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**POLICING AND AUSTRALIAN SECURITY IN  
THE SOUTH PACIFIC:  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE  
TO POLICE EDUCATION  
AND TRAINING PROGRAMS**

by

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**Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy at Monash University**

1995

## STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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Robert H. Smith

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## ABSTRACT

The thesis analyses the role of policing as a means of protecting Australian security in the South Pacific region. It argues that in the past Australian attitudes and policies have been dominated by military considerations but, now that the Cold War is over, the main threat to Australian security interests in the South Pacific is international crime in its various manifestations. Proactive policing is the appropriate response and police education and training programs are essential components.

Chapter One considers the nature of policy, Peel's Principles and their application and some recent trends in policy in Australia; it discusses the international dimensions of policing and surveys police education in Australia and the region. Chapter Two analyses Australian attitudes and policies towards defence and security and concludes that the customary military emphasis still prevails. Chapter Three is a test case which examines the role of the Australian Government in providing development assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. Chapter Four discusses the experience of tertiary education institutions in Australia in attempting to provide tertiary education for police in Fiji and the Cook Islands. Chapter Five argues that, in the post-Cold War World, the two main threats to international order are international crime and the eruption of violent conflicts within states. The nature and range of crime and peacekeeping are analysed. The role of Australian police in peacekeeping operations is surveyed and the idea of an Australian Peacekeeping Institute in Canberra discussed.

The Conclusion considers the three ways of providing police education and training programs discussed in the thesis and supports the proposed Australian Peacekeeping Institute as the most efficient vehicle for the delivery of these services.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My greatest debt is to my wife Janet who has lived with this thesis for some years, during which time my professional life has gone through the demanding process of a merger between the Chisholm Institute of Technology and Monash University to become Australia's largest university. The changes brought about by the merger have been more traumatic than the work involved in producing this thesis. Many people assisted me in my research, some of whom cannot be named by law; innumerable police members, and past members, have been of great assistance. Those who have been "good mates" over the years are past Chief Commissioners of Victoria Police, "Mick" Miller and Kelvin Glare, past Deputy Commissioners of Victoria Police, John Frame and Brendan Crimmins, past Assistant Commissioners, the late Dick Knight and Bob Stewart; indeed in Victoria there are simply too many to mention. John Johnson, previous Deputy Commissioner, Australian Federal Police and now Commissioner, Tasmania Police. Bill Horman, Previous Commissioner, Tasmania Police and Vanuatu's first post-independence Police Commissioner have been influential. Deputy Commissioner Adrien Whiddett, Australian Federal Police has been a close colleague in the matter of police being involved in the peacekeeping process. The Director, Lt Col John Hegart, of the Royal Australian Corps of Military Police and his officers have been most helpful in sharing our passion for peacemaking and peacekeeping. The Prime Minister of Fiji, Maj-Gen Sitiveni Rabuka, and the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, Sir Geoffrey Henry, have both been enthusiastic supporters of this work. Mrs Nel Halloran, my former Secretary at Monash has been invaluable in so many ways. Dr. John Dalton, my Supervisor, has been dedicated to this work. What has been attempted is something that we both acknowledge as important to our nation and the region in which we live.

## PREFACE

This is the first major thesis on the role of policing in Australia and the South Pacific region to put the arguments that proactive policing is the most appropriate and effective method of protecting Australia's eastern approaches and the region itself from the threat of crime, local and international. As such, this is a pioneering work at the academic level. It adds to the public record a great deal of material which is original and hopefully will be of value to future scholars who work in this field. However, one of the problems in providing a pioneering work is that there are few signposts. In Chapter One, there is the lament that extensive data and bibliographical searches revealed little existing relevant material on the general subject or this particular topic. Certain primary sources, including interviews, have been given prominence in particular Chapters because they are the only material available. In some cases (as in the Price Waterhouse Urwich Consultancy involving the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project) commercial confidentiality precluded access. In Chapter Four on Fiji and the Cook Islands, the problem was too much original research material being readily available because of the Chisholm/Monash connection and extensive editing was necessary.

The focus of this work reflects the author's career in intelligence, policy education and academia with an Army Reserve component. The thesis is an exercise in applied Police Studies with an International Relations/Defence Studies dimension with elements of Political Science added. It raises a number of public policy issues relating to defence and security questions. The emphasis on police education and training programs reflects a balance between the academic and the practical and is central to the main arguments presented in the thesis.

A feature of the work which should be stressed is the large number of interviews which underpin it. The research owes much to many members of police forces, both in Australia and in the South Pacific; their insights illuminate the work. Some must remain anonymous for such is the nature of the profession. An aspect of the Fiji and Cook Islands experiences which should be mentioned is the 'personal diplomacy' quality. Where the author has been involved in the actual events described, he has tried to be as objective as possible and to put the record of these events scrupulously. Cross-checking wherever possible was a constant safeguard. The original research material, letters and record of interviews provide a wealth of information now available to other scholars.

Finally, to declare a bias, the author believes that Police Studies (as distinct from Justice Studies) is a serious academic endeavour and hopes this thesis is a worthy contribution.

## GLOSSARY

ABCI	Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADSC	Australian Defence Studies Centre
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AIDAB	Australian International Development Assistance Bureau now AUSAID
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ASIS	Australian Secret Intelligence Service
DCP	Defence Cooperation Program
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DTS	Detective Training School
FMF	Fiji Military Forces
IDP	International Development Program
IPM	International Police Monitoring (Force)
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (US)
ODA	Official Development Aid

ONA	Office of National Assessments
OSCA	Office of Strategic Crime Assessments
PIR	Pacific Islands Regiment
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RFMF	Royal Fiji Military Forces, prior to 1987
RFP	Royal Fiji Police, prior to 1987
RPNGC	Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Operation
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNFCYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
USP	University of the South Pacific





## CHAPTER ONE

### POLICING: SOME DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

#### The Nature of Policing

The closing lines of Raymond Chandler's classic detective mystery, *The Long Goodbye*, are "I never saw any of them again—except the cops. No way has been invented to say goodbye to them."<sup>1</sup> Reiner comments: "Philip Marlowe's fatalistic lament ... embodies a basic assumption by even those who are critical of the police. Welcome or unwelcome, protectors, pigs or pariahs, the police are an inevitable fact of modern life."<sup>2</sup>

It is a remarkable phenomenon that the study of the historical development of the police is such a neglected area of academic inquiry. Extensive computerised literature searches and direct bibliographical investigation indicate that there exists, at present, only brief and/or descriptive works with little or no analysis of the development of policing as a universal societal mechanism. The rationale and justification (both in terms of morality and social control) for their existence are seldom considered. It seems that the very existence of police forces is regarded as both self-evident and self-justifying and, therefore, no real debate is necessary which creates a strange academic lacuna. The authors of a broad comparative study of the police as an institution, published in 1988, state "It is surprising that the police have until recently either been overlooked or taken

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<sup>1</sup>Chandler, R., *The Long Goodbye*, quoted in Reiner, R., *The Politics Of The Police*, Harvest Press, London, 1986, p.9.

<sup>2</sup>*ibid.*

for granted since they are commonly (if sometimes mistakenly) understood to provide to provide the first line of defence against internal disorder".<sup>3</sup>

In Australia there has been relatively little academic interest in the police as an institution, although the more sensational aspects of police behaviour such as allegations of corruption, deaths in custody and police shootings attract a great deal of media attention and public interest and scrutiny.<sup>4</sup> The reason for the relative lack of interest in the police as an institution can be traced to our convict origins, the Eureka legacy and the traditional perceptions of the police as the agents of authoritarian states and repressive governments.<sup>5</sup> The domestic repercussions of the Vietnam War<sup>6</sup> reinforced in the minds of Australian generation the image of the police as the agents of repression, creating attitudes (reinforced by the anti-Springbok Tour demonstrations)<sup>7</sup> which remained with the 'best and brightest' of the generation as many of them moved into senior positions in academia, the legal profession, politics and the media.<sup>8</sup> It is only now that the Universities and advanced educational centres are beginning to treat police, policing and public safety as proper subjects for academic study. The situation is better in Britain where the modern police force was invented and where there remains a lively interest in academic, legal, media and political circles in the relationship between the police and society.<sup>9</sup> In the US, particularly small town America, the police are typically

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<sup>3</sup>Brewer J.D., Guelke A., Hume I., Moxon-Browne E., & Wilford R., *The Police, Public Order And The State: Policing In Great Britain, Northern Ireland, The Irish Republic, The USA, Israel, South Africa and China*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1988, p.1.

<sup>4</sup>Harding, R., *Police Killings in Australia*, Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1970.

<sup>5</sup>See Ward, R., *The Australian Legend*, OUP, Melbourne, 1958.

<sup>6</sup>See Murphy, J., *Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993

<sup>7</sup>See Harris, S., *Political Football: The Springbok Tour of Australia, 1971*, Gold Star Publications, Melbourne, 1972.

<sup>8</sup>See Gerster, R., *Seizures of Youth: The Sixties in Australia*, Highland House, South Yarra, Melbourne, 1991.

<sup>9</sup>For a chilling and insightful view of what is, and what might be, see Campbell, B., *Goliath-Britain's Dangerous Places*, Methuen, London, 1993.

seen as servants of the community with sheriffs and other public safety officials elected by the citizenry. Many American universities have their own campus police forces which are seen as the guardians of the academic community. Even in the major cities where police commissioners are appointed by the Mayor, the police are organized on a precinct basis which creates a sense of local community identification- for better or for worse depending on the state of local police-citizen relations. There is in the US intense public interest in the role, powers and behaviour of the police.<sup>10</sup> This interest is deepened by the respect Americans have for their Constitution and Bill of Rights as living documents which protects them from abuses of state power aided by the shield of the Supreme Court and its rulings such as the famous Miranda case.<sup>11</sup>

This work seeks to explain, within a framework of political theory and sociological analysis, the existence of police and to justify their existence in terms of societal needs. The direction of the research is pioneering as a reflection of the relative lack of literature on policing as a universal given within all societies whether so-called developed or not. Comparisons between various police forces with differing cultural roots, ethnic backgrounds, philosophical differences and political contexts will be so much easier insofar as a police force is a police force no matter the country in which it exists and operates. For instance, are Western democratic police forces able to be compared legitimately with a police force in an authoritarian, repressive, non-democratic society? The answer to this is that, notwithstanding the political structural differences, police forces can legitimately be compared. To adopt a functional approach, it can be said that "the enduring nature of order-maintenance is derived from the fact that it fulfills a

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<sup>10</sup>See Keppeler, V.E., *The Police and Society: Touchstone Readings*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Ill, 1995. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (US), *Police Use of Force*, US Department of Justice, Rockville, 1994.

<sup>11</sup>See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, *Respecting The Vitality of Miranda: The Case for Preserving the "Right to Remain Silent"*, Washington DC, 1988.

primary need of all states".<sup>12</sup> For developing countries such as those in the South Pacific, the problem is more acute for "if order is not maintained the process of nation-building will be based on only incomplete and insecure foundations."<sup>13</sup>

The basic underpinning of any police force is that it is the repressive arm of government which is able to exercise legitimate violence to maintain order in the interests of the State.<sup>14</sup> To discuss police force legitimacy also vitally involves discussion about the legitimacy of the State; however, to be over-concerned about questions of legitimacy is to occlude the wider issue of order maintenance. Discussions about legitimacy of political regimes and police forces must always be considered in *realpolitik* terms. For example, the former White-dominated Republic of South Africa and the South African Police—all four of them, White, Coloured, Bantu, Asiatic (sic)- had massive credibility gaps as to claims regarding their legitimacy; yet when it suited other nations to co-operate with the South African authorities, as in international fraud cases, expediency overrode morality. It can therefore be sustained that order maintenance, as part of policing, gives a *de facto* legitimacy to policing around the world irrespective of ideology.<sup>15</sup>

Order maintenance can then be seen to be neutral in its universalization and utility. But the points of comparison are only aspects of a practical nature such as operational efficiency, technological development and the actual hardware of policing. Comparisons of order maintenance and an arrival at some form of moral equivalence are dangerous and lead to the shoals of inhumanity whereby the Gestapo could be held to be the paradigm of police efficiency and effectiveness. Order maintenance is an important

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<sup>12</sup>Brewer, J.D., et al., *op cit.*, p.1.

<sup>13</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>See Keppeler, V.E., *op cit.*

<sup>15</sup>It could not be sustained that the Fiji Police Force has been any less effective or efficient since the first coup in May, 1987; rather it could be argued that it is more effective and efficient because of computerization in certain areas which occurred despite the two coups of 1987.

function of policing, but the notion of accountability maintains a pre-eminent position.<sup>16</sup> The principle of the accountability of police is unique to those countries which are based on the Common Law and where police are individually responsible for their actions and cannot legally be directed by anyone.<sup>17</sup> Police Common Law accountability effectively predates Nuremberg and My Lai by nearly one thousand years. In the system that is commonly known as the Westminster system of government,<sup>18</sup> it is generally assumed that the police are independent of the political process, that is, like the judiciary, they are accountable directly to the law itself. The three South Pacific states considered in this thesis—the Cook Islands, Fiji and Papua New Guinea—are all in this category, so comparisons with Australia, *mutatis mutandis*, are valid.

There has developed in Australia in the last twenty or so years a move towards the alteration of policing from this ancient basis; the ancient basis of the 'original authority' of the constable as established in Anglo-Saxon law to that of becoming a mere public service functionary in a government department. In the United States, on the other hand, there really has never been the notion of a completely independent police force, certainly not at the state or municipal levels, in that the Chiefs of Police in these particular jurisdictions are usually elected officials.<sup>19</sup> It is only when one comes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which only by a quirk of definition is a police force, in that its major function is the investigation and detection of breaches of American Federal law without a generalist or community policing function, that

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<sup>16</sup>For an extensive discussion of police accountability, see Reiner *op cit*. Reiner moves across the gamut of policing (see Index p.254); this index lists around 20 separate aspects of policing related to accountability.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, p.15. Reiner it appears is somewhat contemptuous of the reliance on the ancient office of Constable. Yet in Australia in the case of the Cairns Watchhouse Keeper in Queensland in 1992 and *APPM v Fox* in Tasmania in 1993 the presiding judges upheld the concept as relevant to the contemporary scene.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup>Keppeler, V.E., *op cit*.

independence can be seen.<sup>20</sup> Critics of the FBI have often attacked it on the basis of this perceived independence, particularly developments during the tenure of its original Director, J. Edgar Hoover, who, they allege, misused this independence and grossly abused his authority.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the theoretical incorruptibility of such an organisation, it is again clear that the heads of the FBI, originating with J. Edgar Hoover to the present Director, are nevertheless political appointees. Now, of course, the reality is that in our British-derived police forces the Commissioner of Police in every State in Australia (the Chief Commissioner in Victoria) has to have his (and it is *his* at this stage) appointment confirmed by the various levels of Executive Councils in both the State and the Federal areas of jurisdiction, but nevertheless, it has been held by precedent and convention that a Commissioner of Police is indeed independent of the political process.<sup>22</sup> Police are accountable in the British-derived system to the law and only to the law, but we are witnessing a practical change from the theoretical to a situation where police are indeed becoming more politicised. This has developed to the extent that both patronage of a political nature and direct political interference are becoming 'normal' functions to some degree within the existing Australian culture.<sup>23</sup> This tendency is a departure from the Anglo-Saxon concept of the 'original authority' of the office of Constable to a movement towards some aspects of United States policing, the most extreme situations occurred in the Deep South during the era of terrible racial discrimination against the black population; those who were disenfranchised had no say whatever in the selection and appointment of Chiefs of Police and had no protection in fact from the Police

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<sup>20</sup>See Brewer, W.B., *J Edgar Hoover and his G-Men*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1995.

<sup>21</sup>Summers, A., *Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J Edgar Hoover*, Gollancz, London, 1993

<sup>22</sup>Practicalities have overridden this precedent to some extent, but these are outside the scope of this work.

<sup>23</sup>This particular theme was discussed widely throughout the Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland in 1987-1988.

Departments themselves.<sup>24</sup> Conversely, it can be argued even within the Australian milieu that policing as we know it does not represent the totality of the society. Various critics of the law itself and of the police, and also as a result of the connection between the two, see the total function of the law, including its enforcement, as a class-based structure whereby the propertied classes keep the working class under some degree of control.

Throughout the modern world, that is in a chronological rather than developmental sense, police and policing are accepted as a concomitant of daily life. Although at first seemingly simple, to effect an analysis of the conceptual constructs of police and policing becomes at once both a daunting and virtually impossible task. To merely point out that police, in some form or other, exist in every form of society is sufficient in itself, but it is not a necessary solution to explain their existence. To take this approach would only lead to a *reductio ad absurdum* position whereby police are in existence in a universal sense and further conceptual analysis is pointless. A clue as to what police and policing really are lies in the Corps motto of the Royal Australian Artillery, "*Ubique*", and to some extent this motto ought to be adopted by police for it is in the combination of ubiquity, powers and duties together with necessity that police are distinguished from other sections of society. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Hobbes to the French sociologist Raymond Aron have pointed out that it is impossible to have a society of individuals.<sup>25</sup> Such a view implies consensus and a degree of sublimation of personal inclinations; in an ideal world this would be achieved through rationality and those "noble instincts" imputed to humans by some writers. At the practical level there has, it seems, always been some form of coercion needed to ensure

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<sup>24</sup>See Hawley, F.R. and Messner, S.F., "The Southern Violence Construct: A Review of Arguments, Evidence, and the Normative Context", *Justice Quarterly* 6: 481-511.

<sup>25</sup>See Scruton, R.A., *A Dictionary Of Political Thought*, Pan Books, London, 1982, under the heading of 'Society' for a concise discussion of this point.



that persons conform to the minimum requirements of behaviour required by the group or the society. But here it is only the concept of enforcement that has been raised and this enforcement may simply be a form of brutality or naked force. Thus the concept of enforcement needs to be refined from that of mere physical or psychological force to that of police and policing.<sup>26</sup>

### **Peel's Principles and their Application**

The majority of Common Law nations derive their policing antecedents from Peel's Constabulary (a paramilitary form of policing).<sup>27</sup> The police of the late Twentieth Century, whilst being more technologically advanced than their Nineteenth Century progenitors, are still rooted in the same soil—the preservation of life and property. Charles Reith extrapolated twelve points, known as Peel's Principles, from the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act:

1. The police must be stable, efficient, and organized along military lines.
2. The police must be under government control.
3. The absence of crime will best prove the efficiency of the police.
4. The distribution of crime news is essential.
5. The deployment of police strength, both by time and areas, is essential.

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<sup>26</sup>Regarding the events of June, 1989, in Tienanmen Square in Beijing I posit the view that the brutal acts inflicted on the hapless demonstrators were legal within the terms of the law of the People's Republic of China; morally these brutal acts would have fitted the legal parameters of Nuremberg and My Lai. It is also clear that in Marxist/Leninist/Maoist terms the People's Liberation Army's actions were legitimately violent acts to enforce obedience to the State through the Party.

<sup>27</sup>It is interesting to note that in the England of 1829, before the first Reform Act and nearly 100 years before total adult suffrage was granted, the creation and existence of police depended upon the consent of those policed.

6. No quality is more indispensable to a policeman than a perfect command of temper. A quiet determined manner has more effect than violent action.
7. Good appearance commands respect.
8. The selection and training of proper persons are at the root of efficient law enforcement.
9. Public security demands that every police officer be given an identifying number.
10. Police headquarters should be centrally located and easily accessible to the people.
11. Policemen should be hired on a probationary basis before permanent assignment.
12. Police crime records are necessary to the distribution of police strength.<sup>28</sup>

Peel's Principles were formulated to meet the needs of his era, even so the community acceptance of the newly-formed police force was not immediate. The very first "on the beat" patrol was confronted by hostile London citizenry and the Sergeant in charge was killed by the mob.<sup>29</sup> The actual implementation and acceptance of the Principles took some time, but eventually the reputation of the Metropolitan Police became legendary throughout the world.<sup>30</sup> This by no means suggests that the Metropolitan Police is without its problems and critics; indeed over the past few decades it has been subject to

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<sup>28</sup>Sullivan, J.L., *Introduction to Police Science*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1971, pp.11-12.

<sup>29</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>The British criminologist Kevin Stenson provides a polemical discussion as to the rates of, and reasons for, public acceptance of police in Britain, the USA and Europe. Stenson K., "The Scope of Crime and Problems of Definition", in Stenson, K. & Cowell, D., (eds), *The Politics Of Crime Control*, Sage Publications, London, 1991, pp.4-5.

many reviews both judicial and administrative that have in some sense dulled the reputation of this oldest 'modern' police force.

The modern police force operating under the Westminster system of parliamentary government has its roots deep in English history prior to the Norman invasion. From its earliest forms of the "town system", commencing somewhat before 700AD, the system of policing was the product and emanation of the social order it served. This followed as the system depended upon each community in fact policing itself. Law enforcement was often chaotic and at best inefficient, but there was a community involvement in the process. In a rough comparison of these early law enforcement systems with those of the present, a paradox is revealed. The early Anglo-Saxon communities were ruled by absolute monarchs, yet there was community participation albeit imposed on the community by the ruler; the present mode of Westminster-style governments is based at least theoretically on mass participation in the political process, but there is little, if any, mass participation in the law enforcement process.<sup>31</sup> It appears that what has happened in Western society since the Industrial Revolution is that specialization and division of labour have limited the task of law enforcement, along with most other endeavours, to the professional or the specialist.

This specialization of the police function, which substantially began with Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, can be seen to have partially, and in some cases completely, broken the traditional nexus between law enforcement and community participation. Specialization and accountability have not necessarily gone hand in hand in terms of the police function. A fairly complicated relationship between the society, or community, and its regulation is brought into play. In theory, at least, the concept of representative democracy allows for an extended chain-like process of direct involvement in the governmental and legislative function; so that this form of

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<sup>31</sup>Sullivan, *op cit.*, pp.4-8.

government provides for direct, but attenuated, participation by those who are enfranchised. If a group seeks to implement its own rules should it not have either the right or the capacity to enforce these rules through employing a delegated person to act on its behalf? And should not this person or persons be an active member or members of the group? In this way a process of law enforcement is created on the same conceptual basis as representative democracy. If this special enforcement officer is not to be member of the group, then it becomes reasonable for group members to see this person as alien. Manning remarks:

The problem of the police is, essentially, the problem of the democratic society, and until the central values and social structures of our society are modified (and I think we are seeing such a modification) there can be no real change in the operation of social control.<sup>32</sup>

It is the concept of social control that is at the core of the police function. There are, of course, other areas of social control whose activities affect the community in many diverse ways, but none of these other areas of social control is as ubiquitous as the police in either function or actual physical presence. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the police it is their ubiquity which causes concern to the community at large. The constant police presence, or even fear of a constant police presence may be conducive to a feeling that the police are controlling rather protecting the community. The ability of the police to apply deadly force is also a matter of great concern, particularly for groups which because of their class, race or ethnic group feel marginalised and vulnerable. Of course, this is an imperfect perception as to what constitutes the police role. And until this role is adequately established and accepted then the police will be blamed for carrying out initiatives often not of their own making because of role confusion. This is

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<sup>32</sup> Manning, P.K., "The Policeman As Hero", in Silver, I. (ed), *The Crime Control Establishment*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974, p113.

not to discount the place of discretion in law enforcement by the police, but discretion is a separate matter from the present discussion.<sup>33</sup>

In many ways the old concept of citizen participation in law enforcement was preferable to the customary Australian practice where the community assists the police only in time of emergency. While at the conceptual level participation in the police function appears to be more desirable than a wholly professional police force, it was in the realm of reality that historically the participatory system broke down. Not only were bad laws in existence which had to be enforced, but also the system was really only operable within a small and localized community. The advent of mass industrial society made consensual policing difficult to achieve. However, there is now a movement in police circles to develop a form of community policing described by NSW Commissioner Tony Lauer as "a partnership with the people".<sup>34</sup> This has involved neighbourhood watch, information drives, community consultative committees, school education programmes and youth activities. Prominent changes within police ranks include tertiary education for police, merit-based promotion systems and a new proactive mentality. The results have been mixed:

Within the police culture, however, these changes are causing concern. Beyond the caring rhetoric, the principles which underscore community policing are often misunderstood and misapplied. Blatant public-relation exercises have masqueraded as community policing, and the concept has been used to justify increased police numbers and build empires within the police bureaucracy.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>For a discussion of the place of discretion in policing, see Avery, J., *Police: Force or Service*, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981.

<sup>34</sup>O'Neill, J., "Cop-out", *The Independent Monthly*, Sydney, November, 1994, p.31.

<sup>35</sup>*ibid.*

Whether community policing becomes, in the words of Superintendent Frank Byrne of Victoria Police, "the saviour of society" remains to be seen.<sup>36</sup> The appearance of academic work such as *The Police And Young People In Australia* indicates that community policing questions are now matters for public debate and scholarly discourse.<sup>37</sup> The extent to which the public can be genuinely involved in real policing, as distinct from cosmetic public relations exercises, is an open question.

Civil policing in the Australian context and those of its English antecedents dates from Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. At best, this tradition in its colonial manifestation is now 166 years old in 1995 and, in its actual form, has existed for 94 years since Federation when the influence of the military was formally removed by the Commonwealth's acquiring the naval and military forces of the former colonies under the provisions of Section 51 of the Australian Constitution.<sup>38</sup> The method of policing introduced by Peel into London was introduced into New South Wales almost immediately and was adapted to local conditions. From its inception as a penal colony, New South Wales had been under quasi-martial law and certainly under military control.<sup>39</sup> The transition from a military to a civilian system of policing has not been accurately traced or recorded; an apparent amalgam of both tiers of law enforcement is supposed to have existed until the end of the Gold Rush period. Legend and myth have replaced hard evidence in this regard. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the police forces in colonial Australia did not enjoy a good reputation. Ward states, "it may be doubted whether the police force of any English-speaking country, except Ireland, has ever been more thoroughly unpopular than were those of most Australian

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<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>White, R., and Alder, C., (eds), *The Police and Young People in Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1994.

<sup>38</sup>Part V—Powers of Parliament, Section 51(vi).

<sup>39</sup>Davidson, A., *The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 1788-1901*, C.U.P. Melbourne, 1991.

colonies in the last century".<sup>40</sup> A considerable number of these police, due to the peculiar exigencies of the developing colonies, were freed 'ticket of leave' ex-convicts whose own new-found respect for the law is alleged to have been at best dubious.<sup>41</sup>

Police tradition in Australia has a negative background and history and it is this which militates against community interest and participation in the development of a community policing role in this country. At present, and it has existed for a number of years, there is a demographic tide flowing towards an increasingly pluralist, multicultural Australia. It is a developing trend to be ethnically-sensitive in Australia; this position is largely a reaction to the crude Australian nationalism that tried to enforce some form of assimilationist homogeneity in a response to post-war mass migration to Australia. Australia is now beginning to discover the roots of its multicultural origins and yet despite this awakening, the nation remains predominantly Anglo-Celtic in the areas of law and social custom. So far the law and its enforcement have remained one-dimensionally Anglo-Celtic in origin and universal in application. However, some recent developments indicate change may be under way. It should be noted that in the South Australian legal jurisdiction, Aborigines in some cases can elect to be punished according to tribal law. In a recent murder trial in Melbourne, the accused, the woman of Italian origin, claimed the defence of 'honour' to excuse her shooting of another woman of Italian origin. It is interesting to note that the jury accepted her defence that she was provoked and forced to defend her honour. The jury found her guilty not of murder but of manslaughter. If the law is in any sense to be the *vox populi* then it could become heterogenous to match the heterogeneity of Australia's population. Such an outcome would be a legislative and legal nightmare, and where to draw the acceptable cultural lines would test the wisdom of Solomon. There are suggestions that, if we accept the view that our law derives from our culture, then it is patently clear that our

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<sup>40</sup>Ward, *op cit.*, p.144.

<sup>41</sup>Davidson, *op cit.*, p.102.

law should change in consonance with our multiculturalism. This may mean in time different laws for different cultural or ethnic groups. A parallel development in South Pacific countries at present exists with suggestions that elements of traditional legal systems should co-exist with modern law.<sup>42</sup> The role of custom and tradition in tribal societies is a subject which is beginning to attract a great deal of serious consideration, both by politicians and academics, as a means of bridging the law and order gap in developing countries. An important dimension of the provision by Australia of police education in the South Pacific should be an awareness of the cultural specificities of each indigenous society and a recognition that the West does not have all the answers. The point of the matter is that the police must be prepared to accept, and even anticipate, major changes in the law; but, at the individual level, the reality is that the policeman or policewoman has sufficient difficulty in enforcing the changing law of the dominant Anglo-Celtic tradition. This difficulty is brought about by the increasing complexity of the law in most areas of the criminal jurisdiction. Burgeoning areas of legal changes relating to law enforcement in the fields of hijacking of aircraft, terrorism, narcotics and corporate crime have pushed most Australian police forces beyond their operational limits.

In fairness to the dedicated, who constitute the majority, it can only be said that they are pursuing at least a holding operation. It may be instructive to cite the views of Joseph Wambaugh, a former Los Angeles policeman who had a dual career as a novelist and television writer, whilst serving as a policeman. In his novel *The New Centurions*, he likens the role of modern police to the Centurions of the Roman Empire during its collapse.<sup>43</sup> Wambaugh claims that the Roman Centurions were endeavouring to enforce laws that the majority of people no longer respected; the role of the Centurions was

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<sup>42</sup>See Pacific Perspective, *Rethinking Pacific Constitutions*, South Pacific Social Sciences Association, Suva, Vol.13, No.1.

<sup>43</sup>Wambaugh, J., *The New Centurions*, Sphere Books, London 1971.



merely that of attempting to hold together an unwilling society.<sup>44</sup> Certainly this informs us of the state of police culture in Los Angeles with its emphasis on a siege mentality and an 'enemies within the citadel' complex. The infamous Rodney King case however suggest that most Blacks and Hispanics suspect it is more a case of who guards the guards?

In Australia it appears that both the police themselves and the public see the police only as implementers of the law. Such a view derives from the civil service nature of the police being a government department with its own responsible minister. To a large extent this is a correct view but it does not encompass the equally important factor that the police are independent in terms of the actual enforcement of the law. The political machinations of actual legal reality are quite another matter. To the extent that the police are seen to be only implementers of the law, they are a negative factor in the running of society, negative because they are seen to be the instrument of punishment rather than of reward or benefit. Positive aspects of policing such as the provision of peace and tranquillity are readily forgotten by a citizenry who can perceive all police as ready to interfere with their liberties and innocent pursuits. Thus, the fact that the police are likely to apprehend errant citizens and the resentment this causes may be related to erroneous concepts of the police as some form of corporate father figure. The police are seen to be separate from the rest of the community; indeed this separateness may even be empirically true, but that is not the point. The concept of pluralism in both the political and occupational senses has not penetrated to the general view taken by police. Wambaugh's view is interesting here. One of Peel's Principles was constructed on the basis of the police being founded on military lines; so that the concept of police duty and military active service being equivalent is a constant one. To a large degree the military

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<sup>44</sup>*ibid.*

aspect, or what is perceived to be military, has not yet been dispensed with in terms of commitment to their vocation.

Public access to the police, or the lack of it, revolves around the concept of police professionalism. The question may well be asked of police in Australia-whose police are they? If, to any extent, the public feels alienated the question may be a difficult one to answer. In the South Pacific countries discussed in this thesis, the answer to the question in the Cook Islands and Fiji may well be phrased in terms of the traditional chiefs (the *Ariki* and the *Ratus*) and in Papua New Guinea in terms of the clan (the *Wontok* system).<sup>45</sup> The situation in Fiji is made more complicated by the racial divide between Fijians and Indians and in Papua New Guinea by regional differences. It is relatively plain that the role of police in Australia has not yet become clear for either the police or the public. Ambivalence prevails on both sides; there is a separation between police and the public they serve and it is this separation which is the basis of role confusion or, indeed, even the ability to define just what the police role is supposed to be. Rather than analyzing their role, or even goals, the police for their part have been concerned with becoming more efficient in what they are presently involved with, and the public on their part have not have not challenged the existing police role through the political process. Certainly inquiries into police have occurred from time to time, but they are essentially procedural inquiries into the alleged criminal activities of individual police or the use of excessive force: none has sought to examine or establish the general role of police in society.

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<sup>45</sup>See Ravuvu, A., *Vaka I Taukei: The Fijian Way of Life*, USP, Suva, 1983; and Clifford, W., et al., *Law and order in Papua New Guinea*, INA/IASER, Port Moresby/Boroko, 1984.

## Control of the Police in Australia: A Reform Agenda

The control of police in a democracy presents a dilemma for those who address the fundamental societal issue of law and order. The challenge is to find the balance between the two perceived evils, the evil of a government with complete control of the activities of its appointed police and the evil of a police force uncontrolled by government with the potential for developing its own political agenda and exercising its coercive power without proper supervision.

In theory, a balance is to be found in the people's endorsement of a clearly expressed relationship between governments and the police that distinguishes yet preserves the responsibilities of both. The relationship is premised on the need for openness and collaboration by the police with the people, full accountability in all matters; strong leadership<sup>46</sup>, and lastly, though not finally, the professionalization of all in the police service. In practice, the likely outcome of this dilemma will be a combination of coercing the police to be more accountable as well as a cooperative effort of the people, its police and governments to incrementally improve the state of law and order in Australia by putting these theoretical means into practice.

John Avery, a former Commissioner of the New South Wales Police Service, questioned the role of policing in his book *Police-Force or Service?*<sup>47</sup> The debate which he began is not yet over in Australia; he focuses on the quandary confronting society of the power inherent in the maintenance of law and order and, particularly, its enforcement and how this power is to be controlled. According to Lord Watson, "the administration of justice, the maintenance of law and order and the repression of crime are among the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government".<sup>48</sup> Parliament makes the laws and

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<sup>46</sup>Fitzgerald, G.E., *Commission Of Inquiry Into Possible Illegal Activities And Associated Police Misconduct*, 1989, p.134.

<sup>47</sup>Avery, J., *Police-Force Or Service?* Butterworths, Sydney, 1981.

<sup>48</sup>*Coomber v. Justice of Berks.* (1883) 9 A.C., 61, p.74.

establishes independent agencies within the judicial system to enforce the law, dispense justice and to punish the guilty.

The convention that has emerged over time from judicial pronouncements<sup>49</sup> prescribing for police a personal accountability to the law and the independence from the control of the executive is cause for concern.<sup>50</sup> Mr Justice E. Lusher has observed that insulating the police from government control "itself has the potential for political power."<sup>51</sup> The breakdown of law and order in Northern Ireland during the 1960's was substantially attributable to the vagaries of the Inspector General of Police who enjoyed "constabulary independence" over the operations of a para-military police force to the exclusion of any political influence.<sup>52</sup>

Australian history is replete with examples of police betrayal of the constable's oath of office and the "social contract"<sup>53</sup> with the abuse and misuse of their powers,

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<sup>49</sup>Lord Blackburn, *Coomber v. Justice of Berks.*, 1883, 9 A.C., 61, p.74.

Sir Samuel Griffith, *Enever v. the King* (6 C.L.R.569).

Mr. Justice McCardie, *Lester v. Oldham Corporation*, (1930, 2 K.B.384).

Mr. Justice Dixon, *Little v. The Commonwealth*, (75 C.L.R.94).

Viscount Simond, *A.G. (NSW) v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.*, (1955, A.C.457).

Lord Denning, Lord Justice Salmon and Edmond Davies L.J., *R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex-Parte Blackburn*, (1966, 2 Q.B.183).

<sup>50</sup>Lustgarten, L., *The Governance of Police*, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1988, p.83.

<sup>51</sup>Lusher, Mr. Justice E.A., *op cit.*, p.679.

<sup>52</sup>Oliver, L., *Police, Governance And Accountability*. The McMillan Press Ltd., 1987, pp.124-126.

<sup>53</sup>In the context of police, society entrusts police with its protection in exchange for the relinquishment of its "natural liberty". This onerous trust requires police to set the standard of exemplariness whilst "on" and "off" duty as well as being the "bulwark against the tide of disorder which would threaten to overwhelm society without their protection." The Right Honourable Sir Harry Gibbs, Chief Justice of Australia, Address to Australian Federal Police Commissioned Officers' Course, 1986.

impartiality<sup>54</sup> and discretion.<sup>55</sup> The insularity, disciplinary irregularity and even criminality of a few police within all ranks, as well as instances of conformity in operations to the political will of the day<sup>56</sup>, raise the spectre of the eventual breakdown of law and order<sup>57</sup> and the emergence of an uncontrolled police state.<sup>58</sup> As Fitzgerald noted, "it threatens our happiness, security, freedom and future"<sup>59</sup> and "the general community .... is also alienated from and sceptical about its police force".<sup>60</sup> Hence the debate to which Avery refers. On the one hand, there is "a police force allowed to operate free from government control—an army of men, responsible to no one but itself ..."<sup>61</sup> which is aberrant to the principles of democracy. On the other hand, it is essential "that the powers of police should be exercised fairly and impartially, and for that reason the police ... must be free from the control of politicians, who are not required or expected to always act impartially."<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Lustgarten, *op cit.*, p.184.

"Impartiality and like treatment of like cases are demanded of the police officer, not because he is a servant of the Crown, the Law or some other abstraction, but because they are the imperatives of a liberal society."AND

"The paramouncy of Law is not the highest social good".

<sup>55</sup>Lustgarten, *ibid.*, p.24.

"It is an executive discretion in relation to the administration of criminal law, a function of particular importance to personal freedom and the legitimacy of the state, which should therefore remain free of political control to remove any possibility of its perversion in the service of personal or partisan ends."

<sup>56</sup>Sarre, R., "Towards The Notion Of Policing By Consent And Its Implications For Police Accountability, in Chappell, D., and Wilson, P. (eds) *Australian Policing: Contemporary Issues*, Butterworths, 1989, p.104.

<sup>57</sup>Fitzgerald, *op cit.*, p.150.

<sup>58</sup>Lusher, *op cit.*, p.679.

<sup>59</sup>Fitzgerald, *op cit.*, p.150.

<sup>60</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>61</sup>Gibbs, *op cit.*, p.3.

<sup>62</sup>*ibid.*

Avery correctly observes that constables are getting on with the job of enforcing the laws of the state while the debate over how they should be controlled continues.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, the revelations of numerous Commissions of Inquiry have cast a dark shadow over the integrity of the police and their privilege of public trust. Yet the level of public disquiet has not yet prompted a call for governments to revamp the judicial system<sup>64</sup> or otherwise diminish the original authority of the constable and curb the exercise of their discretion. Rather, it seems that society is giving police (and governments) an opportunity to retain their powers and the privilege of constabulary autonomy provided they "will themselves uphold the standards of integrity and impartiality and compliance with the rules of law which are the very basis for the particular powers with which they are invested by the community through Parliament and to which their oath of office binds them".<sup>65</sup> Governments and police organizations are endeavouring to seize this opportunity by implementing drastic reforms. Clearer workable relationships between police and government, openness, accountability and collaboration across the spectrum of society on law and order issue; professionalization of the police member; and engendering a new police culture are prominent on the agenda.

If these reforms are implemented, relationships between governments, police and the community should improve over time. It is important to note the distinction that exists between "the responsibility of police themselves for law enforcement" and the responsibility of government "for the provision of resources and for ensuring that police

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<sup>63</sup>Avery, J., *op cit.*, p.63.

<sup>64</sup>Lustgarten, *op cit.*, pp.1-4. Refers to the European judicial system as a model where police are controlled by a "judicial officer" in an inquisitorial, rather than an adversarial system of law enforcement so alien to the English experience which nevertheless makes continental countries no "less democratic or libertarian, nor makes their police into greater instruments of political oppression."

<sup>65</sup>Lusher, *op cit.*, p.720.

act efficiently and responsibly and according to the law".<sup>66</sup> In relation to the first point, Neesham<sup>67</sup>, Lusher,<sup>68</sup> Gibbs<sup>69</sup> and others<sup>70</sup> have affirmed the responsibility for law enforcement rests with the police. It is unlikely in the current climate of reform that this principle will be disturbed. The Commissioner's appointment by government, however, "harbours within it the possibility of political control and pressure to conform with a given political ideology." <sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, Ministers cannot be held responsible for the "acts or deficiencies of a police member or for the day to day enforcement of the law"<sup>72</sup> and rarely have they demonstrated an eagerness to do so when censure is likely. In relation to the second point, "the Minister has a legitimate and proper area for direction".<sup>73</sup> It is the right of government to set the political agenda on law and order issues and to accordingly seek the advice of the Commissioner and direct him on general policies and priorities. The relationship between the police and government in New South Wales is said by Bryett<sup>74</sup> to have been improved by the introduction of Lusher's notion of a Police Board "as an agent of change in policing style, ethics, organisation, management, financial control and training."<sup>75</sup> Avery lauded the

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<sup>66</sup>*ibid.*, p.719.

<sup>67</sup>Neesham, T.A., *Report Of The Committee Of Inquiry-Victoria Police Force. Executive Summary*, 1985, p.7.

<sup>68</sup>Lusher, *op cit.*, p.45.

<sup>69</sup> Gibbs, *op cit.*, p.2

<sup>70</sup>Scarman, The Rt. Hon. The Lord, *The Brixton Disorders*, HMSO, London, 1981, p.63.

"The exercise of police judgement has to be as independent as the exercise of professional judgement by a doctor or lawyer. If it is not, the way is open to manipulation and abuse of the laws, whether for political or for private ends."

<sup>71</sup>Neesham, T.A., *op cit.*, p.104.

<sup>72</sup>Lusher, *op cit.*, p.719.

<sup>73</sup>*ibid.*, p.719.

<sup>74</sup>Bryett, K., *Accountability And Control Of The Police*, Research Paper No 18, The Centre for Public Sector Management, Griffith University, 1992, pp.18-21.

"In any event the police board has spearheaded significant changes in the administration, structure and conduct of the New South Wales Police Service", p.20.

<sup>75</sup>*ibid.*, p.19.

innovation as a productive contribution to the management of police forces, "which provides a measure of independence in the possible event of undue or inappropriate pressure from government."<sup>76</sup> Neesham saw merit in Lusher's Police Board proposal "in providing broader avenues of advice .... and the potential for greater community input",<sup>77</sup> yet rejected the concept because of the "inevitable inroads into the Chief Commissioner's independence."<sup>78</sup> Justification for such a Board would, however, arise where there was evidence of "serious mismanagement in the force."<sup>79</sup> Neesham would probably seize upon Fitzgerald's later warning that "the boundaries between the creation of policy in which political consideration may legitimately be taken into account and the application of that policy, in which political consideration have no place are however easily blurred"<sup>80</sup> as justification for not recommending a Police Board for Victoria. However, one of the first innovations of the Kennett Government following its election in 1992 was to establish a Police Board.

Nevertheless, Lusher's Police Board in New South Wales has responded to the government's agenda for administrative reform and professionalizing its police without infringing upon the independence of the Commissioner and his constables. Providing the Commissioner with "broader avenues of advice"<sup>81</sup> and "greater community input"<sup>82</sup> and a higher degree of accountability to all for the actions of government and the police has been shown to have produced benefits for New South Wales.

Openness and accountability of police activities and decisions will gradually improve as police members increasingly realize they are accountable to all in society; citizens have

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<sup>76</sup>Chappell and Wilson, *op cit.*, p.99.

<sup>77</sup>Neesham, *op cit.*, p.553.

<sup>78</sup>*ibid.*, p.115.

<sup>79</sup>*ibid.*, p.115.

<sup>80</sup>Fitzgerald, *op cit.*, p.120.

<sup>81</sup>Neesham, *op cit.*, p.115.

<sup>82</sup>*ibid.*, p.115.



a legitimate interest in the way the police handle the independence of their office and the manner in which they exercise their powers. Such a development will depend to a large degree on the proper educational programmes and the demise of the old "them and us" police culture, with its adversarial and exclusionist features. Jurists have espoused and reaffirmed the principle that police are accountable to the law and the law alone:<sup>83</sup> Lord Scarman extends the principle to "society, both morally and legally."<sup>84</sup> The principle provides an essential mechanism for separating the powers of government from that of the police. It has, however, seduced police into believing they are accountable to a judge whereas, in reality, their judge has always been the people; this view reflects the ultimate accountability of the total criminal justice system to the people. Fitzgerald's observation that "the general community is frustrated, confused and gravely under-informed" should be noted and it is also his view that "it is also alienated from and sceptical about its police force so that the social order is vulnerable to contempt"<sup>85</sup> is a manifestation of the principle and the attitudes it engenders.

In the main, the quality of Australian life and the extent of public trust and confidence in police are commensurate with, firstly, the degree to which the activities of police are open and subject to audit by society and, secondly, the extent to which police appreciate their contractual obligation to society and are involved with them in the maintenance of law and order. As Lusher discerned, "the old statement that the public are the police and the police are the public still holds good."<sup>86</sup>

The Commonwealth Government has set the standard of public accountability with the introduction of its body of administrative law. The rights of people to privacy; to access information; to seek reasons for decisions and administrative or legal redress if

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<sup>83</sup>Lustgarten, *op cit.*, p.64.

<sup>84</sup>Scarman, *op cit.*, p.83.

<sup>85</sup>Fitzgerald, *op cit.*, p.148.

<sup>86</sup>Lusher, *op cit.*, p.45.

necessary; to complain; and to be treated fairly and equitably are guaranteed. This legislation "forced" on departments has had a profound impact on administration, operations and the accountability of "decision makers" and particularly so with members of the Australian Federal Police. The means are available to State Governments to impose such measures on their police (and all State Departments) to the benefit of all. The spirit of this legislation will not be adopted voluntarily by police for such a development would require a major change in the mindset of most members.

Police must continually remind themselves that their "powers are derivative, they spring from the people."<sup>87</sup> Being involved with the community across the full spectrum of Australian society will serve to remind all of their obligations to each other, for the benefit of all in terms of a "social contract" approach to policing. Avery's initiatives in establishing community consultative committees across the state<sup>88</sup> and decentralizing and delegating authority "has thrust many of our middle managers into situations of open and positive interaction with the community in a way which has hitherto been beyond the conceptual horizons of many."<sup>89</sup> Accountability is open and shared through this collaborative process and greater trust will evolve as a result.

The quality of leadership of and within police forces will continue to improve as the emphasis on such selection criteria as empathy, professionalism, vision and the ability to initiate and implement change are maintained. Fitzgerald attributes debilitation of law and order to, among other things, deficient leadership of and within the police force.<sup>90</sup> He noted how an unsavoury culture within the force was "encouraged and expanded"<sup>91</sup> for over a decade because of the power relationship that existed between the

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<sup>87</sup>*ibid.*, p.45.

<sup>88</sup>Avery, J., *Issues On Police Leadership*, *op cit.*, p.97.

<sup>89</sup>*ibid.*, p.97.

<sup>90</sup>Fitzgerald, *op cit.*, p.201.

<sup>91</sup>*ibid.*, p.201.

Commissioner and his Premier; a culture that was degenerative of the quality of life and freedom in Queensland. He called for "strong honest leadership"<sup>92</sup> as one means of building a new police culture and developing public confidence.

In marked contrast, Avery is regarded as a living example of strong, honest leadership and has earned the respect and confidence of the people he served, his government, his peers and the more enlightened police then under his control. He retained his operational independence yet, with the aid of the Police Board, set his police on the path of "relating to wide social perspectives"<sup>93</sup> and "involvement of the community in their own social salvation",<sup>94</sup> professionalism, and a new culture based on integrity, rule of law and the preservation of individual rights and freedom. Replacing the old police culture with a culture that is in harmony with society's expectations of police is the linchpin to eventual acceptance and endorsement of police independence yet will prove to be the greatest challenge of all to Avery's reforms. Eventual success will largely depend on quality leadership and support from a society that has faith in Avery's ideals.

The quality of police service will also improve over time, commensurate with the advances being made by governments, Commissioners, and police unions in professionalising the police member. Initiatives to set uniform national recruitment, qualifications and remuneration standards are being addressed. Pre-service tertiary education is established for one force and other models of tertiary education have been introduced for newly-appointed and experienced members in other forces. The Australian Federal Police set up an Undergraduate Entry Scheme in 1991 and 1992; it was initially piloted in 1990 at Chisholm Institute of Technology/Monash University just prior to the merger of these two institutions. Entry to the Australian Federal Police

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<sup>92</sup>*ibid.*, p.134.

<sup>93</sup>Avery, *op cit.*, p.98.

<sup>94</sup>*ibid.*, p.100.

is now restricted to Graduates only. Seven Australian Universities, all former Colleges of Advanced Education, took part in this programme. In Queensland, Commissioner Noel Newnham (a former Deputy Commissioner of Victoria Police, later sacked in 1993 by the Premier of Queensland for reasons that are still obscure) introduced a Tertiary Pre-Service course at Griffith University and the Queensland University of Technology. This scheme was dropped by the current Commissioner, J. O'Sullivan.

