



MONASH University

**AN EXPLORATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SADC
MEMBER STATES – THE ROLE OF BRICS
(2001 – 2014)**

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Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Social Science (Hons)

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International Studies

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ABSTRACT


In 2000, the World Bank published a report entitled *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* In this report the argument was made that this was indeed possible and cited the continent's great economic potential, but only if the challenges of governance, conflict, state building, poverty, inequality and human development were addressed. So far, the 21st Century has witnessed the continent become progressively more engaged and economically active, evidenced by increased trade and investment between the continent and partners across the globe. This has led to, *inter alia*, a marginal decrease in poverty, however, the continent remains largely underdeveloped with high rates of inequality in most areas. This highlights the need to ensure that this escalated economic integration and engagement is both beneficial and sustainable for African states. In Southern Africa a large contributor to development in the new millennium has been the engagement of the BRICS. This engagement has revealed new avenue paths to development. This has supplemented the traditional western engagement through Bretton Woods' institutions and effectively fostered new relationships and created access to markets that were not as accessible before. The study investigates the role that BRICS engagement has played in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe through aid, investment and trade; which are the cooperative's main areas of engagement on the continent. This is done by documenting changes in the respective economies, societies, environments and governance in relation to cooperation with the BRICS. This investigation found that the individual BRICS states have had differing impacts on sustainable development elements in each of the case studies – with both positive and negative results. However, as a whole the cooperative offers promising and solid options for the development of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It is evident though that better management of these partnerships is required on the part of the case study states to ensure that these engagements are beneficial in both the short and long term. The investigation also found that good governance is an arguably crucial element of sustainable development in the case study states. This is supported by the fact that the political aspect of BRICS engagement has encouraged the maintenance of the status quo in Angola and Zimbabwe, and the weakness in governance of all three case studies – clearly illustrated by their stunted development.

Keywords: BRICS, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, sustainable development, trade, investment, aid.

DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature:



Name: Melba Chengetai Nyabereka

Date: 26th July 2016

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“Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord and in the power of His might.”

Ephesians 6 vs 10

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Bretton Woods institutions	<i>grouping of</i> – the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation
BRIC	<i>grouping of</i> – Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	<i>grouping of</i> – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
EIA	Environmental Investigation Agency
ESAPs	Economic Structural Adjustment Programs
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IHDI	Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
ILO	International Labour Organisation
NDB	New Development Bank
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO(s)	Non-governmental Organisation(s)
NIEs	Newly Industrialised Economies
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SMS	SADC member states; <i>grouping of</i> – Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

SOE	State-owned Enterprise
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UN	United Nations Organisation
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environmental Programme
UNGA	UN General Assembly
US\$	American Dollar
WHO	World Health Organisation
WST	World Systems Theory
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWGIs	World Wide Governance Indicators
ZAR	South African Rand

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

“We attach the highest importance to economic growth that supports development and sustainability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realised their full economic potential.” – BRICS Summit 2012 (Delhi Declaration and Action Plan)¹

1.1 Introduction and Background

The 21st century has seen a more globally engaged and economically active African continent² – a reality that has been evidenced by the increasing trade and investment between the continent and partners across the globe, which has led to, *inter alia*, a decrease in poverty over the past decade.³ The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) notes that the global poverty rate – much of which can be attributed to the developing world, particularly Africa, which has historically been “widely perceived as the world’s poorest continent”⁴ – fell from 47 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2014.⁵ Some states, like South Africa, have become better developed, achieving 0.66 (out of the ideal score of 1) on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2015 – significantly more than the 0.463 average in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).⁶ Africa has also received a significant amount of aid over the years, which has helped to alleviate the burden of a number of similar socio-economic challenges.⁷ Despite these improvements, the continent continues to be largely underdeveloped.⁸ Today, about 41 percent of the SSA population still lives in extreme poverty.⁹ This figure highlights the need to ensure that this escalated economic integration and engagement is both beneficial and sustainable for African states.

¹ "BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805> (accessed February 2, 2016).

² Charles Robertson, *The Fastest Billion: The Story Behind Africa's Economic Revolution* (Moscow: Renaissance Capital, 2012); Tony Binns, Alan Dixon and Etienne Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 271-2.

³ The World Bank, "An analysis of issues shaping Africa's economic future," *Africa's Pulse* 7(2013).
⁴ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*, 1.

⁵ Mark Anderson, "Millennium development goal 1: 15 achievements on poverty and hunger," *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/19/mdg1-millennium-development-goal-poverty-hunger-achievements> (accessed July 8, 2015).

⁶ "About South Africa," UNDP, http://www.za.undp.org/content/south_africa/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed September 30, 2015).

⁷ Nathan Andrews, "Foreign aid and development in Africa: What the literature says and what the reality is," *Journal of African Studies and Development* 1 no. 1 (2009).

⁸ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*, 1, 312-14.;
"Africa at a turning point," UNDP, <http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/regioninfo.html> (accessed September 20, 2015).

Scholars such as Giddings and Redclift and organisations such as the World Bank agree that when considering the issue of sustainable development, there are three essential aspects, namely, the economy, the society and the environment and, according to Soubotina, the development of human resources (the “social” constituent) is the most significant of these elements.¹⁰ It is therefore important to consider whether or not this economic engagement has had, or is having, any impact on the social development agenda, especially considering it is one of the most pressing matters for the southern African region.¹¹ This is an area in which previous North-South economic engagement has been relatively unsuccessful,¹² as economic wealth does not ensure improvements in the quality of living experienced by people in a state. This situation is particularly evident in resource-rich African states where wealth accumulation has not guaranteed development in critical social components such as health, employment or equitable resource distribution across social groups, to name but a few examples.¹³

Indeed, a prominent example can be seen in the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) that were encouraged and implemented through the Bretton Woods institutions.¹⁴ Many of the problems arising from this system have to do with the fixation on economic growth through Washington Consensus ideals that encourage fiscal discipline, privatisation, financial and trade liberalisation and deregulation.¹⁵ In most cases, these strategies have been largely unsuccessful as they fail to encompass the socio-political aspects of growth within the economic strategy, which often means the programme is unsustainable for various reasons and eventually fails.¹⁶ Bond is quoted by Binn et al. as

¹⁰ Tatyana P. Soubotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*, (Washington: The World Bank, 2004), 113, 17.; Bob Giddings, Bill Hopwood, and Geoff O'Brien, "Environment, economy and society: fitting them together into sustainable development," *Sustainable Development* 10, no. 4 (2002); Michael Redclift, "Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age," *Sustainable Development* 13, no. 4 (2005). "Social & Human Development," SADC, <http://www.sadc.int/themes/social-human-development/> (accessed November 28, 2015).

¹² Mihaela Papa and Nancy W. Gleason, "Major emerging powers in sustainable development diplomacy: Assessing their leadership potential," *Global Environmental Change* 22, no. 4 (2012): 916; Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 315.

¹³ Soubotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 7, 8, 121.

¹⁴ This refers to the grouping of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); See: A. P. Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*, Ninth ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 469.

¹⁵ David Held and Anthony McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (2003). 174-5, 424-27, 81; John Williamson, "Speeches, Testimony, Papers Did the Washington Consensus Fail?," *Institute for International Economics* (2002): 1.

¹⁶ "What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus?," *The World Bank Research Observer* 15, no. 2 (2000): 251; Doug Porter and David Craig, "The third way and the third world: poverty reduction and social inclusion in the rise of 'inclusive' liberalism," *Review of International Political Economy* 11, no. 2 (2004): 388-9.

arguing that “Africa’s key problems are exploitative debt, financial dominance by the North, misdirected aid, capital flight, a ‘brain drain’ to the North and the negative role played by ruling elites.”¹⁷ In southern Africa, these effects are apparent. The reasons for the continued underdevelopment of many states is an issue of contentious debate on the continent and among various international and regional organisations and individuals. One of the more prominent arguments is centred on corruption amongst political elites and civil servants, often referring to the abuse of authority and misdirection of public resources for personal gain.¹⁸

There are many indicators that highlight this underdevelopment, ranging from poor economic performance, political unrest or democratic failure, to health problems such as the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and Malaria and socio-environmental challenges such as famine.¹⁹ Such underdevelopment is experienced in all spheres of development on the continent. For example, Angola, Africa’s second biggest oil producer,²⁰ is among the world’s poorest countries. This paradox is exemplified by the fact that the state was amongst the highest gini coefficients²¹ of 42.7 in 2013.²² Yet another example can be seen in Mozambique, which has one of the world’s fastest growing economies, yet in 2013 the state had a high gini co-efficient of 45.7,²³ illustrated by the fact that more than half of the state’s population lived on less than one American Dollar (US\$1) per day.²⁴ In another example, despite making a recovery of sorts from a complete economic collapse in 2008, Zimbabwe can no longer use its own local currency and depends instead on the US\$ and South African Rand (ZAR) for all transactions. Although this move has helped to

¹⁷ Patrick Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation* (Scottsville, South Africa: Zed Books, 2006); Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 315.

¹⁸ Soubbotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 120-1.

¹⁹ Coetzee, J. K., *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*, ed. Jan K. Coetzee, et al., Oxford Southern Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 31.

²⁰ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 292.

²¹ The Gini index measures the levels of inequality within a state, a score of 0 would indicate perfect equality and conversely a score of 1 would indicate perfect inequality. See: "Income Gini coefficient," United Nations Development Programme, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient>. (accessed August 30, 2015).

²² BBC, "Angola Profile," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036740>; "Income Gini coefficient". (accessed February 4, 2016).

²³ "Income Gini coefficient".

²⁴ "Mozambique Profile," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13890416>. (accessed February 4, 2016).

stabilise the economy, it has not necessarily translated into benefits for the Zimbabwean people and the state still has a high prevalence of poverty.²⁵

The emergence of economic cooperatives consisting of Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) such as BRICS²⁶ in the new millennium has thus created an opportunity for alternative and, in some cases, supplementary pathways to development. They present opposition to traditional models of cooperation through “informal and flexible multilateralism determined by political and economic pragmatism”.²⁷ This alternative pathway is largely a result of cooperatives such as the BRICS not attaching dividends to conditionality, as is the case with the Bretton Woods institutions.²⁸ The use of what has been termed “Beijing Consensus strategies”, which has ideals that encourage “self-reliance, indigenous innovation, prudent financial liberalisation, a stable political environment and the localisation of best practices borrowed sparingly”²⁹ by BRICS has in some ways mitigated the challenges faced by developing nations when engaging in traditional North-South relations with regard to economic engagement, aid effectiveness and conditionality.³⁰ Through these strategies, developing nations are offered the opportunity to attempt new approaches to development by engaging with these NIEs. As developing states are faced with this opportunity, it has become increasingly important to ascertain which approaches are optimal for individual states.³¹ Shaw suggests that “Africa can benefit from ‘new donors’ and ‘innovative sources of finance’” such as BRICS.³²

²⁵ "Zimbabwe Profile," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113249>. (accessed February 4, 2016).

²⁶ BRIC was established in 2001 and consisted of four major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa joined in late 2010 changing the acronym to BRICS. This cooperative will be discussed further in the paper.

²⁷ E. P. Contipelli and S. Picciau, "BRICS Members' Interests and Priorities for Cooperation - The Institutional Status of the BRICS and Pragmatic Cooperation: The Case of South America," *International Organisations Research Journal* 10, no. 2 (2015): 121.

²⁸ Hui Fang Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs," *Global Finance Journal* 18, no. 2 (2007): 144,54; Peter Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries," *International Journal of Technology and Globalisation* 4, no. 1 (2008); Papa and Gleason, "Major emerging powers in sustainable development diplomacy: Assessing their leadership potential."

²⁹ Xin Li, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, and Michael Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles," *China Economic Journal* 2, no. 3 (2010).

³⁰ *ibid.*, 297-300; Paul Collier et al., "Redesigning conditionality," *World Development* 25, no. 9 (1997): 1399-400.

³¹ Charles Mutasa and Mark Paterson, *Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 1.

³² Timothy M Shaw, "'African Agency' to Maximize the Continent's Policy Choices after a Decade of the BRICS: Beyond Dependency?," in *Contemporary Regional Development in Africa*, ed. Kobena T. Hanson (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016), 226-7.


This situation prompts one to question if the UNDP's suggestion given in the *Human Development Report 1996* that “human development is the end – economic growth the means” has had practical implications in the world.³³ It is in this context that the study seeks to examine BRICS' engagement *vis-a-vis* sustainable development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, specifically in relation to BRICS' core areas of engagement as described by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as trade, investment and aid. These, as well as other important concepts, will now be defined and elaborated upon below.

1.2 Conceptualisation of Key Concepts

The study's central concepts of “development” and “sustainable development” will be explored in-depth in Chapter Two's literature review. However, it is necessary to clarify some of the relevant concepts now.

1.2.1 SADC

Figure 1.1: A map of the SADC member states³⁴



³³ Soubotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 8.

³⁴ South African History Online, "Southern African Development Community (SADC)," SAHO, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/southern-african-development-community-sadc> (accessed August 21, 2014).

The SADC bloc, established in 1992, is a cooperative consisting of fifteen member states, namely Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, The Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The cooperative was initially formed in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).³⁵ SADC has been chosen as a case study as it is the most important inter-governmental organisation (IGO) in southern Africa, and one of its objectives is to “promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security” for its member states.³⁶ As their development objectives align with the selected framework, the member states are relevant and ideal case studies for the present study.

1.2.2 BRICS

The term “BRIC” was coined by a British economist Terrence O’Neill in 2001 to represent a group of emerging economies considered to be capable of unprecedented growth in the new millennium. The group consisted of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and from 2010, now includes South Africa, thus forming the acronym “BRICS”.³⁷ According to Carey and Li and Contipelli and Picciau, the cooperative is an “informal” “political-economic association” or “lobby group” that “operate[s] in a pragmatic way to develop common interests through joint actions.”³⁸ In 2014 two institutionalised or formalised structures within the cooperative were created, which have been the focus of attention in recent years namely, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Agreement (CRA). This was seen as the formalisation of the cooperative’s ambitions to extend their influence in the global economy as they represent rival institutions to the World Bank and the IMF, offering an alternative for developing states. This move was also solidified by the

³⁵ SADC, "SADC Overview," Southern African Development Community, <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/> (accessed January 6, 2014).

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ Jim O'Neill and Sachs Goldman, *Building better global economic BRICs* (Goldman Sachs, 2001). 3-4; Pádraig Carmody, "Another BRIC in the Wall; South Africa's Developmental Impact and Contradictory Rise in Africa and Beyond," *European Journal of Development Research* 24, no. 2 (2012): 223.

³⁸ R Carey and Xiaoyun Li, *Understanding the BRICS Evolving Influence and Role in Global Governance and Development*, vol. 119, Institute of Development Studies: Policy Briefing (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2016). 1; Contipelli and Picciau, "BRICS Members' Interests and Priorities for Cooperation - The Institutional Status of the BRICS and Pragmatic Cooperation: The Case of South America," 120, 23.

strategic placement of the headquarters in China, a regional centre in South Africa and the appointment of a Brazilian as the first chair.³⁹

The cooperative is very active on the African continent and even more so within the SADC region. This activity is evidenced by the increased focus it has committed to the continent, which has repeatedly been stated in BRICS Summit declarations since 2009. BRICS have also committed to “promoting development in a sustainable way,”⁴⁰ which also makes the exploration of their contribution to sustainable development in SADC a relevant and important matter.

1.2.3 Trade, investment and aid

In this study, the term “trade” refers to goods and services exchanged between SADC states and BRICS, focusing on the most profitable and growing industries within the SADC states. “Investment” refers to foreign direct investment in the form of economic, technological and other exchanges of the like, as well as bilateral investments or other such agreements. The term “aid” relates to monetary and in-kind assistance given to the states in one of the three forms such aid can take – tied, untied and partially tied. “Aid in-kind” or “technical assistance” will broadly refer to the provision of training, industry or sector experts, expertise and other such related exchanges provided to the selected states by the BRICS states.⁴¹

1.3 Problem Statement and Aim of the Study

As noted before, NIEs such as BRICS offer new avenues towards development.⁴² Increased engagement of these NIEs on the African continent has been marked by a sharp increase in trade and investment and, in many cases, aid, particularly in the SADC bloc where BRICS is the most prominent economic cooperative.⁴³ It has already been noted that BRICS is a significant contributor to the economic growth and prosperity being experienced across the continent as a result of their unique approach to engaging with the developing world in both

³⁹ "BRICS Members' Interests and Priorities for Cooperation - The Institutional Status of the BRICS and Pragmatic Cooperation: The Case of South America," 121, 24.

⁴⁰ "VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration," BRICS, <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/253-vii-brics-summit-ufa-declaration> (accessed January 14, 2016).

⁴¹ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa," (Online: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2013), http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/africa-brics_cooperation_eng.pdf (accessed November 17, 2015).

⁴² Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."

⁴³ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

the political and economic spheres.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, a deeper, more comprehensive inquiry into the beneficence of BRICS' engagement is needed, as it has attracted a great deal of attention from the international community.⁴⁵

In the cases of China and India, heated debate has emerged regarding the question of the contribution of their partnerships in the developing world,⁴⁶ and most certainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where concerns have been expressed regarding the developmental consequences of these newly forged and intensified partnerships.⁴⁷ The decision to rid a state of the negative repercussions of North-South and Bretton Woods institutions' strategies, such as debt, dependence and underdevelopment, is to be taken with care. Indeed, although the relationships emergent between the BRICS and Africa are proving to be a positive economic force, it is uncertain if these new partnerships have yielded results that will prove beneficial for engaging developing nations in the long term.⁴⁸ This issue is particularly pressing when one considers the tendency of BRICS to turn a blind eye to the domestic issues such as poor governance and corruption that arise in their partnering states as a result of their commitment to a policy of non-interference.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, and as mentioned above, BRICS have been noted by UNECA to have three core channels of engagement within the African context: trade, investment and aid (predominantly through technical assistance), and UNECA contends that their involvement on the continent has "shown that development is possible even when the initial conditions

⁴⁴ O. Diallo and S.J.A. Tapsoba, *Rising BRICs and Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa's Business Cycle Patterns* (International Monetary Fund, 2014); Pravin Jadhav, "Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: Analysis of economic, institutional and political factor," *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 37, no. 0 (2012); Michael Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa," *Foresight* 13, no. 3 (2011); UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

⁴⁵ Taku Fundira, *Trade at a Glance: The BRICS and Japan's Engagement with Africa*, (Online: Trade Law Centre, 2012), <http://www.tralac.org/2013/08/28/e-book-brics-south-africas-way-ahead/> (accessed June 6, 2015), 3.; Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa," 39.

⁴⁶ Lucky Asuelime and Abel Jethro, "Building with BRICS: A Burgeoning Dynamic for South Africa?," (2011).

⁴⁷ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Harry G. Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007); "China and India go to Africa: New deals in the developing world," *Foreign Affairs* (2008); Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."

⁴⁸ S. M. Murshed, P. Goultart, and L. A. Serino, "Globalization and the South at the crossroads of change," in *South-South Globalisation: Challenges and opportunities for development*, ed. S. M. Murshed, P. Goultart, and L. A. Serino (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 16.

⁴⁹ "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan," BRICS, <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/223-sixth-summit-declaration-and-action-plan> (accessed January 12, 2016).

appear to be unfavourable.”⁵⁰ The cooperative’s policy towards the continent is one that aims to finance development through the promotion of development cooperation and investment.⁵¹ The cooperative has increasingly pushed for a more multilateral and multipolar global environment capable of affording more equitable engagement and development (in its various facets) for individual states and the developing world as a whole.⁵²

As such, the aim of this study is to explore BRICS’ engagement *vis-a-vis* sustainable development in specific relation to trade, investment and aid in specific SADC member states between 2001 and 2014. At this point, it should be noted that the cooperative’s policy towards the continent is one that aims to finance development on the continent through the promotion of development cooperation and investment.⁵³ It is within these contexts that the study will explore their engagement with the selected SADC member states. This is not, however, to suggest that their engagement is limited to these prescribed elements: the time period chosen is indicative of the establishment of the BRICS cooperative in 2001,⁵⁴ and, currently, SADC’s fifteen member states are all at different stages of economic, social and political development.⁵⁵ Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the specific SADC member states (hereafter referred to as “SMS”) of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have been chosen, as Angola and Mozambique have the fastest growing economies in the SADC cooperative,⁵⁶ whilst Zimbabwe has been selected as it is relatively economically and politically isolated, save its engagement with BRICS.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa," iii.

⁵¹ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Maxi Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south," *The International Spectator* 46, no. 1 (2011); J. Stevens and S. Freemantle, "BRICS–Africa trade update," in *Africa Macro* (Online: Standard Bank, 2013); UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

⁵² "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan".

⁵³ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."; Stevens and Freemantle, "BRICS–Africa trade update."; UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

⁵⁴ "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

⁵⁵ The World Bank, "Southern Africa: SADC - Southern African Development Community," The World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTREGINI/EXTAFRREGINICOO/0,,contentMDK:20626642~menuPK:1592446~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1587585,00.html#institutional> (accessed March 15, 2014).

⁵⁶ This was correct at the time the study was first considered in 2014.

⁵⁷ Diallo and Tapsoba, *Rising BRICs and Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa's Business Cycle Patterns*: 4-7.; Taku Fundira, *Working Paper Trade at a Glance : The BRICS and Japan's Engagement with*

1.3.1 Research purpose and question

The purpose of this study is to explore how BRICS' economic engagement (through trade, investment and aid) with the chosen SADC member states may or may not have contributed to sustainable development within those states. Therefore, this study seeks to answer the question:

What role has BRICS played in contributing to sustainable development in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe through its engagement?

The research sub-questions are:

- a. How have the concepts of “development” and “sustainable development” evolved?
- b. How, if at all, has international economic engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe contributed to their sustainable development prior to BRICS' involvement?
- c. How, if at all, has BRICS' economic engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2014 contributed to:
 - i. Economic development;
 - ii. Social development; and
 - iii. Environmental development.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study brings together many of the issues discussed above, which are of serious concern to the African subcontinent. Sustainable development and global partnerships are the core issues addressed in the study. The study will address the gaps in literature pertaining to the role of BRICS' engagement within the SADC region as a cooperative, particularly on various aspects of the selected states and the competencies of BRICS in relation to sustainable development.⁵⁸ The contemplation of a political or governance perspective will also be a valuable addition to the study as this is an area in which many developing states

Africa, 2012, <http://www.tralac.org/2013/08/28/e-book-brics-south-africas-way-ahead/> (accessed June 6, 2015), 3.; Kahn, “The Fall of the Wall, the Rise of the BRICs and the New Scramble for Africa,”; Mpho Tebele, "Mixed bag of fortunes for SADC," *The Southern Times*, <http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/articles/10306/Mixed-bag-of-fortunes-for-SADC-----/#.VOTSuywwCX4> (accessed September 9, 2014).

⁵⁸ Namely trade, investment and aid.

are struggling. This consideration will explore how poor governance has influenced sustainable development in the SMS.⁵⁹

The study will address several areas of concern for sustainable development in Africa by revealing the economic options available for African states, highlighting viable approaches and identifying areas of concern. It may also help to inform policy implemented by developing states as well as those of the BRICS and other NIEs when engaging with African states to ensure both sides benefit from such engagements. It is important to understand how the South-South engagement by a prominent global cooperative such as BRICS contributes to these aspects of development so as to better equip African states with knowledge on how to best develop their states.

1.4.1 A brief literature review

This section will give a brief overview of the literature pertaining to BRICS' engagement in Africa in particular. A more comprehensive review of the literature with regard to the concept "development" and development theory will be discussed in Chapter Two, which will offer an historical and theoretical review of the relevant points.

The emergence of BRICS as progressively strong economic and development partners in Africa throughout the 2000s has drawn a significant amount of attention from individual scholars such as O'Niell, Calderón-Zaks, Cheng et al., Diallo and Tapsoda, Fundira, Kahn, Muhr, Stolte and Yang and Mwase, and organisations such as UNECA, the World Bank, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the South African Institute of International Affairs.⁶⁰ This interest has largely been focused on the economic engagement of the cooperative through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and their role as an alternative partner, thus challenging traditional Western hegemony over the global economy and governance. Some literature also discusses the arguably comparable resource hunger of some states in the cooperative, especially China and India. Some

⁵⁹ See: Figure 4.6, which illustrates a suggested "four pillar" approach to sustainable development by including a political consideration.

⁶⁰ Taku Fundira, "Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) Summit: An opportunity for a win-win strategic partnership," Tralac Trade Law Centre, <http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5274-forum-on-china-africa-co-operation-focac-summit-an-opportunity-for-a-win-win-strategic-partnership.html> (accessed March 1, 2015).; Christina Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," *Chatham House Briefing Paper*, no. 1 (2012); Michael Calderón-Zaks, "Are the BRICS a Viable Alternative to the West? A Succinct Analysis," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 13, no. 1-2 (2014); Thomas Muhr, "Beyond 'BRICS': ten these on south-South cooperation in the twenty-first century," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2016); Yongzheng Yang and Nkunde Mwase, *BRICs' philosophies for development financing and their implications for LICs* (International Monetary Fund, 2012).

scholars, namely Alden, Schoeman and Vickers⁶¹ have also explored South Africa's role as a member of the cooperative within the African context. Much of the research on the cooperative's engagement with African states has been focused on specific contributions of individual or selected BRICS states in individual African states, on particular sectors such as health and agriculture, and is usually related to aid or technical assistance. This study makes a contribution to the growing body of literature on BRICS in Africa and, in particular, SADC. Furthermore, it makes a contribution to the growing literature pertaining to sustainable development in the developing world.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

As noted above, Chapter Two will entail an historical and theoretical review of the literature on development. However, it is important here to describe the sustainable development model and indicators that will be used in the study.

Sustainable development is defined by the World Commission on Economic Development as development that allows the current generation to cater for its needs without sacrificing this same ability for future generations.⁶² However, it is also a dynamic concept meaning different things to different people.⁶³ For instance, Redclift notes that the evolving nature of development contributes to the definition of sustainable development as the changing needs of people depending on their age, physical location and culture.⁶⁴ According to Holme and Watts, there are "three pillars of sustainability": economic, social and environmental. The economic pillar is concerned with economic growth, financial performance, long term competitiveness and economic impact. The social pillar is concerned with social inclusion and various aspects of the human development such as gender, health and inalienable rights,⁶⁵ and the environmental pillar largely focuses on

⁶¹ Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, "South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa," *International Politics* 52, no. 2 (2015); Brendan Vickers, "Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 4 (2013), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.744638> (accessed January 8, 2016).

⁶² N. Visvanathan et al., *The Women, Gender and Development Reader*, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2011). 31; World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 34.


⁶³ As quoted by Markus Langer, "Comparability of Sustainability Reports - A Comparative Content Analysis of Austrian Sustainability Reports," in *Sustainability Accounting and Reporting*, ed. M. Bennett and R. Burritt (Online: Springer, 2006), 586.

⁶⁴ Redclift, "Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age."

⁶⁵ "Sustainable Development: Overview," The World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sustainabledevelopment/overview#1>. (accessed January 18, 2016).

resources and their use and emissions.⁶⁶ Although there are varying definitions, it is widely accepted that these three pillars need to be harmonious in order for a state to be considered to be developing sustainably.⁶⁷

Figure 1.2: An illustration of the World Bank Sustainability Model⁶⁸



With this model in mind, for the purpose of this study the term “sustainable development” will be defined and gauged by economic, social and environmental development, as illustrated in

Figure 1.2. These facets will be given equal importance as suggested by former World Bank President Robert McNamara, as they are inextricably bound together and should ideally reflect the condition of the other.⁶⁹ In the view of the researcher, this approach will encourage a reliable representation of the sustainability of BRICS’ engagement with the SADC member states.

In addition to these three pillars, another element that emerges in literature is a “political” constituent, which highlights the importance of good governance, defined by Kaufmann et al. as:

⁶⁶ Langer, "Comparability of Sustainability Reports - A Comparative Content Analysis of Austrian Sustainability Reports."

⁶⁷ Please see: Giddings, Hopwood, and O'brien, "Environment, economy and society: fitting them together into sustainable development."; "What is Sustainable Development," The World Bank Group, <http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/sd.html>. (accessed April 6, 2015).

⁶⁸ "Sustainable Development," World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/sd.html>. (April 6, 2015).

⁶⁹ Wolfgang Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (New York: Zed Books, 2010).

The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected and replaced, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interaction among them.⁷⁰

It is clear in the developing world that good governance plays an integral role in the sustainable development of a state, as it determines the capability and role government is able to take in facilitating development in a state.⁷¹ The growing value afforded to democracy and good governance by African states became apparent in the early 2000s with the signing of several declarations on democracy⁷² and the African Union's (AU's) establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003. Among other principles, the APRM promotes a "holistic approach to development" that emphasises: "poverty eradication; gender balance; decentralisation; the capacity of countries to participate in the APRM; access to and dissemination of information; anti-corruption measures; broad-based participation; and sustainability in financial, social and environmental issues."⁷³

However, the *World Development Report 1997* highlights the political shortcomings of many developing states. It was stated that government credibility was poor, as many failed to fulfil their role as development facilitators. Some of the reasons cited for this failure include poor economic policy, poor service delivery and corruption.⁷⁴ Kabange notes that many African states today still lag behind in development because of the disharmony of private investment, political stability and human rights across the continent.⁷⁵ The political element is one that must be considered carefully as none of the provisions made available

⁷⁰ D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002," *The World Bank Economic Review* 18, no. 2 (2004).

⁷¹ UNDP, "Governance for Sustainable Development: Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development Framework," (2014); Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 372-4; Madaleine Weber, "Q&A with Mark Robinson: The Role of Good Governance in Sustainable Development," World Resources Institute, <http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/02/qa-mark-robinson-role-good-governance-sustainable-development> (accessed November 2, 2015).

⁷² Examples include the Lomé Declaration (July 2000); the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002); and The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007).

⁷³ Chris Landsberg, "The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Afro-governance 10 Years later," *The Thinker* 55 (2013): 14-17.

⁷⁴ The World Bank, "World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World: Overview," *IDS Bulletin* 29, no. 2 (1998).

⁷⁵ C-J. N. Kabange, "Balancing the interaction between political stability, human rights and private investments in the sustainable development process: an ongoing challenge for African governments and their peoples," *Journal of Environmental Development and Sustainability* (2012).

for development can be sustainably implemented if governments are corrupt or ineffectual in their duties.⁷⁶

1.5.1 Explanation of indicators

As noted, economic engagement between SADC and BRICS will be considered as trade, investment and aid – which, as mentioned above, are the prominent areas of BRICS' engagement in Africa. The researcher will consider how this engagement has contributed to a *harmony* of development needs of the SMS. Kabange, Rapley, Yates, Parris and Leiserowitz rightly note that a harmony needs to be established amongst the various aspects of development in order for it to be sustainable.⁷⁷ The consideration of these three key areas will inform the study and provide a holistic understanding of the engagement between the SMS and BRICS.

Since different states prioritise different aspect of development to accommodate their needs, it has been necessary to create internationally acknowledged basic and common development goals to measure and compare development.⁷⁸ This requirement is shown in the creation and introduction of the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and, more recently, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2016. As stated previously, to consider sustainable development of the chosen SADC states, one must cover the various social, economic and environmental aspects of the state.⁷⁹ However, these are still quite broad and therefore, for the purposes of this study, various specific indicators⁸⁰ will be consulted and specific aims identified for analysis. The three pillar approach (as indicated in Figure 1.2) will be consulted in selecting the indicators for the study. According to Soubotina and Sheram, composite indicators make available simple comparisons of countries that can be used to illustrate the multifaceted and sometimes elusive issues in many fields of study. They argue

⁷⁶ Douglas A. Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources* (London: Pluto Press, 2012). 42; John Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*, Second ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 40-1, 43-4.

⁷⁷ J. Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007); Kabange, "Balancing the interaction between political stability, human rights and private investments in the sustainable development process: an ongoing challenge for African governments and their peoples."; Robert W. Kates, Thomas M. Parris, and Anthony A. Leiserowitz, "What is Sustainable Development? Goals, Indicators, values, and practice," *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 47, no. 3 (2005).

⁷⁸ Soubotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 7

⁷⁹ Redclift, "Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age."

⁸⁰ Most of these will be taken from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Human Development Index (HDI) and the World Wide Governance Indicators (WWGIs).

that this is why they are employed by various organisations and most governments to identify common trends and benchmark country performance.⁸¹

Table 1.1: The World Bank Sustainable Development Model

Economic	Environmental	Social
<p>Growth</p> <p>Efficiency</p> <p>Stability</p> <p>Services</p> <p>Household needs</p> <p>Industrial growth</p> <p>Agricultural growth</p> <p>Efficient use of labour</p>	<p>Healthy environment for humans</p> <p>Rational use of renewable natural resources</p> <p>Conservation of non-renewable natural resources</p> <p>Bio-diversity</p> <p>Carrying capacity</p> <p>Ecosystem integrity</p> <p>Clean air and water</p>	<p>Equity</p> <p>Full employment</p> <p>Security</p> <p>Education</p> <p>Health</p> <p>Participation</p> <p>Cultural identity and preservation</p> <p>Empowerment</p> <p>Social mobility</p>

Source: The World Bank.

The selected indicators for this study listed below are selected from Table 1.1. They will be used to explore the various elements of this study as already discussed. The indicators will be used in Chapters Three and Four, and are also informed by multiple sources, which will be discussed below. Chapter Three will focus on exploring the levels of development in the selected SADC member states, with specific focus on their performance in the new millennium. The indicators will be presented categorically in relation to the three pillars of sustainable development specified above. Chapter Four will focus on exploring BRICS' engagement with the SMS in relation to trade, investment and aid. Indicators for this chapter will also be presented in a categorical manner, specific to the discussion.

In Chapter Three, as an indicator for **economic performance**, each state's annual GDP growth will be considered. Industrial and agricultural growth will also be considered using each sector's annual contribution to GDP. As indicators for **social performance**, changes in selected health, education and poverty indicators will be utilised. And as an indicator of

⁸¹ T. P. Soubbotina and K. A. Sheram, "Composite Indicators of Development," in *Beyond Economic Growth: Meeting the Challenges of Development* (Washington: The World Bank, 2000).

environmental performance, access to safe drinking water, biodiversity and the integration of sustainable development policies and programmes will be considered. Additionally, as an indicator of **good governance**, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) will be made use of.

In Chapter Four, as an indicator of BRICS' engagement in **trade**, the total monetary trade value and traded commodities of significance to the economy will be considered. As an indicator of **investment**, the total monetary investment value and sectors invested into will be utilised. Finally, **aid** will be explored through the total monetary value and assistance in-kind that is provided.

A limited number of indicators have been chosen in order to accommodate limitations in the size of the study. These indicators have been acquired from a number of sources, including but not limited to the UNDP, UNECA, the World Bank and the Michigan State University Global Edge Data databanks to ensure availability and reliability of the data collected.⁸² It is the belief of the researcher that whilst not all aspects of sustainable development will be considered, a fair representation of BRICS' and SADC member states' engagement will be the result, as these indicators cover most aspects of the nature of engagement and make use of the most comprehensive data sets available. The researcher would also like to point out that the discussions on India and Russia will be noticeably shorter than those of China, South Africa and Brazil, owing to these states' limited engagement in the chosen case studies.

