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ERRATA

Contents page, Part 1, 2: "Dramatis" for "Dramtis"
p 262, para 2, first sentence: "Brudenell" for "Brudenall"
p 299, n. 58: "Longfield" for "Llongfield"
p 361, para 1: "nephew" for "son"

ADDENDUM

p 12: Add at the end of para 1:

"This is not to suggest that a real political battle was not fought between anti-communists against communists and other left wing groups seeking to bring revolution to the United States and Australia. Nor to deny that it could seem, at intermittent moments from 1917 until the Second World War, that reformers and revolutionaries might be successful in altering the essential social, economic and political institutions of western society. This was particularly apparent in the United States, for example, during the general strikes of 1919, the rise of the Farmer-Labor alliance in the mid-West in the mid-1920s and after the great stock market crash of 1929, when tens of thousands flocked to anti-capitalist banners, forcing President Franklin Roosevelt to devise a political program progressive enough to defuse the appeal of radical reformism.¹

Nevertheless, anti-communism in the United States and Australia invariably manifested itself in severe reactions completely disproportionate to the threat it posed.² Moreover, the forces ranged against communism habitually neglected to perceive that a more significant threat to democracy was being posed by the forces of the right, which pursued their objectives with far greater success than communists or other left wing reformers, under the standard of anti-communism. This thesis will not, therefore, emphasise the actual political threat of communism in Australia and the United States, as opposed to other determinative factors that have been overlooked."

p 12, para 2, line 1: delete "For these reasons".
p 322, n. 113: Full publication date of *Pastoral Review* is 16 January 1918.
p 337, para 2, line 8: delete "magnate" for "magnates" and delete "Justice".
p 361, para 1, line 1: delete "Scottish".

¹ Edward P. Johanningsmeier, *Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994 and Harvey Klehr and John E. Hayes, *The American Communist Movement: Storming Heaven Itself*, Maxwell Macmillan International, New York, 1992 chart the fortunes of the Communist Party of the United States c. 1917 – 35. From the early 1920s when it was a tiny, infighting irrelevancy of barely ten thousand, largely foreign-born radicals, the Party endured desperate times after the Great War before becoming an 100,000 member-strong partner in the New Line, anti-fascist, Democratic Front of the New Deal. Opposition to American involvement in the Second World War again saw the Party become a political pariah and victim of official suppression.

² It is incumbent on a historian not to presume that their perceptions of past events were not apparent to people who lived through them. There were numerous citizens who regarded the anti-communist conduct of governments, intelligence agencies and patriot groups as being completely disproportionate to any threat that was posed, compromised by questionable and base motives, and far more damaging to American democracy than domestic communism. See Richard Polenberg, *Fighting Faiths: the Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech*, Viking, New York, 1987. John Salmond, *The Conscience of a Lawyer: Clifford J. Durr and American Civil Liberties, 1899-1975*, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1990 profiles a principled and eminent opponent of the communist witch-hunting of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which began sitting in the 1930s.

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Nick Fischer

PhD Thesis in History

The Savage Within:
Anti-Communism, Anti-democracy
and Authoritarianism in the United
States and Australia, 1917 – 1935

January, 2001

Department of Historical Studies

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Abstract

"The Savage Within" examines the influence of anti-communism on the United States and Australia from 1917 - 1935. Anti-communism shaped the political culture and experience of both nations in the twentieth century, becoming a fundamental political principle and a vital form of identification for a majority of American and Australian citizens. Nonetheless, anti-communism remains an understudied and misunderstood phenomenon. Largely perceived as a Cold War phenomena, its origins in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century have been ignored. The complex psychological dimensions of the phenomena, too, are infrequently discussed, as is the role of anti-communism in the creation of political structures in modern democracies. This thesis attempts to heighten historical understanding of these dimensions of anti-communism.

The birth and development of anti-communism is analysed in three ways. First, the history of anti-communism as a national political experience is outlined, followed by discussion of the identity and motives of individuals and organisations who made important contributions to anti-communism. Finally, the psychology of anti-communism is scrutinised. By repeating this formula in relation to two national communities the thesis sheds light on generic characteristics of anti-communism and the extent to which it and other forms of political extremism are affected by particular environmental conditions. Further, analysis of the form and effects of American and Australian anti-communism exposes common and particular characteristics of American and Australian socio-political culture.

The response to communism experienced in Australia and the United States reveals much about the nature of power in those societies. In particular, the study of anti-communism demonstrates how select individuals and groups converge around and use doctrines and fear to change local and national political landscapes. Anti-communism was a vital impetus for the production and development of internal security and intelligence bureaucracies. It was the rationale that underpinned and justified mass surveillance of civilian populations and other forms of authoritarianism. It grew to become more than a political ideology but also a force for general conservative social conformity.

Anti-communism, therefore, became a central arbiter of the relationship between governments and citizens in Australia and the United States, although it has not been sufficiently analysed by historians in this light. That relationship was progressively characterised by governmental mistrust, antipathy and an abstract sympathy for citizens. This thesis sets out to analyse why, how and where such sentiment was manufactured, and to describe how American and Australian citizens, through the influence of anti-communism, have been progressively alienated from their democracies.

This doctoral thesis in history contains no material that has been accepted for any other degree and to the best of my knowledge contains no material previously written or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment has been made in the bibliography and in footnotes.


Nick Fischer

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of two men for whom I couldn't finish the project quite quickly enough. I hope that they would have enjoyed it.

INTRODUCTION

Anti-communism profoundly influenced the social and political environments of the United States and Australia in the twentieth century. In both nations, anti-communism became a cornerstone of political principle; in the United States, it became a political obsession, the dominant influence on foreign policy after the Second World War and a primary source of identification for American citizens. While its reach in Australia was less marked, and its character less extreme, it was, nonetheless, a major influence on foreign policy and communism was a political anathema to a majority of Australians.¹ Therefore, it is important that anti-communism is understood, for it reveals much about the nature of power and influence in political democracies, and the role of psychological and social factors in the growth and spread of political extremism. Yet, for all its significance, anti-communism remains an understudied and misunderstood phenomenon. While its impact during the Cold War is widely recognised, its evolution and development before this time is infrequently discussed. In addition, its role in the creation of modern political structures, particularly the production and development of security and intelligence bureaucracies, is neglected. Moreover, historical interpretation of anti-communism has been compromised by methodological inadequacies; it has been regarded, too narrowly, as an economic and political phenomenon, its psychological dimensions overlooked. Because it has flourished in political democracies like Australia and the United States, historians who have dealt with the subject specifically have also been complacent in accounting for its success, too readily regarding it as a creature of the people and a manifestation of their collective will.

This historiographical tradition has flourished in the absence of rigorous analysis of the psychosocial structure of anti-communism. Recent monographs examining the identity of supporters of the Bolshevik party in revolutionary Russia, for example, are

¹ Joel Kovel notes that in 1988, an electoral survey of voters in the United States found that anti-communism was the "single most common [constitutive] element of American identity." While 70 percent of the respondents identified themselves as anti-communists, only 49 percent identified with the next largest social category, people considering themselves religious. See Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America*, Basic Books, New York, 1992, p. 4. The only referendum held in Australia proposing the proscription of any political party took place in 1951, when the conservative government of Robert Menzies invited the Australian public to outlaw the Communist Party. It failed by the narrow margin of 2%.

methodologically far more exhaustive.² However, the absence of political tyranny in Australia and the United States, and the longevity and broad popularity of anti-communism, appear to have convinced numerous historians that the phenomenon was largely an expression of mass culture; while the importance of pivotal anti-communists has been acknowledged, their influence has ultimately been attributed to popular appeal. This perception rests on second-hand historical commentary rather than empirical data.

This study aims to address these methodological problems and bring into greater relief the early history of American and antipodean anti-communism. Anti-communism's importance to the ongoing evolution of both nations' political economies is essayed. Psychological theory is used to deepen analysis of anti-communism and specifically to analyse its impact on democratic governments. Finally, its comparative perspective sheds light on anti-communism's character, as well as common and particular characteristics of American and Australian socio-political culture, thrown into relief by tumultuous political currents.

This task is approached in the following manner: this introductory chapter reviews the methodology of previous studies, before outlining my theoretical model. The rest of the thesis is divided into two large sections, each describing a national history of anti-communism. The first section relates to the United States, the second to Australia. Each of these sections is divided into three subsections. The first track the course of events in the birth and growth of anti-communism. The second subsections establish the identities of important anti-communists and analyse protagonists' psychological states. The final subsections examine the psychological condition of anti-communism, before conclusions are offered. Only the first chapters of each large section are structured in chronological fashion. Because they explore questions of character, identity and psychology rather than events, the succeeding subsections are structured thematically.

² See Richard Pipes *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919 - 1924*, Harvill, London, 1994 and Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891 - 1924*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996.

The most problematic perception about early anti-communism is that its influence dramatically dissipated after the great Red Scare, which affected many nations from 1919 until early 1920, and did not really resurface until after the Second World War. It is frequently contended that after the Red Scare economic recovery pushed anti-radicalism from the centre stage of mainstream politics as conditions of "normalcy," in the celebrated phrase of United States President Warren Harding, resumed.³ While such a picture is broadly accurate, it becomes seriously misleading if the short-lived nature of public and rabid anti-communism is taken to suggest that its rise and fall was meteoric. The Red Scare is more often than not depicted as a force which sprang forth from a maelstrom of fear, rage and anxiety, giving birth to fevered, incoherent, indiscriminate repression. Such an interpretation of the Scare is not altogether baseless and appropriately conveys the heightened insecurity and uncertainty of people affected by it. However, besides reminding us that we cannot know the consequences of our deeds, nor fully comprehend our motives, a model of emotional and political chaos is limiting, because anti-communism incorporated and bequeathed a number of enduring social, governmental and psychological legacies, and every action or thought connected with anti-communism, whether fearful, calculated, ridiculous or belligerent, shared a critical psychological consistency: the compulsion to exert social domination.

Anti-communism emerged from pre-existing forms of social tension, including religious and sectarian conflict. Anti-communism absorbed much of the energy and ideology of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism and many important special interest groups partial to promoting religious intolerance influenced anti-communism. Anti-communism also had a close relationship with nativism. At a time when Social

³ Robert Dallek, for example, writes in a history of the United States, "by the mid-twenties traditional consensus politics and individual economic advance once again [became] the center of American life." See Robert Dallek, "Modernizing the Republic, 1920 to the Present," in Bernard Bailyn, Robert Dallek, David Brion Davis, David Herbert Donald, John L. Thomas, Gordon S. Wood, *The Great Republic - A History of the American People*, D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington, 1985, p. 704. Several historians have similarly argued that a sense of normalcy also returned stability to Australian political life. Gordon Greenwood writes that in Australia, as in the United States and Britain, "uncertainty about values apart from an emphasis on utilitarian goals" typified "the loss in the twenties of a sense of conscious social direction." Moreover, he claims that "after the war most attention was concentrated on material exploitation and economic development," as a "burst of optimism" saw Australians anxiously getting back "to the business of developing the country ... possessed [by] an uncritical belief in the limitless possibilities of the continent." See Gordon Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties, 1919 - 1929," in *Australia: A Social and Political History*, Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1977, pp. 299 and 294.

Darwinism and racialism were at the apex of their influence. Australian and American nationalists' concern for the survival of the national entity was acute.⁴ Such concern had been exacerbated, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the mass migration of non-English-speaking migrants to the United States, while in Australia, white settlers viewed the protection of their national and racial integrity as one of the state's paramount political tasks. Anti-communism also arose at the end of a generation-long period which had seen the ferocity of economic conflict within both nations escalate to unprecedented levels. The intensification of these disparate tensions during the Great War heightened the political importance of dominating the realm of ideas in the public domain; the years immediately following the Bolshevik revolution saw anti-communists continue to devote themselves, fanatically, to the regulation of political ideology and the constitution of national entities.

The character and effect of such activity was of lasting importance. Anti-communism definitively changed American and Australian society. In the United States, the Red Scare was a critical stimulus to the introduction of immigration quotas based on race, while in Australia it confirmed the necessity of maintaining the racially-determined immigration practice known as the White Australia Policy. In both nations, anti-communism made more absolute the association of non-English-speaking peoples, Catholics and Jews with anti-social behaviour and pathology. Anti-communism greatly advanced the development of modern domestic, internal surveillance industries, while encouraging a massive, unprecedented and, most important, largely unnoticed transfer of administrative power from more accountable branches of government to permanent bureaucracies. In both nations, but more dramatically in the United States, new repressive legislation greatly restricted political and civil rights. Such restrictions were enthusiastically augmented and enforced by the courts. Anti-communism also brought government officials and special interest groups into relationships of singular intimacy, jeopardising democratic government to an unprecedented extent. Although vigilante forces such as the Ku Klux Klan had previously operated with the tacit approval of government officials, anti-communism

⁴ Ivan Hannaford convincingly demonstrates that racist ideology did not fall from grace in scientific, intellectual and other key social sectors until after the defeat of Nazism. Moreover, he cautions that racialism, as recent conflict in the Balkans and in Africa indicates, is far from being a declining influence. See Ivan Hannaford, *Race - the History of an Idea in the West*, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Baltimore, 1996.

encouraged the incorporation of private organisations into the structure of government, empowering them to enforce government policy and criminal law, a process begun during the Great War. In Australia, similar overlaps occurred. The Commissioner of Police in Victoria in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Brigadier-General Thomas Blamey, moonlighted as commander of the League of National Security, a leading right-wing paramilitary force of the time.⁵ Another fundamental legacy of the Red Scare was the devastation of the American left. The radical element of the Australian left was hardly less damaged and while the power of organised labour in Australia remained far greater than in the United States, the political aspirations of the left and its electoral strength were greatly diminished by the spectre of communism.

Such legacies of the Red Scare were, for the most part, not solely responses to the challenge of communism. However, the 1920s and early 1930s witnessed an extraordinary development and institutionalisation both of anti-socialist consciousness and the machinery which conservative elites and special interests deployed to enforce and engender that consciousness. The atmosphere and institutions of anti-communism, which have become synonymous with the well-publicised McCarthy era and the Cold War, properly trace their heritage directly to this period. This crucial fact is insufficiently emphasised in existing historiography. Some important studies recognise the long-term significance of the Red Scare. H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite's *Opponents of War, 1917 – 1918*, concludes that the restriction of liberty enforced during and immediately after the Great War permanently destroyed precious civic rights previously enjoyed by American citizens. William Preston, Jr., author of *Aliens and Dissenters – Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903 – 1933*, also argues that the war years and the Red Scare established patterns of behaviour and government that progressively diminished Americans' civil liberties. John Higham, in *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 – 1925*, contends that the "new equation between national loyalty and ... political and social conformity" engendered after the Great War destroyed "the old belief in America as a promised

⁵ Blamey was something of a career vigilante and his involvement with the LNS did not represent his first dalliance with extra-legal armed forces. In November 1923, shortly after assuming the position of Army Chief of Staff, Blamey assisted his former commanding officer, Sir Brudenell White, in forming a paramilitary group to help break the Melbourne police strike. The group took the moniker the "White

land for all who yearn for freedom."⁶ Among Australian historians, John F. Williams, Terry King, R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving, Richard Hall and Stuart Macintyre, commenting on the right's post-war domination of Australian nationalism, have acknowledged that this was facilitated, in part, by the Red Scare.⁷ Nonetheless, a number of other important works under-emphasise the significance of the Red Scare and the anti-communist practices of the 1920s.⁸

Even those focussing more directly on anti-communism, such as Peter Buckingham, indirectly create problematic impressions. Buckingham confines discussion of events between the Red Scare and the McCarthy era to one, short chapter. Moreover, he entitles that chapter "From Normalcy to a Second Red Scare, 1921 - 1950," encouraging the perception that little of real significance occurred during the period; between episodes of "national hysteria," there apparently lies a gulf of "normal" time. Keith Richmond, commenting on Australian responses to communism in the inter-war years, similarly suggests that the graver hallmarks of anti-communism were characteristic only of the Cold War era.⁹ This idea is, to a lesser extent, also encouraged by Robert K. Murray's study, *The Red Scare*. In a monograph of nearly 300 pages, Murray confines analysis of the lasting influence of the Scare to one chapter. He also attributes too much significance to the return of "normalcy," citing for example, the election of President Harding as a key indicator of a shift in public

Guard," presumably styling itself after the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War. See Richard Hall, *The Secret State - Australia's Spy Industry*, Cassell Australia, Sydney, 1978, p. 20.

⁶ H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917 - 1918*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1957, p. 305, William Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters - Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903 - 1933*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966, p. 275 and John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 - 1925*, Atheneum, New York, 1973, p. 330.

⁷ John F. Williams, *The Quarantined Culture: Australian Reactions to Modernism, 1913 - 1939*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1995, Terry King, "The Tarring and Feathering of J. K. MacDougall: 'Dirty Tricks' in the 1919 Federal Election," in *Labour History*, No. 45, Nov. 1983, R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving, *Class Structure in Australian History*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1980, Hall and Stuart Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia: Volume IV, 1901 - 1942, The Succeeding Age*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986.

⁸ These include Peter Buckingham, *America Sees Red: Anti-Communism in America, 1870's to 1980's - A Guide to Issues and References*, Regina Books, Claremont, 1988 and in Australian historiography, G. L. Kristianson, *The Politics of Patriotism - The Pressure Group Activities of the Returned Servicemen's League*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966 and Keith Richmond, "Response to the Threat of Communism: The Sane Democracy League and the People's Union of New South Wales" in *Journal of Australian Studies*, vol. 1, June 1977, pp. 70 - 83.

⁹ See Buckingham, *America Sees Red* and Richmond, "Response to the Threat of Communism," p. 72. The graver forms of anti-communist reaction on which Richmond comments comprise "loyalty investigations ... worries over foreign involvements ... fears of internal subversion ... and [the] creation of numerous movements to oppose subversives."

The Savage Within - Introduction

behaviour and feeling toward political "indifference."¹⁰ For Murray, the Red Scare "did not basically change the pattern of modern American history," although it did "greatly" affect "certain subsequent developments" and "public opinion."¹¹ Yet these "subsequent developments" should be regarded, nonetheless, as very significant, particularly as Murray fails to observe or mention some of the more important ones.

Among the long-term developments Murray cites, several played major roles in shaping the "pattern of modern American history." First, the perpetuation of rabid "100% Americanism" propounded by patriotic societies survived in the nation's learning institutions and directly influenced radical changes in immigration policy. The political and economic strength of organised labour, savaged during the Red Scare, continued to decline in the face of triumphant open shop forces. Civil liberties were crushed by repressive laws, reactionary court rulings and vigilante action, and the United States' foreign policy toward the Soviet Union remained hamstrung by ideological intransigence. The American radical left, meanwhile, was utterly extinguished.¹² These events in themselves are significant enough and would appear more significant if Murray conveyed their broader effect.

It is the nature of Murray's commentary, rather than his identification of relevant issues, which produces critical problems. He writes, for example, that the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion (AL) "propagandized the need for the 'Americanization' of school texts, loyalty oaths for teachers, and more stringent immigration legislation."¹³ Yet, as this thesis will show, the influence of these organisations over education and immigration extended far beyond propaganda. The AL actually became a controlling force over education, exerting or being invited to exert its influence by educational institutions and governments at all levels. Similarly, Murray's contention that the United States Supreme Court began to interpret constitutional liberties in a more "liberal" fashion after 1927 contradicts historical evidence.¹⁴ The chief defect of Murray's analysis is that he seems not to have noticed several of the most consequential outcomes of the Scare to which I have alluded,

¹⁰ Robert K. Murray, *The Red Scare*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1953, p. 261.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 263 - 81.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

namely the incorporation of powerful, sectional interests into the structure of government and the institutionalisation of repression within steadily growing bureaucracies. Murray's concluding summation of the Red Scare's import suggests one major reason for this oversight: his conception of the Red Scare is that it was a *national* malady, affecting the majority of the nation's inhabitants in much the same fashion. His study's concluding passage, for example, states:

Our Red Scare experience of 1919-20 illustrates clearly that communism cannot be fought effectively by hysteria, or by restrictive legislation, or by mob violence. In the long run we do more damage to ourselves than to the enemy.¹⁵

This statement indicates that Murray views the Scare as having sprung from the wellsprings of the nation. What Murray has failed to highlight is the fact that the "we" to whom he speaks can not be simply analysed, because "the United States," or for that matter "Australia," did not perpetrate the Red Scare. Rather, supporters of anti-communism set out, during the Scare, and with varying degrees of consciousness, to reconstruct their local and national communities. Such action was undertaken by specific sections of the populace, with differing degrees of enthusiasm and rationales. Murray's failure to give due attention to this fact can be attributed, in part, to an unquestioning association of all political events in democracies with popular will.

This association, which dogs much of the historiography of early anti-communism, is revealed in a number of stock phrases used by historians that lack supporting evidence and attribute primary significance in the evolution of political events to popular appeal. Time and again, readers are informed that historical events occurred because "the public," "most people," "Australians," "many Americans," or "the American people" felt that they were necessary. Causal links between events and major protagonists are either not investigated or included in analysis. This problem besets a variety of studies besides those providing a general overview of anti-communism.¹⁶ It also pervades biographies of important political identities of the period and studies of

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁶ Several contributors to another general study, Joan Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties - The Critical Issues*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1972, also subscribe to this assumption. Their contributions will be considered further on.

political extremism, such as those of Preston, Murray, Peterson and Fite, and Higham.¹⁷

Buckingham's study most obviously evinces troubling methodology, making his analysis formulaic, rushed and arbitrary. He concludes, for example, that nineteenth-century populists rejected socialism because they, like "most people" in the United States, "perceived it as un-American." Similarly, he attributes the demise of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to the fear industrial unionism inspired in "many Americans." And although Buckingham inadvertently admits that the IWW was destroyed by vigilante groups of prominent businessmen and a coalition of state Governors, he nonetheless maintains that the IWW was undone by their defence of free speech and the prevalence of hysteria "on both sides" of industrial conflict, which allegedly poisoned "the public mind against the Left as a whole." Buckingham's analysis of anti-communism continues to be inadequate, as he feebly attributes the rise of anti-Red hysteria in 1919 to the anti-Bolshevik sympathies of "the people," and related persecution of political and cultural minorities to "many Americans [having] lost their sense of perspective."¹⁸

Robert Murray also argues that the passions of "the people" were chiefly responsible for the rise of anti-communism. Throughout his survey he repeatedly connects the "outrageous" behaviour of "super patriots" and the mainstream press with "the public at large," even while the substance of his text contradicts such a conclusion.¹⁹ For example, in his account of anti-IWW violence that broke out in the Washington town of Centralia in November 1919, Murray claims that the riot revealed "the extent to which anti-radical thinking and propaganda had affected the public mind." Yet he establishes that the incident resulted from the initiative of a businessmen's patriotic society and the AL. In addition, he imprudently concludes that enthusiastic support accorded the Legion by press barons and conservative elements of the Congress and the federal Administration proves that "majority opinion was convinced that the responsibility for the lawlessness ... rested squarely on [radical] shoulders."²⁰ Other

¹⁷ For an example of such a biography, see Stanley Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1963.

¹⁸ Buckingham, *America Sees Red*, pp. 7 - 23.

