

2475/3873

Rd.

hip

cro,

on

ears

is to
the

rding
to the

MONASH UNIVERSITY
THESIS ACCEPTED IN SATISFACTION OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ON... 5 July 2002

.....
Sec. Research Graduate School Committee

Under the copyright Act 1968, this thesis must be used only under the normal conditions of scholarly fair dealing for the purposes of research, criticism or review. In particular no results or conclusions should be extracted from it, nor should it be copied or closely paraphrased in whole or in part without the written consent of the author. Proper written acknowledgement should be made for any assistance obtained from this thesis.

ERRATA

p 2 para 2, first sentence: "are often blurred" for "is often blurred".

p 2 para 3, first sentence: "An interesting dilemma" for "One of the interesting dilemmas".

p 4 para 3, second sentence: "issues which drive" for "issues which drives".

p 6 para 2, seventh sentence: "are external" for "as external".

p 7 para 1, second sentence: "philosophy of a universal" for "philosophy a universal".

p 7 para 2, sixth sentence: "Baumgarten's claim ... opposing assertion" for "Baumgarten's claims ... opposing assertions".

p 156 para 2, second sentence: "ethical position" for "ethical postion".

The Metaphysical Grounds for the Modern Relationship between Aesthetics and Ethics.

Submitted by
Kenneth Desmond Felstead, MA. (Deakin University)

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

School of Literary, Visual and Cultural Studies.
Monash University.

July 2001

Table of Contents.

Summary.	i
Signed Statement.	iii
Acknowledgements.	iv
1. Introduction.	1
2. Schiller's <i>Das Ideal und das Leben / The Ideal and Life</i> .	12
3. Metaphysics, the Undulating Landscape of the Shadowlands and Beyond.	24
4. An Exordium from the Blessed on the Olympus of Philosophy.	37
5. Kant's Aesthetics.	58
6. Friedrich Schiller's <i>On The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters</i> .	102
7. The Nature of the Natural in Man.	126
8. Laocoön: The Tragic Art of Suffering.	148
9. From Myth to Truth.	184
10. Shimmering Spaces Beyond the Shadowland.	214
Appendix.	225
Bibliography of Works Cited.	241

Summary.

The Metaphysical Grounds for the Modern Relationship between Aesthetics and Ethics is a study which strives to achieve an understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. It develops that understanding prompted by the allusions to that relationship found in Friedrich Schiller's poem *Das Ideal und das Leben* (*The Ideal and Life*). It considers the views of Schiller and his direct influence, Kant, both of whom can be considered to be at the cusp of the beginning of modern thought. Plato's and Aristotle's views provide an historical framework for the modern ideas about this relationship. Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger represent a variety of positions in its development.

The study gives consideration to how that relationship might be perceived to exist. It uses a narrow definition of metaphysics to investigate the description of perceptions of existence and the necessary relationships which form that existence. It also pursues the later perspective by Heidegger which rejects a traditional possibility of metaphysics.

Kant's and Schiller's ideas about aesthetics and ethics are examined in detail: Kant's through his *Critique of Pure Reason*, his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and his *Critique of Judgement*; Schiller's through his *On The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*.

Ideas, particularly those of Rousseau's, about how we perceive the nature of man, are introduced into the discussion because of their influence on the perception of the aesthetic-ethics relationship.


A close consideration of Schiller's poetic declarations about the unspeakable pain caused by humanity's suffering in the twelfth stanza of his poem pursues the understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics through the moment in which it reveals itself in art. This extends into a detailed discussion of Hegel's, Nietzsche's and Heidegger's attitudes to the relationship, and constitutes a major

component in the development of our understanding.

This is followed by a discussion which evokes the ancient squabble between art and philosophy. It investigates the positions of the various thinkers on the capacity for art to find and to reveal both rational and non-rational truth.

Statement.

This thesis contains no material which has been presented for a degree or diploma at any other university or institution. It contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where duly acknowledged.



Kenneth Felstead.

July 2001

Acknowledgements.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Associate Professor Walter Veit, for his contribution to this study. Without his considerable knowledge and his understanding of the broader landscape surrounding this focus, I would have floundered around in waters often far from the coast of the land of my destination. I am particularly grateful to him for calling to my attention Schiller's *Das Ideal und das Leben*, and for making me aware that this study could revolve around it. His attention to the derivation of words contributed considerably to my understanding of the importance of historical influence on their meaning, and at the same time, it raised my awareness of their dependency on context, both historical and textual. I am also appreciative of his attention to nuances of meaning in words difficult to translate and sometimes missing even in highly regarded English translations of texts. His more wide reaching comments and criticisms have, of course, contributed significantly to those elements in this work which might be considered successful.

I owe much to Dawn. Without her encouragement I would not have embarked on this study, and without her support I would not have completed it.

I am also grateful to the many students and academics whose papers and views I had the opportunity to listen to. In particular, many of the presentations and discussions by members of Professor Veit's postgraduate circle informed and stimulated me, even though their subject areas are not directly aligned with mine. They gave me the opportunity to look at ideas from a different perspective, and to test (through my thought processes if not always through discussion) those ideas against my interest.

1. Introduction.

The prime task for this study is to achieve an understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Now, when I say *the* relationship, it appears that the relationship is singular, therefore making the task apparently straight forward. This is certainly not the case, just as it is not the case that any understanding will be directly transferable to all situations and times when this relationship is perceived to exist. So that when I speak of the relationship, it should be taken as meaning the relationship within the context of the position taken which forms that particular perception of the relationship. The question of that relationship is made more complex by the fluctuations in the meanings and uses of the words *aesthetics* and *ethics*. Before I attempt to confine these problems, I will express the focus in slightly different terms, and phrase it as a question, purely in an effort to indicate the direction of my interest. Is there a relationship between art and how we live or should live, and if so what is it? This later expression has problems of its own, so it should be remembered that it is an indication of direction only, and that it is intended to signal my focus in general on art and its connection to the way we choose to act.

The word *aesthetics*, with its meaning of that which is perceived by the senses, has been used predominantly since Baumgarten's introduction of the word into our modern vocabulary, to indicate the balance of sensitivities required for a critical awareness of the arts. While this is the thrust of the basis on which I choose the word as a focus, I recognize, however, that the word is not always strictly confined to that meaning. It is also applied to an awareness of the senses outside of the realm of art. Kant's science of sensuous perception is a case in point. There are also important and defining considerations from before the current use of the word from the likes of Plato and Aristotle which fall into the category of aesthetics. Although the arts are generally

considered by the thinkers considered in this study as epitomising the awareness of the senses and our physical relationship to the world (often through the process of art functioning as a microcosm), I do not insist on considering what is said about aesthetics only if it is applied to art. But I am interested in what is said about aesthetics on a broader front in relation to what that might mean for aesthetics in relation to art, and, of course, in its implications for ethics.

The meanings of the words *ethics* and *morals* is often blurred and their use is frequently considered to be interchangeable. However, they do have distinct meanings in the areas of study for which they are the focus. In general, *ethics* is used to refer to the theory of how one *ought* to act, and *morals* refers to the practice.¹ There is usually an inference in the use of the words ethics or morals that the action which is connected to them is 'good' or praiseworthy. This study does not enter into the question of the veracity of the choices made. Of greater interest are the grounds on which a sense of the 'truth' which governs those choices is understood. The possibilities exist in a division which is found to be an underlying factor in this study. Choices are made either on the basis of that which exists as an intrinsic value such as good in itself or beauty as good in itself, or on the basis the importance of pursuing for its own sake what is determined in a variety of ways that which is good or right. However, in general, I use the word *ethics* simply to indicate a process of thought by which the individual chooses his actions.

One of the interesting dilemmas which arises in a choice of action stems from the tension brought about by the desires of an individual and those of his community. That the words *ethics* and *morals* are both linked in origin to *ethos* (with its sense of the spirit of a culture or community) brings to the fore the question of how an individual reconciles the choice of action made by that individual with the culture or community in which they make that choice. Some of the thinkers in this study address that question.

¹ Johnson, Oliver A. 'An Introduction to the Study of Ethics' in *Ethics. Selections from classical and Contemporary Writers*. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 1965) p2

My use of the word *modern* in the title of this study is intended to indicate not so much a set time period, but rather, a period from which works of art incorporate some of a particular range of attitudes. These attitudes include a rejection of traditional values and assumptions derived from systemic morality; a display of commitment to a self referential construction of meaning; a privileging of the inner sense of the individual over social man, giving considerable credence to the unconscious; a sense of alienation and despair deriving from a reasoned loss of intrinsic values; and the expression of these ideas in often fragmented and apparently unordered forms as reflections or representations of those ideas. They are attitudes which derive in part from Kant's articulation of a change in the way we know about things. It is not within the range of the study to discuss that modern relationship. My study simply sets out to establish an understanding of the grounds on which contemporary thought is established.

The focus for the examining of the aesthetics and ethics relationship is confined to a small number of thinkers of whom it can be said they represent significant positions from which later attitudes to this relationship are developed. While it is certainly true that Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger do not exist in isolation, and that a study of other thinkers could have contributed significantly to our understanding of the aesthetic-ethics relationship, those named seem to me to best represent to a large degree the parameters of the attitudes to that relationship. While the investigation is focussed on these thinkers, I attempt to place their positions broadly in context with what I acknowledge is a highly condensed outline of the initiating elements of the relationship as articulated by Plato and Aristotle.

Two issues should be quickly addressed before moving on. The thinkers under consideration in this study only ever use *he* as the personal pronoun. I have retained that practice only because it is a closer reflection of their expression. Second, translations of texts always provide some problems. While I have attempted to use translations made by recognized experts in their fields, some words and phrases are translated in ways which

can provide traps for the unwary and the unskilled. I have been fortunate in having the linguistic skills of Associate Professor Walter Veit (as I have already acknowledged) to assist me in avoiding where possible those skewed meanings. The translations of Schiller's *Das Ideal und das Leben* which were available to me is a case in point. In some instances in those translations, the lines were rearranged and the imagery made the meaning more ambiguous. Professor Veit's linear translation enabled me to obtain a clearer reading of the poem, even if it still required me to test particular inflections of meaning against the German text.

While Schiller's poem constitutes the central core around which the study or the relationship between aesthetics and ethics revolves, the investigation consists of several components. The first considers how the relationship might exist. The next outlines the origins of the ideas which drive the perceptions of such a relationship. Because they represent the major impetus for the modern understanding of this relationship, Chapters five and six examine Kant's and Schiller's ideas in detail. Perceptions of the nature of man are discussed with their influence on the apprehension of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in mind. This leads to the important consideration of the moment in art which, for each of the thinkers, demonstrates art's relationship with ethics. The next section considers why these thinkers allocate to art a special place in the evoking and presentation of an understanding of ethics. And the final section revisits the consideration of how in the light of changing attitudes, that relationship might continue to exist.

The study begins with an examination of Schiller's poem *Das Ideal und das Leben* - *The Ideal and Life*. That examination unveils the issues which drives the investigation. The poem results from Schiller's own inquiries into the ideas associated with art and its place in the world. Critical to his work are ideas about how our nature and the physical world interact with how we believe we should act in the world. The issues canvassed by

the poem make it an ideal vehicle for asking 'what is the relationship between aesthetics and ethics?' The examination recognizes that the piece of work under investigation is primarily a poem. This is important for later discussions about knowledge and ways of communicating. Schiller constructs his poem by condensing and presenting elements of concepts which he uses as indicators for the imagery which follows. He uses the technique to both convey and demonstrate his ideas about the pain of existence afforded by the limitations imposed by the physical, time and death. The artist is used to allude to that sense of soul and reason through which we share the possibilities of an immortality by its relative independence and its capacity to guide and control his physical product. In the case of the artist it is the work of art. By extrapolation, the work of art is the making of the physical aspect, the choices of how we live. That aspiration for overcoming these limitations reveals itself as an ideal, and inevitably unachievable in the most desirable sense. Schiller turns to art to provide the example which reveals the only way in which that aspiration can be achieved. The answer lies in how we choose to use our mind. If we willingly and actively choose to accept the limitations of the corporeal world, we achieve a form of immortality. The physical is accepted with its limitations. The mind gains control of its physical life, not only of how it conducts life, but ultimately by taking complete charge of life by including the only form of control available to it of the pain and the limitations which physicality and time place on it. This is the point where Schiller's aesthetics and ethics meet.

Having found this focus, I move to a broader view in a chapter which looks at the idea of relationship and how a relationship such as that which we are considering might be said to exist. It is, I suggest, conveniently housed under the notion of a metaphysics. Metaphysics is itself a word which does not evoke an immediate agreement about its meaning. I choose to use it to describe perceptions of existence and the necessary relationships which form that existence. This chapter draws a picture of perceptions of interactions between the senses and the mind and ways of knowing 'reality'. It briefly

outlines Plato's speculation of nature derived from without, and then balances it against Aristotle's understanding of the substance of existence from within the corporeal world. For Aristotle, it is the characteristic which makes something what it is that provides us with the means of knowing. The oppositions inherent in the positions demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle are turned around by Kant in a way which justifies why he is so important to this study. Knowledge for Kant is derived from experience of objects through the senses conforming to *a priori* concepts. The privileging of the individual and his concept over the objective world establishes a relationship which sees the experiences of the real world guided by those of the mind. The brief outline of these attitudes to relationships I think justifies my position that the understanding of the aesthetics-ethics relationship we are pursuing is, in a broadly defined sense, metaphysical.

The shaping of the issues and ideas about the relationship between the arts and ethics has its most recognizable origins in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Chapter four sets the scene so to speak by outlining their early attitudes to and ideas about art. It alludes to a number of issues and connections which find their way into the thoughts and frameworks of the thinkers in this study. Plato raises the issue of the artist's knowledge and capacity to convey truth. Arts can be dangerous for society because they are appealing to the senses and divert attention from the higher truths. If they are to play a part in society, they must instruct. Beauty and goodness as external and eternal in Plato's view. An outline of the ancient Greek usage of the words beautiful and good establishes an understanding of a linguistic interconnection which in some respects lays the ground for the later insistence on their continuing connection. Plato's views on art as an imitative process, his discussions of the various ways and conditions in which we describe something as beautiful, and his outline of the progressive elevation of understanding of beauty into a realm beyond the physical casts a pebble in the pond to create ripples that continue to lap at today's shores.

Art for Aristotle is an example of a way life comes to be. Its capacity to imitate

action indicates a capacity to realize rational choices, and it links the arts with the beautiful through order. The arts are linked to philosophy through the capacity shared with philosophy a universal rather than an individual focus, thereby making of art a means of linking the individual with the community. Aristotle's interest in Tragedy as the epitome of the arts resurfaces in Schiller and Nietzsche. Aristotle introduces the notion of pleasure to the purpose of art. This is adapted most notably by Nietzsche. While Tragedy offers the pleasure of catharsis, the highest pleasure the arts afford is contemplation. This provides one of the more immediate links which allows Schiller's development of the capacity for intellectual choices to overcome the limitations of the physical and to achieve a form of immortality.

Schiller acknowledges the substantial influence Kant has had on his thought. However, it is an influence which pushes well beyond Schiller to have considerable impact on contemporary thought. *Kant's Aesthetics* strives to establish an understanding of just how Kant perceives of our relationship with the world. It is a relationship which is dominated by reason. The word aesthetics is introduced into the modern vocabulary by Baumgarten. Baumgarten's claims for the possibility of knowledge through a science of sense perception sharpens Kant's opposing assertions that objects conform to our knowledge. In a more detailed account of Kant's views, this chapter outlines the thinking through which he establishes his ideas about the pleasures which are derived from a disinterested judgement and which through the critical faculty of taste is indicative of the development of moral ideas.

Schiller's alternative to Kant's insistence on the importance of reason over sense is developed in his *On The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. The chapter which explores this work brings to light Schiller's belief in man as an entity which, at an ideal, is a balanced interplay of the sensuous and the formal. It is in that developed state (acquired through education) in which man has achieved an awareness of both the sensuous and formal senses that he becomes truly aesthetic and beautiful. Beauty leads to

truth because it is in that middle aesthetic state where the balance of feeling and thinking is in equipoise that freedom of choice through contemplation is achievable. Schiller reinstates art as functioning as an exemplary process. Man's contemplative efforts are formed through a discourse which is enhanced by his natural proclivity to representation or semblance. It is the pleasure in what he does rather than what he is given that marks the progress in man of his developing humanity and his contribution to culture. Schiller's perception of the play of the material and the formal elements of man, and the use of art as the example of the embodiment of that ideal, constitute the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, the subject of this study.

In *The Nature of the Natural in Man* I suggest that the various notions of aesthetics and ethics discussed thus far develop a relationship between those entities on the basis of the differences between mind and body and the governing perceptions of the nature of man. Consequently, an outline of the concepts of man as an outcome of perceptions of nature throws considerable light on the various outlines of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. This chapter introduces for the first time an introductory consideration of thought by Hegel, Nietzsche and Hegel. And it also examines Rousseau's highly influential views about nature. Rousseau's views are confined to this chapter, serving only to inform us of the grounds on which the views of Kant and Schiller were built. Rousseau established an understanding of the nature of man as both an individual and a participant in community. Man is, in his view, essentially a feeling animal which develops into a communal being by rationalizing his feelings. This places Kant's move to the other side of the fence and his discernment of reason as the means of articulating man's own nature, into an historical perspective. Schiller takes the view that man's divided nature is, by nature, capable of learning to balance the opposing drives and to make choices in an environment which does not suffer from the undue emphasis of one drive over the other. Hegel is shown to perceive of nature as a unified whole. Nietzsche finds the impetus for life in life itself. Heidegger suggests that by nature we impose

meaning on the world in which we find ourselves, and we choose what we consider is currently the truth of the object or the situation through an intuitive recognition. Armed with this understanding of the nature of man we are ready to embark on an examination of the point of contact between art and ethics.

Laocoön: The Tragic Art of Suffering closely examines Schiller's perception of the point at which art and ethics meet and operate. It takes its impetus from the twelfth stanza of his *Ideal and Life* which speaks of the unspeakable pain Laocoön experiences in his inequitable struggle against the limitations of his existence. After briefly looking at the backgrounds to various representations of the story, including that by Virgil and the rediscovered Roman sculpture made famous in descriptions by Pliny, the word sympathy and its relation to pathos is outlined. Kant's uses of the words are set out to provide a comparison with Schiller who argues that the experience of sympathy can move us to adopt an ethical position. He outlines his understanding of the term sublime. When applied to the individual, it represents someone who, while succumbing to the fearful, does not fear it. It is an acceptance and a willing of the inevitable. It is a separation of our moral selves from the sensuous part of our being. We also look at how that sense of the sublime is portrayed in art, and with it, the role of the artist. Schiller's argument eventually speaks for a non-prescriptive art, an art which, instead, convinces us by the evoking of an empathy which encourages us to embrace and share the tragic moment, that an individual can rise to the dignified height of humanity through an act of will.

The same question is then asked in turn of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Hegel differs significantly with Schiller in his perception of free will. Hegel's perception of free will is tightly tied to the Absolute, which is a marriage of concept and the phenomenal world, a complete knowing and being, but at the same time it is not fixed, but is, rather a developing process of becoming. Art can represent all that is in the minds of man. It has the capacity to present emotions in a way which permits a distancing and therefore a disinterested contemplation so that we are freed from the emotion and able to reconcile

the sensory form with its concept or meaning and its consequent truth.

Nietzsche's ideas on the subject culminate in the suggestion that tragedy instills a fundamental comfort in the spectator by conveying a sense that life itself underlies everything. He credits the Greek satyr chorus with the successful consignment of experience of living to the audience. It acts as an empathic intermediary for the spectator and intercedes between him and the Dionysian state with its acknowledgement of the full range of emotions and its awareness of the horror of existence, by transforming that knowledge through the symbolism of dance, tone and words into a dream like Apollinian vision which conveys a veiled sense of the nearness of the redemptive driving force of life.

For Heidegger pain occurs in the separation from an authentic nature. Thrown into a world not of his own choosing is Dasein's first instance of a lost opportunity to authentically be itself. Truth for authentic being is tied not to reason but to the possibilities offered in the world in which Dasein finds itself. His relationship of the aesthetic and the ethical hinges on listening to that inner voice which guides within the possibilities offered by the aesthetic world the authentic decision for the individual potentiality for Being.

Chapter nine considers the question why art champions the relationship between aesthetics and ethics when it presents in configurations such as sense and intellect and the beautiful and the good. In the main, the discussion reduces to the ancient question of whether art or philosophy is better situated to find and present the notion of truth. Presentation of the non-rational evokes an interest in myth and how it functions, raising comparisons with art. Kant's separation of art from knowledge, and his promotion of the merits of reason over feeling motivate Schiller's revision of the role of art. We look closely at Schiller's efforts to reinstate the imaginative as a legitimate force in the unveiling of truth through an acceptance of a disinterested semblance which exists because of the idea and satisfies the need for individual choice against the background of community values. He sees art as an ideal of humanity. His use of myth tells us much

about how he perceives art functions. It is a communal vocabulary with an open ended capacity to play with the meanings of images. Schiller's idea of the artist, then, develops into an understanding of mans creative capacity to contribute to the making of meaning and to institute its ethical premiss.

We ask of Hegel's *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics* the same general question. We follow his reasoning in order to understand his concern that art is perhaps to be outdone by the other sciences in its ability to attain to truth. It is a concern which hinges on his understanding of art as an expression of rational understanding. Nietzsche, on the other hand, rigorously advocates the use of art and its mythical and imaginative thought as a means for representing the joyous desires for life in conflict with the discordant phenomenal world and for presenting a transfiguring illusion to permit man to embrace individuation.

For Heidegger, art is both an historical assembling of individual understandings of the 'disclosedness of Being' and a means for the individual to fix in place his own truth. It is in the language of the arts that a way is found to represent that which is beyond every entity. Although unrepresentable as itself, its truth appears in the work as beauty. Our attraction to art and its beauty is a response to the appeal of the truth of Being.

The final chapter revisits the notion of the metaphysical assumptions which permit the development of an understanding of the existence of a relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Where the early chapter examined early ideas about these assumptions, this chapter reflects on the later position held by Heidegger and his rejection of traditional metaphysics. He rejects traditional metaphysics because of its fixed nature and its insistence on looking only at the truth of beings and not at the truth of Being. He argues instead for a thinking which is non representational, which is responsive to Being and which opens itself to the experience of Being.

The chapter finishes with a short conclusion.

2. Schiller's *Das Ideal und das Leben* / *The Ideal and Life*.

Schiller's poem *Das Ideal und das Leben* provides the focal and pivotal point for this body of work. In general terms, Schiller presents in poetic form an understanding of a set of relationships between man's physical existence and his world which transcends sensory experience. In presenting that relationship, Schiller suggests that art plays a significant role in the coming to terms with, and in the interplay of how, one world effects the other. This chapter achieves two goals. First, it establishes what the poem says. Second, because of the relationship between the subject matter and means by which the poem functions, an awareness of the poem functioning as a statement of concept evolving into image is incorporated into the discussion as a means of supporting and developing the meaning of the poem. The discussion is followed by a brief outline of the issues which both drive the poem and which form the basis for the investigation which develops from it.

Friedrich Schiller's poem *Das Ideal und das Leben*, written in 1799, is a creative distillation of an intellectual position which seeks to present an understanding of what man is through a proposition about how he relates to both the physical world and the world of thought. The perception of these worlds is not new. They are presented across time in a variety of guises, such as nature and the divine, body and soul, sense and reason, aesthetics and morality, and the relationship between the beautiful and the good. Schiller's poem, in some respects, stands on the cusp of these ideas in that it results from and yet furthers reflection on a history of previous beliefs and perceptions. Consequently, it stands as a significant point against which ideas are later adjusted and honed or rejected. The significance of the poem's place in this range of thought is that it represents a mature

expression of the modern and generally persisting notion of that movement of thought categorized as Romanticism, which, with its heightened consciousness of self, places the individual at the centre of life. That consciousness of self brings with it the perception of the individual as a part of nature and, at the same time, an awareness of individual possibilities: possibilities which include an awareness of the future and of death; and possibilities which involve the choice of how to act. Consequently, the relationship between what one is, and how one should be, finds itself central to man's declarations about what he is.

The naming of Schiller's poem, *The Ideal and Life* (*Das Ideal und das Leben*)¹ sets in place a juxtaposition which is indicative of a pattern to be repeated throughout the work, and indeed, Schiller's body of thought. I hesitate to label this pairing of the Ideal and Life and the other combinations he uses as opposites or polarities, because, although that classification might be appropriate at certain points in the work, their relationships do not remain fixed. Indeed, it is the notion of the relationship, how the individual components function and how the relationship is negotiated that forms the basis from which Schiller addresses the question 'what is the whole of man?'. Schiller also uses the poem itself as an example of this constant dialectic, and he employs it as a demonstration of the eventual integration of the constituent elements to form the ideal of man. From within each stanza and to the structure of the whole poem, concept and image are consistently arranged and paired against each other, until they merge in the story and image of Heracles.

The opening three lines of the poem construct a symbol of the ideal by alluding to the timelessness and the eternal existence of life itself by using the image of the pure reflection of the ethereal character of life enjoyed by the Olympian gods, those imaginary

¹ Schiller, Friedrich. 'Das Ideal und das Leben'. See Appendix.

entities in man's idealized and elevated image. The judicious use of 'clear like a mirror' (spiegelrein)² plays on, against and around the Platonic construction of the world as shadow to suggest an illusionary world of the mind, unencumbered by the physical and not distorted or stained by the intrusion of the temporal. Schiller contrasts the timelessness, and the consequent immutability of the ideal with the ephemeral nature of the physical world³ as he locates the human in a state of dilemma, having to choose, as he says, "*Between happiness of the senses and peace of the soul*".⁴ This human anguish indicates an awakening to the existence of a realm which is beyond the physical. As an onto-theological interpretation of human existence - interpreting a Judeo-Christian understanding of man through Platonic philosophy - the intellectual, the spiritual, the emotional, are non-physical aspects of the human. It is not necessary at this stage that they be separated and understood as specific areas of the non-physical. After all, in the wakening stages of his existence, man does not make that differentiation. At the outset, man simply becomes aware that there is something more beyond the physical senses, and that it is necessary to choose to accept that added dimension as part of being human. At that point of uncertainty and anxiety, the supreme resolution of the marriage of the two realms is projected as the image of the highest of the gods reflecting the ultimate success of the uniting of these elements.⁵ Here is a representation of the ideal human being.

If that ideal is your desire, Schiller says addressing the reader - if you want to be like those around us who have already achieved the ideal of a complete life, that is, living comfortably in the knowledge of the inevitability of death - admire the beauty of the

² Ibid. Line 1

³ Schiller, Friedrich. 'The Ideal and Life', Translator Walter Veit. Lines 3-6

⁴ Ibid. Line 7

⁵ Ibid. Lines 9 and 10

senses, but don't succumb to their charm.⁶ A surrender to the pleasure of and a preoccupation with the senses leads quickly to the dissipation of those senses through the loss of desire.⁷ Schiller makes no secret of the danger of ignoring the non-physical to the benefit of the sensuous. *The enjoyment of changeable pleasures / Is avenged quickly by the flight of desires.*⁸ He uses the word 'avenged' in the manner of 'a punishment'. It is an understandable emphasis given that for Schiller the inevitable result of a preoccupation with the senses is the punishment of death. This is because the ideal of human existence, for Schiller, results from the interacting relationship between the physical and the nonphysical, making both realms necessary. He hints at man's inability to achieve a sense of immortality if man is unable to step beyond the inevitability of the death of the physical and into its possibility through the mind. This view is reinforced somewhat by Schiller equating the exclusion of that which is beyond the physical senses with the death of the soul of the human being. The poem achieves this through the imagery of Proserpina, the daughter of Ceres.⁹ Despite the warnings of her saviour, Proserpina surrendered to the temptation of the physical senses by eating a pomegranate and found herself condemned to a lower life and the consequent death of the soul through eternal commitment to the god of the underworld.¹⁰

Schiller pursues the anxiety of this awareness of death and the consequent thought of the annihilation of the self when he compares the temporary nature of the physical with the immutability of the Ideal. The body, that emblem of physicality, is inevitably bound

⁶ Ibid. Lines 11, 12

⁷ Ibid. Lines 13 -16

⁸ Ibid Lines 15 and 16 (my emphasis)

⁹ Ceres is the Roman goddess associated with the legend of the Greek goddess Demeter. Persephone, the name of Demeter's daughter, is corrupted to Proserpina. *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*. Compiled, Paul Harvey. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984) p314

¹⁰ 'The Ideal and Life' Lines 17-20

to the limitations of time and death.¹¹ In contrast, the soul, the supreme Form ('die Gestalt'¹²) - that which is essentially beautiful - does not know these limitations. Using the words "If you want to hover high upon her wings" (*Wollt ihr hoch auf ihren Flügeln schweben*)¹³ Schiller creates an image which functions as a physical illustration of using the divine aspects of the soul as a vehicle to rise above the physical terrain. This symbolizes the means by which the anxiety, the fear and apprehension which is experienced in the awareness of the inevitability of death is overcome.

In an example of Schiller's poetic *modus operandi* where he converts ideas into palpable images, he employs the lines "Youthful, of all earthly stains / Free, in the radiance of perfection / Floats here humanity's image of gods,"¹⁴ to convey a sense of the idea of humanity; that something which can be perceived in man; the essence. He extends his image of the idea of humanity to a point where it is tangible enough to descend into the battle of life. As such, it *appears* in what was 'the mournful sarcophagus' of physical life as a victory.¹⁵ However, that Ideal does not negate the battle with life. It does not substitute for life. Nor does it allow us to avoid life. Life itself, and time, forces our involvement with it.¹⁶ Rather, the Ideal of the essentially beautiful soul and essence of humanity, becomes an encouragement. When the courage needed to face the limitations of the physical world begin to wane, that Ideal perched in that elevated position of the hill of beauty becomes a target for that flight from the pain.¹⁷ Schiller continues the metaphor of the battle to convey a sense of the difficulty of life and the effort it requires to engage

¹¹ Ibid. Lines 21-22

¹² Ibid. Line 26

¹³ Ibid. Line 27

¹⁴ Ibid. Lines 31-33

¹⁵ Ibid. Lines 37-40

¹⁶ Ibid. Lines 41-46

¹⁷ Ibid. Line 47-50

with it. He creates an image of the individual in conflict where the chance circumstances of the physical world are pitted against the courage it takes to battle them: '*When fighter storms against fighter/ On fortune's, on fame's course,*'.¹⁸ And like the chariots competing in the hippodrome where the purpose is to win the race, to win, or to 'force fate' against the vagaries of life, requires courage.¹⁹

It is a courage which finds its reward in the possibility of fulfilment through the exchange between body and soul, the achievement of a harmony between the demands of nature and reason. That harmony is suggested by the image of the nebulous stream of life housed in -enclosed- by the corporeality of cliffs. At first the stream of life is uncontrolled and chaotic. However, when it enters the 'silent shadowlands of beauty' or reason - an image which we can speculate is derived from the poetic logic which perceives of reason as that part of the broader realm of the soul which, by its existence is able to impose itself on, influence, or (poetically speaking) to throw a shadow on, the physical aspects of our lives - it flows smoothly.²⁰ The extremes of dawn and evening (Aurora and Hesperus) uniting in 'Grace's free bond' is a further indication of the interchange of what Schiller calls elsewhere 'predilection and obligation'²¹, or the marriage of the physical laws with the freedom to choose behaviour within those laws and limitations. However, Schiller indicates that as a result of this activity, the reconciled desires are only resting.²² This is an indication that the reconciliation is not a permanent solution. Because of the changing circumstances of life, and the consequential constancy of the negotiations between desire

¹⁸ Ibid. Lines 52 and 53

¹⁹ Ibid. Lines 55-60

²⁰ Ibid. Line 61-64

²¹ Schiller, Friedrich. *Schiller's Treatise Über Anmut Und Würde An Annotated Translation into English*. Trans. Leon Liebner. (University Microfilms International. Evanston Illinois. 1979)

²² 'The Ideal and Life.' Line 69

and the law, the union remains a goal; that 'target reached in flight'; an ideal.

It is this freedom of choice played against the physical laws - the compromise between desire and obligation - which constitutes the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. To put it another way: because man is, and is forced to live with both the physical aspect of his existence (over which he has no control over what he receives) and his mind, (the means for making his own decisions and choices), man imposes his choices on, and within the constraints of, the physical world. In the process of determining those choices, man develops an understanding of existence which he uses as the basis for his decisions. Consequently, man imposes meaning on the physical world and on the way in which he chooses to live.

The individual who best approaches the ideal of the negotiated interaction between the corporeal and the mind is exemplified by Schiller through the concept of the artistic genius. "*When - in order to animate the dead by giving it form, / (And) to wed himself to matter - / The genius blazes full of action...*".²³ The zeal, perseverance and commitment of the artistic genius to the moulding of his subject matter to his will is an image which serves Schiller's concept well. It allows him to imply that the creative element, the artist, can be found in everyone, and, at the same time, to suggest that the artist epitomizes the creative role of an approach to life. The artist, through his creation of the ideal in form (Gestalt) of an anthropomorphic sculpture of a god or goddess, or the story of an Heracles, gives meaning to his life and at the same time establishes an ethical premiss. The references to mythology throughout the poem lead easily to the assumption that the model for Schiller's genius as artist-sculptor is that of the Greek sculptor. This is a particularly useful metaphor, because the Greek artist-sculptor fashioned the human in a very life-like way. The images he created resemble the physical body of the human we see, thus negating the requirement of the observer to undergo a process of interpretation of the

image to comprehend that what he is seeing is (a representation of) a human being. Thus Schiller's imagery presents us with an understanding of man as artistic genius - that which brings into being - as creator of himself through the fashioning of the material in collaboration with that of thought. Man as we know him is man as he has made himself. And art becomes a metaphor for the development of a meaningful and ethical existence.

The reward for persevering to achieve this act of creativity - a meaningful life - is the beauty and the satisfaction which results from the success of the battle.²⁴ Schiller's suggestion of the slim and light image springing from nothing to stand before our delighted gaze,²⁵ implies a sense of freedom from the physical limitations of nature as a consequence of the imposition of beauty.²⁶ It is a delight derived from an appearance which has been shaped or understood by the projected Form rather than any delight in its pure materiality. And this is the difficulty.

When the raw elements of humanity are compared with the sheer force and grandeur of nature, and man suffers the guilt of not achieving the beauty of the ideal he has established as sacred, the truth of the 'gruesome chasm' separating man and his ideal emerges. Despite man's virtue and deeds, no man has achieved that ideal of becoming divine. In Schiller's words, "*No created being has reached that goal in flight*".²⁷

The answer to this dilemma, he suggests, is to step beyond (indeed he advocates more urgency: flee) the barrier of the senses and into the freedom of thought or reason.²⁸ The characteristics of the divine in their freedom from the anxiety, fear and apprehension of the inevitability of death can be achieved through making your will fulfill that godlike

²⁴ Ibid. Lines 81-90

²⁵ Ibid. Lines 85,86

²⁶ Ibid. Line 83

²⁷ Ibid. Line 97

²⁸ Ibid. Lines 101, 102

function.²⁹ This involves accepting what cannot be changed. Nature's laws enslave or control the mind only if the mind holds those laws in contempt in the mistaken belief that they can be ignored or conquered.³⁰ By accepting the inevitability of those laws, the effects of nature become less terrifying.³¹ As a visual illustration of this concept, Schiller returns to sculpture as a metaphor for our capacity to shape ourselves. Although the story of Laocoön and his sons wrestling with and being killed by serpents was known in story form from at least as far back as Virgil, the discovery in the 1500's of a famous statue from Roman times depicting Laocoön and his sons, and the discussions this statue evoked from Schiller's contemporaries, made this well known image a useful resource for his illustration. The Laocoön image presents us with a likeness of man's subjection to the senseless suffering we experience at the behest of the apparently vindictive (god of) Nature, and it underlines our inability to call on anything beyond our physicality to hear our suffering. The inanimate nature of the sculpture with its incapacity to speak translates via the metaphor as "*unspeakable pain*".³² It is here that man should revolt, says Schiller.³³ Man should cast off his allegiance to his desire for the domination of the ideal to which he aspires. But the revolt Schiller asks for is not a rejection of the realm of the Ideal. It is a call for a recognition of the separation of the realms of mind and sense, and a recognition of their limitations. The call is found in the following two lines: "*At the vault of heaven should beat his lament / And tear apart your feeling heart!*"³⁴ Man can acknowledge humanity's suffering by complaining and expressing his dissatisfaction and

²⁹ Ibid. Line 105

³⁰ Ibid. Lines 107-108

³¹ Ibid. Lines 109-110

³² Ibid. Line 113

³³ Ibid. Line 114

³⁴ Ibid. Lines 115- 116

consequently his desire. But as a human, man is subject to nature and to the senses. Capitulate to feeling. Schiller's assertion that "...*holy sympathy should triumph / Over the immortal in you.*"³⁵ is not an argument for a submission to nature at the eradication of the Ideal. Rather, it is a call for a recognition of the power of physical laws over mankind *because* it has no control over that other aspect which makes us human beings. It is a call to endure what he cannot change. And as such, it is a call to man to take charge of his own fate by willing what he cannot avoid.

It is in the serene regions of pure forms, the region of thought, where the soul does not suffer.³⁶ And it is through art, or rather, by life emulating art - 'spirit's brave resistance'³⁷ - that colour can begin to shimmer (there is an allusion to beauty here) through the sad and sombre veil of the pain of life, the pain of mortality.³⁸

Schiller uses his two last stanzas of the poem to exhibit his ideas in a more concrete form through poetic imagery by appropriating the myth of Heracles (Alcid).³⁹ Just as man feels he has a personal right to the divine, but in truth suffers the pain of mortality, Heracles is robbed of his birthright to Zeus' divine empire. And, like man who, through the capriciousness of the physical world, finds the realization of his desire for immortality thwarted, Heracles' access to immortality is obstructed by Hera, a vindictive, jealous and quarrelsome goddess of the physical world in conflict with the divinity of Zeus. Despite his toil and glory and the virtue of his deeds in his struggles with hydras, and the lion monster, and his selfless efforts to save his friends in the face of death,⁴⁰ and despite his endurance of the humiliations and torments of appetite, lust, madness, slavery

³⁵ Ibid. Lines 119-120

³⁶ Ibid. Lines 121-125

³⁷ Ibid. Line 126

³⁸ Ibid. Line 129

³⁹ Ibid. Lines 131-150

⁴⁰ Ibid. Lines 134 - 136

and murder heaped upon him by the regal envoy of the physical world, Heracles, as the archetype of all mortals, fails to win divinity. It is only when Heracles accepts the inevitability of his fate arising from wearing the poisoned robe and takes control of that inevitability by having a pyre built, placing himself on it and ordering that it be set alight,⁴¹ that he achieves his desire. This is not an act of suicide. His actions are a deliberate act of acceptance and participation in that which he cannot change. It is at this point that Hebe, the goddess of eternal youth (the product of the union of Zeus of the divine world and Hera of the physical world) rewards Heracles with the cup of immortality.

Given Schiller's expression of man's concern with the limitations of the physicality of the world (as is illustrated by the inevitability of death), the anxiety this causes and the resulting desire for immortality, coupled with the perceived relationship of the mind to the physical (the connection between deciding and acting), and the expression of that relationship in, along with the function of, art, it seems most suitable to couch the driving question of this study as asking 'what is the relationship between aesthetics and ethics?' The question shelters a number of subsidiary questions. For example: why is art thought to best represent that relationship?; what is the function of art?; how do we decide what is 'right'?; what is the nature of knowledge and how do we communicate it?

The nature of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics appears to be solidly grounded in the category of metaphysical enquiry. I intend to justify this statement in the next chapter. If, however, it is the case, what does this mean for our understanding of the driving question? At the same time, we come to this poem with a tacit understanding that Schiller's position is but one in an historical line of many. The date of his writing of the poem provokes fundamental questions which beg acknowledgement of the basis for the development of Schiller's position, along with the reactions to and developments which

⁴¹ Ibid. Lines 141 - 142

have resulted from his thought. And importantly, we should address the question which asks how do we accommodate the different shifts of positions expressed over time (including those to which we might presently and personally subscribe) without discarding them as somehow completely wrong or pointless? That is, when is truth truth?

In an effort to address these questions, the study emanating from Schiller's poem will encompass not only an outline of Kant's influence and his reaction to Platonic and Aristotelian thought, but it will also pursue notable stations of the development of these issues immediately after Schiller in thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.

*But when enclosed by cliffs
Rushing wild and foaming,
(Now) soft and smooth does glide the stream of life
Through the silent shadowlands of beauty¹*

3. Metaphysics, the Undulating Landscape of the Shadowlands and Beyond.

In the previous chapter I suggested that Schiller's poem indicates his preoccupation with relating the sensory world (and in particular aesthetics as art) to the formal. It seems to me that in order to best understand that relationship, not only do we need to ask *about* the relationship and how it functions, but also to ask *how* the relationship might exist. It is on this question of existence that I think metaphysical thought (broadly speaking) can play an important role by providing an understanding of the grounds on which this relationship can be said to exist. This chapter will attempt to establish an outline of just what that means and what its implications are for this study.

After a brief acknowledgement of the role Parmenides plays in the establishment of metaphysics as a discipline, I turn to Plato and Aristotle to evoke a sense of its general thrust and meaning and to provide a glimpse of the range of concerns along with the possibilities of the basis from which the lines of thought are developed. Although Kant is some considerable time down the metaphoric line of the development of the discipline, I turn to him for two reasons. The first is that he presents a significant change in the approach to the problems of metaphysics. The second is that this study revolves around the more immediate consequences of that approach. Kant's work is a convenient marker for the turn to a so-called modern attitude. The consequences of his thought, the development of and the reaction to his ideas form the basis for a further rearranged set of

¹ Schiller, Friedrich. 'Ideal and Life.' translation by Walter Veit. Lines 61-64

grounds for today's understanding of the relationship with which we are concerned. I then outline my usage of the word and indicate its use as an organizing principle for the broader understanding of the comparative positions taken by the thinkers under investigation.

Schiller uses the image of the shadowlands to embody an imposing of reason on the physical world. The image acts as both a physical manifestation, and a recognition, of an area beyond the sensory world which interacts with and brings order and calm to the life found within the bounds of the physical body. It is because of this power and its implication of being of a higher order than the physical to which it ministers, that Schiller classifies the shadowlands as beautiful. But the depths and recesses of that area from which the shadow springs house more than reason. It is an abiding concern (and one which Schiller's poem pursues) that urges us to speculate about and understand the possibilities of existences impinging on us from beyond our sensory experiences. The study of this area is generally known as metaphysics because of its literal meaning 'after' physics.² But the use and definition of the word 'metaphysics' is plagued by disagreement. Its various uses include the description of things which are beyond sense perception and things which transcend nature. It has been applied to speculation about things which are beyond scientific verification, and also to spiritual and religious matters. The more broadly accepted usage of the word today is found in its application to categorizing what is, and their modes of being: on concepts of existence and the nature of relationships. Despite the differing opinions about its meaning, the word is useful if we use it in its widest sense of perceiving existence and the relationships which constitute existence. The shifting meanings and uses of the word tend to suggest the particular preoccupations of the user with what is believed to be the crucial factors for existence. The thinking by which existence is understood by particular individuals provides a premiss on which the possibilities of the existence of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics is built. My

²

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Ed. Lesley Brown. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p1753

interest in this aspect of the question lies in the light the perceptions of existence can throw on understanding that relationship.

As I have indicated, an outline of Kant's metaphysics provides the focus for this chapter. Although I do not set out to formally present similar outlines for the thinkers which follow him, the discussions which ensue make use of their concerns and perceptions of existence. Indeed, this chapter can act as an alert for understanding that perceptions of the aesthetic-ethic relationship hinge on the thinker's wider understanding of existence.

Parmenides is credited with developing the early basis of metaphysics. He emphasised reason over the senses as a means of understanding the universe, used general principles from which to determine reality, and made the distinction between apparent reality (or appearance) and the truth of true reality. He linked true reality with a lack of change and movement. However, like the majority of present day philosophical issues, we can find the core elements for an understanding of the composite perceptions of the metaphysical terrain in a brief encounter with Plato and Aristotle. This will position us for a leap across time to Kant, who presents a change of perceptions which is an important basis for the remainder of the study.

Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo* likens his fear of using his senses to investigate reality to the fate of those who examine an eclipse of the sun by direct observation. "I was afraid I might be completely blinded in my mind if I looked at things with my eyes and attempted to apprehend them with one or other of my senses; so I decided I must take refuge in propositions, and study the truth of them."³ This statement is about the means of knowing reality. Most importantly, it is a means which acknowledges the importance of the proposition. The type of proposition outlined here performs as a declaration of belief about the underlying truth of the subject. It is an assumption on which, with further speculation, the truth is logically developed. Socrates describes the process this way: "On each

3

Plato, *Plato's Phaedo*. Trans. R Hackforth. Library of Liberal Arts. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1955) XVI 99E p133

occasion I assume the proposition which I judge to be the soundest, and I put down as true whatever seems to me to be in agreement with this;... what does not seem to be in agreement I put down as false."⁴ His description clearly indicates the speculative and judgmental nature of the process and its premiss. The example Socrates uses to follow that explanation is a fitting indication of Plato's assumption of the Form as cause:

I shall assume the existence of a beautiful that is in and by itself, and a good, ... It appears to me that if anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself the sole reason for its being so is that it participates in that beautiful; ... if anyone tells me that the reason why such-and-such a thing is beautiful is that it has a bright colour or a certain shape or something of that kind, I take no notice of it all... ⁵

Plato's speculation about the nature of the world as deriving from original Form where the 'true reality' is fixed and exists outside the corporeal world, represents one end of the speculative option. Aristotle's assumptions that the core or substance of existence is to be found within the bodily world represent another.