Considerable emphasis is being given to instilling integrity into police culture and practice through the development of integrity plans, counter-corruption measures, security strategies, drug-free workforce policies and the application of stringent audit and disciplinary sanctions. Traditional organization structures and employment arrangements are undergoing change. Flattened structures will provide members with greater autonomy in keeping with their professionalism. Employment on contract will disturb the traditional bonding that exists which, in its negative form, is the root component of an unsavoury culture. It will also provide an incentive to perform professionally to the benefit of the member and society. It will enable a Commissioner to effectively decline from re-engaging those in whom he no longer has confidence or who fail to provide the service society expects. An environment is being established within policing where the old culture is under increasing pressure to change due to better leadership at the top and an infusion of professional police members into the lower ranks.

Law and order and policing in Australia are at the crossroads. Revelations of the misuse of power over the past decade have awakened an Australian society to the need for reform, access to information and a rigorous accountability of those it has entrusted with its care and protection. Society is searching for safeguards against the corrupting influences of power to assure itself that security and liberty will prevail. The efficacy of traditional relationships between governments and elements of the judicial system is being questioned.

The question of who should control the police presents a dilemma. Governments have a primary and inalienable responsibility for the administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order. Yet, at one extreme, it would be untenable for the police, as enforcers of the law, to be the servants of a partisan government. The other extreme of police being their own masters with the power to apply a political agenda independent of that of the government is equally untenable. The challenge is to find a balance that keeps politics out of policing yet holds police accountable to the people, both directly and through government, and to the law. Fortunately, police have an opportunity and the means to build a quality law and order service by taking charge of their own destiny in a campaign of reform directed at settling on a publicly-endorsed relationship with their government, implementing the principles of openness and collaboration with the people, accepting a full accountability in all matters, developing strong leadership and improving police services through professionalism.

The challenge of reform is daunting to most police, yet the challenge must be accepted if police are to retain their constabulary independence and secure the trust of the people they serve. Society's support and some degree of patience will be needed as police shed their deficient yet traditional culture and practices developed from the judicially-preserved notion of a police accountability to the law and the law alone. The dilemma of the independence of the police will be resolved in time. The challenge of police reform is underway. Progress is already evident in establishing the conditions that will bring the people and their police closer together; that will motivate the people to accept an even greater responsibility for the peace and liberty of their society; and that will gradually diminish the significance of the debate on who should control the police, from a contemporary issue of grave concern to an academic exercise.

An Australia which is engaged in providing police education and training for our South Pacific neighbours needs to get its own house in order first.

## The International Dimension and Security Aspect

Policing is, and probably always will be, a conundrum for it deals with the most elemental aspects of a polity. Its immediate and long term effects are profound. It derives its force and legitimacy from the majority in a democracy or its force alone from the dominant groups in non-democratic forms of government. It concerns itself with the relationship between the individual and the state and the power relationship between the two; because it is an instrument of the state its functions are often inimical to the rights of the individual. International policing is a conundrum within a conundrum when perceived analogously to Linklater's views of social and international theory where he claims "that none of the main branches of modern social and political theory provides a comprehensive analysis of the state's multiple locations".<sup>95</sup>

If it is difficult to locate the role of policing at a national level, then it is certainly more difficult at the international or regional levels. Until 1964, when a civil police contingent was attached to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNIFCYP), there was no view that civil police had a role outside of limited domestic boundaries.<sup>96</sup> Indeed even in Australia it was not until 1917, as a result of a minor assault on the person of Prime Minister W. M. Hughes in rural Queensland, that the notion of a Commonwealth Police Force was raised.<sup>97</sup> Policing in Australia was very much tied to the concept of it being a States' matter and for the defence forces to protect Australia from external threat. This view, formed in the more innocent days of simplistic views

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<sup>95</sup>Linklater, A., Unpublished Paper, *"Marxism And International Relations, Antithesis, Reconciliation, and, Transcendence"*, New Directions In International Relations, Implications For Australasia. Conference, Department of International Relations (with cooperation from the Peace Research Centre), Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, February, 15-17, 1989, p.14.

<sup>96</sup>Brown, G., Barker, B., and Burke, T., *Police As Peacekeepers*, Management Services, Police Headquarters, 380 William St. Melbourne, UNCIVPOL (Victoria Club), 1984.

<sup>97</sup>For a discussion, see Murphy, D.J., "Thirteen Minutes of National Glory: The Warwick Egg Incident 1917", *Queensland Heritage*, Brisbane, 3 November, 1975.

about crime and criminality, still largely prevails with no real acceptance that crime is, and can be, transnational rather than purely domestic. The only view of crime transcending the national arena was that of international political conspiracy and imported revolution. Nevertheless, this was never within the province of civil policing and was always, and still is, closely connected to the concept of external military threats to be dealt with by the intelligence agencies and the armed forces.

The emerging international role of police as peace-keepers is one which, in the process of evolution, is likely to grow in scope as the practical advantages become more recognised.<sup>98</sup> It may be the case that a conceptual difference between the military as peace-keepers and the police as peace-keepers needs to be employed to better inform policy choices and operational commitments. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has had some difficulty coming to terms with its new peace-keeping role. A Parliamentary Committee reviewing Australians participation in peace-keeping noted "the ADF's point of view that peacekeeping is a supplementary activity to be performed once higher priorities have been met".<sup>99</sup>

Peacekeeping in any environment dictates that a crisis occasioning potential conflict is imminent or actual and that a neutral body needs to intervene to prevent a clash occurring, or to resolve that clash. In international terms this can be defined as

....operations in which personnel owing allegiance to the United Nations are engaged in military or para-military duties designated by the United Nations as being necessary ... the practitioner remains wholly impartial and uninvolved in the dispute of the parties concerned and where its

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<sup>98</sup>Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report, *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, pp.87-88.

<sup>99</sup>*ibid.*, p.86.

terms of reference are founded on negotiation and not enforcement action."<sup>100</sup>

It is contended that peacekeeping can only be effective if certain circumstances prevail:

"First, there must be relative equivalence of power among the local forces, since the UN can usefully interpose a force only if neither party can gain a quick military advantage; second, unless the Security Council is willing to use its special privileges under Chapter 7 to bypass host-state rejection of forces, it is able to cooperate only with the consent of one or more of the local disputants; third, either the General Assembly or the Security Council must be able politically to agree on the mandate and organisation of the emergency force."<sup>101</sup>

Unless these rigorous conditions are met it is not possible for a peacekeeping force to be meaningfully activated. Indeed, Jones argues that "... agreement in principle on the conditions and scope of peacekeeping is a required precondition for reliable utilisation."<sup>102</sup>

Although there exists a direct link between the Metropolitan Police Act, 1829 and the civil police of today there has not been a recognition that civil police have a defence function in times of national emergency as in any other areas than that which can be described as civil defence. It is allowable to conclude that Sir Robert Peel sought to separate the civil role of the police from the military in the light of both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France where the gendarmerie performed an amalgam of police and military functions. Indeed a gendarme is defined as a soldier performing police duties. In 1990 when economic rationalism and security projections had sought to reduce the size of the Australian Regular Defence Force, Alan Wrigley, a former Director-General

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<sup>100</sup>Brown, G., *et al*, *op cit.*, p.6.

<sup>101</sup>Jones, W.S., *The Logic of International Relations (5th Edition)*, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1985, p.551

<sup>102</sup>*ibid.*, p.552.



of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and a career Defence "mandarin", saw the immediate, and foreseeable, role of the ADF as that of a "Constabulary function".<sup>103</sup>

However defined, military peacekeeping is not policing; peacekeeping has its own intrinsic value and later in this work the role and concept of police peacekeeping will be discussed. For the present, 1986 (the year the Dobb Report was published) will be taken as a landmark year in a deliberate effort to discuss self-contained defence as distinct from the international dependency that prevailed during the earlier period.<sup>104</sup> It is not the purpose of this work to either belittle or denigrate the defence and foreign policies of that period—they are simply not cognate to a furtherance of the discussion surrounding the role of police in an international sense. There is no point in discussion either of the Malayan Emergency or the Korean War, although both have been described as "police actions", for clearly in the words used as "exclusions" in most life assurance and general insurance policies they were "warlike activities". It is true that in Malaya troops were used to assist Police under the legal provisions which relate to Military Aid to the Civil Powers (MACP); but it is equally true that the dimensions of this assistance despite its legal reality turned into the practical reality of a large scale military operation; and as for Korea there is no way in which the defence of the Republic of Korea can be defined as policing—it was a convenient legal nicety to overcome political problems within the United Nations.

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<sup>103</sup>*The Age*, August 2, 1990.

Alan Wrigley was commissioned by the Minister of Defence to investigate Australia's defence. In the available newspaper reports there is no definition preferred of constabulary function; I assume this to mean that the ADF would be involved in military peacekeeping functions which are not synonymous with policing. It is also unlikely that the ADF, given the thrust of the 1994 Defence White Paper, will become a gendarmerie.

See Chapter Two below.

<sup>104</sup>*Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Report to the Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, March, 1986. Better known as the Dobb Report.

Cyprus was the first UN peacekeeping action to involve civil police; it is also the longest and perhaps the most frustrating of actions.<sup>105</sup> The origins of this engagement and the subsequent record of Australian peacekeeping are considered below. What should be noted here is the traditional military mindset and how this has dominated Australian official attitudes and conventional approaches to security. The following quotation is instructive:

It was not one of the many Leagues of Ancient Greece which brought peace to that squabbling civilization, nor philosophers like Thales of Miletus or Isocrates of Athens urging the cause of civilized unity as Briand urged it at Geneva—there were then not as many political and social prejudices against such a move as there are now—but a soldier named Philip of Macedon; whose untimely assassination removed him before his work was done. A lasting peace was finally imposed by Roman Legions.<sup>106</sup>

This view of war and military forces as a means of achieving peace was conventional wisdom taught to Australian Army Officers seeking promotion up to ten years ago in the Military History Course. The view propounded here was that the philosopher king of Plato was not as effective or efficient as the soldier in restoring or creating peace.<sup>107</sup> Nowhere, of course, was the concept of peace defined—it was implied that peace was

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<sup>105</sup> *Australia's Participation In Peacekeeping, op cit.*, p.89.

<sup>106</sup> Macklin, W.H.S., CBE, Brig (Ret'd) Canadian Army— *An Introduction To The Principles of War*, Military History Notes, Eastern Command, Australian army, circa 1960, p.21.

<sup>107</sup> This theme has been encapsulated succinctly in an unpublished paper by the late Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mench, Royal Australian Infantry Corps, delivered to a conference of the Study Group on Armed Forces in Australian Society at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1976. The paper was entitled *From Athens To Sparta: The Training And Education Of Australian Army Officers*. Mench, who commanded the First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was an ardent supporter of the Athenian position which advocates an inclusive education for Army Officers, rather than a concentration on military skills alone.

merely the absence of war.<sup>108</sup> It is certainly not the peace and tranquillity as alluded to in Peel's Principles in 1932 relating to the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act which dealt with the qualities and characteristics of a civil police structure.<sup>109</sup> The Principles of War show a commonality with Peel's Principles for Policing. The Principles of War are essentially value free and have the capacity to change over time. The Principles as extrapolated by Macklin were as follows:

Turning to official doctrine, in 1932 the British Field Service Regulations enumerated eight principles: Maintenance of the Objective; Offensive Action; Surprise; Concentration; Economy of Force; Security; Mobility; and Cooperation.<sup>110</sup>

When Field Service Regulations was rewritten about 1935, however, the "Maintenance of the Object" was altered to the principle of the "Object" or "Aim", and this was treated as a sort of overriding or master principle, affecting all the others. It would seem that, at one time, the CIGS Field Marshall Montgomery, was inclined to rate "Air Superiority" as a principle of war, but apparently this was reconsidered, for it did appear in the new list. The list again included eight principles: The Object; Maintenance of Morale; Concentration; Security; Offensive Action; Flexibility; Surprise; and Administration.<sup>111</sup> Two principles "Economy of Force" and "Cooperation" were dropped from the old list;

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<sup>108</sup>So inaccurate was this lack of definition that, following World War Two, the term *Cold War* was invented to describe a condition that was neither peace nor war. Indeed this form of *peace* it can be argued is capable of being seen as a form of terror; so that while peace existed tranquillity certainly did not. See Seton-Watson, H. *Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World*, Methuen, London, 1960.

<sup>109</sup>The necessity for armed to put down conflict is not in question: it would be both foolish and impractical to do so. But the best that can be said for armed conflict is that it can be the midwife for peace of the sort that encompasses "tranquillity".

<sup>110</sup>Macklin, *op cit.*, p.3.

<sup>111</sup>*ibid*

two were added "Maintenance of Morale", and "Administration", and Mobility was changed to "Flexibility".<sup>112</sup>

These illustrations show plainly enough that there never has been complete unanimity and agreement as to those things that deserve to be ranked as Principles of War. Their changing nature indicates that there is a flexibility of approach to matters military, but it is a flexibility which exists only within a military matrix. At the same time there tends to exist within domestic jurisdictions an unnecessary rigidity relating to principles associated with policing. Peel's Principles are flexible enough within themselves to be capable of being widely interpreted and applied to international situations as well; the Principles of War are more restricted in that they naturally relate to War with an imperfect logic it can be asserted that the Principles of War have no factor of proactivity built into them and that diplomacy is the proactive arm of defence.

Since 1983 and the election of the Hawke Government the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade have been merged into a single Department. It can be claimed that this merger has converted traditional diplomacy into cash terms; and yet this merger has candidly recognized the close connection between diplomacy and trade. It is the argument of this thesis that there needs to be a similar recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of this country.

If this connection is to be properly realized, then policing as a security mechanism needs to be factored into Australia's defence equation together with the element of proactivity. The policy of Forward Defence (see Chapter Two below) needs to be readopted with less emphasis on purely military means to achieve it. Barry Buzan in his book, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, has argued

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<sup>112</sup>Showing that complete standardization with the United States had not been achieved in this matter, the American list as used at the US Command and Staff College includes: The Objective; The Offensive; Mass; Economy of Force; Management; Surprise; Security; Simplicity; and Cooperation. Cited in Macklin, *op cit.*, p.3.

against the preoccupation with military threats and their containment as the time test of a nation's security.<sup>113</sup> Gary Smith advocates what he calls the demilitarising of security:

Releasing security from its militarily imposed straightjacket and reconsidering the concept (of security) in light of its general usage, enables military policies and budgets to be placed in perspective, and focusses intellect and resources onto the broad security agenda.<sup>114</sup>

This leads Smith to develop a concept of non-provocative military defence which, to some critics is an oxymoron. Where his argument is more convincing is in his advocacy of a broad security agenda which includes areas of environmental and economic concern. These areas are of particular interest to South Pacific nations which face serious environmental problems (including nuclear contamination-perhaps the more so since the election of Jacques Chirac as President of France) and suffer the plundering of their natural resources, particularly the poaching of their tuna and other marine assets. There is, however, a glaring omission in Smith's new world order and that is his failure to consider a role for police. The use of police would seem a step towards the demilitarisation of security which he seeks.

In the post-Cold War world, the notion of security has to change fundamentally to accommodate new realities. The prominent foreign affairs commentator, Greg Sheridan, argues:

We are entering an era in which the intersection of politics, technology and cultural alienation are transforming the nature of the threats we will face.

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<sup>113</sup>Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf Publications, UK, 1983.

<sup>114</sup>Smith, G., "Demilitarising Security", in Smith G. and Kettle St J., *Threats Without Enemies*, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1992, p.26.

The decline of the nation state has been much oversold as a post-Cold War concept, but it is true that the vast majority of conflicts in this period have been within States rather than between States.

Sub-national threats as they are sometimes called, involve such things as piracy, narcotics trafficking, illegal population movements and terrorism.<sup>115</sup>

President Clinton's nominee to head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has warned of growing threats to the US from terrorism, crime and drug-running.<sup>116</sup> The evidence seems to suggest that these threats are not only national but global and neither Australia nor the South Pacific region is immune from the contagion. While counter-terrorism may require a military dimension, the campaign against crime and drugs is one traditionally associated with the police and the courts.

There is ample evidence to suggest that there is now a developing awareness in the South Pacific of the existence of dangers to both national and regional security which are not associated with traditional threat perceptions relating to military incursions. The problem of drugs is a good example. The discovery of \$A 30 million worth of hashish in Fiji in 1992 highlighted the need for an efficient regional drug-policing network,<sup>117</sup> the PNG government closed all its airports outside Port Moresby to direct international flights in a bid to halt a thriving trade in drugs and guns. According to PNG Police Minister Ijape, Australian crime syndicates were using PNG's porous borders to trade drugs from Australia and marijuana from PNG.<sup>118</sup> PNG's Comptroller of Customs in

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<sup>115</sup>*The Australian*, 29 March, 1995.

<sup>116</sup>*ibid.*, 28 April, 1995

<sup>117</sup>Tiffany, M., "Who's Looking After You?", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, Vol 64, No 3, March, 1992, Suva, Fiji, pp.6-7.

<sup>118</sup>*ibid.*

1992, Pius Saun, said they did not have the necessary capability and the exchange of information-especially with Australia-was a vital part of the war against drugs.<sup>119</sup>

Saun was also the chairman of the Customs Head of Administration Meeting (CHARM) which meets annually to discuss regional customs issues. He pointed out the growing regional concern about drugs, and particularly the growing use of Pacific Island countries as transit points into Australia, New Zealand and the United States: "The problem will not disappear overnight. PNG is a staging point through which drugs from Thailand, Singapore and the Middle East come", Saun said.<sup>120</sup> He said Guam and the Northern Marianas are increasingly being used as viable routes to the US drug market and again stressed the need for an exchange of information.<sup>121</sup>

The Solomon Islands Customs Department has warned the scattered nature of the country's islands, manpower shortages, and the lack of modern equipment has hindered them in battling narcotics. Many of the islands are uninhabited, and some could be used by overseas drug syndicates for drug trafficking. However that added that a regional police and customs network now enable national authorities to monitor, to a certain extent, the movement of illegal drugs.<sup>122</sup>

The current approach to domestic policing is described as being "proactive" rather than "reactive". This approach is not a simple use of jargon, but implies a serious synthesis of available police resources to prevent crime rather than to detect crime. This is a reversion to the third of Peel's Principles cited above: The absence of crime will best prove the efficiency of the police". Proactive policing as practised in most modern, industrialized societies had its modern genesis, or perhaps rebirth, in the United States.

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<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.*

On deeper analysis, and this will be done later in this work, when discussing the application of universalized policing to the South Pacific Region, the concept of proactive policing derives from a tribal society that our culture thought it had outgrown.<sup>123</sup> There is consonance between present day trends towards proactive policing and the order maintenance of ancient Anglo-Saxon society.

The development of the South Pacific police forces that are the main focus of this work, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Cook Islands are dealt with in the sections specifically focussed on them. It is sufficient to say here that these police forces grew out of the colonial regimes that controlled them until the advent of independence. The case of the Cook Islands is particularly interesting in that the London Missionary Society was the original "colonial power" and that in 1821, the date of European takeover, there were over 1, 000 church police whose major task it was to eliminate all "heathen" and immoral practices among the "natives".<sup>124</sup>

In the case of Fiji, Ratu Cakobau, the dominant political figure, decided to raise a permanent military force and, in 1871, the Royal Army, a thousand strong battalion with European Officers, was established. Its first military operation was in 1872 against the Ku Klux Klan, a political organization of white settlers in Levuka which had offered armed resistance to Cakobau's government. The operation was successful as was another the following year. When Fiji became a British colony in 1874, the Royal Army became the Armed Native Constabulary, a purely military body, and it was eventually merged with the civil police in 1904 to become the Fiji Constabulary.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>Even those of us who claim 100% Scottish descent do not take the clan system anywhere as near seriously as say do the Highlanders of PNG whose "wontok" system of clanship is almost totally binding and irrevocable.

<sup>124</sup>See Scott, D., *Years of the Pooch-Bah: A Cook Islands History*, Cook Islands Trading Corporation, Rarotonga, Cook Islands, 1991.

<sup>125</sup>The British Model Soldier Society, *The Bulletin*, Fiji Islands Edition, No3, Coulsdon, Surrey, UK, 1983, p.6.



The first police in what is now Papua New Guinea were established in New Guinea in 1884 while it was a German colony. British New Guinea (later to be known as Papua) was declared part of the British Empire in 1888 and the first Police Force there was erected in 1891, in the form of an Armed Native Constabulary. In 1906, Papua became an Australian possession and in 1914, following the outbreak of World War One, Australian armed forces occupied German New Guinea. The territory became a League of Nations Mandate administered by Australia and then a United Nations Trust Territory after World War Two. Initially the Police Force was known as the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and New Guinea Police Force, but was renamed the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary in 1952. Twenty years later in 1972 the name was changed to its present title, the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.<sup>126</sup>

It was not until the Japanese invasion of PNG that a military force was created; until then the PNG Constabulary were the only armed indigenous personnel. In a very real sense therefore the police have a longer history than does the military in PNG-but they do not have the same prestige.

It will be seen that the standard approach was to impose policing standards and practices extant throughout the British Empire; vestiges of these practices are still evident, though in attenuated forms. It will be further shown that despite independence there has been in the three countries a culture of dependency on the former colonial powers to provide a continued impetus for the development of policing. This is true in other foreign aid areas, but these are beyond the scope of this work. It is only now that the Cook Islands and Fiji are beginning to assert their independence from the previous colonial regimes. Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, is still closely tied through aid dependence to

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<sup>126</sup>Sinclair, J., *To Find a Path: The Life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment, Volume 1- Yesterday's Heroes 1885-1950*, Boolarong Press, Queensland, 1990.

Australia for the training and development of police and policing and this approach is criticized in the section dealing with Papua New Guinea.<sup>127</sup>

Proactive policing is a somewhat revolutionary process for *traditional* police to accept. It removes the emphasis on detection and the concomitant career status of detectives. In the traditional, Common Law- derived police forces, the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) and its members have been held out to be the elite of the organization; uniformed members have been treated, at least by the middle echelon police members, as those who could not satisfy the fairly rigid entry standards to the CIB. Role confusion has taken over where previously a career based on crime detection has been replaced, or perceived by many to have been replaced, by an amorphous concept that denies the credibility of "real" police work.

Proactive policing in a democratic context has not yet reached its full acceptance. It is unlikely that proactive policing in an international sense has any real likelihood of early acceptance except at the incipient level.<sup>128</sup> Proactive policing, while ancient in origin both in Britain and the South Pacific, is new and different in the modern context and, as such, is likely to provoke the usual human hostility to change. Yet the ultimate aim of Australia's regional police education and training programmes is to create a proactive security environment where surveillance, information-pooling and the early detection of criminal activities protect both South Pacific countries and Australia itself. It is in this context that the impact of police education and training is of crucial importance and new

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<sup>127</sup>See Chapter Three on The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Project below.

<sup>128</sup>Federal Attorney General Michael Lavarch has recently raised one of the most important aspects of international policing; this involves some form of extra-territoriality in the reach of Australian Law to its citizens who commit crimes outside Australia. In essence the proposal is aimed at Australian paedophiles who travel to Asia with the intent of debauching poverty-stricken children. At the present such persons are beyond the reach of Australian law. The Attorney General, clearly hampered by lack of international precedent and treaties, is according to Melbourne's *The Age*, 3 April, 1995, coming under some form of international pressure to give some protection to the children set upon by Australian paedophiles.

and expanded police roles such as peace-keeping operations to protect regional security need to be considered.

The outcome in a practical and operational sense of Peel's Principles ought to be the realization of peace and tranquillity or, at the very best, the absence of crime. This ought to be as true in the international arena as in the domestic context. Although these Principles were formulated for conditions in England in 1829, they are capable of being adopted and used at the end of the Twentieth Century and beyond. They possess a timeless quality that is intrinsic either to a modern liberal democracy or to a developing country. In this regard, therefore, a form of knowledge and technology transfer is possible, and even desirable, within policing through education and training programmes. If proactive policing measures are to be put into place in the South Pacific region, Australia has the means to provide them. Whether they develop indigenous roots or not depends to a large degree on the acceptance by the Australian authorities of the need to be sensitive to the nuances of the 'Pacific Way'.<sup>129</sup>

The profession of policing, as is the case in the profession of arms, can be seen as an unusual phenomenon. But this does not mean that police practice can be universally employed in the same way that many military professionals in the West thought that military practice could be applied to meet any number of contingencies. These military professionals were, with a few notable exceptions, incapable of understanding the real nature of guerilla warfare or insurgent tactics although a study of the Principles of War ought to have taught them otherwise. The American Civil War dictum 'getting there

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<sup>129</sup>The Pacific Way is an euphemism that seeks to assist outsiders come to terms with what is almost a regional way of carrying out business. It is capable of being interpreted, and misinterpreted, as corrupt insofar as transactions often involve the extended family. A far more gentle and realistic interpretation is that a foreigner has learn to keep in step with local practices. It is not a mystique but it has some of the qualities that unless the foreigner fits in with local practices then it is unlikely that anything will be accomplished; it is a lovely barrier that I have coined in relation to PNG as the Melanesian veil of courtesy. See Crocombe, R., *The Pacific Way*, USP, Suva, 197.

firstest with the mostest' is good advice but not a battle plan. If principle is the parent of practice, then it has many children.

It should also be noted that policing practice is becoming somewhat standardized with a large US influence at work. The shift in Australia from a traditional reliance on English policing to American style thought and method has already been stated above. The Americanization of policing is fundamentally a neutral development. Critics assail it on nationalistic grounds, realists accept it as another inevitable aspect of the 'global village' and the key role the US plays in this process. But such standardisation of policing must allow for particularisation that allows for modification to suit local conditions. In any case, with around 45, 000 separate police forces in the United States, it is nonsense to speak of the 'typical' American police force.<sup>130</sup> It is only safe, therefore, to speak of universalization in terms of principles and equipment rather than practices. The *modus operandi* of one domestic police force will differ markedly from that of its neighbour, more so when we discuss national, regional and international contexts. The necessity for Australia to accept the reality of difference when dealing with its South Pacific neighbours needs constant emphasis.

When the link between regional proactive policing and security is considered, the relationship seems so symbiotic that it is difficult to comprehend how most academic experts and defence practitioners have previously overlooked the role of police in national and regional defence. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, it was accepted as virtual dogma in Australia that a conventional defence force response was the only armour against threats to national or regional integrity. 'Forward Defence', for many years Australia's official defence posture, was always considered in terms of conventional military forces acting in concert with the armed forces of our allies to counter threats from forward positions in Asia. Cooperation with Asian and Pacific

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<sup>130</sup>See Sullivan, J., *Introduction to Police Science*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1971.

allies was usually expressed in terms of defence cooperation, that is, the training and equipping of the conventional armed forces of friendly countries. A mental dichotomy existed between our perceptions of soldiers and police with the latter having no perceived role to play in promoting the security of their country or region. It is argued that this is an attitude that needs to change.

Forward Defence may no longer be fashionable as security doctrine in Australia, but it is submitted that a new, non-military, version/variant involving proactive policing measures such as surveillance, detection and apprehension deserves to be considered. In defence analysts' language, the concept is one of 'denial in depth' to produce a security buffer zone through policing operations to defend Australia. Our South Pacific approaches should be protected by proactive policing operations involving cooperation between Australia and regional police forces. While the primary guarantee of security is still a nation's defence force, this is more true in a reactive than a proactive sense. There is a case for selective preemptive strikes, but not as a general rule; otherwise security begets aggression. The police, both by institutional ethos and training and their relationship with the citizenry, are better equipped professionally to deal with these new low-level, non-military threats in a proactive fashion. The police are capable, if given the funds, equipment and training opportunities of constructing a new kind of "Forward Defence" policy in the South Pacific which will benefit both Australia and the region.

### **Police Studies in the Region**

Tertiary education for police in Australia is still a relatively new development.<sup>131</sup> There have, of course, been small numbers of police who have undertaken courses at the tertiary level for many years but their studies have been largely in Law and Accountancy

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<sup>131</sup>The information in this section is taken from a range of University Calendars/Handbooks supplemented by personal knowledge and contacts.

which have tended to lead to careers outside of policing. To a lesser extent there has been a small number of police who have read Criminology. But the major push for the tertiary education of police in Australia began in the early 1970's as a direct consequence of a similar movement in the United States in the 1960's. This was supported by massive injections of funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) to help meet the perceived threats to law and order and to professionalise the United States police. The Australian move was slightly different in that courses for police come at a time when the Colleges of Advanced Education were burgeoning and programmes and courses of all kinds were appearing. 1974 was the 'Golden Year' for the Colleges of Advanced Education; almost overnight the size of tertiary education in Australia doubled. This was the era of the 'binary system' whereby Universities, some of which were themselves under ten years old, found themselves operating side by side in a form of educational 'apartheid', equal but different, with institutions (Colleges/Institutes) that had evolved from the era of the Mechanics' Institutes and were up to 100 years old. This growth was a means whereby access to higher learning was to be made more accessible to those who wanted it. Universities tended to continue to teach what they perceived to be traditional areas, even though disciplines such as Sociology were themselves relatively new.

It is also worth pointing out until the early 1960's there were only six capital city universities, one national university and one regional university in Australia. By the early 1970's Colleges of Advanced Education along with former Teachers' Colleges had started teaching degree courses, rather than diploma, level courses; as well they continued to teach Associate Diplomas which were two year post-secondary courses. Largely inspired by the American LEAA initiatives linked with a local momentum, three Australian Colleges of Advanced Education introduced almost simultaneously Associate Diplomas designed for serving police members and other interested parties - the three were the Mitchell College of Advanced Education, Bathurst, New South Wales, the Phillip Institute of Technology and Caulfield (later Chisholm) Institute of

Technology, both in Melbourne. Of the three, Caulfield's course was designed exclusively for police members.

In New Zealand, Massey University developed a Diploma of Police Studies which from inception has never reached a proper point of take-off insofar as it has not really been accepted by members of The Royal New Zealand Police Force. Even as late as July, 1993, there was a reluctance on the part of the University to introduce a Bachelor's degree and a reluctance on the part of the New Zealand police members to enrol at Massey. Rather the police expressed a preference to enrol at Monash University, the successor upon merger to the above mentioned Caulfield/Chisholm institution.

The University of Papua New Guinea has on its books a Diploma of Police Studies located in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology; as far as can be determined, no one has yet taken out this Diploma. It is the case that Papua New Guinea police members seeking higher education actively apply for study overseas - for study in Australia they compete for Sir John Crawford Scholarships (formerly Equity and Merit Scholarships) awarded by the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (formerly AIDAB, now AUSAID).

The University of the South Pacific (USP) has at present no course specifically designated as Police Studies or Justice Administration. Police members in Fiji do undertake courses in Management, Accounting and other subjects, at the Laucala Bay Campus in Suva. Extension Service (Distance Education) courses for police in the other nations served by the USP are quite limited in scope and most are at the Certificate and Diploma levels which at July, 1993, did not provide credit exemption towards the scant Degree offerings available. This latter point is not a criticism of the USP, but reflects the reality of attempting to provide courses with extremely limited funding. Indeed one of USP's greatest problems is that students prefer to study in the United States, Australia and New Zealand; apart from any perceived status value of overseas study the possibility of staying on after graduation and earning overseas salaries must be factored

into the career equation in the South Pacific. There is a growing recognition that police recruits/students are best trained and educated within their countries of domicile, at least in terms of their initial qualifications both academic and professional. The somewhat romantic view of a student being acculturated overseas has passed into the cynical view that a form of cultural 'subversion' takes place and is often not in the interests of the student's home nation.

Some policing-type subjects may be included eventually in the curriculum of the USP's new Law School which is located in the Vanuatu capital of Port Vila and thus has some cultural advantages. The foundation stone was laid in March this year and the building is expected to be completed in September 1996. It is interesting to note that the project is being funded by the government of the People's Republic of China through an interest-free loan of \$US5,800,000.<sup>132</sup> It represents an attempt by USP to decentralise its activities to help remove the 'Fiji-dominated' stigma which has dogged the so-called regional university. The USP's new Law School has designed degree courses which will take account of European-style law and traditional and cultural principles.<sup>133</sup> The Foundation Professor is Mark Findlay of the University of Sydney's Institute of Criminology, of which he is Director; he has an academic background in Criminal Law and Criminology. He was for a time in charge of the Justice Administration Course at the Mitchell College of Advanced Education, now Charles Sturt University. It is to be hoped that the USP Law School will seek to interest regional police forces in its activities and programs. Professor Guy Powles, Faculty of Law, Monash University, was a member of the 1992 regional workshop which planned the future of the USP Law School. He is of the opinion that regional police forces could benefit immensely from participating in suitable academic programs offered by the new Law School.<sup>134</sup> He

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<sup>132</sup>*Pacific Islands Monthly*, Suva, May, 1995, p.20.

<sup>133</sup>USP Law Curriculum Workshop, *Recommendations*, Port Vila, 23-25 March, 1992, p.1.

<sup>134</sup>Interview, Monash University, 17 May, 1995.



supports the introduction of Associate Diplomas in Criminology and in Police Studies as worthy additions to the courses to be offered in Port Vila (with progression to Bachelor's degrees and beyond subsumed in his comments).

The discussion now moves to a consideration of Australian attitudes and policies towards security.

## Summary

This Chapter, Policing: Some Dimensions and Perspectives, considered the nature of policing, Peel's Principles and their application and some recent trends in policing in Australia. It discussed the international dimensions of policing and surveyed police education in Australia and the region.

These factors are intimately linked to the argument of this thesis *that there needs to be a recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of this country in regional terms and perspectives.*

Through the examination of The Nature of Policing, Peel's Principles and their Application, Control of the Police in Australia: A Reform Agenda, The International Dimension and Security Aspect and Police Studies in the Region, a clear line has been argued that there is an inextricable link between policing and defence.

Defence and security throughout the Twentieth Century, and certainly during the so-called Cold War period, were seen to be primarily a naval and military concern. Diplomacy was cast in the Clausewitzian model as the handmaid of defence and security. The advent of the New World Order, following the apparent collapse of European Communism, has radically reshaped the nature of defence and security. This Chapter has argued that despite changes to threat perceptions affecting national and international integrity the solutions are still seen in official circles to be naval and military.

New, or radical, thinkers on defence have argued that the policy of Forward Defence needs to be readopted with less emphasis on purely military means to achieve it. It has been argued that the concept of non-provocative military defence needs to be developed to include a broad security agenda including environmental and economic concerns. In the South Pacific, where only Papua New Guinea and Fiji have Defence Forces, the use of police is a natural concomitant of non-provocative defence. There is ample evidence to suggest that there is now a developing awareness in the South Pacific of the dangers to both national and regional security which are not associated with traditional threat

perceptions relating to military incursions. It is both interesting and surprising that these new defence thinkers have not considered policing as a factor to be reckoned with in their conceptual framework-though at times they come close to recognising it.

And yet, if it is difficult to locate the role of policing at a national level, as has been demonstrated in this Chapter, then it is certainly more difficult at the regional and international levels. Until 1964, when a civil police contingent was attached to the United Nations force in Cyprus(UNIFCYP), there was no view that civil police had a role outside of limited domestic boundaries. The emerging international role of police as peacekeepers is one which, in the process of evolution, is likely to grow in scope as the practical advantages become more recognised.

The concept of proactive policing derives from a tribal society that our culture thought it had outgrown. There is a consonance between present day trends towards proactive policing and the order maintenance of Anglo-Saxon society. Proactive policing in a democratic context has not yet reached its full acceptance. It is unlikely that proactive policing in an international sense has any real likelihood of early acceptance except at the incipient level.

The ultimate aim of Australia's regional police education and training programmes is to create a proactive security environment where surveillance, information-pooling and the early detection of criminal activities protect both South Pacific countries and Australia itself. When the link between regional proactive policing and security is considered, the relationship seems so symbiotic that it is difficult to comprehend how most academics and defence practitioners have previously overlooked the role of police in national and regional defence.

The police, both by institutional ethos and training and their relationship with the citizenry, are better equipped professionally to deal with these new low-level, non-military threats in a proactive fashion. The police are capable, if given the funds, equipment and training opportunities, of constructing a new kind of "Forward Defence" policy in the South Pacific which will benefit both Australia and the region.

## CHAPTER TWO

### AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TOWARDS SECURITY

#### Introduction

In discussing Australia's regional security doctrine, Fry states: "Australia first developed a regional security doctrine in the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century. Focussing on the Pacific Islands region, including New Guinea, Australia (and New Zealand) policy makers proclaimed what became known as the Australian Monroe Doctrine: an attempt to promote the South Pacific as an Anglo-Saxon preserve in which other powers should not trespass".<sup>1</sup> There was in our history an early recognition that Australia's security was tied to the peace and tranquillity of the South Pacific region. It was believed that ultimately this depended on the presence of superior military force, such force to be provided by a great and powerful friend. There is no disagreement here with the proposition that the security of Australia is bound to be affected by events and developments in the South Pacific. The question to be addressed, however, is whether an emphasis on military means is appropriate in the post-Cold War world given that the nature of threats to our security has changed and dangers now come in different forms.

#### Great and Powerful Friends

Australian Defence Policy has not conceptually altered since the First Fleet—what has been the dominating theme of denial has only altered in its geographical locus. In a

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<sup>1</sup>Fry, G., "Australia's Regional Security Doctrine: Old Assumptions, New Challenges" in Fry, G. (ed.), *Australia's Regional Security*, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1991, p.2.

practical sense the settlement at Port Jackson in 1788 predates Dibb's concept of denial and self-reliance of 1986;<sup>2</sup> an isolated settlement and an isolated nation are conceptually identical, only the technology has changed. Australia's traditional view of its strategic environment was dominated by a sense of isolation and threat<sup>3</sup>. Given the country's huge area and long coastline, its small population, its proximity to Asia and remoteness from Britain, fear was a natural reaction. A threat mentality developed along with the belief that the defence of Australia by Australians themselves was physically impossible. Hence it was necessary to rely on "great and powerful friends" to protect Australia. Camilleri observes: "To meet various potential threats, most Australian governments have emphasized the need for a defence capability not in order to counter the threat directly, but with a view to securing the assistance of a powerful ally"<sup>4</sup>. This led to the idea of an alliance as a kind of insurance policy and our involvement in various foreign military expeditions, ranging from the Maori Wars in the 1860's to the Vietnam War, represented premiums which had to be paid to preserve the alliance, first with Britain then with the United States<sup>5</sup>. Hasluck in writing of the Australia between 1939 and 1941 comments that:

A changing and confused nation, engaged on its domestic problems in the midst of a changing and confused world, found itself on the brink of war. Materially and spiritually it was unprepared for war and its unpreparedness was aggravated by its uncertainties both as regards itself

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<sup>2</sup> Dibb, P., *Report to the Minister for Defence—Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Australian Government Publishing Service—Canberra, 1986.

<sup>3</sup> See Dupont, A., (ed.), *Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search For Security*, SDSC, ANU, Canberra, 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Camilleri, J., *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, Fourth Edition, Jacaranda Press, Milton Qld., 1979, p.20.

<sup>5</sup> Darlington, R., *Sudan to Vietnam*, Shakespeare Head Press, Drummoyne, NSW, 1987.

as nation and as regards its place in the world. How was such a nation isolated in the South Seas, to survive?<sup>6</sup>

In answering his own question, Hasluck replies: "the military means was to be co-operation and mutual aid between the nations of the British Commonwealth and such allies as might gather to them".<sup>7</sup>

The collapse of the British in Malaya and the fall of Singapore in February, 1942 accelerated the realistic acceptance of the US as our new great and powerful friend. This relationship was cemented officially after World War 2 in the ANZUS Treaty which brought Australia, New Zealand and the US into collective security arrangements. As far as Canberra is concerned, the relationship remains crucial. The 1994 Defence White Paper states: "Australia's defence alliance with the United States continues to be a key element of our defence policy, and will remain so over the period (into the next century). The relationship formalised in the ANZUS Treaty reflects the close alignment of our enduring strategic interests".<sup>8</sup> While the dependency on a major ally doctrine may have made good strategic sense, it did, however, reduce Australia to junior partner status and cultivate reactive responses to defence issues in official circles.

### Strategic Denial

A constant theme in Australian defence thinking was the concept of strategic denial; enemies had to be "denied" access to territory or to sea routes which could be used to threaten Australia. Van Dieman's Land (Tasmania) was settled in 1805 to prevent it falling into the hands of the French. Australian efforts to persuade the British to acquire

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<sup>6</sup> Hasluck, P., *The Government And The People. 1939-1941*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp.7-8.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.* p.8.

<sup>8</sup> *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.95.

more territories in the Pacific Islands during the Nineteenth Century were designed to promote the security of Australia (or at least the colonies which were to become Australia) through attempts at, in Fry's term, "strategic denial by annexation".<sup>9</sup>

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Australia's Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, practised a denial tactic in having the Conference agree to the League of Nations' Mandate over former German New Guinea being administered "as an integral portion of the Commonwealth of Australia".<sup>10</sup> His aim was to prevent the Japanese gaining access to the territory through the application of the Immigration Restriction Act, otherwise known as the White Australia Policy. In 1921 Hughes developed the concept of denial as a major plank in the development of Australia's Defence Policy:

In developing Australian defence plan, proposals were made to reorganize the citizen army, which would be composed of volunteers from the A. I. F. and universal trainees, but the first line of defence was to be the navy. Sea power was essential to the political integrity of sea-girt nations, said Hughes. In view of controversies which developed later, it is interesting to note the view he took of the air force. The air, that new element which man had now conquered, was but the sea and it was in the air over the sea that Australia would have to look for defence.<sup>11</sup>

The Imperial Conference of 1923, at which Australia was represented by Prime Minister S. M. Bruce, resolved that "the Conference affirms that it is necessary to provide for the adequate defence of the territories and trade of the several countries comprising the British Empire."<sup>12</sup> The Conference suggested as a "guiding principle" adequate

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<sup>9</sup> Fry, G., *op cit.*, p.3.

<sup>10</sup> Hasluck, *op cit.*, p.10

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, p.10.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, p.13

provision for safeguarding the maritime communications of the several parts of the Empire and the routes and waterways along which their armed forces and trade passed.<sup>13</sup>

The theme of strategic denial can be traced in more modern times from H. V. Evatt to Malcolm Fraser to Bill Hayden. Evatt refashioned an antipodean version of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1944 ANZAC Pact between Australia and New Zealand with a defensive standard concept. Clause 31 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement stated:

Within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the Southwest and South Pacific areas shall be established ..... this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand stretching through the arc of islands north and north-west of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.<sup>14</sup>

For Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister the problem of regional security focussed on the activities of the Soviet Union and its proxies (Libya especially) in the South Pacific. A revived strategic denial doctrine was invoked to counter any Soviet advance in the region. Fry comments:

Any Soviet diplomatic or economic link with a South Pacific state was to be seen as the thin edge of the wedge—a possible stepping stone to a military base or Soviet-influenced island government which could either be a launching point for attack on Australia or Australia's sea lines of communication. Australia's preferred form of South Pacific security, then, was an absence of Soviet influence.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> *ibid.* It is significant that the Conference recognized that trade was an element in the overall security of the Empire; security implied defence but consisted of other elements as well. See also McCarthy, J., *Australia and Imperial Defence: A Study in Air and Sea Power*, UQP, Brisbane, 1976.

<sup>14</sup> Australian-New Zealand Agreement, Clause 31.

<sup>15</sup> Fry, *op cit.*, p.6.



Australia, in the absence of strong American interest in the region, (interest which was not to develop until the publication of the Solarz Report, *Problems in Paradise*,<sup>16</sup> in 1990 and then only briefly), sought to develop a regional security community. Australia's preferred strategies to promote regional security were economic assistance, regional cooperation, diplomacy and defence cooperation.

Bill Hayden continued this approach in the early years of his stewardship as Foreign Minister with the emerging crisis in ANZUS which gave the South Pacific a new strategic concern and made Soviet activities (fishing agreements and the like) appear more sinister in intent.

### Forward Defence

The theme of denial has been a constant one in Australian perceptions of its regional strategic environment. Another important theme after 1945 was that of "Forward Defence", a strategy whereby Australia would be defended at a distance. Schott states: "Following World War Two, Australia maintained what was referred to as a 'Forward Defence' concept whereby ground troops were stationed forward of Australian soil in South Eastern Asian countries".<sup>17</sup> Prime Minister Menzies, in his 1955 statement referring to Australia's commitment of troops to Malaya during the Emergency, declared that if there was to be war for our existence, it should be carried out by us as far from our own soil as possible. The element of proactivity was obviously present in a policy which saw Australian troops serving overseas in what was officially peace time. Likewise, the Confrontation episode saw Australian troops deployed to protect the new

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<sup>16</sup> US Congress committee on Foreign Affairs, Congressional Delegation Report, *Problems in Paradise: United States Interests in the South Pacific*, USGPO, Washington, 1990.

<sup>17</sup> Schott, D.G., "Australian Defence Policy 1976-1987", *Defence Force Journal*, AGPS, Canberra, No.67, November/December, 1987, p.12.

state of Malaysia against Indonesian incursions.<sup>18</sup> The Forward Defence policy reached its apotheosis with the Vietnam War as expressed in the slogan, "Better Saigon than Sydney", used to justify Australia's involvement in the war. The extent to which this policy was analysed and debated at the time is open to question. Schott maintains: "although the concept was recognised, little intellectual effort appears to have gone into its development as an indigenous defence policy for Australia."<sup>19</sup> He lists a number of "significant geo-strategic events" which led to a change in Australian attitudes; the British withdrawal "East of Suez", the defeat of US forces in Vietnam and their subsequent disengagement from South East Asia, the emergence of China from its diplomatic isolation and its new place in world affairs and, finally, President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" which, in his view, was the most important factor as it removed the expectation of a guaranteed American response to conflict in South East Asia.<sup>20</sup>

It is true that Forward Defence, as a viable military option, was always envisaged in the context of acting in concert in the field with powerful allies.<sup>21</sup> The Minister for Defence Mr. John Dedman, had stated in the first major post-War defence policy statement on 4 June, 1947, that the Australian armed forces were to be maintained under arrangements for Cooperation in British Commonwealth defence. The British withdrawal "East of Suez" (a policy expected to be completed by 1971) had already produced a major revision of Australian Labor Party policy on Forward Defence. The then Shadow Defence Minister, Lance Barnard, stated in 1969:

It is the declared policy of the Party that the bulk of Australia's forces should be concentrated on the mainland of Australia. There is certainly no place for small contingents of Australian land forces on the Asian

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<sup>18</sup> See Mackie, J.A.C., *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1967-1966*, OUP, London, 1974.

<sup>19</sup> Schott, *op cit.*, p.12.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>21</sup> See Barnard, L., *Australian Defence: Policy and Programmes*, Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1969.

mainland. Their presence cannot serve to promote Australian national unity; indeed they could prove counter productive.<sup>22</sup>

Schott sees the culmination of these events and influences, including the end of Australia's involvement in the war in Vietnam, as leading to "the abandonment of 'Forward Defence' and a commitment to the 'Defence of Australia' concept with its associated goal of self-sufficiency."<sup>23</sup>

It may be the case that the Vietnam War experience has been the most enduring influence on defence policy making in Australia. The inglorious end to that commitment, coupled with the dubious morality of the war itself and the methods used to wage it, particularly conscription, produced a revulsion in Australia against foreign military expeditions, especially those involving conventional land forces. The recent controversy in the US surrounding the publication of Robert McNamara's book, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*,<sup>24</sup> has led some commentators to observe what they see as the paralysis in defence policy is America's new Vietnam War legacy. The distinguished columnist, Sam Lipski, argues that the doctrine enunciated by US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger that the US should not go to war unless victory can be guaranteed in advance and there is overwhelming support from Congress and public opinion is a prescription for foreign and defence policy paralysis in Washington. He states: "it is that doctrine which dominates the thinking of today's Pentagon chiefs, virtually all of whom were platoon or company commanders or the equivalent in Vietnam."<sup>25</sup> In Australia, the stress placed on reactive, defensive operations in current military thinking may well have its roots in the Vietnam War experience.

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<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>23</sup> Schott, *op cit.*, p.13.

<sup>24</sup> McNamara, R., *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, Random House, New York, 1995.

<sup>25</sup> *The Age*, 21 April, 1995.

This is not to suggest that a mood of isolation has swept the nation. Australia's ready response in supporting our great and powerful friend, the US, in the Gulf War in 1990 showed that the old policy of paying insurance premiums was still operative. However, it should be noted in this context that the commitment involved only the provision of naval vessels (not land forces) and regular ADF personnel (not conscripts). It is reasonable to suggest that, if the commitment had involved the provision of land forces, then the Australian public would have been less supportive. The Gulf War commitment was less about Forward Defence (and Kuwait) and much more about protecting the Australian-American alliance.

