimination or violation of the law are rare and their severity is difficult to evaluate, especially where discrimination is concerned. However, the evidence provided here serves to confirm their existence.

4.2.2. Conditions of stay: work and residence rights

The state's control over migrants' mobility in the labour market and even within the same organisation is very strict in Germany, especially for TW visa workers. It requires a lot of a worker's time and resources to move from one job to another. Immigrant B.1.2. described the routine he adhered to for three years as follows:

> Every time I changed my job title [position in the company], I needed to change my visa, since I have a visa attached to a particular employer and a specific position. Every time I have to make even a small change, it must be approved by

> the Foreigners Authority.[4] I have changed it four times already.

TW visa holders had many restrictions with regard to their work and stay in Germany. Usually such restrictions placed applicants in the situation where they did not have access to certain rights because regulatory formulations disabled them from doing so, with negative consequences:

> If I were to go to a new job, then my current employer would have to give me permission to move. Accordingly, due to this, I have never considered other proposals, even if they sounded pretty attractive – there was a higher salary or perhaps some more interesting projects. But due to the fact that it would be very difficult for me to switch to another company because of this [situation], and because I still didn't speak German at all and didn't understand how everything worked in terms of these documents, I simply didn't take these opportunities. That is, if I hadn't had such restrictions, I'm not sure that I would definitely have looked for something else, but at least I could have considered doing so. But since I didn't have this opportunity, I didn't even consider it. (Immigrant B.1.2.)

Like Immigrant B.1.11. (see Section 4.2.1.), Immigrant B.1.2. did not start negotiations on a salary raise because he felt tied to his employer: the employer could refuse him a salary raise and suffer no consequences, knowing that the employee would be reluctant to resign. Thus, Immigrant B.1.2. felt unable to bargain over his salary, although he realised that it was low. He also indicated that this potential situation discouraged him from negotiating with the employer because of his fears of being removed from the country should a conflict with the employer arise. Feeling trapped in his current employment, Immigrant B.1.2. and his Ukrainian colleagues who worked in the same company and under the same conditions experienced difficulties in expressing their views to their European co-workers, fearing that this might cause extra conflicts. Immigrant B.1.2. said that this experience was akin to feeling that he was regarded as belonging to an inferior social class.

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[4] Ausländerbehörde (German)

Immigrant B.1.9. confirmed that he felt constrained by the terms of his visa which limited his freedom to change employers. He said that the only thing that comforted him was his trusting relationship with his employer:

> In my visa, I am bound to one profession, which is registered in the contract, and to one company. If something suddenly goes wrong for any reason, I will be restricted and limited in what I can do next. But, fortunately, everything is fine.

Nevertheless, Immigrant B.1.9. counted on changing his status in future and having more freedom to change employers: ‘I hope that when I replace my working visa with a permanent residence permit, things will be fine, and I’ll be free to choose if something goes wrong.’

Given that temporary visa workers were required to go through a complicated process of application, several of them, including Immigrant B.1.11., doubted that they would be granted the same visa to work with another employer. For this reason, TW visa holders tried to maintain the best possible relationship with their current employers and avoid placing it at risk.

Blue Card holders enjoyed more freedom, but still encountered bureaucracy to some degree. While they were not required to ask permission from their current employer to move to another job, the requirement of the Blue Card to inform the Foreigners Authority each time the Blue Card holder changed employers applied to them. After being informed of such a change by the applicant (whose personal attendance was required), the Foreigners Authority would issue a document that certified the employee's new position and employer. This procedure increased the burden of bureaucracy. However, Immigrant B.1.4. did not find this inconvenient: 'My attitude towards this, I would say, is between "negative" and "neutral."' The organisational support provided by the company perhaps explains why the respondent did not find such a requirement limiting: 'Instead of my going to the Foreigners Authority, the HR manager went there for me.' Immigrant B.1.4's story also demonstrates that the state places the burden of newcomer migrants' integration upon employers. Yet, this is rather an unplanned consequence than an intended policy of the state, because there is no formal rule under the Blue Card system in Germany that would oblige an employer to act as B.1.4.'s employer did.

The conditions of the Blue Card were not perceived by Blue Card holders as limiting or restricting, but there is strong evidence that participants were not interested in their entitlements beyond their temporary needs:

> I think that the biggest inconvenience was that I had to spend a lot of time trying to figure out what was required. But other than that I didn't feel any restrictions – perhaps I simply didn't think that it's important whether there are any or not. In my opinion, everything is in accordance with the law. As if I knew the law! [laughs] (Immigrant B.1.5.)

Answering the question whether he ever felt any dependency on his employer, Immigrant B.1.5. responded that he had never considered himself an immigrant – that is, someone who intends to stay in the new country permanently – only a temporary worker. Like Immigrant B.1.13., he had a backup in case anything went wrong: he could escape from his precarious position by returning to Ukraine. ‘When I was migrating,’ he reported, ‘I hesitated for a long time about whether I needed to or not. I realised that I could return at any moment.’ In addition, Immigrant B.1.6. explained that in Ukraine IT professionals were very flexible in the labour market due to significant demand for their labour and also due to being able to work as freelancers. This is a further reason why the custom of staying with one employer may have caused discomfort:

> We all worked there [back in Ukraine] as if we were self-employed (for tax optimisation purposes). We somehow felt more or less free as far as changing employers was concerned […]. And secondly, if you want to work here as a freelancer, you are welcome to do so, but you have to support your family, so you have to find a very good contract. Otherwise, you just have to stay with the same employer.

He indicated that he felt some pressure regarding changing employers due to the German cultural approach that favoured staying with one employer for a long time. Immigrant B.1.6. emphasised that such a culture is useful for migrants who bring their families, and especially where spouses are financially dependent on their partners. Yet it goes against the professional and cultural habits of primary applicants.

These examples of participants’ responses to questions regarding their conditions of stay demonstrate how these conditions affect their employment relations. Based on this sample, it can be seen that TW visa holders were in the most precarious positions, Blue Card holders who migrated with their families were less precarious, and the least precarious of all were single Blue Card holders, whose greatest inconveniences were bureaucratic procedures and lack of awareness of their existing entitlements.

4.2.3. The requirement to find employment within three months (temporariness)

In the previous section the point was made that Ukrainian IT workers were used to a particular professional culture in Ukraine which they could not maintain in Germany. This section elaborates on this circumstance in more detail. For example, according to Immigrant B.1.6., Ukrainian IT workers were able to afford, and tended to take a few months' break between jobs when changing employment in Ukraine, because workers in the IT sector in Ukraine had a lot of freedom due to the good salaries and working conditions the local market offered. The practice of having a break between jobs was popular in Germany among German citizens as well. However, Ukrainian migrants in Germany were restricted in their ability to exercise this right by the requirement embedded in the Blue Card and the TW visa prohibiting migrant workers from being unemployed for more than three months, after which they had to leave the country.[5]

Diaspora Activist B.2.1., who had lived in Berlin for almost ten years, when asked whether it was possible to find employment in three months, replied, 'No, that's not enough. You need a half a year at least.' This opinion is subjective, since at least two other IT professionals interviewed said that due to market needs they would be able to find employment in three months. However, the restriction still limited their freedom as professionals:

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[5] Changing of jobs during the first two years of employment under the Blue Card conditions requires the approval of the Foreigners Authority (Section 19a (4) of the German Residence Act). TW visa holders as well as Blue Card holders also should notify the Foreigners Authority if they lose their employment and do not find any new employment as prescribed by Section 82 (6) of the German Residence Act. The Foreigners Authority then decides how long the visa holder is allowed to stay: 'this time limitation may however take account of the possibility to seek employment, particularly if entitlements to unemployment benefit 1 ("ALG I") have arisen as a result of contributions that have been made' (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2019). Usually they decide to allow immigrants to be out of work for three months as prescribed by Article 13, Paragraph 1, Directive 2009/50/EC (Council of the European Union 2009), but migrants may also be given six months (Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten Ausländerbehörde Berlin 2019, 149).

> From the perspective of, say, recovery from possible stress due to loss of work [three months] may not be enough – for example, in the hypothetical situation where the company goes bankrupt. It is forced to dismiss all its employees […]. Maybe, in this case, I would want to take a break and use half a year to do a project of my own, or travel, or just study. But in such a case there could be problems with the Blue Card. (Immigrant B.1.5.)

Immigrant B.1.14. and Diaspora Activist B.2.2. confirmed that problems existed for professions that are not IT-related, whereas IT professionals had good chances to find new employment within three months after losing their previous employment. Immigrant B.1.10. explained that the majority of employers in Berlin employing IT workers were start-up businesses which could easily dismiss their workers during the initial stage of employment. This caused extra stress for workers: additional to the stress arising from the fact that could they be made redundant, they would have a limited time for finding new employment before their visa expired: 'She [his wife] works in an IT corporation. But it's easy to be dismissed in a start-up during the first six months or year. And then the Blue Card expires and we have to go back home.'

The imperative not to be out of work for more than three months caused immigrants to be particularly alarmed regarding the length of their employment contracts. As Diaspora Activist B.2.1 noted, 'This must be taken into account – just quitting employment and continuing to live here is not possible.'

Dependency on the employer created some concerns for workers' dependent spouses because if the visa of the main applicant was cancelled, their stay became impossible as well. Spouses were also required to leave even if they were employed unless the employer was ready to arrange for an appropriate new visa, but if the profession is not of special interest to the German government this is unlikely:

> It creates a concern, an anxiety. You need to search for another place to work quickly, because you understand that your visa can be stopped. And given the nature of the labour market in Germany this cannot be quickly done. Usually people go to the Job Agency to get help. They can search for half a year before finding employment. In comparison with Ukraine, it is slower. It bothers me. So I'm developing my career as well. That way we'll have two equivalent labour units in the labour market. (Immigrant B.1.12.)

Dependent spouses who did not have a chance to develop careers in their preferred occupations in Germany considered returning to Ukraine as a backup. While they had the dependent visa status that they received on arrival as secondary applicants, they remained in a precarious position and were required to follow their spouse if the spouse's visa was cancelled. Immigrant B.1.13. confirmed that because of her uncertain position in Germany she was inclined to make a sudden decision to return, and her husband is under pressure because of this.

Immigrant B.1.6. shared his experience of how the rule of not being out of work for three months worked in practice for people who have families. He reported that, as a rule, decisions about whether to cancel a migrant's Blue Card were taken by the Foreigners Authority. This institution considered the degree of integration of the migrant's family when deciding whether to allow the applicant to stay in the country and rely on unemployment insurance from three to six months. A family could be regarded as integrated if, for example, the spouse of the applicant attended integration courses and children had been enrolled for a considerable period of time in a kindergarten or a school. Immigrant B.1.6. noted, however, that if a family had only one breadwinner the unemployment insurance money would not allow the whole family to survive for six months. This leaves applicants in the precarious position of having to take any employment that is available at a particular time. For some applicants this creates significant inconveniences in negotiating the development of their careers and income while securing their ability to stay in the country.

Immigrant B.1.11. indicated that his sole guarantee not to be removed from the country was his trusting relationship with his employer. In his view, the management of the company was aware of his precarious migrant status and of the fact that the termination of employment would mean removal from the country for him and his family. Therefore, the interviewee believed that his employers would not terminate his employment contract because they sympathised with him.

4.2.4. Conditions that regulate access to permanent residency

In contrast to Australia, in Germany there was no scheme under which skilled migrants could apply for permanent residency prior to arrival. Instead, migrants were entitled to live in Germany for a defined period of time and may then have been able to apply for permanent residency. The duration of this period was different for temporary visa workers and for EU

Blue Card holders, as will be explained in detail below.

There were different motivations for striving for permanent residency, but all of them were related to the limitations that Ukrainians experienced due their migrant status compared to citizens of Germany or the EU. As Immigrant B.1.2. put it,

> I am definitely considering getting a residence permit. The main reason is that I want to have free access to travel [and work] in Europe and Ukraine. Even though we can travel to Europe without a visa [for up to 90 days every 180 days], this doesn't give us the right to work. We are seriously limited.

Diaspora Activist B.1.2. reported that migrants' queries most often related to permanent residency and the correct ways of obtaining it. All migrants, even if they considered their migration temporary, wanted permanent residency. The element of intra-EU mobility was attractive for some Ukrainian migrants and affected their decisions to migrate to particular states. So placing limits on those rights (which were enjoyed by citizens of the EU) caused them extra discomfort because it affected their labour mobility.

Almost all interviewees mentioned that they planned to apply for permanent residency after living in Germany for a couple of years. Although he had serious intentions of doing so, Immigrant B.1.4. mentioned that he was not in a rush with his application. Section 19a (6) of the Residence Act prescribes that holders of the EU Blue Card are to be issued a permanent residence permit if they have been employed for at least 33 months, if they have made contributions to the statutory pension insurance scheme for that period, and if they have basic German language skills. Immigrants can receive a permanent residence permit within 21 months of application if their language skills are recognised as sufficient. Immigrant B.1.4. mentioned that he did not take German language classes to accelerate his family's access to permanent residency. It will be explained in Section 4.5. in this chapter why primary applicants rarely learn German intensively.

Asked for his opinion on these provisions of the Residence Act, Immigrant B.1.6. responded that Germany had given him and his family the opportunity to get permanent residence in less than two years and to be free from attachment to a particular employer. This fact he regarded as highly acceptable for Ukrainian IT professionals. Immigrant B.1.6. emphasised that his family had chosen Germany as a destination country because of the opportunity it offered to access permanent residency quickly. (However, in a later conversation Immigrant B.1.6. and his spouse said that settlement in Germany was not their goal.)

Immigrant B.1.7. explained her understanding of her chances as a dependent applicant to get a permanent residence permit:

> It may come to pass that the visa won't have be extended every four years. The Blue Card is in fact a four-year visa. As far as I know, only my husband will be given a residence permit, so we need to continue extending our current visa. He will have payouts – 33 months of pension deductions. I don't work and I have no payouts, so I cannot make such a claim. But if after five years I still live here, I can get permanent residence (though I won't have had work experience).

She added that permanent residency would also resolve some casual inconveniences that their temporary status had caused: 'We shall be able to drive our car more than five or 10 days in

Ukraine: we are still residents of Ukraine, we have Ukrainian passports, but our car is registered in Germany. We cannot go to Ukraine easily […] If the car were registered for a German resident, the situation would be different.'[6]

Immigrant B.1.9. also confirmed that his intentions were to stay permanently. In his words, he would need about ten years of living in Germany as a TW visa holder before he could receive a permanent residence permit. Obtaining permanent residency is generally also a priority for members of the accompanying family of the primary visa holder. A member of Immigrant B.1.6.'s family mentioned that he was considering living in Ukraine again, but said that being able to stay in Germany without time limits would reduce the tensions that the family experienced, obviate the necessity of prolonging visas every few years, and would allow migrants to have a more predictable future: that is, it would reduce precariousness.

4.2.5. Conditions of entry and stay for spouses

In contrast to Australia, migrants entering Germany were not allowed to bring their partners if they were not officially married. For family reunion purposes they were required to lodge their marriage certificate. In addition, in contrast to the EU Blue Card requirements, applicants for the TW visa had some restrictions that apply to family rights as prescribed by Section 30 of German Residence Act (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2004; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2013, 30). These included the obligation for spouses to have a certain level of German language proficiency, as Immigrant B.1.11. noted:

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[6] Pursuant Article 380 of the Customs Code of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada Ukraïny 2012), non-residents of Ukraine can bring their private cars registered in a foreign country, to the territory of Ukraine for up to one year; residents of Ukraine can bring their private cars to the territory of Ukraine for maximum of 10 days without paying taxes. This period can be extended to 60 days if these Ukrainians are registered with the Ukrainian Consulate in the foreign country. Such registration generally becomes available to Ukrainian citizens when they receive a permanent residence permit of a foreign country. The policy exists to prevent Ukrainian residents from buying cars in foreign countries for use in Ukraine, but avoiding paying Ukrainian customs duties on imported cars. Large numbers of. Ukrainians buy second-hand cars abroad because of the internal market for them is poorly developed.

> It was difficult, because a partner must pass an examination at the Goethe Institute, obtain a certificate at least at A1 level and lodge it with other documents. Since my wife and child hadn't learnt German language previously, they were required to go to German language courses in Ukraine. So my wife studied to a sufficient level in Kyiv [which is not original city of residence of this couple], passed the exam, and only then did we apply for reunification. From the time when I moved in November 2014 it took eight months for my wife to be able to join me.

Immigrant B.1.8. pointed out that family reunion visas which prohibit entry without proper German skills, separate couples, because they are not able to move simultaneously: 'I began to attend these courses on August 1, and in early January I had already received a visa: at first for three months, and then it was prolonged once I was here.'

The situation was different for EU Blue Card holders, since the spouses of the applicants were not required to lodge any documents that proved their language skills. Moreover, they received the right to work straight away: 'When we received a visa at the German embassy, we were entitled to come and work together. That is, I could work right away if I found a job' (Immigrant B.1.3.). Immigrant B.1.6. highlighted the fact that spouses of EU Blue Card holders are entitled to a wide set of opportunities, such as various types of income-earning activities. These entitlements are even broader than those which primary holders of the Blue Card have: 'I had to work full-time, and she has the right to not work at all or to work part-time.' Although Immigrant B.1.12. belonged to the group who had received a TW visa, not the EU Blue Card, his wife confirmed that she received the complete set of work rights straight after she was granted a family reunification visa.

Despite the fact that dependent migrants have access to a wide range of rights to employment, they are not usually able to use them during the first years after arrival. For reasons that are explored in Section 4.7. below, these dependent partners generally believed that they were temporarily excluded from the labour market, so they were often not even interested in searching for a job and were not confident whether they had any rights to work or not: 'It seems that in my passport [in my visa] there is some note that I am allowed to work here' (Immigrant B.1.8.). One main applicant reflected on the conditions of his wife's visa with same uncertainty: 'There is nothing more about the work permit or anything else in this visa grant. We didn't know if [she could work], or not (Immigrant B.1.9.).'

Immigrants often felt such uncertainty because of their status and because of the lack of clarity about the development of future events. For these reasons Immigrant B.1.8. postponed her family reunion visa application:

> [His move] was subject to very uncertain conditions, and we didn't know how long it would last or whether he would be able to extend his visa […]. Because they originally issued a work visa for three months. And we wanted him to get firm confirmation that he would get a job. (Immigrant B.1.8.)

The period of time during which a couple lived separately due to immigration policies was usually used by the dependent applicant to learn the German language in Ukraine and for the main applicant to arrange housing and household-related matters:

> Since [I had] not the Blue Card, but a working visa, my wife could not move immediately with me […]. We decided that I would move in the first place, find an apartment there and deal with everything over the first half year. When my wife had learnt the language a bit, and so on, we would lodge all the certificates, and then it would be possible for her to move here. And that is what we did. (Immigrant B.1.9.)

In addition, the main applicant indicated that he wished to have his wife with him in Berlin even before she obtained her language certificate. In 2015, Ukrainians were not yet allowed to enter Germany or the European countries of the Schengen Area without a visa (the free-visa regime for tourist purposes was enacted in June 2017). In order to reunite, the couple came up with a tourist visa invitation for the wife, so she could visit Berlin for the Christmas holidays. The couple also complained that they had encountered difficulties to book an appointment at the Embassy for her new visa – the waiting time was too long and inconvenient.

In addition to the aforementioned limitation of the TW visa, another interesting limitation of employment-related rights was mentioned by a male dependant of a spouse who held a Blue Card:

> The only limitation I have is connected with my wife's job contract. If I don't find work here, or if I don't have a business, and she, for example, loses her job and can't find another, then we won't be able to stay here, although we have invested a lot to create normal living conditions here. (Immigrant B.1.10.)

Immigrant B.1.13. explained some of the limitations that are due to her status. Because she arrived at a time when the rules for the EU Blue Card were more restrictive than those in force at the time of interview, she was limited in her work rights: ‘I was given a letter telling me that I had to take obligatory [integration] course B1. And only then did I have the right to seek a job’ (Immigrant B.1.13.).

This subsection has focussed on the legal requirements that impede the labour market integration of trailing spouses. The language requirement for TW visa secondary applicants and the dependence of their status on the length of employment of their spouses are the factors that contribute most to their precariousness. The section as whole has described the ways in which the conditions of entry and stay in Germany affect immigrants from Ukraine. Some additional conditions, as well as socio-economic aspects of migration, are considered in greater detail in separate sections below.

4.3. Change of socio-economic statuses of Ukrainian information technology (IT) specialists in Berlin

Most of the interviewees who were employed in the IT industry in Germany, and members of their families, complained that they had experienced downward mobility in terms of socio-economic status. In particular, their relative purchasing power in Ukraine had been higher than in Germany. Most of the group that was interviewed indicated that their family income was lowered due to migration:

> IT specialists in Ukraine financially could afford a lot. I compared [our place in Berlin] with where we had lived previously, and for the first three days I was in

> a very bad state; for the first six months, too. If you aren't inside a country, you don't know exactly what it is like or how to get ready properly. We had two months to prepare for the move. This was not enough. (Immigrant B.1.7.)

Downward social mobility was also exemplified by Immigrant B.1.10. He said that in Ukraine his family had had a very good income, calling themselves 'rich people.' Their actual monthly income decreased significantly in Germany. Their migration turned out to be not economically beneficial for them. Some of the interviewees indicated that despite their hopes of getting a better and more secure future in Germany, they had encountered financial hardship, which had not been the case in Ukraine. For example, Immigrant B.1.8. indicated that even the price of the German language integration course, which is essential for secondary applicants, was too expensive for the family budget. The interviewee was forced to miss classes in order to economise on fees, with negative consequences for the quality of learning. According to Immigrant B.1.8., this situation arose because one of the spouses was unemployed. Another IT professional (Immigrant B.1.9.) attributed his family's difficult financial circumstances to low starting salaries, emphasising that, in his view, start-up companies usually offered quite low salaries to all employees regardless of nationality.

The same immigrant, who had arrived in Germany under a TW visa, said that he intended to advance his legal status by receiving the Blue Card. To achieve this he would have liked to complete his degree in Germany, but since he was the single breadwinner in his family he could not afford to study (even though higher education in Germany is free).

Immigrant B.1.7. explained that her financial problems were related to the move to Berlin, as the family needed to spend a large amount of money at once to rent an apartment and buy furniture. Her testimony also reflects how in her case gender and language skills were interrelated issues which in combination affected her socio-economic status:

> Another problem was with the language. I was constantly with the child, and I had no way of leaving him to anyone, or [of getting a] nanny. I didn’t have financial opportunities, either, because after the move I didn’t know how to manage the budget correctly, because we had many expenses – for the apartment and some furniture. We could not immediately afford nanny services for three hours every day to go and learn the language.

Diaspora Activist B.2.2 explained that, while many immigrants had salaries in Germany similar to those they had received in Ukraine, their purchasing power had declined due to the higher cost of living in Germany. As Immigrant B.1.7. pointed out, some people could not withstand such financial hardships and the related emotional pressure; they stayed for a few months and left.

Although the economic well-being of many migrant families deteriorated, most wanted to remain, either temporarily or permanently. Their willingness to do so was related to the initial impetus to migrate. Immigrant B.1.12. shared her feelings about political and economic reforms in Ukraine after the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine: ‘There was hope for a better future, but the changes in the economic sphere and in my profession were very small.’ In the interpretation of Diaspora Activist B.2.3., active supporters of the Euromaidan protests left because of their disappointment with events that happened afterwards: ‘Maybe [Ukrainian immigrants] thought that everything would improve, but they saw that it was getting worse (in their opinion), so they decided to leave.’ Immigrant B.1.10. said that he was an active supporter of events during and after the Euromaidan, but it influenced his decision to migrate, notwithstanding:

> Two factors influenced me: the Euromaidan itself – firstly. But that was a positive factor, which, on the contrary, kept my thinking off migration to some extent. The second factor was the war in the East, where I come from. And it, in fact, was a bigger factor for my wife. She didn't really want me to join the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I wasn't against it, but it was very troubling for her. And many people at that time, when the situation was acute and many were conscripted, migrated quickly just anywhere, simply not to get into the armed forces. We have been in Ukraine all this time, somehow this avoided me.

The fact that many migrants that I interviewed were supporters of the Euromaidan events, but were not satisfied, at least partly, with economic opportunities in Ukraine [e.g. for spouses who are not in IT] suggests that they might fall into the precarious category that Van Hear (2014, 115) described in his study.

Migrants' assessments of the situation in Ukraine were not uniformly negative, however. Immigrant B.1.10., for example, said with regard to the post-Euromaidan reforms, 'It was a time when it was felt that there could be sufficiently significant changes to the positive side. And I think that many of them have happened. I would even like to contribute to them.'

Interviews with Ukrainian professionals who had migrated to Berlin suggest that they had enjoyed a particular socio-economic status in Ukraine: they were young, well-educated and politically active, and they had good incomes. As a result of migration to Berlin they experienced at least a temporary lowering of their socio-economic standing.

4.4. Labour market in the global city of Berlin and the role of skills

Globalisation and rapid development of technologies generated demand for IT professionals in Germany, and particularly in Berlin. Shortages in this occupation are addressed by German immigration policy, which encourages this type of professional to migrate. It does so by lowering the minimum salary that employers must offer immigrants; this enables employers to offer more positions, which in turn is advantageous for potential migrants looking for migration opportunities. This is despite the fact that a Directive of the Council of the European Union stipulates that the gross annual salary of a third-country national who applies for an EU Blue Card ‘shall be at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned’ (Article 5, Paragraph 3, Directive 2009/50/EC [Council of the European Union 2009]). Germany opted out of this recommendation, setting its threshold lower than the Council of the European Union recommends (Kolb 2017, 18). Apparently, in the opinion of German policymakers, the salary threshold that the Council of the European Union recommended was not enough to encourage German employers to hire non-EU citizens.

Data obtained in interviews suggest that Berlin is a destination where Ukrainian skilled immigrants arrived upon receiving employment opportunities mostly in the IT industry as software developers or in IT-related professions such as IT recruitment: ‘Berlin represents itself as a “start-up valley.” I think that in Munich or Stuttgart there are migrants who aren’t software developers. But here non-IT professionals simply cannot be invited’ (Diaspora Activist B.2.1.). Diaspora Activist B.2.2. confirmed that he had observed changes in the labour market in Berlin in the recent decade similar to those described by Diaspora Activist B.2.1.:

> Investments are getting attracted to this city, and there is a shortage of labour.

> The local market produces specialists, but, as I understand, they are not willing to work for the proposed money in the proposed positions. So they invite our specialists from Ukraine […]. They want to make Berlin the IT capital of Europe.

Labour market access, therefore, is a significant concern for the category of people who arrive in Berlin without an employment offer. Immigrant B.1.10., a secondary visa applicant dependent on his spouse, highlighted the main problem of his labour market integration – the absence of pre-arrival job offers:

> I really want [to work]; in fact, my problem is the difficulty of integrating into local society, something that most immigrants do through work. Work provides a first small circle with which you integrate and where you begin to acquire contacts.

While all the main applicants in the sample were invited to Germany as workers in the IT industry, the majority of their spouses had non-IT qualifications. Immigrant B.1.7. made the following remark about their employment prospects in Berlin:

> If you have a degree, you have to retrain. If you are not in the IT industry, you need to have some other strengths to find a job. Because there is a separate market for IT specialists you can choose a bit: the worker chooses. And in other circumstances, you can be chosen – that is, you go to where you have been chosen.

Diaspora Activist B.2.2. identified the main barrier which a person from outside the IT industry might encounter in Germany as follows: 'Germans are sometimes too thorough regarding licenses and permits as they relate to some professions.' This finding corresponds to what Seifert (1996, 433) said with regard to recognition of foreign diplomas in Germany: 'Certificates are generally of considerable importance in the dual German system of vocational education and training, and the lack of these certificates confers a crucial disadvantage.'

In most cases, a dependent applicant who arrived without a pre-arranged employment contract needed to be retrained in order to conform to German requirements for occupations. For example, Immigrant B.1.12. experienced this situation as follows:

> In Ukraine, I graduated from the university and for many years I worked as a chief accountant. I realised that there are opportunities for me as a professional: my degree in economics is recognised here, in Germany. I can continue studying German accounting while working as an accountant. And this work is well paid – of course, not as well as IT but I can work, and this makes me happy.

Immigrant B.1.12. further explained that to achieve full recognition of her qualifications and receive the right to work as an accountant she had to undergo 'retraining.'[7] This meant that on the basis of her Ukrainian degree she had to study for two years instead of the normal three years (the duration of the course for entrants with no degree at all). She also emphasised that her profession was not in demand in Germany. Although her economic degree was transferrable to Germany, labour market competition required to receive a local degree.

Immigrant B.1.3. also indicated that not every occupation required formal recognition of qualifications – for example, journalism, which is treated in Germany as a 'free profession': 'To study here – yes, you still need to have your degrees recognised. But for work, as in my case, experience is needed. If you can provide some examples of your work, this is already a recommendation.' Thus, in the case of the Immigrant B.1.3., other criteria – local experience or language proficiency – played a role in accessing the labour market. Diaspora Activist B.2.2. confirmed that problems with integration into the labour market occurred frequently, in particular for those who wished to work according to their qualifications. Even after their degrees were recognised the absence of local experience remained a significant barrier.

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[7] Umschulung (German)

Diaspora Activist B.2.1., likewise noted that one of the most frequent queries from migrants concerned the recognition of degrees. Immigrant B.1.7. told of a woman who had qualified as a medical practitioner in Ukraine and had practiced there:

> I got acquainted with a woman in my language courses. She had studied for [an extra] two years [in Germany] and had passed the medical language test. When I saw her again, she wasn't working: 'for half a year I have been looking for a job.' She added: 'I'm even looking for work in the state of Brandenburg.' In other words, she had found no employment in Berlin. It is not a small area. She said that if her family lived in West Germany, or somewhere near Munich, there would be a job for her there.

In addition to confirming that medical workers were required to have their qualifications formally recognised in Germany, evidence from Immigrant B.1.7. demonstrated that the labour market is also difficult for them in that there is limited demand for medical workers in Berlin, just as there is limited demand for people with degrees in economics, as Immigrant B.1.12.

indicated.

Having a degree in marketing from one of Ukraine's universities, Immigrant B.1.8. was uncertain whether she would find employment in this occupation in Berlin:

> As I see my future, I have two career options. The first is the simpler, I believe. It's just developing English language skills, developing skills in IT, and working in this area. Because, so far, to get a job in this field is a little easier, because there is high demand for such workers and slightly better conditions, and because a degree isn't required. The main thing is skills. This is the priority.

One of the reasons why trailing spouses experience delay in developing their careers in Berlin is the lack of language skills. Immigrant B.1.8. continued,

> But if, for example, I'm not able to find a job within one or two years, then, most likely, I'll try to study to improve my German. Perhaps I'll do some kind of training, and then maybe I'll work in my occupation – but I think arranging this would be quite complicated […]. I have marketing experience from Ukrainian enterprises. Of course, the theories are applicable anywhere in the world, but the circumstances here are different. [My marketing work in Ukraine] was all directed at a different audience. So I don't think that my future will be related to this.

Immigrant B.1.10., who has a degree and professional experience in the IT industry in Ukraine, arrived as a trailing spouse without German language skills. This person also experienced difficulties in finding employment and at the time of interview had been unemployed for more than eight months since arrival in Germany. The IT skills of the Immigrant B.1.10. did not help him to find employment quickly, he thought, because of differences in approach in the two countries, and because of market demand: ‘I was a “broad profile” specialist, let’s call that. That’s not so popular here. And it complicates the interview process.’