It is well known that Aristotle did not use the word 'metaphysics', and that his book *Metaphysics* was so named because it follows *Physics* in the body of his works. His book makes the connection between the physical and the mind by developing a series of thoughts on what we now think of as a specific area of philosophy. He begins with the declaration that all men desire to know, but that there are different kinds of knowledge.⁶ The kind of knowledge he respects above sense-perception, experience, that of the artist, the mechanic and the master worker, and theoretical and productive knowledge (in that hierarchical order), is wisdom. Wisdom, he says, is "Knowledge about certain principles and causes."⁷ There are four causes: substance or essence; matter or substratum; the source

⁴ Ibid. 100A p132

⁵ Ibid. 100B-D p134

⁶ Aristotle. 'Metaphysica' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941) Book 1 980 p689

⁷ Ibid. 982a

of change; and the purpose or good.⁸ This science, as he calls it, has as its subject 'being *qua* being',⁹ and its rightful area of investigation is being itself and its attributes, the principles and the causes.¹⁰ Because the substance of being is a unity of principle and cause, it is the task of this science to investigate those elements of unity and the similarities which necessarily arise in the same types of being.¹¹ Of the many substances, the particular substance for this study is that which is both separable and is remote from change. The study of natural science does not answer this call because it relies on matter and consequently on change. Nor is mathematics suitable: while theoretical and not subject to change, it is not separable from matter. What Aristotle is searching for is a substance which is without change. It must be eternal, he says, and it must belong to the causes of First Science to produce the effects of Divinity. If it exists, it will be prior to all things. As the highest substance it is the cause and principle of being as a whole. "For" he says, "who can doubt that, if there is Divinity anywhere in the universe, then it is in the nature studied by First Science that It is to be found."¹² Consequently, what Aristotle calls First Science, he also labels as theology.¹³

Plato's Forms do not provide the substance Aristotle feels is necessary to the study of First Science. A major objection he voices is that Plato's Forms do not cause change nor modify things that come into being.¹⁴ And he asks, "[H]ow would the Forms, being the substance of things, exist apart from them?"¹⁵ Plato's relating of the sensory object to the

⁸ Ibid. 983a

⁹ Ibid. Book 4 1003a

¹⁰ Ibid. 1003b

¹¹ Ibid. 1003b

¹² Ibid. 1026a

¹³ Op. Cit.

¹⁴ Ibid. 991a

¹⁵ Ibid. 991b

Form as imitation, or that things participate in them is, says Aristotle, "to say nothing and to give poetic metaphors".¹⁶ Aristotle's reasons for his rejection of Plato's Forms underlines the nature to which the substance he is searching for is to conform. It is a substance which is an inherent part of a being; the substance to which items owe their being; that "something defined that underlies".¹⁷ That substance he calls essence; the "what-it-is-to-be-that-thing... what it is taken to be *per se*."¹⁸ He argues that the essence defines the physical substance of a thing as a group or species,¹⁹ so that in that collective sense his essence is a universal.

Aristotle connects this essence to form: "[A]nd by form I mean the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing for each thing and the primary substance."²⁰ While form is an essential contribution to the making of matter, it is a constant. In contrast, the matter to which it contributes is changed.²¹ Another important difference is that the form cannot be produced.²² The essence of something simply exists. Consequently the species and substance to which it contributes is a composite which differs individually within the parameters of its essence or form. The nature or form of the production such as a man or plant is the same, but the entity which is produced is individual. "And the full output, this sort of form in this very flesh and bones is Callias or is Socrates. They differ materially (their matter is different), but they are formally the same (indivisibility of the form)."²³ The outcome of this concept results in a notion of actuality and potentiality. There can be

¹⁶ Ibid. 991a

¹⁷ Ibid. 1028a

¹⁸ Ibid. 1029b

¹⁹ Ibid. 1031a-b

²⁰ Ibid. 1032b

²¹ Ibid. 1033a

²² Ibid. 1033b

²³ Ibid. 1034a

no question that actuality is prior to potential, he says.²⁴ The potential must develop out of what he calls 'a primary initiator of the process', and thus, he argues, the process initiator already is in actuality.²⁵ An actuality grows from the potential, but in the first place, the actuality must exist for the potential to develop. The substance and the form are actuality, he says. "Also, the point of matter's being in potential is that it may progress to the form. Whenever, by contrast, it has actual being, then it is actually in the form."²⁶

There is another aspect to Aristotle's assumption of the relation between actuality and potentiality that is in some respects illustrative of this investigation. That which is related to the serious (or ethical) in actuality is 'both better and more worthy' of authority than the serious in potentiality.²⁷ The potential for anything has as its concomitant the potential for its opposite. Both opposites (such as being well and being ill) cannot be realized at the same time, so it follows, he says that one of the opposites must be the good. In relation to the actual and the potential, actuality is better because "there is among the primordial and eternal things nothing that is evil, or defective or corrupt (for corruption is to be counted as an evil)". Evil is, he suggests, naturally posterior to its potentiality.²⁸

Central to Aristotle is the notion that the distinguishing characteristics that makes something what it is, also provides the qualities by which that something can be identified and classified. The source of the knowledge of these characteristics comes primarily through experience and observation rather than through an imposition of a direct conception. Nonetheless, the means of knowing contributes to an understanding rather than providing a full answer to what is.

Kant, on the other hand, admits a wider range of resources for knowledge.

²⁴ Ibid. 1049b

²⁵ Op. Cit.

²⁶ Ibid. 1050a

²⁷ Ibid. 1051a

²⁸ Op. Cit.

Importantly, he repositions the origin of knowledge away from that which is solely innate, or from that which is solely empirically derived, to that which is realized from within the individual's relationship with the object. His understanding of knowledge is a reconciliation of reason and empiricism. Although Kant's opening comments in his *Critique of Pure Reason* recall Aristotle's observation about the existence of different kinds of knowledge, Kant focusses on the source and acquisition of knowledge. While reason can be a factor in knowledge, Kant separates that kind of knowledge from logic, which, he says, has as its role the giving of an exposition and proof of the formal rules of thought.²⁹ Rather, if reason is to contribute to knowledge, some of that knowledge must be known *a priori*. The relationship of *a priori* knowledge to its object can be found in its determining of the object and its concept (theoretical knowledge of reason), or in making the concept actual (practical knowledge of reason).³⁰ In regard to the use of reason in relation to concepts, Kant claims, even students of the likes of Natural Science founded on empirical principles learned that the use of reason provided insight only when reason first determined the laws, and *then* the empirical evidence was rigorously tested against it.³¹ Metaphysics, however, is not directly provable through empirical testing. "Metaphysics is," he says, "a completely isolated speculative science of reason, which soars far above the teachings of experience, and in which reason is indeed meant to be its own pupil."³² The question of the pure knowledge of objects (where the knowledge is of the nature of the object and is applicable to the genre of objects rather than to a specific object,) is a case in point which, Kant argues, can be extrapolated to Metaphysics. Kant takes the assumption that all our knowledge must conform to objects and turns it on its

²⁹ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. (London: Macmillan, 1961.) B ix p18

³⁰ Op. Cit.

³¹ Ibid. B xiii p20

³² Ibid. B xiv p21

head (in the manner that Copernicus reversed the common perception of his day that the stars revolved around the spectator), to suggest that the objects of the senses conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition.³³ More specifically (and importantly), it is the *experience* of the objects through which they are known that conforms to the concepts. It is, he suggests, a more successful way of explaining what we know of objects. Experience is a kind of knowledge which involves understanding; "and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as *a priori*. They find expression in *a priori* concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform and to which they must agree."³⁴ Similarly, objects about which we think but cannot experience (in the standard understanding of the word), "we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them."³⁵ Kant suggests that the proof of the possibility of the application of *a priori* reason to metaphysics is found in the comparison of the harmonic outcome of the dialectic between knowledge of things as appearances and the knowledge of things in themselves with a similar dialectic between reason and objects not conditioned by sense experience (the unconditioned).³⁶

It is in the realm beyond the world of the senses, says Kant, that reason asks about and examines the very important and unavoidable problems of God, freedom and immortality. The 'science' which is for the purpose of answering those problems is, he says, metaphysics.³⁷ Metaphysics ought to contain '*a priori* synthetic knowledge' which adds "to the given concept something that was not contained in it" and which goes beyond

³³ Ibid. B xvii p22 (The German *Anschauung* translates more correctly as 'sense perception' or 'sense receptivity'.)

³⁴ Ibid. B xvii p23

³⁵ Ibid. B xviii p23

³⁶ Ibid. B xx p24

³⁷ Ibid. B 7 p46

experience.³⁸ The practical employment of that knowledge, however, is directed beyond those problems to another: what we ought to do; to moral laws. "[W]hat we ought to do if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world."³⁹ It is this determining of how to act, given the possibilities of the existence of a God, freedom and immortality, that provides the purpose for the employment of reason.

Kant's understanding of the mechanism for how we 'see' that which is beyond the sensory world has implications for this study. Kant points out that there is a difference between "something being given to my reason as an *object absolutely*, or merely and *object in the idea*."⁴⁰ Kant turns to the idea of God as a convenient example. We determine the sensory object through the use of concepts. The *object in the idea* has only a schema or a general form, so that it can only be represented in an indirect way by a sensory object. That representation is achieved, he says, through the systematic unity of the relation of the representing object to the idea.⁴¹ Kant makes a useful distinction when he claims that the idea is really only a heuristic, not an ostensive concept.⁴² This distinction shifts the implanted image away from being a direct indication, imitation or demonstration of the *object of the idea* to its use as a *means of discovery* of the idea by the individual through his or her understanding of experience. But it is not only a means of understanding. It contributes to a systemisation (and consequently a strengthening) of knowledge. The process applies to the way reason represents the psychological, the cosmological and the theological transcendental ideas, and as such forms an amalgam of representation which leads to what Kant terms a systematic unity which in itself leads to an extension of empirical knowledge. Thus he says:

³⁸ Ibid. B 18 p54

³⁹ Ibid. B 828f p632

⁴⁰ Ibid. B 698 p550

⁴¹ Op. Cit.

⁴² Op. Cit.

This, indeed, is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason, not as *constitutive* principles for the extension of our knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as *regulative* principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical knowledge is more adequately secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would be possible, in the absence of ideas, through the employment merely of the principles of understanding.⁴³

It is a contribution to the system of philosophical knowledge which takes philosophy beyond its constraints of the scientific 'logical perfection of knowledge' to the concept of philosophy Kant calls the *conceptus cosmicus*, and personified in the perception of God as the ideal philosopher, where "philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason".⁴⁴ Essential ends are, he says, the whole vocation of man. Its philosophy is moral philosophy.⁴⁵ Consequently, Kant understands the relationship of the experience of the real world as guided by the moral experience of obligation.

As I indicated at the outset of this chapter, it is not my intention to provide and adhere to anything more than a broad understanding of the word metaphysics. I use the word metaphysics as a descriptor, not because, as for example in the case of Kant, it defines a particular range of subject matter, but because it perhaps best encapsulates certain over-riding characteristics with which this study is concerned. The governing feature of this study resides in the word 'relationship'. It is a relationship which both adheres to and links aesthetics and ethics. Aesthetics (as we will explore more closely in the next chapter) concerns itself directly with the senses, whether simply in its usage as indicating the natural physical world, or in its usage in the production of art. To ask what the perceptions we sense mean, is to enlarge on the physical representation of the word

⁴³ Ibid. B 699 p550

⁴⁴ Ibid. B 867 p657

⁴⁵ Ibid. B 868 p658

and to enter the arena of the application of thought to the senses. In fact, any proposition about the material becomes a proposition about the relationship between the actual and its possible sense content. Ethics, on the other hand, is a prescription for action which comes in some form (either perceived as an inherent command attributed perhaps to God, or, as somehow independently and dialectically determined) through individual and communal thought. Ethics begins (in most perceptions) in thought and belief. Its physical outcome is a manifestation of that range of thought and belief. The important point here is that to engage in the necessary interpretation and validation of this kind of action, it is impossible to avoid the intermixing of the phenomenal and the transcendent.

But we can see already in the flurry of these simplistic attempts to adequately define the two words 'aesthetics' and 'ethics', that the knowledge which we might claim for the meanings of the words, and for the meanings we derive for the building of and for the result of that relationship (to treat it for the moment as singular) presents questions about our experiences, and how and what we know of those experiences. If, in the process of reaching beyond our physical selves, this kind of interrelations of experience is knowledge, it is difficult to avoid the thought that we are engaged in metaphysical considerations. Speculations about that which contributes to the relationship, but which requires the presentation of sensory objects to indicate to others the means by which they can discover what has been experienced, also provides the grounds for the kind of investigation which, I think, can be categorized as an investigation into an essentially metaphysical area. This charges art (as the post Kantian focus of aesthetics in the relationship) with the additional issues of the purpose of art; its place and function in our comprehension of and consequent actions in the world.

Having established this investigation as a consideration of the metaphysical concerns and structures which drive the understanding of the relationship of aesthetics and ethics, I will return to this subject at the conclusion of the study to provide a view of the changing concerns which, I suggest, have resulted in directly effecting the change in the

understanding of that relationship.

*Eternally clear and clean like a mirror and smooth
Flows the zephyr-easy life
Of the Blessed on Olympus.¹*

4. An Exordium from the Blessed on the Olympus of Philosophy.

While Schiller's lines are used here as somewhat tongue in cheek, it is true that the origins of much of the thought about art and ethics and their relationship to each other can be found in the thoughts of the ancient Greek philosophers. And although many of the ideas were raised and discussed by their predecessors, Plato and Aristotle capture and articulate more roundly the issues which have since driven many of the more recent ideas about the arts and their connection with ethics. In the interests of establishing a starting point from which to pursue the modern grounds for the perception of this affiliation, it is my intention to broadly outline the historical precedents using Plato and Aristotle as the articulate repositories of the older positions. At the same time this outline will serve to introduce several terms and positions which will find their uses, albeit with adaptations and differences, in the area which is the focus of this study.

This chapter looks at the standing both Plato and Aristotle afford art. It outlines Plato's questioning of the poet's knowledge and his capacity to convey truth. Plato argues from the basis of his conception of reality that the artist's representation is a third remove imitation which presents nothing more than a superficial, phenomenal appearance. Rather than conveying knowledge, the artist is inspired or possessed by the Muse which demonstrates a preoccupation with the senses. The seductiveness of the arts divert man from the higher truth, and herein lies one of the real dangers to society of the arts. In Plato's opinion, if the arts are to have a place in society they must teach. As an educational

¹ Schiller. 'The Ideal and Life' Trans. Walter Veit. Lines 1-3

tool, and with a properly controlled output, the arts can convey an understanding of the beautiful and the good. The beautiful and good is shown to be related through meanings derived from one Greek word. Plato's dialogues which attempt to pin down the meaning of beauty discuss the various conditions under which the word beautiful is used. It leads to an explanation which understands beauty to be unveiled through love in its various stages and builds to a revealing of non physical understanding of beauty and good which is eternal and unchanging, and promises a form of immortality. We then turn to Aristotle's perception of reality as a coming to be. For Aristotle, art is inextricably involved in coming to be, and as such provides a model for man. He is aware of the differences between nature's power to initiate a coming to be, and the artist's capacity to initiate a making of art. Art becomes an example of choice initiated by desire and reasoning, and, with reason's attraction to the adherence to truth, evokes the truth of the object from within the confines of the artist's theoretical knowledge. Imitation for Aristotle is not a third rate representation, but rather, it is an instinct which contributes to the cause of poetry and pleasure. Beauty is considered to exist as various forms of order and measure, and is the second cause of poetry. Aristotle presents Tragedy as the epitome of the arts, in part because of its capacity to make action present. The importance of action resides in it being a physical indication of our capacities to make rational choices. Art is at its most successful when it presents a universal view rather than a peculiarly individual focus. A capacity to discern the universal which, as a revealing of a truth, relates poetry (and presumably all the arts) to philosophy. Tragedy is also held aloft as a tool in the pursuit of pleasure. While pleasures vary in relation to the activities on which they impose themselves, Tragedy arouses pleasure by evoking a sense of catharsis. The basis of catharsis is pain; pain caused by the fate of the protagonist. It is this sense of pain which provides an important connection with Schiller. But it is the activity of understanding that pain which leads to the highest pleasure. That highest pleasure is contemplation. It brings greatest happiness, links man with the divine, and provides the opportunity to participate

in the immortal. Man's developed being, however, can only be achieved through education; and for Aristotle, art, especially Tragedy, is one example.

In his *The Republic*, Plato has Socrates express admiration for Homer the tragic poet as the "original master and guide of all the great poets".² But admiration does not prevent a scepticism which calls into question the role and skills claimed for Homer and tragic poets in general, and their capacity for wisdom and truth. The exploration of the issue revolves around the idea of representation. Plato³ calls into service the structure of existence as the basis for his argument. Beds and tables are his example. At the top off the three levels is the Form of the bed. On the second level is the copy of the bed or table which is made by the craftsman with his 'eye on the appropriate form'. At the third level is the poet and painter who make copies of the second level copy. Socrates points out that it is a craft which is not difficult to do, and he compares it with the capacity of the mirror to reflect.⁴ So that where god created the nature of the bed, the carpenter manufactured a specific bed, but the artist did not make or manufacture. He 'represents what the other two make', and as a consequence, his representation 'stands at a third move from reality' and a third remove from the 'throne of truth', Socrates argues.⁵ What is more, the artist's representation is not of the object as it actually is, its truth. It is not a representation of things 'as they are', but rather, 'as they appear'. In other words, his representation is of the superficial appearance. Socrates uses the painter's representation of a bed from an obtuse angle as his example. That representation makes the bed look different without the bed being different. Therefore, Socrates argues, the painter is referring to the superficial

² Plato. *The Republic*. Trans. Desmond Lee. 2nd Ed. Revised. Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1975) 595c

³ I assume that the views expressed by the character Socrates represent Plato's position.

⁴ Plato. *The Republic*. 596e

⁵ Ibid. 597e

appearance and not to the object as it actually is.⁶ Consequently, Socrates concludes that "The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from truth, and it is able to reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of mere phenomenal appearance."⁷

This has a couple of outcomes. The first arises from the question of how knowledgeable artists are about the subjects they draw on, and how much we should look to them as the wise and as teachers. Socrates asks, "[D]o good poets really know about the subjects on which the public thinks they speak so well."⁸ Given Homer's representations of military strategy, political administration and human education, Socrates feels that should imply Homer's advanced understanding of human excellence and an ability to judge the kind of behaviour that will benefit the individual or the community. He asks for evidence of any state Homer's writings might have reformed, for the name of a city which attributes its legal system to his skill, for records of a war fought successfully under his command or advice, for devices he might have invented, or for a school he might have founded.⁹ Homer's failure in all these areas ties him to all the poets which follow him and their shared capacity to produce only superficial likenesses with no grasp of truth.¹⁰ The painter who has no experience of either the making of an object or the capacity of that object to fulfill its task fails in a similar way because he is ill-informed about the object he represents.

Plato objects to the lack of science in what and how the poet or painter knows. He argues that the artist does not have knowledge. Rather, he is inspired. Plato compares both the activity of the poet and that of the interpreter of the poet's work to the attracting forces

⁶ Ibid. 598a

⁷ Ibid. 598b

⁸ Ibid. 599a

⁹ Ibid. 599e - 600b

¹⁰ Ibid. 600e

of the magnet.¹¹ Like an iron ring which feels the force of the magnetic stone of Heraclea and passes the force onto other rings to form a chain, the poet feels the force or inspiration of the Muse, and through the sharing of his poetry forms a chain of enthusiasm. The word 'inspiration' is used here not only as the meaning of a drawing in of breath to the degree that the breath is given as a divine influence, but it is also used in the more dominating sense to indicate 'possession'. It is a possession by the Muse which separates the poet from himself, his senses and from reason. This is well illustrated when Socrates claims that even the poets talk of bringing sweet melodies from the gardens of the Muses, "And what they say is true, for a poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him."¹² Under possession, the poems, then, are voices for the gods. They are divine, and the means by which the gods become 'articulate to us'. On the other hand, the poet as somehow privileged and to be revered because of the wisdom and knowledge he possesses in his own right is dismissed. Poets are "nothing but interpreters of the gods, each one possessed by the divinity to whom he is in bondage."¹³

A second outcome of representation being so removed from truth arises as a result of the perception that the arts are so seductive. Visual images, words or phrases, metre and rhythm are charming or beautiful and therefore persuasive enough to have people make judgements on that basis alone. "So great is the natural magic of poetry," says Socrates.¹⁴ And although the artist has no knowledge or understanding about the goodness or badness of the things he represents¹⁵ he will continue (in the case of the poet) to write poetry. What

¹¹ Plato, *Ion* in *The Dialogues of Plato*. Translated and Commentary R.E. Allen. Vol 3. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996.) 533d

¹² Ibid. 534b

¹³ Ibid. 534e

¹⁴ *The Republic*. 601b

¹⁵ Ibid. 602a

he represents will appeal to and give pleasure to the 'ignorant multitude'¹⁶ through some of the lower elements of man, our senses, those elements "far removed from reason".¹⁷ It is an appeal which is removed from the good. In a time of sorrow with its temptation to grieve, reason and principle dictate restraint. However, Socrates suggests man's opposite impulse to remember and lament suffering is, "irrational and lazy and inclined to cowardice."¹⁸ But it is that element which provides plenty of easily represented and popular material for the dramatic poet. The poet gratifies and indulges our instinctive desires by showing us someone else's suffering. In thinking that we are not constrained by the restraint we would reasonably apply to our own grief, the feelings we experience for others in grief inadvertently infects what we feel for ourselves. Socrates points out that "[I]f we let our pity for the misfortunes of others grow too strong it will be difficult to restrain our feelings in our own."¹⁹ The arts, then, divert man from the exercise of self control that reason gives. Man's thoughts are encouraged to focus on the senses and emotions and he loses sight of the higher truth. The works of both the dramatic poet and the painter have low degrees of truth and both deal with the lower elements of the mind.²⁰ Reason and truth are the casualties and the individual's striving for betterment is placed in jeopardy. Consequently, that drama and poetry provide pleasure is not enough for the arts to be considered to have a place in a well run society. If they are to have any standing in society, they must serve a higher purpose. They must bring "lasting benefit to human life and human society".²¹

Underlying the conditions for Plato's acceptance of the arts is their adherence to

¹⁶ Op. Cit.

¹⁷ Ibid. 603b

¹⁸ Ibid. 604d

¹⁹ Ibid. 606b

²⁰ Ibid. 605b

²¹ Ibid. 607d

their capacity to properly instruct. This passage from Socrates in a detailing of the appropriate content for poetry and drama, and a consequential rejection of the depiction of pitiful laments by famous men, amply illustrates a belief in the instructive capabilities of the arts. "Then we should be quite right to cut out from our poetry lamentations by famous men. We can give them to the less reputable woman characters or to the bad men, so that those whom we say we are bringing up as guardians of our state will be ashamed to imitate them."²² With that capacity for the arts to teach right behaviour comes a downside: the concern that they can also establish undesirable traits which can be acquired unconsciously and incorporated all pervasively into everyday habits. After all, the pleasurable affect of the arts makes them an indiscriminately effective educative tool. "For have you not noticed how dramatic and similar representations, if indulgence in them is prolonged into adult life, establish habits of physical poise, intonation and thought which become second nature?"²³ Consequently, for the arts to properly instruct, they must represent truth. For a poet to say for example that "the gods disguise themselves as strangers from abroad, and wander around our towns in every kind of shape" is clearly wrong, argues Socrates.²⁴ 'Every god is perfect in beauty and goodness', so that any change of the form of the god will be for the worse: a direct contradiction to the perfection of the beauty and goodness of the god. It is with this same objective of the avoiding of falsehood that Socrates says,

We must look for artists and craftsmen capable of perceiving the real nature of what is beautiful, and then our young men, living as it were in a healthy climate, will benefit because all the works of art they see and hear influence them for good, like the breezes from some healthy country, insensibly leading them from their earliest childhood into close sympathy and conformity with beauty and reason.²⁵

²² Ibid. 388

²³ Ibid. 395d

²⁴ Ibid. 381d

²⁵ Ibid. 401d

Plato is creating here a clear marriage between the aesthetic and the ethical through the portrayal of good character and discipline in the arts as an educative tool for the development of the beautiful and the good in the individual and society. He is also advocating the real nature of the beautiful as a premiss (and it is an ethical premiss) for aesthetic judgement.

We have tacitly accepted Plato's use of the words 'beauty' and 'good', here. They are words which are pressed into service either explicitly or implicitly by all the thinkers in this study, but with considerable variation of meaning and purpose. Plato's use of the words establishes much of the outline of the issues which recur throughout their later repositioning.

That Plato's beautiful and good appear in an almost effortless juxtaposition perhaps owes to his use of the Greek word '*kalós*'. Evoking the meaning of 'powerful' 'excellent' and 'strong', it is used in three senses. Its first use is the sense of 'healthy' and 'serviceable'. The second uses is as 'beautiful', 'attractive', 'lovely'. The third sense in which it is used is as 'good'. All senses of the word are housed under the idea of 'what is ordered or sound'. Consequently, the noun '*tó kalón*' means both 'the good' or 'virtue', and 'the beautiful' or 'beauty'.²⁶ Plato ties *kalón* closely to the *agathón* (the good).²⁷ The best way to see how this occurs is to pursue Plato's attempts to define what beauty is.

In a dialogue which attempts to tease out that concern, Plato steers the discussion through a range of ways in which the *beauty* is used, but with the clear intention of pinning down that important element which can be attributed to all that we call beautiful. His Socrates points this out to Hippias early in the attempts to satisfy the curiosity of Socrates' so-called noble friend. Socrates reminds Hippias, "he asks you not what is beautiful, but

²⁶ *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich. Trans. and Abridged Geoffrey W. Bromley. (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans. 1985) p402f

²⁷ Op. Cit. And Ibid p3

what is beauty.²⁸ The discussion quickly establishes that we discern a relative relationship of that which is beautiful. Beautiful apes are ugly in comparison with the human race, for example.²⁹ Socrates rephrases the question to focus more clearly on beauty as that "by which all other things are ordered in loveliness, and appear beautiful when its form is added."³⁰ But Hippias is not yet willing to move beyond the material realm. He picks up on the notion of 'that which is added' and suggests that the addition of gold beautifies objects. This suggestion is developed into an agreement about considering something as beautiful if it is appropriate to a particular thing. Gold is beautiful when it is appropriate, but ivory or stone used in appropriate circumstances displaces gold as that which is beautiful.³¹ The characteristic of beauty as unchanging destroys the suggestion from Hippias that to be rich, healthy, honoured, to reach old age, to bury his parents, to be ceremoniously revered at his own funeral and to be survived by children is what every man considers is most beautiful.³² That there are those such as Tantalus, a son of the god Zeus, who lived under the punishment of standing up to his neck in water which flowed from him when he tried to drink, and over whose head hung fruit which was blown out of his reach by the wind every time he tried to grasp it,³³ who would consider surviving his own parents as the antithesis of that which is beautiful, simply serves to emphasize that what we understand as beautiful to date is only that which is 'beautiful to some men and not to others' says Socrates.³⁴ Although the characteristic of beauty as unchanging has been

²⁸ Plato. *Greater Hippias*. in *Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series, (New York: Pantheon Books. 1961) 287e

²⁹ Ibid. 289a

³⁰ Ibid. 289d

³¹ Ibid. 290c-d

³² Ibid. 291d

³³ Warrington, John. *Everyman's Classical Dictionary*. Everyman's Reference Library. (London: J.M. Dent and Sons. 1961) p492

³⁴ *Greater Hippias*. 293c

introduced here, the example is primarily a further demonstration of appropriateness. It allows a further examination of the means by which something is caused to be appropriate, and it allows for the question, does beauty cause things in which it is present to *appear* beautiful or to *be* beautiful?³⁵ Socrates dismisses the example Hippias uses of an appropriately well dressed person appearing as beautiful, as a fraud in relation to beauty, largely because of its capacity to present that which is not truly of beauty as beautiful.³⁶ That which causes things to appear beautiful, then, is not that which causes things to be beautiful.

Socrates then floats the idea of the useful as what we call beautiful. When something has the power to fulfill a specific purpose, it is beautiful, and the lack of that power is ugly. It is a line of thought which fulfills the requirement of the cause of something being beautiful, but it falls down on the basis that it is also a form of appropriate beauty. What if, Socrates asks after second thoughts, that power to fulfill a specific task is used to work some evil? That, surely, does not allow us to say that these useful objects are beautiful?³⁷ What it might suggest, though, is that beauty is both useful and powerful for some good purpose.³⁸ If beauty is beneficial, and it is the beneficial which produces the good, and that which produces is cause, then is the beautiful the cause of good? Socrates asks.³⁹ On the basis of cause, it is obviously a position which Socrates must reject. If beauty is the cause of good, then beauty cannot be good. And like the father is not the son nor the son his father, that position suggests that beauty is not good nor the good beautiful. It is a suggestion which does not please Socrates.⁴⁰

³⁵ Ibid. 294

³⁶ Ibid. 294b

³⁷ Ibid. 296c

³⁸ Ibid. 296d

³⁹ Ibid. 296e

⁴⁰ Ibid. 297c

He turns instead to the notion of beauty as the pleasant which comes through the senses of hearing and sight.⁴¹ However, the narrowness of the range of senses which allow something to be designated beautiful without incurring ridicule (as in the case of calling something pleasant to eat 'beautiful') creates a problem. Another difficulty arises from the argument that if that which is beautiful gives pleasure through sight, it cannot do so through hearing, and vice versa. Consequently, he argues, the objects which cause the pleasure must have a common quality.⁴²

But that common quality, on the basis of Socrates' argument, must preclude the senses.

How, then, is this common quality found? In his speech in *Symposium*⁴³ Socrates develops through the affection and passion associated with the animalistic desire and drive to procreate, the means by which this is achieved. Love is described as an important spirit which occupies the middle ground between humans and gods; between mortality and immortality.⁴⁴ Love is attracted to beauty,⁴⁵ and, importantly, falls between knowledge and ignorance.⁴⁶ Because love of knowledge is the definition of the (Greek) philosopher (*philosophia*),⁴⁷ love is equated with the philosopher. As a lover of beauty or attractive things, he desires that object to be his.⁴⁸ What he gains is more easily answered by substituting 'goodness' for 'attractiveness'. In this case, Socrates points out, the lover

⁴¹ Ibid. 298a

⁴² Ibid. 300b

⁴³ Plato. *Symposium*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. World's Classics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994)

⁴⁴ Ibid. 202d

⁴⁵ Ibid. 203c

⁴⁶ Ibid. 204a

⁴⁷ Ibid. see translator's note page 85

⁴⁸ Ibid. 204d

gains happiness, the ultimate purpose in life.⁴⁹ The stages in the development and sophistication of love outlines philosophy's progress toward the beautiful. It is a progression which "uses the things of this world as rungs in a ladder"⁵⁰ to eventually achieve a recognition of true beauty. The initial (and youthful) focus on beauty in the single physical body acts as a medium for the growth through reasoning to the understanding of a more general beauty which can be found in all bodies.⁵¹ This leads to a valuing of mental beauty over physical beauty, and further, to developing an interest in ethical thought. As a direct consequence of his interest in ethical thought, he looks at what is attractive in people's activities and institutions. Eventually, he becomes enamoured with the beauty of the knowledge people have, which encourages his own reasoning and thinking - a love of learning- and which enables him to catch a glimpse of a unique kind of knowledge of beauty.⁵² It will be a perception of beauty 'in itself and by itself' rather than as something physical or something known or reasoned. Although this sort of beauty (and ultimately, good) is beyond the sensible and is known through perception, Plato attempts to demonstrate it and how it operates by comparing it to the vision of the sun and its power. While eyes have the capacity for sight, they require light from the sun in order to see. Similarly, the mind's eye needs to look at (or perceive) objects illuminated by truth and reality so as to know. Light and sight are like the sun, but they are not the sun itself. Knowledge and truth are like the good, but good is higher than they are.⁵³ This kind of beauty remains constant and eternal, Socrates says. And he adds, "[E]very other beautiful object somehow partakes of it, but in such a way that their coming to be and ceasing to be

⁴⁹ Ibid. 205a See also note p.86

⁵⁰ Ibid. 211c

⁵¹ Ibid. 210b

⁵² Ibid. 210c-d

⁵³ *The Republic.* 507a-509e

don't increase or diminish it at all, and it remains entirely unaffected."⁵⁴ This unchanging, eternal characteristic has appeal to the mortal nature of man which "does all it can to achieve immortality and live forever".⁵⁵ It is a preoccupation which is usually fulfilled through reproduction, the replacement of the past generation with another. However, some turn to mental offspring such as virtue and wisdom which manifest through the likes of poets and craftsmen, or through the instillation of self discipline and justice in the management of political and domestic activities, or, in a contribution to someone's education.⁵⁶ But the achievement of he who 'sees' true beauty - 'absolute beauty, divine and constant' - is to give birth to true goodness. Here the intellect takes part in the unchanging and eternal Form. "And don't you realize that the gods smile on a person who bears and nurtures true goodness and that, to the extent that any human being does, it is he who has the potential for immortality?"⁵⁷

While Plato understands an enduring transcendent reality, an existent Being, in the beautiful and the good, and art as a third remove representation or imitation of that reality, Aristotle understands reality as a coming to be. That which drives the coming into being is either nature, art or spontaneity.⁵⁸ Of the natural things which come into being, that from which it is produced is immanent in nature itself.⁵⁹ Productions other than natural products are called 'makings', all of which are derived either from art, a faculty or from thought. From art proceed the things of which the form (the essence or primary substance) is the

⁵⁴ *Symposium*. 211b

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 207d

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 209a-b

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 212a

⁵⁸ Aristotle, 'Metaphysics' Op. Cit. 1032a

⁵⁹ Op. Cit.

soul of the artist, Aristotle says.⁶⁰ That is, the making has its source or potential in man, whereas natural beings have the essence within themselves. All art is concerned with the realm of coming-to-be, Aristotle claims, "a thing whose starting point or source is in the producer and not in the thing produced."⁶¹ This passes to the artist a moving power, a capacity to initiate action suggestive of or parallel to that of nature. But there are differences between man's capacity to initiate action and nature's. There are three elements in the soul which control action, says Aristotle. They are sense perception, intelligence and desire.⁶² Those elements seek action on the basis of truth because truth is the function of the intellectual faculty. Sense perception does not initiate action. Choice (which belongs to thought) and desire do. If choice of an action is to be good, reasoning must be true and desire correct. Choice is the starting point of action, and the starting point of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. This is why, Aristotle says, there cannot be choice without intelligence or without some moral characteristic. However, the kind of action which reflects an essentially ethical position - that is, acting rationally - is different from that of art which is a rational *production*. Aristotle claims the soul expresses truth by affirmation or denial in five ways: art, science, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom and intelligence.⁶³ The difference lies in the distinction between how we act (that is, moral action under the direction of rational choice), and the production of an (art) object under the guidance of reason which elicits the truth of the object being created and expresses the truth of the artist's theoretical knowledge.⁶⁴ This supplants Plato's objection to art as imitation rather than truth, with a notion of art as containing the truthful in its

⁶⁰ Op. Cit.

⁶¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. Martin Oswald. First Edition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981) 1140a

⁶² Ibid 1139a

⁶³ Ibid. 1139b

⁶⁴ See Ibid. 1139a

own right. And it turns art away from existing as an educational tool for morality.

In his *Poetics*, Aristotle lists imitation (mimesis) as one of the two causes of poetry.⁶⁵ Both causes contribute to pleasure. Mimesis is, he says, an instinct lying deep in our nature. Man both learns from imitation and feels pleasure from experiencing the imitation. The pleasure he feels derives either from a learning situation made possible by the distancing of a difficult or unpleasant object made accessible and comprehensible by the representation, or from an appreciation of the skill of the representation.⁶⁶ Tied to this first instinctive cause of poetry is a second; an instinct for harmony and rhythm. As a natural gift, it develops into poetry through use and trial and error. Depending on the individual character of the writer, imitation was put to use to capture either the noble actions of good men, or the actions of meaner men. The inevitable development of these two lines resulted in Tragedy and Comedy.⁶⁷

Tragedy is, for Aristotle, the finer, more complete art form.⁶⁸ He describes Tragedy as the imitation of an action, where, of the six parts from which it is constituted, Plot, the imitation of action or the arrangements of incidents which are caused by thought and character (the latter being the qualities ascribed to the acting agent) is the most important.⁶⁹ Imitation of the qualities of the agents involved in the action holds second place in importance. Thought holds third place. It is the faculty which provides the persuasive or rhetorical⁷⁰ possibilities within the particular circumstances for revealing the choices, the moral determinations, of the character. Diction, the metrical arrangement of

⁶⁵ Aristotle. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. With a critical Text and Translation of the Poetics*. Translated and critical notes, S. H. Butcher. Intro. John Gassner. Fourth Edition. (New York. Dover Publications. 1951) *Poetics* 1448b

⁶⁶ Op. Cit.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 1449a

⁶⁸ Ibid. Ch. XXVI

⁶⁹ Ibid. 1450a

⁷⁰ Ibid. 1456a

the words⁷¹ provides the formal clarity of expression. Song and Spectacular elements (the mechanical presentation) are persuasive embellishments.

Aristotle also describes Tragedy as "an imitation of action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude".⁷² Aristotle's idea of imitation is different from that of Plato's. Where Plato's is about a copy of what exists and which fails because what it copies is not reality, Aristotle's artist, as maker, creates in the fashion of and therefore in imitation of, life, but in a manner which finds the truth of what he makes in the universal, rather than in the specific, copied particular. Aristotle's focus emphasizes imitation of action with its consequence of the imitation of life, because "life consists in action".⁷³ Indeed, he adds that the purpose of life, its end, "is a mode of action, not a quality."⁷⁴ It is men's actions which determine their happiness or lack of it, and it is in that sense that the action is a bringing to the fore the serious elements of the living of life itself. It becomes apparent here that the object of focus is wider than the individual. "It ... is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen, - what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity," Aristotle points out.⁷⁵ In contrast, the historian relates a specific set of occurrences linked to a particular individual. The tendency for poetry, then, is "to express the universal, history the particular."⁷⁶ Consequently, the demands of the universal view lead Aristotle to perceive of poetry as more philosophical and of a higher purpose than history.⁷⁷ The truth and importance of the universality of the action portrayed is supported by the many Tragedies which feature

⁷¹ Ibid. 1449b

⁷² Op. Cit.

⁷³ Ibid. 1450a

⁷⁴ Op. Cit.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 1451a

⁷⁶ Ibid. 1451b

⁷⁷ Op. Cit.

fictitious names and exploits and yet provide pleasure.⁷⁸ As a contribution to the verity of that universal action, Aristotle lists completeness or unity as a crucial element. Again, he is not concerned with the individual and the creating of a 'united hero' where all the actions undertaken by that hero in some way make complete sense of that individual's life. Rather, he calls for a 'structural union' which sees an assembling of all (and only) relevant components which contribute to the one action, the plot.⁷⁹ Sufficient time (an attribute which Aristotle labels 'magnitude') is required to convey the vagaries of the fortunes of the life shown.⁸⁰ Too little time provides a paucity of detail; too much results in a loss of unity and a sense of the whole. It is an argument for ample time in which to do justice to the telling of the story.

Tragedy has another function in its pursuit of pleasure. It arouses pity and fear, and elicits pleasure from the 'purgation' or catharsis of these emotions.⁸¹ But to do that it relies on the universality of the action. Aristotle's insistence on recognition as a functioning element of catharsis emphasizes the integral part catharsis plays in Tragedy and positions catharsis as something more than a chance outcome. He points out that recognition is a change from ignorance to knowledge.⁸² Initially he aligns recognition to surprise in both the reversal of situations and the recognition of the identity of the players, from within the

⁷⁸ Op. Cit.

⁷⁹ Op. Cit.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 1451a

⁸¹ Ibid. 1449b S. H. Butcher traces a number of discussions of the idea of catharsis and its implications for pity and fear in Aristotle's work. He notes the work of Jacob Bernays in the mid 1800s, particularly of the medical metaphor of purgation, which establishes an analogy between the effect of medicine on the body and the pleasurable relief felt by the soul. Bernays suggests that the stage provides a harmless and pleasurable outlet for instincts which demand satisfaction, and which can be indulged here more fearlessly than in real life. (Ibid. p245) Butcher also observes that Aristotle's use of the term expresses "not only a fact of psychology or of pathology, but a principle of art." (Ibid. p253)

⁸² Ibid. 1452a

plot. He also adds the Scene of Suffering as a third factor.⁸³ While the presentation of recognition might awake an empathic sharing in those elements of surprise with the audience, it is the drastic actions taken either deliberately or in ignorance against family or friends in the plot⁸⁴ which evokes a recognition of the terrible and the pitiful in the audience, and which more emphatically relates to the concept of catharsis and its ensuing pleasure.

In what is said to be his more mature discussion of pleasure⁸⁵ Aristotle suggests that pleasure is complete in itself, and that it superimposes itself on the activity.⁸⁶ Life is inextricably linked with pleasure. Life is an activity, pleasure completes that activity, and consequently life is desirable.⁸⁷ He adds further depth to this relationship by suggesting that pleasure in fact increases an activity.⁸⁸ He appears to mean by this that the pleasure derived from the activity encourages the participant to perform the activity better. This suggests that pleasure stimulates life and the desire for life. But pleasures differ. It has already been pointed out that Aristotle perceives of Tragedy as the more complete art form. However, he reminds us that we should expect of Tragedy only that pleasure which is proper to it, the pleasure which comes from the experiencing and the draining of the emotions of pity and fear.⁸⁹ This supports his notion that pleasures differ in kind in that they correspond to the activities they complete.⁹⁰ It is appropriate, then, that some pleasures are good, some are bad; they derive that value from the activities which provoke

⁸³ Ibid. 1452b

⁸⁴ Ibid. 1453b

⁸⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics*. P203 note 59

⁸⁶ Ibid. 1174b

⁸⁷ Ibid. 1175a

⁸⁸ Op. Cit.

⁸⁹ *Poetics*. 1453b

⁹⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics*. 1175a

the pleasure.⁹¹ With differences in activities making for differences in pleasures, Aristotle considers a hierarchy of both activities and its accompanying pleasure. Sight, for example, is superior in purity to touch; and the pleasures of thought are superior to the pleasures of the senses. That hierarchy is developed and measured against the idea of the good man.⁹² In fact, anything that is valuable to a good man "actually is valuable and pleasant."⁹³ Because intelligence is our highest possession, contemplation is considered to be the most virtuous activity and leads to a happy life.⁹⁴ The happiness that brings to life, however, makes of that life something more than human. Not only does contemplation provide the opportunity to impose or to arrive at an understanding of the pain of living, it permits man to participate in the divine. Man is a composite being of form and matter; the divine, as pure intelligence, is undivided and superior to our composite nature. For man to live guided by intelligence is to have a life which is divine in comparison with human life. Although a small part of our nature, this divine element is the most powerful and valuable. "One might even regard it as each man's true self, since it is the controlling and better part," Aristotle declares.⁹⁵ Just as the most blissful activity of the divinity is contemplation, so too, human contemplative activity is the most conducive to happiness.⁹⁶

When Aristotle describes good as always in some action⁹⁷ (as opposed to Plato's good as inherent) then it can be said that for Aristotle contemplation leads to the ultimate in human good. At the same time that he describes good as always in some action, he observes that the beautiful can also be in things without movement. Mathematics provides

⁹¹ Op. Cit.

⁹² Ibid. 1176a

⁹³ Ibid. 1176b

⁹⁴ Op. Cit.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 1178a

⁹⁶ Ibid. 1178b

⁹⁷ *Metaphysics*. 1078a

an example of this with its uses of the major Forms of the beautiful (order, symmetry and delimitation) as objects of the proofs of the mathematical sciences.⁹⁸ If we recall Aristotle's citing of harmony and rhythm as the second instinctive cause of poetry, we are reminded that harmony and rhythm fall within the bounds of this definition of beauty, and so beauty is understood as a governing force in the arts. At the same time, Aristotle's opinion of poetry as closely aligned with the contemplative activity of philosophy, contributes to the sum relationship which makes of poetry (and by extrapolation, the arts) a relationship of the beautiful and the good and thought and material; in our terms, aesthetics and ethics.

With Aristotle's interest in State driven education as the means for achieving the only proper fulfilment of a moral life through developing man's body to an alignment with the soul and a governing of appetites by reason,⁹⁹ Art holds an important place in society due largely to its exemplary, imitative and pleasure giving capacities. This is demonstrated, as we have seen in the essentials of Aristotle's argument, that art, with Tragedy as its epitome, gives pleasure through a formal and therefore beautiful organization of a demonstration by imitation of the action resulting from the motivating thought of a moral position.

These defining attitudes to the relationship of art and ethics are presented in the interests of indicating the grounds on which a narrow but important range of later thinkers have grappled with and rethought that relationship. Even a cursory glance will show us that these thinkers have selectively chosen aspects of issues flagged here as corner stones to elements of their arguments. We will see reiterated a preoccupation with issues such as the division and union of the material and the immaterial, considerations of and

⁹⁸ Op. Cit.

⁹⁹ Aristotle. 'Politics' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941) 1332bf

opinions about the relative importance of each, concern with truth, what constitutes truth and the capacity for art to reveal it. This finds further discussion in the continuation of the contest between art and philosophy. Other issues such as imitation and representation, concern with universality, unity, choice and immortality occur with considerable frequency. Kant adapts the idea of contemplation to embrace a notion of disinterest. Schiller is drawn to the notion of education and the necessity to develop individual order and to make man a social being in a way which it could be argued has its origin in Aristotle's sense of beauty as order and in the achievement of the fully developed social being. Adaptation of the empathy aroused by Tragedy plays a very important part in Schiller's perception of the relationship between art and the ethical. Hegel's interest in the concrete universal no doubt owes much to Plato. Aristotle's idea of pleasure as a life enriching and motivating finds echoes in Nietzsche's sense of joy and exhilaration in the experiencing of life. And Heidegger no doubt shares with Aristotle a sympathy in a number of respects of the individual eliciting of the truth of an object.

I have offered merely random associations here, but the number is probably sufficient to indicate the very real association to be found in the works of the thinkers we are about to consider.

*Only the chisel's hard blows can smooth
Marble's unyielding grain.¹*

5. Kant's Aesthetics.

How can I in agreement with others recognize an object as beautiful if beauty is not inherent in the object? The same question can be asked of goodness. Kant makes an enormous and defining contribution to the way this question is answered. This chapter plots Kant's position on this, and as a consequence, it shows the grounds on which much of the later discussions relating to aesthetics and ethics unfold. He also constructs a framework on which an understanding of judgement is built. While later thinkers take issue with the emphasis Kant develops in its final shape, his scaffolding, nonetheless, provides the structure to support their own vision.

The chapter begins with Baumgarten's introduction of the word *aesthetics* to the modern world, and it briefly outlines his proposition that a science of perception is possible so that knowledge can be achieved through perfection in poetry. It is this echo of our initial question regarding the possibility of the inherent nature of beauty and goodness, with its intimation that perfection is somehow inherent, and as a result a science of aesthetics is possible because the perfect poem can convey knowledge, which Kant opposes. It is this opposition which, in some respects, encapsulates the thrust of Kant's ideas which this chapter sets out to present. The word *aesthetics* is used as a term to indicate a philosophy of art and to indicate a theory of sense perception. Kant is interested in pursuing ideas about knowledge. But he argues that it is the conjunction of sense perception and understanding that forms experience and, ultimately, knowledge. Kant begins by turning the assumption of knowledge conforming to objects on its head, to an assumption that objects conform to our knowledge, in what he terms his Copernican

¹ Schiller. 'The Ideal and Life'. Trans. W. Veit. VIII. Lines 79, 80.

revolution. His ideas about the roles of sensibility, understanding and the contribution of *a priori* knowledge to human knowledge, all within the realm of judgement, is developed. The part imagination plays in the knowledge of objects through the union of sensibility and understanding is linked with the relation of the representation to the thinking subject and an *a priori* sense of time. Time is a necessary part of the perception of experience and ties man to the finite. Reason (*Vernunft*) is separated from understanding (*Verstand*), and it is one of the defining aspects of man because it gives him the capacity to determine what he ought to be and to make laws which allow him freedom of action, albeit under the obligation of reason.