¹⁹ Murray, *The Red Scare*, p. 168.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 181 - 6. After the incident attracted national attention, Congress extended the most

historians, too, have been content to place responsibility for political extremism on the shoulders of "the people." Otis L. Graham, author of an essay "Postwar Progressivism," attributes the collapse of Progressivism and the triumph of political conservatism to the "apathy" of an "ill-informed and irrational" public.²¹

Scholars' acceptance of the determinative influence of popular will has obscured the extent to which reactionary political movements were driven by central figures, and how important elite support was to their fortunes. Joan Hoff Wilson, for example, writes that in only "a few instances" did "respectable" people support the hijacking of "legitimate service and civic groups" to further "antilabor, anticommunist and antiforeign" interests.²² John Higham, similarly, credits the public with terminating abuses of democracy associated with A. Mitchell Palmer, despite the fact that his evidence shows that powerful interest groups, including the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the Bar Association of the City of New York, were decisive in the defeat of "Palmerism" in 1920.²³ Peterson and Fite finally affirm "the people's" influence, concluding that the Red Scare collapsed under the weight of

enthusiastic expressions of gratitude and support to the Legion, while newspapers spoke of "Returned Heroes Slain by I. W. W.," a "Radicalism Run Mad" and "An Act of War Against the United States." It is these events and sources that form the basis of Murray's verdict that "the man in the street" were "convinced" of radicals' perfidy. Murray similarly (and unaccountably) claims that President Wilson's response to "the radical menace" resulted from "mounting public pressure," immediately after noting the powerful influence of reactionary members of the President's Cabinet, which was directly reflected in the Administration's draconian censorship restrictions and use of an injunction to smash a major coal strike. See pp. 198 and 205. A number of other incidents are unsatisfactorily explained by the influence of "public opinion," including the failure of the impeachment of A. Mitchell Palmer. Murray writes that the public was "apathetic" about Palmer's fate, suggesting that the vast majority of Americans, residing in the political centre, evinced "neither condemnation nor praise for Palmer's position." They were, apparently, "confused, for although many had become sceptical of the Attorney General's earlier activities, they were still willing to accept the possibility that his 1919 anti-Red campaign had had some basis in fact. The failure of the attempt to indict Palmer for criminal conduct in office was, however, far less ambiguous or subject to the vagaries of "public sentiment" than Murray indicates. The procedure was simply derailed by a reactionary clique within the presiding Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee, Senator Thomas Sterling, refused to bring the findings of the inquiry before the Judiciary Committee and the Judiciary Committee pointedly refused to accept the dissenting report of Senator Thomas J. Walsh as being representative of the Sub-Committee. Among those who buried Walsh's report was Senator Lee Overman, convener of the first major Senatorial inquiry into the effects of Bolshevism in the United States. See pp. 256 - 7 and Louis F. Post, *The Deportations Delirium of 1920: A Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience*, Da Capo Press, New York, 1970 (originally published 1923), pp. 302 - 3. Overman and his colleagues, including Le Baron Colt (a pronounced patriot who saw limitless evil in foreign foes of the United States), were opposed by Senators Walsh, George W. Norris and William E. Borah, all of whom would be accused of communist treachery by the super-patriot Fred Marvin and the Congressman Martin W. Littleton, in 1927. Colt, Marvin and Littleton will all appear at later points in this thesis.

²¹ Otis L. Graham, "Postwar Progressivism," in Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*, p. 18.

²² *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.

public opposition. They state that "legal repression" brought about by the Scare abated as "people finally came to realise that there had been no real danger from the Bolsheviks in the first place" and that their attention became increasingly occupied with "other things such as prohibition, woman suffrage, and the coming presidential election."²⁴

This tendency to ascribe the fate of major political forces within a democracy to popular will alone rests on more than an under-analysed association of events with social mood. It is made tenable by a failure to examine the systemic structural weaknesses of democracies. Peterson and Fite decline to accept important historiographical challenges, preferring instead to point the finger of history at an amorphous mass of "people" that is equally responsible for social outcomes. This permits them to praise and take comfort in the efforts of *a few good men* to uphold democracy.²⁵ Indeed they appear, at times, almost cavalier in their disregard for the gravity of anti-communism's challenge to democratic processes, exhibiting unwarranted confidence in the strength of democratic institutions.²⁶ Such theoretical reductionism encourages many inappropriate impressions of political extremism. Movements such as anti-communism appear to emanate wildly and shapelessly from a myriad of street-level sources and the complex psychological and political character of such forces are ignored.

²³ Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, p. 233.

²⁴ Quoting Murray, they also contend that "the temper of war [gave] way to the temper of peace" and that "it was too much to expect that Americans would for long exhibit wartime hysteria, even when stimulated by the fears of radicalism, when those fears proved to be illusory." See Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, p. 293.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294. Peterson and Fite's failure to emphasise the importance of political factors, including changes to the structure of government arising through the growth of bureaucracies is particularly pronounced in their unwarranted implication that officials such as Louis Post, the assistant secretary of Labor during the Red Scare, succeeded in reversing the "extreme actions" of men such as Mitchell Palmer. William Preston demonstrates, as will this thesis, that the influence of men such as Palmer and their repressive programs was far greater in the long term than the defence of libertarian principles expedited, from time to time, by a handful of unusually-principled senior executives. See also Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*.

²⁶ Peterson and Fite write, for example, that "the idea of repressing radicals by jailing them was silly because ideas are not so easily curbed. The way to deal with the problem was to try to remove the causes of the discontent and restlessness rather than to suppress manifestations of that unrest." Their use of the word "silly" seems rather mild, to say the least, and in any case is misleading, for physical repression of radicals, as they themselves appreciate, *was* effective in stifling the spread of ideas. Further, their assertion that "it took over a year after the war for a majority of the American people to recognise this elementary principle" is entirely unjustified. See Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, p. 294.

Broadly speaking, Australian historians have not so crudely ascribed political events to popular influence, though exceptions to this general rule can be found.²⁷ The political strength of labour in Australia throughout the twentieth century has arguably forced Australian historians to demonstrate a greater awareness and acknowledgment of the importance of class division within the national body, in comparison with their American counterparts. For this reason, Australian historians less readily associate the views of the mainstream press, the judiciary, politicians and special interest groups with "the people." Nonetheless, Australian historiography lacks a focussed study of the impact of communism on the inter-war period and in general betrays a widespread unwillingness to extend the theoretical parameters of analysis of political extremism. In addition, the value of several key studies of left-wing organisations has been diminished by their failure to speculate on the broader implications of the power of conservative and reactionary forces in the period.²⁸

For these reasons the historian who reviews the historiography of anti-communism is more than justified in concluding that the analysis of anti-communism is in need of methodological invigoration. The use of psychology as an aid for historical examination of political extremism is an appropriate response to this problem and has been endorsed and undertaken by numerous historians. Peterson and Fite, for instance, note that their monograph is chiefly about social "hysteria ... intolerance and the

²⁷ Hall, for example, casually states that large numbers of German-born, unnaturalised residents of Australia were interned in camps during the Great War because "a large proportion of the population was obsessed with spy mania." Yet the views of "a large proportion of the population" in this matter should not be mistaken for those of Army and security service officers, and the small number of "patriots" informing on unnaturalised residents, who were directly responsible for the policy. See Hall, *The Secret State*, p. 13. J. R. Poynter similarly opines that the Commonwealth's expenditure on defence throughout the 1920s remained low because "perhaps no more than a minority of Australians had felt a sense of urgent insecurity in the Pacific; certainly the majority now felt none." This conclusion is particularly negligent, considering that Poynter establishes that Australian defence policy rested in the hands of literally a handful of men, as Australia's tiny external affairs bureaucracy was in its infancy. See J. R. Poynter, "The Yo-Yo Variations: Initiative and Dependence in Australia's External Relations, 1918 - 1923," in *Historical Studies*, Vol. 14, 1969 - 1971, pp. 231 - 49.

²⁸ John F. Williams and Judith Smart are among those historians who have effectively differentiated "the public" from specific agents of change in Australian history. See Williams, *Quarantined Culture* and Judith Smart, "Feminists, Food and the Fair Price: The Cost of Living Demonstrations in Melbourne, August-September 1917," in *Labour History*, No. 50, May 1986. Verity Burgmann and Stuart Macintyre have both written monographs examining Australian left wing, revolutionary parties. Burgmann limits her account of the Australian IWW to profiling an organisation which offered "an example of more effective oppositional politics, whether within the labour movement or in wider society, while" Macintyre also declines to comment extensively on the legacy of the repression of the Communist Party of Australia, preferring to focus on the deep flaws "that nurtured tyranny within its emancipatory scheme." See Verity Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism - The IWW in*

demand for conformity," subjects about which they believe "psychology and social psychology have much to say."²⁹ They do not, however, develop this aspect of inquiry. Murray, who also recognises the presence of psychological factors in the Red Scare, and makes frequent reference to the "hysteria" of super-patriots, similarly declines to relate psychology more precisely to the phenomenon.³⁰ Joel Kovel is one historian who has (more recently) analysed the centrality of psychopathology in anti-social, political behaviour. In *Red Hunting in the Promised Land*, Kovel attributes the distinctive strength and importance of anti-communism to various kinds of passion: sexual, moral and theological. Emphasising the emotional character of anti-communism, Kovel notes that anti-communists were united in perceiving a "sense of superordinate badness" in communism, which transformed their opposition to the doctrine into a spiritual crusade. He states:

anticommunism became a kind of state religion in cold war America ... a kind of deification of the state and a quasi-spiritual rendering of politics [splitting] the world into radically separate moral domains, turning dissent into heresy.³¹

In such an atmosphere, when politics mutates into doctrinal crusading, conceptual fundamentalism – expressed through virulent, irrational hatred – becomes the vital force binding the extraordinary actions and statements of extremist movements. Nonetheless, in spite of his theoretical sophistication, Kovel's treatment of popular influence and participation in anti-communism is still problematic. Although he rigorously distinguishes the influence of political "elites" from that of ordinary citizens, and elite from "populist or mass anticommunism," he maintains that anti-communism turned American "democracy into inquisition" and, moreover, that "the source" of anti-communist, moral absolutism lay "in the recesses of collective identity." He also argues that even though anti-communist leaders gave the phenomenon a "conscious shape for their political ends," the people's "leadership

Australia, CUP, Melbourne, 1995, p. 276 and Stuart Macintyre, *The Reds – The Communist Party of Australia, from Origins to Illegality*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p. 413.

²⁹ Peterson and Fite, *Opponents of War*, p. vii.

³⁰ Both John Higham and John F. Williams often describe the role of psychology in political and cultural extremism. However, Higham's use of such theory is, in this writers' judgment, not particularly developed, while Williams' area of interest is too narrow to permit close comparison with works such as Higham's and Peterson and Fite's.

³¹ Kovel, *Red Hunting*, p. 8.

[came] from the American soil no less than [did] the masses of people, and their success in public life [depended] in good measure on being able to draw upon and focus the common culture."³²

While anti-communism was present and strong in the American population at large, Kovel's concept of "collective identity" is too ill-defined to enhance understanding of the way in which public opinion and popular culture is formed. Conclusions founded on habitual references to a collective entity whose structure, actions and opinions are unverified require detailed historical analysis. In studying anti-communism, historians must better explain the fundamental issues of precisely who supported, enforced and tolerated anti-communism, along with the reasons why they did. These questions cannot be resolved unless the identity of those who were repressed and those who repressed others is rigorously examined. In addition, the relative power of historical agents must be judged. Evidence unearthed in this thesis suggests that more often than not, very few of "the people" regularly participated in anti-communist activity. Historically, only a fraction of the population of the United States has been instrumental in formulating and spreading earlier forms of political extremism. David Brion Davis concludes, for example that "scarcely over twenty-five or thirty" men were responsible for propagating influential paranoid notions of a Southern Slave Power conspiracy prior to the Civil War. The Slave Power conspiracy theory held that a clique of Southern slaveholders was successfully manipulating governments and courts to ensure the survival and expansion of slavery throughout the Union. This notion was "delineated" by a small group of men who drew solely from "one another's works." This fact prompts Davis to advise historians against using "a collective portrait of such counter-subversives [to support] explanatory generalizations" about mass behaviour.³³

The importance of "the people" to the prevalence of political extremism is, therefore, often incidental. Many anti-communist leaders simply did not need widespread public support to achieve many of their objectives, even if they may have needed to *believe* that they had it. One of the more important facts study of anti-communism reveals is

³² Ibid., pp. 87, 8 and 10.

³³ David Brion Davis, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1969, p. 62.

the degree to which significant anti-communist leaders could operate beyond the public's control. Only senior politicians could really be weakened by (concentrated and mobilised) public opinion. Other anti-communist powerbrokers, including federal and state bureaucrats, judges, district attorneys, business organisations and patriotic associations were subject more to special interests than to "the people's" authority. And when, on the odd occasion, politicians – and, even less frequently, bureaucrats, patriots and businessmen – were called to account by minority sections of "the public" – such as eminent lawyers and energetic civil liberties groups – they were permitted to pass the buck of responsibility until inquiries foundered for lack of support.³⁴

In short, to suppose that the "leaders" of anti-communism had to refer their actions to the sovereign people is to put the cart before the horse. If such an assumption is rejected, analysis of anti-communism can better expose the functioning and structure of power in democratic societies. Anti-communist hysteria can reveal much about the relationship between the administrators of law, order, information and morality, and the bulk of "the people," who were *not* privileged to formulate social policy, but *were* subject to its authority and influence. Anti-communism must not be regarded simply as an expression of mass xenophobia, hatred and fear, for it is a phenomenon that was in a large measure produced and directed by powerful elites and special interests, who either whipped themselves into a paranoid frenzy or manipulated the public for financial and political benefit. In either case, anti-communist leaders achieved success by imposing or grafting *their* objectives onto those of the wider community. The "public," generally distant from the political arena, was consistently and deliberately misinformed about the ideological struggle anti-communist crusaders waged in their name and anti-communism represented a major political victory for the forces of reaction and conservatism.³⁵ Historians, therefore, must ask why "leaders" gave anti-

³⁴ The inconclusive investigation into the infamous, anti-radical actions of A. Mitchell Palmer and the Department of Justice shows how anti-communists avoided public scrutiny and accountability. Before the Senate Committee investigating the affair was derailed by reactionary interests within the Committee, it heard evidence from Palmer and his subordinates regarding how illegal investigations had come about. Generally ignorant of constitutional and legislative provisions governing the conduct of the investigations, Palmer deferred all questions to the then chief of the Bureau of Investigation's General Intelligence Division, J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover, in turn, stated that local Department of Justice officials had been entirely responsible for organising raids of radical premises and arrests of alien radicals and that he had had no idea how many search warrants had been sought and issued. The matter was permitted to rest there. See Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 222 – 7 and footnote 16.

³⁵ This conclusion is widely accepted, including by the historians I have referred to. Joan Hoff Wilson, for example, avers that the spectre of radicalism prevented moral and technological change from

communism a "shape for their political ends," and account for anti-communism's popular appeal without assuming that all such efforts were "conscious," or drew upon and focussed a "common culture."

The understanding of the psychopathology and social structure of anti-communism can also be furthered by close examination of the identification and treatment of suspected radical organisations and individuals by patriots, governments, covert intelligence agencies, and conservative business and civic associations who uniformly identified communism with the same persons and causes. The enemies of the United States, for instance, were habitually classified within a few categories. First there were those groups and individuals reckoned to boast an obvious, open loyalty to Russia. Then there were the unions and associations whose behaviour revealed their subterranean, communist character. These groups included the Worker's Party of America, newspapers that treated fears of imminent revolution with scepticism, and unions that held unemployment rallies, or objected to racial quotas in immigration laws.³⁶ In support of these organisations were ethnic and minority groups with communist aims - including feminism and equal rights - that were attempting to hijack the political system. Other dangerous groups posed as reformers of American political institutions and guardians of constitutional liberties. They were regarded as socialist, internationalist lackeys. The foremost such association was the much-hated American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which was supported by reform societies like the League for the Amnesty of Political Prisoners and the Public Ownership League. Supporters of seemingly benign reform, such as constitutional and legislative amendments to prohibit exploitative child labour, were similarly suspected of aiding a Soviet scheme to reorganise juvenile labour and education, by keeping youths in

stimulating "equivalent change" in crucial, "perennial features of American life ... race relations" and conservative "economic and political concepts." See Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*, p. xxiv.

³⁶ J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from 1924 until his death in 1972, particularly mistrusted what he referred to as the "Jewish section" of the Worker's Party, which he believed was striving to capture the labour movement. [See General Intelligence Bulletin of 15/9/25 - 15/10/25, forwarded to the Director of MI on 4/11/25, Military Intelligence Files, Reel 23]. Another important super-patriot, journalist and lobbyist Fred Marvin denounced the Moving Pictures Operators and Upholsterers Union, which opposed the immigration laws, in his *Daily Data Sheet*, the organ of his patriotic society the Key Men of America, in his issue of 20/10/27. [See Loyola University of Chicago, Elizabeth Cudahy Library, Dorr E Felt Collection]

school until the age of eighteen, to facilitate their subjection to extended communist instruction.³⁷

As varied and many as these causes and organisations are, they nonetheless represent a mere handful of the categories formulated by anti-communists to pigeonhole their enemies. The existence of such categories indicates that anti-communism wholly lacked ideological and corporeal boundaries. Only histories which incorporate psychological theory can hope to account for the volume and diversity of suspect organisations and individuals, for the only consistent threads binding these entities together were psychological.

Anti-communism in the inter-war period was a product of shared paranoid feelings, characterised by habitual lapses into chronic conceptual simplification, the cultivation of conspiracy theories, intense fear of hostile penetration and the nurturing of bitter resentment toward externalised, separated enemy Others. These feelings made anti-communists yearn for a change in the social and political structure of their local and national communities. They wanted to seize civic power and entrust it solely to an (imagined) constituency whose loyalty was incontestable. The composition of this constituency, it was hoped, would not be determined through notions of democratic justice and participation. Anti-communists rather desired to give control of their communities to a *kinship group*, defined, in part, by resolute anti-communism. This in-group had a responsibility to strike back at the communist Other, which was invested with terrible, projected attributes, to protect itself. Anti-communists were convinced that they could not afford to hold faith with all elements of the civic body and shared a strong fear of real social equality, or *a need for inequality*, based on a basic sense of mistrust in collective, mutual reliance. The anti-communist Self constructed itself in increasingly narrow, reactionary terms, conceived its own worth, relative to the Other, with gross conceit and made concerted efforts to abolish popular franchise and reorder society around a trusted, worthy system of reduced suffrage. This behaviour originates in what several scholars, notably Richard Hofstadter,

³⁷ *The Woman Patriot*, Vol 9. #17, 1 September 1925, "The Communist Plot to Capture the Youth of America."

David Brion Davis and Eli Sagan, have described this as the "paranoid position" of the psyche.³⁸

Psychology teaches that individual psychic perception must develop through various phases, similar to sexual development. In early childhood, a child regards itself as omnipotent, believing its thoughts "operate the world and the people in it."³⁹ Whereas a healthy psyche develops beyond this misapprehension, a psychotic remains convinced of their own omnipotence. Eli Sagan, author of *The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America*, contends that this "developmental view" of the psyche illustrates the "causes of human unhappiness," demonstrating that the road to adulthood is "enormously complicated." Failure to negotiate barriers to maturation produces "anxiety and depression, the two great manifestations of human distress." Nobody, Sagan warns, "does more than reasonably accomplish this journey." In its relationship to the external world, the psyche therefore must tread a "crucial developmental sequence: (1) paranoia, (2) the paranoid position, and (3) overcoming the paranoid position."⁴⁰ No adult psyche is free from "some significant residue of the paranoid position." By the same token, he suggests that every society, like an individual, cannot completely escape the reach of the paranoid position and the degree to which success in mastering the paranoid position occurs can "differ profoundly ... from one decade to the next, even from one year to the next."⁴¹ David Brion Davis' *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style* reinforces this view. Carefully distinguishing "the word 'paranoid' ... from the disease of paranoia," Davis states that paranoid conduct refers to "patterns of behaviour that can be found on a continuum from extreme abnormality to relative normality." He also argues that all people, at one time or another, experience "paranoid moments."⁴²

The rhetoric and actions of anti-communists are totally consistent with the mindset

³⁸ See Davis, *Slave Power*, Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965 and Eli Sagan, *The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America*, Basic Books, NEW YORK, 1991. Whereas Hofstadter popularised the term "paranoid style," Sagan has modified this term into the "paranoid position," a term I find more useful.

³⁹ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴² Davis, *Slave Power*, p. 6.

Hofstadter, Davis and Sagan describe. Hofstadter and Sagan best explain why the significant difference between the paranoid position and paranoia is decisive in making paranoid position behaviour viable. The very fact that paranoid individuals collectively realise that they are *not* omnipotent permits broad subscription to the pivotal feelings that underpin paranoid-style politics.⁴³ As Hofstadter succinctly states:

It is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant.⁴⁴

Sagan, elaborating this observation, adds:

The "normal psychopathology" of human existence, the "psychotic-like" actions of those who rule society, the extent to which deep irrationalities govern the behaviour of nations - all resonate significantly within the concept of "paranoid."⁴⁵

Hofstadter and his successors have used the term "paranoid" because they have found that "no other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy" manifested by numerous extremist movements throughout history.⁴⁶ They have little trouble in showing that paranoid politics is an "old and recurrent [phenomenon] whose content remains the same even when it is adopted by [people] of distinctly different purposes." While it "comes in waves of different intensity, it [is] all but ineradicable" and flourishes not because it is concerned with "truth or falsity" but with addressing primal psychic needs through a mode of advocacy and belief.⁴⁷ Hofstadter, Davis and Sagan find examples of paranoid-style politics in every era of American history. Significantly, they demonstrate that the propaganda of mid-twentieth century anti-communism, late

⁴³ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 15. Hofstadter also notes of the paranoid, "Insofar as he does not usually see himself singled out as the individual victim of a personal conspiracy, he is somewhat more rational and much more disinterested. His sense that his political passions are unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indignation." See Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Here I am paraphrasing Hofstadter from his own work, and from Davis'. See Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 6 and Davis, *Slave Power*, p. 3 respectively.

nineteenth century populism, and late eighteenth century anti-Catholicism and anti-Masonry is basically identical. Once specific names of protagonists are removed, they are interchangeable, absolutely uniform in their psychological aspect. They are, nonetheless, careful not to suggest that such protagonists are unaffected by particular historical conditions.

For those mired in the paranoid position, their "quintessential overriding concern ... is the question of [social] control." Individuals and kinship groups fret over who is dominating whom, and, anxious to be in a position of pre-eminence, direct "all activity, mental and actual ... toward obtaining a certain kind of controlling power." The paranoid issue "shrill laments" that they are losing or have lost "controlling power" and are fixated with "fantastical attempts to regain it."⁴⁸ The paranoid *weltanschauung* is prefigured around a fundamental distrust in people. The paranoid Self cannot avoid the conclusion that it is surrounded by "conspirators and traitors." The paranoid similarly cannot accept that "those of contrary political positions are ... entitled to their opinions," because they are not loyal to the society which the Self cherishes. In addition, they are somehow reckoned not to be "a part" of the Self. The Self also imagines that it is constantly the subject of fearsome external threats. Forever anticipating assault, from both within and without, the paranoid Self inevitably magnifies the power and ingenuity of the enemy Other⁴⁹ (see Figure 1). The panic induced by the siege-mentality of the paranoid position promotes obsessive fears of internal contamination and corresponding regulation of the composition of society; unwanted elements are eliminated, expelled and repelled. But the paranoid cannot accept that the measures it takes to ensure its protection are sufficient and it must live in a "more or less continuous state of total mobilization." Prompted by fundamental pessimism, the paranoid conclude that the world is implacably hostile and that their only viable mode of defence is permanent offence.⁵⁰


The slide into the paranoid position is triggered by a perception that one's communal space, one's "home," is being taken away from the Self and transformed into

⁴⁸ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 16.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18 - 19. Sagan's conclusions are influenced by David Shapiro's *Neurotic Styles*, Basic Books, New York, 1965.