In addition to the factors named above, the long period of unemployment of Immigrant B.1.10. was related to the fact that he undertook some business activities. ‘I had not been registered yet. As I understand the law, you can engage in business without official registration.’ The case of this immigrant illustrates the situation where, after a long period of unemployment, skilled immigrants may be inclined to take up illegal, low-paid or part-time employment. In fact, a long unemployment period for trailing spouses is common for the group in question. Many skilled immigrants feel desperate when they cannot utilise their formal qualifications and therefore tend to look for unqualified work. The situation is readily recognisable as brain waste (Boyd 2013, 166):

> The months of waiting here were catastrophic for me, and I, of course, was looking for work. I didn’t speak German, so I tried to apply for a job as a Russian-speaking guide. This was through a Russian-language website. It was an environment with very dubious organisers. But I tried to apply there. I got no answer. So now I work as a trainee at the tax office and I can say that this is my first job, but I’m working for free. (Immigrant B.1.12.)

She confirmed that the employment search in Berlin for migrants was a difficult process and took years. The only way to accelerate this process was to find a ‘sufficiently open-minded employer' who would agree to hire such employees before they came to Germany.

Difficulties with bringing former qualifications into conformity with local requirements, or the so-called educational mismatch (Chiswick and Miller 2011, 2015) lead to situations where immigrants decide to start their careers from the beginning by completely changing fields. As an option some migrants take short courses to get low-skilled employment. Such was the case of Immigrant B.1.14. who gave up her career in finance to become a part-time photographer in Berlin. She suggested, however, that her higher degree in finance could be useful in the future, confirming the uncertainty of her intentions to stay in the field of photography.

In the opinion of Diaspora Activist B.2.3., the professional chances of non-IT workers in Berlin were limited: 'I think it's very difficult. I think it's better if you come here, then do your master's, because by doing this you get connections and an understanding of how everything works here […]. But I think the German labour market requires skilled employees. But other than software developers I don't know anyone who would be so well settled.'

The recommendation to obtain a German master's degree is in keeping with one of the policy approaches that are widely reflected in the immigration law of western industrialised countries (Hawthorne and To 2014). Immigrant B.1.7., however, indicated that she had not had an opportunity to search for employment or to do a master's degree due to her family duties. This is related to the gender dimension of migration that creates obstacles for trailing spouses. Impediments notwithstanding, she did some research into how she might undertake work or study:

> My profession is quite specific – I'm a specialist in fire safety […]. Here the

> laws pertaining to fire safety are completely different from those in Ukraine […]. I could study and do a master's. We looked at an educational institution – it's not in Berlin, as I remember it […]. Well, and as for my second degree – I also don't know how to utilise it here correctly.

Diaspora Activist B.1.2. argued that the introduction of the EU Blue Card in Germany changed the composition of Ukrainians migrating to Berlin, and in consequence new problems had arisen for immigrants:

> A wave of migrants has taken shape that is different from the previous one. Before this, [Ukrainians] mostly came to study. It was one of the easiest ways to move before the Blue Card was introduced. And that's why engineers and software-developers came here, that is, the professions that Germany needs. But they [members of the new wave] skip the stage of assimilation, or acquaintance with German society, which for others had occurred through the university. They immediately get into a start-up (this very special world). The only big question is how much they actually live in this environment.

In summary, there are several common barriers to accessing Berlin's labour market that skilled Ukrainian immigrants who arrive as family members of primary applicants encounter. The first barrier is that, as family members, they are not required to have an employment contract before arrival, so they are starting to look for employment in the destination country. They have terminated their previous employment in Ukraine, and then they must dedicate years to looking for job while being unemployed. The process creates gaps in their CV. The second barrier is the IT-focussed labour market and one of its consequences, the shortage of job vacancies in other occupations. The third barrier is the need for formal recognition of education certificates and the corresponding need for retraining for the majority of professions. The fourth barrier is language: while for members of the IT professions English is often a business language, for other professions speaking German is a requirement. Most of the trailing spouses need to learn both languages, but some of them indicate that English as a lingua franca is the better choice in the first instance.

The findings of this chapter corresponds to what Seifert (1996, 433) found: that the level of education does not play a significant positive role in the integration of immigrants. The fact that Ukrainian skilled migrants usually possessed a master's degree attained in Ukraine did not help their integration. This situation lead to brain waste.

This section demonstrates that arriving in Germany without a prior employment offers creates significant uncertainty for migrants as they try to access the labour market. For many, retraining, advancing language skills to a sufficient level, and finally finding a first job take years. In creating immigration programs, policymakers focus on the need to attract more brains to the country by simplifying visa processes. This often means that skilled workers who are spouses of primary applicants prefer to abandon the specialisations in which they hold degrees and start with unqualified jobs, rather than resigning themselves to being financially dependent on their spouses during the period of language training and professional retraining.

4.5. Language proficiency: roles of German and English

Language adjustment is a common difficulty that affects immigrant integration (Birrell et al. 2006, 84). This study examines situations in which this is crucial. For Berlin two languages matter: German as an official language, and English, because of its globalised status. Diaspora Activist B.2.2. outlined the situation as follows:

> A lot of people in Berlin speak English. Mostly all IT professionals come with English skills. As for communication with the authorities, they usually find someone who speaks German to go with them to these organisations. Often, they ask me for small things: to find a place in a kindergarten, to find a place in school, to change schools – elementary things, because the person just doesn't know English or German […]. A person should have at least the B1 level to be able to communicate when they move here.

Nevertheless, Diaspora Activist B.2.2. and a number of immigrants who undertook language (integration) courses indicated that language certificates are usually not effective guides to language proficiency, as a person's spoken language does not always correspond to the level indicated in these certificates. Consequently, successful passage of the exam does not guarantee employment or integration.

It is indicative of the preliminary state of migrants' language knowledge that all persons interviewed for the project had come to Germany without any knowledge of the German language. Immigrant B.1.7. explained that her level of German was so low when she began her German course that she did not understand a word that the facilitator said to her: 'Until I arrived

I didn't speak German at all, I didn't even hear it because I studied English at the university and in school. That is, I had no connection to German at all.' In consequence, she was seriously stressed, and this influenced her physical health.

Immigrant B.1.2. described his interaction with public institutions as follows: 'The only way I could communicate was by writing what I needed to say into "Google Translate," and then showing it to them. Otherwise, they simply didn't understand what I wanted, and I didn't understand what they wanted.'

Participants suggested that the absence of a requirement to speak German made it easier to immigrate. However, they also pointed out that it made it harder to communicate with public institutions and affected their economic conditions and mental and physical health. Immigrant B.1.1. indicated that when she attended the Foreigners Authority in Berlin she was required to speak German. Since she did not have any German skills, she tried to explain her business in English, but the civil servant refused to speak English. It was pure luck, she said, that another employee of the Foreigners Authority spoke Russian. This was rather an exception. For instance, for Immigrant B.1.10. the outcome was wholly negative – he was simply not able to collect his driving licence.

The fact that migrating professionals can access the German labour market without formal verification of language skills (English or German) is a cause of precariousness. According to German immigration policy, it is a responsibility of the employer to verify the level of language skills necessary for the work in question. In the following particular case, English skills were verified by the employer and recognised as 'sufficient' for professional communication. However, Immigrant B.1.2. provided the following comment on this situation:

> Work was very stressful, because my English skills weren’t so good. When I arrived, I realised that I was still quite far from speaking fluently. And I had a lot of misunderstandings: somebody would say what should I do, and I understood the opposite – that I shouldn’t do this. There were many such misunderstandings. It was quite difficult, because usually by the afternoon my head would be dull […], and I couldn’t work at all. It took me at least three months to feel more or less comfortable. And to speak fluently took me about a year. During the first year I needed to attend various meetings that my employer organised, or just to go out for lunch, and I wasn’t shy, but I rarely talked to others because I was afraid I would say something stupid.

In addition to his imperfect English, Immigrant B.1.2. indicated that his German language skills were not verified by the state’s institutions, nor the employer. The absence of German skills affected his communication with public institutions and in consequence created situations where he was at a disadvantage:

> I didn’t have any German skills and I had many awkward incidents. I had to register my place of residence (in Germany you are obliged to inform authorities about your address). The officer in the registration office didn’t speak English, which was very strange to me, since he works with foreigners. It turned out that I didn’t understand him very well when we were talking about religion. He asked me what religion I was. I replied it didn’t matter to me. And he asked me if ‘Catholic’ suits me. I said, ‘It suits me.’ [Laughs]. I just wanted to fill out this document and get away as soon as possible. After a couple of years, I learned

> that if I'm a Catholic, I have to pay [church] taxes. It cost me 1000 euro each year. And I only realised this and changed it in my registration after three and a half years. I have never been a Catholic, but in Germany, I was made a Catholic. And that happened precisely because I didn't speak German.

He added that similar misunderstandings happened to him while he was looking for an apartment to rent. Real estate agents spoke neither English nor any other language that Immigrant B.1.2. could understand; rental agreements and other documents were available only in German. This research participant spent months living in a hotel that cost him a significant amount of money. Eventually, the HR manager in the firm where he worked assisted him in signing the necessary documents for his first rented apartment. According to Immigrant B.1.2. and Immigrant B.1.8., the actual work in any international company in Berlin did not require German language skills. However, German became crucial when dealing with the bureaucracy in order to access various services that were important for one's life. Furthermore, all contracts, including the employment contract, had to be in German.

Immigrant B.1.2. reported that he was asked to sign an employment contract that he did not have a chance independently to verify. The document was offered to him in German and English and in the event of a conflict between the versions, the German text would have been the legally valid one. Immigrant B.1.9. confessed that he signed his employment contract, relying on the relationship of trust with his employer.

Immigrant B.1.3. expressed the view that without German language skills it is not safe to sign employment contracts, and therefore immigrants hesitated to sign them or take up new employment until their language level was sufficiently improved for them to understand the terms of the contract independently. It is worth noting that at the time of interview Immigrant B.1.3. was still unemployed after two and half years of residency in Germany. This person also believed that without German skills some professions could not be accessed: ‘Then, when we had got the Blue Card and I had signed up for the integration course, I went to study journalism. Working in the media is very difficult, because everything is mostly in German.’

German is particularly crucial for professions where language is very important such as journalism, as mentioned above: ‘Most of the jobs or internships had the requirement of a native level of German’ (Immigrant B.1.3.). Immigrant B.1.6. reported similar experiences: ‘In order to work as a contractor in Germany, first of all, you have to develop very good communication skills in German.’

Even professionals who worked in the international environment and were able to function in English at their workplace or during job interviews encountered barriers if they did not speak German: ‘I’m conscious of the fact that a German citizen will come and negotiate on terms, wages and so on, in German. Perhaps this elicits a more positive psychological response’ (Immigrant B.1.4.).

Immigrant B.1.4. emphasised that knowledge of German language is the most important skill for any kind of integration into German society, and if a person is unable to communicate in German or to understand the language, there is a constant need for the services of translator and interpreter. The level of language skills influences the extent to which migrants can access information about legislation and other rules in Germany:

> I cannot say that we are very well informed about our rights. We are not familiar

> with the legal system of Germany, and until we encounter an issue, we may well not know about it. That is, here you probably have more rights [than you are aware of], but you do not know the language. (Immigrant B.1.7.)

Immigrant B.1.9. considered language to be the most difficult barrier for migrating professionals, indicating that in Germany information in languages other than German can actually be harmful:

> Language either opens doors or keeps them closed. Everything can be understood with the help of someone else, but if you don't understand the language yourself, then, of course, this will always be a problem and an obstacle. You'll need to look for information in languages that you can read, and it may, in fact, be either outdated information, or maybe not all nuances are described.

Immigrant B.1.12. agreed that knowledge of languages other than German was not enough for achieving complete labour integration, but also pointed out that, in German, slang and accent matter. Because she arrived as the spouse of TW visa holder, she took a German course in Ukraine and received a certificate of basic proficiency. She reported, however, that in Germany she was confused and could not focus at all due to accents and slangs.

Immigrant B.1.9. and Immigrant B.1.11. said that, as main applicants who needed to support their families, they had to work hard, particularly in the first year. They simply did not have time to study German:

> Although I want to learn it, I just never have enough time. I started three times,

> I went to German courses, but it's a bit exhausting, because after eight hours of work you go to German classes at 6 p.m. almost every day (four days a week), and until 9 p.m. you need to study. After 9 p.m. you still have to go home, do your homework, talk with your family. When the course was over, I thought: 'No, I'd better stay home for a month, and then I'll return to the usual rhythm.' But then that month is stretched out to half a year and so on (Immigrant B.1.11)

German language is essential for a partner who is in charge of a child, according to Immigrant B.1.12.:

> To prepare the child for school, to pass tests with the child – we went with friends who helped us translate. At the parents' meeting, too, it was very difficult at first. I didn't understand anything. Help is needed in the form of translation and tips.

Although migrants are not required to speak German to enter the country, Diaspora Activist B.2.3. referred to legislation that discourages employees of public institutions from answering queries in languages other than German: 'I was told: "we all understand very well that these people are also people, but German law tells us that German government officials should speak German only."' This rule is imposed by Section 23 of German Administrative Procedure Act (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 1976). This rule again undermines the idea that migrants are allowed to enter the country for work and residence without German language skills.

For independent long-term life in Berlin it is crucial to speak German, and Immigrant B.1.8. confirmed this. She emphasised the role of friendships that assisted in accessing services, because when Immigrant B.1.8. once asked civil servants to speak English, they refused, claiming that they weren’t allowed to.

The examples given above suggest that the German government contributes to putting migrants into precarious situation by allowing them fast-track entry without verification of language skills. In this regard Immigrant B.1.13. stated:

> [Language skills verification] would have had a negative effect, in that I wouldn’t have been able to migrate, that is, I would have had to stay and prepare. I don’t think that in this country they would have been able to wait for half a year or a year for me to learn the language. But again, for me it’s much better to know the local language of where I live – to be able to communicate in the store or in the hospital.

Immigrant B.1.5. asserted that, in his opinion, the German language policy that was in force at the time of interview was an instrument for attracting skilled immigrants, in particular from Ukraine.

Diaspora Activist B.2.1. characterised the language situation of migrants who arrived after the Euromaidan as follows:

> What distinguishes them for me is that they didn’t come here to study. This means that they often don’t speak German and they don’t even need to learn it. They communicate in English. And they immediately plunge into the international environment. This can be either an advantage or a disadvantage.

This statement is in line with the literature on skills and the global race for talent (Hawthorne and To 2014) that advocates student migration as a tool for integrating professionals with the help of the university environment. In addition, Diaspora Activist B.2.1. highlighted that those migrants who stay in the country and do not learn the German language do not consider this country as a potential place of settlement:

> I wouldn't say that it makes life difficult […], but it's a constant reminder that Germany cannot be regarded as the state of their permanent residency. Because you must, at least, be free to communicate with government agencies. And if you cannot do this, it essentially limits your mobility with respect to all these rules and requirements. You always need advice or support […]. I can hardly imagine a person in our age who is ready to live their whole life, – actively, professionally and intelligently – in a country without knowing its language. Perhaps they will learn it with their children as the children grow up. Perhaps, three years later, when the stress of migration goes down, they will go to German courses. But if this does not happen, then, most likely, they will move to the next country, or do something else. They are cosmopolitan in their worldview.

Language policy also becomes one reason why trailing wives become isolated and unemployed for a long period of time: 'They have the opportunity to migrate on the partner's Blue Card [which places no language requirements on the accompanying spouse], so it makes these women unemployed because their adaptation is much more complicated' (Diaspora Activist B.2.1.).

According to Diaspora Activist B.2.3. language acquisition relates to every field of life, and German is essential in Berlin, but in her opinion this situation is abnormal: 'Germany is a country of migrants. There are many people who don't speak German, who are highly skilled and very intelligent. I understand that the national language is German. But there should be a translation into English.' This statement by Diaspora Activist B.2.3. referred to the position of Berlin as a global city and the importance of supporting expatriates through policies which took this situation into account. However, the interviewee believed that the policies in force, especially those regarding language, worked against migrants in practice.

This section has provided an overview of problems that arise from language policy requirements and the ways in which these problems affect the labour market and the legal integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin. Moreover, the discussion has shown that negative phenomena such as delay in the recognition of diplomas and the mental stress caused by the absence of language skills are tightly intertwined with issues of gender and socio-economic status in a globalised market for skilled labour.

4.6. Social safety net and Ukrainian professionals in Berlin

About half of the interviewees in Berlin emphasised that they were not interested in the use of any social benefits: 'As long as we are able to cope, I do not want to ask for help without investing anything in this state. This is my principled position' (Immigrant B.1.9.) As Immigrant B.1.10. put it, 'Many come here as social migrants; in fact, they are counting on social support from the state. That was not our goal, because we know that we can provide for ourselves.' Given such a predisposition, it could be assumed that not all the immigrants interviewed clearly understood what services might be available to them. Immigrant B.1.14.

confirmed this assumption: 'I probably don't use them because I don't know about them. But I think this will happen later. That is, the more you live, the more you learn about your rights.' Immigrant B.1.10. stated, while having no expectations of benefits from the social safety net, that international migration put migrants into situations where some help would be beneficial.

Since many migrants experienced downward social mobility and trailing spouses especially found it hard to find employment, it was important to consider whether they had access to the social safety net and how well they were informed about their entitlement to use social benefits. The question was of importance also in the light of the fact that, as Mahroum (2001) points out, good access to welfare can be a factor of retaining skilled migrants in the host country. One of the fundamental components of a social safety net is access to healthcare. Immigrant B.1.2. shared his understanding of the system of medical insurance in Germany and of how his new position as a migrant prevented him from enjoying the benefits he desired:

> I had an experience with German doctors. And I will say that everyone who works in Germany or lives in Germany is insured; that is very good. [This insurance] covers all expenses: treatment by doctors, surgery, all the medical services that are necessary. And there are two types of insurance: public and private. Public insurance is obligatory. Half is paid by the employer, half by the employee. […] If you need to go to a doctor, you wait in line for two or three weeks, which is very, very long. Especially, for example, when I needed to have an endoscopy. I had to queue for two months, whereas in Ukraine it could be done on the next day. And also when I broke my knee in Germany, I was hopping on one leg for a month, waiting for my appointment for surgery. The solution is private insurance. If you have private insurance, you can use it immediately. The

> only problem is that, in order to get it, you have to have a minimum wage (it changes every year): right now you need to be earning 57,000 euros a year to get it. And if you have it, this is, in fact, very cool. It makes a huge difference. I don't have this private insurance at the moment, but I plan to switch to it.

It is important to note that salaries which even IT professionals accept for their first employment in Germany are about 38,000 euros yearly. This salary is lower than the average in Germany for IT professionals (according to the opinion of a few of the interviewees), and is especially is limiting where there is a family with children and only one breadwinner. Access to the social safety net could help correct this imbalance that was created by immigration.

Immigrant B.1.4. commented on the extent to which it was possible to take a break between jobs (a topic discussed earlier in this chapter) and rely on unemployment insurance. His statement demonstrates that doing so is difficult in the situation in which immigrants typically find themselves, where the family is usually structured according to the 'breadwinner-caregiver' model (McDonald 2000; Pfau-Effinger 2004), with only one person in the family working:

> In the current situation [taking a break between jobs] would be difficult, because I don't have permanent residence. This means that I need to work. After receiving a permanent residence permit, theoretically speaking, I think that I could do this. It is also worth remembering that I would be paid less money […]. I wouldn't ever do it deliberately, because it's not in my interest. It would make the pathway to permanent residence permit longer […]. [In practice] I couldn't do it. This is a pity. (Immigrant B.1.4.)

Diaspora activist B. 2.3. confirmed that unemployment benefits that migrants are entitled to cover only about 60% of salary, which would make supporting dependent family members difficult.

However, not all migrants ignore the social safety net they can access in Germany. In fact, those families with children where wives were unemployed and which experienced a decrease in their family incomes looked for opportunities to augment their budgets. Immigrant B.1.6. noted that help for every child, about 190 euros monthly, was quite useful; in addition, kindergartens were cheap and of very high quality. Immigrant B.1.13. also noted that the cheap childcare that is specific to Berlin is a significant financial support for her family. In addition, some of the available benefits surprised her: ‘Tax refunds for travel, for the purchase of equipment, for moving, for furniture – all this was news to me. It was also a little cultural shock: how was this possible?’

Migrants are mostly not informed about their pension insurance, as was the case with Immigrant B.1.2.: ‘Yes, I’m paying for this. But honestly, I’m not sure how it will work. I think that I just have the right to reclaim the contributions that I have paid if I want to leave Germany.’ This statement also reflects many migrants’ uncertainty as to whether they will stay in the country. There is similar scepticism regarding pensions. As Immigrant B.1.8. put it, ‘We don’t really hope for social assistance here. I hope that we will receive a pension, but we also don’t expect it.’

Immigrant B.1.12 was also among those who used her right to an affordable education in Germany, but noted, ‘It’s not completely free. My education costs 500 euros per month. I was registered with the Job Agency as unemployed, but I didn't receive any payments or help. If you were really keen and studied the legislation closely, you might be able to find ways to help you solve some of your social problems.'

Immigrant B.1.7. indicated that she was not allowed to access some forms of social safety net because she had not worked in Germany for a sufficient period:

> My parents are concerned that I'm 30 years old now and that I don't have much work experience; they are very worried about this. Here a person up to 25 or 30 years old can still study, look for opportunities, try things out or travel. We also looked a little at their pension reform, at how much the pension is and how long it's necessary to work to get a pension. Working for 10 years is not enough to earn a pension by any means.

Diaspora Activist B.2.2. explained the differences between social benefits that migrants with different statuses are entitled to, should they become unemployed, as follows:

> A person who starts working – a person who pays taxes – gets full rights to all the social benefits that exist in Germany: social benefits [unemployment benefit], health insurance, pension insurance and insurance for incapacity for work after injuries in the workplace or somewhere else. Receiving unemployment benefits, a person who has worked for half a year has the right to be out of work for three months and will receive assistance from the state during this period. The level of assistance will depend on earnings. If a person has worked for a year or more, he or she can receive unemployment benefits for half

> a year. That is, they are in no way limited. Nor is there any limitation on the right to switch from 'unemployment benefit 1' to 'unemployment benefit 2.' If you have been on the first of these for six months and haven't found a job, you are transferred to the second. That is, the state fully provides for you. But in order to receive [these benefits] you must already have permanent residency.

This section reviewed cases where due to migrants' legal statuses they have limited capacity to use some of the social safety net services that citizens and migrants with permanent statuses are entitled to. This partially explains why states are interested in attracting skilled migrants: they bring economic benefits and rarely claim their social rights, as was discussed in Chapter Two. Nevertheless, when economic need arises, some immigrants do use the opportunities that they have to access some social rights – at least those they are informed about.

4.7. Gender and family: trailing wives of Ukrainian IT specialists in Berlin

It is not a new insight that, relative to other groups seeking to access the labour market in Germany, foreign women are at the greatest disadvantage (Seifert 1996, 423). In the present study they appeared to be the subject of the greatest degree of precariousness. The term 'wife of an IT professional' was used many times by interviewees in Berlin: 'In Ukraine there is even a profession: "wife of a IT professional." It is not as noticeable there as it is abroad' (Immigrant B.1.14.). Diaspora Activist B.2.1. described the wave of Ukrainian migrants following the Euromaidan as follows: 'It turned out that every second one of these migrants was a male software developer. And, of course, they brought their family here: wives and children who often do not speak the language at all.'

The concept of 'trailing spouse' encompasses both sexes (Harvey 1998). Yet, in the sample of contemporary skilled migrants from Ukraine in Berlin interviewed for this project trailing spouses turned out to be mostly women. The result is likely to be indicative of the distribution of gender roles in this wave of migration in general, a state of affairs that may be explained by, first, the prevalence of males in the IT industry both internationally and in Ukraine; and second, the fact that women may be excluded due to the absence of 'gender awareness' (Boucher 2016) in German immigration policy. German immigration policy favours skilled migrants screened for qualifications and work experience in employment areas where there is strong demand, pre-eminently IT. This factor affects why the main applicants for German work visas are mostly men.

The position of Ukrainian trailing wives in Berlin is characterised by long terms of unemployment upon arrival: about three years. At the time of interview, many women participants remained unemployed. Furthermore, the standard model of migrating families is the 'breadwinner-caregiver' model. As Diaspora Activist B.2.1. put it, 'I heard conversations where it was said that that [trailing] wives study [the German language], and husbands work, bringing in the money.' The study revealed that such situations were generally caused by the fact that trailing wives accompanied their partners without prior preparation for the German labour market. They arrived in the country without an employment contract, which meant that they needed to search for employment after arrival. Diaspora Activist B.2.1. shared her opinion on this matter:

> I think it's easier for husbands – they migrate with an employment contract already in hand. For them, the job search and the confirmation of qualifications has taken place before they move. For their wives the contrary is the case: first

> they relocate, and then the countdown begins: ‘What shall I do next with my career?’ There are different cases: some get their qualifications recognised if their profession is demand in Germany. Others go and study the same profession in which they qualified at home, or even take a break of one or two or three years, they try everything, and then decide what they are going to do. They use this as an opportunity to make a second start to their career. (Diaspora Activist B.2.1.)

However, there are cases which suggest a variety of other reasons why trailing wives’ labour integration is delayed. For example, Immigrant B.1.13. reported that she was limited in her job search as a result of directions from German Federal institutions:

> I received a visa that was tied to my husband. Both of us – my child and I. But I could work, in a way: if I found a job. Naturally, at first I didn’t look for work, because we had to learn the language. We went to an organization [the Foreigners Authority] where I was given a letter testifying that I had passed the obligatory course at the B1 level of German language skills. Only then did I have the right to search for a job.

As was discussed in Section 4.4. above, to find employment matching their skills trailing wives need to have their formal qualifications recognised by German federal institutions or to find an employer willing to employ them without such formal recognition. Interviews suggest that skilled foreigners encounter difficulties in the Berlin labour market except for those who work in the IT industry. Furthermore, for the group interviewed, IT appeared to be a male profession *per se*: ‘Very rarely does it happen that a woman programmer from Ukraine migrates and brings her husband – probably only in 1% of cases. […] There are those who are nervous about [the hardship of integration], there are those who cannot cope with it – they return to Ukraine. Families fall apart' (Diaspora Activist B.2.2.).

As a consequence, and as discussed above, due to the fact that most of the professions of trailing wives who were interviewed for this study did not belong to shortage occupations such as IT, they all acknowledged that they required professional retraining or needed to have their degrees formally recognised. The purpose of the latter is to screen the degrees of migrants to ascertain whether in their tertiary education institutions in Ukraine they had studied disciplines corresponding to those in the German education system. If spouses' degrees did not meet these standards, they were advised to retrain. This involved a tertiary course shorter than the one usually required to get the equivalent qualification. However, not all professions are in demand in Berlin. According to Immigrant B.1.14., his expectations concerning his wife's career advancement were broken: 'She was a financier by profession, and I thought her job prospects were much greater in Europe than in Ukraine. But now I understand that I was a bit mistaken about this' (Immigrant B.1.14.).

In the majority of cases, trailing spouses who made the decision to follow their husbands into emigration did so quickly; they had little chance to research the processes for obtaining recognition of their qualifications for the professions in demand in Germany.

Another factor that influenced the labour market integration of trailing spouses was the absence upon arrival of the most necessary skill: language proficiency, and in most cases the lack of proficiency in both German and English, a circumstance poignantly remarked upon by Immigrant B.1.8.: 'Of course I would have liked to work here at once. But I simply understood that I do not speak English, nor German at an acceptable level, so I put [this intention] aside.'

Other difficulties that trailing spouses encountered were characteristic of the life situations of women generally, due to their reproductive roles of bearing and nursing children. Because male migrants work, they become ‘breadwinners,’ while women who stay at home and either take care of their children or learn the language to help organise their life in Germany, become ‘caregivers.’ Drawing upon her personal experience and that of her acquaintances, Immigrant B.1.7. indicated that migration with children significantly delayed the professional integration of mothers: ‘All three of us – myself and two other women – have children. And we are busy with our children’s education.’ Having a child is a big responsibility which also affects parents’ mobility. For example, one interviewee, unable to find job in Berlin, would have liked to move to another German or European city, but this was problematic because of a child:

> In our case we are dependent on our child. When a single person migrates there are more chances for mobility. We cannot suddenly migrate further. A year from now we have to apply to the school where we want our child to be enrolled. Once the child goes to school, you cannot move anymore. (Immigrant B.1.7.)

The fact that qualified migrant women often take up caregiver roles is a consequence of the specific design of German immigration policy. Aiming at attracting skilled migrants to the German labour market, legislation allows those who receive an employment contract to be main applicants for the relevant visa without verifying their language proficiency. At the same time, main applicants are checked for their education and work experience, while their spouses are not. Given these parameters, it is unsurprising that all the spouses who participated in interviews, though tertiary-educated, arrived in Germany with either a complete absence of German skills or a very basic level of German. English proficiency appeared to be the second important factor that influenced their employability as well as their overall integration in terms of understanding the legal, social and cultural order.

Because trailing wives' primary objective in Berlin was the study languages, first of all German and additionally – in rare cases – English, they also delayed starting the process of recognition of their tertiary diplomas. Many of them were not aware of the opportunities they may have had in relation to their education and the further development of their careers. The management of complex accommodation, health, childcare, educational and other practical matters in an unfamiliar environment became their duty and formed the content of their unpaid labour. At the same time their husbands, who suddenly became their families' single breadwinners, experienced a higher sense of responsibility for supplying family needs than had been the case in Ukraine. A male software developer confirmed that such a division of responsibilities had taken place in his family: 'We are a team: her remarkable organisational skills and ability to communicate help us a lot in solving various problems' (Immigrant B.1.4.). Immigrant B.1.11. also confessed that, because he was the breadwinner in their family, his wife took upon herself the duty of learning the German language and organising their life: 'I don't deepen my knowledge of all the laws and so on. For this I have a wife' (Immigrant B.1.11.). While the breadwinner works, he has no time to learn German by attending language courses, and his unemployed wife is better positioned to do this.

In all these cases, immigration policy was favourable to husbands, seeking to attract IT professionals to the German market as soon as possible, but it left trailing wives to their own devices. The absence of employment contracts, recognised degrees and German language proficiency interrupted the careers of these women for years (in the case of most of those interviewed, more than three years). In particular, trailing wives who arrived with children found it difficult to integrate because of extra household and family duties.

4.8. Conclusions

This chapter contributes to the literature on the practical understanding of immigration policy and law in Germany; on barriers that are experienced by skilled immigrants from Ukraine; and on the difficulties of socio-economic integration faced by these migrants. The chapter began by discussing the initial stage of the relocation of Ukrainian immigrants. In particular, Section 4.2. described the responses of immigrants to conditions of entry, stay and employment for primary and secondary applicants, and explored the extent to which these conditions have become barriers for Ukrainian skilled migrants. The main findings of this section are that Ukrainian immigrants in my sample arrived in Germany in two employment-driven streams: those receiving the TW visa, and those who received the EU Blue Card. The requirements of both visa types create onerous bureaucratic processes of application and shape the future precarious status of immigrants in Germany. However, the Blue Card is less cumbersome in terms of procedure and is associated with a more attractive set of rights, such as accelerated access to permanent residency (cf. consideration of this issue in general terms by Cerna 2008). Visa conditions generate degrees of precariousness that include, for example, the temporary character of work permits and the consequent uncertainty of continuing work.

Section 4.3. addressed changes in socio-economic status that, as Yakushko (2013) observed, generally accompany international migration. The main finding of this section is that Ukrainian skilled migrants experience downward socio-economic mobility, their purchasing power in Germany being significantly lower than it had been in Ukraine. Section 4.4. shed light on migrants' perceptions of their ability to make use of their skills in the new IT-focussed labour market. The main finding of this section is that immigration policy, which aims at attracting skilled migrants, places immigrants who are allowed to arrive in the country without employment contracts into a precarious situation. Skilled trailing spouses' biggest difficulties lie in securing recognition of their formal qualifications and retraining. This barrier makes it impossible to be employed during the first year of residence, and there are several cases where trailing spouses remain unemployed for a greater number of years.