1.6 Research Methodology

The qualitative and quantitative approaches are the two prominent methods used for conducting research. Davis notes that the distinction between the two methods is largely in how the researcher chooses to "collect, analyse and interpret the information that will serve as evidence" for their study.⁸³ This process also directs the data collection and methods of analysis employed in the research process.⁸⁴ The quantitative method provides statistical information largely in numerical form. It is used to predict, explain and generalise occurrences based on these results. In contrast, the qualitative method offers interpretive

⁸² These include government and NGO documents and publications and journal and peer reviewed sources.

⁸³ F. du Plooy-Cilliers, C. Davis, and R-M. Bezuidenhout, *Research Matters* (Cape Town: Juta & Company Ltd, 2014). 14.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 15-16.

information, which can be used to understand, explore and describe occurrences.⁸⁵ In short, quantitative methods are concerned with numeric or statistical evidence while qualitative methods are concerned with meanings.

According to Bernard, researchers investigating socio-economic and political occurrences believe it is best to use qualitative methods. It is widely accepted that qualitative methods allow a researcher to describe the individual characteristics of inquiries of a qualitative nature (as opposed to the generalisation of quantitative methods) and highlight the varying differences that are present in these inquiries.⁸⁶ The study's aim is to explore and describe the nature of BRICS' economic engagement using the case studies of selected SADC states. It will be a qualitative case study exploration of the role of BRICS' engagement in the SMS between 2001 and 2014. An exploratory case study approach has been chosen, as it provides "a rigorous description of the case within its broader context in an attempt to understand the nature of the case."⁸⁷

While there are distinguishing characteristics between the qualitative and quantitative approaches, Dey argues that these do not completely divorce one from the other. Quantitative data is used in many day-to-day activities, such as making purchases by summing up totals, travelling by calculating distance and even more specific tasks such as gauging a government's economic performance using indicators such as GDP. Units of measurement are used to measure quantity in terms of currency, such as weight and distance. When applied to qualitative research, they can inform the findings arrived at through analysis as they represent accepted standards of measurement. In this qualitative study the use of quantitative or numerical data for the various indicators as outlined in section 1.5.1 will ensure a "common standard" in this study, which makes data collection and analysis more reliable.⁸⁸ This dimension of this study is helpful, as qualitative methods have been criticised as being "too subjective" because assessments are "not made in terms of established standards."⁸⁹

⁸⁵ H.R. Bernard, *Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches* (SAGE PUBLN Incorporated, 2000); G M du Plooy, *Communication Research: Techniques, methods and applications* (Cape Town: Juta & Co, Ltd, 2009); V. Jupp, *The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods* (SAGE Publications, 2006).

⁸⁶ H. Russell Bernard and Gery Wayne Ryan, *Analyzing qualitative data : systematic approaches* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2010).

⁸⁷ du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis, and Bezuidenhout, *Research Matters*: 179.

⁸⁸ Ian Dey, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists* (Oxon and New York: Routledge 1993). 9-10. *ibid.*, 2-3,9-10.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 14.

The method of data collection employed in this study is through content analysis.⁹⁰ The study will utilise primary, secondary and tertiary data, which will be collected from various (mainly digital) sources, including publications by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scholarly articles from peer reviewed journals and publications, newspaper articles and reports and government publications and documents. As the SADC member states enjoyed other engagements before (and during) their intensified engagement with BRICS, an exploration of these previous relations is needed in order to determine the kind of international economic engagement that existed prior to BRICS' involvement and their contribution to sustainable development in the selected states. Scholarly sources such as those mentioned above as well as credible statistical sources such as the OECD, UNDP and government websites and documents will be consulted.

In order to explore changes in trade, investment and aid in the SADC states, scholarly articles along with data from (but not limited to) respective governments, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the specified time period will be consulted and utilised. This data will be supplemented with government publications and documents, where available. The collection and tabulation of this data will be critical for considering the contribution of BRICS to these changes. Data from this process will be used when exploring the nature of BRICS' engagement in each SMS. This information will allow the researcher to consider the contribution of BRICS to the changes experienced in the SADC member states as a result of their engagement over the prescribed period of time.

Interpretivism will be the main analytical paradigm of the study because this form of analysis stresses the importance of meaning as a result of context.⁹¹ An interpretivist approach will allow the researcher to explore possible outcomes of the relationships shared by the SMS and BRICS through the analysis and comparison of the context-specific variables identified above. However, it must be noted that the interpretivist approach has been criticised for the possibility of excessive subjectivity by the researcher, who may be influenced by the social conditions of the study.⁹² It is suggested that the research process, such as data collection, use and analysis, may also be affected by researcher bias – a

⁹⁰ Dey, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists*.

⁹¹ du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis, and Bezuidenhout, *Research Matters*.

⁹² Ron Weber, "Editor's comments: the rhetoric of positivism versus interpretivism: a personal view," *MIS quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2004): viii; Bernard, *Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches*: 335.

phenomenon that has been termed the double hermeneutic.⁹³ These shortcomings indicate a limitation of the study, as the data collected and presented may be under or over emphasised in the researcher's analysis. In order to improve the reliability of the results offered in this study, various sources and analytical approaches will be employed, as outlined throughout this section. It is the intention of the researcher that this design will allow for the collection, analysis and interpretation of data in a way that will be relevant and beneficial to the study.

1.6.1 Scope and limitations of the study

The study is limited to the specific SADC case studies of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The researcher acknowledges that an investigation of all SADC member states would have been ideal; however, such was not possible within the scope of this study. Thus, specific states were selected for the reasons stated previously. In addition, this study is conducted purely through desktop research, as the researcher was not able to travel to the SADC states to conduct first-hand research and interviews. The researcher did, however, have access to various sources of primary and secondary data that compensated for these limitations.

The study spans from 2001, when BRIC was established, through to 2014 and does not include the year 2015. This decision was made on the basis of the potential and probability of missing or incomplete data sets for the year 2015. The completeness and full reliability of China's trade, investment and aid data may act as a limitation to the study, as this missing information hinders the research process and creates limitations for the conclusions. This situation is also the case for Angola, which has also not been forthcoming about the extent of its cooperation (i.e. amount of credit that has been negotiated) with China.⁹⁴ Murray and Attaran confirm the concerns regarding the availability and reliability of some of the data to inform the study. They both note that many African states have limited capacities in maintaining such records.⁹⁵ This is indeed so for all three of the chosen case studies.

⁹³ Frances Maggs-Rapport, "‘Best research practice’: in pursuit of methodological rigour," *Journal of advanced nursing* 35, no. 3 (2001): 377.

⁹⁴ Abdon Yezi et al., Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries, (Online: South African Resource Watch (SARW) & Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), 2012), <http://www.osisa.org/books/economic-justice/regional/win-win-partnership> (accessed October 8, 2015).

⁹⁵ Christopher JL Murray, "Towards good practice for health statistics: lessons from the Millennium Development Goal health indicators," *The Lancet* 369, no. 9564 (2007); Amir Attaran, "An immeasurable crisis? A criticism of the millennium development goals and why they cannot be measured," *PLoS medicine* 2, no. 10 (2005).

1.6.2 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations that stem from the involvement of people as a part of the study have been eliminated through the selection of desktop research as opposed to interviews and fieldwork.⁹⁶

1.7 Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter introduced the topic. The background, purpose, importance and scope of the study were discussed. This section also offered a summary of the research methods employed by the researcher, outlining data sources, collection and analysis.

Chapter Two will present an historical and theoretical overview of the concept of “development”. This chapter will be presented using a chronological approach, in which the literature will be presented in distinct sections according to the various issues pertinent to this study.⁹⁷

Chapter Three will offer a historical background and chronicle of past international engagements of the chosen SADC member states, starting with their respective independences from colonial rule to the year 2014. This chapter will also explore how previous economic engagement in these states may or may not have contributed to their sustainable development up to the time period investigated in this study.

Having provided a background to the historical conceptualisation of the terms “development” and “sustainable development” as well as having provided an overview of international engagement in the SADC member states, Chapter Four encompasses the central aim of the study by discussing BRICS’ engagement in trade, investment and aid in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in relation to the sustainable development framework illustrated in Figure 1.2.

The final chapter (Chapter Five) of the study will offer a summation of the findings and a conclusion, along with suggestions for further research as determined by the findings of the study.

⁹⁶ du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis, and Bezuidenhout, *Research Matters*: 264-68.
⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 102.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALISATION OF “DEVELOPMENT”: AN HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

“Today we live in a world that tends to be multi-polar. For this reason it is essential that we recognise the right to diversity and difference as grounds for the creation of more fair and balanced international relations to ensure peace and global security.” – Jose Eduardo dos Santos⁹⁸

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a theoretical literature review, which will discuss some of the most relevant ideas to this study. It is presented in a chronological manner, in which several distinct time spans and accompanying development theories will be covered, beginning at the end of the Second World War (WWII) with what Sachs has termed “the birth of the development period.”⁹⁹ This era begun with former US President Harry Truman’s promise that the “underdeveloped” world would soon be on a par with the developed world.¹⁰⁰ This discussion aims to follow the evolving meaning of the term “development” since then and consider the various relevant terms and theories attached to the process over these years with a view to informing the context of this specific study.

2.2 An Introduction to Development in the Developing World

Towards the end of WWII in 1944, some global leaders met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in the United States of America for the UN Monetary and Financial Conference, otherwise known as the Bretton Woods Conference, “to establish a framework for economic cooperation and development that would lead to a more stable and prosperous global economy.” Some of the most significant outcomes of this meeting were the creation of the IMF and the World Bank. These organisations’ purpose was to increase the living standards of citizens of member states.¹⁰¹ Indeed, these organisations have and continue to play a prominent role in global development today, particularly in the developing world.

⁹⁸ Carine Kiala and Nomfundo Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," in *South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme* (South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2011), 5.

⁹⁹ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, vii, xvi, 1; Arturo Escobar, "Imagining a post-development era? Critical thought, development and social movements," *Social text* (1992): 22.
"The IMF and the World Bank," The IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm> (accessed March 30, 2016).

At the end of WWII, the term “developing world” would have described the global “South”, consisting of much of Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.¹⁰² The central idea behind development quickly became that of economic growth, as propagated by Rostow, Lewis and Baran as entailing the “modernisation” of economies through industrial development and trade.¹⁰³ As such, in 1952 the UN published the *Report on the World Social Situation*, which highlighted the social inequities and poverty that plagued the developing world.¹⁰⁴ Sachs argues that although this encouraged the vision for the development of basic social services and “caring professions” (such as medical practitioners, nurses and social workers) such as those present in developed countries, the ideal of modernisation through industrialisation for purely economic growth dominated discourse in the 1950s.¹⁰⁵ However, as Bernstein and Hill note, it soon became apparent that this focus on economic growth was ill-suited to aspirations of comprehensive development, as it neglected to consider social and political aspects of the “underdeveloped” states.¹⁰⁶

2.2.1 The first Development Decade

The first UN Development Decade (between 1960 and 1970)¹⁰⁷ highlighted the UN’s (and thus the “global”) acceptance of the social elements lacking in development frameworks. A more integrated economic and social venture was needed to ensure “the key concept...improved quality of people’s life.”¹⁰⁸ By the end of the decade, the increasing awareness of this failure of economic growth to support social development was noted by former World Bank president Robert McNamara, who suggested that the following development decade call for greater social development alongside economic growth. Estava points out the view of many official bodies at the time:

¹⁰² Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no. 2 (2004); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹⁰³ Gustavo Estava in *The Development Dictionary*: 8; Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 320-1.

¹⁰⁴ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹⁰⁵ Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Stages of Economic Development (Speech at the Chinese Academy of Arts and Sciences)," Columbia University, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/china_speech061904.pdf (accessed September 10, 2014); Jeffrey D Sachs and John W McArthur, "The millennium project: a plan for meeting the millennium development goals," *Lancet* 365, no. 9456 (2005); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹⁰⁶ Henry Bernstein, "Modernization theory and the sociological study of development*," *The Journal of Development Studies* 7, no. 2 (1971); Helen Hill, "'Peripheral Capitalism', Beyond 'Dependency' and 'Modernisation'." *Journal of Sociology* 11, no. 1 (1975); K. Konadu-Agyemang and M.K. Panford, *Africa's Development in the Twenty-first Century: Pertinent Socio-economic and Development Issues* (Ashgate, 2006); Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ *The Development Dictionary*; United Nations, "The UN and Development Policies," in *UN Intellectual History Project* (Online: United Nations, 2010).

¹⁰⁸ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

The fact that development either leaves behind, or in some ways even creates, large areas of poverty, stagnation, marginality and actual exclusion from social and economic progress is too obvious and too urgent to be overlooked.¹⁰⁹

While this was the viewpoint of several global bodies, during this time many economists described the social aspects of development as “obstacles” rather than an aspect of development requiring equal if not more attention than that of economic growth. As suggested by McNamara, however, both are inextricably bound together and should ideally reciprocally reflect the condition of the other.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, during this first Development Decade, ideas for development were taking an entirely different form on the African continent, spearheaded by the recently liberated states of Tanzania and Ghana, led by Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah respectively. Whilst global committees focused on capitalist ideals for economic growth and prosperity, communist rhetoric was dominant in African discourse for the development of the newly independent states of the time. This reality was evidenced by the formation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963, with the aim of political liberation for the rest of the continent.¹¹¹ For both Nyerere and Nkrumah, this approach was a step forward in the unification of the continent; however, their views on how such unification was to be done differed drastically: while Nyerere favoured a gradual process for integration of African government and leadership, Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist ideals called for a more radical “United States of Africa” at the gathering.¹¹²

The communist rhetoric was also illustrated by the 1967 Arusha Declaration, written and presented by Nyerere, which stressed the importance of self-reliance and socialist values.¹¹³ The declaration’s aim was the implementation of an economic programme that reflected African socialist ideals for the benefit of the people – an approach apparent in Tanzania through the involvement of the government in all aspects of the state (limited privatisation) and collectivisation of agriculture in the state.¹¹⁴ In Ghana, Nkrumah had taken a moderate socialist stance to development by making an attempt to diversify agriculture (which was largely dependent on cocoa) and increasing infrastructure to entice FDI. Towards the end of his tenure, disappointed by the failure of his

¹⁰⁹ ibid.

¹¹⁰ ibid.

¹¹¹ This organisation has since transformed into the African Union (AU). See: "AU in a Nutshell," African Union, <http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell> (accessed March 6, 2016).

¹¹² Kwame Nkrumah, "African socialism revisited" (paper presented at the African Forum: A Quarterly Journal of Contemporary Affairs, 1966); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹¹³ Julius Kambarage Nyerere, *The Arusha Declaration and Tanu's policy on socialism and self-reliance* (Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1968).

¹¹⁴ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

moderate attempts, Nkrumah chose to have the economy run by the state.¹¹⁵ For both states, these approaches led to rampant corruption and inefficiency of the state-run service providers.¹¹⁶ Yet, although these prominent leaders of African independence and ideals left much to be desired in the running of their respective states, they became the forefathers of the African political, social and economic development trajectory.

2.2.2 The second Development Decade

The second UN Development Decade (between 1970 and 1980) saw the introduction and adoption of an International Development Strategy in 1970, which aimed to address the issue of inequitable social and economic development. The UN resolution on the issue called for a unified approach to development, “which would fully integrate the economic and social components in the formulation of policies and programmes.”¹¹⁷ This decade brought to the fore other issues of concern such as population growth, hunger, women’s rights (gender equality) and the environment.¹¹⁸ At this time, various groups and organisations – including the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1975 – found that the division between the developed and developing states had grown in the first half of the decade, and thus pushed for a more effective and comprehensive approach to development than the International Development Strategy.¹¹⁹ This decade also saw the start of ESAP implementation in developing states.

Furthermore, at the UN *Conference on Trade and Development* in 1974, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was put forward to the UNGA by a number of developing nations. The NIEO was aimed at supporting developing nations through improving various aspects of international engagement. Some of these aspects included tariff reductions, an increase in development assistance, fairer terms of trade, respect for sovereignty in all aspects of governance (including the right to choose economic and social systems that furthered their development), equality and more commitment from developed states to solving global economic problems.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Tetteh A. Kofi, "Structural Adjustment in Africa," *A performance review of World Bank policies under uncertainty in commodity price trends. The case of Ghana*, UNU/WIDER (1993); Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, "The best of times and the worst of times: structural adjustment programs and uneven development in Africa: the case of Ghana," *The Professional Geographer* 52, no. 3 (2000).

¹¹⁶ "The best of times and the worst of times: structural adjustment programs and uneven development in Africa: the case of Ghana."

¹¹⁷ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*; Nations, "The UN and Development Policies."

¹¹⁹ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹²⁰ Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, "The mirage of NIEO: reflections on a Third World dystopia," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 8, no. 4 (1982).

Also in this decade, at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) *Conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress* held in 1976, a “basic needs approach” aspiring for a “minimum standard of living” to be achieved by the year 2000 was proposed.¹²¹ Suggestions were made that urged various organisations to deal specifically with the needs of “underdeveloped” states as opposed to expecting their fulfilment as a by-product of the development process. The World Bank implemented this initiative widely across the “underdeveloped” world by engaging farming and rural communities. Many governments and experts also promoted this approach as it was deemed to have “universal applicability” and was relative enough to be “country specific”.¹²²

Other scholars, such as van Arendonk and Omo-Fadaka, were against this form of development assistance. They argued that it was foolish of developing states to adopt development strategies offered by developed nations because factors such as culture, assimilation and applicability presented large problems. They suggested that many of the ideals brought forward through Western intervention assumed a ready and willing population in the host state.¹²³ Omo-Fadaka thus suggested that social and economic stability could be achieved through commitment to African principles and ideals adapted for their time, which echoed the ideas of Nkrumah and Nyerere. The trajectory of this argument is also similar to the ideals of the Beijing Consensus (mentioned in Chapter One and discussed in detail in Chapter Four), which encourage tailor-made solutions for individual states.

2.2.3 The third Development Decade

The 1980s Development Decade became known as the “lost decade of development”, as many developing countries experienced development stagnation despite the implementation of policy reforms.¹²⁴ ESAPs continued to be implemented on a global scale, which entailed the implementation of what Williamson would later refer to as the “Washington Consensus” principles in 1989. These principles were used as a blueprint for the implementation of ESAPs in developing states by the Bretton Woods institutions.¹²⁵ The Washington Consensus was seen as the

¹²¹ Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹²² *ibid.*

¹²³ Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, "Development: the third way," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 1, no. 1 (1975); "Education and Endogenous Development in Africa," *Prospects: Quarterly Review of Education* 12, no. 2 (1982); "The mirage of NIEO: reflections on a Third World dystopia."; "Alternative Sources of Energy: Indigenous Renewable Resources," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 6, no. 3 (1980); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

¹²⁴ L. Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development & Society* (Weaver Press, 2012); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*; William Easterly, "The lost decades: developing countries' stagnation in spite of policy reform 1980 -1998 " *Journal of Economic Growth* 6, no. 2 (2001).

¹²⁵ Williamson, "Speeches, Testimony, Papers Did the Washington Consensus Fail?," 1; "What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus?," 251. Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*: 76.

representation of the ideals of modernity and social and economic growth in a nation through its emphasis on economic prosperity as propagated by the primogenitor of market-based macroeconomics, Adam Smith.¹²⁶ Williamson's "ten basic principles" to achieving modernity through economic prosperity were indeed based on the key elements suggested by Smith. These principles were:

- i. Fiscal discipline;
- ii. Redirection of public expenditure towards education, health and infrastructure investment;
- iii. Tax reform – broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates;
- iv. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;
- v. Competitive exchange rates;
- vi. Trade liberalisation – replacement of quantitative restrictions with low and uniform tariffs;
- vii. Openness to FDI;
- viii. Privatisation of state enterprises;
- ix. Deregulation – abolition of regulations that impede entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions; and
- x. Legal security for property rights.¹²⁷

Theoretically, the process of achieving modernity is undertaken through a number of stages. The first and most important element is allowing the market to regulate the economy of a nation,¹²⁸ through trade liberalisation and removing protective barriers enforced by a government on imports and exports.¹²⁹ Secondly, FDI should be liberalised to encourage the influx of foreign currency and encourage market competition in developing markets.¹³⁰ These changes are coupled with the removal of regulations that restrict or counter market entry and competition. These principles will then facilitate the emergence of competitive exchange rates and allow for interest rates that are determined by the market, thereby encouraging tax reform to take place. The success of these principles is highly dependent on limited interference of the state in economic activities.¹³¹ This

¹²⁶ GR Bassiry and Marc Jones, "Adam Smith and the ethics of contemporary capitalism," *Journal of Business Ethics* 12, no. 8 (1993): 621.

¹²⁷ Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 584. Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*: 77-92.

¹²⁸ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (BoD-Books on Demand, 2009). 53; Mark Blaug, *Economic theory in retrospect* (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 57.

¹²⁹ Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*.

¹³⁰ John Williamson, "Democracy and the "Washington consensus"," *World development* 21, no. 8 (1993): 1333; "Speeches, Testimony, Papers Did the Washington Consensus Fail?," 2.

¹³¹ "What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus?," 257.

limitation must also be applied to other aspects of governance, resulting in limited expenditure of the government, done through encouraging fiscal policy discipline by restricting large deficits incurred by social expenditures. This principle is facilitated by the privatisation of parastatals and reduction of subsidies, which allow for the re-allocation of public spending from subsidies for social projects towards more economically productive ventures by the state.¹³²

Williamson's ten principles were the basis for the implementation of ESAPs, which were supposed to induce a fast-track to modernisation and development for the developing world. Williamson, however, denounces understanding the Washington Consensus as neo-liberal, citing the implication of a political ideology, which encourages "minimal state interference in economic and social affairs; low taxes; individualism, and a general indifference to the income distribution produced by market forces."¹³³ He acknowledges that there has been a large discrepancy, however, between the promises of ESAPs and the experience of the majority of developing nations using these principles under the guidance of the Bretton Woods institutions, despite their noted success for developed nations.¹³⁴ This observation compels one to question why some nations have been unsuccessful in the implementation of ESAPs and failed to reap the rewards of using these principles in their attempts to reach higher standards of human and economic development. In theory, Smith's ideals should work in any nation, regardless of its stage of development.¹³⁵ Perhaps the challenge faced by developing states lies in the expression of these ideals through the Washington Consensus and their implementation through the key financial institutions of the Bretton Woods and their use of conditionality to further these principles.¹³⁶

It must be noted that the idea of the market being the sole and perfect regulator of economic transactions as presented by Smith has been embraced by NIEs such as BRICS.¹³⁷ It has also led to the growth and expansion of multiple developing nations, especially on the African subcontinent. This growth has been achieved through intensified trade, FDI and development aid and assistance, again raising the question as to how these partnerships have managed to encourage and facilitate growth, where ESAPs have failed. Kingsbury suggests that a reassessment of the approaches perpetuated by current practice for trade and official development aid is needed.¹³⁸

¹³² "Democracy and the "Washington consensus", 1332.

¹³³ Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 584.

¹³⁴ Williamson, "Speeches, Testimony, Papers Did the Washington Consensus Fail?," 3.

¹³⁵ Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*.

¹³⁶ Williamson, "Speeches, Testimony, Papers Did the Washington Consensus Fail?," 3; Collier et al., "Redesigning conditionality," 1400-1.

¹³⁷ Li, Brødsgaard, and Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles."

¹³⁸ D. Kingsbury, *Critical Reflections on Development* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Furthermore, although the period from the 1980s proved to be a vital time for development around the world with some developing states achieving good economic growth rates, the African continent on average lagged behind.¹³⁹ While a straightforward approach to economic development was taken by the Bretton Woods institutions, Escobar notes that development was seen as “a matter of capital, technology, and education and the appropriate policy and planning mechanism to successfully combine these elements.”¹⁴⁰ Sen also points out that there was a “widely prevalent concentration on the expansion of real income and on economic growth as the characteristics of successful development.”¹⁴¹ Sachs therefore calls for a more focused approach to address the needs of developing states at different stages of development. He points out three transformations in policy and strategy that need to take place in an economy to achieve aspired development and wealth:

- i. Commercial – a basic division of labour exists between the rural and urban sectors, with the rural providing food and other agricultural output and the urban focusing on manufacturing goods and providing services;
- ii. Industrial – a focus on manufacturing and international trade to diversify produce; and
- iii. Knowledge-based – an economy dependent on innovation and high input of science and technology.

However, Sachs also notes that the challenge faced by most developing states is failing to transition from one stage to the next.¹⁴²

In Africa specifically, Sachs observes that most economies fall within pre-commercial and commercial stages, which means they have the most basic standard of economic organisation. He adds that contributing factors to this lack of progression are limited infrastructure, high population growth, disease and hunger, and while the rural population is in various stages of poverty, the urban areas house various stages from extreme poverty to affluence. He also notes that many nations become stagnated at pre-industrial and industrial stages of development because of their dependence on primary commodities.¹⁴³ This is an obvious challenge for the African continent

¹³⁹ Andrews, "Foreign aid and development in Africa: what the literature says and what the reality is."; Ademola Ariyo and Afeikhena Jerome, "Privatization in Africa: an appraisal," *World Development* 27, no. 1 (1999); n.a., *Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead : summary*, ed. World Bank (The World Bank, 1994); Jan N. Pieterse, "My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development," *Development and Change* 29(1998).

¹⁴⁰ Escobar, "Imagining a post-development era? Critical thought, development and social movements."

¹⁴¹ Amartya Sen, "Development as capability expansion," *Readings in Human Development. Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm* (2003), 41.

¹⁴² Sachs, "Stages of Economic Development (Speech at the Chinese Academy of Arts and Sciences)".

¹⁴³ *ibid.*; Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*.

because of what has been termed the “resource curse”¹⁴⁴ by Auty in the early 1990s. This term describes the inability of developing nations to benefit from their natural resources and their dependence on primary production, which hinders the diversification of the economy.¹⁴⁵ The cyclical problem of debt reliance as a result of undiversified and underperforming economies in the developing world creates a sense of what Nkrumah called neo-colonialism. This observation is supported by Escobar, who argues that international institutions and developed states have control of developing states through economic and monetary means.¹⁴⁶ Omo-Fadaka thus believes that developing states in Africa need to create new ideas for socio-economic development that cater to their own individual needs.¹⁴⁷

2.3 Reimagining Development

This section focuses on key aspects, terms and debates on development from the 1990s, since the so-called Development Decades.

The 1990s brought about a change in both the North’s and South’s approaches to development. Whilst the North focused on “redevelopment” and environmental sustainability, the South was afforded the opportunity to use what is now deemed “dated” and “destructive technology” in the North to develop both their industries and economies as well as those of the North’s. This “development” was (and continues to be) mostly through the exploitation of natural resources.¹⁴⁸ The destructive elements of this process were largely ignored by many states with the ambition of gaining advantage over their neighbours and other developing nations. Sachs argues that this approach erased the “development” and progress made over the previous three Development Decades, whilst facilitating the booming of transnational trade and investment, which suited the world market demands of the time.¹⁴⁹

The meaning of the term “development” became an issue of even more contention amongst various groups at this time. Even within the mainstream, the term had evolved from purely economic to include social aspects of development¹⁵⁰ and, in the new millennium, the focus has become that of

¹⁴⁴ This term will be discussed further on in this chapter.

¹⁴⁵ Richard Auty, *Sustaining development in mineral economies: the resource curse thesis* (Routledge, 2002); Richard M Auty, "Industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries: The resource curse thesis," *World development* 22, no. 1 (1994).

¹⁴⁶ Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism*, vol. 140 (Nelson London, 1965); Escobar, "Imagining a post-development era? Critical thought, development and social movements."

¹⁴⁷ Omo-Fadaka, "Education and Endogenous Development in Africa."; "The mirage of NIEO: reflections on a Third World dystopia."

¹⁴⁸ Charles Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries," *World Development* 28, no. 5 (2000); Sachs et al., *The Development Dictionary*: 313-16.

¹⁴⁹ *The Development Dictionary*.

¹⁵⁰ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 313-14.

human development, focusing almost entirely on the social rather than immediately considering the economic or monetary aspects as more important.¹⁵¹ These changes were also reflected in post- and anti-development agendas¹⁵² that insisted on a redefinition of the goals of development and mostly suggested a focus on social welfare.

Over the years, the evidence of the ineffectiveness of foreign aid and development assistance in Africa provided through the Bretton Woods institutions has accumulated. Much of the literature found on development in Africa is centred on the effects, efficiency and beneficence of foreign aid within the continent. Andrews argues that there is a focus on macro-economic indicators for the states, which are not necessarily always an indicator of the reality of the day-to-day lives of the general population.¹⁵³ For example, ESAPs have generated debates on the efficiency of their implementation and impact in the developing world, with the areas of concern being human and economic development.¹⁵⁴ Multiple scholars have discussed the difficulties of the integration of structural adjustment policies in many nations across Africa.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, it is apparent when considering the attempts of many developing nations to achieve their development goals that ESAPs as prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions have hindered progressive development by perpetuating underdevelopment through the conditionality of development assistance.¹⁵⁶

Yet although ESAPs have been less than successful; the principles behind the programmes continue to be the dominant execution of neo-liberal development in the developing world. For instance, the emergence and increasing activity of NIEs in the 21st century has presented the possibility of alternative routes to development for developing nations.¹⁵⁷ As noted briefly in Chapter One, unlike the previous neo-liberal application of the Bretton Woods institutions in developing states, cooperatives such as BRICS do not attach dividends to conditionality. This approach offers the developing world the opportunity to attempt new approaches to development by engaging with these NIEs. As developing states are faced with this opportunity, it has become

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, 332-33.

¹⁵² These will be discussed further on in this chapter.

¹⁵³ Andrews, "Foreign aid and development in Africa: what the literature says and what the reality is."

¹⁵⁴ Held and McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*: 5, 330, 479.

¹⁵⁵ See: Stef Coetzee and Mohammed Jahed, "Structural Adjustment: A Review of the State of the Art," *Africa Insight* 23, no. 2 (1993); Hevina S. Dashwood, *Zimbabwe: The political economy of transformation* (University of Toronto Press, 2000); Theresa Moyo and SAPRI Zimbabwe, *Financial Sector Liberalization and the Poor: A Critical Appraisal* (SAPRI, 2001); Peter Balleis, *A Critical Guide to ESAP: Seven Questions about the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe* (Mambo Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁶ Kofi, "Structural Adjustment in Africa," 3.

¹⁵⁷ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs," 144,54; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Papa and Gleason, "Major emerging powers in sustainable development diplomacy: Assessing their leadership potential."; Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 366.

increasingly important to know which approaches are conducive to sustainable development. The opportunity to rid a state of the negative repercussions of ESAPs, such as debt, dependence and underdevelopment, however, should be taken with care, as noted previously.

2.3.1 Sustainable development

One of the most prominent issues in debates regarding development is that of *sustainable* development. This issue was brought to the fore in 1987 at the World Commission on Environment and Development in the *Brundtland Commission Report*. This report highlighted the growing concerns of many scholars on the relationship between the environment and socio-economic issues. In this report the term was described as "...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."¹⁵⁸

In 1992, the Earth Summit was held by the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The conference focused on a wide range of issues pertaining to environmentally focused sustainable development. Some of the most important and prominent documents that came about as a result of this conference are Agenda 21 and the Declaration on Sustainable Development, which were adopted at the conference. The summit guided other UN conferences to consider the interrelation of the various areas of societal development, economic development and environmental sustainability, marking another shift in the focus of the development agenda.¹⁵⁹ The Earth Summit also contributed to the formation of the MDGs, discussed below, which guided development agendas and aims from 2000 to 2015 and will be replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals in 2016, until 2030.¹⁶⁰

According to Redclift, the evolving nature of development contributes to the definition of sustainable development as the needs of people change depending on their generation, physical location and culture.¹⁶¹ This issue raises the question of the universality of the concept of sustainable development and its approved aims within the global community. It is reasonable to accept that not all parties can be considered and the principles beneficial for the majority are the only achievable benchmark. Sen argues against this notion, noting that there are challenges

¹⁵⁹ "United Nations Conference on Environment & Development Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992 Agenda 21," (Online: United Nations, 1992); "Agenda 21," United Nations Environment Programme, <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=52> (accessed September 10, 2015); "UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992)," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html> (accessed September 10, 2015).

¹⁶⁰ "INFOGRAPHIC: What are the SDGs about?," EurActiv.com, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/infographic-what-are-sdgs-about-315651> (accessed September 11, 2015).

¹⁶¹ Redclift, "Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age."

inherent in the global approach to development. He points to the focus on economic performance as a gauge for successful development and its failure to address the issue of well-being for individuals in various contexts. He proposes that the means of measurement do not reflect the reality of the complexity of life. Sen additionally argues that the means for evaluating successful provision for various individual groups, i.e. the disabled or pregnant women, using a blanket system, is inefficient and inadvertently a failure. He insists that the failure of this system of evaluation forces people to accept their condition because “their circumstances [do not allow them] to desire what they can never expect to achieve.”¹⁶²

Yet whilst the universality of these aims for development cannot be guaranteed, the UNDP, in its 1999 report, called for globalisation that encouraged development that is ethical, equitable, inclusive, sustainable (in terms of the environment) and equips states to better fight poverty and deprivation and ensures human security.¹⁶³ Another significant event a few years later was The Paris Declaration of 2005, which was agreed upon by international donors who saw the need for more collaboration to “harmonise” and “align” donor efforts towards common goals so as to make aid more beneficial and efficient. These two examples highlight the progression that has taken place in the realm of aid for development.

As discussed in Chapter One, the World Bank offers an interrelated system of objectives for sustainable development, which it argues must all be addressed and focused on equally. These fall into the categories of social, economic and environmental, as shown in Table 1.1.¹⁶⁴ Soubbotina argues that if even some of these areas are neglected, they pose a threat to the rest of the system, as they may hinder and reverse progress made in other areas.¹⁶⁵ An example may be seen in many developing states where economic growth and development has not necessarily led to social development in terms of equity, education and employment, for instance. Also noted in Chapter One is the importance of acknowledging that the needs that populate each pillar of sustainability evolve and change between different states and over time – which is why it is important to have a government that is capable of identifying these needs and of creating and implementing effective plans towards their achievement in the interests of its people.

¹⁶² Sen, "Development as capability expansion."; Thomas Wells, "Sen's Capability Approach," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/> (accessed April 2, 2016).

¹⁶³ Held and McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*: 424.

¹⁶⁴ "What is Sustainable Development"; Soubbotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 10.

¹⁶⁵ *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*. 9-10.

2.3.2 Development and governance indices

2.3.2.1. *The Human Development Index (HDI)*

The culmination of the discourse stressing that approaches to development within the global community were lacking during the 1980s also led to the introduction of the HDI in the Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990 by the UNDP.¹⁶⁶ The main goal of the report was to illustrate the importance of comprehensive development in enriching the quality of people's lives and not just a focus on economic indicators. It aimed to communicate that whilst economic growth and development was a necessity for the achievement of human development in its various aspects, it was important to consider how this growth affected the achievement of these aspirations in different societies around the world.¹⁶⁷ The HDI measures life expectancy, educational attainment and standard of living, differing from the dominant gross domestic product (GDP) measure by including non-monetary measures.¹⁶⁸ The UNDP states that the HDI "represents a national average of human development achievements in the three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living."¹⁶⁹

It can be noted (as the report also indicated) that around the world in developing states and most certainly within the SADC community economic growth does not always directly translate into human development.¹⁷⁰ In this report, the UNDP highlighted various aspects of human development that needed to be addressed in the future. These included, *inter alia*, sustainable development (environmental), population growth in the developing world, the role of NGOs in securing human development, economic cooperation, development aid and the widening divides in development between the North and South.¹⁷¹ Other development indices have been developed that take the shortcomings of the HDI into account. These indices address issues such as gender and poverty, i.e. the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the Human Poverty Index (HPI) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ Mark McGillivray, "The human development index: Yet another redundant composite development indicator?," *World Development* 19, no. 10 (1991); Farhad Noorbakhsh, "A Modified Human Development Index," *World Development* 26, no. 3 (1998).