There are just two moves they can make
— war against Russia which will mean
revolution at home; peace with Russia,
which will mean the spread of Soviet
principles throughout the world.—*Liberator*,
Feb. 1880



"Checkmate, Gentlemen!"

(Figure 1: The notion that the Self was forever on the brink of being crushed by the Other is expressed in this 1920 cartoon, which shows how quickly the Bolshevik leader Lenin inspired acute fear in the United States.

Source: *Revolutionary Radicalism – Its History, Purpose and Tactics, with an Exposition and Discussion of the Steps Being Taken and Required to Curb It*, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities in the Senate of the State of New York, Vol. 1. Part I.)

something unfamiliar. The Australian political scientist Ghassan Hage, author of *White Nation – Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, argues that the paranoid engage in paranoid-style politics to re-establish "a privileged relationship between" the Self and its imagined "territory."⁵¹ This territory or "home" is more like "a structure of feelings than a physical ... construct," a series of "fragmentary images, rather than explicit formulations of what the homely nation ought to be like" that is imbibed from one's social surroundings. Such images structure one's home territory:

like many other images of homely life, around the key themes of familiarity, security and community ... Familiarity is particularly associated with practical spatial and linguistic knowledge [and] when the [paranoid] feels that he or she can no longer operate in, communicate in or recognise the national space in which he

⁵¹ Ghassan Hage, *White Nation – Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1998, p. 28.

or she operates, [their community] appears to be losing its homely character. Familiarity is essential for a sense of community, but the latter also requires a sense of shared symbolic forms and the existence of support networks of friends and relatives. Security is impossible without familiarity and community, but it also involves the possibility of satisfying one's basic needs and an absence of threatening otherness.⁵²

When the paranoid feel insecure, dissatisfied and aware of otherness, they move onto the offensive. The revolution in immigration policy effected in the United States during the 1920s is a good example of paranoid, aggressive behaviour. In all its essential aspects the new immigration practice reflected the imperatives of the paranoid position. The stated motive of the new immigration restrictions was to protect the nation from being "swamped" and "contaminated" by foreign peoples and doctrines. The individuals and groups identified as being unwelcome were so determined because the paranoid imagined that their racial, cultural and political heritage made them unassimilable. And the methods used to effect the policy change, the drastic reduction of the number of immigrants admitted to the nation, the violent ejection of thousands of individuals and the brutal separation of families and communities, bear the hallmarks of paranoid behaviour. Anti-communism of the period is generally characterised by paranoid, "deliberate, planned" use of violence and even murder as an "instrument of political policy" by "non-psychotic paranoid people," including police, patriotic societies, covert intelligence agents and the military.⁵³

The "psychological mode ... most intrinsic" to paranoid behaviour is that of projection, which Sagan describes as "the attribution to external figures of motivations, drives, or other tensions that are repudiated and intolerable in oneself." Intent on dominating their environment, the paranoid allege that shapeless, enemy Others are guilty of this desire. So, unwilling and unable to forebear "the tolerance that democratic society demands," Australian and American anti-communists discovered conspiracies hatched by the Other to destroy democracy.⁵⁴ Paradoxically,

⁵² Ibid., p. 40.

⁵³ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 19.

⁵⁴ Ibid. Sagan's description of the mechanics of projection is strongly influenced by Shapiro.

the paranoid Self, feverishly guarding against the imagined assaults of the Other, begins to behave in precisely the manner it ostensibly fears. This particularly typifies the behaviour of American anti-communists, who, concerned about communist infiltration and subversion of society, created an industry and culture of covert surveillance, blackmail and physical intimidation under the auspices of governments and intelligence agencies. And the political right in both nations, mindful of the ability of the left to effectively organise, increasingly marshaled its own forces into new collectives, while continuing to denounce anti-individualist, anti-capitalist principles of organisation.⁵⁵ The projection of the paranoid is prompted by an inability to create or recognise "psychological distance" between the Self and the Other. To the paranoid there are only friends and enemies, good and bad parts of the Self, characterised respectively by amity and love, and hostility and envy. Without a strong, internal sense of identity and stability, the paranoid are unable to imagine "an independent, possibly different, even indifferent, other."⁵⁶ This makes participation in democratic society almost impossible for the paranoid, because they cannot bear to place their own security in the hands of others who may not share their values and goals.

In attempting to understand the durability of the paranoid position, it is helpful to remember that the paranoid position is itself a defence against the more severe psychopathology of paranoia. What prevents those in the paranoid position from necessarily progressing past this mode is the "unconscious anxiety" that they might not advance into a state of lessened angst but, on the contrary, regress into paranoia. This is why the paranoid cling to primitive, pejorative concepts, such as racialism, to distinguish themselves from the Other. Without maintaining these distinctions the mental health of the paranoid would further decline. So, even in democratic society, "psychological bondage" to "persistent modes of paranoid defence," such as imperialism and anti-Semitism, remain.⁵⁷ There are several reasons why such modes of defence are expressed in nativist and racist terms (both of which are central in anti-communism). Fundamentally, the attempt to reorganise society along these lines

⁵⁵ Ibid. Sagan notes that Hofstadter observed that the paranoid were inclined sometimes to mirror the superficial visage of their Other. The fiercely anti-Catholic Ku Klux Klan, for example, adopted priestly regalia, elaborate rituals and a regimented hierarchy.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

derives from the desire to establish a dominant kinship group. The paranoid imagine that nationalist, religious and racial concepts can separate the deserving Self from the Other and bind the kinship group together. This explains why the racial prejudice underpinning "racist" behaviour frequently serves not so much to defend a notion of the racial superiority of a specific racial type but rather to marshal the power of racial prejudice to defend an imagined communal space which the Self aims to master; the Self seeks to control that space so that it can once more *choose* whether or not to tolerate the presence of Others.⁵⁸

Nativism and racism become powerful unifying notions for the paranoid because they express feelings of loss of territorial and cultural control that a broad cross-section of people can simultaneously experience. They also draw upon deep cultural understandings, shared by a wide variety of socio-economic groups, with disparate interests and politics. Among the most important of these understandings is a conviction of entitlement to power. Nativist, racist and anti-communist rhetoric rests on a belief that the nativist, racist or anti-communist has a superior right to govern their communal territory. Hage dubs this conviction the sense of "governmental belonging." The sense of governmental belonging within a territory is, rather than a question of legal rights, one of "cultural entitlement" and its importance lies in the fact that on the level of "everyday" interaction between "individuals and groups from [a] dominant culture" and "minorities," it, rather than "formal" rights, most influences an individual or groups' social position.⁵⁹ This suggests that the compact of citizenship, even within democracies like Australian and the United States, is based, to a significant extent, not on political, but rather culturally-conferred types of entitlement, conveyed through notions such as race, religion and nationality. Indeed, some scholars have strongly argued that governing conceptions of political entitlement in western democracies are historically grounded in notions of inherent, natural characteristics rather than political compacts. In his masterful survey of the evolution of modern racism, *Race - the History of an Idea in the West*, Ivan Hannaford notes that from the mid-seventeenth century until after the Second World War, the "rights, duties, and obligations which," according to ancient Greek and Roman perception, 'released man from Nature [came to be] seen *in* Nature and

⁵⁸ Hage, *White Nation*, p. 28 - 31.

directly derived from it regardless of the postulates of politics."⁶⁰ Such an observation assumes critical significance in the analysis of Australian and American anti-communism, for the importance of racialised concepts of belonging and entitlement as foundation stones in anti-communist fantasies of superiority can hardly be overstated.

How society progresses into democracy and therefore, the institutionalisation of mutual trust and obligation, depends on an ability to go "beyond the personal to the abstract." Sagan states "the paranoid position is intensely personal." For the paranoid:

All evil wears a specific human face. The individual suffering from paranoia may believe in malicious cosmic forces disrupting and poisoning the world, but the paranoid sees a person or persons behind all life's evils.⁶¹

The paranoid is capable of devotion only to identifiable, trusted, familiar persons, not to ideal notions of freedom, tolerance and equality. Moreover, the paranoid can only respect and reside with that which is like itself. Unable to "respond to the abstract, generalized human quality of those ... superficially different," the paranoid direct "xenophobia ... internally into society," finding "security and comfort ... only in a completely homogenous world."⁶² Because the paranoid has an underdeveloped ability to cope with difference internally, and often must still remain committed to democratic culture, the paranoid splits society into those who legitimately belong and those who do not, so that the pretence of democracy survives. Paranoid impulses, therefore, "seek satisfaction outside the society" and "those who are beyond the pale of democratic sovereignty become ... objects of aggression."⁶³ This aggression is not merely directed toward that which is clearly external and foreign. There is also violent internal contraction of acceptance and inclusion, an abandonment of the concept of democratic citizenship and of the psychological strength it requires. The paranoid attempts to reconstitute social organisation on the basis not of "justice, but kinship - a tribal bond":

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 40, 46, 49 and 51.

⁶⁰ Hannaford, *Race*, (for quote see p. 12).

⁶¹ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 23.

⁶² Ibid., p. 24.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 25.

a replication and extension, not a transformation, of the bonds of kinship: comradeship, relatedness, an acute sense of in-group belonging, conflicted love, and an intense sense of out-group exclusion.⁶⁴

Democracy, because it dissolves "kinship forms of social coherence," stimulates separation anxiety. The paranoid no longer feel included in or protected by the collective.⁶⁵ Indeed, democracy cannot completely replace the psychological need for kinship, at best it can subsume or channel it, for:

no matter how well developed the concept of justice may be within a society, at the border of the *polis*, the tribal bond is supreme. Having left our parents' protection, we look to the tribe to assuage our anxieties. It becomes the common repository of our interests and we are ready to defend it against the interests of other *poleis* ... Like the kinship system, the state defines us, preserves us, defends us against threatening others. The security of the kin is a fundamental defence against the paranoid anxiety of being left totally without protection. It is almost impossible to live without it.⁶⁶

Periodically, then, a democracy's capacity to serve as a vessel for feelings of belonging and defence breaks down. The fundamental question is why this actually occurs. Like much anti-democratic reaction, anti-communism erupted in the United States and Australia during an extended period of serious instability. War, European revolution, economic hardship and internal, social change and conflict undermined anti-communists' confidence in their capacity to continue as a cultural power within a democracy; a democracy which they dominated became an insufficient palliative for their separation anxiety.

Even during periods of security, an individual's personal confidence in the strength of their governmental belonging is tenuous, resting largely on the sense that while one is not actually a ruler, one nonetheless belongs, by virtue of one's cultural identity, to society's ruling group. When an individual's cultural identity no longer appears to

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 301.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 146.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 303.

embody "a hope of social mobility," when "the order of things" – the cultural environment – becomes unfamiliar and when no "coercive apparatus" – such as the state – appears capable of guaranteeing the survival of the familiar order of things, then the paranoid individual abandons the idea of democracy.⁶⁷ Under such circumstances the paranoid imagine that Others are responsible for the perceived collapse of their social power and they begin to evince, in the words of Sagan, "a fright of freedom and a contempt and hatred for the concept of equality." Anti-communists sought to relieve these anxieties through radically extending their own powers and restricting the freedoms of millions of other people.

The role of separation, splitting or Othering in this process is vital. As Sagan explains:

if such restriction is undertaken in the interests of "justice," then an enormous psychological and moral ambivalence is reconciled in one stroke.⁶⁸

Anti-communists, in order to reconstitute their communities, and expel the socialist threat, formed "networks" of clubs and societies to help them bring back meaning and belonging to collective society. The explosion of patriotic societies, directly stimulated in Australia and the United States by elite political executives, powerful business magnates and the covert intelligence hierarchy, embodied anti-communists' search for "purpose, place, and order." Anti-communists wanted to resolve the critical "moral, psychological and political problems" of determining the boundaries of inclusion within the political Self, the behaviour of that Self toward the external world and the size of the Self's franchise.⁶⁹

The actions and thoughts stemming from paranoid drives are defence mechanisms operating against the Self's fear of annihilation, a fear directly related to paranoia but of greatly reduced severity. Unlike sufferers of paranoia, who frequently seek refuge in delusions of omnipotence, the paranoid will most frequently set out to make the external world safe for habitation, through conquest. "Those who adopt this manner," states Sagan, "have made much of the world's history." They project their own irresolvable conflicts onto society, which is transformed into the theatre of conflict

⁶⁷ Hage, *White Nation*, pp. 211 – 17.

⁶⁸ Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 147.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 147 and 304.

resolution. Whereas the clinical paranoid believes him or herself to be the direct object of hostile conspiracies, the "spokesman of the paranoid style" detects a threat to his or her nation and the culture of countless others.⁷⁰ Indeed, Hofstadter suggests that paranoid spokesperson's belief that their "political passions are unselfish and patriotic ... goes far to intensify [their feeling] of righteousness ... and moral indignation."⁷¹ The paranoid who actually channels these feelings into concrete attempts at conquest oscillates between paranoia and the paranoid position, "sometimes acting truly psychotically and sometimes shrewdly paranoid." Such extreme individuals like Hitler:

regard a "vast" or "gigantic" conspiracy as *the motive force* in historical events. History *is* a conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the usual methods of political give-and-take, but an all-out crusade. The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms - he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization.⁷²

Neither American nor Australian anti-communism produced a Hitler and particular idiosyncratic characteristics prevented antipodean and American anti-communists from assuming aims of external conquest, but their rhetoric is uniformly saturated with paranoid psychology. It is clear that paranoid anti-communists affected by this siege mentality also believed that they had to destroy the threats they perceived, because the failure to do so would result not in "peace and equality" but their own abject slavery. The paranoid cannot believe in the benign or friendly intentions of the Other. Those who strive for dominance find the very concept of equality, "the necessity to recognize the true existence of others ... anathema; it stands between him or her and the medicine need to assuage anxiety." Further:

the paranoid who uses domination as a primary defence has an absolute need for a victim, a need as intense as the alcoholic's for drink. If everyone in adult world

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

⁷¹ Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 4.

⁷² Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 27.

must be treated as an equal there will be no victims. What then will we do with our anxiety-panic?⁷³

Anti-communists' most strident, virulent attacks on social radicalism totally repudiate the very concept of intrinsic human equality. This discomfort with egalitarianism is also expressed in the "paranoidia of greed," the sense that "the only way to be secure and to reduce anxiety is to have 'more.'"⁷⁴ Many anti-communists manifested this irrational drive in their determination to demoralise, injure, and frequently kill, striking workers or political protestors, rather than make concessions or permit collective bargaining and representation. For many historians it is self-evident that the efforts of industrialists and their allies to crush trade unionism and public ownership of resources was merely *rational*, self-interested politics. Yet such rationales do not explain why poor and anti-communist leaders, for instance, successfully recruited lower middle class people. Moreover, at the most basic level, no political or economic behaviour can be interpreted as being purely rational and the question of why so many people want *necessarily* to have *more* than their fellow citizens is not so easily answered. Nor is the question of why they are prepared to go to the ultimate lengths to achieve and perpetuate inequality and hierarchy. While the process of splitting society was essential for the paranoid, the paranoid position nonetheless places individuals under enormous psychological stress. The paranoid convince themselves that they are special victims of hideous, malignant Others and set out to achieve "hopelessly demanding and unrealistic goals." As these goals are unattainable, the paranoid experience heightened frustration.⁷⁵ Yet the process of splitting satiates the paranoid in spite of this failure; detection of enemies brings a new sense of "ideological discipline" to a kinship group.⁷⁶

Australian and American anti-communists, like the propagators of Slave Power conspiracy fears, split society to help them emphasise "the need for elevating and purifying society [and revive] a sense of communal solidarity" and protect "fundamental values."⁷⁷ Anti-communism gave its adherents a renewed "sense of

⁷³ Ibid., p. 29.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, p. 31.

⁷⁶ Davis, *Slave Power*, p. 37.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 64 – 65.

historical identity and purpose" while only so horrible an enemy as international communism could breach "the inner sanctuary of individuality" to the point where enough people would feel compelled to help construct a newly "cohesive community." This is why anti-communist rhetoric, like all paranoid bombast, speaks as much of "the amorality" and criminal indolence of elements of the Self as much as it does of the Other.⁷⁸ Even the failure of a crusade brings the paranoid some fulfillment: "the images of national and personal disintegration" paranoid fear "promotes, as well as the fear of insignificance that propels it ... successfully promotes" paranoid fear "as a drama of survival and heroism."⁷⁹ And anti-communist vigilantism and public policies, particularly restrictive immigration practices, can similarly be viewed as "rituals of [Self] empowerment" providing the paranoid with opportunities to "renew the belief in their possession" of the Self's environment and "make decisions" about its governance.⁸⁰ Moreover, the Other continually allows the paranoid "to believe in the possibility" of creating an ideal space for the Self," saving them from having to contemplate "the impossible nature of what they are pursuing."⁸¹

In succeeding chapters, this thesis will, with the psychological theories just described, illuminate the phenomenon of American and Australian anti-communism. In this respect, comparative analysis of anti-communism is critical. There is much value in comparing the response of communism experienced in two similar societies that shared common, inherited concepts and broad systems of government and it is only through comparative study that general observations about the phenomena of anti-communism and insights into the particular environmental sources and effects of different national contrasts can emerge.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 74, 84 and 83.

⁷⁹ Hage, *White Nation*, p. 225.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 241.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 74.

PART I

Chapter 1: The History of American Anti-Communism, 1917-1935

The Historical Context of American Anti-Communism: An Overview

At the outset of this chapter outlining the history of American anti-communism, it is important to briefly summarise the phenomenon. American anti-communism was built on an edifice of fears, prejudices, and recurrent waves of paranoid feelings, so the historian is challenged to identify its particular significance. As William Preston, Jr. notes, American anti-communism was the product of a "unique convergence of two parallel and often complementary traditions," nativism and anti-radicalism, and its singular authority and influence "reflect[s] the force" of the two "fused" traditions. These movements bequeathed anti-communism important psychological and concrete legacies for "dealing with ... marginal groups in society."¹

During the Great War, anti-radical and nativist consciousness and activity escalated to unprecedented levels. Legislative and administrative procedures, judicial rulings and vigilante acts which had been steadily developing were suddenly channeled, simultaneously, into new practices, creating an environment of extraordinary social repression. In the aftermath of the Great War, a number of avenues for political repression were closed, as various wartime Acts were rescinded and important, right-wing, patriotic societies disbanded. It is these events which have underpinned the widely held view of the 1920s as a period of political "normalcy." Yet beneath the veneer of normalcy, a structural revolution in the government of the United States took place, as a significant number of organisations and procedures formed and developed during the Great War and the Red Scare were quietly institutionalised. As the 1920s progressed, these surviving authoritarian, anti-democratic practices were normalised under the new banner of anti-communism. This chapter will describe how this occurred.

My survey of the origins and implications of American anti-communism will be divided into four parts, examining the early origins of the phenomenon (before and during the Great War), the Red Scare and the post-Scare period. As this is primarily a

¹ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 7.

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study of the psychology and nature of anti-communism, and its implications for conceptions of government, the state and social order, the first two sections remain brief.

The Origins of Anti-Communism: Nativism and Anti-Radicalism in the United States, c. 1870 – 1914

The association of immigrants with political heresy and turmoil was long established in the United States and occasioned recurrent, draconian reaction. As early as 1798, Franco-British conflict prompted a pro-British Congress to pass Alien and Sedition Acts which complicated naturalisation processes, invested the President with extraordinary powers over aliens' rights and empowered the federal government to "punish as crimes remarks ... tending to incite disobedience to the law."² Fifty years later, the arrival of several million Catholic refugees, many of whom were fleeing failed revolutions in Europe, revived nativist fears of imported subversion. However, it was not until the 1870s, when the United States experienced periodic episodes of economic depression, industrial conflict and social dislocation, that anti-nativist and anti-radical reaction began to develop its future, anti-communist shape.

From the mid 1870s until the first decade of the twentieth century, the United States was plagued by economic and political strife. The depression years of 1873 – 7 were marked by strikes, urban riots and armed workers' revolts and harsh living conditions promoted the growth of not only workers' unions but also socialist and anarchist organisations. Another depression in the 1880s condemned millions to unemployment, encouraging industrial warfare of unprecedented savagery and corresponding radicalisation of worker and revolutionary organisations.³ Little relief came in the 1890s, as massive strikes and lockouts drove a greater wedge between capital and labour.⁴

With each succeeding period of disturbance, the identification of terrorism and perfidy with labour organisation and aliens intensified. Industrial magnates, chambers of commerce, mainstream papers and politicians seized upon violent incidents,

² Gordon S. Wood, "Framing the Republic, 1760 – 1820," in Bailyn, Dallek, Davis et al, *The Great Republic*, p. 251.

³ From 1876 – 80 the Socialist Labor Party in the United States increased its membership to 10, 000 members. The Party also published over twenty papers and several of its directors were elected to public office. After 1878, anarchists and socialists also succeeded in boring from within the more mainstream Knights of Labor. The SLP itself split in 1880 as its radical wing committed itself to the violent doctrines of the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakunin, demanding "destruction of...existing class rule...by energetic, relentless, revolutionary and industrial action." See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 25.

particularly the 1886 bombing of Chicago's Haymarket Square and the 1892 assault by the anarchist Alexander Berkman on Henry Clay Frick, the manager of Carnegie Steel's Homestead plant, to promulgate the notion that foreign-born agitators were corrupting the United States' civic culture. Such incidents left a lasting impression, as did the assassination of public officials by radicals in several European nations in the late nineteenth century. From this time, radical aliens wore the odium for any act of political extremism, regardless of their involvement.⁵

As each period of turmoil brought aliens and radicals into greater disrepute, the severity of private and government reaction increased. A new statute aimed at restricting immigration was enacted in 1882. Aliens were increasingly not considered for employment with public agencies and the anti-Catholic American Protestant Association spread its divisive message. Private militias had also begun to put down strikes and popular assemblies, often with the support of police, the newly-established National Guard and federal troops. Such action frequently resulted in the death of workers and, occasionally, of strikebreakers and detectives employed by corporations.⁶

Nonetheless, the strength of fear and resentment for aliens and radicalism was at this time not constant. Residual confidence in governments' capacity to control unorthodox elements and the "invulnerable superiority" of American capitalism periodically restored calm.⁷ However, during the 1890s anti-radicalism and nativism became increasingly inseparable. Conservative reaction intensified and proved more durable. A United States Supreme Court judgment of 1893 was the first of a series of juridical rulings and legislative acts which steadily eroded aliens' rights to access American law. In *Fong Yue Ting v. U. S.*, the Supreme Court declared that deportation

⁴ The most notable such events occurred at the Carnegie Steel Company's foundry in Homestead, Pennsylvania and Chicago, where the Pullman rail strike of 1894 was broken.