Section 4.5. focusses on language proficiency. In particular, based on the data analysed, it details migrants' need for proficiency in English and German in Berlin as a global city. All the primary applicants arrived with a basic or intermediate level of English to work in the IT field. None of the interviewees were able to speak even basic German on arrival. Lack of language skills affected various aspects of immigrants' everyday life. Most importantly, immigrants were disadvantaged when undertaking even trivial tasks, such as signing employment contracts or registering their data with the taxation office. Because most interviewees decided to migrate in a rush, they did not have enough time to learn the language prior to their arrival in Germany.

Section 4.6. highlighted the importance for immigrants of having access to the social safety net. Although immigrants often deny their intentions to use social benefits, knowledge of possible ways to use them increases family income. Even though policymakers globally are in favour of skilled, high income immigrants because of the economic advantages that they bring to their country, access to the social safety net increases the chances of retaining immigrants who are temporarily trapped in difficult financial situations.

Finally, Section 4.7. summarises the negative experiences of immigrants in relation to gender and family matters, highlighting the special role of women at the intersection of employment relations and international migration. My fieldwork data have confirmed for the case of Ukrainians migrating to Berlin what Harvey (1998) and Boucher (2016, 3) observed in relation to other contexts: that women migrate in most cases as secondary applicants following the careers of their husbands. In this section I have also adduced evidence suggesting that the structure of German immigration policy to attract IT workers has boosted traditional gender roles and a traditional distribution of social roles between men as breadwinners and women as caregivers.

To sum up, this chapter has provided an overview of the legal, social and economic circumstances that create degrees of precariousness for Ukrainian immigrants in Germany. Interviewees were given an opportunity to analyse their situations, and the perceptions of the majority of them did not lead me to apply the notion of 'victimhood' to them. However, the interviews lead me to argue that legal requirements do cause barriers that can be overcome, or at least mitigated, with the help of social capital in the diaspora community, which will be explored in Chapter Six of this dissertation.

Chapter Five: Integration Barriers for Skilled Ukrainian Migrants in Melbourne

5.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the barriers encountered by skilled Ukrainian migrants in the process of their integration in Melbourne. It covers for Melbourne the same areas as were dealt with in Chapter Four in relation to Berlin, although its structure is slightly different because of differences in the priority of issues that arise in the two different contexts. Most of the difficulties encountered by recent Ukrainian immigrants in Melbourne have been caused by the visa statuses which they obtained upon entry. I continue to employ the concept of ‘precariousness,’ introduced in Chapter Two, to describe the insecurity experienced by these migrants in the Australian labour market as a result of particular immigration policies. Precariousness can be experienced in various degrees, as was observed in the case of Ukrainian skilled migrants in Germany. In Australia, such variation is also in evidence. However, different visa policies and market situations in the two countries mean that the experience of Ukrainian skilled migrants in Australia differs to some extent from that of their counterparts in Germany.

5.2. Entry and residence conditions for Ukrainians in Australia and the precariousness of their legal statuses

5.2.1. Types of entry into Australia for Ukrainian skilled migrants

Ukrainian migrants who came to Australia after the start of the Euromaidan (late 2013) had access to a wider range of visa statuses than those who went to Germany. In Germany only a work visa (in the form of the TW visa and the Blue Card) was available to migrants on entry, whereas in Australia migrants also had access to permanent residence visas.

Volodko (2014b; 2014c) documented student migration as a means by which skilled Ukrainians migrated to Germany. Likewise, the student visa has become a channel of migration to Australia for some Ukrainians, despite the fact that in their native country most of the interviewees were tertiary-educated and successful in their professions. Use of the student visa for Ukrainian labour migration to Australia is a new phenomenon. Migrants used student visas when in fact their intention was not to study, but to migrate for work. Immigrant M.1.9. made the point that while looking for employment he found that recruiters were surprised to discover that students' dependants possessed full-time working rights. Some potential immigrants to Australia wanted to migrate and work in the country immediately upon arrival, but because their qualifications had not been recognised by Australian professional societies or were not included in the list of professions (AGDHA 2019c) desirable for migration they could not apply, for example, for the Independent Skilled visa (subclass 189). Hence they decided to apply initially for a student visa. Given that they would not able to migrate as professional workers, they enrolled at universities to obtain visas for themselves and their partners. Education was not their primary aim: they were keen to obtain full work rights, access to the labour market and employment as soon as possible, even if it was part-time. (Students are allowed to work up to 40 hours per fortnight during semesters, and full-time during off-semester periods.) This was the situation of Immigrant M.1.4. and her partner:

> We initially intended to migrate for work straight away, but at that time there were no such options. We looked at a tourist visa as a way of coming for three months and finding a job, but I've read the forums and it's hard to do. So the only option remaining was for one of us to study and the other to get a job as a dependant. That's why we decided that I would do a master's and [the participant's partner] would come as a dependant on my visa, and work.

This quote illustrates the pattern of economic migration through the use of student visas – a practice which Hawthorne and To (2014, 1) and Czaika (2018, 7) describe as a tactic of state policy within the global race for talent. According to Birrell and Hawthorne (1997, 6-7) the vast majority of those who are tertiary-educated in their home countries receive another degree in host countries in order to facilitate labour market integration. As described by Immigrant M.1.5., the aim of the wave of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian migrants to Australia was to develop their careers; they considered studying in Australia to be part of their investment in their career, as well as a pathway to getting a visa and entering Australia permanently. Immigrant M.1.5. reported that he and his partner had looked for ways to obtain the best legal status they could in Australia. Accordingly, he arrived at first as a dependant on his partner's visa. Then they switched to permanent residency with him as the main applicant. Immigrant M.1.8. and Immigrant M.1.9. also confirmed that their ultimate aim was to migrate for employment rather than study, but that in order to do this it had been necessary for one of the partners to enrol at an Australian university, regardless of her having received a double higher degree in Ukraine.

Immigrant M.1.4. pointed out that dependants of student visa holders could have full work rights only if their spouses studied for a master's degree of more than 12 months duration and held a Higher Education Sector visa (subclass 573) [AGDHA 2019a]. This observation confirms the importance of student migration as a means of economic migration to Australia. (By contrast, applying for short training courses is not enough to achieve the goal of bringing a working partner into the country.) The interviewee emphasised that under Australian immigration law Ukrainian citizens have disadvantages compared even to nationals of some other foreign countries. Immigrant M.1.4. stated that Ukraine was on a special list of 'risk' countries, nationals of which did not have a choice other than to enrol for at least 12 months in order to bring partners to Australia with full work rights. According to her, nationals of some countries are exempted from this rule. It might be that at the time of the application by Immigrant M.1.4. such a list existed, but at the time of writing visa 573 was not longer available for application.

5.2.2. Temporariness of immigrant status

Analysis of the data collected in Australia shows that one of the factors that place migrants into a precarious position is a limitation imposed by the visas which Ukrainian migrants receive upon entry, namely, their temporary character. Temporariness as a feature of the legal migrant status limits mobility in the labour market, because many Australian employers refuse to employ temporary residents. For example, as Immigrant M.1.4. put it, 'In every advertisement on SEEK (Ltd) [a website] I found [the words], "permanent residents or Australian citizens or New Zealanders only." [...]. That is, for international students to find a skilled job in their occupation is almost impossible.' The situation is one well described by the term 'migrant penalty,' introduced in Chapter Two.

Immigrant M.1.8. went through the same experience of being excluded from job vacancies requiring permanent residence status. She indicated that she would probably have worked full-time if she had been allowed to do so. She also confirmed that students had limited employment opportunities in Australia, and that this mostly related to their temporary status and the unwillingness of potential employers to take risks and invest effort in a person who might leave soon. As a result of this limitation immigrants who succeeded in finding an employer were dependent on a single employer and limited in their ability to negotiate about their salaries or promotions.

Temporariness of migrants' status can also be caused by the complexity of the bureaucratic process involved in receiving a permanent residency permit – a process that also has the potential to bind the migrant to a particular employer. The majority of the research participants stated that they do not necessarily consider Australia to be their country of settlement. However, they all confirmed that the status of permanent resident was a goal that they aimed to achieve. Obtaining permanent residence, they believed, would allow them to expand their rights, which, in turn, would improve their economic and social well-being. For example, when asked, 'What was your purpose in obtaining this residence permit: to settle here forever, or simply to expand your rights?,' Immigrant M.1.7., the secondary holder of a temporary work visa (subclass 457) responded,

> Yes, to expand our rights. And once extended rights are available we will decide whether it is really worth staying here forever. Because permanent residency gives

> one the opportunity to live here, but does not deprive one of the right to return to Ukraine. What's more, it opens the prospect of considering the possibility of both returning and staying.

The majority of the interviewees held opinions similar to those of Immigrant M.1.7. regarding the opportunities that the status of permanent resident offers. These favourable opinions about permanent residency implied negative attitudes toward their temporary status prior to obtaining permanent residence: the sense of being tied up working at the same place while trying to persuade an employer to nominate them for a permanent visa such as the Employer Nomination Scheme Visa (subclass 186), or the feeling of significant dissatisfaction with their visa status and the set of obligations that immigration law imposed on them.

Some examples may illustrate such dissatisfaction. Immigrant M.1.4. felt disadvantaged in the labour market because of her student status, although, according to the law, there was no reason for her to experience any disadvantage. Her case is evidence of the fact that some employers are able to take advantage of immigrants with non-permanent status:

> I worked before I became a permanent resident. I worked in three places. The first job was an unpaid internship. It always bothered me, because if I could not find a job in my occupation, why then had I studied it and spent that money?! Then at my second job [...] they always let me understand that since I do not have a permanent visa, I cannot just leave them. They paid me less than I would have been paid if, for example, I had had permanent residence. At my third job, [...] it seemed to me, they just did not realise that I could not go and find another job without being a permanent resident. But on the other hand they apparently

> did understand this, because when I got a visa [permanent residence], they offered me another contract the same day for a much larger amount.

There were also situations where, by contrast, workers did not have any feeling of being disadvantaged. In conversation Immigrant M.1.2. observed that professionals like him in the IT industry usually did not consider joining any professional associations that might improve their ability to exercise their labour rights: 'Never even thought about it.' He further explained,

> I'm not talking about myself, I say this in general: being tied [to an employer] on a [temporary work] visa is a formula for potential abuse by the employer and creates the possibility of such abuse. Why? Because the employer can lower your wages, right? You cannot easily leave this employer, unless you want to return to your home country. I did not have this problem, because […] I was interested in all the experience [that I would gain], and since I was not an economic migrant I was never going to stay here in the first place. I did not have to worry about whether I could afford a mortgage here – the money that I received was enough for me and my family to live on.

Immigrant M.1.5. was not bothered by salaries either, for the same reason: 'I clearly understood how much I was paid and for what. It was more or less enough for me. I was satisfied.' The response of the interviewee shows that he did not consider whether his payment was fair or not, but whether it was enough for him. Presumably he received more in Melbourne than in Ukraine, and this demotivated him from getting to know the market situation.

The majority of the interviewees indicated that they felt highly dependent on employers due to their desire to be nominated for a permanent residence visa. For this reason, they tended to behave in ways intended to 'please' their employer: 'I worked so much that when I quit I had two months of unused leave […]. I suppose I had a very serious attitude towards work […]. This helped me in the sense that the employer agreed to sponsor my visa' (Immigrant M.1.5.).

All the participants in Melbourne who held temporary visas intended to access permanent residency through the employer-nominated visa class. This, however, was often accompanied by the sense of being bound to the existing employer. Crépeau (2015, n.p.) described this predicament as 'a factor in the precariousness of migrant workers, as they will endure unfair conditions in order to make sure that the employer will not derail their access to permanent residence.' One of the interviewees, Diaspora Activist M.2.3., remarked that: 'if they [migrants] were on this visa, and their plan was to stay, they might deliberately decide not to demand compliance with their rights and simply endure […] these inconveniences with the purpose of being able later to apply for permanent residency.' In this the diaspora activist concurred with Crépeau (2015, n.p.).

The interviewed group did not generally experience abuse, but the temporariness of their status together with their desire to obtain permanent residence was a source of anxiety. These circumstances may have encouraged migrants to endure positions of disadvantage. For example, when asked about overtime work, both Immigrant M.1.2. Immigrant M.1.5. said that they worked overtime and were not financially rewarded for doing so. However, they both emphasised that this was completely at their own initiative. Immigrant M.1.5., who worked zealously to help his employer in difficult times, was later rewarded:

> They saw that I wanted to help them, [working as I did] beyond the business hours of nine to six. […] They agreed to help me, too: they were ready to put in some work to prepare additional documents and to pay some extra money to help me stay in Australia.

Immigrant M.1.2. worked overtime for no extra pay because of his desire to maintain his reputation in the IT sector. In Germany IT professionals usually demand financial reward if they work overtime. The explanation of this difference lies in the different labour laws and social standards in the two countries. In Australia migrants sometimes encountered the expectation that they would work 'flexibly.'

Other reasons why migrants apply for permanent residence visa as soon as possible are considered in the Section 5.6. of this Chapter.

5.2.3. Precariousness experienced by migrants who enter the labour market without an employment offer

Speaking of immigrants who arrive in the country without an offer of employment, Diaspora Activist M.2.3. said, 'The point [for them] is whether they will have a job, and how they'll get it.' In other words, the most important thing for such migrants is to find employment. They are exposed to forms of precariousness different from those encountered by migrants who receive a temporary visa with a job offer arranged beforehand (Immigrant M.1.10.). This group includes holders of student visas, partners of holders of temporary work visas and some permanent residents who received their status before entering Australia such as holders of Independent Skilled visa (subclass 189) or the Skilled Nominated visa (subclass 190).

As shown above, immigrants with temporary status encounter difficulties in finding employment because many advertisements specify that a position is open to 'citizens or permanent residents only'. Immigrant M.1.7. explained that there are particular professions in the government sector that require potential employees to be permanent residents or citizens. But this situation is rather unique. In other cases, such advertisements were posted by private companies which, according to the law, were able to employ non-permanent residents.

To receive an employment offer before applying for a visa, potential immigrants are required to find an employer who would be willing to initiate the process of invitation, as Immigrant M.1.2. did by undergoing an internship at the company that would later employ him:

> Since I had been working there for four months, I was genuinely involved in real projects. [...] I had interacted directly with clients of the company. Doing the internship put me in the position where, if someone were to ask, 'Who else is suited for this position? Who else has the experience, understands the needs of the company and knows its clients?' there would be no one [except me]. (Laughs.)

Receiving a Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) does not guarantee that the labour market will not exploit a person's lack of experience of the local system. Immigrant M.1.6. did not know that the type of employment contract that he signed involved the duty of working overtime. The respondent wished he had known more about this type of employment, since its conditions were unexpected for him and caused inconvenience:

> I was looking for a job and it was extremely difficult [to find one], so I agreed to a ‘contract.’[8] Well, I didn’t know how bad it was. I was employed through an intermediary – a third party. I would never have agreed to be employed through any specialized agency [if he had been familiar with this type of employment beforehand] – simply never, not for any salary. Was this [his unsatisfactory work conditions] related to my immigration status? Only partly. For example, if I had been, let’s say, a student who had just graduated, it would have been similarly difficult. (Immigrant M.1.6.)

These words compare the status of Immigrant M.1.6., an experienced skilled immigrant on an independent visa, with that of Australian graduates who are at the beginning of their careers and must accept unfavourable working conditions if they want to have their first experience of working in their occupation. Immigrant M.1.6.’s testimony corroborates the findings of the literature on precariousness which sees graduates and students as also belonging to the ‘precariat’ (e.g. Standing 2012, 595).

5.2.4. Public services in Australia and visa status

In Germany migrants were especially critical of public services that worked with delays and made mistakes due to language misunderstandings and difficulties in interpreting newly introduced legal norms. In Australia, complaints were not related to these issues, perhaps because Australian public services are more technologically automated and English as a lingua franca is more accessible for migrants.

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[8] The contract to which Immigrant M.1.6. refers was of the kind where a job agency – the intermediary between the employee and the real employer – figures as the official employer. Under such a contract the worker cannot directly negotiate with the (real) employer over pay or other conditions. All of the employee’s conditions are inscribed into the contract with the intermediary company, which profits from the difference between what the (real) employer pays, and what the employee receives under the contract.

However, Australian immigration rules are subject to frequent change, a fact that puts immigrants into precarious positions, especially those seeking to transfer from a temporary visa to permanent residency. Diaspora Activist M.2.1. described this predicament as follows:

> I have friends here who have already had a working visa for four years, but they are still uncertain about what will happen next. Many come here, say, as students, and then try to get a job. They try to find different ways to stay […]. I often see that some are faced with the fact that the [immigration] agents that they know promise a lot, take their money, and then disappear.

Here the diaspora activist mentions another source of precariousness: the risks related to the use of immigration agents. Inability to be protected from the consequences of using the services of unqualified immigration agents can put migrants into precarious conditions.

Immigrant M.1.7., the dependant of a partner on a temporary work visa, commented on how changes in immigration law suddenly complicated their access to permanent residency:

> Well, due to the complexity of the system that the government is trying to implement here things will be more difficult, but everything depends on the employer. That is, if the employer agrees to sponsor [the permanent residence application]. And here the question also arises of how much he will have to pay for it. We still have six months to wait [before applying]. In general, it is possible

> [to get permanent residency], but the occupation we have [is listed] neither as regional, nor state, nor federal, and therefore [we can get permanent residency] only through the sponsorship of the employer.

The interviewee emphasised that the chance of receiving the desired permanent residence visa depended on her husband's employer. The whole family hoped that he would be nominated, so they could all stay. The predicament of Immigrant M.1.7.'s family confirms the findings of the literature which suggests that there has been a shift in Australia's migrant policy direction from a skills-driven orientation to an employer-sponsored orientation in both permanent and temporary programs (Czaika 2018, 15).

The next step that a migrant must take after being nominated by an employer is to apply for an actual visa that allows the migrant to settle in Australia permanently and consequently to be given access to a wider set of entitlements (AGDHA 2019b). Immigrant M.1.4. described the length of the application process as follows:

> We started this process probably in February 2015. […] There were several stages in this process. In about a year's time we applied for permanent residence, and this took another 10 months. That is, we received permanent residence on the 186 visa in January this year [2017].

These words illustrate the fact that applying for, and receiving, permanent residency requires much time and paperwork. The complexity of the process also discourages employers from accelerating the nomination of their immigrant employees for permanent residency, as in the following case: Immigrant M.1.10. was eligible to apply for a permanent employer-sponsored visa before entering Australia. Instead, his employer told him that such a process required a lot of time, whereas the company needed a specialist urgently. The employer thus insisted that Immigrant M.1.10. apply for a 457 visa – a temporary visa. The employer promised that he would nominate the immigrant for a permanent visa after he had worked and lived in Australia for two years. Yet the employer delayed acting on his promise for a period which at the time of writing had lasted for more than a year. Indeed, as was mentioned before, for some employers it may be convenient to keep their workers on temporary visas.

Bureaucratic processes also make it difficult for the potential migrant to work out whether an employer is seeking an employee on a temporary visa in order to be able to dictate conditions, including salary, or whether the employer genuinely needs to fill a position immediately.

5.2.5. Risks for family members

Secondary applicants are usually at a bigger disadvantage than primary applicants. A statement by Immigrant M.1.9. illustrates how the legal status of dependants limits their abilities to exercise certain rights:

> In the second company they were straightforward and said, 'We want to hire you – we have not found anyone better. But we cannot hire you because your visa depends on your wife [...]. Tomorrow she could decide to return to Ukraine, and we would lose you as an employee, because your visa would automatically be cancelled if she did not continue her education.

Immigrant M.1.9. said that he would not be able to undertake any desirable type of employment, in particular the contractual employment typical of his field. In the IT industry, for example, due to the fact that contract jobs are generally given on a temporary basis (e.g. six months), an employer could not sponsor a permanent visa for Immigrant M.1.9.

There is yet another complication associated with the status of a dependant of a temporary visa holder. To be employed, Immigrant M.1.9. had to lodge with the employer his wife's identity documents, including her certificate of enrolment at the Australian university where she was studying and evidence of their marital relationship. These documents confirmed for the employer that the person was a legal migrant, but they also signalled that his stay in Australia could be limited in time. Furthermore, dependants of primary visa holders cannot open their own bank account while they are unemployed. This creates barriers for people wishing to bring their savings to Australia and makes life uncomfortable for them. Interviewee M.1.9.'s report reflects the fact that the pattern of economic migration using the provisions of the student visa is quite new for many employers who, accordingly, are apprehensive over the risks of employing dependent applicants.

5.3. Socio-economic characteristics of skilled Ukrainian immigrants in Melbourne and motivations for leaving Ukraine

Chapter Four discussed the change in the socio-economic status of Ukrainian skilled migrants, mainly Information Technology (IT) specialists, and their families that resulted from their migration to Berlin: a decline in their purchasing power and the status that was attached to their income. The wave of migration of Ukrainian IT professionals to Australia in the years immediately before the Euromaidan was studied by Oleinikova (2015) on the basis of interviews with Ukrainian immigrants residing in Sydney and its surrounds. In the course of my fieldwork in Melbourne, by contrast, I met informants from a range of professional backgrounds; IT was just one of the industries in which my interviewees were employed. The Euromaidan events of late 2013 were followed by the military conflict that continues at the time of writing (2019). For IT professionals this fact mattered, since their incomes were calculated in foreign currency at a time when inflation drove the Ukrainian Hryvnia to a third of its previous value. Ukrainian IT professionals suddenly became much richer than professionals employed in other industries. After migration to Germany, where the IT profession is well paid, but is not advantaged relative to other professions to the same extent as in Ukraine, most Ukrainian IT workers experienced a downgrade not only of their purchasing power, but also their incomes, as well as their social positions. This occurred because of their acceptance of employment offers with the purpose of fast-track migration (Council of the European Union 2009). In Melbourne, Immigrant M.1.9. made a similar observation with regard to the economic situation in Ukraine and IT professionals:

> IT professionals [in Ukraine] used to be much as they are now in Australia – ordinary people. [But after the Euromaidan] they have become something of a special class. There's an IT boom[9] going on, and because of the large difference [in Ukraine between the incomes of persons working in IT and other professionals] it doesn't look as if it is going to end in the next two or three years. All the young people who work in IT in Ukraine feel themselves to be an elite.

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[9] Ukrainian politicians, Ukrainian and some global media outlets and think tanks suggest that Ukraine's information technology industry is thriving, and did so especially in the years 2013-2018. In particular, their reports focus on Ukraine's rich engineering past as a former member of the USSR and the consequent supply of tech-trained specialists. Some also name the cheap cost of developing the industry and the start-up atmosphere among the reasons for such a flourishing of the industry. (UkraineInvest 2018, 24; Tkach and Stoelwinder 2018; Rybak 2018; National News Agency of Ukraine 2019; Collins 2019).

> That's why it seems irrational that some people leave everything and go to Melbourne. The economics of this point of view is not clear to many people.

Since the majority of persons I interviewed in Melbourne were not IT professionals, I cannot make a generalisation about the downgrading of the incomes of skilled IT immigrants from Ukraine to Melbourne after the Euromaidan events. The majority of my interviewees, including IT professionals, did not draw attention to changes in their socio-economic status. Here is how Immigrant M.1.10. commented on the question of income:

> Frankly speaking, I was not much driven by economic factors. Although I was not a rich person [in Ukraine], I do not think that money is the most important thing in life. We have got enough money here. I simply wanted to try to live in a more developed society. Because [the Australian employer] wanted to attract me, I was immediately given a great salary.

The idea of migrating to Australia for a change in lifestyle prevailed among the research participants in Melbourne. Similar trends have been observed by researchers of other skilled migrant groups (Castles 2016, 395).[10] Like many participants who migrated to Berlin and were not motivated by the prospect of better incomes, Ukrainians applying for migration to Australia were more focussed on other factors such as the political situation in Ukraine, the opportunity of broadening their professional horizons and their desire for adventure.

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[10] What comprises the Australian lifestyle is, obviously, a matter of opinion. Nonetheless, the study of Purdie and Wilss (2007, 79) suggests that young people understand Australian lifestyle through the lens of two dimensions: 1) plenty of leisurely outdoors activities, sport, a focus on achievement, mateship; 2) a 'lifestyle of one's choice,' implying the ability to easily maintain democratic values, such as voicing an opinion and choosing one's religion.

For some interviewees, however, the downgrading of their economic position and occupational status was a crucial concern. In order to avoid such an outcome some undertook educational courses, mostly master's degrees, in Australia on top of their higher degrees in Ukraine, as was reported in Chapter Two. Others nonetheless considered accepting offers that would downgrade their career development:

> I had two options. One of them was a great proposal for emigration to [an East European country]. It would have meant a wonderful upgrade in the profession with excellent career prospects. [The other option was to go] to Australia, where my professional position has been significantly downgraded. We decided with my partner, nevertheless, to sacrifice my career ambitions for the sake of family well-being. It seemed to us that it would be better for the children and for my partner as well, so we chose Australia. (Immigrant M.1.10.)

Van Hear (2014) describes professionals such as those who migrate from Ukraine after the Euromaidan as generally politically active and likely to participate in protest actions. Melbourne data support this generalisation. Like many Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin, most of those who migrated to Melbourne were participants in the events of the Euromaidan. Immigrant M.1.5.'s partner volunteered to help with the organisation of protests, Immigrants M.1.7. and M.1.10. attended demonstrations, while Immigrant M.1.2. and his family helped coordinate local protests outside Kyiv. Most of them said that neither the Revolution of Dignity nor the outbreak of military conflict in eastern Ukraine was a push factor for their migration. For some, however, it was a trigger. Migration did not prevent these people from being dedicated supporters of volunteer fighters or of other causes in Ukraine or the Ukrainian community in Australia.

Van Hear (2014) applies the term 'precariat' even to people who possess human capital (e.g., are well-educated or experienced) but cannot find the ideal position in the labour market which, in their view, is appropriate to their social status, and for this reason seek means, including international migration, by which to improve their situation. Yakushko (2013, 518) points out that, despite possessing diverse forms of capital (e.g., human capital, social capital, cultural capital), migrants are not protected from discrimination or poverty in the destination country – indeed, from membership of the precariat. This is true also of some Ukrainian skilled migrants who came to Australia after participating in the Euromaidan: they were politically engaged in Ukraine, highly interested in reforms, well educated and relatively prosperous. As professionals they enjoyed an acceptable standard of living and relatively high social status. Some of them, however, did not find in Australia the recognition and social rewards to which they thought themselves entitled. This may partly explain why such people were sensitive to their status in destination countries.

5.4. Migrant penalty and skill recognition barriers: Melbourne

This section documents the consequences of Australian policies that contribute to Ukrainian migrants' precariousness. The concept of 'migrant penalty' helps to qualify such consequences. It is evident that this concept is well suited to encompass the situation of migrants in Melbourne, whereas it was less relevant to Berlin.

Australian immigration authorities maintain an extended list of professions whose members can apply for permanent visas. At the time of writing occupations whose practitioners can apply for Skilled Independent Visa (subclass 189) – Points-tested stream, for example, include accountant, agricultural consultant, translator, a range of medical and IT professionals, as well as many others (AGDHA 2018c). Indeed, members of the Melbourne Ukrainian community who immigrated after the end of 2013 reflect this broad array of professions.

While there is a certain number of people who successfully apply for such permanent visas as the Employer Nomination Scheme Visa (subclass 186), the Skilled Independent Visa (subclass 189) and the Skilled Nominated Visa (subclass 190), there are also skilled workers who are not eligible to apply for permanent residency. They include, for example, people who arrived as family members of primary applicants and did not undergo skills assessment at the time of their first entry into the country or were not nominated by an employer. Such people encounter difficulties in accessing jobs after their arrival. One of them explained why, from her perspective, many professions that Ukrainians possess are not transferable or only partly transferable to Australia:

> This is due to the specifics of the profession and the fact that the diploma is from Ukraine. The procedure [of recognition] involves the assessment of a diploma [...]. Firstly, the Ukrainian education assessments of university subjects are not easily transferrable to the local education system; and the second problem is that the subjects in my diploma have such titles as 'Criminal Law of Ukraine,' or 'Constitutional Law of Ukraine.' It would help if it were just 'Constitutional Law.' But the 'Ukrainian' element crippled the possibility of having my diploma recognised. I was told that I would need to retrain, and this would require two and a half to three years of study at university (A research participant).[11]

The response from this immigrant illustrates the fact that, in order to be employed in some occupations, formal recognition by professional associations is essential. Inability to have her diploma recognised prevented this immigrant from taking a job in the tertiary sector of economy and inclined her to take up unqualified employment. Such a situation, referred to as brain waste (Sassen 1988; Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden 2008) or educational mismatch (Chiswick and Miller 2011, 111; Leontiyeva 2014), is one of the reasons why, according to Heath and Cheung (2007, 5), immigrants are often unable to access jobs in foreign labour markets. Diaspora Activist M.2.2. mentioned a similar case where a lawyer who came to Australia was not able to have his diploma recognised or to work in his profession.

The complex process of recognition of Ukrainian diplomas leads professionals from Ukraine to give up their occupations in favour of other jobs and activities:

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[11] See Chapter Three for an explanation of why this interviewee was indexed in this way.

> As for the recognition of my educational qualifications, I once thought about it and tried to understand [the process] a bit. From what I read at the time I concluded that it was not worth [the effort of trying]. I decided that, when I started looking for a job, I'd start from scratch. (Immigrant M.1.1.)

Immigrant M.1.3. likewise concluded that her professional qualification would not be useful in Australia and decided to undertake a TAFE (Technical and Further Education)[12] course. She also volunteered in charitable organisations such as Op-Shop and the Red Cross in order to get local experience. Consequently, Immigrant M.1.3. was outside the labour market for a considerable period of time. She was of the opinion that migrants could not expect normal earnings for their first job: 'When I arrived […] I managed to find a job, but the only thing is that this job […] is not financially profitable – it's just a hobby. It helps me keep up some of my skills.'

Local experience appears to be the requirement most in demand in the Australian labour market, as immigration law, too, attests. For example, in applications for a points-tested visa such as the Independent Skilled Visa (class 189), a year of local experience is considered to be as valuable as three years of professional experience outside Australia (AGDHA 2018d). Immigrant M.1.4., who graduated with a master's degree in Australia on top of her Ukrainian higher degree, declared that, based on her experience, Ukrainian diplomas were not wanted in Australia: her qualifications, whether reported in her resume or explained during job interviews, were ignored, even though, at the stage of applying to study at an Australian university, she had been required to undergo a formal procedure of recognition of her Ukrainian diplomas and submit recognised certificates to her Australian university. By contrast, her Australian diploma was appreciated. The evidence from Immigrant M.1.4. confirms other reports that employers in the Melbourne market tend to ignore Ukraine-issued diplomas even from the top universities and for market-relevant occupations. I suggest that these are cases where migrant penalty comes into play.

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[12] In Australia, technical and further education or TAFE institutions provide a wide range of predominantly vocational courses. These are mostly qualifying courses under the National Training System/Australian Qualifications Framework/Australian Quality Training Framework.

In the same vein, Immigrant M.1.5. stated that he utilised his Ukrainian diplomas only while applying for his permanent residence visa, the Employer Nomination Scheme Visa (subclass 186). He used them when undergoing the prescribed skills assessment process (AGDHA 2018e). The job he found did not relate to his profession, but was also highly paid.