¹⁶⁷ "A Modified Human Development Index.," *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 122.

¹⁶⁸ *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 158.

¹⁶⁹ "Frequently Asked Questions - Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)," UNDP, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/inequality-adjusted-human-development-index-ihdi#faq-expand-all-link> (accessed October 10, 2015).

¹⁷⁰ UNDP, "Human Development Report 1990," (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1990).

¹⁷¹ Jackie Smith, "Bridging Global Divides?: Strategic Framing and Solidarity in Transnational Social Movement Organisations," *International Sociology* 17(2002).

¹⁷² *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 158.

2.3.2.2. *The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs)*

The CPI was introduced in 1995 by the NGO Transparency International.¹⁷³ The organisation defines corruption as “the use of entrusted power for private gain” and measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide.¹⁷⁴ The WGIs offer a similar gauge in a set of aggregate indicators that relate to “six broad dimensions of governance” designed by Daniel Kaufmann. The WGIs are a summary that reflects perceptions on the “quality of governance” of citizens, enterprise and “expert survey respondents” for a given country.¹⁷⁵ Six individual aspects are taken into consideration – voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.¹⁷⁶ It is necessary to note that the CPI and WGIs illustrate just how important governance or politics is in a state and the extent to which bad governance can affect various areas of the state and multiple, if not all, stakeholders. In considering the explanations of the two indices, it is clear that poor governance can affect important social, economic and environmental elements of development within the state, as various stakeholders and, in particular, foreign entities will fail to have confidence in the surety of their status in such a state.

Given Kaufmann et al.’s definition of good governance (as quoted in Chapter One), it is clear that the government plays a pivotal role in the state. For many African states, Kaufmann et al.’s definition would automatically warrant a failing grade for governance as the ruling party is usually in control of the aspects described. “The process by which governments are selected and replaced” is often controlled by the ruling party, and in many cases this has meant that no “replacement” or “selection” is allowed to take place in order to perpetuate neo-patrimonial systems (discussed below) and maintain the status quo. As a result of this inability of citizens to replace poor or ineffectual government, the “capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies” is negated. The effects of this situation are seen mostly in poor social provision, i.e. prevalence of preventable diseases, high illiteracy rates and poor access to safe drinking water and sanitation. In states like these it is rare to find institutions that are able to “govern economic and

¹⁷³ "Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International, <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>. (accessed January 8, 2016).

¹⁷⁴ "What is corruption," Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/>. (accessed March 29, 2016).

¹⁷⁵ n.a., "The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2015 Update: Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996 - 2014," ed. The World Bank (Online: World Bank, 2015).

¹⁷⁶ Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues," in *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430* (Online: World Bank, 2010).

social interaction” amongst the different stakeholders because the state or government also holds the role of regulatory institution. Thus a cycle is formed in which the above mentioned aspects of good governance cannot take place because the “traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised” cannot be created or improved.

The term “neo-patrimonial” systems has been used to describe developing states in the developing world, particularly in Africa and Asia, where personal relationships are used to distribute power and are can be either legally (formally) or informally legitimised, or both. The system takes various forms, some of which are clientism, cronyism and kleptocracy. Clientism refers to situations where individuals are given special privileges by political elites in exchange for their unconditional support. This situation often leads to cronyism, which is the appointment of allies or clients in positions of authority without consideration of their eligibility, and more often than not the result is a kleptocratic system of governance, where public resources are used for personal gain.¹⁷⁷

2.4 Development in the New Millennium

From the literature reviewed above, it is apparent that a global development strategy that encompassed economic, social and environmental aspects was needed and in 2000 the MDGs were unveiled. Various UN and NGO mandates were entrusted to assist governments in achieving the eight development goals, which are as follows:

- i. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- ii. Achieve universal primary education;
- iii. Promote gender equality and empower women;
- iv. Reduce child mortality;
- v. Improve maternal health;
- vi. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- vii. Ensure environmental sustainability; and
- viii. Develop a global partnership for development.¹⁷⁸

While these goals have proven to be largely helpful in various sectors, scholars such as Andrews, Attaran, Bhaumik, Easterly and Fukuda-Parr argue that there are many discrepancies in the

¹⁷⁷ Erali Paiziev, "Gods of Central Asia: Understanding Neopatrimonialism" (Central European University, 2014); Tim Kelsall, "Rethinking the Relationship between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa," *IDS bulletin* 42, no. 2 (2011).

¹⁷⁸ United Nations, "Official list of MDG indicators," United Nations, <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm>. (accessed November 8, 2014).

valuation and statistical information used to gauge performance.¹⁷⁹ Some of these discrepancies stem from the availability of reliable data sets in developing states, as well as the efficacy and comprehensiveness of the statistics in reflecting issues investigated. Murray, Attaran and Sutterthwaite suggest that the unreliability due to irregularities in collection and tabulation (or both) of the statistics gathered at all levels creates a problem for gauging advancement, or worse, for making informed policy decisions for many developing states, because they are “scientifically invalid.” Another problem faced is that the starting point – 1990 – presents the challenge of incomplete data sets for many states, especially in the developing world, as many states had not (and some still have not) developed the capacity for this process.¹⁸⁰ Amin also suggests that the goals do not reflect some of the greatest needs of the African people, such as land rights and conflict.¹⁸¹

At the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, discussion on a follow-up framework for sustainable development resulted in the formation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were announced in 2015. The SDGs rolled out January 2016 and are intended to build upon and address the shortcomings of the MDGs.¹⁸² It should be noted that the SDGs comprise over double the number of the MDGs, are more detailed in nature and address a wider range of development issues for all states, not just in the developing world.¹⁸³ They also consider governance, peace and justice as necessities for sustainable development.¹⁸⁴

2.5 Alternative Development and BRICS

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, South-South engagement became a prominent form of economic activity. More favourable agreements and exchanges were experienced in the form of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTAs) and Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs), which served the purpose of establishing the

¹⁷⁹ William Easterly, "How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa," *World Development* 37, no. 1 (2009); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, "Reducing Inequality–The Missing MDG: A Content Review of PRSPs and Bilateral Donor Policy Statements," *IDS Bulletin* 41, no. 1 (2010); Andrews, "Foreign aid and development in Africa: what the literature says and what the reality is."; Attaran, "An immeasurable crisis? A criticism of the millennium development goals and why they cannot be measured."; Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, "Does the World Bank have any impact on human development of the poorest countries? Some preliminary evidence from Africa," *Economic Systems* 29, no. 4 (2005).

¹⁸⁰ Murray, "Towards good practice for health statistics: lessons from the Millennium Development Goal health indicators."; Attaran, "An immeasurable crisis? A criticism of the millennium development goals and why they cannot be measured."

¹⁸¹ Mutasa and Paterson, *Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*: 3-4.

¹⁸² "Review of Targets for the Sustainable Development Goals: The Science Perspective," ed. Anne-Sophie Stevance, et al. (Online: International Council for Science & International Social Science Council, 2015).

¹⁸³ "INFOGRAPHIC: What are the SDGs about?"

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*; "Review of Targets for the Sustainable Development Goals: The Science Perspective."

terms for private investment by nationals and companies of either state involved. Such terms used addressed favourable conditions of operation within a country in terms of taxes, profit repatriation and other aspects, which were ideally intended to encourage FDI and reduce trade deficits, amongst other benefits.¹⁸⁵ These agreements encouraged the exchanges to continue, for example amongst members of regional blocs like SADC. In the new millennium, the global emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) took this phenomenon a stage further by forming an intercontinental economic cooperative. Then, in 2010, BRIC was joined by South Africa to become BRICS.¹⁸⁶

Today, BRICS has a notably influential role in world development as a result of its unique positioning in the global economy,¹⁸⁷ as well as being politically influential regional and global states.¹⁸⁸ Klinger, Khan, Gammeltoft and Schoeman note that these states are becoming ever more influential in global finance, governance, trade and investment, especially in Africa where their presence has been a contributing factor to the pace of development.¹⁸⁹ The main characteristics of BRICS' involvement in Africa are trade, FDI and development assistance. These relationships, however, also include diplomatic and cultural cooperation and relations. Khan and Cheng have stressed the importance of BRICS' relations with Africa, noting that cooperation in various respects affords the continent a renewed chance for economic growth and sustainable development.¹⁹⁰ In addition, many scholars acknowledge that the most prominent of the BRICS nations in Africa is China, which is considered to be the next super power.¹⁹¹ A comprehensive discussion of China in Africa will be provided in Chapter Four.

¹⁸⁵ "What are BITs?," UNCTAD, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx; J. S. Mo, "Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements," Oxford Bibliographies Online, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0019.xml#obo-9780199796953-0019-div2-0001>. (accessed June 5, 2015).

¹⁸⁶ B. Klinger, "South-South Trade a testing ground for structural transformation?," (Geneva: Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 40, 2008); Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."

¹⁸⁷ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa," 3.

¹⁸⁸ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa."

¹⁸⁹ Klinger, "South-South Trade a testing ground for structural transformation?."; Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."; UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

¹⁹⁰ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."

¹⁹¹ Peter Brookes, "Into Africa: China's Grab for Influence and Oil," The Heritage Foundation; Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States," The Heritage Foundation, February 22 2006; Martyn Davies, "How China is influencing Africa's development," Background paper prepared for Perspectives on OECD's Global Development Report (2010).

A large part of the hindrance to stabilising economies across the continent is the availability of funding.¹⁹² The proposal of a developmental bank by BRICS for Africa poses an opportunity for a bypass of the traditional role of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF and, to some extent, the African Development Bank as the terms of doing business will, in the view of the BRICS nations, be more favourable for the continent (as compared to those offered by the Bretton Woods institutions). As the BRICS have elevated their individual and collective standing to become an international economic and political force, the cooperative has seen a more than notable growth in their influence in global trade and investment.¹⁹³ The availability of funds in the cooperative also makes it a large contributor to financial aid across the African continent, although it is apparent that the involvement of each state varies greatly across the continent, with South Africa, China and India being significantly more active than Brazil and Russia¹⁹⁴ – a fact also highlighted by Li, Brødsgaard and Jacobsen, who have noted the use of Beijing Consensus principles in Brazil, India and Russia.¹⁹⁵

Yet the provision of development assistance to African states is one of contentious debate amongst the global community,¹⁹⁶ as the availability of funding without the conditionality can potentially be either a hindrance or accelerator to development. As it is, there are largely two camps on development aid as a means of encouraging development and boosting a recipient nation's ability to engage fully in trade. The first encourages the provision of aid for the afore-mentioned reasons, whilst the other argues that the continuous provision of this form of aid stunts social and political development because it does not address the inherent difficulties faced by many African nations, including corruption in government and the mismanagement of the funds. Similarly, those in favour of the continued provision of aid acknowledge the shortcomings of African states, citing the need for increased transparency in the spending of aid funds. However, it is clear to both camps

¹⁹² Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Collier et al., "Redesigning conditionality."; Jakob Svensson, "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," *Journal of Development Economics* 61, no. 1 (2000).

¹⁹³ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Jadhav, "Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: Analysis of economic, institutional and political factor."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."

¹⁹⁴ UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

¹⁹⁵ Li, Brødsgaard, and Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles," 299, 301-7.

¹⁹⁶ UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

that aid is a necessity for developing nations in order to facilitate the possibility of engagement in trade and to encourage FDI through the development of infrastructure.¹⁹⁷

2.6 The Evolution of Development Theory and Practice in Africa

Throughout the Development Decades, a number of economic development theories emerged as a result of the observations made on the different paths states took in pursuing economic development. These theories largely sought to describe the various interactions taking place in the global economy between and amongst different actors. Brown, Pieterse and Potter et al. outline various development theories and practices that have been prominent in Africa since the late colonial era until more recently in the 1990s. These were classical economics (late colonial era), practiced through western-style, project-based development; modernisation (from the 1950s), practiced through national development strategies; dependency theory (from the 1960s), which saw a shift towards the pursuit of self-reliance; the basic needs approach (from the 1970s), leading to the pursuit of interventions for infrastructure and capacity building; and neo-liberalism (from the 1980s), which was practiced through ESAPs (as discussed above). From the 1980s human development also came to the fore, encouraging inclusive “bottom-up development.”¹⁹⁸ The 1990s saw the advent of anti- and post-development movements, which sought alternative approaches to development that were suited to localised success. Binns, Dixon and Nel note that although many different strategies were employed in the pursuit of economic development, the “various theories and practices...are not mutually exclusive; nor do they necessarily replace each other in direct sequence.” They also note that these approaches can be in use parallel to each other in one state, citing simultaneous national growth strategies and the basic needs approach as an example. Furthermore, not all states made use of the evolving approaches such as that of self-reliance,¹⁹⁹ which can arguably be the result of the inability of African states to be self-reliant, owing to the overwhelming number of developmental issues they face.

2.6.1 World systems theory and dependency theory

As discussed above, a number of development theories and strategies were utilised and/or implemented throughout the course of the 20th century. Another theory very relevant to the developing world and most certainly to SSA is the World Systems Theory (WST). The WST integrates these theories and their arguments that pertain to the relationships shared by the

¹⁹⁷ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."

¹⁹⁸ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 317.


¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 316.-17.

developing world as individual states and regional and international groups. It highlights the role each state holds depending on its position in the core, semi-periphery and periphery of the global economic system.²⁰⁰ Wallerstein describes the world system as:

...a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence. Its life is made up of conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage.²⁰¹

Stephan et al. note that many scholars believe the marginalisation of SSA was a result of the end of colonialism and was exacerbated by the end of the Cold War. One could argue that the latter pertains to the defeat of a counter hegemonic socialist bloc in the form of China, Russia and Cuba (all of which played a significant role in the liberation of many African states), leaving many states with little to no freedom to join the established international system. Stephan et al. argue that the recent emergence of China as a contender for economic dominance has erected “a new pillar of power within the structures of the international political system.”²⁰²

Figure 2.1: An illustration of the World Systems Theory²⁰³



Illustrated in Figure 2.1 is the WST as described by Wallerstein. It features a core, which describes the developed world that is dependent on cheap labour and raw materials from the rest of the system that these countries use to produce high profit consumption goods. These are then sold as complete

²⁰⁰ *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 77.

²⁰¹ I. Wallerstein, "The Modern World-System," in *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 229.

²⁰² Harry Stephan et al., *The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South* (Cape Town: Renaissance Press, 2006). 7-18.

²⁰³ G. Neilson, "Power Relations in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement," Pacific US Forum, <http://pacificusforum.com/2013/08/21/power-relations-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement/>. (accessed July 25, 2015).

products back to states in the semi-periphery and periphery. These states of the developed world are characterised by high development and infrastructure, high levels of education and high standards of living, which deplete significantly as the semi-periphery and periphery are considered.²⁰⁴

The periphery describes the developing world. These states are largely dependent on selling raw materials and providing cheap labour to the core and semi-periphery. They are characterised by low levels of development, infrastructure, education and standards of living. The semi-periphery describes states that are somewhat developed as they manufacture, produce and sell some finished goods; however, they also depend on the sale of raw materials to the core.²⁰⁵ Almost all states in SSA fall within the periphery of the world economic system. Their poor integration into the system has had many adverse impacts on all aspects of sustainable development. Environmentally, the dependence on largely primary goods (as the continent is rich in natural resources) has been detrimental to sustainability. In many states, large areas of land and bodies of water have been degraded and polluted in efforts to extract natural resources.²⁰⁶ This situation has also created many problems for the people of these states as the economies are not diverse enough to encourage a skilled labour force, and high incomes from the extraction of high value minerals encourage corruption and misuse of funds within the government. This reality has led to a dependence on a limited number of sources for income and lack of interest in diversifying into finished goods, along with lack of infrastructure and skilled labour. These challenges have had the overall effect of underdevelopment.²⁰⁷

2.6.2 State development typologies

Whilst some scholars focus on the economic issues affecting development in the developing world, others consider other issues affecting development in specific regions. Harrison suggests the lingering effects of colonial rule in SSA are a significant contributor to the national politics of development in the region. Whilst acknowledging the many differences the various states have, he constructs “a rough development typology” from the states he considers key to defining socio-economic change and the course of public action in the region. He states that no one state will fit perfectly into one of his typologies as so many of them share the same characteristics. Through his development typologies, however, Harrison aims to illuminate the issues in the region’s

²⁰⁴ *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 87.

²⁰⁵ *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*: 87-89.

²⁰⁶ Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 352.

²⁰⁷ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*: 230.

development politics. He identifies seven key typologies for development for a specific region: the peasant state, settler state, industrialising state, mineral state, conflict state, entrepôt state and the micro state. Within these typologies, he identifies the developmental and political issues of each state type.²⁰⁸

As illustrated in Table 2.3, the term “mineral state” refers to states such as Nigeria, Angola, Zambia and Botswana. They can be described as “rentier states” because they all depend on renting one or two minerals to external clients to provide the bulk of their revenues.²⁰⁹ In Angola, a source of revenue has been created through oil and diamonds, whilst Zambia has not been as fortunate, owing to the consistent fall in copper prices in the global market.²¹⁰ It is noted that these incomes should ideally result in investment in development of infrastructure; however, this is rarely the case. These “rentier states” only become interested with perpetuating revenue from the single source and develop only that sector to boost exports. The reason for this is largely based on the political economy of mineral states and their tendency towards conflict and inequality.²¹¹

In Angola, this use of income for conflict was an evident issue, fuelling the civil war for over a quarter century, with the government making use of the large oil revenues and the rebels doing the same with the diamonds. This war took the lives of over one hundred thousand people.²¹² Angola is an example of a state that suffers from the “resource curse” because of the devastation that the sale of oil and diamonds have caused in the region over the years. In Zambia, the volatility of the copper market led to the steady decline and eventual collapse of the economy after independence. This failure was also largely a result of their dependence on a single resource, as 90 percent of revenue was based on copper.²¹³ Other states also faced various challenges after independence. For instance, “settler states” are states where prime farming land was put aside primarily for European commercial farmers. These states inherited many challenges from the colonial period. These challenges were largely centred on the vast agricultural sectors, and the peasantry created to service them.²¹⁴

²⁰⁸ G. Harrison, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in *The New Regional Politics of Development*, ed. A. Payne (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 218-47.

²⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 229-30; Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*: 79-100.

²¹⁰ Harrison, "Sub-Saharan Africa," 229-30.

²¹¹ *ibid.*

²¹² BBC, "Angola Profile"; Technology Integration Division, "Angola in Perspective: An Orientation Guide," (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Centre, 2011), 20-21.

²¹³ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*: 230.

²¹⁴ *ibid.*, 226-7.

Table 2.1: Harrison's Development Typology for Sub-Saharan Africa

<i>Type</i>	<i>Development Issues</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Political Issues</i>
<i>Peasant State</i>	Peasant engagement with national/global markets	Tanzania, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Burundi	The top-down nature of state-peasant relations
<i>Settler State</i>	Inequality and dualism between types or rural regions	Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia	The redistribution of land
<i>Industrialising State</i>	Modernisation and economic nationalism	Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, Mauritius	The failure of government industrial policy and "overstretched" states
<i>Mineral State</i>	High export revenue and ineffective public action	Angola, Nigeria, Zambia, Botswana	<i>Rentier</i> states; corruption and the struggle for resource control
<i>Conflict State</i>	Provision of humanitarian relief and its relationship with rehabilitation	Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia	Effective conflict management
<i>Entrepôt State</i>	Inequalities between the coast and the hinterland	Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau	Creole elites and relations with peasant societies inland
<i>Micro State</i>	Dependence on global economy	Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland	Extreme vulnerability of states

Source: Harrison, "Sub-Saharan Africa," 224-5.

Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola are examples of settler states that had vast agricultural sectors using land appropriated by colonial settlers. In Zimbabwe, this situation was seen in the Eastern Highlands where there was a sense of "dualism", with contrasts of well developed, racially defined areas segregated from "peasant hinterlands".²¹⁵ In these cases, the main issue after independence was rectifying this dualism, resulting in the politicisation of land, hence the controversy surrounding the land redistribution carried out in Zimbabwe.²¹⁶

Mozambique also faced an issue of dualism on a more extreme scale as illustrated by the differences in coastal and inland regions, which contributed to conflict within the state after independence. It is what has been termed an *entrepôt* state as a result of the development of the

²¹⁵ Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 227; Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*: 262-4; Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*: 40, 95.

²¹⁶ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*: 227.

coastal area because of its strategic importance for import and export activities. A major issue became the merging of the two very different parts of the state and the nature of the state's integration into the global economy, which made the state focus more on external relations than the challenges of building a stable state. Harrison argues that this situation was a result of the unique strategic positioning of Mozambique, as it holds a large part of the coast of the Indian Ocean in southern Africa (which it shares with South Africa). This geographical aspect allowed for interdependence (for transport) between southern Africa's mostly landlocked states and Mozambique, and encouraged the government to overlook the integration of poor rural areas with the rest of the developed coastal areas.²¹⁷

2.6.3 Development traps

Collier also takes a more comprehensive approach in trying to explain the causes of underdevelopment, with a focus on Africa.²¹⁸ He describes a series of “development traps” that largely have their sources in the colonial era. The aforementioned Natural Resource Trap or the “resource curse”, resulted from the use of colonies by imperialists as a source of cheap raw materials and captive markets, resulting in the flawed integration of these colonies into the international economic system.²¹⁹ The poor transition from colony to independent state also led to the conflict trap, which is fuelled by the natural resource trap, leading to the further trap of bad governance as a result of the lucrative nature of natural resource trade – a means to income exploited and monopolised by state officials. The exploration of other sources of income has been all but secondary and other means to development such as hydro-electric power are poorly invested in.²²⁰

Neff also notes the partitioning of Africa as having contributed to tension and trans-boundary conflict over these profitable resources. An example can be seen between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo over the region that borders the mineral rich Luapula and Katanga provinces on either side. In line with the WST, the peripheral African states have provided low-cost agricultural and mining commodities such as gold, copper, cotton, palm oil and rubber to core states (largely to their coloniser) in exchange for manufactured goods sold to them at high profit, such as agricultural equipment and household goods. This is a trend that is largely perpetuated today and has created a dependence on natural resource extraction for income.²²¹ However, the

²¹⁷ *ibid.*, 231-2.

²¹⁸ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 315.

²¹⁹ *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, Fourth Edition ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). 61.

²²⁰ *ibid.*, 14.

²²¹ Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*.

“intensive mineral exploitation early in the twenty-first century is continuing as Africa’s full potential in this sector has yet to be fully realised.”²²² These are other reasons validating the importance of considering not just the beneficence of increased economic activity by African states in the new millennium but also the importance of the quality of governance in these states to better manage the income generated by these resources. Collier also raises the issue of “being land locked with poor neighbours” whose actions inadvertently impact neighbouring states.²²³ This situation is evident in countries across the continent where political and economic stability cause problems for other states, as factors such as transport networks and social issues such as refugees have an impact on neighbours.

2.6.4 Neo-colonialism

In discussing the impact of colonialism and North-South engagement in comparison to South-South engagement, we must also consider the characteristics they have in common. Whilst the general rules of engagement may differ (as exemplified by the Beijing Consensus), there are inherent similarities which have caused scholars such as Zartman, Bond and Calderón-Zaks to progress and adapt the idea of neo-colonialism, as the dominant actors in Africa have also done over the years.²²⁴ Schraeder notes that “direct colonial rule has been replaced by a series of neo-colonial relationships that perpetuates external domination – albeit in a more subtle form – of African international relations.” He also quotes Zartman as describing the process as multi-layered, where as one layer is cast off, the next is left “vulnerable, untenable, and unnecessary.”²²⁵

This is also the case when one considers the emergence of states like those in BRICS as dominant allies to African states. This relationship has come about after a series of partnerships since the beginning of the decolonisation era, starting with European neo-colonial ties that were evidenced by the continued dominance of colonial powers in prior colonies and based on various needs such as natural resources, investment income and human capital, as discussed by Amin.²²⁶ This phase was followed by the emergence of Cold War superpowers as dominant international allies who weakened European neo-colonial ties and, more recently, has been dominated by new global powers such as those represented by the BRICS states.²²⁷ This progression has been argued to be

²²² *Understanding Contemporary Africa*: 14.

²²³ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 315.

²²⁴ Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism*, 140.

²²⁵ *Understanding Contemporary Africa*.156-7

²²⁶ Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and dependence in Black Africa—origins and contemporary forms," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no. 04 (1972): 504.

²²⁷ Calderón-Zaks, "Are the BRICS a Viable Alternative to the West? A Succinct Analysis."; Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*.

giving African states a more active and central role in their foreign policy, thus being able to choose strategic allies who are sympathetic to their need for sovereignty.²²⁸ This change can be illustrated by states such as Angola and Zimbabwe, whose relationship with emerging global powers like China has afforded them more flexibility in exercising this sovereignty, but still leaves the state dependent on an exterior source of validation and support in the same capacities.²²⁹

2.7 Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa

The underdevelopment of the developing world became an issue of great concern in the post-WWII time as it equated to the suffering of millions of people. The UN and other IGOs saw it necessary to provide monetary aid to fund development projects and support fiscal deficits. Over the past decades, aid has played a large role in the development of SSA. Scholl notes that on average in SSA it has contributed 11 percent of recipient nations' GDP between 1972 and 2000.²³⁰ It has been used in various ways by different donors, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and has been used as a subsidy for social, economic, political and environmental funding.

Aid is provided in three forms: tied, untied and partially tied. The term "tied" refers to whether there are conditions under which aid is given to the recipient. There are also three ways of tying aid: tying to a specific development project, tying to acquisitions from a specified location (i.e. from the donor state) and tying to the purchase of specific services or commodities.²³¹ The tying or conditionality of aid has been an issue of great debate in the international community, with arguments focusing on the effectiveness of such demands. Aid effectiveness is described by the World Bank as "the impact that aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating achievement of the MDGs."²³² Some scholars attribute effectiveness to policy formation and implementation in the receiving state and some to the donor state. There are a significant number of scholars who believe there is an effectual relationship between foreign aid, sound economic policies and growth.²³³

²²⁸ *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 157.

²²⁹ Calderón-Zaks, "Are the BRICS a Viable Alternative to the West? A Succinct Analysis." Shaw, "'African Agency' to Maximize the Continent's Policy Choices after a Decade of the BRICS: Beyond Dependency?." pg225

²³⁰ Almuth Scholl, "Aid effectiveness and limited enforcable conditionality," *Review of Economic Dynamics*, no. 12 (2009).

²³¹ C. J. Jepma, *The Tying of Aid*, Development Centre Studies (Paris: OECD, 1991).

²³² "Aid Effectiveness," The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid-effectiveness>. (accessed July 20, 2015).

²³³ Scholl, "Aid effectiveness and limited enforcable conditionality," 378. Mutasa and Paterson, *Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*. pg 6-7

Whilst many aspects of the giving and receiving process can be considered, they are largely affected by a political element from either the donor or the receiver. The policies in place for distribution, use and accountability are all dependent on the governance of the state. It is in this vein that many scholars concerned with aid have considered the problem of corruption, especially on the African subcontinent.²³⁴ For many, the lack of accountability, cronyism and nepotism and poor governance policies has resulted in a grim outlook for many states. This reality is especially true in states where large reserves of high value minerals are present,²³⁵ proving that a large part of economic, social and environmental development and performance is dependent on the political stability of a state.²³⁶

2.7.1 Technical assistance

As a result of the observation of these challenges, donor states and NGOs adopted a strategy to provide “technical assistance” to recipient states in their areas of need. Initially this move was seen as a step forward in addressing the various institutional challenges of aid use in developing states;²³⁷ however, it became clear that this change presented its own challenges. Former Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation Eveline Herfkens was the first to point out the flaws of technical assistance based on an evaluation conducted by her ministry.²³⁸ Her concerns were later echoed by other authorities and scholars.

Firstly, the cost of employing “western experts”²³⁹ is very high and is usually more than many government employees earn. This cost is coupled with bloated living allowances and packages that detract even further from the limited resources made available for aid. Secondly, it has been found that technical assistance has not been effective in building capacity or reducing poverty, as plans are usually made on the decisions of the consultants who have a limited understanding of the needs of the state. The World Bank and the OECD have admitted that technical assistance has had a limited impact on development and there has been no correlation between technical assistance and

²³⁴ Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*: 40,43; Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 119.

²³⁵ *Economics of Development*: 77-78.

²³⁶ *ibid.*, 79-80, 118-21, 25-27.

²³⁷ By providing the states with consultants for their various areas of need. See: Martin Godfrey et al., "Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia," *World Development* 30, no. 3 (2002).

²³⁸ Anne-Lot Hoek, *From idealism to realism: a social history of the Dutch in Zambia*, (Leiden, The Netherlands: African studies Centre, 2014), <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/25710/ASC-075287668-3506-01.pdf?sequence=2>. (accessed September 3, 2015), 65.

²³⁹ Who are usually nationals of the donor country or employees of a multi-national of the country or that has offices in the country. See: Romilly Greenhill, "Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work," (Online: Action Aid International, 2006).

economic growth.²⁴⁰ Thirdly, Action Aid notes that the precedent behind technical assistance is warped as it perpetuates the assumption that western policy and expertise are best. This assumption is evidenced by the more often than not misguided solutions desired by western experts in the developing world, and certainly in Africa.²⁴¹ NIEs like the BRICS offer technical assistance, which is in some cases is different in its application and has been argued to be significantly more effective. This difference is evidenced by the cooperation offered through cooperatives like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which are more flexible, significantly take into account the recipient state's opinions, and largely expect independent management of projects once funding is provided. This approach presents another way in which South-South cooperation seems to be more amicable between donor and recipient.

2.8 Conclusion

The chapter began by discussing the three development decades that took place between the 1960s and 1980s before delving into the more recent period of alternative development from the 1980s onwards. It then analysed development theory and practice since the end of WWII, highlighting those most relevant to Africa, that is, WST, dependency, development traps, state development typologies and neo-colonialism. This chapter brings together many of the issues that are of serious concern to the African subcontinent. Economic, social and environmental development, good governance and global partnerships are core issues addressed in this study. The impact of these engagements on the continent is a pertinent matter if states are to develop to their full potential regarding sustainability. The rectification of the negative aspects of traditional engagement is a matter that must be addressed to encourage sustainable development in which all aspects of the state are progressed in favour of its people. Whilst NGOs and IGOs have made a large contribution in assisting the developing states to reach their current states of development, much of the responsibility must fall on the state to better provide for the various needs of its people through managing its people, economy and environment. To do so, it is important to know the effects that South-South engagement with a prominent global cooperative such as BRICS is having on these aspects of development so as to better equip developing states with knowledge on how to best develop their states. In order to examine the development paths of the SMS with BRICS' involvement, it is firstly important to establish their development history. This issue will be the focus of the next chapter.

²⁴⁰ *ibid.*

²⁴¹ Examples of these can be found in - Greenhill, "Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work," (Online: Action Aid International, 2006).

CHAPTER THREE

AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIO-POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZIMBABWE SINCE INDEPENDENCE

“The granting of independence that began in the 1950s did little to alter the constraining web of economic, political, military, and cultural ties that continued to bind African countries to the former colonial powers.” – Samir Amin²⁴²

3.1 Introduction

Before exploring the specific role that BRICS has or has not played in contributing to sustainable development in the chosen SMS (the focus of Chapter Four), it is first important to provide some historical context. Therefore, this chapter will offer a brief overview of each country’s political landscape since independence as well as their economic, social and environmental development experiences through their general international economic engagement. The main purpose of this chapter will be to address the second research question, which is: How, if at all, has international economic engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe contributed to their sustainable development? The chapter will focus on developments within these states up to 2014, beginning with independence from previous colonising powers.

3.2 Decolonisation: Political and economic colonial inheritance

Decolonisation was the process through which imperial powers such as Portugal, Britain and France gave up official authority over their colonial territories across the globe.²⁴³ The process of decolonisation took many forms but was commonly the result of a violent and armed struggle between the indigenous populations and the colonial powers.²⁴⁴ Many of these post-colonial states took on the various governing traits of their former colonisers, which in turn resulted in differing outcomes for the newly independent states in terms of democratisation and development.²⁴⁵ It has also been argued that these variances in ruling style were a contributing factor to the progression

²⁴² Amin, "Underdevelopment and dependence in Black Africa—origins and contemporary forms."

²⁴³ Antony Best et al., *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, Second ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2008). 404-8.

²⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 418-21; Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique A History of Unity and Division*, ed. Masako Osada (Somerset West: African Minds, 2013). 1-3.

²⁴⁵ Harrison, "Sub-Saharan Africa," 218-19; Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 13-17.

and development of newly decolonised states. These differences can be illustrated by the civil wars that followed the independence of Angola and Mozambique and the relative peace that followed independence in Zimbabwe, which will be discussed in this chapter.²⁴⁶ Harrison offers one of many perspectives that attempt to make sense of the varying complexities that need to be considered when discussing development within the African context. He believes that the differences in the governance of African states led to different “developmental typologies” amongst African states.²⁴⁷ Some of the most relevant to southern Africa are the mineral state, the settler state and the entrepôt state, which were discussed in Chapter Two.

The legacy of colonial rule created a number of obstacles to the establishment of effective government at independence for many states. Mamdani suggests that the colonial system served to create “a weak rather than a strong state” because of the many problems that emerged as a result of colonial rule such as indirect rule (where individual chiefs were charged with maintaining order in their territories and the collection of taxes), which could not work or be perpetuated after independence with a central government. There was also the problem of no traditional “pluralist political institutions” to which the emergent African leadership had been exposed.²⁴⁸ This reality meant they would find it difficult to run parliamentary democracies and also created a challenge in accommodating opposition, and largely led to the formation of one party states.²⁴⁹

The lack of qualified professionals to provide key services to the nation was also a legacy of the colonial era. It was common at independence for a state to have a large illiterate population with some semi-skilled individuals and only a handful of skilled professionals. This situation led to annoyance and discouragement amongst the people of these states, as the promises made at independence for social provision failed to materialise. This frustration was made worse by the fact that the availability of resources to those within the power system made it possible for some to support their own agenda for personal wealth. Best et al. argue that this possibility bred clientism, cronyism and kleptocracies, which were exercised by the political elites of such states because “they abused their power and squandered development aid to enrich themselves and their cronies.” They suggest the solution to this problem is the reduction of state involvement in economic matters “to allow market forces to shape the future of development.”²⁵⁰ However, in instances where this principle has been applied, it has not necessarily translated into less

²⁴⁶ Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique A History of Unity and Division*: 2.

²⁴⁷ Harrison, “Sub-Saharan Africa,” 220, 24-25.

²⁴⁸ Best et al., *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*: 422, 18.

²⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 419.

²⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 421.

corruption, as demonstrated by many SSA countries, such as Angola.²⁵¹ This problem will be discussed later in this chapter.

3.3 Historical Context and Development in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

In the following section, a brief historical overview of each state will be provided followed by the economic, social and environmental development of the chosen SMS. This section will be followed by a discussion of the governance and factors leading to corruption in these states.