⁵ The New York *Herald*, for example, claimed in the 1870s that rail workers riots were "instigated by men incapable of understanding [American] ideas and principles." The Haymarket incident, which sparked riots and saw four anarchists hanged on spurious evidence has been described as an "historical watershed that sent anarchism into oblivion and raised nativism to new heights." The IWW, for example, was persecuted for the bombing of the premises of the *Los Angeles Times* in 1912, before two officials of the Structural Iron Workers, an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor, admitted responsibility. See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 24 - 5 and 48.

⁶ Killings occurred, for example, on the Ohio and Baltimore Railroad in Maryland in 1877, at the McCormick reaper plant outside Chicago in 1886 (the incident which sparked off the Haymarket riot) and the Carnegie Steel lock out of 1892.

should not be considered a form of criminal punishment but rather an administrative process for expelling undesirable aliens.⁸ The Bureau of Immigration controlled the deportation process, beyond the province of the courts, as a succession of Congressional Acts in the first decade of the twentieth century broadened its powers.

These Acts were, in part, a response to events such as the 1901 assassination of president McKinley by an American-born ethnic Hungarian. They aimed to extinguish radical terrorism by punishing foreigners who attacked elected officials and preventing their entry into the country through immigration restrictions and screening processes. President Theodore Roosevelt delineated the state's intent. He proposed that all "believers in anarchistic principles or members of anarchistic societies" be barred from the United States. The "second object" of a legislative program would be the institution of an "educational test" of prospective immigrants, measuring an alien's "capacity to appreciate American institutions and act sanely as American citizens." This, Roosevelt believed, would "decrease the sum of ignorance so potent in producing the envy, suspicion, malignant passion, and hatred of order out of which anarchistic sentiment inevitably [sprung]." Roosevelt also recommended that standards of "economic fitness" be established to prevent the migration of working class peoples who settled in slums, undersold American labour and spread "pestilential social conditions [into the] great cities, where anarchistic organisations [had] their greatest possibility of growth."⁹

Over the next generation, Roosevelt's program was implemented. The Alien Anarchist Act of 1903 changed the regulation of immigration by empowering federal judges to deny citizenship to aliens deemed anarchists. They could also deport anarchist aliens for up to three years after their arrival. A new precedent in American law, the concept of guilt by association, was introduced, as anarchists could be deported for being members of proscribed organisations. The Naturalisation Act of 1906 brought further important change, forcing immigrants to swear not to oppose constitutional government and to disavow anarchism. The Act also terminated the century-old power of State courts to confer citizenship. Yet legislation framed

⁷ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11 – 12. Preston, Jr. notes that this judgment, along with that of *Japanese Immigrants v. U. S.*, ensured that the "Bill of Rights applied only to persons charged with crime."

between 1903 - 10 did not permit the state to deport aliens resident for longer than three years; such action was still regarded as unduly harsh. It also signified the capacity of lawmakers "to accept responsibility for the views acquired by an alien in [their] adopted home." Yet, succeeding legislation enacted during the Great War and after the Red Scare disavowed the notion that American conditions might corrupt political belief, as economic fitness and literacy tests became law in 1917. Such changes reflected "a major ideological" - and psychological - "retrogression."¹⁰

While Congress initially retained some respect for the political effect of social conditions in the United States, the Bureau of Immigration jettisoned this belief. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Bureau improvised an administrative process capable of removing large numbers of aliens with minimal obstruction. Regional Bureau operatives were authorised to apprehend suspects before telegraphing the DL in Washington for individual arrest warrants. This devolution of power gave enormous discretion to local officials "susceptible to local pressure," particularly that exerted by business interests.¹¹ In addition, detained aliens were subjected to "preliminary hearings," informal, extra-legal interviews, which the Bureau used to secure the evidence it required to justify issuing warrants and deportation orders to the aliens whom it routinely deprived of legal counsel.¹²

It is clear that in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, vital notions and practices which would underpin anti-communism became influential. A precedent for extinguishing the civil rights of people with unorthodox political views was set. Moreover, the extinguishment of those rights legitimated the resort to violence by the state and private forces operating with the state's approval, and these forces were being professionalised. They were also becoming accustomed to exercising unfettered power, encouraging resort to paranoid "solutions" to society's problems. The paranoid element of nativism and anti-radicalism only grew in the coming years of turmoil.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 30 - 1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 32.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 14.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

Nativism and Anti-Radicalism in the Great War, 1914 – 1919

Nativist and anti-radical reaction intensified after the outbreak of the Great War. This was due, in part, to the fact that greater force was required to preserve the structure of the United States' political economy. Prior to the Great War, American society was riven by extreme inequality. Two percent of the population owned sixty percent of the nation's wealth, while sixty-five percent of the population earned only five percent of the national income. Between one third and one half of the populace lived in or near starvation and 35, 000 workers died annually in industrial accidents.¹³ With the American Federation of Labor (AFL) failing to assist millions of unskilled workers, many turned to radical organisations, most notably the IWW. After successfully defending free speech rights in numerous regions, the "Wobblies" began to successfully organise labourers in critical industrial sectors. The Wobblies were particularly feared in California, where action cost agricultural bosses perhaps \$40 million from 1914 – 17. By autumn 1917 the union was also threatening oil profits in the west and north-east and had mobilised unemployed migratory lumber workers in the Pacific north-west.¹⁴ For local and, eventually, federal authorities, the suppression of the IWW became an abiding concern, and this proved to be a turning point in the evolution of authoritarian political culture in the United States. The IWW was crushed by an extraordinary coalition of state agencies and private corporations that created the means and established precedents for the treatment of other unorthodox individuals and organisations.

The outbreak of the Great War and the United States' entry into the war in April 1917 was a tragedy for radicals and aliens. The perceived need for total, national unity produced an atmosphere of super-patriotism and prompted the federal executive to assume extraordinary powers to engender nationalism. By May 1917, president Wilson had assumed more power than any of his predecessors.¹⁵ Political rebellion was not tolerated as the federal government moved to stamp out opposition. The 1798 Alien Enemies Act was revived, empowering the government to arrest and deport unnaturalized subjects of an enemy power. This Act was reinforced by measures

¹³ Ibid., pp. 35 – 7.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 51 – 9, 131 and 157.

¹⁵ The president's Special Boards and Commissions directed the drafting of soldiers, industrial production, distribution and arbitration, shipping and rail transportation, telecommunications, energy resources, capital finance and national defence.

directing the flow of political information. At the urging of Wilson's Attorney-General, Thomas Gregory, Congress passed on 15 July an Espionage Act prescribing fines of up to \$10,000 and/or twenty years jail for "false" reports or statements concerning government policy or hampering the war effort. Subjective standards of proof in the juridical administration of political belief were now enshrined in law. The Act became the executive's chief weapon for silencing critics and was used in conjunction with the Alien Anarchist Law and Alien Enemies Act to expel alien radicals. It also conferred extensive censorship powers on the Postmaster-General, whose authority was further augmented by the Trading with the Enemy Act. Meanwhile, a new government agency, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), controlled the dispensation of war information to the general public.

Draconian as these measures were, business and patriot groups nonetheless continued to struggle to stifle dissent and industrial action and powerful business interests turned to the Immigration Act of February 1917 as a new weapon. Rather than petitioning federal authorities, who had failed to curb the activities of the IWW, they sought to influence local authorities.¹⁶ The former Governor of Minnesota, John Lind, for example, in his capacity as a member of the Public Safety Commission of Minnesota, urged immigration inspectors to arrest all alien agitators on the State's mining ranges. Like other "proponents of suppression," Lind "did not demand a full-scale attack" on alien radicals, "but rather a careful ... purge" of a handful of "leading agitators accompanied by ... well-publicised but fictitious [threats] to deport all alien [revolutionaries]." With labour scarce and production levels vulnerable, Lind reasoned that the eradication of the IWW's leadership (two thirds of which, he estimated, comprised aliens) would leave business with a malleable workforce. Deportation procedures were also simple to expedite and far more threatening to radicals than charges leveled under criminal statutes, which required the state to prove individuals' guilt in laborious and slow court procedures.¹⁷ Yet these solutions still took too long and business groups pressured governments to suppress radicals with

¹⁶ The Wilson Administration conducted an abortive investigation into the organisation, in 1915, instructing a special agent from the Department of Justice to see if he could produce an indictment for conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce.

¹⁷ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 99 - 100.

federal troops as well as judicial prosecutions. Both of these measures were countenanced by wartime emergency legislation.¹⁸

In July and August 1917, West coast lumber bosses successfully used federal troops to put down a strike. This was the first time since 1894 that federal soldiers had suppressed an industrial dispute. In early 1917, soldiers were illegally placed at business' disposal by the War Department (DW), which ordered local officers to "sternly repress acts committed with seditious intent" and protect "public utilities" essential to war.¹⁹ Following the example of lumber bosses, agricultural, oil and copper interests also won the right to use troops to crush industrial action. This tactic was spectacularly efficient. Businesses were spared the expense of maintaining private strikebreaking forces and prisoners detained by the Army were unable to present *habeas corpus* petitions, as they were being held by a military power rather than civil authorities. The army and business magnates shamelessly justified this procedure as being necessary for the protection of detained radicals and federal troops continued to police industrial disputes until long after the war.²⁰

The DW was not the only sector of the federal administration determined to destroy the Wobblies and in August 1917, President Wilson formed a Council of National Defence to help his government enforce its legislative provisions. The Council pooled the resources of the President, the Attorney-General and the Department of Justice (DJ), the Department of Commerce and Labor (DL), the Postmaster-General's Office and the AFL. The following month, Thomas Gregory directed the DJ to raid all Wobbly cells across the nation. With documents seized during the raids, over one hundred Wobbly leaders were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the war, while the organisation itself was shown to constitute a conspiracy against constitutional government.²¹ The capacity of the IWW to publicise its cause and fight this attack

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 102 - 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 103 - 5. Preston, Jr. notes that Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution declares that the federal army may suppress disturbances on its own initiative only when federal laws are contravened. It may put down rebellion against State authorities only when legislatures or governors certify that the State's remedies are exhausted and a presidential proclamation ordering rebels to disperse has been issued. A federal Act of 1878 also prohibits federal troops from being used as a *posse comitatus* by federal law officers.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 106 - 9 and 131. The U. S. Army occupied some copper mine camps until 1921.

²¹ Among those charged was the former Socialist presidential candidate Eugene Debs, who was sentenced to ten years jail, while the Wobbly leader "Big" Bill Haywood and 112 other Wobblies were

was then extinguished by the Postmaster-General, who used his censorship powers not only to prevent the Wobblies from distributing any circulars, but also from receiving business letters and other forms of mail in their official premises. Dozens of other socialist publications also lost their second-class mail privileges.²²

The treatment of the IWW typified that meted out to a myriad of organisations and individuals. Other radical groups of the left were prominent and obvious targets of repression. The headquarters of the Socialist Party of the United States (SPUSA) was raided by federal agents and Party leaders, including general secretary Charles Schenck, and the popular lecturer Kate Richards O'Hare were arrested and promptly incarcerated. Radical organisations were not suppressed simply on account of their economic beliefs. Authorities presumed that they comprised disloyal opponents of the war and unassimilable aliens. The newly-established Bomb Squad of New York City's Police Department, for example, devoted itself to assaulting revolutionary and radical groups as diverse as German-Jewish Marxists, Italian anarchists and Indians fighting for independence from Great Britain.²³

State and municipal authorities joined the charge to crush opponents of the war effort. Indeed, they often pre-empted federal activity. While Congress legislated in May 1917 for the conscription of soldiers, nine States made opposition to the war a criminal offence. Several others passed sedition laws and fifteen State legislatures passed laws prohibiting membership of "syndicalist" organisations such as anarchist, Wobbly and socialist cells.²⁴ In California and Kansas, mass indictments of radicals were expedited under such legislation. This legislation was enthusiastically reinforced by the courts, which handed down savage penalties for infractions of wartime statutes. A typical sentence meted out to the president of the World Peace League, William Madison Hicks, saw the pastor sentenced to twenty years jail (later commuted to five)

also incarcerated. Ninety-six of the 113 defendants were found guilty after their jury deliberated for just 55 minutes.

²² Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 47 – 8.

²³ The Squad's expertise, in time, was carefully utilised by more important bodies. The career paths of Squad members demonstrates the practical organisation and perpetuation of anti-radicalism. The Squad's founder, its successive chiefs and other, lower-ranked operatives went on to enjoy employment with the United States Army, some formulating anti-radical policy with Military Intelligence. See Thomas J. Tunney, *Throttled! The Detection of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters*, as told to Paul Merrick Hollister, Small, Maynard & Co. Inc., Boston, 1919, pp. 3 and 5. Hollister himself had already co-authored a monograph titled *The German Secret Service in America*.

and slugged with a \$10,000 fine. Those who refused to enlist were more soundly persecuted. A socialist inhabitant of Minneapolis was sentenced to twenty five years jail for this offence.²⁵

Judicial authorities were infected by paranoid war fever and entirely compromised by inappropriate relationships with other arms of the legal infrastructure, business interests and patriotic societies. Judge Milo P. Smith of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, was one legal official whose sense of duty and outrage at civil disobedience degenerated beyond the point of providing adequate support to local stakeholders. Sentencing a Wobbly organiser for possession of anti-war literature and membership of an unlawful organisation, Smith remarked:

It pleases me to impose this sentence upon you. I regret that the law did not permit me to order you stood up against the wall and shot.²⁶

Another senior judicial officer in the pay of business associates was Judge Fred W. Henshaw of the California Supreme Court. Henshaw ensured the conviction of the socialist Thomas Mooney for allegedly preparing a bomb exploded in San Francisco on Preparedness Day in 1916. Although threatened with exposure for corruption by a leading journalist, Henshaw clandestinely financed his own special investigations of radicals and assisted federal agents with similar inquiries. Using the testimony of turncoat radicals, he helped indict sixty-two nonconformists in blanket indictments for unsolved crimes of arson and terrorism.²⁷ The Judiciary of Iowa produced at least one other distinguished anti-radical, United States District Court Judge Martin J. Wade, who connived extensively in the prosecution of Kate Richards O'Hare with Charles

²⁴ Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 17 – 18.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 23 – 6, 38 and 48. After the Army Bill authorising conscription of servicemen became law in May 1917, opponents of war began to be charged and sentenced. The majority of opponents were socialists, anarchists and Wobblies but many eminent and formerly-irreproachable citizens, such as the president of Stanford University, David Starr Jordan, also spoke out against the war. Alexander Berkman and his lover, the prominent socialist Emma Goldman, were two individuals harshly dealt with, charged with being "principles in a nationwide conspiracy against the Government" and sentenced to two years incarceration and ordered to pay fines of \$10,000. Other recalcitrants distributing anti-draft meeting literature, for example, were sentenced similarly.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²⁷ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 132 – 6.

Daniel Frey, founder and chief of the patriotic army the American Protective League (APL).²⁸

Such behaviour from the judiciary was symptomatic of a general corruption of community spirit and identity manifest at local, state and national levels. Both official and private forces began to enforce not only wartime provisions and capitalist hegemony, but also conservative and reactionary ideology. The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety, commanded by the Governor and staffed by the State's Home Guards, closed offensive saloons and movie theatres, conducted a census of alien land holdings, sold Liberty bonds, monitored citizens' loyalty and appealed for public assistance in fighting sedition. Similar appeals were made by the CPI, army officers and prominent broadsheets and journals²⁹ (see Figure 2). County Councils of Defence in Missouri even issued "red, white and blue cards of warning" to alleged miscreants.³⁰

Of the plethora of private patriotic societies complementing official forces, among the more important were the American Defence Society (ADS), the National Security League (NSL), the Home Defence League, the Liberty League and the APL. While the ADS, whose honorary president was Teddy Roosevelt, formed an American Vigilante Patrol to stamp out objectionable street oratory, the APL was actually recruited by the Wilson Administration to help reinforce federal policy. By early 1918, the League had become a 250,000 member-strong adjunct of government, liaising with the DW and Military Intelligence (MI), the Attorney-General, the DJ and the Bureau of Investigation (BI), the DL and its Immigration and Naturalisation

²⁸ Frey initiated contact with Wade, O'Hare's trial judge, concerned that her bail bond had been cancelled while she awaited judgment. Similarly unnerved, Wade regretfully informed Frey that he could neither keep O'Hare in custody, nor "have her arrested for contempt" of court, two courses of action suggested by Frey, who was endeavouring to forward copies of O'Hare's speeches to authorities in districts where she planned to speak, so that they might impeach her. Hoping that she might fall foul of the Espionage Act, Wade indicated that he would liase with the District Attorney in North Dakota in connection with the matter. See Letter from Wade to Frey, 27 March 1918, Frey to Wade, 2 April 1918 and Wade to Frey, 23 April 1918 (BI - MSS, Records of the American Protective League, Box 1 A1, Entry 14, 15, 16).

²⁹ Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 20 and 194.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 151. The Council explained the purpose of such procedures, stating "The person to whom the first warning card is sent, generally takes it as a warning that they are being watched and immediately become very careful in their expressions. It has been found necessary in only a few cases to send a blue card to anyone and the red card has never been sent. The red card is simply a statement from the Council of Defense that the recipient will be reported immediately to the United States Secret Service."

44 The Literary Digest for August 10, 1918

Have You Met This Kaiserite?

NAIL LIES LIKE THESE:

THAT Red Cross supplies are being sold to shopkeepers by dishonest Red Cross officials.

THAT the Masonic orders have protested against allowing the Knights of Columbus to build recreation huts for soldiers.

THAT interned German prisoners are being fed five meals a day.

THAT this is "a rich man's war" or "a business man's war."

THAT farmers are profiteering.

THAT nine American warships were sunk in a disastrous engagement in the North Sea.



YOU FIND HIM in hotel lobbies, smoking compartments, clubs, offices and even in homes. He thinks it's clever to repeat "inside facts" about the war. He is a scandal-monger of the most dangerous type.

He repeats all the rumors, criticisms and lies he hears about our country's part in the war. He gives you names, places, dates. He is very plausible.

But if you pin him down, if you ask him what he really **KNOWS** at first-hand, he becomes vague, non-committal, slippery. He tries to make you think that the Government can fool you, if you are willing to let it—but it can't fool him. No, sir! He's too smart.

People like that are hurting your country every day. They are playing the Kaiser's game. They are fighting against this country. They are making it harder to win the war.

Through their vanity or curiosity or **TREASON** they are helping German propagandists to sow the seeds of discontent. For every lie that has been traced originated with a German spy. Don't forget that.

There was the one about the President's Secretary. It was said, and said again, and spread broadcast, that Mr. Turnulty was convicted of treason and shot at Fort Leavenworth. That lie was easily scotched by a public statement from Mr. Turnulty himself.

But other lies are more insidious—harder to down. In another paragraph some of them are told. But they are only a few of many.

They are taken from a publication, issued by the Committee on Public Information, called:

"THE KAISERITE IN AMERICA"

101 GERMAN LIES

This little book describes the methods of Germans here and quotes 101 lies that have been nailed by a newspaper which took the trouble to run them down. It will be sent to you upon request.

John Brown

Get the Facts from Washington!

Get in the fight to stamp out this malicious slander. As you travel about the country or even in your social life at home, run down these lies. Call the bluff of anyone who says he has "inside information." Tell him that it's his patriotic duty to help you find the source of what he's saying.

If you find a disloyal person in your search, give his name to the Department of Justice in Washington and tell them where to find him. It is your plain and solemn duty to fight the enemy at home by stamping out these lies. Where shall we send your copy of this book? It's free!

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION
8 JACKSON PLACE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONTRIBUTED THROUGH DIVISION OF AMPTHEM

THIS SPACE CONTRIBUTED FOR THE WINNING OF THE WAR BY

THE ROBBINS & MYERS CO., Springfield, Ohio

(Figure 2: A typical CPI advertisement, published in the *Literary Digest* of 10 August 1918, exhorting the public to "dob in" to federal authorities persons they suspected of treachery.

Source: National Library of Australia, Records of Herbert Brookes.)

Service (INS), and various police departments. The League's newsletter, *The Spy Glass* provided its members legal instruction and general information. *Spy Glass*' maiden issue of 4 June 1918 analysed the new amendment to 1917's Espionage Act and the Sedition Act of May 1918 and categorised offences operatives were to punish, including making "false and interfering reports" about the armed forces, "obstructing Bond sales" and "enlistments," "curtailing production" and making "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive" attacks on government or the flag. *Spy Glass* also compiled lists of aliens and the disloyal to be observed and apprehended³¹ (see Figure 3). A membership fee of 75 cents or \$1 entitled Leaguers to become state-appointed vigilantes³² (see Figure 4).

Once unleashed by constituted authorities, patriotic societies perpetrated limitless acts of illegal and violent persecution. Socialists in Philadelphia were set upon by vigilantes who tore off and souvenired their clothing. Mobs in Seattle smashed IWW printing presses. Citizen militias in Jerome, Arizona herded over one thousand striking miners, at gunpoint, into rail carts and attempted to expel them into California; they were rebuffed at the State border by Californian forces, who threatened to shoot both the guards and their prisoners if they attempted a crossing. Another thousand workers of Bisbee, Arizona were successfully deported into New Mexico, while in Butte, Montana, an IWW leader named Frank Little, who was part native-American, was hanged. The ringleaders of all these acts were never punished.³³

Repressive legislation was also used to wipe out non-socialist organisations and movements that threatened vested political and economic interests. Broad-based rural cooperative groups were an important target. One example of such a group was a Farmers' and Labourers' Protection Association in West Texas, formed to facilitate cooperative marketing and oppose the war. After the association canvassed opposing

³¹ *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.1 *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 7, p. 4. Numbers 8 and 9. Bureau of Investigation chief, A. Bruce Bielaski, formalised the incorporation of the APL into the government, ordering all Bureau employees to give "full cooperation" to League members in their "slacker" tracing endeavours, supporting their authority when required. See *Spy Glass* Vol. 1, No. 10, p. 3 (all issues BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, Entry 14, 15, 16).

³² Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 19.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31 and 53 - 60. Although the president's Mediation Commission declared the hanging of Little to have been illegal, no prosecutions followed its judgment. The *New York Times* and the *Literary Digest*, meanwhile, concluded that Little, like all Wobblies, was a German agent and that the affair served as a "salutary warning" to the disloyal.

the draft, fifty-five of its members were brought to trial. A more significant challenge to established order was posed by the "Green Corn Rebellion" of mobilised, debt-ridden, tenant farmers and sharecroppers of the Mid-West. Many of these men were members of the Working Class Union, which maintained connections with the IWW and another radical organisation, the "Jones Family." This alliance of labourers and agriculturists was also crushed by the draft law.³⁴ However, the most important agricultural force, eventually destroyed through the concerted efforts of the major political parties, the CPI and banks, was the Farmers' Non-Partisan League (NPL). An alliance of farmers, lawyers and merchants, the League won control of North Dakota in 1916 and governed there until the early 1920s. By the end of 1917, its influence was spreading through Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho and other western States. Because the League amended North Dakota's constitution to permit the State government to engage in industrial business, loan funds to farmers and introduce a ground-rent tax (which lifted land taxes above rental values, shifting the tax burden to the wealthy and creating large revenue increases) it was denounced by patriots and politicians as a:

Socialist conspiracy controlled entirely by a bankrupt Socialist ... exploiting the farmers to establish a Socialist autocracy of which A. C. Townley [was] the Czar, Kaiser and Sultan.³⁵

Political repression could be delivered more summarily. When the Mayor of New Ulm in Minnesota, displeased the State Governor by permitting a local meeting to convene to discuss the draft, the Governor removed him from office.³⁶

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 41 and 46.