This provides a background against which we can then consider Kant's thoughts on aesthetic judgement and, in what seems like a contradiction in terms, his ideas about the universality of its subjectivity.

Judgement is aligned with the finality of an object. Finality might be perceived in an understanding which is prior to any concept and allows pleasure to be derived from a contemplation of the form of the object. Judgement can also be made which matches the fulfilment of the purpose of the object with the object. Kant discerns the kinds of pleasures which can arise from judgements made in a climate of disinterest, in situations where gratification of the senses is influenced by the inclinations of reason, and in response to the good. We also see how he addresses the question of the subjective judgement as universally veritable, and the universal communicability of the sensations of delight. He also outlines a link between the ideal of beauty and reason. His discussion of the sublime positions the ground for the beautiful in external nature, and the ground for the sublime within ourselves and the attitude of mind which it takes to a representation of nature. It is on the basis of his thought to this point that we can examine his ideas about art as a made object directed by reason, and where the standard of fine art is found in reflective judgement rather than sense perception. This has implications for that rare artist the genius, just as it has for aesthetic ideas in opposition to rational ideas, and to the

relationship of the aesthetic experience to the moral experience. He links fine art to the spirit of mankind and the universal communication of the inmost self. His relating of thought and the culture of moral feeling to the senses forms an influential and important basis for the thought which follows and discerns its own understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.

In 1735 Baumgarten wrote:

The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have already distinguished between *things perceived* [αἰσθητὰ] and *things known* [νόητα]. It is entirely evident that they did not equate *things known* with things of sense, since they honoured with this name things also removed from sense (therefore, images). Therefore, *things known* are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; *things perceived* [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic.²

So begins the modern use of the word aesthetic. Baumgarten claims that what is known through the senses contributes to rational knowledge. He is best known for the notion that art epitomizes that knowledge by presenting a sensate representation of perfection. Baumgarten's vision for aesthetics is as the development of a science of the knowledge of beauty and the arts.³ He argues that sensate representations or images (that is, ideas expressed in language⁴) belong to poetry, and that the clearer those representations are, the more perfect the poem is.⁵ Better clarity and a more perfect poem is achieved by representing more sensual detail.⁶ Partial imagery can be good value because it can evoke

² Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb. *Reflections on Poetry (Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus)*. Trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1954) §116 p78

³ Ibid. §115 p77f

⁴ Intro. P19

⁵ Ibid. §§12-13 p40f

⁶ Ibid. §17 p43

the image of the object as a whole, thereby achieving more clarity than a partial image might logically suggest.⁷ Poetry is also enhanced by the representation of emotion,⁸ and it has the capacity to represent dreams, memories and other such imaginary worlds.⁹ The science of poetic representation and knowledge embraces an adherence to an interconnection of the representations;¹⁰ in particular, the interconnection of those representations with the necessary theme.¹¹ It also relies on a rule of order based on a succession of representations which progressively accumulate to clarify the theme, and somewhat in the manner of the rule of order "by which things in the world follow one another for disclosing the glory of the Creator, the ultimate and highest theme of some immense poem..."¹² Essentially, Baumgarten is advocating a science of art which understands the collection and inter-relating of visually driven ideas which evoke a poetic truth. The more perfect the poem in its representations, the more we learn and know.

Kant takes issue with Baumgarten. He acknowledges two uses of the word *aesthetic*, and he acknowledges Baumgarten's role in initiating the use of the term *aesthetics* to signify the critique of taste (or philosophy of art). But (in his *Critique of Reason* at least) he declares a preference for reserving its use for the 'doctrine of sensibility' (the theory of perceiving with one's senses).¹³ The latter, he suggests, is true science and comes close to the ancient Greek's division of knowledge into things perceived and things known. We have here an indication of the importance Kant places on the interplay between sense perception and understanding in the formation of

⁷ Ibid. §30 p49

⁸ Ibid. §25 p47

⁹ Ibid. §§ 37-65 pp51-62

¹⁰ Ibid. §65 and §68 p62

¹¹ Ibid §66 p62

¹² Ibid. §71 p64

¹³ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Op. Cit. B36 p66

experience. It is this interplay which creates knowledge. Art, on the other hand, does not contribute to knowledge. We subject art to judgments about the correctness of the rules of art (and consequently to our knowledge of those rules), but art does not furnish knowledge.¹⁴

It is the question of how we know, that is of issue here; and it is a question which is of consuming interest for Kant. His work turns previously accepted perceptions of knowledge on its head. This is what he says about the relationship he perceives between objects and knowledge.

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.¹⁵

Kant underlines the significance of this inversion of understanding knowledge by likening it to Copernicus' hypothesis which explains the movement of heavenly bodies by shifting the previous thoughts that stars revolve around the spectator, to that of the spectator revolving while the stars remain stationary. Like the Copernicus hypothesis, Kant's theory is a very different way of perceiving the world, and a very different way of understanding our world.

Kant declares that the object of our senses must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition.¹⁶ *Intuition* is translated from *Anschauung* and used by Kant to mean 'viewing', 'seeing', and ultimately 'sense perception'. But the *experience* (*Erfahrung*) or practical knowledge of the perceived object is sense perception formed by rules of understanding. This makes intuition or direct sense perception a representation of the

¹⁴ Op. Cit.

¹⁵ Ibid B xvi p 22

¹⁶ Ibid. B xvii p22

experience of the object. As a representation of the object that representation must conform to the concept by which the object is determined.¹⁷

As a species of knowledge, experience (*Erfahrung* - practical knowledge) involves understanding, "and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as *a priori*."¹⁸ This is not to suggest that Kant is advocating that ideas are innate. He states quite clearly that knowledge begins with experience (*Erfahrung*).¹⁹ However, we must keep in mind that for Kant this is a practical knowledge which arises from sense perception formed by understanding (*Verstand*). Consequently, he can declare that while knowledge begins with experience, it does not necessarily follow that all knowledge arises out of experience.²⁰ Knowledge which is independent of experience and of all impressions of the senses he terms *a priori*.²¹

Kant builds verity of knowledge on judgement. He points out that while in our reasoned quest for knowledge we apply analysis more than any other process to the concepts we already have of objects, we can, in that process make some judgements which yields real knowledge *a priori*. These two kinds of knowledge comes about through different kinds of judgements. *Analytic judgment* simply breaks up the subject into "those constituent concepts that have all along have been thought in it..."²² That is, what the analysis affirms or denies about the subject does not add anything which is not already contained in the concept. *Synthetic judgement*, on the other hand, will "add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no

¹⁷ Op. Cit..

¹⁸ Op. Cit.

¹⁹ Ibid. B 1 p41

²⁰ Op. Cit.

²¹ Ibid. B 3 p43

²² Ibid. B 11 p48

analysis could possibly extract from it..."²³ While all judgements of experience are synthetic judgements because separate concepts, although not contained in the other, are parts of a whole experience thereby allowing for an immediate and unreasoned or intuitive perception, *a priori* synthetic Judgements do not have the luxury of experience to confirm them. We simply know (in combination with *necessity* - "a proposition which in being thought is thought as *necessary*..."²⁴) on the basis of 'mere concepts'.²⁵ He cites pure mathematics²⁶ geometry²⁷ and physics²⁸ as areas in which *a priori* synthetic judgement are be made on the basis of strictly universal *a priori* knowledge as in the case of the mathematical example of 'every alteration must have a cause'. Universality achieved through the process of induction necessarily incorporates exceptions. A universal judgement for Kant is one where there are no exceptions and is not derived from experience.²⁹

Kant differentiates between the two lines of human knowledge: *sensibility* (*Sinnlichkeit*) - the ability to perceive through one's senses - and *understanding* (*Verstand*). *Intuition* (*Anschauung*) appears to be a repository or form for sensibility. Because the *form* of appearance (a complexity developed from the imposing of order) and into which the sensations are posited, cannot be sensation, he argues, it must be found in the mind *a priori* and so considered apart from sensation. Intuition, then, has an 'immediate relation' to objects in that it is the receptor for the representations 'given' through sensibility and from

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid. B 3 p43

²⁵ Ibid. B 13-14 p50f

²⁶ Ibid., B 15 p52

²⁷ Ibid. B 16 p53

²⁸ Ibid. B 17 p54

²⁹ Ibid. B 3 p44

which they are thought through understanding. This thought gives rise to concepts.³⁰

On the other hand, pure representations, or those which do not derive from sensation are a pure form of sensibility which he calls *pure intuition* (*reine Anschauung*).³¹ And so he declares:

Thus, if I take away from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in regard to it, substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc., something still remains over from this empirical intuition, namely extension and figure. These belong to pure intuition, which, even without any actual object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the mind *a priori* as a mere form of sensibility.³²

The science of the principles of *a priori* sensibility he calls *transcendental aesthetic*. He determines *transcendental* as "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*."³³ Time and space are, he claims, two pure forms of sensible intuition (a relationship of *pure intuition*, and the *form* of appearances) which serve as principles of *a priori* knowledge.³⁴ "By means of an outer sense, a property of the mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside ourselves, and all without exception in space".³⁵ It is an inner sense which results in time as the determinate form on which the inner state is intuited. This *a priori* knowledge of time and space is a concept, a "necessary representation that underlies all intuitions."³⁶ What we intuit, then, is the "representation

³⁰ Ibid. B 34 p65

³¹ Ibid. § 1 B 35 p66

³² Ibid. § 1 B 35 p66

³³ Ibid. B 25 p59

³⁴ Ibid. § 1 B 36 p67

³⁵ Ibid. § 2 B 37 p67

³⁶ Ibid. § 4 B 46 p74

of appearance".³⁷ Therefore, he argues, we cannot know what objects are in themselves. Perceiving space and time as necessary conditions of all outer and inner experience and as subjective conditions of all our intuition, offers a unifying and reasoned order on which human knowledge as a form giving process can build.

Intuitions which derive from the senses, Kant says, depend on emotions (ie *Affectionen*, affections).³⁸ On the other side, understanding, which is a non-sensible faculty of knowledge and therefore cannot be a faculty of intuition, yields knowledge through concepts. Concepts rest on 'functions'; that is, the "unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation."³⁹ Understanding makes use of these concepts (which arise from spontaneous thought) to judge. But because a representation always intercedes between the object and the concept, "Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it."⁴⁰ The outcome, Kant argues, is that all acts of understanding are judgements (which are, in themselves, functions of unity among our representations). The ensuing representation benefits from the collective knowledge of the others, and results in understanding.

Kant's term *understanding* is known in translation as the *faculty of judgement*.⁴¹ A more correct translation emphasizes *understanding* as the *ability to judge* (*Vermögen zu urteilen*). But if the capacity for knowledge acquired by understanding is the result of thought based on concepts, the difficulty is, in Kant's words, that "concepts, as predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a not yet determined object."⁴² Consequently, Kant argues that there are *a priori* conditions for the possibility of objects

³⁷ Ibid. § 8 B 59 p82

³⁸ Ibid. B 93 p105

³⁹ Op. Cit.,

⁴⁰ Op. Cit.,

⁴¹ Ibid. B 94 p106

⁴² Op. Cit.,

being thought.⁴³ These representations have an underlying structure which, as *a priori* concepts, and using Aristotle's terminology, he now calls categories.⁴⁴ And the synthesis (or judgement) in which the object of knowledge which is the concept in which the manifold of a given intuition is united⁴⁵ comes about through "the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious."⁴⁶

Imagination, then is a power which facilitates the union of sensibility and understanding. The resulting mediating representation is in one regard intellectual, in another sensible.⁴⁷ While the act of imagination provides an image for the concept (the schema of the concept⁴⁸), the schema always remains a product of imagination, thereby ensuring that while the image mediates between sense and reason, it does so on the premiss that the possibility of the image as mediator is confined to that which the mind itself constructs.

A knowledge of objects, achieved through the synthesis of representations requires three conditions. First, a synthesis of representations is dependent on imagination. Second, the synthetic unity required for judgement relies on the relation of a representation to the thinking subject. Kant names this condition *apperception* and defines it as "Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perceptions".⁴⁹ Third, an inner sense of time in its *a priori* form is needed so that there is a possibility of existence.⁵⁰

⁴³ Ibid. B 103 p111

⁴⁴ Ibid. B 106 p113

⁴⁵ Ibid. B 137 p156

⁴⁶ Ibid. B 103 p112

⁴⁷ Ibid. B 177 p180

⁴⁸ Ibid. B 180 p182

⁴⁹ Ibid. A 107 p136

⁵⁰ Ibid. B 194 p192

However, if we are to have knowledge of an object, that object must be capable of some immediate sensory perception. By this he means the imagined object, the thought representation must relate to actual or possible experience."⁵¹

In the schematic categories of experience (named by Kant as the *Analogies of Experience*), he asserts: "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions."⁵² This "synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions"⁵³ is the result of universal rules of unity.⁵⁴ Consequently, it is a knowledge which is derived not as it is experienced, but rather, through the relation of that object to time in general, "and therefore only through concepts that connect them *a priori*".⁵⁵ Time is a necessary component of the perception of experience. In support of this notion, Kant discerns three principles which relate to appearances in time, all of which exist prior to experience and make it possible.⁵⁶ He describes them by analogies with *duration*, *succession* and *coexistence*.⁵⁷

Of the principle of Duration (or Permanence of Substance) he says: "In all changes of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished."⁵⁸ He builds on this thought by suggesting that all appearances are in time, but that appearance contains both a notion of the substance (that is, the permanence or the truth) of the object, and, its transitory existence. Because the substance or the basis on which all change occurs remains the same, even though the way it exists might change, its

⁵¹ Ibid. B 195 p193

⁵² Ibid. B 218 p208

⁵³ Ibid. B 218 p209

⁵⁴ Ibid. B 196 p193

⁵⁵ Ibid. B 219 p209

⁵⁶ Op. Cit.

⁵⁷ Op. Cit.

⁵⁸ Ibid. B 224 p212

total quantity of existence does not alter. Hence Kant can say

All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence or that which remains and persists. In all appearances the permanent is the object itself, that is, substance as phenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to their determinations.⁵⁹

The determination of a substance, the particular way in which it exists, Kant labels as *accidents*.⁶⁰ He describes accident as "being simply the way in which the existence of a substance is positively determined."⁶¹ Because of the difficulty for us in separating changeable aspect of the substance from that which would remain, the relations between substance and accident become a condition of the existence of objects in a possible experience. Consequently, the two exist at the same time.

The second principle addresses succession in time. The coming into being and the passing away of a substance are perceived as appearances which exist at opposing periods of time, and in which one precedes the other. It is not within the capacity of sense and intuition to connect these two perceptions. The connection is made through imagination, but imagination is unable to determine the order of connection. Time cannot be perceived in itself. Therefore, a comparison of an earlier object with a later object will not reveal its relation in time. It is only in pure concept which lies in understanding and not in perception which permits knowledge of the relation of cause and effect.⁶²

Kant says that the various definitions of understanding such as spontaneity of knowledge, power of thought, faculty of concepts or faculty of judgements are identical in that they can all be characterized as the faculty of rules. Understanding is required for

⁵⁹ Ibid. B 227 p214

⁶⁰ Ibid. B 229 p216

⁶¹ Ibid. B 230 p216

⁶² Ibid. B 234 p219

all experience and for its possibility.⁶³ Understanding is always occupied in the investigation of appearances in order to detect some rule in them.⁶⁴ The highest law (under which all others stand) 'issue *a priori* from understanding itself'. It relies on the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances (which exist only in our sensibility) and as such is only possible in the unity of apperception. "All appearances, as possible experiences, thus lie *a priori* in the understanding, and receive from it their formal possibility..."⁶⁵ Consequently, it is an order of successive synthesis through which the object is apprehended. Thus the relation of cause and effect in a sequence of appearance is a condition of the possibility of experience.

Kant's third principle of appearance in time focuses on coexistence. "All substances in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity."⁶⁶ The perception of objects apprehended to exist at the one time and in relation to each other cannot, he claims be the result of an empirical synthesis, but rather, comes about because of a sense of a "thoroughgoing community of mutual interaction".⁶⁷

As regulative principles of experience, Kant's three analogies of the existence of appearance in time provide the basis for the relation of objects to experience. "Taken together," Kant says, "the analogies thus declare that all appearances lie ... in *one* nature, because without this *a priori* unity no unity of experience, and therefore no determination of objects in it, would be possible."⁶⁸

Kant in summary of the necessary conditions of empirical thought suggests we can

⁶³ Ibid. A 199 p225

⁶⁴ Ibid. A 126 p147

⁶⁵ Ibid. A 127 p148

⁶⁶ Ibid. B 256 p233

⁶⁷ Ibid. B 260 p235

⁶⁸ Ibid. B 263 p237

only know and experience those objects of the physical world which are, through the formal conditions of experience (intuition and concept) possible; actual (that is connected to material conditions); and necessary. These are necessary *a priori* conditions on which experience rests. Reality cannot be thought *in concreto* without the aid of experience.⁶⁹ Reality is tied to sensation. It is the matter component of experience.⁷⁰ But when Kant differentiates between the role of the senses which represent objects *as they appear*, and understanding which represents objects *as they are*,⁷¹ he emphasizes the necessity of representing the object as appearances in interconnection with one another. Consequently he says, "*Understanding and sensibility, ... can determine objects only when they are employed in conjunction.*"⁷²

But this exchange does not necessarily lead to a true knowledge. Kant speaks of transcendental dialectic as a '*logic of illusion*' [*Schein*]⁷³ or a false use of reason. The problem does not arise from our intuition of an object, but rather, from the relation of the object to our understanding;⁷⁴ the judgement. Concepts are obtained by inference. That is, they are the result of a logical sequence which connect or unite thoughts about experience.⁷⁵ The problem of illusion arises when we make the jump to believing that because our use of reason to develop a concept for understanding an object follows fundamental rules and maxims, (thereby resulting in subjective knowledge) that it becomes "an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves."⁷⁶

⁶⁹ Ibid. B 270 p241

⁷⁰ Op. Cit. p241

⁷¹ Ibid. B 313 p274

⁷² Ibid. B 314 p274

⁷³ Ibid. B 349 p297

⁷⁴ Ibid. B 350 p297

⁷⁵ Ibid. B 367 p308 and B 361 p304

⁷⁶ Ibid. B 353 p299

Kant speaks of 'things in themselves' as beyond experience: real but not known to us. That which is beyond experience and all appearance is *unconditioned*. It is this unconditioned "which reason, by necessity and by right, demands in things in themselves, as required to complete the series of conditions [of existence]"⁷⁷ So, he argues, while all speculative knowledge of reason is limited to objects of experience, and we cannot know objects as things in themselves, we must at least be able to think them as things in themselves.⁷⁸ Speculative reason cannot be used to obtain transcendent insight because the principles it uses is limited to objects of possible experience. Any application of those principles to that which cannot be an object of experience changes the object into an appearance, thereby making it a contradiction and an impossibility. Consequently, Kant says, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*."⁷⁹ In the case of the employment of reason to that which cannot be objects of experience, *assumptions* are made as a basis for reason's activity.

Kant separates reason from understanding. He suggests reason contributes to knowledge by apprehending "the particular in the universal through concepts."⁸⁰ Understanding, he says, is the faculty which unites appearances by means of rules; and reason is the faculty which "secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles."⁸¹ Hence, reason is dislocated from experience and is employed only in the service of unifying the knowledge of the many experiences of understanding.⁸² Our knowledge of objects through reason must, therefore, be different from that which is

⁷⁷ Ibid. B xx p24

⁷⁸ Ibid. B xxvi p27

⁷⁹ Ibid. B xxx p29

⁸⁰ Ibid. B 357 p301

⁸¹ Ibid. B 359 p303

⁸² Op. Cit.

achieved though understanding.⁸³

Kant puts forward a schemata of concepts for what takes place in the synthesis of perception and thought required for knowledge. Concepts of understanding deal with phenomena. As *a priori* thought they are concerned with experience, but, he says, they contain "nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances, in so far as these appearances must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness."⁸⁴ As such, concepts of understanding provide the material for the inferences on which concepts of reason are derived. But concepts of reason are not limited to experience. Empirical knowledge is only a part of its knowledge. Experience is not always the source of rules. Where nature is concerned, "experience supplies the rules and is the source of truth."⁸⁵ However, man has the capacity to do more than find and follow nature's laws. "Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive laws prescribing what *ought to be done* from what *is done*, or to impose upon them limits by which the latter is circumscribed."⁸⁶ Man, whilst having an empirical character like other things in nature, knows himself and nature through his senses. But unlike his knowledge of nature, he also knows himself through the non-sensible impressions of apperception and inner determinations.⁸⁷ What is understood of nature is confined to what is, what has been or what will be. Man, on the other hand, has the capacity to develop ideas which determine what *ought to be*.⁸⁸ As a result, we understand a cause, an imperative, which culminates in the imposition of rules which suggest how we should act. Behaving how we 'should' is ethical behaviour. Kant locates a different basis for action in ethical behaviour. "This '*ought*' expresses a possible action

⁸³ Ibid. B 363 p306

⁸⁴ Ibid. B 367 p308

⁸⁵ Ibid. B 375 p313

⁸⁶ Op. Cit.

⁸⁷ Ibid. B 575 p472

⁸⁸ Ibid. B 575 p473

the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; whereas in the case of a natural action the ground must always be an appearance."⁸⁹ 'Natural grounds' and 'sensuous impulses' may exhort the will to act, but they can never produce an 'ought'. Only an unconditioned reason can do that. Thus the laws made by reason leads to freedom of action.⁹⁰ Reason develops an order, Kant says, which is independent of the

order of things as they present themselves in appearance [by framing] for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they have never taken place, and perhaps never will.⁹¹

It is from this position that Kant needs to develop his ethics which later became so important for Schiller when he tried to develop the possibility of freedom in a reality of necessities. Schiller found that freedom in art.

Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* develops the conceptual framing of the ethical law. He further defines the moral law as the law of freedom as opposed to the law of nature.⁹² But the whole of moral philosophy is to be based on only pure knowledge. Thus these laws are *a priori* in the concepts of pure reason. When Kant speaks of the moral law as the law of freedom, he declares that the laws we determine for how we ought to act are not in some way inherent. Right behaviour is not based on predetermined laws. Unlike Plato's notion of Good, Kant's idea of good is conditional. Good does not exist as a predetermined entity. The only good that exists without qualification, says Kant, is good will.⁹³ While there are many things which are good in particular situations and

⁸⁹ Op. Cit.

⁹⁰ Ibid. B 581 p476

⁹¹ Ibid. B 576 p473

⁹² Kant. *The Moral law. Kant's Goundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. H.J.Paton. (London. Hutchinson & Co. 1978) 387 p53

⁹³ Ibid. 393 p59

circumstances, their propensity not to be good in other situations underlines their qualified, conditioned nature.⁹⁴ Good will is, by definition, good in itself and not for what it accomplishes. If everything else in the natural being designed for life has its appropriate purpose, then reason must have its purpose. The assumption that happiness might be served by reason is dismissed on the grounds that happiness is better served by other faculties. The true function of reason, then, must be to produce a will which is good in itself.⁹⁵

Kant emphasizes the obligation of action to the grounds of reason from which it springs. It is not enough that an ensuing action conforms to the moral law. Moral law must carry with it "absolute necessity" if it is to be valid as a ground of obligation.⁹⁶ The action is morally good only if it is performed for the sake of the law. That is, it must be performed out of duty. Good as the 'principle of volition' dominates over good realized by action. Good actions conditioned by their ends do not reflect a good will, because, as he points out earlier, good will exists without qualification. Observing a law which does not serve personal inclinations results in a personal principle of volition - a maxim - which is grounded in a universal law. So that when Kant says, "I ought never to act except in a way that *I can also will my maxim should become a universal law*"⁹⁷ he is laying claim to the categorical imperative: the necessity of acting on the basis of the purity of good will.

While everything in nature works according to laws, it is only the rational being which has the power to act in accordance with his ideas of laws or principles. Hence a rational being has the faculty to decide on and initiate action. He has will. Will is, quite clearly, the instituting and enactment of reason. "Since *reason* is required in order to

⁹⁴ Ibid. 394 p60

⁹⁵ Ibid. 396 p62

⁹⁶ Ibid. 389 p55

⁹⁷ Ibid. 402 p67

derive action from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason."⁹⁸

An imperative is, for Kant, a command of reason arising from the conception of an objective principle.⁹⁹ All imperatives, (he perceives three) are expressed by an 'ought'. Imperatives are formulae for deciding a course of action which is necessary for some sense of good. If the action is necessary as a means to bring about something else, (that is, the action is good for a particular purpose) then the imperative is classed as an hypothetical imperative. An imperative which deems an action to be necessary in itself and without regard to a purpose is classified as a categorical imperative.¹⁰⁰

This is not to say that a categorical imperative doesn't direct an action at an *end*. Where an action is directed at an end which supplies a means to the satisfaction of an impulse, this value does not produce a universal principle (and would in fact derive from a hypothetical imperative). But the existence of a rational being "has *in itself* an absolute value".¹⁰¹ This results in the notion that man exists as an end in himself. Kant puts it this way.

Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value *for us*; they are *objective ends* - that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end to which they would serve *simply* as means; for unless this is so, nothing of *absolute* value would be found anywhere. But if all value were conditioned - that is, contingent - then no supreme principle would be found for reason at all.¹⁰²

Thus, the notion that something which is shared by everyone as an end in itself forms an objective principle of the will and therefore can serve as a practical law. Kant does acknowledge that by man conceiving of his existence in this way, it is a subjective

⁹⁸ Ibid. 412 p76

⁹⁹ Ibid. 413 p77

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 413 p78

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 428 p90

¹⁰² Ibid. 428 p91

principle of human actions, but he also claims it as an objective principle because it is "also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground..."¹⁰³ This prompts the following practical imperative.

Act in a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.¹⁰⁴

The corollary of this interconnection is that the principle of humanity is an end in itself because it is universal; it is an objective end which, stemming from pure reason, forms the limits of our subjective ends. The universal law to which we are subject is the result of human will.

The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it must be considered as also *making the law* for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author.)¹⁰⁵

Ultimately, this establishes the notion of autonomy; the freedom of the will. As rational agents, the moral law articulates our own nature, and it is that to which we are subject.

The universality of the law results in Kant's perception of "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws" which he calls a 'kingdom of ends'.¹⁰⁶ As participants in the making of the universal law, and as subject to it, the rational being constitutes "a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends which each may set before himself."¹⁰⁷ However, Kant does acknowledge this as an ideal. A kingdom of ends is possible only if the maxims resulting from the categorical

¹⁰³ Ibid. 429 p91

¹⁰⁴ Op. Cit.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 431 p93

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 433 p95

¹⁰⁷ Op. Cit.

imperatives are universally followed. It is an ideal easily confounded by both the unwillingness of others to obey the categorical imperative and the possibility of the kingdom of nature not 'working in harmony' with the individual.¹⁰⁸ This does not, in Kant's view, diminish the virtue of the maxim. Its command is, after-all, categorical. And it makes of each member a disinterested participant in what Kant terms the mere dignity of humanity, the rational nature of man with its reverence for a mere Idea.¹⁰⁹

Kant acknowledges that the possibility of a categorical imperative rests solely on the presupposition of the Idea of freedom. The rational thought which arises from that presupposition should be sufficient to convince us of the validity of the categorical imperative as a principle of action. But reason is incapable of explaining how pure reason can be practical. The intelligible world cannot be used to provide the answer. Kant says that although he has an Idea of his own of that world, it derives from grounds which does not come from the world of sensibility nor from the power of reason. That his Idea signifies a 'something' that is over when he excludes the world of sense from the grounds which determine will, serves merely to indicate that all actions are not driven by the senses. Of that Idea, he knows nothing more than its form (that maxims should be universally valid) and the concept of it as a cause which determines the will. Consequently, if sensuous motives are removed from the cause determining will, then the Idea would have to be the motive of morality.

Although knowing that the intelligible world is something beyond the sensible is the limit of his knowledge about that world, that knowledge is important in that it prevents reason from searching the sensible world for empirical motives for morality, or from resorting to the empty notion of transcendental concepts. But "the Idea of a purely intelligible world, as a whole of all intelligences to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (although from another point of view we are members of the sensible world as

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 438 p100

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 439 p100

well,) remains always a serviceable and permitted Idea for the purposes of rational belief..."¹¹⁰ Ultimately, what ought to be done is directed by pure reason and is not dependent on sensible conditions.

We have seen so far the theoretical grounds for Kant's perception of knowledge, our cognitive faculties and their relationship to phenomena. In particular, he has emphasized the role of understanding and its *a priori* principles as that faculty of an ability to judge and to yield knowledge using concepts. We have also looked at his perceptions of freedom of will, its relation to desire and reason, and their role in driving ethical behaviour. Thus, Kant discerns two kinds of concepts: those of *nature* and of *freedom*. The concept of nature gives rise to theoretical cognition on the fundamental truths of *a priori* principles. The concept of freedom establishes fundamental principles on which to base practical action. The Philosophy of Nature is concerned with theoretical principles; the Philosophy of Morals is concerned with principles of the practical laws of reason.

The faculty of cognition with its two realms, that of natural concepts which is theoretical and establishes laws of consequences through understanding, and that of the concept of freedom which is practical and where reason prescribes laws for acting, runs into the difficulty of an apparently untraversable gulf which prevents them from forming the one realm. That gulf is created by the seeming lack of influence of the concept of freedom on the laws of nature and of the lack of influence of the concept of nature on the laws of freedom. Kant suggests the gulf results from on one hand the concept of nature 'sees' its objects (in intuition) only as phenomena, while on the other hand, the concept of freedom deals with an object which has the characteristics of a thing in itself - that is,

real but beyond experience - but it does not make it available to intuition as phenomena.¹¹¹

Yet the super-sensible (the realm of the concept of freedom) is *meant* to influence the sensible, Kant declares. It is his ambition to define the grounds for the uniting element which makes it possible to link the fundamental truths of both.

We shall see that Schiller is also preoccupied with bridging this chasm. He perceives art to be the mediator between necessity and freedom.

Kant finds the grounds for connecting the two philosophies in the cognitive faculty of judgement which, he says, stands between understanding and reason. It provides a 'merely subjective *a priori*' fundamental truth or principle against which to test laws.¹¹² Judgement also has the capacity to function in those three powers of representation, the *faculty of knowledge*, the *feeling of pleasure or displeasure*, and the *faculty of desire*.¹¹³ He argues that understanding (that is, the ability to judge using concepts) is sufficient to legislate for the faculty of knowledge by means of *a priori* concepts of nature. For the faculty of desire (which operates under the concept of freedom) reason prescribes laws *a priori*. Between these two faculties of knowledge and desire, stands the feeling of pleasure. It stands between them with mediating possibilities as judgement does standing between understanding and reason.¹¹⁴ Given their corresponding positions as the meat in the sandwich so to speak, Kant assumes both pleasure and judgement contain *a priori* principles of their own. Consequently the *a priori* principles or fundamental truths housed in pleasure will facilitate a transition between the realm of concepts of nature to that of the concept of freedom, just as in that made possible between the legislative faculties of

¹¹¹ Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952) 175 p13

¹¹² Ibid. 177 p15

¹¹³ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 178 p17

understanding and reason.¹¹⁵

Kant defines judgement in general as "the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal."¹¹⁶ If the universal in the form of a rule, a principle or a law, is given, then the judgement made about the particular collected under that universal is classed as *determinant*. It is a judgement which operates under universal transcendent laws furnished by understanding and has no need to devise a law for its own guidance.¹¹⁷ The judgements made about experience on the basis of the understanding derived from 'the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions'¹¹⁸ is a good example. However, given the many laws which are 'undetermined', reflective judgement (that which "is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal"¹¹⁹) requires a principle. It is a principle which it cannot borrow from experience. It is a transcendental principle which, Kant says, "reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself."¹²⁰ Reflective judgement gives itself laws in the manner reflective of the universal laws. We perceive, particular empirical laws "according to a unity such as they would have if an understanding ... had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to natural laws."¹²¹ The notion which drives this assumption revolves around a concept of *finality* (*Zweckmässigkeit* - purposefulness). The concept of an object ("so far as it contains at the same time the

¹¹⁵ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 179 p18

¹¹⁷ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁸ *Critique of Pure Reason*. Op. Cit. B 218 p208

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 180 p18

¹²⁰ Ibid. 180 p19

¹²¹ Op. Cit.

ground of the actuality of this Object"¹²²) is linked with its end or purpose. The agreement of the object with what we perceive it to be, Kant suggests, is only possible through the "finality of its form" - its purpose.¹²³ Kant hastens to reiterate that this is a means of providing a law so that judgement can carry on its business. It is not, he points out, a substitute for discovering the law in nature. Rather, this 'transcendental concept of a finality' is a subjective principle, an *a priori* maxim of judgement.¹²⁴

Finality in an object can be represented in two ways. The first is subjective and provides the grounds for aesthetic judgement. Here, the form of the object is perceived in an understanding which is prior to any concept.¹²⁵ The limited knowledge of the object is only that of the sensation of the matter of its form. But the form provides the grounds of pleasure for reflecting on the representation of the object. It is the comparison of the representation with the object which calls into play the imagination and which tests that representation against the understanding of the visual form of the object that arouses pleasure, and at the same time, provides the finality or purposefulness for the reflective judgement.¹²⁶ Kant adds the following explanation.

When the form of an object...is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, ... estimated as the ground of pleasure in the representation of such an Object, then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the Subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass judgement. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste.¹²⁷

The second way in which finality can be represented in an object revolves around

¹²² Op. Cit.

¹²³ Op. Cit.

¹²⁴ Ibid. 184 p23

¹²⁵ Ibid. 192 p33

¹²⁶ Ibid. 180f p29f

¹²⁷ Ibid. 190 p31

the objective.¹²⁸ This comes about through the representation of the object fulfilling its perceived purpose. Finality, says Kant, is "represented as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form."¹²⁹ Thus, when a concept is given, we engage in a process of judgement which pursues an understanding and estimation of the object's success in fulfilling that purpose. Kant defines this as a teleological judgement.¹³⁰

Aesthetic judgement, then, is the faculty of estimating the formal finality, or the subjective agreement of the imagination and understanding with the form, by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Teleological judgement is the faculty of estimating the 'real finality' of nature, the success of an object's ability to fulfil its purpose, by understanding and reason.

Kant extends his argument to suggest judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.¹³¹ It is a proposal that fuels Schiller's fire for his ambition to link necessity and freedom. Reflective judgement presupposes *a priori* the condition of the possibility of the end in the concept of freedom which is to exist or to manifest in the sensible world. This leads to presuppose the possibility of that end in nature through the nature of the Subject being of the sensible world..¹³²

Considering the nature of the task of this study, it is my intention to concentrate the focus of the remainder of this chapter on Kant's aesthetic judgement. Kant addresses the question of the subjectivity of aesthetic judgement and the apparently contradictory notion of its universality in his 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement'. He divides aesthetic judgement

¹²⁸ Ibid. 192 p33

¹²⁹ Op. Cit.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 193 p34

¹³¹ Ibid. 196 p38

¹³² Op. Cit.

into two: judgement of the beautiful (or the judgement of taste where taste is the faculty of estimating the beautiful¹³³) and judgements about the sublime.

To discern something as beautiful is to respond to the object by feeling pleasure. The feelings of pleasure or displeasure denote nothing in the object. The feelings belong to the subject and are emotional responses to the object.¹³⁴ The judgements made on this basis refer to and compare other responses of this type which the subject has felt. Consequently, those responses contribute nothing to knowledge.

There are for Kant three kinds of pleasure, only one of which is attributable to beauty. "All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation."¹³⁵ This is a judgement of beauty made in the climate of disinterest. However, pleasure can be found in the agreeable. The 'agreeable' provides gratification of the senses and is therefore open to inclination and the influences it exerts on reason and therefore will. Pleasure found in the 'good' is also a pleasure linked with interest. The idea of 'good' is tied to a concept which in turn implies an end. That relates it to reason, and possibly to willing, and so suggests a delight in the existence of an object or action for an interest or purpose.¹³⁶ The pleasure derived from both the Agreeable and the Good is linked with desire. It is a pleasure which is determined not only by the representation of the object, but also by the connection between the subject and the real existence of the object. Judgement of taste, however, is indifferent to the existence of the object, and judges only on how the object stands with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgement is not a cognitive judgement and therefore is not grounded on concepts. It serves no sense or reason and is thereby disinterested and free.

¹³³ Ibid. 203 fn p41

¹³⁴ Ibid. 204 p42

¹³⁵ Ibid. 205 p43

¹³⁶ Ibid. 207 p46

This condition for the judgement of beauty establishes the subjective aspect of the activity, but the disinterestedness or the lack of involvement with the object also removes the object from the subject and prepares for the possibility of a shared or universal agreement in the principle of aesthetic judgement. If the beautiful as an object of delight is independent of interest and therefore not based on any inclination of the Subject, it is inevitable, says Kant, that the object should contain the same grounds of delight for all men.¹³⁷ One difficulty which arises is that the sense of a shared delight then tends to evoke a perception that beauty is a quality of the object, and the ensuing judgement of it, logical.¹³⁸ However, because the judgement cannot derive from concepts and is therefore subjective, and since the judgement is detached from personal interest, thereby claiming validity for all men, the claim for the beauty of an object must be that of a subjective universality.

In an effort to address the apparent contradiction between a subjective aesthetic judgement which is universally veritable and where both are defensible, Kant points out that we often apply the notion of taste to that which is agreeable. In doing so, we respect the rights of an individual to have his own opinion without the insistence that everyone else agrees with the judgement.¹³⁹ Although both are aesthetic judgements, the first is a private judgement, the second of general public validity. Although the latter judgement remains subjective, its universality is contained in the validity of the reference of a representation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every Subject.¹⁴⁰ It is a personally felt satisfaction which is shared by others. The matter is complicated a little when Kant points out "In their logical quantity all judgements of taste are *singular*

¹³⁷ Ibid. 211 p50

¹³⁸ Ibid. 211 p51

¹³⁹ Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁰ Op. Cit.

judgements."¹⁴¹ The first encounter of the object with the Subject's feeling of pleasure or displeasure is without the benefit of the quantitative support of an objective general validity. Because concepts do not play a part in the estimation of beauty, there is no rule which compels others to recognize something as beautiful. But by pronouncing something as beautiful, we believe, says Kant, that we are speaking in a universal voice. However, such a judgement does not demand everyone's agreement. Rather, "it only *imputes* this agreement to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks for confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of others."¹⁴² Consequently, Kant points out, the universal voice is only an idea.

Kant asserts that it must be fundamental that the pleasure of the representation of the object is communicable to our mental state. But that which can be communicated universally is limited to what we know - the cognition - of the object: its representation in so far as it relates to that perception.¹⁴³ In the case of aesthetic judgement where the cognition of the object is not confined by a definite concept, the forming of the representation is open to the free play of the cognitive powers. Kant lists these powers as "*imagination* for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* for the unity of the concept uniting the representations."¹⁴⁴ However, free play imposes a constraint. The representation of the object must "admit of universal communication". That is, the perception of the object must be valid for everyone. Accordingly, it is the general communicability of the mental state in a given perception which is fundamental to a judgement of taste as its subjective condition, and which has, as a consequence, the pleasure of the object. This subjective judgement of the subjectively determined object (in Kant's terms, the representation of the object) both precedes and provides the grounds for

¹⁴¹ Ibid. 215 p55

¹⁴² Ibid. 216 p56

¹⁴³ Ibid. 217 p57

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 217 p58

the pleasure to be found in the harmonisation of the imagination and understanding which forms the universal subjective validity of the delight we feel for an object we call beautiful.¹⁴⁵

How are aesthetic judgements possible? Kant asks. And how do we become aware of the judgement of taste? Is it aesthetically by sensation and internal sense? Or is it intellectually by a consciousness of bringing imagination and understanding into play? The latter would invoke a concept which set about uniting imagination and understanding with the intention of bringing about a knowledge of the object. This is both a use of concept (which Kant rejects as a grounds for aesthetic judgement) and a judgement which eschews the necessary use of pleasure and displeasure. But because the judgement of taste determines the object (that is, judgement precedes the object and determines the grounds for pleasure in the harmonization of the cognitive factors), the effect on the mind of that subjective unity of imagination and understanding can only be known through sensation. Thus, the subjective judgement of an object as universally beautiful is achieved by means of the conjoint operation of understanding and sense.¹⁴⁶

We have seen so far the requirements for the aesthetic judgements of beauty incorporates a disinterested and universally communicable pleasure in the perceived object. Kant points out that the sole foundation of the judgement of taste is the object, the mode of representing the beautiful, the 'form of finality of an object'.¹⁴⁷ He reminds us that the judgement of taste is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgement, and so does not deal with any concept of the nature of the purpose of the object. Rather, aesthetic judgment is applied to the 'relative bearing' of the *form* of finality of the object. The relation of the parts which comprise the form in an object which is 'given' to us can evoke feelings of pleasure and is characterized as beautiful. The pleasure is contemplative, and our

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 218 p59

¹⁴⁶ Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 221 p62

proclivity to dwell on it strengthens and increases that pleasure.¹⁴⁸ But Kant warns against making judgement based on the feeling of pleasure. This course of action incorporates 'interest' and robs taste of its impartiality. His dismissive comments about *charm* and *emotion* having no place in aesthetic judgement hinge on the idea that they provide a purpose or end in the form of gratification.

Kant's disassociating of the judgement of beauty from any representation of the *good* and *perfection*,¹⁴⁹ both of which require a concept of an end, brings into view his objections to Baumgarten's efforts to estimate an object's beauty based on its perfection.

In a discussion of the judgement of taste and a perception of a link between the beautiful and good, Kant discerns two kinds of beauty. He categorizes beauty which presupposes no concept of what the beauty should be as free beauty or self subsisting beauty. The other kind of beauty presupposes a concept and is a judgement which is awarded to objects which are perceived to have a particular end. This kind of beauty he describes as dependent or conditioned beauty. The former is decided through the pure judgement of taste. The latter is not pure. It is never completely aesthetic. Its dependency on an end is restrictive and the resulting judgement is no longer free and pure.¹⁵⁰ Any comparison between the object as it is given to us, and the object in relation to the concept of the object, inevitably results in a reviewing of the sensation in the object.¹⁵¹

There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful can be defined by concepts, Kant says. But it is in the universal communicability of the sensations of delight or aversion that he sees affirmation and agreement for judging that which is beautiful.¹⁵² As a result, some products are held up as examples of beauty. However, to

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 222 64

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 15 p69f

¹⁵⁰ Op. Cit.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. 231 p74

¹⁵² Ibid. 232 p75

imitate that example does not lead to the acquisition of taste. Taste must be an original faculty, therefore the archetype of taste is only an idea which must be engendered in each person's own consciousness. Kant defines an *idea* as signifying a concept of reason, and an *ideal* as representing an individual existence as adequate to an idea. This archetype of taste, which cannot be represented by concepts, but which can be achieved in an individual presentation is appropriately called the *ideal of the beautiful*. Because that ideal comes into existence as a presented form, it must be, he argues, a product of the imagination, that faculty which is the ability of presentation or of making present.¹⁵³

In an underlining of his grounds for rejecting Baumgartens's vision for a science of aesthetics, Kant points out that such a beauty must be fixed by a concept of objective finality, thereby making the resulting judgement of beauty in line with that ideal as a conditioned rather than free beauty. And it is because of the reason required for the determination of ends that an ideal of beauty applies only to man. It is determined by man and found in man. It is only man's ability to determine his end, compare them with universal ends and pronounce on how they correlate which allows him to form an ideal of beauty and an ideal of perfection.¹⁵⁴

This comes about through two factors. The first is the usual idea, which is both aesthetic (that is, non-conceptual) and an accumulation of individual intuitions of representations of what is the norm for mankind. The second factor is the idea of reason, or that which is transcendental to our understanding of the world. This considers the finality or purpose of humanity in as much as it can be represented sensuously, and converts it into a principle for estimating an "outward form through which these ends are revealed in their phenomenal effect."¹⁵⁵

The usual or normal idea draws from experience those components by which we

¹⁵³ Ibid. Op. Cit.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 233 p77

¹⁵⁵ Op. Cit.

recognize the form of a particular (for example) animal. It is an amalgam of the experience of singular intuitions which results in an intermediate archetypal image of the genus. The usual or normal idea only provides "the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and, consequently, only *correctness* in the presentation of the genus."¹⁵⁶ In other words, it is a general *rule* of the form on which beauty can be presented, and as such will not be contradicted by the presentation of anything judged as beautiful.

The image of the ideal is different from the normal idea and is located in the idea of the judging Subject. It is only in the human figure that the ideal of the beautiful can be found. Ideal beauty cannot be a *free* beauty, but must be one fixed by a concept of objective finality. Judgements based on ideal beauty must be grounded on an underlying idea of reason derived from concepts of the internal possibility of the object and determined *a priori*. Only man is able to determine his ends by reason and then judge aesthetically in accord with those ends. Consequently, only man can suppose an ideal of beauty.¹⁵⁷ The ideal of the beautiful steps beyond the intermediate position of representation. The ideal, says Kant, "consists in the expression of the *moral* [*des Sittlichen*]"¹⁵⁸ It appears that here we catch sight of the bridge between aesthetics and ethics. As much as it owes to thoughts from Plato, Kant is handing a new design to Schiller and Hegel. The meaning of *des Sittlichen* in this context is closer to *der Sitte* or custom and implies an awareness of communal norms. Consequently, the expression of an ideal reflects the need to please both universally and positively as an exemplary communal paradigm. Observation and experience allows us to know the visual bodily manifestations of those reasoned morally good attributes such as benevolence, purity, strength and equanimity. Forming a judgement of those visually evident moral attributes through the conjoined imaginative powers (the making present) merged with pure ideas of reason

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 235 p79

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 233 p76f

¹⁵⁸ Op. Cit.

shows that a judgement of an ideal of beauty cannot be a simple judgement of taste.¹⁵⁹

We shall see how Schiller addresses this interconnection of the morally good and its manifestation in the aesthetic or physical being of man.

Kant juggles the universal legitimacy of the subjective judgement when he argues that the beautiful is a *necessary* reference to delight. He uses the word 'necessity' not in the theoretical objective sense of the *a priori* knowledge that everyone will agree with my judgement of beauty, nor in the practical sense of delight as a necessary consequence of an objective law, but rather as is thought in aesthetic judgement to mean 'exemplary'.¹⁶⁰ It is the necessity of the assumption of agreement to a judgement which is "regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation."¹⁶¹ This judgement illustrating a universal rule which will necessarily evoke an agreement is not derived from rational concepts. Nor does it result from the universality of experience.¹⁶² It is a judgement made by an individual with such certainty that everyone *ought* to agree with it. The principle on which this judgement is grounded must be at once subjective, yet universally valid as a means of determining through *feelings* what pleases. It is a principle which Kant says can only be a 'common sense'; although not, he hastens to point out, the common sense known as *sensus communis*. The latter type of common understanding operates from often obscured concepts and principles rather than from feelings. The common sense to which Kant refers is "the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition."¹⁶³

Kant claims that cognitions and judgements along with the certainty with which

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 235f p80

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 237 p81

¹⁶¹ Op. Cit.