One ADF unit which could maintain a proactive, forward stance is the 1st Commando Regiment (essentially an Army Reserve Unit). The Regiment and the Special Air Services Regiment constitute the Australian Army's Special Forces contingent. The type of training which the Commandos undergo equip them to undertake "first-strike" operations but, it must be said, on a limited basis in terms of the overall ADF effort. If the quality of the intelligence material provided is sufficiently accurate and up-to-date, then the Commandos would be able to mount proactive operations, particularly against would-be terrorists- although the 1994 Defence White Paper, *Defending Australia*, allocates this role primarily to the SAS. The political problem in the South Pacific is how to secure the cooperation of national governments well in advance and, both within Australia and the region, how to avoid charges of interference in the domestic affairs of small neighbouring states.<sup>26</sup>

### **The South Pacific and Australia's Security: The Debate**

The debate surrounding the strategic value of the South Pacific and its place and role in Australia's security provoked a lively debate both here and abroad. Some of these

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<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the 1st Commando Regiment and its activities, see *The Australian*, 19 April, 1995.

views are now canvassed to illustrate the nature of that debate and to demonstrate its dynamics.

Richard Herr adapted Jonathon Swift's classic, *Gulliver's Travels*, to describe the situation in 1983:

Although there is no immediate, identifiable strategic threat to the region, the ease with which this circumstance could be changed is of concern. The possibility that any single state could dramatically alter the military balance in the South Pacific by becoming a client state to a power such as the Soviet Union is real albeit remote. Sensitivity to the Islands and their needs is crucial. It is vital if friendly external states are to assist the Islands without becoming either patronizing or domineering. It is also important if one is to distinguish between a microstate seeking "to play the ANZUS card" for more aid or one engaged in a rhetorical display of its sovereign independence from one genuinely concerned for its own or the region's security. Such distinctions are not easy to make. The view from Lilliput is not the same as from Brobdingnag even where there are interests in common.<sup>27</sup>

The title of Herr's paper, *South Pacific Security: Perspectives from Lilliput to Brobdingnag*, was an imaginative one, but it is guilty of literary licence as, within four paragraphs, Herr surrenders its relevance by pleading the breakdown of the analogy<sup>28</sup>. Nevertheless, his innovative way of looking at the South Pacific region was important and highlighted the rationale for greater regional awareness. However, despite its virtues, his analysis still emphasizes the connection between regional security and traditional military means.

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<sup>27</sup> Herr, R.A., *South Pacific Security: Perspectives From Lilliput to Brobdingnag*, Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer, 1983, p.40.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p.33.

The influential American commentator, John Dorrance, in his paper, *Strategic Cooperation And Competition in the Pacific Islands: An American Assessment*,<sup>29</sup> published in 1990 but written before the end of the Cold War, also alluded to *Gulliver's Travels*, but did not sustain the analogy. He was scrupulously fair in declaring that the major premises of his argument were indeed derived from American perspectives. The tone of his paper is one of superiority. Dorrance sees the Pacific in terms of what the metropolitan powers are able to do with the region:

Historically, external power interest and competition in the Pacific islands has flowed primarily from the latter's geographic relationship to trans-Pacific lanes of communication. That factor alone drove Western colonization of the islands.<sup>30</sup>

He recognizes the reality of change:

However, the nearly complete decolonization of the region, and changing transportation, communications, and defense technologies, have assured new dimensions to external power strategic cooperation and competition —as have recent changes in East-West relations. From a Western state perspective, the Soviet threat to the former's regional strategic interests appear to be receding. More immediate concerns relate to political volatility within the region as manifested by military coups, violent secessionist movements, insurrection and other problems intrinsic to the region.<sup>31</sup>

This "far more complicated strategic arena" has generated "a requirement for increased cooperation between Western powers with regional interests, and between them and the regional states". Dorrance did not intend to convey an overly neo-imperialist or neo-

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<sup>29</sup> Dorrance, J.C., *Strategic Co-operation And Competition In The Pacific Islands: An American Assessment*, Working Paper No 203, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p.i.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p.i.

colonial stance, but his advocacy of increased cooperation between Western powers with regional interests could open the door to such charges. His critics would assert that it smacked of proprietorial interests in the region. His conclusions, which are worth quoting at length, demonstrate signs of a 'management mentality'; the South Pacific has to be ordered and managed by the great powers (including the Soviet Union), with the appropriate attention and sensitivity to local concerns, to achieve the proper strategic balance. He states:

From a Western power perspective, change and challenge in Oceania has not yet reached unmanageable proportions, especially since Western and regional state strategic interests are generally compatible. But the potential for trouble is present as less conservative, and more ideologically motivated and assertive, island elites replace those who emerged in the immediate post-war period; no expectations out-pace economic development; and as the Soviets and some other external powers seek opportunities to challenge traditional Western influence.

If nothing else, change and challenge in Oceania now require higher levels of Western strategic cooperation through policy consultation and coordination, higher levels of development assistance, and sustained higher levels of attention to and sensitivity toward regional state interests and concerns. The latter point particularly applies to the United States vis-a-vis the South Pacific

Regional change also requires adjustment to new realities, including acceptance of a permanent Soviet presence, and the likelihood of its expansion. The Western strategy of deterrence of conflict through alliance strength and cooperation will remain essential in the Pacific as elsewhere, but hopefully at less expensive and less threatening armament levels. In that context, a major challenge for the West will be to develop a political strategy for Oceania, including through dialogue with the Soviets, which will channel the latter's new presence in directions that mesh with broader strategies intended ultimately to integrate the Soviet

Union into the matrix of normal global political and economic processes.<sup>32</sup>

Recognizing that Dorrance's paper is written from an American viewpoint, as stated in the title, his statement advocates a form of great-power neo-colonialism which imposes, or seeks to impose, Western hegemony over the microstates of Oceania. He fails to grasp that the problems of the microstates were created by major power scrambles in the "Golden Age" of imperialism. He further does not see that the microstates have become conduits that are capable of disrupting the integrity of middle ranking powers such as Australia and New Zealand. Dorrance, like other writers, only conceives of security in a military sense—he has no feeling for security in a civil sense that involves policing and makes no allowance for wider and more contemporary threats in the region.

The "security equals military" syndrome can be detected even in the work of contemporary left-wing critics who were hostile to Western (especially American) influence in the region. J.M. Anthony, in a paper written in 1985 entitled *"Great Power Involvement in Oceania: Implications for, and appropriate responses from Pacific Island Micro States"*, attacks the Western position in the region:<sup>33</sup>

What emerges is that "strategic denial" is now very much the cornerstone of American policy in the region. Its pivotal preoccupation is the "right" (of the U. S.) "to deny access to the islands to any present or potential enemy and to assure that, whatever political changes may take place ..... the government will remain friendly to the interests of the United States. "Translated into operational terms this means that the U. S. reserves the right to prevent, by whatever means necessary, and Pacific island state from entering into any foreign relationship of which the U. S. does not approve. Not without significance this is a policy which is tacitly

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<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, p.20.

<sup>33</sup> Anthony, J.M., *Great Power Involvement in Oceania: Implications for, and appropriate responses from Pacific Island Micro States*, Pacific Research and Information Network, Honolulu, Hawaii, November, 1985.



supported by the governments of Australia and New Zealand. "Strategic denial" is thus a policy which has enormously important implications for island politics.<sup>34</sup>

He placed both Australia and New Zealand 'in the dock' through a guilt-by-association process:

With Australia and New Zealand, of course, the islands of the South Pacific have had a lot more contact—historically through trade, education, sport and cultural exchange programs. Despite the fact that both Australia and New Zealand now provide a number of island states with not insignificant amounts of aid I think it is arguable whether theirs has been all that much of a close relationship. A large part of the Australian and New Zealand aid program is motivated by political consideration important to the interests of both donor countries and urged on them in no small part by the U.S. in the interests of "Western security".

Both Australia and New Zealand, again, no doubt, at the behest of the United States, are very much a part of the fabric of 'strategic denial'. Both Australia and New Zealand, for example, have rapid deployment forces established to quickly intervene in island domestic political situations which might, by their standards and that of the U.S., threaten "Western security interests". Although those rapid deployment forces have not yet been used they are a chilling reminder of the vulnerability of island states to outside interference in their internal affairs and, in a real sense, a crude measure of their not so independent status.<sup>35</sup>

The Pacific Islands, in this case the South Pacific, are viewed through the left-wing lens as the victims, past and potential, of Western political interests backed by their military force. Both Australia and New Zealand, it is alleged, hold their rapid deployment forces

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<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, pp.22-23.

in readiness to intervene militarily in South Pacific states. According to this left-wing view, threats to the peace and tranquillity of the South Pacific are state-directed and emanate from the American preoccupation with strategic denial and the role of Western military power in the region. Presumably peace is not only the absence of war, but the absence of military power altogether.<sup>36</sup> No mention is made of non-military threats or dangers. Moreover, the ability of private individuals or civilian-initiated and directed activities to damage regional peace and tranquillity does not seem to occur to these left-wing critics. The Left and Right shared something in common, a penchant for interpreting security in the region in military terms and a preoccupation with state-directed threats.<sup>37</sup>

### The Dobb Report and its Aftermath

In March, 1986, the *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Report to the Minister for Defence by Paul Dobb was released. This report (to be known as the Dobb Report) was the most thorough examination of Australia's defence since 1937 and brought with it a revised assessment of Australia's capabilities. Indeed Dobb addressed for the first time in forty nine years the concept of Australia defending itself with its own resources. His conclusions properly and correctly reflect his brief from the Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley. He cannot legitimately be criticized in this work for areas not asked for by his Minister. That Dobb failed to consider threats to Australia from any source other than naval or military in terms of security or integrity was the fault of the brief, although as it will be shown he came close to recognizing other threats but failed to follow through this line of investigation.

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<sup>36</sup> See Smith, G., and Kettle, St J., *Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security*, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1992

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

It is pertinent to assess Dibb's conclusion prior to examining aspects of his Report in detail where policing could have been included as part of a defence scenario. It is significant that Dibb's conclusion begins with a quotation from 1938 which is as follows:

The Government's defence policy provides for defence against both invasion and raids. As raids are the most probable form of attack, the completion of the defence against this contingency is the immediate objective of policy. The new defence programme will provide adequate defence against raids and, at the same time, will afford a deterrent to and a substantial measure of defence against invasion.<sup>38</sup>

Dibb thus establishes the linkage between his findings and those of the pre-World War II debate about the defence of Australia. It is important to realize that Dibb was acting as the paradigmatic public servant in the manner in which he reported his brief. His Minister was the Minister for Defence; Beazley's portfolio did not cover Foreign Affairs and Trade let alone Justice. The neat political division of labour applied in his report was specific rather than wholistic. Thus, unable to examine activities outside Defence, he was able to assert that "It must be a primary national policy objective in the 1990's to ensure that Australia's favourable regional security situation endures. This is a matter mainly for our foreign and economic policies, although defence activities can contribute".<sup>39</sup>

The following excerpt from Dibb's conclusion cannot be criticised for its general accuracy:

Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world. it is distant from the main centres of global military confrontation, and is surrounded

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<sup>38</sup> Thorby, H.V.C., Acting Minister for Defence, 1938, cited in *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities—Report to the Minister for Defence by Paul Dibb*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, p.174.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p.175

by large expanses of water which makes it difficult to attack. Australia shares no land borders with any other nation, it does not stand astride any vital international sea lanes, nor does it control crucial maritime choke points. Our neighbours possess only limited capabilities to project military power against us. Only once in its 200 year history has this nation experienced the prospect of invasion. Even then, the Japanese had already decided in 1942 that the conquest of Australia was beyond their military capacity.

Australia's area of primary strategic concern—South East Asia and the South West Pacific—is one of the most stable regions in the world. Although not without problems, nation—building in this region is proving successful, and economic prospects are more promising than in many other parts of the Third World.

We have no traditional enmities or traditional disputes with neighbouring countries. These states are favourable disposed towards us, and they recognise that Australia does not threaten them.<sup>40</sup>

And yet, the very tenor of the text is decidedly parochial almost to the point of what used to be called Little Englander. It promotes the view that security is exclusively concerned with defence and indeed that the two are synonymous. The military balance of South East Asia and the South West Pacific has not changed dramatically since Dobb published his report, although the Spratly Islands dispute seems to be developing as a potential flashpoint. It is somewhat disturbing to point out that the Natural Disasters Organization, a branch of the Defence Department, is not mentioned at all in the Report. This sin of omission can be traced to the terms of reference which stressed military defence. It is in the area of the South West Pacific where natural disasters, such as Cyclone Ona in the Solomons in 1989, can nearly destroy an economy and thus bring about both economic and social instability which can be more ruinous than military invasion. Of course, the Australian Defence Force, through the Royal Australian

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<sup>40</sup> *ibid.* p.174.

Engineers, has provided civil engineering support to the South West Pacific in terms of cyclone rehabilitation.

Dibb however gave some interesting pointers for others to take up that were outside his terms of reference:

"....., Australians have generally felt threatened from one direction on another. In the period between the two world wars, a great debate raged over whether we were faced with the threat of invasion or only of raids. This debate is still with us, even though Australia itself has only ever experienced raids. In the post-war period, China, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Indonesia have variously been seen in opinion polls as the most source of threat. The very volatility with which threat perceptions can change in Australia—for example, regarding China—is an indication of public insouciance and the lack of a real consensus in this country on what the Defence Force is defending us against.

In the prolonged era of 'forward defence' Australia was able to avoid the central question of what forces were needed for the defence of Australia and its vital interests.<sup>41</sup>

The Report alluded to financial constraints in the definition of the role of the Australian Defence Force but defence was always to be seen as reactive rather than as proactive. The inability to define a role for the ADF is laid at the feet of apathy, both governmental and public. Dibb argued:

It is essential that the Australian people be convinced that this large amount is being spent wisely and that Australia's defence forces are indeed capable of defending the nation. That this is not the case can be attributed to a lack of informed public debate on defence issues in this country. Unlike many other Western countries, Australian governments have not published regular reviews about our defence policies. (The last Defence White Paper was published almost a decade ago.)<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, p.176.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, p.176

The validity of this opinion cannot be doubted but there is a flaw, not in the statement itself but in the general proposition regarding public perception. The ineluctable impression is that the Defence Force is in a stand-down position—it has not fought since withdrawing from South Vietnam in 1972 and from a certain perspective has not earned its keep.<sup>43</sup> This crude perception does not take into account the training costs necessary to provide personnel and material for unforeseen contingencies.<sup>44</sup> The difficulty that exists is that the Australian Defence Force has no real perceived peacetime utility. Unlike the United States Army, which through its Corps of Engineers is engaged in road and other civil engineering projects, the Australian Army has no active role, although the Royal Australian Engineers have been involved in cyclone rehabilitation projects in the region. Such activities are naturally only on a reactive basis. The major problem for the Defence Force in terms of public debate is that of financial accountability. It has been suggested that the accountants have now taken charge of the debate which is limited to cost effectiveness. Because the role of the Defence force is focused on purely military defence it is seen as a cost negative factor, whereas, if the role was widened to include defence in its widest form, as posited in this work, then the cost effectiveness criticism could be easily met. Such a view presages the Wrigley Report of 1990 which will be discussed below in this Chapter.

The great debate generated by the Dibb Report was not matched by its impact on policy. The Report was a political casualty of the great and powerful friend syndrome in that it was widely perceived as anti-American alliance in its thrust and isolationist in its tone. One of the most significant criticisms was that "Dibb was leading the government

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<sup>43</sup>To continue with this perception is to assert that an unemployed Defence Force is a cost drain on the economy and cannot be afforded; in the absence of threats there is no need to have a Defence Force.

<sup>44</sup>The Australian Army's Operational Deployment Force-Ready Reaction Force-is of only Company strength and is seen by some as next to useless rather than as an effective force for low-level emergencies.

towards the adoption of a Fortress Australia defence policy".<sup>45</sup> With the Cold War still the dominating condition in world affairs and Gorbachev's "Vladivostok Initiative" speech in 1986, it was not an opportune time to be advocating a policy of self-reliance. The political flak which the Dibb Report attracted forced Defence Minister Beazley to produce a more conventional and comforting 1987 Defence White Paper. It managed to preserve some of the self-reliance elements whilst renewing our commitment to the American Alliance.

The 1987 Defence White Paper<sup>46</sup> took up the matters raised by the Dibb Report and clearly recognized the eleven year gap between White Papers. As discussed above regarding the Dibb Report, it was disappointing that the continued myopic vision of threat perceptions was evident throughout the White Paper: any threat to Australia can only be perceived as a defence threat.<sup>47</sup> The White Paper lucidly argued the case for a properly reconstructed Defence Force with priority given to self reliance based on an "extensive zone of direct military interest".<sup>48</sup> There was nothing in the White Paper that considered other types of threats, a disturbing feature in a world of practical realities. For instance, brucellosis (a disease of cattle) could cause more harm in the Northern Territory than if a low-level military incursion was to occur; but this is not seen as a

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<sup>45</sup>Schott, *op cit.*, p.13.

<sup>46</sup>*The Defence of Australia 1987*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987.

<sup>47</sup>The central argument of this Chapter has to be reiterated. Threats come in all forms-only one of which is militarily -based and can be met by military means. In the post-Cold War world threats to national stability of terrorism, drug importation, and organized crime with its various permutations are of greater threat than invasions in the traditional military sense. To argue this way in no form denigrates traditional military defence. The argument is that serious thought must be given to the augmentation of traditional defence and to consider criminal threat as part of legitimately perceived threats to national integrity and autonomy.

<sup>48</sup>*The Defence of Australia*, p.vii.

security problem, yet the effects may be more harmful and long-lasting<sup>49</sup> to a vital Australian national interest-trade.

Defence Minister Kim Beazley, in his Preface to the White Paper, did not perceive a pro-active role for the Defence Force except as part of treaty and other regional obligations that contribute to regional stability. The closest approach to this view was a deterrent statement:

Our formidable long range detection and strike capabilities would make it difficult to land major forces on Australia's shores. But should any hostile forces land on Australian territory they would be met by a highly mobile Army.<sup>50</sup>

Beazley had proven himself to be a competent and pragmatic politician and a talented Minister and it is surprising that, despite the constraints of his ministerial role in Defence, that he limited defence to armed resistance to military challenges.<sup>51</sup> It is appropriate to point out that the parameters were far too limiting and that, with the talent available within Defence Central at Russell Hill in Canberra, those parameters should have been seen as limited.<sup>52</sup>

The White Paper was comforting in its conclusions and restricted in scope. It was the sense of comfort which was its disturbing note:

This Government believes that Australia must be able to provide its own defence in circumstances of military threat posed to Australia from within or through our region. Although such contingencies are now

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<sup>49</sup>The conceptual approach to threat perception must be enlarged to include all threats to national integrity and not be confined to limited thinking about naval and military defence.

<sup>50</sup>*op cit.*, p.ix.

<sup>51</sup>It is always easy, and perhaps too clever, to criticize a Department and its Minister by going beyond the parameters that have been properly set. It is not the intention of this work to attempt such a destructive approach.

<sup>52</sup>In various private conversations with uniformed and civilian senior members in Defence Central, my views about perceptual limitations are shared. Interviews, Canberra.



considered remote, we have explained that they would place great demands on our defence capacity. Our practical defence development over the coming years must ensure that we have, and can be seen to have, the capacity to respond effectively to them.<sup>53</sup>

No doubt American and British defence planners once believed that Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour and Singapore were remote contingencies.

The final paragraph of the White Paper provided a scintilla of hope that the range of defence options might move beyond the conventional:

Our basic competence and preparedness in matters of national defence are the necessary foundation for our own security and for our defence activities and influence further afield. The Government believes that the planned development of the Defence Force is attuned to Australia's national security needs. It accomplishes the priority task of defending the nation, ensures that we would be a most difficult country against which to use force, and allows for a realistic contribution to regional and alliance activities.<sup>54</sup>

Nevertheless the 1987 White Paper was a continuum of an ongoing defence debate within Australia.<sup>55</sup> The revised discussion on defence commenced in 1987 following the White Paper and began with the publication by the ANU's Strategic and Defence

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<sup>53</sup>*The Defence of Australia 1987*, p.10.

<sup>54</sup>*ibid.*, p.112.

<sup>55</sup>It is a debate that has been formally engaged for for one hundred years since before Federation. The defence debate, if indeed it can be called such, has been rather an in-house affair. In times of peace, or non-war, the debate has been very much centred on cost-efficiency and the professional versus citizen soldier. (Australia's largest University, Monash, is named after Sir John Monash the eponymous incarnation of the citizen soldier whose role would be denied by today's uniformed mandarins.) The debate has also continuously dwelt on military threats and military defence. The debate has begun to widen, but it is still largely within its predetermined military confines. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, a Centre which draws funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence, contributed to the revised debate on defence within Australia. A politically bipartisan approach to defence is now in place and the parameters of the debate largely centre on costs and financial accountability.

Studies Centre of J.O. Langtry's, *The Defence Para-Military Manpower Dilemma: Militia or Constabulary?* Colonel Langtry's abstract of his Working Paper states:

Whatever the level of defence contingency under consideration, Australia's potential to mobilize manpower warrants urgent consideration. This applies in particular to the problems inherent in the provision of para-military forces. This paper proposes that at least a partial solution could be found in the creation of special paramilitary forces in the form of constabulary (auxiliary police) on call to undertake lesser security tasks in time of need.<sup>56</sup>

Whilst this conclusion may be logically correct, it still remains erroneous insofar as the premiss is erroneous. His assumption throughout is predicated on one singular view—that of military incursion. Nowhere does he consider crime or any other issues as threat factors and yet he points towards the possibility of the consideration of non-military threats, but he never makes a leap of faith to admit the possibility. In his synopsis he evades the possibility altogether by setting his parameters as "Whatever the level of defence contingency under consideration, ...."; but in his penultimate paragraph he teases the reader with an idiosyncratic interpretation, or variant reading, of Dobb. Langtry states that:

It is against this background that Dobb's assertion that Internal security and law and order would remain a civil responsibility" warrants detailed consideration. Also relevant to any such consideration is the question of where the line should be drawn between "internal security" and "rear area" security.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Langtry, J.O., *The Defence Para-Military Manpower Dilemma: Militia or Constabulary?* Working Paper No.131, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1987.

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, p.14.

This background" mentioned above deals specifically "with the protection of specific vital national installations (VNI)."<sup>58</sup> So whilst, for the present writer, Langtry is hovering around the concept of non-military defence and even defence against crime, there is no further attempt to disengage the focussed, monocular view of defence as that which only properly concerns the Australian Defence Force.

In a 1988 Working Paper, *Security Cooperation In The South Pacific*, produced for the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University, Steve Hoadley defines what he means by Security Cooperation:

Security is a multi-dimensional concept, and forms of cooperation will vary widely. In its military sense, security is the ability to deter or repel armed attack, so security cooperation is the working together of governments to enhance that capacity. The normal means are consultation, exchanges of personnel and intelligence, standardization of equipment and procedures, joint exercises and planning, and collective defence arrangements. In its political sense, security is orderly, effective government free from intimidation, subversion, or political violence; so security cooperation includes diplomatic confidence building measures and mutual support, and may include also summit and specialist consultations, formation of regional organizations and assistance for information gathering and administration. In its economic sense, security is material sufficiency, fair distribution, and the prospect of adapting to changing conditions in an orderly manner; so security cooperation entails mutual efforts to stabilize markets, resources, and environmental conditions, to increase production, and to distribute goods through employment, services, subsidies, or aid.

Security has other nuances, and there are various means of enhancing it by cooperation in addition to self-help. But the point to be made at the outset is that military security cooperation is only one of several means, and that diplomatic, political, economic, technical, and cultural cooperation are the preferred means. Granted that the military dimension

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<sup>58</sup>*ibid.*, p.13.

must be on the agenda of any responsible government, it remains a last resort in the search for security, especially among small South Pacific governments.<sup>59</sup>

Hoadley's definitions are interesting and to some degree innovative in their encompassing areas; it is still surprising though that, in looking at security in its political and economic senses, there is no mention of enforcement provisions. In the general sense of security the military remains as a first and last resort.

Hoadley, in a section, "Security Perceptions And Initiatives By Island States", indicates strongly that in his view these perceptions are in the minds of outsiders and not those of South Pacific citizens.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless this elegantly argued section does not see security involving criminality and policing. And yet he comes close to this recognition in the following extract where Australia and New Zealand provided Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) in airlifting materiel to the Vanuatu Police:

Above all, Australia and New Zealand must harmonize their policies with each other and with the other members of the South Pacific Forum, and another (sic) relevant bodies for South Pacific security cooperation. A good model was Australian and New Zealand aid to riot-torn Port Vila in May 1988. The coordinated, prompt, and low-key support of Prime Minister Lini's government was reassuring without being overbearing, and was noted by neighbouring countries with approval.<sup>61</sup>

Apart from an overstatement about Port Vila being riot-torn, the tenor is accurate.<sup>62</sup> Hoadley concluded his paper by making a series of recommendations which are sensible, if of the "motherhood statement" variety. That he felt it necessary to do so

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<sup>59</sup>Hoadley, S., *Security Cooperation In The South Pacific*, Working Paper No 41, Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988, p.1.

<sup>60</sup>*ibid.*, p.14.

<sup>61</sup>*ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>62</sup>A relatively minor fracas occurred involving a former Lini Minister, Barak Sope, whose threat to "storm" Parliament dissipated after riot gear was flown in from Australia and New Zealand.

indicates the poverty of mind of the larger nations in their attitudes and actions towards the South Pacific.<sup>63</sup>

An almost contemporaneous paper was delivered by Dr Stuart Harris, the then Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on 27 May, 1988, considering *Australian Foreign Policy And Its Links With Defence Policy*.<sup>64</sup> In discussing what is a fairly standard approach to Defence Policies, Harris stated:

We have been particularly concerned, as have a number of countries in the region, with the effects that drugs or crime can have on undermining

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<sup>63</sup>His recommendations were as follows:

The following suggestions are offered to the statesmen and scholars of the Pacific Rim countries. They assume that closer cooperation with the South Pacific, and in the South Pacific, is desirable not only for military security but also to enhance political harmony, economic development, social justice, and intellectual vitality, and to avoid lawlessness, polarization, oppression, exploitation, plunder, and violence. The overriding objective is to preserve the fundamentally non-military character of the region while enhancing its political and economic security, in the face of changes within and from without. 1. *Be informed.* Study the region and its elements. Set up South Pacific policy study units in governments and academic institutions. Sponsor travel, research, and publications in and of the region. 2. *Be receptive.* Learn the Pacific Way. Listen to and see the Oceanic point of view. 3. *Be discriminating.* Differentiate between distinct governments, policies, and events. Be analytical as well as synthetic. Focus particularly on Melanesian states. 4. *Be generous.* Provide technical aid for regional organizations and study centres. Fund security study units at South Pacific universities. Expand military assistance and share intelligence in an orderly, dependable fashion. 5. *Be cooperative.* The four principle Pacific Rim governments-the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand-should harmonize their South Pacific policies and set an example of cooperation. Japan's Kuranari Doctrine initiatives should be dovetailed with those of the Pacific Rim states and international aid agencies, for example. 6. *Be inclusive.* Draw the French, the Koreans, the Chinese, the Indonesians, and even the Soviets into a consultative relationship. Share information and attempt to look to the future instead of rehearsing old rivalries. 7. *Be patient.* The South Pacific has become a complex international sub-system in its own right, and South Pacific governments are now significant actors. The "South Seas" can no longer be colonized, manipulated, or patronized. They must be accepted as partners and persuaded to move constructively into the future with the Pacific Rim countries. (pps 19-20)

These recommendations of Hoadley, whilst eminently sensible, are in a sense reverse paternalism; they treat the reader as a neophyte in a manner that tourist guide books often do. And yet, without these recommendations, the obvious can be overlooked and offence given.

<sup>64</sup> Harris, S., *Australian Foreign Policy And Its Links With Defence Policy*. Talk given to RAAF Staff College, Canberra, 27 May, 1988, Backgrounder No 622, June, 1988, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, pp.A1-A18.

social structures, legal institutions, police and indeed law and order as a whole. We have also been concerned at the damage that terrorism can create for the inter-national order. We have good collaborative relationships with most of the countries in the region on both of these aspects.<sup>65</sup>

Harris does not in his paper, develop this theme or in any way suggest ways or means by which the concerns could be addressed. The "collaborative relationships" to which he alludes were in 1988, to say the least, nascent

It is significant that Harris sees Defence and Foreign Policy as reactive:

..., we would obviously like to have a very clearly articulated long-term strategy for our foreign policy. As a small country, however, the international environment is something you generally have to accept-that you cannot determine or even change the international environment. Uncertainty is therefore a major factor in the equation for developing our strategy about our foreign policies. Flexibility has similarly to be an important factor in our foreign policy. That does not mean it is unprincipled nor that it is not based on long term strategic thinking but that it is inevitably more reactive to specific developments than say a foreign policy of a country like the United States.<sup>66</sup>

There is no concept of pro-activity here. It is significant that a connection can be drawn in Harris's paper between the reaction of Australia to problems of crime and policing in the region and the concept of foreign policy generally. The conventions of diplomacy may well preclude pro-active measures in case they may be seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of other nations. But when Australia is a member of regional bodies, such as the South Pacific Forum, then the scope for pro-activity is always present, particularly if the recommendations of Hoadley are taken into account. It is clear that in 1988 Harris was aware of the problems as a single issue to be dealt with at a policing

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<sup>65</sup>*ibid.*, p.A9.

<sup>66</sup>*ibid.*, p.A15.

level; the view that terrorism and criminal activity are separate issues continues to hold sway, issues to be dealt with in detail later in this thesis.

And yet, in the period from March, 1986, to July, 1989, the apparently monocular view of Dibb changed to that of apparently multifocal. In his *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* discussed above, Dibb asserted that "the central theme of this Review is that Australia is a defensible continent and that, with some important reordering of priorities, we can provide for our own defence."<sup>67</sup> and concentrated on defence as purely naval and military. In July 1989, in a proceedings paper of a workshop of the South Pacific Security Project, Dibb in *One Strategic Entity: An Australian Defence Perspective On The South Pacific* effectively moves into the proactive area of defence whilst not moving away from the traditional view as enunciated in his 1986 Report. In discussing the concept of regional security for the South Pacific, he states:

The analysis of security prospects in the South Pacific requires a different approach; a different methodology to that applied to the analysis of global strategy or even of security prospects in Southeast Asia, where there are concerns about the future projection of military power by China and India. The analysis that we should develop needs to be sophisticated but clearly adjusted to the local situation. Attempts have been made, mainly under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, to establish a separate discipline into the study of security problems faced by small states. I think that has proved to be of extremely limited utility. The conclusions by the Commonwealth Secretariat about the vulnerability of small economies are useful but other assertions need to be tested against the specific political, social, demographic and geographic circumstances that apply quite specifically to the South Pacific countries. We should be careful not to exaggerate the vulnerabilities ascribed to the smaller states simply because of their smallness. For instance, the security prospects of

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<sup>67</sup>Dibb, P., *op cit.*, p.17.

Western Samoa, to pick one country, are not similar to those of the Maldives.<sup>68</sup>

He finally adds in his short paper that Australia

.... has a primary role in regard to the management of the regional strategic framework while the management of change is principally something that the island countries themselves are best placed to handle, with Australia's role, certainly from the defence view, being a secondary and supporting one.<sup>69</sup>

In these two quotations Dobb has moved dramatically from his 1986 view of defence though, despite a multifocal view, he still only sees defence as a naval and military matter. He acknowledges the need for a new methodological approach in perceiving what security means to the nations of the South Pacific, but does not articulate what the new methodology would entail.<sup>70</sup>

Dobb in urging the reader to "be careful not to exaggerate the vulnerabilities ascribed to the smaller states simply because of their smallness", reduced his earlier claim for the need to find a "different approach, a different methodology" to a benign form of paternalism. It is precisely the microcosmic view of vulnerability that ought to be applied to the macrocosmic vulnerability of Australia. It is contended that organized crime poses the same threat to large and small nations in the analogous view that a small

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<sup>68</sup>Dobb, P., *One Strategic Entity: An Australian Defence Perspective On The South Pacific* in David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds). *The Security of Oceania in the 1990's*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.60, ANU, 1989, p.69.

<sup>69</sup>*ibid.*, p.70.

<sup>70</sup>It is as though in a Biblical sense he can perceive "the mote in his brother's eye, but not the beam in his own". By this it is inferred that Dobb recognizes a change in the security perceptions of others, but will retain the status quo for himself and Australia.



burglary is as harmful as a large one—if the psyche of the victim is as damaged and the criminal is as successful, the dimensions are quite immaterial.<sup>71</sup>

The views of senior politicians are beginning to change in such a way that traditional approaches to foreign affairs-if not defence—are altering. In tabling a Ministerial Statement on Australia's Regional Security, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, on 6 December, 1989, stated *inter alia*:

The South Pacific faces rather more problems. A number of the island nations confront economic, environmental, cultural and demographic pressures which will place increasing strain on their political systems. In view of its crucial strategic location for us, the course of Papua New Guinea's development will have particular significance for Australia's security, requiring a sustained and sensitive Australian policy response in the months and years ahead. None of this is to suggest that the South Pacific region as a whole is likely to pose major strategic problems for Australia over the next 10 years or so. But there is certainly the possibility that we will see over this period in some of the island nations a renewal or a continuation of many of the political tensions which have been evident over the last few years.<sup>72</sup>

The Minister set out seven policy areas for a multi-dimensional approach to regional security<sup>73</sup> The seven areas are set out as follows: Firstly, there is the acquisition and maintenance-in line with current defence policy-of a military capability designed to deter , and if necessary defeat, aggression against our territory or maritime jurisdiction.

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<sup>71</sup>It is not an academic version of "straining out gnats and swallowing camels" that is in force here.

Rather it is a genuine and considered view that defence threats are only one form of external threat to Australia. This view is slowly being recognized by others, but has yet to be incorporated in official policy. The present writer was at a closed meeting of the National Crime Authority in Melbourne on 1 February, 1991, where economic crime as an external threat to national integrity was raised by him-unanimous support for his views were proposed as part of an action plan.

<sup>72</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-Backgrounder, Vol 1, No 4, December, 1989. *Australia's Regional Security*, pp.1-2.

<sup>73</sup>*ibid.*, p.2.

This capability, based on the principles of self-reliance and defence in depth, should be seen as relevant not only to the defence of Australia, but also to the security of the region as a whole. Australia's possession of significant but non-aggressive military power contributes to the strategic stability of our neighbouring regions by providing a "secure south" for South-East Asian countries, and a "secure west" for South Pacific nations.

**Secondly**, Australia should use its military assets and presence in the region to help foster the gradual development of a regional security community based on a sense of shared security interests: this is described in the Statement as the exercise of politico-military capability. We should not be embarrassed about using the military capability we possess, with prudence and sensitivity, to advance both Australia's and the common security of the region. The Statement also addresses the sensitive and difficult question of the extent to which we should be able, and prepared, to use military force in pursuit of security interests going beyond the defence of Australian territory, noting that this is an issue which arises more in the South Pacific than the South-East Asian context. It makes the point that the use of military force may conceivably be appropriate in unusual and extreme circumstance, and that any such decision can only be made on a case-by-case basis bearing in mind certain cumulative criteria which are canvassed. The Statement explicitly rejects any notion of Australia claiming the role of regional arbiter of political legitimacy or moral acceptability.

**Thirdly**, we should use traditional diplomatic skills of persuasion to manage tensions and frictions, to ensure that small problems stay small, and to achieve accommodations of interests with mutual benefit. Diplomacy should also extend beyond the region itself to dialogue on regional security issues with those external actors capable of exercising influence within the region. The Statement, here as elsewhere, carries some important implications for departmental resources, which I will be addressing within the context of our overall needs and priorities in the lead-up to next year's Budget.

**Fourthly**, the Statement emphasises the importance of trade and investment in creating more substantial and mutually beneficial links, especially in South-East Asia where economic complementarities offer a great deal of scope for expansion. We must devote a level of effort and resources to our economic relationship with the region greater than its current relative economic importance might otherwise justify, bearing in mind that, in this region as elsewhere, our success will depend primarily on the success of our efforts to restructure the Australian economy into a strong and internationally competitive entity. We do not pretend that nations which trade together always stay together. But extensive economic linkages create mutual interests which can work to restrain any resort to military conflict. The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation process, notwithstanding its exclusively economic focus and broader membership, is an excellent example of how new connections can be built up in the region. The Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia, to be signed next week, is another example of a non-military solution to a problem that historically has often led to conflict—a disputed boundary involving prized resources.

**Fifthly**, development assistance programs can contribute to our national security interests in the region in a variety of ways: promoting economic and social development; reducing the political disaffection caused by economic deprivation; creating further economic linkages with Australia; and encouraging perceptions of Australia as a sensitive, practical and technologically competent neighbour.

**Sixthly**, Australia can further demonstrate its neighbourly credentials by assisting regional countries with so-called "non-military threats" such as environmental degradation, AIDS, narcotics trafficking and unregulated population flows, including the problem of refugees.

**Finally**, there is scope for a great deal more to be done in the area of exchanges of people and ideas to reduce the cultural distance between Australia and the region, and to

overcome the significant image problem we still tend to have in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. Mutual understanding, like all of the other strands in this multi-dimensional approach, is no guarantee of peace. But mutual ignorance is a greater risk, and so called 'second track' diplomacy seeking to get our message across through various non-governmental channels, has an important role to play in countering it.

He concluded his statement by incipiently recognizing the reality of non-military security for countries within the region, but does not apparently accept such non-military security for Australia:

In the 1950's and 60's, and during some of the 70's, Australia tended to perceive the relevance of South-East Asia and the South Pacific to our security largely in military term. We now have the capacity to reinforce our national security by utilizing the many dimensions of our external policies in an informed, co-ordinated and vigorous way to participate in the shaping of the regional environment. It is very much in our interests to be seen as a significant partner to the region, an accepted and natural participant in regional affairs. Effectively implemented and properly explained, the multi-dimensional approach to regional security advocated in the Statement is the best way of maintaining our national security into the next century.<sup>74</sup>

The multi-dimensional approach enumerated in the policy statement was nevertheless predicated on the military approach to security; it is yet a long way from recognising that national security and sovereignty can be threatened by non-military dangers and contingencies.

In June 1990, Alan K Wrigley's, *The Defence Force and the Community*, Report to the Minister for Defence, crashed around the heads of the Australian Defence Force

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<sup>74</sup>*ibid.*, p.3.

establishment.<sup>75</sup> For such a sensible report, subtitled *A Partnership in Australia's Defence*, to have created such a furore was quite remarkable.<sup>76</sup> Even five years later it is doubtful whether the Report will ever be implemented as both the Regular and Reserve Force feel threatened by Wrigley's view of integrating the Australian Defence Force with the Australian community.<sup>77</sup>

The Wrigley Report was essentially an efficiency document that sought to achieve "best practice" in personnel utilization. It did not address threat perceptions, nor was it intended to do so, but sought to provide a rational resource provision for previous reports and assessments for both personnel and material. In an interview with Wrigley in August, 1990, he agreed with the contention that the concept of defence be widened to include a policing function.<sup>78</sup>

Local security initiatives which could be considered enlightened and progressive were also dominated by an emphasis on the military. Sir Julius Chan, the former and present Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, has been a constant advocate of a regional security force. As Prime Minister in 1980 he sent troops to the island of Espirito Santo

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<sup>75</sup> Wrigley, A K., *The Defence Force and the Community*, Report to the Minister for Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990.

<sup>76</sup> To this writer, who served for many years as a senior Non-Commissioned Officer in the Army Reserve, Wrigley merely applied common sense in his report.

<sup>77</sup> George Bernard Shaw once remarked that all professions are a conspiracy against the public and it would appear that the profession of arms is included in this number.

<sup>78</sup> Telephone interview with Alan K Wrigley, August, 1990. Since June 1990, Wrigley has been the *bête-noir* of the Australian Defence Force so it is unlikely that his concordance with the writer's views give them much credibility within established circles. It is sufficient to say that in non-established arenas the search for a wider concept of defence is shared and continues. For the time being the traditional view holds sway.

in Vanuatu to help quell a secessionist movement after independence.<sup>79</sup> At a seminar in Melbourne he recounted the circumstances that caused him to commit PNG forces to Vanuatu; he spoke of "the need for a South Pacific peace-keeping force to handle any similar situations in the future".<sup>80</sup> Continuing his speech he declared:

The force I envisage would contain personnel from all its democratic member countries, with at least half coming from Island State members, and may be funded predominantly by Australia, New Zealand and, maybe, even the United States. It would be a small but highly mobile body and, in times of peace, carry out a continuous programme of engineering projects and immediate disaster relief.<sup>81</sup>

Sir Julius also stated:

Its use as a military peace-keeping force would be only at the request of legitimate, democratically-elected governments-"as was the case in Vanuatu". He said the peace-keeping force would be a watchdog for small Island States-a potent deterrent to individuals seeking to overthrow the will of the majority". However, he pointed out that this was not a proposals for Australia to play "regional policeman".<sup>82</sup>

While the regional security force would be multi-functional, the key elements for purposes of the present discussion are that the force would consist of *military* personnel and it would be *reactive* in nature. A legitimate democratically-elected government

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<sup>79</sup>This force from the PNG Defence Force, and under the command of Brigadier-General Ted Diro, was sent at the request of the Vanuatu Prime Minister Father Walter Lini. The detailed circumstances of this operation are covered by John Beasant in his *The Santo Rebellion: An Imperial Reckoning*, UHP, Honolulu, 1984. Briefly, the rebellion was caused by the offer of a group of Right-wing American businessmen operating under the name of the Phoenix Foundation who attempted to purchase the island from traditional landowners so that they (the Phoenix Foundation) could set up the world's first private enterprise nation. That this failed because of the intervention of the PNG Defence Force does not mean that subsequent attempts should be dismissed out of hand.

<sup>80</sup> Chan, Sir Julius, *Developing a Pacific Security: Strategy for Peace*, Institute of Public Affairs Seminar, 21 March, 1988, Melbourne, pp.13-17.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> Tiffany, M., "Who's looking after you?", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, Vol.62, No.3, March 1992.

would have to request the force be activated for peace-keeping purposes before it could intervene. There is no reference to civil police or proactive measures in the Chan proposals which demonstrates both a failure of imagination and a lack of awareness of the real problems now facing the region. A regional peace-keeping force could hardly solve the law and order problem now facing Papua New Guinea. There is some evidence of a developing recognition in Port Moresby of domestic priorities.

In January 1992 PNG considered setting up its own anti-terrorist squad to counter attacks like the one January 23 which has crippled the Australian-owned Mount Kare alluvial gold mine. Police Minister Mathias Ijape wanted urgent Cabinet approval to set up the crack unit of 300 specially-trained policemen. Later that month, PNG announced it was going to establish a rapid response police unit to protect its mining industry.<sup>83</sup>

It is appropriate to consider the general question of how realistic are proposals to create a regional security or defence force. There is little political support from Australia and New Zealand, the two countries which would contribute the bulk of financial and logistical support necessary to make the project viable. Commenting on the 1992 Chan proposal, the New Zealand Army Chief of Staff, Major General Bruce Meldrum, said his country was cautious about the political, financial, and administrative implications of a military force. He said the idea of full-time armies for small Island nations and a regional force are matters for individual nations and regional governments but, in his opinion, the Islands did not need full-time armies.<sup>84</sup> The new defence attache at the Australian Embassy in Suva Lt-Col Mike Dennis, agreed with Maj Gen Meldrum: "This question has been raised several times previously, mainly by Sir Julius Chan, and it generally has received a cool reception in the South Pacific."<sup>85</sup> A major reason for its

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<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*

cool reception, he said, "is people have had difficulty explaining how such a force would be used in what many people consider localised or internal problems".<sup>86</sup> Funding sources and the level of enthusiasm also were questionable, he added.<sup>87</sup>

The issue also was expected to be discussed at the Forum Regional Security Committee meeting from February 18 to 21, 1992, in Suva. Despite earlier rumours that the meeting could consider setting up an Islands Interpol, the meeting chairman, Nauru's Leo Keke, told the media during the meeting that the Forum would not be setting up a regional security force and the idea was not even on the meeting agenda. They discussed drug trafficking, a review of regional arrangements for extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters, and assessment of regional training arrangements, but not a regional security force.<sup>88</sup>

Papua New Guinea's Comptroller of Customs, Pius Saun was not supportive despite his countryman's enthusiasm. Saun said a regional security force might be hard to develop, and would involve delicate questions such as national sovereignty. A Pacific intelligence and information network would perhaps be more realistic than a regional defence force.<sup>89</sup> Asked about the feasibility of an international network, Lt Col Dennis said sharing of intelligence information of a bilateral nature already occurs in the South Pacific on drug trafficking, money laundering and the movement of fishing boats. He said an organisation especially for intelligence was probably not necessary because there were already enough existing avenues and bilateral arrangements developing: "The umbrella is basically provided through the Forum with its regional security committee,

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<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *ibid.*



where this type of information-sharing rather than intelligence on those various subjects is discussed".<sup>90</sup>

Suggestions that the future security of the South Pacific can continue to be left in the hands of the great powers do not generate a great deal of support in the region. The US still seeks to assure Pacific nations that it will maintain the appropriate military presence in the region to protect its allies and counter any threats to peace. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Solomon, addressed the Twenty-Second South Pacific Forum Heads of Government meeting in 1992 and told the leaders of the fifteen member nations that the US would remain a power in the region. He warned that a unilateral withdrawal of American forces would be destabilising and declared that, despite the thawing of the Cold War in Asia, the US security presence in the region would remain.<sup>91</sup> Such assurances are regarded as having little real substance in the post-Cold War world with the US now more concerned with domestic problems, weary of its world leadership role and led by a President with little knowledge or interest in foreign affairs. In any case, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to envisage any country which offers a military threat to the region, and another *Rainbow Warrior* episode is unlikely to occur.

### 1994 Defence White Paper

The latest official statement on the Australian Government's attitudes and policies regarding the defence of this country are to be found in the 1994 Defence White Paper, *Defending Australia*<sup>92</sup>. The link between defence and security forms the content of the

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<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

first chapter which is significant and evidence of that the conventional view still dominates. The military emphasis is to be maintained:

Maintaining a defence force capable of ensuring that armed force is not successfully used against Australia is essential because armed force remains a factor in international affairs. It continues to be one of the ways in which national power can be asserted and national self interest pursued.<sup>93</sup>

The military mind-set remains reactive as the White Paper states:

Australia's strategic stance is, in the broadest sense, defensive. We will not have to use armed force except to defend our national interests, and we do not envisage resorting to armed force other than in response to the use or threat of force by others. We have no dispute with other countries which might be expected to give rise to the use of force, and no reason at present to expect that disputes of that sort will develop.<sup>94</sup>

A number of consistent themes which are central to the discussion in this thesis arise out of this excerpt: Australia's strategic stance is defensive, our responses reactive and armed force is the proper means to defend our national interests; these national interests are undefined and threats emanate from disputes with other countries, that is, they are state-directed. There is no doubt in the official mind that "the first priority of Australian defence policy is to build, maintain and support armed forces which are capable, without help from the combat forces of other countries, of defeating any attack which could be credibly mounted against Australia".<sup>95 96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, p.3

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, pp.3-4.

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, p.153.

<sup>96</sup> This wording in the White Paper is consonant with the Role of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps: "The role of the infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, regardless of season, weather, or terrain.", Australian Army Training Information Bulletin Number 28 The Infantry Division(Provisional), 1975, Chapter 3 Paragraph 301.

Where more modern contingencies such as terrorism are considered, the response is still reactive and military with priority placed on the Special Air Services Regiment which, the White Paper states, "maintains a highly respected capacity for counter-terrorist operations."<sup>97</sup> The document recognises the role the South West Pacific plays in Australia's overall strategic picture:

The countries of the South West Pacific are strategically important to Australia. In the unlikely event that a potentially hostile power acquired undue influence over one or more of the island states, the effect could be detrimental to the region and to the security of Australia. Therefore, we will continue to cooperate with and assist these potentially vulnerable countries in securing their protection. Our present defence activities with these countries reflect this commitment. We will continue to build on these relationships, and further our efforts to promote the prosperity and well-being of our Pacific Island neighbours.<sup>98</sup>

The White Paper emphasises that "our defence relationships with Papua New Guinea is the most substantial in the South-West Pacific"<sup>99</sup> and based on the assessment of Australia's enduring strategic interest in the stability and security of that country. The stress is on consultation "if an external armed attack threatens the sovereignty of either country".<sup>100</sup> If the police have a role, it is in assisting the PNG Defence Force in addressing the country's current and pressing problems more efficiently.

Where other South Pacific countries are concerned, *Defending Australia* states:

... we will give priority to developing the capabilities of these nations to assert and protect their sovereignty in peace, often cooperating with police forces where regular military forces do not exist. We will continue

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<sup>97</sup> White Paper, *op cit.*, p.138.

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, p.92.

<sup>99</sup> This is not surprising as the Army component of the PNG Defence Force was the Pacific Islands Regiment of the Australian Defence Force prior to PNG's independence.