³⁵ The speaker of these words was Rome G. Brown, a lawyer from Minneapolis. His address titled *Americanism versus Socialism*, delivered at a meeting of the Middlesex County Bar Association, in Boston, in December 1919, was entered into Congressional records by Frank Kellogg, the future Secretary of State, an ardent anti-radical. Brown believed Townley intended to place unserviceable tax burdens onto private enterprise, forcing them into bankruptcy, so that they might leave their assets to the socialist State. Therefore, his objections to Bolshevism were founded in his almost total, indiscriminate opposition to state regulation of the economy, which he sought to associate with the worst excesses of government tyranny, whether from the left or right end of the political spectrum. See *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 260, *Americanism versus Socialism*, Address delivered before the Middlesex County Bar Association of Boston, December 1919, by Rome Brown, pp. 11 - 15.

³⁶ Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 37 - 8.

 <p>ARNOLD HENKEL</p> <p>German army officer; age, 35; height, five feet seven inches; dark complexion; gray eyes; dark-brown hair tinged with gray above, red below; weighs 150 pounds; right leg bowed; buckshot wounds in shoulder, six or seven buckshot still in left wrist.</p>	 <p>JACOB BREUER</p> <p>Sailor; age, 36; height, five feet nine inches; dark complexion; blue eyes; brown hair. Has following tattoo marks: bust of sailor boy on right forearm, anchor and initials K. B. between thumb and index finger of right hand. Weight 120; muscular build.</p>
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Get These *Dangerous* Enemy Aliens

ESCAPING from the internment camp at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, under circumstances which indicate their ingenuity and readiness to take risks, three enemy aliens—Germans—have managed to evade recapture for more than a month.

The Department of Justice has issued a special bulletin to U. S. attorneys, marshals, special agents and local officers of the Department urging them to make every effort to find and apprehend these men. Their photographs and descriptions are printed herewith in order that members of the League may join in the search and bring about, if possible, the arrest of these dangerous criminal fugitives.

Arnold Henkel, the probable leader of the trio, is an officer in the German army, and was the chief actor in another jail-breaking before his internment at Fort Oglethorpe. It is more than likely that he will try to make his way to Mexico or to some South or Central American port, either by way of the Texas border or through one of the Gulf seaports. While interned, he stuttered. Whether this is a fixed habit or merely an assumed peculiarity cannot be learned. The man

is capable enough to act a part over a long period.

William Wegner, the youngest of the fugitives, served four years in the German Navy and has a considerable knowledge of explosives and of electrical equipment. He was arrested at Ketchikan, Maine,

where he was employed by a lumbering concern. He is probably trying to make his way to Chicago or to the northwestern lumber districts for further mischief.

Jacob Breuer has also had experience in prison-breaking. He was convicted of forgery in San Francisco and sentenced to San Quentin penitentiary. He escaped, but was taken, returned to prison and served out his term. Like Wegner, he is a sailor, having followed the sea since he was sixteen years of age, and will probably try to make his way to a seaport and ship to some South or Central American country.

The intelligence and desperate character of all three men make them a serious menace to this country so long as they remain at liberty. League members should be on the lookout for them, and should give local agents of the Department of Justice every aid in their efforts to apprehend them.



William Wegner—German naval reserve; aged 24; height, five feet six inches; fair complexion, light blond hair, very blue eyes, habitual smile. Upper front teeth separated; little finger on each hand thick and crooked. Weight, 150 pounds.

(Figure 3: A *Spy Glass* Special Supplement exhorted APL members to "Get These Dangerous Enemy Aliens," German-born citizens and residents of whom large photo identities were supplied.

Source: BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, Entry 14, 15, 16).

The History of American Anti-Communism

Form 1

BADGE RECORD

Application for Enrollment as a Volunteer in the *Bureau Chief*

Commission No. *18*

American Protective League

☒ Captain ☐ Lieutenant ☐ Operative

Organized with the Approval and Operating under the Direction of the
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation

A. M. BRIGGS, Chairman National Directors,
AMERICAN PROTECTIVE LEAGUE,
Washington, D. C.

Tampa Fla *5/20*, 1918

Dear Sir:—I beg to make application for enrollment as a Volunteer in the American Protective League, City or Division of *Tampa* and for the purpose of such enrollment make the following statement:

1. Name in full *Carroll G. Copp*
2. Place of birth *Stanstead Co., Q. Age 40*
3. Residence Address *5203 Seminole Ave*
4. Business Address *Tampa Drug Co.*
5. City *Tampa*, State *Florida*
6. Business Phone *3752*, Residence Phone *72-137*
7. With what firm or corporation *Tampa Drug Co.*
Present position *Secretary; Buyer*
Nature of Business *Wholesale Drugs*
Business experience and history *24 years*
wholesale drugs
8. Use, if any, of intoxicating liquors *none*
9. Experience, if any, in military, police or governmental service, State or National *none*
10. With what clubs or organizations are you affiliated?
Masons, Shriners, Rotary
11. Are you married? *yes*
12. What foreign languages do you speak or understand?
none
13. Do you understand that you will receive no compensation or expense allowances for services rendered? *yes*
14. I agree to surrender my credentials at any time upon request of the Chief. I will notify my Chief of any change of business or residence address.

Signed *Carroll G. Copp*

OATH.

I, Carroll G. Copp, a member of the American Protective League, organized with the approval and operating under the direction of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, do hereby solemnly swear:

That I am a citizen of the United States of America; and that I will uphold and defend the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the same at all times and in all places as a true and loyal citizen thereof.

That I will give due time and diligent attention to such service as I shall undertake to render; and that I will execute promptly and to the best of my ability the commands of my superiors in connection therewith.

That I will in all respects observe the rules and regulations, present and future, of this organization; and that I will promptly report to my superiors any and all violations thereof, and all information of every kind and character and from whatever source derived, tending to prove hostile or disloyal acts or intentions on the part of any person whatsoever and all other information of any kind of interest or value to the Government.

That I will not, except in the necessary performance of my duty, exhibit my credentials or disclose my membership in this organization; and that I will not disclose to any person other than a duly authorized Government official or officer of this organization, facts and information coming to my knowledge in connection with its work.

That the statement on the opposite side hereof, by me subscribed, is true and correct.

That I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge my duties, without reward to myself, as volunteer for the defense and preservation of the United States of America.

So help me God.

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this *18* day of *May*, 1918
M. Caraballa
Notary Public.

Carroll G. Copp

THIS CARD MUST NOT BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE THAN A BADGE RECORD

(Figure 4: The membership form of the APL, secured by members for a paltry sum, enabling them to become state-appointed vigilantes.

Source: BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, Entry 14, 15, 16)

In this atmosphere of paranoid patriotism and conformism, news suddenly reached the United States that Bolshevik revolutionaries had seized power in Petrograd, on 7 November 1917 and proclaimed the world's first socialist government. Government and business elites, in particular, received the news with dread and bewilderment. In the place of a military and commercial ally there suddenly stood a socialist regime, which abruptly withdrew its forces from the war and announced it would not honour the fiduciary debts of previous governments. The Bolsheviks' avowed endorsement of violent, class-based insurrection and policies of land and resource nationalisation promised a terrible future within and without the new socialist republic. Labour movements across the world drew strength from their Russian comrades' victory, sent them congratulatory messages and announced their intention to tread the same path. The Bolshevik threat was immediately perceived as the most serious menace to internal security and order and American political elites and capitalists resolved to ensure that Bolshevism would make neither domestic nor international headway.

The federal government responded to the Bolshevik hazard by enlarging its repressive powers. A crude Revenue Act in early 1918 attempted to encourage immigrants' "Americanisation," that is naturalisation and, more important, assimilation, by taxing "non resident" aliens at twice the rate of "resident" aliens. More important, the Sedition Act proscribed "any disloyal opinion...contemptuous reference to the United States flag, form of government or Constitution" with penalties of twenty years gaol and fines of up to \$20,000.³⁷ The government's reforming zeal also extended well beyond the United States' borders and around June 1918, president Wilson and his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing committed the United States to military intervention in Russia. The authorities' primary focus, however, was domestic, although many of its initiatives were also designed to expedite foreign policy goals. Chief of these was the compulsory enlistment of all eligible citizens for military duty. To ensure that none escaped service, the government resolved to round up those neglecting their responsibility and 12 September 1918 was declared a national registration day, during which all absent draftees were to report for service or be

³⁷ The historian David M. Kennedy notes that severe as the Sedition Act was, it was used by Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Gregory to stave off reactionary leaders urging that jurisdiction of counter-espionage proceedings be transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of War. See David M. Kennedy, *Over Here – The First World War and American Society*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p. 80.

rounded up. The APL helped enforce this "Slacker Drive," which was a resounding success.³⁸ Tens of thousands of men were apprehended or questioned by the authorities.³⁹ The government of Washington State was so impressed by the national initiative that it promptly conducted its own Slacker Drive. Both the director of the BI, A. Bruce Bielaski, and Attorney-General Gregory declared that summary raids would become a cornerstone of domestic government (see Figure 5). The DW even envisioned an extensive role for League personnel in overseas missions, partnering the Red Cross and YMCA.⁴⁰

Besides being politically expedient, repression was lucrative. The treatment accorded radicals continued to be influenced by corporate imperatives, as the prosecution of two hundred Finnish members of the IWW in Minnesota shows. Unable to understand the regulations to which they were subject, the Finns were arrested in the summer of 1917, ostensibly for failure to register for the draft, but principally because iron companies wanted to keep them off the range while strikes threatened. Nonetheless, company directors were anxious to retain the Finns' labour and they advised John Lind to petition Thomas Gregory to ensure that their sentences be deferred, so that they be kept at work. Locked into indeterminate periods of bonded good behaviour, the labourers' industrial behaviour was entirely controlled by their employers.⁴¹

Kate Richards O'Hare, like many socialists, was outraged by the legal machinations which delivered her labour to capitalist concerns while she was incarcerated. As an

³⁸ *Spy Glass* proudly stated that according to the Provost Marshal General's office, the League had arrested between 20 - 25,000 "delinquents," in "more than two hundred cities and communities" during the period from June 1917 until the Drive of September 1918. See *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 7 p. 1.

³⁹ *Spy Glass* noted that 12, 115 slackers were netted from just five New Jersey cities in the great Drive. See Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Gregory complimented the League on its contribution and patriotism, personally thanking League Chairman A. M. Briggs. Gregory remained an enthusiastic and vocal supporter of the League while in office. This support was widely reflected throughout government agencies. R. Lee Craft, a Special Agent in the Pueblo, Colorado branch of the BI, thanked the League for their assistance in the arrest of 250 people and applauded their "splendid organisation," which had prevented them from "disturbing the industrial conditions" of the region. The Chief Naturalisation Examiner of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, in St. Louis, thanked his local group for identifying six hundred applications for citizenship made by enemy aliens. See *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 7, Vol. 1, No. 12, (regarding R. Lee Craft) Vol. 1, No. 11, Letter of Chief Examiner St. Louis INS to APL, 26 July 1918 (BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, A1, Entry 14, 15, 16) and (regarding War Department) *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 10, p. 1 and Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 286.

⁴¹ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 138 - 9.

Confidential

The SPY GLASS

*A Bulletin of News and Better Methods
issued by The American Protective League*

Vol. I

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 22, 1918

No. 12

"Carry On!" Attorney General Gregory Urges

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

November 21, 1918.

National Directors,
American Protective League,
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

I feel it my duty at the present juncture to call upon the officers and members of the American Protective League throughout the country to carry on steadfastly for the present their most effective aid and co-operation with the Department of Justice.

The sudden termination of hostilities has reacted strongly upon the public, and there is everywhere evident a desire on the part of patriotic citizens, heretofore intent upon winning the war, to withdraw immediately from war work. Such a course, if generally followed, would involve serious consequences.

Your organization has performed a great task, both in active and passive service. The number of investigations participated in by you, many of which have resulted in the uncovering of serious enemy activities and disloyalties and the apprehension and prosecution of the individuals concerned, the large number of draft evaders detected, and your many other activities, have been an important factor in winning the war. A service of equal value has been the passive but powerful influence exerted by your organization upon alien enemies and disloyal persons. The knowledge upon their part that everywhere about them were the eyes and ears of a great organization auxiliary to the Government raised a fear in their hearts as to the consequences of hostile action, and became a powerful deterrent of enemy and disloyal activity.

These services cannot yet be dispensed with. Illegal activities harmful to the public morale during the discussion of peace terms must be watched for and reported. Violations of the war statutes, all of which are still in force, must be prosecuted. Pending investigations must be continued and others instituted.

I sincerely trust that, in view of these grave considerations, your members will be aroused to the need of carrying on your work for the immediate future with the fullest degree of efficiency. I earnestly ask your continued aid and co-operation.

Respectfully,

T. W. GREGORY,
Attorney General.

(Figure 5: *Spy Glass*' issue of 22 November 1918 informed members of Attorney-General Gregory's continuing need for their law enforcement services in the post-war period.

Source: BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, Entry 14, 15, 16)

inmate of Missouri State Penitentiary, O'Hare calculated that had she been paid non-union, sweatshop wages she would have earned \$1800 during her imprisonment.

However, she received \$10.50 on her release and caustically remarked:

The difference between the wealth I created and the pittance paid me went, not into the treasury of the nation I was presumed to have injured, not into the treasury of the state of Missouri, but into the pockets of the prison contractor as profits.⁴²

Yet the most profitable repression was undertaken by the federal government and involved the expropriation of nearly \$1 billion worth of "enemy alien" properties in the United States. A. Mitchell Palmer, appointed Alien Property Custodian in October 1917, was initially authorised only to hold seized property in a trust, but by March 1918 restrictions preventing him from selling seized assets were removed. Palmer petitioned over 100,000 citizens to help him locate enemy alien assets and received tens of thousands of responses from attorneys, banks, postmasters, building and loans associations and other government department heads.⁴³ The APL was also empowered to aid the Custodian and could bring legal suit against those who obstructed its business.⁴⁴

Although careful to appoint men with strong financial credentials to the upper tier of his agency, Palmer dispensed political largesse in the form of lower level commissions. Of the fifty-one State counsels who managed the Custodian's litigation in State courts, seventeen were national committeemen, or legal partners or relations of national committeemen of the Democratic Party. Others were appointed as directors or attorneys for companies seized by the Custodian and received huge fees for administering these companies' affairs. Moreover, the Custodian's Advisory Sales Committee, which supervised the sale of all assets, grossly undersold these assets, nominally the state's property, to corporate associates of the Committee and the Custodian.⁴⁵ An adroit politician, Palmer knew that seizing German property was

⁴² Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 257.

⁴³ Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 129 - 31.

⁴⁴ *Spy Glass*, Vol. 1, No. 5. Under a headline "Wanted: More Millions of Enemy Property," *Spy Glass* outlined whose property was to be confiscated. It also empowered its men to undertake such action, advising "who should make the report[s]," what properties to confiscate, and which nations' citizens were to be considered "enemies."

⁴⁵ Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 132 - 9.

good politics. Having had his patriotic *fides* questioned by the mainstream press in 1917, Palmer realised that his presidential aspirations were contingent on a conspicuous record of nationalistic loyalty. Yet, until this point, Palmer had often shown himself to be socially progressive and his transformation into the nation's most prominent German and Red baiter at least partially reflects the corrosive effects of widespread paranoid feeling.⁴⁶

The activities of the Custodian represented only one facet of the general escalation of repression prolonged paranoid feeling generated. Intelligence arms of the War and Justice departments and their private associates continued to harass the nations' enemies: "slackers," German aliens, "pro-Germans," Wobblies and now "Bolsheviks." The case files documenting these agencies' activities reveal how few, if any, residents of the United States were contemplating unconstitutional revolt. The Workingmen's Union of New Haven, Connecticut was a typical target of paranoid attention, described by BI agent M. A. Cooper as "American Bolsheviki," because the organisation met at the Labor Lyceum on alternate Sundays and mostly comprised Russians.⁴⁷ While some were observed for only a short time, many were watched for longer periods. Indeed, numerous organisations and individuals were subjected to continuous investigation for well over a decade. One such individual was the Reverend Kirby Page, a "radical pro-German" noted for his outspoken criticism of the Allies' war policies.⁴⁸ Another who was constantly observed was John Dewey, professor of philosophy at Columbia University and a prominent civil rights and humanitarian campaigner. The director of the ACLU, Roger Baldwin, was also

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 118 – 49. In Palmer's case, as in many others', paranoid feeling nourished a life-long mistrust of recent migrants. Palmer initially fell foul of patriots on account of his lukewarm reaction to the sinking of the British merchant vessel, *Lusitania*, in 1915, which saw 128 United States citizens perish. This prompted the New York *World* to allege that a high government official, named "M. P." was petitioning the president to send food and textiles to Germany. Desperate to win new political office, Palmer, according to a friend, "made up [his] mind [to] just ... get into [a patriotic fervour] somehow." After his appointment as Alien Property Custodian, and as he and his chief investigator, Francis P. Garvan became aware of the extent of German property in the United States, he began to regard German investment in American industry as industrial and commercial espionage. Yet, although his suspicion of foreigners was likely genuine and deep-felt, the skill Palmer demonstrated in manipulating the president, persuading him to enlarge his powers suggests that, at least prior to the bombing of his Washington house in mid-1919, his flirtation with the paranoid position was quite conscious.

⁴⁷ OG 105400 dated 13 March 1918 (BI OG – MSS).

⁴⁸ Letter from Edgar Sisson to BI Chief A. Bruce Bielaski, 26 September 1917 and report by BI Agent C. R. Holland, Waco, Texas, 24 November 1917 (BI OG – MSS, OG 70976). Kirby also served with the YMCA in Europe during the Great War.

observed for many years. Even conservatives of seemingly impeccable pedigree, such as Dr. Edward Egbert, Chief Surgeon to the American Red Cross Mission in Russia, were watched.⁴⁹

The surveillance activities of state and private intelligence agencies were not only partisan but utterly incompetent, dogged by ignorance, prejudice and incomprehension. Moreover, investigations were generally banal and inconsequential. The afore-mentioned case of Kirby Page demonstrates the professional standards of the BI. Writing his Special Agent in Charge in Houston on 1 October 1917, Bielaski requested that he investigate Page and drew his attention to an article from the *Houston Chronicle*, published the previous month, describing Page's political views. It was not until 24 November that Bielaski received notice from a Waco operative that they had just become aware of the article. Yet even this correspondence was coincidental, for the Houston office had made contact with the Director to inform him of the article's existence.⁵⁰ More senior officials of the agency were unable to demonstrate greater efficiency. For example, when he learned that Harold Laski, an internationally-renowned British lecturer in history at Harvard University, had accepted a position at the London School of Economics, J. Edgar Hoover asked MI in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to investigate "someone by name of Lasher or Lashing, a very radical man."⁵¹

Government and military officials, goaded by the mainstream press, continued to encourage the general public to spy on one another and initiate suppression of disloyalty. They received many reports of treachery. These reports were invariably informed by innuendo and only brought trouble to habitually suspected subversives. Regional influences played some role in determining the identity of suspects. In the industrialised east, immigrant groups of Germans, Poles and Hungarians were denounced, whereas in the South, while the radicalism of central and eastern

⁴⁹ A large BI folder detailing the activities of Dewey through the 1920s and into the 1950s resides in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University (FBI - MSS). For Baldwin see, for example, BS 202600 - 22 (BI OG - MSS), which covered his chairing of Sacco Vanzetti benefit meetings, BS 202600 - 39 (BI OG - MSS) detailed his correspondence regarding a national inquiry into the mining industry and combating the education bills of the Lusk Committee. Regarding Egbert, see letter from National Director APL to Bielaski, 15 April 1918 (BI - MSS, Records of the APL, Box 1, A1, Entry 14, 15, 16).

⁵⁰ Report of BI Agent C. R. Holland, Waco, Texas to Bielaski (OG 70976).

⁵¹ Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Cambridge MI, 19 January 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 15).

Europeans was acknowledged, blacks and disenfranchised workers were more feared. Concerned citizens of Chicago were in a particularly invidious position: their city played host to millions of international and Southern, black migrants. Yet "American" citizens were not above suspicion either.⁵²

While security forces spied on civilians, other arms of the patriotic front continued and extended their repressive activities. The prosecution of the 113 IWW leaders in Chicago prompted regional administrations to indict hundreds of lesser Wobbly leaders. The IWW rank and file did not escape assault either; 1200 Wobblies were arrested in a single raid in Detroit on May Day 1918. While the Chicago trial was in session, BI and MI agents raided IWW offices for evidentiary materials and the State of California even indicted the organisation's defence committee leaders. Bureau of Immigration agents in Washington State detained alien Wobblies who contributed to defence funds, sold defence literature or worked for defence organisations. Repressive measures in the Northwest were also particularly harsh and were administered by the Army, federal, State and municipal officials (including members of the Fire Department) and a raft of civilian forces who summarily arrested citizen and alien "enemies" and handed them over to federal authorities. Private militia groups received generous financial rewards for their work from regional industrial interests. Such persecution, together with censorship and mail provisions which prevented the IWW from publicising their plight and raising money, transformed the IWW from an aggressive, powerful workers' advocate into the "ex-champion of the radical world."⁵³

The courts also made a palpable contribution to the annihilation of the IWW. Crucial rulings, such as that handed down by Judge Jeremiah Neterer in the western district of Washington State contradicted the advice of the Assistant Secretary of the DL, Louis Post and dismissed *habeas corpus* appeals of aliens arrested for supporting the IWW.⁵⁴ Yet important as such rulings were, many radicals and aliens' civil rights

⁵² A. Bruce Bielaski, for example, received a letter from a Mr. Carter serving on the Commission of Merchants and Butter Manufacturers, in Washington, D.C., advising that a Harold A. Peterson, residing in Washington, was "a pronounced Pro-German - so much so in fact that his neighbours [had] had to call his attention to his attitude." Carter also reported, with consternation, that Peterson had "recently been employed by the U. S. Government as an electrician ... and sent ... to Philadelphia, to work on ships." See Letter from Carter to A. Bruce Bielaski, 22 June 1918, BI OG - MSS, OG 105400).

⁵³ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 144 - 66.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 186 - 9. Post declared on 11 November 1917 that aliens could only be charged under the Espionage Act for distributing, as opposed to merely possessing or hearing subversive literature.

were grievously harmed by lengthy periods of incarceration between their arrest and trial. A number of Wobblies arrested in Kansas and on eastern oil fields were held in jail for two years before being tried in December 1919, when they were convicted for acts of wartime conspiracy. Arguably greater crimes were perpetrated against a number of Wobblies held by the U. S. Attorney in Omaha, Nebraska, who languished in detention for eighteen months before being released for lack of incriminating evidence; the delay had been ordered by the DJ, which was concerned that a trial verdict favouring the defendants would damage their indictment in Chicago.⁵⁵ The legal machinery of the state was manipulated to repress other political threats, besides the IWW. When the accidental death of a Wisconsin Senator forced an election in April 1918, the popularity of the Socialist nominee, Victor Berger, moved local authorities to indict him for violating the Espionage Act. News of his indictment was withheld until the climax of the campaign, when it caused Berger maximum damage.⁵⁶

The degree of autonomy enjoyed by local officials permitted and no doubt encouraged licentious treatment of detained "traitors." Conscientious objectors to the war were subjected to the full fury of outraged patriots and victimised by sadistic practices rooted in paranoid feeling. Objectors imprisoned in Fort Jay, New York, for example, were kept in solitary confinement in the cellars of the fort's prison. Several prisoners were shackled to the bars of their cell windows or doors and were deprived of clothing and toilet facilities. Prisoners in other locations were fed just one meal a day and numerous cases of nervous collapse were recorded.⁵⁷

Other activities of the period further illustrate the depth and prevalence of paranoid feeling in patriotic ranks at the close of the Great War. Just like the Soviets (and Fascists and Nazis) whom they would later denounce, American patriots organised

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 132 – 7 and 161. Many people arrested in Seattle also spent many months in jail before being tried.