3.3.1 Angola

The Republic of Angola is a former Portuguese colony and “overseas province” that gained independence in 1975. Angola’s independence followed a guerrilla war between various groups of the native population (the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA)) and the Portuguese armed forces, which lasted from 1961 to 1974.²⁵² Then, almost immediately afterwards, the civil war began, which lasted 27 years from 1975 to 2002, as a result of territorial and political disputes.²⁵³ The civil war has been called a proxy war of the Cold War as the different sides were assisted by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. Multiple international powers were also engaged, including China, Cuba and South Africa, who all had different motives for their involvement, which included protecting their investments and resources and maintaining the balance of power in the bipolar world created by the Cold War.²⁵⁴ This state is largely resource dependant, which contributed to the civil war at the time and today contributes to the socio-economic disparities amongst its people. Indeed, although Angola is one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, it has recorded very little social development since the end of the civil war.²⁵⁵

The social impact of the turbulent political atmosphere since independence is one of the most obvious issues in Angola. The civil war had massively negative effects on the people of Angola. Throughout the war, thousands were killed and millions were displaced.²⁵⁶ Moreover, massive

²⁵¹ See: graph on Angola’s CPI scores in Figure 3.9.

²⁵² Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*; Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars, 2013).

²⁵³ Tony Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*, Second ed., African Issues (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 1-3, 9-19.

²⁵⁴ Best et al., *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*.

²⁵⁵ BBC, "Angola Profile"; Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*: 45, 141-43; n.a., "Angola: The oil-barrel blues," *The Africa Report*, December 2014 - January 2015 2014, 110.

²⁵⁶ BBC, "Mozambique Profile".

amounts of revenue from aid and through the sale of oil and diamonds was directed to the purchase of arms and funding the war, as well as being lost to corruption, and, consequently, very little was spent on infrastructural development and social welfare. The result was that the state was in a worse position at the end of the civil war in 2002 than it had been before independence.²⁵⁷ Thus, Angola is now regarded to have weak social and political institutions and infrastructure that has been severely damaged by the decades of civil war. The state is (as mentioned above) one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and has massive oil and gas resources, rich arable land and mineral deposits, which pose an opportunity for the diversification of its economy. Yet in spite of these advantages, the country has a devastating poverty problem (see table below). Since 2002, there have been significant efforts to rebuild and repair the various aspects of the state requiring attention, such as health, education and infrastructure.²⁵⁸

Table 3.1: Poverty distribution in Angola

Indicator	2008
Population living below national poverty line (%)	36.60
Population living -/> US\$2 per day (%)	67.42
Population living -/> US\$1 per day (%)	43.37

Source: The African Development Bank

Table 3.1 indicates the severity of poverty in Angola. In 2008, only 32.58 percent of the population lived on more than US\$2 a day, and an even smaller 24.05 percent live on US\$2 a day, whilst the majority (almost half) of the population lived on about US\$1 a day. The table also indicates the incapacity of the government to collect and provide consistent data on the welfare of its citizens. For the time spanning 2001 and 2014, only data for 2008 was available.


Poverty has a direct influence on other social issues such as health and education because any money earned is used to meet immediate needs such as sustenance, water and shelter. It is evident when one examines government expenditure on health and education, as illustrated below in Figure 3.4, that development in these areas is limited. Life expectancy has steadily increased over the new

²⁵⁷ Florian Krampe and Henning Melber, "Angola and Mozambique: Honeymoon after civil war?," *New Routes* 15, no. 4 (2010).

²⁵⁸ Mills, G., *Big African States* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006). 125, 30-1, 34.

millennium by about 6.4 years; however, this finding may be related to the end of civil war and relative stability in the state.

Figure 3.1: Health and education indicators for Angola²⁵⁹



Whilst government expenditure on health has been relatively well recorded, this has not been the same for education. The poor ratings for education are also indicative of the challenges being faced by the people of Angola. As illustrated above, although the expected numbers of years of schooling have risen, the mean years of schooling have not. This issue may be because of poverty, as education is not an immediate need and therefore expenditure on it is kept to a minimum. The issue of education can be further exemplified by the literacy rate of the adult population, which in 2001 was 64.7 percent and increased to 70.8 percent in 2013. This problem is particularly evident in the female population, of which just over half are literate, as indicated in Table 3.2. It is encouraging to note, however, that the ratio of female to male enrolment in tertiary education is dominated by women.

²⁵⁹ Graph created using data from the World Bank Databank and UNICEF.

Table 3.2: Education indicators for Angola

Indicator	2001	2002	2006	2011	2013
Illiteracy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above)	45.81	-	-	-	40.33
Illiteracy rate, adult male (% of males ages 15 and above)	17.08	-	-	-	17.68
Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	32.59	-	-	-	29.22
Ratio of female to male enrolments in tertiary education	-	65.45	-	37.03	80.13

Source: The African Development Bank.

When one considers the economic performance of the state, it is obvious that Angolans should be enjoying a much higher standard of living in all areas. However, if Angola is considered through the lens of the Resource Curse and as a “rentier” state, these challenges are typical of a state in its position. This dependence on natural resources has been a trend that has characterised the state since independence, owing to the state’s economic colonial inheritance.

Yet prior to independence, like many former colonies, Angola’s economy grew immensely as a result of the abundant natural resources and advanced infrastructure. Luanda, the capital of Angola, was one of the major trading hubs of Africa. The province was extensively developed and the colony traded many raw and processed goods including wax, timber, ivory, tobacco and coffee, which was the biggest export. In 1955, the Portuguese discovered petroleum in the Cuanza Basin and extraction began, followed by projects in the Congo Basin and in Cabinda. The extraction of petroleum has grown to be the dominant source of income for the state today. However, this initial growth has led to problems in the post-colonial state. Although Angola did not take part in structural adjustment, the state was coerced by the Bretton Woods institutions into implementing Washington Consensus ideals to their economy in order to receive aid and loans from said institutions and other international donors. This lending led to massive external debt, which the state is still servicing. More recently, to secure funding, the government began acquiring “oil-backed loans”,²⁶⁰ which also had a detrimental effect by creating loopholes that are exploited by the kleptocratic government.²⁶¹ A prominent example of this is noted by Yates, who explains the evasive nature of Sonangol from all forms of audit and highlights some aspects of the destructive nature of the parastatal. It allegedly understates oil prices for the state budget and has monopolised


²⁶⁰ Stephan et al., *The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South*.

²⁶¹ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*.

the economy by branching out into other areas of the economy (such as shipping and mobile telecommunication).²⁶²

In the 2000s Angola's economy grew at an impressive rate, which was indicated by the growth of their GDP; however, the economy's dependence on oil has also meant that it is vulnerable to the vagaries of commodity prices on the international market, making growth erratic. This fluctuation is illustrated below in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Real GDP annual growth rate (%)²⁶³



Nevertheless, the production of oil has been highly profitable over the years and has contributed most significantly to the growth of the economy. Extraction yields have grown exponentially over the years from 208 thousand in 1984 to 1,654 thousand barrels per day in 2015.²⁶⁴ This production was undisturbed, even throughout the duration of the civil war, which has caused many to question the morality of foreign (predominantly American) companies in the war.²⁶⁵ This is also

²⁶² *ibid.*


²⁶³ Table created using data from the African Development Bank Database 1960-2016.

²⁶⁴ "Angola facts and figures," Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm. (accessed February 6, 2016).

²⁶⁵ Mary H. Moran and Mary A. Pitcher, "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2004); Gerhard Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique," in *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, ed. Gerrit J. Abbink, Mirjam De Bruijn, and Van Walraven (Boston: Brill, 2003).

compounded by the fact that Angola did not join the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) until 2007,²⁶⁶ despite the fact that it was and remains one of Africa and the world's biggest oil producers. Indeed, although the state also exports diamonds and agricultural produce such as coffee and fish, in 2015, oil production and related activities accounted for 45 percent of GDP and more than 95 percent of exports.²⁶⁷ The dominance of the oil industry is illustrated below in Figure 3.3, again showing the dependence of the economy on the resource.

Figure 3.3: Angola main sector contribution to GDP²⁶⁸



Angola's main export partner is China, accounting for more than 40 percent of total exports, followed by the United States, India, France, Taiwan, South Africa and Canada. This trade is largely dominated by the purchase of oil. The state imports machinery and electrical equipment, vehicles and spare parts, medicines, food, textiles and military goods. Portugal is the main import supplier, accounting for 18 percent of total imports, followed by China, United States, Brazil and South Africa.²⁶⁹ It can be noted here that four BRICS states – China, South Africa, India and Brazil – appear as the dominant trade partners with Angola, which will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

²⁶⁶ "Angola facts and figures".

²⁶⁷ *ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Graph created using data from the African Development Bank.

²⁶⁹ J. D. Muzima and F. R. Mendy, "Angola 2015," in *African Economic Outlook* (Online: African Development Bank & The UNDP, 2015).

Yet the economic prosperity has not translated into development in the state. There are massive differences and developmental divides between the coastal cities, which are hubs for oil exports, and production and rural areas. This disparity confirms the developmental challenges caused by dualism, which is propagated by Harrison as a feature of resource-run states.²⁷⁰ Angola's economic exploits have left much to be desired in terms of human and social development and have also led to massive ecological and environmental damage.²⁷¹ Examples of such damage can be seen in deforestation and over logging as a result of timber companies, the use of trees for fuel and land clearing for subsistence farming. Prospecting for diamonds and oil both inland and coastally has also led to the pollution of water bodies and the destruction of land. This destruction is particularly prominent in the Cabinda province, which continues to fuel locals' anger towards the foreign population, as they are forced to live off the damaged land and have little to no share in the profits of the region.²⁷²

3.3.2 Mozambique

The Republic of Mozambique is also a former colony and overseas province of Portugal. Similarly, independence followed a guerrilla war against the Portuguese forces, waged by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and some smaller nationalist movements.²⁷³ The state also experienced a civil war that lasted almost seventeen years, but the country has remained politically stable since 1992. The impact of foreign forces in Mozambique is also apparent when one considers the origins and perpetuation of the civil war, because the anti-government forces were created, mobilised and funded by the then-white Rhodesian secret service and South Africa's apartheid government.²⁷⁴

One of the biggest issues that emerged during the civil war was the systematic torture and abuse of the Mozambican people by both the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the government throughout the years of the war. The majority of the RENAMO forces were made up of child soldiers ranging in age from ten to seventeen years of age. Many of these children were kidnapped from their homes and trained to join the armed forces under threat of execution and maiming as well as were enticed through drugs.²⁷⁵ The abduction and abuse of women was also a

²⁷⁰ Harrison, "Sub-Saharan Africa."

²⁷¹ Division, "Angola in Perspective: An Orientation Guide."

²⁷² Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*; Muzima and Mendy, "Angola 2015."

²⁷³ Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."

²⁷⁴ BBC, "Mozambique Profile"; Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."; Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique A History of Unity and Division*: 5-9.

²⁷⁵ Moran and Pitcher, "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique."

prominent feature of the civil war. Many women were removed from their homes, raped, forced to marry their abductors or killed. This abuse created a fragmented society that is still recovering today.²⁷⁶ Moreover, as the years passed, a kleptocratic government emerged, which caused severe economic decline, poverty, famine and inequality, amongst other issues. This situation encouraged the recruitment for RENAMO within the state, as the government became increasingly unpopular in many areas because they consistently failed to deliver.²⁷⁷

During much of Machel's presidency, the Soviet Union was Mozambique's principal economic, military and political ally. This changed following his death and succession by Joaquim Chissano, who abandoned Machel's Marxist policies and adopted capitalist policies across the board. Yet it must be noted that under Machel's leadership, Mozambique had joined the Bretton Woods institutions in 1984 in an attempt to revive the economy.²⁷⁸ Between 1986 and 2000, Mozambique implemented two structural adjustment programmes financed by the Bretton Woods institutions. These structural adjustments required the state to employ all the usual ESAP policies mentioned in Chapter Two. The first of the programmes began in 1987 under the name Economic Recovery Programme (PRE).²⁷⁹ That year the government began a series of macro-economic reforms designed to stabilise the economy. The World Bank sponsored an economic recovery plan for Mozambique, but many have argued about the practicality behind implementing such a programme within a country at war. Despite a positive GDP growth within the first two years, and Mozambique being regarded as the success of ESAPs,²⁸⁰ the PRE exacerbated the poor living standards of a large section of the population. Writing in 1990, Marshall stated: "the PRE brought extreme hardship, forcing most people to a series of desperate schemes and scams. The broader social fabric has deteriorated to one of individual survival at all costs".²⁸¹

Despite many setbacks,²⁸² the programme paved the way for investment and trade with the greater international community (as a result of the deregulation and privatisation elements of structural adjustment) where it had been largely limited to FRELIMO's allies.²⁸³ The privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became a major focus of the state's multi-lateral donors in addition to

²⁷⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷⁷ Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."

²⁷⁸ Moran and Pitcher, "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique."

²⁷⁹ Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."

²⁸⁰ Channing Arndt, "Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique: An Appraisal," (Indiana: Purdue University, 1999).

²⁸¹ J. Marshall, "Structural Adjustment & Social Policy in Mozambique," *Review of African Political Economy* 17, no. 47 (1990).

²⁸² Arndt, "Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique: An Appraisal."

²⁸³ *ibid.*

continued aid provision. This had the unwanted effect of encouraging corruption within the government, as the process was left to the discretion of individual ministries and offices²⁸⁴ – a decision that can be attributed to the weak state of governance and regulation in the state, as suggested by Stiglitz and Nellis.²⁸⁵ Some of the outcomes of the PRE (discussed above), combined with donor assistance and political stability since the multi-party government was formed in 1994, have led to dramatic improvements in the country's economic growth rate. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. These economic changes have not, however, improved the lives of Mozambique's people.²⁸⁶ The country remains heavily dependent on aid and has remained on the top 20 list of aid recipients since the 1990s.²⁸⁷ In addition, the purposeful destruction of infrastructure by the RENAMO forces and flooding caused by Cyclone Eline in 2000²⁸⁸ has set the country back drastically, and is still now a developmental issue for the state.²⁸⁹

Today, Mozambique has one of the world's fastest growing economies but, like Angola, it is also largely resource-based. These resources have attracted a large amount of investment in the state and led to exponential economic growth. As compared to Angola, the state's economy is more diverse, as illustrated in Figure 3.4 below. Mozambique's dominant exports are aluminium, electric energy, tobacco, natural gas, sugar and prawns. The state imports machinery and equipment, vehicles, fuel, chemicals, metal products and foodstuffs, and its main trading partners are South Africa, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. It is notable that the two most dominant BRICS countries in Africa – China and South Africa – are dominant trade partners with Mozambique (discussed further in Chapter Four).

²⁸⁴ Stephan et al., *The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South*.

²⁸⁵ Chris Cramer, "Privatisation and the Post-Washington Consensus: Between the Lab and the Real World?," *Centre for Development Policy and Research Discussion Paper*, no. 0799 (1999).


²⁸⁶ Arndt, "Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique: An Appraisal."

²⁸⁷ It ranked sixth, thirteenth, tenth and eleventh in 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 respectively. Jean Grugel and Daniel Hammett, *The Palgrave Handbook of International Development* (Springer, 2016). 434.

²⁸⁸ "Mozambique: How disaster unfolded," BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/655227.stm>.

²⁸⁹ n.a., "Mozambique: Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000 to 2013," in *Recovery Framework Case Study* (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2014).

Figure 3.4: Mozambique main sector contribution to GDP²⁹⁰



Despite the success of the economy, Mozambique, like Angola, continues to struggle with human development, for example over half the population is living on less than US\$1 per day.²⁹¹ Figure 3.6 shows that the country's economy has had relatively steady growth throughout the 2000s, but again, like in Angola, this has not meant that Mozambicans have experienced a significant amount of positive change or development. More than half of the population lives below the national poverty line and a large majority of the population lives on US\$2 or less per day, as illustrated in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Poverty distribution in Mozambique

Indicator	2002	2008
Population living below national poverty line (%)	54.10	54.70
Population living on US\$2 (%)	90.03	82.49
Population living on US\$1 (%)	74.69	60.71

Sources: The UNDP and the World Bank.


As in many African states, there are marked differences between the rural and urban areas. There is also an issue of dualism in Mozambique as the most developed areas lie on the coast (which

²⁹⁰ Graph created using data from the African Development Bank.

²⁹¹ Rapley, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*: 41-45.

holds the economic hubs). The further inland one travels, the less development and infrastructure is apparent. This poverty and lack of development has effects on a host of social issues. Below, in Figure 3.5, is a depiction of health and education in Mozambique between 2001 and 2014.

Figure 3.5: Health and education indicators for Mozambique²⁹²



After independence, the government established a primary health care system that was applauded by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as a model for developing countries. During this early period, almost 11 percent of the government budget was allocated to health care. However, the war led to a significant setback in the primary health system and RENAMO's attacks on government infrastructure included those for health and education.²⁹³ As illustrated above, little progress is being made in both respects. An issue that also arises in this state is the gender gap. In 2014, only 45 percent of girls completed primary school, in comparison with 51 percent of boys.²⁹⁴ These figures are discouraging, especially when one considers that, on average, over 80 percent of children have enrolled for primary education throughout the 2000s. This is likely another case where extreme poverty makes education a non-essential part of social development for citizens.

²⁹² Graph created using data from the World Bank Data Bank.

²⁹³ Moran and Pitcher, "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique."; Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."

²⁹⁴ Source: World Development Indicators.

3.3.3 Zimbabwe

The Republic of Zimbabwe is a former colony of England. The state gained independence in 1980 following an armed struggle against the colonial government of Ian Smith (leader of the Rhodesian Front) who had unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965.²⁹⁵ This declaration caused international uproar and led to greater support for the nationalist movements of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe (who would later become president) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo.²⁹⁶ At independence, Mugabe included Nkomo in his Cabinet; however, this arrangement did not last long as Nkomo was expelled from government in 1983 under accusations of plotting to overthrow the government. This action was compounded by a genocide that has been called "Gukurahundi", in which thousands of civilians lost their lives as the ruling ZANU government attempted to flush out alleged Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (ZAPU armed forces) "dissidents" who were seen as a threat to the newly formed government.²⁹⁷ In 1987, Nkomo and Mugabe joined parties once again to form ZANU-PF, which effectively stopped the fighting.²⁹⁸

From this time there was very little politically motivated instability or violence in the state; however, it could be said that the events leading up to the formation of the ZANU-PF made it clear that the government was not willing to accommodate opposition movements. The self-appointment of Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe and alterations to the state's constitution giving the president more power also led to a period where Zimbabwe was a one-party state. Towards the end of the 1990s, under the stress of a failing ESAP and growing discontent amongst the people, the decision to embark on the land reform programme was made, aimed at the redistribution of land to the indigenous people. This move also led to the formation of the dominant opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai.²⁹⁹ Also, international contempt for land reform led to the economic and political isolation of the state. This isolation, coupled with other factors, resulted in economic collapse in 2008. The state is now in a period of

²⁹⁵ B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo, *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008* (Weaver Press, 2008). 110-11, 13.

²⁹⁶ BBC, "Zimbabwe Profile".

²⁹⁷ Maurice T Vambe, "Zimbabwe genocide: Voices and perceptions from ordinary people in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces, 30 years on," *African Identities* 10, no. 3 (2012): 282; S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Rethinking *Chimurenga* and *Gukurahundi* in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan national History," *African Studies Review* 55, no. 3 (2012).

²⁹⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹⁹ Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008*.

recovery; however, it still suffers from, *inter alia*, widespread poverty and a lack of infrastructure.³⁰⁰

As a result of the nation's unique colonial history, Zimbabwe had the second most industrialised economy in Sub-Saharan Africa well into the 1990s³⁰¹ – unlike the other SMS in part, because of civil war in Angola and Mozambique. Yet although great strides and success were achieved in social service provision, crop yields and the growth of non-traditional exports, the economy steadily declined. Nevertheless, the Bretton Woods institutions gauged the performance of the nation during the 1980s as an indication of the possibility of Zimbabwe being the first African country that would successfully implement an ESAP. The above average economic performance of the nation as compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, coupled with multiple advanced and diversified sectors (manufacturing, agriculture and mining) gave the prospect of successful implementation.³⁰²

However, Zimbabwe failed to perform using structural adjustment. The performance of various industries and other productive and necessary sectors fluctuated, while some went into recession. Most years were typified by extreme incongruity between the target and recorded performance of the nation.³⁰³ Moreover, the state of the economy was that of one in the periphery, which provided low-skilled and labour intensive production.³⁰⁴ The Bretton Woods institutions tried to encourage the economic development of Zimbabwe through modernising the means of production with investment, technology transfers and assisting with better participation in global markets.³⁰⁵ Encouraging modernisation in the nation would have allowed for the industrialisation and modernisation of various sectors and, in turn, move the nation progressively toward the core where production required high skill and was capital intensive.³⁰⁶

As it was, initial dependency on a limited number of productive resources in the mining, agriculture and manufacturing sectors meant the state held a peripheral status,³⁰⁷ primarily providing raw

³⁰⁰ BBC, "Zimbabwe Profile".

³⁰¹ Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development & Society*: 85.

³⁰² Patrick Bond, "Who Fools the Bill? Contrasting Views on the Success of Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 170; J. Chipika et al., *Effects of Structural Adjustment in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe's Manufacturing Sector During Phase 1 of ESAP, 1991-1995* (SARIPS of SAPES Trust, Regional Office, 2000); Balleis, *A Critical Guide to ESAP: Seven Questions about the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe*.

³⁰³ Adapted from UNDP, World Bank and African Development Bank databanks.

³⁰⁴ Bond, "Who Fools the Bill? Contrasting Views on the Success of Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," 174.


³⁰⁵ Williamson encouraged privatisation and liberalisation policies to encourage investment and modernisation. See: Williamson, "Democracy and the "Washington consensus"," 1333.

³⁰⁶ Hill, "'Peripheral Capitalism', Beyond 'Dependency' and 'Modernisation'." 32.

³⁰⁷ As it is described in the World Systems Theory.

materials to core and semi-peripheral states, whilst the state itself did not realise much development.³⁰⁸ The alterations in production caused unsustainable growth in various productive sectors. The rash liberalisation of production and manufacturing sectors in a bid to encourage market competition and efficiency had a devastating effect on local businesses as they failed to keep up with the market.³⁰⁹ The cumulative impact of these policies was the further distancing of development goals the nation and the Bretton Woods institutions had set, and the ability of the nation to meet them. Eventually, in 2008 the economy collapsed and was dollarised. However, changing currency, along with the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Mugabe's ZANU-PF government, led to renewed support and confidence for investment within the state and resulted in an upturn for the recently devastated economy.³¹⁰ This shift is illustrated in Figure 3.2 by the fluctuations in GDP growth throughout this time. The Zimbabwean economy today is largely dependent on services, whilst trade is focused on agriculture and industry, as illustrated in Figure 3.6 below.

Figure 3.6: Zimbabwe main sector contribution to GDP ³¹¹



³⁰⁸ ibid., 31; J Matunhu, "A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: Critical assessment," *African Journal of History and Culture* 3, no. 5 (2011): 68.

³⁰⁹ Pédraig Carmody, "Neoclassical Practice and the Collapse of Industry in Zimbabwe: The Cases of Textiles, Clothing, and Footwear*," *Economic Geography* 74, no. 4 (1998).


³¹⁰ ADB, "Zimbabwe Report Chapter One: From Stagnation to Economic Decline," (Online: African Development Bank, 2012); John Deferios, "Zimbabwe's economy steadily growing," in *CNN International* (Online: Cable News Network, 2013); Mediel Hove, "The Debates and Impact of Sanctions: The Zimbabwean Experience," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 3, no. 5 (2012).

³¹¹ Graph created using data from the African Development Bank.

Zimbabwe largely imports fuel and capital goods – merchandise purchased for use in producing other goods and not for direct resale to consumers. The state’s main exports are tobacco (23 percent), nickel (20 percent), diamonds and platinum. Zimbabwe’s main trading partners are South Africa and China, which account on average for three quarters of the state’s cumulative trade.³¹² These two states again are the most prominent BRICS states active in SADC, showing how vital their engagement is for some states (discussed further in Chapter Four).

Although the economy has made a recovery since 2008, the government has had a fiscal deficit since 2001. This situation has affected the government’s ability to provide basic social services such as sanitation, education and sustainable improved sources of drinking water. Like the other SADC member states, Zimbabwe has high levels of poverty. Although there is almost no official government data reported to support this number, the World Bank data suggests that in 2011 people living below the national poverty line amounted to 72.3 percent.³¹³ It would seem, however, that education has not suffered as much compared to the other SADC member states, as illustrated below.

Figure 3.7: Health and education indicators for Zimbabwe³¹⁴




³¹² Data available on the World Bank Databank and the African Development Bank.

³¹³ "Zimbabwe," The World Bank, <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/ZWE>. (accessed February 4, 2016).

³¹⁴ Graph created using data from the World Bank Databank.

The various economic development challenges faced by Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are reflected by polarised levels of development within their populations and in the quality of living experienced by their people. An issue arising out of the various problems discussed above is that of extreme inequality in all of the SMS. Illustrated in Figure 3.2 are the HDI scores of the SADC member states in comparison to the SSA and global averages. Even at a glance it is clear that SSA and all SMS fall far below the global average standard. When one considers socio-economic development in the SADC member states, it is clear that the states are struggling to reach par with international development trends, as President Truman had hoped. Table 3.5 supports the indication of overall poor development illustrated by the HDI ranks in Figure 3.8. There are also inequalities that are not represented in these illustrations, the most important of which (in the opinion of the researcher) are those of gender and poverty. For example, whilst Angola and Mozambique may have growing literacy rates, there is still a skew towards male literacy in this growth. Also to be considered is the fact that although GDP per capita may seem reasonable in a developing world context, the distribution of this wealth is very uneven and there are significantly high rates of poverty in these states.

Figure 3.8: A comparison of HDI scores between 1980 and 2013³¹⁵



³¹⁵ Graph created using data from the UNDP database.

3.3.3.1 An overview of international economic engagement

For Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe at independence, the role of international engagement expanded to include not only their previous colonisers, but a variety of individual states and multi-lateral organisations. This engagement took different forms in the SMS and had varying outcomes for all of them. The common factor was the economic downturn that followed independence as a result of these engagements, as well as political factors, global financial crises and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. Adding to the challenges of development was the inheritance of largely resource-dependent economies, in which most of the infrastructure was geared towards servicing these parts of the economy. The diversification of the economies became a big challenge, which to date most SSA states struggle with. This, coupled with the pressure from Bretton Woods institutions to liberalise economies, had disastrous effects for development and the people.

Moreover, it is clear when one considers the progression of the Angolan civil war that the involvement of foreign benefactors encouraged and prolonged the political instability of the state. Throughout the civil war, foreign powers funded opposition movements, sold and traded arms, took part in illegal diamond trading and financed oil extraction with little gain for the Angolan people. These exchanges encouraged corruption on a massive scale within the government ranks as well as within the opposition UNITA forces. Most of these exchanges took place despite sanctions and clear protocols, which made such dealings illegal.³¹⁶

In Mozambique, foreign aid from other states, IGOs and NGOs became a necessary source of income. The government depended on this aid to provide much needed food and other basic necessities, owing to the collapse of the agricultural sector during the course of the war, which had until then made up the bulk of the economy and also ensured food security.³¹⁷ This provision of aid created a dependence, which to date the state has not been able to rectify. Today, Mozambique has what Hofmann has labelled an aid-based economy in which government depends on aid to form the state budget; at the end of the civil war in 1992, aid to Mozambique was equivalent to 75 percent of the GDP³¹⁸ and in 2008 it accounted for 56 percent of the state's budget.³¹⁹

³¹⁶ BBC, "Angola Profile"; Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

³¹⁷ Moran and Pitcher, "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique."

³¹⁸ Seibert, "The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique."

³¹⁹ n.a., "UN System Aid Effectiveness in Mozambique," (Maputo: UNDP, 2010).

In Zimbabwe, ESAP was implemented in efforts towards stability and development, as keeping the promises made at independence proved to be a challenge. This was the result of the various obstacles that emerged in the global economy and affected all states (i.e. not just developing states) and from the environment and within the state's own political structures. These problems included drought, the drastic and erratic changes of commodity prices and the frequent changes in ideas amongst economists on development issues.³²⁰ ESAPs also significantly contributed to debt, which is still a prominent issue for all the SMS today.³²¹ Simutanyi accurately sums up the challenges presented by structural adjustment, noting that:

Since the advent of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-inspired structural adjustment policies there has been a concern regarding sustainability of economic policy reforms. As economic reform measures hurt some groups and benefit others they produce winners and losers. The groups that were hurt by the economic measures often resisted them, leading to their suspension and cancellation.³²²

3.3.4 The environment in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

In discussions on the development of the SMS, the environment is a concern that is not commonly considered. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) the environment and its governance are integral parts of sustainable and equitable development.³²³ UNEP stresses the importance of developing economies integrating sustainable environmental practices into their economies, particularly for trade, because this approach “can help grow their economies through trade while reducing the negative environmental and social impacts of key national economic sectors”, making trade “an engine for sustainable development, social inclusion, and poverty reduction.”³²⁴ In the new millennium, the SMS' nation-level efforts towards more sustainable practices have taken the form of National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (NBSAPs) along with other MDG-related strategies.³²⁵ Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have also signed and ratified a number of environmental agreements (some of which are illustrated below). SADC has identified nine agreements it deems “necessary for successful environmental protection and

³²⁰ Best et al., *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*.

³²¹ *ibid.*

³²² Neo Simutanyi, "The politics of structural adjustment in Zambia," *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1996).

³²³ "New Study: Good Governance Of Natural Resources Essential For Post-Conflict Peacebuilding And Economic Recovery," United Nations Environment Programme, <http://unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=27074&ArticleID=36161&l=en#sthash.cComLYvc.dpuf>. (accessed May 2, 2016).

³²⁴ "Trade: an engine for sustainable development, social inclusion and poverty reduction," United Nations Environment Programme, <http://unep.org/stories/GreenEconomy/Trade-an-engine-for-sustainable-development.asp>. (accessed: April 10, 2016).

³²⁵ "Zimbabwe - Overview," Convention on Biological Diversity, <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=zw>; "Mozambique - Overview," Convention on Biological Diversity, <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=mz>; "Angola - Overview," Convention on Biological Diversity, <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=ao>.

sustainable development,”³²⁶ which are listed in Table 3.5. SADC itself has also issued a number of protocols on environmental issues such as those on fisheries and forestry, for example the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Stockholm Convention.³²⁷

Another notable convention to which Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are party is the Kyoto Protocol of 2005. Mozambique is also party to the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement, which is significant because of the importance of the timber trade for the state’s economy. These conventions have directed the environmental development agenda over the years and contributed to the NBSAPs. Through the NBSAPs the SADC member states have managed to make headway towards integrating sustainable practices for the environment and their economies, especially in relation to the MDGs, which guided a part of their agenda. All three of the selected SADC member states have shown some progress towards achieving MDG Seven and its associated outcomes. However, that being said, none of the discussed states have up-to-date reports on their achievements; Angola and Mozambique’s last reports were for 2010 and Zimbabwe’s was in 2012.³²⁸ Their known achievements are illustrated in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.4: MDG 7 performance of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

Target	Indicator	Ang.	Moz.	Zim.
7. A - Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.	Land covered by forests (% of total land area)	46.9	51	54
	Land protected to maintain biological diversity (% of total land area)	7	17.2	26.6
	Proportion of population using solid fuels (%)	54	>95	71
7. C – Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.	Proportion of population without access to an improved water source (%)	51	42.2	76.6
	Proportion of population without access to improved sanitation facilities (%)	48.9	79.6	63

Source: The UN Environment Programme Database.

³²⁶ "Conventions," Southern African Development Community, <http://www.sadc.int/issues/environment-sustainable-development/conventions/>. (accessed May 4, 2015).

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ "MDG Progress Reports - Africa," United Nations Development Programme, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdg-reports/africa-collection.html>. (accessed November 12, 2015).

At a glance, it is clear that the people living within the SADC member states are not receiving a range of basic services and needs in varying degrees of extremity. The populations have limited access to improved sources of drinking water and sanitation services – a serious health hazard that can exacerbate the spread of communicable disease, as was seen in Zimbabwe with the cholera outbreak between 2008 and 2009, which claimed the lives of 4288 people.³²⁹ In addition, as shown above, in all the states, more than 50 percent of the populations are dependent on the use of solid fuels. These are defined by the UNEP as “biomass fuels, such as wood, charcoal, crops or other agricultural waste, dung, shrubs and straw, and coal.”³³⁰ This reality is indicative of the challenge regarding electricity supply and infrastructure within the states, despite the fact that all the states have access to and infrastructure for hydro-electric power, which Neff notes could be a significant resource because of Africa’s dramatic and varying topography, and could be harnessed to enhance economic development.³³¹ In SADC, the most notable of these sites for hydro-electric power is the Zambezi River’s Kariba Dam shared by Zambia and Zimbabwe, which has not been fully exploited. Angola and Mozambique also have large coastal areas, which they could exploit.

Yet in order for the environment to be harnessed sustainably for development, UNEP highlights the importance of good governance.³³² As noted previously, for any development to be successful and sustainable, good governance is imperative.

3.4. Governance and Corruption in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

In the SMS the challenging issues of politics and governance has served to undermine development in all the three pillars of sustainability, leading to poor social development (as defined in Chapter One), with significant disparities in wealth distributions across the states’ populations. Some of these challenges are illustrated in Table 3.5. One of the most striking observations that can be made is how high GDP per capita is in Angola; however, when one considers the extreme inequality in wealth distribution in the state there is evidence of the sentiment that economic wealth does not necessarily lead to social development. The low scoring of the states on the HDI also indicates the

³²⁹ Sarah Cumberland, "An old enemy returns: the recent cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe highlights failures in the global fight against an old enemy," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 87, no. 2 (2009); n.a., "Cholera Country Profile: Zimbabwe," in *Global Task Force on Cholera Control* (Online: World Health Organisation, 2009).

³³⁰ "Population Using Solid Fuels," UN Environmental Programme, http://geodata.grid.unep.ch/mod_metadata/metadata.php. (May 2, 2016).

³³¹ *Understanding Contemporary Africa*: 14.

³³² "New Study: Good Governance Of Natural Resources Essential For Post-Conflict Peacebuilding And Economic Recovery".

poor life expectancies and adult literacy rates recorded, pointing towards poor quality of living. The problems described can be linked directly to the quality of governance present in the SMS – especially in the cases of Angola and Zimbabwe, which have not experienced a change of leadership for over 35 years. Soubbotina notes that where there is poor governance, there is a lack of social capital – organisations, norms and relationships that determine the ways in which “people interact, cooperate, and resolve their conflicts” – which should serve to encourage “trust, coordination and, cooperation at all levels.”³³³ Where this social capital is fragmented, corruption is rife and impedes development in the economy, society and the environment. Illustrated below are the CPI scores of the SMS between 2001 and 2014. On the scale from zero to 100, all the SMS have consistently reflected high levels of corruption within government, scoring less than 35 throughout the period.