¹⁶² Op. Cit.

¹⁶³ Ibid. 238 p83

they are derived must be universally communicable.¹⁶⁴ Because this can only be achieved through feeling and not by concept, there must be, he argues, "a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge..."¹⁶⁵ Although our judgements of something as beautiful are made only on our feelings, we perceive of those private feelings as universal in that we assert that judgement as a recognition of a public sense. My judgement of taste is my judgement of an example of that common sense. "Hence," he says, "common sense is a mere ideal norm."¹⁶⁶ Thus, any judgement made on that basis, and any object which is pronounced upon in that kind of judgement contributes to the rule for everyone.¹⁶⁷

Kant sees some agreement with the beautiful in the sublime. Both reflect universally valid subjective feelings of pleasure and neither furthers our knowledge of the object.¹⁶⁸ However, where natural beauty conveys a finality or purpose in its form which appears to make itself an object of our delight readily open to our powers of judgement, that which evokes the feeling of sublime appears to be beyond our powers of judgement, is ill adapted to our powers of presentation, and violates our imagination.¹⁶⁹ It is because of this that it would be technically inaccurate to label an object of nature 'sublime'. The sublime cannot be contained in a sensuous form. Rather, the object is of the kind that it provokes a discovery of sublimity in the mind. The sublime concerns ideas of reason which can be evoked in the mind by that which cannot be presented sensuously. If an intuition arising from something like a storm at sea elevates into a pitch of feeling beyond

¹⁶⁴ Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. 239 p84

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. 239 p84

¹⁶⁷ Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. 244 p90

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. 245 p91

sensibility - a state which is itself sublime - it puts to work ideas which involve a higher finality.¹⁷⁰ The display in nature of chaos, irregular disorder and desolation with signs of magnitude and power, all of which appear to have no objective principles, leads to our using ideas of the sublime. Kant emphasizes this distinction in our position between our concept of natural beauty and the sublime. The ground for the beautiful in nature is external to us. The ground for the sublime is found within ourselves and the attitude of mind which it takes to a representation of nature.¹⁷¹ The inability of the senses to comprehend the magnitude of things in the world awakens a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us. It is a faculty of mind which transcends every standard of sense.¹⁷²

The idea of the comprehension of any phenomenon is an idea imposed on us by a law of reason. It is a law of reason which presumes we can understand something as an absolute whole. If our imagination is incapable of reaching a full comprehension of a given object, we respond with a respect for that object because of the assumption that the object is capable of fulfilling that law of reason that the object is an absolute whole. We might be incapable of a full comprehension of something, but we are capable of making reasoned assumptions about it. Therefore, Kant argues, the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own humanity which we then attribute to an object of nature by means of subreption, "the substitution of respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self".¹⁷³ This feeling arouses a perception of the supremacy of our rational cognitive faculties over the imagination, the greatest faculty of sensibility. A law of reason which informs us of what we are tells us that ideas of reason are greater than everything which is for us great in nature as an object of sense. Anything which makes us aware of the supersensible side of our being is an important and pleasurable aspect of that

¹⁷⁰ Ibid 245f p92

¹⁷¹ Ibid. 246 p93

¹⁷² Ibid. 250 p97f

¹⁷³ Ibid. 257 p106

law.¹⁷⁴ Consequently, where an aesthetic judgement of the beautiful comes through a restful contemplation, the representation of the sublime in nature sets the mind in motion. Where the interaction of imagination and understanding co-operate in an estimate of the beautiful, the conflict of imagination (with its inadequacy to present the whole) and reason function in an estimate of the sublime.

The involvement of reason is a crucial characteristic of the sublime. Kant points out that a feeling for the sublime in nature requires an association with an attitude of mind resembling the moral, but rather in a sense of the freedom of play rather than the law giving function of human morality where reason sets out to dominate sensibility. However, aesthetic judgement exercised over the sublime uses imagination as an instrument of reason.¹⁷⁵ Kant categorizes delight in the sublime in nature as negative because the feeling of imagination in its inadequacy and subsequent action deprives itself of its freedom by receiving a final determination in accordance with a law other than its own. As a faculty which facilitates the union of sensibility and understanding, imagination in these circumstances gains an extension and a might, but it feels the cost of its inability to fully comprehend the magnitude of things. Consequently, Kant says, "The sublime must in every case have reference to our way of thinking, ie maxims directed to giving the intellectual side of nature and the ideas of reason supremacy over sensibility."¹⁷⁶

With the involvement of reason in the estimate of the sublime, the universality and the communicability of the sensations of delight and pleasure has a consequence for the impact of the sublime which transports us beyond that of shared feelings to that of a shared assumption. The pleasure in the sublime in nature, says Kant, presupposes that, arising as it does from the mind, the sublime has a moral foundation.¹⁷⁷ Once again we see in place

¹⁷⁴ Op. cit.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 269 p120

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 274 p127

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 292 p149

a direct link between the aesthetic and ethics.

On the other hand, the practice of the judgement of taste contains implications of sociability. The communicability and agreement of the pleasures of taste come about through a necessary involvement with a public or common sense of judgement: *sensus communis*. The reflective act balances an *a priori* awareness of the collective reason of mankind against a personal response to form a balanced or consistent judgement. This results in Kant's suggestion that "We might even define taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation *universally communicable* without the mediation of concept."¹⁷⁸

It is this emphasis on man as a social creature, and sociability as a characteristic of humanity, that places taste as the faculty which enables us to 'communicate our feeling to everyone else' and to share an awareness of our natural inclinations.¹⁷⁹ In a refined society communication of the sensations or feelings becomes the focus, and the value of the sensations resides in their universal communicability.¹⁸⁰ But it is in that same communicability or sharedness which Kant recognizes the danger of a transition from the enjoyment of sense to moral feeling through a ready fusion between the inclinations and passions of society and its interest in the beautiful, thereby forming what he terms as a "very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good."¹⁸¹

However, Kant does offer the opinion that to take an interest in the beauty of nature is an indication of a good soul and suggestive of the kind of mind set favourable to a thoughtful (or moral) feeling suitable for the contemplation of nature. There is evoked alongside the purely aesthetic response to the form in nature, an intellectual pleasure in the form's existence and an interest in the uniformity of nature's products to evoke a universal

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 295 p153

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 297 p155

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. 297 p156

¹⁸¹ Op. Cit.

and disinterested delight. Interest aroused in the design, laws and purpose of nature while reflecting on its beauty can only come about when someone has established the process of moral thought; which leads to the assumption that the person who reveals this interest has at least "the germ of a good moral disposition."¹⁸² Art does not evoke the same immediate interest because it is recognized as being only an imitation of nature. Our interest in art, unlike that which is evoked by the beautiful in nature, is confined to the end product and is not given to art in itself.¹⁸³

Kant defines art on the basis of three characteristics. He argues first of all that art is significantly different from nature in that it is a product of freedom. Art is a made object and that making is directed by reason. Therefore he says, art is production "through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action."¹⁸⁴ The second characteristic evolves from a distinction in the type of making. When an object is required and a knowledge of how to make it is available to produce the desired result, the product is not, in Kant's view, art. It is a form of a mechanical art or a craft. The third characteristic expands on the difference between art and craft. Art is free in that it exists for its own sake as play, whereas craft or industrial art exists for what it achieves. An example of the latter is payment for the product.¹⁸⁵ Unlike mechanical art, aesthetic art has as its immediate end, pleasure.¹⁸⁶ Aesthetic art can be further divided. 'Agreeable art' is the kind of representation which has as its end a pleasure in sensation. It provides enjoyment and is diversionary. On the other hand, 'Fine art' is used to describe a representation where

¹⁸² Ibid. 301 p160

¹⁸³ Ibid. 301 p161

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 303 p163

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. 304 p164

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 305 p165

'modes of cognition' accompany the end.¹⁸⁷ Fine art, Kant says, "is a mode of representation which is intrinsically final, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication."¹⁸⁸ This bases the universally communicated pleasure in reflection rather than sensation. The result is that the standard of fine aesthetic art (art which is beautiful) is found in reflective judgement and not in sense perception.¹⁸⁹

The pleasure derived from the ends of an art where its ends only services the senses, or where it is found in an object created for a particular purpose, is not a pleasure gained from the judgement of beauty. Because the judgement of beauty is not to be found in the end of the object, fine art must appear to be like nature in that it does not look as though it is intentional, or that it is following the rules of art, or that the artist has laboured to create it within those artistic rules.¹⁹⁰ The capacity to create art like this is found in the natural endowment of the *genius* artist. Kant argues that because fine art cannot be made to a concept, and art relies on rule but cannot produce the rule itself, then it is that natural capacity in the individual which supplies the rule, thereby making fine art possible only as a product of genius.¹⁹¹ A primary property of fine art is its originality of production. It must also stand as an exemplary model for the judgement of beauty; and its existence must be unexplainable in that it is the result of some natural law occurring through the medium of genius. This is not to suggest that fine art simply occurs as a result of a natural and inspired whim experienced by the so-called genius. While the genius furnishes the rich material of ideas for fine art, the elaboration and form of those ideas require an academic training to enable the communicability of those ideas.

¹⁸⁷ Op. Cit.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. 306 p166

¹⁸⁹ Op. Cit.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 306-307 p166f

¹⁹¹ Ibid. 307 p168

Where taste is all that is required to judge the beauty of nature (that is, a beautiful *thing*), genius is needed for the possibility of the beauty of art because the beauty of art is a *beautiful representation*; a making present. What art makes present is the perfection of the representation in the agreement of the concept of what the thing is intended to be with its inner character, and which allows it to be described as beautiful. Because aesthetic judgement for art is logically conditioned, the object which is represented does not have to be regarded as beautiful in nature.¹⁹² Genius possesses the faculty of presenting an aesthetic idea. (Genius, for Kant, is the rare artist who is able to achieve a feeling of unity in his assembled presentation without the need to follow set principles. Genius, he says, "is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the *free* employment of his cognitive faculties."¹⁹³) Kant defines an aesthetic idea as a "representation of the imagination which induces much thought" but for which a concept is inadequate and language incapable of fully expressing.¹⁹⁴ It is, he says, the counterpart to a rational idea (which is a concept and inadequately represented by the imagination).¹⁹⁵ It is imagination which makes present another nature from the material provided by actual nature. Whether what the imagination makes provides entertainment, or remodels experience, it uses analogy to communicate the aesthetic idea. By using representations of actual nature to convey more than they do in their natural state, we surpass the limitations of nature. In the attempts to convey that which is beyond the confines of experience, the approximation of a presentation of concepts through the process of analogy provides those concepts with a semblance of reality. However, those representations retain the name of aesthetic *idea* because "no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal

¹⁹² Ibid. 311f p173

¹⁹³ Ibid. 318 p181

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. 314 p175f

¹⁹⁵ Op. Cit.

intuitions."¹⁹⁶ Images, or a 'multiplicity of partial representations' employed in association with the representation supplements a concept and provokes more thought than a literal expression of a concept can achieve. It is in the art of poetry that the faculty of aesthetic ideas shows itself to full advantage, Kant claims.¹⁹⁷

Fine art is not a product of rationality and science. It is a product of genius and must derive its principle of action from aesthetic ideas. Those ideas are essentially different from rational ideas of determinate ends.¹⁹⁸ And, Kant says, it is only the hypothesis of the 'idealism of the finality' in estimating the beautiful in art (and nature) that can "explain the possibility of judgement of taste that demands *a priori* validity for everyone (yet without basing the finality represented in the object upon concepts)."¹⁹⁹

Intuitions or representations are required to verify the reality of our concepts. As empirical representations, they are examples. As pure concepts of understanding, the intuitions are known as schemata. However, intuitions of rational concepts are an impossibility. The making present in sense (the representation) functions either as schematic, in which the intuition corresponding to a concept comprehended by understanding is given *a priori*, or as symbolic where the concept can only be thought by reason and no sensible intuition can be adequate.²⁰⁰ Judgement of the symbolic is made not on the basis of the intuition, the content, but rather, on the basis of the form of reflection on what agrees with the concept. For Kant, the symbol is not simply a mark which designates or reinvokes a concept. A symbol is an indirect presentation of the concept and works with the aid of analogy.²⁰¹ As such, it relies on semblance rather than a direct

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. 314 p176

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. 314 p177

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. 351 p221

¹⁹⁹ Op. Cit.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 351 p221

²⁰¹ Ibid. 352 p222

transference. Consequently, when he claims the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good,²⁰² and that the beautiful allows judgement to find "a reference in itself to something in the Subject itself and outside it, which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with the ground of the ... supersensible",²⁰³ he seeks to show similarities (rather than a direct reciprocal equivalent) between the aesthetic experience with that of the external world and that of the 'supersensible' moral experience. The similarities he presents are: both please immediately; but they differ in that the beautiful does so in reflective intuition whereas morality does so in its concept. Beauty pleases 'apart from all interest'. The morally good is connected to interest, but it is limited in that it follows after the judgement: it does not precede it. The freedom of the imagination in aesthetic judgement is in accord with understanding. In moral judgements the semblance is found in the freedom of the will being in harmony with the universal laws of reason. The subjective principle in the judgement of the beautiful is perceived as universal, but is not known through concept. The objective principle of morality is universal and known through concept.²⁰⁴

Consequently, Kant argues that sensible objects can evoke sensations which have comparisons to the "consciousness of the state of mind produced by moral judgements."²⁰⁵ Taste makes this transition, because "it represents the imagination, even in its freedom, as amenable to a final determination for understanding, and teaches us to find, even in sensuous objects, a free delight apart from any charm of sense."²⁰⁶ The grounds for the highest forms of fine art is not to be found in particular commands and precepts, but rather, in the spirit of mankind which embraces a culture of mental powers driven by a universal

²⁰² Ibid. 353 p223

²⁰³ Ibid. 353 p224

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 353 p224f

²⁰⁵ Ibid. 354 p225

²⁰⁶ Op. Cit.

feeling of sympathy and a faculty which communicates universally one's inmost self.²⁰⁷ (We will see this sense of a universal feeling of sympathy and communication in Schiller in what he calls his 'holy sympathy', that sacred suffering, the sharing with others the pain we suffer as humans.) Taste is the critical faculty which judges the presenting of moral ideas in the senses. The feelings this rendering of moral ideas evokes provides the grounds for the pleasure which taste judges is valid for mankind in general. Thus Kant declares "the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling."²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Ibid. 354 p226

²⁰⁸ Ibid. Part I Book II § 60 356 p227

*United in Grace's free bond,
The reconciled desires are resting,
And the enemy has vanished.¹*

6. Friedrich Schiller's *On The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*.

We have looked at some length at the scaffolding Kant has erected for understanding the function of judgement. That scaffolding incorporates some judgements of its own. An important one is Kant's privileging of reason over sense in his development of aesthetics as a theory of sense perception. This is also reflected in the extension of his thoughts on beauty as a pleasure deriving from judgements of fine arts and in relation to the good.

It is well known that Schiller was strongly influenced by Kant's ideas. In fact he openly declares that his work *On The Education of Man in a Series of Letters* revolves around Kant's principles.² But Schiller wrote this work in an attempt to reposition his thoughts in the face of some concerns which arose from Kant's ideas. This chapter concentrates on discerning what Schiller says in that work. In the process it indicates the points of difference with Kant, and it outlines Schiller's ideas which reposition art as an important medium and exemplary process for the development of a human being. Schiller equates beauty with the aesthetic. Both are redefined by his understanding of them as a result of a balanced interplay of two drives: the sensuous impulse and the formal impulse. The synthesizing of the two drives forms the *play drive* which allows man to access the

¹ Schiller, 'The Ideal and Life'. Trans. W. Veit. Lines 68-70.

² Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. Edit and Trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. English and German Facing. (Great Britain: Oxford University Press. 1967) Letter 1.3

beautiful or the living form. It could be said that for Schiller, aesthetic means a considered awareness of all senses (where the definition of senses is broadened to include cognitive functions). Man's sensuous nature is not discarded, but, through a combination of freedom and necessity it is shaped and prevented from dominating the actions and aspirations of the individual and, importantly, society. Schiller's understanding of man offers art as an example of the necessary discourse for becoming a human being and for the development of a social order which, instead of compulsion, is grounded on a rational freedom.

Schiller perceives of man as an entity born into one state with the potential to develop into something more. He differentiates between man in the 'natural' state and the developed state which he calls a human being. The use of the word 'education' in the title of his treatise offers a strong hint that the transformation from man to human being is a process which is not an automatic development of the individual, but rather, one which requires participation and contribution. These ideas about man and his transformation, however, apply not only to the individual, but also to people as a society. The word 'transformation' perhaps most aptly describes the general task which Schiller assigns to the process of education. It is a process which reconciles the rational and the sensuous rather than, as in Kant's case, awarding dominance to reason over the senses.

For Schiller, man is initially, and remains substantially, a creature of sense. What makes man different from the rest of nature is his capacity to use Reason to change what nature has given him. Man has the power "of transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free choice, and of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity."³ In the early stages of man's existence, when his physical needs are high and he is governed only by the senses, Nature provides for him with impulsions which Schiller terms 'blind

³ Ibid. Letter 3.1

necessity'.⁴ At this most basic configuration, man is little more than animal and his actions are governed by basic needs determined by his senses. But man awakens from the 'long slumber of the senses'. As individual or social being he becomes aware, or indeed is compelled to become aware of his potential, to know himself for a human being.⁵ Schiller calls that moment of compulsion the point of self consciousness or self awareness.⁶ Part of what is natural to man is his capacity for reason. But in his compulsion to withdraw from the 'dominion of blind necessity' he conceives of, or imagines, through the use of Reason, an idealized state of nature and a power of free choice.⁷

Schiller equates this state to a similar coming to maturation of a society which realizes it has the capacity to transform its Natural state into a moral one.⁸ The danger Schiller perceives in both cases, and which he illustrates in relation to society, is that if Reason does away with the Natural State, physical man, who exists for the sake of the moral man, is jeopardized. This is in part a reaction to Kant's emphasis on the supremacy of reason over the senses. The physical man exists, but if he is risked for the possibility of an hypothetical ideal of society, if man is deprived of his animal existence, he is deprived of a condition of being human.⁹

Schiller suggests that in the interim period where preparation is made for the transition from mere force to the rule of law, society needs to find support to ensure the continuance of society. That support will be found in the admixture of the dependence on the senses which is an attribute of the physical character of man, and from the freedom

⁴ Ibid. Letter 3.2

⁵ Ibid. Letter 3.2

⁶ Ibid. Letter 19.11

⁷ Ibid. Letter 3.2

⁸ Op. Cit.

⁹ Ibid. Letter 3.3

found in the moral character. The senses will be made conformable to laws, moving them away from matter, and the moral freedom will be made dependent on sense impressions, thereby taking it closer to matter. This is a move designed to create a third character which promises the sensible world a sense of morality.¹⁰

Schiller emphasizes the importance of both the physical drive and the form drive when he claims that the will of man stands completely free between duty and inclination.¹¹ But a consequence of this is that if man is to retain power of choice and yet to be a part of the realm of cause and effect, (considering that inclination and duty produce identical results in the phenomenal world) then it must be understood that both inclination and duty contribute to the determination of free will. Man can reason or he can 'feel' what should be done. Impulse stands alongside reason as a law maker.¹²

Schiller's urge to balance both aspects of man impacts on the question of retaining individuality within a society. Each individual carries within him an ideal or an archetype of a human being. The individual sees it as his task to unite with that ideal. The State also strives for an ideal, but it aims to achieve it through a union of individuals. This poses the possibility of the ideal man suppressing the empirical and the State annulling individuals, or an inversion of those scenarios. Schiller encapsulates the difficulty when he declares that Reason demands unity and Nature demands multiplicity, both of which have a claim on man.¹³ If the moral character asserts itself only by sacrificing the natural, and the political constitution achieves unity only through the suppression of individuality, it is, declares Schiller an unsatisfactory education.¹⁴ The process of bringing about a

¹⁰ Ibid. Letter 3.5

¹¹ Ibid. Letter 4.1

¹² Op. Cit.

¹³ Ibid. Letter 4.3

¹⁴ Op. Cit.

transformation of experience through freedom requires respect. Just as the artist respects his material by adapting it to his ideas so that he appears to only be obeying the laws of the material, so too must the teacher and politician respect and be aware of the nature of the human material they shape.¹⁵ Ultimately, the triumph of form is the result of the maintenance of variety and the existence of law. "Wholeness of character," Schiller says, "must therefore be present in any people capable, and worthy, of exchanging a State of compulsion for a State of freedom."¹⁶

While the ancient Greeks achieved this wholeness of character and humanity through a balance of form and content in their art where, for example, poetry used intellect and sense as interchangeable expressions of the truth, in later civilizations (including Schiller's and, no doubt he would say, ours) fragmentation of skills is encouraged, as is the specialization of single faculties, so as to reap the acknowledged benefits from those activities. Although the development of these skills in individuals might make them extraordinary, it does not make of them happy and complete human beings. Indeed, Schiller charges those who perform this concentration of powers with suffering a mutilated nature in their slavery for mankind.¹⁷ What this sacrifice of wholeness achieves, however, is the awareness of the need to restore "by means of higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed."¹⁸

The process of transformation is not, however, one which simply begins with a sense of awareness. It begins with Nature within the physical creation and progresses through several stages of maturation before it is ready to take on the moral. The independence of man's character "must first have become secure, and submission to

¹⁵ Ibid. Letter 4.4

¹⁶ Ibid. Letter 4.7

¹⁷ Ibid. Letter 6.14

¹⁸ Ibid. Letter 6.15

external forms of authority have given way to a becoming liberty, before the diversity within him can be subjected to any ideal unity."¹⁹ Similarly, society must liberate itself from the 'blind forces of Nature' so as to prepare itself. It is not reason or knowledge which initiates this transformation into a whole human being. It is the capacity for feeling, "not merely because it can be a means of making better insights effective for living, but precisely because it provides the impulse for bettering our insights."²⁰ Quite clearly, the development into the complete man has its beginning for Schiller in the physical and prior to reason and freedom. This is in contradistinction to Kant's route through the imposition of will and reason.

If man's elementary nature is to mature sufficiently to allow man to embark on a transformation into a human being, it requires an agent to tap into that element already in man which enables him to develop into a higher form of being. Schiller names Fine Art as that instrument capable of opening up these 'living springs'.²¹ Art in some important respects remains independent from a variety of influences. While it is susceptible to the tastes and interests of the time, its characteristics of truth and beauty remain untouched. The artist will use subjects in vogue or of interest at the time, but the form will reflect the concerns of humanity itself. Schiller expresses it as "but the form he will borrow...from the absolute, unchanging, unity of his being. Here, from the pure aether of his genius, the living source of beauty flows down, untainted by the corruption of the generations and ages wallowing in the dark eddies below."²² Schiller allocates to the artist the role of go-between for the bringing of truth and beauty out from the shared grounds of humanity and into the light of day so to speak by manifesting it in the physical world. Art preserves the

¹⁹ Ibid. Letter 7.2

²⁰ Ibid. Letter 8.7

²¹ Ibid. Letter 9.2

²² Ibid. Letter 9.4

truth of humanity. "Truth lives on in the illusion of Art, and it is from this copy, or after-image, that the original image will once again be restored."²³ But, Schiller points out, not everyone, either because of time or ability, can transform this ideal into art. To satisfy this end, Reason accepts the end result and is not so concerned about how it is achieved. Consequently, Schiller suggests that the living of life is not just a means, but a means and an end when he says in terms reminiscent of Eastern religious proclamations "the Direction is at once the Destination, and the Way is completed from the moment it is trodden."²⁴ However, this is not just a condescension on Schiller's part in order to avoid alienating those who feel incapable of producing art. He is primarily concerned with the way life is lived. The artist is used as the metaphoric epitome of how that can occur in the circumstances where to become a human being man needs to create a balanced exchange between the senses and thought. That goal for living life is an ideal. Historic examples and experiences of beauty incline us to expect an empirical concept of beauty. But, says Schiller, perhaps experience of this sort is not the basis on which to judge beauty. The beauty of which he speaks is certainly not the same kind of beauty as the historical examples of accepted beauty. Rather, he says, "Beauty would have to be shown to be a necessary condition of Human Being."²⁵ Beauty, then, is a command. It is an ideal which is urged upon us to achieve through the admixture of the sensuous and the rational.

We have seen that for Schiller man begins with what is given to him. However, man is subject to external factors which account for a considerable influence on what he becomes. Man as a finite being is a mixture of a constant and change: the Person or self, and his Condition or determining attributes.²⁶ Schiller charges the external changing

²³ Op. Cit.

²⁴ Ibid. Letter 9.6

²⁵ Ibid. Letter 10.7

²⁶ Ibid. Letter 11.2

conditions existing outside of the enduring Person with the reason why we feel, think and will. While the Person has its pretext for existence - its ground - within itself, the Condition, by virtue of its changeability, cannot owe its existence to the Person because it is 'not absolute'.²⁷ Condition is a random and therefore unsystematic attribute which cannot proceed from something. Time is one of these conditions. Man is Person situated in a particular Condition, and every Condition has its origins in time because it has a limited existence in time. Man, as a phenomenal and a becoming being, has a beginning and an existence in time, and is, therefore, a determinate being.²⁸ Of the combination of constant and change, it is the Person - the never-changing 'I' - which remains the constant. The 'I' transforms what it apprehends into a knowledge we call experience and which Schiller describes as "organiz[ing] it into a unity which has significance".²⁹ In postulating the rules which are perceived in the changes, man endeavours to make sense of an integral part of what he is. Schiller underscores the mixed nature of man when he says, "Only inasmuch as he changes does he exist; only inasmuch as he remains unchangeable does he exist."³⁰ It is the ideal, he says, the mind's construct, 'man imagined in his perfection', which remains eternal and unaffected by change.

Schiller equates the capacity and necessity for man to become, with the characteristic of divinity. And the means to that divine in man's personality is opened up to him through the senses. Man's personality is a predisposition to an expression of his infinite nature. His sensuous nature revolves around matter and contributes nothing to understanding. Man's challenge is to create a unity: "to externalize all that is within him,

²⁷ Ibid. Letter 11.4

²⁸ Ibid. Letter 11.5

²⁹ Ibid. Letter 11.6

³⁰ Op. Cit.

and give form to all that is outside him."³¹

Schiller suggests the existence of two opposing drives which impel man into full realization. The sensuous drive (*Stofftrieb*) acts to engage man in existence in time and consequently in change. It is through sensation that physical existence makes itself known.³² But although this drive awakens and develops the potentialities of man, it also limits their complete fulfilment by curbing infinite thought to the confines of the present. It is a drive which is both limiting and finite. The second drive, on the other hand, focusses on the eternal. It springs from that which is self-existent, the absolute existence of man, his rational nature. Schiller calls it the formal drive (*Formtrieb*). The drive gives man the freedom, or the capacity within his own inclination as Person, to govern and unify how he presents within the changing conditions of physical existence. Because the Person is an absolute and unchanging entity, the drive which affirms the Personality can only demand that which is binding on it to all eternity. By imposing this sense of unity, it effectively annuls time and change. In other words, says Schiller, "it insists on truth and on the right".³³ The unity imposed by this drive exhibits as laws for judgement of knowledge and laws for determining action. Where feeling has only a subjective truth, moral feeling turns individual instances into truths we judge to be applicable to all. When Schiller says, "The judgement of all minds is expressed through our own, the choice of all hearts is represented by our action",³⁴ he is saying that man so believes himself to be true to himself and what he is, the judgements he makes are made in the faith that they represent the truth of his species.

Given their apparent opposition, the reconciliation of these drives appears to be an

³¹ Ibid. Letter 11.9

³² Ibid. Letter 12.1

³³ Ibid. Letter 12.4

³⁴ Ibid. Letter 12.6

impossibility. However, the characteristic of change housed in the sensuous drive does not extend to the Person or to change of principles. The unity required by the formal drive does not require the stabilization of Condition or the sameness of sensation.³⁵ Because both drives represent the parameters of our concept of humanity, they are required in equal balance to restore the unity of human nature. Schiller designates culture (in its capacity of cultivation and development and as a euphemism for education), to the task. He warns of the consequences of permitting one drive to dominate the other and he stresses the need for Personality to confine the sensuous drive 'within its proper bounds' with Nature charged with the same responsibility for the formal drive.³⁶

Schiller acknowledges that the notion of the reciprocal relationship of the two drives is the *Idea* of his Human Nature and as such is unreachable. But something which allowed the simultaneous experience of being conscious of his freedom and aware of his existence, and at the same time to know himself as matter and as mind, would provide him with an immediate apprehension of his human nature. The object which achieved this would become a symbol of his destiny and serve as a manifestation of the Infinite.³⁷ A situation where the two drives co-operate within an experience awakens a third drive which Schiller calls the play drive (*Spieltrieb*). It operates by making the initial two drives contingent on each other. In a description of its function, Schiller says of the play drive, "To the extent that it deprives feelings and passions of their dynamic power, it will bring them into harmony with the ideas of reason; and to the extent that it deprives the laws of reason of their moral compulsion, it will reconcile them with the interests of the senses."³⁸ The general object of the play drive Schiller entitles 'living form'. He says it is "a concept

³⁵ Ibid. Letter 13.2

³⁶ Ibid. Letter 13.6

³⁷ Ibid. Letter 14.2

³⁸ Ibid. Letter 14.6

serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call beauty.³⁹ We will recall that Schiller has already claimed beauty as a command, a necessary condition of Human Being, and an ideal which urges the connection of the sensuous and the rational. So for living form to have beauty, it requires a connection to the Human Being. It requires a sense of life. Given the lifelessness of a piece of marble, for a sculpture to be considered beautiful, and a living form, its form must live in our feelings and its life take on a form in our understanding.⁴⁰ By tying beauty to achievement of his definition of a human being, Schiller takes beauty out of an exclusive relationship with a perception of physical objects and locates it as an expression of a complete human existence, thereby linking it with the phenomenal presentation of the mind. Schiller points out that in the same way that man is both matter and mind, Beauty, as the consummation of humanity, cannot be exclusively life or exclusively form.⁴¹ It is the object of the play-drive and as such, the play-drive has as its object the formation of the Human Being.

Schiller justifies using the term 'play' on the grounds that it indicates that which objectively and subjectively independent, and which carries with it the capacity not to impose any kind of constraint. In fact, his description of the role of play is that in concentrating on the contemplation of the beautiful, the psyche (*das Gemüt* - the mind or soul in its meaning of a life force rather than in the meaning which would associate it with the finite mind) finds itself positioned midway between the demands of each drive, with the seriousness of the calls of one drive easing the demand to adhere to the equally serious calls of the other.⁴² But attached to that easing of the demands of each drive is an

³⁹ Ibid. Letter 15.2

⁴⁰ Ibid. Letter 15.3

⁴¹ Ibid. Letter 15.5

⁴² Op. Cit.

important implication which allows man through ethical choice to rise above the limitations of his physical being. Schiller attributes two demands to each of the drives. The material drive is concerned with the reality in the field of knowledge, and with the preservation of life in the sphere of action. The formal drive is concerned with the necessity of things, and in the sphere of action the maintenance of dignity. It is the maintenance of dignity which is of interest here. Schiller suggests that "life becomes of less consequence once human dignity steps in." He follows up this claim with the words, "by entering into association with ideas all reality loses its earnestness because it then becomes of small account."⁴³ Now, although he indicates a reciprocal modification of necessity by feeling, it is the adjustment of the importance of life to accommodate the dignity or true worth of man that paves the way for man to overcome one of his greatest points of anguish: life as finite. Consequently, for Schiller, it is that involvement in the play between the forces of the drives that defines man as a human being. He encapsulates it his well known declaration: "man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays."⁴⁴

Schiller acknowledges the shortfall of the reciprocal action of beauty in experience when compared with the idea of beauty and its ideal point of equilibrium. The beauty related to experience is a compensatory act which derives from the circumstances of the experience and the point of development of the individual.⁴⁵ But Schiller also emphasizes that beauty cannot bridge the gulf separating feeling from thinking. While the senses provide the occasion for thought to manifest itself, thought is not (or is 'so little') dependent on the senses. Thought's operation is autonomous and excludes outside influences. Consequently, beauty does not provide an aid to thought. Its function is to

⁴³ Op. Cit.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Letter 15.9

⁴⁵ Ibid. Letter 16

equip the thinking faculty with the freedom to "express itself according to its own laws."⁴⁶ Beauty, then, becomes a means; a means of "leading man from matter to form, from feeling to law, from a limited to an absolute existence."⁴⁷ A factor which contributes to the confusion that beauty can provide an aid to thought rather than act, as Schiller claims, as a means, is the fact that the mind is separate from the formal drive (as it is also from the sense drive). Both drives exist and operate *within* the (finite) mind. The mind might combine with the drive toward form or the drive toward matter, but the mind itself is "neither matter nor form, neither sense nor reason".⁴⁸ That the separation of the mind from these drives is not always recognized is evidenced, he says, by those who acknowledge the mind's engagement with reason, and deny its activity in endeavours which are at odds with reason.

While both primary drives strive for satisfaction, neither can cancel out the other. The power by which this is achieved (and Schiller positions this power as the ground of all reality, that is, the basis of how we choose to exist) is the will. This will or inner freedom is man's only power says Schiller.⁴⁹ The will presupposes a self awareness or Personality. But the awakening of that self-consciousness, (along with sensation, the appearance of the concepts of Truth and Right, an awareness of the Eternal in Time and of the Necessity in Chance) is an involuntary and unexplainable occurrence.⁵⁰ However, once man has acquired an awareness of his absolute existence, and both drives come into existence (the sensuous drive awakening with the experience of life the beginning of our individuality, and the rational drive awakening with the experience of law the beginning

⁴⁶ Ibid. Letter 19.6

⁴⁷ Op. Cit.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Letter 19.9

⁴⁹ Ibid. Letter 19.10

⁵⁰ Ibid. Letter 19.11

of our personality) the basis of man's humanity is established through the possibility of freedom.⁵¹

Freedom is reliant on the full development of both drives. But, Schiller argues, sensation precedes consciousness and therefore we know that the sensuous drive comes into operation before the rational drive. It is at the so called moment before the form impulse kicks in that the senses form the power for man (as opposed to will as the only power of the human being). That sense of power, then, must be destroyed before any idea of law can be installed. However, the reality man has gained from the determination of the power of sense must not be lost while that power is annulled. The German word for determination in this context is *Bestimmung*. It has as its root *Stimme*, meaning voice or verb. *Stimmen* is used for giving voice, or tune/melody. The prefix *be* intensifies the meaning to 'order', 'categorise', or 'determine what someone or something is, or should be'. Thus the sensuous drive (*Stofftrieb*) is put in its place while it is determined by the formal drive (*Formtrieb*). Schiller captures this in his imagery of the artist wielding hard blows to shape the marble.⁵²

The annulment of that power of sense can only be achieved by confronting it (and thereby balancing out its power) with another determination of equal strength. Consequently, the process by which the psyche moves from sensation to thought is through a middle and balanced arrangement of an equally active sense and reason. Not surprisingly, this arrangement or disposition conforms to Schiller's understanding of the aesthetic. "[I]f we are to call the condition of sensuous determination the physical, and the condition of rational determination the logical or moral, then we must call this condition of real and active determinability the aesthetic."⁵³ He labels it aesthetic because it

⁵¹ Ibid. Letter 19.12

⁵² 'The Ideal and Life.' Lines 79,80.

⁵³ *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Letter 20.4

conforms to aesthetic character which he describes as "relating to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them".⁵⁴

The state of aesthetic determination brings with its capacity to balance out the force of the drives a moment, or a single point of contact as Schiller calls it, of indetermination. It is a moment where any determinate mode of existence is excluded. Schiller likens this moment to infinity, and suggests that the aesthetic freedom of determination must be an infinity filled with content.⁵⁵ It is a moment in which Schiller classifies the result of man as Nought, and the state of beauty and its mood as indifferent and unfruitful in relation to knowledge or character. This state of beauty appears to equate with Kant's notion of disinterested beauty in that no interest is served for either of the drives. As an indeterminate position it means for man that by the grace of Nature, he can make of himself what he will through self-determination (*Selfbestimmung*). It is that moment before the ethical choice is made; where, in Schiller's words, "that freedom to be what he ought to be is completely restored to him."⁵⁶ Schiller sees this as the gift of humanity itself. It is a gift of the power of becoming human bestowed on us by Nature but which leaves us with the freedom to use that power to make our own choices. And so when he says, "It is, then, not just poetic licence but philosophical truth when we call beauty our second creatress,"⁵⁷ he is indicating not only the creativity, but the potential (housed in a later comment which declares "the aesthetic alone leads to the absence of limitation"⁵⁸) for creativity without constraint. It is also that moment when suffering (the conflict of desires) is suspended and we become aware of what man could be. We become

⁵⁴ Op. Cit. Footnote.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Letter 21.3

⁵⁶ Ibid. Letter 21.4

⁵⁷ Ibid. Letter 21.6

⁵⁸ Ibid. Letter 22.1

aware that man could be something beyond what he is.

Having reached this stage in his treatise, Schiller turns his attention to the practice and judgement of art. Schiller claims that to surrender to the enjoyment of genuine beauty leaves us at ease and in control of our powers and choices.⁵⁹ This is the mood which a genuine work of art should imbue in us, and it is the touchstone by which Schiller suggests we judge true aesthetic excellence.⁶⁰ But he acknowledges that a work of art can only approximate the ideal of aesthetic purity because man is always subject to conditioning forces. The medium of the particular art-form also has a tendency to appeal to a particular sense with which its art-form has an affinity. One example he gives is the leaning toward the 'arbitrary and casual play of the imagination' displayed by even the most successful poetry. But it is the mark of the consummate achievement in any art-form to remove or reduce the limitations its particular sense appeal might have without destroying the qualities of its art.⁶¹ Subject matter also detracts from the success of art. Subject matter affects one or other of man's functions, whereas form affects the whole man. Just as art which teaches or moralizes is dismissed as unsuccessful fine art, so too is art which arouses passions. The unfailing effect of beauty is freedom from passion, says Schiller. He means by this that in a successfully aesthetic (and therefore beautiful) piece of fine art, form isolates us from passion (suffering in the broadest sense) and we gain the opportunity to observe and understand passion rather than being absorbed by and into it.⁶² Of course, the audience for art has a part to play. Apprehension of the arts from either an exclusively intellectual or an exclusively sensory position will destroy what the art piece has to offer.⁶³

⁵⁹ Ibid. Letter 22.2

⁶⁰ Ibid. Letter 22.3

⁶¹ Ibid. Letter 22.4

⁶² Ibid. Letter 22.5

⁶³ Ibid. Letter 22.6

Although the aesthetic state is a middle state between feeling and thinking (and therefore between a passive and an active, willing, state), the aesthetic state can decide nothing. Rather, it is a state in which decisions can best be made. What it does is it provides the necessary pre-condition for our insights or convictions in that the exchanges between concept and understanding, and moral form (the law) and will are immediate.⁶⁴ The aesthetic state is also a necessary state if the sensuous man is to achieve the free determination he lacks. If in the process of acquiring active determination he loses his passive determination, man is in danger of losing all. Each aspect needs the other just as thought requires a body. Both passive and active determination need to exist co-actively within man if he is to succeed. The answer is to become aesthetic, Schiller says.⁶⁵ The progression from beauty to truth and duty then becomes a relatively simple matter. The step to developing the spiritual man becomes much easier than the step from the physical state to the aesthetic because the move from the aesthetic to the logical involves man taking from himself something he already has. It requires a fragmenting of his nature. To progress from brute matter to beauty, however, requires a new activity to be opened up. His nature must be altered. And it is not something he can will. Man is obliged to the grace of Nature for this step.⁶⁶

But Schiller envisages more for man than the development of the individual. He wants man to find a path which leads from a limited existence to an infinite existence. He wants man to develop out of a dependent condition to one of autonomy and freedom. An individual, he suggests, is merely subservient to the laws of nature. The man Schiller perceives is part of the species of man and must therefore participate in the judgement and

⁶⁴ Ibid. Letter 23.2 and 3

⁶⁵ Ibid. Letter 23.4

⁶⁶ Ibid. Letter 23.5

will of man.⁶⁷ For man to employ reason to control the actions nature demands of him is ennobling: it "dignifies and exalts him to strive for order, harmony and infinite freedom..."⁶⁸ It is the destiny of man and the destiny of the individual as part of the species.

There are, then, three stages of development for both the individual and the species for a full realization of their destiny. "Man in his physical state merely suffers (*sic*) the dominion of nature; he emancipates himself from this dominion in the aesthetic state, and he acquires mastery over it in the moral."⁶⁹ In Schiller's idea of the state before beauty⁷⁰, nothing has meaning. Objects are unrelated and serve man only to further his own existence. Man does not see himself as part of a wider existence. His awareness is of that which his senses immediately provide. He constantly feels the anguish of demands and desires. Exhaustion provides his only rest and spent desire provides his limits. It is a 'kindly nature' that gives man the capacity to reflect, and it is through reflection that he learns to distinguish himself from things. And it is through the demand for the Absolute that reason makes itself known in man. The emergence of reason does not mean, however, that man has begun to be truly human. In fact, Schiller suggests, it begins by making man totally dependent on the senses by producing unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need and therefore by installing the attributes of Care and Fear.⁷¹ But as soon as man begins to connect the phenomena around him with cause and effect, Reason acts with the intention of finding an 'absolute connection and an unconditioned cause'. At this stage, the world of sense retains its influence on the intellect, and if cause is not found within

⁶⁷ Ibid. Letter 23.6

⁶⁸ Ibid. Letter 23.7

⁶⁹ Ibid. Letter 24.1

⁷⁰ Ibid. Letter 24.3

⁷¹ Ibid. Letter 24.4 and 5

this realm, man resorts to feelings for answers. Because the moral law is inhibitory and focusses on his animal 'self-love', its voice is likely to be perceived in the early stages of his development as external to him, and the concepts of right and wrong as imposed at the behest of some will, rather than understanding them as "something valid in themselves for all eternity".⁷² In seeking an explanation of the moral world outside of Reason, man forfeits his humanity by installing a Godhead based on the laws to be found within Reason. Despite the intrusion of Reason into his material realm, at this stage these prevailing conditions indicate that the life-impulse is the master over the form impulse, and does not fulfil man's destiny where both systems of rule are meant to co-exist.⁷³

While man does no more than feel, he remains at one with the world. In the aesthetic stage he differentiates himself from the world. Contemplation places him outside of the world by placing him in relation to the world. That which dominated him is now perceived as object, and consequently, has no power over him because it is he who imparts form to matter. Man can conquer the fear inspired by the most awesome of nature's presentations and assert his dignity in the face of nature as a force "once he knows how to give it form and convert it into an object of his contemplation."⁷⁴ But while beauty is the work of free contemplation, it is not isolated from sense. In fact, reflection and feeling are so synthesized, Schiller says, "that we imagine that the form is directly apprehended by sense."⁷⁵ This makes beauty both an object (we have sensation of it through contemplation) and a state of the perceiving subject (where feeling is a condition of our having any perception of it). "Thus beauty is indeed form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time life, because we feel it. In a word: it is at once a state of our being

⁷² Ibid. Letter 24.7

⁷³ Ibid. Letter 24.8

⁷⁴ Ibid. Letter 25.3

⁷⁵ Ibid. Letter 25.5

and an activity we perform."⁷⁶ The greatest triumph for Schiller, is the moral freedom of man is not repealed by his inevitable dependence on physical things, and ultimately, his mortality. In the enjoyment of beauty, a union and interchange takes place between matter and form and proves that the infinite can be realized in the finite.⁷⁷

The condition for becoming a human being is discourse: discourse with the implication of exchange through communication. The germ of beauty first occurs when Man discourses with himself. This manifests as a growth of self awareness: a sensitivity to his senses and a communication established and nourished between pleasure and thought, and the development and respect for a law of order which has as its consequence the development of life. Beauty flourishes when the discourse is taken to the others of his kind.⁷⁸ Representation or semblance plays an important role in as part of the language of discourse. Schiller suggests that the visible signs of what he calls the 'savage's entry upon humanity' is the "delight in semblance, and a propensity to ornamentation and play."⁷⁹ Schiller sees these objects of delight as symbols of a release from externally imposed demands on our drives, and of an inner freedom which makes us aware of a power which is able to move of its own accord. Semblance owes its existence to man, not nature, and in that respect a nature which delights in semblance is "no longer taking pleasure in what it receives, but in what it does."⁸⁰ Consequently, Schiller regards semblance as an enlargement of humanity and a decisive step towards culture. And unlike Plato, he regards semblance in art as an important and defining attribute. Semblance is, he says, the essence

⁷⁶ Op. Cit.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Letter 25.6

⁷⁸ Ibid. Letter 26.2

⁷⁹ Ibid. Letter 26.3

⁸⁰ Ibid. Letter 26.4

of fine art.⁸¹

Nature predisposes us to and trains us for semblance. The mind converts the sensations received by the eye and the ear so that it is we who bring about the object. At the stage when man begins to enjoy and value the act of seeing, he is, Schiller says, already aesthetically free and the play-drive has started to develop.⁸² At this early point man acquires an understanding of semblance as autonomous. Being able to distinguish semblance from reality, and consequently form from substance, he has the capacity to abstract one from the other. This has a significance for fine art in that "The capacity for imitative art is ... given with the capacity for form in general".⁸³ It is because of his ownership of semblance, and the laws which he alone constructs for it, that man has an unrestricted freedom to defy nature by linking or separating aspects of it in ways it would not do itself. The more clearly man discerns form and substance, and the more autonomy he gives to form, the further he will extend the realm of beauty and the clearer the distinction he will make between semblance and actuality or truth.⁸⁴ But it is only in the clear recognition of semblance as man's construct that semblance conforms to Schiller's definition of aesthetic. And it is on this basis where it is accepted that semblance does not represent reality, nor that it needs to be represented by reality, that semblance obtains a legitimate place in the moral world. Either condemning semblances as misrepresentations or affording them undue standing as absolute statements of truth is a refusal to recognize the autonomy of the laws of imagination.⁸⁵

The transition from man's everyday use of semblance to his allowing it an

⁸¹ Ibid. Letter 26.5

⁸² Ibid. Letter 26.6

⁸³ Ibid. Letter 26.7

⁸⁴ Ibid. Letter 26.9

⁸⁵ Ibid. Letter 26.14

autonomous existence in the ideal realm of art requires a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance.⁸⁶ Traces of this condition can be found in crude attempts to embellish his existence and in a preference for form over substance. The gathering of a superfluity of materials which satisfy appetites and desires leads through anticipation to a different kind of enjoyment which is then ennobled when form becomes part of that enjoyment and registers the outward appearance of the things which satisfy his desires.⁸⁷ While the addition of form to superfluity changes the value which is at the basis of aesthetic play for man, superfluity has its precursor in nature which, in situations of overproduction coupled with lack of purpose, in the material sense, says Schiller, might well be called play.⁸⁸ Man's imagination without the governance of form also partakes of material play through a free association of ideas. But it is from this free association of ideas where the imagination in its attempts at free form makes the leap to aesthetic play. Schiller says it must be called a leap because it is a new power which goes into action. It is a power governed by the mind. The mind begins to impose law on the operations of blind instinct. It subjects imagination's arbitrary activity to an eternal unity, the mind's rational nature. It "introduces its own autonomy into the transient, and its own infinity into the life of sense."⁸⁹ But because nature's law urges change, the aesthetic play drive will, even under the efforts of the mind to fight its instability, exhibit an uncultivated and generally bizarre taste. At this stage of the development of the natural impulse into aesthetic play, what man calls beautiful is only that which excites him as material with the possibility for shaping into an autonomous activity. From an interest in that which pleases him, he progresses to wanting to please. The form of the objects he presents move beyond

⁸⁶ Ibid. Letter 27.1

⁸⁷ Ibid. Letter 27.2

⁸⁸ Ibid. Letter 27.3

⁸⁹ Ibid. Letter 27.4

an expression of their function: "they must at the same time reflect the genial mind which conceived them, the loving hand which wrought them, the serene and liberal spirit which chose and displayed them."⁹⁰ Eventually the ties to utility are cut and 'Disinterested and undirected pleasure' become the focus of delight.