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*, p.92.

to give high priority to helping develop capabilities to police maritime Exclusive Economic Zones through continuing support for maritime surveillance projects and activities, and consulting closely with the Forum Fisheries Agency. In particular, in the Pacific Patrol Boat program the Government will offer a half-life refit package for all vessels, at a total value of \$19 million. The work will extend over eight years, beginning in 1995, and will involve the overhaul and upgrade of systems and equipment to overcome obsolescence and ensure all vessels reach their planned fifteen year life span.<sup>101</sup>

It is interesting to note that when police forces are mentioned in this context, i.e., in relation to Australia's security, it is in a 'second-best' sense. Regular military forces are the 'norm' in this mind-set. No consideration is given to police forces as a front-line, proactive means of containing and eliminating the new type of threat which might filter through the South Pacific region.

In relation to wider questions of conflict resolution, the discussion of "Peace Operations" in the White Paper is a remarkably revealing section. It quite properly records the role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in our past and present peace operations.<sup>102</sup> However, it is extraordinary that in this section there is not a single mention of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) which has been jointly involved with the ADF in a number of UN and non-UN *peace operations*. One can only question whether the failure to mention civil police is a mere oversight or whether they are seen to be some form of threat to the ADF in budgetary terms or function. This is a conundrum here because in the section on the *South-West Pacific* there is a clear

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<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, p.92.

<sup>102</sup> This term, *peace operations*, is apparently used to describe the activities of the ADF; whereas the training for ADF personnel is carried out at the Australian Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre. Whilst there may be equivocation as to definitions it is relatively clear that *peacekeeping* takes its form from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and that *peace operations* is the generic role in which the ADF is involved and includes both *peacemaking* and *peacekeeping*.

recognition of a police role in guarding sovereignty (albeit grudgingly), but no similar recognition of the AFP's role in peace operations.

### **The Defence Cooperation Program**

Australia has for many years maintained a Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with friends and allies within the region.<sup>103</sup> These activities originally stemmed from bilateral arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore in 1963 and were extended to include Indonesia in 1968.<sup>104</sup> In 1972-73, the other than ASEAN states, Thailand and the Philippines, and Fiji were included and in 1975 Papua New Guinea. The program was expanded to include Vanuatu, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu and more recently the Marshall Islands, the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.<sup>105</sup>

The aspect of DCP which is most relevant to the focus and arguments of this thesis is the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) project.<sup>106</sup> The history of the development of this project is as follows:

The Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) project, sponsored and financed under Defence Cooperation, is the largest and most complex defence cooperation project ever funded by Australia. The project dates back to 1979 when a group of Australian and New Zealand defence experts visited the South Pacific region at the request of the Pacific Island states. The declaration of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) greatly expanded the island countries' formally recognised sovereign

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<sup>103</sup> For an evaluation of the DCP, see Department of Defence, Inspector General Division, *Defence Cooperation: Program Evaluation*, Defence Publishing Centre, Canberra, 1994. (Draft version).

<sup>104</sup> Merchant, S., Australia's Defence Cooperation Program and Regional Security, in Hegarty, D., and Polomka, P., (eds), *The Security of Oceania in the 1990's*, Vol.1, SDSC, ANU, Canberra, 1989, pp.71-77.

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> See Bergin, A., *The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation*, Department of International Relations, ANU, Canberra, 1994.

rights and economic interests. The examination highlighted surveillance as an effective means of asserting these rights and protecting these interests. On 29 August 1983 Gordon Scholes, Minister for Defence, announced the development of the PPB project. In 1983 it was expected that five or six vessels would be involved. When the contracts were signed in September 1985 three island countries were involved at a cost of \$8.4m (November 1984 prices) and the program had grown to an expected 10 vessels. By 1993 the structure of the program had expanded with the delivery of 15 vessels in eight countries at a cost of \$91,503m (April 1993) prices. In February 1993 contracts were amended to provide five more vessels to three other Pacific Island states. The revised total project cost for the 20 vessels is \$137,981m (October 1992 prices).<sup>107</sup>

Anthony Bergin in his definitive study, *The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation*, argues that the project has been a successful example of defence cooperation, although it appeared in the first two or three years of its operation that it would be more political trouble than it was worth.<sup>108</sup>

The PPB project, involving as it does surveillance and deterrence functions, is the activity which has the closest present connection with policing. If, as Bergin suggests, the PPB project has been a success despite some initial problems, then it may provide some lessons for the provision of police education and training assistance under the umbrella of DCP. However, for both political and operational reasons, it is better to have such assistance provided through civilian agencies such as the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB now AUSAID) or Australian Universities. The various State police forces and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) should have a training role with possibly the DCP providing budgetary assistance.

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<sup>107</sup> Department of Defence, *Defence Cooperation: Program Evaluation*, pp.2-3, para 209 (Draft Version).

<sup>108</sup> Bergin, A., *op cit.*

It is to the subject of Australian efforts in providing police education and training in the South Pacific that the discussion now turns.

## Summary

This Chapter, Australian Attitudes and Policies Toward Security, analysed Australian attitudes and policies towards defence and security and concludes that the customary military emphasis still prevails.

Early in Australia's history there was a recognition that Australia's security was tied to the peace and tranquillity of the South Pacific region. It was believed that ultimately this depended on the presence of superior military force, such force to be provided by a great and powerful friend initially Great Britain. At the turn of the Twentieth Century the British, French, Dutch, German, American and to a lesser extent Portuguese, Russian and Japanese Empires were active in the Asia/Pacific region. What occurred within and between the metropolitan powers very much affected the region of Australia's defence concerns; Australia's colonial borders in Papua were contiguous with those of Germany and Holland. The outcome of World War I profoundly altered the colonial outposts of the Asia/Pacific region. The eventual defeat of Germany in Europe, but its prior defeat in New Guinea by the Royal Australian Navy in 1914, provided security until the fall of France in 1940 and the entry of Japan into World War II on 7 December, 1941. The post-war defeats of the Dutch and French Empires in Asia led to an acceptance, quite properly, of the defence doctrine of protecting our North-Western approaches through variations of Forward Defence and Fortress Australia always with the underpinning of, and reliance on, the United States Navy's 7th Fleet based in Hawaii, with elements in Guam and the Philippines and a Fleet Train on constant patrol and exercise in South East Asia.

In all of this there was no disagreement with the proposition that the security of Australia was bound to be affected by events and developments in the South Pacific. But this was always based on the assumption of automatic protection by great and powerful friends.

The question that has been addressed is whether an emphasis on military means is appropriate in the post-Cold War world given that the nature of threats to Australian security has changed and dangers now come in different forms. This question is merely a mirror of the centrality of this thesis *that there needs to be a recognition of the close*



*connection between policing and security and defence of this country in regional terms and perspectives.*

The mood of the Australian Defence Community with its stress on reactive, defensive operations may well have its roots in the Vietnam War experience. Certain elements of the Australian defence force, notably the 1st Commando Company and the Special Air Services Regiment, have proactive capabilities but these are essentially in the field of anti-terrorism. The political problem in the South Pacific is how to secure the cooperation of national governments well in advance and, both within Australia and the region, how to avoid charges of interference in the domestic affairs of small neighbouring states.

The available literature really only discusses the "security equals military" syndrome. The notable Australian defence analyst, Paul Dibb, sees within his extensive *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* (1986) the necessity of maintaining the existing stability of the South Pacific region through nation building linked with economic development he does not allow for civil development in the provision of security. The central argument of this Chapter has to be reiterated. Threats come in many forms only one of which is militarily based and can be met with military means. In the post-Cold War era international threats to national stability of terrorism, drug importation, and organised crime with its various permutations are of greater threat than invasions in the traditional military sense. To argue in this way in no form denigrates traditional military defence. The argument is that serious thought must be given to the augmentation of traditional defence and to consider criminal threat as part of legitimately perceived threats to national integrity and autonomy. The conceptual approach to threat perception must be enlarged to include all threats to national integrity and not be confined to limited thinking about naval and military defence. It has to be pointed out that privately some senior members of the Defence establishment share the author's views about limited perceptions of what constitutes "Defence".

It is clearly argued that the Pacific Patrol Boat Project, involving as it does surveillance and deterrent functions, is the activity which has the closest present connection with policing. The apparent success of this programme may provide lessons for the provision of police education and training assistance under the umbrella of the Defence Cooperation

Programme. Such assistance, for both political and operational reasons is likely to be best provided through civilian agencies such as AUs AID or Australian Universities. Such a view maintains the centralised argument of this thesis.

## CHAPTER THREE

### AUSTRALIA AND THE ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

This Chapter examines some of the key issues in the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) Development Project which grew out of a request by the Government of Papua New Guinea for assistance. In meeting this request, the Australian Government engaged Mr E.T. Millar, former Deputy Commissioner (Administration) of Victoria Police, to undertake a study of the development needs of the RPNGC.<sup>1</sup> In November 1986, the study recommended a training and development program for the RPNGC using Australian technical assistance. The RPNGC Development Project Phase I (1987-1992) aimed to improve the Constabulary's ability to provide an effective government agency for the maintenance of law and order in PNG.<sup>2</sup> The \$A29.7 million project included programs of activities to assist in administration, operations, personnel management, forensic science, computing and training. The principal focus of the project was on the provision of assistance for operations and training.<sup>3</sup> The role of the advisers was particularly important, with advisers based at centres around the country to provide formal and on-the-job training and courses for trainers. In 1991, the Project had 42 advisers drawn from most Australian and New Zealand police forces based in Port

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<sup>1</sup>Feasibility Study and Project Design for the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, 15 November, 1986, no location, p.1.

<sup>2</sup>Engel L., *The Australian Aid Program and Its Role in Supporting PNG's Law and Order Policies*, in Thompson A. (ed), *Papua New Guinea-Issues For Australian Security Planners*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1994, p.158.

<sup>3</sup>*ibid*

Moresby, Lae, Rabaul and Mt Hagen.<sup>4</sup> The Contractor was the Price Waterhouse Urwick Chartered Accountancy firm.

A review of the RPNGC Development Project in June 1992 "highlighted the continuing need of the RPNGC for assistance in addressing law and order problems".<sup>5</sup> Following the recommendations of the Review, the decision was made to extend the Project into a second five-year period (1993-1998), with an Australian contribution of \$A62.1 million and a PNG contribution of K 9.2 million.<sup>6</sup> The contractor for Phase II was ACIL Australia Pty. Ltd., consultants to governments, commerce and industry. The project had as its overall objective to advise and work with the RPNGC to improve their capability and to preserve peace and good order and to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and adjective manner. Engel describes Phase II of the Project:

The second phase of the project will build on progress made in the first five years. It will consist of five components: operations support, training support, administration and management, computing and scientific services. A total of 53 Australian advisers will provide technical assistance and training in six regional centres: National Capital district, Lae, Goroka, Rabaul, Mt Hagen and Madang. Phase 2 comprises six components:

**Component 1: Operations Support.** Operations Support involves the placement of 24 advisers in 6 locations who will provide advice on matters such as policing practices, criminal intelligence gathering and analysis and dog handling. Specialist advisers will provide training for officers in prosecution, sexual offences squads and the drug detection unit.

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<sup>4</sup>Hogan, E., *Reluctant Kiaps: Dilemmas of AIDAB's Police Development Project in Papua New Guinea*, unpublished paper. Pacific Islands Political Studies Association (PIPSA) Conference, Monash University, 1991, p.1.

<sup>5</sup>Engel, L., *op.cit.*, p.159.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*

**Component 2: Training Support.** The support component involves 19 advisers in 6 locations. Seven advisers will be based at the Police Training College at Bomana to assist in the design and delivery of the major formal courses of the RPNGC. Five advisers will provide specialist training for the Mobile Squads and the remaining advisers will be out-posted to major police stations to provide short upgrading and specialist courses and on-the-job training.

**Components 3 and 4: Administration and Management.** Support will focus on the administrative systems in the RPNGC Headquarters, in particular, on consolidating the use of management and financial systems established in the first phase and on training of local personnel in the operation of these systems. Particular attention is to be given to the management of RPNGC personnel including the integration of training into career planning.

**Component 5: Computing.** Computing is designed to increase the capacity of the RPNGC computing operations.

**Component 6: Scientific Services** involves the further development of the scientific forensic services and the enhancement of the capability of the Police in this important area.<sup>7</sup>

It is not the purpose of this Chapter to provide a detailed history of the Project (Phase I and Phase II), but rather to concentrate on the major early studies on the provision of police education and training for police in Papua New Guinea and to present some very real criticisms on the way in which the Australian Government and its official aid agency went about providing such assistance. If future Australian Governments are to be encouraged to provide such assistance on a broader scope and with proactive policing in mind, then the lessons of the past are valuable ones.

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<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*

The subject of internal stability and the related questions of the armed forces, the police and law and order in an independent Papua New Guinea began to be of concern and interest in Australia from the early 1970's, as the prospect of independence became part of the political agenda. In June 1972 *The Age* published a two-part article by Hugh Armfield about the possibility of stability for an independent Papua New Guinea:

What the defence advisers were saying was:

"Watch out, internal trouble and dissension evident in South-East Asia could be repeated in Papua New Guinea."

Many people in Australia and in Papua New Guinea believe that some independence, when Australia no longer exerts a dominant administering authority, there will be serious divisions in the country. Already there are secessionist movements in copper-rich Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula and parts of the coastal region of New Guinea. If these are fostered and fomented by outside pressures there could be real trouble.<sup>8</sup>

The article continued to debate the possibility of external threat and to ask whether, if there was no external threat, was there a need to have a defence force?. Armfield, in what must be viewed in hindsight as one of the most prophetic and proactive analyses of Papua New Guinea, argued in his first article for a "peculiar to task" paramilitary force. In the second article he was seduced into describing a force that had to be put together quickly—the title of the second article was "Time is the enemy in defence of PNG." An extensive citing of his second article is important as it points to what has not been achieved in over twenty years:

Government officials in Canberra and Port Moresby, as well as Territory politicians, agree that there is a need for a defence force—basically the army—but more for para-military than for usual military functions.

If there was a bigger and stronger police force, or if the country was not so fragmented and likely to face internal dissension, it could be argued that it could be a waste of money for Papua New Guinea to have a

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<sup>8</sup>Armfield, H., "Papua NG's Army a force for Unity", *The Age*, Melbourne, 28 June, 1972.

defence force. But there are internal problems and the police force is not big, so there is a need for a military force.

"Military" force is a better term than "defence" force, because defence against an external aggressor is not what it is all about. But there could be some military requirements resulting from minor incursions along the border with West Irian.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the possibility of tribal fights secessionist movements and general unrest, the PIR has another role to fulfil and this is summed up in a phrase used to describe part of the regiment's training—"aid to the civil power".

It is a wide-ranging term, but it means that if the civil power cannot maintain law and order through normal channels—civil administrators and the police, etc—the army as an agency of the civil power, must be available and prepared to provide assistance.

As the Territory's Chief Minister (Mr Somare) has put it, if there are major disturbances which the police force, of some 3500 men, cannot cope with, the PIR will have to be used. PIR units are given about 10 weeks' training each year in "aid to the civil power". This training covers everything from simple traffic control to a Northern Ireland type of situation—in which the soldiers would not use rubber bullets.

One thing that is perhaps frightening to Australians is that the military forces in Papua New Guinea might in the future be placed in the situation where their leaders believe it is necessary to carry out a military coup. Such talk is frowned upon, but this is a possibility. Why should Papua New Guinea be so different from Africa?<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Armfield supported the concept of a dual-function army:

"One of the major functions of the military force, now and in the future, is to show the flag for the central administering authority throughout the country. The Pacific Islands Regiment, which is almost the whole of the military force, moves far and wide, patrolling in remote areas and carrying out civic-action projects. In what is a geographically and ethnically divided country, where people from one valley regard people from the next as foreigners, the multi-racial PIR demonstrated that people from different tribal and regional groups can, and do, work and live in harmony." *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Armfield saw no problem with continued civilian control:

"It is instilled in the soldiers and officers of the PIR that they are there to serve the people and the Government. There is no reason to believe that a coup situation would develop unless there was a breakdown of Government." *ibid.*

That is a fear. The primary fact, however, is that there is an important role for the military forces in an independent Papua New Guinea. Can a viable local military force be established in Papua New Guinea in the few years remaining before the country becomes independent? "The short answer is "no"—but we're working like bloody mad to do as much as we can in the short space of time left to us, " said one senior officer who is deeply involved with the problem.<sup>11</sup>

The concluding section of Armfield's two-part article addresses a question which has not been properly answered in the twenty-three years since the article was written:

What kind of military force should Papua New Guinea have?

The answer to this question lies very much with the Chief Minister (Mr Somare) and his colleagues. But given that they see a role for a military force to act as an agent for the Government—showing the flag and possibly being used as a supporting force for the police in time of major civil disturbance—it seems that a force of about the same size and formation as the present one would be appropriate.<sup>12</sup>

It is important to note that whilst the proposed PNG Defence Force was to act in support of the police "in time of major civil disturbance,"<sup>13</sup> that is, under legislation commonly known as Military Aid to the Civil Power, there was no specific question about the future role of the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary.

In an interview in July, 1972 Brigadier McKinna, the then Commissioner, South Australia Police, described the innate problems of the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary. The problems were fundamental; for example, whereas the Army (the Pacific Islands Regiment) was supplied with rations the police had to purchase their own on an individual basis.<sup>14</sup> Such basic discontents were a cause of considerable tension

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<sup>11</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>See Sinclair, J., *To Find A Path: the Life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment*.

<sup>14</sup>At this level of rations and quartering the Army had a distinct privilege over the police—their wives were able to quartered with them.



which may partly explain the hostility between the two organisations though these issues have now been somewhat resolved.<sup>15</sup> The police were beset with problems of finance which related to salaries and training. For instance, an Army Private received an annual salary of \$A4, 000 compared to a Constable's annual salary of \$A2, 000 (out of which, as mentioned above, costs of rations had to be deducted).

Training related to in-service training at the time is best reported in a communication from the Commissioner of the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary in February, 1972.<sup>16</sup> The program was summarised as follows:

1. Members are chosen for promotion, to ranks of Constable I/C, Senior Constable and Sergeant, on the basis of examinations passed, length of service and efficiency. At the same time, selected individuals who possess high educational qualifications and proven efficiency may undertake specialised training courses. Satisfactory completion of such courses results in promotion, without regard to seniority or length of service.
2. N.C.O.s and lower ranks, with a minimum of 3 years service and at least Form 2 education, may apply to be considered for Commissioned Officer training. At the conclusion of a 2 year Cadet Officer training period they are commissioned as Sub-Inspectors. Their training embraces both on the job and institutional instruction.
3. Courses in various subjects are undertaken by commissioned officers at the Administrative College in Port Moresby, the Australian Administrative Staff College at Mt Eliza, Victoria,

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<sup>15</sup>A constant source of tension occurs each pay day in the national capital Port Moresby; well-paid but inebriated soldiers are arrested by lesser-paid police Army colleagues then try to 'un-arrest' their confreres and brawling takes place. Senior officers of both bodies inevitably work out some form of *modus vivendi*.

<sup>16</sup>The letter to me from Commissioner N.A.M. Nicholls, in my capacity of Education Officer, Victoria Police Sub-Officers' Course, was somewhat bland but instructive as to the developments that were occurring in Papua New Guinea.

and the Commonwealth Police College, Manly, New South Wales.

4. Advantage is taken of attachment to Australian Police Forces for instruction in such fields as training, traffic, prosecutions and drug control.
5. Members who show an aptitude for a certain type of work are attached to the pertinent section or Branch. They are permitted to continue to specialise, except where it is obvious that their promotional prospects are likely to be jeopardised by a lack of general police knowledge. The secondment of members from Australian Forces, to instruct in specialist duties, will permit the expansion of in-service training.
6. Apart from the Police College in Port Moresby, a training school is maintained near Rabaul for the training of mobile squads in crowd control, etc.
7. The Police College conducts courses for—
  - (a) Basic recruits
  - (b) Officer Cadets
  - (c) Accelerated promotion
  - (d) Specialist duties
  - (e) Basic and advanced driver training.

It also organises and supervises promotional examinations.

Because of literacy and comprehension problems there is only a limited reliance on written instructional material, for members training for non commissioned ranks. A C.I.B. training manual is now in the course of

preparation and will form part of the course to be undertaken by members selected for that duty.<sup>17</sup>

On 11 July, 1972, McKinna wrote a report on the secondment of Australian Police to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea when Andrew S. Peacock took up office as Minister for External Territories. The secondment scheme was not successful, apart from the occasional visit. Detective Inspector T.J. Rippon of Victoria Police visited Port Moresby in 1972 for the purposes of setting up a Detective Training School (DTS) along the lines of the Victoria Police's Detective Training School.<sup>18</sup> McKinna firmly believed that an education scheme should be set up and implemented along the lines of police education in Victoria; that is, seconded school teachers to be employed within the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary. McKinna could see, in 1972, the necessity to split the police strength so that no danger of a police take-over could occur and that there ought to exist difficulties in getting large numbers of police together.<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to note that the military were used in a civil-aid role whereas the police, among other duties, were used in a tax-collecting role. Such a role militated against the police moving closer to the people; this was seen as a role—reversal whereby in most other situations it is the military which alienates itself from the public and the police are seen to be closer to the community.<sup>20</sup> This would explain why the development of community policing in Papua New Guinea has been such a difficult process.

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<sup>17</sup> Letter from Commissioner N.A.M. Nicholls, Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary to R.H. Smith, 24 February, 1972.

<sup>18</sup> It is an absolute mystery as to what happened to Rippon's DTS, as in 1992, a new Detective Training School was being set up under the Price Waterhouse Project by a seconded Victoria Police Officer who was not a trained detective.

<sup>19</sup> He drew on the development of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary which traditionally moved on foot whereas the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment relied on airlift and sealift.

<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless tax collectors have had a "bad press" since the time of Zaccheus—the tax collector mentioned in the New Testament.

In 1970 Assistant Commissioner R.M. Braybrook of Victoria was commissioned to conduct an investigation entitled *Advice On The Establishment And Operations Of The Detective Branch—Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary*. The document was submitted to the then Minister for External Territories, Andrew Peacock. Braybrook clearly did not link policing with defence as this thesis attempts to do, but he would not disagree with the connection.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless in his 1970 Report an extrapolation of Braybrook's recommendations indicates a clear connection between policing and societal integrity which is, of course, an element of defence argued in this work. Braybrook was aware of the inherent value of the "native" police members. He was highly critical of the lack of advancement by non-indigenous members of the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary. He was particularly critical of what amounted to inertia in grooming indigenous PNG police for positions in the Criminal Investigation Branch, the area on which he was tasked to report; his comments would validly apply to all areas of the Royal PNG Constabulary. There were suggestions that the European officers were content to maintain the Royal PNG Constabulary as a bastion against independence in policing. Many of these European officers formerly served in Kenya, Northern Rhodesia (by then Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia which had staged its act of Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the UK. In other words these Europeans comprised many who did not want the Sun to set on Empire. Braybrook, in his courtly manner, damns with faint praise the existence of the Criminal Investigation Branch.

Part III of Braybrook's Report was entitled—*Problems Associated With Investigation In The Territory Of Papua And New Guinea Which Are Without Parallel In Australian States*.

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<sup>21</sup>A mutual friend interviewed Braybrook (now deceased) in early 1992 and Braybrook accepted the connection of policing and defence as valid.

What Braybrook set out was damning of the neglect (benign or deliberate) which Australia, as the colonial and mandated authority, meted out to Papua New Guinea. It is important to note that Braybrook as a trained and experienced policeman was able to gain insights apparently not previously identified. It is also fair to say that the Minister for External Territories, Andrew Peacock, was a dedicated Minister making serious attempts to have Papua and New Guinea achieve independence as soon as possible.<sup>22</sup> Braybrook stated the necessity of providing educationally contextual subjects in the Detective Training Course. These included:

#### **Anthropology of the Territories**

- (a) Traditional culture and society
  - (i) Social structure: kinship, descent, marriage and divorce, leadership
  - (ii) Social and political control: customary law including inheritance, reciprocity, property rights and trading customs. Concepts of justice including retribution and punishment. Moral responsibility and status. Aspects of shame and prestige.
  - (iii) Land tenure and land use.
  - (iv) Magic and religion (i.e. including sorcery, its practice and beliefs)
- (b) Social and economic development including employment systems, urbanization and migrant labour.
- (c) Race relations, culture contact and social change.
- (d) Responsibility: motivation, discipline and rewards—their separate and cumulative effects.

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<sup>22</sup>It is legendary that Andrew Peacock and Michael Somare became close friends in the movement towards independence.

- (e) The development of law and order in the Territory, Territory Laws, Ordinances, Native Laws, and Instructions, i.e. laws and usage of the Territory, settlement of disputes and complaints.
- (f) The development of political cohesion as a basis for self-government and independence, the growth of local government and area administration.
- (g) History of the Police Service in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Loyalty to the Police Service, i.e. above and beyond family or tribal allegiance. (Giving examples of heroism and self-sacrifice by native police and patrol officers, both in peace time and in war).
- (h) Loyalty to the Government as supreme; why it is necessary and how it can be inculcated in subordinates.<sup>23</sup>

That these educational foundations were never implemented can only be explained away by the rather quaint pleading of "exigencies of the service", a phrase usually meaning financial pressures.

If the Braybrook report, and its initial implementation by Inspector Tom Rippon of Victoria Police, had continued, then clearly there would have been no necessity to recast the C.I.B. course in 1991 as part of the Price Waterhouse Project. In 1991 a perceptive critic of the AIDAB-funded Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Project stated "it would have been better if police training had been done before independence. But for various reasons the situation has deteriorated."<sup>24</sup> Of course, with proper educational and training evaluation procedures, a revolutionary course development would have occurred. What Braybrook and Rippon set in train somehow broke down—the reasons for such a breakdown are beyond the scope of this work as the original source material is simply not available. Although Braybrook's brief was to establish a Detective Branch within

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<sup>23</sup>Braybrook, *op cit.*, pp.19-20.

<sup>24</sup>Hogan, E. *op cit.*, p.1.

the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary it has been demonstrated that an extrapolation could have been made over the whole of that body.

The opportunity presented by the Braybrook Report was unfortunately lost and it was not until 1986 that steps (false ones as it later emerged) were taken to introduce police training and development programs:

The Government of Papua and New Guinea has requested Australian assistance with the development of Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). In meeting this request, the Australian Government engaged Mr E.T. Millar to undertake a study of the development needs of the RPNGC in the period August 1985—January 1986.

The study recommended a training and development program for the RPNGC using Australian technical assistance.<sup>25</sup>

It is of considerable importance that Eric Millar had only recently retired as Deputy Commissioner (Administration) of Victoria Police. The selection of another Victorian was a continuing recognition of the pre-eminence of Victoria Police in the field of education and training. However, it is extraordinary that nowhere in the document is reference made to the work of Braybrook sixteen years earlier. It is further extraordinary that such a narrow focus was taken of the role of policing in Papua New Guinea and that no connections whatever were made with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

The Feasibility Study and Project Design was in fact the Tender Document submitted by Price Waterhouse Urwick, one of the 'Big Four' Chartered Accountancy firms in the world; another of the 'Big Four', Coopers Lybrand was an unsuccessful tenderer for the

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<sup>25</sup>*Feasibility Study And Project Design For The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary*, November 15, 1986, no publisher, no location, p.1.

project.<sup>26</sup> At the outset it has to be made clear that nowhere in the Price Waterhouse document is policing seen as having any connection with defence. In terms of the focus of this thesis this is a glaring omission as reference to the Armfield articles, discussed above in this Chapter, would have at least drawn the attention of the writers of the Report to the fragile nature of Papua New Guinea as later demonstrated by the rebellion on Bougainville. It can be argued that the document and the actual Project smack of neo-colonisation insofar as the 'new' Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary was to become in effect an Australian-style police organization. The Objectives of the Study as listed below demonstrate this:

## 1.2 Objectives of the Study

The study is to provide:

- 1.2.1 Descriptive information on the basic policing problems and the RPNGC's development needs as a basis of justification for the project.
- 1.2.2 An analysis of the needs for development, the proposed project of assistance and the options for inputs and activities.
- 1.2.3 A revised detailed design of a justifiable and workable project of Australian assistance to the RPNGC.
- 1.2.4 Conclusions and recommendations on the justification and implementation of the proposed project design.<sup>27</sup>

The significant point to be made is that the objectives in 1.2.4 (above) had already decided that the RPNGC needed this project. The next section elicits the tone set out in the objectives. It is certainly the case that the Feasibility Study was commissioned by

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<sup>26</sup>It should be noted that throughout the Price Waterhouse document references are made to recommendations made by Coopers and Lybrand in a previous report on training within RPNGC — these will be referred where necessary even though the primary source document is not available.

<sup>27</sup>*ibid.*, p. 1.



the Papua New Guinea Government, but it was apparent that non-PNG solutions were set in train prior to the project being implemented as the *Matters to be Addressed* demonstrate:

1.3.1 The study should provide an overall justification for the project by reference to:

- (a) the size and scope of the law and order and policing problems;
- (b) the characteristics, strengths and development needs of the RPNGC;
- (c) proposed developments and changes in the RPNGC organisation and procedures;
- (d) the existing training and development programs for the RPNGC;
- (e) the political and financial priority to development of the RPNGC.

The project design was to specify:

- (a) the overall rationale of the project;
- (b) specific target objectives;
- (c) approach and method of operation;
- (d) project components and linkages between them;
- (e) staffing requirements;
- (f) training provisions;
- (g) equipment provision;
- (h) capital works provision;
- (i) resource requirements;

- (j) administrative/management arrangements;
- (k) counterpart inputs and funding;
- (l) recurrent cost implications of the project;
- (m) potential constraints and problem areas;
- (n) methods of monitoring and evaluation;
- (o) estimates of costs and benefits;
- (p) implementation plan, including phasing.<sup>28</sup>

*The Matters to Be Addressed*, as set out above, reveal a steady incremental approach. The tone can be construed at least as condescending. The accomplishments of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary are simply not recognised. It is curious that nowhere in the whole document is any comparison, or even allusion to, made with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.<sup>29</sup>

It is only in 1.3.1 (a), above, that the study mentions "the existing training and development programs for the RPNGC". Not surprisingly when this was investigated later in the project study it was found to be so seriously lacking as to be virtually useless.

The Feasibility Study Team consisted of the following members:

- Team Leader            Retired Commissioner, South Australia Police
- Staff Development    Associate Director, Price Waterhouse, Sydney
- Computer Specialist   Senior Consultant, Price Waterhouse, Sydney

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<sup>28</sup>*ibid.*, pp.2-4.

<sup>29</sup>Later in the document an example is given by an Australian Major as to 'the hopelessness' of police personnel engaged in communications—this officer makes no comment about soldiers of the PNG Defence Force.

- Project Manager      Development Manager, Hawthorn Institute of Education,  
Melbourne
- Training Specialist      Inspector, Training Research Station, Victoria Police
- Forensic Science      Division Manager, Chemistry
- Specialist      Division, Victoria Police
- Police Management      Superintendent, Management
- Specialist      Services, Tasmania Police
- Social Scientist      Social Worker, AIDAB, ACT Regional Office<sup>30</sup>

Now, although "the Government of Papua New Guinea had requested Australian assistance with the development of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary",<sup>31</sup> nowhere did it request Australian dominance or control of the Project or its activities. Not one member of the study team was a Melanesian, let alone a Melanesian of Papua New Guinea citizenship. The specializations of the team members were not questioned save in the context of Papua New Guinea; not one member of this team was an expert on Papua New Guinea itself. To attempt to see this team as anything other than a Tender acquiring group is simply wrongheaded. This is a Price Waterhouse Urwick team which, having won the tender, at least four of the team remained in Papua New Guinea to implement the program. It cannot be surprising, if a Tender is at stake, that a comprehensive long-term project is recommended; it may explain why neither the Braybrook Report nor the PNG Defence Force were mentioned. It is frankly the case that in Australian policing circles the Project is cynically regarded as the Team Leader's

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<sup>30</sup>Feasibility Study And Project Design, *op cit.*, p.5.

<sup>31</sup>*ibid.*, p.1.

## Option One

Development of Administration and Operations	A\$4, 683, 000
Development of Training	7, 000, 000
Development of Forensic Science	2, 535, 000
Development of Computing Facilities	1, 795, 000
Project Management	4, 240, 050

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Total A\$20, 253, 050

- 3.6 The stress of Option One is development for the future, with a large proportion of inputs giving into the training area.

## 3.7 Option Two

Development of Administration and Operations	A\$3, 523, 000
Development of Training	2, 960, 000
Development of Forensic Science	1, 230, 000
Development of Computing Facilities	945, 000
Project Management	3, 213, 750

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Total A\$11, 871, 750

- 3.8 This option is less ambitious and stresses the use and deployment of present facilities in order to make the most of the resources currently available.

- 3.9 In each option the team takes the view that fellowships are of limited use and that wherever possible training should be done in-country as a (rule of thumb) the allowance for fellowships is restricted to:

Option One	51 man years
Option Two	40 man years

- 3.10 In each option the team is of the view that the selection of the Managing Agent is of prime importance for an efficient and well-run project.<sup>33</sup>

The Executive summary leads inevitably to Option One as superior to Option Two and for a mere \$A8, 381, 300 there is an investment in the future rather than the present. There is an immediate and apparent illogicality in the construction of both Option Tables. Training is set out as an end in itself, but development in any area without training is futile and absurd. Nevertheless the Executive Summary is both persuasive and seductive.

A disturbing feature of the document was is the tenor of 3.10 (above) regarding the selection of the Managing Agent. The concern here is that an external body staffed by "white pellas"<sup>34</sup> was preferred rather than a mixed team of PNG nationals and white pellas. It is still an unfortunate occurrence that the absolutism of Nineteenth Century Christian missionaries has been taken up by the secular missionaries of the later Twentieth Century. These secular missionaries promote (either deliberately or unconsciously) neo-colonialism covered with the veil of economic development.

The Feasibility Study document is predicated, in Chapter 1—*Police In Papua New Guinea—An Overview*, on a connection between law and order and economic development; it is economic development that takes precedence. This is why, earlier in this Chapter, the role of one of the world's four largest Chartered Accountancy firms was questioned in its involvement with the development of policing. It would indeed be odd if a Chartered Accountancy firm was not to be concerned about economic development, but, when the economic imperative overtakes the needs of people in terms

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<sup>33</sup>Feasibility And Project Design, *op cit.*, pp.6-7.

<sup>34</sup>Pidgin for Europeans.

of policing planning, then there are legitimate grounds for criticism. Indeed, it is argued that Chapter 1 provides ample evidence of an economic development imperative:

The road system consists of roads joining the highlands with the coast at Lae along the coastal plain to Madang in the west and Wan in the east. The cities on the northern side of the mountain range are not joined to the capital by road. *The highland highway in particular is essential to the economic development of the area (original emphasis).* The country is generally mountainous overall with tropical vegetation in the higher rainfall areas. The secondary islands are also mountainous with tropical vegetation. *In summary, the country is difficult to police because of the lack of a road network and the nature of the terrain (emphasis added).* The average number of people per square kilometre is approximately 7.5, however, the population is concentrated in the major towns and in the highlands. From a policing point of view the towns are controllable in the sense that police patrols can show a police presence and, if necessary, impose a curfew as was the case in Port Moresby last year. The essential problem areas are in the highlands where the population is centred and much of the agricultural production takes place, particularly tea and coffee growing. The Highland Highway is not secure despite the fact that it joins a number of major population areas.

The Sepik Province and the Fly River area are not as densely populated but the lack of roads and even regular air services means that the waterways are the main mode of travel. The police have limited access to boats to police the area. *To sum up, the population is centred in the most difficult terrain (emphasis added).*

## 1.2 Law and Order In Relation To Development

Economic growth and development is one of the PNG Government's major objectives and law and order provides the infrastructure for this to be achieved. *Without a stable law and order situation it is difficult to be competitive on the world market because of the increased burden carried by the private sector in order to ensure the security of plant and equipment and employees (emphasis added).* It is estimated that the private sector spend K78m per year on private security services. This is nearly twice the budget for the RPNGC (K39m). This adds to the

already high cost of production and is a direct disincentive for investment in the manufacturing sector. This is in addition to other disincentives which exist as far as foreign and domestic investors are concerned such as the lease system of land tenure and a high cost structure for salaries and wages. *In the tourism industry again the lack of a stable law and order situation acts as a disincentive to potential tourists (emphasis added).* PNG is not an inexpensive place to visit and certainly has great potential as a tourist destination, however, people in America and Europe will not visit a place where there is a risk of being held up and robbed or raped. Personal security is of fundamental importance for a country attempting to attract tourism.

The agricultural sector is also suffering because the major cash crops are produced in the highlands (coffee/tea/cocoa/copra) and the Highlands Highway provides the only route to transport these commodities out. *This highway is not secure and despite the efforts of the highway patrols, hold-ups are an all too common occurrence on this road (emphasis added).*

In particular the coffee buyers who must pay the small holders in cash are vulnerable to attack and robbery because of the large amount of cash they must carry. This at least limits the development of the coffee industry at a time when it should be booming because of the failure of crops in other countries.

Investment in virtually all areas of the economy is effected (sic) by the law and order problems. In addition, it also makes it difficult to recruit technical expertise from overseas which would contribute to economic growth and assist the government to ensure that industry is properly administered. *To summarise, the team is of the view that the creation of a stable law and order situation is one of the preconditions for economic development (emphasis added).<sup>35</sup>*

Now it is certainly true that the Feasibility and Project Design document specified that it was discussing the relationship between law and order and development—but it is also

<sup>35</sup> Feasibility and Project Design, *op cit.*, pp.9-11. Original emphasis occurs in the document.

the case that it is development at any price. It is a reactive policing scenario rather than a proactive one. It is a piece of writing that in no way asks the question about the nexus between the citizens of Papua New Guinea and the developers who are mostly foreign based or funded. This point is not being laboured for its own sake; it shows that a foreign system of commercial development has been imposed upon Papua New Guinea citizens; and one can detect a lightly covered theme of racism present. To the student of development politics it seems clear that an alien policy of development is the model. The document does not go to the root causes of the so-called law and order problem. What is proposed is, in fact, a pacification programme by the police. There is apparently no awareness that such a concept can, and does, lead to political unrest and disturbances and, given the level of regional feelings in PNG, fragmentation.

The next section deals with the nature of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary:

The RPNGC is part of a Western style system of law and order which has been introduced into a culture which is very different from western cultures. Basic elements of the culture such as the land tenure system, marriage arrangements, the system of payback, the place of women in society, to mention just a few, make it very difficult for this transplanted system of policing to operate effectively. In addition, community policing, enabling two-way feedback between the police and the community in which it operates, is a concept and a practice which has so far been scarcely attempted.

Traditional forms of control and social discipline have always been in existence as in any society. The Kiaps or patrol officers were an introduced form of control and were responsible for large areas of the country involving large numbers of people, and the police had responsibility for the remainder in the more accessible areas. In fact, at independence the police were responsible for 10% of the land area which included 40% of the population.

Improvements in communications and increased movement of the population to urban areas have changed this, bringing more people under the control of the police. But the task of the police force has



consequently become more complex as more people accustomed to mainly informal, community-based social control have had to deal with a very different system.

Traditionally Papua New Guinea has been a rural based society involving communal ownership and strong obligations linking people to each other. For these rural dwellers the informal methods of social order are still central and official law and order policies are seen as needing to support these. For example, the style of decision-making is by consensus and wrong-doing is dealt with by a complicated system of compensation. Urban dwellers, on the other hand, are less interdependent although, at the same time, they will still frequently solve disputes by using informal systems. The task for a system of law and order is thus exceedingly difficult as the old world and the new world interrelate. Clan obligations will frequently create a conflict between a person's work role, and conforming to expectations of his clan. For a policeman this conflict would be demonstrated in situations such as disciplining, taking and giving orders, and dealing with law breakers.

The move to the new world has also brought with it economic problems, both for individuals and the nation, further increasing the complexity for the police force as politics begin to impinge upon it. For example, increasing numbers of unemployed young people, produced by contact with an education system which has raised their expectations and alienated them from their culture, is the sort of development in present day PNG with which a police force is faced.<sup>36</sup>

The above section is based on the fallacy that the RPNGC is "part of a Western style system of law and order"; it continues from thence to describe accurately the asymmetrical relationship between this "Western style system of law and order" and the traditional culture in which it operates. No doubt is cast at all upon the possible inappropriateness of a Western styled police force for Papua New Guinea. There is no concept of formalizing traditional law and order methods into both legal and policing

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<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*, pp.11-13.

practice. Once again the Project Team only acknowledged the reality of the status quo and produced an acceptable document; clearly when a project tender document is being prepared the guidelines are adhered to and it would be safe to say that Price Waterhouse did this.

The question should be asked that with a \$A20 million prize at the end could more be done? It is clear that a blended system, involving imposed and traditional forms of law and order, could well have been recommended without violating the notion of an aid project. It is not as though the Feasibility Study Team members were unacquainted with programmes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory which have blended policing where relatively large numbers of tribal Aborigines live. Once again the imperative of the Report was to acknowledge facts and then accept an imported and effectively neo-colonial system.

The concluding paragraph of Chapter 1—*Police in Papua New Guinea—An Overview* is illustrative of the above point:

The matters discussed in this Chapter really amount to the social context in which the RPNGC operates—the sociological backdrop, the characteristics of the PNG community, relationship issues, women in society and within the police force. This Team places a great deal of importance on these factors and the need for them to be understood and noted by the incoming project team. In fact, we recommend that a person be employed on the team to constantly ensure that the team takes note of cultural and contextual factors. We would see that person specifically dealing with cross-cultural and relationship issues which will arise between advisers, contract officers and national staff; working with the Training Division to produce material to raise awareness about such issues as in-service courses, which we believe will need to be held regularly; relating to people involved at all levels to assist in the evaluation of the program as it proceeds; advising on contact with the community as crime prevention and community policing begin to be a

reality. We would also see such a person as having responsibility for the welfare needs of the project team and their families.<sup>37</sup>

And yet there is no statement, or even inference, that the RPNGC could be reformed on the very grounds stated in the last paragraph of Chapter 1.

It is perhaps no wonder that the next section of this Chapter is a critique of the Project. The comments are extrapolations from the Feasibility and Project Design document prepared by Price Waterhouse and placed within the Papua New Guinea and regional context—the critique is from within the Project itself:

Although politically independent from Australia Papua New Guinea is still totally dependent on Australia economically. One quarter of this country's total GNP of K1.2b is supplied either in direct or tied aid from Australia. An estimated 60% of its mining, commercial and agricultural enterprises are directly or indirectly owned by Australians or Australian companies. Because of this Papua New Guineans feel a sense of frustration of not being able to stand on their own two feet. They acknowledge a lack of expertise and the necessary work ethic to be able to achieve the level of business sophistication that has built western and some Asian economies. To a great extent they are still subjects of a colonial power, if not politically then economically.

This frustration is borne out daily in the letters to local press urging countrymen to take the reins of the economy and steer it to a destination decided by themselves and not by foreign multi-nationals. They decry the decimation of their rainforests by foreign logging companies who are known to bribe national and local politicians to illegally log protected forest. They are appalled at the contempt that these large companies show when they dump untreated waste into their rivers knowing a third world country does not have the political or social strength of purpose to be able to stop them.

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<sup>37</sup>*ibid.*, p.18.

This frustration has been building to a noticeable resentment, often hatred, of all things foreign. It is against this background that the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project is currently operating.

It is not the case that these sentiments are new but it is revelatory that the Feasibility and Project Design document was apparently unable to identify them. They add weight to comments made earlier in this Chapter that the Project is essentially neo-colonial in tone and character. And further it can be added that the Project is seen by RPNGC members as a commercial enterprise. Expatriates, it seems, do not realize that their salaries, conditions and perquisites affront the locals who are carrying out similar tasks; it is quite a different matter if expatriates are seen to drawing local salaries. It is evident that in Australia there is resentment when United States or United Kingdom "experts" arrive to provide advice on local policing problems; it ought to have been as evident to Price Waterhouse that Papua New Guinea locals would feel the same kind of resentment.

Although beyond the scope of this work, it is odd that in 1986 Price Waterhouse was employed by the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) to conduct a Feasibility Study and then in 1987 to become the successful tenderer for the implementation of the findings of the same Feasibility Study. Another Chartered Accountancy firm, Coopers Lybrand, had conducted a previous survey into the RPNGC but were the unsuccessful tenderers in this instance. These sort of arrangements may well come under close scrutiny in the future by either a Parliamentary Select Committee, the Australian Federal Police or the National Crime Authority.

A perceptive critic of the Project with first-hand experience has stated:

For Price Waterhouse Urwick to be able to take on reform of the RPNGC it had to tap into the appropriate expertise. That expertise in the main lay with serving or ex-policemen. The pool of expertise appropriate for this project within Price Waterhouse Urwick itself was small and relied on people with skills in training, finance and personnel

management. To be able to reform police operations and training it was essential that policemen be recruited for the job. With the co-operation of the police forces of Australia and New Zealand Price Waterhouse Urwick recruited serving policemen between 1985 and 1987 to commence work with the R.P.N.G.C.—Development Project.

Other policemen were released from their respective police forces by way of leave of absence. Price Waterhouse Urwick employed them as contract consultants, designated with the title "adviser". The original thrust of the project was in the area of administration and training. These were the skills originally sought in the first stage of the project. As the project developed more police were recruited to advise on police operations and investigations.

Currently the variety of expertise and diversity of police experience is impressive with police from Hong Kong, New Zealand, Ireland and most states of Australia. Ranks of the police range from Senior Constable to

Commissioner with detective, operational, training and administrative experience. Because of this diversity problems have arisen. There are retired, serving and ex-police employed on the project.

During the latter part of 1990 and the early part of 1991 the Australian and PNG governments took a decision to dramatically increase the size of the project. From the original 13 in 1987 to 42 in 1991. This was in response to an ever growing law and order problem within PNG. For policemen to want to come to PNG an underlying sense of adventure was required as well as a sense of human willingness to work under the most trying conditions and, not least, patience to enable a proper working relationship with our national counterparts.

Now whilst my discussant moves later on to severely criticize the Project there is not at this stage, nor later, any concept that the Project was flawed or inappropriate in the first place. He spoke earlier of the resentment to and even hatred, "of all things foreign", but he accepts the need for foreign police expertise to assist in the reformation of the RPNGC. He accepts the proposition, as does Price Waterhouse, that the establishment of 'proper' law and order conditions are a precursor to economic development; it seems

that no one associated with the whole Project has been able to come to terms with the view that an equitable, from a PNG citizen's viewpoint, economic development process would obviate many law and order problems. The last sentence of the above quoted paragraph is an unconscious indictment of the Project personnel. At best it is a modern day version of a 'Boys' Own' stereotypic hero venturing into a strange country with hostile natives, at worst it portrays an insensitive neo-colonialism which my discussant has previously eschewed.

The question of proper selection and remuneration for police serving in other police jurisdictions is one which must be addressed if regional police co-operation is to advance beyond the present form of 'secular missionary' endeavour. If there is, indeed, an international police 'brotherhood' then it seems that commonsense would dictate the creation of egalitarianism among police—this cannot occur where wage differentials remain so high for expatriate police as compared with local police. The model that ought to be enacted is that pertaining to Australian Volunteers Abroad, a Non Government Organization (NGO) where expatriates are paid local wages but are provided with housing and means of transport. Such a move would eliminate carpetbaggers. In other words local police will accept expatriate police who are closest to them in salaries and benefits—the politics of envy ought not to occur.

Despite this lapse my discussant goes on to compare and contrast the roles of Consultant and Policeman. His opinions are reported at length here because they represent a sustained assessment by an insider and therefore have a special informed critical edge:

A consultant by definition is a person who has qualifications and experience in a particular field and is sometimes considered an "expert". He operates by himself or from within an organisation. The product he is selling is his experience, qualifications and expertise. This product is sold for profit. When other organisations, public or private, have a problem or require an independent perspective on a problem they call in experts who are paid consultants' fees. In order to collect these fees and

ensure business in the future the consultant must be able to demonstrate results, real or otherwise.

The consultant's livelihood depends on profits. The commercial world is fickle and ruthless, quickly dispensing with new performers or non-profit makers. A consultant does not clock in from 9 am to 5 pm each day with weekends off. Nor does he normally receive a set salary which can be relied on every fortnight. He must be able to work independent of time restraints in order to produce desired results. His accounting comes at the end of the day when profit is and be valued by his company. His work ethic dictates that he merely "gives the client what he wants" regardless of whether it is what he needs.

He does not enjoy the institutional security of the public sector worker with employment for life (unless there is a serious transgression of institutional rules). A consultant's life is "cut-throat" in every sense of the word. To an extent because of the combination of the institutional, Australian International Development Aid Bureau (AIDAB) and the commercial, Price Waterhouse Urwick (PWU), consultants are able to enjoy profits without results.

The consultant cannot fathom the mentality of the policeman. He sees him as arrogant, demanding and unappreciative of the trappings afforded them in this private enterprise world. He is astounded at the constant demand for the accounting of time and the bickering over conditions. He fails to see things from their perspective.