Table 3.5: General socio-economic indicators for Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

		Angola	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
GDP per capita (US\$)		6127	626	1036
Life expectancy		51.9	50.3	59.9
Adult literacy (%)		71.14	58.77	86.5
HDI (out of 187)		149	178	156
FDI (US\$ million)		288	5935	400
Mobile phone penetration (%)		61	48	96
Key export		<i>Petroleum</i>	<i>Aluminium</i>	<i>Tobacco</i>
Last change of leader		1979	2015	1980
GDP % growth	2012	5.2	7.2	10.6
	2013	6.8	7.1	3.3
	2014	3.9	8.3	3.1
	2015	5.9	8.2	3.2


Source: The Africa Report, December 2014 - January 2015.

The civil war in Angola is indicative of the deep seated political challenges the state has suffered. Today, although the state is in relative peace, the fact that Jose Eduardo Dos Santos continues to

³³³ Soubbotina, *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development*.119-20.

be president is an issue of contentious debate amongst the international community. Indeed, the role of government has been distorted, resulting from the neo-patrimonial system that still exists today. It is clear that the government has failed to control corruption in order to safeguard the interests of its citizens. Similarly, although Zimbabwe did not experience a civil war, governance too became an issue of serious concern. Like in Angola, many of the problems faced by the state are related to governance issues – one of which was the much debated land redistribution programme in which the government engaged early in the 2000s. Some of the effects of poor governance have seen basic services becoming almost non-existent and widespread corruption is rife, perpetuated by a neo-patrimonial system of governance.

Figure 3.9: Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe’s CPI scores³³⁴



Van de Walle states that “at the dawn of the twenty-first century, most of sub-Saharan Africa remain[ed] mired in economic crisis despite two decades of donor-sponsored reform efforts.”³³⁵ The implementation of ESAPs and encouragement of neo-liberal policies created an exploitable situation in which states accepted such policies with no genuine interest in reform in order to access

³³⁴ Figure created using information from the Transparency International Research Database.

³³⁵ Nicholas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001):3

“policy rents”.³³⁶ The policies were largely unsuccessful and created more problems than they solved, especially because of corruption. The prevalence of clientist, neopatrimonial governments is a factor that has limited the economic development of the SMS economies, as positions of authority are perpetually understood as opportunities for access to resources for not only these individuals, but also their family and friends.³³⁷ This corruption has led to below average development in the states. The limited intervention in political or governance issues in the SMS has also facilitated these shortcomings. The predominantly unchanged and poor performance of the states on the CPI is also indicative of the lack of progression in this aspect of the state.

A lesson can be learned from the failure of ESAPs as they exposed the challenges of development in the African state. For example, farmers in Mozambique rarely saw their profits because of the middleman’s exploitation of the transportation of capital and goods. The revealing and confirmation of embedded problems can be used to create discussions on how better to solve these challenges and create ways in which the limited funding made available in these states could be directed in economies that both need short-term solutions to alleviate the challenges of the masses as well as encourage long-term growth. The dependence of many of these states on aid is another factor that can be considered to be deterring development in these states. However, the provision of this aid has assisted in providing much needed services, especially in the public sector.

The fluctuating economic performance and poor governance have also had an impact on the environment, which has been degraded in various ways to accommodate the growing and evolving needs of the people and the economy. In all the SMS, protests have taken place over the allocation of land to projects from which the people did not benefit. Land has also been cleared for mining, commercial agriculture and, in some cases, housing. The industrial impact on the environment is also a negative one, as some industrial processes pollute water sources, in states where water provision is already stretched far beyond capacity. Indeed, in many cases locals do not benefit from natural resources as they are allocated to industry and social provision is not prioritised. Some of the most important aspects of the environment for development have been noted as education, the harmonisation of the environment and economic activity and governance of the environment to support post-conflict development.³³⁸ In the 2016 book *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-*

³³⁶ Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn, *Inside African Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013), 238.

³³⁷ *ibid.*:164

³³⁸ "Education vital for healthy, productive ecosystems," United Nations Environment Programme, <http://unep.org/stories/education/Education-vital-for-healthy-productive-ecosystems.asp>. (accessed April 10, 2016). "New Study: Good Governance Of Natural Resources Essential For Post-Conflict Peacebuilding And Economic Recovery"; "Mozambique: Investing in environment Pays off for the Poorest," United Nations

Conflict Peacebuilding, it is argued that “natural resources are essential to sustaining people and peace in post-conflict countries, but governance failures often jeopardise such efforts.”³³⁹ This statement is particularly true for Angola and Mozambique, which are struggling to facilitate inclusive development in their post-conflict societies, especially in the areas of social development.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion on the political and economic inheritance of the SMS from the processes of decolonisation. This section was followed by a brief overview of the states’ histories since independence, highlighting their social and economic development since then and the contribution of international engagement to this development. This summary was followed by a concise exploration of environmental development in the states. The chapter concluded with a discussion of issues relating to governance and corruption within the SMS. Throughout the discussion it was apparent that the SMS are lagging behind in various aspects of development, despite encouraging economic performance, which has not translated to human development. Even states with great mineral wealth suffer as a result of political ineptitude. This reality highlights the importance of competent political leadership to ensure good governance. Economically, all the states are largely dependent on primary and some secondary industry for income; however, it can be noted that tertiary or service industry (service exchange or production based on knowledge) contributes significantly to all the states’ GDP.

As a result of the disharmony in the economic, political and environmental sectors, social provisions fail to be met at various levels, making poverty and a myriad of its related symptoms prevalent in the SMS. Good governance, as described by Kaufmann et al., has proven to be an elusive element necessary for development within the SMS to varying degrees. However, the engagement of the differing and arguably opposing actors in the international community has in various ways contributed to development. Today, colonial and Western powers still play a dominant role in African development, contributing a significant amount of trade, aid and investment. The emergence and dominance of China and South Africa along with the other BRICS states as supplementary and even alternative partners to traditional western engagement is an important element of the development of the SADC member states in the new millennium.

³³⁹ Environment Programme, <http://unep.org/stories/Mozambique/Investing-in-Environment.asp>; "Trade: an engine for sustainable development, social inclusion and poverty reduction". (accessed April 10, 2015).
"Governance, Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," Routledge, <https://www.routledge.com/products/9781849712354>. (accessed April , 2015).

Having explored general development trends in the SMS since their independence, it is necessary now to investigate BRICS' engagement with the SMS through trade, investment and aid. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

BRICS TRADE, INVESTMENT AND AID IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZIMBABWE

“...each of the BRICS countries works for a true partnership with Africa...Viewing Africa as the new global growth centre, BRICS countries are emerging as the new largest investors and trade partners to the continent with strong exponential growth potential for the future.” – Maite Nkoana-Mashabane³⁴⁰

4.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the SMS are noticeably underdeveloped as compared to global trends in a wide range of economic and social or quality of life issues as illustrated by the various indicators. Binns et al. suggest that the disparity between the global and African performance is indicative of the “persistent poverty” that plagues the continent.³⁴¹ They also argue that there is an urgent need for development in all aspects of the state, not just on “economic growth.”³⁴² As discussed in previous chapters, economic growth rarely, if ever, manages to address the social aspects of growth. Instead, it threatens environmental sustainability whilst creating opportunities for corruption in government. This is a view that BRICS shares with Binns et al., which is reiterated in the Delhi Declaration, the eThekweni Declaration and the Fortaleza Declaration. BRICS cite the importance of inclusive, sustainable development as paramount in their agenda for engagement with the African continent.³⁴³

As BRICS is becoming ever more influential in global finance, governance, trade and investment,³⁴⁴ it is important to consider what elements of BRICS’ engagement have resulted in development in the social, economic and environmental elements of the relevant states. This is especially true for Africa, where their presence has been a contributing factor

³⁴⁰ South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, 2013.

³⁴¹ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 314, 23, 42.

³⁴² *ibid.*, 314, 50, 53.

³⁴³ "BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration"; "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT," BRICS, <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/fifth-summit/>. (accessed February 2, 2016).; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan".

³⁴⁴ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."

to the pace of development in the new millennium.³⁴⁵ Some have stressed the importance of BRICS' relations with Africa, noting that the cooperation in various respects affords the continent a renewed chance for economic growth and sustainable development.³⁴⁶ However, Binns et al. suggest that African states may be "engaged in [the] 'neo-colonial plunder' of their resources in their desperation for economic growth, as BRIC exploit them for raw materials needed to bolster their own economies."³⁴⁷ The South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, disagrees with this assertion, arguing that these sort of views are "the result of a dogmatic application of classical notions of imperialism and the centre-periphery model of American sociologist and world-systems analyst Immanuel Wallerstein, to a situation that is fundamentally different from what these theories were trying to explain."³⁴⁸ This statement indicates the general attitude of African states towards BRICS' emergent South-South engagement and highlights the fact that the cooperative does offer an alternative approach to development than what was previously available to Africa.

Since 2009 BRICS have made efforts to clarify their agenda, reiterating the aims of sustainable global development and prosperity through cooperation,³⁴⁹ with the main drivers for this cooperation being trade, investment and aid.³⁵⁰ These efforts have taken the form of summits hosted in turn by each member state and more recently in South Africa, Brazil and Russia in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively, and regional neighbours have been invited to take part in South America, east Asia and southern Africa. It is still to be seen how the outcomes of these summits will affect global development. However, this chapter will offer a discussion on the engagement of BRICS regarding trade, aid and investment in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe since 2001.

³⁴⁵ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*.

³⁴⁶ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."

³⁴⁷ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 366.

³⁴⁸ "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation," in *Papers of the Fifth BRICS Academic Forum*, ed. Ahmed Bawa, et al. (Online: The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 2014).

³⁴⁹ "1st First Summit," BRICS, <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/first-summit/>. (accessed January 10, 2016); "2ND SECOND SUMMIT," BRICS, <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/second-summit/>. (accessed January 10, 2016); "3RD THIRD SUMMIT," BRICS, <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/third-summit/>. (accessed January 2, 2016); "4th FOURTH SUMMIT," BRICS, <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/fourth-summit/>. (accessed January 12, 2016); "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT"; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan"; "VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration".

³⁵⁰ "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation."

4.2 BRICS and Africa

BRICS have become increasingly engaged in “a wide range of development initiatives in African countries since its establishment in 2001.”³⁵¹ Although BRIC did not formalise their agenda for the African continent until 2009 at their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, the cooperative has been gradually engaged with Africa since 2001.³⁵² This is especially true for the SADC region, which has become BRICS’ biggest trade partner in Africa over the course of the new millennium.³⁵³ The successive BRICS summits have communicated the progression of the cooperative’s views, goals and agenda, which have continuously evolved to encompass the changing needs of the international community and, in particular, the prioritised emerging and developing states.³⁵⁴ In 2009 and 2010, the summits did not carry a theme; however, from 2011 the themes since then have been: *Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity* (2011), *BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity* (2012), *BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation* (2013), *Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions* (2014) and *Partnership: A powerful factor for global development* (2015).³⁵⁵

At these summits, BRICS expressed their commitment to, *inter alia*, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) framework for development, the WTO’s Doha Development Round and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) objectives. In particular, infrastructure development and industrialisation within the NEPAD framework, issues of global and regional trade barriers according to the Doha Development Round and UNCTAD strategies for technical cooperation and research on issues affecting development and trade have been prioritised.³⁵⁶ BRICS have almost mirrored and executed these UNCTAD objectives in their own engagement with African states by becoming facilitators of infrastructure development and encouraging industrialisation in various ways. This engagement will be discussed further in this chapter.

During these summits, BRICS have continued to draw attention to the flawed global economic system perpetuated by the Bretton Woods institutions (that is, poor

³⁵¹ *Africa Diversity and Development*: 367.

³⁵² "1st First Summit".

³⁵³ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*.

³⁵⁴ "1st First Summit"; "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT"; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan".

³⁵⁵ "3RD THIRD SUMMIT"; "4th FOURTH SUMMIT"; "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT"; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan"; "VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration".

³⁵⁶ "BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration"; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan".

representation of the global community and failure to provide sustainable development assistance) and how these shortcomings mostly affect the emergent and developing states negatively.³⁵⁷ These detrimental effects can be seen in the failure of their neo-liberal policies in developing states while encouraging sustainable development and the ever increasing and crippling debt in which the poorest states find themselves as a result of some of these policies, as discussed in Chapter Three. BRICS have also stressed the importance of breaking the hegemony of the post-WWII world in favour of a multipolar and multilateral one which is beneficial for all.³⁵⁸ In an attempt to bolster these efforts and make financial provision for developing and emerging states, the cooperative has formed the CAR and NDB “with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in...emerging and developing economies.”³⁵⁹ BRICS’ commitment to the African continent for the future is also shown by the BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Co-Financing Agreement for Africa, which seeks to create alternative sources for Africa to finance infrastructure projects across the continent.³⁶⁰ It is interesting to note that these approaches, themes and ideals are very similar to those suggested by China in FOCAC, which is indicative of the dominance of China in the cooperative.

Indeed, FOCAC is the most prominent agenda cited when discussing China’s engagement with Africa. It is “a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation.”³⁶¹ Tri-annual FOCAC Summits are held to discuss and reorient development plans between African high-level ministers and China. These summits (except the first), like the later BRICS summits, have had a theme. These themes were: *Carrying Out Practical Cooperation and Taking Specific Actions* (2003), *Friendship, Peace, Cooperation and Development* (2006), *Deepening the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership for Sustainable Development* (2009), *Building on Past Achievements and Opening Up New Prospects for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership* (2012) and *Africa-China Progressing Together: Win-Win*

³⁵⁷ "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan".

³⁵⁸ "1st First Summit"; "2ND SECOND SUMMIT".


³⁵⁹ "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan"; "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation."; Calderón-Zaks, "Are the BRICS a Viable Alternative to the West? A Succinct Analysis."

³⁶⁰ UNECA, "Africa–BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."; "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT".

³⁶¹ Tracy Hon et al., "Evaluating China's FOCAC commitments to Africa and mapping a way ahead," (Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 2010), 1.

Cooperation for Common Development (2015).³⁶² Hon et al. note that FOCAC “provides a unique diplomatic mechanism to promote dialogue between China and Africa, while at the same time facilitating the development of a common political and economic agenda which is intended to advance constructive South-South co-operation.”³⁶³

Figure 4.1: BRICS’ total trade with SADC (US\$ millions)³⁶⁴



As stated above, BRICS’ biggest trade partner in Africa is SADC. Since 2001, despite the global economic decline, BRICS have enjoyed, on average, positive trade growth in Africa and most certainly in SADC. As is evident in Figure 4.1, the most prominent or active of

³⁶² "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)," FOCAC, <http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm>. (accessed February 12, 2016); Fundira, "Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) Summit: An opportunity for a win-win strategic partnership"; "FORUM ON CHINA AFRICA COOPERATION," South African Institute of International Affairs, <http://www.saiia.org.za/news/focac-background-and-2015-focus-priorities>. (accessed March 1, 2016).

³⁶³ Hon et al., "Evaluating China's FOCAC commitments to Africa and mapping a way ahead."

³⁶⁴ Graph created by author from compiled data available from Hugh van Niekerk, "Synopsis - Africa-Brazil trading relationship," in *Trade Data Analysis* (Online: Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2013); "Synopsis - Africa-India trading relationship," in *Trade Data Analysis* (Online: Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2013); Viljoen, "Synopsis: Africa-South Africa trading relationship."; Brian Mureverwi, "Synopsis: China-Africa Trading Relationship," Tralac Trade Law Centre, <http://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/9174-china-africa-trading-relationship.html>. (accessed March 22, 2016).

the BRICS nations in trade in SADC is China.³⁶⁵ Bilateral trade between China and Africa has grown exponentially over the past fourteen years. In 2000 it was worth US\$10.6 billion, which escalated to US\$201.1 billion in 2014.³⁶⁶ South Africa is also a large contributor to trade in the SADC region, second only to China.³⁶⁷

The prominence of South Africa as the second largest trade partner is a notable achievement, especially if one is to consider that the state has by far the smallest economy of all the BRICS.³⁶⁸ South Africa also has an important role in this study because the state is both a member of both SADC and BRICS and thus holds a critical role for both parties. The inclusion of South Africa into BRICS also saw an increased concern over the development priorities of Africa, which is a departure from the usual status of African states as bystanders in and recipients of policy formation.³⁶⁹ The state's membership of BRICS, G20 and other multilateral organisations – including those on the African continent – is a symbol of the increasingly important role that Africa plays in the global community and the solidarity of the global South towards inclusive growth through more favourable principles for their development – that is, not dominated by neoliberal principles. Furthermore, the state's support (financial and otherwise) for the AU, NEPAD, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Southern African Customs Union speak to the efforts South Africa has made to consolidate its role as a competent regional and continental “manager”. These efforts over the course of the late 1990s and throughout the

³⁶⁵ Sumon Kumar Bhaumik and Catherine Yap Co, "China's economic cooperation related investment: An investigation of its direction and some implications for outward investment," *China Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (2011); Peter Brookes, "Into Africa: China's Grab for Influence and Oil," The Heritage Foundation; Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States," *The Heritage Foundation*, February 22 2006; Fantu, Obi and Cheru, Cyril, "Decoding China-Africa Relations: Partnership for development or '(neo) colonialism by invitation?', " *World Financial Review* (2012), <http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=858>. (accessed April 5, 2016); Martyn Davies, "How China is influencing Africa's development," *Background paper prepared for Perspectives on OECD's Global Development Report* (2010); Joshua Eisenman, "Zimbabwe: China's African Ally," *China Brief* 5, no. 15 (2011); Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 367.

³⁶⁶ "FORUM ON CHINA AFRICA COOPERATION".

³⁶⁷ Willemien Viljoen, "Synopsis: Africa-South Africa trading relationship," in *Trade Data Analysis* (Online: Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2015).

³⁶⁸ Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," *International Affairs* 89, no. 1 (2013): 115.

³⁶⁹ Shingirirai Mutanga and Thokozani Simelane, "Energy Industries as Drivers of Regional Integration: The Case of SADC," *Drivers of Regional Integration: Value Chains, Investment and New Forms of Co-operation* (Online: Economic Policy Forum (EPF) and South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2015); Christopher Wood, "Diversion and Agglomeration: Regional Dimensions of South Africa's Investment Promotion Policies," in *Drivers of Regional Integration: Value Chains, Investment and New Forms of Co-operation* (Online: Economic Policy Forum (EPF) and South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2015).

2000s earned South Africa the position of “an essential player in any international arrangements regarding continental affairs.”³⁷⁰ This position and efforts have led some to suggest that the state is a regional (SADC) and continental hegemon, intent on pursuing self-interest over inclusive development.³⁷¹

In terms of China, the state’s economic success using alternative neoliberal principles, whilst maintaining their communist stance on governance, has given many developing nations, especially those in Africa, the hope of increased development through China. This success has given hope for development through similar avenues for many African states.³⁷² The emergence of what Li, Brødsgaard and Jacobsen have dubbed the Beijing Consensus³⁷³ as an alternative neoliberal economic application (as opposed to the taxing application of the Washington Consensus by the Bretton Woods institutions) has shown an altogether altered application of neoliberal economics.³⁷⁴ The Beijing Consensus proposes ten basic principles for economic prosperity. These principles seem to address the difficulties identified in the Washington Consensus for the developing world.

Firstly, it is argued that the application of “best practices borrowed” from different policies is beneficial when attempting to grow or resuscitate an economy.³⁷⁵ This is the case because arguably it is impractical to suggest a blanket solution to every nation’s economic problems, as has been aptly illustrated through ESAPs. A combination of liberal market allowance and structured planning must also be used at the discretion of the nation. Willingness to adjust this plan in order to reach different development goals is also necessary, as market conditions and planning will not always be in harmony.³⁷⁶ These principles tackle the challenges presented by the inflexibility of ESAPs.³⁷⁷

Secondly, it is also argued that the freedom of internal policy must also be left at the discretion of that nation, with minimal intervention from the global community.³⁷⁸ This

³⁷⁰ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 114.

³⁷¹ Vickers, "Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner": 536, 550 Patrick Bond, "Sub-imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘deputy sheriff’ duty within bricks," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013).

³⁷² Englebert and Dunn, *Inside African Politics*.

³⁷³ This is an adaptation of Ramo’s initial Beijing Consensus theory. Li, Brødsgaard, and Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles," 298.

³⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 299-307.

³⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 301.

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 303.

³⁷⁷ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Centre 2004), 3-4.

³⁷⁸ Li, Brødsgaard, and Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles," 303.

principle embodies the stance of non-intervention employed by BRICS across the continent. Conditionality based on social and political issues is very limited, if not avoided completely. This non-intrusive principle allows BRICS to focus almost solely on trade and investment where they have found profitable ventures. This principle has also been forced upon the West when engaging with China, as the state is now a dominant player in the global economy. Western concerns held over China's domestic politics are now largely quietened in favour of economic engagement. Araujo and Cardenal insist that it is "a clear indication of how China's economic influence can push the political agenda to the side lines."³⁷⁹ However, some criticisms of the Beijing Consensus note the lack of sizable employment creation, deficient knowledge and skill exchange, concentration on extractive industry and lack of local economic development, amongst other shortcomings.³⁸⁰

It can however be argued that BRICS' investment in countries where conditionality by the Bretton Woods has previously hindered development has allowed these nations to implement other principles of the Beijing Consensus. Self-reliance, constant advancement of industry, indigenous innovation, and practical financial liberalisation can all be used to achieve economic prosperity "for social harmony".³⁸¹ These principles all require relatively stable economic environment in order to succeed,³⁸² and a large part of the hindrance to stabilising economies across the African continent is the availability of funding.³⁸³ The New Development Bank (NDB) poses an opportunity for a bypass of the traditional role of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF and, to some extent, the African Development Bank, as the terms of doing business will, in the view of the BRICS nations, be more favourable for the continent as compared to engaging with the Bretton Woods institutions.³⁸⁴ As BRICS have elevated their individual and collective standing to become an international economic and political force, the cooperative has seen a more than notable

³⁷⁹ Heriberto Araujo and Juan Pablo Cardenal, "China's Economic Empire," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/02/sunday-review/chinas-global-reach.html?ref=Sunday>. (accessed October 28, 2015).

³⁸⁰ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*, 45.

³⁸¹ Li, Brødsgaard, and Jacobsen, "Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles," 305-7.

³⁸² *ibid.*, 304.

³⁸³ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICs."; Collier et al., "Redesigning conditionality."; Svensson, "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality."

³⁸⁴ "5TH FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT"; "Sixth Summit: Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan"; "VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration".

growth in their influence in global trade and investment.³⁸⁵ The availability of funds in the cooperative thus also makes these nations large contributors to financial aid across the African continent, although it is apparent that the involvement of each nation varies greatly across the continent, with South Africa and China being more active than India and Brazil, and even more so than Russia, as will be explored below.³⁸⁶

However, the provision of development assistance to Africa's nations is one of contentious debate amongst the global community.³⁸⁷ The availability of funding without the conditionality can potentially be either a hindrance or accelerant to development. There are largely two camps on development aid as a means to encouraging development and boosting a recipient nation's ability to engage fully in trade. The first encourages the provision of aid for the aforementioned reasons, whilst the other argues that the continuous provision of this form of aid stunts political development by perpetuating the inherent difficulties faced by many African nations, such as corruption in government and the mismanagement of funds. This latter view supports Calderón-Zaks' assertion that although the emergent relationships and engagement of BRICS and African states pose a viable alternative to the West, African states are merely substituting the role the West played, which may have the same repercussions as North-South engagement.³⁸⁸ This dependency will likely be seen through the dependency of African states on exterior support to supplement state function. Similarly, those in favour of the continued provision of aid acknowledge the shortcomings of African states, citing the need for increased transparency in the spending of aid funds. It is clear to both sides, however, that aid is a necessity in the developing states in order to facilitate the possibility of engagement in trade and encourage FDI through projects such as the development of infrastructure.³⁸⁹ For BRICS, the tying of a specified fraction of funding to specific projects such as those for infrastructure in one way mitigates the challenges presented by the provision of financial aid, because funding

³⁸⁵ Cheng et al., "A future global economy to be built by BRICS."; Jadhav, "Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: Analysis of economic, institutional and political factor."; Schoeman, "Of BRICS and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."

³⁸⁶ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

³⁸⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸⁸ Calderón-Zaks, "Are the BRICS a Viable Alternative to the West? A Succinct Analysis."

³⁸⁹ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICS and the new Scramble for Africa."; Gammeltoft, "Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS countries."; Schoeman, "Of BRICS and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."; UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

is freed for other projects as the recipient state sees fit. However, the persistent challenge of corruption within African states poses a significant obstacle.³⁹⁰

Nevertheless, as trade has proven to be a dominant factor in the growth of developing nations across the world,³⁹¹ the BRICS cooperative have over the years sought to consolidate their partnerships in Africa through trade. This situation has resulted in trade in Africa growing to over USD 340 billion since 2012.³⁹² Yet, although the figures are very encouraging, the trade the cooperative has with African states is still largely dependent on primary commodities, i.e. mineral products, precious metals and stones and agricultural produce. These, in the case of BRICS, contribute anywhere from 54 percent to 86 percent of total trade a year.³⁹³ Much of the profits made through these exchanges benefit the investor, whether it be the state or corporations and investors from these states. This pattern has, unfortunately, led to a lag in the growth and development of African states, as their progression in both is limited by these agreements.³⁹⁴ For example, Angola continues to find it difficult to diversify its economy because the vast majority of the state's trade and investment and aid in the form of loans are dependent upon oil alone.³⁹⁵

However, in 2013, FDI became another area in which the BRICS cooperative proved to be prominent and increasingly active. China, India and Brazil contributed well over 21 percent of Africa's FDI, which is an extremely positive contributor to much of the growth being experienced across the continent.³⁹⁶ Improvements in the areas of infrastructure through

³⁹⁰ Englebert and Dunn, *Inside African Politics*.

³⁹¹ Jadhav, "Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: Analysis of economic, institutional and political factor."; Klinger, "South-South Trade a testing ground for structural transformation?."; OECD, "South-South Trade: Vital for Development," (OECD Observer, 2006).

³⁹² UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa," 7; UNCTAD, "Rethinking the role of Foreign Direct Investment," in *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Economic Development in Africa* (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2005).

³⁹³ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."; "Three Year Macro-Economic Policy & Budget Framework (STERP II)," ed. Ministry of Finance (Online: Zimbabwe Government, 2009); "Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) - Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again," (Online: Zimbabwean Government, 2009).

³⁹⁴ Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."; UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

³⁹⁵ Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*: 161-9; Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 292-3; Ron Sandrey et al., *Africa's Trade Relations: Old friends, good friends and new friends* (Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre (Tralac) and National Agricultural Marketing Council, 2015). 338, 42-3; UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa," 15, 17.

³⁹⁶ "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

project funding, political stability encouraged by non-interference, economic stability through trade, FDI and aid and the creation of an adequately educated and competent population through knowledge transfer, education and training are key components to maximising benefits of the exchanges.³⁹⁷ These other needs are addressed through BRICS' capacity building and education initiatives (as discussed later in this chapter). Their commitment to education and advancement in a wide range of social development issues discussed further below pose an opportunity for more comprehensive, fast paced development.

4.3 BRICS' engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

The following section will discuss the engagement of the BRICS with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It will follow the order of prominence by beginning with China, followed by South Africa, Brazil, India and Russia. This engagement has seen various outcomes for Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which the rest of this chapter will explore and discuss.

4.3.1 China's trade, investment and aid

Over the course of the 2000s, China's economic engagement progressively dominated all other states. This situation has drawn a significant amount of attention and accusations, by both the international community and citizens of host states, of China's alleged exploitation, stating that inappropriate practices have typified this engagement.³⁹⁸ It is undeniable that the state has been "very active in bilateral relations with SADC member states and provides development assistance in various areas."³⁹⁹ Investment by China in Africa (as well as globally) is supported by the government through the provision of financing and subsidies, which give Chinese corporations an advantage over their competitors in various markets.⁴⁰⁰ The China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) are key in the ambitions of China to become a global power, supplying finance for projects by Chinese firms in areas of particular interest and advantage – such as example infrastructure development – to make other projects in sectors of interest

³⁹⁷ ibid.; Kahn, "The fall of the Wall, the rise of the BRICs and the new Scramble for Africa."; Schoeman, "Of BRICs and mortar: the growing relations between Africa and the global south."

³⁹⁸ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*. 23-24.

³⁹⁹ Hon et al., "Evaluating China's FOCAC commitments to Africa and mapping a way ahead," 170.

⁴⁰⁰ Araujo and Cardenal, "China's Economic Empire".

(i.e. extractive industries) executable. The state also loans billions of dollars to developing states for the purchase of Chinese merchandise.⁴⁰¹

This aggressive method of expansion has, as noted above, been criticised by many, especially in the West, because of these parties' belief in conditionality for aid based on the respect for human rights, good governance and good business practices (i.e. trade law, employment standards, business ethics and social responsibility).⁴⁰² Yet, in his *Eight Principles for China's Aid to Foreign Countries*, former Premier Zhou Enlai highlighted that "in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges."⁴⁰³ Former Sierra Leone Ambassador to China Sahr Johnny sums up the welcoming stance of most African states to this relatively "easy-going" approach, saying, "We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and then they just do it... There are no benchmarks or preconditions."⁴⁰⁴ The preference of China to avoid involvement in internal politics means that their aid and assistance has been instrumental in so-called "pariah states" such as Angola and Zimbabwe, which have faced isolation, sanctions and reduction of aid from the international community and organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions.⁴⁰⁵ Strange et al. argue that the provision of this alternate aid has been beneficial as the "sudden withdrawals of 'traditional' aid no longer induce conflict in the presence of sufficient alternative funding from China."⁴⁰⁶ This situation appears to be evident in states where conflict has resulted from competition over resources and lack of social provisions.

FOCAC also highlights this new type of China-Africa strategic partnership⁴⁰⁷ in which there is dialogue and cooperation between African states and China on the immediate and

⁴⁰¹ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*.

⁴⁰² Austin M Strange et al., "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China's Development Finance and the Aid–Conflict Nexus Revisited," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2015): 3.

⁴⁰³ "China's Foreign Aid," China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/21/content_12374580_14.htm. (accessed March 1, 2016); n.a., "Premier Zhou Enlai's Three Tours of Asian and African Countries," ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online: People's Republic of China, n.d.).

⁴⁰⁴ Ali Zafar, "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, investment, and aid links," *The World Bank Research Observer* 22, no. 1 (2007): 103, 06.


⁴⁰⁵ Araujo and Cardenal, "China's Economic Empire" 1; Zhang Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," in *Global Powers and Africa Programme* (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014), 5, 15.

⁴⁰⁶ Strange et al., "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China's Development Finance and the Aid–Conflict Nexus Revisited," 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Lucy Corkin, "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," in *Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2012), 4.

long-term needs of both parties. Trade plays a significant part in this partnership. In SADC, China's trade has grown and is distinctly more diverse than that of the other BRICS members, save South Africa. Although China's exports to the region are relatively well distributed with little concentration of any one product, imports from the region are highly concentrated with the top five imports accounting for 82 percent of the total and the top twenty accounting for 96 percent. Indeed, SADC is China's most significant bloc partner in Africa. In 2013, 76 percent of the total imports from Africa originated from there and were worth approximately US\$89 million. Conversely, SADC only accounted for 32 percent of exports to Africa from the state. The significance of the bloc may be attributed to the dominance of the South African and Angolan economies on the continent. Some of China's major trade partners were South Africa (31 percent), a fellow member of the BRICS and one of Africa's largest economies, and Angola (17 percent).⁴⁰⁸ These figures not only show the popularity of the region in Africa as a market for Chinese products, but also indicate its dependence on China.

Figure 4.2: China's total trade with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (US\$ millions)⁴⁰⁹



⁴⁰⁸ Mureverwi, "Synopsis: China-Africa Trading Relationship".

⁴⁰⁹ Graph compiled using data from the UNDP Statistical Database, AEO datasets and Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 16.

Illustrated in Figure 4.2 is China's total trade with the SADC member states between 2001 and 2014. Mineral products have been a dominant import for China in the 2000s, explaining the dominance of Angola in trade, as it is the continent's second largest source of oil behind Nigeria.⁴¹⁰ Additionally, South Africa and Angola were among the top five markets for Chinese exports in 2013.⁴¹¹

China's trade with Mozambique and Zimbabwe has been notably more consistent, with gradual increases over the years. In 2013, China was the third highest source of imports and fifth most popular destination for exports for Mozambique,⁴¹² and in 2011 it was third for both source of imports and export destination for Zimbabwe.⁴¹³ China is also playing a significant role in Africa in terms of direct investments and loans. The absence of comprehensive data from both China's and African governments (as they do not regularly publish or make readily available such information), has forced many scholars to estimate how significant these loans and investments are.⁴¹⁴ Even though there is uncertainty on statistics on the topic,⁴¹⁵ in 2007 China invested and/or loaned US\$9 billion, which was significantly more than the US\$1.5 billion made available by the World Bank.⁴¹⁶ *The Financial Times* valued China's loans at US\$110 billion in the two year period from 2009 to 2010, which also dwarfed the contributions of the World Bank for that time period.⁴¹⁷ In addition, in 2009, almost half (45.7 percent) of China's foreign aid was given to Africa, which, compared to less than the two percent given by IGOs, is more than encouraging to China's aid recipients on the continent,⁴¹⁸ especially when one considers that the continent

⁴¹⁰ "Angola facts and figures".

⁴¹¹ "Synopsis: China-Africa Trading Relationship".

⁴¹² n.a., "2014 Mozambique," in *Country Fact Sheet* (Online: WESGRO Cape Town & Western Cape Research, 2014), 7.

⁴¹³ "2012 Zimbabwe," in *Country Fact Sheet* (Online: WESGRO Cape Town & Western Cape Research, 2012), 3.

⁴¹⁴ See: Davies, "How China is influencing Africa's development."; Johansein Mkwawa and Amina R. Rutaihwa, "Empirical Analysis of China-Africa Economics and Trade cooperation; for Good or Bad?," *International Journal of Research in Business and Social Sciences* (2011); Bhaumik and Co, "China's economic cooperation related investment: An investigation of its direction and some implications for outward investment."; Michael Nelson, "China's Aid Statistics," Wesleyan University, <http://mbnelson.faculty.wesleyan.edu/2011/04/24/chinas-aid-statistics/>. (accessed March 3, 2016); CEIP (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), "China's Growing Role in Africa: Myths and Facts," CEIP, <http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-myths-and-facts/9j5q>. (accessed May 20, 2013).

⁴¹⁵ David Shinn, "China's Investments in Africa," *Africa Up Close*, <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/chinas-investments-in-africa/>. (accessed March 3, 2016).

⁴¹⁶ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*. 58.

⁴¹⁷ Araujo and Cardenal, "China's Economic Empire".

⁴¹⁸ Nelson, "China's Aid Statistics"; Deborah Brautigam, "Chinese Development Aid in Africa," ed. Jane Golley and Ligang Song, *Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities* (Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press and Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2011),

has the lowest standards of living in the world.⁴¹⁹ Table 4.1 below shows the scope of direct investment and contracts between the SADC member states and China between 2001 and 2014.

In many instances, the type of engagement China has with its partners is difficult to classify as one single form of cooperation. For example, funding and loans (aid) may be made available by the Chinese government to facilitate direct investment activities, such as those shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Some Chinese investors in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2014.