⁵⁶ Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 164 – 5. The District Attorney in Chicago cynically defended the suppression of the indictment, claiming that "the government [made] the announcement ... at this time to develop other angles of the case."

⁵⁷ Ibid., 259 – 63. Fite and Peterson evince only qualified sympathy for the victims of brutal prison conditions. For example, they describe one prisoner, as "an excellent example of the political prisoner who, although badly treated, brought much of his difficulties upon himself." They explain that he was "an uncooperative and incorrigible individual of the braggart type whose actions would have tried the patience of a Job, to say nothing of an army officer."

children into loyalist organisations to stamp out anti-war opinion.⁵⁸ Complex psychic processes underpinned the state's cynical staging of mass show trials of Wobblies. The successful prosecution of nearly 270 Wobblies in the Chicago, Fresno, Sacramento and Kansas City trials should be regarded as stemming from and serving identical psychological and political purposes as the infamous political trials held in Russia in the 1920s and '30s.

By the close of the Great War restrictions on civil liberties were perhaps more far-reaching than at any previous time in the United States' history. Surging paranoid feeling, complemented by a greatly-expanded infrastructure of repression was changing not only the structure of government but also the nation's political ethos. The ideals of freedom of belief and association were being rejected and while the psychological state peculiar to war undoubtedly encouraged this, a new conception of government had taken root. Having had their responsibilities and numbers enlarged, official policing agencies were anxious to ensure that their extraordinary powers were preserved. And although a handful of senior executives voiced misgivings about the new culture of nativist anti-radicalism, the bulk of them, along with industrial heavyweights and super-patriots, were excited by the possibilities wartime developments presented.⁵⁹ Had economic conditions markedly improved after the war, paranoid psychology may have played a reduced role in political life. However, the years immediately following the war were notable not for the restoration of civil liberties and economic and political stability, but for anti-communist hysteria.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 151.

⁵⁹ In this researcher's reading, only the wartime Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Labor, William Wilson and Louis Post emerge as consistent, committed critics of the developing repressive powers of the federal bureaucracy, embodied in agencies such as the Bureaus of Investigation and Immigration. Although Attorneys-General Gregory and then Palmer disbanded the APL and (from time to time) questioned the need for private patriotic forces, they also repeatedly used such organisations and did very little to discourage them from their endeavours. As Alien Property Custodian Palmer made extensive use of the APL and Gregory, along with A. Bruce Bielaski, gave unqualified support to the League on several occasions. See for example *Spy Glass* Vol. 1, No's 7, 12 and 15.

The Red Scare, 1919 - 20

The cessation of the Great War had little effect on political temper in the United States. International events continued to heighten political and industrial elites' anxiety. The collapse of the Romanov regime in Russia presaged the total collapse of the old order in Europe. Militant nationalist forces staged a revolution in Turkey, communist governments were formed in Munich and Budapest and the Spartacist workers' movement in Germany won substantial electoral support. Massive strikes broke out across the British Commonwealth and in Europe. The United States, too, was not untouched by chaos. While war did not devastate the nation to the extent experienced in Europe, it greatly diminished the standard of living for most citizens, drove up corporate profits and heightened social division. Inflation and paucity of essential resources eroded wage increases and exacerbated tension between rural and urban locales: cities were desperate for primary produce and could not pay the prices agriculturists demanded. Confronted by the collapse of the progressive program to more fairly distribute wealth, the Wilson Administration did little to ameliorate the plight of the needy and instead dismantled its special Boards and Commissions and returned ownership and management of resources to major corporations. The planned nationalisation of industry, particularly rail, was aborted as magnates attempted to bind workers to war-time wage rates. Bitterly disappointed with the post-war social contract, over four million workers took industrial action, in over 3,600 strikes during 1919, a greater number than would strike from 1923 - 32.⁶⁰ Civil, military and private forces in turn escalated the program of repression developed during the war. Reflective analysis and reaction to the nations' problems was seemingly beyond the ethical, psychological and perhaps technical capacities of the majority of public leaders.

At the beginning of 1919, the United States experienced its first ever general strike in Seattle, when the Emergency Fleet Corporation refused to renegotiate the pay and hours of 35,000 shipyard workers. On 6 February, over a hundred unions walked off the job, responding to the call of the Seattle Central Labor Council. The resolution of the strike not only consolidated established patterns of repression of economic and political protest but also marked a watershed in the political fortunes of unionism and

⁶⁰ Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, p. 173.

industrial radicalism. For while conservatives had long associated industrial dissent with economic lunacy and treachery, the unprecedented general strike seemed to them not dissent, but "Bolshevik" revolution. The fear of organised protest irreversibly heightened. Authoritarian reaction to civic tumult, having been further legitimated, became more widespread. The career of the "hero" of the general strike, Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson, demonstrated that crushing civic and industrial disturbance was an effective means of winning great celebrity, prestige and economic reward.

Ole Hanson was charged with the task of destroying the IWW by conservative business interests and local Army commanders frustrated by the organisations' resilience.⁶¹ Since early 1918, the Bureau of Immigration had sought to destroy the regional IWW by deporting all "undesirable" or "pro-German" aliens. Although the Secretary of Labor, William Wilson had insisted that proof of individual guilt precede the issuance of warrants and that possession of Wobbly literature or adherence to Wobbly beliefs did not amount to advocating illegal principles, the Seattle office of the Bureau assumed the authority to make mass arrests. Local businessmen and officials hoped that the procedure would rid the region of between three and five thousand alien Wobblies and in the first two weeks of raids, two hundred persons were seized. Yet William Wilson reiterated that only activists who had personally violated immigration laws would be deported and the program stalled.⁶²

Resolving to destroy the "American manifestation" of Bolshevism, Hanson gathered the names and addresses of Wobblies and their literature distribution points.⁶³ On 2 May 1918, Hanson closed Seattle's IWW halls and confiscated Wobbly literature, burned their other possessions (or turned them over to federal authorities) and broke-up their street meetings.⁶⁴ Like most government officials, Hanson could not distinguish Bolshevism from anarchism, socialism and industrial syndicalism. He

⁶¹ Whereas industry feared the economic costs of worker mobilisation, the Army's hierarchy feared that the Wobblies were corrupting their soldiers. They claimed that soldiers on furlough in the city invariably returned with anti-war literature, having heard anti-government speeches and slept with "itinerant women ... reeking with disease." Such women, it was feared, were "German agents, paid with German money to destroy [their] health." See Ole Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1920, pp. 7 - 8.

⁶² Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 163 - 8.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

equated all radicalism with a total decline in civilisation.⁶⁵ In January 1919, Hanson declared that Bolshevik spies had infiltrated the local radical movement, the mainstream labour unions and the Seattle Central Labor Council to bring about the general strike. Further, he regarded the strike as merely the initial phase of "attempted revolution," orchestrated by revolutionaries from every corner of the United States who were taking advice from visiting Russian dignitaries. Realising that the lumber unions of Washington contained the "best-organised revolutionaries" in the nation, the Bolsheviks had resolved to start revolution with a shipyard strike in Seattle, which would flower into a national, general strike toppling the federal government. The conspiracy had broad international connections, as a shipyard workers' strike which broke out in London, on 28 January 1919, confirmed.⁶⁶

Precisely how much of Hanson's argument was *post hoc* rationalisation or speculation cannot be determined, particularly as Hanson, who became a national celebrity for his "red-blooded" patriotism, resigned his office and embarked on a lucrative lecture tour.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, Hanson's rhetoric and anti-strike actions suggest that he likely believed in his propaganda. Hanson's immersion into the paranoid position helped him act with severity. The strike was crushed with the assistance of the Army, the National Guard and citizen militias. Moreover, the City's regular police were authorised to mobilise trucks armed with mounted machine guns and to shoot any "lawbreaker attempting to create a riot" on sight.⁶⁸ Once the crisis was over, thirty-six alien Wobblies were expelled and sent to New York to be deported.

The Seattle general strike was a political disaster for the American labour movement, in spite of the efforts of a supine AFL to dissociate itself from imported, noxious

⁶⁵ "With syndicalism – and its youngest child, bolshevism," he wrote, "thrive murder, rape, pillage, arson, free love, poverty, want, starvation, filth, slavery, autocracy, suppression, sorrow and Hell on earth. It is a class government of the unable, the unfit, the untrained; of the scum, of the dregs, of the cruel, and of the failures. Freedom disappears, liberty emigrates, universal suffrage is abolished, progress ceases, manhood and womanhood are destroyed, decency and fair dealing are forgotten, and a militant minority, great only in their self-conceit, reincarnate under the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* a greater tyranny than ever existed under czar, emperor, or potentate." Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, p. viii.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 57 - 71.

⁶⁷ Murray, *Red Scare*, pp. 65 - 6. Hanson earned \$38,000 in seven months of lecturing. His office salary was \$7,500 per annum.

⁶⁸ Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, pp. 87 - 91.

revolt.⁶⁹ Reactionary opinion held that the Seattle insurrection was the direct result of insufficient immigration regulations. Hanson and more prominent leaders called for massive reform to immigration practices and the introduction of ambitious "Americanisation" programs. But faith in assimilation diminished. Conservative opinion held that whereas immigrants had been easily assimilated during the Reconstruction era, contemporary immigrants didn't work the land, failed to raise families, comprised itinerant single men and formed separate colonies in foul, congested, industrial centres.⁷⁰ The fear of Bolshevism fed into racial and cultural antagonism, horror of the corruptive influence of cities and dread of profound economic change. Governments and interest groups maintained their uncompromising attitudes to these problems, convincing themselves that policy concessions were impossible.⁷¹

As the year developed, further industrial crises hardened anti-radical opinion and ultimately, strengthened its proponents' economic and political position. Massive walkouts by coal and steel workers, merchant sailors, airmail pilots and the Boston police force were violently suppressed. The succession of paralysing strikes aggravated reactionary sentiment and placed governments under increased pressure to bring an immediate end to civil strife by force. With President Wilson collapsing with a stroke in September, senior, hard-line Cabinet members and Congress forced presidential aspirant, Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer, to take action. Palmer responded by declaring that proposed, national, coal and rail strikes scheduled for November would constitute unlawful interference with the production and transportation of essential material under wartime legislation which remained active.⁷²

⁶⁹ Besides accepting the Bureau of Investigation's assistance in purging its ranks of radicals, the AFL actively fought organisations established to defend radicals charged under wartime legislation. Forming its own American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, the AFL never defended a single civil liberties case which involved a member of the IWW. See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 129 and 142.

⁷⁰ Ole Hanson favourably compared earlier with later migrants, noting their efforts to bring their families with them, their production of native-born children, their determination to become citizens, farmers and "real Americans." See Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, p. 247.

⁷¹ Hanson summed up their temper, stating The irreconcilable agitating alien, bolshevik or anarchist ... is an ever-increasing danger, is no good to himself or to any one else, is a trouble-breeder, a teacher of falsehood and sedition, and *must, and shall, be sent out of this land of the free ...* Again I say, deport the anarchist, the bolshevik, the alien agitator. Americanize the alien; spend time and money and effort ... *Reds must do right or starve.* Ibid., pp. 247 and 298 - 9.

⁷² Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 176 - 9. Hardline Cabinet members included Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Postmaster-General Albert Burleson and Director-General of Rail Walker Hines.

While the federal executive enforced industrial orthodoxy, legislative bodies felt compelled to investigate the depth of Bolshevik infiltration of American society and labour organisations. The United States Senate convened a Judiciary Subcommittee while New York authorities established a Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, headed by Senator Clayton Lusk. The Senate Committee sat for only a month, but heard testimony from various sources, including the former Ambassador to Russia, David Francis and a famous, anti-Bolshevik revolutionary, Catherine Breshkovskaya, a member of the Socialist Revolutionary party, popularly known as the "grandmother of the revolution." Both these Committees publicised what would become archetypal notions of Bolshevism: the Bolshevik revolution was the brainchild of East-Side New York Jews, Bolsheviks were anti-Christ, Bolsheviks established Commissariats of free love, used hordes of Chinese henchmen as executioners and slaughtered their class enemies.

Through fora such as these, a small number of individuals disproportionately influenced public and government opinion. Breshkovskaya had the ears of notable liberal conservatives, including Dr. Edward Egbert and through him, the director of the Red Cross mission and future Minister for Commerce and President, Herbert Hoover. Egbert's personal contacts also included the founder of the CPI, George Creel, numerous Senators and Congressmen and the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Forming the Catherine Breshkovskaya Russian Relief Fund and becoming its Executive Secretary, Egbert committed himself to securing American aid for anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia. Convinced that the Bolsheviks could not hold power provided the Russian populace was given sufficient aid to support economic and political progress, Egbert remained a steadfast supporter of intervention in Russia, canvassing politicians and prominent patriots even after the collapse of counter-revolution.⁷³

Beyond the corridors of government and elite societies working for a democratic, capitalist Russia, knowledge of the Bolsheviks and their political principles was scant and deeply prejudiced. The CPI, which tightly controlled the release of government information, was often negligent and compromised by its methods of researching and

⁷³ See Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Edward H. Egbert - MSS. This was the new name for

procuring intelligence. The conservative bias of intelligence derived from the government's choice of personnel and its overarching desire to manufacture propaganda for domestic consumption. The manufacture of anti-Bolshevik propaganda had been government policy following the return from Russia, in 1917, of Senator Elihu Root's fact-finding mission, which recommended that a major anti-radical propaganda campaign be undertaken. Washington allocated over five million dollars for the task, which was spent acquiring and distributing information the government knew to be false - most notably, the notion that the Bolsheviks were in the pay of Germany - in the United States and, later, in Russia itself.⁷⁴

The federal government also encouraged the mainstream media to disseminate "news" that confirmed that the Bolsheviks were the tools of Germany, and utterly depraved besides. The most influential articles related to the Bolsheviks' destruction of the nuclear family. Western papers printed chilling stories of the "nationalisation" of women and children by Commissariats of Free Love. Married and unmarried women were allegedly required to report to Commissariats for compulsory sexual intercourse with random partners, their offspring becoming the property of the state. Although these stories originated in Russian anti-Bolshevik papers, the press and governments claimed that they had been sourced to the Bolshevik paper *Izvestia*. The "public," meanwhile, remained ignorant of the frauds being foisted upon them.⁷⁵ No retractions or corrections of manipulative lies ever occurred when more reasoned analyses of

the Breshkovskaya Fund. One such patriot was Ralph Easley.

⁷⁴ The Wilson Administration authorised the purchase of what became known as the "Sisson Papers" in early 1918, because they purportedly established that the Bolsheviks were German agents. The papers were purchased by the president's envoy (and later, the second most senior officer of the CPI) Edgar Sisson, editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, managing editor of *Collier's* and editor of *Cosmopolitan Magazine*. Ambitious, vain and self-serving, the implacably anti-Bolshevik Sisson - and the American Ambassador to Russia, David Francis - were taken in a confidence scam by the editor of a Petrograd evening-scandal sheet who sold a raft of documents, supposedly lifted from Bolshevik files, demonstrating that Trotsky and other senior Bolsheviks were working for German intelligence. In spite of the fact that the documents were written in flawless Russian, and Sisson and Francis' failure to consult experienced military and diplomatic personnel for advice regarding the matter, the President and State Department decided to publish the documents and leak their contents to the mainstream press. The government even empanelled a National Board for Historical Research to authenticate the documents, which was perspicacious enough to comprehend its political task. Contrary to the conclusions of the commander of the American Military Mission and Raymond Robins, a senior member of the Red Cross Mission - not to mention that of the British Government, which had determined that all the documents had been written on the same typewriter and were, doubtless, fraudulent - the Wilson Administration knowingly propagated lies for political gain. See George Kennan, *Soviet-American relations, 1917 - 1920: Russia Leaves the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1956, pp. 50 - 2, 416 - 9 and 447 - 50. The United States' government's propaganda activities in Russia will be discussed in later chapters.

Russian affairs and radical philosophy were widely available and legislative bodies took little interest in the testimony of people like Raymond Robins because it didn't precisely corroborate the uniform, hostile impressions of Bolshevism which elites were determined to cultivate.⁷⁶

The materials legislators considered in framing measures were garnered exclusively from special interests and partisan sources. The documents describing Bolshevism, internationalism, pacifism and Germanism published by Congress demonstrate this. They included an article by L. White Busbey published on 7 December 1918 in the *Saturday Evening Post*, which stated that international socialism had "destroyed all government in Russia" and described socialists as "extreme individualists" and "victims of class consciousness to the point of madness that would send the ordinary man to an insane asylum as a dangerous paranoiac." Senate Document 78 comprised an address titled *Present Dangers Confronting Our Country*, delivered before the State Bar Association of Florida by George E. Chamberlain, who attacked wealthy, liberal pacifists (whom he described as "respectable sources") for mounting the greatest threat to America's national security and Constitutional order.⁷⁷ One of the Senate's own, the Republican leader of the Senate Committee on Immigration, Le Baron Colt, expressed the House's view of contemporary political chaos. Conflict between socialism and capitalism was not "European conflict" but rather:

a gigantic struggle between two world systems ... the civilisation of Europe and America, which is fast spreading over the globe [and] an old and dead civilisation, the so-called civilisation of Germany [founded upon] the blind worship of a soulless mechanism called the State, controlled by a military caste.

For Colt, there was "nothing new" in Germany's "seeking the lordship of the earth by the subjugation of other States and the imposition of her own civilisation upon the conquered." However, the battle against socialism was vital for it would:

⁷⁵ David Mitchell, *1919: Red Mirage*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1970, pp. 74 - 5.

⁷⁶ Robins spoke before Congress' *Bolshevik Propaganda Hearings* in 1919. Noted sociologists and social workers also suggested, after interviewing members of the URW in New York, that social radicals and aliens resident in the United States presented little or no danger to constitutional government. See Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, p. 219.

finally [settle] whether mankind will submit to the abandonment of what it has achieved in its long upward march from barbarism.⁷⁸

Congress, like the Wilson Administration, emphasised the authenticity of its information and attempted to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks, by their own admission, were the essence of perfidy. Yet these documents, too, were obtained from partisan authorities, emanating from sources such as the Russian Division of the State Department, and submitted by Senators including Henry Cabot Lodge, a leader of the legislature's reactionary immigration reform clique. The documents themselves were apparently translated directly from Russian sources like *Izvestia* and the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-revolution, Terrorism and Extortion, or "Cheka." The materials showed that the Bolsheviks distributed food with discretion, favouring their supporters, and formed the Red Army to help reduce unemployment and lawlessness. Comments attributed to Lenin revealed cynical manipulation of the population through propaganda. Regional Bolsheviks also seemed corrupt and willing to exploit the peasantry and the fearsome Cheka dominated government departments.⁷⁹ Congress' reports, however, did not come from Russia. Official American accounts were coming from Finland and often emerged from obscure sources, such as "a personal friend" of anonymous American foreign representatives. Such reports invariably failed to analyse Bolshevism in relation to Russian history or contemporary conditions. Moreover, they entered Congressional records alongside hysterical, sensational accounts of socialism in the United States, and were therefore compromised by their context.⁸⁰

The documentary evidence presented to legislatures illustrates only one process by which their conclusions were formed. Official inquiries into Bolshevism were

⁷⁷ *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Document 78, p. 4.

⁷⁸ *Cong. Rec.*, 65-3, Senate Document 265, pp. 3 - 4. Colt also sat on the Senate Sub-Committee which acquitted A. Mitchell Palmer of abuses of office.

⁷⁹ The reign of terror then being conducted by the Cheka greatly concerned Congress, which learned of mass executions of those who opposed Soviet power, had relatives overseas, or failed to join a Soviet. Many were shot through errors of identity and others were committing suicide, depressed by starvation and despair. The country was being ruined by hyper-inflation, chronic power shortages and the breakdown of industry. These facts were entered into the *Cong. Rec.*, 66-2.

⁸⁰ A typical domestic document was *Cong. Rec.*, 66-2, Senate Document 260, *Americanism versus Socialism*. It comprised the text of a diatribe denouncing the Non Partisan League, delivered at a meeting of the Middlesex County Bar Association, in Boston, by Rome G. Brown, a lawyer from

invariably proposed and directed by small coterie of conservative, reactionary, well-connected individuals. The identities and careers of these persons will be spelt out in succeeding chapters. For the moment, it is important to note that legislative inquiries into Bolshevism profoundly influenced the political and cultural landscape. They not only made legal findings and recommendations but took a more pro-active role in anti-Bolshevism, introducing and fostering various anti-radical practices. The Lusk Committee, for example, advised New York authorities to prosecute radicals under sections of the State Penal Code of 1902, which outlawed "criminal anarchy," the doctrine preaching that "organised government should be overthrown by force or violence ... or by any unlawful means." Advocacy of such a doctrine, through voluntary assembly or membership of a criminally anarchist group, was made felonious. Suspects were promised immunity from prosecution in the hope that they might betray their associates and divide the radical movement.⁸¹

The psychological and political tenor of authorities' perception of the threat of Bolshevism danced in tune with their perception of the general mood of the nation. As the year progressed, events conspired to confirm the pessimism of those who already doubted the viability of an ethnically and politically diverse society. Paranoid fear and rage was released in violent episodes of civil tumult, in which racialism, anti-radicalism, war fatigue and simmering frustration with eroding living standards seamlessly fused. On May Day a series of clashes and riots accompanying red flag parades quickly degenerated into devastating race riots which tore through twenty-five cities and left over one hundred people dead and thousands more injured. Then, in September, the Boston police force struck and briefly left the city prey to looters and thieves. More important, the nation-wide steel strike in which 350,000 workers struck for the right to organise and work an eight-hour day saw steel companies and MI aggravate fear of revolution and economic collapse, as they distributed through the mainstream press propaganda predicting that the strike, like the Seattle strike, was the thin edge of coming revolution.⁸²

Minneapolis. The speech was presented to the Senate by Frank Kellogg, the future Secretary of State, who was an ardent anti-radical.

⁸¹ See Richard Polenberg, *Fighting Faiths: the Abrams case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech*, Viking, New York, 1987, p. 171.

⁸² Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, pp. 174 - 6.