Just as experience is transformed by the freedom of play in this description of the development of aesthetic play, so too are man's appetites and desires transformed in parallel across all facets of his life. The capacity for beauty to resolve conflict between opposing natures offers a possibility for the whole of society. In the midst of what Schiller names as the 'fearful kingdom of forces' and the 'sacred kingdom of laws' his 'third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance' offers a hint of eternal life in the face of the constraints of both the physical and the moral sphere.⁹¹ 'Eternal' for society transposes into a sense of the self-existent through the aesthetic state. Its self-existence is achieved by consummating the "will of the whole through the nature of the individual".⁹² Beauty is the only means of conferring on man a social character, because the taste which develops harmony in the individual can bring harmony to society. In contrast to other forms of communication which divide society because they relate either to the private receptivity or the private proficiency of an individual, Beauty as a communication and pleasure relates to that which is common to all.

But does this State of Aesthetic Semblance exist? Schiller asks. It exists as a need in every finely tuned soul, he suggests, but as a realized fact we are likely to find it "only in some few chosen circles."⁹³

⁹⁰ Ibid. Letter 27.5

⁹¹ Ibid. Letter 27.8 see commentary p296 outlining the allusion to the joyous kingdom.

⁹² Ibid. Letter 27.10

⁹³ Ibid. Letter 27.12

For Schiller, beauty is not a predetermined idea by which an object can be measured. It is not that which is judged to be a socially communicable and pleasurable response to sensation. Nor is it to be found in the reflective judgement of fine art and linked by process to the critical faculty of taste in the judgement of freedom (arising from within reason) in its manifestation in the senses. Beauty for Schiller is the culmination of the play of the material and the formal elements of man in a reconciliation which recognizes the essentiality of the sensuous in man with his naming of it as an aesthetic state. It is a state which, because it incorporates freedom in appearance clearly links an aesthetics with ethics. The parallel relationship of the process of making art to the process of becoming a human being makes art a direct example of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.

*Only the body is owed to those powers
Which plait dark fate¹*

7. The Nature of the Natural in Man.

When Schiller speaks of the anguish of choosing "*Between the happiness of the senses and peace of the soul*"² he summons into service a particular understanding of the nature of man. Based on a wider reading of Schiller's work, we read the line as distinguishing between the realms of nature and reason to imply an inherent freedom in the choice of the degree to which those realms are '*United in Grace's free bond*'.³ In the various notions of the movement and interplay between aesthetics and ethics discussed in this study, most can be classified as involving variations on the relationship between the human body and mind. When one is equated with nature and the other is not, the aesthetic and ethic relationship hinges on a sense of the perception of what is natural and something else. Depending on how that relationship of the body and mind is perceived, that which is 'natural' to man and that which man adds, even if his capacity to add is considered a natural characteristic of man, can make of man a highly divided entity. This is due in part to 'nature' being used as both something separate from man, in that man has reason which somehow takes him beyond the realm that which is termed natural, and as some basic element which indicates an inherent characteristic which broadly governs and is a predictor of how man generally acts. There are elements such as to be found in Kant's

¹ Schiller's *The Ideal and Life*. Translation by Walter Veit. Lines 21,22

² Ibid Lines 7 and 8

³ Ibid Line 68

thought which sees man and nature in conflict. Others such as Hegel perceives of man as a natural part of a whole. So, what is it that is meant when we speak man as part of nature? What is meant when we speak of the nature of man? Nature appears to be a concept which requires some clarification. We can say from the outset that not only will the concepts of nature vary from thinker to thinker, but also that the concepts of nature will be tied to their concept of man.

We begin with a survey of the origins of the word. We then move to Kant's understanding of man. His thought demonstrates Nature as a cause separated from the independence of ethical choice. I then turn to Rousseau. Although Kant was considerably influenced by Rousseau, he rejected Rousseau's emphasis on feeling. The outline of Rousseau's position conveys an understanding of Kant's ideas as a reaction and an alternative view. Rousseau's thoughts on the subject not only discerns the distance between, but undertakes to bring about a resolution to the differences inherent in the particular and the universal, individual freedom and community law, and the actual and ethics. His use of the natural is brought about by a rationalization of feeling. This serves to highlight Kant's privileging of reason as the means for articulating our own nature. Schiller, on the other hand, works to create a more equitable balance between what he understands is a more balanced understanding of the nature of man with his most ideal state in which choices are made is that aesthetic state in which neither the senses nor the mind has sway. At this stage I introduce for the first time the thinkers I have chosen to represent some of the developments and variations on the thoughts of Kant and Schiller. They are also important because they have provided the filter through which we have viewed and received his ideas in the first place. These outlines can be considered as an introduction and orientation to their views. Hegel, for example perceives of man as part of a whole and the medium through which Spirit or thought passes. Art is conscious recognition of the divinity in man. His is a revealing of the truth of things. The sensuous world is a manifestation of the Absolute. Nietzsche, on the other hand, focuses on the

nature of the finite world and finds in it the justification for life itself. Heidegger accepts the givenness of the world as a nature with variable circumstances which exert their influences on what we become. We erect an umbrella of meaning over this material and, with an embedded understanding of what we are, we bring out into the open a radiance which we recognize as a truth. Each thinker presents us with a different understanding of a relationship between aesthetics and ethics.

The root for the Greek word *phýsis* is from a word meaning 'to become'. While *phýsis* is used in the original sense as *nature*, it also has connotations of *growth*, *development* and *flower*.⁴ Hence when Aristotle uses *phýsis* to indicate the inner constitution or character of something, he defines *phýsis* as the end product of that something's development.⁵ This reflects his attempts (echoed by others in a variety of configurations) to address the two trends of meaning - origin and constitution - which he denotes as *essence* and *primal force*. It is a usage of the word which indicates inherent characteristics which drive something to realize its inherent potential. These two streams are not, however, the only use to which the word is directed. Another application of the word *phýsis/nature* has a proscriptive capacity. It distinguishes the characteristics or features of animals, plants and social structures to provide the means by which we categorize them. It is also used to indicate "the limitation and vulnerability of human existence", in contrast to that which shares in "divine nature".⁶

To further muddy the waters, there are links with the word *kósmos*. The sense of *world* attached to the word *kósmos* evolves out of its initial connection with 'order' and with 'ornamentation'. That link with order is demonstrated in its various uses: a well

⁴ *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Op. Cit. p1283

⁵ *Ibid* p1284

⁶ *Op. Cit.*

constructed assemblage derived from individual parts; various groupings of humans, such as of rowers, of an army, or of a city or state; a general sense of 'right order'; as a designation of beautiful (inevitably linked with order); and of course, as world.⁷ There are significant implications arising from these components which merit emphasis.

When *nature* is accepted as interchangeable for *kósmos* when *kósmos* is used to designate the spatial sense of the world, the implications of order and beauty are intensified. Significantly, so too is the ethical element of 'right order', which develops against the at times perceived opposition of nature and law, into the use of *natural* as that which is *right* - a meaning relating to order, or a law of justice - and which is understood as emanating from innate moral feelings.⁸ Aristotle calls on this relationship of natural and right when he says: "We should consider what is natural not in things which are depraved but in those which are rightly ordered according to nature."⁹ However, the idea of the ethical arising from the natural is perceived by Aristotle as an inherent or natural characteristic, rather than a prescription for a particular virtue. Virtue is not, he suggests, a given. Man simply has the capacity for morality. "The virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature: we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them..."¹⁰ This makes man's natural state more aptly described as an original state, and his inherent capacity as that which is natural to man.

The use of the 'original state' seems to carry with it an implication of that which inherently is right and therefore good (sometimes referred to as primitive innocence) precisely because it is the so-called natural, original order. It is, however, an ideal. The human world would not exist without human contribution. Therefore, any ethical

⁷ Ibid p460

⁸ *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. Op. Cit. p 1888

⁹ Aristotle. *Politics*. Op. Cit. Bk. I, ch. 2

¹⁰ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Op. Cit. p33

consideration which evokes a call for the natural state of man must ask not so much about whether man *should* move from a state of primitive innocence, but rather whether the means by which he does so, and the end result, is in accordance with what is perceived to be right and good.

I indicated in the introduction to this chapter that any understanding of nature is inextricably tied to a perception of man. Kant, for example, as does Schiller after him, separates matter and mind through the concepts of 'nature' and 'freedom'.¹¹ Thus an understanding (or philosophy) of nature is developed on a theoretical principle, and a practical principle of freedom is realized as a philosophy of Morals.¹² The directions from which these philosophies are derived further indicate the gulf between the physical and non-physical. One develops from observation into theory or understanding, the other manifests physically, out of reason. Kant elaborates on the separation of the two realms by differentiating between the causality of nature and the causality of freedom. He insists that understanding and reason have two distinct jurisdictions over the same territory of experience. Although he declares that both "limit each other...in their effects in the sensible world",¹³ he makes his position clearer when he says: nature is powerless to influence the realm of the concept of freedom, but freedom or reason is *meant* to influence nature.¹⁴ He continues: "nature must...be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom."¹⁵ We read from this that while action determined by reason is limited to the possibilities set by the laws of nature, reason

¹¹ Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement*. Op. Cit. Intro. 171 p8

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid. Intro. 175 p13

¹⁴ Ibid. Intro. 176 p14

¹⁵ op. cit.

itself is not reduced to simply being a product of nature in the mechanical sense.

Dieter Henrich notes Kant's admiration for and indebtedness to Jean Jacques Rousseau.¹⁶ Rousseau also exerted considerable influence on Schiller. Rousseau's concept of the organization of society projects an understanding of society which derives from what he believes is the essential character of man. That which he discerns as the essential character of man is easily rephrased as 'the nature of man'. For Rousseau, the organization of a society is built on reflecting the group custom within the society. In the respect that Rousseau understands ethics as accepted or customary behaviour to the benefit of society, he echoes the locating of the ethical focus in Plato's *Republic*. With sentiments which would not be out of place in our own, present day society, Rousseau expresses his dissatisfaction with his society's political preoccupation with wealth, when, in his 'A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences' he looks back with nostalgia and considerable idealism at the ancient world to say: "The politicians of the ancient world were always talking of morals and virtue; ours speak of nothing but commerce and money."¹⁷ His philosophy is most certainly founded on an ideal rather than historical fact. Note in the following passage how he establishes a sense of the innate, natural moral purity of primitive man by directly linking the image to nature.

We cannot reflect on the morality of mankind without contemplating with pleasure the picture of the simplicity which prevailed in the earliest times. This image may be justly compared to a beautiful coast, adorned only by the hands of nature; towards which our eyes are constantly turned, and which we see receding with regret.¹⁸

¹⁶ Henrich, Dieter. *Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World*. Stanford Series in Philosophy; Studies in Kant and German Idealism. Eckart Förster, Ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.) p10

¹⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 'A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences' in *The Social Contract and Discourses*. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. Everyman's Library. (London: Dent. 1979) Part two. p16

¹⁸ *Ibid* p18

The assumptions of the associations of beauty and morality with nature is crucial for the marriage and interaction of the two images. Indeed, Rousseau readily acknowledges in the introduction to his 'Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind' that his reasoning is hypothetically and conditionally calculated "to explain the nature of things [rather] than to ascertain their actual origin."¹⁹ This is particularly important because it turns the focus to the consideration of human nature, and it results in the rise of the idea of nature as an ethical ideal.

Rousseau defines the difference between man and animal by saying, "in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free will..."²⁰ Of further importance to the act of free will, Rousseau claims, is that the consciousness of that freedom displays the spirituality of man's soul.

For physics may explain, in some measure, the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; but in the power of willing or rather of choosing, and in the feeling of this power, nothing is to be found but acts which are purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the laws of mechanism.²¹

Thus man begins with purely animal functions, with seeing and feeling his first condition. But nature also gives him the capacity to rise above animal instincts by providing a soul. Until new circumstances prompt new developments of his faculties, "to will, and not to will, to desire and to fear, must be the first, and almost the only operations of his soul."²² Rousseau argues against the idea of man's lack of knowledge of good or bad being as in

¹⁹ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 'Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind' in *The Social Contract and Discourses*. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. Everyman's Library. (London: Dent. 1979) p45

²⁰ Ibid p53

²¹ Ibid p54

²² Ibid p55

some way instrumental in his development. He does, however, suggest that man possesses compassion as a natural virtue. It is a virtue which some animals share, but for man it is, when coupled with reason, a driving and shaping force. He resolutely rejects the Socratic notion that virtue is acquired by reason, preferring instead to say that "compassion is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the activity of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the whole species."²³ It is reasoning which takes the step from love of self to the benefiting of self through a desire motivated by the compassion to protect others. We could assume that the move from self love to compassion for others is driven by self-serving empathy. Rousseau, however, declares man possesses a natural goodness,²⁴ which, he argues, becomes evident through man's desire to do as little evil as possible.²⁵ That natural goodness uncorrupted by social and political institutions becomes an ideal against which those institutions are measured.²⁶ But further, it is an ideal which holds to a universality.

This universality is illustrated when Rousseau differentiates between a general will and a particular will. He speaks of the general will as that "which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, [and which] constitutes for all the members of the State, in their relations to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust..."²⁷ The general will is always for the common good, and it is therefore the role of the government "whose object is the good of the people...to follow in everything the general will."²⁸ It forms the basis of the conventions

²³ Ibid p 68

²⁴ Ibid Appendix p106

²⁵ Ibid p69

²⁶ Ibid p105

²⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 'A Discourse on Political Economy' in *The Social Contract and Discourses*. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. Everyman's Library. (London: Dent. 1979) p 120

²⁸ Ibid p123

for a legitimate authority among men: an authority which no man has naturally over his fellow man.²⁹ The development of the civil state, Rousseau would argue, is a formalizing of man's nature. The application of reason defines and delineates man's natural goodness so that capriciousness is eliminated. Rousseau phrases it as "substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked."³⁰ Where this would appear to curtail the freedom which Rousseau perceives as defining man, the gain for man (providing there is no abuse of the system) is the intervention of reason resulting in the extension of his ideas, the moral elevation of his feelings and the uplifting of his soul: and the achievement of a new level of freedom. "We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty."³¹

Rousseau's moral law serves the civic state. When man chooses to serve the general will, he acquires freedom. Rousseau's general will, as we have seen, is distinctly rational. However, because it is a reasoned demarcation of man's natural goodness, the source of that general will is not rational. His general will is established on feeling. And although Rousseau makes no attempt to address the relationship of aesthetics and ethics as such, that relationship hovers persistently throughout his constructing of the civic state through the notion of functional beauty - a notion which declares an object beautiful because of its excellence in fulfilling a task. Therefore, it is that which is natural to man which provides the source of the proper function of man.

Kant, on the other hand, derives his moral imperative from the purely rational. The material aspects of nature, whilst perhaps providing cause for the will to act, cannot

²⁹ Ibid p169

³⁰ Ibid Book I, chap. viii p177

³¹ Ibid p178

produce a moral command. While the sensible world supplies us with impressions, they are unintelligible without concepts, and they require judgement to balance the concepts. Thus, the categorical imperative can only be achieved through the rational: the development of an order through ideas which, while adapting the empirical, is independent of the order of the things as they appear.³²

Rousseau's notion of natural goodness as an inherent quality is rejected by Kant, who argues that although results produced by many talents and qualities are often considered good and desirable, the talents are not good in themselves, because they can be used to achieve undesirable results. The only good which does not require qualification is *goodwill*.³³ *Good will* is good, not because of the ends it serves, but because, by its very definition, it is a willing of good. It is, Kant says, 'good in itself'.³⁴ Reason is a practical power which functions to influence the will. Its role is to "produce a *will* which is *good*, not as a *means* to some further end, but *in itself*..."³⁵ In contrast to Rousseau's establishment of laws grounded on a notion of goodness which rationalizes feeling, Kant's directives are not contingent on sensible conditions. Nor are his categorical imperatives governed by a specific end. Rather, these laws derive from laws of reason which issue from the principles which can be willed as universal laws.³⁶ But at the same time, those willed universal laws are possible (and limited) by the formation of understanding.

As outlined in the previous discussion of Kant's work, Kant argues that a categorical imperative is a law developed out of the purity of good will, and which demands action for its own sake and without regard to a specific purpose. While action

³² *Critique of Pure Reason*. B 576 p473

³³ Kant. *The Moral law. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Op. Cit. 393 1 p59

³⁴ *Ibid* 394 3 p60

³⁵ *Ibid* 396 7 p62

³⁶ *Ibid* 402 17 p67

directed at an end as a means of satisfying an impulse does not produce a universal principle, it is untrue to say that a categorical imperative never directs an action to an end. Man is an end in himself. The difference is that the existence of a rational being has absolute value for us. Although that existence is an end, it is an objective end: the action is directed at an absolute value.³⁷ Kant points out that human will is "subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as author.)"³⁸ If that declaration is phrased differently, it can fairly be said that if as rational beings we develop a moral law which articulates our own nature, and to which we voluntarily submit ourselves, then Kant subscribes to the notion of establishing his ideas on the basis of that closed sense of 'man's nature'.

Now, while Kant locates freedom in the rational, Schiller sets out to address the lack of balance he perceives results from not taking account of what he sees as the full nature of man. Schiller, like Rousseau, uses the *idea* of nature rather than nature as an historical fact. He uses that idea to convey an understanding of what he perceives as the necessary and (because as potential it is an inherent characteristic of man) natural components for man to become a human being. In his *On Grace and Dignity* Schiller's personification of a creative and paternal Nature defines animals and plants, determines what they are to be and takes responsibility for turning that definition into reality. However, while nature provides the full service for a coming into being for these non-human entities, he perceives that man is given by nature a capacity which he must place into operation himself. "But with man, all she does is provide the definition, or vocation, and leave the fulfilment of his vocation in his own hands. This and only this makes him a human being."³⁹ It is the endowment of the capacity to reason and to make choices that Nature makes a 'natural' component of being a human. It is also this capability which

³⁷ Ibid 428 p90f

³⁸ Ibid. 431 p 93

³⁹ Schiller, Friedrich. *Schiller's Treatise Über Anmut und Würde An Annotated Translation into English.* Op. Cit. 69 p31

enables man to be aware of and to find a way of facing the inevitability of death. In a passage resonant of Rousseau, Schiller describes the process of man's awakening from the somnolent state of the senses into an awareness or consciousness of knowing himself as a human being with the capacity and the necessity for moral choice:

he conceives, as idea, a state of nature, a state not indeed given him by any experience, but as a necessary result of what Reason destined him to be; attributes to himself in this idealized natural state a purpose of which in his actual natural state he was entirely ignorant, and a power of free choice of which he was at that time wholly incapable; and now proceeds exactly as if he were starting from scratch, and were, from sheer insight and free resolve, exchanging a state of complete independence for a state of social contracts.⁴⁰

Although the latter passage alludes to social man, and the former to individual development, both passages have the same thrust. Nature provides the physical attributes and capacities of man, but what man does with those attributes is the result of his choices. Nature provides the condition from which man actively creates his individual life. In Schiller's words, man becomes the "autonomous originator of his state of being".⁴¹ Reason for Schiller, like Rousseau and Kant, is the instigator of the moral sense and the means by which man becomes a human being. While it is reason which distinguishes the human being from other organisms, it is the moral position achieved through reason that creates the divide between the human being and nature. Schiller argues that in the process for achieving the moral position, man finds himself in conflict with the physical demands and drives. This is the point at which Schiller discerns a conflict between the separated natures of man. His ideal is to unite and unify these disparate natures and to make man 'whole'. His task for achieving the ideal of humanity is not to overthrow his sensuous drives, but rather, to reconcile them to his moral spirit. A difficulty is that the fragmented

⁴⁰ Schiller, Friedrich. *Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. Op. Cit. Letter 3.2

⁴¹ *Über Anmut und Würde* 78 p38

nature of man can, if incorrectly developed, lead to the evolvment of the individual at odds with what might be called his true potential nature. This results in the form of man which, depending on whether he chooses to privilege feeling or principle, Schiller labels as savage or as barbarian.⁴² In contrast, "The man of Culture makes a friend of Nature, and honours her freedom whilst curbing only her caprice."⁴³ Schiller believes that the natural potential for a truly developed human being necessitates a balanced conciliation of the oppositions. So that when he declares "only the reconciled enemy is truly overcome"⁴⁴ he is suggesting that an opposition which remains unreconciled is hostile to the natural well being of the human being. It is, perhaps, the difficulty of achieving that goal of conciliation that leads him to describe the quest for fulfilment by each of the two interests as a rivalry governed by an inimical intensity.⁴⁵

Schiller's idea of the relationship of beauty and morality demonstrates his commitment to the marriage of the mind with the physical as a psychologically satisfying - and therefore natural - realization of the characteristics of both spheres of the human being. He suggests that the basis on which we perceive something as beautiful relies at the most basic level on the concepts we impose and the judgment of how entities fit into and fulfil the ideals of that concept. He uses apparently different kinds of ways of allocating the label of beautiful to an object to illustrate his point. When he uses the illustration of structural or architectonic human beauty - that is, beauty determined exclusively by natural forces - compared with the ideal beauty of the human being, the Venus in his example of Venus emerging from the sea foam perfectly formed, is, Schiller points out, a product of necessity and is therefore incapable of any further development. Because we 'understand'

⁴² *Aesthetic Education of Man*. Letter 4.6 p21

⁴³ Op. Cit.

⁴⁴ *Über Armut und Würde* 98 p48

⁴⁵ Ibid

what we are seeing, we overlook the concept that conditions what we see, and we make aesthetic judgments apparently on the basis of the appearance alone. "[S]ince she is nothing other than a lovely presentation of the ends which Nature intends for man, and hence each of her qualities is exhaustively determined within the concept which underlies her being, she can be regarded as completely given..."⁴⁶ Beauty which is determined by natural forces, is thought to be beautiful by virtue of the quality of its presentation.⁴⁷

The same conceptual underpinning is true of the kind of beauty which is perceived because of the technical perfection of the object in regard to its capacity to fulfill its specific function. The beauty of the object does not appear through sense, but rather, is comprehended through an intellectual response resulting from an understanding of the success of the object's function. But it, too, is judged apparently solely on the grounds of how it appears. Consequently, Schiller says:

So although the architectonic beauty of the human figure is conditioned by the concept which underlies it and by the ends which Nature intends with it, the aesthetic judgment nevertheless completely isolates beauty from these ends, allowing nothing to be included in the notion of beauty but what is immediately present within the phenomenal world.⁴⁸

There exists a relationship between the phenomenal and our conceptual understanding which allows us to slide into the assumption that beauty is a naturally occurring and inherent entity. While the differentiation between the perception of the purpose and the ideal organization of a created object through the mind, and the making present of that creation through Nature is straight forward enough, what fudges our understanding of the constitution of beauty is that while beauty can only show itself in the physical, the basis for that ideal exists in Nature itself. Schiller says of this,

⁴⁶ Ibid 26 p8

⁴⁷ Ibid 27 p9

⁴⁸ op cit

But it is peculiar to beauty that it is not just presented in the sensible world, but originates there too; that Nature does not just express beauty, it also creates it. Beauty is in every respect a property of the sensuous realm, and even the artist who strives for it can attain it only to the extent that he can maintain the semblance that it had been fashioned by nature.⁴⁹

This is a reading of beauty which recognizes only that which manifests in the physical world as beautiful. Beauty can only appear as a physical entity. And that which is deemed beautiful is so within the confines of the medium in which it appears. But that all too ready acceptance of the relationship of the beautiful with the physical tends to encourage us to ignore, or at the least to overlook, the existence of the concept. Consequently, beauty is perceived as 'naturally' existing. This is compounded by the capacity of our senses to very readily respond to the physical beauty of man. Schiller points out that the apparent lack of mediation in the process of the judgment of an object as beautiful fails to acknowledge that man's sensuous nature is grounded in the concept of his humanity, and the idea of what is beautiful in man is grounded in that concept of his humanity.⁵⁰

Nature, then, can dispense only sensuous excellence, Schiller says.⁵¹ Consequently, nature and freedom (through reason) are separate orders. Our interaction with the material world is mediated by reason. He suggests reason puts phenomena to use in two ways. It can derive a concept from the object itself. This often occurs in attempts to explain the nature and purpose of the object. The second uses the object as a subjective expression of the concept. In this case, the physical presentation of beauty is 'adopted' into the 'land of Reason' thereby imbuing reason with a sense of beauty.⁵² While the physical nature and beauty which nature alone awards man is a necessary condition for one aspect of his

⁴⁹ Ibid 32 p11

⁵⁰ Ibid 33 p12 paraphrased.

⁵¹ Ibid 77c p 36

⁵² Ibid 37 p14

humanity, so too is the freedom to feel and to will how he appears and acts in the phenomenal sphere.⁵³ That freedom to 'determine the play of appearances'⁵⁴ carries with it a duty to act in a manner which does not conflict with the natural purpose of the physical being. Schiller calls this marriage of the necessity to act (arising from Reason) and the necessity for that action to be appropriate for its physical manifestation, a duty of phenomena - beauty. This is Schiller's understanding of the connection - indeed the integration - of aesthetics and ethics. A dutifully appropriate physical action arising from the individual freedom of self determination, which, in the combination it creates, manifests for Schiller as that which is both right and beautiful. It is an ideal of the nature of man.

We will explore how this works in full in the next chapter.

Before we consider how Hegel furthers and shifts Schiller's position, we will take a moment to review some of the differences in perception of the locating of the source of beauty and its relation to ethics.

Plato's beauty and truth as objective entities are to one side of the conceptual spectrum. While Beauty and Truth are separate from being and reality, the beauty and truth of both sensory objects and the human psyche are allied to those objective entities through participation in them.

The transcendental universality of Beauty and Truth with its teleological implication, provides the grounds for actual being. Any beauty or truth in objects, actions or thought are representations of true reality. Therefore the representations of beauty or truth are not subjectively imposed, but instead, introduce a presence or an appearance which triggers an appropriate response. The human psyche receives this presentation in a way which opens in man a longing to transcend his mortality and an aspiration for that higher order.

⁵³ Ibid 40 p17

⁵⁴ Ibid 45 p18

It is this inevitable longing (revealed to man by the reflections of the higher order of Beauty and Truth) which makes the aspiration for, and his relationship with the higher perfection of the actual, part of man's nature.

Kant, on the other hand, places beauty under the governance of the subject. For Kant, beauty is no longer perceived as an objective, fixed entity. Objects lose their endowment of beauty as an unequivocal property or characteristic. It is the experience of the percipient that determines the conditions under which beauty (and for that matter, art) is apprehended. The interplay of self, concept and the object can result in a response which uses beauty as a subjectively judged value. The focus of that subjective value is both spatial and temporal objects, and that which overwhelms our imagination. This makes objects the provocation of a response, but not the controller of the response because the knowledge gained from experience is mediated by ideas of reason and morality. The subjective experience of beauty provides an important introduction to disinterested reflection, while experience of the sublime evokes a sense of self esteem and respect for the 'humanity within us' - our moral ideas. Thus experience provides a subjective basis for the transition to morality. Cognitive and ethical judgements are based on pure reason or *a priori* knowledge, a knowledge which is both universal and necessary, and which goes beyond ordinary experience. Although the categorical imperative is developed from pure reason and is therefore not reliant on sensible influences, it does rely on its capacity to be determined as a universal law, and in that respect must appeal to that which is, by its nature predicated of many. Again, we are presented with perception of a relationship between aesthetics and ethics built on a conception of nature which separates the natural from man's contribution.

Kant's inclination to attribute a weighted importance to reason to the detriment of the sensuous prompts Schiller's development of the play impulse to reconcile the material and formal impulses by reaching for a fundamentally ideal beauty manifested in an aesthetic unity. Schiller places the artist at the epitome of creativity for his ability to play

the oppositions of the material and the ethical in order to create an aesthetic life. In that respect, the artist is the ideal human being, and that creatively balanced life, that created beauty, is the ideal of Human Being. However, in the face of the limitations of the realities of the material world, the silent shadowlands of such a beauty are restricted in how they contribute to that balance, and the art which presents that ideal presents nothing more than an ideal.

In regard to beauty, Hegel privileges art itself. Art contains beauty of a higher order than natural beauty. In this respect he reverses Kant's emphasis. Beauty does not depend on the pleasure derived from contemplation of the natural world in the first instance. In what at first appears to be a similar position to Schiller's, Hegel's beauty results from the development of thought into a 'sensuous appearing of the Idea'. However, art for Hegel demonstrates an increasing significance of thought over the sensuous, as his understanding of Classical art's combining of the spiritual and the natural as the 'completion of the realm of beauty' illustrates. This presentation of the mediation of mind over nature, in one sense, formalizes the domination of mind over that which is external to it, and in another sense, heralds an understanding that an awareness of the sensuous is only an indicator of something beyond it. Consequently, man is the medium through which Spirit or thought passes, and art becomes a conscious recognition of the divinity in man. Because only mind is capable of truth, that which is beautiful is so because it 'partakes' of that higher element. In other words, the world is known and understood through the imposition of meaning. The world does not have a meaning which is interpreted by man. The beauty found in nature is an imperfect and incomplete reflection of that which is to be found in the mind. This process is not directed at accentuating the opposition of man and nature, but instead, works to recover nature for the Spirit. The notion of starting from the idea of the beautiful, so that the truth of things which are manifest in the sensuous world are reflections of the Absolute, is reminiscent of Plato. The metaphysical and universal aspects of beauty locates art in the sphere of the actual, while at the same time it provides

the conduit for our self consciousness through articulation and expression of that beauty. Its expression through art is a cognitive link with beauty and the universal. The finite discloses the actual presence of the infinite, thereby overcoming any sense of a divided being or a divided world. If art, through the process of encouraging contemplation, acts as a means by which the 'individual and sensuously particularized representation' throws light on the general, then it encourages the development of the moral process of reflecting on what is right and dutiful. In the free choice of duty, the question of opposition between the sensuous and the spiritual does not arise because the impulses which conflict with duty ought to yield to it. The nature of Hegel's man, then, is he who participates in the beauty of the Absolute.

Nietzsche, however, takes a more Aristotelian outlook and finds an inexplicable pleasure in the desire for life: a life that is at the core of the physical. Rejecting the usual sense of a transcendental force and other world, Nietzsche focuses instead on the finite world where man optimistically aspires to the illusion of sense in a world deplete of a reasonable purpose other than to live. His natural world accommodates an all pervasive force in his Will to Power which both desires, drives, and consequently affirms life. And he perceives a sense of immortality derived from a notion of eternal recurrence. Existence and the world can only be shown to have good cause or reason - in Nietzsche's terms, 'to be justified' - as an aesthetic phenomenon. The Christian emphasis on a morality which concentrates on, and only finds truth in that which is beyond the presentation of the foibles, artifices and stumbling of the realm of physical life, is rejected in favour of the exaltation and valuing of life itself. Thus, Nietzsche argues, art, *not* morality is the truly metaphysical activity of man.⁵⁵ All of life is, he suggests, "based on semblance, art,

55

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Modern Library. (New York: Random House, 1968) 'Attempt at Self Criticism' 5 p22

deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error."⁵⁶ What matters is not that particular stances, moral interpretations and views on the significance of life are correct, but rather, that the artist puts us in touch with, indeed fights for, the joy of life itself. This encapsulates Nietzsche's ethical position. Joy in the fulfilment of living. Where Kant establishes a judgement of the beautiful in the aesthetic world by stepping back from it and detaching the mind by separating the emotional elements of the mind from the world we can see, feel, smell and touch, Nietzsche imbues art with the capacity to provide direct access to and to reveal the truth of that which drives the existence of the finite world. Art is significant in the presenting of ideas or intuitions without first perceiving of the object in analytical concepts. It discloses the true essence, the fundamental reality of the 'will to power' of the thing in itself, and it functions as an individual expression of the nature of life shared with man in general. Art is an intensification and focussing of the emotions, an expression of awe at the nature which man shares with the primordial being, a participation in the desire for and joy in existence, and, a means by which he understands the pain of the limitation of individual existence with its inevitable separation from the eternal element of nature, that drive for life.

Heidegger understands man as an entity influenced heavily by his circumstances, and by the natural world. Man does not choose the world into which he is thrown. He finds himself inevitably linked with the entities which he encounters. For Heidegger, there is no pre-given human essence. The fulfilment of possibilities through his actions is that which creates the identity of his being. Man makes himself what he is through his choices and actions, but his choices, and the kind of being man has the opportunity to become, is governed by the world or community in which he finds himself. Heidegger sees man as a self interpreting being. He acknowledges that individuals find themselves in worlds of vastly differing circumstances, including those of time or history.

There are parallels with the way art comes into being with that of the way we create our identity of being. However, art is more than that to Heidegger. It provides the medium through which things are comprehended and articulated. Consequently, it can shape how man lives. For a work of art to come into being, it requires a setting up of a 'world'. The implication of the imagery declared by the idea of 'world' is that of a limited or enclosed entity which makes sense within its own parameters. As a 'world', the entity is an erection of an umbrella of meaning (governed by an understanding of what is right⁵⁷) over the material aspects used to present that world (the earth as a 'sheltering agent'⁵⁸). That understanding of right, or truth, which contributes to the making of the 'world' and which Heidegger labels 'unconcealedness', is not a truth measurable against a set yardstick. Nor is it a truth which is of our making. While we know little of ourselves, we have some sort of instilled understanding of what we are. In a successful attempt to find the truth in the context of the world in which we find ourselves, there is a uniting in the struggle of 'world' and 'earth', a 'bringing *here* into the unconcealed', a radiance which we recognize as a truth. A work of art shows us truth not by means of a correct representation, but through a counter-play of 'world' and 'earth' - an interpretation which displays meaning through the physical representation - which provides a revelation. It is this combination which displays the nature of the being, and it is the illumination or the shining of this nature from the work which Heidegger labels the beautiful.⁵⁹ This is but a variation of the case of truth grounded on an understanding of nature which includes both the physical attributes of the world in which we find ourselves, and an intuitive understanding of that world stemming from the nature of man.

⁵⁷ Heidegger, Martin. 'The Origin of the Work of Art.' in *Philosophies of Art and Beauty. Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger*. Ed. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1976) p 762

⁵⁸ Ibid p 671

⁵⁹ Ibid p 682

With this broad outline of the various perceptions of the nature of man, we can now take a closer and more detailed look at how art and ethics might be perceived to exist. This is the task of the chapter which follows.

XII.

When humanity's sufferings are enclosing you,
 When Laocoön the snakes
 Fends off in unspeakable pain,
 Then mankind should revolt.
 At the vault of heaven should beat his lament
 And tear apart your feeling heart!
 Nature's frightening voice should win,
 And joy's face should pale,
 And holy sympathy should triumph
 Over the immortal in you.¹

8. Laocoön: The Tragic Art of Suffering.

Schiller negotiates the relationship between human suffering and sympathy. This chapter examines Schiller's perception of that relationship and what it reveals about that moment in art which conveys an understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. The chapter begins by placing the story and the history of the sculpture of Laocoön and his sons in context. The etymology of the word 'sympathy' is examined and its relationship to the word 'pathos' discussed. Kant's uses of the word are set out so as to place Schiller's differences in context. An informed reading of the twelfth stanza of Schiller's poem 'Ideal and Life' establishes a full outline of Schiller's position and shows how he perceives that relationship of aesthetics and ethics exists and functions. The questions of how that point of contact between art and ethics might exist and function, and how those positions differ from those which precede it are then asked in turn of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Virgil's *The Aeneid*, a narrative of the mythical origin of the Roman nation,² tells

¹ Schiller, Friedrich. 'Ideal and Life', an interlinear translation by Walter Veit. Lines 111 - 120

² Virgil. *The Aeneid*. Trans. W. F. Jackson Knight. Penguin Classics. (England: 1974) intro p12

of the heroic struggles of the occupants of the earthly world in the face of (in the words Virgil uses to describe the condition of Sinon's escape from Troy after his successful role as an agent for the acceptance into the city of the Trojan horse) "the divine protection of an unjust destiny".³ It is the inequity of this struggle and its inevitable outcome which becomes the focus of the sculpture of *Laocoön and his sons*. Virgil's story tells of Laocoön, chosen by chance to be priest of Neptune (Poseidon), and who, distrustful of the Trojan horse (and by extrapolation, the machinations and inclinations of the goddess Minerva) declares his opposition and defiantly implies war on the object of Minerva's intention by casting his spear at the wooden horse. Two giant sea snakes are sent, apparently in reparation for Laocoön's wickedness, where they crush and devour his two sons.

Next they seized Laocoön, who had armed himself and was hastening to the rescue; they bound him in the giant spirals of their scaly length, twice round his middle, twice round his throat; and still their heads and necks towered above him. His hands strove frantically to wrench the knots apart. Filth and black venom drenched his priestly hands. His shrieks were horrible and filled the sky, like a bull's bellow when an axe has struck awry, and he flings it off his neck and gallops wounded from the altar. The pair of serpents now made their retreat, sliding up to the temple of heartless Minerva, high on her citadel, where they vanished near her statue's feet behind the circle of her shield.⁴

Virgil's account is late in a line of a number of variations of the story. Kerényi notes, for example, that an earlier Laocoön has offended the god Apollo for whom he was also a priest.⁵ Defying a directive not to marry, Laocoön defiles the god's shrine by using it as the place for he and his wife to conceive their two sons. Apollo is important for his interest and judgements in matters relating to law and order across not only the physical

³ Ibid II. 258 p58

⁴ Ibid II 223 p58

⁵ Kerényi, C. *The Heroes of the Greeks*. Trans. H.J. Rose. (USA: Thames and Hudson. 1981) p358

and social spheres, but also the intellectual and moral spheres.⁶ The various versions of the story of Laocoön have in common the idea of the inadequacy of mortal will when opposed by godly dictates. Individual mortal circumstances are of no importance or relevance when they conflict with the rulings and desires of the gods. Consequently, regardless of whatever justification he might offer for his actions in any configuration of the story, Laocoön's stance is futile in the face of divine decree. Individually and collectively, man suffers as a result of the lack of sensitivity of the gods to man's plight. The world serves the whim of the gods. The physical world relies in part on that other world. But when mortal will conflicts with the purpose of the other world, man cannot win. Man is at the mercy of the gods.

The sculpture of *Laocoön and His Sons* has its own complex history; a history which makes problematic the ensuing interpretations of the group as an ideal. The sculpture is said to have been created by three artists, Hagesandros (Agesander), Polydorus and Athenodorus from Rhodes. From the time of its disappearance from public view in approximately the 5th c. A.D. to its discovery near the Baths of the Roman emperor Titus in Rome in 1506, the sculpture existed as an ideal as a result (some say of a misreading⁷) of the praise Pliny (the elder A.D. 23/4-79) heaped upon it in his *Natural History*.⁸ The rediscovered sculpture was identified by Michelangelo as the original described by Pliny.⁹ However, several hundred fragments of an identical group discovered in a cave at Sperlonga in Italy in 1957 were claimed by Professor Giulio Iacopi, a Roman archaeologist, to be the true original. Others consider both to be copies of a lost original,

⁶ *Everyman's Classical Dictionary*. Op. Cit. p 52

⁷ Clark, Kenneth. *The Nude: A Study of Ideal Art*. (London: Murray. 1956) Kenneth Clark believes the original may have been bronze. Pliny's claim of the Laocoön made of one stone as a work of art to be preferred to all others might have been misinterpreted, and that he meant preferred to all others made in paint or bronze.

⁸ Pliny. *Natural History: a selection*. Trans. John F. Healy. (London: Penguin Books. 1991)

⁹ Warrington. Op.cit.

possibly made of bronze.¹⁰ Even the shape of the statue became the subject of dispute. In the sculpture discovered in 1506, both the figure of Laocoön and that of his younger son (the one on our left as we view the sculpture - the sculpture was apparently designed to be viewed from the one vantage point-) lacked right arms. The older son was without a hand. When Francis I, King of France pressed Pope Julius II to make the statue a gift to France, the Pope commissioned a copy to be made. The maker of the copy designed and attached outstretched arms and hands in an effort to complete the statue. (This is the image most familiar in Australian text books.) In 1905, a German archaeologist discovered what he suspected to be Laocoön's missing arm in a shop in Rome. In contrast to the 'false' outstretched arm, the rediscovered arm bent at the elbow and the hand was located near the back of the head. But it wasn't until the late 1950's that the Vatican Museum restored the arm and countenanced some smaller adjustments to the other two figures.

The various existences of this piece of art, and the variety of sources from which it and the readings were or could have been informed, underlines the conditional nature of the readings resulting from an engagement with the work. And there are many readings. Winkelmann, for example, suggested that the *Laocoön* provided an example of the nobility, elevation, serenity and simplicity ('eine edle Einfalt und eine stille Größe') to be found in Greek art. This was in sharp contrast to the horrible cries Virgil wrung from his Laocoön.¹¹ Lessing responded to this with the claim that the differences in the means of presentation of the various arts imposed different means of expression. Painting, for example, is concerned with visual attributes, while poetry focusses on action.¹² Others such as Schiller, Goethe, Hirt, the Schlegels, Schopenhauer, Herder and K. Moritz (to

¹⁰ Op. Cit.

¹¹ Winkelmann, J.J. *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture*. Trans Elfriede Heyer and Roger C. Norton. (Illinois: Open Court. 1987)

¹² Lessing, G.E. 'Laocoön; or, On The Limits of Painting and Poetry. 1766' in *The Laocoön, and Other Prose Writings of Lessing*. Trans. W.B. Rönfeldt. (London: Walter Scott, Ltd.) Chap XVI p90

name some) were also drawn into discussing ideas provoked by the idea, and/or, the body of the statue. Although a number of issues were evoked by the existence of several pieces and configurations of the *Laocoön*, the aggregate situation of the *Laocoön* parallels the exchanges between the broader discourse on the ideal and the aesthetic (of which art is the consummate example).

However, the issue on which I will focus here is how the perceptions of the suffering man endures through the limitations imposed on him by the physical world are incorporated into and actively inform his ethical position - his determining of how he lives his life - and how that ideal is thought to find expression through art. To phrase the issue more succinctly, and as a question: how does the aesthetics of art embrace and show us the ethical moment? But this is not quite enough. Schiller's use of the word *sympathy* is pivotal to the meaning of the stanza which evokes the first question. It would be judicial, then, to ask what part *sympathy* plays in answering that initial question. Consequently, we should inquire a little into the word before investigating how Schiller uses it.

The Greek word *sympathēs* is tied closely to 'having the same *páthos*', hence meaning sharing the same experience, suffering etc.¹³ While *páthos* shares the history of *páschō* as 'experience' and then 'misfortune', it also extends to mean 'mood,' 'emotion,' 'passion,' 'impulse,' and also 'change,' 'process,' and 'attribute'. The extension of *pathos* to *pathetic* sees a tendency for an emphasis to be placed on 'producing an effect on the emotions', making it closer to Aristotle's use of *pathos*. In his translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Martin Ostwald notes

In its most rudimentary sense, *pathos* is the opposite of *praxis*, 'action', and denotes anything which befalls a person or which he experiences. In most cases, EMOTION comes closest to what Aristotle means; but when the connotations of this are too narrow or misleading, AFFECT is used, in Spinoza's sense of *affectus*¹⁴.

¹³ *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Op. Cit. p802

¹⁴ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Op. Cit. Glossary p311

For example, Ostwald translates Aristotle's *pathos* as *emotion* in a passage listing feelings which, Aristotle claims, is followed by pleasure or pain.¹⁵ Aristotle also uses the word to designate 'movement of the body'¹⁶ in his search for the attributes of the soul in *De anima*. He suggests that of the various kinds of souls which exist, the sensitive soul has the function of perceiving, with the consequence of feeling pleasure and pain, and therefore desire. (While suffering is discerned here as caused by forces external to man, modernity acknowledges internal forces as cause.) From the cognitive side of the sensitive soul grows imagination and then memory; from the nutritive or appetitive side comes the faculty of movement. (Exclusive to man is the faculty of reason.)¹⁷ Because thought and imagination are caused to move by the object of desire, desire is the faculty which Aristotle recognizes as setting us in movement.¹⁸ Remembering that for Aristotle, desire results from the perception of pleasure and pain stemming from emotion, it is only a short step to the modern expression of 'being moved' by a particular emotion.

In his discussion of the Sublime, Kant declares that it is only when man becomes conscious of "a disposition [within himself] that is upright and acceptable to God" that the awesome fearfulness which natural phenomena can inspire can serve to remind man of the idea of the sublimity of God, in that man recognizes the "the existence in himself of a sublimity of disposition consonant with His will..."¹⁹ The point Kant makes is that sublimity is an idea in the mind which may evoke a consciousness of our superiority of our thought over the might of external nature. How we generally agree on how to judge the

¹⁵ Ibid. 1105b, 23

¹⁶ Aristotle. 'De anima' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941) 403a

¹⁷ Ibid. 413 a22-b27, 414 a29-415 a12

¹⁸ Ibid. 413 a23

¹⁹ Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement*. Op. Cit. § 28 p114

sublime in nature comes from a culture which arises from the 'native capacity' in human nature for moral feeling.²⁰ For Kant it is through imagination which, by acting on the principles of judgment and at the same time 'acting as an instrument of reason and its ideas' that we are able to assert our independence against the influences of nature, to diminish its strength by locating the 'absolutely great' within the self.²¹ He explains this claim by saying it is through our imagination that, when we experience the *astonishment* which gives rise 'almost to terror', and the awe and thrill of devout feeling that is evoked by the spectacle and might of nature when we are in no immediate danger from these forces, we feel the might of this power and, at the same time experience it with a calm mind, knowing our mind is superior and therefore not dependent on external nature for our well being.²² The satisfaction or delight (encompassing pleasure and pain²³) which is derived from an object depends, Kant says, on the reference we give to the imagination in order to serve the mind.²⁴ But aesthetic representation of the moral good must be represented as sublime rather than as beautiful.²⁵ This is because presentation of the moral good as the sublime arouses a feeling of respect and avoids the difficulties that feelings such as love present for it.²⁶ Kant's use of 'respect' implies a distancing from emotions (such as sympathy which can be associated with one of the requirements of love). It further underlines Kant's thought that good is a product of reason. Affections²⁷ are blind in that

²⁰ Ibid. § 29 p116

²¹ Ibid. §29 p121

²² Op. Cit.