Immigrant M.1.6. is an accountant. His professional qualification is recognised by the relevant professional association and his profession is in demand in the market. However, he insisted that his job search was still complicated due to his lack of local experience. In this case immigration policy allowed the immigrant to enter Australia, but did not take into account the fact that the immigrant would not be able to find employment because of additional informal labour market requirements. Immigrant M.1.6. attested that getting his first experience in the Australian labour market was the greatest challenge he faced in the process of economic integration, and in the beginning it required preparation and significant financial support. This also held true for Immigrant M.1.3., whose savings from her previous well-paid job in Ukraine enabled her to spend some time volunteering. Immigrant M.1.7. was informed by an employee of a job agency that immigrants' resumes were not considered if they did not include local experience. Certain kinds of disadvantage, if they cannot be demonstrated to fall within an official definition of discrimination, can still be instances of migrant penalty: 'An acquaintance of mine, a human resources officer, told me that in Australia there is a clandestine practice whereby, once they see your [foreign] surname and given name, they understand that you do not have local background [and consider your application less favourably]' (A research participant). The fact of possible discrimination, however, cannot be proved in such cases, given that it is based on speculation and word of mouth. Regarding possible discrimination, Diaspora Activist M.2.3. said, 'This is a difficult question. I think that there is now an atmosphere of suspicion towards immigrants in Australian society.'

Immigrant M.1.6. explained that in some occupations extra qualifications such as licenses and certificates for courses are demanded on top of university degrees:

> It's a feature of the financial labour market, which is overflowing with skilled workers – I've heard it so many times, and I confirm it. It is also extremely difficult to get one's first [work] experience. Plus, there are local and even international certifications of expertise in finance [that one needs to have]. The market is so strong that without these certificates it is difficult to get a good job, so I've started to sit for these exams.

Chiswick and Miller (2011, 115) see the requirement to get occupational licences as one of the barriers to migrants' accessing the labour market in the occupations for which they qualified by completing university degrees in their countries of origin. However, visas allow entry into the receiving country without these licences, encouraging wrong expectations. This explains the education-employment mismatch which migrants frequently encounter in the host countries' labour market and has their disappointment as its result – as well as, sometimes, brain waste.

Diaspora Activist M.2.1. described cases of Ukrainians who arrived as medical workers but did not manage to complete the process of diploma recognition or to pass the required examinations in time. As a result, these doctors ended up taking on physical work, and their qualifications were wasted by the Australian market. The evidence provided by immigrants in Melbourne suggests that most of the occupations named in the lists of eligible skilled occupations (AGDHA 2018f) were not considered in practice to be highly in demand, with the exception of IT professionals. Immigrant M.1.9., for example, was surprised to see the many offers available in the field of information and communications technologies. But Diaspora Activist M.2.2., drawing on the experience of communicating with newcomers, suggested that translators, teachers and philologists were at risk of being ignored by employers due to the expectation that their command of the English language would be inadequate, despite their diplomas being recognised by Australian professional associations.

Such a mismatch between legal regulations and market demand was observed by Diaspora Activist M.2.1. In relation to the State-nominated Permanent Visa class 190 he commented,

> Of course I think they are suffering. If a specialist has worked or, say, had a certain position in Ukraine and cannot do anything here – at some point that can destroy one's faith in oneself. So I think that the immigration policy should have been somehow [different]. I know one man, a skilled worker, who has no work. When I went to [the relevant] Australian government website, I saw that his occupation was sought after here [in the state of Victoria], and yet he cannot find a job.

Discrepancies such as these between the official account of demand for occupations, and the real situation in the job market, help explain why many such migrants take Australian higher degree courses on top of their education in Ukraine and apply for student visas. Similar situations of educational mismatch were documented for the Czech Republic by Leontiyeva (2014) and through my fieldwork in Germany.

Diaspora Activist M.2.1. noted that in cases where an Australian state nominated a particular profession as being in demand, an applicant who obtained the corresponding visa (e.g. visa subclass 190) was obliged to stay and live in this state for the next two years. The fact that official lists of professions that are in demand in Australia are outdated affects these migrants to the extent that they need to give up their professions and undertake unqualified employment for that period, leading to brain waste.

The testimony of Immigrant M.1.9. may serve as a summary of this section by providing several details of the extent of the ethnic penalty experienced by recent Ukrainian migrants in Melbourne:

> I am constantly confronted with the fact that I must have documents that are recognised here. This means that a) they must be in English, which for us is not always an option, because [all our documents] are in Ukrainian; b) they must be recognised internationally, [which is a problem because] in our country, the Bologna [points] system has just begun to work; c) everything must be certified – but a [Ukrainian] notary cannot write anything in English, because it's just illegal in Ukraine. Australians cannot understand how this notary cannot certify a signature in English […]. I could apply for a [permanent] visa, but I have a

> problem. I studied computer science and in fact I could be recognised as a specialist in this field. But on the basis of my certificates I cannot be so recognised. This is the biggest thing that impedes me now in my efforts to integrate [economically].

5.5. The role of English language proficiency and self-representation for Ukrainian migrants in Melbourne

As was discussed in Chapter Two, language is a skill acquired by an individual and, in consequence, an element of that individual's human capital (Boucher 2016, 22). Immigration policy imposes language requirements on migrants, determining the minimum level of language competence required in order to apply for particular types of visa. In Australia, the language competence of intending migrants is measured through international examinations such as IELTS (Minister for Citizenship of Australia 2018; AGDHA 2018a; AGDHA 2018b). All primary applicants for skilled or work visas are required to pass such an examination. Where applicants undergo skills assessment, high grades in the IELTS examination can be rewarded with extra points, easing access to permanent residency. Spouses of those who apply for permanent visas are required to pass the IELTS as well, although they are not required to reach the same grades as the primary applicant. They can also pay an additional visa application charge instead of passing this exam.[13] In the opinion of Immigrant M.1.1. the bureaucratic processes related to immigration are complex for average Ukrainian applicants, in particular for those with limited English language skills. In particular, as she put it,

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[13] To apply for the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) family members, who do not speak functional English can be required to pay the second instalment charge of an indicated amount (AGDHA 2019d). In 2019 this charge was $4,885.

> For a person from Ukraine to understand visas and all their nuances, and how to fill out [visa applications] properly if that person does not speak English very well – this is probably very difficult. Even for a person who speaks the language it's not easy. (Immigrant M.1.1.)

As was mentioned in the previous section, Heath and Cheung argue that lack of language fluency is one of the reasons why even skilled immigrants are often unable to access jobs and move up the socio-economic ladder. Inadequate language competence significantly reduces an immigrant's productivity in occupations and positions that require utilization of communication skills and, in consequence, restricts migrants to less-skilled jobs or manual labour. Poor knowledge of the main language of the host country may lead migrants to work with members of ethnic communities whose language they know – co-ethnics, for example (Heath and Cheung 2007, 5). Regarding brain waste and working in ethnic enclaves because of a lack of language fluency, Diaspora Activist M.2.2. noted:

> Because of their lack of knowledge of English, [migrants] go to Russian-speaking employers [in this case the research participant had in mind members of the broader 'Soviet' community, not speakers of Russian who identify themselves as Ukrainians] employers and are employed there [...]. We know quite a lot of cases where such people are exploited. For example, one young woman worked for a month and was not paid, and that was called 'training.' Then for the next month she was already supposed to be paid, but they still didn't pay her. This went on for a few months. And she felt that she needed to keep that job – because, though she was looking for work elsewhere, she could not find any. There are similar cases in 'Russian' stores. They pay very little and

> conditions are also such that [...] their hours fill up the whole time when they [migrants] could go to look for another job.

The information provided by Diaspora Activist M.2.2. refers to a state of affairs common in ethnic enclaves. Ukrainians all over the world tend to join Russian-speaking communities based on a shared language (Ukraine is bilingual) and the common USSR background.[14] Diaspora Activist M.2.2. also noted that because in Melbourne there is no area densely settled by Ukrainians and few businesses are run by Ukrainians, many newcomer Ukrainian migrants turn to the broader community of post-Soviet employers, who are mainly Russians.

The fact that language is considered to be the biggest barrier for labour market integration was confirmed by many interviewees. For example, when asked, 'What would be the most important thing that would help newly arrived immigrants to integrate properly into the labour market?' Diaspora Activist M.2.3. responded,

> First of all, knowledge of the language is very important for this. Especially for those people who do not have extensive work experience abroad, even if they had such experience in Ukraine [...]. [The problem is] not accent, because in Australia all speak with accents, but speaking correctly, using correct language – grammar and syntax – yes, this matters.

Not all interviewees, however, agreed that accent is not an issue: Immigrant M.1.4. said that her boss had remarked that her accent had 'good days and bad days.*'*

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[14] For example, in Germany a network of Russian-speaking enterprises was involved in illegal businesses and received a bad reputation (Radio Svoboda 2016).

On another aspect of cultural custom, the style of job interviews, Diaspora Activist M.2.3. observed,

> [Immigrants] simply do not imagine how the system works, how the Australian resume should properly look, what you should emphasise, what the format should be, what the interview scheme looks like – because each country has its own specific protocols [...]. [It is necessary to know] where to look for a job and how to react when you are not offered it; and to realise that this very often does not mean that you are being discriminated against – or maybe it does.

Diaspora Activist M.2.1., likewise, referred to the manner of self-representation of newly arrived Ukrainians during job interviews. Ukrainian interview style differs from its Australian counterpart, and failure to take account of this often puts migrants at a disadvantage:

> It may be that there is an inherent trait of modesty in almost every Ukrainian: we cannot glorify ourselves. We can always praise anyone else, glorify someone else. And we always put ourselves in the last place. And so, for many people, this can be a little bit damaging as they try to integrate.

According to Immigrant M.1.3., in workplaces Australian-born people tend to separate their communication circles from immigrants, trusting each other more than anyone else. Immigrant M.1.3. thought that this was not discrimination, but said that it did engender a feeling of exclusion. This instance of 'migrant penalty' confirms the insight of Hasmath (2012, 82) discussed in Section 2.1.5. of Chapter Two, and vividly highlights how absence of trust toward immigrants might cause them to feel disadvantaged in comparison to locals. Immigrant M.1.6.

also argued that there was, in his opinion, 'a difference between those who were born and raised in Australia and the rest in terms of pure Australian accent and local slang.' Immigrant M.1.8. pointed out that it was easier to establish friendly relationships with other migrants than with people who saw themselves as established members of the Australian population.

Immigrant M.1.4. emphasised that language proficiency plays a crucial role for networking and as a consequence for developing careers. She said that her Australian co-workers used slang and jokes, but when she joined a conversation they would begin to pick their words and to speak much simpler English with her than with each other. Immigrant M.1.4. also noted that her English proficiency might be an obstacle to her efforts to get a promotion:

> My profession is very technical; there is a lot of professional terminology I need to use. I am at a very initial level now. When I need to communicate professionally with a lawyer or with someone else, I simply cannot pick the right words, for example. I know how I would say [what is needed] in Ukrainian or Russian, but it is very difficult for me to look professional in English.

Immigrant M.1.5. concluded that the accent of any immigrant will never be perfect or reach 'native' level. Immigrant M.1.9. also emphasised that incorrect pronunciation would be the biggest obstacle to his climbing the socio-economic ladder in Australia. While this interviewee referred in rather general terms to 'attitudes' and 'opportunities,' Immigrant M.1.6. was more specific:

> I heard from some of my colleagues that top managerial positions are a little harder to get if you are not born in Australia – if you have a cultural accent. It

> may be that when you compete on equal terms, with equal qualifications, you can lose against an Australian.

Immigrant M.1.7. emphasised that it was difficult to assess one's own level of English fluency since Australians never spoke about this issue. Immigrant M.1.1. said that despite the fact that she had been in Australia for many years, there were still areas of communication where she felt uncertain due to her lack of practice: her family spoke Ukrainian at home, and she had not worked for a couple of years due to maternity leave.

In Australia, immigrants experienced two main problems caused by language policies. First, those who migrated as primary applicants and whose language proficiency was thoroughly verified upon entry encountered difficulties mostly regarding promotion and their access to managerial positions. Secondly, immigrants who arrived as secondary applicants and whose qualifications were not verified (e.g., those on a temporary work visa) or who were admitted with very low language test grades (e.g., those on Visa subclass 189) encountered consequences of a more serious nature, such as inability to get an employment offer at all.

While in Germany the greatest obstacle to communication with public services was the inability of immigrants to speak German and the refusal of employees of state agencies to speak English, in Australia there was no corresponding situation. The status of English as a global lingua franca means that many migrants have relatively high English language skills. Additionally, in Australia structured access to translators and interpreters, offered as a public service, provides a way of resolving language issues where they arise.

5.6. Skilled migrants' access to the social safety net in Melbourne

Immigration law in Australia places temporary immigrants in a precarious position: they are not entitled to public healthcare (Medicare), and housing mortgages and education loans are much more expensive for them than for Australian citizens and permanent residents.[15]

Evidence from Diaspora Activist 2.3 illustrates the difficulty which skilled immigrants experience in accessing healthcare services due to the fact that they have no choice but to rely on private insurance and because of this neglect their health: 'I heard about cases where people delayed seeking medical assistance, especially when it came to dentists or ophthalmologists, because their private insurance didn't cover it.' The interviewee was pointing out that migrants who reside in Australia under the conditions of temporary visas such as student or temporary work visas are not entitled to be covered by Medicare or private medical insurance policies that can be purchased only if a person has become a permanent resident. Diaspora Activist M.2.2. emphasised that mothers as a group are at the biggest risk of undertreating their health because of their inability to use services under Medicare. Immigrant M.1.2. recalled that, when his wife was giving birth to their child, they were required, as temporary visa holders, to pay full hospital costs. Luckily for them, the mother and the child were completely healthy, which allowed them to check out of the hospital the morning after the childbirth and thus avoid paying extra fees. Immigrant M.1.7. and Immigrant M.1.10, who shared their experiences of being pregnant and giving birth in Australia without Medicare, found this to be an expensive ordeal.

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[15] For example, temporary residents are not entitled to apply for a First Home Owner Grant (FHOG) (State Revenue Office Victoria 2019). Temporary residents cannot get Commonwealth supported places (CSPs) in higher education institutions (Australian Government Study Assist 2019a). Permanent and temporary residents are not able to get HELP (Higher Education Loan Program) loans, except for very specific bridging study courses (Australian Government Study Assist 2019b).

Confirming the observation of Diaspora Activist M.2.3., Immigrant M.1.5. said that, while on a student visa, he and his partner could allow themselves to get sick in a way that required treatment only about once a year. They did not seek medical services that their insurance could not cover. Consequently, they ended up treating themselves with the help of traditional medicine: 'Some kind of tea with lemon and vitamins. That is, [the illness] wasn't anything serious – we were lucky that it wasn't.' Immigrant M.1.5. emphasised that, once he and his family had access to Medicare, they felt more secure and confident, and received significant financial support: 'Most medical tests are for free, and some doctors are completely free. [Mostly] you do not pay anything, and even where you do have to pay, you pay only a fraction.' These passages of the interview demonstrate how important it is for skilled immigrants to have the ability to use Medicare benefits. Immigrant M.1.3., who received access to Medicare with permanent residency, remarked: 'You know, [now] if you get sick, you do not have to pay crazy money.' This reflection demonstrates that even for immigrants who, like Immigrant M.1.3., are able to provide for themselves financially, it is crucial to have Medicare insurance.

Immigrant M.1.7. mentioned that contributions to the tax system which her husband paid for Medicare without having the legal right to use government-subsidised health services were able to be refunded at the end of the tax year. This was important for her family, where there were a number of children and only one person working; private insurance was a big part of the family budget. (They were obliged to pay both the Medicare levy through their taxes, and premiums for the private health insurance that temporary residents must subscribe to). Notwithstanding the refund, the family would have preferred to have the advantage of Medicare insurance.

Examination of Ukrainian immigrants' ability to access the social safety net in Berlin (Chapter Four) revealed two major reasons that prevent migrants from doing so. These correspond to the two main factors identified in previous literature on migration: restrictions imposed by immigration policies; and informal difficulties such as lack of language proficiency and unfamiliarity with local laws and rights (Askola 2012, 348).

With regard to housing, the case of Immigrant M.1.2. is illustrative. Immigrant M.1.2. explained that the company which invited him to Australia for an internship and later for work arranged housing for an initial period. Because at that time his family did not intend to settle in Australia they were not interested in getting a mortgage and were not concerned about this issue. (Immigrant M.1.2.'s employer was of Ukrainian origin, and the housing assistance rendered to the employee was an instance of the activation of the social capital of the Ukrainian community, a matter that will be explored in Chapter Six.) For Immigrant M.1.10., by contrast, the ability to get a mortgage was one of the reasons why the family desperately tried to switch from their temporary visa to permanent residency, since the company where Immigrant M.1.10. worked was not generous in providing the employee even with temporary housing, and therefore rent took up a big part of the family budget. Immigrant M.1.4., for her part, reported that due to her impending permanent status she would be entitled to various benefits such as social housing or grants from the government that could significantly reduce housing expenses.

With regard to other benefits granted by the state which can be considered welfare assistance, Immigrant M.1.2., who was able to compare his status as a temporary worker and as a permanent resident, confirmed that the social benefits of permanent residency are very useful in financial terms:

> As permanent residents we have already derived benefits from the refund of taxes, because there are children and my wife didn't work. [...] If a family's

> expenses are greater because they have children, the tax burden on the family is reduced. It was a refund from the taxes we had paid, and we used it.

Another factor that usually limits immigrants from accessing social benefits is their lack of familiarity with local laws and rights (Askola 2012, 348). In Berlin many Ukrainian skilled immigrants did not actively seek information about their entitlement to the social safety net because they thought it irresponsible to ask the government of a host country to fund their needs. A similar tendency was observed in Melbourne. As Immigrant M.1.3. put it,

> When we were migrating, we absolutely did not expect the state to help us in any way. We relied on our savings and our knowledge. We did not even think of approaching any institutions here.

Immigrant M.1.2. indicated that in general he had not used any social benefits even in his home country, because he could afford to live without them. Such an attitude of 'not being interested in social benefits' prevents migrants from learning about their entitlements. Immigrant M.1.4. and Immigrant M.1.5. both confirmed that, while working in Australia under the conditions of a temporary visa, they did not specifically investigate their entitlement to any social benefits. Yet, after receiving permanent residency, Immigrant M.1.4. eventually did discover that they were entitled, for example, to social housing. Immigrant M.1.5. had the following to say about social benefits: 'Apparently, we do have some rights to them, but I don't even know how that works, to be honest. That is, we did not think about it.' Likewise, Immigrant M.1.1. claimed that she was not interested in checking the social rights corresponding to her legal status. In other words, it is not the intention of this category of migrants, who in Ukraine had been relatively well off, to rely on the social safety net.

That skilled immigrants do not rely on social benefits is one of the assumptions of policymakers, according to the literature on the global race for talent (Hawthorne and To 2014; Boucher 2016; Czaika 2018). In fact, such reluctance to seek social welfare benefits helps boost the economies of host countries, which collect taxes from immigrants and utilise the potential of their human capital (Czaika 2018, 8). Yet, on balance, ability to access social benefits as compensation for a lack of career development might be a pull factor inducing migrants to stay in a particular country (Mahroum 2001). Ability to access social benefits easily, whether because of customary practices or of legal status, might encourage migrants to pick one destination country over another. In other words, social benefits could be a factor in the competition to attract desirable migrants.

In Melbourne as in Berlin, although many research participants stated that they ignored information about social benefits and were not particularly interested in using them even if they had the right to so, there were also some immigrants who paid particular attention to the entitlements which they could have as permanent residents, but which their temporary status denied them. For example, Immigrant M.1.7. explained that having access to public schools had financial significance for her family:

> In Victoria education for children is free of charge and high school is also covered, but at universities [the cost for temporary residents is the same as it is] for international students. Including me. That is, if I were interested in the possibility of studying, I would need to pay [full fees]. And there are no state loans, of course: the state does not provide these [to temporary residents].

Immigrant M.1.10.'s partner was unable to undergo necessary retraining, since the family could not afford her studying for a profession in Australia. Since they resided in Australia under the conditions of a temporary work visa, they would have had to pay much more for her course than, for example, Australian citizens.

As Kofman at el. (2000, 136) suggest, women are more likely than men to exercise their right to social benefits – even if they possess market-relevant professions, since even in such cases they are more in need of these benefits than men. Immigrant M.1.1. explained that when she arrived in Australia she encountered many social issues that she did not know how to resolve. This was one of them:

> I didn't know whether I could send my child to kindergarten so that I could go to work, or how to do it. It was difficult for me to understand the system and how it works [...]. A day at the kindergarten costs a little more than a hundred dollars. For a person who has come from Ukraine paying 100 dollars a day while looking for work, which could take weeks, is simply unrealistic. If we are talking about people from Ukraine, they're not people who have savings of thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of dollars [...]. Only later did I learn that the state could pay half of this bill, but no one told me about this at the start [...]. It seemed to me that it would be more profitable for me to take care of my child and not have any income (Immigrant M.1.1.)

This quotation illustrates how, in situations of international migration, gender intersects with people's ability to exercise rights to social benefits.

It is not only temporary residents who do not have access to social benefits on equal terms with citizens of Australia. Permanent residents, too, are not completely equal to citizens in this respect. There are restrictions on the use of some social rights during first two years after acquiring permanent residency status. Like the majority of Ukrainian skilled emigrants, Immigrant M.1.6. was not interested in receiving any social benefits, yet he had thoroughly explored the set of rights he was entitled to:

> Yes, I have them [social rights]. I know about my social rights. [...] For those people who become permanent residents there is a rule that for the first two years they cannot receive social benefits unless they have a family that includes small children. I did not plan to come here to receive social benefits. I planned to come here to work and develop a career. [But] I know what social benefits there are – I know all this in detail, and it is described here on the Centrelink site.

Immigrant M.1.3. shared her experience regarding how she learned about her social rights and how this knowledge helped her as a permanent resident:

> When we arrived, we had the right to apply to Centrelink and to register for [...] employment services. We just went to this institution and filled in the questionnaire there, but we were told at once that we should not rely on them but look for work ourselves. And this was true – they never did contact me. The only thing that we have been given is Medicare. This is in principle good, because you feel some kind of protection. Then I was given advice that the state provides 300 hours of English, but this turned out to be untrue. (Immigrant M.1.3.)

In the opinion of Diaspora Activist M.2.1., rights to social benefits are essential if immigrant brain waste is to be avoided. According to this informant, of the Ukrainians who come to Australia most are young professionals. Many of them have not had much work experience even in Ukraine; they had neither savings nor any offer of employment. For such people, who have permanent residency but cannot exercise their rights to social benefits for the first two years of their stay in Australia, the financial situation can be difficult. Consequently, many of these migrants take up unqualified jobs to survive. In some cases, after two years have passed, migrants are able to get a loan from the government to continue their studies and obtain their qualifications. Yet it is likely that a proportion of them will not go back to their occupations, creating potential for brain waste.

By contrast, in Germany unemployment services as well as education are free for foreigners without restrictions. Unemployment assistance is granted after a person has worked for a certain time in the country.

5.7. Gender and family in Ukrainian migration to Melbourne

One of the main differences between the cohort of Ukrainian migrants in Berlin and their counterparts in Melbourne lies in the different proportions of women who are primary visa applicants. In Berlin I encountered only one family where a woman was the primary applicant (she was employed in the IT industry) and brought a dependant, whereas in Melbourne Ukrainian women who brought their husbands as dependants are more frequently encountered. The gender distribution among Ukrainian migrants in Germany can be explained as a consequence of market demand and the nature of that country's immigration policy (Boucher [2016, 3] suggests the same with respect to Canada and Australia). Germany allows fast-track access to migration for IT professionals, among whom men are in the majority worldwide (Cohoon and Aspray 2006; UNESCO 2017, 22-23).

The situation of Australia is different. Immigration law allows migration to Australia to an extended list of professions on a footing that is equal to that of IT professionals and in some cases even more advantageous. This holds true especially for applicants for the permanent residence visa. It is also the case that students tend to apply to study for professions other than IT, and women appear quite often as main applicants for the student visa. Besides, not all the men interviewed in Australia were IT professionals. Among the other professions that were represented were engineering, accounting and even linguistics. These professions have been in demand in the Australian market, including Victoria, and were officially listed as being so in 2013. This factor enabled members of these professions to apply for migration. Management, marketing and real estate management were also mentioned by interviewees as being popular among people applying for student visas as primary applicants. It has been possible to draw the conclusion that market demand and the reflection of this demand in immigration policy have shaped the professional profile of the migrant cohort and, in turn, its gender composition as well.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that women primary applicants are more prevalent in Australia than in Germany, the traditional ‘breadwinner-caregiver’ role distribution (McDonald 2000; Pfau-Effinger 2004) is in evidence in both countries. In immigrant families in Australia where men were the primary applicants the situation is quite similar to the situation in Berlin. For example, in relation to the biological role of childbearing Immigrant M.1.2. commented, ‘[My wife] did not work, because she was pregnant, gave birth to a child and was caring for the child all that time.’

In the previous section Immigrant M.1.1. reported that high prices for childcare in Melbourne discourage women from searching for a job. In Berlin, by contrast, most kindergartens are completely or almost free of charge. Because of high Melbourne childcare prices, for the wife of Immigrant M.1.10. migration turned out to involve a transition from a high position in industry and education in Ukraine to the role of a caregiver in Australia. In Australia, she gave birth to a child. Had she taken up the low-paid work available to her, her income would not have covered the cost of childcare. Thus, she would have had no benefit from working, whether financial or in terms of career development. Diaspora Activist M.2.2. reported on the problems that such ‘trailing wives’ (Harney 1998, Boucher 2016, 3) encounter in Melbourne:

> In most cases nowadays, those who immigrate either have been offered a job or come here [independently] because their occupation is on the skilled occupation list [AGDHA 2019c]. For example, a husband might come with a wife and children; or adults may come to study, and bring their family. [...] It often

> happens that if one person already has a job, [the other,] a woman, for example, looks for a job. Sometimes a rather long time passes before they find work. The mother may feel very solitary: if a child falls ill there is no grandmother here, and with the husband at work there is nobody with whom to leave one child while taking the other to a doctor. It does happen that that a person feels stressed [in such circumstances], and this is difficult to handle.

The interviewee pointed out that the dependent applicant is often at a disadvantage. In particular, the 'trailing wife' role is accompanied by a high level of stress and mental discomfort. The dependant also usually has weaker language skills (the admission of spouses with low language proficiency is a consequence of the immigration policy). Diaspora Activist M.2.2. affirmed that, while men do appear as trailing spouses, women do so much more often. Diaspora Activist M.2.1. also said that women are more likely to adjust to the husband's employment situation and support the family in a caregiver role until the breadwinner settles into the new position. However, while Ukrainian women in Berlin often stayed at home due to their inability to combine language learning, professional retraining and taking care of household-related issues, in Australia women stayed home because childcare was too expensive.

The distribution of gender roles according to which the man is considered the breadwinner also affects those women who migrated under conditions of a student visa as primary applicants. As Immigrant M.1.8. put it,

> There were some options. For my husband to find a job and come on a working visa would have been quite difficult; well, plus, [his profession] was not on the

> skilled migration list. And therefore I had to act – to sacrifice myself, so to speak [laughs].

By this, Immigrant M.1.8. meant that both spouses had to choose who was going to study and who to work. There were probably social levers, such as likely income of each partner, that made this family take the decision that corresponds to the standard gender role distribution where a man is the breadwinner.

Immigrant M.1.4., a woman, also applied as the primary applicant for a student visa. Her husband, the dependant according to his visa status, went to work immediately and became the breadwinner. A number of women in my sample entered into such arrangements; in general, they dedicated more years to their education than men did, and they were likely to be financially dependent on their male partners.

It is fitting to conclude this section, which deals with the impact of gender on an immigrant's ability to work or retrain in Australia, with the words of Immigrant M.1.3.: 'The point is that I did not initially look for work.' The research participant dedicated her time to volunteering instead, because the role of trailing wife meant that, on the one hand, her husband's income gave her the resources to do so and, on the other, the obstacles to her seeking work exceeded the potential benefits.

5.8. Conclusions

This chapter shed light on difficulties that skilled migrants from Ukraine experience in Australia due to immigration regulations. In comparative perspective, differences of detail become evident between the situation of Ukrainian skilled migrants in the two countries: Australia confers a broader range of visa statuses than Germany; immigrants in Australia experience less pressure in terms of purchasing power; there is a slight difference between the occupational composition of migrants in Berlin and Melbourne (in Berlin IT professionals prevail); the social safety net is weaker in Australia than in Germany for holders of temporary visas; and women more often apply to come as primary applicants to Australia than to Germany, though the 'breadwinner-caregiver' division of labour is as relevant as in Berlin.

Chapter Five enumerated the visa types that skilled migrants from Ukraine receive on entry into Australia. These are the student visa and various temporary and permanent work visas, as well as visas for family members of visa holders in each of these categories. In contrast to Germany, permanent residence visas may be issued to migrants prior to their arrival in Australia. Student visas were not a common pathway for the migration of skilled Ukrainians to Germany after the Euromaidan (in contrast to the years preceding the EU Blue Card implementation in 2012), while in the case of migration to Australia the use of student visas for this purpose did become popular.

Section 5.2. described the disadvantaged position in the labour market of temporary visa holders. Many employers indicate in advertisements that they do not wish to employ temporary visa holders. Once job is found, temporary visas often tie migrants to one employer and lead to migrants' accepting unfavourable working conditions that they would not normally accept as permanent residents. This Section also explored the precariousness of those who arrived in the country for permanent residence, but without an employment offer. Lack of local experience and knowledge of types of employment pushed such migrants into accepting employment under unfavourable conditions, including sometimes unpaid or underpaid overtime work. They suffered downward mobility in their occupations relative to the status they had enjoyed in Ukraine.

Interaction with public services was found to be easier in Australia than in Germany. However, the long wait for a permanent residence permit generated uncertainty and precariousness. Since dependants' status is defined by the status of main visa holders, they are usually constrained to stay no longer than the main holder. Sometimes potential employers prefer not to employ them, since their visa may be revoked if their partner's visa is cancelled. In addition, some services are denied them: banks in Australia do not allow trailing spouses to open independent accounts – they can only open a joint account shared with the main visa holder.

Section 5.3. examined the socio-economic status of recent skilled Ukrainian immigrants in Australia and inquired into shifts in that status that may have resulted from migration. In contrast to Berlin, I did not observe that Ukrainians in Melbourne had experienced any decrease in their purchasing power. I suggest that this difference resulted from the fact that the majority of those who migrated to Berlin and the majority of those who migrated to Melbourne belonged to different occupational groups and therefore had different earnings in Ukraine. The difference in occupational profile of the Ukrainian migrant cohorts in Berlin and Melbourne, in turn, was the consequence of different market demands and visa requirements in the two countries: in Germany the Blue Card application process favoured IT professionals, whereas Australia admitted migrants with occupations corresponding to a relatively broad skilled occupations list. Some did, however, experience as newcomers downward mobility in the prestige of the jobs they held and, in consequence, in their social status relative to the status they had enjoyed in Ukraine. Some migrants abandoned the quest for employment appropriate to their higher educational qualifications in favour of volunteering and low-skilled jobs. Section 5.3. also reflected on precarious status of Ukrainian migrants in the context of their engagement in political protests in the country of birth. I suggest that the sensitivity to the set of rights they have in the destination country (which directly affects their quality of life) was connected to their high demands they placed on life in Ukraine: among the sources of their dissatisfaction were Ukrainian welfare provisions and the political situation under the Yanukovych regime.