Consultants seem to prostitute themselves for their clients' wishes. At times they fail to take a stand and force issues. At other times they disregard the human factor and take ruthless decisions failing to consult. This is the world of commercialism which is valid if a commercial objective is to be achieved. You cannot achieve results without somebody getting hurt. This in itself leads a policeman to criticize project management for a lack of leadership and poor management.

By nature the commercial organisation is in business to compete and make a profit. The consultant is constantly in competition, not only for his company but against his fellow workers. The "brotherhood" of police is completely alien to him. He is a competitor, not a co-operator.

These factors above set the police and the consultants up to be in two different groups that compete, whether they intend to or not. Competition means conflict, both sides have legitimate objectives to fulfil but come from different directions.

Policemen are part of an unique subculture with a work ethic that is anathema to that of the consultant. A policeman is a creature of time, regimentation and a very definite view of what has to be done and how it is to be done. He takes a moral view of his work and will give his "client" what he "needs", not what he "wants". As a policeman he makes a poor consultant. A policeman likes to confront and challenge and achieve results that accord with his view of the world. He will work extraordinarily long hours (with overtime) to achieve those results but expects his salary every fortnight with allowances. If he transgresses he expects to be able to use the system to save himself against arbitrary dismissal. He knows he is like a barnacle on a ship's hull, almost impossible to remove. He can be a performer or non-performer and know he will always have a job. Jobwise a policeman's world is one with a high degree of certainty.

If you take a policeman out of his environment and put him into once where he must fend for himself, financially and commercially he becomes defensive and insecure. He focuses not on his own insecurity but on what he sees as the cause, in this case Price Waterhouse Urwick. Animus develops out of this misunderstanding along with an unhealthy "us and them" attitude.

In order for policeman to develop a healthy relationship with their commercial master they must come to terms with their motivation. It is often said in PNG that there are only three types of people who come to this country, mercenaries, missionaries and misfits. Police fall into the category of mercenaries. They are here for the tax free dollar and a lifestyle that would be unattainable at home, overseas travel, domestic servants, and colonial indulgence.

Leadership and good management are values highly regarded by policemen, even though they themselves often break every leadership and management rule in the book. Policemen like to point to their own



organisations as examples of good leadership and management and are quick to criticise others outside the police brotherhood.

Policemen do have a very strong sense of right and wrong. This is a quality reinforced by the police brotherhood. They believe that right is right and should not be compromised. To tell somebody something is O.K. when it is not is something they cannot come to terms with.

As a consultant this is something he must do at times whether he likes it or not. A policeman takes co-operation for granted and expects it from the organisation he works for. He is put into conflict with non-police on this project because of their behaviour which is basically competitive. To be competitive the consultant is not always open and holds things in reserve or takes advantage of others if it furthers his own cause or ambition. The level of co-operation police expect in their police institution does not exist in the commercial one.

Price Waterhouse Urwick is a commercial organisation that is interested in financial returns rather than artistry. Achieving results is of little value if the organisation is not also making a profit. This commercialism, at times, conflicts greatly with the goals of the police on the project. The police institution is service orientated with no history of profit making. Police are familiar with working within budgets but unfamiliar with working within budget, and returning profits.

All executive decisions affecting the project come from the Project Coordinator (Price Waterhouse Urwick Manager/consultant) and the Sydney office of Price Waterhouse Urwick. At times a "results at any cost" stance is taken by management forcing police to act contrary to their institutional instincts, and at times, ethics. The project is managed by a policeman who seems to have little control when commercial decision is made.

My discussant concludes his strong critique of the RPNGC—Development Project with what can only be described as a stinging attack on a project that, in his opinion, has run out of control:

Where two different subcultures are ideologically opposed, as are police and consultants, there is bound to be friction. Any friction in the work environment produces largely negative results and reduces the motivation of its employees. The RPNGC—Development Project has been no exception. The differences between the two groups has been a major factor in its failures. When the project was first organised in 1987 neither the Australian Government nor Price Waterhouse Urwick counted on the problems it had between the two groups. The conflict has for the most part been hidden but at times has broken out into open bickering and arguments, all of which has been carefully noted by members of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary who are quick to criticise us for not getting our act together. The latter part of 1991 seems to have seen a coming together of the two groups for a common goal. If management is astute enough it will build on these breakthroughs by more open communication with both groups. Communication is a key word in this project as there has been a definite lack of it on both sides. If the perceived problems of both sides were talked through as they arose I am sure results would have been achieved far quicker than has been the case to date. Communication is absolutely essential in an environment where two competing philosophies are in conflict as they are between police and consultants on this project.

Price Waterhouse Urwick insists on secrecy when it comes to the salaries and conditions of individuals employed on the project whether police or consultants. Yet they never explain to the police why. This is part of the commercial culture, not the police one. Police salaries and conditions are published in the Police Gazette for all to read, there are no secrets. In the commercial world each consultant negotiates a salary with his employee. The employer organisation tries to negotiate with the employee that most advantageous package for itself. It does not wish the next employee to know what was negotiated with the last employee as this would provide ammunition for the negotiation. When Price Waterhouse Urwick offered the police on the project a certain package we all took it having no idea how to negotiate for ourselves. To a certain extent we were taken advantage of by Price Waterhouse Urwick. This is now a lesson learnt by all and police renegotiating contract renewals aren't as easy a target the second time around. This has caused resentment on this project as Price Waterhouse Urwick did not set the

ground rules for the police and failed to communicate any information relating to their new circumstances. These are the simple things that cause conflict between the groups.

Price Waterhouse Urwick's behaviour in the initial part of the project indicated shrewd management, but poor leadership. Police on the project were treated differently and some with contempt. Price Waterhouse Urwick often patronised less senior police on the project. Whether Price Waterhouse Urwick like to admit it or not they perpetuated the group rivalry by poor communication and leadership. It would have been far better if they had given the police on the project the advantage of assimilating into their new environments by assisting in their retraining. This retraining would have been especially helpful in merely introducing us to the world of the consultant. A lot of the friction could have been avoided if this had been done as each adviser arrived in the country.

As advisers we do not have any police powers in PNG and can only advise our National counterparts. This in itself is something new for police but familiar to consultants. As police we tend to confront rather than consult. A lot of frustration and bitterness resulted because of the misunderstanding of our role as consultants. We all tended to take charge of our particular areas instead of merely advising our counterparts. Some National officers accepted this, but others did not, often resulting in open conflict. Price Waterhouse Urwick knew of this but did nothing to stem it by proper orientation of the police coming onto the project.

Instead each policeman on the project was forced to discover his position through trial and error. This provided more ammunition for the consultants to throw at us.

The consultants on the project seemed to fit into their individual roles far more readily than police. They were comfortable with giving advice and then sitting back and not getting frustrated when the advice wasn't taken. Their culture in a lot of respects had better equipped them for the advisory for advisory role than the police. The worth of consultants on this project is highly underestimated by police as none have really taken the time to have a look at what they do. The consultants have the more specialised jobs such as corporate planning, personnel management,

internal consulting and financial management. They tend to work quietly behind the scenes and do not spend a great deal of time socially with police on the project. Again more communication on both sides would bring them closer together. Four years to date is too long a time for groups to be in conflict on a project of this size and magnitude.

Police are by no means blameless when it comes to criticism of the project. We have tended to be very tunnel visioned in our views of how this project should be managed. To a great extent we have failed to appreciate that we are working for a commercial organisation with legitimate profit orientated goals. These goals may not meet our cultural and ethical idea of what is right and wrong but are no less valid. At times certain police on the project have not performed to expectations as they have developed an attitude of complacency justified by their belief they are working for mercenaries who only require their presence in PNG, not their skills. The poor performers on project have now settled into the realisation that they can get by with doing the minimum and still be retained as contract consultants. This is an area where Price Waterhouse Urwick have been poor performers themselves.

Price Waterhouse Urwick at times must demonstrate good management and strong leadership by getting rid of non-performers on the project by quickly replacing them with someone who will perform. This means consultants and police.

In the early part of the project when Australia was still enjoying some prosperity police were reluctant to come to P.N.G. Originally Price Waterhouse Urwick was forced to take what it could find in the way of police skills. Now things are tight in Australia and there is a large pool of talent to choose from. This is the opportunity for them to up the standard of both police and consultants on the project by refusing to renew the contracts of non-performers and replacing them with fresh blood willing to work.

The R.P.N.G.C.—Development Project is vitally important to both P.N.G. and Australia. Strategically Australia cannot have a country in chaos on its doorstep when it has such tenuous relationships with both Indonesia and the Philippines. East Timor is currently enough of a headache without having the added burden of worrying about Indonesia

flowing over the border from Irian Jaya. After having lived in PNG and visited most parts of the country I now know that this country is teetering on the brink of chaos. I place considerable faith in the project and do not want to see it fail due to the petty squabbling of police and consultants. Price Waterhouse Urwick must accept the ethical responsibility of this project by paying less attention to its commercial decisions. This is the price it has to pay for managing the project. A strictly commercial approach to the management of the project is as wrong as the strictly ethical one. They must take the practical approach and balance both their responsibilities.

Institutional reform is an important challenge. In an industrialised country such as Australia the success of that reform is important, not absolutely essential. In PNG success is absolutely essential as the survival of PNG literally depends on it. Bougainville and parts of the highlands have been without law and order for almost two years. These areas have been recaptured by ancient tribal conflicts and hatreds. Law and order has been replaced in these areas by the rule of the gun. These areas are on the increase not decrease. I sincerely believe this project may well prove to be a vital element in the success or failure of this country.

The relationship between the police and the consultants has been a stormy one due to a real difference in their work ethics. This is a trial for Price Waterhouse Urwick to see whether they can live up to their international reputation as management consultants and for the police to see whether they are flexible enough to come to terms with their role as *consultants*.<sup>38</sup>

This critique of the Price Waterhouse Urwick Development Project is the most thorough currently available to researchers. It demonstrates that the timeline between colonialism and modernity is unbroken; the fact of independence has in reality been

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<sup>38</sup>This section and all bold entries in this come as a result of a highly confidential interview and protection of the source is most important; that is why each section has not been footnoted. The identity of the source can be revealed on a confidential basis through the usual sealed envelope method.

avoided. In Papua New Guinea independence has been treated by Australia in a continuing paternalistic manner. Virtually all Australian dealings with Papua New Guinea are conditional upon that Government agreeing to terms set down by Australia for assistance, and Australia becomes irritated if Papua New Guinea sets out to gain assistance from elsewhere. It is though an unwritten Australian version of the Monroe Doctrine, referred to in Chapter Two, is in place. Australia seems to know best what is good for Papua New Guinea when in dealing with Papua New Guinea, the truth is that Australia knows what is best for Australia. Sadly this paternalism is unconscious and plays on the misperceptions of what is supposed to comprise 'the Melanesian Way'. The suspicion remains that this notion of 'the Melanesian Way' is an excuse for treating Papua New Guinea and its citizens in a patronising manner. Of course, it would be absurd to suggest that 'tied' aid should not exist. But there is a vast difference between directing aid for projects that have been asked for and providing aid for that which has not been requested. It is curious, and frustrating, that the inability to gain access to the original documents relating to the Development Project, means that the claim made that the Papua New Guinea Government initiated requests to the Australian Government for aid in restructuring the RPNGC cannot be tested. Throughout the Price Waterhouse Urwick document what emerges is a replication of an Australian policing model; it is doubtful that Port Moresby would have specifically requested such a model.

In terms of public policy making where foreign aid is concerned, the appropriateness of Chartered Accountancy firms being involved in the analysis and operation of activities normally regarded as being outside their area of expertise can be questioned. Despite the widening of their activities Chartered Accountancy firms are in business to make profits; as indicated above, there is nothing wrong with profit-making so long as the profit motive is not the sole end. It is a matter of opinion whether a commercial firm can give impartial advice on areas which are inherently free from the profit motive. Virtually no Western style police force exists to make a profit; in some areas there is a proper charge made to users on a fee—for—service basis, policing is a service function.

It would be profligate to suggest that proper accounting practices are forgotten in a drive to deliver services, but the social aims of policing should be paramount.

An analysis of both the Price Waterhouse Urwick and Cooper's Lybrand tender documents for the RPNGC Development Project suggests that both documents are universal and effectively value-free. It is not a travesty to suggest that such documentation can easily be adopted to suit other tender bids for police contracts in other countries. With the availability of word processing it is now possible to use a set format and interpolate what is considered to be relevant to the current tender; it can well be envisaged that where Papua New Guinea appears in one document that an other country's name can be substituted. This universality of approach, whilst innovative, is extremely disturbing if it could be proved to be true. The paradox is that a document can point out the need to be sensitive to local issues and then proceed to ignore them and seek to impose an alien police culture on an independent and developing nation.

Given that there are frailties connected with Royal Commissions and Judicial Inquiries, normally to do with the terms of reference, there is a reasonable assumption that evidence will be properly addressed and weighed by learned counsel. Within the same timespan of Price Waterhouse Urwick's and Coopers Lybrand's tenders, based on a survey by Cooper's Lybrand, there were three Judicial Inquiries into Australian police forces, New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. The Australian Government would certainly have been aware of these inquiries as would most likely the Papua New Guinea Government could have been apprised of the existence of the Australian Inquiries. It is a wonder that a Judicial Inquiry was not suggested to Papua New Guinea. It is not profitable to speculate what a Judicial Inquiry would have found regarding the RPNGC—but it is very likely to have been different from that of a consulting arm of an international Chartered Accountancy firm. My discussant perhaps has summed it up well when he compares the roles of consultants and police—consultants advise on what the client wants, not on what he needs.

The Price Waterhouse Urwick—RPNGC Development Project came to an end in late 1992. In August, 1992, both the Australian Federal Police and the Northern Territory Police were advertising in-house for police members to go to Papua New Guinea as Training Advisers. According to a highly placed source in the Australian Federal Police<sup>39</sup> there had emerged a substantial change of opinion between what may be described as police providers and commercial providers. The Australian Federal Police view was not markedly different from that expressed in this Chapter—that PNG is a sovereign nation which has to solve its own problems with assistance where necessary. The commercial view remained that of providing PNG with what the commercial providers feel is best for the RPNGC. In other words the revised and continuing Project was likely to produce more of the same with different actors.

On 22 June, 1992, a Report of The Joint Review Of The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project was completed by the Pacific Regional Team, Centre For Pacific Development And Training of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau which is part of the Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade. This document revealed no new insights into either Papua New Guinea or the RPNGC; rather it sought to scrupulously examine the existing Price Waterhouse Urwick management of the Project. That it has done so in a short period, of just over one calendar month from 10 May, 1992 to 22 June, 1992, is perhaps complimentary to the perspicacity of the Review Team. The Terms of Reference also make a major contribution to the quality of the Review document. To this extent the Terms of Reference need to be set out:

#### **Introduction:**

A major constraint to the development of P.N.G. is the poor law and order situation. This contributes to discouraging investment in the

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<sup>39</sup> Acting Deputy Commissioner Adrien Whiddett, interview 24 September, 1992.



country and reducing the quality of life of its citizens. In recognition of this the Australian and P.N.G. Governments agreed in 1985 to undertake a study to assess the development needs of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. This study recommended a training and development program for the R.P.N.G.C. using Australian Technical assistance.

The outcome was the establishment of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project, an institutional strengthening program, which commenced in February 1988 under the management of Price Waterhouse Urwick.

The Project is designed to provide an integrated package of assistance to upgrade general police capabilities over a five-year period. Police department functions being addressed include administration, operations, personnel management and training, as well as some specialised areas such as computing, mobile squads and forensic science. Programmed structural and operational changes have been implemented at R.P.N.G.C. Headquarters and the Project is now moving to assist counterparts at regional and provincial levels. Australia's contribution to the Project, administered by A.I.D.A.B. under the bilateral aid program, is currently estimated at \$29.7 million while the contribution of the Government of Papua New Guinea is estimated at K2.5 million. The Project was reviewed in December, 1990. Subsequent to this review the scope of the project was considerably expanded. This review recommended that a further review of the project be undertaken at the end of 1991. It also indicated that in order to achieve significant progress towards the project goal, the project would need to continue beyond the initial five year term.

The Government of Papua New Guinea has requested the extension of the project. Australia has agreed to examine the feasibility of extending the project beyond the current phase which is due to be completed in 1992. It was agreed that an assessment of the project was required and, consequent to the findings of that assessment, a proposal for a second phase developed.

#### **Objectives And Scope Of The Review**

The objectives of the review are:

- to assess the impact of the Project to date and, in particular, the progress made since the Mid Term Review and as expected by the completion of the Project in December, 1992;
- to assess the need for, scope and duration of a further phase of the project; and if it considered appropriate;
- prepare a draft design for the second phase.

### **Assessment of Progress**

The Team will assess the progress made toward the goal and objectives as agreed between Papua and Australia ..... An examination of the extent to which the endorsed recommendations from the Mid Term Review have been implemented will be an important part of this assessment.

The Team will focus on assessing the effectiveness, impact and appropriateness of the activities undertaken and the sustainability of the activities by the R.P.N.G.C. after the completion of the Project. Factors which have contributed to progress or lack of progress should be identified and alternatives for achieving progress examined.

The Team will specifically address the monitoring arrangements for the Project.

### **Assessment of The Need For, Scope and Duration of a Further Phase**

On the basis of the above assessments and the results of commissioned studies into specialist areas, identify the priority needs of the R.P.N.G.C., assess Australia's capacity to assist P.N.G. in addressing these needs and establish the goal and objectives for the second phase.

Particular attention should be given to the following areas:

- supply services (including management of the supply functions for vehicles, uniforms, stationary (sic), plant and office equipment, radio and communications equipment);

- policies and practices of the R.P.N.G.C. with respect to women police;
- recruitment;
- promotion, including advancement to officer rank;
- educational and training opportunities, including access to training;
- conditions, including housing;
- the opportunities for assisting in the reduction of domestic violence;
- the impact of budgetary and personnel restrictions on the sustainability of project activities;
- quality, direction and co-ordination of the future program of training;
- project monitoring arrangements.<sup>40</sup>

Once again the whole Project emphasized its apparent mendicant nature. It is difficult to understand the lack of perception on the part of both the Australian and Papua New Guinea governments in this regard. Essentially the project is a one-way process: aid from Australia to Papua New Guinea with a small local contribution. There is no written, or implied, notion that the Project could well be a two way process that benefits both nations. There is no understanding that policing in the region is a vital component of defence and security and should be regarded as such.

The major lesson from this episode has been that it has almost attained, in the view of this writer, the paradigmatic status of how not to do things in the region. Policing

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<sup>40</sup>Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Australian Assistance To The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary—*Report Of The Joint Review Of The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project*. 22 June, 1992. Canberra. Appendix 2.

assistance remains, in the official sense, what Australia can do for the South Pacific.<sup>41</sup> However, there is no institutional awareness of a partnership being created, or that Australia might benefit in terms of improved regional security. The region, through Australian official eyes, has yet to be seen as contributing to the security of the whole. For Australia, the relationship with Papua New Guinea is the most important in the South Pacific, especially when the triangular connection with Indonesia is taken into account. The most serious threat to Papua New Guinea's internal stability is the law and order problem which, in the end, only a well-trained, professional police force can overcome. The National Crime Summit held in Port Moresby in 1991 decided that the nation was facing a crisis of confidence, "a crisis that threatens the social and economic fabric of the nation as well as impacting on those countries that have developed special relationships with PNG."<sup>42</sup> The Summit concluded: "Since independence, government neglect has gradually eroded the capacity of law and order agencies to tackle the problem. With this decline has come a rapid increase in fear within the general population. No longer does the average citizen feel safe to go about their daily tasks. No longer can business people feel secure to invest and create new opportunities. No longer can doctors, nurses, teachers and diplomats deliver their services free from fear of criminal elements."<sup>43</sup> Whether the enormous financial commitment of Australian foreign aid to police development in Papua New Guinea has been wisely spent is doubtful when the model chosen at the start was so obviously flawed. It may well be

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<sup>41</sup> *The Australian*, 5 October, 1992. The New South Wales Police Commissioner Tony Lauer announced in a brief paragraph the Australian Commissioners' Conference would provide assistance to the region.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Clausen, M., *The Australian Government's Relationship to PNG: An NGO Perspective*, unpublished paper, PIPSA Conference, Monash University, 1991, p.3.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.* Unfortunately the situation has not improved. A lecturer in Commerce at the University of Papua New Guinea was stabbed to death recently. Armed police took over 24-hour patrols of the campus, *The Age*, 27 May, 1995.

the case that the real beneficiaries have been consultants with major international firms, not the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.

## Summary

Chapter Three is essentially the discussion of a test case which examines the role of the Australian Government in providing development assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Development Project is the first attempt by a nation of the region to recreate its police, derived from a colonial structure, to meet the needs of a diverse and developing nation with the financial and personnel assistance from the former colonial power Australia.

Because of its diversity of cultures, languages and ethnic composition, Papua New Guinea presents both a microcosmic and macrocosmic view of the policing required for developing nations in the region. The focus of the argument, from both ends of the telescope, is nevertheless fixed on the centrality of the thesis *that there needs to be a recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of this country in regional terms and perspectives*. A stable Papua New Guinea, the only nation with which Australia shares a border, presents Australia with both practical and moral responsibilities.

Independence came relatively easily to Papua New Guinea but the Cassandras were warning of the possible implosion of the proposed new nation for several years prior to its independence from Australia in 1975. And yet the warning was about the power of external forces to act as a fuse for this implosion; despite tensions ranging from minor to severe the nation has largely kept its integrity intact with the exception of Bougainville.

In the earlier sections of this Chapter it was reported that a number of influential critics were questioning the necessity for Papua New Guinea to have a Defence Force at all. While this debate raged, no one specifically questioned the future role of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.

Essentially from 1971 to 1987 there were spasmodic and genuine attempts to bring the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary into line with Australian police practices. The Price Waterhouse Urwick managed project documents not once mentioned policing as having any connection with defence. From the viewpoint of this thesis, this is a glaring omission for the writers of the Report should have delved to find that there were several extensive newspaper articles and other commentaries that specifically mentioned the fragile

nature of Papua New Guinea as later demonstrated by the rebellion on Bougainville. It can be argued that the document and the actual Project smack of neocolonialism insofar as the "new" Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary was to become in effect an Australian-style police organisation. This theme is thoroughly developed in the Chapter. Attention was also strongly drawn to the dominance of "white pellas" in the management team; with Australia as a signatory to various anti-colonial treaties and agreements, it is surprising that no Papua New Guinea nationals were included in the staffing of the management team.

The historical primacy of the police over the military was emphasised. Until Independence in 1975 the Papua New Guinea military were the Pacific Islands Regiment of the Royal Australian Regiment—Australia's primary Infantry Regiment. The military are well resourced, housed and trained; they also enjoy the melding phenomena that are usually associated with regimental life thus the military while separate from the general population are also a unifying factor for future and present leaders of a developing nation. The police, on the other hand, live and work with the general population. The Project has been criticised for not recognising the need to mix modern and traditional methods of law enforcement; this was shown to be poignant when in Australia there is now a recognition of traditional Aboriginal Law by the Court hierarchy.

Strong criticism is made of the motives of the Project Managers and their role in apparently garnering as much profit as possible. It demonstrates that the timeline between colonialism and modernity is unbroken; the fact of independence has in reality been avoided. In Papua New Guinea independence has been treated by Australia in a continuing paternalistic manner. Virtually all Australian dealings with Papua New Guinea are conditional upon that Government agreeing to terms set down by Canberra for assistance, and Australia becomes irritated if Port Moresby sets out to gain assistance from elsewhere. Australia seems to know what is best for Papua New Guinea, the truth is that in reality Canberra knows what is best for Australia in terms of benefits.

The Project, in the view of this writer, has the paradigmatic status of how **not** to do things in the region. The whole aid scenario has produced benefactors and supplicants. There has not been created the spirit of regional cooperation in the area of policing specifically attributed to this Project.

A detailed analysis of the law and order problem has been carried out in this Chapter. The most serious threat to Papua New Guinea's internal stability is the law and order problem which, in the end, only a well-trained, professional police force can overcome.

The Chapter concludes with the assertion that the real beneficiaries of the Project have been the consultants and not the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. This is the antithesis of the recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of a nation.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### TERTIARY EDUCATION FOR POLICE IN FIJI AND THE COOK ISLANDS

#### **Fiji: Dashed Hopes**

This Chapter considers the problems associated with proposals to introduce tertiary education for police in the South Pacific, considered on the basis of personal experience and original material from dealings with the authorities in Fiji and the Cook Islands. The aim of the Chapter is to highlight the academic, bureaucratic and political minefields which have to be traversed and the role that conflicting personalities and political interests play in such operations. Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the experience is an awareness of the vagaries of the process.

Tertiary Education for police in Australia as a serious move in terms of the creation of new discipline began in 1972; it followed the pattern set down in the United States of America by its Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Agency. Tertiary Education for police in the South Pacific began formally in July, 1991, when Monash University's Department of Police Studies (now the Centre for Policing and Public Safety) commenced teaching its Associate Diploma of Arts (Police Studies) to a group of eighteen police members in Rarotonga, Cook Islands. In a sense this was a consolation prize, as attempts to have the course adopted by the then Royal Fiji Police had begun in 1987 prior to the first military coup by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka.

The Chisholm Institute of Technology (merged to create a new enlarged Monash University in July 1990) was one of the first tertiary institutions to introduce higher learning for police personnel in Australia. Its David Syme School of Business had

introduced as part of its program an international study tour for students; this scheme encouraged students to undertake visits to various overseas financial institutions for the purpose of allowing students to experience for themselves these institutions in operation. As well, the Chisholm Institute of Technology had a solid reputation for running Summer Semester courses over the November to March period which is traditionally a non-teaching period. A tour of Fiji by serving police members organised by the Chisholm Police Studies Section was in the process of being organised when the first Coup in Fiji occurred on 14 May, 1987.

The impact of the Coup was quite dramatic and the Australian and New Zealand media had a field day concerning the alleged impact which it would have on Australasian interests.<sup>1</sup> So that Chisholm Institute of Technology would not run foul in any way of the Australian Government's attitudes and policies towards the 14 May Coup, contact was made with both the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Justice.<sup>2</sup> DFAT, being the consummate diplomatic organization, responded by stating that Australian citizens had the right to travel wherever they wanted.<sup>3</sup> The Justice Minister's Private Secretary reiterated DFAT's advice but added when pressed that it would be preferable if the Study Tour did not proceed.<sup>4</sup> To test the water, as it were, a telephone call was placed to the Royal Fiji Police Headquarters in Suva; the view from Suva was that the Study Tour would still be welcome.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Operation Morris Dance, which is outside the scope of this study, was an operation involving the Australian Defence Force's Operational Deployment Force: the New Zealand Army's Special Air Service Squadron were placed on alert. But, apart from political huffing and puffing, no intervention at the military level took place. An appreciation of the situation clearly indicated that the Royal Fiji Military Forces had three battalions (experienced in South Lebanon and Sinai) resting at home with several Reserve battalions.

<sup>2</sup>The mood was emotional and highly charged. For a detailed coverage see the *Australian Financial Review*, 21 May, 1987.

<sup>3</sup>Telephone call. R.H. Smith to Karina Campbell, DFAT, 15 May, 1987.

<sup>4</sup>Telephone call. R.H. Smith to Daryl Smeaton, Department of Justice, 15 May, 1987.

<sup>5</sup>Telephone call. R.H. Smith to unnamed Royal Fiji Police Member, 15 May, 1987.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the Study Tour would have indeed been welcome, but there was also the risk of becoming involved in a political incident at a time of heightened international tension. It is not the function of tertiary educational institutions to become involved in international politics—although it may have been somewhat exciting and emphasized that an international brotherhood of police and military does exist. Had the Study Tour gone ahead Chisholm would have experienced a good deal of opprobrium both politically and academically. In the event a Study Tour did take place because of students' leave arrangements; the destination was changed to Honolulu.

The Study Tour to Hawaii was most instructive in one special sense. The discussions with the Honolulu Police Department were intrinsically interesting but of no real advantage in terms of the development of tertiary education for police. Indeed the special sense learned was that there was no interest in tertiary education for police in Hawaii; Brigham Young University, Chaminade University and the University of Hawaii had no programmes in place nor did they intend to do so.<sup>6</sup> It was also surprising to find that Hawaiian experts on the Pacific had absolutely no interest in civil policing in the region; it seems that their interests were geo-political and concerned with Cold War politics. In numerous interviews, there appeared to be no concept that civil policing had any international implications, nor for that matter did crime have international or political relevance.

Professor Robert Kiste, Director, Centre of Pacific Island Studies at the University of Hawaii is rightly regarded as an expert and foremost authority on the Pacific. The following letter to him brought a sharp and salutary response that indicated the possibility of experts being as blinkered as anyone else:

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<sup>6</sup>Interview with Professor Greg Mark, Criminology Department, Chaminade University, Hawaii, 9 June, 1987.

Dear Dr Kiste,

I was in Hawaii in early June, 1987 and because you were on leave I was unfortunately unable to meet you. I am currently involved in research into various aspects of Policing within the South West Pacific region.

On advice from Professor Greg Mark of Chaminade University it was suggested that I contact you as you may be interested in sharing some ideas particularly from an American perspective of the region. If this were to be acceptable to you we may be able to write a joint article looking at the region in terms of Policing through both Australian and American eyes. It seems from my perspective that the current interest in the region is military and that there seems a great potential to look at the region in terms of Policing.<sup>7</sup>

A reply from Dr Kiste took some time but it was unequivocal in its tone—"I have no interest in this area".<sup>8</sup>

Generally speaking the Study Tour to Hawaii was merely a stop gap measure for the intended Study Tour of Fiji. One of the important issues that arose out of the Study Tour to Hawaii was a realisation of the myopia of the Honolulu Police Department.<sup>9</sup> But it is not only American bureaucracies which demonstrate these traits. On return to Australia from Hawaii, contact was made with DFAT which frankly showed no interest at all in the concept of policing as a foreign affairs concern.<sup>10</sup> Their major concern was that no embarrassment be caused to Australia. As a result arrangements were almost immediately made to undertake a private visit to Fiji scheduled for August, 1987. The purpose of the proposed visit was to meet with the Commissioner and members of the Royal Fiji Police still with a view to introducing Chisholm's Associate Diploma of

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<sup>7</sup>Letter—R.H. Smith to Dr. Robert Kiste, Director, Centre of Pacific Island Studies, University of Hawaii, 19 August, 1987.

<sup>8</sup>Letter—Robert Kiste to R.H. Smith, 22 September, 1987.

<sup>9</sup>Interviews, Honolulu, June, 1987.

<sup>10</sup>Telephone call R.H. Smith to Karina Campbell, DFAT, 19 June, 1987.

Police Studies to Fiji.<sup>11</sup> The anxiety about contact with Fiji was essentially only in the minds of Foreign Affairs mandarins in Canberra. It is true that the behaviour of DFAT was professionally impeccable but there was a strong impression that their excessive moral rectitude was in a very real sense putting at risk Australia's capacity for influence in the region.

This period, that is July 1987, appears to be something of a seminal period for the region. Apart from being shortly after the May Coup in Fiji, it was also the time in which the contracts were let for the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Project, discussed in the previous Chapter. The Victorian Overseas Projects Corporation had reached an agreement with Price Waterhouse Urwick, the successful tenderers to manage the Fellowship Training Program. A tacit agreement was reached between Chisholm Police Studies and the Victorian Overseas Projects Corporation that Chisholm would be actively involved in the Fellowship Training Program. The other Victorian tertiary institution that was considered was the Hawthorn Institute of Education—a specialist teacher training and industrial training institution. The actual Program did not amount to much. Only one group of police personnel from the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary actually came to Melbourne and that was to the Hawthorn Institute of Education. Out of the whole Program, Chisholm, (by that stage 1990 merged with Monash University), obtained only one student, a female Inspector who completed an Associate Diploma of Police Studies under the provisions of a Sir John Crawford Scholarship rather than through the Price Waterhouse Project.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Contact was made with a senior officer in the Office of National Assessment who gave unofficial and moral support to this proposed visit with a request that material gained was made available to him. There was absolutely nothing covert in this—O.N.A. is merely an intelligence assessment organization not a gatherer.

<sup>12</sup>Chisholm Institute of Technology Internal Memo R.H. Smith to R.J. Snedden 20 July, 1987.

In July 1987, the Police Studies Section at Chisholm Institute of Technology was still trying to utilize normal governmental approaches to introduce its Associate Diploma of Police Studies into the South Pacific region; further it was interested in facilitating proper regional cooperation between police bodies within the region. The following letter was sent to the Director—General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization; the letter remained unanswered although several telephone conversations did take place:

I am currently engaged in research relating to policing in the South West Pacific region.

One of my hypotheses relates to the viability of an integrated or cooperative system of policing for the region. This would be a development further to the current South Pacific Forum Police Commissioners' Conference.

I am still waiting for my copy of the proceedings of the South Pacific Forum held recently in Western Samoa. In reading a copy of "The Guardian Weekly" of a fortnight ago. I discovered a news brief that indicated that members of the Forum would share their security intelligence product. If this report is true, it is germane to my research.

I would be grateful if I could discuss with you in general terms and "off the record", my hypotheses relating to a larger Australian commitment to the South West Pacific region.<sup>13</sup>

Other telephone conversations did take place, but the essence was that, as the Australian Government had suspended Defence Cooperation with Fiji and that was normal conduct—then any security dividend would not be shared at that stage. In the period immediately following the Coup in Fiji, there was a period of hiatus involving the suspension of Defence Cooperation. The then High Commission in Suva became an

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<sup>13</sup>Alan Wrigley was Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization during the late 1980's.

ineffective listening post.<sup>14</sup> It did not take long after the Coup for matters to settle down in Fiji, although there was certainly a stream, perhaps a flood, of professionals, mainly Indo-Fijians, who saw no future for themselves or their families in Fiji. Australia has been but one recipient of these political and economic refugees. The former Commissioner of Police, Prem Raman, migrated to Australia and obtained a clerical position within the New South Wales Police Service.<sup>15</sup> Once the glare of press focus had shifted, it seemed that there was a role for Chisholm Institute of Technology to engage with what amounted to a new Royal Fiji Police. It was apparent at the time that Fiji was the pariah state of the region and that, if no friendly gestures were made, then that country would be open to the blandishments of others. The renewed approach to introduce a course of tertiary education for police did not, on advice, breach any provisions of the suspension of the Defence Cooperation Programme. Care was also taken to ensure that no other Commonwealth laws, particularly the Foreign Incursions Act, would be breached; in essence this Act makes it an offence for any Australian citizen or Permanent Resident to act in a manner hostile to the legitimate government of a foreign nation. Australia still regarded the government of Dr Timocei Bavadra as the legitimate government of Fiji and the regime of the now Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka was not recognised.

It should be remembered that contact between Chisholm and the Royal Fiji Police and the Royal Fiji Military Forces had been maintained since before the 14 May Coup.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>It was not until June, 1991, that the Defence Co-operation Programme was restored. The writer was in Suva at this time and attended the "Beating The Retreat" parade at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks; at which an Australian Defence Attache was also present. It was instructive that at the "Beating of The Retreat" there were officers from New Zealand, the United States and Israel.

<sup>15</sup> Commissioner Raman was not available for interview, this was strongly suggested by Chief Commissioner S.J. Miller, Victoria Police.

<sup>16</sup>Chief Commissioner S I Miller, Victoria Police, to Commissioner Prem Raman, Royal Fiji Police, 21 March, 1987, introducing the Chisholm proposal and asking that assistance be given.

Commissioner Prem Raman to Chief Commissioner S I Miller, 8 April, 1987, agreeing to proposal.

Support for the continuation of this contact came from the senior levels of Chisholm management. It was judged prudent to formalize, in writing, that a visit was being made to Fiji. During the post- Coup period warnings had been issued to travellers by Foreign Affairs and Trade about travelling to Fiji. Such warnings are standard practice and reflect the pragmatic attitude that a responsible nation has for the safety of its citizens. As the post- Coup regime was not recognized as a legitimate government, it was judged a wise precaution to seek what amounted to safety assurances. Such practical and sensible measures proved to be unnecessary. Two similar letters were written, one to the Commander, Royal Fiji Military Forces and one to the Commissioner, Royal Fiji Police.

The letter to the Royal Fiji Police was as follows:

Previous correspondence has taken place between our organizations along with Victoria and Australian Federal Police forces regarding study tours in your country.

Following receipt of a telex from your office relating to the emergency currently in force we were not able to bring a party of Australian police and students of Chisholm Institute of Technology to visit your country. However I shall be arriving in Fiji on Saturday 29 August for private research into Policing in the South West Pacific as part of a research project that I am undertaking.

I am bringing with me a student and colleague, Inspector ....., of the Victoria Police who will be acting in his private capacity as a student of this Institute and not as a member of the Victoria Police. We will be staying initially at the Skylodge Motel, Nadi and moving on Sunday 30 August to the Capricornia Apartments in Suva for the remainder of the week.

I have already written under separate cover to Colonel Rabuka, I would be extremely grateful to be given the opportunity to discuss my project with either yourself or some of your senior officers. My research is not involved in any way with the current emergency which is in any case only the concern of your country; but the research does involve the



concept of seeing Fiji as the pivotal point of policing within the South West Pacific Region.

One of the concepts that I would like to explore with you is the possibility of developing closer police relationships between the nation of the South Pacific Forum with particular reference to education, training and general crime prevention. At this stage my research is still in embryonic form and it is really necessary for me in the first instance to try to understand the "Melanesian Way" particularly as it applies to policing.

One of the problems that I have encountered so far in my research the potential danger of Australia and Australian police forces being seen by countries in the region in a neo-colonialist light. The purpose of my research is to investigate the possibility of greater liaison between police forces in the region with a particular emphasis on equal partnership and non-interference.

On our arrival at Nadi and Suva, both ..... and myself would be extremely grateful to be met by either officers of your force or officers of the Royal Fiji Military forces. We both feel that it is vital to the integrity of our respective research that we place ourselves under your control and guidance and are both prepare to allow our preliminary research documentation to be vetted by either your Department or the R.F.M.F. We are not in any way seeking to be involved in controversy or speculation relating to the emergency and can assure you that any findings will not be released to the Australian press in any form. We would appreciate it if it were possible for us to meet socially as well as privately with your members and perhaps it may be possible for us to join your officers at their Mess on several occasions during our stay.

It would be most helpful if we could both receive what amounts to a virtual letter of approval that will demonstrate to either members of the R.F.M.F. or your own personnel that we are legitimate researchers and not in any sense trouble makers.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Letter—R.H. Smith to Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, Royal Fiji Police, 18 August, 1987.

It needs to be unequivocally stated that no letter of safe passage, or its equivalent, was needed. The Australian print media had created an impression that Fiji was under a state of siege—it was actually in a state of emergency.<sup>18</sup> Whether through fear, as indicated by the media, or by acceptance of the immediate reality, Fiji appeared to be calm. This was due in no small part to the actions of the newly appointed Commissioner of Police, Josefa Lewaicei, appointed directly after the dismissal of Commissioner Raman. Lewaicei visited all police stations on Viti Levu, the main island of Fiji.<sup>19</sup> In speaking to the members of the Royal Fiji Police he simply put to them—Fijian and Indo-Fijian—that policing would be more difficult as a result of the Coup than before and that a formal ethnic tension was likely to arise and that if any member wished to be discharged that discharge would be an honourable one. According to Lewaicei not one Royal Fiji Police member left; the general feeling was that their oath of office "to enforce the law without fear of favour, malice or ill-will" would be needed in the new Fiji.<sup>20</sup>

A spiteful incident occurred at Police Headquarters on Wednesday 2 August, 1987 which had serious consequences for policy in the region. After much planning and negotiation it was decided that the Royal Fiji Police would 'go on line' with the New South Wales Police Bureau of Criminal Intelligence computer; this would enable a

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<sup>18</sup>A large reason for this was the banning of Australian journalists entering Fiji and the highly speculative reporting from outside Fiji. To rely on these press reports and from warnings issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade there was an expectation of landing at an airport heavily guarded by the military.

<sup>19</sup>Extended interview with Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei 31 August, 1987, Ratu Sakuna House, Suva, Fiji.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.* In all serious events there are vignettes that lighten the seriousness. My police colleague noticed that at the charge counter at Police Headquarters while we were waiting to meet Commissioner Lewaicei there were three police caps—two had the "Trenchard Tartan", the dark blue and white chequered cap band, and the other did not. In conversation with Lewaicei it was ascertained that the Royal Fiji Police had no money to purchase cap band material. On our return to Australia I contacted the supplier of cap bands to Victoria Police and having just lost the contract to supply South Australia Police had a roll of cap band material of 75 metres for which they had no further use. I received this at no cost and sent it to Lewaicei who was extremely grateful. I notified DFAT of the gift, but not the source, and the splenetic response was "are you now supplying uniforms?"

further linkage to take place with all State police and Australian Federal Police computers and with the national criminal intelligence data base at the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence in Canberra. Dissemination of criminal intelligence as a vital tool for the proper investigation of crime was to begin its Pacific regionalization. Acting Senior Superintendent Krishna Kumar activated the "link-up" at about 11.00 a.m. Suva time; by about 3.00 p.m. Suva time the link was cut, according to him at the direction of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.<sup>21</sup> This action in the view of Kumar put back the concept of regional cooperation to colonial days; in this particular case it was clear that the action by the Australian Government was guided by political correctness rather than *realpolitik*. The tragedy in regional policing terms is that vital criminal intelligence about business and economic issues were denied to the region; by "punishing" Fiji the whole region suffered this loss of modern technology even if individual countries were still able to contact the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence as they had done previously. However, the concept of using the Royal Fiji Police as a regional clearing house dissipated; both Wellington and Canberra remain the clearing houses and, unfortunately, the police forces of the region act still as mendicants. The 1987 Coup, therefore, in a sense re-established or re-affirmed attitudes that can only be seen as colonial or neo-colonial to many in Fiji and in the region.

The Royal Fiji Police were acting in this period as police in the tradition of Peel, although their Constabulary functions have been discussed earlier in this work. The original authority of the ancient office of Constable was assiduously applied and Commissioner Lewaicei was adamant in the defence of his independence as Commissioner of Police even though he had been appointed by the new regime.<sup>22</sup> This

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<sup>21</sup>I, along with my Victoria Police colleague, was a witness to this event.

<sup>22</sup>Josefa Lewaicei is a relative of Sitiveni Rabuka—but in the world of Melanesian kinship this perhaps does not mean nearly as much in a modern bureaucracy as it is supposed to do in village life. See Ravuvu, A., *Vaka i Taukei: The Fijian Way of Life*, USP, Suva, 1983.

example of the separateness of the police and the military may not by some be regarded as evidence of actual separateness and they may well be correct. But in terms of legality the role of the military was under the provisions of Military Aid to the Civil Powers. To all intents and purposes the Royal Fiji Military Forces had withdrawn to their Barracks and the newly promoted Colonel Rabuka was the only public face of the military.<sup>23</sup>

It appeared that a new era of policing was beginning in Fiji and that there was opening for the introduction of Chisholm Institute of Technology's Associate Diploma in Police Studies to Fiji. From 1987 to the present there have been discussions as to whether the Associate Diploma, now a Monash University qualification, should be accepted by the Fiji Police. It still has not been accepted. And it is this non-acceptance that is as vital in an international political sense as its actual acceptance. Rabuka has long been a firm supporter of the concept of a specific tertiary qualification for police; two Commissioners, Josefa Lewaicei and Phillip Arnfield, have opposed the idea—neither have opposed it on grounds other than 'now is not the right time'. It is important to make the point here that the two Commissioners were exercising their independence against the nominal Head of Government who elsewhere was being portrayed as possessing tyrannical powers. Rabuka, despite having overthrown a popularly-elected Government, likes to see himself a man of both modern ways and ancient traditions.

Within the Royal Fiji Police there was, and still is, relatively strong support for the introduction of tertiary education for police. This support came from the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner levels; the strongest supporter at the time was the Assistant Commissioner (Operations) Jimi Koroi. Koroi was well known

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<sup>23</sup>In almost every adverse circumstance there are wry moments. Each time that Sitiveni Rabuka was promoted—Colonel to Brigadier to Major-General the badges of rank and other appurtenances of Office came from the Australian Army. At a low level of intensity and in a jocular way (though some may see it seriously) Australia was involved in sales of military equipment to Fiji.

in the region as a modern and reformist policeman who was endeavouring to make the Royal Fiji Police an equal to any in Australasia.<sup>24</sup>

As mentioned above, the major purpose of visiting Fiji in the first place was for the purpose of promoting Chisholm's Associate Diploma of Police Studies to the Royal Fiji Police. Encouraged by the conversations with the Commissioner, Josefa Lewaicei, it was decided to pursue the issue and to attempt to strengthen ties between the Fiji Police and Chisholm Institute. It was observed that the Police Academy Library was virtually bereft of books and that Graduation ceremonies a roneoed booklet was presented to the outstanding student as a book prize. An offer was made and accepted that these should be a Chisholm Institute of Technology Book Prize for the outstanding student. The book chosen was Robert Haldane's *A People's Police—The History of the Victoria Police*; this book derives from Haldane's doctoral thesis and is indeed an attractively published book. This practice still continued, at least until the end of 1994, although it was renamed the Monash University Book Prize.

The initial attempt to create and develop a relationship between Chisholm and the Royal Fiji Police is set out in a letter to Josefa Lewaicei:

Dear Commissioner,

I am pleased that our Book Prize arrived on time to have been presented to the recipient of the Baton of Honour and we look forward to

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<sup>24</sup>Not long after our visit he was involved in a near fatal car collision outside of Sigatoka; despite the best medical attention in both Wellington and Seoul he remains a paraplegic. The resultant effect on Koroi's career illustrates the different approaches of the Fiji Police Force and the Fiji Military Forces (by now the Royal appellation had been dropped as Fiji had become a Republic and had left the Commonwealth. Koroi after substantial hospitalization, accompanied by the relevant sick leave entitlements as the collision had occurred whilst on duty, was permanently confined to a wheelchair. The Fiji Police retired him and it was not long thereafter that the Fiji Military Forces appointed as a Lieutenant-Colonel to head-up and start the Fiji Intelligence Service. Indeed Koroi was used by Rabuka to clear up levels of corruption within the Fiji Police that resulted in several senior police being arrested, tried, convicted and imprisoned.

This has been substantiated in conversations with both Koroi and Rabuka in Suva.

photographs of the presentation so that our Public Relations people can take advantage of the event and hopefully show to the Australian press that Fiji is a normal country and not that as portrayed in our local media here.<sup>25</sup>

At this stage subject to the approval of my Director, I intend to bring a group of around twenty five Victoria Policemen to Fiji between the 7—17 November this year. It would be greatly appreciated if we could utilize a classroom at your Police Training College for classes during this period. We intend to stay at the Grand Pacific Hotel which is of course most convenient to your College.

With your permission I would like to 'pilot' a subject called 'Police Studies 1' of our Associate Diploma in Police Studies with a group of your personnel. My thinking at this stage, that during the ten days we are in Fiji I could conduct classes specifically for your personnel as an introduction to our Associate Diploma. At this stage arrangements would have to be informal but if you were satisfied that the content of the course and your personnel felt that it was useful we could then enter into a formal relationship between the Royal Fiji Police and this Institution through our Foreign Affairs Department.

As I mentioned to you in your office, this Institute is not concerned with making money out of such a relationship, what we must do obviously is to cover any out of pocket expenses that would occur as a result of our teaching the Associate Diploma to your officers. Would you please let me know as soon as possible whether this proposal meets with your approval so that I can arrange course material notes, etcetera to be brought out with me on the 7th November.

I look forward to my second visit to your country as I believe we are entering a period of relative excitement in terms of what this Institute can offer to your Force and to other Forces within the region.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>In 1994 we were still waiting for these photographs, an example of 'Pacific Time' at work.

<sup>26</sup>Letter—R.H. Smith to Josefa Lewaicai, 18 September, 1987.

By the time Lewaicei would have received this letter, Rabuka had carried out a second Coup on 25 September, 1987. Lewaicei's Staff Officer was contacted on Monday 28 September and he stated that, although he could not talk about future relationships, there was no reason why the proposed Study Tour should not go ahead in November.<sup>27</sup> But the complexities of Fijian politics intervened with the declaration of the Republic of Fiji outside of the Commonwealth on Wednesday 7 October, 1987. The actual declaration took place at midnight on the 6th October with the beginning of 7 October as the first day of the new Republic.

With a view to not involving Chisholm in controversial overseas political events, the proposed Study Tour to Fiji was cancelled by the present writer on Wednesday, 7 October, 1987. Contact was immediately made with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra. A return telephone call from the Head of Section South Pacific Desk advised that Foreign Affairs considered it not appropriate to continue with the Tour "because of the ambiguous role of the Royal Fiji Police in the coup".<sup>28</sup> That she regarded the role of the Royal Fiji Police as "ambiguous" demonstrated that Foreign Affairs had not really been in touch with the events in Fiji since May 1987 and had not come to terms with what role police had to play within society—particularly a divided society.