Arguably the most significant stimulus to anti-Bolshevik hysteria was a series of bombing attacks, made on 2 June, against prominent politicians and leading businessmen. These attacks, which followed similar attempts at the lives of Ole Hanson and a Georgia Senator in late April, occurred simultaneously in eight cities and killed two people. While one device damaged the Massachusetts legislature, another destroyed a considerable portion of Attorney-General Palmer's Washington home. This botched assassination attempt critically influenced the course of political events and the escalation of paranoid anti-socialism. Prior to the bombing, Palmer had not felt inclined to "become an apostle for ... superpatriots." The riots of May had not convinced him, even if they had a nervous Congress, that a campaign of repression was warranted. On the contrary, Palmer publicly endorsed the right of citizens to lawfully change their system of government. His attitude, however, was irrevocably changed by the attempt on his life. Radicals had won themselves a dedicated and powerful enemy encouraged by political circumstance and psychological drives to seek their total destruction.⁸³

As Attorney-General Palmer was singularly well-positioned to instigate a wholesale assault on radicals and aliens. Palmer immediately established a sub-section in the BI, the General Intelligence Division (GID), to compile intelligence about and direct investigations into radicalism. As head of the Division Palmer chose J. Edgar Hoover, an ambitious, young bureaucrat with legal training. Meticulous, doctrinaire and obsessive, Hoover set about establishing a card index system of radical individuals and organisations, which grew to contain profiles of over 60,000 individuals and 200,000 organisations.⁸⁴ Congress, meanwhile, allocated \$500,000 to facilitate radical hunts. With a mounting sense of frustration, the House urged Palmer to take definitive steps to facilitate the apprehension and expulsion of undesirables and Palmer soon obliged them, unleashing a national anti-alien and anti-radical campaign.

⁸³ Eyewitnesses to the attack on his home confirmed that Palmer was genuinely terrified by the incident. He was also a presidential aspirant given license by government colleagues to avenge his personal sufferings and prevent recurrent political terrorism. He stated at the time, "I remember ... the morning after my house was blown up, I stood in the middle of the wreckage of my library with Congressmen and Senators, and without a dissenting voice they called upon me in strong terms to exercise all the power that was possible ... to run to earth the criminals who were behind that kind of outrage." See Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 205 - 6.

⁸⁴ Murray, *Red Scare*, p. 192.

Palmer's tenure as Alien Property Custodian had already provided him with valuable experience in political crusading and he knew how to promote his activities while simultaneously protecting the interests of political and business elites. When he was briefed, as Attorney-General, to prevent post-war profiteering, Palmer preferred to ostentatiously try alleged profiteers rather than investigate the economic conditions deflating the currency and keeping vital goods and services out of circulation. By emphasising the role of "unconscionable men in the ranks of dealers" and setting loose a bureaucratic army, along with auxiliary civilian organisations, to monitor the behaviour of producers and retailers, Palmer legitimated the practice of addressing social problems through retributive rather than constructive means. The bulk of anti-profiteering investigation was, therefore, by default as much by design, directed toward the pointless surveillance and persecution of minor retailers.⁸⁵ With this precedent established, exactly two years after the Bolshevik uprising, Palmer commenced his national anti-communist strike with a raid on the New York offices of the Union of Russian Workers (URW). Three hundred suspects were arrested. The following day, the Lusk Committee had a taskforce of BI and State police raid seventy-three radical centres and arrest over five hundred individuals. Other States' police forces, inspired by news from New York, also worked with federal agents to seize alleged radicals and illegal aliens. In several States, the prisoners were charged under criminal syndicalism laws.

The raids inevitably encouraged vigilante violence and anti-radical forces mustered by authorities and business interests destroyed suspects' property and perpetrated human rights atrocities. Congress and the mainstream press unanimously supported this savage repression, regarding the resistance of radicals as barbarous challenges to the sovereignty of the United States to be punished severely.⁸⁶ This verdict was endorsed

⁸⁵ Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 157 - 65. Among the organisations Palmer invited to monitor price levels was a women's auxiliary of his investigative taskforce, led by senior officials of other influential women's organisations. Individual detectives, meanwhile, investigated allegations against grocers, clothiers, restaurants and bakeries. As with anti-radical and anti-German campaigns, innuendo and malice - rather than evidence - occasioned investigation.

⁸⁶ Murray, *Red Scare*, pp. 182 - 9. Probably the most appalling incident occurred on the anniversary of Armistice, in the Washington town of Centralia. As an American Legion parade passed by Centralia's IWW hall - one of only two remaining in the State - a melee ensued and four Legionnaires were shot. Incensed, the Legion imprisoned several Wobblies and brutally lynched, castrated and finally shot Wesley Everest, himself a former serviceman; his body was left hanging from a railway bridge, its neck stretched to the length of a foot. Raids across the north-west broke out the next morning, with hundreds of arrests taking place while mobs destroyed radical associations' premises.

by courts across the nation, who uniformly acquitted perpetrators of anti-radical violence, while super-patriot organisations, supported by a typically cowed AFL, called for immediate, extensive immigration restriction. Powerful factions within Congress also looked to magnify the state's power to expel alien radicals. The House Committee on Immigration carefully scrutinised the influx and expulsion of alien radicals, investigating the number of deportations from Ellis Island between February 1917 and November 1919. Dissatisfied with the ratio of deportations relative to internments, the Committee manipulated the political environment to ensure that sympathetic bureaucrats implemented its objectives.⁸⁷ Frustration with regulations restricting the Bureau of Immigration's capacity to expel aliens also prompted leading anti-radicals to propose that responsibility for deportation be shifted, through legislation, to the DJ. Doing what it could, the Bureau responded by declaring membership of the URW a deportable offence. Accordingly, on 25 November, the Russian People's House in New York City was raided by State and federal agents, who claimed to have seized enough material to construct a hundred explosives. Anti-radicals' greatest *coup* followed in December, when 249 aliens and anarchists were banished to Russia.

State administrations and legislatures adopted a less spectacular but more absolute approach to engendering socio-political conformity. Numerous State Acts restricted the use of foreign languages. Idaho and Utah required non-English speakers to attend instruction classes. Nebraska's assembly forbade public meetings in foreign tongues,

⁸⁷ Chairmanship of the Committee had passed, in March 1919, to Albert Johnson, a Washington State Republican whose leadership of a vigilante, anti-strike movement, in 1912, had brought him national recognition. Having won office on an extreme, anti-radical and restricted-immigration policy, Johnson removed Ellis Island's administrator, Frederic Howe, savagely criticising him for his liberal attitudes and treatment of inmates and replacing him with a more compliant appointee. The mainstream press' analysis of Howe's removal, typified by the *Public Ledger* of Philadelphia, accused Howe of harbouring "a great tenderness toward the 'Reds' and toward that 'liberty of action' that makes a farce of law and order and a mockery of the country's right to protect itself and to enforce the laws." Labelling Howe a "parlor-Bolshevik," the *Ledger* even suggested that the federal administration was under the influence of a "malign fairy" who had convinced it "that the only way to deal with anti-social radicalism was to give the radicals and their sympathizers important and pivotal government positions." This judgment was favourably received among patriotic business groups such as the Better America Federation of Los Angeles, which reprinted the editorial for its membership. Adding its own interpretation of Congress' investigations, the Federation claimed that Ellis Island had been "a kind of headquarters for the 'Reds' in place of a prison." Moreover, Congress had found that "scores of 'Reds' sent to the island" had been "permitted to 'escape,'" while "scores of others" were released on "straw bonds," immediately proceeded to stir up industrial trouble in coal and steel districts. See Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Margaret Ann Kerr - MSS, Box 1, BAF, *Weekly Letter* 25, 10 December 1919 (hereafter referred to as *Weekly Letter*).

excepting only religious and lodge functions. The State of Oregon forced all foreign-language publications to issue accompanying, literal English editions. The control of education also tightened, as fifteen States decreed English the sole language of elementary schools. It became standard practice to employ only those teachers who were citizens. Political censorship, expressed through criminal syndicalism, immigration and espionage Acts, was augmented by the passage of legislation outlawing the display of red flags in thirty-two States and the cities of Los Angeles, New Haven and New York. Over 1400 people were jailed under these provisions.

Of the methods federal authorities had used to crush undesirable beliefs and persons, namely military repression, trials and deportation proceedings, deportation was regarded as the most effective. With the closing of the Great War, prosecutions under war legislation became impractical. While the Sedition Act was not repealed until 1921, government officials feared that courts would no longer enforce the legislation rigorously. Regular penal codes were also regarded as unreliable and the passage of peacetime sedition bills in Congress seemed far from assured. The "full fury of repression therefore descended down the one remaining channel of deportation." Now "freed from the restraining influence of wartime labor scarcity," the government moved to "initiate wholesale expulsions of aliens."⁸⁸

Anti-radical bureaucrats were also concerned by newly-effective legal defences being mounted by the IWW's senior attorney, George F. Vandever, who pressured the government for *habeas corpus* suits and obtained permission to inspect Bureau of Immigration and Investigation records. After interviewing his clients, Vandever appealed directly to the senior executive of the DL, highlighting the "tenuous basis for many of the arrests" and "numerous illogical shifts in official policy." In this fashion, Vandever secured the release of many Wobblies deported from Seattle by Ole Hanson. On the defensive, the Bureau of Immigration attempted to ensure that its "canons of constructive intent" be used as the "test of an alien's deportability." This in effect would mean that an alien would be required to demonstrate that their subscription to an unlawful organisation was due only to ignorance and that they had been passive members. However, this argument did not persuade William Wilson and

⁸⁸ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 194 - 5.

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Louis Post. Thwarted Immigration Bureau officials' "enthusiasm for antiradical pursuits" not only grew but became wholly vengeful. The Bureau, in concert with the BI, covertly arranged to exclude defence lawyers from "the early stages" of communists' deportation hearings. On 30 December 1920, three days before the DJ was to carry out a nation-wide raid on "communist" organisations to entrap ten thousand members of the Communist and Communist Labor parties. Acting-Secretary of Labor John Abercrombie quietly sanctioned an order providing that aliens could only call on legal representation once "government interests" had been served. Senior bureaucrats also realised that aliens' growing familiarity with government tactics would likely prevent the extraction of confessions. Therefore, raids were ordered in the hope that they would enable the authorities to capture membership records before they could be destroyed. Finally, the establishment of crippling bail terms would ensure that aliens could not secure their release prior to their hearing.⁸⁹ As William Preston, Jr. notes:

Like a pig in a Chicago packing plant, the immigrant would be caught in a moving assembly line, stripped of all his rights, and packaged for shipment overseas – all in one efficient and uninterrupted operation. American know-how was going to put an administrative procedure on a mass-production basis.⁹⁰

While federal authorities were prosecuting "Reds," conservative elements in the Congress decided that the Bolshevik crisis justified the abandonment of constitutional government. Accordingly, in December 1919 the House refused to seat a now victorious Victor Berger. The following January the New York legislature barred five elected socialists from taking office. On the street, the DJ complemented their work, arresting ten thousand members of the Communist and Communist Labor Parties. However, in taking such far-reaching and open action, legislative power-brokers, together with Palmer and his subordinates, overreached themselves. The disbarment of the five New York socialists was roundly condemned, even in the mainstream press, as an unnecessary harm to democracy and various legal and political identities,

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 196 – 236. See also MI - MSS, Reel 15. A typical case report reads: "CLARA ROFSKY, Chicago, Illinois, 10110-1584-1.1 Subject held as prisoner at E. Chicago Station, taken in raid made by the Department of Justice, January 1, 1920, bond \$2,500. Member of the Secretarial Committee of Cook County Socialist Convention, May, 1919." These files were distributed to the War Department Office of the Chief of Staff and to MI.

including Senator Warren Harding. Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard University's Law School and Charles Evans Hughes, the former Governor of New York and a Republican presidential candidate in 1916, voiced their disapproval of the legislature's actions.⁹¹ Moreover, the arrest of so large a number of political prisoners prompted the National Popular Government League, an elite panel of lawyers and legal academics, to investigate charges relating to the legal impropriety of the mass raids and the use of torture and coercion by authorities in forcing aliens to incriminate themselves. Once more in control of their Department, William Wilson and Louis Post ensured that deportation cases proceeding on the grounds of membership or affiliation with a communist organisation were discontinued. Enraged, Palmer's Congressional allies attempted to impeach Post.⁹²

These events marked a turning point in the fortunes of the most visible proponents of anti-Bolshevism. Although enthusiasm for peacetime sedition bills remained, conservative elements could not agree on the appropriate form for such a law and compromise measures failed. Moreover, important judicial rulings criticised not only the denial of *habeas corpus* rights to aliens but also the very notion of Americanisation. In addition, some powerful businessmen, notably Charles Schwab of Bethlehem Steel and T. Coleman DuPont, publicly denounced the hysterical persecution of aliens.⁹³ The impeachment proceedings against Louis Post, meanwhile, collapsed before Post's own defence and the week before Post confronted Congress' Rules Committee, Palmer caused himself considerable political damage by forecasting mass radical uprisings across the United States. Authorities in various communities took the warning seriously, placing public buildings and important peoples' homes under armed protection, enrolling militias and even rounding-up hundreds of suspected radicals for temporary imprisonment as a precautionary measure. Yet the day passed without incident and Palmer was flayed by the press,

⁹⁰ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 220.

⁹¹ Buckingham, *America Sees Red*, p. 26.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 27. Post made use of a recent United States Supreme Court ruling in *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US*, which outlawed the use of illegally-seized evidence to cancel the bulk of the arrest warrants.

⁹³ Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 232 - 44. Judge George Anderson of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston opined in *Colyer et al v. Skiffington* - a case involving 18 aliens seeking release on writs of *habeas corpus* - "This is no time to whittle down the rights of American liberty, whether it be against anarchists or not." And of the federal raids he commented, "a more lawless proceeding it is hard for anyone to conceive. Talk about Americanisation! What we need is to Americanise people that are carrying on such proceedings as this."

which pronounced him a hysteric.⁹⁴ Less than a fortnight later, the House Rules Committee, finalising its investigation of Post, demanded Palmer defend himself and his Department against various charges of impropriety. Before he testified, the National Popular Government League issued its findings in a pamphlet which tabled and detailed the Department's many abuses of procedure and strongly implied that such conduct had been outside their sphere of responsibility. Palmer made a final pathetic attempt to inflame anti-radical sentiment after a bomb explosion in Wall Street in September killed thirty-three and wounded over two hundred. However, elite opinion was not supportive; Palmer's political career was dead.

⁹⁴ Few media outlets could have been as two-faced and cowardly in their treatment of the Attorney-General than the *New York Times*. Always at the forefront of the Red-Baiters, the *Times* had, for example, criticised Thomas Gregory for being too "hasty in telling the patriotic and defensive societies that their help in guarding the Republic is neither needed nor welcome." Moreover, when Palmer had initially opposed Congress' moves to reform immigration legislation, in October 1919, the *Times* denounced his "ancient and outworn views on immigration" as "pre-Adamite sentimentality." Ibid., pp. 200 and 214. In addition, the *Times* had strongly supported the barring of the Socialist members elected to the New York State legislature. See Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 294.

After the Red Scare: Anti-Communism in the United States, 1920 – 1935

The fall of Palmer proved a turning point in American anti-radicalism. The zealotry and hysteria which had characterised reactionary initiative since the Great War could not be sustained, emotionally or politically, at such an intense level. And when the BI's director Bielaski accompanied the Attorney-General into exile the practice of mass indiscriminate raids fell into disuse. In November 1920, Senator Warren Harding, an old-style conservative Republican who had spoken out against the excesses of Red Scare hysteria and campaigned for the resumption of pre-War business and government norms, was elected President. Yet the termination of the Palmer raids and the change of leadership in the BI in no way reflected a liberalising of American society. Proponents of authoritarianism did not suddenly discern the importance of political diversity and economic parity. Rather, Palmerism expired, for in abrogating constitutional politics it too nakedly challenged the nation's socio-political traditions. Ultimately, its disruptive effect on national governance and business determined its defeat; chaos could not continue indefinitely.

Yet the Red Scare remained a great and enduring triumph for the Right. In a few short years, incomparable damage had been done to forces challenging capitalist plutocracy. A succession of powerful reactionary administrators and legislators had developed a formidable arsenal of weapons to transform the battle against radicalism into a crusade for the defence of the open shop and the unbridled power of business magnates. Conservatives adroitly adjusted to new situations and requirements. Their continued anti-reformism became, if anything, more strident and powerful. Important elements of the machinery of repression remained essentially intact. With considerable dismay, the ACLU perspicaciously remarked that while there was no political "demand for wholesale deportations, nor for federal anti-radical legislation," the "whole fight" had been "transferred to the field of conflict of organised capital and organised labor, with more practical generals in command."⁹⁵

The decline of Palmerism inflicted little systemic damage to elite reactionary forces and the legitimacy of anti-radicalism as an ideal and political objective remained unchallenged. While Palmer escaped punishment for his abuse of power, the DJ

⁹⁵ ACLU, *A Year's Fight for Free Speech*, September 1921 - January 1923, p. 6.

lobbied for the passage of a new punitive Immigration Act which made possession of radical literature by aliens a deportable offence.⁹⁶ The Act was immediately put to use, permitting the Bureau of Immigration to deport, over the philosophical objections of Louis Post, nearly six hundred aliens seized in the 1920 New Year raids. In spite of infrequent executive opposition, functionaries effectively pursued their objectives through surviving legal structures. Although deportation levels reached their peak during the Red Scare, the Bureau of Immigration "was left free to reimpose the ... autocratic processes it had created before the Palmer raids" as the federal government continued to pursue policies of the Scare. As the furore about Palmerism subsided, border posts forced the federal executive to reinvest them with the power to summarily arrest suspicious or transgressive aliens. By the close of the 1920s, subordinate officers in the DL were processing twenty thousand telegraphic warrants annually. In early 1924, immigration inspectors regained the power to deny aliens legal counsel at their own discretion so that by 1930 ninety-five percent of cases recommended deportation. Bail continued to be set at the prohibitive level, established by J. Edgar Hoover, that only fifteen percent of those arrested could raise. Only two percent of prospective deportees sought *habeas corpus* suits and of that number, only one sixth made successful petitions. Moreover, the Bureau only paroled or discharged radicals who repudiated former radical beliefs and ceased associating with radical organisations. Many aliens who refused to cooperate in this manner were coerced into "choosing" to be repatriated to their former homelands.⁹⁷

The review of sensitive political cases continued to be handled by a special section of the Department which obstinately failed to re-examine the cases of Wobblies and other radicals. Aliens left to languish in prison had little choice but to acquiesce in their deportation. Even then, some aliens seeking to find early release through these means were kept in custody by the Pardon Attorney's Office, which refused to commute their original sentences.⁹⁸ These activities by the Immigration Bureau represented only one facet of the bureaucracy's program. While it worked to expel

⁹⁶ Efforts to ensure the formal investigation of Palmer by the Judiciary Committee of the Senate were obstructed by an internal cabal until the Committee was finally released from any obligation to consider the matter, in February 1923.

⁹⁷ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 229 - 39.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Preston, Jr. notes that the Bureau of Immigration continued to mount more modest raids on alien radical premises, while the Department of Labor deported not only members of undesirable organisations but also those who had transgressed the Espionage and Draft Acts.

aliens interned during and following the Scare, the War and Justice Departments clandestinely suppressed radicals, often cooperating with State authorities. Having ensured that the Immigration Act of 1920 removed all restrictions against deporting aliens who had been resident in the country for a prescribed length of time, the DJ also recommended that the Department Secretary be given ultimate discretion in ordering the deportation of aliens convicted under wartime statutes.⁹⁹

An officer of the Investigation Bureau of the Australian Attorney-General's Department once likened the measures his government and super-patriots employed to crush radicalism to using "a steel hammer to crush a nut."¹⁰⁰ The metaphor aptly characterises American anti-communism also, for even before anti-communist practices were institutionalised in the 1920s the radical movement had been reduced to a state of pathetic abjection by adverse legislation, administrative procedures, surveillance, raids, expropriations, deportation orders, criminal prosecution, state-sanctioned extra-legal violence and relentless media harassment and excoriation. Whereas in early 1919 the SPUSA could boast over 100,000 members, by early 1920 it had split into three factions, whose combined membership barely equaled a third of the old Party's. Moreover, the entire cause of the reform of capitalism had been derailed. Business interests and their public representatives realised anti-Bolshevism could facilitate their continued dominance of the national political economy. Social circumstance conspired to favour their objectives. The influential social commentator Henry L. Mencken probably spoke for many when he expressed his distaste for the authoritarian moral crusades the President had made synonymous with progressivism, opining:

If I am convinced of anything, it is that Doing Good is in bad taste.¹⁰¹

Perhaps more important, economic hardship hastened the death of Wilson's progressive coalition. As commodities shortages and prices brought agrarian producers into conflict with the urban masses, old alliances between agricultural and

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 247 – 59.

¹⁰⁰ Report from Inspector Roland Browne to Commonwealth Investigation Branch Director Harold E. Jones, 7 March 1931 (AA, A369, D585).

¹⁰¹ Nathan Miller, *Star Spangled Men – America's Ten Worst Presidents*, Scribner, New York, 1998, p. 194.

metropolitan interests collapsed. This tension particularly harmed the Democratic Party, divided as it was between urban, immigrant, anti-prohibition and strongly Catholic elements in the north-east and rural, native-born, dry Protestant factions in the south and west. The spectre of Bolshevism also kept labour and the left in total disarray. While socialist leaders defected to the Farmer-Labor Party, conservative elements in the farmer-labor coalition barred broader socialist elements from their organisations, turning the movements against one another and decimating their electoral strength.¹⁰²

Nonetheless, economic conditions remained trying for the majority of America's citizens. While a handful of Americans prospered in the 1920s, commodity prices remained depressed at war levels and the distribution of income progressively favoured the wealthy. Half of the families in the United States earned \$1500 or less per year when government statisticians claimed that a family of four required, at a minimum, \$500 more than that to tread water. Corporate profits soared. Surtaxes on the highest incomes were halved, taxes on incomes under \$4000 per year were reduced by 25% and inheritance and gift taxes were abolished altogether. While President Coolidge's Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon asked Department employees to find ways to eliminate his personal income tax burden, the President preserved high tariffs, which penalised consumers, rather than large producers, "eviscerated regulatory agencies" and acquiesced, at the urging of big business, in the defeat of farm relief legislation.¹⁰³

In spite of such widespread misery, progressive, let alone radical reform stalled. Conservative and reactionary forces continued to dominate political and economic life. The success of anti-reform interests in a significant measure reflected not only the superior organisation of the right but also the widespread impact of paranoid feeling across American society. While the inability of disparate socio-economic interest groups to form a cooperative political front magnified the power of the right, the right also benefited from the fact that a significant number of people outside the mercantile, industrial and political elites threatened by economic hardship and social

¹⁰² See, for example, Miller, *Star Spangled Men* and Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*. The Railroad Brotherhoods and the AFL were the most important conservative forcers in the coalition.

¹⁰³ Miller, *Star Spangled Men*, pp. 88 and 104.

disunity channeled their feelings of fear and loss into concrete acts of anti-communism and made this their primary political concern. While there is no empirical evidence to justify the claim that a majority of "the American people" became active anti-communists, what can be verified is that anti-communist elites found *enough* support among the paranoid and disaffected to enable them to dominate politics and industry.¹⁰⁴

The spectre of Bolshevism permitted anti-reformists to attack organised labour, for example, as soon as President Wilson's special Boards were dismantled. Through syndicated media attacks, elites ensured that trade unions (which were either treacherous or had been subverted) were indivisibly linked with economic and political sabotage. And whereas President Wilson had felt the need to keep mainstream labour on side during the war, he later began to use legislation to crush a strikes.¹⁰⁵ With the election of Harding, business groups mounted a propaganda offensive as open-shop groups appeared in nearly 250 cities throughout forty-four States. Campaigning for the destruction of worker representation were the U. S. Chamber of Commerce (with 1400 member organisations), the National Association of Manufacturers (comprising 6000 corporate and private members), the National Founders Association, the Bankers Association (with over 50,000 members) and the National Grange, the voice of over one million farmers.¹⁰⁶

One of the more important anti-radical employers group was the Better America Federation (BAF). The Federation sought to politicise the business community and ensure that representatives protective of business and property rights were elected to government. To achieve this, the Federation undertook mass mail-outs, combating proposed measures such as the Single Tax, social insurance and an Absent Voters Law. It also distributed voting recommendation leaflets.¹⁰⁷ The Federation's leadership maintained that business alone formed the backbone of the nation and was

¹⁰⁴ As Otis L. Graham has put it, "veterans of a certain type of reform" felt that the defence of their way of life "required a cultural rather than an economic emphasis: after the war we find old Tom Watson railing at Negroes and Jews, William Jennings Bryan putting down the Darwinian heresy, A. Mitchell Palmer straining at every nerve to round up and export dangerous political ideas and their carriers." These former reformists, as Hage would term it, regressed into a defence of their most primitive fantasies of governmental belonging. See Graham, "Postwar Progressivism," p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ In January 1920, for example, the Administration smashed a coal workers' strike in this fashion.