Inquiring further into Ukrainian migrants' downward social mobility and deskilling in Australia, Section 5.4. identified such forms of disadvantage – results of a mismatch between the education of skilled migrants in the country of origin and in destination countries – as instances of 'migrant penalty' and, sometimes, outdated regulations. Some Ukrainian skilled migrants who were secondary applicants found it difficult to have their diplomas and the experience they gained in Ukraine recognised in Australia. Inability to do this also had a negative impact on the ability of those who arrived as temporary workers to apply for permanent residence visas, prolonging their high degree of precariousness.

Section 5.5. focuses on language as a barrier that inhibits migrants' successful integration into the labour market in Australia. The dominant language of Australia is English, the lingua franca for most skilled migrants from Ukraine. This fact significantly eases their access to the labour market as well as to public services, in contrast to the case of Berlin. Language proficiency requirements that are strict (in comparison to those in force in Germany) and verified in the course of the visa application process lead migrants who succeed in coming to Australia to be relatively well prepared (again, in comparison to their counterparts in Berlin). However, interviewees still reported that their career success depended on language proficiency and that imperfect command of English was the biggest barrier to their integration. While this might suggest that scrutiny of potential migrants' English skills is insufficient, I do not draw the conclusion that language requirements should be increased, as such a change might decrease the ability of migrants to go through an already complicated visa process. (In Germany, by contrast, language requirements are lenient, and I suggest, for reasons set out in Chapter Seven, that they should be made more stringent.) Linguistic accent and the cultural habit of underrepresenting one's achievements, in the opinion of research participants, also serve as barriers to moving up the socio-economic ladder.

Section 5.6., while noting many migrants' reluctance to seek the government social safety net, focussed mainly on a limitation imposed on temporary visa holders: they are ineligible for health services funded by the Australian government's Medicare program, leading some to neglect their health and well-being. In Germany there was no major difference between the health insurance available to permanent residents and temporary residents. Public insurance was mostly provided through the employer, and contributing to its cost through taxes did not disturb migrants in Germany to the same extent as having to use private medical insurance worried their counterparts in Australia. However, private insurance became accessible to migrants only after they reached a particular annual salary threshold (which was relatively high), and it did not cover family members.

Section 5.7. emphasised the impact of gender on individuals' migration experience. It was noted that in Melbourne women who had applied as primary applicants constitute a larger proportion of the immigrant cohort than is the case in Berlin. These women, having chosen to migrate for study or employment, are generally better prepared for the labour market than 'trailing spouses.' Despite this fact, the breadwinner-caregiver distribution of gender roles is still present: men are more likely to take up employment while women either take care of children or focus on their studies in order to provide a guarantee that both spouses are able to stay in the country while the trailing husband works and earns money. Ukrainian migrant women's circumstances in Australia are also highly intertwined with access to the social safety net and the general welfare policy of the country. For example, women tend to stay out of work for an extended period because childcare in Melbourne is very expensive. By contrast, in Berlin there is a more supportive welfare policy in this regard, most kindergartens charging only nominal fees.

Chapter Six: Social Capital and National Identity in Ukrainian Communities in Berlin and Melbourne

6.1. Introduction

This chapter documents findings on social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora community and its ability to assist recent immigrants in their endeavours to overcome integration barriers that the migration process imposes on them in both Berlin and Melbourne. The approach adopted for this chapter is to compare and contrast the social capital developed by the Ukrainian diaspora community in Berlin, as well as that community's sense of national identity, with corresponding phenomena in Melbourne. Ukrainian migrants in the two cities benefit from the group of relationships that Bourdieu (1986) labels as social capital. To demonstrate this is the primary objective of this chapter.

The chapter seeks to determine whether skilled migrants who arrived in Berlin and Melbourne after the beginning of the Euromaidan in 2013 and the subsequent war in the east of Ukraine were encouraged to leave the country because of these events or not. Interview questions about the impact on research participants of the Euromaidan and the war revealed that the push factors which prompted the migration of skilled Ukrainian migrants existed prior to these events. However, for some the Euromaidan and, more significantly, the ongoing military conflict that began immediately afterwards became a trigger for leaving the country at this particular time. Definitions of push and pull factors, as well as triggers of migration, are provided in Section 2.1.4.)

The existing literature takes note of some groups of migrants of various profiles comprising the contemporary Ukrainian diaspora community in Berlin. These groups include students, labourers, repatriated ethnic Germans and Jews who were formerly citizens of Ukraine, and individuals who came to Germany because they married German citizens. However, the literature excludes information on professionals, especially the IT specialists who are of preeminent interest to this study. The content of relevant websites and social media platforms was analysed to assess the nature and scale of Ukrainian diaspora institutions and social networks in Berlin that is lacking in the literature. Analysis of social media, in addition to interviews regarding the status of the Ukrainian community in Melbourne, shows that the emerging initiatives of the new Ukrainian diaspora were embedded in the structures provided by these 'old' diaspora institutions. This element of the research complements the historical overview with perspectives on the contemporary Ukrainian community in Melbourne which are lacking in the existing academic literature. In this way, the findings provided in this chapter contribute to the literature on Ukrainians in Australia.

This chapter sheds light on the relationship between the generations or 'waves' of Ukrainian immigrants, as well as the nature of the resources of social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora communities in Berlin and Melbourne. In doing so, the chapter reflects on the significance of miscommunication between members of the different migrant waves, social media use, the specifics of German and Australian labour market relations and the existence of physical community spaces. Drawing upon social capital theory I suggest that social networks with other compatriots matter for Ukrainian skilled migrants. The networks they have built in Berlin have the potential to become durable institutional structures. In Melbourne the sharing of information as a resource, as well as the assistance rendered by Ukrainians to each other, provides evidence that Ukrainians have managed to create social capital in their community.

This chapter demonstrates that a sense of national identity is an important component of, and a prerequisite of creating, social capital in the Ukrainian immigrant community. The relationship between Ukrainian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Berlin and Melbourne was studied as part of the inquiry into the role of community members' sense of national identity in generating the Ukrainian community's social capital. The study shows that there is a sense of solidarity in the Ukrainian community despite the fact that some Ukrainians speak mainly Ukrainian, while others speak mainly Russian. Members of the Ukrainian diaspora display a sense of a civic national identity similar to that of the Ukrainians who stayed in Ukraine. This sense was intensified during the Euromaidan protests. Analysis of interviews reveals a change in the perception of Russian-speaking Ukrainians by members of the 'old' diaspora that corresponds to what scholars have observed to be a process of transition from an ethnic to a civic national identity in Ukraine itself.

6.2. Push factors for the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian migration

6.2.1. Berlin: three types of migrants

Part II of Chapter Two documents a debate in the historical and sociological literature on whether there are grounds to regard the post-Euromaidan emigration wave as separate from the economic post-Soviet wave. I took the post-Euromaidan migration as the subject matter of my research project on the basis of the hypothesis that the Euromaidan had shaken up Ukrainian society in Ukraine (Kulyk 2016) as well as in the diaspora, transforming its sense of belonging and national identity. This circumstance, I initially believed, would provide a basis for observing changes in the nature, acquisition and uses of social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora. Yet my interviews with post-Euromaidan migrants as well as diaspora activists demonstrated that for this particular group, the Euromaidan events and the military conflict following it were factors that reinforced their long-standing desire to emigrate, rather than radically altering their life plans.

As was shown in Chapter Four, between late 2013 and 2017 Ukrainian immigrants came to Berlin in large part because of the attractiveness to IT professionals of the so-called 'Silicon Valley of Europe.' As Diaspora Activist B.2.2. commented, 'Berlin has just become the capital of start-ups [new technology-based businesses], not only in Germany but also in Europe.' To encourage such immigrants, in 2012 Germany introduced the EU Blue Card program that significantly simplified migration of IT professionals from countries outside the EU, including Ukraine.

For an inquiry into the nature of social capital in the Ukrainian community in Berlin it was important to investigate whether the Euromaidan and following war affected the sense of national identity of these migrants, and whether this in turn encouraged them to come together in groups in which social capital might be generated. In other circumstances migrants from Ukraine seeking work in other countries were perceived by some to display low levels of national identity or commitment. For example, Kubal and Dekker (2014) noted that after the dissolution of the USSR, economic migrants from Ukraine in the United Kingdom were condemned by the representatives of the 'old' diaspora for not having a sense of Ukrainianness. The 'old' diaspora was outraged by the voluntary decisions of Ukrainians to emigrate instead of contributing to the political and economic development of independent Ukraine. The 'old' diaspora regarded itself as having been deprived of such an opportunity by political circumstances.

The question arises whether the national identity of post-Euromaidan emigrants was, or was perceived to be, more salient than that of their post-1991 predecessors. The gaining of independence by Ukraine and the Euromaidan both stimulated the intensification of Ukrainian national identity in Ukraine (Kulyk 2016; Diuk 2014, 15). In addition, the Euromaidan confirmed the willingness of Ukrainians to separate themselves from Russian and post-Soviet influence and strive for the maintenance of European values. The change of political power in 2014 promised to be an icebreaking period for reforms and changes in the country. This raises the question of whether those Ukrainians who left the country at this moment did not believe in a better future for Ukraine and did not want to contribute to reforming the country, or whether there were other push factors behind their migration.

The research participants can be divided into three groups: (1) those who started their migration process before the events of the Euromaidan and whose migration happened to coincide with the Euromaidan and the outbreak of war; (2) those who had been planning to migrate, and for whom the Euromaidan became a trigger; and (3) those whose decision to migrate was the consequence of the Euromaidan.

The first group is exemplified by Immigrant B.1.2., who indicated that for him the Euromaidan events were not push factors for migration, since he had left before their dramatic and history-changing escalation. Immigrant B.1.1. considered the employment offer she received to be an opportunity to get international experience that she could not afford to forgo and noted that she was upset to leave Ukraine at such an important and interesting time. Similar feelings were present in some of the other research participants. One of the interviewees eventually returned to Ukraine to work there permanently. Immigrants B.1.6 and B.1.7., who had also started to plan their migration before the Euromaidan, indicated that their reasons for migrating did not relate to the Euromaidan events in any way. Immigrant B.1.9. and Immigrant B.1.11. indicated that the timing of their migration was just the result of the appearance of an interesting career opportunity in Berlin. They seized this opportunity because it was important from the point of view of their professional development. Both of these individuals were from middle-sized towns in Ukraine; they considered migrating to Berlin a better investment in terms of opportunities for intellectual development than moving to a larger Ukrainian city with more employment opportunities.

Despite the fact that these interviewees explained their migration during the Euromaidan and at the time of the outbreak of the war as coincidences resulting from opportunities arising in Germany, it is possible that other factors may also have affected the timing of their departure, perhaps subconsciously. The general situation in Ukraine, considered depressed and unsatisfactory by many, could also have been a push factor. If so, these migrants would more properly fall within the second category.

This second group of research participants comprises those who had been planning to migrate and for whom the events of the Euromaidan and the war become a trigger. These people had long-lasting aspirations regarding migration. For example, Immigrant B.1.8. was dissatisfied, having growing up in the socially insecure, in her subjective opinion, semi-criminal environment of a particular district of her Ukrainian town. That, she said, was why she had been inspired since childhood by stories of migration and dreamt of moving away one day. Immigrant B.1.12., who had held a top managerial position in her industry for many years, complained about the stressful environment at work as well as the lack of opportunities for her teenage child. For both immigrants, the Euromaidan was proof that the environment in Ukraine was unsafe and would remain so in future. They also thought that there had been no positive changes, whether in their professional environment or in society more generally.

One of the interviewees mentioned that he and his spouse were hoping for further professional development, since they already were successful professionals living in the capital of Ukraine. After the outbreak of the military conflict in the east of Ukraine, the family actively supported people who suffered as a result and invested their economic capital there. But the woman was worried that her spouse would be conscripted into the military and began looking for opportunities to migrate as soon as this possibility arose. Immigrant B.1.14. indicated that he had attempted to migrate to Berlin a year before the Euromaidan but had not been successful. This was not a big disappointment for Immigrant B.1.14., who at that time enjoyed good living conditions in Ukraine. However, after the Euromaidan, when the family lost a large amount of money because of the inflation that escalated after the Euromaidan (they had been saving to purchase an apartment), they decided not to reject the next employment offer and to move immediately.[16]

The third group consists of migrants whose decision to migrate resulted directly from the Euromaidan and the subsequent events. A representative of this completely different group was a research participant[17] who had been a successful businessman in Ukraine. However, the outbreak of the military conflict ruined his business plans, and one of his business partners in Berlin invited him to work there temporarily. This led to more long-term employment which at the time of writing had lasted for three years.

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[16] Ukrainian IT workers indicated in interviews that they had received offers via the social media application LinkedIn without having submitted an application. This confirms the fact that there exists a significant demand for Ukrainian IT workers in Berlin.

[17] See Chapter Three, for an explanation of why this interviewee was indexed this way.

Evidence of a similar situation was provided by Immigrant B.1.11., who said that after the outbreak of the military conflict, when he was still in Ukraine, his employer had proposed moving the whole company with all its employees to Poland. Immigrant B.1.11. was surprised by such a proposition, since he had always considered his employer a loyal citizen and a patriot of Ukraine. According to another research participant, who had access to information from an IT recruitment firm in Ukraine, some IT immigrants who emigrated immediately after the Euromaidan had returned to Ukraine by July 2017. The research participant observed that IT professionals with families with children were inclined to stay in the host country for longer than single individuals.

Another research participant indicated that her employer was dependent on an enterprise in the east of Ukraine which closed after pro-Russian separatists declared the so-called Donets'k and Luhans'k People's Republics. This immigrant had to support a relative from this territory, offering the person a place to live in Kyiv. The loss of employment, as well as worsening living conditions, encouraged this woman and her spouse to think of international migration. They relied on the more flexible and desirable skills of the spouse: as an IT professional he had more chances to emigrate legally.

All interviewees condemned the Russian Federation for its role in the conflict in the east of Ukraine. Immigrants born in the occupied territories in the east of Ukraine or who had relatives in parts of Ukraine that were under threat were especially concerned and stressed about the conflict and the post-Euromaidan process. Immigrant B.1.1. commented:

> I even tried to return home because of the situation that had arisen. I will honestly say, the Euromaidan itself gave me some patriotic feelings. Just before the

> Euromaidan, I had wanted to move somewhere. After it happened, I no longer did. I understood that [working abroad] is a good life experience anyway. It would be good for the resume – to learn another language, to establish useful and interesting relationships. However, every evening I still watched the news, I was worried about my parents because they were in the south of Ukraine and it was scary.

The push factors for migration of Ukrainians to Berlin after the Euromaidan did have a link to the military conflict and the loss of economic and professional perspectives in Ukraine. Yet the majority of migrants suggested that such circumstances were rather a trigger than a push factor. Most migrants in the sample had considered the possibility of emigration prior to the Euromaidan. They had done so in connection with the pre-revolutionary situation in Ukraine. Fuller investigation of their motivations must be reserved for further studies. At this stage, however, what is known about their aspirations does not appear to justify classifying these post-Euromaidan emigrants as a wave separate from their predecessors. Labour market demand and the introduction of new German laws had more impact on their decisions to emigrate to Berlin than any new social circumstances arising as a result of the Euromaidan. This brain drain of Ukrainians and its motivations are not substantially different from the one that was a part of a wave of economic migration after the dissolution of the USSR (Xinhua News Agency 2012; Vakhitova and Coupe 2013, 36; Kupets 2017, 43).

Nevertheless, in a few instances the rise of patriotic feelings due to the Euromaidan and the following military conflict caused some migrants to consider remaining in Ukraine or returning there. This explains the difference between the situation described by Kubal and Dekker (2014), where migrants of the 1990s were widely perceived by members of the ‘old’ diaspora to have a weak sense of national identity, and the one examined in this study, and justifies exploration of national identity as one aspect of migrants' mind-set that influences their decisions regarding migration.

6.2.2. Melbourne: the absence of a Euromaidan-driven migration

In the previous subsection Ukrainian professionals who emigrated to Berlin after the start of the Euromaidan protests were categorised into three groups depending on the circumstances that triggered their decision to emigrate. The first group indicated that they began actions that led to their emigration before the Euromaidan protests began. Their actual emigration took place after the Euromaidan only because visa applications involve a long process – the Euromaidan did not influence their decision to emigrate. The second group encompassed individuals who had intentions to emigrate before the Euromaidan but whose migration was triggered by the political and economic situation that arose during and after the protests and the military conflict in the east of Ukraine. The third group involved individuals who migrated mainly because these political events influenced their well-being and sense of security. Some individuals indicated that there was a lucky coincidence between their aspirations to emigrate before the Euromaidan and their ability to do so after it began, when their sense of insecurity was reinforced.

Two out of these three categories are relevant to the situations described by research participants in Melbourne: the first and the second. Migrants who fall within these categories corroborate the findings of Düvell and Lapshyna (2015, n.p.), who state in general terms that migration after the Euromaidan may be described as 'varied international migration, flows of individuals seeking employment or education, including those with some mixed political and economic motivations.' The category of migrants for whom the Euromaidan and the outbreak of the military conflict were the main reason for their decision to emigrate was poorly represented in Melbourne.

In regard to immigrants of the first group, some details clarify their motivations for emigrating, their aspirations as migrants, and their attitudes to the Euromaidan and national identity. Immigrant M.1.1., who would be categorized into this first group, indicated that her spouse's professional ties with his Australian employer predated the Euromaidan by many years. The offer to move in 2014 had no connection to the Euromaidan. It was based on the agenda of this Australian company to extend its team of employees. The company in question was owned by a person of Ukrainian background, which was the likely basis of the migrant's pre-existent connection to the employer.

Immigrant M.1.5. indicated that he and his partner began their adult life in 2009-2010, when they first began to work in their professions. They realised that the political situation of the time – the rule of President Viktor Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions – influenced business to the extent that it limited opportunities for professional development. As Immigrant M.1.5. put it, 'The [Euro-] Maidan itself, when it began, did not motivate us to leave – on the contrary, it motivated us to stay. We thought, "Why are we leaving, given the importance of these protests? Maybe we could help."' This response corresponds to the attitude of Immigrant B.1.1. in Berlin, who said almost the same words: she was motivated by the prospect of professional growth, yet she even considered cancelling her migration plans due to her belief in the possibility of improvements after the Euromaidan protests.

Career opportunities are often a main reason for skilled Ukrainians to emigrate. This study recorded mainly the aspirations of relatively young people – from those who had graduated a couple of years prior to the conduct of the study to those who had a maximum of 15 years of professional experience and were no older than 40. As Immigrant M.1.6. commented, ‘I thought: while I’m young, while I’m single, I need to see the world, see how people live in developed countries with high living standards and try different experiences there.’

For the first group of individuals, therefore, migration after the start of the Euromaidan coincided with their long-term aspirations to emigrate and mainly related to their desire to take advantage of professional opportunities. These people indicated that they would have emigrated regardless of the Euromaidan and its aftermath.

As was stated in Chapter Four, many migrants in Berlin were inspired to leave Ukraine by the pre-Euromaidan situation. Likewise, in Melbourne Immigrant M.1.4. connected her aspiration to migrate to the rule of Viktor Yanukovych. In addition to personal motivations, she indicated that some of her acquaintances who were entrepreneurs experienced persecution by the government, which made it impossible for private businesses to survive without bribery. She emphasised that after the Orange Revolution of 2004 many people in her social circle, mainly young professionals, were inspired by the possibility of change in Ukraine. Reforms had been slow in 2005-2010, but when Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010 corruption increased, while the human rights situation and the business environment deteriorated significantly. As Immigrant M.1.4. put it,

> The Maidan was just the logical step if Ukraine was to move in a different direction from the one that prevailed in the days of Yanukovych. We went to the

> Maidan with my co-workers and volunteered in the kitchen. We had our office close to Independence Square in Kyiv and we were able to visit the Maidan every day.

Diaspora Activist M.2.2. also mentioned that some of the migrants from Ukraine in Melbourne had complained about the insecurity of business relations and the disappointing economic changes in Ukraine before the Euromaidan events.

Like Immigrant B.1.11, an IT professional in Berlin, Immigrant M.1.2 in Melbourne stated that among his acquaintances in Kyiv and Lviv were many who left Ukraine after the start of the Euromaidan because they feared for their own security and that of their businesses. Many of them had top managerial positions, and some moved their businesses abroad together with their employees. The research participant from Berlin indicated that the destination country of choice for such business migration was Poland, a fact which helps explain why there were no business migrants among this project's interviewees in Berlin or Melbourne.

Another possible explanation of why such persons were not found in the cities in question, Immigrant B.1.1. suggested, was their tendency to return to Ukraine after a couple of years to live and work there – once it was clear that the military conflict was frozen and unlikely to spread beyond a small area in the east of Ukraine. So, even if some companies had moved their physical locations and employees to Berlin or Melbourne after the Euromaidan, they may already have returned to Ukraine by the time this research project was undertaken.

For individuals from the second group, the Euromaidan protests were a trigger for migration. As Immigrant M.1.10. commented,

> We always thought that we could change something in life – not because it was bad, but because it could be better. And since the events of the last Euromaidan we were pushed to do so. My spouse and I were there, and we saw that Ukraine was moving in a spiral: the new Maidan was simply a repetition of the previous one [the Orange Revolution of late 2004], and it is still unknown how many of these events will soon happen again. That's why it came to our minds that we must try [to emigrate].

Interestingly, while most Euromaidan-focussed literature considers that these protests increased sentiments of unity in Ukrainian society (e.g., Kulyk 2016; Diuk 2014, 15), Immigrant M.1.9.'s personal impression was that there had been a greater sense of unity during the Orange Revolution in 2004. The fact that similar protests had happened again, in his opinion, proved that the political situation in Ukraine had not improved. He further explained that, due to the geopolitical situation, he did not believe in a better future for Ukraine in coming decades. Therefore he was pushed to take concrete steps towards migration.

For Immigrant M.1.2. migration took place due to an attractive employment offer. Despite the fact that this interviewee was an active participant in the post-Euromaidan transformations, he stated that the military conflict in the east of Ukraine had played a role in his decision-making. According to this research participant, the conflict was artificially created by Ukrainian politicians for personal gain. For this reason, the interviewee said, he did not condemn the men who tried to avoid military conscription by fleeing Ukraine.

Avoiding military conscription was named as a reason for Ukrainian migration in the aftermath of the Euromaidan by Düvell and Lapshyna (2015). However, the skilled migrants in my sample, whether in Berlin or in Melbourne, rarely mentioned conscription as a cause of their migration. Immigrant M.1.8., one of the exceptions, noted that the fact that some of her acquaintances were conscripted encouraged her to lodge an immigration application as soon as possible in order to avoid the possibility of a similar problem arising for her husband, although this was only part of her rationale for wishing to migrate.

Interviews with residents of both Berlin and Melbourne made evident that women were more inclined than men to admit that the issue of military conscription bothered them. With the exception of one person in Melbourne, male research participants tended rather not to mention this issue at all or to deny that it influenced their decision to emigrate. By contrast, in Berlin one research participant stated that he would not mind being conscripted and had thought of serving in the army, while his wife was concerned about this possibility and decided to emigrate for this reason. These data suggest that only a minority of professionals emigrating after the start of the war were pushed by the fact of military conscription. Most did not find this a reason to emigrate. (It should be noted that many men in Ukraine are exempt from military service. It is possible that those of my interviewees who fell into this category did not mention conscription as a push factor because they were not under threat of it.)

Research participants also referred to their feelings of insecurity. Although Immigrant M.1.3. had commenced her migration application to Australia a few years before the Euromaidan, she recalled, ‘I considered this visa a salvation because I could not stay in Ukraine. We lived in Kyiv, quite close to the Maidan [in this context Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), the main location of mass protests in late 2013-early 2014]. I was sitting at home all the time. I did not want to go out because I was scared.’ This immigrant had wanted to emigrate many years before the Euromaidan for other reasons: limited government welfare support and few professional opportunities. But the fatal violence of government forces against protesters convinced this person that migration was a good choice at that moment.

Economic deterioration in Ukraine did not significantly affect the professionals interviewed. Almost none specified it as a trigger for their migration. The sole exception was Immigrant M.1.6., who indicated that he emigrated at the time of the Euromaidan because of fluctuations in the value of foreign currency in Ukraine. This implied that, being paid in Ukrainian currency, he was anxious that the value of his earnings was declining, and this pushed him to accelerate his previously planned application process. Diaspora Activists M.2.1. and M.2.2. also referred to economic reasons for migration, but in general terms. In particular, they stated that the main aim of young professionals in migrating to Australia was to receive international experience in their occupations. In the opinion of the two diaspora activists, many of these immigrants would try to return to Ukraine once they had achieved this aim. Some immigrants confirmed that they had such expectations, and did not deny that they might return to Ukraine after gaining the experience necessary to become more competitive in the Ukrainian labour market.

As for the third group identified in the classification of Ukrainian migrants in Berlin, it was not represented among the research participants in Melbourne, none of whom made the decision to emigrate based purely on what had happened during the protests or the economic deterioration or war that followed. The absence of this group from my sample is most probably the result of the fact that the decision to emigrate to Melbourne in the majority of cases was taken prior to the outbreak of the Euromaidan. It may also be a consequence of the fact that the majority of interviewees came from western, central and northern territories of Ukraine that were less affected by the war. The snowballing approach to recruiting interviewees may have resulted in several research participants being from the same cities in Ukraine. Finally, because the study was limited to persons who entered Australia on work visas, it could not capture others who may have left Ukraine because of the war – refugees, for example.

In conclusion, factors that pushed Ukrainian immigrants who moved to Melbourne after the start of the Euromaidan only partly correspond to those observed in Berlin. No persons who emigrated because of the annexation of Crimea by Russia or the outbreak of the military conflict were among those interviewed for this study. This is not to say that there are no such immigrants living in Melbourne. Most participants who took part in the study just proceeded with applications for migration which had been commenced before the Euromaidan. For a minority, the Euromaidan operated as a trigger that hastened their emigration.

In contrast to their Berlin counterparts, immigrants in Melbourne clearly related the pre-Euromaidan ‘pre-revolutionary’ atmosphere to the rule of Viktor Yanukovych and his party. They believed that private entrepreneurship was in danger in Ukraine during those years, and that the flourishing of corruption had reduced the living standards of Ukrainians significantly. Analysis of the attitudes of skilled migrants towards the Euromaidan in this study did not suggest that these attitudes were decisive factors in driving these persons to migrate. The data do not support the view that the Euromaidan created a separate new wave of migration of professionals.

Drawing upon the corresponding analysis of migrants’ responses in Berlin, I suggest that to identify whether the conflict affected migration, new studies would have to be conducted and people who migrated in years later than 2017 would have to be surveyed. This timeframe would make it possible to observe the full implications of the conflict and the post-Euromaidan political, economic and military situation for emigration from Ukraine.

6.3. The contemporary status of Ukrainian organisations in diaspora

6.3.1. Berlin: multilayeredness of the Ukrainian community and its initiatives

Data gathered during the fieldwork for this PhD project confirm the recent intensification of political and social activity of Ukrainians in Berlin. A similar observation has been documented by Łada and Böttger (2016), who argue that Ukrainians had intensified the dynamics of their participation in socio-political activities in Germany after the start of the Euromaidan protests. All three diaspora activists that I interviewed noted that the rise of Ukrainian initiatives, particularly in Berlin, happened right after the first Euromaidan protests broke out in Ukraine. In the Facebook group 'Ukrainians in Berlin' some individuals initiated the organisation of demonstrations to support their compatriots in Ukraine. These demonstrations, which were widely advertised and held near Berlin's landmarks, attracted the attention of those immigrants who did not previously know these community activists. Newcomer migrants were also easily able to join these activities. Diaspora Activist B.2.3. commented:

> 'Ukrainians in Berlin' has increased fourfold. We have very often heard people say, 'I have lived in Germany for ten years, and I have never sought contact with former fellow citizens. And then, when that happened, I realised that I could not be alone, I had to unite [with other Ukrainians].' Suddenly the need for a community has grown, which for years was not felt at all […]. But this has brought, of course, a great deal of friction.

The friction that the research participant refers to is the tension between different groups of immigrants. This quote reflects the multi-layered nature of this community, a quality that

Kozachenko (2018, 96) found to be characteristic of Ukrainian migrant communities generally. The term 'multi-layered' that Kozachenko uses to describe communities containing members of both the 'old' and the 'new' diasporas is also an apt descriptor, in the case of Berlin, for a community that encompasses a multiplicity of social interest groups defined by the period of their emigration and, as a consequence, their visa status and social status.

On one hand, the 'new' diaspora's platforms for communication and information exchange serve as useful instruments for improving the organisational life of Ukrainians in Berlin. On the other hand, as Immigrant B.1.3. observed, many of the new grassroots initiatives compete with each other for governmental funding – behaviour which, in the opinion of this immigrant, does not encourage unity in the community. Moreover, newcomer migrants experience difficulties in joining already established circles of activists in the diaspora.

A majority of the research participants mentioned that they were aware of the Facebook platform 'Ukrainians in Berlin.' Several, however, added that they were unaware of other diaspora organisations. This fact demonstrates that, though social media is a powerful medium for generating information about the existence of the Ukrainian community in Berlin, it does not stimulate newcomer migrants to join more formalised initiatives or organisations.

Few migrants mentioned the importance of the Embassy of Ukraine in Germany as a platform that co-organises some cultural events and shares information about events where Ukrainians can meet in Berlin.[18] Ukrainians are aware of this institution since they require consular services from the Embassy of Ukraine, such as notarization of Ukrainian documents. Information about the Ukrainian Embassy is located on its website (Embassy of Ukraine in the Federal Republic of Germany 2018). The Embassy is physically located in the central part of Berlin, which makes it easy for Ukrainians temporarily or permanently living in Berlin to access. However, several immigrants reported that they had not yet used these services.

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[18] In contrast to Germany, in Australia the Ukrainian Embassy is located in Canberra, a capital city located at some distance from Sydney and Melbourne, the country's largest cities which also host its largest Ukrainian communities. As a result, the majority of the Ukrainian population in Australia cannot easily access the Ukrainian Embassy, a fact that limits the scope of the relationship between the Embassy and the community.

To find information about life in Germany, immigrants attended web-forums for the international community of expatriates, social media groups and chats, and also formed their own networks for this purpose. For example, every interviewed Ukrainian had joined the Facebook group ‘Ukrainians in Berlin’ upon arrival in the city. One diaspora activist also emphasised the importance of the Facebook group ‘Ukrainian-German Professionals Network’ that brings together people looking for employment opportunities, grants or volunteering projects that might improve their professional development.

Speaking of social media resources which they had used, information technology workers named the Facebook group ‘IT-Berlin.’ This group, created by a Ukrainian professional for Russian speakers of different nationalities as a digital social group, organised meetups for communication and exchange of information regarding employment opportunities. Some migrants looking for officially established Ukrainian diaspora organisations took note of advertisements in the Internet and attended cultural events organised by the Embassy of Ukraine, the CAUG or, most significantly, by numerous organisations of the kind that Kozachenko called grassroots initiatives.

I have not found a correlation between the degree of interest in diaspora activism and the gender of research participants. Despite the fact, elaborated in Chapter Four, that trailing wives are more inclined to engage in non-employment activities than their husbands, in only one case was a wife more active in the Ukrainian community than her husband. A couple of men who were classified as breadwinners appeared more inclined to seek out relationships with other Ukrainians.

In my research on Ukrainian organisations in Berlin I followed Kozachenko's practice of categorising Ukrainian organisations into grassroots initiatives and formal institutions. Analysis of the collected data confirms that the Ukrainians diaspora is multi-layered in nature, as observed in the literature (Kozachenko 2018). Furthermore, the data shed light on the question of why friction between layers of the diaspora community occurs. One important source of such tension is the large number of grassroots initiatives, mostly organised in the digital space, founded by Ukrainians who came to Berlin under different visa conditions (student, labour, ethnic repatriation etc.) and the resulting competitiveness between them.