COUNTRY	COMPANIES	SECTORS
ANGOLA	Sinopec, Dreal, China Railway Construction (CRC), Sinohydro, China Railway Engineering (CRE), Sinomach, China Communications Construction (CCC), Sinoma and Power Construction Corporation (PCC)	Energy, Real Estate, Agriculture, Transport, Other
MOZAMBIQUE	Wanbao Grain, CNPC, Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (AFEC), MCC, Henan Guoju, CCC, State Construction Engineering (SCE), Sinomach	Agriculture, Energy, Metals, Utilities, Real Estate, Transport
ZIMBABWE	Zhenfa New Energy Science, Sinosteel, Yunnan Investment, AFEC, Sinohydro, Sinomach, China Jiangsu Int'l, PCC, CRC, Chint	Agriculture, Energy, Real Estate, Metals, Transport

Source: American Enterprise Institute.

These engagements have facilitated and helped to bolster development in various ways in each country. One of the most important avenues in which this has had an impact is in the development of infrastructure in various capacities according to the needs of different states.⁴²⁰ It is clear that the high demand for natural resources such as forest products, water,

<http://www.oopen.org/download?type=document&docid=459495#page=227>. (accessed November 6, 2015); Strange et al., "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China's Development Finance and the Aid–Conflict Nexus Revisited."

⁴¹⁹ Kathleen Beegle et al., "Poverty in a Rising Africa, Africa Poverty Report," in *Overview* (Washington: World Bank, 2016), v.

⁴²⁰ Strange et al., "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows China's Development Finance and the Aid–Conflict Nexus Revisited."

land, diamonds, minerals and gas for China's manufacturing and industrial sectors is driving this aggressive expansion.⁴²¹ Some of the more significant and telling engagements between China and the individual case studies will be discussed below.

4.3.1.1. China in Angola

Since the end of the civil war in 2002, the Angolan government has found it difficult to diversify its economy from its almost purely extractive state. Although the state continues to make efforts to bolster the industrial and agricultural sectors, the productivity of oil and diamond extraction has led to the majority of focus being on these areas (as noted in Chapter Three).⁴²² The instability of the state in the years following 2002 led to the deterioration of relations between the state and Western donors and Bretton Woods institutions, which refused to extend any further significant financial assistance. This situation led the state to broaden its horizons and forge alternative partnerships and deals, the most significant of which was with China.⁴²³ By 2011, loans from China's Exim Bank were estimated to be almost US\$10.5 billion.⁴²⁴ The political relationship between the two states has thrived since then, which is evidenced by several high level official visits being made between the states and the bilateral agreements that have been signed.⁴²⁵

In 2006, Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, visited Angola and left having brokered a deal for US\$9 million to be used for infrastructure development in exchange for oil. The Angolan Minister of Petroleum, Jose Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos, has said that China has a proactive role in the development of the economy, particularly in the sectors of agriculture, construction and energy.⁴²⁶ However, not all in Angola share this optimistic outlook, with some citizens arguing that "the agreements with China are a benefit for them and the president and not for us".⁴²⁷ This statement supports the notion that the partnership with China is not a welcome one for all citizens because many do not benefit from it. This statement is also indicative of the perception of corruption within the Angolan government

⁴²¹ Sigfrido Burgos and Sophal Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China* 21, no. 74 (2012): 359.

⁴²² *ibid.*; n.a., "Angola: The oil-barrel blues."; Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*.

⁴²³ Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 6; Corkin, "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," 4.

⁴²⁴ "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," 2.

⁴²⁵ Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 15.

⁴²⁶ Burgos and Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," 358.

⁴²⁷ Joe Brock and Herculano Coroado, "Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-china-insight-idUSKCN0PJ1LT20150709>. (accessed April 15, 2016).

and the mistrust it fosters amongst the citizens. This mistrust is nurtured by the government's failure to communicate with its citizens. For example, in 2015 after a state visit to China, dos Santos "kept the details of the latest deals secret and stressed the 'cooperation' and 'mutual benefits' from his Beijing visit," whilst "Premier Xi Jinping hinted at a much more lopsided relationship, saying he had agreed to 'assist' Angola."⁴²⁸

Nevertheless, there are largely two key areas to China's engagement in Angola, namely, oil trade and infrastructure development. The two states have formed what could be considered a mutually beneficial relationship in which China provides funding, technical expertise for development projects and investment to bolster the economy, whilst Angola provides raw materials, predominantly the oil (Angola provides about a quarter of China's oil and is the second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia)⁴²⁹ needed by China to fuel its industrial and economic growth.⁴³⁰ On one hand, in 2012 Angola's imports from China were diverse, consisting of a variety of exports;⁴³¹ on the other, in the same year, state-owned Sonangol provided 200,000 barrels of oil daily to China on behalf of the government.⁴³² Although China is now the state's largest trade partner, this could be detrimental to sustainable development as on average more than 99 percent of exports include crude oil.⁴³³ This agreement is unsustainable for both the economy and the environment, as Angola's oil is finite and there is no significant effort being made to diversify the state's economy.⁴³⁴ This situation is especially of concern when one considers that Angola's oil accounts for 46 percent of its GDP and 80 percent of government revenues. It is detrimental to any efforts the state may make towards sustainability of the economy, because only one sector of one industry is being developed whilst the rest are neglected as they are not as profitable. This approach has already proved to be a problem in "rentier" states such as Angola because of the volatility of primary resource markets, which are easily destabilised by market prices and other monetary fluctuations. These

⁴²⁸ *ibid.*

⁴²⁹ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries.*

⁴³⁰ Burgos and Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," 352.

⁴³¹ Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 15.

⁴³² Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries.*

⁴³³ Mureverwi, "Synopsis: China-Africa Trading Relationship" 2.

⁴³⁴ "Angola: 2007 Article IV Consultation Staff Report," in *IMF Staff Country Reports* (Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 2007), 9.

changes have led in particular to challenges for government budget deficits as these budgets are primarily made on predictions and estimations of income from these resources.⁴³⁵

From their side, China has been heavily involved in the development of infrastructure in Angola since 2004 with an initial US\$2 billion line of credit.⁴³⁶ The relationships Angola has formed with states such as China where services are bartered for resources has come to be known as “Angola mode”.⁴³⁷ These relationships are important because in the aftermath of the civil war the government has made reconstruction and development a priority.⁴³⁸ Benazeraf and Alves note that, “Although this funding formula is not unique to China, the Chinese model is distinct in that it encapsulates a 100 percent state financial circuit (from the lending institution and contractors to the off-taker).”⁴³⁹ This approach is unique as China is able to provide multi-faceted and complete planning strategies as part of their cooperation in which funding and expertise are sourced or provided by the state. Some of these projects have seen the creation of entire new cities such as Kilamba Kiaxi, the general hospital in Luanda and many road and rail works through Chinese funding.⁴⁴⁰

This relationship has not been without its share of challenges, however. Some issues arising from these arrangements include the fact that close to 70 percent of the project⁴⁴¹ must be taken on by Chinese companies and are paid for in China directly to these organisations. This agreement has made it difficult for the Angolan government to control engagement and has resulted in some doubts and concerns being expressed regarding the quality of projects by Chinese companies.⁴⁴² For example, concerns have been raised about the Luanda General Hospital in the capital gifted to Angola by China in 2005.⁴⁴³ Just five years later in 2010 there was an emergency evacuation of the hospital, owing to fears of collapse because of the compromised structural integrity of the building as a result of it being built on land with a high water table.⁴⁴⁴ It has been argued by some that the “infrastructures built

⁴³⁵ n.a., "Primary Commodity Booms and Busts: Emerging Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa," (Addis Ababa: UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, 2016), 12-14.

⁴³⁶ Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 6.

⁴³⁷ *ibid.*, 15.

⁴³⁸ Burgos and Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," 358.

⁴³⁹ An off-taker may manage the purchase or sale of parts of a project after completion. See: David Benazeraf and Ana Alves, "'Oil for Housing': Chinese-built New Towns in Angola," in *Global Powers and Africa Programme* (SAIIA, 2014), 2.

⁴⁴⁰ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*; Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 17.

⁴⁴¹ "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 15.

⁴⁴² See: Benazeraf and Alves, "'Oil for Housing': Chinese-built New Towns in Angola."

⁴⁴³ Yezi et al., *Win win partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive Industries*. 61.

⁴⁴⁴ Corkin, "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," 11.

by Chinese firms are of good quality, low cost, and oftentimes completed in less than half the time that such projects would usually take in Angola.”⁴⁴⁵ However, these latter characteristics of Chinese construction have also been cited by a local NGO director as the root causes of their inferiority. Corking notes that “the overriding perception is that Chinese companies have been employed to construct infrastructure quickly and cheaply.”⁴⁴⁶

Another example can be seen in some of the Chinese “oil for housing” *nova cidades* (new cities) built in Angola since the mid-2000s, the most prominent of which are Kilamba Kiaxi, Cacuaco, Zango, Km 44 and Capari, in the radius of the capital city of Luanda. Since its completion in 2011, Kilamba Kiaxi has been the most prominent in discussions of the beneficence and long term sustainability of the Chinese funded housing projects in Angola. The city was labelled a “ghost town” by international media because few locals were able to afford the units (up to US\$125 thousand for the smallest unit) set by the private company Delta Imobiliaria, which is managing distribution. Various other issues pertaining to how the properties were distributed also arose, which fuelled allegations of nepotism; Buire notes the use of the project for civil servant “bonuses” as the most prominent accusation. Following protests, dos Santos, declared a “state-backed mortgage scheme open to all Angolans” in 2013.⁴⁴⁷ However, other underlying issues are present within the housing projects in Angola that are noted by the president of Kilamba Kiaxi’s administrative president, Joaquim Israel Marques: the planning of these projects does not accommodate the Angolan context. According to Marques, these Chinese construction plans are out of context for many locales, especially those in rural areas such as Malange and Huila in which many people may be uncomfortable with the concept of living in multi-storey housing. The provision of various public services, such as dependable power and water supply, are also an issue.⁴⁴⁸

Infrastructure Development in Angola

China is clearly playing a large role in Angola’s infrastructure development through a number of multi-national corporations (MNCs) such as the China International Fund Ltd

⁴⁴⁵ Burgos and Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," 358.

⁴⁴⁶ Corkin, "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," 11.

⁴⁴⁷ Chloé Buire, "Views of suburban Luanda: banishing the ghosts from Kilamba," Africa Research Institute, <http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/blog/views-of-suburban-luanda-banishing-the-ghosts-from-kilamba/>. (accessed November 18, 2015); Louise Redvers, "Angola's Chinese-built ghost town," BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18646243> (November 18 215); Benazeraf and Alves, "'Oil for Housing': Chinese-built New Towns in Angola."

⁴⁴⁸ "'Oil for Housing': Chinese-built New Towns in Angola," 3.

(CIF) and Golden Nest International (GNI), which will be discussed in this section. CIF is based in China and in 2005 became a part of Angola's economic and political scene. It is owned by a combination of international development companies as well as the Sonangol Research and Production Company. The organisation has played a significant role in the design and implementation of infrastructure projects in conjunction with the Angolan National Reconstruction Office, which coordinates the government's plans for social reconstruction in post-civil war Angola.

Table 4.2: CIF's infrastructure and development projects

PROJECT	YEAR	OUTCOME
Public Housing	2006	Constructed 215 500 units for public housing in various provinces but mostly in Luanda.
Public Utilities	Ongoing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Upgrade of Luanda drainage and water supply - Reconstruction of the main drainage and water supply in Senado da Câmara, Rio Seco, Surcoa and Cazenga - Repair of six main roads in Luanda - Re-planning and reconstruction of infrastructure in Precol, Cazenga-Cariango and Nelito Maiamga
Highway	Ongoing	<p>The reconstruction of three major highways linking major cities and ports:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Luanda to Lobito, 497.5km connecting Angola's biggest ports - Malanje to Saurimo, Luena to Saurimo and Dundo to Saurimo, totalling 1107km
Railway	2011 2012 2013	Reconstruction of Luanda, Benguela and Moçamedes railways and repair and construction of depots
Aviation	Ongoing	Construction of the "largest airport in Africa": the New International Airport of Luanda
Water and Hydro-electric Power	Ongoing	<p>Improvements on 'mother river of Angola' the Kwanza River</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Irrigation projects - Hydro-electric power project
Industrial Zone	Ongoing	Factories producing sand, bricks, corrugated sheeting and other building resources
Logistics Centres		Logistics bases in Luanda, Benguela and Namibe
National Administration Complex	Ongoing	<p>New National Administration Complex</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Presidential palace - Parliament house - Supreme courts - Ministry offices - Conference centre - Museums
New City	Ongoing	Rebuilding and upgrading Luanda, the state capital

Source: China International Fund Ltd.

The organisation is directly accountable to President dos Santos,⁴⁴⁹ which presents a challenge for the accountability and transparency of the organisation. The direct accountability to dos Santos hints at neopatrimonial, kleptocratic and clientist behaviours. Regardless, the CIF has been involved in ten national reconstruction and infrastructure projects that have had a significant impact on development in the state. These projects include housing, roads, railways and hydro-electric power. The projects indicated in Table 4.2 are indicative of the widespread involvement of CIF in development in Angola since 2005.

It is worth noting that there is a bias towards the development of Luanda, the state capital, which features in eight of the ten projects listed in the above table. There are vast areas inland that experienced minimal development during the colonial era, and what was built was mostly destroyed by the decades of civil war that followed independence. This issue must be addressed in order for the development efforts to benefit the Angolan people.

Another Chinese company which is very active in Angola is Golden Nest International. According to their website, they have been involved in “large-scale construction operations” since 2000,⁴⁵⁰ listed in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3: Golden Nest International projects in Angola

Date	Project
2000	Angolan National TV Station Healthcare Centre
2003	One thousand houses (first in forty years with plumbing, electricity and roads)
2003	Four primary schools funded by Japan
2005	Project started with Department of Education (eleven colleges built in Luanda, Malanri and Bengema) funded by China
2005	Waste Power Station Project started

Source: Golden Nest International.

Golden Nest International also have five separate factories producing steel, concrete blocks, sand products, paint and alnico in Angola.⁴⁵¹ The combination of organisations like CIF

⁴⁴⁹ Burgos and Ear, "China's Oil Hunger in Angola: history and perspective," 362. ; n.a., "CIF SPACE VIII (Feb 2012)," in *Company Publications* (Online: China International Fund Ltd, 2012), 13.

⁴⁵⁰ "Brief Introduction of Golden Nest," Golden Nest International <http://www.goldennest.cn/index.php/english/view/id/2442>. (March 3, 2016).

⁴⁵¹ Corkin, "Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Social Responsibility Perspective," 7.

and Golden Nest International has made construction projects much easier and cheaper as they manufacture and locally distribute the materials required for their projects. However, their presence has also monopolised the market as they are able to produce higher volumes and offer better prices than local businesses. This is unsustainable in many ways, but largely because the local industry is flooded by Chinese business and does not allow for local competition.⁴⁵²

4.3.1.2 China in Mozambique

Mozambique is also a beneficiary of the generous credit lines and investment provided by China; however, the high rates of crime, riots and poor infrastructure are hindering their expansion.⁴⁵³ It would seem that despite the fact that the civil war ended in 1992, the Mozambican government has not focused much on infrastructure development until more recently in the new millennium. However, this delay may also be the result of the floods and the large scale destruction that resulted from Cyclone Eline in February 2000.⁴⁵⁴ The state's infrastructure development is an area in which China has also become heavily involved, offering assistance and cooperation. Between 2012 and 2014, funding increased by 160 percent and a number of investment deals were negotiated.⁴⁵⁵ In 2012 Mozambique received loans amounting to US\$1.15 billion, some of which were aimed at building a number of infrastructure projects, including (amongst others) a Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, Maputo International Airport, the China Investment and Trade Promotion Centre and a low income residential building. In 2013 China committed to further develop bilateral cooperation for the construction of infrastructure in agriculture, energy and innovation.⁴⁵⁶ Finance is another sector in which China has been increasingly active in the state, in

⁴⁵² Kingsley Ighobor, "China in the heart of Africa: Opportunities and pitfalls in a rapidly expanding relationship," *Africa Renewal*, no. January (2013), <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa>. (accessed January 6, 2016).

⁴⁵³ David H. Shinn, "China's involvement in Mozambique," *International Policy Digest*, <http://intpolicydigest.org/2012/08/02/chinas-involvement-in-mozambique/>. (accessed January 18, 2016).

⁴⁵⁴ "Mozambique: How disaster unfolded".

⁴⁵⁵ "Chinese financing to Mozambique increases 160 pct in 2 years," Macau Hub, <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2015/07/27/chinese-financing-to-mozambique-increases-160-pct-in-2-years/>. (accessed January 12, 2016).

⁴⁵⁶ Jinyan Zhou and Wenping He, "Chinese Cooperation in Mozambique and Angola: A Focus on Agriculture and Health," in *South-South Cooperation* (Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center, 2014), 10.

particular through MNCs such as Geocapital, which are providing support for investment in Mozambique⁴⁵⁷ in a similar way to CIF in Angola.

Alden and Chichava, Brautigam, and Ekman and Robinson note that there have been various challenges to China's engagement with Mozambique linked to the poor capacity of the state. These largely have to do with infrastructure development, local disapproval of activities linked to projects such as land distribution and deforestation and the poor capacity of the locals in terms of education and training. These challenges, however, have not significantly impeded cooperation.⁴⁵⁸ Loro Horta, an expert on Sino-Lusophone Africa relations, has observed that "China is fast emerging as the most important economic and diplomatic player in Mozambique, bringing billions of dollars in investments and asking no questions."⁴⁵⁹ This view can also be equated to the relationship China shares with Angola given its standing in global politics and economic relations. Similar to other cases of engagement and cooperation China has had in the other African states, some concerns have been raised over the sustainability and responsibility of these engagements in Mozambique. These will be discussed below.

Development cooperation in Mozambique

One of the more significant elements of China's engagement with Mozambique is in agriculture, which they have identified as one of the main areas in which they will boost cooperation to assist the state with food security. Yet in recent years the misgivings of China's engagement have been largely linked to the agricultural and forestry industry. For example, the forestry industry, which received 67 percent of agricultural FDI between the years 2000 and 2010,⁴⁶⁰ has raised an alarm as a result of the illegal timber exports from the country.⁴⁶¹ Another example is a natural gas project in the Afungi Peninsula that has led to the forced resettlement of entire villages to make way for the project, resulting in disgruntlement in local communities, largely because they have not been adequately

⁴⁵⁷ Sérgio Chichava, "Xai-Xai Chinese rice farm and Mozambican internal political dynamics: A complex relation," *Occasional Paper* 2(2013): 4.

⁴⁵⁸ Chris Alden and Sérgio Inacio Chichava, "China and Mozambique: from comrades to capitalists," (2014).

⁴⁵⁹ Shinn, "China's involvement in Mozambique".

⁴⁶⁰ Chichava, "Xai-Xai Chinese rice farm and Mozambican internal political dynamics: A complex relation," 8.

⁴⁶¹ Sigrid-Marianella Stensrud Ekman, Huang Wenbin, and Ercilio Langa, *Chinese trade and investment in the Mozambican timber industry: a case study from Cabo Delgado Province*, vol. 122, China-Africa Forest Governance Project (Online: CIFOR, 2013). vii; Bo Li and Yaxin Yan, "How Does China's Growing Overseas Investment Affect Africa's Forests? 5 Things to Know," World Resources Institute, <http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/02/how-does-china%E2%80%99s-growing-overseas-investment-affect-africa%E2%80%99s-forests-5-things-know>. (accessed March 3, 2016).

compensated.⁴⁶² The Mozambique National Peasants Union (UNAC) in 2013 expressed its concerns over the decreasing land available to local farmers as a result of the government leasing some land already in use by locals “to foreign agribusinesses” despite the availability of an estimated 13 million hectares of suitable land.⁴⁶³ This style of antagonistic expansion can also be seen in the forestry sector where Chinese Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are exceptionally active. Their activities would seem to suggest that there is some accuracy in Binns et al.’s assertions that some African states are suffering a neo-colonial plunder of their resources.

The timber industry

In 1998 the Chinese government enforced a logging ban domestically, which made it impossible for the state to satisfy the growing and high demand for timber locally. This ban saw an exponential increase in China’s import of African timber and investment in the sector in over 25 African countries, mostly in SMEs, resulting in an average of three quarters of the continent’s timber being exported to China every year.⁴⁶⁴ The timber industry has been one of the focal points in discussions of China’s engagement with Mozambique, largely due to illegal exports and corrupt administration. There has been “evidence of how China’s insatiable demand for timber is directly driving increased illegal logging and timber smuggling in Mozambique.”⁴⁶⁵ Hubert notes that this increase was simultaneous with Chinese demand for Mozambican timber, with more than 80 percent of timber exports destined for China.⁴⁶⁶ It is also notable that in 2012, 48 percent of China’s timber exports from Mozambique were illegally felled and smuggled out of the country.⁴⁶⁷ The illegal logging has led to large scale deforestation; the Environmental Investigation

⁴⁶² Celine Salcedo-La Viña, "Q&A with Alda Salomao: Natural Gas Project Threatens Community Land in Mozambique," World Resources Institute, <http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/03/qa-alda-salomao-natural-gas-project-threatens-community-land-mozambique>. (accessed March 4, 2016).

⁴⁶³ William Mapote, "Mozambican Farmers Fear Foreign Land Grabs," Inter Press Service, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/mozambican-farmers-fear-foreign-land-grabs/>. (accessed October 12, 2015).

⁴⁶⁴ Li and Yan, "How Does China's Growing Overseas Investment Affect Africa's Forests? 5 Things to Know"; n.a., "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests," (London: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), 2014), 2.

⁴⁶⁵ "First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique," (London: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), 2013), 1.

⁴⁶⁶ Thomas Hubert, "Surge in Chinese demand exposes cracks in Mozambique forest policy," CIFOR, <http://blog.cifor.org/22055/surge-in-chinese-demand-exposes-cracks-in-mozambique-forest-policy?fnl=en>. (accessed January 15, 2016).

⁴⁶⁷ n.a., "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests," 5.

Agency (EIA) has projected that this logging is likely to strip Mozambique's forests in the very near future, as it is not being carried out sustainably.⁴⁶⁸

Through their investigations and as reported in their 2013 and 2014 reports on timber trade in Mozambique, the EIA found that 90 percent of timber exports to China consisted of only five protected species of timber, namely Chanfuta, Jambirre, Mondzo, Pau Ferro and Umbila, which are classified as "first class" despite there being legislation enacted in 1999 and Decree No 12/2002 Regulation of Wildlife and Forest Law of 2002 that bans their export. The aim of this legislation was to encourage local job creation and skills transfer through domestic timber processing.⁴⁶⁹ However, challenges in this area persist, including a lack of infrastructure (timber processing industry), a lack of trained personnel such as forest engineers and irregularities in taxing and record keeping.⁴⁷⁰

Table 4.4: The top six Chinese timber traders in Mozambique

Company Base	Province(s) and size of concession(s)	Type(s) of timber	Containers exported/year	Crime(s)
Mozambique First National Development (MOFID) <i>Pemba</i>	Cabo Delgado, Niassa <i>One million hectares</i>	Chanfuta, Chanete, Mondzo, Pau Ferro	+/- 2400	Smuggling Bribery Collusion with member of govt.
Senlian Corporation <i>Pemba</i>	Cabo Delgado, Niassa <i>60 000 hectares</i>	Mondzo, Pau Ferro, Wenge	+/- 800	Smuggling Bribery Collusion with member of govt.
Fan Shi Timber <i>Beira</i>	<i>None</i>	Chanate, Mondzo, Pau Ferro, Umbila	+/- 3000 to 4000	Smuggling Bribery
Pingos Marinah <i>Pemba</i>	Cabo Delgado <i>Not specified</i>	Umbila, Wenge	+/- 1000	Smuggling Bribery
Verdura Ida <i>Quelimane, Beira, Nacala</i>	-	Chanate, Mondzo, Pau Ferro	+/- 2000	Smuggling Bribery
Tsou Family Companies <i>Manica, Nampula</i>	-	-	-	Smuggling Bribery

Source: The Environmental Investigation Agency.

⁴⁶⁸ Andrea Dijkstra, "Mozambique will be stripped of its forests 'in just a few years'," Mail & Guardian <http://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-19-moz-will-be-stripped-of-its-forests-in-just-a-few-years>. (January 6, 2016).

⁴⁶⁹ n.a., "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombe Forests," 3, 5, 6.

⁴⁷⁰ "First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique," 6.

Listed below are six Chinese SMEs guilty of flouting forestry bans amongst other laws. Two have admitted to deliberately disregarding the law, citing the ease of evading justice either because of political patronage or the ability to bribe officials as reasons for their doing so. These are activities that a number of Chinese companies have been caught engaging in,⁴⁷¹ indicating that the logging bans and other legislation have proved ineffectual in curbing their illegal activities.

The issue of corruption within the Mozambican government in this discussion cannot be overlooked. It clearly indicates the importance of good governance to sustainable development. In two cases – those of MOFID and Senlian Corporation (a subsidiary of Chinese SOE Shanghai Senlian Timber Industrial Development Co. Ltd) – government officials were directly involved in aiding unregulated mass felling, assisting in evading the law and facilitating the export of illegal “first class” timber. In these cases, the current Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, Jose Pacheco, has been involved with MOFID since 2000 during his tenure as Governor of Cabo Delgado Province, where MOFID is based, and has assisted in securing the vast forest concessions for the company. Former Minister of Agriculture and Member of Parliament Tomas Mandlate was inappropriately involved with Senlian Corporation as a shareholder and wage recipient. He was also identified as the chairman of a company in the Port of Nacala that has storage facilities and offers transport and customs services for exporters.⁴⁷² He was forced to resign in 2013 as a result of the Public Probity Law, which “bars all holders of public office from receiving wages or fees from other public institutions or companies.”⁴⁷³

Despite some measures taken to curb corruption, such as the customs inspection of all exports introduced in 2011, all seven companies freely admitted to bribing government officials to allow them freedom to export banned timber. The smugglers also employed a number of techniques to hide the timber, such as hiding the banned wood behind legal wood and “processing” banned wood by partially stripping the trunk and registering the cargo as finished product.⁴⁷⁴ The prevalence of corruption from the upper to lower levels of

⁴⁷¹ Please see: *ibid.*; “First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests.”

⁴⁷² “First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique,” 7-8.

⁴⁷³ “Mozambique: Deputies Affected By Public Probity Law Resign,” All Africa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303121343.html>. (accessed March 5, 2016).

⁴⁷⁴ “First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique,” 7-10.

government are also indicated in the various and repeated offences most of the companies listed above have committed, that is,

- In 2007 47 containers belonging to MOFID were seized by officials at the Port of Pemba.
- In 2009 four Chinese companies including MOFID were caught and fined attempting to smuggle banned timber.
- In 2011 MOFID, Senlian Corporation and three other Chinese companies were caught smuggling 161 containers of banned timber after having successfully loading their cargo onto the ship Kota Mawar.

These crimes were not punished to the full extent of the law despite clear penalties being set out by the 1999 Forest and Wildlife Law in Article 44 of the enactment and the Forestry and Wildlife Regulations of 2002 and 2011.⁴⁷⁵ These companies have been at most fined or had their license suspended (not revoked), as was the case for MOFID; however even this has done little to halt their operations, as there are illegal channels for them to exploit, including smuggling through alternate routes or ports and bribery for continued operations.⁴⁷⁶ What is also concerning is the conspicuous law breaking of a SOE like Senlian Corporation without any perceivable reaction from China.

There has been little communicated cooperation between the governments regarding the challenges of timber logging in Mozambique. The first, to which is commonly referred, is the yet to be signed Memorandum of Understanding for the forestry sector between the two states, for which negotiations began in 2011. The second is a programme for the training of both the Chinese investors and Mozambican forestry administration on State Forestry Administration rules and on the promotion of sustainable forest management.⁴⁷⁷ Hubert notes that the dysfunctional relationship between forestry policy in the state and “Chinese business practices” is one that exposes the problem of timber logging “concessions without management”, citing the lack of accountability and regulation in the industry despite the introduction of laws to curb unsustainable practices.⁴⁷⁸ This account is supported by the fact that between 2007 and 2012, the discrepancy between official government statistics on

⁴⁷⁵ Maria Muianga and Duncan Macqueen, "Exploring options to improve practice for Africa's largest exporter of timber to China," in *China- Africa Forest Governance Project* (London International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 2015), 2.

⁴⁷⁶ n.a., "First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique," 11.

⁴⁷⁷ Muianga and Macqueen, "Exploring options to improve practice for Africa's largest exporter of timber to China," 2.

⁴⁷⁸ Hubert, "Surge in Chinese demand exposes cracks in Mozambique forest policy".

timber trade were incongruous, with a difference of 707,025 cubic meters of timber.⁴⁷⁹ The vast illegal logging and smuggling has lost the Mozambican government millions of dollars. In 2012 alone the amount lost to uncollected taxes was estimated to be US\$30 million, without considering other income from the “first class” timber.⁴⁸⁰

The agricultural sector

It is evident that the timber industry has presented a number of problems in Sino-Mozambique relations. However, not all Chinese engagement has been marred by as many challenges as those presented by Chinese investors in timber. National level projects such as those in agricultural technology exchange and cooperation have been somewhat successful. An example can be seen in the agriculture technology demonstration centres (ATDCs) and booming rice farming industry.⁴⁸¹ The ATDCs have been a prominent element of China’s cooperation. The first of these was the *Centro de Investigação e Transferencia de Tecnologia Agrárias do Umbelúzi* (CITTAU) in Boane District built upon fifty two hectares of land ceded by the Agrarian Research Institute of Umbelúzi for the project. Former President Armando Guebuza saw CITTAU as a crucial mechanism with which to combat the state’s food security and poverty issues. It was officially opened in July 2011 and by 2013 there were fourteen ATDCs in other locations in Mozambique. Research is conducted at the CITTAU on adapting Chinese seed varieties and livestock for profitable production in Mozambique, despite the insistence for the testing of local variants by the government. This irregularity may indicate a challenge for local government in claiming ownership or authority over Chinese funded projects once they are completed, probably because they have contributed little to their initial development.

The ATDC also serves as training centre for local producers and agricultural experts by providing instruction “on vegetable production, agricultural machinery operation, animal nutrition, rice and maize production, processing and management.”⁴⁸² In 2014 the Boane ATDC also introduced alternative energy training in biogas production using animal and

⁴⁷⁹ n.a., "First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique," 4-5.

⁴⁸⁰ "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests."

⁴⁸¹ See: Chichava, "Xai-Xai Chinese rice farm and Mozambican internal political dynamics: A complex relation."

⁴⁸² S. Chichava and N.N. Fingerhann, "Chinese and Brazilian agricultural models in Mozambique. The case of the Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre and of the Brazilian ProALIMENTOS programme," *Working Paper-Future Agricultures*, no. 112 (2015): 3-5.

organic waste.⁴⁸³ Some of the challenges with this project will be discussed further on in the chapter, in the section on Brazil's agricultural engagement and cooperation.

4.3.1.3. China in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has had a great deal of engagement with China since the turn of the century. Their relationship has been instrumental in influencing Zimbabwe's development in various arenas. In 2003, Zimbabwe began the "Look East" policy, arguably encouraged by Western sanctions instituted against Zimbabwe in response to the government's land reform programme. When coupled with China's FOCAC policies, this has created an alternative development path for the state.⁴⁸⁴ Their engagement has largely taken the form of "development co-operation through China's provision of aid and concessionary loans."⁴⁸⁵ The extent of this relationship can be seen in the increasingly larger role China plays in Zimbabwe. Between 2005 and 2013, China accounted for 82 percent of FDI,⁴⁸⁶ in 2014 bilateral trade peaked at US\$1.24 billion⁴⁸⁷ and aid between 2004 and 2013 added up to US\$103 million.⁴⁸⁸

China has thus become one of Zimbabwe's main trade partners (third behind South Africa and the European Union) in a variety of commodities, largely in the agricultural and mining sectors.⁴⁸⁹ As is the norm with China in Africa, trade has been dominated by the export of cash crops and minerals, while imports are largely manufactured goods. In 2014, machinery and high tech products made up 77 percent of imports, while tobacco, high carbon ferrochrome, nickel ore and concentrate and cotton made up 97 percent of exports.⁴⁹⁰ It should be noted, however, that unlike other engagements China has with African states, Zimbabwe has a trade surplus with China.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," 8. Gregor Aisch, Josh Keller, and K.K Rebecca Lai, "The World According to China," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/business/international/the-world-according-to-china-investment-maps.html>. (accessed February 2, 2016).

⁴⁸⁵ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," 7, 8.

⁴⁸⁶ Aisch, Keller, and Lai, "The World According to China".

⁴⁸⁷ n.a., "Bilateral Trade ", ed. Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office in Zimbabwe, Bilateral Cooperation (Online: Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2015).

⁴⁸⁸ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," 15, 19.

⁴⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 14-15.

⁴⁹⁰ n.a., "Bilateral Trade "; "Spreadsheet: China-Africa Trading Relationship ", ed. Tralac Trade Law Centre, China-Africa Trading Relationship (Online: Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2016).

⁴⁹¹ "Bilateral Trade ".

Cooperation between the states has also taken the form of bilateral economic and technical cooperation agreements such as that signed in February 2004. This agreement was aimed at helping the tobacco industry, which had suffered as a result of the land reform programme. The agreement aimed at increasing tobacco output capacity ten-fold from 80,000 tonnes to 800,000 tonnes annually. This agreement showed the ambition of the Zimbabwean government and its trust in the capacity of China to provide technical assistance. Zimbabwe's signatory Finance and Economic Development Minister, Chris Kuruneri, stated "we have the land and manpower and you [China] have the resources."⁴⁹² Many other bilateral agreements have been signed that impact upon various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy, such as the mining and manufacturing industries. However, as in Angola and Mozambique, these agreements have led to the marginalisation of the local people – a trait that is common across the continent as little employment is created locally and little to no skills transfers are initiated.⁴⁹³

Some, such as infrastructure development projects made possible through Exim Bank, have had an immediate benefit for the citizens of Zimbabwe. One such project was the US\$144 million refurbishment of a water treatment facility, also begun in 2008 subsequent to a cholera outbreak in that year.⁴⁹⁴ Other projects include the construction of hospitals such as those at Mahusekwa in Marondera and the refurbishment of many SOEs such as The Zimbabwe Defence College, the Victoria Falls Airport and the Kariba Dam.⁴⁹⁵ The presence of Huawei (an ICT services company) in the state has also seen an increase in ICT development in the state from which both public and private institutions can benefit. These projects have the potential to make a valuable contribution to sustainable development in Zimbabwe in the areas of health, education and power generation by improving the state's capacity for these functions. However, these benefits are somewhat marred by the same lack of transparency in China's relationship with Zimbabwe as was discussed above in the relationships between China and Angola and China and Mozambique. It is illustrated in

⁴⁹² "Zimbabwe, China Sign Agreement to Strengthen Trade Relations," Xinhua News Agency, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/88067.htm>. (accessed March 5, 2016).

⁴⁹³ William Gumede, "One-sided relationship between Africa and China is increasingly irking African," *World Commerce Review* 8, no. 4 (2014): 16.

⁴⁹⁴ "Regional Focus: China-Africa," *The China Analyst*, <http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/tca/editions/the-china-analyst-apr-2014/236-regional-focus-china-africa>.

⁴⁹⁵ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations."; "China Exim Bank," *The Source*, <http://source.co.zw/tag/china-exim-bank/>. (accessed November 12, 2015).