²³ Ibid. §3 p45

²⁴ Ibid. p122

²⁵ Ibid. p123

²⁶ Op. Cit.

²⁷ Used here by Kant as a noun to mean a mental or physical disposition related to feelings: an emotion or mood.

they contain no characteristics which contribute to choice. In other words, they lack reason. Kant defines affections as impetuous and irresponsible.²⁸ In a qualifying of Aristotle's position which saw passion as instigating movement, Kant, while charging that affects obstruct the "mental movement whereby the exercise of free deliberation upon fundamental principles with a view to determining oneself accordingly" is achieved,²⁹ suggests that in their aesthetic manifestation, affects do influence the mind. In this regard an aesthetic manifestation or form of intuition is "nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity (namely, through this positing of its representation) and so is affected by itself".³⁰ Kant is thereby able to allocate a usefulness to the affections by dividing them into two types: the Strenuous and the Languid. The latter which represents emotions that lead to a wallowing in the experience of the affections through an avoiding of the use of reason to uplift us to respect "the worth of humanity in our own person and the rights of men" lacks worth.³¹ It might simply display a sensuous beauty. On the other hand, the Strenuous type of affection (such as anger or desperation) which Kant categorizes as aesthetically sublime, is that which stimulates an awareness of our power of overcoming resistance.³² The sublime presentation must, he emphasises, leave behind "a temper of the mind which, although it be only indirectly, has an influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure intellectual finality (the supersensible).³³ The delight which the sublime communicates can, on occasion, manifest as a sadness which arises from the evil actions man inflicts on his fellow man, because it is based on ideas of what man could be. But the

²⁸ Ibid. p124 n

²⁹ Ibid. p124

³⁰ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Op. Cit. B68 p87

³¹ *The Critique of Judgement*. p123

³² Ibid. p125

³³ Ibid. p126

sadness which derives from a sympathy for that which fate brings down on others, is not, Kant declares, an aesthetically sublime affection because it does not derive from moral ideas.³⁴

Schiller, however, does not accept this relegation of *sympathy* to the beautiful. He argues that it is the experience of sympathy which can move us to adopt an ethical position.

With the lines *When humanity's sufferings are enclosing you, /When Laocoön the snakes/ Fends off in unspeakable pain*,³⁵ Schiller directly links at the whim of a higher power the image of Laocoön and the pain of death to the condition of human suffering. The specific image becomes a shorthand representation of the general condition: that like Laocoön, man is inevitably forced to face the death of those closest to him and his own death. Because it is a condition which is beyond our control Schiller understands that condition in relation to the sublime and the pathetic. "We call an object sublime," he says, "if whenever the object is presented or represented, our sensuous nature feels its limits but our rational nature feels its superiority, its freedom from limits."³⁶ That which is sublime is superior to us as natural beings. That which we experience as sublime must fulfill the requirement that "we see ourselves with absolutely no physical means of resistance and look to our nonphysical self for help."³⁷ It also means that the object is frightening to our sensuous side. We gain independence only as rational beings, as beings not belonging to nature. This clearly points to the separate existence of man within nature. While we are subject to the forces which nature applies, we have a certain capacity to be independent

³⁴ Ibid. p130

³⁵ 'Ideal and Life' Op. Cit. Lines 111 - 113

³⁶ Schiller, Friedrich. 'On The Sublime (*Vom Erhabenen*) (Toward the Further Development of Some Kantian Ideas). In *Friedrich Schiller, Essays*. Ed Walter Hinderer. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. The German Library. Vol. 17. (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 1993) p22

³⁷ Ibid. p28

of those forces. Schiller makes this point when he declares that the two fundamental instincts which drive us stand in opposition (or contradiction) to nature. He describes the roles of these instincts this way.

First, we possess an instinct to alter the condition we find ourselves in, to express our existence, to be effective, all of which amount to acquiring representations or notions for ourselves. ... Second, we possess an instinct to maintain the condition we find ourselves in, to continue our existence...³⁸

The first instinct concerns knowing. He calls it the cognitive instinct. The second is known as 'the instinct for self-preservation' and, with its concern with feelings, focusses on inner perceptions of existence.³⁹ Kant declares "Whatever incites me directly (through my senses) to abandon (to depart from) my condition is unpleasant to me, it gives me pain".⁴⁰ Schiller amplifies this to suggest that where pain is the indicator to the self-preservation instinct of a threat to our physical life, fear arises if that danger is the sort which is futile to resist. It is, however, only frightening to our sensuous being, because it is only in our sensuous state that we are dependent on nature. That force has no power over our will. Our will is not subject to natural law.⁴¹ The existence of the idea of immortality as the prevailing idea acts to pacify the feelings of desperation, defenselessness, fears of annihilation and the threat of violent assault felt by the sensuous nature. As a result death becomes no longer fearful and the sublime - the limitation felt by the sensuous nature - disappears.⁴² This is a pacification of and a sense of security for our sensuous nature and our instinct for self-preservation in situations which our imagination feels incapable of

³⁸ Ibid. p 23

³⁹ Op. Cit.

⁴⁰ Kant, Immanuel. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. (U.S.A. Southern Illinois University Press. 1978) p131

⁴¹ Schiller. *On the Sublime* p24

⁴² Ibid. p32

overcoming. A force which is threatening to our physical condition, and which provides a danger which we feel we are not able to conquer with our physical powers needs to be overcome by achieving a sense of security through an attachment to our principles rather than focussing on the security of our existence.⁴³ Given that divinity poses the latter form of threat to man, the one element which we have to act independently of the divine, even though it shares with divinity a sense of reason which is manifest in divine law, is the determination of our will. It is a purely moral freedom and must, says Schiller, be understood to be completely independent of our physical nature.

...it must be completely irrelevant to us how we fare as sensuous beings in the process [of facing the fearful object], and our freedom must consist merely in the fact that we regard, our physical condition, determined as it can be by nature, as something external and alien, having no influence on our moral person, and as something we do not count as part of our self.⁴⁴

When applying the term *sublime* to the individual, the meaning revolves around the person's capacity to fearlessly face the inevitable. Thus someone who overcomes what is fearful is only magnificent, but someone who, while overwhelmed by the fearful, and yet does not fear it, is sublime.⁴⁵ It is the provision of an *ideal* security through the capacity to resist by separating physical existence from personhood that eventually removes the condition for something to harm us. It does not overturn or overcome the danger to the sensuous part of our being, rather, it is an understanding that our moral selves cannot be harmed.⁴⁶

Reflecting on how a sense of the sublime is portrayed, Schiller claims that a representation of the sublime is aroused by the combining and interrelating of three

⁴³ Ibid. p33

⁴⁴ Ibid. p34

⁴⁵ Ibid. p35

⁴⁶ Op. Cit.

images: the first is of an objective, physical power; the second is of our subjective, physical impotence; and the third is of our subjective, moral superiority. This can be achieved in two ways. By the objective presentation of an image of an object which causes the suffering, and where the observer interprets and creates an understanding of that suffering and his moral relationship with it. This Schiller entitles the *contemplatively-sublime*. Or, it can be achieved by the objective presentation of an image of the cause of the suffering, an objective representation of the suffering itself, which leaves it to the individual to apply his moral condition to it and to "produce something sublime out of something fearful". He calls this the *pathetically-sublime*.⁴⁷ Schiller points out that because the contemplatively sublime is only a presentation of nature as a powerful subject matter and does not elucidate the relationship and danger of that power to our physical state, thereby imposing on or including our moral character, the effect is not as powerful as that which he categorizes as the pathetically sublime.⁴⁸ In the case of the latter, where the power is shown and at the same time demonstrated to have "catastrophic consequences for people", the power is shown as a hostile expression.⁴⁹ Unlike the situation of the contemplatively sublime where, because the presentation of the object does not demonstrate the threat to our physical state, the imagination has the 'choice' not to become aware of the danger, the situation of the pathetically sublime, with its demonstration of the consequences of that power, leaves the imagination no choice but to engage with it. The image provokes the imagination into an involuntary act of sympathy. It is involuntary because, Schiller says, "The moment we have an image of it, we *must* feel it. *Nature*, not our *freedom* acts..."⁵⁰ But if the object which arouses the emotion is to be the basis for the sublime, the suffering it evokes in the observer must not be an actual suffering. This is

⁴⁷ Ibid. p36

⁴⁸ Ibid. p37

⁴⁹ Ibid. p41

⁵⁰ Ibid. p42

because it would inhibit the freedom of spirit. Rather, it is a suffering with, an empathy, an entering into someone else's feelings, but with a separation which recognizes that our moral self is removed from the causality of the suffering and its determining of our willing.⁵¹

Schiller asserts that the "ultimate purpose of art is to depict what transcends the realm of the senses and the art of tragedy in particular accomplishes this by displaying morality's independence, its freedom, in the throes of passion, from nature's laws."⁵² This statement is a clear declaration of Schiller's early⁵³ understanding of the relationship between aesthetics (meaning art) and ethics. He claims this to be achieved through establishing the tragic hero as someone who is sensitive and feels.⁵⁴ The role of the artist is to evoke a sense of pathos - to depict suffering - not of the trivial, but of that which is essential to human nature. This is one of the reasons Schiller so much admires the Greek sculptors and their works. He reads the Greeks' depiction of their heroes without garments metaphorically as allowing them to reveal more of the hero's *human nature*. And the heroes epitomise the ideal in ethical man through their achievement in not being overcome by suffering even though they feel it 'intensely and inwardly'.⁵⁵ It is the perceived success of the Greeks in their attainment of the depiction of suffering in their art which prompts Schiller to frame two laws for the art of tragedy: depicting the suffering nature, and portraying moral resistance to the suffering.⁵⁶ He emphasises that the mere portrayal of

⁵¹ Ibid. p42f

⁵² Schiller, Friedrich. 'On the Pathetic' (*Über das Pathetische*) In *Friedrich Schiller, Essays*. Ed Walter Hinderer. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. The German Library. Vol. 17. (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 1993) p45

⁵³ 'On the Pathetic' was published in 1793. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters* was published in 1795.

⁵⁴ 'On the Pathetic' p46

⁵⁵ Ibid. p47

⁵⁶ Ibid. p48

emotions and passions which afflict the senses and reveal pain simply gratify the senses. It is not the 'ultimate purpose' nor the 'immediate source of pleasure' in the tragic.

Art must delight the spirit and oblige freedom. Anyone who falls victim to pain is simply a tormented animal and no longer a suffering human being, for a moral resistance to suffering is absolutely required of a human being and only by this means is the principle of freedom within him, intelligence, able to make itself known.⁵⁷

It is the portrayal of passion and, at the same time, the portrayal of the power of resistance beyond the senses - that which springs from reason - which makes the representation sublime. Thus he says, "The pathetic is aesthetic only insofar as it is sublime."⁵⁸

This leads Schiller to consider how ideas as a phenomenon beyond the senses can be represented in art. Instinctive responses to passion produce physical phenomena such as increased heartbeat or cries of fear or delight. But that instinct can be curbed through the influence of the will. Therefore, he argues, instinct alone does not determine all the appearance of a person in passion. It is through a depiction of attempts to control the instinctive responses to passion that reveals the moral independence of the human, thereby making the portrayal "all the more pathetic, and the *pathos* all the more sublime."⁵⁹

In an illustration of arriving at an understanding of the sublime and evoking a sense of pathos through contemplative means, Schiller points out that Virgil's goal in the telling of the plight of Laocoön was not to move us to sympathy, but rather, to create an image of divinely ordained punishment. This he achieved by showing the cause of the suffering and thereby instilling us with terror.⁶⁰ So how does the transition from powerful object to the sublime take place for the audience? Schiller's answer is that we need to spontaneously

⁵⁷ Ibid. p49

⁵⁸ Op.cit

⁵⁹ Ibid. p53

⁶⁰ Ibid. p55

produce two distinct images of comprehension in the mind. The first makes the connection between the mighty force of nature and the human being's comparative physical incapacity to withstand that force, to create an understanding of that force as frightening. The second measures our will against that force in a manner which reminds us of "our will's absolute independence from every natural influence".⁶¹ In this case it is the presentation of something both powerful and frightening which provokes in us that ability to be affected by the suffering or grief of another - that instinct to sympathise - which in turn arouses our instinct for preservation. Schiller seems to be suggesting that an external fiction - that is, a presentation of a frightening image - can provoke an empathy which sees us engage in a form of transference where we imagine ourselves in the position of the protagonist in the fiction, and which encourages us to project onto the situation an understanding of how we might deal with it. No doubt the supporters of the view that art is cathartic would find much to applaud in this position.

Schiller also suggests that Virgil's story demonstrates the capacity we have to feel sympathy for someone else's sympathy. His claim submits that an ability to recognize and empathise with suffering forms a common link between the specific individual and the portrayal of man's general condition, and that the individual is capable of recognizing the arousal of sympathy in a fictional construct, thereby being able to feel a sympathy for that fictionally constructed sympathy. The example he uses is Virgil's description of the serpents killing the sons before attacking Laocoön. Schiller clearly locks the poem into arousing the observer's sympathy for the ethical action taken in response to the horror. "It makes for a great effect, the fact that the moral human (the father) is attacked before the physical human is. All emotions are more aesthetic secondhand, and no sympathy is stronger than the sympathy we feel with sympathy."⁶² But what makes Laocoön even more worthy of respect as a 'hero as a moral person' is his decision to fulfill his paternal duty

⁶¹ Ibid. p56

⁶² Ibid. p58

as protector of his children rather than seek his own safety. It is, Schiller says, as though Laocoön had freely chosen to surrender himself to the disaster, thereby making Laocoön's death an action of his own will.⁶³

It is in the interrelationship of the senses and the spirit which Schiller sees as necessary to the forming of pathos. That is, the suffering of either the individual or humanity as a whole played against the freedom of the mind or an indication of the independence of spirit.⁶⁴ If the state of the physical side of a human being does not control his ethical side, this can manifest as a sublime composure which is observable and therefore suitable to the work of pictorial or plastic artists. On the other hand, if the ethical side prescribes to man's physical side and influences his condition, the resulting sublime action (which requires an understanding of the succession of thought to perceive it as a result of free choice) is more suitable to the characteristics of poetry.⁶⁵

If we recall Schiller's earlier declaration that the "ultimate purpose of art is to depict what transcends the realm of the senses,"⁶⁶ we recognize by benefit of his later discussions that his idea of the purpose of art is not to prescriptively represent a moral position for the purpose of directing its audience. Rather, it is to convey the understanding that an individual can rise to the full dignity of humanity through a single act of will.⁶⁷ It is therefore, he says, "merely via the representation of its possibility that the actual exercise of an absolutely free willing pleases our aesthetic sense."⁶⁸ For Schiller, then, art inspires us (through our capacity to empathise with the character portrayed in the poetic fiction) to emulate the exercise of free will, his keystone of ethics.

⁶³ Ibid. p59

⁶⁴ Ibid. p59

⁶⁵ Ibid. p59f

⁶⁶ Ibid. p45

⁶⁷ Ibid. p68

⁶⁸ Ibid. p66

Poetry can come to be for the human being, what love is for the hero. It can neither counsel him nor join him in battle nor otherwise do any work for him, but it can develop him into a hero, call him to action, and equip him with the strength to be everything he ought to be.⁶⁹

So when we contemplate a tragedy such as *Laocoön and His Sons*, the most tragic moment, that moment of pathos, arises from an empathy which allows us to comprehend and share the suffering, and which, at the same time, sanctions an understanding that as ethical beings we can be independent of the inevitability of the physical limitations which cause the sufferings. But when Schiller says *Nature's frightening voice should win, / And joy's face should pale / And holy sympathy should triumph / Over the immortal in you*⁷⁰, is he reminding us of the gulf between the ideal and life? Is he pointing to that 'gruesome chasm' where, in our sympathy with the suffering of a fellow human being - and, ultimately, of our awareness of human mortality - we are shown to be irrevocably mortal and inevitably unable to reconcile human suffering and philosophical construction? It would seem that the difference between what we ought to do, and what we do remains an abyss.

If art for Schiller has the capacity to embrace and reveal that ethical moment at the point of man's struggle with existence, and to inspire the exercise of individual free will, do others perceive art to do the same?

Hegel's thoughts on this matter do not revolve specifically around Tragedy. Rather, they encompass the arts in a more general way. But the major point of difference between Hegel and Schiller can be traced to their different perceptions of free will and its function. Understanding Hegel's free will requires an awareness of the relationship he perceives free will has with the 'Absolute'. In contradiction to the claims of the True as intuition or some

⁶⁹ Ibid. p67

⁷⁰ 'Ideal and Life' lines 117 - 120

form of immediate knowledge of the Absolute, religion or being, Hegel declares that the only component of the existence of truth is the idea or concept.⁷¹ Any claim for the Absolute needs to specify what it is, rather than adhere to a formalism which repeats the insight that "although one has been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, the A=A, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one."⁷²

For Hegel, the absolute is both substance and subject: the being for that which knowledge is about, and at the same time the immediacy of that knowledge.⁷³ It is substance only in that it "is part of the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual."⁷⁴ The True is the whole, Hegel points out, and the Absolute exists only as a result. The Absolute is not an imposed or overriding means of ordering the world. Rather, it is a marriage of concept and the phenomenal world. He states it clearly when he says: "...the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its own development."⁷⁵ There are two important points here. The first is that it is the outcome of the combining of the being and the knowledge, that is the Absolute: the Absolute is a complete knowing and being and is not simply a mediation of the two. That complete knowing and being is its nature says Hegel: the end result of the becoming of itself. There is no mediation, he stresses, because the mediation is absent in the Absolute.⁷⁶ The second point is telegraphed by the word 'development'. Our concepts change and develop. Consequently, the Absolute is not fixed. It is a

⁷¹ Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977) Preface. 6 p4

⁷² Ibid. 14 -16. p8f

⁷³ Ibid. 17. p10

⁷⁴ Ibid. 18. p10

⁷⁵ Ibid. 20. p11

⁷⁶ Ibid. 19 - 20. p10f

changing, developing, process of becoming.⁷⁷

The importance of the concept re-emerges when Hegel speaks of 'Right' as a form of conduct brought about by the will. He points out that his use of Right [*Recht*, i.e. *jus*] embraces not only the general understanding of civil law, but also morality, ethical life, and world history. Why? "[B]ecause the concept brings thoughts together into a true system."⁷⁸ Hegel claims that the basis of right is, in general, the mind, and its precise place and point of origin is the will. He continues: "The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature."⁷⁹ The will is structured on a hierarchical range of complexity: the concept as abstract right; its embodiment - morality; the combination of abstract right and morality to form ethical life - that is "the unity of the will in its concept with the will of the individual"; the embodiment of that ethical life into family; the transmission of the family as ethical life into civil society; and finally the "prodigious unification of self-subsistent individuality with universal substantiality" to achieve the state. The right of the state is freedom in its most concrete shape, subordinate to one thing only, Hegel says: "the supreme absolute truth of the world mind."⁸⁰

Hegel rejects any idea that the free will of right, ethical life, is arbitrary. The guarantee or certainty of its freedom is to be found in its rationality, its formal universality (or essential nature) and its unity of self-consciousness.⁸¹ An impulse is a uni-directional

⁷⁷ Ibid. 85 - 89. p54ff

⁷⁸ Hegel, G. W. F. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Trans. T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1953) Addition 20. Paragraph 33. p233

⁷⁹ Ibid. Introduction, 4. p20

⁸⁰ Ibid. Addition 20. Paragraph 33. p234

⁸¹ Ibid. Introduction, 15. p27

urge which has no measuring rod in itself,⁸² he argues, so it is an unsatisfactory idea that the will makes its choices simply from the contents of that which is presented to it. Rather, the impulses should be purified. That is, "they should be freed both from their form as immediate and natural determinations, and also from the subjectivity and contingency of their content, and so brought back to their substantial essence."⁸³ This is demonstrated (as we shall see) in the role Hegel perceives for art. Reflection on the essences of the impulses "invests the material with an abstract universality"⁸⁴ and allows for a reasoned employment of these urges. This manifests as duties performed within the sanctions of the institutions of the ethical life.⁸⁵ Consequently, the will is universal, and freedom is the 'rational system of mind' which actualizes the will.⁸⁶ The result is an annulling of the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity, says Hegel.⁸⁷ The outcome of this process is that will and freedom join the individual with society.

It is appropriate in the light of this outline to return to the question of how Hegel links art with ethics and to ask if, like Schiller, he uses the sublime and the pathetic to evoke the exercise of free will to develop an ethical answer to the pain of living.

Art for Hegel is a human activity which is a sensuous presentation of the rational.⁸⁸ As a representation or semblance, rather than an actual material presence, the work of art occupies the central point between the immediately sensuous and ideal thought.⁸⁹ In

⁸² Ibid. Introduction, 17. p28

⁸³ Ibid. Introduction, 19. p28

⁸⁴ Ibid. Introduction, 20. p29

⁸⁵ Ibid. 150ff. p107ff

⁸⁶ Ibid. Introduction., 27. p32

⁸⁷ Ibid. Introduction, 28. p32

⁸⁸ Hegel, G. W. F., *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Trans. Bernard Bosanquet. Ed and Commentary; Michael Inwood. (London: Penguin Books. 1993) Ch III XLI p30

⁸⁹ Ibid. Ch III LVII p43

contrast to the scientific search for the universal, artistic contemplation cherishes individual existence.⁹⁰ (Already we can see in the idea of art as a product of a society, and its capacity to at the same time accommodate the individual, a repeat of the thrust for combining of the subjective and the objective so that the individual and society are a complete unit.) In his efforts to establish what he perceives is the purpose of art, Hegel declares its capacity to imitate nature as essentially a superfluous labour⁹¹. But in an effort to sidestep the means by which Schiller feels art can achieve its ends - its capacity to exemplify, and to evoke through an empathic sharing of emotions an understanding and desire to act independently of physical limitations - Hegel goes to some pains to dismiss what he calls the common opinion of what should be the content of art and its purpose. It is the common opinion, he says, "that it is the task and aim of art to bring in contact with our sense, our feeling, our inspiration, *all* that finds a place in the mind of man."⁹² Art is able, through its use of images, symbols and ideas, to create semblances which represent "*the content of reality.*"

Hence it is all the same to our feelings whether external reality or only the semblance of it is the means of bringing in contact with us a situation, a relation, or the import of life. Either mode suffices to awaken our response to its burden, in grief and in rejoicing, in pathos and in horror, and in traversing the emotions and the passions of wrath, hatred, compassion, of anxiety, fear, love reverence, and admiration, or of the desire of honour and of fame.⁹³

Therefore, he argues, because art is capable of "impressing on the heart and imagination good and bad alike" to establish art as a means of acquainting us with emotions and feelings is to make art an empty vessel for any and every kind of content,⁹⁴ and therefore

⁹⁰ Op. Cit.

⁹¹ Ibid. Ch III LXII p47

⁹² Ibid. Ch III LCVI p51

⁹³ Ibid. Ch III LCVI p52

⁹⁴ Op. Cit.

without ultimate purpose. There are echoes here of Plato's outcry against poetry.

The purpose Hegel suggests for art is found in its capacity and function of mitigating the fierceness of desires.⁹⁵ When art presents desires and passions they become objects on which we can contemplate. In other words, art allows, and indeed for Hegel provides, a distancing for the individual from his emotions. That distancing or separating is brought about through the shift from experiencing the emotions to observing and reflecting on them as an object. The result is a sense of freedom from the emotion because it is recognized as something external, and as such, becomes an object with which he "must now enter into an *ideal* relation".⁹⁶ One of the benefits Hegel emphasises is the liberation it provides. In Hegel's words, it delivers man "from the power of sensuousness."⁹⁷ He goes so far as to say it raises man above the 'coarseness and savagery' of nature. This is achieved by diverting focus from an unrestricted engagement with the emotions to that of contemplation which, in turn, progresses to cultivating an interest in their significance.⁹⁸ That art ennoble man by evoking a contemplative response which further leads away from the senses by arousing an interest in meaning is an important combination for Hegel. It is reformatory of man in the sense that it progressively distances man from the senses, and as a consequence, underlines the significance of reason.

Both Schiller and Hegel subscribe to art as a mediating vehicle which precipitates a distancing. For Hegel, as we have seen, that distancing is a separating from directly feeling emotions to a position of contemplating them. Schiller focusses on that which is overwhelming, and he enters into a relationship with free will initially through a sympathy with the emotion; a sympathy which, because of the indirectness of the involvement with the emotion, retains an awareness of a capacity within the self to find a non-physical way

⁹⁵ Ibid. Ch III LCVII p53

⁹⁶ Ibid. Ch III LXVII p54

⁹⁷ Op. Cit.

⁹⁸ Op. Cit.

to face the cause of the emotion. Hegel's art appears to sidestep the full experience of the emotion. The emotion appears as an object outside the individual, and it evokes a response which is strictly intellectually driven.

How is art perceived to form an explicit alliance with ethics? Hegel defines morality as involving "*reflection* and the definite consciousness of that which duty prescribes, and acting out of such a prior consciousness."⁹⁹ Duty, which Hegel describes as the law of the will, is derived freely out of man's own self. If we recall: duty arises as a result of contemplating on the impulses, and purifying them to reveal their substantial essence in order to provide an abstract universality on which to focus.¹⁰⁰ When taken by itself, this abstract universal of the will is, says Hegel, "the direct antithesis of nature, the sensuous impulses, the self-seeking interests, the passions, and of all that is comprehensively entitled the feelings and the heart."¹⁰¹ Hegel charges that the modern thought of his day has elaborated on these oppositions to the point that they are seen as unbending contradictions. Because both of these contenders are found within the subject, man finds himself divided when facing the demand for an impulse to yield to duty. These oppositions also emerge on a broader scale, and in various forms, as distinctions "between that which is real essentially and in its own right, and that which is external reality and existence",¹⁰² thereby setting man to "live in two contradictory worlds at once".¹⁰³ However, unbending contradictions, do not allow a resolution to man's dilemma., and truth is not to be found in either one of the alternatives. The truth only lies in the conciliation and mediation of the two, Hegel says. If we return to the discussion of Hegel's thoughts on the Absolute, we will recall that the True is the whole. The Absolute is a marriage of concept and the

⁹⁹ Ibid. Ch III LXXI p58

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Introduction, 19. p28

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Ch III LXXI p58

¹⁰² Ibid. Ch III LXXII p59

¹⁰³ Ibid Ch III LXXIII p59

phenomenal world.¹⁰⁴ And, from what Hegel has argued, art shows us the Absolute: through the effective reconciliation of its sensory form and its concept or meaning¹⁰⁵ art functions to *reveal* the truth in the form of sensuous artistic shape, and it *represents* the reconciled antithesis.¹⁰⁶ In Hegel, as in Plato, truth on the level of the Absolute also is the morally good.

One step further in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche, a fierce critic of Hegel, nevertheless writes in his *Preface to Richard Wagner* which introduces us to his *The Birth of Tragedy* that he is convinced that art represents the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life.¹⁰⁷ It is the means by which we can examine the value of existence, he says.¹⁰⁸ By emphasizing art's representative characteristic, and aligning it with metaphysical activity, Nietzsche underlines the analogous nature of metaphysical thought in the determination of our relationship with the world, and art as the vehicle or means of analogy. His most forthright analogies he imbeds in the two Greek art deities of Apollo and Dionysus. On the one hand, Apollo embodies the sense of that which the art world presents as dreams, and which Nietzsche extends to encompass illusion. It is a comforting illusion which incorporates restraint and a denial of what Nietzsche calls "the wilder emotions".¹⁰⁹ He likens Apollo's representation to Schopenhauer's description of a man wrapped in the veil of *māyā* (illusion) sitting calmly in the midst of a world of

¹⁰⁴ *Phenomenology of Spirit*. 20. p11

¹⁰⁵ Michael Inwood's commentary in *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics* p140 elucidates this point.

¹⁰⁶ *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. ChIII LXXIV p61

¹⁰⁷ Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Op. Cit. p31

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid. Attempt at Self Criticism*. P18

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* I p35

torments, supported by and trusting in the principle of individuation.¹¹⁰ For Nietzsche, Apollo encapsulates the illusion of the representation of the inner connection between - the oneness of - the immortal element in man, the divine and the divinely beautiful. On the other hand, the Dionysian nature, which Nietzsche makes analogous to intoxication, is an experiencing and acknowledgement of the full range of our emotions. In the face of an inescapable knowledge of terror when faced with some forms of phenomena, man loses trust in his principle of individuation, his perceived inner link with the divine, and instead begins to experience the full gamut of emotions available to his nature. The analogy of intoxication is used to indicate the loss of awareness of self which the acknowledgement of all our emotions achieves by its reunion of man and man, and man and nature. There is for each individual, suggests Nietzsche, a sense of unity, reconciliation and fusion with his neighbour: a "mysterious primordial unity".¹¹¹ This manifests in an overriding sense of joy and exhilaration in the experiencing of life itself: a bliss born of the pain of the contradictions which arise when confronting the terrible and wonderful might of nature.¹¹²

To return to Nietzsche's early claim, how does he perceive art facilitates the metaphysical activity of determining our relationship with the world? Against the claims of the early ages of art alternating under the sway of at once the illusionist concern with the individual at-oneness with the divine, and at the other, the forays into the intoxicating truth of excesses, there develops, claims Nietzsche, a 'mysterious union' of both these tendencies to produce the art of *Attic tragedy*.¹¹³ Nietzsche initiates his explanation of the union of the subjective and the objective by calling on Schiller's understanding of the creative process. Schiller begins with what he calls a *musical mood*. It is a feeling devoid

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p36

¹¹¹ Ibid. p37

¹¹² Ibid. IV p46f

¹¹³ Ibid. p47

of images and with no definite purpose.¹¹⁴ A crucial factor in the success of Nietzsche's ideal is the union of the individual with the work he produces: the artwork reflects the feeling and commitment to life - it is an extension of life - of the artist. Nietzsche finds this element automatically incorporated in ancient lyric poetry with its union of "the *identity of the lyrist with the musician*."¹¹⁵ The artistic act begins as a subjective identification with the pain and contradiction of the primal unity - the Dionysian process - and finds its expression as a form of mirroring by means of a specific symbol as an Apollinian *symbolic dream image*.¹¹⁶ But the difficulty for Nietzsche is that while this union functions well for the artist, the spectator is treated only to the illusory result without making contact with the initial experience of the inner understanding of that primal union. Consequently this privileges the artist.

Only insofar as the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world, does he know anything of the eternal essence of art; for in this state he is, in a marvellous manner, like the weird image of the fairy tale which can turn its eyes at will and behold itself; he is at once the subject and object, at once the poet, actor and spectator.¹¹⁷

For Nietzsche the question is, how is the artist's experience of the primal pain made accessible to the spectator? He argues, turning to Schiller once again, that it was achieved in the Greek satyr chorus of Attic tragedy through a successful combining of the Apollinian and the Dionysian elements. Rejecting other and popular perceptions of the purpose and function of the chorus, Nietzsche takes up Schiller's explanation of the chorus as "a living wall that tragedy constructs around itself in order to close itself off from the world of reality and to preserve its ideal domain and its poetical freedom."¹¹⁸ He applauds Schiller's

¹¹⁴ Ibid. V p49

¹¹⁵ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁶ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p52

¹¹⁸ Ibid. VII p58

appeal against naturalism in art, noting that "with our present adoration of the natural and the real, we have reached the opposite pole of all idealism, namely the region of wax-work cabinets."¹¹⁹ We find here echoes of Plato's disdain for art as imitation. For Plato, sensory objects are not truth or reality. But they participate in truth by sharing the characteristics of truth. Nietzsche's argument against naturalism evolves from a belief in the capacity for art to express a truth. However, he is not to be tied to any fixed understanding of truth, except one: and that is his premiss or general truth that man shares and is united in a common force - a life giving source.

Just what this means is best amplified by his understanding of the faculty of will and how he perceives it contributes to action. Now this sentence alone is enough to initiate a misunderstanding of Nietzsche's perception of will. Will is not a faculty which decides on and initiates action. Indeed, he even states in one of his considerations that there is no will.¹²⁰ This apparently contradictory claim furthers the idea that will is not a particular or unified capacity, but rather, is the result of or an amalgam of many different forces. This provides the grounds for the existence of individual difference. Consequently, Nietzsche rejects the idea of a 'will to truth', preferring to call it "will to the conceivability of all being". But, and most importantly, he declares, that concept of being "must bend and accommodate itself to you." In short, truth is nothing more than what *we* are in *our* existence. And with life comes a will. Nietzsche calls that will *will to power*.¹²¹ Life itself is the *will to power*. Willing is, he says, a mix of things; it is something *complicated*.¹²² It is a composite of a plurality of sensations (incorporating the sensations of the conditions

¹¹⁹ Op. Cit.

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Vintage Books. (New York: Random House. 1968) 46 p28

¹²¹ *A Nietzsche Reader*. Compiled and Translated R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books. 1981) 203 p224 (from *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Part II *Of Self Overcoming*)

¹²² Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books. 1990) 19 p47f

we leave, the conditions towards which we go, the admixture of leaving and going, and the physicality we project onto it); thought (an integral part of willing); and affect - emotion - (an emotion which is derived from the knowledge that 'this and nothing else is necessary now'; an emotion which Nietzsche classifies as an affect of command).¹²³ But the strangest thing of all about the will, observes Nietzsche, is that we both command *and* obey. In our role of obeying, we become subject to other forces which cause us to bring into play such senses as constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance and motion. This is because to a large extent how we live is in response to our social environment. Nietzsche says it succinctly: "for our body is only a social structure composed of many souls."¹²⁴ It is worth noting Nietzsche's understanding of willing in the context of a 'well-constructed and happy commonwealth' and in which the aims and aspirations of the class which rules coincides with the commonwealth's successes.

In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as I have said already, of a social structure composed of many 'souls': on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing as such with in the field of morality: that is, of morality understood as the theory of relations of dominance under which the phenomenon of 'life' arises.¹²⁵

Thus *Will to Power* broadly encompasses those energies such as instincts, desires and ideas which drive the organic, psychological and the moral realms.¹²⁶ What Nietzsche describes as *Will to Power*, then, is, the complex of drives and their relationships involved in the act of living; a process more accurately characterized as the act of becoming.

In claiming that the Greek satyr chorus epitomizes the successful transmission of the experience of the very core of living to the observer through the medium of art,

¹²³ Op. Cit.

¹²⁴ Ibid. 19 p49

¹²⁵ Op. Cit.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 36 p66

Nietzsche is positing it with the role of a universal symbol for the audience of the time. He suggests that the satyr as a fictitious natural being, provides as a chorus an intensity which 'nullifies' the individual. Individuality is lost; it is absorbed and raised to the level where "the state and society and, quite generally, the gulfs between man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature."¹²⁷ That life is 'at the bottom of things' is the comfort Nietzsche feels tragedy imparts; and the satyrs as fictitious natural beings provide access to that understanding because they remain 'eternally the same'. They are not subject to the changes civilization brings about.

But with access to the Dionysian state comes a knowledge of the helplessness of man; a helplessness that results from the knowledge that man can change nothing about the eternal nature of things. Man faces the horror of existence and is nauseated, unable to act because he knows the absurdity of doing so. It is the satyr chorus which Nietzsche credits with presenting to the Greeks an intermediary world against which those feelings exhaust themselves.¹²⁸ It acts as an embodiment of the truth the Greeks worshipped. Nietzsche labels it "the sympathetic companion in whom the suffering of the god is repeated."¹²⁹ It represents the eternal core of things - the thing-in-itself - a more truthful representation of existence than those representations which are more cultural or illusory. And it does so by representing the sexual omnipotence of nature and the consequent eternal life which lies at the core of existence. It is the promise of the eternal in the light of the deterioration of the physical.¹³⁰ While the chorus is characterized by Nietzsche as 'sympathetic' to the truth of existence, the Greek spectators enter into that revealing of knowledge by virtue of the configuration of the theatre. The theatre places the spectator in relation to the chorus so that he feels he is engulfed by it, thereby inducing him to lose

¹²⁷ *The Birth of Tragedy*, 7 p59

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* p60

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* 8 p61

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* p62

sight of the 'reality' around him and to be at one with the chorus. The magic of this transformation is the foundation of all dramatic art, says Nietzsche. The chorus takes over for the individual. It does not act, but provides the Dionysian expression of nature through rapturous pronouncements, a sharing of the Dionysian suffering and wisdom and proclamations of "truth from the heart of the world."¹³¹ It achieves this through the symbolism dance, tone and words. From this grows the Apollinian 'vision' where Dionysus is personified on stage in what has been thought of as the 'real' action of the drama, but which, thanks to the chorus as generator of the image, is imbued with a sense of rapture.

In this magic transformation the Dionysian reveler sees himself as a satyr, *and as a satyr, in turn, he sees the god*, which means that in his metamorphosis he beholds another vision outside himself, as the Apollinian complement of his own state.¹³²

Thus the sense of suffering and the knowledge of man and his relationship with the world is symbolically represented by the chorus which, by creating an empathy with the spectator in which he feels he absorbed into and is an emotional participant in the chorus, understands the physical manifestation in the form of the epic hero, the vision of the drama on stage,¹³³ and the beauty evoked by the dialogue,¹³⁴ as a veiled or dream-like representation of the nearness of the god, the driving force of life. In this, the ideal form of art, Nietzsche makes the beautiful representation of the knowledge of the will to power a redemptive basis for living. If this conflates into an understanding of living life itself, then this is an ethics for living.

Because of his insistence that language itself speaks, that all art is poetry (the art

¹³¹ Ibid. p65

¹³² Ibid. p64

¹³³ Ibid. p64f

¹³⁴ Ibid. 9 p67

of making), and that man is Being's poem, it is, perhaps, appropriate that the vehicle Heidegger uses to demonstrate his understanding of pain is the language of a poem. He uses a line from the poem *A Winter Evening* by Georg Trakl. The line is: 'Pain has turned the threshold to stone'.¹³⁵

Heidegger's understanding of pain is closely linked to his understanding of the nature of being and, in relation to that, how language and poetry function. We should begin with what he says of pain. "Pain is the joining agent in the rending that divides and gathers. Pain is the joining of the rift....Pain joins the rift of the dif-ference. Pain is the dif-ference itself."¹³⁶ Heidegger uses Dif-ference to mean a separation. It is a separation of what Heidegger calls the *intimacy of world and thing*.¹³⁷ He says of 'thing' that it is a 'presencing'. It is the occurrence of an awareness of an essential nature.¹³⁸ Essential to that awareness is the physical manifestation of an entity which embodies that essence. Heidegger points out that the Old High German word *thing* was used to mean a gathering, "specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter."¹³⁹ The gathering which gives rise to that presencing or awareness of an essential nature is a gathering which recognizes the full nature of things. It is not, in the sense of the Roman word *res* simply that which belongs to man. Nor is in the Mediaeval sense of the word *ens*, a term for everything present, including that which presents only in mental representation.¹⁴⁰ Rather, it is an awareness of an essential nature which arises within the context of the unity of existence. Both 'context' and 'unity of existence' are important

¹³⁵ Heidegger, Martin. 'Language'. in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998) p195

¹³⁶ Ibid. p204

¹³⁷ Ibid. p202

¹³⁸ Heidegger, Martin. 'The Thing'. in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998) p174

¹³⁹ Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p176

because they provide two foci on existence in the actual world. The gathering is of the essential nature from within the context of the unity of what Heidegger calls the united four: earth and sky, divinities and mortals.¹⁴¹ Now, each of the united four, as what they are, are both part of the unity, and reflect or appropriate that existence in the unity as a part of what they are. As a unity of beings as a whole, they are called world. But in the process of the appropriation in which they participate in that unity, they become separate beings.¹⁴² This is the rift. This is the pain.

This rift has its broad equivalent in Schiller's image of Laocoön suffering and its significance as a representation of the pain of human suffering. But there are important differences. Schiller's position on pain results from art providing a sensuous experience which leads to an apprehension of the significance of the suffering, and a motivation to reason how to act in the light of that significance. Heidegger on the other hand focusses on the nature of Being. His focus on art is grounded in the idea that the nature of art as a thing can reveal a truth about Being which is applicable to man as a being. Heidegger speaks of man as Being's poem.¹⁴³ He adds a complexity to this statement: "But poetry that thinks is in truth/the topology of Being."¹⁴⁴ The ambiguity of the phrase 'in truth' in the line helps to imply a truth constructed from creative thought. But it is a truth which is not simply imagination passed off as truth. Heidegger states it quite clearly. "Poetry, however, is not an imagining of whimsicalities and not a flight of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal."¹⁴⁵ Poetry is, rather, an 'illuminating projection', an unfolding of truth

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p178

¹⁴² Ibid. p179

¹⁴³ Heidegger, Martin. 'The Thinker as Poet'. in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998) p4

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p12

¹⁴⁵ 'The Origin of the Work of Art.' p72

projected 'ahead into the design of the figure'.¹⁴⁶

What is meant by Heidegger's projection? 'Projection' is the word used in the translated text to capture the sense Heidegger implies of both a throwing away from one, and the sense of a sketching of a project.¹⁴⁷ Essentially, the word represents a pre-ontological concept which advances possibility. Heidegger points out that an understanding of Being is taken for granted in projecting the possibilities of being.¹⁴⁸ He says of Dasein - 'thrown' into a world not of his own choosing - that "Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities....As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it *is* its possibilities as possibilities."¹⁴⁹ Man's transformation into what he projects his possibilities to be takes place in the temporal world.¹⁵⁰ These possibilities are disclosures of what Dasein understands itself to be, and which Heidegger equates with truth; in particular the truth of Being.¹⁵¹ To explain how that truth is formed, Heidegger says: "Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self."¹⁵² It is quite clear that reason is not the one overriding factor for discovering truth. That truth of Dasein, that identity or being, is covered because Being is already in the world. Care (as Heidegger calls it) or temporality¹⁵³ is

¹⁴⁶ Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1973) footnote by translators. p185

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. H.147 p187

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. H.145 p185

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. H.199 p243

¹⁵¹ Ibid. H.220 p263

¹⁵² Op. Cit.

¹⁵³ Temporality is the meaning of Care. Ibid. H.327 p374

ahead of itself.¹⁵⁴ Dasein is already acting in the world. It is 'thrown' into a world not of its own choosing; but that world in which it finds itself is the basis for the potentiality for Being.

Let us return to Heidegger's declaration of poetry as an illuminating projection of truth. Although he speaks little of beauty, Heidegger connects beauty with truth, charging that the appearance of truth in the work is beauty.¹⁵⁵ However, he glosses over this connection because of his interest in truth. He declares that all art functions as poetry in that it is a "letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is..."¹⁵⁶ The nature of art is that it incorporates truth: Heidegger coins the phrase "the setting-itself-into-work of truth";¹⁵⁷ thus he says, "It is due to art's poetic nature that, in the midst of what is, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual."¹⁵⁸ The choice of a possibility of being makes other possibilities unbeing. Art is a means of ordering and projecting rather than simply being an unfounded flight of fancy. Said poetically: "Singing and thinking are the stems/neighbour to poetry./They grow out of Being and reach into/its truth."¹⁵⁹

Heidegger does not dispute that language is an expression.¹⁶⁰ But he is intent on also showing that the nature of language is that it, too, speaks. He argues that language evokes by calling. It evokes, calls up, or brings near a presence in our mind while the actual object remains absent. But it is more than the object itself which can be evoked. He concentrates on the line, *Pain has turned the threshold to stone* to realize an understanding

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. H220 p263

¹⁵⁵ 'The Origin of the Work of Art. p81

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p72.

¹⁵⁷ Op. Cit.

¹⁵⁸ Op. Cit.

¹⁵⁹ 'The Thinker as Poet'. p13

¹⁶⁰ 'Language'. p197

which the nature of the words allow. By teasing out possible implications of the words in relation to each other, Heidegger shows us how language can speak by calling to us an understanding of the nature of pain in existence: the nature of the perceived unchangeable difference between world and thing is materialized in the pain which is set into stone as a threshold which both separates and joins. The implication this has for our being relies on an idea of existence which does not differentiate between the variety of things which exist.

The pain of which Heidegger speaks is not that of Schiller's suffering at that moment of understanding of man's limitations in the face of the might of nature. Heidegger's pain is derived from the separation from unity with nature and from separation from authentic nature. He speaks of this separation as a 'falling', using the examples of a preoccupation with how others perceive us and the subsequent moderation this affects regarding what we say or do; and, being absorbed in others and their "idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity".¹⁶¹ Falling also describes a diverting away from the task of authentic being, that existence which is individual to each Being in the world (Dasein).¹⁶² But even more than this is the inevitability of pain: falling is an essential characteristic of Dasein. Thrown into a world not of its own choosing, Dasein has lost in the first instance its opportunity to authentically be itself.¹⁶³ This emphasizes the conditional nature of authentic being. The truth to which Dasein aspires for authentic being is tied to the possibilities which present within the world in which Dasein finds itself. Truth is tied to the physical world rather than reason. Time, history, other beings and language combine in a way which present individual possibilities for individual agents. To be authentic requires individual decisions and taking responsibility for that individual life. This comes about through Dasein recognizing that which is authentic by an 'inner voice'. Heidegger makes this statement.

¹⁶¹ *Being and Time*. H.175 p220

¹⁶² *Ibid.* H.42 p67

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* H.176 p220

"Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it."¹⁶⁴ It is what he terms a 'Being-with'. In the case of Dasein it is a Being-with self: an awareness of and a listening to self. And it is, for Heidegger, the listening to self within the context and the possibilities of the aesthetic world which provides the opportunity for an authentic and consequently ethical existence.