6.3.2. Melbourne: merging of new initiatives with the 'old' diaspora

An overview of the literature on Ukrainian institutions in Australia confirmed that there is a long list of formal institutions established by the 'old' diaspora in Melbourne. Some authors suggest that in 1991-2013 newcomers tended either to join the established Ukrainian institutions of the 'old' diaspora, or to integrate into Australian society through other communities and circles (Lysenko 1998, Oleinikova 2015). This was confirmed by the comments of the research participants. For example, Diaspora Activist M.2.2. stated that after the Euromaidan the Ukrainian formal institutions recorded a renewed flow of persons who turned to these institutions to demonstrate their sense of belonging to the Ukrainian nation and offered their support. Diaspora activists also advised that they were informed by word of mouth about events organised by Ukrainians outside the formal organisations of the Ukrainian diaspora. (None of the persons whom I interviewed were organisers of such ‘informal’ events.)

Research participants among the group of newcomer Ukrainian immigrants identified the Ukrainian organisations in Melbourne that were of particular interest to them. The ones with which they were most familiar and which they found most approachable were the Ukrainian Saturday schools for children in North Melbourne and Noble Park; the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in Balaclava and Essendon and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Cathedral in North Melbourne; and the Ukrainian community centres in Essendon and Noble Park. These testimonies were confirmed by searches in social media. The majority of events organised by the Melbourne Ukrainian diaspora community took place in the venues of the aforementioned bodies. On this basis it could be concluded that the three main focusses of the Ukrainian community in Melbourne were teaching children Ukrainian language, history and culture; maintaining religious practice within the Ukrainian churches; and maintaining community organisations and their structures (often referred to by activists as ‘community-building’).

Facebook was observed to be a powerful tool for communication within certain Ukrainian communities (Nedashkivska 2018; Kozachenko 2018). Accordingly, information from this platform was studied for Melbourne. Groups analogous to the ‘Ukrainians in Berlin’ Facebook group were found to exist in Melbourne as well. However, ‘Ukrainians in Melbourne (Social Page)’ and ‘Ukrainians in Melbourne in Australia’ were less popular in numerical terms than their corresponding entity in Berlin. The nature of the content also differed: in Berlin there were dozens of publications a day, including enquiries about visa issues and employment search requests, while in Melbourne there were mostly advertisements of Ukrainian-focussed events, news about Ukraine, and a small number of private business advertisements.

Among other Ukrainian-focussed groups on Facebook there were ‘Ukrainian Ladies (Mums) of Melbourne,’ which was more active than the two aforementioned groups and in terms of content was similar to ‘Ukrainians in Berlin’ – even though it professed to have been established ‘for primarily ladies of Ukrainian background living in Melbourne, mums or otherwise (Ukrainian Ladies [Mums] of Melbourne 2019)’; ‘KOLO Ukrainian Playgroup and School in Melbourne,’ another children-focussed project, the main aim of which is teaching children Ukrainian language, history and culture; and ‘Vesela Zustrich Ukraintsiv Mel’burnu’ [Happy Meeting of Ukrainians in Melbourne], whose activity consisted of monthly meetings of newcomer Ukrainians for finding new friendships. The latter meetings were similar to gatherings which, according to Berlin diaspora activists, were held in that city in the years preceding the Euromaidan under the heading ‘Ukrainischer Stammtisch in Deutschland.’ The Melbourne version was launched in 2016 and was possibly inspired by the precedent of Berlin (Figurek 2018).

In contrast to the many grassroots initiatives in Berlin, in Melbourne there were only a few that might be so classified. This may be explained by the fact that most areas of activity of the grassroots initiatives in Berlin were covered in Melbourne by the Ukrainian ‘old’ diaspora organisations, including charity for the victims of the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine. The Euromaidan events did not give birth to numerous new organisations, as happened in Berlin, but they gave new purpose to the existing community.

6.4. Social capital and its elements in the Ukrainian diaspora

6.4.1. The potential of the social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin

This thesis employs the theory of social capital that was introduced in Chapter Two to investigate whether and to what extent Ukrainians derive benefits from networks with other Ukrainians abroad in terms of socio-economic integration. Such benefits may include the satisfaction of their labour or welfare needs, or of their intellectual ambitions. An example of such a benefit would be an enhancement of migrants' capacity to work in their occupations and to climb the socio-economic ladder on equal terms with citizens of the host country. It is shown below that through networks with other Ukrainians migrants often ease their economic integration while maintaining their sense of belonging to the Ukrainian community.

Drawing upon Bourdieu's definition of a social capital, I understand that the first quality of any form of a social capital and its significance for a community is the fact that it is believed by the community to exist and have value (Bourdieu 1986, 248). The majority of research participants in this study confirmed that the availability of social networks was a key instrument for improving their integration into life in Germany.

Some indicated that immigrants wish for networks as means through which to make friends and to surround themselves with a circle of people they can trust during the stage of the culture shock.[19] A friendly environment of people on whom newcomer immigrants can rely is able to provide necessary emotional support and practical recommendations. Often, migrants make friends with people of the same origin even if they happen to meet them by accident — at a doctor's practice or a bus station. Some of the interviewees said that having a cultural background in common helped them feel at ease, to share problems and to celebrate achievements according to shared customs. As Immigrant B.1. 7. stated,

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[19] The term is used to describe feelings of anxiety and stress when a person is exposed to a new environment. In migration studies the term applies to the experience of immigrants during their first period of integration in a host country when they encounter difficulties in adjusting to a new culture and rules (Winkelman 1994, 121).

> [It is helpful] when you can get advice, or someone can just listen to you and understand you. Because for the first six months I did not understand why I had changed my home, [leaving] Ukraine. Your mentality has to change now. You used to understand how everything works in your native country because you were born there. But when you come here you do not even know how people react.

These were the words of the wife of a primary applicant, an EU Blue Card holder. As she had arrived in Berlin without an employment offer and as the mother of a toddler, without good German or English language skills, she felt isolated and disoriented. Her statement suggests that for the group of immigrants classified in this thesis as trailing spouses, the emotional support of compatriots is crucial.

Yet, regardless of whether one is a trailing spouse or a primary applicant, one can benefit from networks with other Ukrainians. Diaspora Activist B.2.1., asked why Ukrainians need these networks, responded,

> I think this is just the easiest way to find interesting contacts and possibly some kind of friendship, to find new friends. It's always easier to contact people with

> whom you have a common origin. Both things, the common background in Ukraine and the migration experience, bring people closer together.

The last sentence of this quotation identifies two elements of common experience that are important in the formation of useful social networks: a shared Ukrainian background, and shared migration experience. Ukrainians – for example, family members of an immigrant – who have stayed in Ukraine cannot be helpful to the same degree as those who have migrated to the same city and are coping with the same difficulties. Similarly, migrants who have a different national origin are less likely to become close friends with newcomer Ukrainian immigrants due to the absence of common language skills, memories or customs – symbols that unite Ukrainians in their native country. In other words, common nationality operates as a shorthand which makes the formation of friendships quicker than it would be with others with whom migrants must start from scratch.

There are different ways for Ukrainian immigrants in Germany to establish friendly relationships with each other. Some of the recent immigrants who participated in the research project and who came either on a labour visa or were the spouses of persons who were invited as (skilled) labour migrants made connections before migration. They included migrants who had been recommended to employers in Germany by their compatriots, as well as those who had been inspired to migrate by the success stories of their acquaintances. As Immigrant B.1.4. put it,

> I had friends who migrated from Ukraine to Germany. And I talked to them [...]. I got an offer from Germany almost instantly, just by chatting with my friend

> who said to his manager, ‘We need another engineer in the start-up. Here is the person we need.’

In such cases, immigrants tended to maintain the relationship after arrival in Germany. Immigrant B.1.2. recalled that his university friend met him at the airport, helped him to understand the public transportation system and bring his luggage to the hotel room, and stayed in touch thereafter. Such cases suggest that qualified migrants rely on their networks and understand that this makes their integration easier.

Some migrants came to Germany completely independently. Some companies, after hiring the first Ukrainian, hired others because of their positive experience with their first Ukrainian employees. In such instances, those immigrants who were hired first immediately began to communicate with the newcomers, exchanging information about issues of integration in Germany. Five research participants reported such an experience (Immigrants B.1.2., B.1.4., B.1.9., B.11., B.1.14.).

Some of the trailing spouses in my sample were women with children. These mothers established relationships with other Ukrainians, mostly other mothers, while looking for advice regarding the care of children. Some women reported that they found new acquaintances by accidentally meeting compatriots in educational institutions, such as language courses. In all cases they maintained relationships with individuals of Ukrainian origin; however, there was also a tendency to communicate with mothers from other countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. This communication occurred because the women were fluent in Russian, which had been the lingua franca in all the Soviet republics, including Ukraine. Many people in these countries still speak Russian as their first or second native language. Three women

(Immigrants B.1.7., B.1.12., B.1.13.) shared the aforementioned experience independently of each other. The issue of solidarity with non-Ukrainian immigrants, especially Russian speakers, will be explored in this chapter's section on national identity below.

The evidence adduced above shows that social networks of Ukrainian migrants in Berlin exist, and that they play an important role in these migrants' integration in Germany. In Bourdieu's theory of social capital, the second quality of a social network that determines its salience is its durability. The question of whether the networks established by Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin are durable remains unresolved. In trying to answer this question, I interviewed three diaspora activists, all of them Ukrainian immigrants whom social media identified as active leaders. They had played initiative roles in organising Ukrainian-focussed events and establishing web-based initiatives.

All of these activists had migrated in the early 2000s. Diaspora Activist B.2.1. reported that the majority of people who arrived in Berlin between the late 1980s and the time when the EU Blue Card was introduced (2012) were students, repatriated Germans or Jews, or Ukrainians who had married German citizens. Those who migrated as students were able to speak German upon arrival, as they were obliged to pass the language test that was a requirement for enrolment in German university courses. Knowledge of German favourably influenced their ability to integrate, as did the fact that their connections to universities made it much easier for them to join local or international, personal or professional networks than was the case for EU Blue Card holders (Diaspora Activist B 2.1.). This relative ease of integration differentiated them from the group that immigrated after the start of the Euromaidan and comprised mainly IT professionals who arrived without networks or German language skills.

One diaspora activist mentioned that the ‘Ukrainians in Berlin’ Facebook group had been created a couple of years preceding the Euromaidan. Another said that the networks intensified during the Euromaidan protests and political demonstrations organised in Germany by Ukrainians after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Since then, as Diaspora Activist B.2.2. pointed out, the dynamics of participation in diaspora events had changed: as of August 2017, fewer people were interested in political demonstrations, and there was more of a focus on spending time together at private picnics. This implies that a transformation of needs had taken place: people had become more interested in establishing stable relationships with other Ukrainians based on common interests.

While it appears that networks established by Ukrainians in the 2000s have survived, even as their focus has changed, these networks cannot yet be called durable in the macro perspective, given that not many years have passed since the establishment of formal institutions. According to the website of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), the Central Association of Ukrainians in Germany (CAUG) is a member of the UWC (Ukraine World Congress 2018). Kozachenko (2016) defines all the organisations organised under the umbrella of UWC, and therefore CAUG, as belonging to the ‘old’ diaspora. Despite this definition, the fact that the CAUG was founded in 2007 does not yet demonstrate the durability of all the networks associated with CAUG. In other words, the so-called ‘old’ diaspora does not have a strong representation in Berlin.

However, there are grounds for arguing that the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin has a potential to be durable. The ‘new’ diaspora that uses social media as the basis of its communication was established in the mid-2000s by graduates of German universities who arrived in Germany for mixed reasons: either for the purpose of family reunification, or on student visas (Diaspora

Activist B.2.1.). Several grassroots initiatives established before or during the Euromaidan have achieved visibility, and the creation of the web-platform 'Ukraine in Deutschland' [Ukraine in Germany] confirms this. The appearance of a Ukrainian weekend school for children and of pre-school organisations are evidence that Ukrainians aspire to stay in Berlin in the longer term and for this reason make arrangements to teach their children Ukrainian.

Many events for Ukrainians in Berlin are conducted under the auspices of the Ukrainian Embassy in Germany. The active participation of the Embassy in the Berlin Ukrainian community contributes to the strengths of its networks and enhances the likelihood that networks between Ukrainian immigrants will be durable. The Ukrainian Embassy website advertises and encourages participation in cultural events (such as literary readings and academic presentations). Evidently, the official representation of the Ukrainian state is engaged in maintaining a relationship with Ukrainian immigrants.

There is a particular dynamic in the circles of Ukrainians who stay in their professional environment and establish personal contacts with compatriots. According to Diaspora Activist B.2.2., the majority of IT professionals have distanced themselves from the Ukrainian-focussed activities that are organised by activists and demand personal contributions of time and energy – for example, political demonstrations that require the participant to stand and hold a flag all day long. IT professionals tend to avoid such events because 'they believe that they are working in their main occupation, making money; [they're] tired. They would prefer something relaxing.' As was noted in Chapter Four, the majority of Ukrainian IT professionals in Berlin are the only breadwinners in their family during the first years of their stay in Germany and experience a downgrading of their economic capacities. This explains their desire to work harder: they wish to provide for their dependants at a level that continues to meet their expectations.

One of the reasons why Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin do not have a well-knit community in Berlin, Diaspora Activist B.2.3. speculated, was that they did not have their own stable physical space:

> There used to be no sense that 'We are a civil society.' Now, I do have this feeling. And somehow in recent years, especially after the Euromaidan, or shortly before the Euromaidan, we realised that we have to make it [a physical space] ourselves – but this has not yet happened. That is, this physical space could be, for example, a little cafe with a bookstore, where newcomers would know: this is a Ukrainian cafe, you can come here, meet here, attend events here. It seems to me that through such a physical space a certain network of people can be formed, which can then evolve into a political structure. And this was evident during the Euromaidan.

In many interviews, research participants acknowledged that they were considering returning to Ukraine. However, they also admitted that practical considerations, such as the extent of their children's integration into German society or the efforts they had put towards receiving permanent residency, would discourage them from leaving Germany in the coming few years; meanwhile, they could enjoy the benefits of their stay in Berlin while waiting to see whether the situation in Ukraine improve. It is likely that the networks they have established with other Ukrainians will be maintained in coming years. I base this expectation on the evidence that none of the immigrants who arrived after the Euromaidan spoke German at level allowing a friendly relationship with German nationals.

The third component of social capital as conceptualised by Bourdieu (1986, 249) is the profit that accrues from participation in a network. This includes different types of services that such a relationship may provide, whether symbolic or material. Providing information on integrational issues is one type of such services (Keles 2016, 323). In the case of Ukrainians in Berlin, information that contributes to social capital is, first and foremost, information which helps reduce the precariousness that results from particular visa statuses and is an obstacle to economic integration. This comprises information on how to apply for visas correctly and how to use all of the opportunities that these visas entail, including information on how to transfer from one visa class to another, usually from a temporary visa to a permanent residency visa.

An example of such information sharing is to be found in the groups of Ukrainian IT specialists in Berlin. These IT professionals use specialised digital applications such as GitHub,[20] as was mentioned by Immigrant B.1.6. Ukrainian IT professionals used this platform to store documents on how to integrate better in Germany – documents containing information on German laws or, simply, offering practical advice. Everyone was able to contribute such documents. However, mostly it was only IT professionals who did so, since they also used GitHub for other, professional purposes.

For Immigrant B.1.2. not receiving correct visa information in a timely manner had negative consequences. He initially applied for the EU Blue Card, but his education certificate was not recognised and, as a consequence, the visa could not be granted. He gave up to trying to migrate, and did so only when it was revealed that he would be able to apply for another visa type. Immigrants B.1.9. and B.1.11., likewise, did not qualify to apply for the EU Blue Card, but their Ukrainian connections at their future workplaces helped. The employer made extra efforts to employ them under the conditions of the TW visa instead. Immigrant B.1.9. commented that the fact that the company had already employed a Ukrainian under the same scheme made the application process much smoother, because the worker who had been hired earlier advised his compatriot.

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[20] GitHub Inc. is a web-based platform that is mostly used for hosting and reviewing computer code and building software. It was created for businesses and for open source projects (GitHub, Inc. [US]).

Chapters Four and Five established that recognition of diplomas is an important and complex migration barrier that requires the applicant to attain a lot of knowledge regarding the process. Most of this information is available publicly in the German language, which complicates access to it for newcomer migrants. Immigrant B.1.6. and Immigrant B.1.7. said that they had heard by word of mouth that there were private institutions in Germany which help to evaluate diplomas. Such institutions advise customers on whether their diplomas can be recognised or whether they can retrain. These institutions were relevant for migrants who arrived in the country without an employment offer, in this case as trailing spouses.

For the majority of trailing spouses obtaining information on how to utilise their qualifications in Germany was a key determinant that defined their future in Germany. For example, Immigrant B.1.12. was able to obtain advice from another immigrant regarding how to retrain during her first year in Germany. This advice encouraged her to undertake an extra educational course that fit her profession and would allow working in this occupation in the coming years. However, some women did not receive such information in time, and for this reason, as well as due to maternal duties, were not able to retrain in the first couple of years after migration. The significant interruption of their occupational experience discouraged them from continuing their careers.

Usually, Ukrainians who migrated earlier transferred information to newcomers. Indeed, among the research participants of this study there were people who arrived on the recommendation of other compatriots and subsequently received help from these acquaintances. However, there were also people who arrived independently, having found their job offer on the Internet (through LinkedIn), and whose prospective employers were not of Ukrainian origin. Such migrants (for example, Immigrant B.1.2.) sometimes consider themselves to be pioneers: Immigrant B.1.2. at a later stage of his migration helped those of his co-workers from Ukraine who were hired after him. Immigrant B.1.2. was assisted on arrival with some basic needs by a university friend. However, he made the most important arrangements, such as negotiating his rent contract and obtaining various registrations, by himself with little help from his German employer and, as detailed in Chapter Four, had many unpleasant experiences and was economically disadvantaged because of this.

Some migrants contacted those who had migrated in the pre-Euromaidan wave of migration, for example in order to get help in relation to labour market integration. Diaspora Activist B.2.3. recounted the following:

> Once, a very intelligent and well respected lady showed me her resume. It looked like [a resume written for an employment application] in Kyiv. I was horrified. I thought, 'My God! [In Germany] you write a resume in a completely different way.' Nobody had showed her how to do it. And who could have shown her?

As this quote demonstrates, in the opinion of the diaspora activist knowledge of such matters as what a resume should look like has to be communicated by someone who already has experience of seeking employment in Germany and in Berlin, in particular. It also illustrates the tendency of skilled migrants to approach other educated and more experienced migrants when requiring advice on integration.

Information is not the only resource that constitutes social capital. According to Bourdieu (1986, 252), capital can be converted from one type to another. In particular, economic capital is able to be converted into social capital and vice versa. Social capital converted from economic capital can take the form of 'a specific labour, i.e., an apparently gratuitous expenditure of time, attention, care, concern, which, as is seen in the endeavour to personalise the gift, has the effect of transfiguring the purely monetary import of the exchange […]' (1986, 253). Such free gifts of services that otherwise would command a fee circulate within the social networks of the Ukrainian community in Berlin, especially among those who are skilled. For example, Immigrant B.1.8. recalled that a friend of her family helped to arrange appointments with public institutions. Moreover, several immigrants commented that in order to comply with all the formal requirements that must be met on arrival, immigrants visiting public institutions should be accompanied by a person who speaks German.

Immigrant B.1.5. commented on the potential benefit of institutionalising informal migrant networks. This would facilitate migrants' communication with one another and, as a consequence, their integration:

> Listen, it would have been super useful if there had been such a 'Mamma' organisation, and it had helped with understanding all these documents, as well

> as institutions. And also it would be great if this organisation could say to a person, ‘Here is a package of services for you. Here we include all [the information] on your social health insurance. When you decide on an apartment, we will help you to sign contracts and agree on additional services that include internet, lighting – perhaps something else, such as insurance for the apartment.’ These things are all so standardised that they could be automated, [...] or at least offered in the form of a service with ready-made solutions.

Immigrant B.1.5. further remarked that having these services in the Ukrainian language would be a huge benefit. He pointed out that if he spoke German, such an organisation would be unnecessary for him, since he could get the required information from the original sources. Diaspora Activist B.2.3. noted that organisations of this kind do exist, including ones that help migrants to resolve such integration issues in a range of languages, including English and Russian. She said that on request even the Ukrainian language can be provided. However, due to the large number of immigrants in Berlin the long waiting time discouraged skilled migrants from making appointments with such organisations in the first place. I discovered that most immigrants do not know about these organisations. Those migrants who do, find them excessively bureaucratic.

Diaspora Activist B.2.3. agreed on the need for an organisation within the diaspora community which could provide consulting services for Ukrainians. She pointed out that this could best be done in a designated physical space and on a regular basis by a person who would answer enquiries. Yet, as Immigrant B.1.3. emphasised, it would be difficult to create such an institution for the Ukrainian diaspora due to the absence of funding. In fact, most diaspora institutions operate on a volunteer basis. In the opinion of this research participant such services would require too much effort and too many resources to organise: ‘We would need some philanthropist who is ready to dedicate himself to helping, informing, writing, doing…,’ she speculated.

To sum up, networks with compatriots help to overcome culture shock, provide assistance in arranging necessary services such as childcare and are useful in the search for employment. The impact of these networks is significant, yet migrants do not set out with the intention of relying on them. While the durability of the Ukrainian diaspora network in Berlin is not assured, current networks and grassroots initiatives may demonstrate durability in future. Moreover, as a result of the Euromaidan and the war in Ukraine that commenced in 2014, different layers and groups of migrants in Berlin might unify around a common objective.

6.4.2. Durability and institutionalisation of Ukrainian networks: contribution to social capital in Melbourne

The literature review on the history of Ukrainian migration and the section on the contemporary status of Ukrainian organisations in Melbourne established that the structures of the Ukrainian community in that city have been relatively stable since 1949. They manifest both durability and institutionalisation, qualities which, according to Bourdieu (1986; 248), are important features of entities that possess social capital. One of my findings on the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin is that it has the potential to accumulate social capital, but has not yet had time to do so. It is still, so to speak, a start-up project. To correspond fully with Bourdieu’s (1986) understanding of groupings endowed with social capital, this community must remain in existence for a longer period of time, during which its institutional features continue to be in evidence. In contrast to Berlin, in Melbourne initiatives of the new Ukrainian diaspora were mostly merged with the activities of the older diaspora community, which is highly institutionalised. Detailed descriptions of the history of the numerous Ukrainian organisations in Melbourne that abound in the literature attest to its institutionalised character.

The remaining element, in addition to durability and institutionalisation, of Bourdieu's definition (1986) of entities possessing social capital, is resources that are circulated within these durable and more or less institutionalised networks of people. In Berlin, information about visa issues, employment search, workplace communication and other labour market integration problems, and assistance in resolving them, were found to be a resource of the newly created social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin. Similar circumstances were found to prevail in Melbourne. For example, the finding that social capital in the Ukrainian immigrant community, while not essential for successful integration, nevertheless accelerated the process of such integration, also held in Melbourne. As Immigrant M.1.9. put it,

> The fact that we had friends [of Ukrainian origin] in Melbourne was very important. Although neither of us [the research participant and his wife] was afraid of emigration, living in a new country, meeting new people or encountering a new culture, we nonetheless received a lot of useful advice from friends. I called my friends in Melbourne and asked what needs to be done – [I requested] a step-by-step guide. They advised that it is useful to begin one's studies at Semester One, because then it is much easier to integrate into a group and into university life [...]. We thought we would be short of time, but they said that there was enough time to prepare for migration and enrol [for Semester One].

This quote also illustrates the fact that information about visas and the application process is one of the resources that were circulated in the network, creating social capital. While in Germany the process of applying for the EU Blue Card was relatively simple and applicants for the Card did not require a lot of help, applicants for the German TW visa used advice from their compatriots much as Immigrant M.1.9. did in the Australian context.

Despite the similarities, there were also some differences between the nature of the social capital accumulated in Berlin and Melbourne. First, Ukrainian newcomers to Melbourne were less likely to ask for help through public social media groups. In general, the process by which they established relationships with other Ukrainians in Melbourne began with face-to-face encounters in Ukrainian-focussed physical spaces: community centres, churches and schools. Second, the nature of their needs also differed. In Australia, Ukrainian skilled immigrants were less concerned about the bureaucratic processes of public institutions and sought the help of interpreters less than their counterparts in Berlin. This can be explained as a consequence of a requirement of Australian immigration policy: that main applicants must pass an English language test before applying for an Australian visa. The primary applicant's level of proficiency must be at least at upper intermediate level. Secondary applicants also must demonstrate knowledge sufficient for independent communication in English. The way in which Australia manages its bureaucracy also resulted in relatively easy access by immigrants to public services. For example, in Australia many services are online, while in Berlin newcomers had to attend many offices in person.

On the other hand, Ukrainians in Melbourne complained about unpredictable changes in Australian immigration policy and the waiting time for receiving a response to an application for permanent residency. They usually tried to seek advice from their compatriots before applying for this type of visa. In some cases, advice from Ukrainian acquaintances was not enough, and some Ukrainians preferred to hire migration agents to lodge their applications. In many cases, these migration agents had Ukrainian background.

A third difference between the social capital in the Ukrainian community in Berlin and Melbourne was that in Melbourne professionals were less likely to establish relationships with other professionals in their field at an early stage of their integration. Given that my sample in Melbourne contained only a few IT specialists, while in Berlin they were the majority, there was less mention in Melbourne about their professional communication and the use of the GitHub platform, prominent in Berlin and discussed in the previous section. But social networks did play a role in the migration and integration process. One research participant reported that when he arrived in Melbourne he searched for employment and in the first place looked for Ukrainians in his occupation through LinkedIn. Immigrant M.1.9. successfully established contact with a Ukrainian colleague who shared her recent experience of searching for employment. These immigrants were IT specialists.

A fourth difference between the Ukrainian skilled migrant experience in Melbourne and Berlin is that in Australia newcomer Ukrainian professionals were more informed about networking practices in the labour market than their Berlin counterparts about corresponding practices in Germany. Most of the Melburnians were aware that success in the employment search depended on their relationships with other people. Since, in contrast to Berlin, not every main applicant in Melbourne had an employment offer prior to arrival, networking was a key strategy for many Ukrainians in Melbourne. Accordingly, their approach to establishing relationships with other Ukrainians was often more strategic than that of their counterparts in Berlin. This difference in approach can be attributed to the differing nature of labour and social relations in Germany and Australia.

While Bourdieu (1986, 249) suggests that these benefits do not necessarily arise from the intentions of people to derive them, in Melbourne the main Ukrainian community organisation was set up with the express purpose of conferring such benefits. The Memorandum of Association of the Association of Ukrainians in Victoria (AUV) in its Section 3 states that among the Association's objects are:

> a) […] to support and protect the well-being and interest of Ukrainians on Victorian soil; […] c) to diffuse amongst its members information on matters affecting their lives and interests […]; d) to promote, improve and elevate the education and training of its members to enable them to obtain or engage in suitable professions, occupations, trades and pursuits; […] h) to obtain and furnish information or otherwise acquaint its members with a knowledge Australian institutions and the Australian way of life and to deepen understanding and friendship with the Australian Community. (Association of Ukrainians in Victoria 1954)

(In Berlin there is no organisation that would correspond to the AUV. The constitution of the Central Association of Ukrainians in Germany contains no sections on mutual help, nor about supporting its members in their efforts to integrate).

The subsections of the AUV Memorandum of Association quoted above documents the intentions of the 'old' diaspora to help its members achieve legal and economic integration –

that is, fully to exercise their rights. These intentions were confirmed by diaspora activists who were interviewed for this study. All of the quoted subsections articulate objectives that may be identified as intentions to accumulate resources of social capital.

While the intentions of the 'old' diaspora to practice mutual help and support were clear and documented, members of the 'new' diaspora and, in particular, the post-Euromaidan diaspora have a different understanding of the purposes of Ukrainian community social life, different needs and different conceptions of their national identity. For example, Immigrant M.1.9., who stated that he was not aware of any formal Ukrainian organisations in Melbourne, said that he never expected any help from anyone and felt responsible for his own integration. Yet he acknowledged that his situation could have been improved, had certain structures been available to him:

> What do I think I need? Probably professional advice and the opportunity to meet round a table with ten different people [Ukrainians] of different professions: one could be an accountant, another an IT professional [Immigrant M.1.9. is himself an IT professional], the third – a doctor, the fourth – someone else again, for example, a tax agent. And we could chat, just to exchange contacts and experiences as people who had migrated from the same country [Ukraine], and just to help each other with advice. For example, if I needed legal help, I would be able to consult with a lawyer from Ukraine whom I already knew. This would make things much easier for me; a lawyer with Ukrainian background would be able to advise me better than an Australian lawyer, because those [Australian legal] terms are so unfamiliar that even if you speak English you still won't understand anything [legal jargon, the legal system]. (Immigrant M.1.9.)

While Ukrainian immigrants in Germany sometimes said that they needed an organisation with a physical space where advice on integration could be provided, for Ukrainian immigrants in Melbourne such organisations exist. However, newcomers tend not to know about such opportunities. In particular, none of the interviewed Ukrainians showed that they knew about the formal intentions of the ‘old’ diaspora to grant help as described in the AUV Memorandum. For example, Immigrant M.1.7. would have welcomed such opportunities, but did not know who was responsible for providing them. Immigrant M.1.9. suggested that newcomers do not feel at ease accepting help from a formal organisation or people they did not know, but would willingly accept help from close friends.

The similarities and differences outlined above between the nature of social capital in the Ukrainian communities of the two cities related to the needs of newcomer immigrants, as well as to the ways in which they received support from other compatriots. The Ukrainian community in Melbourne proved to be highly formal and, as a consequence, more powerful in terms of owning and controlling resources than its counterpart in Berlin. In particular, it offered newcomers the opportunity to use physical spaces that were often good platforms for networking. Here newcomers could find professionals of different profiles and get advice from them. By contrast, digital spaces such as Facebook pages which helped newcomers to get advice upon request were more developed and more widely used in Berlin.

6.5. Language and national identity in the Ukrainian community

6.5.1. Berlin: testimonies from a predominantly Russian-speaking community

In the academic literature, the linguistic heterogeneity of Ukrainians has been researched from various perspectives. Researchers have examined the relationship of language use to national identity among people who live on the territory of contemporary Ukraine and in the Ukrainian diaspora. The tension between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking diasporas has been the object of qualitative research in several countries (Kulyk 2016; Nedashkivska 2018; Kozachenko 2018). Before the Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian diaspora, generally speaking, was divided into branches which preferred to speak either mainly Ukrainian or mainly Russian (Nedashkivska 2018, 115). Most of the latter were dispersed among other communities formed by immigrants from the former Soviet states, as Diaspora Activist B.2.2. observed.

In this study, all research participants reported that they did not feel any pressure to speak either Ukrainian or Russian while communicating with other Ukrainians in Berlin. While the majority of the interviewees (ten; some could not answer) considered Russian to be their first language or their second native language, only three chose to respond to interview questions in Russian. However, when asked about the language in which the interviewer should put her questions, all three responded that they did not mind if the questions were in Ukrainian. Those who chose to answer in Russian said that they understood the questions, and their responses confirmed that this was indeed the case. Some of them used the opportunity to give the interview in Ukrainian to practice their Ukrainian language skills (e.g., Immigrant B.1.10.).

These language choices in the interview situation reflect the attitudes of the interviewees to the Ukrainian and Russian languages in a way that corresponds, in part, to the findings of Alla Nedashkivska (2018, 111). Nedashkivska's analysis found Russian speakers to be willing to abide by the perceived (though informal) language policy of the Ukrainian diaspora community, which favours Ukrainian. Yet, whereas Nedashkivska's Canada-based study found that many Russian speakers chose to speak Ukrainian in order to be better understood by the mainly Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, interviewees in Berlin appear to have chosen Ukrainian for other reasons, possibly because they had experienced personal transformations in their perception of languages as a result of the Euromaidan and the war. There is also evidence that some Ukrainian diaspora activists who organised Ukrainian-focussed events in Berlin chose to speak Ukrainian during these events, although their first and everyday language was Russian.