Zimbabwe by the failure of both governments to allude to the agreement entered into for the funding made available for the refurbishing of the Zimbabwe Defence College.⁴⁹⁶

In terms of aid, official data suggests that China has made available modest amounts as compared to that made available to other African states.⁴⁹⁷ Listed in Table 4.4 is the aid that has been made available by China to Zimbabwe since 2001. In Zimbabwe, Mapaure notes that “Chinese investments are found mainly in the mining of platinum, gold, diamonds, iron ore and coal,” investment has also been made into the agricultural sector.⁴⁹⁸

Table 4.5: China’s aid to Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2014

Year	Project	Amount
2001	ZINWA infrastructure development and equipment purchase	US\$8 million
2002	Refurbishment of the Harare National Sports Stadium	US\$3.5 million
2003	Maize donation to subsidise shortage caused by land reform	4500 metric tonnes
2006	Maize donation to subsidise shortage caused by drought	3000 metric tonnes
2006	Loan for purchase of agricultural products i.e. fertiliser, tools, irrigation equipment	US\$200 million
2006	Zimbabwe Farmers Development Company loan for agricultural equipment	US\$25 million
2014	Rice donation to subsidise shortage caused by drought	US\$8.2 million

Sources: The FOCAC website, Xinhua News and SAIIA Occasional Paper 205.

In 2013 Zimbabwe was the biggest beneficiary of investment, which was worth US\$ 3.5 billion,⁴⁹⁹ however, before 2003 only three Chinese companies were active in the state, which is indicated above in Table 4.4. By 2012 there were 41 companies investing and active in Zimbabwe.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁶ Clever Mapaure, "Chinese Investments in Zimbabwe and Namibia: A Comparative Legal Analysis," (Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, 2014), 17.

⁴⁹⁷ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," 19-20.

⁴⁹⁸ Mapaure, "Chinese Investments in Zimbabwe and Namibia: A Comparative Legal Analysis," 17.

⁴⁹⁹ Chun, "China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations," 18.

⁵⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 17-18.

Table 4.6: Chinese investment in Zimbabwe up to 2003

Chinese Company	Zimbabwean Company	Amount Invested US\$	% Stake
China Building Material Industrial Corporation for Foreign Econo-Technical Co-operation	Sino-Zimbabwe Cement Company	5.844 million	65
Zimna Tractor Assembly Factory	Dwala Enterprises (PVT) Ltd	4.8 million	58
Hongda Intertexture Factory	Super Garments	810 thousand	50

Source: SAIIA Occasional Paper 205.

Investment has largely been focused on the agricultural, manufacturing and mining sectors. It has also played a significant role in the construction industry, especially with the opening of a factory that manufactures tiles and bricks in 2004. Chun notes that this industry was one of the few sectors that was not as heavily affected by the economic downturn in Zimbabwe over the course of the new millennium. Chinese project contracting has proven to be very profitable, with turnover between 2002 and 2012 averaging about US\$142 million annually, and peaking in 2011 with a turnover of US\$398.91 million.⁵⁰¹ The extractive industry has also been very profitable for Chinese-owned companies, which will be the focus of the following section.

The extractive industry

A prominent example of the marginalisation of Zimbabwe's citizens can be seen with the Chiadzwa mining activities in the district of Marange in Manicaland Province, where "as much as a fifth of the world's diamonds deposits" are found.⁵⁰² This site was discovered in 2006 by locals and after a two-year stint of illegal mining and trade of diamonds from Chiadzwa, the government took over the site in an effort to formalise mining activities and eventually allowed foreign companies (including Chinese) to conduct operations in the area. The process took on a somewhat forceful nature as miners and residents alike were removed from the area, causing some concern from the international community of human rights violations by the government.⁵⁰³ Ultimately, this operation has had an impact on the

⁵⁰¹ *ibid.*, 19.

⁵⁰² Hilary Andersson, "Marange diamond field: Zimbabwe torture camp discovered," BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14377215>. (accessed April 17, 2016).

⁵⁰³ Trynos Gumbo, "Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Sustainable Natural Resources Exploitation in Africa: Lessons from Diamond Mining in Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe," in *Policy Brief* (Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013).

social, economic and environmental development of Zimbabwe. By 2016 at least US\$15 billion in revenue from foreign-run projects was missed.⁵⁰⁴ It therefore serves as an example of the importance of good governance in encouraging sustainable development. Mavhita argues that the government has prioritised economic benefit from this operation over environmental sustainability, as the land and water sources in the area have been degraded and polluted despite the existence of legislation that prohibits such actions, based on international environmental laws.⁵⁰⁵ Mavhita quotes Gilbert Makore from Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA), saying:

The major concern...in Marange and Zimbabwe is the...lack of transparency and accountability in the generation, management, use and distribution of revenue from diamond mining. There was no transparency in the allocation of mining rights to the five mining companies. The contracts were not made public and the actual figures of revenue generated are not clear. The contractual obligations of the mining companies to the community are also not clear.⁵⁰⁶

There are more than five companies in Chiadzwa;⁵⁰⁷ however, the most prominent foreign-owned or dominated are listed below in Table 4.6.

At a glance, the presence of government and government officials, the ZMDC and Chinese entities is evident. It can be noted that of the companies listed above, half are affiliated with Chinese companies. The lack of transparency noted by Makore above is clear here as Jinan and Kusena Diamonds, both involving Chinese-owned companies, have unspecified ownership. The presence of government intervention has also been noted as misdirecting policy for the use of diamond revenue. Mapaire notes the diversion of revenue from Anjin by the government to fund the construction of a military academy in Harare.⁵⁰⁸ Towriss also notes the overwhelming presence of government officials and former government officials in the mining sector, suggesting that this indicates poor governance. Towriss particularly points out the neopatrimonial and clientist elements dominant within the government.⁵⁰⁹ In 2012 a study by the University of Zimbabwe (commissioned by ZELA) established that mines in Chiadzwa were polluting water bodies such as the Save River and

⁵⁰⁴ Chidza, Richard. "Chiadzwa \$15 Billion Diamonds Plunder." *News Day*, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/03/16/chidzwa-15-billion-diamonds-plunder>. (accessed March 16, 2016).

⁵⁰⁵ Nyasha Mavhita, "An Assessment on the effectiveness of international environmental laws in developing countries: a case of Marange diamonds, Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe" (Bindura University 2016).

⁵⁰⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁰⁷ "Diamond Mining," Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation, <http://www.zmdc.co.zw/operations/diamond-mining>. (accessed March 16, 2016).

⁵⁰⁸ Mapaire, "Chinese Investments in Zimbabwe and Namibia: A Comparative Legal Analysis," 14.

⁵⁰⁹ David Towriss, "Buying Loyalty: Zimbabwe's Marange Diamonds," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2013).

its tributaries Bingwizi and Odzi with hazardous chemicals, exposing both humans and animals to contaminated water that had at the time already caused the death of hundreds of cattle and aquatic life in the region.⁵¹⁰

Table 4.7: Foreign-owned diamond mining companies in Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe

Company	Shareholder and origin	Stake (%)
Anjin Investments (Ltd)	Matt Bronze Ltd – Zimbabwe military official	50
	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group – China	50
Diamond Mining Company	Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC)	50
	Consortium of Investors – Dubai, UAE	50
Gye Nyame Resources	Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC)	50
	Bill Minerals – Ghana	24
	Zimbabwe Republic Police Trust	20
	Dantor – Zimbabwean citizens	6
Jinan	Unnamed China-based company	unspecified
	Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC)	
Kusena Diamonds	Alleged Sino-Zimbabwe company joint venture with Zimbabwean government	unspecified
Mbada Diamonds	Marange Resources – ZMDC	50
	Grandwell Holdings – Mauritius-based, South Africa-affiliated controlled by former Zimbabwe Airforce official	50

Source: Table created using information from: Mavhita, "An Assessment on the effectiveness of international environmental laws in developing countries: a case of Marange diamonds, Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe," 54.

This finding affirms Mavhita's assertion that the government is not committed to implementing environmental law and, by extension, also illustrates the disregard for the environment and other sustainable practices by Chinese SMEs in Africa – much like that experienced in Mozambique's forestry sector.

4.3.2 South Africa's trade, investment and aid

South Africa as the only African member of BRICS has played and is continuing to play a significant role on the African continent. This role is evident in the decidedly more imposing foreign policy pursued by the state's leadership in the new millennium. Recently

⁵¹⁰ Mavhita, "An Assessment on the effectiveness of international environmental laws in developing countries: a case of Marange diamonds, Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe," 60.

(since 2010), this new policy has arguably been guiding the BRICS policies.⁵¹¹ An invaluable case in point in this foreign policy expansion was former President Thabo Mbeki's recognition, with the support of the AU and other state leaders, of the need for coordination on the continent towards what was later called a "Marshall Plan for Africa" with the help of the G7/8 countries (as suggested by former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair).⁵¹² The outcome of this was the establishment of NEPAD⁵¹³ and the integration of its policies into the AU (whose creation Mbeki also lobbied for), which encouraged good governance practice in economic and political matters and, as reward, aid and trade from industrialised economies would be made available.⁵¹⁴ When one considers South Africa in the African context especially, it is evident that the state plays an important role as a leader in regional and continental development and advancement in strategy, making South Africa what Alden and Schoeman have called a "self-appointed champion of African development" with an "unashamed claim to African leadership."⁵¹⁵ The role the state now plays is in line with Landsberg's 2004 assertion that South Africa is "a pivotal state both at home and abroad."⁵¹⁶

The growth of the South African economy since democratisation has helped to increase their economic ambitions and capacity across the continent. Alden and Soko note the emergence of South Africa as "a significant foreign investor in Africa, challenging the pre-eminence of the historically dominant corporations from the United States and Europe."⁵¹⁷ South Africa's role in the new millennium as representative for Africa to much of the world and the state's relatively higher levels of governance and development have led to the international acceptance of its position, and is one of the major reasons for the state's dominance on the continent – although some international and continental elements are

⁵¹¹ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 111-12. Rosaline Daniel and Kudrat Virk, "South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects," in *Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report* (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2014). pgs 12-17

⁵¹² Stephen Castle, "G8 Leaders Promise a Great Deal," Global Policy Forum, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/42672.html>.

⁵¹³ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 113.

⁵¹⁴ Chris Alden and Mills Soko, "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 03 (2005).

⁵¹⁵ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 111.

⁵¹⁶ Chris Landsberg, "South Africa: a pivotal state in Africa," *Synopsis: Policy Studies Bulletin* 7, no. 1 (2004): 1.

⁵¹⁷ Alden and Soko, "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents," 370.

wary of granting the state such high praise.⁵¹⁸ Prior to it being overtaken by Nigeria in 2015, South Africa was dubbed “the ‘economic powerhouse’ of Africa,” having the largest economy on the continent.⁵¹⁹ The state is also benefiting from China’s extensive engagement in Africa. Trade between the two states in 2013 accounted for 31 percent of Africa’s total trade with China, with South Africa ranked both the top destination and source of traded commodities.⁵²⁰ The state is also the main recipient of Chinese FDI in Africa.⁵²¹

Since 2001, South Africa’s economic engagement across the continent has intensified with SADC again emerging as South Africa’s main trade region, supplying 7 and 26 percent of imports and exports respectively in 2014, totalling US\$31 billion. Mozambique and Angola were also ranked fourth and fifth as overall trade partners and second and fourth as sources for imports respectively. Mozambique and Zimbabwe ranked third and fifth as destinations for South African exports.⁵²² These figures highlight the significance of South Africa’s trade with the SADC region, and more importantly in the specific case study, SADC member states, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. The graph also demonstrates the increased trade engagement between South Africa and each of the SADC member states. SADC has remained the main import supplier for South Africa. Trade in 2014 grew by 26 percent as compared to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA – 16 percent) and the East African Community (EAC – 10 percent).⁵²³

The dominant growth area of South Africa’s engagement has been in mineral products imports – between 2001 and 2014 this sector has contributed 71 percent. However, exports have been much more balanced with an array of commodities.⁵²⁴ These exchanges have contributed significantly to regional economic growth, particularly in the case of the SADC member states as South Africa has progressively and consistently ranked amongst the top trade partners for each of the states since 2001.

⁵¹⁸ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 112.

⁵¹⁹ Binns, Dixon, and Nel, *Africa Diversity and Development*: 274; n.a., "South Africa: Problems rumble below the surface calm," *The Africa Report*, December 2014 - January 2015 2014, 119.

⁵²⁰ "South Africa: Problems rumble below the surface calm," 120.


⁵²¹ Danielle le Clus-Rossouw, Wilma Viviers, and Elsabé Loots, "Is there a link between BRIC foreign direct investment and SADC export performance?," *Development Southern Africa* 32, no. 6 (2015): 659.

⁵²² Viljoen, "Synopsis: Africa-South Africa trading relationship."

⁵²³ *ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *ibid.*

Figure 4.3: South Africa's total trade with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (US\$ millions)⁵²⁵



Throughout the course of the new millennium as South Africa's economy has grown, so too has its investment. The state's investment in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe has also played a significant role in these states' economies and development. In 2001 South African investment in SADC was ZAR14.8 billion. The second-biggest investor was the UK, with a much smaller amount of ZAR3.98 billion. During this time until 2002 the state embarked upon a number of large investments in the region through South African multinationals. Pretoria Portland Cement Company invested US\$53 million in a merger that led to the establishment of one of its three milling depots in Zimbabwe (the others are in Botswana and South Africa).⁵²⁶ BHP Billiton, Sasol, IDC and Mitsubishi invested in total US\$1960 million in a number of resource projects in Mozambique, including the Mozal aluminium smelter and gas fields in Pande and Temane.⁵²⁷ The number of South African investors in Mozambique has grown to over 300 companies since then.⁵²⁸ It can be noted that no significant investment was made in Angola at this time – probably because of the

⁵²⁵ Graph created using data from UNCTAD Statistical Database, UNCOMTRADE and Tralac Trade Law Centre.

⁵²⁶ "Our History," Pretoria Portland Cement Company (PPC), <http://www.ppc.co.za/about-us/our-history/?yrl=2001>. (accessed March 5, 2016)

⁵²⁷ Alden and Soko, "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents."

⁵²⁸ "Bilateral Relations," DIRCO, <http://www.dirco.gov.za/maputo/bilateral.html>. (accessed May 4, 2016).

civil war, which had not officially ended at that point, making Angola risky for investors.⁵²⁹ This situation changed over the course of the following years and the scale of South Africa's engagement with SADC (and other African states) escalated significantly. Illustrated below in Table 4.7 are the South African investors in the SADC member states between 2001 and 2014.

Table 4.8: South African investors in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2014

COUNTRY	COMPANIES (TOP 10)	SECTORS	PROJECTS
ANGOLA (as of 2014)	Standard Bank, Standard Bank Angola, First Rand, Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Provantage Media, Webtickets, South African Airways, Nampack and Distell Group	Financial Services, Food & Tobacco, Business services, Software & IT services, Transportation, Plastics, Beverages	27 of 27
MOZAMBIQUE (as of 2013)	SASOL, Beacon Hill Resources, Sasol Petroleum Int'l, Vodacom, Grindrod, Tongaat-Hulett, Astral Foods, Game Stores and The Foschini Group	Chemicals, Coal, Oil & Natural Gas, Communications, Foods & Tobacco, Consumer Products	13 of 25
ZIMBABWE (as of 2012)	Nucoal, Implats, Basil Read, Circle Three, JHI, Chas Everitt Int'l, InnoVent, Standard Bank Group, Tongaat Hulett and Aveng Group	Coal, Oil & Natural Gas, Metals, Minerals, Real Estate, Financial Services and Food & Tobacco	10 of 12

Source: WESGRO Cape Town & Western Cape Research.

It is clear here that South Africa's investments are vastly different to those of China, especially because they are not noticeably involved in construction and are not as heavily invested in the extractive sectors. Rather, retail banking and food distribution make up a significant amount of the state's investment in Angola, which is the most resource intensive economy of the three. This table thus illustrates the diversity of South African investment

⁵²⁹ "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents."

and the important role these investments are playing in providing key day-to-day services of importance in the state, particularly because the state itself does not have the capacity for such services. Indeed, as a member of SADC, South Africa has benefitted from the organisation's aim to encourage regional trade integration. The dominance of the state in the bloc thus also allows opportunities for expansion through investment in South Africa and to SADC, as the state offers a more agreeable business environment than most bloc members⁵³⁰ – arguably because South Africa can serve as “a production hub for exports to the surrounding region” and resultantly allow international investors entry to SADC markets.⁵³¹

The openness to South African investment has progressively improved over the past fifteen years. In the early 2000s South Africa faced a backlash in Africa against their rapid expansion on the continent and resultant dominance in foreign economies.⁵³² It was argued by some of the state's neighbours that the higher economic status of the state in the SADC region both politically and economically compromised development as it showed “self-interested behaviour in regional trade negotiations.”⁵³³ This accusation led to some South African investors acknowledging the tension their presence inspired amongst the political and business elites within other African countries. An example of this approach can be seen in Angola, where South African Breweries purchased a local brewery, Nacol (the smallest of three breweries in Angola), directly from the owner without publicity through local middlemen or seeking to “rebrand” the product as South African.⁵³⁴

In terms of aid, South Africa has become one of the biggest government aid providers outside the OECD, ranking twelfth in 2011.⁵³⁵ It has done so despite a number of developmental challenges, particularly in the social sphere (including unemployment, housing, income and other inequalities and HIV/AIDS prevalence) and being a recipient of

⁵³⁰ le Clus-Rossouw, Viviers, and Loots, "Is there a link between BRIC foreign direct investment and SADC export performance?," 659; Onelie Nkuna, "Intra-SADC Foreign Direct Investment: A Gravity Approach to South Africa Outward Investment," *International Journal of Economics and Finance* 8, no. 1 (2015): 79.

⁵³¹ le Clus-Rossouw, Viviers, and Loots, "Is there a link between BRIC foreign direct investment and SADC export performance?," 658.

⁵³² Alden and Soko, "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents."

⁵³³ Aditi Lalbahadur, "South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland," in *South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2014), 6.

⁵³⁴ Alden and Soko, "South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents."; Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa," 248.

⁵³⁵ n.a., "Investments to End Poverty: Real money, real choices, real lives," (Bristol: Development Initiatives, 2013), 238.

development aid themselves.⁵³⁶ In 2013 the state provided US\$217 million in aid to other African states, mostly through African organisations that received just over two thirds of the funding. The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARICF) was the main mechanism of engagement for South African aid, which was replaced by the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as an arm of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which disburses almost two thirds of the state's development cooperation funding.⁵³⁷ The state also makes contributions to African organisations i.e. NEPAD and SADC, as well as UN agencies, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund. A significant amount of aid is directed at governance and democracy, socio-economic development and humanitarian aid. Alden and Schoeman note that through its recent efforts to provide aid and facilitate investment, South Africa is "unashamedly" pursuing a BRIC style approach to economic and foreign diplomacy.⁵³⁸

South Africa's role in Africa is largely because of the advantage it has in comprehending the "security/governance/development nexus" of its neighbours and other African states. This strategic knowledge makes South Africa an invaluable asset for bilateral, trilateral (with both traditional and emergent partners) and multilateral development assistance on the continent.⁵³⁹ Its position and status as a development partner has been further bolstered by its membership of BRICS, which saw it become the headquarters of the BRICS Development Bank in March 2013. This inclusion has further consolidated the move of institutions and states in the global south against the seemingly slow and incongruent policies of the north effected through organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions.⁵⁴⁰

Data on bilateral aid between South Africa and its aid recipients is not fully available, likely because of irregular data collection, as is the case for Angola and Mozambique (amongst others). However, between 2005 and 2011, Zimbabwe was by far been the biggest recipient of aid from South Africa, receiving US\$93 million in bilateral aid,⁵⁴¹ and 2013 aid totalled

⁵³⁶ Vickers, "Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner".

⁵³⁷ Mariella Di Ciommo, "South Africa's development cooperation," (Bristol: Development Initiatives, 2014), 1,5.

⁵³⁸ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 124.

⁵³⁹ Vickers, "Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner". 553.

⁵⁴⁰ Giles Mohan, "Emerging Powers in International Development: Questioning South-South Cooperation," in *The Palgrave Handbook of International Development* (Springer, 2016), 289-93.

⁵⁴¹ n.a., "Investments to End Poverty: Real money, real choices, real lives," 238-40.

US\$100 million.⁵⁴² The state is also active in Angola and Mozambique. In 2000 when Mozambique suffered floods due to Cyclone Eline, South Africa was the first to provide assistance, a week ahead of the wider international community, and in 2002 at the end of Angola's civil war the state donated ZAR500,000 in cash, six tonnes of maize seed and fifty tonnes of maize meal, one hundred tonnes of clothing and other food stuffs worth ZAR3 million and medical equipment worth ZAR80 million.⁵⁴³

4.3.2.1 South Africa's contribution to politics and governance

Whilst South Africa is playing an increasingly important role in the economies of the case studies through trade and investment, the state also plays a pivotal role in regional governance and politics.⁵⁴⁴ The state has also provided aid by making funding and personnel available to the SADC Election Observation Missions (SOEMs) and South African Election Observation Missions to take part in the electoral process of many African states, as was the case for Zimbabwe in October 2013 and Mozambique in July 2014.⁵⁴⁵ In general, the stance of the South African government has echoed that of the other BRICS members, i.e. taking a stance of non-interference, even before the state was a part of the bloc. This stance has been consistent throughout the new millennium, upheld by both the Mbeki and Zuma administrations. Lalbahadur attributes this stance especially in the SADC region to the role the neighbouring states played in the state's independence.⁵⁴⁶

The most prominent case in point in reference to South Africa's contribution to politics and governance in SADC would be that of Zimbabwe (whose history was outlined in Chapter Three). South Africa's non-interference in the state's politics has caused the state to be distrusted by the wider international community as even when South Africa has been given the responsibility and opportunity to act it has not. Such examples can be seen in Mbeki's

⁵⁴² Lorenzo Piccio, "After controversial elections, direct aid to Zimbabwe in limbo," Devex, <https://www.devex.com/news/after-controversial-elections-direct-aid-to-zimbabwe-in-limbo-81572>. (accessed November 5, 2015).

⁵⁴³ "Mozambique Floods," BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2000/dealing_with_disaster/mozambique.stm. May 3, 2016); "South Africa: SA pledges aid to Angola," Pambazuka News, <http://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/south-africa-sa-pledges-aid-angola>. (accessed April 3, 2016).

⁵⁴⁴ Mohan, "Emerging Powers in International Development: Questioning South–South Cooperation," 289.

⁵⁴⁵ African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), "African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Annual Report 2014 - 2015 ", ed. International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (Pretoria: DIRCO, 2015), 18.

⁵⁴⁶ Lalbahadur, "South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland," 5.

decision to continue with Mandela's "quiet diplomacy"⁵⁴⁷ after his nomination as "point man" by US President Bush in 2000 and apparent lack of definitive action regarding the perceived lack of democracy in Zimbabwe and Mugabe's insistence on land redistribution. Another example was South Africa's refusal to vote affirmatively for sanctions (to impose financial freezes and travel bans on Mugabe and 13 government officials as well as an arms embargo) against Zimbabwe in July 2008 in reaction to the contested results of the elections held earlier in March of the same year. China, Russia, Libya and Vietnam also voted against the sanctions. The South African representative stated that they favoured dialogue through the SADC and the AU, and Russia's representative supported this view, pointing to the efforts of Mbeki and dos Santos in mediating for a compromise.⁵⁴⁸ This stance proved successful, as Zimbabwe's GNU was formed as a result.

Zuma's stance has, however, been decidedly less accommodating to Zimbabwe and he has been seen to "deliberately shun" Mugabe at SADC meetings, demanding more free and fair elections. This behaviour has not had any effect on regime change within the state.⁵⁴⁹ Indeed, in his terms of office, Zuma has not taken any decisive economic action against Zimbabwe and bilateral trade and investment continue to grow despite the poor rankings for the rule of law and corruption within Zimbabwe.⁵⁵⁰ Alden and Schoeman note this stance and argue that it shows his commitment to promoting the rule of law even at the stake of alienating "its pan-Africanist constituency" both locally and internationally.⁵⁵¹ This view was proved wrong by Zuma's "swift endorsement" and congratulations to Mugabe on his victory in the 2013 elections, which saw a dissolution of the GNU.⁵⁵² It would seem that South Africa's eagerness to demonstrate its solidarity with African states has led to a softened approach to both Angola and Zimbabwe's political and governance issues.⁵⁵³ This solidarity is rewarded especially in the cases of Angola and Zimbabwe, both

⁵⁴⁷ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 117. Chris Landsberg, "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments," *Africa Insight* 41, no. 4 (2012): 4.

⁵⁴⁸ "Security Council fails to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe leadership as two permanent members cast negative votes," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm>. (accessed May 5, 2016).

⁵⁴⁹ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa," 249-50.

⁵⁵⁰ Nkuna, "Intra-SADC Foreign Direct Investment: A Gravity Approach to South Africa Outward Investment," 82.

⁵⁵¹ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 114, 25.

⁵⁵² Lalbahadur, "South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland," 12.

⁵⁵³ Piccio, "After controversial elections, direct aid to Zimbabwe in limbo".

of which supported South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's (winning) bid for the position of AU Chairperson.⁵⁵⁴ McKinley offers an alternative motive for South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe and other pariah states, arguing that the policy of non-intervention is employed to sustain "a degree of disorder", which serves to perpetuate the domination of South African investors. He further cites the economic and political ties of South Africa's ruling party, the ANC, to companies active in Zimbabwe, where they exploit the poor governance and rule of law to benefit from agreements below market value.⁵⁵⁵ It is interesting to note that this view of the motives of South Africa's engagement with pariah states bears a striking resemblance to those presented on the benevolence of engagement with the BRIC states.

4.3.3 Brazil's trade, investment and aid

Brazil's engagement on the African continent has also increased progressively since 2000, largely as a result of efforts by former president Lula da Silva, who was in office from 2003 to 2010, to intensify cooperation.⁵⁵⁶ At the opening of the 2010 AU Summit, he said, "Brazil wants to be a partner for projects of development. We want to share experiences and lessons, add efforts and unite capacities."⁵⁵⁷ Brazil's increasingly integrative foreign policy – an effort to be recognised as a global power – has led to intensified collaborative engagement in not only trade and investment, but also in development and political cooperation.⁵⁵⁸ Da Silva's successor, Dilma Rousseff, continued with the policies he set out, focusing on the "fulfilment of previous commitments."⁵⁵⁹ Alves notes that:

The contemporary drivers behind Brazil's foreign policy shift toward Africa include a broad political goal of contributing to a greater say of the global South in the new world order in the making, a narrower political goal of securing a key position within this emerging international architecture and lastly a more pragmatic goal of promoting the expansion of Brazil's economic interests in Africa.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁴ Alden and Schoeman, "South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order," 123-24.

⁵⁵⁵ Lalbahadur, "South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland," 9-10.

⁵⁵⁶ José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, "The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. SPE (2010): 178-79.

⁵⁵⁷ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 2.

⁵⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 1.

⁵⁵⁹ Lúcia Cabral and Alex Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," *Future Agricultures. CBAA Working Paper* 51(2013): 5.

⁵⁶⁰ Ana Cristina Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," *Emerging powers in Africa, London: London School of Economics* (2013): 37.

Like China, Brazil is seen to be using a “soft power offensive” in order to gain access to resources and influence in African states by offering political, financial and technical cooperation and support without becoming involved in matters of governance. This influence has grown to encompass various areas, including technology and expertise in infrastructure construction, mining, tropical agriculture and agribusiness, biofuel, communication and hydrocarbon exploration.⁵⁶¹ Yet, as a result of the dominance of China in BRICS, not as much focus has been placed on Brazil, whose relationship with Africa is similar but smaller in scale.⁵⁶² Brazil has placed focus on both political and economic cooperation and, like China, has provided a platform for the development of strategies for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Brazil Africa Forum. This forum began in 2012 and has grown in scale and capacity since then. The forum has also been guided by themes relevant to their engagement. These have been *Infrastructure, Partnerships and Development* (2014), *Challenges and Opportunities for Energy Supply in Brazil and Africa* (2015) and *Strategies for the Development of Agriculture in Brazil and Africa* (2016); it is not clear why there was no forum in 2013. These forums illustrate the eagerness of Brazil to engage on multiple levels with Africa.⁵⁶³

Between the years 2000 and 2012, Brazil-Africa trade grew from US\$4.2 billion to US\$27.6 billion and was dominated by natural resources, specifically crude oil.⁵⁶⁴ Alves suggests that Brazil’s motive for this is largely because the refineries of the state are more suitable to “heavy grade” African oil, and this trend will change once the state builds refineries more suited to their “light grade” oil. This factor differentiates Brazil from China, as this engagement is a method of expansion for Brazilian MNCs rather than a scramble for monopoly over resources.⁵⁶⁵ In the SADC region, trade particularly in minerals (because of Angola) and agricultural products has grown exponentially since 2001.⁵⁶⁶ This growth has been seen in the increase of trade by at least one percent every year, with Angola and South Africa being amongst the top destinations for Brazilian exports.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶¹ ibid., 37,39.

⁵⁶² Langton Makwereza, "Zimbabwe-Brazil cooperation through the More Food Africa programme," in *China and Brazil in African Agriculture Working Paper Series* (Online: Future Agricultures, 2015), 4; "Brazil in Africa: A new Atlantic alliance," *The Economist*, <http://www.economist.com/news/21566019-brazilian-companies-are-heading-africa-laden-capital-and-expertise-new-atlantic-alliance>.

⁵⁶³ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 2.


⁵⁶⁴ ibid., 1.

⁵⁶⁵ Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 40.

⁵⁶⁶ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 2.

⁵⁶⁷ ibid., 4.

Figure 4.4: Brazil's total trade with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (US\$ millions)⁵⁶⁸



In 2012 SADC accounted for approximately 15.6 percent of Brazil's total trade, with Angola being the fourth biggest receiver of Brazilian exports and fourth largest trade partner, with trade amounting to US\$1.2 billion.⁵⁶⁹ Although Brazil has expressed a focus on Lusophone Africa,⁵⁷⁰ in SADC they are far more engaged in Angola than Mozambique in trade. This discrepancy is illustrated in Figure 4.4, which shows Brazil's trade with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Similar to other BRICS countries, Brazil's imports from Africa are dominated by mineral products,⁵⁷¹ which in 2012 accounted for 84.1 percent of imports.⁵⁷² Much of Brazil's trade with Angola may be explained by the significance of mineral products, as is the case with China and South Africa, and is further illustrated by the distinct difference in trade between Angola and Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Brazil's investment in Africa has also reflected this growth pattern.⁵⁷³ When compared to China, the biggest difference is that the state is only partially engaged in the process, especially in the case of financial support for investors as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and Banco do Brasilia are the ones

⁵⁶⁸ Graph created using data from UNCTAD and UNDP datasets and national statistics databases.

⁵⁶⁹ Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 40.

⁵⁷⁰ Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 4.

⁵⁷¹ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 3.

⁵⁷² van Niekerk, "Synopsis - Africa-Brazil trading relationship."

⁵⁷³ Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 5.

who primarily offer credit lines to established MNCs and less so to SMEs. Table 4.8 provides an overview of the main Brazilian investors in Angola and Mozambique.

Table 4.9: Brazilian investors in Angola and Mozambique

COUNTRY	COMPANIES	SECTORS
ANGOLA	Andrade Guitierrez, Asperbras, Camargo Correa, Engevix, Fidens, Odebrecht, Petrobras, Queiroz Galvao, Stefanini and Vale	Energy, Construction, Mining, ICTs, Retail, Real Estate and Agriculture
MOZAMBIQUE	Odebrecht, Vale, Somaque, OAS and Soares da Costa	Construction, Energy and Mining

Source - Table adapted from: Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 6; Judith Fessehaie, Simon Roberts, and Lotta Takala-Greenish, "Key findings from case studies of mining capital equipment, infrastructure inputs and soy agro-processing in Southern Africa and implications for regional industrial development agenda," (Johannesburg: The Department of Trade and Industry and the Centre for Competition Regulation and Economic Development, 2015), 17; João Moura M. da Fonseca, Paulo Luiz M. L. Esteves, and Geovana Zoccal Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," in Policy Brief (BRICS Policy Centre, 2015), 23.

In 2010 four companies accounted for 78 percent of Brazilian FDI in Africa: Vale, Odebrecht, Petrobras and Itau-Unibanco, which are predominantly involved in the mining, construction, energy and banking sectors respectively. This difference can also be seen in the fact that most Brazilian investors are private and few have ties to the government. Cabral notes that in 2012 Africa ranked fifth among Brazil's preferred investment regions, but ranked third in receipt of investment.⁵⁷⁴ These findings illustrate the disconnect between the state's policy and that of investors, possibly as a result of the lack of direct funding from the state, as is the case in China. Nevertheless, like the Chinese, Brazilian investment and government credit lines to Africa are aimed at infrastructure development projects and tied to the acquisition of equipment and services from Brazil.

In southern Africa, investment has been concentrated in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.⁵⁷⁵ Similarly, the majority of investment is in resource extraction (mining and oil) and construction (roads, railways and ports). Investment is also concentrated in Lusophone Africa with a smaller number of investors, but over the course of the 21st century, Angola

⁵⁷⁴ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 5.

⁵⁷⁵ n.a., "Solidarity Among Brothers? Brazil in Africa: trade, investment and cooperation," in *Policy Brief* (Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center, 2013), 11.

and South Africa have received the bulk of FDI.⁵⁷⁶ Angola and Mozambique have been favoured for engagement in this sense⁵⁷⁷ and the absence of significant FDI in Zimbabwe supports this observation. Although Brazil only ranks fourth as an investor in Angola, the state receives the majority share of investment – of the US\$2.8 billion BNDES has made available for private investment, a massive 96 percent has been invested in the state. In 2014 Brazil had sixteen active infrastructure projects in nine of Angola's provinces. The state is also noted to have the most Brazilian SMEs in Africa.⁵⁷⁸ In addition, Brazilian investors are making serious efforts to provide employment in Angola. Examples are Odebrecht, which is the largest employer in Angola, and Vale in Mozambique, which respectively have 90 and 85 percent local employees. Compared to China, Brazil is more concerned with integrating with the state they engage in, as China is often criticised for importing labour from home.⁵⁷⁹ However, some locals have argued that there is a disparity in wages between the locals and Brazilians in similar positions.⁵⁸⁰

In terms of aid and technical assistance, the state has been heavily involved in Africa, which has become the biggest recipient thereof, receiving almost a quarter (23 percent) of aid in 2010.⁵⁸¹ More specifically, this figure relates to Lusophone Africa, where Brazil has been involved in the agriculture and health sectors, with Mozambique claiming 4 percent of Brazil's aid in 2010. Typically, Brazil's aid is linked to peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation, technological and scientific cooperation and education.⁵⁸² The pursuit for South-South cooperation by Brazil has largely taken the form of research in biomedicine, health and agriculture. These have become "effective foreign policy instruments", which are in use across the African continent,⁵⁸³ because these are some of the areas in which African states are in need of the most cooperation. This statement is evidenced by the concentration of engagement found across the continent in

⁵⁷⁶ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 1. ; Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 40-41.

⁵⁷⁷ Gerhard Seibert, "Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector," (2011): 4.