Even the apologia for Rabuka, *Rabuka—No Other Way*, albeit written in 1988 gives a view that Australian Foreign Affairs should have known.<sup>29</sup> Referring to this second Coup the Dean states:

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<sup>27</sup>Telephone conversation. R.H. Smith with Chief Inspector Ramon Tikitoca, Staff Officer to Commissioner Lewaicei, 28 September, 1987.

<sup>28</sup>Telephone conversation Ms Karina Campbell, Head of Section, South Pacific Desk, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, to R.H. Smith 7 October, 1987.

<sup>29</sup>Eddie Dean, *Rabuka—No Other Way*, The Marketing Team International Ltd, Suva, Fiji, 1988. This book is an apologia for Rabuka and is written in a journalistic style. Nevertheless it contains good factual material.

This second time around, international reaction was very different from that which followed May 14's astonishingly unexpected coup; Governments which had breathed "fire and brimstone" in May were very much more muted, and cautious. This was particularly the case with Australia and New Zealand, both Governments having been caught unawares on the occasion of the first coup, and found largely unable to back-up their thunderings against Rabuka and the military. Since then, it had become clear that anti-Rabuka measures of various kinds had been a failure, and there were pressing reasons why relationships should be returned to something nearer normal than those Governments would have ideologically preferred.

While Australia and New Zealand haltingly re-assessed their positions, and moved towards a pragmatic acceptance of Rabuka's arguing influence, other nations—especially those in the region—moved in to fill the vacuum left by Fiji's "traditional" friends. Links had been gently developed with France, which had a special relationship with the Pacific; Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were more than interested in a new and formal exchange with the R.F.M.F., and the possibility of trade; Taiwan was certainly interested in two-way trading prospects; business was being done with Thailand; Israel reportedly planned to open an Embassy in Suva in 1988; and Papua New Guinea—at the Vancouver meeting of the British Commonwealth Heads of Government, in October, 1987, had declared its recognition of Rabuka's regime as a matter of reality. Privately, a number of other, small, island nations around the Pacific were on-side too.<sup>30</sup>

The Head of Section had been correct about the "ambiguous" role of the police but for the wrong reasons; she had interpreted the role of the police as being that of subservient, if not complicit, to the military. According to the apologia, the military were concerned about the 'reliability' of the police and this would account for the sacking of Commissioner Raman and his replacement by Commissioner Lewaicei:

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<sup>30</sup>*ibid.*, pps. 115-116



There had been, at the time of the May 14 coup, grave problems within the Indian-dominated Royal Fiji Police force—with Indians and Fijians poised to attack one another. Beyond this internal racial conflict there was a specific, age-old rivalry between the police and the Fijian dominated Army.<sup>31</sup>

The Police gave a firm indication that they were clearly backing Rabuka.<sup>32</sup> Whatever the private thoughts of the Indo-Fijian police, the public face they presented was that of professional police who were acting in full accordance with their oath of office. In private conversations with both police and military, it was clear that the change from Constitutional Monarchy to Republic troubled them particularly in relation to their respective oaths—this oath involved the swearing of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Fiji, and to her heirs and successors; to the best of my knowledge existing members of the police and military did not reswear their oaths on the creation of the Republic of Fiji. The term "successors" in the oath was deemed to include allegiance to the Republic of Fiji. As indicated above, Commissioner Lewaicei made it clear to all members of the Royal Fiji Police following his appointment after the first Coup in May 1987, that the police stand between the Government and the people in their sworn duty to uphold the law.

In Australia, the tertiary education sector formed its own company, International Development Programme (IDP), for the purpose of marketing Australian courses overseas with a view to bringing overseas students to Australia on a full-fee paying basis. In addition individual institutions tend to have their own specific marketing sections headed by senior members of staff whose role it is to visit overseas and to

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<sup>31</sup>*ibid.*, p.118

<sup>32</sup>The apologia made much of Rabuka as a "healer" of this particular rivalry when he played in a Police jersey in an altered Sukuna Bowl trophy match on 24 October, 1987. Rugby is the game of ethnic Fijians whilst Soccer is the game of Indo-Fijians; so the traditional Rugby rivalry between Army and Police was always between ethnic Fijians.

recruit students. Quite apart from these essentially private ventures the Australian Government through the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) is also involved; apart from in-country aid in the form of projects AIDAB has a scholarship scheme now known as John Crawford Scholarships whereby overseas students come to Australia for study. It was obvious that DFAT officers had difficulty coming to terms with a proposal to teach the Associate Diploma in Police Studies by Chisholm Institute of Technology on a cost neutral, or cost recovery, basis. Moreover, it was also aimed at the Fijian Police who were *institutio non grata*. The proposal was, and still is, quite revolutionary; the concept of taking a course in-country on a cost recovery basis remains virtually unknown. There are now numerous courses, notably in Malaysia, where courses are conducted in-country, but substantially high fees are charged.<sup>33</sup> A senior member of IDP, during an interview with him in Canberra in December, 1987, expressed surprise that the course was to be taught 'in-country' rather than in Australia.<sup>34</sup> When the concept of handing over the course eventually to the University of the South Pacific on a basis of cooperation was raised, this was met with enthusiasm from the senior member. It was clear that IDP had the marketing expertise in off-shore ventures and that this expertise had to be utilized. A verbal arrangement was made that IDP would be provided with the necessary course outlines and course proposals to be used by them to promote Police Studies in Fiji through the University of the South Pacific. The material was forwarded but, like so many other agencies that rely on seconded staff, the personnel changed by early 1988 and the role of pressing its case passed back to Police Studies. The major stumbling-block, apart from staff changes,

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<sup>33</sup>The Malaysian Government encourages overseas Universities to "twin" with local institutions- essentially the first and second years of a three year degree are taught in Malaysia with the third year being taught in Australia, or other country. It is suggested by some that such a scheme limits capital outflow from Malaysia and limits the cultural "pollution" of its students for a limited period.

<sup>34</sup>Interview with Dr Charles Noble, I.D.P., Canberra 14 December, 1987. Dr Noble, now a Professor of Business at Charles Sturt University, was a member of Staff at Chisholm prior to his I.D.P. appointment.

was that the proposal did not have a price-tag; and, as IDP is a profit-making organization, it is not surprising that the new personnel were not interested in a non-profit venture.

It appeared at the beginning of 1988 that the Chisholm Police Studies course was ready to be put in place in Fiji. Whilst significant actors in Canberra, as discussed above, were supportive without providing an imprimatur, this produced an institutional move to proceed with confidence that the proposed venture was not antithetic to Australia's interests within the region. Commissioner Lewaicei's office was contacted on 11 February, 1988.<sup>35</sup> This was a follow up of a letter written to him on 2 February, 1988 and sent by Facsimile. The letter was as follows:

Dear Commissioner

Further to my telephone conversation with you of several weeks ago, I am writing to you to ascertain the present situation regarding the Royal Fiji Police's current position regarding Chisholm's Associate Diploma in Police Studies as mentioned to you in September, 1987, and subsequent correspondence. We are prepared to conduct the Associate Diploma in Suva on a cost recovery basis only, that is reimbursement of air fares and accommodation. We are planning to come to Fiji on a study tour in either late May or early June this year and it would seem appropriate that if the Royal Fiji Police agrees that at least the first subject of Police Studies be offered to members of the Royal Fiji Police say from the rank of Inspector. The subject would be conducted on a daily basis for the duration of our stay, then written work would be submitted to me via post to our campus in Melbourne. I am enclosing a brochure detailing the outline of the Associate Diploma for your perusal.

It seems appropriate that I write to you today as there is an Australian aid team in Suva at present conducting "a survey of needs" regarding Australian aid to Fiji. During discussions with several bureaucrats in Canberra before Christmas, I made the point quite strongly that aid ought

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<sup>35</sup>Telephone call to Commissioner Lewaicei's office, Thursday 11 February, 1988, R.H. Smith.

to be forthcoming to the Royal Fiji Police as your organisation is the pivotal police force in the region in so far as training of regional police forces is concerned. Perhaps if you have the opportunity you can push this point with the Australian officials in Suva at present. Would you also please let me know when the next graduation ceremony of recruits is to take place so we may forward to you the Chisholm Institute of Technology Police Studies Book Prize.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could let me know as soon as possible your thoughts about the Associate Diploma in Police Studies so that forward planning can take place for our forthcoming visit to Suva. In addition to the Associate Diploma we, if you are interested could also bring a member of our Civil Engineering Department to conduct a course within the Associate Diploma on Highway and Traffic Engineering for your Traffic Branch personnel.<sup>36</sup>

Another call was made on 21 March to the office of the Minister for Home Affairs, the now Brigadier Rabuka.<sup>37 38</sup>

It is important to re-emphasize the independence of Commissioner Lewaicei as on 23 March, 1988, Rabuka telephoned the present writer in Melbourne and stated that "it was all systems go for the course"<sup>39</sup> Many erroneous views have been expressed that Rabuka was 'the strongman' of Fiji; Lewaicei's conduct as Commissioner of Police puts

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<sup>36</sup>Letter—R.H. Smith to Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, 2 February, 1988.

<sup>37</sup>Telephone call to Ministry of Home Affairs, Suva, Fiji, 21 March, 1988, R.H. Smith.

<sup>38</sup>The Ministry of Home Affairs covers the Fiji Military Forces, the Fiji Police, the Fiji Prison Service and the Fiji Fire Service; the Minister is the responsible Minister for each of the areas and at the time Rabuka combined his role as Commander, Fiji Military Forces with that of Minister for Home Affairs. Clearly, then, Rabuka was the Ministerial Head of the Police. But, despite this by relying on the Common Law, the Commissioner is independent holding the ancient office of Constable; Ministerial control is purely administrative and has no operational authority beyond discussions with the Commissioner. Much has been written about the independence of the police from governmental control, but it is outside the scope of this work save to raise the issue. As indicated earlier, Lewaicei maintained, if not asserted, his independence as Commissioner *qua* Constable.

<sup>39</sup>Telephone call from Brigadier Sitiveni Rabuka to R.H. Smith, 23 March, 1988.

a different perspective on views. The following letter to Rabuka sets out clearly the major thrust of this work and its concomitant impact and application for Chisholm:

We will be staying at the Grand Pacific Hotel in Suva and it is intended that the second subject of Police Studies, which is part of the Associate Diploma in Police Studies, will be taught during the period of our visit. It would be greatly appreciated if arrangements could be made to free up a lecture room at the Police Training College for each week day morning of our visit; otherwise I can make alternative arrangements at the Hotel to use their facilities.

As discussed with you it would be a wonderful experience if members of the Royal Fiji Police could attend these sessions and that if R.F.P. members submit written work and pass at a satisfactory standard they will be credited with a subject towards C.I.T.'s Associate Diploma in Police Studies. It is my intention, as again indicated to you, that Chisholm, subject to your approval naturally and to that of Commissioner Lewaicea, that members of the R.F.P. undertake studies in our Associate Diploma at absolutely minimum cost to your government. Should this pilot arrangement in May 1988 be successful the proposition that I put before you is that the Associate Diploma would be taught in Suva by Chisholm staff at virtually no cost at all provided that your government could make available through your national carrier (Air Pacific) free travel and that suitable free accommodation and rations could also be made available. The ideal situation for this would obviously be, again depending on space provisions, the Officer's Mess at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, unless other suitable accommodation is available at the Police Training College.

It is the intention of Chisholm to not get itself involved in the commercial exploitation of police forces within the South-West Pacific region. It is vitally important to me as a loyal Australian that the police forces of the region are granted the greatest possible facility and opportunity to update their education and training needs.

In Australia Chisholm has been in the forefront of professional education for police and we would hope that we would also be of service to police forces in our immediate vicinity. It is clear that Fiji, in terms of regional

training, is the pivotal point to which the independent nations of the region look and it is to Fiji that we initially offer this opportunity for your police to engage in an educational programme with their Australian colleagues. It should be clearly pointed out to you that whilst most members of the study group are police members that they are visiting your country as private citizens and more particularly as students of this Institute. We are therefore not Australian government supported nor do we have to seek permission from the Australian government to conduct such a class.

I am personally concerned that Australia is not seen by nations of the region to be utilizing education as an export market to raise funds within the region from nations whose domestic budgets are unable to bear the costs of what I regard being exorbitant charges.

I feel also that it is preferable for staff from Australia to visit your nation to conduct classes that have been piloted and jointly planned with proper consultation with your members for the benefit of your police forces.<sup>40</sup>

This letter which virtually amounts to a *cri de coeur* validated the immediately prior telephone conversation with Rabuka—but no written response to it was ever received. Numerous subsequent telephone conversations also supported the above letter. The Study Tour went ahead without the participation of the Fiji Police.<sup>41</sup>

Prior to departure from Australia, advice and support were sought and gained from the former Prime Minister of Australia, Mr Malcolm Fraser, who at the time was vying for selection as Secretary General of the Commonwealth; he had also recently been

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<sup>40</sup>Letter—R.H. Smith to Brigadier Sitiveni Rabuka, Minister for Home Affairs, Suva, Fiji, 28 March, 1988.

<sup>41</sup>Minor notoriety was achieved when two students (members of Victoria Police) went out as observers with Suva Criminal Investigation Branch detectives and were present when two "crooks" were arrested. The two "crooks" turned out to be Messrs Chaudry and Maharaj—members of the former Bavadra Government Cabinet. Wide publicity was gained in Australia, but the issue damped down quickly as both DFAT and the Ministry of Justice in Canberra had been informed of the study tour and that a programme of working alongside Fiji Police colleagues was planned.

appointed as Chair of CARE Australia, an humanitarian organization of international prominence. Having the support of an 'eminent person' was a possible political advantage.<sup>42</sup> The concept of a Commonwealth Regional Police Force or Regional Peace-keeping Force was something Fraser had not contemplated and he saw merit in it. Apart from New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and American Samoa, the region of the South Pacific is comprised of Commonwealth countries (despite Fiji's withdrawal in 1987). With various Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings and Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meetings being held within the region, it came as a surprise that apparently no consideration had been given to the above concept. After all the British Empire, for all of its faults, did have international (but centrally directed) order maintenance provisions through naval and military forces—actual policing was carried out within the colonies themselves. Perhaps the convergence of the dissolution of the British Empire and the creation of the United Nations was the reason the new Commonwealth of Nations centred on development aid and culture. It is a legitimate view that the Commonwealth has a huge potential to provide policing aid to Common Law nations.<sup>43</sup>

In Fiji, Assistant Commissioner (Administration) Mohamed Ishak, an Indo-Fijian, thought that there was merit in the Associate Diploma of Police Studies so long as a linkage could be made with the University of the South Pacific; this, of course, was the original intention of Chisholm anyway.<sup>44</sup> His colleague, Assistant Commissioner

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<sup>42</sup>Interview with Mr J Malcolm Fraser, former Prime Minister of Australia, Thursday 21 April, 1988, Melbourne, R.H. Smith.

<sup>43</sup>In 1997 with Hong Kong's sovereignty reverting to China there will be a huge pool of Hong Kong Police who will be seeking policing posts elsewhere. Presently there is no open "head-hunting" of the cream of investigators from Royal Hong Kong Police. In the writer's view this is so short-sighted as to be derelict—for the Public Security Bureau of the People's Republic of China is unlikely to use senior police in Hong Kong from the previous regime. If this is the case a huge pool of talent will simply be wasted.

<sup>44</sup>Interview with Deputy Commissioner (Administration) Mohamed Ishak, Police Headquarters, Suva, 31 May, 1988, R.H. Smith.

Waislei, supported this view. Commissioner Lewaicei explained the difficulties, associated with the two Coups and the concomitant expanding work loads, as to why he could not detach officers for a fortnight to attend a Course. Further as the Police Training College had been effectively shut down since the second Coup in September, 1987, there was no accommodation available for the Study Tour Course to be conducted at the College.<sup>45</sup> Once again Lewaicei gave the distinct impression that he supported the Chisholm concept in principle but that it was Ishak and other police bureaucrats who were holding up its implementation. The reality, of course, was that Lewaicei saw no value for the tertiary education of police except in the area of management studies. The only senior police officer to be supportive of the concept was Assistant Commissioner (Operations), Jimmi Koroi. In order to convince Lewaicei and Ishak of the viability of a Chisholm—University of the South Pacific nexus, it was decided to enlist the preeminent Pacific Studies scholar, Professor Ron Crocombe, who with a characteristic ease, when convinced of the correctness of an argument or proposal, gave what amounted to his 'blessing'.<sup>46</sup> Once again, as with the Fiji Police, Crocombe's pre-eminence and his support were not able to overcome bureaucratic intransigence within his own University. Thirteen months after the first coup relations between Australia and Fiji were settling down to a form of normality; the hostility and implied threats had passed although the Defence Cooperation Programme remained suspended. The Australian Embassy in Suva has diplomatic and consular functions to other nations in the region besides Fiji. As DFAT in Canberra had been informed of the Study Tour programme, it was a matter of propriety to visit the Embassy. An interview took place with the Ambassador and the Defence Attache. This interview was pleasant and frank.

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<sup>45</sup>Interview Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, Police Headquarters, Suva, 1 June, 1988, R.H. Smith.

<sup>46</sup>Interview Professor Ron Crocombe, U.S.P. Laucala Bay Campus, Suva, 1 June, 1988. Ron has now retired and is resident in the Cook Islands where he is known to all as 'Papa Ron', a Cook Islands term of respect for senior male members of Cook Islands' society. Emeritus Professor Crocombe is vitally concerned with making USP a proper regional university and not just a Fijian institution.



Both wanted to know whether the Study Tour was in any way breaching the suspension of the Defence Cooperation Programme.<sup>47</sup>

The 1988 Australasian and South-West Pacific Region Police Commissioners' Conference was held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, in mid-June; one resolution passed was that the Commissioners supported the introduction of the Chisholm Associate Diploma of Police Studies, subject to its introduction by the Fiji Police in the first instance.<sup>48</sup> This being the case, contact was made with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which confirmed that it was worthwhile pursuing the Fijians over the matter.<sup>49</sup> Although not realized by the writer at the time, a war of attrition was being waged with the "old guard" of the Fiji Police; there is every reason to hope that the new (1994) Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Zeke Savua, a Sandhurst graduate, is actively interested in the now Monash proposal.<sup>50</sup> In a letter to Senior Superintendent

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<sup>47</sup>The reason for this question emanated from the organizational arrangements of Police and Military coming under the same Ministerial Portfolio-the Ministry for Home Affairs which at the time had as its Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka. The response that Chisholm's proposal was for the academic education of police and had nothing to do with the "nuts and bolts" of police training seemed to be the correct one. Further it was reiterated that the proposal was to seek an arrangement with the University of the South Pacific.

Interview with the Australian Ambassador, H.E. Robert Cotton and the Australian Defence Force Attache, Commander Robert Dagworthy, RAN, Australian Embassy, Dominion House, Suva, Tuesday 2 June, 1988.

<sup>48</sup>Telephone conversation with Commissioner W.J. Horman, Tasmania Police, 1 July, 1988, R.H. Smith. Commissioner Horman was the first post colonial Commissioner of Police in Vanuatu; he was seconded to this position whilst a Chief Inspector in the Victoria Police.

<sup>49</sup>Telephone conversation Ken Brazel, DFAT 1 July, 1988, R.H. Smith.

<sup>50</sup>There was, however, the realization that a blockage existed and that expectation never resulted in fruition. As mentioned above it was clear that the Minister for Home Affairs, Rabuka, supported the proposal but there was an inertia at the upper echelons of the police. For many years the locus of political power in Fiji was the Lau Group of islands-the then Prime Minister (and now President), Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara comes from Lau. An intermediary below the Command structure was sought. Senior Superintendent (previously Superintendent) Panipasa Matailevu who was on good terms with both Rabuka and Lewaicea and although a commoner also was closely affiliated with the chiefly group from Lau appeared to be the one who bring about the break-through necessary for implementation.

Matailevu, it was stated "Whilst in Fiji I hope to be able to complete our discussions regarding the introduction of our Associate Diploma with yourself and the Commissioner with the view to starting the course in 1989".<sup>51</sup>

Contact was once again made with the University of the South Pacific—this time through the Registrar, Mr Phillip Rama who undertook to speak to the Head of Social and Economic Development whose Secretary would contact the present writer as soon as possible.<sup>52</sup> A meeting was arranged and held with Pro Vice-Chancellor Ramesh Chandra at USP's Laucala Bay Campus. At this meeting it was stated that the University had no money for further course development and that there would be no impediment to Chisholm's conducting its Associate Diploma in Police Studies on a continuing basis in Fiji.<sup>53</sup>

At the time, one of the more important political leaders, or firebrands, was the Methodist Minister, the Reverend Manassah Lasaro, who was the spokesman of the Taukei Movement. The reason for wishing to contact Lasaro was that he held the post of Chaplain to the Fiji Police Force and that his views were critical to an understanding of what was going on with the Fijian, and predominantly Christian, members of the Fiji Police.<sup>54</sup> Lasaro, although initially willing to be interviewed, sent his assistant to be interviewed in his stead. This person was a Sergeant in the Fiji Police and was a Methodist Lay Preacher. The message was that Chisholm's course was not wanted by the Fiji Police unless it was conducted through the USP and the USP had insufficient funds to set up a police studies course itself.

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<sup>51</sup>Letter R.H. Smith to Senior Superintendent Panipasa Matailevu, Fiji Police, 11 October, 1988.

<sup>52</sup>Telephone call in Suva to Mr Phillip Rama, Registrar, University of the South Pacific, Laucala Bay Campus, Suva, 21 November, 1988, R.H. Smith.

<sup>53</sup>Interview with Pro Vice-Chancellor Ramesh Chandra, University of the South Pacific, Suva, 22 November, 1988.

<sup>54</sup>The present writer was asked to ascertain this by a senior member of the intelligence community in Canberra—hardly a "Ripping Yarns" task but obviously of some interest in the national capital.

The decision to press the issue resulted in the following letter to Lewaicei:

Re my telephone message to your office on 17 March 1989, I note with interest that you will be attending the 1989 Conference of Commissioner of Police of the Pacific (South West Region) in Melbourne between 13-19 April this year and that the theme of the Conference will be 'Violence in the Community'.

I am checking with my friend Kel Glare to see if there are any spare spots in the programme as this Institute would be honoured to have you visit us during your stay in Melbourne. Kel will undoubtedly let me know soon as to the scheduling of the programme.

I am intending to bring another group of Police Studies students to Fiji in the period 27 May to 12 June this year and will be staying again at the Grand Pacific Hotel in Suva. The group this year will be, at this stage, all Victoria Police members who are, of course, off duty and are attending in their capacity as Chisholm students. Included in this group will be one Superintendent, two Chief Inspectors and two Inspectors.

I know from my discussions with Assistant Commissioner Ishak that you are not yet ready to move towards accepting our Associate Diploma for your members but nevertheless an invitation is still extended for your members to participate in the formal lecture programme during our time in Suva. It would be greatly appreciated if we could be met at Nausori Airport on 27 May on our arrival.<sup>55</sup>

Following the normal pattern there was no reply made to this letter. Arrangements were made though with Chief Commissioner Glare, Victoria Police, to keep Police Studies at Chisholm informed of Lewaicei's programme when in Melbourne.<sup>56</sup> It is a common practice of police, perhaps similar to other professions but with more intensity, to look after interstate and international police visitors. This is seen by critics of police to be a

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<sup>55</sup>Letter to Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, Fiji Police, Suva, 20 March, 1989, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology.

<sup>56</sup>Telephone conversation Chief Commissioner Kel Glare, Victoria Police, a long standing friend of 20 years, R.H. Smith, 4 April, 1989.

part of the police brotherhood syndrome—it has, in fact, great beneficial aspects in terms of police professionalization. In the event, Lewaicei did not attend the Conference. It has been suggested by several members of the Conference that Fiji did not feel welcome in Australia and that perhaps there may have been the possibility of demonstrations against the presence of the Commissioner Fiji Police in Melbourne.<sup>57</sup>

With no reply to the above letter and no attendance at the Commissioners' Conference, further correspondence was sent:

Further to my letter of 20 March, 1989 to you I now wish to confirm that the study tour to be undertaken by Police Studies students will now comprise a part of 14 personnel including myself.

We will be arriving by bus in Suva early on Sunday morning, 28 May—the air connection between Nadi and Nausori does not meet. I would be pleased if you could have one of your members meet our party at Nadi, in the past we have had some excellent Fijian hospitality and this has been much appreciated.

As once again with our last visit with our group in 1988 it would be wonderful if we could have the same level of cooperation from your personnel to enable members of the study tour to meet with your members on a one to one basis in terms of their particular policing speciality.

On Monday 29 May I shall be in contact with your Secretary to make a possible appointment to see you as there are a number of items relating to my research on Policing in the South-West Pacific that only you or members of your command structure can assist me with.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Although not a secret—it is not appropriate to name these sources who are clearly Commissioners of Police in various jurisdictions.

<sup>58</sup> Letter to Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, Fiji Police, 16 May, 1989, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology.

It has to be remembered that the *sine qua non* of the acceptance of the course by other regional police forces was the acceptance by Fiji. Hence the process of attrition. A decision was made to write to Rabuka in his twin roles to place pressure of Lewaicei to accept the course.

I am writing to you in your capacity as Commander, Fiji Military Forces and have written a separate letter to you as Minister for Home Affairs. I will be arriving in Fiji on the 27th May, 1989 with a group of police studies students from this Institute. We will be staying at the Grand Pacific Hotel.

I am engaged in research in Policing the South-West Pacific as an extension of Australia's Defence and Foreign policies and would greatly appreciate the facility of speaking to either the serving or former serving Commander of the Fiji Military Forces peacekeeping force in the Middle East.

I recognise that the only military force within the region that has any experience in international peacekeeping of any substance is the Fiji Military Forces; our defence force has undertaken small scale operations in Sinai, Kashmir, Iraq, Iran and now Namibia. Most of these have passed without any serious incident. The Fiji Military Forces particularly the battalions that served on the South Lebanese borders have been in some of the hottest areas in which a peacekeeping force has been placed. The other experience that Australia has in international peacekeeping is the police contingent in Cyprus.

In my research I have used the Australian police in Cyprus as a paradigm; a subordinate paradigm has been to look at the role of the Fiji Military Forces in the Middle East and as a possible future peacekeeping force within the region.

Despite the protestations of many people of a left wing persuasion in Australia there is no evidence that I am aware of that the Fiji Military Forces have behaved in any sense other than an exemplary manner for the past two years in Fiji.

On this basis it would be greatly appreciated if access could be made to either yourself or to some of your senior officers to discuss matters relating to my research in the area of peacekeeping.<sup>59</sup>

and:

I shall be visiting Fiji with a group of students from this Institute between 27 May and 9 June, 1989.

It would be greatly appreciated if arrangements could be made to be granted an interview with a senior member of your Department to assist me in my research into Policing in the South-West Pacific as an extension of Australia's Defence and Foreign policies.

Let me assure you that my research interests do not involve in any sense the internal politics of Fiji as it is clear to me they are very much the business of Fijians. What I am interested in, in terms of research, is the evolution of policing in the last two years since you were unfortunately forced to take over the reins of Government.

I can guarantee you that the only contact I have had in Australia with elements hostile to the interim government has been a telephone conversation with Mr Jimmy Maharaj who caused me some difficulty on my return to Australia last year when two of my students were in the same vehicle when Messrs Chaudry and Maharaj were taken into police custody. As you were probably aware this incident was blown out of proportion by the Australian press and I was required to answer a question asked in the Victorian Parliament about our trip to Fiji. It transpired that Jimmy Maharaj was the motivating factor behind this question being asked by a left wing politician. My contact with him was to assuage his fears that our trip was sinister in any sense and that our sole purpose was to discuss policing matters with our Fijian colleagues.

Any assistance that you could provide me would be greatly appreciated as you would be well aware that Fiji is the pivotal point of any form of

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<sup>59</sup>Letter Commander, Fiji Military Forces, Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Suva from R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 17 May, 1989.

development in the area of policing with the South-West Pacific region.<sup>60</sup>

Although no written reply was received from Rabuka to either of these letters, a dividend was produced. The first part was a 'freeze' by the police and the second was the basis of a good relationship with the Fiji Military Forces. These will be discussed in detail shortly. The police continued to maintain their independence from the strictness of Ministerial control in their virtual assertion that training and education were linked to operational matters and as such fell outside the ambit of Ministerial control, thus remaining the province of the Commissioner.

Both the Department of Justice and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade were contacted and given details of the proposed Study Tour. Justice was unconcerned about the visit and once again an informal imprimatur was given.<sup>61</sup> Foreign Affairs and Trade were only concerned about who was meeting the group in Nadi. An interview took place with the First Secretary of the Australian Embassy as the Embassy had been informed by Canberra of the Study Tour's visit to Fiji. Essentially the interview was a recapitulation of what had been discussed on previous visits with his predecessors.<sup>62</sup>

A meeting was held with Ratu Lieutenant Colonel Epeli Ganilau, M.C. a son on the Fiji President Ratu Sir Penai Ganilau; Lt. Col. Ganilau won his Military Cross in South Lebanon. As requested in the letter, set out above, to Rabuka, the meeting was a briefing on the Fiji Military Forces contribution to United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations in Sinai and Lebanon.<sup>63</sup> A point of engagement was in education terms; it

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<sup>60</sup>Letter Minister for Home Affairs, Suva, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 11 May, 1989.

<sup>61</sup>Telephone conversation with Daryl Smeaton, Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Justice, R.H. Smith, 25 May, 1989.

<sup>62</sup>Interview Mr Tim George, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Suva, R.H. Smith, 29 May, 1989.

<sup>63</sup>Meeting with Ratu Lieutenant Colonel Epeli Ganilau, M.C., Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Suva, 6 June, 1989, R.H. Smith.

was interesting that while the 'public' Universities in Australia were not able to take Fiji Military Forces personnel as students because of the suspension of the Defence Cooperation Programme the private Bond University in Queensland had five Fijian officers enrolled in a Law course.<sup>64</sup>

During the meeting with Lt. Col. Ganilau, it was revealed that a Police Mobile Force was almost at the point of completion. This Police Mobile Force was to be comprised of police members, all Fijian, under military control but nominally under the Commissioner of Police. It was designed to be a Constabulary rather than police force.<sup>65</sup> As a consequence of the existence of this Force, the Fiji Military Forces expressed some interest in the Associate Diploma of Police Studies for its members to enhance their status vis-a-vis military personnel.

An interview was arranged with the Pro Vice-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, Dr Bill Kenchington, who was also Chairman of the University's Academic Planning Committee. The meeting with Kenchington was to say the least invigorating—there was a virtual and immediate acceptance of the concept of the Associate Diploma being introduced as soon as possible.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>The essence of this was propriety. It seemed that Australian Government scruples were satisfied if no dealings took place through the Department of Employment, Education and Training, the body to whom all "public" universities are answerable, even though the Fijians would have been full-fee paying students and as such they would have been private students; whereas it was morally correct to allow private enterprise to operate even though these officers were temporarily resident in Australia.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, A request was made that the existence of this force be not made public in Australia—this request has been honoured. Its existence is now public knowledge in Fiji and elsewhere.

Now while the request to not make public the existence of the Police Mobile Force was kept the oath of allegiance taken as an intelligence officer over 30 years ago and its compelling force under the Commonwealth Crimes Act, the details of this Force were passed to the relevant authorities as Ganilau knew they would.

<sup>66</sup>Interview Dr. W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, 8 June, 1989.



Contact with the Fiji Military Forces was maintained. Two clearly evident reasons justified this contact; firstly, the Fiji Military Forces come under the Ministry of Home Affairs which also includes the Fiji Police Force (and Rabuka was jointly Commander, Fiji Military Forces, and Minister for Home Affairs—secondly, and in consideration of influence, Ratu Lieutenant Colonel Epeli Ganilau was, as stated previously, a son of the President of Fiji. From an Australian point of view it seemed that the most important aspects were covered, that is, the political and the traditional Chiefly systems. During the remainder of 1989 Lieutenant Colonel Ganilau was the best contact for the promotion of Chisholm's proposal. In July, 1989, he 'staffed through' to Brigadier Rabuka the entire Chisholm proposal with his supporting appreciation. He was confident that the proposal would be accepted by Rabuka and would be implemented.<sup>67</sup> Several weeks later Ganilau was again contacted and he undertook to speak to Commissioner Lewaicei regarding his signal to Rabuka.<sup>68</sup>

A month earlier Lewaicei was sent the following letter:

During my recent visit to Fiji I had discussions with Dr W Kenchington Pro Vice-Chancellor of U.S.P. re the introduction of our Associate Diploma in Police Studies. The discussions seem to be fruitful with a strong indication that the University is interested in coming to an arrangement with this Institution. It would be extremely useful if you can agree to becoming a member of an interim working party for the implementation of this course. As you have no doubt gathered by now Lt. Col. Ganilau has also agreed to act on this interim working party subject of course to the approval of the Minister for Home Affairs.

I am sorry that we were unable to get together during my visit to Fiji and hope that we will be able to do so at a future date. In the meantime I

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<sup>67</sup>Telephone call Ratu Lieutenant Colonel Epeli Ganilau, M.C., Fiji Military Forces, 7 July, 1989, R.H. Smith.

<sup>68</sup>Telephone conversation Ratu Lieutenant Colonel Epeli Ganilau, M.C., Fiji Military Forces, 24 July, 1989, R.H. Smith.

would be most grateful if you would agree to join this Committee which would obviously have to work through correspondence.

The implementation of such an endeavour would be a large step forward for police tertiary education within the region and the success of such implementation depends upon the input of the Fiji Police Force.<sup>69</sup>

Surprisingly Lewaicei responded to this letter, but not surprisingly rejected the invitation included in the letter.

I have received your letter of 20 June, 1989, in which you have requested the Commissioner of Police to be a member of an interim committee for the implementation of a course an Associate Diploma of Police Studies.

It is regretted that I am unable to accept such an invitation.

Regards

Josefa Lewaicei

Commissioner of Police<sup>70</sup>

His response was firm and friendly embracing the style of 'the Melanesian wall of courtesy'—he was clearly not going to be pushed. A major stratagem had essentially failed by attempting to use both military and chiefly pressure upon the Commissioner. Contact has been essentially maintained with Ratu Epeli Ganilau, now Brigadier and Commander, Fiji Military Forces, but his drive to be involved with the police has

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<sup>69</sup>Letter to Commissioner Josefa Lewaicei, Fiji Police Force, 20 June, 1989, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology

<sup>70</sup>Josefa Lewaicei, Commissioner, Fiji Police Force, to R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 17 July, 1989.

apparently diminished save that the present Commissioner, appointed on 1 April, 1994, is a Lieutenant Colonel of the Fiji Military Forces.<sup>71</sup>

In retrospect it seems clear that the following letter to Lewaicei provoked this change of direction:

I was disappointed to receive your letter of the 17 July, 1989 expressing your inability to join the Interim Course Committee in Police Studies.

At present I am engaged in loose negotiations with Dr W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, in terms of introducing our Associate Diploma in Police Studies to not only Fiji but to other nations within the region. Chisholm Institute has also been invited by the University of Papua New Guinea to be involved in the design and teaching of the Police Studies course for the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.

As you know it is my desire that Fiji be the first nation of the region to move into the area of specific Police Studies course as we have discussed on previous occasions the pivotal point of Fiji within the region. Prior to my recent visit to Fiji I had written to Maj. Gen. Rabuka as Minister for Home Affairs about this proposition and whilst in Suva I had discussions with Lt. Col. Ganilau who has agreed in principle to join the Advisory Committee subject to Maj. Gen. Rabuka's approval.

If as you stated in your letter to me you are unable yourself to join the Advisory Committee is it possible that a member of your force be appointed to represent you?<sup>72</sup>

The attempts to introduce the Chisholm course despite the apparent support from the Fiji Military Forces, which have always seen themselves as superior to the Fiji Police Force,

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<sup>71</sup>To read anything into this would be erroneous. The second Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police was Major-General Ronald Grey who did not in any sense try to turn the A.F.P. into a quasi-military force because of his antecedents.

<sup>72</sup>Letter R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Josefa Lewaicei, Commissioner, Fiji Police Force, 6 September, 1989.

had now been deflected into a regional context. In one sense this appeared to be a rebuff, but in another it seemed that the regional context provided an even better chance of acceptance. This regional approach seemed to be congruent with the attempts by Chisholm to develop a linkage with the University of the South Pacific, the member nations of which were also represented at the Commissioners' Conference. Within the region there was then, and still is, a strong feeling that the USP was in danger of becoming a *Fijian* university; the major reason for this feeling is that as the central administration is in Suva, the centripetal power of the bureaucracy causes marginalization of the smaller campuses. The perception of Fijian dominance causes resentment in other nations. To this extent, therefore, the move to have Chisholm's proposal placed before the Commissioners' Conference was unexpected.

Despite this move it was felt that efforts to enlist Lewaicei was still worthwhile. The following Memo is indicative:

**HONORARY ASSOCIATE DIPLOMA IN POLICE STUDIES  
FOR COMMISSIONER LEWAICEI, FIJI POLICE**

It seems that one way of promoting the course, apart from the material that I have forwarded to you from Professor Kenchington of the University of the South Pacific, would be to award Joe Lewaicei an Honorary Associate Diploma in Police Studies.

I have checked through Chisholm's Records Section and there is apparently no policy on this matter. I do not think we would be treading on any toes in a political sense at least at the Federal level if it was possible to make this award to Lewaicei but it would certainly, from the information that I have, make a difference in terms of prestige, etc, if he was the first police officer in the South-West Pacific region to have a piece of paper from Chisholm/Monash.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Memo, Robert H Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies to Richard J. Snedden, Dean, School of Social and Behavioural Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 16 October, 1989.

This proposal whilst having the support of senior Chisholm staff did not proceed as the amalgamation with Monash University was only eight months away and no new Chisholm initiatives were being made. In any case the feelings which some Monash staff had towards the merger and towards the new Fijian Government, let alone Fijian police or any police, were a good reason to let the matter go no further; all decisions prior to amalgamation once the 'Heads of Agreement' documentation was signed meant that conjoint decisions had to be made.

On the same day that the Memo was sent, a letter was sent to Chief Commissioner Kelvin Glare of the Victoria Police through whose offices the Secretariat for the Commissioners' Conference is maintained.<sup>74</sup> This letter was designed to pave the way:

#### **CCOP—ASSOCIATE DIPLOMA IN POLICE STUDIES COURSE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH PACIFIC**

For the past two years I have made deliberate and concentrated efforts to establish Chisholm's Associate Diploma in Police Studies within the region of the South- West Pacific.

Progress in relation to the Fiji Police has been slow. As early as March 1988 in a personal telephone call with Major General Rabuka it was agreed that it be 'all systems go' to establish the Associate Diploma within the then Royal Fiji Police, since then the Fijians have seemed reluctant to 'close' the deal. The deal proposed was that the three subjects of Police Studies and the three subjects of Legal Studies within the Associate Diploma be taught on a face to face contact basis in Suva with the Fijian government providing airfare, accommodation and rations.

As you are aware the Federal Government has suspended the Defence Cooperation Programme to the Fiji Military Forces; because the Fiji Military Forces and the Fiji Police come under the Ministry of Home

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<sup>74</sup>Kelvin Glare has been a good friend of the present writer for over 25 years. In this time friendship has never encroached on professionalism for either of us.

Affairs the Fiji Police are regarded as coming under D.C.P. provisions. It is not my intention, in any sense, to either move against Federal government policy or to involve either myself or this Institution in international politics. However, from a geo-political view point, I feel it is important that efforts be made to keep the Fiji Police within the fold, so to speak. You may be aware, for instance, that the French in Noumea have set up an English Language University which is cost free to students within the region; at the same time Australian tertiary institutions charge approximately \$8, 500 per annum for an Arts degree. It is likely on this basis that the people of the region will choose to be educated in Noumea. The proposal that I have would be effectively cost free apart from airfares, etc, to the Fiji Police.

About ten days ago I had a telephone conversation with an unnamed officer in the Ministry of Home Affairs in Suva to enquire about the progress of the implementation by the Fiji Police of the Associate Diploma. I was told that the lack of progress had nothing to do with their dissatisfaction of the course material, in fact they were relatively pleased with the course as it stands, but that they, the Ministry of Home Affairs would feel more comfortable to have the whole matter discussed by the Regional commissioners.

The purpose of my letter to you is to make a request that the matter be raised at one of your conferences so that Australia can be in a position to offer tertiary studies for police in the region on a virtual cost free basis.<sup>75</sup>

The response from Glare took nearly a month and was indicative of the formal arrangement that were developing between police and politicians in Australia marking the beginning of the end of police autonomy vis-a-vis traditional policing. He replied *inter alia* that:

Due to the nature of your request and the current political situation that exists between the Fijian and Australasian Governments at this time, it would be prudent if this matter was discussed at a Ministerial level.

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<sup>75</sup>Letter, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Chief Commissioner K.J. Glare, A.P.M., Victoria Police, 16 October, 1989.

Consequently I shall raise this matter informally, at the forthcoming Australian Police Ministers' Council which is to be held in mid December this year. Dependent upon a positive reaction to this proposal in Adelaide I am prepared to sponsor this matter at the 1990 Commissioners' Conference which is to be held in Perth during March 1990.<sup>76</sup>

Contemporaneously discussions were still going on with the University of the South Pacific and it appeared that real progress was being made in the introduction to the region of the Associate Diploma. In June, 1989, the following letter was sent to Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice Chancellor, University of the South Pacific:

As noted during our conversation (on 8 June 1989 in Suva) you will place this matter before your Academic Planning Committee for further discussion. To recapitulate what my proposition is the following is pertinent:

- The proposal is that this Institution would introduce its Associate Diploma in Police Studies (A.D.P.S.) for police forces in the region covered by the South Pacific Forum excluding New Caledonia, French Polynesia and American Samoa.
- At present I have the support of my Institution for mounting this course particularly the subjects of Police Studies and Legal Studies on a cost free basis to be taught during both our winter and summer semester breaks. The mode of teaching would be face to face and each subject would involve a fortnight of intensive study to be followed by sufficient written work that would then be forwarded to Australia for correction.
- As discussed with you if we could follow the format that U.S.P. has attached with the Fiji School of Medicine this would seem to be a more than satisfactory arrangement for the completion of the eight remaining subjects within the Associate Diploma.

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<sup>76</sup>Chief Commissioner Kelvin Glare, Victoria Police to R.H. Smith, 14 November, 1989.

- If any police force in the region was interested in the four subjects comprising Traffic Policing Studies this would also be conducted during winter and summer semester breaks, thus reducing resources from U.S.P.
- If U.S.P. is happy about this arrangement then the actual award of the Associate Diploma could still remain with Chisholm or, as from the 1st July, 1990, with Monash University when the merger between the two institutions comes into effect.<sup>77</sup>

Kenchington's reply was quick and focussed. It was indicative of a desire to get things moving although the normal requirements of a bureaucracy clearly had to be met:

I enquired about earlier considerations of your proposal and found that it was to have been discussed at a Head of Department meeting in the School of Social and Economic Development but was not, in fact, considered.<sup>78</sup>

This was a clear indication that his predecessor Chandra had not taken any action from the initial discussions which took place in 1988 as discussed earlier in this Chapter.

A reply was able to be made to Kenchington:

As I see it we would be asking U.S.P. to provide service teaching in those areas of our Associate Diploma in Police Studies (A.D.P.S.) apart from the Police and Legal Studies subjects. That is, we would be looking for eight subjects out of the fourteen subjects needed for the A.D.P.S. to be taught by U.S.P. and I understand the restrictions that you make regarding the number of subjects available but we hope that an exception could be made in this case.

The other alternative, of course, is for this Institution to be involved by some form of distance education for those subjects in excess of your

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<sup>77</sup>Letter, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, 20 June, 1989.

<sup>78</sup>Letter, Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of the South Pacific to Robert H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 29 June, 1989.



regulations. Essentially the subjects we are looking for are units in psychology, sociology, politics, literature and other social science subjects that would fit under the general umbrella in a joint award with Chisholm, or from 1 July, 1990, Monash University. But I wish to assure you that in this instance we are not involved in a form of neo-colonialism or really looking, as some of my colleagues elsewhere, to education as an export commodity for Australia.

I have just written to Commissioner Lewaicei of Fiji Police informing him of our correspondence and with any luck he may be in contact with you.<sup>79</sup>

Kenchington in a long reply made three incisive points that indicated the USP, or at least he, was serious about the development of tertiary education for police. These three points were:

In my opinion, three arrangements are feasible. Each scheme could accommodate variations.

1. A.D.P.S. students could take eight established U.S.P. credit courses under C.O.P. (Certificate of Proficiency) regulations. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two institutions could be drawn up to facilitate this—much in the same way that we have done for the W.H.O. sponsored Diploma in Environmental Health to be awarded by the Fiji School of Medicine.
2. A.D.P.S. students could take three U.S.P. credit courses under C.O.P. regulations, and five U.S.P. credit courses by the extension mode.

This scheme would not require any special enabling document as it does not pose any problem regarding U.S.P.'s established enrolment regulations.

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<sup>79</sup>Letter, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, 6 September, 1989.

3. A.D.P.S. students could take all eight U.S.P. courses by extension. Again, this would be acceptable within our regulations.<sup>80</sup>

A letter from the Dean, School of Social and Behavioural Studies, Chisholm to Kenchington confirmed that variations 2 and 3 above were equally acceptable to Chisholm and that there would be no difficulty in awarding a Chisholm qualification under either variation.<sup>81</sup> Kenchington responded in a positive manner and pointed out that he felt that as the courses mentioned, that is the eight necessary to complete the Associate Diploma, would likely to be 'heavily subscribed' that enrolments would be on a 'first come, first served basis'.<sup>82</sup>

The opportunity to proceed with an arrangement between U.S.P. and Chisholm was achievable but as the following letter to Kenchington will show the perceived necessity to await the decision of the Commissioners' Conference probably killed the introduction of the Course to Fiji:

Reference our telephone conversation of 20 November, 1989 and your letter of the 6 November, 1989. We are more than pleased to proceed on the basis of your suggestion and look forward to a close contact between this Institution and University of the South Pacific.

In regards to the current state of play between Australia and Fiji it has been suggested by the Victoria Police Commissioner that the issue be raised informally at the Australian Police Ministers' Council in mid December. I think this is a prudent move on the part of the Chief

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<sup>80</sup>Letter, Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor University of the South Pacific, to R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 13 September, 1989.

<sup>81</sup>Letter, Richard J. Snedden, Dean, School of Social and Behavioural Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, 31 October, 1989.

<sup>82</sup>Letter, Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor University of the South Pacific, to Richard J. Snedden, Dean, School of Social and Behavioural Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 6 November, 1989.

Commissioner but naturally we are not dependent on his decision or that of the Ministers' Council meeting, but we would be foolish to operate, insofar as Fiji is concerned, if an adverse response were forthcoming. This would not impinge, of course, on relations with other police forces in the nations served by U.S.P.<sup>83</sup>

An explanatory letter to Chief Commissioner Glare stated:

Thank you for your letter of 14 November, 1989, relating to the Associate Diploma in Police Studies (A.D.P.S.) and the forthcoming Police Ministers' Council Meeting.

Since my letter to you of 31 October, 1989, we have finalised an arrangement with the University of the South Pacific (U.S.P.) through Professor W. Kenchington who is Pro Vice-Chancellor of that Institution. The arrangement is a loose one but follows a model that they have with the Fiji Medical School in Suva. The A.D.P.S. would remain an award of Chisholm and from 1 July, 1990 an award from Monash University. The compulsory subjects relating to Police Studies and Legal Studies would be taught in those countries which the U.S.P. services but not at the University campus.

For instance in Fiji it is suggested that these subjects would be taught at their Police Academy and Vanuatu at some location organized by Commissioner Saul. The remaining subjects, that is eight subjects, would be taught by the U.S.P. either on their campus or through an extended mode of study. Naturally none of these will be implemented until such time as I receive your advice as to the appropriateness of the starting time. You will understand, of course, that the reason for discussions in Suva have been related to the fact that the U.S.P. has its Administrative Headquarters in Suva.

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<sup>83</sup>Letter, Robert H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, to Professor W. Kenchington, Pro Vice-Chancellor, University of South Pacific, 29 November, 1989.

I would hope that the Australian Police Ministers' Council would view this arrangement with the U.S.P. as a positive move within the region.<sup>84</sup>

The target audience for this letter was clearly the Australian Police Ministers' Council and the mildly sycophantic tone was deliberate. In any case the matter was passed on to the Conference of Commissioners of Police of Australasia and the South-West Pacific region to be held in March, 1990. It appeared that a form of approval had been given through this mechanism.