The opinion of Immigrant B.1.3. sheds light on the way that some younger migrants see age as a factor that explains and excuses the failure of some of their older compatriots to abide by the Ukrainian diaspora's implicit language values:

> Our generation, I think, should know the Ukrainian language. As for those who are older – there were other conditions [when they were growing up], and I would treat them somewhat differently. I believe that they are as much Ukrainians [as we are], and they feel themselves to be so.

These words support the conjecture that the interviewees were more inclined to speak Ukrainian because many of them had grown up in independent Ukraine and had practised Ukrainian more than those who had grown up in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the people interviewed for this project were all tertiary-educated and had come into the country legally as skilled workers. As a consequence, their need to integrate into the diaspora community was not urgent, and they felt no need to adjust their linguistic behaviour to satisfy the perceived preferences of the diaspora community. Their choice of speaking Ukrainian, therefore, reflected their identity.

Solidarity is an important element of social capital and national identity. In the case of Ukraine there has been a long-standing dispute as to whether such solidarity exists in Ukrainian society despite the fact that the nation comprises citizens who speak mainly Ukrainian and those who speak mainly Russian. According to the data presented in this study, in the Ukrainian migrant community in Berlin conflicts based on language diminished in the years that coincided with the Euromaidan and the outbreak of war in the east of Ukraine. Evidence shows, however, that such clashes still take place, though on a minor scale. For example, two diaspora activists said that once or twice they had witnessed in Facebook groups some Ukrainians commenting emotionally on Russian-language advertisements and wondering why the authors of the latter did not use Ukrainian, the national language of Ukraine. Diaspora Activist B.2.2. called these commentators 'a couple of nationalists' and implied that such behaviour was rare.

Instances of negative reactions by Russian speakers to the use of the Ukrainian language were also recorded, though these, too, were uncommon. In this regard, one diaspora activist mentioned that at a gathering of Ukrainians a Russian-speaking Ukrainian said that he did not understand the Ukrainian language. This statement was perceived as a joke by the rest of the group, and similar cases never happened later. A comment by Immigrant B.1.3. reflects the more general attitude of Russian-speaking Ukrainians to language matters:

> Even Russian-speaking people – those who nonetheless feel an attachment to the Ukrainian community – try to speak Ukrainian when they meet; they like talking in Ukrainian and want to do so, even though they speak Russian with their families. In my opinion, language is not determinative [of one's sense of belonging to the Ukrainian community].

Among Ukrainian immigrants who are less involved in Ukrainian-focussed activities organised by NGOs, movements or initiatives, or in web-based public discussions in Berlin, IT specialists and their spouses constitute a significant group. Immigrant B.1.4. described the linguistic diversity that characterises the typical workplace of such IT immigrants:

> Everyone speaks whatever language they are able to speak. I have a colleague whose native language is Ukrainian. We speak sometimes in Ukrainian and, if I need to, I turn to Russian. I also have colleagues who speak only in Russian, although they are from Ukraine.

The prevailing opinion in this group is that most Ukrainians communicate in Russian with other Ukrainians at their Berlin workplaces for two reasons: 1) the majority of them are Russian-speakers; and 2) Ukrainians collaborate with co-workers from Russia or Belarus, and use Russian as a lingua franca*.* Immigrant B.1.2., a Ukrainian-speaking IT immigrant, said that immigration to Berlin made him much more tolerant toward the Russian language, although he admitted that it was difficult to have friendly relationships with individuals, whether Ukrainians or Russians, who took Russia's side in the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Immigrant B.1.4. reflected more broadly on the nature of communication at his workplace:

> In fact, everyone talks about work mainly in English. That's why there are no problems [...] until the moment people start discussing the political situation. The fact is that we talk on professional topics, about living in Germany, salaries, taxes, and the like. And with Russians I avoid talking about the political situation, and we bypass themes associated with the Russian-Ukrainian war. Well, I would not call this communication super-strained. Well, yes, it's certainly not good to be limited in talking about some topics, but I think it's not super-critical.

As several of the interviewees made clear, language behaviour for them was not necessarily indicative of national identity. In line with Kulyk's (2016, 604) observation that it is possible to be both Russian-speaking and a Ukrainian nationalist, my study shows that the majority of Ukrainians in Berlin have a civic national identity, not an ethnic one. Civic national identity, according to the definition adduced in Chapter Two, is a sense of belonging based on affiliation with a state. By contrast, ethnic identity involves feeling solidarity with people based on ethnic traits such as shared descent, language and customs.

Some of my interviewees mentioned that, though they were not born in Ukraine and had most of their close relatives abroad, they still considered themselves to be Ukrainians because of their Ukrainian citizenship and because they had grown up on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. They also considered that the language they used to communicate with one another had no bearing on their sense of being Ukrainian. However, some of them stated that personal communication with defenders of pro-Russian views could not take place: Ukrainians, even if they were Russian speakers, would not maintain a relationship with other Russian speakers if the latter held pro-separatist or pro-Russian views.

The attitudes expressed by interviewees in this study confirm what has been observed by Brubaker (2002, 171): that dramatic events which present difficulties and challenges ‘crystallise’ national communities more than do positive experiences.[21] They also confirm the observation, frequently encountered in both scholarly and journalistic sources, that the national identity of Ukrainians changed during and after the Euromaidan. Indeed, the majority of those interviewed declared that they saw Russia as an aggressor and made it clear that, as far as the Russian-Ukrainian war was concerned, they were in solidarity with Ukraine. This did not prevent them from communicating with Russians who did not support the current political regime in Russia, nor with any Russian co-workers if they avoided political topics. Some interviewees mentioned that they had relatives in Russia with whom, likewise, they tried not to speak on political themes.

These sentiments regarding Russian aggression and the need to be unified against a common threat helped the Ukrainian community in Berlin to take steps towards creating a community more tightly knit than previously it had been. Their desire to separate themselves from the immigrant community that encompassed citizens of all post-Soviet states pushed them to be more decisive in these matters. As Diaspora Activist B.2.2. observed, Ukrainians who had migrated 20 years earlier, in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, generally identified themselves as belonging to the same nation as Russians, Belarusians and citizens of other former Soviet countries, while almost all of those who migrated after the Euromaidan see themselves as separate and identify only as Ukrainians.

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[21] As was noted in Chapter Two, the outbreak of the military conflict in the eastern Ukraine rallied Ukrainian people more than the declaration of independence in 1991.

In contrast to what Nedashkivska observed in relation to Ukrainians in Canada, the Ukrainian language is not necessarily the main marker of Ukrainianness in Berlin. According to my observations, this role belongs, rather, to volunteering practices associated with Euromaidan events and to helping other Ukrainians in the diaspora and in Ukraine. 'The Euromaidan was a very positive phenomenon,' remarked Diaspora Activist B.2.2. 'It rallied people, it made people get to know one another [...]. They have reduced their activity now. But the charity organisations keep going on.'

Exploring the notion of 'Ukrainianness,' Khanenko-Friesen (2011; 2015) focused mainly on cultural factors that contribute, predominantly, to national identity as an ethnic identity. The present investigation reveals that in the case of Ukrainians in Berlin national identity is best described as civic rather than ethnic. This, however, does not preclude attachment to cultural markers of Ukrainianness. Seeking to clarify the nature of the national identity experienced by Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin as a personal or collective sense of belonging, I asked immigrants what it meant for them to be Ukrainian. Some of them mentioned cultural practices such as cooking Ukrainian food or celebrating Ukrainian national and religious holidays (Immigrant B.1.13.). One mother said that for her it was crucial to have access to Ukrainian literature, because her child had grown up in a Ukrainian-speaking environment and preferred reading books written in Ukrainian (Immigrant B.1.12.).

Another important element of national identity is a sense of solidarity with fellow members of the nation (Smith 1991). Solidarity is also a component of social capital, in that it involves a sense of obligation to help other members of the community of which one is part (Isajiw 2010). Solidarity and the obligations that flow from it take various forms. For example, some migrants demonstrate their solidarity with other Ukrainians by participating in political demonstrations in support of their compatriots who stayed in Ukraine. For others, solidarity with compatriots in the diaspora community manifests itself in such activities as providing assistance to newcomer migrants.

Immigrant B.1.1. stated that ‘obligation’ was too strong a word to describe the feeling that immigrants had toward each other. Migrants helped each other because of a sense of sympathy with other Ukrainians who were going through an integration process similar to what others had already experienced. Immigrants B.1.8. and B.1.9. emphasised that they felt sympathy towards migrants of different nationalities and would help everyone on equal terms. Nevertheless, there are some specific matters that only a Ukrainian could help another Ukrainian with, as Immigrant B.1.10. noted. According to Diaspora Activist B.2.1., such matters include responding to needs for legal aid on the part of persons encountering a violation of their rights or wishing to expand or change their legal status. The diaspora activist noted that in Germany the requirements of immigration law and some other branches of the law are different for persons of different nationalities. Therefore, a lawyer with a Ukrainian background would be in a better position to explain and assist in relation to such matters.

While the majority of Ukrainian migrants expressed cosmopolitan views in regard to helping newcomers of other nationalities, Immigrant B.1.4. said that he felt strongly obliged (he utilised this term) to help other Ukrainians:

> Since I am a visitor here, I would like other visitors to feel better… well, [because of] karma etc. And the second point is that the war with Russia has rallied us against a common enemy, and I believe that it is very important for everyone to stick together and not let ourselves be hurt. Accordingly, yes, I have begun to help people, to suggest things to them, just to improve their situation so we can all be stronger together.

Bourdieu (1986, 249) suggests that ‘the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible.’ In the case of Ukrainian skilled migrants in Berlin, such profits include shared knowledge and mutual assistance. As Immigrant B.1.8., for example, mentioned, in order to attend some state institutions to make enquiries on behalf of her family, she would have needed to speak German. She did not speak German, so she asked an acquaintance from her spouse’s workplace to assist her. The acquaintance was able to act as an interpreter. Diaspora Activist B.2.2. stated that he was often called upon to help in similar circumstances. Usually, migrants ask for help to find a school or kindergarten for their children, but often they also ask for tips on how to find employment, have their diplomas recognised, or begin retraining. They wish to find out what institutions they have to turn to in order to obtain relevant documents. In the initial stages the assistance of a friendly translator is often required.

To conclude, in regard to its linguistic profile the Ukrainian community in Berlin includes many Ukrainians who consider Russian to be their native language or one of their native languages. This does not prevent them from openly separating themselves from pro-Russian interests in eastern Ukraine and identifying strongly with the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian community. Solidarity, an important element of national identity, is not compromised in the Ukrainian community of Berlin by the different language orientations of its members. These immigrants tend to help each other regardless of their choice of language. Moreover, the Euromaidan events helped these Ukrainians to rally and reinforce their sense of empathy and obligation to each other.

6.5.2. Melbourne: attitudes of the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking 'old' diaspora towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians

Different language orientations in a Ukrainian diaspora community was the major issue that was discussed above in relation to the Ukrainian community in Berlin. In Melbourne, Ukrainians attending events organised by the Ukrainian community tended to communicate in Ukrainian. Some newcomer migrants, however, stated that their native language was Russian. As far as language is concerned, the main difference between Berlin and Melbourne is the fact that that Ukrainians in Melbourne, most of whom are descendants of the post-World War II migration wave, are mostly Ukrainian-speaking (when not communicating in English). This is explained by the nature of the post-World War II wave, which comprised mainly Displaced Persons from refugee camps in Germany and Austria. The majority of this population had not experienced russification in the USSR, and many considered Russian to be the language of an oppressor. As some diaspora activists mention, after the dissolution of the USSR some established Australian Ukrainians demonstrated hostility towards those Ukrainians who spoke Russian.

In the majority of cases, Ukrainian-focussed events in the post-Euromaidan era in Melbourne were organised by representatives of the organisations founded in the years after World War II. They were conducted mostly in the Ukrainian language. As Diaspora Activist M.2.1. pointed out, some of the participants were mainly Russian-speaking. Yet they tended to follow the lead of the organisers of the events and switch to Ukrainian in conversations with them. As Immigrant M.1.1. stated,

> This was a feat: people who grew up in a Russian-speaking environment in Ukraine, having arrived in Australia after all the events of the Euromaidan protests (actually, the onset of Russia's aggression – this probably had more influence), decided that they wanted to identify as Ukrainians, not Russians, and to teach their children the Ukrainian language. I would not call these people Russian-speaking: I do not know people who speak only Russian and who go to Ukrainian community events or to the [Ukrainian] church or other events that the community organises, and speak Russian.

This phenomenon is similar to what Nedashkivska (2018) observed had happened in the Canadian digital space. What was observed in Berlin however, was even more unexpected: there many event organisers who were native speakers of Russian switched to Ukrainian when taking part in Ukrainian-focussed events that they themselves had organised. Due to the prevalence of Russian in the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin, for many activists gatherings of Ukrainians provided the only opportunity to practice the Ukrainian language on a regular basis.

Diaspora activists in Melbourne reported that the attitude of the 'old' diaspora to newcomer Russian-speaking Ukrainians changed after the Euromaidan. In particular, the fact that many Russian speakers were active in the military defence of Ukraine against pro-Russian separatists brought about an understanding that the language marker is not essential for a sense of a national identity — a key idea of Kulyk's (2016) study on national identity in Ukraine. The 'new' diaspora also changed its attitude towards the 'old' diaspora. However, one of the interviewees said that she still feared that if she spoke Russian in the Ukrainian church she could be judged. This person felt obligated to speak Ukrainian with members of the Ukrainian community, and this made her uncomfortable. A couple of other immigrants said that some members of the old diaspora had tried to correct their language. Yet, for many newcomer migrants speaking and practising Ukrainian was the main purpose of interacting with other Ukrainians (as was the case in Berlin, where during Ukrainian community events Russian speakers chose to speak Ukrainian).

Apart from the aforementioned exceptions, the majority of Ukrainian immigrants in the Melbourne sample confirmed that communication between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainian immigrants was unproblematic. Newcomers, in particular, easily communicated with each other and helped one another despite linguistic preferences. Diaspora Activist M.2.2. noted that there was a tendency for newcomer Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians to switch to Russian when communicating among themselves. Immigrant M.1.10. observed that many parents in the Ukrainian school speak Russian to each other. It was indicated that there are probably some events in Melbourne, such as public barbecues, where more Russian-speaking Ukrainians are present than Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. Immigrant M.1.2. also remarked that there exists a Russian-speaking community of Ukrainians in Melbourne. Some people he met told him that they had switched from Russian to Ukrainian during the Orange Revolution of 2004. In his opinion, the Euromaidan did not affect people in such a way.

When asked whether there was a conflict between parts of the Ukrainian community on the basis of the language they used, Diaspora Activist M.2.1. reflected in general terms on the sense of unity in the Ukrainian diaspora community in Melbourne, and did not emphasise the issue of language:

> I think that everyone is trying to come together. [...] In each person love for the homeland manifests itself in different ways, but that is exactly what unites everyone: those who came here 50 or only 10 years ago, or a month ago – everyone is worried about their relatives and friends back in Ukraine and trying to help them. I do not know that there have been any miscommunications or problems.

The evolution of linguistic preferences in the Ukrainian community in Melbourne can be generalised as follows. Between World War II and 1991, when Ukraine gained independence from the USSR, the Ukrainian community was predominantly Ukrainian-speaking and disapproved of Russian speakers, because the Russian language was associated with Russian oppression in Ukraine. Between 1991 and the Orange Revolution of 2004 Russian-speaking Ukrainian newcomer migrants either adopted the Ukrainian language for their communication with the 'old' diaspora or joined Russian or Russian-speaking communities (the latter included migrants from many post-Soviet countries, not only Russia or Ukraine). With the Orange Revolution some Russian-speaking Ukrainians switched to the Ukrainian language and became more inclined to interact with the 'old' diaspora and those post-1991 newcomers who had joined the existing community structures. The Euromaidan then changed the attitude of the 'old' diaspora towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians, while many people of Ukrainian origin who had not previously associated with Ukrainian diaspora institutions now did so, offering their financial support for causes in Ukraine. Furthermore, it was reported that some Ukrainians removed their children from Russian-language schools, disapproving of what they saw as these schools' support for Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and for pro-Russian separatists in the east of Ukraine, and sent them to Ukrainian schools instead.

It is important to note, however, that for post-Euromaidan immigrants solidarity between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians still exists when it comes to mutual support on matters of economic integration. For example, Immigrant M.1.6. mentioned that, despite the fact that he was a Ukrainian speaker, the only person who helped him shape his CV was a Russian speaker. This suggests that for such Ukrainian migrants in such contexts linguistic differences did not matter. Ukrainian institutions in Melbourne offer a good platform for establishing relationships between members of different migrant waves and within the same wave. These institutions also help people to meet one another and, as a consequence, get help with their integration issues.

Yet, as Immigrant M.1.1. noted, membership of the established institutions requires a lot of volunteering work. The relatively small Ukrainian community needs volunteers to support its existing infrastructure of schools, churches, community centres and organisations. Furthermore, there is an expectation that newcomers will contribute in this way: 'The community [old diaspora formal organisations] is somehow more interested in engaging people to help them [than it is in offering help itself],' observed Immigrant M.1.3. But some newcomers who did become active in the community nevertheless were concerned about being overwhelmed by such expectations when they also needed to integrate into the labour market and into broader Australian society. Diaspora Activist M.2.2. confirmed that there was a category of newcomer migrants who were not able to engage in active community life:

> There are cases where people would like to be able to interact a bit more with other Ukrainians, but they are so committed [to meeting the requirements of a more advantageous visa type] that they don't have the time to do so, and some simply isolate themselves.

Indeed, the number of people who actually were able to volunteer was not very significant. Nonetheless, whereas before the Euromaidan many institutions of the old diaspora were experiencing stagnation, with the enlargement of the community after the start of the Euromaidan they received some new human resources which helped them continue conducting their activities (Immigrant M.1.10).

Another way in which Ukrainian identity manifested itself was reported by Immigrant M.1.7., who by accident met another woman of Ukrainian background in a parking place in Melbourne. This woman had the Ukrainian national symbol, the trident, displayed on her car. The woman said that since she arrived 15 years ago she had integrated into the English-speaking community and never communicated with other Ukrainians in Melbourne. She expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian nation and those Ukrainians who were left in Ukraine, but not with other Ukrainian immigrants.

The evidence given above makes it clear that the Euromaidan reduced the tension that had existed on the basis of different language orientations in the Ukrainian community in Melbourne and changed the ‘old’ diaspora’s understanding of national identity. A person’s sense of connection to Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora was no longer seen to be necessarily linked to the language that the person usually spoke. This transformation was a reflection of what, as research has shown (Kulyk 2016), had happened in Ukrainian society in Ukraine after the start of the Euromaidan. Immigrant M.1.2. articulated a similar insight into the nature of the Euromaidan and its influence on the nation as follows:

> The Orange Revolution was sort of a ‘revival of everything Ukrainian.’ The Revolution of Dignity [the Euromaidan] absolutely wasn’t. Whether this is a bad

> or a good thing is another question. It was the formation of a civic position, the unification of various segments of the population: Ukrainian, Russian-speaking, poor, rich, socially secure, poorly socialised – that is, it was the formation of [a sense of] citizenship; it was like a boiler where everything is mixed together. It was the birth of a new nation, not necessarily a Ukrainian one […].

The term 'Ukrainian nation' here referred to a Ukrainian nation ethnically defined and linked to a cultural tradition expressed in literature and historical narrative. (Immigrant M.1.2. made reference to the poet Taras Shevchenko, the writer Ivan Franko and the historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi.) He further continued: 'It will be a Ukrainian nation, but in a different way.' This view not only reflected the idea that a new civic identity had emerged in Ukrainian society and in the diaspora communities; it also suggested that the speaker believed that Ukrainian society was experiencing a new consensus as a reaction to Russian intervention in Ukraine and in Ukrainian politics.

Nevertheless, some research participants reported that they had observed a tendency in Ukraine of using more Ukrainian language by Russian-speakers after the start of the Euromaidan. This was possibly connected rather to official discourse encouraging the use of Ukrainian as an expression of commitment to Ukrainian independence than to an actual revival of appreciation for Ukrainian culture or willingness to use Ukrainian in everyday life. The observations of the research participants were limited to the years 2014-2017, because after they emigrated they were not able personally to observe the situation. A more recent study by Sasse and Lackner (2018) documented that more Ukrainian citizens reported their native language to be Russian in 2018 than in 2017. Sasse and Lackner (2018, 5 and 12) saw this change as a negative reaction on the part of some members of the public to a new official state discourse that sought to make a connection between the population's use of Ukrainian language and the security of the country.

Regardless of their linguistic identification, during the Euromaidan protests acquaintances of Immigrant M.1.8. manifested their Ukrainianness by wearing elements of traditional Ukrainian clothes to their workplace in Ukraine to demonstrate their support of Ukrainian values.

Following the lead of Ukrainian society in Ukraine, the Ukrainian community in Melbourne experienced a transformation in its perception of Ukrainian national identity. The representatives of the 'old' diaspora became more accepting of the use of the Russian language, though this process was not complete: there was still some friction, despite the fact that many members of the 'old' diaspora recognised that there were Ukrainian patriots among Russian speakers. Different language orientations within the community, however, did not affect the help that circulated among professionals as they managed their integration into the labour market and endeavoured to exercise their rights.

6.6. Conclusions

This Chapter establishes that many initiatives of the relatively new Ukrainian community in Berlin are on their way to gaining official status. The Euromaidan protests, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia as well as the military conflict in Ukraine's East were factors that influenced the mobilisation of Ukrainians in Berlin. This corroborates what Łada and Böttger (2016) observed more generally: a rise in Ukrainian activism across a broader physical area, the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole.

The analysis of social media content demonstrated that the dynamics of founding new organisations and initiatives was lower in Melbourne than in Berlin. This was because of the activity of the established organisations of the 'old' diaspora that, by contrast, did not exist in Berlin. The few new initiatives were related mostly to childcare-focussed matters. This corresponds to the findings of gender-focussed research into migration referred to in Chapters Four and Five: women are generally more engaged in childcare than men, which may influence their labour market integration. Some Ukrainian women feel overwhelmed juggling their maternity duties, Ukrainian community engagement and labour market integration at the same time. For some, however, the community provides an opportunity for gaining experience by volunteering and networking.

The majority of the group in question did not migrate because of the aforementioned political and military situation in Ukraine. For some, it was a trigger, yet the intention to migrate had been formed before these events. Interview evidence suggests that there were two reasons for this: 1) the pre-Euromaidan situation had already motivated many to emigrate; and 2) the introduction of the EU Blue Card in 2012 facilitated the process of migration for IT professionals whose actual move to Germany coincided with the Euromaidan. It is plausible that those who migrated immediately after the start of the Euromaidan were less influenced in their decision to do so by this event than those who migrated three or more years later.

Exploration of the push factors for Ukrainian migration to Melbourne in the post-Euromaidan period established that newcomer migrants in the city comprise two main groups: those who migrated regardless of the Euromaidan and the military conflict, and those for whom these events became triggers which activated their pre-existing aspirations to emigrate. The presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and the deterioration of political and economic life in

Ukraine were defined by some of the interviewees as a trigger for emigration from Ukraine. The majority of research participants in Berlin did not refer to Yanukovych's regime directly but stated that the lack of opportunities for career development led them to emigrate. The fact that research participants in Melbourne did define Yanukovych's rule as a trigger of emigration suggests that this may also have been true of the similar flow of immigrants to Berlin.

Exploration of the durability of the network of Ukrainian diaspora institutions and activism in Berlin demonstrated that this network is still at an early stage of its development. Its evolution was accelerated by the Euromaidan and the war in the east of Ukraine, which inspired immigrants to rally around a shared condemnation of the Russian intrusion into the affairs of Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea, as well as a shared desire to demonstrate solidarity with the Ukrainian state and compatriots who had remained in Ukraine.

The research revealed that Ukrainian skilled workers do build networks with other Ukrainians, even though many do not perceive such networks as essential to their integration. The main drivers to do so are the need for assistance with communication at the stage of linguistic isolation and the need for help in coping with emotional struggles and understanding the rules and laws of the host society – needs that are best addressed in communication with people of shared origin who have overcome similar problems. Information and direct assistance are the resources to which Ukrainians in Berlin gained access through social networks. The evidence shows that the migration barriers which were explored in Chapter Five can be addressed with the help of social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora.

A majority of Ukrainian immigrants in Berlin believe that there is a demand in the community for a physical meeting space and for more formalised mechanisms for providing assistance to immigrants. But recent skilled immigrants did not consider such a physical space to be indispensable for their integration, though they conceded that it might accelerate their integration and increase their ability to profit from their intellectual abilities and skills.

The resources that Bourdieu (1986) labelled as social capital were found to exist in the Ukrainian community in Melbourne, as was the case in Berlin. Yet, in comparison to the latter case, in Melbourne the networks established by Ukrainians were more durable and more institutionalised. The post-Euromaidan immigrants in Melbourne were observed to be reluctant to demand support from established organisations, but more aware of networking needs than their compatriots in Berlin.

In contrast to Ukrainians in Berlin, contemporary Ukrainian Melburnians enjoy the privilege of using physical spaces that were built by Ukrainian settlers after World War II. The existence of such spaces helps organise networking events and provides venues to which to invite newcomers. On the other hand, digital public communication among Ukrainians in Melbourne is significantly lower than in Berlin. This diminishes opportunities for engaging more Ukrainians in debate about community-building or in the exchange of information on overcoming migration barriers for newcomer migrants. There would be several ways of improving this situation: using an agency that would enable immigrants to explore their opportunities more effectively; making information about these opportunities more readily available on the Internet and, in particular, through social media.

Investigation of the national identity of Ukrainians in Berlin revealed that they may be classified as having a civic (rather than ethnic) national identity. They accept the bilingualism of Ukrainian society, emphasising the importance of the Ukrainian language, but also acknowledging the phenomenon of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism. Analysis of the data shows that solidarity exists between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Berlin, except regarding the political issue of Russia's interventions in Ukraine. The majority of migrants say that they have an altruistic sense of obligation to help other immigrants regardless of their origin. However, there are some migrants who perceive a need to help their compatriots in the first instance, and to ensure that Ukrainians in Berlin become a more tightly-knit community able to respond to the complex political situation in Ukraine.

Although the well-established 'old' diaspora in Melbourne had generated social capital that newcomers could utilise, this post-world War II wave and their children did not find common cause with those members of the post-Soviet wave whose first language was Russian, not Ukrainian. Russian speakers were negatively perceived by the 'old' diaspora, which was mostly Ukrainian-speaking. However, interview data showed that after the Euromaidan and the outbreak of the military conflict the 'old' diaspora reconsidered its attitude towards Russian speakers. Although friction regarding language still exists, there emerged a sense of solidarity between the 'old' diaspora and newcomers based on a common understanding of Russian aggression in the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The Euromaidan events and the following military conflict reshaped the understanding of membership of a national community. A trend toward a civic understanding of national identity could be observed in the Ukrainian diaspora community in Melbourne, mirroring a similar development in Ukraine.

An exploration of the social capital in the Ukrainian diaspora in Berlin and Melbourne made it possible to shed light on several interrelated issues: the institutions and contemporary status of Ukrainians in Melbourne; push factors of the post-Euromaidan migration; the intentions and strategies of Ukrainian immigrants as they built relationships with one another; Ukrainian-Russian linguistic issues and their influence at different times on community solidarity; and the role of the Euromaidan for each of the aforementioned matters. To define whether the Euromaidan and its aftermath became decisive and sole push factors for migration of skilled migrants it would be necessary to survey those who had emigrated after 2017.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

7.1. Findings

This thesis, which has examined visa conditions for migrants who came to Germany and Australia to develop their careers, is a multidisciplinary contribution to migration studies. It has used insights from immigration law and sociology to discuss migrants' socio-economic integration, including labour market access and mobility. It has adopted a sociological perspective in systematising observations on the relationship of these migrants with host societies and other migrants of the same national origin. In addressing these tasks the thesis has made use of such concepts as precariousness of migrant status, brain waste, educational mismatch, the breadwinner-caregiver model of gendered role distribution, trailing spouses, migrant penalty (a new concept analogous to ethnic penalty, introduced here), and, above all, social capital.

Furthermore, drawing upon studies of national identity (Smith 1991; Shulman 2004; Kulyk 2016), the thesis has examined the relationship between migrant status, social capital and national belonging, solidarity and mutual obligation experienced by many Ukrainian migrants. In doing so, it has described and analysed the impact of political and military events in Ukraine on new Ukrainian migrants and on established Ukrainian migrant communities, thereby contributing to the study of the evolution of Ukrainian nationhood. It has also provided observations on Ukrainian diaspora communities that have not previously been studied from this angle. In these respects, the thesis constitutes a contribution to the interdisciplinary field of Ukrainian Studies.

Chapter Two developed the theoretical framework for addressing the research questions formulated in Chapter One of this thesis. The theoretical discussion was mirrored in the analyses undertaken in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The present chapter recapitulates the most important findings of these chapters, highlighting the main similarities and differences between the German and the Australian cases. It sets out potential improvements in the policies and practices of governments and community organisations in regard to Ukrainian skilled migrants (and migrants more generally); and, finally, it outlines possible directions for further research.

The qualitative investigation of migrant statuses in both in Germany and Australia demonstrated that temporary work visas create precariousness for primary applicants for these visas, while their spouses face the greatest difficulties with regard to accessing the labour market and pursuing socio-economic integration. The conditions of primary applicants in Germany who were granted the Temporary Work visa and those who entered Australia on a Temporary Work (Skilled) visa (subclass 457) are characterised by the same potential dependency on employers and similar difficulties with negotiating promotions and salary raises. Holders of the EU Blue Card in Germany had slightly better conditions and felt more comfortable about changing employers or negotiating with them, but still experienced constraints if they were single breadwinners, as most migrants in my sample were. Student visa holders, a significant group in my Melbourne sample, were limited by the hours which they were entitled to work and the difficulty of finding permanent employment prior to receiving permanent status. Their spouses, like the spouses of other temporary visa holders in both Germany and Australia, were often regarded by potential employers as having a status determined by the status of the main applicants for the visa. This made spouses particularly dependent and often excluded them from the labour market because of the assumption that their visa status could be cancelled. Visa conditions made the lives of migrants precarious –

dependent on chance and unpredictable. Such uncertainty for this group of migrants corresponds to the idea of migrant penalty that was discussed in 2.1.5.

The fact that Australia made it possible for migrants to apply for permanent residency through the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) while overseas appeared to confer a huge benefit on those who received such a visa. The visa gave access to a wide set of rights that simplified the search for employment and granted access to a subsidised healthcare system. Germany did not offer such an opportunity, though the EU Blue Card (in contrast to the TW visa) simplified access to permanent residency for migrants who had resided and worked in the country for a few years and demonstrated linguistic integration. The study has showed that for both the German and the Australian cases socio-economic and legal integration of migrants proceeded more efficiently if they were invited for a particular job. This made the Australian Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) a source of precariousness to some degree, because migrants who held it, unlike some other groups, did not need an employment contract to apply for the visa.

The organisation of access to public services appeared to be easier for migrants in Australia than in Germany. This was due to processes in Australia being more automated (many were able to be undertaken online), reducing the bureaucratic burden significantly, and to the fact that in Australia access to services is in English, a global lingua franca which Ukrainian migrants were more likely to know than German. However, whereas in Germany migrants often experienced physical queues in public institutions, in Australia migrants complained of longer waiting periods to obtain visas for which they had applied online than was the case in Germany. This contributed to the precariousness of Ukrainian skilled migrants in Australia.