⁵⁷⁸ João Moura M. da Fonseca, Paulo Luiz M. L. Esteves, and Geovana Zoccal Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," in *Policy Brief* (BRICS Policy Centre, 2015), 22-23.

⁵⁷⁹ "Brazil in Africa: A new Atlantic alliance".

⁵⁸⁰ n.a., "Solidarity Among Brothers? Brazil in Africa: trade, investment and cooperation," 12.

⁵⁸¹ "Investments to End Poverty: Real money, real choices, real lives," 223-4.

⁵⁸² Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 1; n.a., "Investments to End Poverty: Real money, real choices, real lives," 223-4. Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 6.

⁵⁸³ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 1.

these states.⁵⁸⁴ Brazil argues that the similarities between itself and other developing states, especially in Africa regarding climate change and socio-economic development, make it possible for the state to offer relevant and tested solutions contrary to “ideas that might work” offered by traditional donors.⁵⁸⁵ This cooperation is guided by seven principles:

- i. Knowledge transfer;
- ii. Capacity building;
- iii. Use of local labour;
- iv. Project design based in local specificities, acknowledging local experience for adaptation;
- v. No conditionality;
- vi. Respect for the sovereignty of partner states; and
- vii. Drive by demand from developing countries.⁵⁸⁶

These principles in some instances almost directly echo the Beijing Consensus principles. Brazil has made efforts to adhere to these principles in their engagement in the 2000s, especially through the transfer of technical expertise and development assistance by relieving over US\$1 billion of African debt and directing more than 50 percent of their technical cooperation resources to the continent.⁵⁸⁷ Differences can be seen in the methods of loan provision employed by the states as well. Whereas China only barter infrastructure development for resources, Brazil also uses resource revenue as a guarantee for credit, a method it has used in countries like Angola, which are high risk loans.⁵⁸⁸

Brazil’s most prominent agent of foreign policy is technical cooperation. The budget for this area has increased significantly over the course of the last fifteen years, and between 2003 and 2009 the budget went up to just under Brazilian Reals (BRL) 100 million, from supporting twenty three projects to 413. These projects are sometimes entered into with the assistance of traditional donors such as Germany or the United States as trilateral cooperation, allowing all parties involved to share the responsibilities of the project and

⁵⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 5.; Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges."

⁵⁸⁵ Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 5.

⁵⁸⁶ Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 42. Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 5.

⁵⁸⁷ Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?," 2.

⁵⁸⁸ Alves, "Brazil in Africa: achievements and challenges," 41; da Fonseca, Esteves, and Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," 22.

offering a wider base for execution. Agriculture and health account for the bulk of cooperation in Africa, claiming 26 and 22 percent of cooperation (discussed below). Africa has been the focal point of Brazil's technical cooperation, accounting for 57 percent of cooperation, with Mozambique receiving the most aid and Angola the least of the five Lusophone states with which Brazil engages. The reasons for this are mainly linked to issues of governance within the state i.e. difficulty having progressive and executable dialogue with local authorities, limited decision-making power for executing agencies and the high income required for local coordinators.⁵⁸⁹

4.3.3.1 Development cooperation in the health and agricultural sectors

Agricultural and health cooperation will be the focus of this section's exploration of Brazil's cooperation with the case studies. Although Brazil does not have a specific policy for agricultural cooperation, the state's support of agribusiness investment has been evident in all of the cases studies, which has been evidenced by the backing of credit lines, technology demonstration and training and research centres and exchange visits.⁵⁹⁰ This cooperation has largely been through the Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation (Embrapa), which is active in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

4.3.3.2 Health in Angola and Mozambique

Brazil has engaged in development cooperation for health in Angola and Mozambique since the 1990s. Throughout the first eight years of the 2000s, this engagement was geared towards capacity building and training. Between 2009 and 2012 Brazil proposed and implemented a more focused plan for cooperation in Lusophone Africa that aimed to assist the recipient states in reaching the goal of universal access to quality healthcare services. The strategy comprised two elements, the strategic axis and structuring networks, which address the training and functional elements of health cooperation. Although the strategic axis includes seven elements, not all have been implemented in Angola and Mozambique. These seven elements are:

- i. Training and development of a health workforce;
- ii. Information and communication in health;
- iii. Research in health;

⁵⁸⁹ Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 6-7, 9-10.; da Fonseca, Esteves, and Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," 24.

⁵⁹⁰ Cabral and Shankland, "Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: New paradigms," 12, 15-16.

- iv. Development of the health-industrial complex;
- v. Epidemiological surveillance and monitoring of health situations;
- vi. Emergencies and natural disasters; and
- vii. Promotion and protection of health.

Of the above, Angola has only begun projects in training and development of a health workforce and the promotion and protection of health, whereas Mozambique has implemented all but capacity for emergencies and natural disasters,⁵⁹¹ which is curious considering that the state has suffered three floods since 2000.⁵⁹² The second element is the implementation of Brazilian South-South Cooperation (SSC) projects, which address the infrastructural needs for cooperation by building national health institutes, national schools of public health, health technical schools and technical centres of installation and maintenance of equipment. In Mozambique, all four have begun but in Angola only projects relating to national schools of public health and health technical schools have been initiated. Between 2009 and 2014 two bilateral projects were executed in Angola, which both began in June 2010. The first was the second phase of the *Capacity Development for Angola's Health System*, which had been previously successful in helping thirty Angolans to attain their Master's in Public Health. The second was a *Pilot Project in Sickle Cell Disease*, which aimed at improving capacity in the diagnosis, control and treatment of the disease and improving quality of life for those afflicted.⁵⁹³

In Mozambique a number of projects were initiated but the establishment of Africa's first public pharmaceutical factory in 2012, the *Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos (SMM)* (Mozambique Pharmaceutical Ltd) stands out. The project was agreed upon by presidents Chissano and Lula in 2003 as part of their bilateral cooperation. The project began in 2007 and funding from both governments was supplemented by a donation from one of Brazil's biggest investors in the state, Vale. The project defied all previous arguments against profitable pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa and, although it still remains to be seen whether the project will be successful and sustainable after Brazil's complete handover in 2017, it has pushed Mozambique further towards some of its development goals. The project aimed to provide the state with a cheaper supply of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs, reduce its dependence on donations and imports (in 2012 alone

⁵⁹¹ da Fonseca, Esteves, and Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," 24.

⁵⁹² See: n.a., "Mozambique: Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000 to 2013."

⁵⁹³ da Fonseca, Esteves, and Gomes, "Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola," 25-26.

Mozambique's donors spent US\$66 million on ARVs), facilitate the manufacture of generic drugs and build local capacity for pharmaceutical production and industrial management as is set out by Brazil's health cooperation aims above. Manufacturing began in 2013, producing five drugs used for ARV treatment.⁵⁹⁴

4.3.3.3 Agricultural cooperation in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's technical cooperation with Brazil has not been as fruitful as that experienced by Angola and Mozambique. In May 2010 Brazil hosted the *Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development* and Zimbabwe requested cooperation in negating the challenges that had emerged as a result of the land redistribution at the start of the new millennium, highlighting the opportunities for cooperation and investment.⁵⁹⁵ Consequently, the state was amongst the first to be accepted to take part in the programme, signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 2011 and receiving US\$38.6 million in December 2013. However, by 2014 the equipment had not arrived and very little progress had been made. Brazil cited the high demand of the programme as a cause for the delay, but given the state's specified focus on Lusophone states, Zimbabwe may not be as big a priority. Makwereza has suggested that the delay may have to do with the Indigenisation Law enacted in 2013, which has also contributed to the delays in cooperation, because the law requires foreign companies to enter into business with local businesses, to which they must cede at least 51 percent stake of the project.⁵⁹⁶

4.3.4 India's trade, investment and aid

India has also increased its activity on the African continent in recent years with imports growing from 6.4 to 10.1 percent between 2001 and 2013,⁵⁹⁷ and by 2014 the continent made up 11 percent of exports and nine percent of imports.⁵⁹⁸ The trade between India and Africa is also very concentrated with the top five (85 percent) and top twenty (96 percent) imports from the region making up the bulk of the total. These amounts are mainly due to mineral products (which account for 74 percent of the total), highlighting the massive role that oil and similar primary commodities play in trade on the continent. This reality is also

⁵⁹⁴ Giuliano Russo et al., "On the margins of aid orthodoxy: the Brazil-Mozambique collaboration to produce essential medicines in Africa," *Globalization and health* 10, no. 1 (2014): 1-8.

⁵⁹⁵ Langton Makwereza, "Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture: The Case Study of Zimbabwe," (Harare: China and Brazil in Agriculture, 2013), 8.


⁵⁹⁶ "Zimbabwe-Brazil cooperation through the More Food Africa programme," 5, 8-9.

⁵⁹⁷ van Niekerk, "Synopsis - Africa-India trading relationship," 5.

⁵⁹⁸ "Africa - India Facts & Figures 2015," (Addis Ababa, New Delhi: UNECA and the Confederation of Indian Industry, 2015), iv.

exemplified by Angola's continued dominance in trade (as shown below): from 2012 it has become one of India's main trading partners, contributing 11.14 percent of total trade.⁵⁹⁹

Figure 4.5: India's total trade with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (US\$ millions)⁶⁰⁰



Similar to China, South Africa and Brazil, the SADC bloc trade plays a significant role in engagement. SADC is the second biggest trading partner for India. In 2012 South Africa and Angola were some of its top trading partners, contributing 19.41 and 11.14 percent respectively. Trade with Mozambique has also grown, as indicated above, and Zimbabwe has had a similar experience, with trade peaking at US\$180 million in 2014. This relationship, however, has not been good for both states as imports from Zimbabwe have been almost non-existent, decreasing dramatically over the course of the 2000s to just over

⁵⁹⁹ van Niekerk, "Synopsis - Africa-India trading relationship," 4-6; Kiala and Ngwenya, "Angola's Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries," 13-14; n.a., "India-Angola Relations," ed. Ministry of External Affairs (Online: India, 2014), 2-3; Sachin Chaturvedi, "Exploring Indian engagement in Agriculture and Health: A Case of Angola and Mozambique," in *BPC Papers* (Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center, 2015), 16.

⁶⁰⁰ Graph created using data from UNDP and UNCTAD datasets.

US\$700,000.⁶⁰¹ These figures indicate a serious bias in favour of India, with Zimbabwe spending over half (90.1 million) in 2014 on pharmaceutical imports.⁶⁰²

4.3.4.1 Investment

India's investment has been relatively modest compared to the three previously discussed BRICS and investment has largely been through SMEs. In Angola, Indian investors have primarily been interested in manufacturing and retail. Like Brazilian investors, Indian investors recruit locally in Angola. Some of the more prominent investors are Best Angola Steel, which made a US\$5 million investment for the steel plant, and Mohan Exports (India) Private Limited, which is under contract from the army to manufacture uniforms and shoes. Best Angola Steel makes an estimated US\$10 million annually and employs 154 locals and seventy Indian nationals while Mohan Exports employs 1500 Angolans and twenty Indian nationals.⁶⁰³ The smaller investors have engaged in metal, steel, garment and plastics manufacturing, restaurants, catering, supermarkets and trading.⁶⁰⁴

In 2014 India was Mozambique's eighth biggest investor. Between 2004 and 2014 the state received an estimated US\$129.3 million in investments and, by early 2013, investment flow (excluding those for the extractive industries) was approximately US\$625 million. Some of the biggest Indian investors in Mozambique are:

- Damodar Ferro – Iron ore mining;
- Essar – Coal mining and port development;
- Tata Steel, Midwest Africa, Coal India Ltd – Coal mining; and
- Pure Diets, Rajarambapu Group, HK Jalan Group and Asian Tea company – Agriculture.

A number of SOEs have been investing in Mozambique extractive industries. In 2014, two significant investments were made in gas and coal. Bharat Petro Resources Limited, which already holds a tenth stake in the Rovuma gas fields, was joined by ONGC Videsh limited and Oil India Limited (both parastatals) and acquired a fifth stake in the same gas field for

⁶⁰¹ "India Zimbabwe relations," Embassy of India, <http://eoi.gov.in/harare/?2000?000>. (accessed April 28, 2016).

⁶⁰² van Niekerk, "Synopsis - Africa-India trading relationship," 7. "Africa - India Facts & Figures 2015," 14.

⁶⁰³ "Doing business in Angola," Embassy of India, http://www.indembangola.org/angolan_business.html. (accessed March 6, 2016).

⁶⁰⁴ n.a., "India-Angola Relations," 4.

over US\$5 billion. Ventures Pvt. Limited spent US\$50 million to purchase coal resources from Rio Tinto.⁶⁰⁵

In Zimbabwe, over the course of the 2000s Indian investors have spent approximately US\$194.5 million in the manufacturing sector, on infrastructure construction and repair and, most significantly, in agriculture and pharmaceuticals. The investments of Shreya and Ranbaxy and Ipca Lab Ltd in pharmaceuticals have made medicines more readily available in Zimbabwe.⁶⁰⁶

4.3.4.2. Aid

India has offered economic and technical cooperation since 1964 through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). Of the three SMS under discussion here, only Angola is listed as a beneficiary of the programme on the organisation's webpage;⁶⁰⁷ however, all three have benefitted from ITEC cooperation. The programme offers scholarships for short training courses in a number of areas that are beneficial to developing states through Indian institutions such as the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad (IIM-A), the Entrepreneurship Development Institute (EDI), the Central Institute of Tool Design (CITD) and The Barefoot College.⁶⁰⁸ In 2014 the programme offered 238 courses to scholarship recipients.⁶⁰⁹ Of the three case studies, Zimbabwe has been significantly active in this cooperation, most likely because of the higher rates of education and literacy in the state, but also perhaps because one of the requirements of the programme is fluency in English as it is the language of instruction, therefore putting Lusophone Angola and Mozambique at a disadvantage. This (dis)advantage is illustrated by the fact that between 2012 and 2013, Zimbabwe was amongst the highest recipients of this aid, receiving up to 675 scholarships, whereas Mozambique received sixty five scholarships and Angola was amongst the lowest, receiving twenty scholarships.⁶¹⁰ However, 2010 and 2011 were the most successful years for Angolans in the programme (since 2001).⁶¹¹ Approximately sixty scholarships were awarded mostly for the Certificate of Proficiency in English and IT

⁶⁰⁵ "India-Mozambique Relations," ed. Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Relation (Online: India, 2014), 3.

⁶⁰⁶ "India Zimbabwe relations".

⁶⁰⁷ "ITEC Countries," Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation Programme Ministry of External Affairs, <http://itec.mea.gov.in/?1348?650>. (accessed March 5, 2016).

⁶⁰⁸ "Indian Development Cooperation Research Report," (New Delhi: Indian Development Cooperation Research, 2015), 25, 28, 30, 31.

⁶⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 4.

⁶¹⁰ *ibid.*, 7.; "India-Mozambique Relations," 3.

⁶¹¹ Chaturvedi, "Exploring Indian engagement in Agriculture and Health: A Case of Angola and Mozambique," 15.

Skills, Certificate Course in English Fluency and the Advanced Course in Computer Networks Engineering and Management. Through this initiative India has helped to increase the human capacity of many developing states, and most certainly of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This involvement is particularly important in Angola and Mozambique given the low literacy and enrolment rates in these countries.

4.3.5 Russia's trade, investment and aid

Russia's engagement with Africa had been somewhat haphazard before 2001. Initially, the state (as part of the Soviet Union) was a crucial ally in many African state's liberation struggles against colonial rule (including Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) as an element of their Cold War strategy. The eventual fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 weakened the relationships the state had with even its closest African allies. However, in the new millennium, Russia has sought to reengage with Africa. This reengagement seems to be a result of Russia's joining of the BRICS,⁶¹² and can be seen in the similarity between the motivations given for renewed efforts by both former President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009 and President Vladimir Putin in 2013 with BRICS' resolutions for South-South cooperation.⁶¹³ Medvedev encouraged "a new dynamism" in neglected "Russia-Africa traditional relations."⁶¹⁴ This recent effort towards reengagement has made the West uneasy in recent years. This attitude is largely because Russia's re-emergence as a noteworthy partner and ally in Africa went unnoticed as the state remade economic, political and military ties with the continent because so much focus was placed on China in Africa.⁶¹⁵ Like South Africa and China, Russia is a crucial ally to many African states in political and governance matters. The state's continued commitment to non-interference⁶¹⁶ over the years has also made its focused reengagement simpler in states such as Angola and Zimbabwe where the states have faced isolation as a result of perceived poor governance.

⁶¹² Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Vladimir Shubin, "Russia's Africa Policy," in *Global Powers and Africa Programme* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013), 9; Alexander Shishkov, "Back to Africa: US Beating Drums Over Russia's New Geostrategic Pivot," BRICS Information Sharing & Exchange Platform, <http://www.brics-info.org/back-to-africa-us-beating-drums-over-russias-new-geostrategic-pivot/?s=russia+zimbabwe>.

⁶¹³ See: "1st First Summit".

⁶¹⁴ Taku Fundira, "Russia - Africa trade at a glance," (Stellenbosch: Tralac Trade Law Centre, 2011), 2; Arkhangelskaya and Shubin, "Russia's Africa Policy," 5; Percyslage Chigora and Dorothy Goredema, "Zimbabwe-Russia Relations in the 21st Century," *Turkish Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 4 (2010): 187-88.

⁶¹⁵ Vince Musewe, "From Russia with Love!," in *Country Reports* (Zimbabwe: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Foundation) Zimbabwe, 2014).

⁶¹⁶ "Russia advocates the supremacy of international law and respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries," The Kremlin, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/32442>.

Russia's trade engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (and many other African states) pales in comparison to that of its BRICS partners. For example, in 2012 Africa only constituted two percent of Russia's total trade.⁶¹⁷ However, the imposition of sanctions against the state in the West has made engagement with Africa significantly more appealing.⁶¹⁸ Although now it is the only BRICS state that does not appear as part of the top ten trade partners in the case study SMS states, there is abundant opportunity to increase engagement in this area. Yet, as it stands, trade with Zimbabwe over the years has been very low. In 2014, for instance, imports from the state amounted to a mere US\$89,000, which was almost entirely from art pieces and antiques. Exports to the state were US\$54.6 million and consisted mainly of cereals and fertilisers.⁶¹⁹ This difference indicates a serious trade imbalance between the states and considering that one of Russia's biggest imports from the continent is tobacco – which is also one of Zimbabwe's prominent exports – it is surprising they do not exchange the commodity. Angola's trade with Russia has also been significantly low. In 2011 total trade only amounted to US\$36 million, which is likely because both state's economies are highly dependent on hydrocarbons.⁶²⁰ Mozambique's fortunes with Russia have been significantly better than those of its counterparts. In fact, in 2014 imports from the state consisted of tobacco, machinery and animal produce, totalling US\$152.2 million. Exports were significantly less at US\$35.7 million, creating a healthy trade surplus for Mozambique, which imported mainly cereals and electronic equipment.⁶²¹ It is necessary to note here that despite the expressed intentions of increased cooperation by the Russian heads of state, trade with the case study states (and many other African states) does not live up to the historical and political relationship they claim.

Similarly, Russia's investment and cooperation with African countries has been somewhat lacklustre compared to the other BRICS countries, although significantly better than in trade. Russia's cooperation lies in the areas of energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, fishing, education, health, tourism, and military-technical assistance. In 2014, however, the state invested an estimated US\$20 billion across the continent in a number of projects

⁶¹⁷ Ana Alves, Alexandra Arkhangelskaya, and Vladimir Shubin, "Russia and Angola: The Rebirth of a Strategic Partnership?," in *Global Powers and Africa Programme* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013), 17.

⁶¹⁸ Shishkov, "Back to Africa: US Beating Drums Over Russia's New Geostrategic Pivot".

⁶¹⁹ "Zimbabwean-Russian Bilateral Trade in 2015," Russian Exports National Information Portal, <http://www.rusexporter.com/research/country/detail/4625/>.

⁶²⁰ Alves, Arkhangelskaya, and Shubin, "Russia and Angola: The Rebirth of a Strategic Partnership?," 16.

⁶²¹ "Mozambican-Russian Bilateral Trade in 2015," Russian Exports National Information Portal, <http://www.rusexporter.com/research/country/detail/4584/>.

across various sectors.⁶²² In Zimbabwe, Russia's interest has mostly been in the mining sector in which it has made significant investments such as the 2014 Darwendale platinum mine by the Russian investors Rostec, VI Holdings and Vnesheconombank, which is said to be one of the biggest investments made in the Zimbabwe since independence.⁶²³ There have been concerns raised about the possibility of additional agreements between Russia and Zimbabwe, owing to Rostec being the state's biggest arms manufacturer.⁶²⁴

A cause for concern for the Western community is the renewed, increased arms sales of Russia in both north and SSA. The state's main exports are weaponry and natural resources. It is only second to America in weaponry and also has a competitive advantage because their weapons are more "affordable". Coupled with the relative difficulty of procuring weapons from America, this has made Russia a good alternative to sate the high demand in Africa. The state has also been training military and police personnel similar to that offered by the USSR pre-1991, although Musewe notes that these exchanges are hardly ever made public knowledge.⁶²⁵ In 2011 the state was responsible for 11 percent of the weapons supplied to SSA. This figure will definitely rise as one of the state's key sales agents, Rosoboronexport, is engaged in investments in a number of African states including Angola, Mozambique and, more recently, Zimbabwe. In 2013 Angola signed a US\$1 billion arms deal with the company for the supply of military equipment (mostly eighteen Su-30K fighter jets), the construction of an ammunitions plant and the provision of maintenance services. Rosoboronexport also hosted an arms exhibition *Africa Aerospace and Defence 2014* in Johannesburg which was attended by over 25 African countries.⁶²⁶ These are clear indications of the intentions of the company to significantly increase sales in Africa.

⁶²² Shishkov, "Back to Africa: US Beating Drums Over Russia's New Geostrategic Pivot".

⁶²³ Musewe, "From Russia with Love!"; Owen Gagare, "Zim, Russia uneasy bedfellows," Zimbabwe Independent <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2015/05/15/zim-russia-uneasy-bedfellows/>. (accessed February 3, 2016).

⁶²⁴ Wongaim Zhangazha, "Arms deal behind platinum project," Zimbabwe Independent, <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/09/19/arms-deal-behind-platinum-project/>. (accessed September 25, 2015).

⁶²⁵ Musewe, "From Russia with Love!."

⁶²⁶ *ibid.*; Kester Kenn Klomegah, "Russia eyes Africa to boost arms sales," The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/04/arms-trade-africa> (accessed April 7, 2016); "Angola Inks \$1Bn Arms Deals With Russia - Paper," Sputnik News, <http://sputniknews.com/military/20131016/184180992/Angola-Inks-1Bln-Arms-Deals-With-Russia-Paper.html> (accessed May 2, 2016); Zhangazha, "Arms deal behind platinum project".

4.4 The Political Challenge of Engagement

All BRICS states have assumed a deliberate foreign policy towards political, economic and social engagement with the African continent, and specifically in the cases of Angola and Mozambique. The political security that these state's relationship with BRICS has afforded them seemingly encourages them to take increasing ownership of their development paths, which is spurred by the large amounts of financing made available through these same relationships and in some ways undermines the established global system and standards. These relationships have in many ways failed to foster the development of good governance or political structures that bring together the various institutions of government and facilitate trustful relations between the state its people.⁶²⁷ The SMS have in many respects failed to foster good governance since 2001. This failure is evidenced by their poor performance and marginal improvements on the CPI used to determine the quality and competency of government within a state (as outlined in Chapter Two and discussed in Chapter Three).⁶²⁸

Many scholars, for example Brautigam, Knack, Keohane, and international authorities acknowledge the importance of governance in the effective running of a state, as this directly affects all aspects of development within a state.⁶²⁹ It is noted that the instability of government translates directly into, *inter alia*, the volatility of policy, corruption, poor social provision and development, poor infrastructure and degraded natural environments, all of which contribute to unsustainable development, as is evidenced by the SMS in various ways throughout this chapter. More significant efforts need to be made by the SMS to promote harmony between economic endeavours and environmental sustainability and social inclusion and inequality (especially for disadvantaged groups such as children, youth and women).⁶³⁰ As mentioned previously, the BRICS states' use of conditionality based on social and political issues is very limited, if not avoided completely. This strategy of "non-intervention" is one of the most detrimental elements of their engagement. Owen, as he is quoted by Development Initiatives, argues that, "In general we should judge aid by its

⁶²⁷ UNDP, "Governance for Sustainable Development: Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development Framework."; Weber, "Q&A with Mark Robinson: The Role of Good Governance in Sustainable Development".

⁶²⁸ Thirlwall, *Economics of Development*: 121.


⁶²⁹ See: Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa."; Robert Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002); Stephen Knack, "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," *Southern Economic Journal* 68, no. 2 (2001); UNDP, "Governance for Sustainable Development: Integrating Governance in the Post-2015 Development Framework."

⁶³⁰ Weber, "Q&A with Mark Robinson: The Role of Good Governance in Sustainable Development".

direct impact on people to whom it is given, not by its effects on political change or economic growth.”⁶³¹ The researcher would agree with this assertion because all too often the blame of inappropriately used or misdirected aid is placed on the donor. However, in the cases mentioned above, the donors have committed beyond the expected norms and the challenge and initiative of making use of the human capital is in the hands of the recipient state. It is disheartening to acknowledge that a crucial project such as the SMM in Mozambique may fail to stay operational after it is handed over to the state. It is up to the state to ensure that this does not happen; however, state capacity has been proven time and again in the SMS to be poor for reasons of, *inter alia*, an absence of trained personnel and funding as well as corruption.

Whilst BRICS and the wider international community make efforts to provide funding to support social inclusion and environmental development and engage in trade, it is the view of the researcher that this fourth political element is one which needs to be taken into more serious consideration in the World Bank’s Sustainability Model. It forms an integral part of the sustainability prospects of the SMS and many other developing states. This addition is illustrated in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6: An adapted representation of the World Bank Sustainability Model⁶³²



⁶³¹ n.a., "Investments to End Poverty: Real money, real choices, real lives."
⁶³² "Sustainable Development".

The inclusion of a political or governance aspect provides a strong incentive for the promotion of policy and programme transformation in favour of sustainable development. A synergy is encouraged for all four quadrants, as government prioritises equitable development. A renewed focus on public spending towards this outcome will inadvertently lead to improved harmony and traction towards sustainable development. The opportunities to take part in “policy-making rather than -taking” presented by BRICS and other emergent engagements make it an ideal for the honing of policy forming and implementation capabilities.⁶³³

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter began with an overview of BRICS’ engagement with African states in the new millennium. This section was followed by an exploration of each BRICS country’s engagement with the SMS in terms of trade, aid and investment with a focus on particular areas of engagement with impacts on sustainable development. The chapter concluded with a discussion on the challenge of good governance and issues of corruption in the SADC member states, and how these have affected sustainable development in relation to BRICS’ engagement. In all three states the issue of poor governance has been very apparent, especially where trade and investment are concerned.

Furthermore, although four of the five BRICS are “top 10” traders with the SMS and play an integral role in creating income and providing various resources available in return, one of the biggest challenges for Mozambique and in particular Angola is that there has not been enough effort to diversify trade through investing in other sectors of the economy. The engagement of BRICS and their investors do offer opportunities for this to happen under the guidance of the government, but this investment must come with specific set of expectations set out clearly for both parties, which must be upheld. Another matter that illustrates poor governance is Mozambique’s failure to control the Chinese illegal timber logging, which has also exposed the extreme corruption and clientelism rampant within its government. Serious efforts must also be made within these states to be more self-sufficient. Aid has been helpful, but the provision of technical assistance and cooperation

⁶³³ Shaw, ““African Agency” to Maximize the Continent’s Policy Choices after a Decade of the BRICS: Beyond Dependency?.” pg227

by China, Brazil and India in ICT, health and agriculture in particular offers opportunities for advancement, especially through training.

Together, the BRICS form a multifaceted unit, which is engaging Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in various ways and at varying degrees. Although it cannot be said that this engagement has been completely beneficial, each state and type of engagement has vastly redeeming features for at least one of the case studies. BRICS FDI have had a substantial effect on the economies of the SMS, effectively driving the resources on demand because they are also the biggest buyers of these states exports.⁶³⁴ The challenge of infrastructure in the African states has not deterred BRICS investment, as is often argued.⁶³⁵ Instead, they have doubled efforts to assist Zimbabwe and Angola, and Mozambique in particular, to invest in and advance their infrastructure in a wide array of sectors and contributed to SADCs wider infrastructural needs as well. Although there are elements that are cause for concern, i.e. the tying of funding to procurement from a partner, the link of many projects to natural resource exchanges and, in cases like that of Angola's apartment buildings, they do not take away from the fact that development has taken place.

Ultimately, the absence of stringent and pre-stipulated guides for development cooperation for the BRICS (excluding Russia) such as those used by Official Development Aid (ODA) has allowed the cooperative an unprecedented freedom and flexibility to engage the states in myriad ways. The lack of these constrictions has also allowed them to respond to the real and emergent needs of their partners in a way that has not been done before. The accessibility of platforms like FOCAC and the Brazil Africa Forum has given freedom to African states to have a say and hand in whatever they request cooperation for. The increased involvement of MNCs in this cooperation comes with both benefits and challenges. Whilst it has increased capital flow exponentially, unsustainable practices and exploitation are possibilities.

⁶³⁴ le Clus-Rossouw, Viviers, and Loots, "Is there a link between BRIC foreign direct investment and SADC export performance?," 665.

⁶³⁵ Nkuna, "Intra-SADC Foreign Direct Investment: A Gravity Approach to South Africa Outward Investment," 82.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

Throughout the study it has become increasingly evident that “BRICS offers an historic opportunity to explore new models and approaches towards more equitable and inclusive global growth by emphasising complementarities and building on [members’] respective economic strengths.”⁶³⁶ The relationships emergent between the BRICS and Africa are proving to be a positive economic force, although it is still uncertain if these partnerships will yield positive results for social and economic development in the long term – that is, if they will be sustainable. It is the belief of the researcher that the benefits of these engagements can only be fully enjoyed if their sustainability is ensured through well-coordinated policy formation and implementation. The importance of good governance is underscored in this respect, because neither policy formation nor its implementation can be executed well in its absence. This concluding chapter will provide a brief summation of the key findings of this study guided by the research questions and thereafter provide suggestions for future research.

5.2 Key Findings

This study aimed to answer the question:

What role has BRICS played in contributing to sustainable development in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe through its engagement (trade, investment and aid)?

The study was also guided by the following research sub-questions:

How have the concepts of “development” and “sustainable development” evolved?

The aim of Chapter Two was to address this question. As evidenced by the chosen chronological structure of the chapter, the concepts of development and sustainable development have evolved significantly since the post-WWII era to encompass the ever changing needs of the state. Earlier in this evolution, development was focused on economic growth, but as time went on concerns became more focused on human or social development. Later in this evolution the environment became an integral element of development, thus forming the sustainable development triangle in which the economic,

⁶³⁶ "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation."

social and environmental elements are considered. These are the elements considered in this study; however, it must be noted that good governance plays an integral role in the sustainability of economic, social and environmental development.

How, if at all, has international economic engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe contributed to their sustainable development prior to BRICS' involvement?

This question was explored in Chapter Three. It was found that international economic engagement has contributed to a disharmony of the elements of sustainable development discussed above. Initially, this was a legacy or inheritance of the colonial era, but later this disharmony was a product of the engagements of IGOs such as the Bretton Woods institutions, which have played a significant role in guiding development efforts – particularly under the ideals of the Washington Consensus. The result has been, *inter alia*, poverty, poor integration into the global financial system and rapidly degrading natural environments. At this point it is important to note the efforts of other IGOs such as the UNDP that have made significant positive contributions to social and environmental development. Today, former colonial and Western powers still play a dominant role in African development, contributing a significant amount of trade, aid and investment. This role has bolstered development on the continent, especially in terms of social development in which a number of NGOs and IGOs such as the UNDP and WHO are involved. Western economic impact, however, has perpetuated (alongside BRICS) the poor integration of African economies into the world economic system.

How, if at all, has BRICS' economic engagement in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2014 contributed to sustainable (economic, social and environmental) development?

Throughout the study it became clear that one of the more significant challenges faced by developing states were largely linked to economic income and financing for development. In the broader sense of economic engagement this is an area in which BRICS has contributed significantly since 2001 and, in the instance of the SMS, has exceeded traditional engagement by providing more accessible funding in larger quantities with more generous (as a result of significant debt forgiveness and willingness to lend larger quantities) and flexible (as a result of lower interest rates and longer terms of repayment) terms. This finding highlights some the challenges the SMS have faced in moving towards sustainable development through international economic engagement. The long-perpetuated top-down approach of traditional western partners and IGOs, coupled with stringent conditionalities, created a system in which economic development stagnated. It cannot go without saying, however, that significant strides have been made in the social aspect of sustainable development through the use of programmes such as the MDGs and various bilateral and multilateral efforts. Efforts towards environmental

sustainability have largely taken the form of international agreements but are not fully engaged or exercised.

This issue has been worsened by the engagement of Chinese corporations, which have contributed to massive environmental degradation in Zimbabwe through mining and potentially irreparable deforestation in Mozambique in the forestry sector. However, the engagement of Brazil and China in efforts towards agricultural development has resulted in some benefits for the SMS as they have made headway in improving food security in Mozambique and commercial agricultural produce – tobacco – in Zimbabwe. These activities have also contributed to increased trade, which is the dominant aspect of BRICS' engagement. Although the figures are very encouraging, the trade that the cooperative engages in with African nations is largely dependent on primary commodities, that is, precious minerals and stones, ores and agricultural produce (such as gold, platinum, diamonds, tobacco and cotton), and much of the profits made through these exchanges benefit the investor, whether it be the investing nation or corporations and investors from these nations. This pattern has, unfortunately, led to a slowness in growth and diversification of African economies. This result draws attention to the long-term unsustainability of their engagement in trade.

FDI is another area in which BRICS is proving to be prominent and increasingly active. China, India and Brazil now contribute well over 21 percent of the continent's FDI, which is an extremely positive contributor to much of the (relatively slow) growth and development being experienced across the continent.⁶³⁷ Improvements in the areas of infrastructure for social provision and development endeavours are potentially areas in which BRICS could have the largest impact owing to its FDI. However, it is important to note the essential need for good governance in order to ensure that the investment is beneficial for both parties. In all the SMS cases studies, the willingness of some investors to bribe officials and break the law is disconcerting, but it does point to the seriousness of corruption within these states.

Aid through monetary donations and in-kind has been an effective element in facilitating development. This is especially so in terms of social development, particularly in the area of skills development, education and infrastructure. The training centres, schools and scholarships coupled with distinct programmes as the case for Brazil and India may be beneficial, as the availability of an adequately educated and competent population are key components to maximising benefits of the exchanges and encouraging local recruitment by foreign investors.

⁶³⁷ UNECA, "Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa."

It is the conclusion of the researcher that BRICS' engagement with the SADC member states of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is currently not sustainable. This decision was reached after considering that two of the three components of engagement, namely trade and investment, have elements that can be considered to be actively countering sustainable development in the states. However, with the incorporation of good governance principles, it is possible that this challenge can be overcome.

5.3 Recommendations for further study

The findings of this study suggest that further exploration of BRICS' involvement in SADC would be important to ascertain exactly how influential the cooperative could be in the region and on the continent. Secondly, should this suggestion be taken into consideration and funding be available, it would be beneficial to conduct field research so as to attain first-hand evidence for the study.

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