*Full of delight, like Iris' fire of colours
On the scented dew of the thundercloud,
Shimmers through melancholy's sombre veil
Here, tranquillity's serene blue.*

*Until the god, divested of everything earthly,
In a blaze separates from the human
And drinks ether's fresh breeze.
Delighted (about) the new, unaccustomed floating,
He floats upward, and earthly life's
Dark dream image sinks and sinks and sinks.
Olympus' harmonies receive
The transfigured in Kronian's hall,
And the goddess with the rose-cheeks
Hands him the cup with a smile.¹*

Poetry requires a special talent which does not go well together with common sense. At times it is the language of the gods, at times that of madmen, but seldom that of ordinary men. Poetry delights in fictions and figures, and always goes beyond the sphere of real things.²

9. From Myth to Truth.

The major question which guides this chapter is Why is art so often used to assert the relationship of aesthetics and ethics in its various configurations such as sense and intellect and the beautiful and the good? The question is augmented by two others: what is the nature of this relationship? and, how are its claims conveyed? As is to be expected, Schiller, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger hold different positions on these questions. Possible answers for using art as a champion of this relationship leads to discussions which focus on the question of whether philosophy or art is better able to find and present the notion of truth. One of the difficulties inherent in that discussion is in deciding if and how it might be possible to present that which is non-rational. Each of the thinkers explored in this chapter respect aspects of the ancient Greek society, and much of their

¹ Schiller. 'The Ideal and Life'. Trans. Walter Veit. Lines 127-130, and XV Lines 141-150

² Ch. de Saint Évremond. *Oeuvres*, 1711, III, 43 in Tartarkiewicz, Władysław. *The History of Aesthetics*. Vol. III. Modern Aesthetics. Trans. Chester A. Kiesel and John F. Besemer. (Warszawa: PWN. 1974) p380.

work calls on those areas in forming their own answers. A recurring interest revolves around myth, its characteristic for creating image and its capacity to convey non-rational thought. An outline of how myth functions leads to an awareness of art's deployment of the same characteristics and how that in turn links with language.

In a footnote in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant both recognizes A.G.Baumgarten's role in the introduction of the word 'aesthetic' and, at the same time rejects his efforts to make the critical treatment of beauty and the arts a science and thereby a means of acquiring knowledge.³ Kant means by science, philosophy: "philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason... and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason."⁴ Kant clearly separates art from knowledge - the faculty of cognition (his term for the theoretical knowledge of nature⁵) - when he speaks of the subjective side of a representation as "incapable of becoming an element of cognition". Although art does not "contribute a whit to the knowledge of things"⁶ its capacity to arouse pleasure or displeasure causes it to belong to the faculty of knowledge,⁷ but the judgement it demands is subjective. Judgement is a cognitive faculty which, Kant says, forms the middle term between understanding and reason.⁸ Aesthetic pleasure does not engage reason, and so aesthetic judgement evolves through the relations established in *sensus communis*.⁹ This provides a major separation between perceived merits of reason and feeling. It is this, in

³ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Op. Cit. A21 p66

⁴ Ibid. Ch III. A 839 p657

⁵ Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement*. Op. Cit. Intro. 196 p38

⁶ Ibid. Preface 169 p5

⁷ Ibid. Intro 189 p29 and I §1 203 p42f

⁸ Ibid. Preface. 168 p4

⁹ Ibid. §40 p150

Schiller's view, immoderate emphasis on reason which prompts Schiller to revise the role of art. We should recall the doubts he expresses through the imagery of the gruesome chasm in his *Das Ideal und das Leben*, a chasm which divides the intellectual and ultimately rational stance from the experience of and sympathy with human suffering and human mortality.¹⁰

Schiller places the issue of the conflicting efficacy of philosophy and art well to the fore in the early part of his *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. He pointedly rejects the privileging of conceptual articulation and orientation of philosophical language because, in the search for an intellectual understanding of truth, it veils truth from feeling.

In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon [of man's natural moral instinct, the philosopher]...must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words.¹¹

Schiller's declaration that an undue emphasis on the material and the utilitarian - in other words, that which can be shown to exist - is allowing philosophical inquiry to increasingly encroach on imagination¹² points to his interest in the balance provided by the imaginative - the immediate apprehension which images evoke and which sidesteps rationality - the non-rational.

This conflict has another dimension which manifests in another area of tension: that of the individual and society, or as Schiller labels it, the State. On one side of the conflict is rationality's struggle for dominance and the tension between rationality and nature. Rationality demands unity Schiller claims. As a law it wants to prevail unconditionally and its claim on man is "imprinted upon him by an incorruptible

¹⁰ See previous chapter.

¹¹ Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a series of Letters*. Op. Cit. 1.4 p5

¹² Ibid. 2.3 p7

consciousness".¹³ Schiller would agree with the thought that the nature of the concept of the universal that it is grounded on an idea of unity, and its application which, it can be argued, is the means of defining the needs and laws of society, creates the danger of overriding the awareness and the freedom of the individual. That struggle for the survival of the individual is the other half of the conflict. Nature demands multiplicity and impresses that law on man by an "ineradicable feeling" Schiller says.¹⁴

Schiller's high regard for ancient Greek society hinges on his perception of the success it achieved in balancing these oppositions. "In fullness of form no less than of content, the Greeks combined the first youth of imagination with the manhood of reason in a glorious manifestation of humanity."¹⁵ Sense and intellect were not separated as exclusive domains. Both were interchangeable in their honouring of truth. And although various aspects of human nature were divided and projected in magnified form onto their gods, those deities always reflected a full humanity.¹⁶ In contrast, modern man loses this balance because of the sharper divisions which increased empirical knowledge and more exact modes of thought have brought about in the sciences, and because of the demands for job specialization which an increasingly complex State requires.¹⁷ Consequently, Schiller says, "intuitive and speculative understanding" is confined, while imagination often suffers because of the weight given to abstraction.¹⁸ The latter complaint can be rephrased as a bemoaning of the loss of the individual to the universal. The righting of this concern could be understood as Schiller's crusade.

¹³ Ibid. 4.3 p19

¹⁴ Op. Cit.

¹⁵ Ibid. 6.2 p31

¹⁶ Ibid. 6.3 p33

¹⁷ Ibid. 6.6 p33

¹⁸ Op. Cit.

For Schiller, of course, the means of setting that concern aright lies in the use of art. While striving to understand how Schiller perceives art achieves this, we should not lose sight of our driving question. It is pertinent, then, to ask why is art perceived as the vehicle for revealing how aesthetics relates to ethics? Schiller himself shapes the question as one which asks how man is to reach truth. But the answer to this question also informs us about our question. For Schiller, beauty is the result of the union and interchange between Matter and Form.¹⁹ Beauty is, he says, an instance of moral freedom in perfect compatibility with sensuality. Consequently, he says

There can, in a single word, no longer be any question of how [man] is to pass from Beauty to Truth, since this latter is potentially contained in the former, but only a question of how he is to clear a way for himself from common reality to aesthetic reality, from mere life-serving feelings to feelings of beauty.²⁰

It is perhaps important at this stage to acknowledge the recognition Schiller affords the negotiated position reached by discourse as the means by which beauty develops. Beauty is achieved from a setting of a direction - the literal meaning of a discourse - which results from an exchange within the individual, and with 'the rest of his kind'.²¹ This has an immediate implication for art. The individual contribution made by the artist to a work of art is juxtaposed against the communally constructed view of the subject matter and exhibited through communal conventions. There is implied in this notion of art an exhibition of the developed self in relation to (and in consequence, as a contributing to the development of) community, through the means of language (where language applies to art in all its forms).

Rather than define the results of this display by man in the process of his development as art, Schiller chooses to apply the label *Schein*. *Schein* is translated to

¹⁹ Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a series of Letters*. 25.6 p189

²⁰ Ibid. 25.7 p189

²¹ Ibid. 26.2 p191

semblance in the text used for this study.²² Both words speak of outward appearance, but *Schein* seems to lean to the implication of pretence or sham. Both words hint at the notion of substitution or a re-presentation which certainly separates the entity of *semblance* from that of 'reality'. While this recalls Plato's relegation of art to that of imitation, Schiller works to avoid that notion. Nor does Schiller intend the word as a derogatory slur on art. He clearly commits aesthetic *semblance* to meaning, through his term 'play', that which is a creative process and which is not actuality and truth; and he distances it from the apparent sense of order derived from logic.²³ While the rejection of logical *semblance* applies to the creating of a sense of the world through philosophical means, Schiller's distancing of the application of logical *semblance* to art clearly implies an understanding on Schiller's part of art as a not fully rational process. By this it is not meant that art does not contain rational procedures. In serving its communally constructed conventions, art inevitably puts rational processes to work. What art as a not fully rational process does mean for Schiller is that art provides a vehicle by which the imaginative in individual man also affords access to, and contributes to, an understanding of what man is.

This process of the creation of *semblance* is not self delusory. Man is well able to distinguish art as a created entity derived from the admixture of mind and matter.

Once man has got to the point of distinguishing *semblance* from reality, form from body, he is also in a position to abstract one from the other, and has indeed already done so by the very fact of distinguishing between them. The capacity for imitative art is thus given with the capacity for form in general.²⁴

Because of man's capacity to create art and to be aware that it is separate from 'reality', art, in conjunction with the play-drive which creates it, is declared by Schiller to be the

²² Ibid. 26.3 p193

²³ Ibid. 26.5 p193

²⁴ Ibid. 26.7 p195

autonomous 'third joyous kingdom'.²⁵ But the aesthetic appeal of art must be on the basis that its appearance exists because of the idea.²⁶ It is this awareness by man of art as perceived by man and made by man which makes of art no threat to the moral world.²⁷ Indeed, Schiller declares that it is the disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance which provide the signs that an individual is starting to become human.²⁸

However, given the requirement of knowing the limitations of art, the question of why art plays a useful role in man's understanding of how he should live in the world remains. Schiller's answer lies in the enjoyment he suggests man gains from the freedom to play with a superfluity of material (predominantly an 'unimpeded flow of images') which eventually provokes the imagination and the mind to interact (Schiller calls it a leap because a new power goes into action) and to partake in aesthetic play - the process of marrying sense and thought.²⁹ From taking pleasure in the marriage of mind and matter in possession and production of utilitarian objects, man progresses to a desire to please others. He pushes aside the strictly utilitarian aspect of the association to concentrate on the beauty of his personal presentation and surrounds, until the inner man becomes the focus of transformation. Schiller captures the transition in the words: "And ...form gradually comes upon him from without..."³⁰ Art, then, understood as a meeting between intuitive understanding and judgement (or taste), is individual selection made against the background of community values. Both art and the aesthetic state are derived from choice, and as such represent the individual's highest attainment of human values: inclusive of ethical aspirations while at the same time not exclusionary of other considerations. For

²⁵ Ibid. 27.8 p215

²⁶ Ibid. 26.11 p199

²⁷ Ibid. 26.13 p199

²⁸ Ibid. 27.1 p205

²⁹ Ibid. 27.4 p209

³⁰ Ibid. 27.6 p213

Schiller, art is an ideal of humanity.

It is this resulting state of beauty which can 'confer' on man his social character. Schiller phrases this step carefully. "Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual."³¹ Taste (Geschmack) as a faculty of discerning and enjoying beauty is a socially negotiated perception. It presents the opportunity for individual and communal interaction and grounds for agreement. A declaration of beauty is a judgement of the position of the individual balanced against the aggregate judgement of the many. This sense of negotiation and the resolution of the difficulty of the existence of the individual and society and the individual's freedom within society is underscored by the word 'communication' in the following declaration: "only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all."³² The pleasures of the senses and of knowledge cannot be shared by all because those pleasures rely on the individual's abilities to feel and to know. Discerning beauty is the only universal communication and pleasure which can be shared and which benefits from the development of the individual.³³

Schiller's frequent use of myth and reference to mythic players in his work demonstrates another aspect of his preoccupation with ancient Greek society. But just why is myth an integral part of Schiller's writing? The common most basic understanding of myth is that it is a telling of tales.³⁴ This makes sense in the light of the Greek etymological source of myth as *muthos* meaning utterance.³⁵ It also points clearly to the

³¹ Ibid. 27.10 p215

³² Ibid. 27.10 p215

³³ Ibid. 27.10 p215f

³⁴ *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Second Ed. (London: Oxford University Press. 1970) p 718

³⁵ *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. Op. Cit.

oral tradition from which myth has arisen. However, to simply class myth as a telling of tales is to ignore the considerable confusion and disagreement about what myth is. There exists a perception of a range of attributes and, just as importantly, a range of functions of myth. It is assumed that myths are a particular *kind* of traditional tale, and that they have qualities which mark them as profound, imaginative, other worldly, universal or larger-than-life.³⁶ Their longevity as traditional stories,³⁷ albeit adapted and shaped to various times and communities, suggests some form of universality contributes to sustaining them. Kirk, while emphasizing that myths are "not uniform, logical and internally consistent"³⁸ suggests that in a non-literate and highly traditional culture, myth is a primary form of entertainment, communication and instruction. Myths are, he says, "bearers of important messages about life in general and life-within-society in particular."³⁹ While myth can provide this basic and instructional function, they can also perform as a means of explanation, particularly if that which needs explanation is, in some degree, frightening or threatens a sense of well being. H.J. Rose describes myth as "a prescientific and imaginative attempt to explain some phenomenon, real or supposed which excites the curiosity of the myth-maker, or perhaps more accurately as an effort to reach a feeling of satisfaction in place of uneasy bewilderment concerning such phenomena."⁴⁰ In opposition to Rose's rationalistic description, Eliade says of myth: "There is no myth which is not the unveiling of a 'mystery', the revelation of a primordial event which inaugurated either a constituent structure of reality or a kind of human

³⁶ Kirk, G.S. *The Nature of Greek Myths*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1980) p25

³⁷ *Ibid* p27

³⁸ *Ibid* p29

³⁹ *Ibid* p278

⁴⁰ *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. p 718

behaviour."⁴¹ Rose calls these mythic explanations imaginative. In doing so, he touches on a very important attribute: as imaginative explanations, myths use images. Images are presented as explanation; and as explanation those images present argument. How can an argument be made for a non-scientifically provable explanation? According to Eliade, myth, often by appealing to emotion rather than reason, "...reveals something as having been *fully manifested* and this manifestation is at the same time *creative* and *exemplary* since it is the foundation of a structure of reality as well as a kind of human behaviour."⁴² Many share this idea. For example the Symbolist poets insisted that the function of poetic language and particularly the function of images was not to illustrate ideas but to embody an otherwise indefinable experience.⁴³ Can understanding and truth by means other than reason? Schiller does not deny the role Reason has in the pursuit of truth. But, he asks,

will such a mind, dissolved as it were into a pure intellect and pure contemplation, ever be capable of exchanging the rigorous bonds of logic for the free movement of the poetic faculty, or of grasping the concrete individuality of things with a sense innocent of preconceptions and faithful to the object?⁴⁴

Truth, he suggests, goes beyond that which can be explained by logic. In contrasting the strictures of philosophical reason with what he calls intuitive and speculative understanding, Schiller says "as long as philosophy has to make its prime business the provision of safeguards against error, truth will be bound to have its martyrs."⁴⁵

Now, all of these functions of the myth rely on the associative, allusive or connotative characteristics of language for the construction of their meaning. Poetic

⁴¹ Eliade, Mircea. *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries. The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities*. Trans. Philip Mairet. Harper Torchbooks. (New York: Harper and Row. 1975) p16

⁴² Ibid. p14

⁴³ Davy, C. *Words in the Mind*. (London: 1965) p54

⁴⁴ *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. Op. Cit. 6.13 p43

⁴⁵ Op. Cit.

language is known for its use of figures such as metaphor, simile, metonym and personification, to name but some. As tropes the meaning they impart is a result of the twist which is achieved through association and transfer of characteristics. Further and denser meaning is developed through the interaction of tropes. Myth, which is already a communally developed figure with its own associations of meaning holds a dense set of references which Schiller has no hesitation in using as a vocabulary to supply both a short cut to a level of meaning which, in turn, can be used to further develop, create and imply meaning to suit his own intentions. His creative technique is a recognition that meanings arbitrarily assigned to images (and this must extend from visual, to aural and to conceptual; anywhere that images are used as language) are not fixed. This makes of language a conceptual grid based on communally agreed systems of values and through which reality is perceived. Language, then, is a means of thought open to play. And it is a means of thought which is not adverse to drawing on those systems of thought and feeling which are both non-rational and indulgent of multiple meanings. It appears that the conflict between poetry and philosophy hinges on the difficulties encountered with the articulation of the argument, the proofs that are acceptable by most people in the community, and the source of the experience which motivates the argument. If philosophy holds to the so called proper or literal distinction of the word, then the meanings they erect are limited.

What is the role of the artist in this? Although he is not reluctant to use the word 'artist' elsewhere, Schiller's use of the word 'genius'⁴⁶ in *The Ideal and Life* operates as a condensed accentuation which works to underline not only the highly imaginative and creative capacity of the maker of art, but also the artist's innate intellectual power. It is an important emphasis for conveying the idea of man as an intelligence which belongs to, actively participates in and creatively contributes to the making of the meaning of the world and the establishing of its ethical premiss. Schiller proclaims the artist to be

⁴⁶ *The Ideal and Life*. Line 73

someone who searches for that which is the very nature of man - "the absolute, unchanging, unity of being"⁴⁷ - and "to produce the Ideal out of the union of what is possible with what is necessary."⁴⁸ The capacity of the artist to tap into the innate universal nature of man (through the "pure aether of his genius"⁴⁹) and to convert that understanding into an individual expression in relation to the present world makes of the artist an exemplary human being.

The artist's movement from the universal (in the nature of man) to the particular (in the resulting individual expression of the art work) contains distinct reverberations of Kant's statement "Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal".⁵⁰ But where this movement is for Kant a rational process of judgement applied to objects of knowledge such as matters of opinion, matters of fact or matters of faith,⁵¹ for Schiller it is a movement which is both a demonstration of the making of art, and an example of how to give credence and access to the shared elements of the non-rational aspect of man's nature whilst imbuing it with individual choice. Schiller's admiration for the balance of the individual and society achieved by the ancient Greeks would see him approve of Aristotle's use of the same movement from the universal to the particular. Aristotle's claim that poetry has some allegiance with philosophy lies in his perception that philosophy looks for the universal in the particular, while poetry attempts to represent the universal through the particular - to make concrete a universal truth.⁵²

⁴⁷ *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters.* 9.4 p57

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 9.5 p57

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 9.4 p57

⁵⁰ *Critique of Judgement.* Intro. IV p20

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 467 §91 p140

⁵² Aristotle. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art.* Op. Cit. 1451b p35 and p192

Hegel is not so convinced that art can do something more than science, religion or philosophy. In fact, he argues that while art had an important and initial role in conveying the inner depths of thought and truth beyond the conscious, it no longer as useful as it was. The proper aims of science are, he says, those which should also be the proper aims of art: to rise in free independence to the attainment of truth.

Fine art is not real art till it is in this sense free, and only achieves its highest task when it has taken its place in the same sphere with religion and philosophy, and has become simply a mode of revealing to consciousness and bringing to utterance the Divine Nature, the deepest interests of humanity, and the most comprehensive truths of the mind. It is in works of art that nations have deposited the profoundest intuitions and ideas of their hearts; and fine art is frequently the key - with many nations there is no other - to the understanding of their wisdom and of their religion.⁵³

As the latter sentence illustrates, Hegel does not deny the intuitive aspects of thought. In his hands, and with its implication of seeing, making visible, conceiving, intuition for Hegel holds the capacity to create a sense of God. And he acknowledges art's traditional role in giving rise to understanding this facet of thought. Art achieves this by representing those ideas in sensuous forms. But the world into which thought penetrates is, he says, a supra-sensuous world; one which is beyond immediate consciousness and sensation.⁵⁴ He describes 'freedom of thought in cognition' or pure thought as the *power* which enables thought to extend beyond immediate consciousness and sensation. The reconciliation of pure thought and the external is brought about in the *first instance* by fine art, the source of which is generated out of the mind itself.⁵⁵ This is an early sign of where Hegel's argument is leading. Modern understanding is demanding something different to that which art provides.

But his argument does not pursue the usual criticism that art is inadequate because

⁵³ Hegel. *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Op. Cit. XII p9

⁵⁴ Ibid. XIII p9

⁵⁵ Ibid. XIII p10 (my emphasis)

it is merely an appearance and therefore a deception. Appearance is essential to existence as is the existence of truth *for* someone, something or Mind. Nothing substitutes for the reality which arises from the mixture of the genuine object and the meaning we impose on it. However, the intensification of meaning that art imposes on the objects it creates imparts a heightened sense of reality and genuine existence in comparison with everyday reality.⁵⁶ Art also provides a sensuous representation of the prevailing ideas throughout history.⁵⁷ Yet given these attributes, the truth art reveals is limited to that which is capable of representation - that is, the making present - in sensuous form. Deeper forms of truth and consciousness of the absolute are better achieved through the conception and thought religion and philosophy provide.⁵⁸ Modern reflective culture is a major contributor to the decline in the importance of art.⁵⁹

The essential nature of the mind is housed in its ability to think. Although art works are generated by the mind, they are at once removed from the mind. Nevertheless, it is because art work is a sensuous representation pervaded with mind,⁶⁰ that art is more closely related to the mind than is nature. But in art work, thought is removed from the essential nature of the mind. However, the thinking mind not only has the power to know itself in its pure form, but also to recognize itself in its alienation. While the sensualisation of the abstract thought is a form of alienation of the mind from itself, the transformed thought in sensory representation is recognized by the mind which interacts with what it knows of itself in that form, and restores itself by "transmuting the metamorphosed thought back into definite thoughts".⁶¹ It is the universality of the notion preserved in the

⁵⁶ Ibid. XIV p10f

⁵⁷ Ibid. XIV p11

⁵⁸ Ibid. XVI p12

⁵⁹ Ibid. XVII p12

⁶⁰ Ibid. XXI p15

⁶¹ Op. Cit.

particularization of the artwork which makes of art a process of comprehending thought.⁶² Despite this, art, says Hegel, is not the highest form of mind. It fails in its task of bringing to consciousness the highest interests of the mind. "Not every plastic shape is capable of being the expression and representation of those spiritual interests, of absorbing and of reproducing them; every definite content determines a form suitable to it."⁶³

The question of Hegel's perception of the part art plays in the link between aesthetics and ethics, is closely associated with his views on the persistent existence of an understanding of oppositions which construe the world. The view of a fixed antithesis regarding duty (the abstract universal of the will) and the sensuous impulses of nature (desire), is, he suggests, incorrect because it plays on the sense of the contrast of sides, resulting in the requirement that "the impulses which conflict with duty ought to yield to it".⁶⁴ Various forms of oppositions now permeate man's life. This is exacerbated by modern culture, so that man is encouraged to perceive he is living in two contradictory worlds at once.⁶⁵ Philosophy in what Hegel calls its true nature - a means of providing a reflective insight - can be put to work here to institute an understanding of the essence of the antithesis. What this reveals is that truth is a resolution of the antithesis. It is not a denial of one side of the conflict in preference for the other. It is a recognition that both aspects continue to exist within the reconciliation.⁶⁶ Now, the value of art is not to be found in its usefulness as an instrument outside of its role as art. The purpose of art, claims Hegel, is to *reveal* and to *represent*. It reveals *the truth* in the form of a sensuous artistic shape, and in so doing, represents the reconciled antithesis.

There are, however, limitations on art's capacity to make that representation. Art,

⁶² Op. Cit.

⁶³ Ibid. XXII p16

⁶⁴ Ibid. LXXI p59

⁶⁵ Ibid. LXXIII p59

⁶⁶ Ibid. LXXIII p60

Hegel says, presents the Idea in images accessible to sense.⁶⁷ This requires first, that the Idea - the content - is suitable for representation in that particular manner; that it is something seen. Consequently, the second requirement is that the content of art should not be abstract. The example Hegel offers is the comparison of the inability of art to represent the abstracted forms of the Gods of the Jews and Turks with that of the concrete and therefore representable form of the Christian God as a person.⁶⁸ Third, the sensuous form of the content must be both concrete, and appropriate in that it can be understood to refer to what is being represented. That form is, after all, drawn into service to address the 'inward being'. "[I]ts external element of shape, whereby the content is made perceptible and imaginable, has the aim of existing purely forth heart and mind."⁶⁹ The limitations of art as a mode of representation are displayed in the comparison of the degree of success achieved in representations of the Greek gods with the Christian God. Both gods are representable as concrete human forms. But the Christian God is less adequately represented because of the spiritual component of his existence.⁷⁰ The success of art in achieving the representation of the idea, then, depends on the degree of unity achieved by the fusion of the Idea and shape.⁷¹ The adequacy of this union gives rise to what Hegel terms a principle of division.

This principle of division is a division in three parts. The first derives from the general relationship of the Ideal of beauty to both nature and artistic production. The correspondence of the truly concrete Idea that can generate the totally representative shape is the Ideal.⁷² The second division arises from the particular forms of art. The symbolic

⁶⁷ Ibid. XCV p76

⁶⁸ Ibid. XCVI p77

⁶⁹ Ibid. XCVII p78

⁷⁰ Ibid. XCVIII p78

⁷¹ Ibid. XCIX p78f

⁷² Ibid. CII p79ff

form of art is more closely allied to a portrayal rather than operating as a genuine representation. Imposing the representation of an idea onto a natural object is an inadequate and indeterminate means of the expression of the idea.⁷³ The classical form, however, is completely appropriate for the expression of the Idea. Hegel notes, though, that the success of the classical division relies not on an ad-hoc copy of nature, but rather, on the selection of content which is perceived (through man's unity with the universe) as containing a concrete or inner meaning and which, therefore, in its sensory form expresses the idea.⁷⁴ The romantic form of art (epitomized by artistic expressions of Christianity) is too reliant on the subjectivity of the content to be adequate in its expression of the idea.⁷⁵ The third division centres on the realization of the other two divisions in particular media such as architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry. Consequently this, says Hegel, is the unfolding of the beautiful of art into a world of actualized beauty.⁷⁶

Poetry is the most complete of these arts. It combines the sensuous elements of sound and sign found respectively in music and painting into the word which in that form is not, he argues, merely a sign of "indefinite feeling and of its nuances and grades", but rather a sign of an idea. As such, the sign becomes concrete in itself.⁷⁷ In music this sensuous element is tied to inward feeling. In poetry, the mind determines the content for its own sake. It shapes ideas and then uses sound to express them. The sound or sign is put to the service of the mind more than in the other arts by becoming a "mere indication of the mind." It is for this reason, says Hegel, "the proper medium of poetical representation is the poetical imagination and the intellectual portrayal itself."⁷⁸ 'Imagination' is used here

⁷³ Ibid. CV p82f

⁷⁴ Ibid. CVI p84

⁷⁵ Ibid. CVII p85ff

⁷⁶ Ibid. CVIII p89

⁷⁷ Ibid. CXIV p95

⁷⁸ Ibid. CXIV p96

to translate '*Vorstellung*';⁷⁹ making the proper medium of poetical representation the intellectual concept, the idea. Because imagination is common to all types of art it follows, Hegel says, that "poetry runs through them all and develops itself independently in each."⁸⁰ As a consequence, poetry is the universal art of the mind. But this elevation and sophisticated transformation of the sensory to the articulation of ideas and feelings takes art outside its realm: "...art ends by transcending itself, inasmuch as it abandons the medium of a harmonious embodiment of mind in sensuous form, and passes from the poetry of the imagination into the prose of thought."⁸¹ The 'prose of thought' is known in today's terms as the age of science.

The driving principle of the arts is the higher principle of the Idea of beauty. The proper medium of all types of beauty Hegel claims, is the artistic imagination.⁸² In this instance 'imagination' is the translation of '*Phantasie*'.⁸³ The meaning this imposes on Hegel's claim is that the arts are a creative transformation of the Idea of beauty. It implies the application of Kant's use of the word where imagination acts to allow the crossover from understanding to sensibility, and where the only law to which imagination conforms is the law established by the concept.⁸⁴ As a consequence, it can be said that Hegel's art is an expression of rational understanding. It is because of the focus on the Idea of beauty as the over-riding *raison d'être* for art, that Hegel perceives poetry, through its higher capacity to represent the concept, as the purest and most effective form of art. But if it is the making concrete of the concept or idea that is best achieved in the arts by poetry, then the means of that transition from understanding to the sensory is through the linguistic. It

⁷⁹ Ibid. Note by Michael Inwood, p194

⁸⁰ Ibid. CXIV p96

⁸¹ Op. Cit.

⁸² Ibid. CXV p97

⁸³ Ibid. Note Ibid. p196

⁸⁴ Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*. §22 241 p86

would appear that while poetry and philosophy share the same means to their ends, the motivating factor which encourages Hegel not to advocate philosophy to the complete exclusion of art, is that art can play a significant role in 'revealing to consciousness' the 'truths of the mind' quite simply because the sole purpose of art is to sensuously represent the idea of beauty and its concomitant inference, the good.

"As long as there are philosophers on earth, and wherever there have been philosophers (from India to England, to take the antithetical poles of philosophical endowment), there unquestionably exists a peculiar philosopher's irritation at and rancour against sensuality..."⁸⁵ Although this diatribe of Nietzsche's is targeted at the ascetic ideal of stepping back from experience and the consequent devaluing of physical human existence, it pretty much sums up his position in relation to the tension between art and philosophy. Indeed, he couches similar sentiments in stating his preferential leaning to the artist over the philosopher; but what this reveals for us more clearly is the elevated standing he advances to the senses.

In the main, I agree more with the artists than with any philosopher hitherto: they have not lost the scent of life, they have loved the things of 'this world' - they have loved their senses. To strive for 'desensualization': that seems to me a misunderstanding or an illness to a cure, where it is not merely hypocrisy or self deception. I desire for myself and for all who live, *may* live, without being tormented by a puritanical conscience, an ever greater spiritualization and multiplication of the senses; indeed, we should be grateful of the senses for their subtlety, plenitude, and power and offer them in return the best we have in the way of spirit.⁸⁶

It is, however, more than an admiration of the artist as one who and because he focuses on sense. Nietzsche's admiration of art and the part played by the artist is an

⁸⁵ Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'On The Genealogy of Morals', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Modern Library. (New York: Random House. 1968) III, 7, p542

⁸⁶ Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Op. Cit. 820, p434

acknowledgement of the human potential for the creative transformation of and entry into the world through sensibility. Art is, he says, "the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life."⁸⁷ However, the emphasis on creative sensibility is not a total rejection of philosophy. But he does suggest a realigning of the role of philosophy. "All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task is understood as the solution of the *problem of value*, the determination of the *order of rank among values*."⁸⁸ Just what does he mean? Quite simply this: the evolution of our existing moral concepts would be better understood through contributions from the studies of linguistics and etymology; and, primarily, any table of values and morals exist to serve a purpose which is of physical benefit to man, and which could best be explained by physiological and medical science. In short, our values are derived from our physical needs and desires. Studies of those needs and desires could provide information about why particular moral laws are agreed upon. However, the conflict which will arise from the question of which values should gain priority over others (such as in the case of those values impacting on the well-being of the majority against the values which could protect the well-being of a few) should be the task of the philosopher.

Nietzsche suggests that the development of the emphasis on the rational and the consequent rejection of the non-rational and the instinctive is exemplified in the move Euripides made away from Aeschylean tragedy; a move motivated, Nietzsche claims, by Euripides experiencing in it the mysterious, the disturbing and the unexplainable.⁸⁹ Euripides substituted an aesthetic which showed thoughts to be rational, and he brought to the fore the measure "to be beautiful everything must be conscious" as a corollary of the

⁸⁷ Ibid. III (2) p452

⁸⁸ 'On The Genealogy of Morals' I, 17 note, p492

⁸⁹ Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism', Op. Cit. 11, p80f

Socratic dictum "to be good everything must be conscious".⁹⁰ He created an order which placed its emphasis on conscious knowledge to the exclusion of the unconscious insight the likes of Plato perceived in the poet with gifts paralleling the soothsayer and dream interpreter.⁹¹ The outcome of this stress on the rational in the construction of the tragic art form established by Euripides emphasises a core element in Nietzsche's perception of the world. Where for the likes of Socrates, consciousness becomes the creative force, and the correctness of the resulting action is justified by resorting to instinct (I *know* what I have decided to do is right), for Nietzsche, instinct remains the "creative-affirmative force and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively."⁹² Consequently, Nietzsche perceives science as distinctly limited in its capacity to inform us.

Despite it being the mission of science (and its myth) to make existence appear comprehensible and therefore justified, and with its wide reaching promise of the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system coupled with the perception that man's 'noblest' and 'only true human vocation' is to 'fathom the depths and to separate true knowledge from appearance and error', science inevitably reaches its limits, and 'one gazes into what defies illumination'.⁹³ What is the answer? Nietzsche's solution is to return to art. "When they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail - suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, *tragic insight* which, merely to be endured, needs art as protection and remedy."⁹⁴ The claim in the last part of this statement is worth examining a little more closely. Why and how does art provide protection and remedy for the insight that the world is devoid of meaning?

We have already seen that Nietzsche perceives the role of art as serving a purpose

⁹⁰ Ibid. 12, p86

⁹¹ Ibid. 12 p86

⁹² Ibid. 13 p88

⁹³ Ibid. 15 p97f

⁹⁴ Ibid. 15 p98

broader than that of individual indulgence. While art works are individual expressions of the nature of man, if the art work is to reveal the greater truth, no credence should be given to the individual values of the artist. Artists have at all times, says Nietzsche, been valets of a wide range of values and ideologies.⁹⁵ It is only when the individual becomes the ground through which the act of creation at times merges with the 'primal artist of the world'⁹⁶ that there is the production of great art: an art which enables us to contemplate that which is otherwise devoid of meaning; an art which is the expression of a shared primal unity and which is beyond the individual; and an art which is an expression of the force of life itself. It is the joyful experience of life in all the pain and suffering it inflicts which conveys a sense of the culmination of existence and which inveigles us into living on. Great art shows us in a comparative sense that our true worth is as aesthetic phenomenon. Or to quote one of Nietzsche's most famous lines: "for it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally justified".⁹⁷ While this suggests what art achieves in general, and at the same time hints at its role in persuading us to carry on with life because of the joy of life itself, we have not answered the question why and how does art provide protection and remedy?

The explanation can be found broadly in two areas of Nietzsche's thought: in his praise of Schiller's declaration of war on naturalism in art;⁹⁸ and, his interest in Greek art coupled with his use of myth. In a short passage rejecting descriptive music and similar descriptive arts, Nietzsche advises instead: "Appeal to the instincts; art with the power of suggestion."⁹⁹ It is this important element of the power of suggestion, the allusive means by which art functions to build meaning by referring to something else (something which

⁹⁵ 'On the Genealogy of Morals', III, 5 p538

⁹⁶ 'The Birth of Tragedy' I, p38

⁹⁷ Ibid. 5 p52

⁹⁸ Ibid. 7 p58

⁹⁹ *The Will to Power*. 836 p440

is already known and, as such, uses images), and through which meaning is transferred - a broadly encompassing process of metaphor- which Nietzsche applauds. Consequently, he identifies the importance of the artificial, symbolic and ideal character of art.¹⁰⁰ The result is an opposing of descriptive means in favour of the imaginative. "For the genuine poet," Nietzsche says, "metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a vicarious image that he actually beholds in place of a concept."¹⁰¹ As we have seen earlier, myth also functions through its capacity to present images which embody indefinable experience. As such, myth shares with metaphor the same sorts of mechanisms for transferring understanding. The one advantage myth has over metaphor is, in Nietzsche's view, the closer link myth has to particular and universally identifiable experience.

Myth alone saves all the powers of the imagination and of the Apollinian dream from their aimless wanderings. The images of the myth have to be the unnoticed omnipresent demonic guardians, under whose care the young soul grows to maturity and whose signs help the man to interpret his life and struggles.¹⁰²

Nietzsche uses a mythic construct to develop his analysis of art and to argue by implication his understanding of how we function in light of the truth of our existence as aesthetic phenomenon. The terms *Apollinian* and *Dionysian* which he uses to represent the opposing tensions arising from attempts to fulfill two fundamental impulses are turned into anthropomorphic representations forming both a shorthand means of labelling two complex elements and at the same time permitting an understanding of the nature of those elements through an empathic process. He describes on one hand the dominant component of art in the Dionysian element with its joyful acceptance of all experience and its affirmation of life as a corollary of intoxication. On the other, he attributes to the Apollinian a dreamlike vision. It arose, he suggests, because of the encounter with the

¹⁰⁰ *The Birth of Tragedy*, 7 p58

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 8 p63

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 23 p135

terror and horror of existence¹⁰³ and is driven by an impulse which withdraws these horrors from sight or veils them in a dream like illusion. It is this illusion which provides the characteristic which gives to the arts in general the capacity to make life possible and worth living.¹⁰⁴ This feature of 'healing and helping' is achieved through the imposition of symbolic meaning. We will return in a moment to look at just how this functions, and also to the part the extending of the intoxication component of the Dionysian metaphor plays. Before we do, it is worth noting how Nietzsche uses the simple marriage of the basic components of these metaphors to project his idea of the function of art. Nietzsche finds a fundamental ideal of the union of these components in the lyric genius who, with the non imagistic musical representation of the primordial pain he experiences, combined with the poetic symbolic image of the lyric with which he expresses those feelings, conveys through his individual feelings elements of the universal.¹⁰⁵ It is an idea of art as a vehicle for the individual development of primordial pain and its transformation into a tangible image by which, metaphorically speaking, it can be brought forward into the light of day. The making present of the felt pain as an image which is necessarily familiar is a mechanism which allows us an emphatic familiarity with that which is fearful, and therefore permits us to come to terms, and to live with, the pain.

Nietzsche develops a better understanding of how this functions through his explanation of the origins of Greek tragedy. He finds in the satyr a means of representing that inner and commonly shared sense of that which is the core of nature. The satyr as the mode by which this is achieved is a mythic entity, which, through its artificiality is a heightened apprehension of the natural. As a symbolic image, the chorus of satyrs indicates an eternal, unchanging sense of that which is and will remain common to all. It is both the intensity of the heightened apprehension of the natural and the indication of its being

¹⁰³ Ibid. 2 p42

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 1 p35

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 5 p50

shared which is, for the observer, overwhelming and makes inconsequential the sense of separation of the individual from his kind and his society. Incorporated into the Dionysian representation which revels in the joy of this disclosure is a numbing element which Nietzsche portrays through the characteristic of intoxication. It is an apathy which promotes the reluctance to recall personal experience which might refute or water down that infatuation with the cognizance of the elementary core of life.¹⁰⁶

Re-entry into consciousness returns the individual to a awareness of the horror and absurdity of life. The nausea which ensues results in an apprehension of futility with the consequence that the desire to act slips away. This is where art in Nietzsche's view has the capability to help and heal. His suggestion of art's capacity to achieve this indicates his belief in art as a persuasive form of argumentation; a means for convincing us to a course of action which disregards the logical conclusion of the perception of the lack of meaning of existence. To overcome the negation of the desire to act, Nietzsche says, action requires the veil of illusion.¹⁰⁷ The Apollinian representation, the dream-like veiled image, the illusion by which this is achieved, is a directly transferable signification of art. It is art, he says, which can save man from this will-negating world. She [art, the saving sorceress] alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live...¹⁰⁸

Just how does art achieve this? All art forms have different means, but all can transform the Dionysian insight into the Apollinian representation.¹⁰⁹ In whatever form it operates, art shows in some manner the Dionysian reveller the satyr in which he sees himself and his Apollinian metamorphosis as the god.¹¹⁰ Thus that which is presented in

¹⁰⁶ Op. Cit.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 7 p60

¹⁰⁸ Op. Cit.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 8 p64

¹¹⁰ Op. Cit.

art, to use the example of Apollinian dialogue in Greek tragedy, 'looks simple, transparent and beautiful'. But if we disregard the bright image projected by the myth we see just the opposite.¹¹¹ Nietzsche claims the need for both the Dionysian reveller and his vision of the Apollinian counterpart. Using the means of mythical and imaginative thought, art represents the conflicts of the joyous desire for life in the discord of the phenomenal world through the transfiguring illusion which permits man to embrace individuation.

If we could imagine dissonance become man - and what else is man? - this dissonance, to be able to live, would need a splendid illusion that would cover dissonance with a veil of beauty. This is the true artistic aim of Apollo in whose name we comprehend all those countless illusions of the beauty of mere appearance that at every moment make life worth living at all and prompt the desire to live on in order to experience the next moment.¹¹²

Given Nietzsche's uses in philosophy of the mechanisms he advocates for art, it would seem overall that philosophy does not deserve the fate he allocates it. However, he would probably claim that while philosophy can locate the problem in the broad context of the necessity for the development of a relationship between the Dionysian and the Apollinian, it has a diminished capacity to develop the specifics of individual experiences, thereby failing to service the need for individuation.

For Heidegger, the major pre-occupation for philosophy is the concept of Being.¹¹³ It is a concept which, he says, is at once the most universal ('An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity.'¹¹⁴) and yet, because it transcends any universality of genus, remains unclear. While it can be inferred that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity, the concept of 'Being' remains

¹¹¹ Ibid. 9 p67

¹¹² Ibid. 25 p143

¹¹³ Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Op. Cit. 3 p23

¹¹⁴ Heidegger paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*. Ibid. 3 p22

indefinable. Yet it is a concept which is self evident. Any perception or acknowledgement of an entity makes some use of the concept of Being. For Heidegger, the importance of exploring the concept lies in the contradiction that we in some sense acknowledge and live with the perception of Being, but we do not understand what 'Being' represents. That the meaning of Being remains veiled in darkness "proves", for Heidegger, "that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again."¹¹⁵

There is some parallel here between Heidegger's Being as that which is acknowledged and yet remains indefinable, and that point science reaches in which Nietzsche claims 'one gazes into what defies illumination'. While what is shared is the acknowledgement of and yet the difficulty in achieving some sort of understanding of things indefinable, there is a significant difference in the means each chooses to overcome the problem. We have seen Nietzsche clothes his notions in mythic imagery as a means of bringing them into the physical world. Heidegger rejects this approach in his efforts to comprehend Being.

If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists...in not 'telling a story' - that is to say, in not defining entities as entities by tracing them back to their origin to some other entities, as if Being had the character of some possible entity. Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in ways of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered.¹¹⁶

Because it is the Being of entities which is under scrutiny, it is, says Heidegger, the entities themselves which are interrogated.¹¹⁷ Consequently, he insists, the meaning of Being is researched phenomenologically.¹¹⁸ His reasoning develops from the teasing out of the etymology of the word *phenomenology* which, he claims, has two components:

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 4 p23

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 6 p26

¹¹⁷ Op. Cit.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 27 p50

phenomenon and logos.¹¹⁹ *Phenomenon*, he says, "signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest."¹²⁰ The Greeks entitled this totality of 'that which can be brought into the light' as *entities*. However, that which is shown depends on the kind of access we have to it. It is possible that what is shown can be something which the entity is not. The Greek expression *phenomenon*, then, stretches to include the idea of semblance.¹²¹ But Heidegger contends that semblance is structurally interconnected. "Only when the meaning of something is such that it can make a pretension of showing itself - that is, of being a phenomenon - *can* it show itself *as* something which it is *not*; only then *can* it 'merely look so-and-so'."¹²² Consequently, he labels semblance, in what might also be described in other terms as a misreading, as a private modification of phenomenon. His reason for this careful differentiation lies his wishing to establish a distance between phenomenon - that entity which is a totality of that which shows itself in itself - and appearance. Appearance has a direct relationship with the entity itself. It refers directly to and exists because it manifests as a phenomenon. Heidegger's phenomenon as the showing itself in itself, however, he describes as signifying "a distinctive way in which something can be encountered."¹²³ That encounter is achieved through the 'logos' component of the word *phenomenology* which he defines as meaning 'discourse' in the sense that it is a revealing or letting be seen the content or focus of the discourse.¹²⁴ It is an opening up of the entity to perception. Thus Heidegger says, "To have a science 'of' phenomena means to grasp its objects *in such a way* that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 28 p50

¹²⁰ Ibid. 28 p51

¹²¹ Op. Cit.

¹²² Ibid. 29 p51

¹²³ Ibid. 31 p54

¹²⁴ Ibid. 32 p56

it directly and demonstrating it directly."¹²⁵

This allows us to return to the question which drives this chapter: why is art chosen as the vehicle to proclaim the relationship between aesthetics and ethics? We have seen Heidegger understanding of phenomenon as the showing itself in itself signifies "a distinctive way in which something can be encountered". Using very similar wording, he also says "art is by nature an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical."¹²⁶ The thrust of his argument pushes art away from being a 'mere appendix' to culture, an add on, something which simply evolves as an afterthought out of the already existing stage that culture has reached at a particular time. Art, he argues, is an origin. It is a means by which a discourse is developed to achieve an understanding of truth, and as such it becomes a repository of the truths of its creators and the starting point, an origin, for the truth of those who preserve or come after. Art demands the collective understanding of the truth of being, and at the same time it promotes the opportunity for individuation. We get some hint of the significance of what art achieves from this passage in which Heidegger outlines what he means by 'Being'. Being, and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity, Heidegger says. "*Being is the transcendens pure and simple.* And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*. Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge."¹²⁷

The use of art, then, is important on several fronts. Its historical assembling of phenomenological truth is an accumulating of distinct, individual understandings of the 'disclosedness of Being' and which, as a whole, represents a composite understanding of Being, yet it demands the creative interplay of the individual and phenomenon to a 'fixing

¹²⁵ Ibid. 35 p59

¹²⁶ Heidegger, Martin. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998) p78

¹²⁷ *Being and Time*. 38 p62

in place' of his own truth. That truth happens through the building of an understanding of the truth in the way a poet composes a poem.¹²⁸ Although all art is in essence poetry and therefore varieties of the art of language, Heidegger says, the linguistic attributes of the poem in the narrower sense has a privileged position in the arts.¹²⁹ But regardless of the variety of language, truth is conveyed through language. Naming nominates what the beings come into the Open *as*.¹³⁰ The nature of art is poetry, the nature of poetry is art of language and therefore the founding of truth¹³¹; and poetry is projective saying: "the saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods."¹³² Consequently, language finds a way of representing that which is beyond every entity and is therefore unrepresentable as itself.¹³³ What appears as this truth in the work is beauty. Beauty is not something separate and independent Heidegger says. It is the result of, or belongs to the advent of truth.¹³⁴ Our attraction to art and its resulting beauty is, therefore, a response to the appeal of Being¹³⁵ and consequently to the appeal of truth. It is in our dedication to truth that forms the inextricable link with art and beauty; the connecting of the aesthetics and ethics in what seems to be a fusion of art and philosophy.

¹²⁸ 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. Ibid. p72

¹²⁹ Ibid. p73

¹³⁰ Op. Cit.

¹³¹ Ibid. p74f

¹³² Ibid. p74

¹³³ Op. Cit.

¹³⁴ Ibid. p81

¹³⁵ Heidegger, Martin., 'The Thing' Op. Cit. p184

*Mightily, even when your sinews rest,
Does life drag you into its floods
(And) lime (drag) you into its whirling dance.
But if courage's daring wing sinks
At the painful feeling of limitations,
Then behold from the hill of beauty
Joyously the target reached in flight.¹*

10. Shimmering Spaces Beyond the Shadowland.

I suggested at the outset that the term metaphysics used in a broad sense to accommodate an understanding of existence which includes the physical and any of the aspects of or resulting from the formal is a useful term to describe the grounds on which a perception of the existence of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics was built. I also outlined Kant's metaphysical assumptions on which he established his understanding of the aesthetic and ethic relationship. As we have seen, the thinkers considered in this study have built on or reacted to these assumptions in ways which show us an historical development of that relationship in terms of the perception of the arts and ethics. Kant and Schiller represent in many respects the critical point from which the modern perceptions of art and ethics has developed. There is, I believe, sufficient movement in the historical sequence of that relationship to provide the grounds for more clearly understanding the development of later attitudes to art and how they might relate to thoughts about how we should live.