As mentioned earlier, the Commonwealth Attorney General's Department had become interested in tertiary education for police in Australia. A senior officer in the International Law area of the Department had been present at an Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology Conference in 1989 where the present author presented a paper Policing in the South-West Pacific and had expressed interest in the approach which the paper had taken in terms of providing regional education for police. During a telephone conversation he stated that Chisholm should persist with the Fiji Police as a 'prelude to rehabilitation'<sup>85</sup> This conversation was immediately followed by one with the Tasmania Commissioner of Police who undertook to speak to the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police regarding the impending Conference of Commissioners in March; his comment was that both 'will get to' Lewaicei in Perth.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Letter, R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology to Chief Commissioner Kelvin Glare, Victoria Police, 29 November, 1989.

<sup>85</sup>Telephone call. R.H. Smith to Mr Herman Woltring, International Law Division, Attorney General's Department, Canberra 17 January, 1990.

<sup>86</sup>Telephone call R.H. Smith to Commissioner W.J. Horman, Tasmania Police, 17 January, 1990. At this stage Bill Horman and myself had been friends for over 20 years and prior to his appointment as Commissioner, Tasmania Police, had been Deputy Commissioner (Operations) Victoria Police. He had also been the first post-independence Police Commissioner in Vanuatu and was, and still is, well known and respected in the Pacific. Kel Glare and myself had also been friends for a similar period. This proposed action by Bill Horman and Kel Glare on my behalf, that is for the benefit of Chisholm, seemed to have matters "stitched up". How wrong we were as things turned out.

There seemed to be agreement that the Chisholm proposal was good for the region and in Australia's interests, or certainly not acting against those interests.<sup>87</sup> The most interesting however, was with the United States Embassy Legal Attache, Ivian Smith. During the interview he raised a number of points which seemed critical to developments within the region. The most important was that the Royal New Zealand Police would soon be training the Fiji Police.<sup>88</sup> The Australian Government by contrast was continuing to 'freeze' Fiji out of any assistance under the Defence Cooperation Programme which included any aid to the Fiji Police.

The Australasian and South-West Pacific Regions Police Commissioners' Conference was held in Perth in March, 1990, and although the result of the discussion was transmitted verbally, the Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police, wrote on 31 May, 1990, that:

Further to my letter of 14th November, 1989, relating to your request to raise the matter of establishing a Police Studies Diploma at the University of the South Pacific, I advise that the issue was tabled for consideration at the Australian and South-West Pacific Region Police Commissioners' Conference convened in Perth in March, 1990. The issue provoked considerable debate and of the conclusion the accepted position on the matter was expressed by way of resolution. While I understand that you have informally been advised of the outcome, I take the opportunity to convey to you the terms of the resolution viz—

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<sup>87</sup>As is common practice the various interviews were conducted in an "off the record" mode.

<sup>88</sup>He also indicated that he would speak to Lewaicei about Chisholm's Police Studies Course. A letter confirming some of the details was sent to the Legal Attache on my return to Melbourne.

He replied to this letter and the part referring to Lewaicei is as follows: *I should also note that my relationship with the Fiji Police, and Commissioner Lewaicei, would not allow for me to act as an advocate for any training, including that of the Chisholm Institute of Technology. Undoubtedly training by your institution is of sufficient quality to be of value, however, my role does not allow for intervention in the affairs of the Fiji Police-or any other department in my region of responsibility-or act as a broker for training. If I led you to believe otherwise, I apologise for any inconvenience it may have created.*

Conference notes that the educational and training requirements of the various jurisdictions in the South-West Pacific region vary considerably.

Conference also notes that the education and training courses provided need to reflect the real needs of the particular jurisdiction under consideration.

Conference therefore resolves that it does not support the proposal of the Chisholm Institute of Technology to introduce the Associate Diploma of Police Studies into the University of the South Pacific.

Conference is unable to make available documentation of the Conference relating to research by Mr Robert H Smith, Senior Lecturer, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, on policing in the South-West Pacific'.<sup>89</sup>

On face value the Conference had decided to kill any chances of providing tertiary education for police in the region from within the region. The other resolutions reflected the diversity of the region and supported the view that the University of the South Pacific is really a Fijian-dominated institution.

In spite of this apparent set back, Victoria Police and Tasmania Police remained supportive of the concept. When in mid-May, 1990, Assistant Commissioner Mohammed Ishak of the Fiji Police arrived in Melbourne to consult with his Victoria Police counterparts, a process of further lobbying took place. The best that could be obtained from Ishak despite these blandishments was that he would raise the proposal once again with Lewaicei.<sup>90</sup> In June, 1990, a Winter Semester was conducted at the

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<sup>89</sup>Letter, Chief Commissioner K. Glare, Victoria Police to R.H. Smith, Senior Lecturer in Charge, Police Studies, Chisholm Institute of Technology, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>90</sup>The most important gain of this period was that he could see the close professional and social connections between the present writer (as an employee of Chisholm) and various senior members of Victoria Police; these connections had certainly paid a dividend in Victoria in terms of the growth of the Police Studies course and it was hoped that Ishak would be the catalyst for such a connection in Fiji.

Australian Federal Police Academy in Canberra. The purposes of these Semesters and Study Tours have been discussed throughout this work along with their pedagogical underpinnings. It was during this time that, in an interview with the Commissioner, Australian Federal Police, the reason for Chisholm's (and the writer's) lack of success with the Fiji Police was finally revealed. The Commissioner a dour man, (now retired) and known to be economical in the use of words in conversation merely said "that Joe Lewaicei really 'knocked back' the idea of the Associate Diploma in Police Studies because it was 'free' and would be seen by the Fiji Public Service Board and Government as a means to cut the Police Budget".<sup>91</sup>

And so finally after nearly three years of fairly intensive lobbying and cajoling and being almost successful with the University of the South Pacific, the simple fact of a possible reduction in Budget allocation caused the Fijian Commissioner to reject an otherwise acceptable course.

### **The Cook Islands: Another Door Opens**

In July 1990, a telephone call from the State Commander of Victoria Police Traffic Support Group and a part-time lecturer in Traffic Policing at Chisholm/Monash, was received stating that the Chief Executive Officer of the Cook Islands Consulate in Sydney had contacted him and that the present writer would himself be contacted.<sup>92</sup> A call was received from the Cook Islands Consulate shortly thereafter and a meeting was arranged for a week hence; the short reason for the call was that the Cook Islands were suffering an increased traffic fatality rate and they were looking for ways to minimize

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<sup>91</sup>Interview, Commissioner R. Peter McAuley, Australian Federal Police, A.F.P. Headquarters, Canberra, R.H. Smith, 21 June, 1990

<sup>92</sup>Telephone conversation Chief Superintendent D.R. Axup, Victoria Police Traffic Support Group, R.H. Smith, Head, Department of Police Studies, Monash University, 16 July, 1991.

this toll.<sup>93</sup> The traffic problems in the Cook Islands centred around fatalities largely associated with motor scooters, speed and the non-wearing of motor cycle helmets. Helmet legislation had been in place but had been revoked as a result of pressure from the Churches.<sup>94</sup> In addition fatalities occur when tourists hire motor scooters and they are not experienced riders—this accounts for the majority. The two major causes of collisions involving motor scooters are running into, or trying to avoid, wandering dogs and collisions with cars and other light vehicles. Each collision which involves injury or death has to be investigated, but the Cook Islands Police were not trained in Collision Reconstruction methods. In addition to problems with collisions, there was a problem with speeding. The Victoria Police Chief Superintendent offered, subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner, to 'lend' two radar guns which record vehicle speed to the Cook Islands Police; these radar guns were fully operational but as the result of a Victoria Supreme Court appeal had been deemed to be non-usable [and so they were literally gathering dust in the Victoria Police Stores Branch]. The Chief Commissioner approved the 'loan' without demur; this was a practical alternative to writing off, or disposing of, equipments that are no longer viable. The problem then for the Cook Islands Police was to have the Attorney General introduce legislation that enabled the radar guns to be used—to date this legislation has not been introduced and the radar guns are now in turn gathering dust in Rarotonga, the main island of the Cook Islands.

It had been just on three years since efforts had begun to introduce the Associate Diploma of Police Studies to Fiji and to the region of the South Pacific through the University of the South Pacific. In a short period during this meeting the scope and

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<sup>93</sup>Telephone call, Richard Barton, Chief Executive Officer, Cook Islands Consulate, Sydney, R.H. Smith, 16 July, 1990.

<sup>94</sup>There was no theological reason for this; but the women of the Cook Islands wear exquisite hats plaited from coconut fronds. These hats are "Sunday best" regalia and the wearing of helmets meant that the hats would be damaged if placed in motor scooter baskets.



extent of the Associate Diploma had been explained to Richard Barton the Chief Executive Officer of the Cook Islands Consulate; without hesitation he said that he would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister, Mr (now Sir) Geoffrey Henry.<sup>95</sup>

As has been the case all along with Fiji the impetus and contact had come from Chisholm/Monash. As Prime Minister Rabuka had previously asked to be kept informed of developments in relation to Police Studies it was decided to apprise him of the contact from the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands contact was discussed with him in a telephone call. Once again, as on several previous occasions, he took the view that the Course should go ahead and as Commissioner Lewaicei's term of office was coming to an end it would be opportune to make fresh overtures to the Fiji Police.<sup>96</sup>

Although clearly not connected, within two weeks Assistant Commissioner Aisea Taoka of the Fiji Police was in Melbourne to meet with Victoria Police personnel specifically on the issue of traffic and road safety. The Deputy Commissioner (Administration), Victoria Police, contacted Police Studies at Monash and arranged a meeting with Taoka. At this meeting a joint Victoria Police/Monash line was pressed that tertiary education was beneficial for police personnel. Whilst Taoka agreed with this proposition he was still wedded to the notion that students should come to Australia rather than being taught 'in-country',<sup>97</sup> but at least he was apparently keen on the benefits to be gained from tertiary education. After his departure several attempts were made to contact Rabuka a successful telephone call was made during which an invitation was made to the writer to

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<sup>95</sup>Meeting at Monash, Caulfield Campus, Richard Barton, Chief Executive Officer, Cook Islands Consulate, Chief Superintendent D.R. Axup, Victoria Police and R.H. Smith, Head, Department of Police Studies, Monash University, 23 July, 1990.

<sup>96</sup>Telephone conversation R.H. Smith with Major General Sitiveni Rabuka, Minister for Home Affairs and Commander Fiji Military Forces, 1005 hours (Melbourne time) 22 August, 1990.

<sup>97</sup>Dinner, Assistant Commissioner Aisea Taoka, Fiji Police, Deputy Commissioner Brendan Crimmins, Victoria Police and R.H. Smith, 5 September, 1990. It should also be noted that Brendan Crimmins is a Monash Graduate in Police Studies.

"come out to Fiji for a recce" (reconnaissance)—airfares and accommodation were to be met by the Fiji Government. The purpose of the visit was to discuss with himself, Brigadier Ian Thorpe (an expatriate New Zealander who held dual Commissions in the New Zealand Army and the Fiji Military Forces) and Police regarding the Monash courses on offer.<sup>98</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Richard Barton, Chief Executive Officer, Cook Islands Consulate in Sydney, rang Police Studies at Monash and stated that the proposal to introduce the Associate Diploma into the Cook Islands was nearing fruition and that it was just awaiting Cabinet approval. If the course was to go ahead, the time frame was calculated to begin in January, 1991.<sup>99</sup>

In November 1990 an unexpected letter arrived from Assistant Commissioner Mohammed Ishak of the Fiji Police. *Inter alia* the letter states:

We have studied the course contents of the Associate Diploma in Police Studies and have concluded that these studies are quite relevant to the requirements of our police officers. .... In conclusion I would like to say that we will be prepared to recommend that our police officers undertake the Diploma in Police Studies if the courses were made available through the U.S.P. by your institute.<sup>100</sup>

The letter arrived considerably after it was dated and almost on its arrival Professor Ramesh Chandra, who had replaced Kenchington as Pro Vice Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, was contacted. Chandra was directly following the line that Kenchington had taken; that is, a form of bilateral arrangement between the USP

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<sup>98</sup>Telephone call, R.H. Smith to Major General Sitiveni Rabuka, Commander Fiji Military Forces, 0900 hours (Melbourne Time) 12 September, 1990.

<sup>99</sup>Telephone call, Richard Barton, Chief Executive Officer, Cook Islands Consulate, to R.H. Smith, Head, Department of Police Studies, Monash University, 2 October, 1990.

<sup>100</sup>Letter Assistant Commissioner Mohammed Ishak, Fiji Police to R.H. Smith, Head, Department of Police Studies, Monash University, November, 1990.

and Monash. He stated that there was no impediment to the Course beginning in the 1991 Academic Year. No specific student allocation could be made for the Police Studies Course out of existing 'student load' from the USP and Monash would have to cover this for 1991, but that 1992 was likely to be different.<sup>101</sup> Now, although there was no impediment to the commencement of the course, no time frame was given and bureaucracies cannot work on an *ad hoc* basis whether in Universities or elsewhere. It was decided to visit Suva at the earliest possible time which turned out to be mid-February, 1991.

As things turned out the now 'normal' Fijian administrative merry-go-round was still operating. Ishak was unwell but a meeting took place with Taoka and the 'Director Administration'. Shortly after the meeting had commenced Taoka had to leave and attend a briefing meeting with the Commissioner; the present writer was left with the 'Director Administration' the whole process and antecedents had to be explained to him—he was clearly not sure of what was going on despite Ishak's encouraging letter of 1 November, 1990.<sup>102</sup> This process can in fairness be attributed to one of Lewaicei's last hurrahs; it is more than possible that Ishak, in writing his letter, was acting on behalf of Rabuka and that Lewaicei was asserting his position as Commissioner relying on the Commissioners' Conference in Perth in 1990. Effectively once again the Course was back to 'square one'.

In less than two months Chandra, USP Pro Vice Chancellor, had also changed his tune. He now required full documentation of courses taught and a detailed submission for transmission to the University's Senate, this, despite Kenchington's virtual written

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<sup>101</sup>Telephone conversation R.H. Smith with Professor Ramesh Chandra, Pro Vic Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, 20 December, 1990.

<sup>102</sup>Meeting R.H. Smith, Assistant Commissioner A. Taoka and "Director Administration", Police Headquarters, Suva, commencing 1045 hours, Monday 18 February, 1991.

agreement that the course should proceed.<sup>103</sup> The present writer's diary entry for this time is indicative of the frustration felt at Chandra's new proposal, however bureaucratically correct:

On reflection it is probably better for Monash to do the lot. This proposal by Pro Vice Chancellor Chandra means that we are virtually supplicants having to prove ourselves. If we go it alone they can come in later.<sup>104</sup>

A telephone call the next morning to Rabuka tended to put Chandra's view into some perspective. He stated that the reason for the new intransigence was that the Police Administration was to be shortly changed and that the present writer should continue with his endeavours; he was not surprised at Chandra's reaction and agreed that Monash should go it alone. Then a strange thing occurred- he asked the writer if he knew of a suitable Australian senior police officer to take over from Lewaicei. He was given the name of a Victoria Police Commander and they were later in contact.<sup>105</sup> This latter part of the conversation elicited the tensions between Rabuka and the Interim Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara—for within three days an announcement was made that Philip Arnfield, Assistant Chief Constable of the Cheshire Constabulary, had been appointed as Lewaicei's successor. The appointment was not popular as the following newspaper article indicates:

The idea of appointing an expatriate as Commissioner of Police is not popular among police officers, particularly at senior levels, a Fiji Times snap poll yesterday showed. To the question whether they welcomed the appointment of a Briton, Philip Arnfield, as Fiji's Police Chief, most of

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<sup>103</sup>Interview R.H. Smith with Professor Ramesh Chandra, Pro Vice Chancellor, University of the South Pacific, Laucala Bay Campus, Suva, 2.30 p.m. Tuesday 19 February, 1991

<sup>104</sup>Diary entry, R.H. Smith, Tuesday, 19 February, 1991

<sup>105</sup>Telephone conversation R.H. Smith with Major General Sitiveni Rabuka, Minister for Home Affairs, 0820 hours Wednesday, 20 February, 1991.

the respondents expressed disappointment, saying it was a backward step that was likely to cause bitterness and hurt pride.

Mr Arnfield, 52, will become Fiji's new Commissioner of Police when the present commissioner, Josefa Lewaicea retires in April.

Mr Lewaicea, 57, only the second local commissioner, announced his impending retirement at the opening of a new police station on Kadavu on Wednesday.

A senior police officer who spoke on condition of anonymity said the appointment of Mr Arnfield re-introduced 'the lost era of colonialism'.

"The announcement is certainly a great blow, a slap in the face of serving officers who've worked hard and honestly and with a great sense of professional pride through some of the most trying times the force has seen.

"And all in all we've done Fiji proud", he said. "So why bypass us? There are a few of us quite capable of taking up the post and doing a fine job of it". But now, with Mr Arnfield's appointment many of them "will have to mark time", he added.

Another officer said: "I've nothing against expatriates per se, and certainly nothing against Mr Arnfield personally.

"But his appointment undermines the confidence of local people because it would simply remind them of what it was like in colonial days when locals always had to play second fiddle to expatriates", he said.

"Mr Lewaicea, more than any other commissioner before him was at one with the force, identifying with its urge to rise up and be recognised as a true professional organisation.

"He has done a lot for the educational uplift of officers, sending away many of us on overseas courses and meetings", the officer said.

"We're willing to work with the present commissioner for the next two to three years. We know that there are two people in the force who could replace Mr Lewaicea".

A small group of officers said they would rather not say anything because as civil servants they had an obligation not to say anything.

The leader of the Coalition Party, Adi Kuini Bavadra, said: "The appointment of an expatriate reflects poorly on the interim administration's system of grooming senior officers to take up a leading post like Mr Lewaicei's as they become vacant."<sup>106</sup>

With a public response like that from the *Fiji Times*, incidentally part of the Rupert Murdoch chain of media outlets, Arnfield was going to take up his position in the face of some strong opposition. In this particular case the disagreement between Rabuka and Ratu Mara was only that of the nationality of the expatriate appointee—more severe tensions were to surface publicly later with Rabuka having to humiliate himself and apologise by offering the ritual *tabua* (carved whale's tooth) to Ratu Mara but these circumstances are beyond the scope of this work.

A FAX was sent to Arnfield congratulating him on his appointment as Commissioner. His handwritten reply was cordial:

Thank you for your FAX dated 25th February, 1991, offering congratulations, and adverting to your proposed Diploma and B.A. in Police Studies. Clearly I am not yet in a position to respond to the proposals, but no doubt I will be briefed on arrival.<sup>107</sup>

The letterhead on Cheshire Constabulary stationery showed that Arnfield holds a B.A. (Econ) Honours degree. This gave some hope that he would not be opposed to the proposition now before the Fiji Police for nearly four years. In addition a highly confidential source in Fiji indicated that Arnfield's main remit was to cleanse the Fiji Police of corruption at the highest levels. In his three year term he did this—once again this is outside the scope of this work.

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<sup>106</sup>*Fiji Times* 23 February, 1991, Wainikiti Wasa. Choice of Police Chief Unpopular.

<sup>107</sup>Commissioner Elect. Philip G. Arnfield, to R.H. Smith. 7 March 1991.

A letter was sent to Arnfield in Suva soon after his appointment as Commissioner on 1 April, 1991. This letter set out what Police Studies at Monash University was offering to the Fiji Police:

As indicated in my Fax to you in Cheshire this University has been for four years interested in establishing our Police studies courses in Fiji, and the region.

In your reply you indicated that you would be briefed on the matter when you took up your appointment.

I am bringing a group of students, mostly Victoria Police, to Suva in the period 25 May—7 June, 1991, for a Winter Semester Study Tour. In this time a subject, Comparative Policing, will be taught.

It would be my pleasure to have a number, decided by you, of your members to attend our classes free of charge as "Non-Credit" students at the initial stage. You will have gathered the cost structures, etc, that I have proposed for the implementation of our courses. The proposed link with the University of the South Pacific has come to an hiatus—we will move on our own for the time being. A proposal that I put to the previous Force Administration on my recent visit to Suva (February) was that for senior personnel, around Assistant Superintendent level, that we would grant advanced standing to the third year of our Bachelor of Arts (Police Studies)—this would mean that six subjects would need to be completed to complete the degree.

Whilst this scheme appears innovative it reflects current Australian thinking in education—the "buzz-word" is articulation. Articulation here means the proper recognition by tertiary institutions of professional experience.

During the period we are in Suva I would be extremely grateful if you could see your way clear to allow us use of a classroom at your Academy for our morning sessions. Contact with your members by my students would also be greatly appreciated. Both of those measures would enhance the effectiveness of the course. In February, at a meeting with Brigadier Ian Thorpe, F.M.F., an offer was made to use his facilities at the Officer Training School as communications had effectively broken

down with your predecessor. Prior to your appointment I have been encouraged by Maj-Gen Rabuka to continue in my attempts to have the Fiji Police take advantage of our courses. Coincidentally when in Suva in May/June I will be talking with both the A.N.Z. and Westpac Banks to set the ground for an economic crime course which will be a replication of a course this Department is working on jointly with the Australian Bankers' Association Fraud Task Force.

I hope that you can accede to my requests and that a fruitful relationship can be established between this Department and your Force.

I look forward to your early reply.<sup>108</sup>

The reply did come early and was in part a rebuke to the present writer that did, in fairness, leave open a slight opportunity for the future:

I refer to your letter dated 9th April 1991. I am concerned about the whole background to the relationship between Monash University and Fiji Police. Fiji Police is now beginning to benefit from the co-operation with University of South Pacific in producing graduates. It appears that Monash is a competitor?

I understand qualification would require some attendance at Melbourne, and that a significant budget would be required. Whilst having had the benefit of a Police sponsored scholarship in the United Kingdom, and fully appreciating the need to better educate suitable police officers, I am nevertheless reluctant to enter into further schemes whilst the local, low cost arrangements appear to be working well.

This is now the third letter I have received about the Monash Scheme (one was from Suva), and frankly I feel I am being subjected to excessive pressure. Currently I have a very full schedule and considerable pressing responsibilities.

In view of all the circumstances I would suggest you renew the offer made by Brigadier Thorpe at this stage. When I have had sufficient time

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<sup>108</sup>R.H. Smith to Commissioner P.G. Arnfield, Fiji Police, 9 April, 1991.



to fully assess the needs of Fiji Police, and the priorities on a limited budget, it may be that the whole subject of police scholarships can be evaluated.<sup>109</sup>

As mentioned in the letter to Arnfield, a further Winter Study Tour was planned to visit Fiji in June 1991. Having been denied teaching accommodation by the Fiji Police, the offer by the Fiji Military Forces to use their Officers' Training School facilities for teaching purposes at Vutawaqa was taken up. On receipt of Arnfield's letter, the present writer telephoned him to confront him as to what was the real intent of his letter. The conversation was quite amiable and civilized; essentially he wanted to "put the scheme on hold", "as there are too many other concerns to be dealt with at present"; he did mention that he was "flat out", "but that you should make contact on arrival in Suva". He also said that he was sending a Senior Superintendent to Melbourne to consult with Victoria Police about traffic matters.<sup>110</sup>

As is usual with visiting police the Victoria Police try to accommodate official visitors at the Police College, *Airlie*, in South Yarra; as an Officers' Course was in progress there was no accommodation available at "Airlie"—the only available lodgings were at the Police Academy in Glen Waverley. After a discussion with the Assistant Commissioner (Traffic), Victoria Police, the present writer arranged for accommodation to be made available at the Vice Chancellor's V.I.P. Suite at Frank Tate House in Armadale the fees being chargeable to the Department of Police Studies. A FAX was sent to Arnfield apprising him of this situation; it was an opportunity to press the point that the writer was not giving up on assistance to the Fiji Police.<sup>111</sup> Senior Superintendent Qalo Bulatiko, Fiji Police, spent a week in Melbourne being briefed by Victoria Police on

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<sup>109</sup>Commissioner P.G. Arnfield, Fiji Police, to R.H. Smith, Head, Department of Police Studies, Monash University, 30 April, 1991.

<sup>110</sup>Telephone conversation R.H. Smith with Commissioner P.G. Arnfield, Fiji Police, 2 May, 1991.

<sup>111</sup>FAX, R.H. Smith to Commissioner, P.G. Arnfield, Fiji Police, 8 May, 1991.

various aspects of traffic procedures, including the benefits of the use of Radar Guns to deter speeding with the concomitant saving of lives. It was arranged that two Radar Guns, on a similar arrangement to that made to the Cook Islands Police, would be taken to Fiji by the Study Tour Group which included an Inspector adept in their use. On 27 May, 1991, the Radar Guns were handed over to Commissioner Arnfield in his office in Suva.<sup>112</sup>

It was at this stage that a totally unexpected call came from the Executive Office, Cook Islands Consular Office in Sydney in June 1991, to ask whether the Police Studies Course could begin in Rarotonga in early July, 1991.<sup>113</sup> Having answered in the affirmative arrangements were made to be in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, by 1 July, 1991. The Cook Islands Police, out of their Budget, provided tickets, accommodation and a *per diem* allowance for the present writer and the Victoria Police Chief Superintendent, Traffic Support Group (D R Axup). The ease with which this was accomplished was startling compared with the difficulties associated with the endeavours to have the course introduced to Fiji. Whilst in the Cook Islands the present writer drafted a letter for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Police, Mr Ignatio Akaruru, to be sent to the Dean, Faculty of Professional Studies, Monash University. The letter is as follows and is self explanatory:

Dear Professor Snedden

Re: ASSOCIATE DIPLOMA IN POLICE STUDIES

As you are aware Associate Professor Robert Smith and Chief Superintendent David Axup have conducted a two subject Pilot Programme for the Cook Islands Police. The financial basis for this

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<sup>112</sup>Interview R.H. Smith with Commissioner P.G. Arnfield, Suva, 5 June, 1991

<sup>113</sup>Telephone conversation Richard Barton, Chief Executive Officer, Cook Islands Consular Office, Sydney to R.H. Smith in Suva, 5 June, 1991.

programme has been in the basis of the Cook Islands Government providing air fares, accommodation and sustenance in lieu of tuition fees.

It is the wish of my Government that, with the success of the programme, the Associate Diploma in Police Studies be conducted as an award course on the above financial arrangements. We are interested in the areas of Disaster Management and White Collar Crime as you develop them.

Where subjects cannot be taught by your staff it is suggested that Cook Islands Police enrol in non award subjects by Extension through the University of the South Pacific. If these non award courses are recognised by your Faculty Board, then I am informed that the structural requirements of the Associate Diploma and the Bachelor of Arts (Police Studies) can be met.

I am aware of the difficulties encountered in implementing a joint arrangement with your University and the U.S.P. The recently taught programme has convinced me of its utility for this nation and this region.

Associate Professor Smith has indicated that if in the future, we wish to involve Distance Education Centre subjects in the Associate Diploma and Degree the costs are negotiable. He states that this information derives from Mr Gavin Moodie of your Clayton Campus. I am requesting that the services of the Department of Police studies be made available to the Cook Islands Government, through its Police Force, and that the Distance Education Fees, when needed, not exceed the costs of U.S.P. for Extension Studies (the annual costs are \$NZ65 per unit for Non Degree units and \$NZ80 per unit for Degree Units). Associate Professor Smith has further indicated the desire of your Faculty and your University to reach a co-operative working arrangement with U.S.P.

My Government looks forward to a continued relationship with the Department of Police Studies and Monash University. I am grateful that you have allowed the current venture to take place.

The Dean, Faculty of Professional Studies, as a matter involving University policy and commitment passed the letter to the University's Registrar, who replied in the following terms:

Dear Deputy Prime Minister

Re: Associate Diploma in Police Studies

Thank you for your letter of 23 July 1991.

I have discussed the arrangements you propose with colleagues at Monash University and I am pleased to be able to advise you that they are acceptable to the University.

I am pleased that the programs offered so far have proved satisfactory and I look forward to a continuing association between your Government and Monash University.

Associate Professor Robert Smith will arrange to bring non-award subjects offered by Extension through the University of the South Pacific to the Faculty Board of the Faculty of Professional Studies for approval, as required.

The University views this initiative an important step in building goodwill in Australia's neighbourhood region and expects to be able to finance the teaching program on a cost recovery only basis, though this may need to be reviewed if the scheme is enlarged and extended.

Although so easy in coming, the impact of this arrangement between Monash University and the Cook Islands Government has yet to be recognised as significant within the region. This is the *first* time that a regional government has not relied on foreign aid to set up a programme involving advancement of its own people. After considerable administrative problems at Monash, largely due to disbelief that Monash could act altruistically (for such is the entrepreneurial culture regarding overseas students), fourteen Cook Islands Police were awarded the Associate Diploma in Police Studies a Graduation Ceremony in Rarotonga in December, 1993. The second cycle has begun

and on 16 August, 1994, Professor Ian Chubb, Senior Deputy Vice Chancellor, Monash University, gave a verbal undertaking to the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands at a meeting in Melbourne, in the presence of the present writer, that the arrangement would continue for a further five years with Monash support subject to the Cook Islands Government's continuing approval.

While the attempt to have Police Studies introduced in Fiji was not a success, the Cook Islands case demonstrates that, if the circumstances are favourable and the political and administrative will exists, tertiary education for police in the South Pacific can be provided. In a very real sense this was a beginning from which other police education and training programs in the South Pacific region may flow.

## Summary

This Chapter, Tertiary Education For Police In Fiji And The Cook Islands, has considered the problems associated with proposals to introduce tertiary education for police in the South Pacific. The whole focus of the Chapter is to move away from the Aid syndrome as discussed thoroughly in Chapter Three above in relation to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Project.

Whilst keeping firmly in mind the central argument of this thesis *that there needs to be a recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of this country in regional terms and perspectives*, the Chapter traverses the academic and political minefields and political and personality conflicts that have to be met in attempting the introduction of tertiary education for police in nations that have been conditioned to be aid dependent.

The Chapter deals with the general lack of interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials in the concept of policing as a foreign affairs concern; their sole interest was that no embarrassment be caused Australia.

The policing arrangements during the 1987 Coups in Fiji are covered in detail. The rule of law remained intact, despite outside criticism to the contrary. The Fiji Military Forces provided Military Aid to the Civil Powers during this period but in theory, and in fact, the Fiji Police remained in control of law and order. The Australian Government, in concert with most other Commonwealth Nations, disapproved of the Coups and downgraded its relations with Fiji. Fiji opted to leave the Commonwealth before it was expelled and

declared itself a Republic with the Queen remaining Paramount Chief of Fiji a wonderfully Melanesian solution.

The Australian Government went through a vituperative period cutting off all military and law enforcement contact with Fiji. This action, though politically and diplomatically correct, put regional police cooperation on hold for several years. Chisholm Institute of Technology, to be merged with Monash University in July 1990, took a calculated risk by allowing the writer to continue to travel to Fiji and engage in discourse with police, military and political personalities in an endeavour to install its Police Studies Course in Fiji. This was sound because it was clear that the French, who provided military materiel in significant quantities after Australia and New Zealand cut off aid, were seeking to further entrench themselves. To this extent Chisholm was acting in Australia's interests without either approval or blessing from Foreign Affairs and Trade; other agencies were supportive though at a private level.

A detailed litany of efforts to establish the Police Studies Course in Fiji is set out. Despite huge efforts and support from the Fijian Prime Minister downwards, <sup>neither</sup> the Course, nor any other, has been established for the tertiary education of police in Fiji.

During a visit to Canberra in June 1990 a meeting was held with the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (now retired and unfortunately recently deceased) about my lack of success, and Chisholm's in introducing a Police Studies Course into Fiji. The Commissioner a dour man and known to be economical in the use of words in conversation, merely said "that Joe Lewaicei (the Fijian Commissioner of Police) really "knocked back" the idea of the Associate Diploma of Police Studies because it was "free" and would be seen by the Fiji Public Service Board and Government as a means to cut the Police

Budget". And so finally after nearly three years of intensive lobbying and cajoling and being almost successful with the University of the South Pacific, the simple fact of a possible reduction in Budget allocation caused the Fijian Police Commissioner to reject an otherwise acceptable course.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### QUESTIONS OF CRIME AND PEACE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of the so-called New World Order have caused students of world affairs to ponder future global developments. For Francis Fukuyama the answer was a triumphalist 'End of History' statement.<sup>1</sup> Martin Rochester puts a question which is apocalyptic in tone: "the convulsions in world politics" since the late 1980's can be viewed in retrospect as the culmination of a process of ongoing erosion of the bipolar postwar international order traceable back to its beginnings. Long observable trends in the direction of a more complex international system are becoming more pronounced and accelerated.. The question remains whether we are witnessing merely the end of the postwar era and the transformation of the international system back to the more normal historical pattern of full-blown multipolarity, or whether we are on the brink of a more fundamental and epic transformation, namely the unravelling of the very fabric of the Westphalian state system itself that has been the primary basis of political organisation for the last three centuries."<sup>2</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union has led in Europe to two major developments, the public recognition of crime as both a domestic and transnational activity and the reemergence of ethnic and religious hatreds that provoke armed conflict. Bosnia is a

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<sup>1</sup> Fukuyama, F., "The End of History", *National Interest*, Washington DC, 16 (Summer), 1989.

<sup>2</sup> Rochester, J.M., "The United Nations in a New World Order: Reviving the Theory and Practice of International Organisation.", in Kegley, C.W., Jr., ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p. 206.

terrible example of the latter and, in Chechnya crime, race and religion combined to produce the Russian onslaught.

It is significant that a delegation of Russian Justice officials including the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, Mr Veniamin Yackolev, visited Australia in May 1995 to hold talks with the National Crime Authority, the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption and the Federal Government. A key purpose of the visit was to address ways of combating corruption and stopping the internationalisation of organised crime. The Russian Minister of Justice, Mr Valentin Kovalyov, stated:

As Minister of Justice I am most interested ...with the cooperation between different government departments to combat criminality. The problem of organised crime is quite real....in the last three years we have seen a new problem-the internationalisation of criminal activity. We are speaking about drug trading, international terrorism and other things. Fighting international criminality is our main aim and the reason we are here.<sup>3</sup>

The Russian delegation hoped that an agreement between Australia and Russia would bring cooperation between the law enforcement bodies of both countries.

As argued throughout this work, crime ought to be regarded as a threat to national security in the same way as military threats cause concern. It is contended that crime and criminal activities, if externally directed or associated, are the practical equivalent of a 'Fifth Column' which threatens the good health of a nation.<sup>4</sup> This is a novel approach as the term 'Fifth Column' has not usually been applied to crime, but the well-being of a nation and the vitality of its financial system are properly seen as national interests

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<sup>3</sup>*The Australian*, 30 May, 1995

<sup>4</sup> "The Spanish nationalist general, Emilio Mola (1887 - 1937), when asked at a press conference which of four army columns he expected to capture Madrid, answered 'the fifth column', meaning organised sympathisers within the city. Hence: sympathisers within an opposition camp who organise its subversion". Scruton, R., *A Dictionary Of Political Thought*, Pan Books, 1983. London, p.173.

which should be protected and defended as elements of the defence and foreign policy of a nation state. The recent financial scandals in the Cook Islands are a case in point. In April 1995, the New Zealand Reserve Bank produced a report on an attempted CUS\$1.5 billion fraud using Cook Islands financial instruments such as loan guarantees.<sup>5</sup> This was compounded by allegations of taxation evasion by several companies which allegedly obtained bogus exemption certificates. The result was the near collapse of the Cook Islands dollar, dwindling foreign investment and shortages of imported food and fuel in the country.<sup>6</sup> It is idle to pretend that the national interests of the Cook Islands have not been damaged by suggestions of criminal activities. This white-collar crime is as destructive in its impact on the financial good health of this South Pacific nation as the more violent crime which is damaging the economy of Papua New Guinea.

Some countries have for many years recognised the link between crime and the protection of national interests and used what amounts to para-military police in the process. The Italian Government's fight against the Mafia and its varied regional equivalents is conducted by the Carabinieri.<sup>7</sup> Italian policing is divided into two separate organisations, the National Police (a purely civilian structure) and a Carabinieri (the police force under the control of the Ministry of Defence). Apart from the distinctive uniforms, the Carabinieri are trained light infantrymen. In hierarchical terms, they take precedence over the National Police; nevertheless in peacetime they perform a Civil Police function. A similar situation exists in France and its Overseas Departments and Territories between the National Police and the Gendarmerie.<sup>8</sup> Despite this, there is little evidence that defence-based police involved in fighting crime are seen to be protecting the national integrity of their respective countries. In most countries with

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<sup>5</sup> *The Herald Sun*, Melbourne, 14 April, 1995

<sup>6</sup> Rashid, Y., "A major currency crisis", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, Suva, May, 1995, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of Italian police career progression, see Das, D.K., *Policing In Six Countries Around The World: Organisational Perspectives*, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1992.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, for a similar discussion of French police career progression.

democratic political systems based on the Westminster Model and legal systems derived from common law, it is likely to be the case that any suggestion to create para-military police forces to combat crime would arouse fierce opposition because of concerns for civil liberties.

While cliches such as 'crime knows no frontiers' are hackneyed and generally melodramatic, it is no exaggeration to state that international crime, particularly activities involving drugs, is a major and growing threat to the peace and good order of the global community. For the South Pacific it has grave regional implications. Professor Ron Crocombe has argued that international crime is now an established reality in the South Pacific with the associated evils of corruption also present. He regards crime and corruption as a sub-category of hostile economic forces as "the primary interest of organised crime is making money - fast", and notes it is often difficult to draw a line between "legitimate business" and "criminal activity", he warns: "the Australian government has acknowledged the extensive buying of land, hotels, houses, businesses and other investments by leaders of organised crime from Hong Kong and Japan, as well as those from Australia and elsewhere. Most of the purchases are perfectly legal."<sup>9</sup>

The problem of corruption is particularly vexed in small island societies where it is difficult to separate the primary kinship obligations from the onus of public duty. Corruption, defined as the use of public office for private gain, has become a feature of politics in the Pacific Islands. Crocombe states: "Many persons and firms who derive their income from illegal or unethical activities have strong reasons to want to influence the operations of governments. And working in high profit industries, they have the resources to do so. The US Auditor-General's reports on the financial management of

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<sup>9</sup> Crocombe, R., "The Future of Democracy in the Pacific Islands". in Crocombe, R. *et al.*, (eds.) *Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific*, USP, Suva, 1992, p. 13.

the government of Palau show clearly the enormous political force of large-scale crime (exemplified by the murder of one of the nation's first four presidents when he was about to release data on corrupt politicians and the suicide of another when his corruption became public). In another recent case, the 1988 - 1989 Commission of Enquiry in Papua New Guinea showed the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have received large cash gifts from the head of the military in Indonesia when the former was supposedly negotiating on Papua New Guinea's behalf with Indonesia. A little earlier in his career, he had benefited from massive funds generated by foreign businesses whose profits the Minister (when Minister of Forests) had facilitated.<sup>10</sup>

It should not be imagined that the criminal activities in the Pacific are simple operations; they are in fact highly organised and sophisticated involving high finance:

The international finance centres (less politely known as tax havens) in Vanuatu, Nauru, Cook Islands, Tonga and Samoa claim to be scrupulous about handling only legitimate funds. However, the Director of Research of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation pointed out in 1988, in the Pacific, that the funds of organised crime are so skilfully channelled that it would be almost impossible for any international finance centre in the islands to know the real origins of the moneys that pass through its hands. In 1991 the head of the section of the New Zealand police dealing with major fraud made a similar point.<sup>11</sup>

In the Australian context, crime has not been perceived to be a threat to national security, but slowly this is changing. There is in Australian Federal Police circles a gradual awareness of the importance of the South Pacific in this connection. In 1994 a Deputy Commissioner and the Public Service Head of Strategic Intelligence expressed interest in enrolling as Master of Arts students in the Centre for Policing and Public

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<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

Safety at Monash University to specifically undertake a study of crime as a security threat in Australia.<sup>12</sup>

This changing awareness heralds an important and major shift, but crime needs to be thought of in a wider sense than it has been even in police circles where, until quite recently, containment of crime rather than its elimination has been the established practice.

### **Police as Peacekeepers**

Crime is a major international problem in the so-called New World Order, but the more urgent problem is the eruption of violent conflicts within state or emerging successor states. Here Greg Sheridan's statement that "the decline of the nation state has been much oversold as a post-Cold War concept, but it is true that the vast majority of conflicts in this period have been within States rather than between States"<sup>13</sup> is relevant. It should be remembered that, in terms of policing in Papua New Guinea a great deal of what the police are already concerned with in the performance of their duties is a kind of domestic peacekeeping. This country of a thousand tribes, many regions and nineteen provinces is torn by tribal hostilities and regional rivalries which can erupt into clan fights in town or country and an outright secession attempt on the island of Bougainville. The two greatest challenges which have forced an independent Papua New Guinea are the law and order problem and regionalism. In PNG society there are different views of what constitutes law and order as the Clifford Report identified two basic ways in which the phrase is employed:

On the one hand it means 'peace and good order' and is derived from traditional conceptions of welfare in small communities. In the National Goals and Directive Principles it is called 'integral human development'.

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<sup>12</sup> R.H. Smith, Interviews, Canberra, May 1994.

<sup>13</sup> The Australian, 29 March, 1995.

It is the view of law and order which the grassroots hold. The other view defines law and order as 'peace and good order established by the state'. It involves the use of the state's agencies to bring about good order. This is the sense in which the elite, public servants and politicians see law and order.<sup>14</sup>

Trying to satisfy the dictates of Peel's Principles and create a condition of public 'tranquillity' for the populace in a country where policing can often mean peacekeeping means that the police in PNG need a combination of skills for which training is a vital component, especially for conflict resolution and cross-cultural (in this case, tribal or regional) interaction.

Here some formal definitions are useful, in particular to illustrate the difference between "peacemaking" and "peacekeeping". The definitions favoured by DFAT are as follows:

**Peace making.** This is best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving the same range of methods described in Article 33 of the UN Charter ie "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means"- but applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. As with preventive diplomacy, "peace making" has at least two distinct chronological dimensions. Initial (or "Stage I") peace making efforts will usually be aimed at the immediate goals of cessation of hostilities, and stabilisation of the situation on the ground; subsequent (or "Stage II") efforts-which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peacekeeping mission-might be aimed rather at securing a durable political settlement.

**Peace keeping.** This involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between

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<sup>14</sup> Cited in Turner, M., *Papua New Guinea: The Challenge of Independence*, Penguin Books, Ringwood Victoria, 1990, p.166.

governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict. Peace keeping presumes cooperation, and its methods are inherently peaceful; the use of military force, other than in self-defence, is incompatible with the concept. Although neither described nor defined in the UN Charter itself, peace keeping operations have been -both in the pre-Cold War years and subsequently-the most numerous and visible manifestation of the UN's cooperative security efforts. "Traditional" peace keeping operations involve not much more than unarmed or lightly armed military contingents being engaged in the monitoring, supervision and verification of ceasefire, withdrawal, buffer zone and related agreements. "Expanded" peace keeping, by comparison, involves the supplementation of traditional peace keeping with activities such as election monitoring or organisation, human rights protection, and assisting or exercising civil administration functions during transition to independence or democracy.<sup>15</sup>

The Department of Defence argues that:

As peace support operations have become more complex so too has the debate over peacekeeping terminology and there is yet to be wide-spread agreement in this area, particularly when it comes to describing the more complex peace support operations.....we will clarify aspects of the terminology and particularly distinguish between what constitutes peacekeeping as opposed to peace enforcement. In many respects UN intervention since the end of the Cold War have blurred the distinction between the traditional role of peacekeeping and the higher risk role of peace enforcement. It is useful to make the following distinction.

The definitions the Department of Defence prefers are as follows:

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<sup>15</sup> Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p.156. This a key document for any discussion on Australia and peacekeeping and this Section draws heavily on it.



**Peacemaking** involves the process of arranging an end of disputes, and resolving issues that lead to further conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or from other forms of peaceful settlement;

**Peace support operations** is an umbrella term encompassing peace enforcement and preventive deployment. These operations could incorporate elements of security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, enforcing sanctions, as well as any other military, para-military or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacekeeping/preventive diplomacy process;

**Peacekeeping** involves non-combat operations (exclusive of self-defence) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.<sup>16</sup>

There is now in Australia a growing appreciation of the importance of peacekeeping operations on contemporary world affairs, and a recognition that "the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has ushered in a new era in international relations in which peacekeeping (has) played an increasingly significant role."<sup>17</sup> The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, has observed that peacekeeping, which is neither defined nor described in the United Nations Charter itself (although implicitly authorised by Chapter VI), has been fairly claimed to be an invention of the United Nations.<sup>18</sup> Australia has participated in UN missions in the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Sub-Continent, the Mediterranean and South East Asia.

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid.* p.151.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, p.xv.

<sup>18</sup> Evans, G., *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond*, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1993, p.99.

Also, it has supported the UN-authorised peace enforcement operations, the Korean War and the Gulf War. Australia has participated in several non-UN, multi-national peacekeeping missions ranging from Zimbabwe to Turkey.<sup>19</sup> Australia's role and responsibilities as a "good international citizen" are taken seriously in Canberra.<sup>20</sup> Such is Australia's growing reputation in peacekeeping that Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel have been seconded to assist in planning and logistics in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York.<sup>21</sup>

In evidence to the Parliamentary Committee which investigated Australia's peacekeeping activities, Hugh Smith argued that it is Western countries which are best able to provide the professional training required for effective peacekeeping operations:

In the first place (the Western countries) have the personnel and the resources available following the end of the Cold War-assuming, of course, that they do not cash all of the peace dividend. But, more importantly, some Western countries at least can demonstrate the benefits for peacekeeping of intensive training, modern logistic systems, effective discipline, high standards of personal integrity an acceptance of political authority.

There will be some concern about this and complaints have been voiced at the UN that peacekeeping is dominated by white, Western nations. It should be pointed out, however, that the Western military model is the exclusive domain of white and Western powers. The armed forces of countries such as Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Japan are for a variety of historical reasons based on the Western pattern. It may be possible to follow the Western model while avoiding the political disadvantages of making peacekeeping a white man's club.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, p.30.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, p.39.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, p.31.

<sup>22</sup> *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, pp.21-22.

The Committee agreed that rigorous and specialised training for peacekeeping within the framework of military professionalism was essential for consistently effective contributions to peacekeeping.<sup>23</sup> However it rejected any suggestion of a Western monopoly of professionalism and observed that countries such as Fiji had demonstrated high levels of professionalism in their contributions to peacekeeping. The relevant point for the focus of this thesis is the importance the Committee placed on training in all areas including conflict resolution skills, cross-cultural orientation and an awareness of human rights.

A significant development which supports the general argument of this thesis is that a number of submissions to the Committee suggested that consideration should be given to using civil police instead of military forces, an idea also raised by Senator Evans in his book on peacekeeping. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) in its submission "argued that civil police are particularly well suited to basic law and order functions such as crowd control, criminal investigation, arrest and detention. Moreover civil police would be distinguishable from the military peacekeeping personnel and this would advance the principle of separation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement".<sup>24</sup> It was agreed that a clear distinction needed to be made between military and police roles with the AFP rejecting any idea of the police undertaking the role of the military in peacekeeping operations. However, a critical factor in many areas was the necessity to establish a police force and develop a system of law and order in the very early phases of the operation which would guarantee an element of continuity when the military withdrew.<sup>25</sup>

There is an argument which commands attention that the role the police perform in the UN peacekeeping environment is an extension of their domestic policing role. The AFP

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<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, p.100.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*

claims: "The skills that police develop in a democratic society are the same skills that are required to meet the demands placed on them in a peacekeeping operation, for example, investigation skills and conflict resolution".<sup>26</sup> The role of training is paramount: "The police hold that the training which police normally undertake is appropriate for peacekeeping. In essence, police are trained to uphold the rule of law and to deal with people in difficult situations. Specific training for peacekeeping focuses on providing information on the area to which police are to be deployed and preparation for the operation of equipment".<sup>27</sup> A commitment to human rights is a basic philosophical component of police training in Australia and peacekeeping represents an extension of domestic policing based on the principles of maintaining the rule of law, upholding the right of the individual and resolving incidents with the minimum use of force. Police may well be less provocative than their military counterparts in dealing with the tense day-to-day incidents that inevitably occur in peacekeeping operations. Their traditional image of an arm of the civil authorities is their shield; this, of course, is not always effective but more likely to be accepted in conflict resolution situations.

### **Cyprus: The Beginning**

Cyprus was the first UN peacekeeping action to involve civil police; it is also the longest and perhaps the most frustrating of actions. Australia has been involved in the operation since its inception. Two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, have been involved in a "struggle" to exercise control and influence in Cyprus since its independence from Britain in 1960.

In 1954, the government of Greece claimed that Cyprus was a part of Greece despite the fact that other nations had previously ruled the island. It was this claim that essentially

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<sup>26</sup>*ibid.*, p.95.