Different visas require different levels of language skill, resulting in different degrees of precariousness.

As documented in the literature, skilled migrants worldwide sometimes experience downward socio-economic mobility. The migrants interviewed for my project in Berlin, likewise, experienced a downgrading of their families' purchasing power compared to what they had enjoyed in Ukraine. In Melbourne, the majority of interviewees did not mention analogous circumstances, a fact that suggests that they were offered adequate salaries. This might be connected to greater tax obligations in Germany than in Australia, but other explanations can be studied in future research. For example, those who were interviewed in Melbourne may have had different, less privileged, social status in Ukraine than those who migrated to Berlin. It was also that case that in Melbourne a slightly greater proportion of interviewees than in Berlin were interested in activism during the Euromaidan protests, in reform processes in Ukraine, and in diaspora activities in host countries.

Studies of globalisation and labour demand in large urban centres were corroborated by findings that confirmed a rising demand for IT workers in Berlin. In Melbourne the same level of demand for IT was not observed – but this was not sufficient to disprove that it existed. What was evident, however, was that tertiary skills were in need in Australia. Consideration of migrants' skills, their human capital and their ability to transfer skills from Ukraine into the labour markets of Germany and Australia demonstrated serious brain waste for different groups: trailing spouses rarely found employment in line with their diplomas, and main applicants often could not access managerial positions and experienced downgrading of their careers. Such disadvantages were experienced to similar extents in Berlin and Melbourne. I explain such circumstances as consequences of migrant penalty: when visas do not grant unlimited stay, and there are obstacles to the recognition of diplomas, employers become wary of employing migrants. In rare cases, when social networks came into play, employers gained trust in migrants, who were then able to access favourable conditions at the workplace. These empirical observations together with discussions in the extant literature highlight the need to create favourable conditions for skilled migrants if receiving countries are to retain them in the context of the global race for talent.

Addressing the question of the extent to which linguistic skills should be verified at entry, the thesis compared German policy, relatively liberal in regard to German and in some cases English skills, with the much stricter Australian immigration policy concerning language. The comparison demonstrated that migrants were able to traverse the migration process to Germany more quickly than to Australia, but that linguistic integration was much easier in Australia. This trade-off between speed of immigration and speed of integration should be taken into account by receiving-country policymakers as they set their priorities to attract or retaining skilled migrants.

Access to the social safety net was identified as one of the key factors attracting and retaining skilled migrants in a receiving country. However, it was also pointed out that if such access is granted it can become a burden on the local economy. The thesis demonstrated to what extent Ukrainian migrants were able to access the social safety nets in the two countries and revealed that temporary workers were better able to do so in Germany, particularly in Berlin. In Australia those who received permanent residency gained a very important asset: subsidised access to the healthcare system, a benefit which significantly improved their socio-economic well-being. Indeed, the prospect of subsidised healthcare was one of the factors that encouraged them to apply for permanent residency. Despite this fact, in both Berlin and Melbourne migrants claimed that they had not come to the receiving country in order to use social safety net benefits, and that they could provide for themselves.

Gender was problematised as a factor that contributes to precariousness. As is noted in the literature, trailing spouses in most cases are women. Because, in general, they cannot transfer the skills they had gained in the sending country to the receiving country, they easily fall into traditionally female caregiver roles while their husbands assume the role of sole breadwinner. This pattern was observed in Berlin, where in the typical family an IT worker and main visa applicant was a male, and the woman took care of the children or learnt the German language intensively to manage integration and household-related tasks, as well as to be able to interact with the German bureaucracy. In Melbourne, where employees of the IT sector were not in an absolute a majority as in Berlin, there were more cases where women were primary applicants. Even so, in most cases, in Australia men become breadwinners and provided the main income for the family, while women either focussed on getting an extra degree and, by studying, secured the primary visa that enabled both partners to stay in the country, or took care of their children, as many of their counterparts did in Berlin.

Part II of Chapter Two developed the conceptual framework of the thesis on the basis, on the one hand, of Bourdieu's theory of social capital and, on the other, of studies of national identity. It also reviewed the literature on migrants' social networks and on the impact of the Euromaidan on migration from Ukraine. In this context the question of the appropriate classification of the post-Euromaidan migration from Ukraine was addressed, and it was argued that the respondents in my sample could not be regarded as a separate wave of Ukrainian migration: as in Berlin, so in Melbourne most migrants attested that the Euromaidan protests and ensuing war merely reaffirmed their pre-existing aspirations to migrate, and in many they said that cases it was just a coincidence that they had migrated at that time.

Differences between the role of organisations in the Berlin and Melbourne Ukrainian communities were examined. The observation in the existing literature that in Berlin many of these structures were grassroots organisations was confirmed, while in regard to Melbourne it was found that initiatives of newcomer migrants (whose counterparts in Berlin set up grassroots organisations) were generally synthesised with the work of formal long-lasting institutions. It was demonstrated that the relationships established among Ukrainian migrants in Berlin have the potential to become real and long-lasting forms of social capital, while those in Melbourne already constitute a strong network in which social capital is inherent. Furthermore, it was shown that, while the Ukrainian community in Berlin is mostly Russian-speaking and its Melbourne counterpart more Ukrainian-speaking, in both cities there is strong evidence that after the Euromaidan Ukrainian migrants perceive themselves as Ukrainians in the civic sense.

The thesis found that Ukrainian migrants, whether unemployed trailing wives or employed privileged IT professionals, all benefited from networks based in diaspora institutions, through which they collaborated mainly with people of the same profession, but also with members of other white-collar sector professions and managers. In Berlin and Melbourne the majority of diaspora activists were also engaged in white-collar-sector work and were involved in diaspora activism because of a strong sense of national identity.

7.2. Desiderata for governments and other actors

The overarching argument of this thesis is that Ukrainian skilled migrants encounter difficulties while trying to become equal members of society in Germany and Australia. It has been crucial to emphasise this, because skilled migration is often studied as exemplifying relatively comfortable conditions of entry, residence and work in host countries. For this reason the thesis has employed the concept of precariousness to capture the instability, insecurity and dependence that participants in this study experienced and that were barriers to their integration. Such precariousness was shown to result from a range of factors, including visa type, change in socio-economic status resulting from migration, education, level of language skills, access to the social safety net and gender. A significant finding of this thesis is that the social capital which Ukrainian migrant communities create in Berlin and Melbourne on the basis of their members' sense of national identity can and often does serve to ease newcomer migrants' integration into the host country community. Migrant communities become thereby a kind of proxy for the host community: settled migrants often introduce newcomers to the laws and other rules of the receiving country, as well as its labour market culture. They help newcomers to exercise their rights and improve their well-being – that is, to facilitate their access to the goods of the host society on equal terms with citizens.

A key argument of this dissertation is that if western countries wish to attract more skilled workers as immigrants, they should be more attentive to the visa statuses they grant such skilled migrants. For this reason the thesis examines in detail cases that help understand the losses which migrants endure because of their move abroad and uses these cases as a platform for critique of immigration policies. At the same time, it reflects on German and Australian visa conditions in comparative perspective in order to highlight those that are advantageous for migrants and likely to induce them to remain in the host country.

In discussing barriers to migrant employment, the thesis drew attention to the importance of social trust in the process of securing employment. Potential employees who share the cultural code of their potential employer, or who are referred by persons enjoying the employer's trust, are at an advantage relative to migrants. The thesis argued that, despite this, migrants could accrue social trust in two ways: through favourable laws that would grant them additional rights (for example, by facilitating recognition of foreign education and skills and thereby reducing 'migrant penalty'), and through existing social networks between established and intending migrant employees. With regard to the Australian situation, the thesis demonstrated that social trust can be gained both through favourable laws that grant sets of rights (I call this 'state referral') and through existing social networks. Both methods reduce the impact of migrant penalty, which impedes social trust as much through non-recognition of homeland qualifications and skills as through the impact of such cultural traits as accent or a foreign name. Migrant penalty often has the consequence of blocking migrants from top managerial positions.

Government policymakers decide how they prefer immigrants to enter and integrate into the societies of their countries, and embody these preferences in immigration law. Migrant integration can also be facilitated by various kinds of social network – neighbourhood, professional or semi-professional, for example. But, as this thesis has demonstrated, in practice in Germany and Australia Ukrainian skilled migrants find their initial social networks in the diaspora communities of their compatriots. Integration proceeds to best advantage where these communities are well-knit and have strong institutions. Such structural cohesion, in turn, generally presupposes unification around some key ideas – such as a shared understanding of national identity.

7.3. Some thoughts about future German immigration policies

In 2020 new legislation governing skilled migration into Germany comes into effect (Nasr and Hansen 2018; Zech 2019; FMEAE 2019; Eddy 2019; Knight 2019). It focuses on migrants with vocational training and those who have university degrees. It establishes fast-track procedures for receiving a visa and offers entry to a wide range of professions in the German labour market. The legislation was prepared in response to the German demographic crisis, the deportation of asylum seekers who arrived as part of the migrant crisis of 2015, and the ineffectiveness of existing immigration programs that did not manage to fill labour shortages in Germany (Nasr and Hansen 2018). A key characteristic of this legislation is that it facilitates recognition of foreign diplomas in Germany (FMEAE 2019).

The present research project, completed in 2019, could not analyse empirically the consequences of the proposed conditions of entry and stay for Ukrainian migrants under the new visas. However, the legislation does address issues of concern discussed in this dissertation, including language skills requirements and, notably, the need to simplify recognition of diplomas. In fact, analysis of cases documented in my fieldwork demonstrates that excluding some Ukrainian educational institutions from the list of universities recognised by Germany lead to migrants receiving weaker visa statuses than those to which, arguably, they were entitled. I emphasise the value of simplifying the process of diploma recognition in the interests of granting migrants fair visa statuses.

This thesis highlighted the fact that Germany has a lenient policy on migrants' language proficiency. Although this policy helps employers to hire migrants quickly, it has created a situation where migrants are often limited to working in workplaces where their language is spoken (in the cases analysed in this thesis, Ukrainian or Russian) or English is used as a lingua franca. But, as my fieldwork showed, these workers often do not even speak English fluently and, as a result, suffer practical failures at work which, in turn, lead to psychological stress. Germany might well be vitally interested in bringing in a new skilled population to address present and future labour shortages. However, it would be useful, in order to make the life of newcomers less stressful, if a basic language tests for migrants were introduced. I also suggest that employers should be obliged to provide their employees with translators and human resources officers who would be able to escort them to necessary public institutions. My fieldwork revealed that some employers already did this on their initiative. This suggestion applies equally to potential employers who wish to lighten the bureaucratic burden carried by their employees, enabling them to dedicate more time to their work and well-being.

I further suggest that family members of primary visa recipients should receive guidance on arrival about ways of using their educational qualifications or retraining quickly and effectively in their destination country. This could be a task for public agencies or NGOs, which could also monitor labour market needs and provide information about them in foreign languages so that migrants could realistically evaluate their chances of finding employment. Furthermore, public services, especially those that deal with migrants, should have on their staff personnel who speak the foreign languages most widely spoken by migrants or, alternatively, provide information about translation services. It would benefit migrants if translation services were available to them at a discount.

Diaspora organisations and their initiatives already receive some state support in Germany. I believe this to be a positive step toward integrating migrants into their new countries through support for environments that are familiar to them. Such initiatives should be further developed, and the activities of community organisations that help integrate migrants into the host society should be co-ordinated with the work of public institutions. Indeed, I suggest that Germany take steps toward utilising diaspora institutions as proxies of the state in assisting newcomer migrants to integrate into broader society.

Finally, in relation to the gender dimension of migration, I suggest that in the interests of gender equality Germany should encourage more women immigrants to work in the IT sector. Equalising the career chances of the genders in this profession could encourage potential women migrants to study IT in their home countries and as a consequence be more self-sufficient in the future.

7.4. Some thoughts about future Australian immigration policies

In 2017 the Australian government announced that the Temporary Work (Skilled) visa (subclass 457) would be abolished and replaced with a new Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa, which would 'support businesses in addressing genuine skill shortages' (Minister for Home Affairs 2017). My fieldwork began in May 2017, and holders of the 457 visa were included in my sample. The new TSS, introduced in March 2018, is in many respects similar to the 457 visa, most importantly in retaining the old visa's temporary character that is critiqued in my thesis. The impact of TSS visas on migrants should be explored in further research and compared to the impact that visa subclass 457 had made upon them.

As public media report, the Australian government and Australian society are concerned about the pressure on the infrastructure of large cities such as Sydney or Melbourne that results from population growth due to immigration (Murphy 2018). Among the government's responses to this circumstance are efforts to encourage skilled migrants to apply for regional visas. The main condition of such visas is that the recipient stay in small (regional) town for a number of years (at the time of writing generally two years). But as individual cases show (Clarke 2019), such a policy is liable to create brain waste. Such unsatisfactory outcomes for skilled migrants may well encourage them to leave Australia. To avoid this, I suggest that Australia needs to offer an attractive set of rights to migrants in exchange for putting them in areas where they may find it difficult to obtain employment in jobs appropriate to their educational qualifications.

This thesis has demonstrated the types of difficulty that migrants coming to Australia encounter. Many of these could be addressed by changes to immigration policy or administrative practices. The waiting time for visa processing could be accelerated in order to encourage more migrants to apply and choose Australia as their destination country. Temporary visa holders could receive better provision for their healthcare needs (as Chapter five has shown, holders of student visas are in the greatest danger of neglecting their health). Some migrants find that their occupations, officially listed as in demand, are not in fact needed in the local labour market. The demand for some professions in regional Australia can be limited, as illustrated by the case of a qualified accountant in Tasmania who, after a fruitless nine-month search for employment fitting her credentials, ended up as an Uber driver (Clark 2019). For these reasons, the Australian Department of Home Affairs should regularly monitor labour market demand and update its lists of required occupations accordingly. Educational qualifications should be given due recognition so that migrants whose education and skills were not recognised do not use the student visas stream as a means of migrating for work.

Australian policymakers should review the language policies that pertain to skilled migrants. While such immigrants arrive relatively proficient in English, having been successful in language tests, they often feel excluded or insufficiently integrated into their workplace or social circles due to their accents and lack of vocabulary. Some integration courses could be provided on arrival to help. Secondary applicants – trailing spouses of primary visa holders – could have their language skills better verified or be directed into integration courses as is done in the case of Blue Card holders in Germany. This might help integrate trailing spouses and prevent them from experiencing isolation. Such integration language courses are available for some categories of migrants – spouses on family reunion visas, for example – but my suggestion would be to provide these courses also for spouses of temporary labour visa holders, including those who hold student visas.

Some action is required to improve the system that regulates migrants' access to the social safety net. While Australia does not aspire to provide comprehensive welfare even for its own citizens, I suggest that in order to attract and retain skilled workers and their families from overseas Australia needs to come up with competitive welfare offerings for temporary visa holders. Childcare in Australia is expensive not only for immigrants, but the example of Berlin where childcare is almost free of charge suggests that steps should be taken to make childcare more accessible to migrants on working visas.

The use of student visas as tools for migration has to be taken into account seriously by policymakers, and procedures for the recognition of qualifications need to be reformed to discourage the procedure whereby some applicants pay to repeat their courses in Australia because their Ukrainian diplomas have not been recognised.

In the process of migration many Ukrainian migrants experience a decline in their financial standing and downward social mobility relative to their status in their birth countries, often with attendant negative consequences for their mental and physical health. Research would reveal whether skilled migrants from other countries with high educational standards but low overall levels of economic well-being experience similar downward mobility. These important factors need to be taken into account as Australia strives to attract the most skilled workers to its market. Such policies as withholding Medicare and other social services from temporary migrants place them in precarious, disadvantaged positions that act as a disincentive to their continuing to work in Australia. The offer that Germany makes its migrants is generous by comparison. In Berlin good quality and cheap (almost free) childcare, as well as healthcare provisions that do not disadvantage temporary migrants relative to citizens or permanent residents create conditions more likely to attract skilled migrants with families than those in Australia.

The ability to access permanent residence upon entry is one the most attractive features of Australian immigration policy, and abandoning this provision or making it less accessible would make Australia less attractive to migrants. The issue is of significance in light of Germany's decision to introduce new skilled-oriented migration programs, which in 2020 are expected to cause a skilled migrants boom in Germany. To compete with Germany, other countries should consider the set of privileges that Germany proposes to grant to migrants, and why migrants might prefer to settle there.

I suggest gender awareness needs to be a feature of immigration policies. Along with providing improved access to discounted childcare, healthcare and integration courses, migration programs need to be sensitive to the fact that migrant women have sacrificed several productive years to bring up their children and therefore have generally had fewer years than men of exercising their professional skills. Such career interruptions should be taken into account when a points-based system is used to evaluate the suitability of women for migration. The current system, which gives extra points for young age and simultaneously for professional experience needs to be reconsidered in relation to women, especially if they have had children. Lowering the threshold for women would allow more women to apply as primary applicants, receive permanent residency, find employment and abandon the caregiver role if they want to.

7.5. Suggestions for Ukrainian diaspora institutions

In recent decade the rise of diaspora institutions has attracted the attention of scholars. This thesis has demonstrated the social role of diaspora networks for Ukrainian skilled migrants. Ukrainian communities with a significant 'old' diaspora component should strive to understand better the needs of newcomers who, because of their skilled profile, that have the potential to contribute to the community and take leadership roles in it. In a Ukrainian diaspora community like that of Melbourne, passionately maintained by descendants of post-World War II political migrants, understandings based on the findings of this thesis may help bridge the divide between different waves of Ukrainian migrants. In places such as Berlin, where diaspora institutions are relatively young or where 'old' diaspora organisations operate less visibly than young institutions, the latter would benefit from noting the advantages, remarked on in this thesis, of cooperating with established diaspora institutions and sharing their infrastructure – for example, the premises of their Ukrainian Houses or the funds and networks that Ukrainian World Congress and its member bodies might be able to provide.

I suggest that diaspora communities in different countries, such as Germany and Australia, should borrow successful practices from each other. For this reason, better and more frequent communication among them is recommended. This can be done if community activists in various locations follow each other's social media or communicate, online or in person. For example, diaspora organisations in Melbourne might encourage the creation of new grassroots organisations in line with the experience of their counterparts in Berlin. This would enable new immigrants to bring fresh ideas into the community and to involve themselves creatively in its activities. Furthermore, diaspora organisations could bring benefits to their members, especially newcomer migrants, by establishing institutionalised practices of international co-operation between themselves and individuals and structures in Ukraine to facilitate the exchange of information on migration-related matters or other matters of interest to them – cultural developments in the homeland, for example.

7.6. Potential for further research

In this thesis, I applied a number of concepts that served to refine understanding of migrants' realities. While some of these concepts were analysed deeply, there is still potential to extend discussion of them. For example, the theorisation of precarious migrant status can be improved by conceptualising the different forms of precarious status in separate publications. This would bring into sharper focus the precise nature of the temporariness of migrant statuses in Germany, Australia or other locations. Given the current policy and public debate on whether permanent visas in Australia should be replaced by temporary migration, the data presented in this dissertation could be analysed with special attention to the relevance they might have to these current debates.

This thesis does not include analysis of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties as elements of social capital, although this conceptual framework is frequently encountered in migration and integration studies. The main reason why I avoided this classification is that, while it is true that newly arrived migrants establish strong ties as well as acquire weak ones with other members of the Ukrainian community, the detailed classification of such ties and the description of how migrants perceive them would need to be the subject of a complex inquiry. Indeed, the task can be formulated as a research question for another project. The elaboration of the nature of social capital in Ukrainian communities in Germany, Australia or elsewhere could be extended by posing other questions: to what degree does reliance on the social capital inherent in community networks change once immigrants change their status? How does newly arrived migrants’ agency contributes to the development of social networks in the diaspora community?

In this thesis, I briefly mentioned relationships that would fit a framework of translational networks between the diaspora and homeland. The question of whether there will be more returnees among skilled migrants in following years is unanswered and can only be answered in retrospect. In future, research into this phenomenon would allow deeper understanding, not only of the political, economic and demographic situation in Ukraine, but also of trends in the field of transnationalism. It would be relevant in this context to examine the role of embassies and of social media in maintaining such transnational networks.

The phenomenon corresponding to the concept of ‘migrant penalty’ that I introduced in this thesis as a counterpoint to the concept ‘ethnic penalty’ could be studied in more detail. Such an investigation would need to review the historical development of immigration policies more generally, not only with regard to the Ukrainian community, and might usefully take into account migrants of British background in Australia and ethnic Germans in Germany who were born and raised outside of the country.

The qualitative study of Ukrainian skilled migration to Berlin and Melbourne on the basis of interviews with post-Euromaidan migrants yielded new insights into the profile and motivations of this group of people and into their experience of integration into the host societies. However, a different level of definitiveness could be achieved through quantitative research, of which, as is evident from the literature, there is little in relation to the topic of Ukrainian migration. Quantitative studies involving surveys of substantial numbers of Ukrainian migrants would allow researchers to generalise data and build new theories. They could, to take three examples, address with more precision such issues as the extent to which the Euromaidan was a stimulus to migration from Ukraine; or support detailed conclusions about the phenomenon of brain waste as experienced by trailing spouses through research into their employment histories (as suggested for a different context by Mattoo, Neagu and Özden 2008); or answer the question of whether migrants who could not get employment in Berlin or Melbourne had successfully learnt and practised the requisite skills in Ukraine.

In my study I interviewed only people who had migrated in two first years following the Euromaidan. The majority of these people had already planned their migration before the Euromaidan. New studies should survey or interview people who took the decision to migrate later, after mid-2014, when the consequences of negative post-Euromaidan developments, including the war, had begun to be felt. Given the time that elapses between deciding to migrate and actually migrating, such a study would need to take as its subjects people who migrated to Germany and to Australia (which has a relatively long application process) not earlier than 2017.

This thesis utilised Facebook posts and forums on the ‘dou.ua’ website as sources of information about Ukrainian diaspora organisations. Some of this information even gave impetus to the formulation of parts of the research questions posed by the present project. I suggest that social media content can be more broadly used in further research into Ukrainian migration. At the time of writing, the social media application Instagram is perhaps the location where the largest number of migrants place narratives of their migration and other migration-related observations. Analysis of this very large body of content, which is publically available, could yield insights of a quantitative nature about the migration flows of Ukrainians (and international migration patterns more generally), add detail and nuance to the observations on migrant integration reported in this thesis, and extend the range of the comparison of migrant experiences in different destination countries well beyond the two studied here. Studying such content could add precision to understanding both of contemporary Ukrainian migration, and of the transnational relationships between homeland and diaspora that migration generates.

Finally, the material presented in this thesis provides a promising platform from which to start a longitudinal study with the same cohort of research participants in order to trace the further development of their careers and other aspects of their socio-economic integration in Germany and Australia, and to see, for example, whether they have changed their initial intentions either to return to Ukraine or to remain in the countries to which they have migrated.

Whatever the avenues for further inquiry opened by the research conducted for the present project may be, however, this thesis has contributed to the literature an in-depth comparative study of the experiences of Ukrainian migrants in Germany and Australia that adds to understanding of issues that arise more generally in the process of international migration.

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APPENDIX ONE

Questions for interviews with Group One

The Group One: Recent Ukrainian Migrants

The leading question is:

Could you please describe your adjustment period to the life in Australia?

1. I am interested in your story of migration. Would you like to tell me a bit about it?

(Prompts: What was the impetus to migrate? Is that anything from the following list: labour needs that are associated with the economic deterioration in Ukraine; political instability; military conflict and the sense of insecurity?)

2. Was your decision to migrate related to the events that began in Ukraine late 2013, such as the social-political protests, military conflict?

3. Do you think these events caused economic deterioration in Ukraine and the urgency to seek better employment opportunity abroad?

4. What type of visa did you have to come to Australia/Berlin? (Prompts: as a worker, as a student, as a family member of the main applicant, as a holder of the permanent residence permit; the exact type of visa is required).

5. Do you think this visa status represents your initial reason to migrate? (For example, according to the legislation of the receiving country, this type of visa is associated with labour immigration programs. Did you migrate for work and economic reasons?)

6. What do you know about your rights in Australian/Germany?

(Prompts: Economic rights: can you change your employer at any time? Do you feel bonded to your employer? Did your employer have to do a labour market test before employing you? Have you joined a trade union and/or professional associations?

7. Do you get paid the same as your Australian/German colleagues? Are your working conditions the same? Holidays? Overtime? (etc.) Are there differences between your rights and the rights of your Australian/German colleagues in practice, even if in theory you are treated similarly? Do you feel obliged to compromise?

What kind of family rights do you have? Can you bring your family? Can your spouse work; how many hours a week; does he or she simultaneously obtained a work permit? Social rights: Are you aware of and can you equally access unemployment benefits, public retirement pension schemes? What about public educational institutions and services, public housing including social housing schemes, and public health services? Do you think any restrictions of these rights made your integration into the labour market more difficult?

8. Where did you obtain the information required for your application for the visa (from the internet, from a colleague, etc.)? (Follow-up questions: Could you please specify whether your colleague is Ukrainian, what web page you used? Did you use the same sources to find your first employment? Where do you think other immigrants receive this information? Do you think it matters from what source you get the information?) Did you get any conflicting information? If so, how did you decide who to believe?

9. Have you experienced any work-related problems in Melbourne/Berlin? What kind of problems have you encountered in relation to work? (This may be: finding first employment,

language fluency, access to public services for self/family, recognising your skills certificates and work experience, discrimination (differential treatment, either formal, or more commonly, informal expectation of working longer, being paid less, only being promoted later), exploitation ('exploitation' here – underpayment, being tied to employer in hope of PR, etc.); Did this affect the financial situation of your family?)

10. Have you had any assistance from other Ukrainians in relation to work, to improve your integration/access to rights? If so, how did it come about?

11. Have they helped in other ways? If so, do you think they felt obliged to do so?

12. Do you have a sense of obligation to help other Ukrainians?

13. What is your attitude towards Ukrainian Embassies and Consulates? Should they help newcomer immigrants with their integration inquiries?

14. What is your view of Ukrainian NGO's/cultural events and activities? (Prompts: Do you believe that by attending Ukrainian cultural events organised by Ukrainian emigrant community organisations new immigrants increase their chances to benefit from it in regard of receiving help in their integration and rights protection needs? Do you think you (and other new immigrants) attend Ukrainian cultural events because of the sense of unity with the Ukrainian community?)

15. Do you think that Ukrainian immigrant communities and social networks could be more helpful?

(Follow-up questions: If so, why do you think they are not more helpful? How can this situation be improved? If you think it should not be improved, please explain why).

16. Do you think connections within the Ukrainian community are necessary to improve work opportunities and integration needs of new immigrants? Do you think Ukrainian immigrants should support each other as they adapt to life and work in Germany/Australia? Could you please explain your opinion?

17. Do you think the Euromaidan has affected the Ukrainian community in terms of supporting each other? Has it contributed to a sense of Ukrainian national identity?

18. Do you believe that communication with other Ukrainians in the receiving country is a good way to make sure your rights are protected? Are there any drawbacks?

19. Do you believe that the solidarity within the Ukrainian immigrant community exists regardless of the language division between Ukrainian and Russian speakers? What do you think about relationship between Ukrainian and Russian speakers and their ability to help each other in their integration matters?

APPENDIX TWO

Questions for interviews with Group Two

The Group Two: Ukrainian Community (Diaspora) Activists

The leading question is:

Could you please describe your engagement in resolving integration enquiries of Ukrainian immigrants?

1.What is your role (functions and actions) in relation to providing information to newcomer Ukrainian immigrants?

2. Does your position require you to resolve newcomer Ukrainians' inquiries?

3. Why did you decide to be engaged in this type of activities? (This may be existing personal immigrant background, professional interest, sympathy or obligation to help this particular group because of common ethnic ancestry).

4. When you help newcomers, how do you become aware of the Ukrainian newcomer immigrants' needs? (Who provides you with the information, contacts?)

5. What type of migrant rights granted by their labour immigration programs, in your opinion, are or may be threatened in the receiving country (Australia/Germany)? (Economic: free choice of employment (is that possible to change employer at any time? is employer obliged to do a labour market test before employ an immigrants?); the right to join trade unions and professional associations; country's labour rights: 'rights related to equal pay comparing to domestic workers for the same work, the rights to equal employment conditions and legal protection, for example: overtime working hours, weekly rest time, paid holidays, sick pay,

health and safety at work, and protection against dismissal, and the right to redress in case employer violates the terms and conditions of the employment contract; family rights: can immigrant bring his/her family? Can a spouse of immigrant work and how many hours a week, does he or she simultaneously obtains a work permit? social rights: Can immigrant equally access to unemployment benefits, public retirement pension schemes, public educational institutions and services, a public housing including social housing schemes, and public health services?)

6. In your opinion, what do Ukrainian immigrants find the most difficult in adjustment to life in Australia in terms of exercising their migrant rights? (This may be finding employment, recognising their education certificates, language fluency, discrimination, violation of work rights, accessing public services, economic rights of the dependent spouse, accessing social rights). Do migrants who experience many such problems share any characteristics (such as visa status)?

7. What kind of assistance do you think Ukrainian immigrants need in accessing the labour market on a larger scale? (Which needs do you encounter most often/regularly? Who, in your view, is particularly in need of assistance?)

8. Can you confirm that Ukrainian post-Euromaidan migration takes place for economic reasons?

9. What kind of assistance, in your opinion, do Ukrainian immigrants get thanks to Ukrainian immigrant communities and social networks?

10. What kind of assistance, in your opinion, would Ukrainian immigrants like to receive from Ukrainian immigrant communities and social networks, but do not? Why do you think they do

not receive this assistance? How can this situation be improved? If you think it should not be improved, please explain why.

11. Do you personally provide support only for Ukrainian migrants who contribute to the Ukrainian community? (For example, to those who attend community gatherings) or do you provide support for everyone who turns for help, even if they do not contribute to the Ukrainian community?

12. Do you think that newcomer Ukrainians access the Ukrainian community only for getting help, or are they also willing to be recognised as Ukrainians and contribute to the Ukrainian community in future?

13. Do you think all the newcomer immigrants turn to the Ukrainian community for help with integration/rights issues? Do you think they should? Do you think that it can affect their integration in a positive way, for example, accelerate their integration and make it more successful in professional and financial terms? Can it affect their integration in a negative way?

14. Do you believe that those who do not turn for help to the Ukrainian community are not aware of help and services it provides or they do not want to? Do you have any idea why this situation take place?

15. Do you know other persons from the local Ukrainian community that help newcomer Ukrainian immigrants? Why do you think they help newcomers? (This may be the sense of obligation, professional interest). Do you think in that way they express their sense of solidarity with the Ukrainian nation at large, or the Ukrainian community in Germany/Australia, or perhaps the country of residence?

16. Do you think that communication within Diaspora is conditioned by language issues, for example, do Ukrainian-speaking immigrants help Russian-speaking immigrants and vice versa? (the nature of national identity: ethnic and civic).

17. Do you think that the recent events since the Euromaidan and following military conflict in Ukraine affected prospective emigrants in their decision to emigrate? Have you noticed any change in dynamics since then?

18. Do you think that the sense of the national identity, in particular, solidarity is changed within the Ukrainian immigrant community since the events of the Euromaidan and comparing with the state preceded this?

19. If there is the difference in perceiving Ukrainian national identity after the start of the Euromaidan, could you describe, please, how the immigrants who resided here before these events and those who arrived after the Euromaidan perceive it?

20. Do you think there is an interplay between the exercise of rights by newcomer immigrants and national identity? Do you believe that this interplay has a positive outcome or rather negative?