If Kant can be considered the marker for the beginning of this necessarily narrow and selective study, Heidegger represents the later position. It is a position in which art becomes an origin of truth, and truth itself an intuitive understanding influenced by time and the random occurrences in particular situations within the world. Just as Kant's

¹ Schiller. 'The Ideal and Life'. Lines 44-50

metaphysical assumptions were outlined in the interests of providing a slightly more detailed understanding of the grounds for the relationship in this study, by virtue of his later position an outline of Heidegger's assumptions on which he develops his relationship should also be given.

First, a very brief recap of the broad positions we have seen for the basis for the existence of that relationship. We have seen that Kant differentiates between the perceptions of corporeal objects and those which are forged by the mind. For Kant, the existence of a relationship between aesthetics and ethics arises from the understanding that there is, on one hand, sense experience, and on the other, the reasoned means by which we interpret and organize those experiences. He emphasises the reasoning element as constituting man. Schiller accepts Kant's division of world and mind, but acknowledges variation in human nature while perceiving the state of developed man in the successful reconciliation of material and formal impulses mediated by the creative 'play' impulse as beautiful. The aesthetic experience is strengthened to become an important part in the flowering of man, and an indispensable consideration for the moral. Belief in knowing truth through the deduction of reason is nudged aside. Inventiveness of play, its application of possibilities to the aesthetic for the formulation of truth, and an acknowledgement of the part the non-rational plays in the fullness of experience form the grounds for Schiller's relationship of the aesthetic and the ethic.

Hegel, however, rejects the perception that man is divided. His understanding of the aesthetic ethic relationship is framed on the belief in each being a part of the whole. The things we know we know completely as things-in-themselves, and we become aware of them only through their difference to other things. What we know of things, then, is not separated from their innate properties. Consequently, all things are united because they are part of only one substance and one essential nature, making the aesthetic ethic relationship a necessarily interrelated part of man. Nietzsche, on the other hand, establishes the basis for the relationship on materialistic lines. The ideas and beliefs which prompt the historic

connections between aesthetics and ethics are attributable to the actions and reactions of human experience. The passion to pursue life, the one over-riding drive for man, is the criterion on which values are built and judged. A premiss which centres on the passion for life as the driving force would privilege the whim of the individual if it were not for Nietzsche's insistence on building an 'honesty' through action built on an a concept of eternal recurrence and its relationship to the joy of the inexhaustibility of the will to life. Heidegger develops this sense of individualism into an understanding of human existence as at once an intuitively informed knowledge of and participation in the inevitable limitations of the temporal world, but which, through the experience and a susceptibility to *angst* is as much in awe of the impenetrability of fully knowing life as, say, Kant and Schiller are in their interaction with the sublime.

Heidegger acknowledges the influence of Husserl's work on the development of his thinking in his essay 'My way to Phenomenology'.² Husserl's apparently contradictory position of, on one hand, rejecting the idea of the doctrine of thought and knowledge as based on psychologism in logic, and on the other, his describing of the acts of consciousness essential for the constitution of knowledge, prompts Heidegger to ask himself 'what is the phenomenal description of the acts of consciousness?' and, 'wherein does what is peculiar to phenomenology consist if it is neither logic nor psychology?'³ He looks for direction for answers to his questions in later writings from Husserl which relocated the label of 'transcendental' to the subjectivity of knowing, acting and valuing. As a phenomenological investigation, the 'experiences of consciousness' were considered from the point of view of the *structure* of acts of experience, and at the same time the

² Heidegger, Martin. 'My Way To Phenomenology', Trans. John Stambaugh. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975)

³ Ibid. p236

objects experienced were considered in regard to their objectivity.⁴ This led Heidegger to a revelation in his thinking:

What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as *aletheia*, as the unconcealedness of what-is present, its being revealed, its showing itself. That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such.⁵

As a consequence, he decided that it is the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment that should be the subject of the questions of the source and the determination of what must be experienced as 'the things themselves', rather than the idea of consciousness and its objectivity.⁶ As such, phenomenology offered possibilities of thinking rather than a particular method of thought.⁷

Science, Heidegger says, confines its capacity to determine what-is in itself by allowing the object itself the first and last word. This objectivity of questioning, definition and proof limits that which can be revealed.⁸ He means by this that science makes its focus the study of being rather than Being. Consequently, he argues, because of man's insistence on this manner of enquiry into what-is, it becomes instead a discerning of the object *as* and *how* it is. It is the chief thing, he says, which makes what-is become what it is.⁹ The limiting of the investigation constructs a sense of the mind representing objects. Science,

⁴ Ibid. p237

⁵ Ibid. p239

⁶ Op. Cit.

⁷ Ibid. p241

⁸ Heidegger, Martin. 'What is Metaphysics?', Trans. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick. (Published with additional material as *Existence and Being*.) In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975) p243

⁹ Op. Cit.

by its emphasis on substance (the what-is), ignores that which is not substance, the non substance which Heidegger calls Nothing. Science, then, ignores the Nothing and dismisses it as 'that which is not'. He sums up the inevitable difficulty for science when he says: "Nothing - how can it be for science anything other than a horror and a phantasm?"¹⁰ The difficulty lies in the problem that to ask about Nothing assumes that it 'is', that it is an entity. It is nothing of the sort, he claims.¹¹ We can see where the problem of classifying Nothing as an entity leads. If thinking is thinking about something, then logic rules out thinking about nothing because it is a contradiction.

But, Heidegger argues, we *can* think about Nothing. 'Nothing' is admitted through the portal which understands it as "the negation (*Verneinung*) of the totality of what-is: that which is absolutely not."¹² His claim parallels but redirects the notion that everything which can be thought exists as some sort of object. In this case it exists as an object of thought. 'Nothing' is important to Heidegger because it exists as an inherent and inevitable part of what-is. Heidegger argues that the totality of what-is must be given beforehand so that it can 'succumb' to the negation from which Nothing emerges. But while we can perceive this in some regard through the general concept, we can never comprehend absolutely the totality of what-is. What is certain, he claims, is that "we find ourselves placed in the midst of what-is and that this is somehow revealed in totality."¹³ This is existence. Nothing - the negation of existence, the negation of the totality of what-is - is revealed through the experience of dread (*Angst*), where we feel the withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, where we experience a sense of being 'in suspense' because being seems to be slipping away.¹⁴ Schiller's sense of suffering and the pain of the limits of mortality re-

¹⁰ Ibid. p244

¹¹ Ibid. p245

¹² Op. Cit.

¹³ Ibid. p247

¹⁴ Ibid. p249

emerge.

Heidegger places particular emphasis on the notion that Nothing is not an entity in that it replaces what-is. Rather, it belongs to what-is while this is slipping away in totality.¹⁵ Because Nothing is both a conceptual opposite and an original part of the essence of what-is, it makes the disclosure of what-is possible for our human existence. It alone, he argues, brings *Dasein* face to face with what-is. *Dasein* by definition is 'being projected into Nothing' and as such is 'transcendent'. Were *Dasein* not projected from the start to Nothing (the being beyond), claims Heidegger, it could not relate to what-is, and could therefore have no self-relationship.¹⁶ The sense of dread through which we experience Nothing is always with *Dasein*. Although sleeping, "All *Dasein* quivers with its breathing."¹⁷ For those who are the more courageous in acknowledging the dread, it stands, he says, "in secret union with the serenity and gentleness of creative longing."¹⁸ This alignment of the awareness of Nothing with the sense of serenity and creativity indicates its germinal influences which, when *Dasein* projects Nothing onto man in all his finiteness, its acknowledgement enables man to achieve transcendence: the overcoming of what-is-in totality.¹⁹

Consequently, for Heidegger, this investigation into Nothing leads to metaphysics. He interprets the derivation of the name metaphysics from the Greek as characterising an enquiry which is over and above what-is.²⁰ His etymology is considered by many to be at odds with the generally accepted understanding of the word, but it should not, I suggest, be of concern for the intention of this study. Heidegger provides a clear understanding of

¹⁵ Ibid. p250

¹⁶ Ibid. p251

¹⁷ Ibid. p253

¹⁸ Op. Cit.

¹⁹ Ibid. p254

²⁰ Op. Cit.

the terms on which he develops his thought; and it is the development of those ideas and not our judgement of the 'truth' of his assumptions which is of interest here. Unlike 'classical metaphysics' which in one way or another dismisses Nothing as the absence of being, Heidegger argues for what-is-in-totality as what-is inclusive of Nothing. Once Nothing is 'revealed' as integral to the Being of what-is, it forces us, he says, to face the problem of the origin of negation. "Being itself is finite in essence and is only revealed in the Transcendence of *Dasein* as projected into Nothing."²¹ It is this attainment of the awareness of Nothing as the very basis of our *Dasein* that awakens us to the strangeness of what-is and causes us to wonder and to ask 'why?'. Because man's *Dasein* can only relate to what-is by projecting into Nothing - a going beyond what-is - this compunction to question and to enquire into what we are makes metaphysics part of the nature of man. Metaphysics is, he says, the ground-phenomenon, the basic inclination of *Dasein*.²²

But for Heidegger, traditional metaphysics remains a problem. Traditional metaphysics is the history of the truth of what-is, where the what-is represents beings as such. While any relationship to what-is touches on a relationship with Being, the truth of the knowledge of Being cannot be authenticated. Traditional metaphysics looks to find the truth of beings as such, but it does not ask what is the truth of Being. Metaphysics moves in the realm of that truth because it looks at being which, by its nature, is part of Being. But the truth as the basis or grounds of being remains unknown.²³ Heidegger uses the metaphor of light as a means of indicating the state of unconcealedness, the truth, of Being. He says that beings are always seen in some form of light; by which he means we see beings in the light of particular interpretations. And it is in those interpretations that we attain some sort of understanding of Being. Somewhere in the presentation of those various interpretations is something we recognize as the truth of Being.

²¹ Ibid p255

²² Ibid. p256

²³ Ibid. p258

In whatever manner beings are interpreted - whether as spirit, after the fashion of spiritualism; or as matter and force, after the fashion of materialism; or as becoming and life, or idea, will, substance, subject, or *energeia*; or as the eternal recurrence of the same events - every time, beings as beings appear in the light of Being. Wherever metaphysics represents beings, Being has entered into the light. Being has arrived in the state of unconcealedness.²⁴

But the difficulty remains. If and how Being is involved in and manifests in these various interpretations (which Heidegger has labelled as constituting metaphysics) remains obscure. While the truth of Being must, by the nature of being be part of being, the truth of Being is itself not summoned forth. The truth of Being remains a ground for metaphysics, but metaphysics focuses on beings as beings and not on Being as Being.²⁵ To think about the truth of Being is to go beyond metaphysics.

The question is, how do we get to the truth of Being? It can't be achieved through metaphysics, Heidegger points out, because to metaphysics the nature of truth appears only theoretically; that is in the derivative form of the truth of knowledge and its propositions.²⁶ He suggests that the answer might be found in the notion of unconcealedness. The representational thinking of metaphysics would not achieve this end. In fact, Heidegger accuses metaphysics of being a barrier which keeps man from the original involvement of Being in human nature.²⁷ Rather, "What is wanted is ... some regard for the arrival of the hitherto unexpressed nature of unconcealedness..."²⁸ He asks for a kind of thinking which develops out of Being and is therefore responsive to Being.²⁹ He gives the term

²⁴ Heidegger, Martin. 'The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics', Trans. Walter Kaufmann. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975) p265

²⁵ Ibid. p266

²⁶ Ibid. p268

²⁷ Ibid. p269

²⁸ Ibid. p268

²⁹ Ibid. p270

'being there' to characterize "both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ('there') of Being as such..."³⁰ The term 'being there' represents that which should be experienced and which should be thought of as the location of the truth of Being.³¹ He reminds us "That the 'essence' of being there lies in its existence."³² He means by this the fullness of what it is to exist. The constitution of *Dasein*, he tells us, is primordially whole. "Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world essentially includes one's falling and one's *Being alongside* those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which one concerns oneself."³³ This mode of Being-in-the-world is characterized by Heidegger as 'care' and encompasses future, past and present. However, the being we experience is not the same as that experienced by , for example, the Greeks from which the idea of being arose. Heidegger reinterprets the Greek word to mean 'to be present', thereby pointing to the relatedness of the unconcealedness or the truth of Being to Time.³⁴ Consequently, he argues, any representation of a way of understanding the truth of Being must take into account the horizon of Time. Given the perception that Time is both temporal and finite, Heidegger's truth of Being must recognize the inevitability of Schiller's gruesome chasm.

*

We have seen throughout this study an exploration of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. That relationship would appear to be best characterized as a question about the possibility or the means by which this relationship can exist. We have seen the relationship develop out of a reasoned understanding of what natural objects are

³⁰ Op. Cit.

³¹ Ibid. p271

³² Op. Cit. Heidegger quoting from his *Being and Time*.

³³ Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Op. Cit. p H192

³⁴ 'The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics', p274

perceived to be into a relationship which is represented, expressed and pursued through the meaning of aesthetics in application to the arts. The psychological assumptions about what is perceived to be 'natural' have been considered, we have looked at the moments when that relationship expresses itself in the arts, and we have explored the reason why the arts are considered to be the vehicle for that relationship. We have also seen how the varying attitudes, concerns and assumptions about existence itself contribute to different perceptions about the existence of that relationship.

The question of the existence of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics and the capacity, indeed the necessity, of it to and through art has continued to be of issue in the arts past this study's time-frame reference. There is no doubt that the field of relationships we have examined have contributed to the more recent shaping or even the denial of the existence of that relationship. The same concerns continue. Adorno's thoughts on aesthetics, for example, reveals an indebtedness to the line of thought pursued throughout this study. He speaks of all pain and all negativity, the moving forces of dialectical thinking, as assuming the form of physical things.³⁵ He also makes this observation about 'something in reality rebuffing rational knowledge': "Suffering remains foreign to knowledge; though knowledge can subordinate it conceptually and provide means for its amelioration, knowledge can scarcely express itself through its own means of experience without itself becoming irrational."³⁶ It is not difficult to see the more obvious links here with Schiller and Kant. Even Adorno's take on art as being "under the impress of its semblance, what metaphysics, which is without semblance, always wanted to be"³⁷ leaves us with the distinct impression that the perception of a relationship between aesthetics and ethics continues, and that like the previous thinkers that have added their

³⁵ Adorno, Theodor W. *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E.B. Ashton. (New York: The Seabury Press. 1973) p202

³⁶ Adorno, Theodor W. *Aesthetic Theory*. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. (London: Athlone Press. 1997.) p18

³⁷ *Ibid.* p344

voices to the discussion of the relationship, and no doubt like those who follow on from Adorno or oppose him, it is the elementary perception of the world and the interpretation of our place in and in relation to that world that governs that relationship. But these are matters for a later consideration. Given what this limited study has found, it might be worth conjecturing that in investigations into attitudes beyond the time frame of this study, it would be difficult to sustain much of an argument against the notion that if art is in some manner a product of thought, that it does not, in some capacity, reflect a relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Discerning the perceptions of the more recent understandings, permeations and rejections of the relationship will raise further questions about how we perceive ourselves in relation to the world and, at the same time, how we address the pain of existence. These perceptions, the resulting decisions and the part art plays in that relationship will reveal much about the type of society we have developed for ourselves and the strategies we have generated to cope with being human.

Appendix.**Translations of Friedrich Schiller's *Das Ideal und das Leben* / *The Ideal and Life*.**

I.

1

Ewiglar und spiegelrein ¹Smooth, and ever-clear, and crystal bright, ²*For ever fair, for ever calm and bright,* ³**Eternally clear and clean like a mirror and smooth** ⁴

2

Fließt das zephyrleichte Leben;

Flows existence, zephyr-light,

*Life flies on plumage, zephyr-light,***Flows the zephyr-easy life**

3

Im Olymp den Seligen dahin.

In Olympus, where the blest recline.

*For those who on the Olympian hill rejoice-***Of the Blessed on Olympus.**

4

Monde wechseln und Geschlechter fliehen,

Moons revolve, and ages pass away;

*Moons wane, and races wither to the tomb,***Moons change and generations flee,**

5

Ihrer Götterjugend Rosen blühen

Changelessly 'mid ever-rife decay

*And 'mid the universal ruin, bloom***The roses of their divine youth bloom**

6

Wandellos im ewigen Ruin.

Bloom the roses of their youth divine.

*The rosy days of Gods - With Man, the choice,***Without change in (the middle of) eternal ruin.**

7

Zwischen Sinnenglück und Seelenfrieden

Man has but a sad choice left him now,

*Timid and anxious, hesitates between***Between happiness of the senses and peace of the soul**

8

Bleibt dem Menschen nur die bange Wahl;

Sensuous bliss and soul-repose-between;

*The sense's pleasure and the soul's count it;***Humans have only an anxious choice;**

1

Schiller, Friedrich.. 'Das Ideal und das Leben'.

2

Schiller, Friedrich. 'The Ideal and Life', in *Poems of Schiller*, Trans. Edgar A Bowring, 2nd Edition. (London: George Bell and Son, 1874)

3

Schiller, Friedrich. 'The Ideal and the Actual Life'. In *Schiller and Horace*. Trans. Lord Lytton. (London: George Routledge and Sons. 1875)

4

Schiller, Friedrich. 'Ideal and Life', an interlinear translation by Walter Veit.

9

Auf der Stirn des hohen Uraniden

But, upon the great Celestial's brow,

*While on celestial brows, aloft and sheen,***(While) on the forehead of the high Uranid (Zeus)**

10

Leuchtet ihr vermählter Strahl.

Wedded is their lustre seen.

*The beams of both are blent.***Radiates their united (married) ray.**

II.

11

Wollt ihr schon auf Erden Göttern gleichen,

Wouldst thou here be like a deity,

*Seek'st thou on earth the life of Gods to share,***If you want to be like gods already on earth,**

12

Frei sein in des Todes Reichen,

In the realm of death be free,

*Safe in the Realm of Death? - beware***Be free in the realms on death,**

13

Brecht nicht von seines Gartens Frucht.

Never seek to pluck its garden's fruit!

*To pluck the fruits that glitter to thine eye;***Do not break from the fruit of his garden (Orkus).**

14

An dem Scheine mag der Blick sich weiden,

On its beauty thou may'st feast thine eye;

*Content thyself with gazing on their glow -***(Only) on the shine (appearance) may one feast the eye,**

15

Des Genusses wandelbare Freuden

Soon the wild longing's impulses will fly,

*Short are the joys Possession can bestow,***The enjoyment of changeable pleasures**

16

Rächet schleunig der Begierde Flucht.

And enjoyment's transient bliss pollute.

*And in Possession sweet Desire will die.***Is avenged quickly by the flight of desires.**

17

Selbst der Styx, der neunfach sie umwindet,

E'en the Styx, that nine times flowed around,

*'Twas not the ninefold chain of waves that bound***Even Styx, who encircles her ninefold,**

18

Wehrt die Rückkehr Ceres' Tochter nicht,

Ceres' child's return could not delay,

*Thy daughter, Ceres, to the Stygian river -***Does not hinder the return of Ceres' daughter,**

- 19
 Nach dem Apfel greift sie, und es bindet
 But she grasp'd the apple - and was bound
 She pluck'd the fruit of the unholy ground,
 (But) she reaches for the apple and is bound
- 20
 Ewig sie des Orkus Pflicht.
 Evermore by Orcus' sway.
 And so - was Hell's for ever!
 Eternally by the plight (duty) of Orkus.

III.

- 21
 Nur der Körper eignet jenen Mächten,
 Bodies only yonder powers can bind
 The Weavers of the Web - the Fates - but sway
 Only the body is owed to those powers
- 22
 Die das dunkle Schicksal flechten,
 By whom gloomy fate is twin'd;
 The matters and the things of clay;
 Which plait dark fate,
- 23
 Aber frei von jeder Zeitgewalt,
 But, set free from each restraint of time,
 Safe from each change that Time to Matter gives,
 But free of all power of time,
- 24
 Die Gespielin seliger Naturen
 Blissful Nature's playmate, Form, so bright,
 Nature's blest playmate, free at will to stray
 The playfellow of blessed natures (gods)
- 25
 Wandelt oben in des Lichtes Fluren,
 Roams for ever o'er the plains of light,
 With Gods a god, amidst the fields of Day,
 Walks above in the fields of light,
- 26
 Göttlich unter Göttern, die Gestalt.
 'Mongst the Deities, herself sublime.
 The FORM, the ARCHETYPE, serenely lives.
 Godly among gods, the Gestalt (form, beauty).
- 27
 Wollt ihr hoch auf ihren Flügeln schweben,
 Wouldst thou on her pinions soar on high,
 Would'st thou soar heavenward on its joyous wing?
 If you want to hover high upon her wings
- 28
 Werft die Angst des Irdischen von euch.
 Far away each earthly sorrow throw!
 Cast from thee, Earth, the bitter and the real,
 (Then) throw away from yourself the anxiety of the earthly.

29

Fliehet aus dem engen, dumpfen Leben
 To the Ideal realm for refuge fly
High from this cramp'd dungeon being, spring
Flee out of the narrow, hollow life

30

In des Ideales Reich!
 From this narrow life below!
Into the Realm of the Ideal!
Into Ideal's empire.

IV.

31

Jugendlich, von allen Erdenmalen
 Free from earthly stain, and ever young,
Here, bathed, Perfection, in thy purest ray,
Youthful, of all earthly stains

32

Frei, in der Vollendung Strahlen
 Blest Perfection's rays among,
Free from the clogs and taints of clay,
Free, in the radiance of perfection

33

Schwebet hier der Menschheit Götterbild,
 There humanity's fair form is view'd,
Hovers divine the Archetypal Man!
Floats here humanity's image of gods,

34

Wie des Lebens schweigende Phantome
 As life's silent phantoms brightly gleam
Dim as those phantom ghosts of life that gleam
Just as life's silent phantoms

35

Glänzend wandeln an dem stygischen Strome,
 While they wander near the Stygian stream,
And wander voiceless by the Stygian stream, -
Radiantly walk at the Stygian river,

36

Wie sie stand im himmlischen Gefild,
 Or, as in the heav'nly fields they stood,
Fair as it stand in fields Elysian,
Just like these (she) stood in heavenly fields

37

Ehe noch zum traugen Sarkophage
 Ere the great Immortal went its way
Ere down to Flesh the Immortal doth descend: -
Before towards the mournful sarcophagus

38

Die Unsterbliche heruntersteig.
 Down to the sarcophagus so drear.
If doubtful ever in the Actual life
The immortal descended.

39

Wenn in Leben noch des Kampfes Waage
 If in life the conflict-scales still sway
Each contest - here a victory crowns the end
When in life the scales of battle

40

Schwankt, erscheint hier der Sieg.
 Doubtfully, the triumph's here.
Of every nobler strife.
Waver, here appears victory.

V.

41

Nicht vom Kampf die Glieder zu entstricken,
 Not to free the weary limbs from strife,
Not from the strife itself to set thee free,
Not to disentangle from battle the limbs,

42

Den Erschöpften zuerquicken,
 Not to give the faint new life,
But more to nerve - doth Victory
To refresh the exhausted,

43

Wehet hier des Sieges duftger Kranz.
 Blooms the fragrant wreath of victory.
Wave her rich garland from the Ideal clime.
Flies here victory's fragrant wreath.

44

Mächtig, selbst wenn eure Sehnen ruhen,
 Tho' thy nerves may rest, yet, fierce and strong,
Whate'er thy wish, the Earth has no repose -
Mightily, even when your sinews rest,

45

Reißt das Leben euch in seine Fluten,
 In its stream life bears thee still along,
Life still must drag thee onward as it flows,
Does life drag you into its floods

46

Euch die Zeit in ihren Wirbeltanz.
 In its twirling dance Time hurries thee.
Whirling thee down the dancing surge of Time.
(And) time (drag) you into its whirling dance.

47

Aber sinkt des Mutes Kühner Flügel
 But should courage' daring wing not brook
But when the courage sinks beneath the dull
But if courage's daring wing sinks

48

Bei der Schranken peinlichem Gefühl,
 Sad confinement's painful sense to bear,
Sense of its narrow limits - on the soul,
At the painful feeling of limitations,

49

Dann erblicket von der Schönheit Hügel
 Then the soaring Aim with joy may look
Bright from the hill-tops of the Beautiful,
 Then behold from the hill of beauty

50

Freudig das erflogne Ziel.
 Down from Beauty's hill so fair.
Bursts the attained goal!
 Joyously the target reached in flight.

VI.

51

Wenn es gilt, zu herrschen und zu schirmen,
 If 'tis good to govern and defend,
If worth thy while the glory and the strife
 If it counts to rule and to protect,

52

Kämpfer gegen Kämpfer stürmen
 Wrestlers bravely to contend
Which fire the lists of Actual Life-
 (When) fighter storms against fighter

53

Auf des Glückes, auf des Ruhmes Bahn,
 On the path of fortune or renown, -
The ardent rush to fortune or to fame,
 On fortune's, on fame's course,

54

Da mag Kühnheit sich an Kraft zerschlagen,
 Then let boldness wreak itself in force,
In the hot field where Strength and Valour are,
 Then may courage break against strength,

55

Und nit krachendem Getös die Wagen
 And the chariots on the dust-strown course
And rolls the whirling thunder of the car,
 And with crashing din (may) the chariots

56

Sich vermengen auf bestäubtem Plan.
 Blend together, as they thunder down.
And the world, breathless, eyes the glorious game -
 Intermingle on dusty plain.

57

Mut allein kann hier den Dank erringen,
 Courage only here the prize can find
Then dare and strive - the prize can but belong
 Courage alone can win here thanks,

58

Der am Ziel des Hippodromes winkt,
 Of the victor in the Hippodrome, -
To him whose valour o'er his tribe prevails;
 Which beckons at the goal of the hippodrome,

59

Nur der Starke wird das Schicksal zwingen,
 'Tis the strong alone who Fate can bind
In life the victory only crowns the strong -
Only the strong will force fate,

60

Wenn der Schwächling untersinkt.
 When the weak are overcome.
He who is feeble fails.
While the weakling goes under.

VII.

61

Aber der, von Klippen eingeschlossen,
 But although, when rocks its bed enclose,
But Life, whose source, by crags around it pil'd,
But, when enclosed by cliffs

62

Wild und schäumend sich ergossen,
 Wildly foaming on it flows,
Chafed while confin'd, foams fierce and wild,
Rushing wild and foaming,

63

Safnt und eben rinnt des Lebens Fluß;
 Softly, smoothly runs life's gentle stream
Glides soft and smooth when once its streams expand,
(Now) soft and smooth does glide the stream of life

64

Durch der Schönheit stille Schattenlande,
 Over Beauty's silent shadow-land,
When its waves, glassing in their silver play,
Through the silent shadowlands of beauty

65

Und auf seiner Wellen Silberrande
 While, upon its silvery waters' strand,
Aurora blent with Hesper's milder ray,
And on the silvery crest of its waves

66

Malt Aurora sich und Hesperus
 Hesper and Aurora paint each beam.
Gain the still BEAUTIFUL - that Shadow-Land!
Aurora is painted and Hesperus.

67

Aufgelöst in zarter Wechselliebe
 Melted into soft and mutual love,
Here, contest grows but interchange of Love,
Dissolved in tender interchange of love,

68

In der Anmut freim Bund vereint,
 Blended in the happy bond of grace,
All curb is but the bondage of the Grace;
United in Grace's free bond,

69

Ruhen hier die ausgesöhntem Triebe,
 Fiery impulse here cease to move,
Gone is each foe, - Peace folds her wings above
The reconciled desires are resting,

70

Und verschwunden is der Feind.
 And the foe has fled the place.
Her native dwelling-place.
And the enemy has vanished.

VIII.

71

Wenn, das Tote bildend zu beseelen,
 If to animate what erst was dead,
When, through dead stone to breathe a soul of light,
When - in order to animate the dead by giving it form,

72

Mit dem Stoff sich zu vermählen,
 If with matter now to wed,
With dull matter now to unite
(And) to wed himself to matter -

73

Tatenvoll der Genius entbrennt,
 Active genius kindles into flame,
The kindling genius, some great sculptor glows;
The genius blazes full of action,

74

Da, da spanne sich des Fleißes; Nerve,
 Let then industry strain ev'ry nerve,
Behold him straining every nerve intent -
Then, then zeal should flex its nerve

75

Und behäfflich ringend unterwere
 Let the thought's courageous wrestling serve
Behold how, o'er the subject element,
And unwaveringly striving should

76

Der Gedanke sich das Element.
 E'en the hostile element to tame.
The stately THOUGHT its march laborious goes!
Thought subject the element.

77

Nur dem Ernst. Den keine Mühe bleichet,
 Truth's deep-buried spring can only flow
For never, save to Toil untiring, spoke
Only to earnest(ness), which does not fade under strain,

78

Rauschet der Wahrheit tief versteckter Born,
 To the steadfast will, that wearies ne'er;
The unwilling Truth from her mysterious well -
Murmurs the deeply hidden font of truth,

79

Nur des Meißels schwerem Schlag erweicht;

Only to the chisel's heavy blow

*The statue only to the chisel's stroke***Only the chisel's hard blows can smooth**

80

Sich des Marmors sprödes Korn.

Yields the brittle marble e'er.

*Wakes from its marble cell.***Marble's unyielding grain.**

IX.

81

Aber dringt bis in der Schönheit Sphäre,

Piercing even into Beauty's sphere,

*But onward to the Sphere of Beauty - go***But penetrate into beauty's sphere,**

82

Und im Staube bleibt die Schwere

In the dust still lingers here

*Onward, O child of Art! and, lo,***And in the dust remains the heaviness**

83

Mit dem stoff, den sie beherrscht, zurück.

Gravitation, with the world it sways;

*Out of the matter which thy pains control***With the matter, which it (beauty) dominates, behind.**

84

Nicht der Masse qualvoll abgerungen,

Not from out the mass, with labour wrung,

*The Statue springs! - not as with labour wrung***Not wrestled painfully from mass,**

85

Schlank und leicht, wie aus dem Nichts gesprungen,

Light and graceful, as from nothing sprung,

*From the hard block, but as from nothing sprung -***(But) slim and light, like sprung out of nothing,**

86

Steht das Bild vor dem entzückten Blick.

Stands the image to the ravish'd gaze.

*Airy and light - the offspring of the soul!***Stands the image in front of the delighted gaze.**

87

Alle Zweifel, alle Kämpfe schweigen

Mute is ev'ry struggle, ev'ry doubt,

*The pangs, the cares, the weary tolls it cost***All doubts, all battles fall silent**

88

In des Sieges hoher Sicherheit,

In the certain glow of victory,

*Leave not a trace when once the work is done -***In victory's high certainty (confidence, security),**

89

Ausgestoßen hat es jeden Zeugen;

While each witness hence is driven out

*The Artist's human frailty merged and lost***It (the image) has expelled any witness**

90

Menschlicher Bedürftigkeit.

Of frail man's necessity.

*In Art's great victory won!***Of human want (need).**

X.

91

Wenn ihr in der Menschheit trauriger Blöße,

When thou seest the mighty precept placed

*If human Sin confronts the rigid law***When in humanity's sad nakedness**

92

Steht vor des Gesetzes Größe,

In Humanity's sad waste,

*Of perfect Truth and Virtue, awe***We are standing before law's grandeur,**

93

Wenn dem Heiligen die Schuld sich naht,

Or, when to the Holy, guilt draws nigh,

*Seizes and saddens thee to see how far***When guilt approaches the sacred,**

94

Da erblasse vor der Wahrheit Stahle

Then thy virtue well may pallid be

*Beyond thy reach, Perfection; - if we test***Then before truth radiance (should) turn pale**

95

Eure Tugend, vor dem Ideale

In the rays of truth, - despondingly

*By the Ideal of the Good, the best,***Your virtue, before the ideal**

96

Fliehe mutlos die beschämte Tat.

From the Ideal shamefaced action fly.

*How mean our efforts and our actions are!***Flee dejected shamed deed.**

97

Kein Erschaffner hat dies Ziel erflogen,

Nought created e'er surmounted this,

*This space between the Ideal of man's soul***No created being has reached that goal in flight,**

98

Über deisen grauenvollen Schlund

Not a bark, no bridge's span can bear

*And man's achievement, who hath ever past?***Over that gruesome chasm**

99

Trägt kein Nachen, keiner Brücke Bogen,
Safely o'er that terrible abyss,
An ocean spreads between us and that goal,
Carries no boat, no bridge's arch,

100

Und kein Anker findet Grund.
And no anchor catches there.
Where anchor ne'er was cast!
And no anchor finds ground.

XI.

101

Aber flüchtet aus der Sinne Schranken
But, by fleeing from the sense confin'd
But fly the boundary of the Senses - live
But flee out of the barrier of the senses

102

In die Freiheit der Gedanken,
To the freedom of the mind,
The Ideal life free Thought can give;
Into the freedom of thoughts,

103

Und die Furchterscheinung is entflohn,
Ev'ry dream of fear thou'lt find thence flown,
And, lo, the gulf shall vanish, and the chill
And the frightful spectre has flown,

104

Und der ewge Abgrund wird sich füllen;
And the endless depth itself will fill;
Of the soul's impotent despair be gone!
And the eternal chasm will fill up;

105

Nehmt die Gottheit auf in euren Willen,
If thou tak'st the Godhead in thy will,
And with divinity thou sharest the throne,
Take the godhead into your (own) will,

106

Und sie steigt von ihrem Weltenthron.
'Twill soar upwards from its earthly throne.
Let but divinity become thy will!
And it will descend from its throne of the worlds.

107

Des Gesetzes strenge Fessel bindet
Servile minds alone, that scorn its sway,
Scorn not the Law - permit its iron band
Law's stern shackles bind

108

Nur den Sklavensinn, der es verschmäht,
Are subdued by precept's rigid rod;
The sense (it cannot chain the soul) to thrall.
Only the slavish mind which scorns it,

109

Mit des Menschen Widerstand verschwindet

With the man's resistance dies away

*Let man no more the will of Jove withstand,***(Together) with human resistance vanishes**

110

Auch des Gottes Majestät.

E'en the glory of the God.

*And Jove the bolt lets fall.***Also the majesty of the god.**

XII.

111

Wenn der Menschheit Leiden euch umfassen,

When thou art weigh'd down by human care,

*If, in the woes of Actual Human Life -***When humanity's sufferings are enclosing you,**

112

Wenn Laokoon der Schlangen

When the son of Priam there

*If thou could'st see the serpent strife***When Laokoon the snakes**

113

Sich erwehrt mit namenlosem Schmerz,

Strives against the snakes with speechless pain,

*Which the Greek Art has made divine in stone -***Fends off in unspeakable pain,**

114

Da empöre sich der Mensch! Es schlage

Then let man revolt! Then let his cry

*Could'st see the writhing limbs, the livid cheek,***Then mankind should revolt.**

115

An des Himmels Wölbung seine Klage

To the canopy of heav'n mount high, -

*Note every pang, and hearken every shriek***At the vault of heaven should beat his lament**

116

Und zerreiße euer Fühlend Herz!

Let thy feeling heart be rent in twain!

*Of some despairing lost Laocoon,***And tear apart your feeling heart!**

117

Der Natur furchtbare Stimme siege,

Let the radiant cheek of joy turn pale,

*The human nature would thyself subdue***Nature's frightening voice should win,**

118

Und der Freude Wange werde bleich,

Nature's fearful voice triumphant be,

*To share the human woe before thine eye -***And joy's face should pale,**

119

Und der heiligen Sympathie erliege
 And let holy sympathy prevail
Thy cheek would pale, and all thy soul be true
And holy sympathy should triumph

120

Das Unsterbliche in euch!
 O'er thine immortality!
To Man's great sympathy.
Over the immortal in you.

XIII.

121

Aber in den heitern Regionen,
 But in yonder blissful realms afar,
But in the Ideal Realm, aloof and far,
But in the serene regions,

122

Wo die reinen Formen wohnen,
 Where the forms unsullied are,
Where the calm Art's pure dwellers are,
Where the pure forms dwell,

123

Rauscht des Jammers trüber Sturm nicht mehr.
 Sorrow's mournful tempests cease to rave.
Lo, the Laocoon writhes, but does not groan.
Does no longer roar lament's gloomy storm.

124

Hier darf Schmerz die Seele nicht durchschneiden,
 There reflection cannot pierce the soul,
Here, no sharp grief the high emotion knows -
Here pain may no longer cut through the soul,

125

Keine Träne Fließt hier mehr dem Leiden,
 Tears of anguish there no longer roll,
Here, suffering's self is made divine, and shows
No tear will flow any longer here because of suffering,

126

Nur des Geistes tapfrer Gegenwehr.
 Nought remains but mind's resistance brave.
The brave resolve of the firm soul alone:
Only spirit's brave resistance.

127

Leiblich, wie der Iris Farbenfeuer
 Beauteous e'en as Iris' colour'd bow
Here, lovely as the rainbow on the dew
Full of delight, like iris' fire of colours

128

Auf der Donnerwolke duftigem Tau,
 On the thunder-cloud's soft vaporous dew,
Of the spent thunder-cloud, to Art is given,
On the scented dew of the thundercloud,

129

Schimmert durch der Wehmut düstern Schleier
 Glimm'ring through the dusky veil of woe
Gleaming through Grief's dark veil, the peaceful blue
Shimmers through melancholy's sombre veil

130

Hier der Ruhe heitres Blau.
 There is seen Rest's radiant blue.
Of the sweet Moral Heaven.
Here, tranquillity's serene blue

XIV.

131

Tief erniedrigt zu des Feigen Knechte,
 Great Alcides erst in endless strife
So, in the glorious parable, behold
Deeply humiliated as slave of the coward,

132

Ging in ewigem Gefechte
 Trod the weary path of life,
How, bowed to mortal bonds, of old
Went in eternal combat

133

Einst Alcid des Lebens schwere Bahn,
 Humbled e'en the coward's slave to be, -
Life's dreary path divine Alcide trod:
Ages ago Alcid life's hard course,

134

Rang mit Hydern und umarmt' den Leuen,
 Hugg'd the lion, and the hydra fought;
The hydra and the lion were his prey,
(He) struggled with hydras and embraced the lion,

135

Stürzte sich. Die Freunde zu befreien,
 Into Charon's bark, he, dreading nought,
And to restore the friend he loved today,
Cast himself, to free his friends,

136

Lebend in des Totenschiffers Kahn.
 Plunged alive, that he his friends might free.
He went undaunted to the black-brow'd God;
Alive into the barge of the boatman of the dead.

137

Alle Plagen. Alle Erdenlasten
 All the heavy loads that earth brings forth,
And all the torments and the labours sore
All torments, all earthly burdens

138

Wälzt der unversöhnten Göttin List
 On the shoulders of the Hated one,
Wroth Juno sent - the meek majestic One,
Heaped the cunning of the unreconciled goddess

139

Auf die willgen Schultern des Verhaßten;
 By the Goddess are heap'd up in wrath,
With patient spirit and unquailing, bore,
 Unto the willing shoulders of the hated (man),

140
 Bis sein Lauf geendigt ist -
 Till at length his race is run.
Until the course was run -
 Until his run has ended -

XV.

141
 Bis der Gott, des Irdischen entkleidet,
 Till the god soars hence like some bright flame,
Until the God cast down his garb of clay,
 Until the god, divested of everthing earthly,

142
 Flammend sich vom Menschen scheidet
 Casting off his earthly frame,
And rent in hallowing flame away
 In a blaze separates from the human

143
 Und des Äthers leichte Lüfte trinkt.
 And the aether's balmy incense drinks.
The mortal part from the divine - to soar
 And drinks ether's fresh breeze.

144
 Froh des neuen, ungewohnten Schwebens,
 In his new unwanted pinions glad,
To the empyreal air! Behold him spring
 Delighted (about) the new, unaccustomed floating,

145
 Fließt er aufwärts, und des Erdenlebens;
 Upward flies he, and the vision sad
Blithe in the pride of the unwanted wing,
 He floats upward, and earthly life's

146
 Schweres Traumbild sinkt und sinkt und sinkt.
 Life had fashion'd, sinks, and sinks, and sinks.
And the dull matter that confined before
 Dark dream image sinks and sinks and sinks.

147
 Des Olympus Harmonien empfangen
 Harmony, that of Olympus speaks,
Sinks downward, downward, downward as a dream!
 Olympus' harmonies receive

148
 Den Verklärten in Kronians Saal,
 Hails the blest one where Kronian lives,
Olympian hymns receive the escaping soul,
 The transfigured in Kronian's hall,

149

Und die Göttin mit den Rosenwangen
And the Goddess with the rosy cheeks
And smiling Hebe, from the ambrosial stream,
And the goddess with the rose-cheeks

150

Reicht ihm lächelnd den Pokal.
Smilingly the chalice gives.
Fills for a God the bowl!
Hands him the cup with a smile.

Bibliography of Works Cited.

Adorno, Theodor W. *Aesthetic Theory*. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. (London: Athlone Press. 1997.)

Adorno, Theodor W. *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E.B. Ashton. (New York: The Seabury Press. 1973)

Aristotle. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. With a critical Text and Translation of the Poetics*. Translated and critical notes, S. H. Butcher. Intro. John Gassner. Fourth Edition. (New York: Dover Publications. 1951)

Aristotle. 'De anima' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941)

Aristotle. 'Metaphysics' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941)

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. Martin Oswald. First Edition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing. 1981)

Aristotle. 'Politics' in *The Basic works of Aristotle*. Ed/intro Richard McKeon. Trans. W.D. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1941)

Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb. *Reflections on Poetry (Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus)*. Trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1954)

Ch. de Saint Évremond. *Oeuvres*, 1711, III, 43 in Tartakiewicz, Władysław. *The History of Aesthetics*. Vol. III. Modern Aesthetics. Trans. Chester A. Kisiel and John F. Besemer. (Warszawa: PWN. 1974)

Clark, Kenneth. *The Nude: A Study of Ideal Art*. (London: Murray. 1956)

Davy, C. *Words in the Mind*. (London: 1965)

Eliade, Mircea. *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries. The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities*. Trans. Philip Mairet. Harper Torchbooks. (New York: Harper and Row. 1975)

Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977)

Hegel, G. W. F. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Trans. T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1953)

Hegel, G. W. F. *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Trans. Bernard Bosanquet. Ed and Commentary; Michael Inwood. (London: Penguin Books. 1993)

Heidegger, Martin. 'My Way To Phenomenology', Trans. John Stambaugh. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975)

Heidegger, Martin. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998)

Heidegger, Martin. 'The Thing' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998)

Heidegger, Martin. 'The Thinker as Poet' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998)

Heidegger, Martin. 'The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics', Trans. Walter Kaufmann. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975)

Heidegger, Martin. 'What is Metaphysics?', Trans. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick. (Published with additional material as *Existence and Being*.) In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Meridian. (New York: The New American Library. 1975)

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1973)

Heidegger, Martin. 'Language' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Perennial Library. (New York: Harper and Row. 1998)

Henrich, Dieter. *Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World*. Stanford Series in Philosophy; Studies in Kant and German Idealism. Eckart Förster, Ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.)

Johnson, Oliver A. 'An Introduction to the Study of Ethics' in *Ethics. Selections from classical and Contemporary Writers*. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 1965)

Kant, Immanuel. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. (U.S.A. Southern Illinois University Press. 1978)

Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. (Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1952)

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. (London: Macmillan, 1961.)

Kant. *The Moral law. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. H.J.Paton. (London. Hutchinson & Co. 1978)

Kerényi, C. *The Heroes of the Greeks*. Trans. H.J.Rose. (USA: Thames and Hudson. 1981)

Kirk, G.S. *The Nature of Greek Myths*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1980)

Lessing, G.E. 'Laocoön; or, On The Limits of Painting and Poetry. 1766' in *The Laocoön, and Other Prose Writings of Lessing*. Trans. W.B. Rönfeldt. (London: Walter Scott, Ltd.)

A Nietzsche Reader. Compiled and Translated R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books. 1981)

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books. 1990)

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'On The Genealogy of Morals', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Modern Library. (New York: Random House. 1968)

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Modern Library. (New York: Random House. 1968)

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Vintage Books. (New York: Random House. 1968)

Plato. *Greater Hippias*. in *Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series, (New York: Pantheon Books. 1961)

Plato. *Ion* in *The Dialogues of Plato*. Translated and Commentary R.E. Allen. Vol. 3. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996.)

Plato. *Plato's Phaedo*. Trans. R. Hackforth. Library of Liberal Arts. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1955)

Plato. *Symposium*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. World's Classics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994)

Plato. *The Republic*. Trans. Desmond Lee. 2nd Ed. Revised. Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1975)

Pliny. *Natural History: a selection*. Trans. John F. Healy. (London: Penguin Books. 1991)

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. Everyman's Library. (London: Dent. 1979)

Schiller, Friedrich. 'Das Ideal und das Leben'.

Schiller, Friedrich. 'The Ideal and Life', in *Poems of Schiller*, Trans. Edgar A. Bowring, 2nd Edition. (London: George Bell and Son, 1874)

Schiller, Friedrich. 'The Ideal and the Actual Life'. In *Schiller and Horace*. Trans. Lord Lytton. (London: George Routledge and Sons. 1875)

Schiller, Friedrich. 'Ideal and Life', an interlinear translation by Walter Veit.

Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a series of Letters*. Edit and Trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. (Great Britain: Oxford University Press. 1967)

Schiller, Friedrich. 'On The Sublime (*Vom Erhabenen*) (Toward the Further Development of Some Kantian Ideas). In *Friedrich Schiller, Essays*. Ed. Walter Hinderer. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. The German Library. Vol. 17. (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 1993)

Schiller, Friedrich. 'On the Pathetic' (*Über das Pathetische*) In *Friedrich Schiller, Essays*. Ed. Walter Hinderer. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. The German Library. Vol. 17. (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 1993)

Schiller, Friedrich. *Schiller's Treatise Über Anmut Und Würde An Annotated Translation into English*. Trans. Leon Liebner. (University Microfilms International. Evanston Illinois. 1979)

Virgil. *The Aeneid*. Trans. W. F. Jackson Knight. Penguin Classics. (England: 1974)

Winkelman, J.J. *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture*. Trans. Elfriede Heyer and Roger C. Norton. (Illinois: Open Court. 1987)

Everyman's Classical Dictionary. Warrington, John. Everyman's Reference Library. (London: J.M. Dent and Sons. 1961)

The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Second Ed. (London: Oxford University Press. 1970)

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Ed. Lesley Brown. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1993)

The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. Compiled, Paul Harvey. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984)

Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich. Trans. and Abridged Geoffrey W. Bromley. (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans. 1985)