<sup>27</sup>*ibid.*

caused a breakdown in relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It was the forces of self determination and nationalism that were the exacerbating factors which eventually led to conflict. Between 1955 and 1960 the governments of Greece, Turkey and Britain came up with a reasonable proposal to guarantee the integrity of Cyprus. The breakdown came when a significant group of Greek Cypriots wanted unification with Greece. Fighting inevitably broke out and, by December, 1963, it became evident that UN assistance was needed to aid the British. Ultimately the United Nations in Cyprus (UNIFCYP) was established in March 1964. It was initially intended that this force be of only three months duration-it is still in existence in 1995, with no immediate prospect of termination. The initial force was comprised of military personnel, but a civilian police force was perceived as being of use in Cyprus as a result of the tasks which needed to be fulfilled after the separation of the contending parties. This was the first time in which civil police have been used in international peacekeeping, itself a relatively new phenomenon.

Australia's involvement in Cyprus was not one which was hastily decided upon; indeed, the concept of peacekeeping had been raised in the 1950's by Dr H.V. Evatt, then Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party. The ALP Opposition expressed concerns in 1956 that Australia was not actively taking an interest in the Cyprus state of emergency which was declared on 26 November, 1955. Evatt queried Australia's possible involvement in May, 1956, when he questioned Prime Minister Menzies:

I ask the Prime Minister a question related to the tragic situation that exists in Cyprus, affecting the UK and the people of Cyprus, many of whom have relatives in Australia, and also affecting Greece, which country was perhaps the most stalwart ally of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth during the greatest crisis of war in Europe, when Greece was directly affected. I do not make any analysis of causes of the present situation, nor do I assign any blame to any group of people or any power. However, in the interests of Australia and its close

relationships with these nations and their peoples, will the Prime Minister and his government consider Australian intervention in this matter? I refer not to intervention in the UN where ultimately this matter may be referred, after many months have elapsed, but to direct approach to the governments affected, particularly those of Britain and Greece, in order to determine whether Australia can make any contribution towards reconciling the parties concerned on some basis of justice...<sup>28</sup>

The initial lack of support which the Menzies government gave to Evatt's innovative concept of direct Australian intervention indicates that at this time Australia was cautious about becoming involved with this aspect of international affairs. On the other hand, it is possible that the Menzies government could have considered such action had it not been proposed by Evatt; the scars of the bitter dispute of the Petrov defection and the subsequent Royal Commission into Espionage were still extant.<sup>29</sup> Menzies' reply gave little support to an independent approach to the parties involved, preferring to make judgements of the Cyprus situation after Britain had decided how to approach it. His caution was evidenced thus:

...this matter is one of great delicacy ... the position of Cyprus in the Middle East is one of vast importance not only to the United Kingdom, but to Australia itself.... We should all like to see sensible and peaceable arrangements made but, of course, such arrangements require up to at least two cooperating parties, and up to now there have been difficulties which, I venture to say, have not been the making of the United Kingdom Government.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives*, 1956, p.2079.

<sup>29</sup> Vladimir Petrov was a Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra and a member of the Soviet Intelligence Service (KGB); he had been actively courted by Australia's counter-intelligence body (the Australian Security Intelligence Organization ASIO). He eventually defected in 1954, shortly before his wife Evdokia-both were Majors in the KGB. Controversy has raged since then as to the political machinations surrounding the defections.

<sup>30</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives*, 1956, p.2079.

It may be argued that Australia's middle power status was the reason why it was called upon by the United Nations Secretary-General to provide a police contingent for Cyprus;<sup>31</sup> the more realistic view is that Australia was called upon because the former colonial power, Britain, had imposed English Common Law on Cyprus and that the enforcement of that law was best carried out by a Commonwealth country.<sup>32</sup> The legal justification was provided by Article 43 of the UN Charter; this Article provides that, "... member states though prior agreements make armed forces and facilities available to the Security Council at its request."<sup>33</sup> This clause only recommends collective military action and as result, a newer concept for collective security was devised whereby "the .... General Assembly, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, has also acquired power to authorise members to join in a collective police action."<sup>34</sup> It is under this clause that an international police force under UN auspices was developed whereby its members are prohibited from engaging in combatant roles but permitted to do so if required to defend themselves.

On April 12, 1964, the Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, asked a number of countries to send small civilian police groups to Cyprus in order to ".... act as liaison groups between the UN force and the local police."<sup>35</sup> Within twelve days of U Thant's

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<sup>31</sup> Whilst this may be true, it must also be remembered that Australia was one of the members of the UN forces in what has euphemistically called the UN Police Action in Korea-this action was a war by any other name.

<sup>32</sup> It is interesting to note that the members of the Australian contingent were not allowed to have been born in the United Kingdom; the reason given at the time was that this would eliminate any possibility of a police member having previously served in Cyprus as a National Serviceman in the British Armed Forces or as a Colonial policeman.

<sup>33</sup> Plano, Jack, C., and Olton, R., *The International Relations Dictionary*, (3rd Edition), ABC-Cllo, Santa Barbara, California, 1982, p.351.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, p.351.

<sup>35</sup> *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, June, 1964, p.20123.

request, Australia had responded (probably at the request of the British Government) and on 24 April, 1964, Prime Minister Menzies declared:

My government has considered an urgent request from the Secretary General to the UN for Australia to provide a volunteer force of 40 Australian police for service with the UNFCYP in Cyprus. My government has decided in principle to endeavour to meet the Secretary General's request but, in doing so, appreciates that the manning of such a force could only be achieved with the cooperation of the States.<sup>36</sup>

Since the Commonwealth Police Force was a small organization concerned primarily with physical security of Commonwealth installations and only comprising a small cadre of what may be described as 'normal' police, it was decided that,

In the interests of sharing the commitment and avoiding depletion of the small Commonwealth Police Force, the States were approached to contribute. New South Wales and Victoria each agreed to supply 10 members, South Australia five, including an officer, the Commonwealth three, including an officer, Queensland five, Western Australia three, Tasmania two, and the ACT and Northern Territory each one.<sup>37</sup>

The urgency with which the police contingent was required in Cyprus resulted in selection processes being completed within four weeks. The training commenced on May 19, 1964 at the Royal Military College, Duntroon in Canberra, where "... they were shown how to handle booby traps and explosives, and trained in pistol shooting and driving four-wheel drive vehicles."<sup>38</sup> One week later the Australian contingent of UNFCYP was in Cyprus. This innovative application of civil policing to an area of an essentially military role set the scene for future UN ventures. Peacemaking and peacekeeping in the so-called Post-Cold War Era are slowly evolving in terms of both

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<sup>36</sup> Brown, *et al*, *op cit*, p.22.

<sup>37</sup> "AFP's Peace Men", *Platypus*; Journal of the Australian Federal Police, No.26, July, 1989, p.2.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid*.



International Law and indeed International Morality. That the Cyprus "problem" has not been resolved in over 30 years is in no way the fault of the police; it can clearly be argued that, while a political settlement has not been reached, there has been relative peace, albeit one of high tension. At the time, it appeared that the whole Cyprus venture was a knee jerk reaction designed essentially to prevent the USSR from splitting two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and thus enabling the USSR to gain access to a warm water port in the Mediterranean. Civil Police involvements in other areas have not had to cope with the strategic imperatives associated with Cyprus.

In 1964 there was no indication that Australia's involvement would be anything other than short term; it was expected that it would be only a three month tour of duty. The then Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, was asked the following question in Parliament:

Is it true that this force of Commonwealth Police was originally sent for a period of three months? How long is it intended this particular force shall remain on its present tour of duty before returning to Australia? If it is intended to return the force to Australia in the near future, is it to be replaced by a further small contingent?<sup>39</sup>

It is evident that at this stage, the Australian Government had not fully assessed the likelihood of the UN needing the UNCIVPOL contingent for many more years. Hasluck's reply illustrates this:

If the Secretary General of the UN ... were to request the Australian Government to provide a contingent of police, we should have to consider such a request... I cannot forecast what action would be taken by the Government if and when a request was received. I should like to take advantage of the opportunity to say that Australia has very good reason to be proud of the way in which this particular contingent has served the cause of international peace in Cyprus. Members of the

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<sup>39</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1965, p.43.*

contingent have brought on themselves and on Australia generally very considerable credit by their efficiency, general conduct and demeanour.<sup>40</sup>

A predominant theme which is clear at this time, but buried by the events surrounding Australia's involvement in the Vietnam theatre and forgotten (or disregarded) by opponents of Australia's international activities, is the credit with which the Cyprus involvement reflected on Australia.<sup>41</sup> The general professionalism of the Australian police was clearly a major factor contributing to the overall decision to continue sending police contingents to Cyprus. By May, 1965, however, the pattern of Australian participation had begun whereby the contingents were posted for periods of one year at a time before replacement. In a speech noting the sending of a second contingent Menzies said:

This second contingent, like the first, will be engaged in police duties which experience has shown to be more suitably carried out by a civil policeman than by a soldier... The Australian Government has been assured by the UN that without the police the UN force in Cyprus would have experienced many more difficulties. The present members of the Australian police element have served with distinction and have been a credit to Australia. They have received compliments on their work from several sources both in general and for specific tasks...<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, pp.43-44.

<sup>41</sup> The level of goodwill, reflected as previously mentioned from Australia's military involvement in the disastrous Greek campaign in World War Two, was outstanding. There was virtually nothing that the Australian police contingent could do wrong. Some ridiculous anecdotes support this - perhaps the most far - fetched, but true, was an apparent complaint by Turkish Cypriots to the UN commander that the Australians were instructing the Greek Cypriots in the use of new guided weapons. On investigation it turned out that the Australians were showing the Greek Cypriots how to throw boomerangs; the matter was quickly resolved when they moved into territory held by the Turkish Cypriots and introduced them to the arcane skills of boomerang throwing. This was about the most serious complaint ever made about the Australians.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, pp 1141-1142.

Praise for the Australian police was further added in the Senate by John Gorton, later to become Prime Minister. On United Nations Day in 1965 he told the Senate that:

.....Australia had again demonstrated her support for the vital peacekeeping functions of the UN by the despatch of an Australian police contingent to Cyprus to serve with the UN peacekeeping force ... these police, who were all volunteers, had been very fully engaged ... they had earned high praise for their hard work, efficiency, and integrity. They had enhanced Australia's reputation in very difficult circumstances.<sup>43</sup>

### **The Australian Federal Police**

The role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in peacekeeping was a subject which was emphasized in the Parliamentary Committee's deliberations. The AFP itself presented a substantial submission which was successful in terms of recognition of budgetary assistance being a necessary precondition for AFP involvement in peacekeeping. Recommendation 35 stated: "The Committee recommends that special funding be allocated to the Australian Federal Police to support its contribution to peacekeeping".<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, the Committee decided to recommend that the Australian Federal Police peacekeeping role be given formal recognition as one of its specific roles. It also proposed that consideration be given to the feasibility of attaching a representative of the Australian Federal Police to the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York.<sup>45</sup>

### **Recent Activities**

The reputation begun in Cyprus continues. Australian police contributions to peacekeeping operations have developed significantly in recent years as the nature of

<sup>43</sup> *Parliamentary Debates (Senate)*, 1965, pp 37-38.

<sup>44</sup> *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, p.88.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, p.98.

peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has changed. It is reported that requests for AFP participation in peacekeeping operations have increased substantially with the expansion in the role of UNCIVPOL, the United Nations Civilian Police.<sup>46</sup> Some of the recent operations have been varied in character and called for the application of different types of police skills. In 1989, UNCIVPOL was requested to assist in the conduct of elections in Namibia. Australia contributed a contingent of fingerprint experts who were drawn from the police forces of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. They were assigned to UNTAG, the United Nations Transitional Group in Namibia.<sup>47</sup> From 1989 until late 1993, AFP members served with UNBRO, the UN Border Relief Operation on the Thai/Cambodian border assisting with the provision of security for displaced Cambodians located in refugee camps.<sup>48</sup> The AFP was again involved in providing assistance with elections in May 1992 when ten AFP members were deployed to Cambodia to work with UNCIVPOL in the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) peacekeeping mission: "In Cambodia bringing about a situation conducive to the holding of a free and fair election but also to investigate human rights violations and to supervise and train local police."<sup>49</sup>

The Cambodian experience is held to be of special interest and significance because of the range and complexity of the task and some different features of the operation. In Cambodia the Australian police contingent was in a unique position in that it was the only group which had a district command within the country (apart from one which collapsed). In operational terms, the Australian contingent was directly responsible to the UN Police Commissioner in turn who directly responsible to the UN Special Representative. It was a difficult chain of command from the previous Australian

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<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*, p.91.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, p.90.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, p.90.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*

experience in Cyprus where police worked through the military system to the Special Representative. An aspect of the Cambodian operation was what is called "mission creep" whereby "the AFP identified a need and took it upon themselves to perform additional tasks to their formal duties to redress the situation".<sup>50</sup> The AFP contingent took the initiative in developing law enforcement through the establishment of local police and judiciary. Such initiative won high praise from Lieutenant General J M Sanderson, the Commander Joint Forces Australia, who stated:

"the very small Australian Federal Police contingent did a remarkable job in Cambodia. Its members numbered 10 out of a total civil police force of 3,600. If there had been 360 groups of that potency, I think we would have had a much more significant impact on the outcomes in Cambodia because the law is the key issue in this."<sup>51</sup>

The enthusiasm of the Lieutenant General obviously was not shared by those on Russell Hill (Australia's Pentagon) who were responsible for producing the 1994 Defence White Paper which was noticeably reluctant to acknowledge the role the AFP as mentioned in Chapter Two above.

The Australian Federal Police played a role in UNOSOM II, the United Nations Operation in Somalia. An AFP officer was seconded to the post of Senior Police Officer to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Somalia. This officer was given the tasks of providing advice on monitoring civilian police and organising the development and training of the civilian police authority in Somalia.<sup>52</sup> In March, 1994 sixteen AFP officers were deployed in Mozambique to examine the newly appointed Mozambique police force and to assist in developing an appropriate ethos in that

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<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, p.93

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, pp.49-50.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, p.91.

country. The police were deployed in eight units to different regions in Mozambique to provide training in managerial skills and human relations techniques.<sup>53</sup>

The most recent commitment of local police to peacekeeping duties is the Australian contingent in Haiti which included three Victoria Police members as part of the International Police Monitoring (IPM) force with the US military performing a security role in what is known as Operation Uphold Democracy. The IPM's role is to monitor and mentor a newly formed Haitian Police Force and to ensure no human rights violations are committed. Senior Detective Glen Askew, a member of the Victoria Police in Haiti, comments:

Prior to the US occupation, Haitian Police inflicted gross atrocities upon the population. "Police is actually a misnomer as they were in effect army personnel who enforced the will of the current dictator and stamped out civil disobedience. Understandably the population loathe the police and have no confidence in them whatsoever....the task of monitoring the local police is a frustrating one as they lack any motivation and have very limited ability."<sup>54</sup>

It is obvious that the opportunity to serve overseas on peacekeeping duties is highly prized in the Victoria Police as there were 149 applicants for the positions, with a short list of 12 and a final selection of 3 members. The Australian contingent consisted of a total of 30 members, 25 from the AFP, three from Victoria Police and two from the Queensland Police.

The state police were officially sworn in as members of the AFP and issued with official Australian Government passports. Senior Detective Askew was full of praise for his Federal counterparts:

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<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Askew, G., "News from Haiti", *Police Life*, Victoria Police, March 1995, p.21.

The organisational ability of the AFP was very impressive and the amount of equipment at the disposal of the contingent was awesome. It appeared that no expense had been spared and the professionalism of the planning was heartening.<sup>55</sup>

After a period of training in Canberra, the Australian contingent travelled to Puerto Rico for a week of briefings, lectures and training with the United States Armed Forces. They were then sent to Haiti on a US Air Force C-130 transport plane.<sup>56</sup>

A number of lessons can be drawn from the Haiti episode. Firstly, peacekeeping is recognised as a proper role and function of policing; secondly, the opportunity to serve overseas in peacekeeping operations is highly prized by serving police members; thirdly, a high degree of cooperation exists between the AFP and the various State Police Forces; and, fourthly, a close working relationship with the military is accepted as natural, sensible and necessary by the police.

#### **The Australian Defence Studies Centre Submission**

The submission of the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC) of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) was a key document in persuading the Committee of the value of training for peacekeeping. Recommendation 50 states:

"The Committee recommends that an Australian Peacekeeping Institute be established within the Australian Defence Studies Centre. Further the Government undertake a feasibility study to determine whether or not the Australian Defence Studies Centre is the most appropriate location for the Institute.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, p.20.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping*, p.140.

Given the seminal role of this submission, the key section is reproduced here as it raises many issues which are germane to this Chapter.

### **An Australian Peacekeeping Institute**

This submission proposes the establishment of an Australian Peacekeeping Institute. In outline the functions of the Institute would be to:

1. Provide training for Australian and regional personnel involved in peacekeeping and related activities.
2. Conduct research into all aspects of peacekeeping and related activities.
3. Serve as a focus of information and expertise in Australia, including a publications program.
4. Develop cooperation with regional defence forces and institutions concerned with peacekeeping.
5. Act as a point of contact for Australian and overseas organisations involved in peacekeeping.

The Institute would not confine itself to military aspects of peacekeeping but would extend to all of the elements of contemporary peacekeeping, including civilian police, electoral, civil administration, human rights and humanitarian elements. While the primary focus of the Institute would be peacekeeping it would also concern itself with preventative diplomacy and peace enforcement and would cover issues such as refugees, mine clearance and the role of UN volunteers as they relate to peacekeeping.

The Institute would draw on expertise in many organisations, notably the ADF, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Electoral Commission, the Departments of Defence and of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Parliament, the



Parliamentary Research Service, DSTO, and the diplomatic community as well as many Non-Government Organisations. At the same time it would make use of academic expertise in peacekeeping and related fields. Media involvement would also be important.

The role of such an Institute would thus be far wider than that of the Peacekeeping Wing of the ADF Warfare Centre at RAAF Williamtown. That organisation is required, quite properly, to focus on the needs of the ADF.

The training activities of the proposed Institute would include:

- short and medium term training courses, conferences and seminars.
- instruction modules as required by the ADF, Commonwealth Departments, Federal Police, NGOs and other organisations involved in peacekeeping.
- providing information to schools, universities and other interested institutions.

The scope of training activities would extend to the countries of Australia's region as requested.

The arguments for establishing a broadly-based Peacekeeping Institute in Australia can be summarised as follows:

1. It would strengthen Australia's contribution to international peacekeeping in general. The importance of training in peacekeeping has been emphasised by Senator Evans in his book, *Cooperating for Peace* (p.126).
2. It would enhance cooperation with Australia's regional neighbours, including but not limited to the defence forces of regional countries. The Institute would thus complement an important element of current defence policy.

3. It would develop the theory and practice of multi-dimensional peacekeeping by bringing together the diverse elements of contemporary peacekeeping between the military and other components, in particular non-government organizations, has been emphasised by Lieutenant General Sanderson, Force Commander in Cambodia.
4. It would be able to assist Australian business and industry in learning about peacekeeping and about opportunities to tender for UN and other contracts where peacekeeping is conducted.

An Australian Peacekeeping Institute would complement developments in other parts of the world where training centres are being established or under consideration, including Canada and Europe. The proposed Institute would be ideally placed to serve the needs of our own region and allow Australia to make maximum use of its undoubted expertise and experience in the many facets of contemporary peacekeeping.

### **Location of the Proposed Institute**

The location of the proposed Institute is an important issue. It is argued here that it should be located in Canberra and in particular at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Location in Canberra would permit access to the many organizations that are involved in peacekeeping. The Institute would be able to draw on the expertise of many ADF, police, electoral, public service, parliamentary, government, diplomatic and academic personnel who have experience in and knowledge of peacekeeping. Canberra is unrivalled in Australia in this respect. Also important is the fact that those attending the Institute come from Canberra, thus making attendance easier and cheaper than at courses elsewhere.

A Canberra-based organisation would replace some and perhaps all of the functions performed by the Peacekeeping Wing of the ADF Warfare Centre at RAAF Williamtown. (It is envisaged that ADF personnel would be posted instead to the proposed Institute.) The Wing has performed extremely valuable work but is limited partly by its charter as noted above and by its location. A Peacekeeping Institute in Canberra, by contrast, would have easy and, most importantly, continuous access to a very wide range of expertise in peacekeeping.

This submission further proposes that the Institute be located at the Australian Defence Force Academy and in particular at the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC). The ADSC is a Centre of the University College, of the University of New South Wales at the Defence Academy and has a strong reputation for bringing together academic, military and official expertise to focus on practical problems. The proposed Institute would thus be under the aegis of the Australian Defence Studies Centre which would provide the institutional and intellectual basis for the new Institute.

Agreement would be necessary from both the Department of Defence and the University of New South Wales, together with other sponsoring organisations, to establish the Institute and to develop an appropriate charter, together with management and funding arrangements.<sup>58</sup>

### **Training for Peace and Security**

The proposal to establish an Australian Peacekeeping Institute is an exciting one which opens the door to a range of police education and training programs. The Institute would, the submission states, draw on expertise in many organisations and specifically mentions the Australian Federal Police. It promises training activities including short

<sup>58</sup> Submission to the Defence Sub-Committee of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: *Inquiry into Peacekeeping* by the Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, June, 1994, pp S501-504.

and medium term courses and instruction modules. The role of the police in peacekeeping operations is an expanding one and the proposed Institute could as part of a regional focus provide proactive education and training programs in anticipation of an eventual settlement of the Bougainville dispute. The botched attempt by Australia and such South Pacific countries as Tonga to play a peacekeeping role on Bougainville demonstrates the need and the urgency for effective peacekeeping forces in the region.

It is perhaps time to add to the traditional three arms of defence—the navy, army and air force—policing in its proactive capacity to protect Australia's eastern approaches and the South Pacific region itself at the same time. Ideally this should involve a proactive partnership between the police in Australia and their counterparts in the South Pacific. Australian police forces should become more aware of the importance of the region in terms of crime prevention. In turn, the Australian Government should provide the funds to support police education and training programs (both within Australia and the region) to improve the quality and capacity of police forces in the South Pacific. It should also set up police liaison avenues and mechanisms to enhance regional cooperation for the benefit of all; until quite recently this task was left to one highly motivated and efficient Superintendent of the AFP—but clearly the task is beyond the best endeavours of one officer. It is important to note that the countries of the region have much to teach Australian police in terms of conflict resolution methods, both traditional and modern. Fiji, for example, has had extensive experience in peacekeeping in the Middle-East and in 1992-1993 had more personnel involved in peacekeeping operations than did Australia.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> *Australia's Participation on Peacekeeping*, p.49.

### Summary

This Chapter, Questions of Crime and Peace In The New World Order, is the most eclectic in the thesis but nevertheless continues to focus on the centrality *that there needs to be a recognition of the close connection between policing and the security and defence of this country in regional terms and perspectives.*

The collapse of the Soviet Union has led in Europe to two major developments, the public recognition of crime as both a domestic and transnational activity and the re-emergence of ethnic and religious hatreds that produce armed conflict.

The Chapter analysed the problems posed by crime as a factor in international instability in Russia, Italy, the Cook Islands, and the other small island nations of the Pacific. Criminality under the guise of legitimate business dealing saps national will and integrity as effectively, and probably more so, than the threat of military invasion. Only properly trained national and regional law enforcement bodies are capable of fighting what amount to international crime cartels.

In the Australian context crime has not been perceived to be a threat to national security, but slowly this attitude is changing. There is in Australian Federal Police circles a gradual awareness of the importance of the South Pacific in this connection. The Police Studies course at Monash, under my direction, was instrumental in bringing about this change. This changing awareness heralds an important and major shift, but crime needs to be thought of in a wider sense than it has been even in police circles where, until quite recently, containment of crime rather than its elimination had been the established practice.

The Chapter deals extensively with police as peacekeepers not in any amorphous sense but in practical terms. It looks at the problems of Papua New Guinea and relates them to Peel's Principles in terms of creating public tranquillity. Police education and training, conducted properly, are necessary for this to be attained.

A substantial discussion about Peace-making and Peace-Keeping explicitly admits the need to involve Civil Police in these activities. Although their roles are defined differently it is possible for the Defence Force and Civil Police to act in a symbiotic alliance to attempt to produce some form of peace. In Australian terms, the Royal Australian Corps of Military Police, could well be the midwife here; this is another Monash Police Studies initiative, under my direction, that proved to be successful the enrolment of Military Police Officers as students in the Police Studies course.

Australia's Defence Planners, in *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping* (covered in detail in this Chapter), took a submission from the Australian Federal Police that they should be used more extensively in international peacekeeping operations this has been done and is continuing to be done. To support the continued role of the AFP in peacekeeping the previous role of their predecessor, the Commonwealth Police, and State Police Forces in Cyprus since 1964 has been examined in detail; there are still 34 AFP personnel in Cyprus engaged in peacekeeping duties. Cyprus may in a sense be a United Nations failure but it is certainly a civil police success. The continued role of the AFP in other theatres was critically examined.

Peacekeeping in general terms has become a legitimate activity for the Australian Defence Force. The Parliamentary Committee has supported an Australian Peacekeeping Institute. This Chapter firmly supports the contention that the Institute should be situated at the

Australian Defence Studies Centre of the Australian Defence Force Academy, itself a University College of the University of New South Wales, It is contended that there ought to be a Civil Police Wing of the Institute at the Defence Force Academy.

The Chapter finally argues that reciprocity of experience with nations of the region ought to be fully developed. For instance, the Fiji Military Forces are unquestionably the most experienced peacekeeping troops in the region, including Australia, having had extensive experience in the Middle East in South Lebanon and Sinai; as well their experience in anti-terrorism is quite substantial-the Officer in Command of the "raid" on the Iranian Embassy in London in the 1980's by the Special Air Services Regiment was a Fijian Military Forces Officer. Regional cooperation is the *sine qua non* of successful regional law enforcement.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to explain the existence of police and to justify their existence in terms of societal needs as delineated extensively in the opening chapter of this work. Order-maintenance is indeed an enduring and primary need of all states irrespective of ideology or principles of societal organisation. The role, powers and functions of the police in democratic countries are particularly sensitive questions as they involve a trade-off between individual rights and freedoms and the demands of public order. Manning's comment is particularly apt:

The problem of the police is essentially the problem of the democratic society, and until the central values and social system of our society are modified (and I think we are seeing such a modification) there can be no <sup>change</sup> real in the operation of social control.<sup>1(a)</sup>

If Australia ever does acquire a Bill of Rights, the question of police powers will have to be addressed to determine the proper balance between the individual and society.

The essential element for the successful policing (and thus the management of forces) of any society is that <sup>there be</sup> majority community support for the aims and methods of the policing authority. Where there is any perception of bias in the application of these efforts, or where otherwise acceptable police functions lead to a legal system which fails to dispense justice in an equitable manner, those sections of the community who perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by the entire process will rightly reject that system, to the ultimate disadvantage of the criminal justice system and other objectives of that society. Modern societies largely consist of <sup>various</sup> ethnic groups or alternatively are polarised along sectarian lines, as is currently the case in Northern Ireland. In these instances, a police force which is not representative of the views of the majority will be viewed with suspicion at best, or be powerless at worst. The preservation of the power of a policing authority, as the primary

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<sup>1(a)</sup> Manning, P.K.. "The Policeman As Hero". in Silver, I. (ed). The Crime Control Establishment. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1974. p.113.



instrument of government policy for the maintenance of law and order within a society, is determined by the acceptance of the population served by that police force. That acceptance will quickly evaporate if police actions are interpreted as favouring one or other of the conflicting views of the protagonists of internal conflict in any society.

In South Pacific terms, the obvious examples are Fiji and Papua New Guinea, two countries where policing is a particularly difficult task because of societal factors. In Fiji, the Fijian-Indian divide works against the efficient and harmonious exercise of policing and in Papua New Guinea tribal and regional factors weaken community acceptance of the police as a national institution. Hence the importance of police education and training programmes, which are culturally sensitive and politically aware. Here, as argued in Chapter One above, the Universities have their part to play in providing such programmes; it would be entirely appropriate for the University of the South Pacific's new Law School in Vanuatu to provide curricula which incorporate traditional cultural elements and develop an informal awareness of social and political realities in Pacific Islands states while taking account of prevailing European-style law.

The central argument of this thesis is that Australia's previous concentration on a military definition of security is no longer valid (if it ever was) and such a notion is both irrelevant and obsolete in the post-Cold War world. Threats to Australia's security now come in different forms and the main danger is now international crime in its various manifestations, with drugs being the most obvious example. There is now a need to demilitarise security to encourage the growth of a broad security agenda with both military and non-military components. Moreover, there is need to recognise that policing is a more effective "threat containment" mechanism in these changed global circumstances than the more traditional military responses. Piracy, drug trafficking, illegal population movements, poaching, environmental pollution and terrorism are the international hazards which should now be included in Australia's definition of threats to our security. It is further argued that the police are better trained to meet these hazards and here both Australian and regional police forces should be involved in the campaign.

The other dimension of the argument which needs to be reiterated is the question of the police peace-keeping role and capabilities of the police. This thesis has demonstrated the

already considerable involvement of the various Australian police forces in peace-keeping operations and the potential exists for even greater involvement in the future. The multi-functional role of many of the world's police forces has indeed recently been recognised and demonstrated by the deployment of police contingents overseas where non-military intervention, or "peacekeeping", roles have been undertaken. In what might be described as a classical extension of the community policing role into the "global village" and internal affairs of another country, police from a number of countries, particularly Australia, have been deployed in places such as Cyprus (since partition in 1961), Cambodia, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique and most recently in Haiti. The Australian Federal Police have played a significant role in these policing duties as a result of the Australian Government's responses to calls by the United Nations for other than armed interventions in the internal affairs of developing nations which have previously suffered considerable instability. Thus Australian police are playing an important role in contributing to Australia's growing reputation as a good international citizen.

The choice of police for such tasks may seem curious, but while unarmed police in such situations might appear to have limited effectiveness, it is the deployment of their accumulated experience in dealing constantly with stressful, antagonistic situations, involving the provision of assistance, guidance and leadership to individuals and communities in a manner designed to assist in the restoration of normalcy, that is preferred to the deployment of military forces operating in a more confrontational mode.

There are essential differences between the two powers in that the military function is to protect Australia from foreign aggressors by the use of deadly force, without accountability to the civil courts of law so long as established international conventions for the conduct of war are adhered to. The civil power is fundamentally devoted to the preservation of peace and good order. The two propositions are thus at odds, with one power being purpose designed, equipped, trained and directed in the use of ultimate deadly force, whilst the other is concerned with the use of minimum force at all times, even if that is not always possible.

The lack of direct accountability of the military to the civilian courts, in addition to government policy, dictates that military aid to the civil power will be short term, not provided without proper consultation at ministerial level between the particular state and

federal governments, be for a specific purpose and only provided for as long as required to restore the situation to that which can be controlled by the civilian authorities. By these arrangements, it is intended to ensure that the military assist, not replace, the civil authorities.

Societies, both in the national and international contexts, exist in a wide range of competing pressures and interests, pursued either legitimately or illegitimately by interest groups and individuals for an equally wide range of reasons. Democratically elected governments seek to provide a stable society in which those legitimate interests can prosper, whilst providing a reasonable degree of certainty of detection and punishment for those who pursue illegitimate activities. The role of the police in providing a protective wall against criminal elements operating at both the national and international levels, is a key element in this process.

The Australian Government also maintains other non-police agencies dedicated to the protection of society from the effects of subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism and politically-motivated violence: among these agencies are the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Office of National Assessments, the Defence Signals Directorate and the Defence Intelligence Organization. These agencies are significant contributors to the "policing" of society, for while they do not possess the executive powers of police forces (and in some cases are prevented by legislation from directing their efforts against Australian citizens or have no other powers than the intelligence process), their individual and collective efforts, coupled with effective information exchange arrangements both nationally and internationally, result in additional barriers to civil and criminal unrest within this country and our international treaty and trading partners.

The technological advances of the Twentieth Century, particularly in the fields of transportation and communications, have reduced the world to a truly "global village", with consequential benefits for both legal and illegal activities and with concomitant difficulties for governments seeking to ensure that national security, integrity and sovereignty are maintained. The product of these forces of change in both national and international societies is the emergence of government policies and mechanisms seeking to maintain the

equilibrium between advantage and disadvantage on a range of issues, including internal law and order, foreign relations, internal and external trade and the balance of military power sufficient to dissuade would-be aggressors yet insufficient to alarm would-be traders and travellers.

The importance and essential nature of international policing, as both an adjunct to providing stability in otherwise unstable countries in the pursuit of usual policing functions, is witnessed by the existence of Interpol and the Australian Federal Police international network. The Interpol network, initially established to service the United Kingdom and Europe, has extended throughout the world and provides an essential addition to the information sharing and enforcement activities of many of the world's countries, particularly through the location of offenders who have fled from jurisdictions in which they have committed serious offences. The Australian Federal Police international network (presently located in 15 cities and covering 30 countries) provides essential direct interface between Australian law enforcement interest and those of other countries in recognition of the transnational nature of late Twentieth Century criminal activity and its impact on this country.

It could be argued that the internationalisation of criminal activity is an undesirable but inevitable result of the globalisation process which is impacting on so many spheres of human endeavour, such as trade and finance, technology and communications, tourism and entertainment. This has been accompanied by the phenomenon of the mass movement of people whether as migrants, refugees or tourists. Jet aircraft transport has made this process incredibly swift even by the standards of only half a century ago. These changes have made it much easier for national criminal syndicates to spread their wings and infiltrate foreign countries, regional bodies and international institutions. The Russian Minister of Justice quoted in Chapter Five above is in no doubt that the problem of organised crime is a reality and a new problem, the internationalisation of crime, has aggravated the situation for national law enforcement agencies which must now contend with domestic and foreign threats to law and order and the peace and tranquillity of domestic society and the stability of the international order. The South Pacific is no exception and, given the geographical and other links that bind Australia to the region, the security of our South Pacific neighbours is our shield as well.

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It is here that the element of proactivity which has been stressed throughout this thesis comes into prominence. It was argued that policing as a security mechanism should be included in Australia's defence equation together with the element of proactivity. The difficulty that our police forces have in accepting the policy and practice (let alone the concept) of proactive policing demonstrates an obscurantist reluctance to think in bold and imaginative ways which are also relevant and effective. A limited conceptual approach stresses an obsolete reactive mode of law enforcement, one in which post-facto investigation, detection and apprehension are operational norms. Proactive policy in a democratic context has yet to obtain general acceptance. To be fair, there are real problems associated with the type of police powers which may be required to mount effective proactive operations and the extent to which these powers may have to be exercised to get results. Again, with the general question of police powers in a democratic society, it is a question of balance.

In the international sphere, it is a case of enlightened self-interest where states are prepared to act for the common good. As has been suggested, the ultimate aim of Australia's police education and training programmes is the creation of a proactive security environment in the region, one in which protective measures such as surveillance and other early detection methods provide a barrier against criminal activities and threats or damage to national interests, including trade and natural resources. Such a proactive security environment is for the mutual benefit of all states in the South Pacific region as well as for Australia. The sharing of information is a crucial measure in this regard and the provision by Australia of integrated, computerised information systems is essential, if early warning is to have any real meaning.

The doctrine of Forward Defence which shaped Australia's security responses for several decades after 1945 is no longer as fashionable as it once was. But this thesis has argued that a new, non-military version should be considered, employing the protective measures mentioned previously, to create a 'denial in depth' strategy. The emphasis should be on regional cooperation with our South Pacific neighbours, not in any sense of domination or a benign paternalism, but in a true partnership based on equality and respect. Australian police forces have the operational training facilities and the technical equipment to make such cooperation effective.

Such a regionally-oriented programme would require a concerted diplomatic campaign by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and liaison with the Department of Defence where defence aspects or issues are concerned or military assistance appropriate. The role of the Australian Federal Police and the various State Police Forces in Australia will have to be carefully coordinated and monitored to avoid duplication of effort or lest wasteful competition and rivalry develop among Australian police forces as providers of services. It is a question of providing police education and training programmes which are both appropriate and effective.

The most practical contribution that Australia can make to enhance its own security in the changed international situation in the South Pacific is to assist with the creation of professional, disciplined, well-trained and well-equipped local police forces which have modern, up-to-date technology to combat crime in all of its manifestations in the region. Crime, not military threats, is the real enemy of stability in the South Pacific, both for the countries in the region and in Australia and New Zealand. The Commonwealth Secretariat is concerned "over the vulnerability of all small island states to military takeover, and, in multi-island states to secession. It regards non-military threats as the most serious. In the latter category it includes the weakness of single-resource economies, of economic exploitation (by among other forces, fishing vessels) of toxic dumping schemes and of drug smugglers and other criminals."<sup>1</sup> The doyen of scholars who research the South Pacific, Emeritus Professor Ron Crocombe, considers that there is evidence which suggests that the *Yakuza*, the Japanese crime syndicates, are now firmly established in the South Pacific and have been able to penetrate governments and bureaucracies in the region.<sup>2</sup> A regional approach thus brings a focus to the need for a proactive approach of a non-military nature. This represents a major move away from Australia's conventional approach to the defence of the South Pacific nations, and entails a substantial shift in prevailing attitudes in political, bureaucratic and military circles if it is to be put in place.

The evidence suggests that within the policing profession itself there was not, and is still not, a view to providing 'fraternal' assistance to regional police forces unless backed up

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<sup>1</sup>*Pacific Islands Monthly*, Suva, Fiji, Vol.59, No.20, p.27.

<sup>2</sup>See Crocombe, R.G., *Pacific Neighbours: New Zealand's Relations with Other Pacific Islands*, USP, Suva, 1992.

by the foreign aid dollar. The idea of a cost-neutral training program is still very much a novel proposal. In 1987 there was a move from the Criminal Intelligence Analysts Association of the Pacific Rim to establish a relationship with the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence; this proposal was referred to the South West Pacific Region Police Commissioners' Conference when they met in Apia, Western Samoa.<sup>3</sup> Because of a lack of available funding, the valuable initiative to link the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence with the Criminal Intelligence Analysts Association of the Pacific Rim remains in limbo.<sup>4</sup>

The episode which is most instructive, if only in a negative way, about the provision of police education and training programs is the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) Project, the Australian aid-funded project which used private consulting companies to both design and deliver the services. One could describe this Project as a negative model, an object lesson in how *not* to approach the question of assessing the development needs of South Pacific police forces. It also raises doubts about the wisdom of enmeshing Official Development Assistance (ODA) with private enterprise activities when sensitive areas of public policy are concerned. It is not special pleading to argue that assessing police needs is a subject where the appropriate and proper inputs should come from regional police forces and academic institutions, not organisations dictated to by the profit motive. It is also instructive that in Chapter Three above, the views of an officer connected with the Project are extensively quoted as they provide an unique insight into the operations of such private enterprise projects and the tensions

<sup>3</sup>This was referred to the Conference by the Deputy director of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Chief Inspector David Smith of Victoria Police—telephone call to the present writer 14 December, 1987.

<sup>4</sup>As a counterpoint to this thinking a Conference for Collision Investigators of Australasia and the South Pacific was planned by the Centre for Policing and Public Safety at Monash University for 1992. A result of three telephone calls—General Motors Holden, Mercedes Benz Australia and the Australian Tyre Manufacturers Association a sum of \$15,000 was obtained to bring to Melbourne (air fares and accommodation) two delegates from each Australasian police force as well delegates from Fiji and the Cook Islands.



they create between the consultants and the police force members involved. There is certainly a strong case for the provision of ODA for police education and training programs, but how and by whom the money is spent are the real questions in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The official AIDAB *Business Kit* states that a prime concern in awarding contracts is "to ensure that our Overseas Aid Program remains identifiably Australian and that, in line with the National Preference Agreement, commercial benefits should accrue to Australian and New Zealand business".<sup>5</sup> It seems to have been the case with the RPNGC Project that these criteria have been met only too well.

Australia had much to make amends for in terms of the neglect of the police force in Papua New Guinea during the period of its colonial stewardship. As the authors of a political history of Papua New Guinea state:

"Police training was neglected by Australia except as a para-military patrol force and they were never adequately trained for urban life. In 1976 they were described as 'immature, undereducated, underpaid and inexperienced' and are receiving the same wage 'as garbage collectors.'"<sup>6</sup>

In 1975, the year of independence, the official government publication, *Programmes and Performance*, described a highly unsatisfactory situation:

Major problems are being faced by the Constabulary because of a lack of experienced and adequately trained staff. Of a total force strength of 4400 there are 239 commissioned officers, 96 below established strength. Sixty-two of the officers are expatriates and 177 Papua New Guineans. The average national commissioned officer is aged 28 years,

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<sup>5</sup> No publication details provided.

<sup>6</sup> Griffin, J., *et al.*, *Papua New Guinea: A Political History*, Heinemann Educational Books, Melbourne, 1979, p.267.

has an average total service in the Force of less than five years and average service as a commissioned officer of less than three years.

In the following year, *Programmes and Performances*, said:

Newly commissioned officers do not offset the experience lost by the departure of expatriate staff, of which 43 left ... in 1975-76. Only 30 expatriate staff remain in the Force.<sup>7</sup>

As early as 1978, only three years after independence, Prime Minister Somare was expressing grave concern about the crime rate and the effects this might have on stability.

The fixation in Australian official circles with the military definition of security led to the unhealthy emphasis on the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) and consequent diversion of funds and resources. In Canberra, the "PIR Lobby" was extremely successful in securing favoured treatment for the military in Papua New Guinea while the RPNGC was down-graded and denied adequate training and resources. The Royal Papua New Constabulary Development Project which involved Price Waterhouse Urwick and ACIL was perhaps a belated attempt to redress the situation, but it may have been a case of belated good intentions paving the road, if not to Hell, then another form of torment. The amount of money allocated was not insignificant and, if properly spent, could have made a major contribution to the reform and improvement of the RPNGC. If the police in Papua New Guinea had been properly trained in peacekeeping operations techniques, then they would have been able to play a much more effective role in helping to resolve the crisis on Bougainville where the Government's preferred military solution has been a tragic failure. The proposed Peacekeeping Institute in Canberra would be able to provide such services and thus make a positive contribution to the peace and stability of Papua New Guinea and Australian security.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

The theme of Chapter Four could well be described as 'Against the Odds'. In an expository way, the educational experience of the present writer and of his previous Centre and Faculty are a testimony to the lassitude that pervades Australia's relationships with the South Pacific, and the failure of comprehension that pervades official circles. It is also safe to conclude that, when different academic institutions are involved, the problem of competition not cooperation can easily arise. In the case of the South Pacific, the University of the South Pacific, although widely criticised within the region for alleged domination by Fiji, can don the regional mantle to warn off academic trespassers and interlopers and garner some local support in the process. The suspicion that a 'dog in the manger' attitude may be at work here is difficult to avoid especially when the USP has done little to promote Police Studies as an academic discipline either at Laucala Bay or its regional campuses. As suggested in Chapter One, the new USP Law School in Port Vila may eventually provide some police studies courses and programs, but it is more probable that Criminology will take precedence over Police Studies given the likely academic direction of the institution.

The experience in Fiji suggests that the question of providing police education and training programs can become enmeshed in local political and bureaucratic rivalries and power struggles. The dimensions of a post-coup political order with still undefined and evolving power relations made it extremely difficult to anticipate and balance the competing interests. The contradictory attitudes of the Australian Government, which adopts a very pragmatic approach to authoritarian and often brutal regimes in Indonesia and the People's Republic of China yet maintained a highly moralistic approach towards post-coup Fiji, created obstacles in dealing with the authorities in Suva. The Republic of Fiji as a state and society combines both modern and traditional elements and one aspect of tertiary education for police there (if it eventuates) should be to consider the reintroduction of traditional law enforcement institutions and methods in Fijian villages.

The foreign aid mechanism employed by Canberra in the AIDAB-funded RPNGC Development Project was, as suggested, seriously flawed both in concept and execution and such a procedure in future is not to be recommended in public policy terms. The record of Australian academic involvement in attempts to provide Police Studies in tertiary education programs, either directly or in collaboration with the USP is mixed, a failure in Fiji success in the Cook Islands. The reefs of local political rivalries and vested interests can make such voyages hazardous, but they are certainly worth attempting in the interests of police education in the region.

The other option which deserves support is the concept of an Australian Peacekeeping Institute as favoured by the Parliamentary Committee which considered Australia's participation in peacekeeping. The submission by the Australian Defence Studies Centre at the Australian Defence Academy is sensible and persuasive and offers exciting prospects of valuable future developments. There are two *caveats* that need to be issued. First, the proposed location in a *defence force* academy should not mean a primary focus on the military as the true source of peacekeeping resources. There will have to be a large and meaningful role for the Australian Federal Police and the State Police Forces in the proposed Institute if all aspects of peacekeeping operations are to be properly presented. Second, in terms of police education and training for peacekeeping roles. The Institute should not become just another academic centre, long on theory short on practice. There is already in existence at the Australian National University a Peace Studies Centre whose worthwhile activities need not be duplicated by yet another institution in Canberra. The proposed Institute should have an applied focus with Police Studies a central part of the academic core curriculum and activities taught by Australian and international Police Studies practitioners. There should be in-service training provided by Federal and State police and from regional police force members with practical experience in peacekeeping operations. This is not a professional demarcation dispute, but a judicious best use of available and appropriate human resources. The Director of the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Dr. Anthony Bergin, a Monash

graduate, is well aware of these issues and emphasizes that the training component will be given a high priority and profile in the Institute's activities should it be located within the ADSC.<sup>8</sup> He envisages an important role for the AFP and the State police forces with contributions from members of various South Pacific police forces as visiting lecturers and instructors.<sup>9</sup>

Policing has the capacity to make a real contribution to the security of Australia by helping to create a safer and more stable regional environment. The provision of police education and training programmes is the best way to achieve this objective for the benefit of both Australia and its South Pacific neighbours.

<sup>8</sup>interview (telephone discussion), 17 May, 1995.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*

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### Interviews

Many of the following have been interviewed on more than one occasion.

Akaruru, I., Deputy Prime Minister, the Cook Islands.

Arnfield, P.J., Commissioner of Police, Fiji.

Babbage, R., Centre for Strategic Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, Canberra.

Ball, D., Head, Centre for Strategic Studies, School of Pacific Studies, ANU, Canberra.

Boehm, A., Attorney General's Department, Canberra.

Brazell, K., DFAT, Canberra.

Bulatiko, Q., Superintendent, Fiji Police.

Campbell Karina, DFAT, Canberra.

Captain "X", Fiji Military Forces.

Cotton, R., Ambassador, Australian Embassy, Suva, Fiji.

Crocombe, R.G., Emeritus Professor, USP.

Dagworthy, R., Commander, RAN, Defence Attache, Embassy, Fiji.

Dauth, J., DFAT, Canberra.

Fraser, J.M., former Prime Minister of Australia.

Ganilau, Ratu Brigadier, E.MC, Commander, Fiji Military Forces.

George, T., First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Suva, Fiji.

Gordon, R., Office of National Assessments, Canberra.

Grey, Marquant, Solicitor, Suva, Fiji.

Hegarty, D., now High Commissioner, Western Samoa, previously, Strategic Studies  
Centre, ANU, DFAT and elsewhere.

Henry, Sir Geoffrey, Prime Minister, the Cook Islands.

Horman, W.J., former Commissioner of Police, Vanuatu; former Commissioner,  
Tasmania Police; former Deputy Commissioner, Victoria Police; former  
Director of Operations National Crime Authority.

Ingram, V., High Commissioner, Cook Islands, Canberra.

Ishak, M., Assistant Commissioner, Fiji Police.

Khan, J., Assistant Superintendent, Fiji Military Forces.

Koroi, J., Assistant Commissioner of Police, later Lieutenant Colonel, Fiji Military Forces, Fiji.

Kumar, K., Superintendent, Fiji, Police.

Lewaicei, J., Commissioner of Police, Fiji.

Mack, A., Head, Centre for Peace Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, Canberra.

Matailevu, P., Senior Superintendent, Fiji Police.

Matapo, T V. "Bobby", Commissioner of Police, Cook Islands.

Mc Donald, P., Office of National Assessments, Canberra.

McAuley, R P, Commissioner, the Australian Federal Police.

McKenzie-Orr, Brigadier M, OBE, GM, Canberra.

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Peacock, A S., Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Canberra and Melbourne.

Rabuka, S., Maj-Gen, Prime Minister, Fiji.

Raeburn, N., Attorney General's Department, Canberra.

Rajalingam, V., Third Secretary, Fiji Embassy, Canberra.

Smeaton, D., Department of Justice, Canberra.

Smith, I., Legal Attache, US Embassy, Canberra.

Sturgiss, J, Jnr., Legal Attache, US Embassy, Canberra.

Thorpe, Brigadier I., Fiji Military Forces.

Wardlaw, G., Australian Institute of Criminology, now Director, Office of Strategic Criminal Assessments (OSCA), Canberra.

Werner, V., Assistant Commissioner (Ret'd), Victoria Police, Senior member RPNGC Development Project.

Whiddett, A., Deputy Commissioner, AFP.

Wilkinson, P., University of St Andrews, February, 1994.

Woltring, H., Attorney General's, Department, Canberra.