¹⁰⁶ Murray, *Red Scare*, pp. 267 - 8.

¹⁰⁷ BAF Members' Friends' newsletter 19 November 1918 (Margaret Ann Kerr - MSS).

essential for stability and progress. While it welcomed Palmer's crushing of "Red" coal and steel strikes, they nonetheless feared that "public opinion," which "strongly opposed" nationalisation, was "not consolidated." The "public," it reasoned, required political education and the Federation diligently strove to ensure that a maximum number of citizens adopted its views.¹⁰⁸ For the BAF, any industrial reform amounted to socialism and the success of industrial reform reflected Bolshevik infiltration of government agencies and trade unions.¹⁰⁹ Business and industry would not admit that integral problems beset the American economy. The importance of trade imbalances and high import rates in inducing a falling standard of living were dismissed, next to the phenomenon of strikes, for which Bolsheviks bore full responsibility. Industrial woes were the doing of strikers, saboteurs and slackers, all "paid agitators with transcontinental records."¹¹⁰ Governments were cautioned not to interfere with "finely adjusted" market forces, lest they destroy the balance of the economy. Federal and State arbitral bodies were to be regarded as unconstitutional, as they violated employers' liberty to seek growth.¹¹¹

Many business leaders stuck fast to anti-democratic doctrines of innate inequality and they began to popularise this notion among both employers and employees in special pamphlets. These pamphlets taught captains of industry the importance of not talking down the economy and bolstered labour's faith in capitalism. One such circular, distributed in California during the early 1920s, was *The Straight Shooter*. The *Shooter* argued that America possessed the greatest industrial and political economy the world had ever seen. It was not possible to better America, it stated, except by reinforcing the capitalist principles on which it was founded. Enthusiastic clients of the *Shooter* included a number of regional industrial heavyweights.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ *Weekly Letter* 23, 26 November 1919.

¹⁰⁹ The Federation believed, for example, that the Federal Commission on Trade had been penetrated by Bolshevik spies, that unnaturalised aliens served on the Trade Commission's Board and had influential jobs in the Department of Labor, and that American businesses had suffered because alier Board members were covertly advancing the industrial causes of the nations of their birth. The Federation also maintained that the German government had spent \$50 million to stimulate radicalism in the United States and that this sum had been augmented by a \$10 million donation from American parlour Bolsheviks. Therefore, it was clear that nationalisation of industry would emanate from international labour cooperatives which would progressively Bolshevise national economies. See *Weekly Letters* 23, 26 November 1919, 25, 10 December 1919, and 29, 7 January 1920.

¹¹⁰ *Weekly Letter* 19, 31 October 1919.

¹¹¹ *Weekly Letter* 24, 7 January 1920, 17, 17 October 1919, and 35, 17 February 1920.

¹¹² The San Joaquin Light and Power Corporation, the Los Angeles Railway, the Union Oil Company of California, the Southern California Gas Company and the Farmers and Merchants National Bank

Business crusaders invariably described their cause in racist, nativist terms. Always ready to mobilise fear and hatreds and frame token scapegoats, the BAF declared its campaign "a labor of love," commenting:

surely there is no higher degree of civic patriotism than that which [we] are displaying in organizing the middle classes against the vicious attacks of vicious minorities.¹¹³

The weak-kneed political response of the mainstream labour movement helped compound business organisations' initiatives. Conservative unions, such as the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), attempted to preserve what remained of their power and reputation by vigorously supporting anti-radicalism. Whereas the UMW had once sought to nationalise the coal industry, it now collaborated with industrial magnates to produce reactionary nativist propaganda, which it hoped would dispel notions of its complicity with revolution by throwing suspicion firmly onto immigrant labourers.¹¹⁴ The AFL was so fearful of being tarred by the radical brush that it declined to campaign against the treatment of political prisoners because of the high proportion of Wobblies among their number. Yet in spite of its wholesale adoption of corporate ideology, its abasement before government authorities, its patronage of progressive employers' worker education societies and its denunciation and purging of radicals, the AFL was unable to prevent the departure, between 1920 and 1923, of over a million members. The Federation and the left paid a crippling price for political cowardice and the failure to defend civil rights.¹¹⁵ It failed to persuade outsiders of its

were important clients of the Shooter. See Margaret Ann Kerr - MSS, Box 2.

¹¹³ *Weekly Letter* 37, 2 March 1920.

¹¹⁴ One series of articles produced by the union were so conservative that Henry Cabot Lodge found them agreeable enough to introduce into the Congressional record, in January 1924. These lengthy articles, which emphasised the UMW's importance as a bulwark against communist infiltration of industry, were published nationally, in syndicated broadsheets. Endorsing and perpetuating reactionary analyses of the causes of social conflict, the UMW offered readers an "exposé of the Communist revolutionary movement in America, as promoted and fostered by the Communist International at Moscow," in which the patriotism and heroism of the union became clear. "Imported revolution" was "knocking at the door of the United Mine Workers of America and of the American people" and "the seizure of [the] union [was] being attempted as the first step in the realization of a thoroughly organized program ... of conquest of the American continent." See *Congressional Record*, 68th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 14, *Attempt by Communists to Seize the American Labor Movement*, 'Article 1 - The Amazing Scheme,' p. 1.

¹¹⁵ Since the late nineteenth century the AFL's primary political tactic had been the attempted solidification of labour's integration into the existing industrial system. Choosing not to campaign for legislative or judicial protection, the Federation fostered alliances with progressive employers who formed societies such as the National Civic Federation (founded in 1900) in the hope that they might

anti-radical *fides* and surrendered control of national political and economic debate to open-shop advocates and super-patriots.

In this environment, careerist politicians such as President Harding's Attorney-General, Harry M. Daugherty capitalised on opportunities to win business support, staging major anti-radical raids and breaking strikes. By arguing that unions were in the pay of Moscow, Daugherty obtained anti-strike injunctions from courts, paving the way for the continued use of federal and State troops and militia in strikebreaking activity.¹¹⁶ The battle against organised labour was pitched principally in the east, in the coal, rail, clothing and textile industries. In spite of the election of candidates pledging to defend civil liberties in the regional and gubernatorial elections of autumn 1922, interference with rights of assemblage and picketing, although prohibited, continued. Local constabularies, private armed guards and troops habitually exceeded their powers and unions were unwilling to take action against over-zealous public officials, magnates and vigilantes.¹¹⁷ Civil liberties groups could do little but combat reactionary power through community action and the courts. The Daugherty injunction campaign was a huge drain on their limited resources and harmed the capacity of the organisation to fight other cases. And the courts continued to support legislative and extra-legal restrictions of civil rights.¹¹⁸

With these precedents established, the repression of workers remained the dominant trend of industrial relations. Repression was particularly effective in California where

facilitate greater industrial peace by giving workers a forum for the voicing of their concerns with management. However, the Federation failed to appreciate that it would always remain the junior partner in such organisations. See Ronald Radosh, "The Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders," in Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*, pp. 75 - 83 and Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 259.

¹¹⁶ ACLU, *A Year's Fight for Free Speech*, p. 4. In 1922, for example, Daugherty won an injunction against rail workers. Following the repeal of the Sedition Act in 1921, States had been rebuilding their National Guard units to substitute for federal forces compelled to retreat from anti-strike activity.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24. For example, the chief of police in Manchester, New Hampshire illegally closed workers' meetings during a textile strike. The ACLU's attempt to prosecute the case foundered because the United Textile Workers were unwilling to proceed.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 20 - 1. The United States Supreme Court made two significant, reactionary rulings diminishing the civil rights of labour in picketing cases. Arguably its most important decision was to uphold the decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona which declared legislation limiting the power of injunctions in industrial conflict unconstitutional. A Californian judge, meanwhile, upheld the State's criminal syndicalism law while another judge in New York reaffirmed the legality of council ordinances empowering local officials to control the right to hold public meetings. The mayor of Mt. Vernon, New York was granted such powers, on appeal by the Court of Appeals. The ACLU took the case to the federal Supreme Court.

police, employers and the BAF used sweeping injunctions to intern undesirable elements without trial.¹¹⁹ The UMW discovered its sycophancy had been of little value when West Virginian coal operators, who refused to ratify a wage agreement, evicted over a thousand miners from their homes. Further abuses of constitutional rights occurred during a silk-workers' strike in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1924 - 5. The workers' strike meetings were closed by police, as was a subsequent protest meeting, when five hundred protestors were attacked. Eleven people were charged with spurious offences and while most of these charges were dismissed, defendants were fined \$25,000 for disorderly conduct and then indicted for unlawful assembly, an English common law charge last used in 1796. The cases were tried in the Court of Common Pleas, in the absence of a jury and stenographer. After withholding a verdict for three and a half months the trial judge found all defendants guilty, without rendering opinion on relevant law or the specific facts of the case. The practice of damaging protest movements through targeting their leaders continued, as only Roger Baldwin, the director of the ACLU, was sentenced to six months imprisonment while the other defendants received \$50 fines.¹²⁰ West Virginia was another major site of conflict where injunctions and deportations were used to purge the clothing and mining industries.¹²¹

Worker victories were invariably undermined by devastating setbacks. The Kansas Industrial Court's compulsory arbitration law, for example, was struck down by the federal Supreme Court. A complete breakdown of civil rights occurred in connection with the Passaic, New Jersey textile strike of 1926. At the close of the decade, a series of textile strikes broke out between April and October of 1929, which saw seven strikers killed, twenty-four wounded, another seven kidnapped and beaten, and seven more sent to prison. In New York, thousands of needle trade workers were also arrested for strike action. Ten years after the Red Scare, industrial orthodoxy was

¹¹⁹ During a waterfront strike in Los Angeles, in the summer of 1923, hundreds of "radicals" were arrested without warrants, held in a stockade in congested and unsanitary conditions, frequently beaten by police officers and charged with trumped-up offences of vagrancy and criminal syndicalism. See ACLU, *The Record of the Fight for Free Speech in 1923: The Work of the A. C. L. U. January to December 1923*, May 1924, pp. 13 - 14 and *Free Speech in 1924*, p. 17.

¹²⁰ ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, pp. 25 - 7. The other charges originally leveled at the prisoners included disorderly conduct, blocking traffic, resisting arrest and holding a meeting without permission.

more entrenched than ever, effectively incorporated into government policy, structures and culture. The reactionary credentials of State and local administrations throughout California, Washington, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were particularly infamous. The San Francisco Police Department was just one organisation that was prepared to kill radicals if that proved expedient, while the notorious "Red Squad" of the Los Angeles Police Department was nationally-renowned for the brutality and fanaticism of its partisan activities.¹²² Officials who were unwilling to persecute radicals were customarily disciplined by more zealous colleagues.¹²³

Government executives, bureaucrats and the judiciary continued to connive in the repression of undesirable civilians. In a circular to United States District Attorneys, Harry Daugherty advised them to liaise with District Court judges in the prosecution of strikers for any perceived interference with the judicial process, including the obstruction of scab workers.¹²⁴ Daugherty also corresponded with judges regarding the prosecution of striking railway workers for violations of injunctions.¹²⁵ The corruption of the judicial system practiced by federal Attorneys-General was

¹²¹ ACLU, *Free Speech 1925-1926: The Work of the A. C. L. U.*, April 1926. In 1925, over one hundred-and-fifty striking miners were jailed for violating an injunction. Several miners continued to serve prison sentences under charges of treason leveled four years earlier.

¹²² The "Red Squad" liaised closely with the BAF while San Francisco police subjected members of the Marine Transport Workers' Union to repeated raids in 1923. Encouraged by the ACLU, one unionist was persuaded to file a damage suit against the police in federal court. Before the trial could commence he disappeared. See ACLU, *Free Speech in 1923*, p. 14.

¹²³ *Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, 3rd Session, House Documents Vol. 11, *Appendix to the Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the U. S. for the fiscal year 1922*, Letter from H. Daugherty to President Harding, 29 July 1922. A Chicago attorney advised Daugherty, in October 1922, that unreliability of state law-enforcement officers might be attributed to "the close proximity" of State primaries and elections which encouraged lenience toward "strikers and their sympathizers" for "fear" of their political power. Suggestions were made that city officials, police and sheriffs were either former members of striking organisations or were actually striking themselves. Such "cowardice ... fear [and] sympathy" had meant "local enforcement was generally of such a character that there was no restraint on anarchy and bloodshed." See Letter from George E. Strong to Daugherty, October 1922, in *Appendix to the Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the U. S. for the fiscal year 1922*.

¹²⁴ *Appendix to the Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the U. S. for the fiscal year 1922*, Circular to United States district attorneys 23 August 1922. Daugherty counseled efficiency in prosecution, advising that evidence in each case be "fully in hand" before instituting proceedings. His subordinates were instructed "You will have enough cases without undertaking any that are doubtful and which require long tedious trials with problematical results. You will readily understand the importance of this, as after a few convictions and sentences you will probably have fewer prosecutions; whereas acquittals will only incite strikers."

¹²⁵ *Appendix to the Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the U. S. for the fiscal year 1922*, Letter from H. Daugherty to Dickinson, 28 October 1922. Daugherty himself obtained much of his information from media reports. It was through the "public press" that he learned that 20,000 unemployed workers were striking in northern Illinois. A firm believer in the efficacy of corporal punishment, Daugherty decided to have a number of them "summarily dealt with," through convictions for "flagrant contempts." Such action, he believed, would produce "a wholesome effect."

commonly aided by State and local judicial officers. Justice was perverted not only to punish radicals and aliens, but to protect the state from embarrassing exposures of incriminating evidence.¹²⁶ And well into the 1930s, the DL continued to dispatch agents to observe trials of strikers, to secure the deportation of suspected radicals.¹²⁷

The courts remained a critical forum for the eradication of civil liberties, as their decisions protected the growing machinery of repression. In 1927, the United States Supreme Court upheld all thirty-four extant State criminal syndicalism laws. In only one State, California, was a repeal of criminal syndicalist legislation attempted: the measure failed to garner a single vote in the Assembly. A symbolic case, also tried in 1927, was *Bedford Stone Co. Indiana v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association*, in which the majority of the court held that the Association's refusal to cut stone worked by non-union labour constituted a conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce. Equally reactionary was the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' "Red Jacket" ruling, interpreting UMW activities in a non-union field as "unlawful interference with interstate commerce." This judgment permitted the issue of sweeping injunctions on behalf of the Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Company, prohibiting UMW from distributing funds to strikers. Little had changed, then, since 1920, when a New York court held that union boycotts of open shop produce constituted a conspiracy against "public welfare."¹²⁸ Judicial conduct helped ensure that workers' rights continued to be savaged into the new decade. Whereas in 1928 the ACLU counted 418 prosecutions for industrial protest, the number rose in 1929 to over 2500, after the widespread use of anti-strike injunctions. Moreover, when eight hundred workers in New Bedford appealed their convictions, the Superior Court ruled that all defendants were to be placed on probation for six months to a year with no trial.¹²⁹ In the 1930s, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania continued to sustain injunctions and forbade interference with scab "yellow dog" contracts, while the Supreme Court of Massachusetts advised the State legislature its pending anti-"yellow dog" bill would

¹²⁶ ACLU, *Free Speech 1926 - The Work of the A. C. L. U.*, p. 6. In 1926, affidavits secured from two former Department of Justice agents demonstrated that the Boston District Attorney's office had colluded with the Bureau of Investigation, in 1921, to procure spies to obtain evidence for deportation proceedings against alien radicals. Massachusetts' Attorney-General terminated an investigation, instructing the Boston Department chief to refuse opposing counsel access to vital documents.

¹²⁷ ACLU, *"Sweet Land of Liberty" 1931 - 1932*, June 1932, p. 15. This occurred, for example, in Lawrence, Massachusetts.

¹²⁸ *Weekly Letter* 53, 22 June 1920.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

be ruled unconstitutional for depriving individuals of the right to make contracts.¹³⁰

The services rendered wealthy and powerful elites by the courts and other arms of government undermined democracy in the United States. Few changes in governmental practice and ethos were more significant than the legitimation and institutionalisation of covert surveillance of the civilian body. While some federal departments had maintained surveillance organisations before the Great War, the threat of subversives spurred a massive expansion in the prestige and power of surveillance organisations. With that expansion came a thorough professionalising of intelligence bodies, overseen by emerging hierarchies of newly-permanent bureaucracies. These organisations exercised enormous influence over government policy and administration. Internal departmental powerbrokers such as those directing the Russian Division of the State Department oversaw the education and training of American agents and diplomats. Protected from external scrutiny, they controlled the flow of information to elected officials, cooperated effectively and cultivated powerful civilian supporters. The surveillance industry sometimes suffered temporary setbacks, but its structural integrity never weakened. As previously noted, the Bureau of Immigration simply ignored reforms imposed by Louis Post after his resignation. The BI was slightly more troubled by the release of officers with tarnished records and a modest reduction in manpower and financial resources which had to be endured from 1924 – 33. Nonetheless, the architect of its anti-radical program, the Assistant Director and head of GID, J. Edgar Hoover, became the Bureau's Director.

Hoover and his fellow organisational chiefs convinced important extra-official organisations and individuals that the threat of radicalism necessitated permanent espionage and repression. Many observers failed to appreciate the significance of this social revolution. Even the ACLU believed that "the activities of the Bureau [of Investigation] were radically changed after the resignations of Attorney-General Daugherty and [Director] William J. Burns." Too readily reassured by this cosmetic reform, the Union even concluded that the Bureau had been "put in its proper place as a legal investigating agency, and its propaganda against radicals and organized labor

¹³⁰ ACLU, *"Sweet Land of Liberty,"* p. 13.

... entirely cut out."¹³¹ The transfer of power from elected officials to a growing, fanatical, bureaucratic elite was dangerously imperceptible. Moreover, scholars such as Preston, Jr. have seemingly failed to appreciate its full significance.¹³²

The consistent behaviour of anti-radical agencies continued to be determined by ideological conviction and psychological drives institutionalised during the Red Scare. Case files and other materials gathered during the Scare provided a template for the future collation of data and ensured that the same people were observed and repressed, without pause, by security personnel who regarded them as intrinsically perverse. Yet paranoid impulses robbed law enforcers of a sense of judgment and perspective and a myriad of associations manifesting signs of non-conformism or simple liberalism were regarded by authorities as Bolshevik front organisations. Supporters of political amnesty and trade with Russia were among the most observed, as were participants in unemployment rallies and activities.¹³³ Intelligence and police officers, often under the influence of alcohol, habitually assaulted suspects and were neither dismissed nor disciplined. They also leaked information to government officials and business interests who soon learned the profit of soliciting the intelligence community.¹³⁴

¹³¹ ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, p. 9. The ACLU was not alone in misjudging the character of J. Edgar Hoover. One of the security chief's strongest backers was future president Herbert Hoover, who had recommended for the Directorship. See Joan Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover - Forgotten Progressive*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1975, p. 81.

¹³² Preston, Jr. comments on the activities of the Bureau of Investigation after the reforms of 1924, "the department [of Justice] and the bureau returned to their proper functions in law enforcement. By 1925 all that remained of the department's energetic crusade were the lists of suspected radicals and the confidential material about them that the zealous detectives under Palmer and Daugherty had gathered. These files remained an idle symbol of a past hysteria until the reactivation of the General Intelligence (antiradical) Division in 1939. Then, reversing the Biblical injunction, the government could use them to pour old gossip into new dossiers." This passage reveals several problems in the perception of the Bureau's influence and the implications of its institutional paranoid character. Typically, these problems are due to negligent expression. Preston, Jr. is quite wrong to suggest that these security files remained "idle" until 1939. They were undoubtedly referred to continually throughout the period and were a critical support for later anti-democratic endeavours. It is entirely improper to dismiss the import of the files and their retention. See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 243.

¹³³ The Bureau of Investigation, for example, compiled files on the American Freedom Convention, the League for the Amnesty of Political Prisoners, the Union Brotherhood of Carpenters from Charleston, West Virginia, the New York Cloak and Suit Operators Union, the Citizens Amnesty Committee of Palo Alto, California, the International Association of Machinists, Tacoma, Washington, the Ladies' Garment Workers Union of Cleveland, Ohio and Reverend Harold Stratton, Minister of Harvard Congregational Church, in Boston. Similarly, unemployment meetings and rallies were categorised socialist rallies. Concerned citizens urged the Bureau to monitor other Bolshevik-front bodies, such as the International Federation of Hotel Workers, whose members were allegedly threatening to close down all hotels and restaurants. See BI OG - MSS, OG 180980 and OG 317834.

¹³⁴ One official who found it expedient to call for classified information was the Governor of Ohio. In March 1919, he vetoed a bill providing for the cessation of German language instruction in public

While MI frequently protested that it did not observe civilians in times of peace, these claims were disingenuous. Headquarters and functionaries were prudent enough to avoid being linked directly with activities like the Palmer raids, but internal memos establish their complicity and contribution.¹³⁵ The BI and MI regularly received and distributed information about "radicals" with non-government, anti-radicals. An influential "study on subversives" by Major Richard Charles, a reserve officer of MI serving with the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, was derived principally from information provided by notable patriotic groups such as the ADS, the NSL, the Key Men of America, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) and the BAF.¹³⁶ During the Great Depression, MI supported a consortium of business interests which hoped to seize control of food cooperatives responsible for feeding the County of Los Angeles; the fear of communist infiltration and capture of the cooperatives proved a decisive factor in this action.¹³⁷ Industrial magnates and senior federal politicians had the ear of the intelligence community. The Board of Directors of the National Civic Federation (NCF) in 1930 included T. Coleman DuPont and Senators Elihu Root and Archibald Stevenson, the prime mover of the Lusk Committee and Chair of the Federation's Subversive Movements Department. While officials were occasionally exasperated by incessant requests for military involvement in domestic surveillance, security agencies never reproached patriots or denied them support.¹³⁸

elementary schools, because he believed the bill ought to encompass "private and parochial schools" as well. Nonetheless, local Republicans accused the Governor of being pro-German. Responding to this political pressure, the Governor requested the Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau's Cincinnati office to turn over their files on German Propaganda in Public and Private Schools, hoping this would demonstrate his patriotic *fides*. See BI - OG, MSS, OG 351241.

¹³⁵ For example, a telegram from the Assistant Chief of Intelligence in Chicago, Colonel Gordon Johnston, to the director of MI, dated 1 January 1919 reads "Headquarters of the I. W. W., Communist and Communist Labor Party will be raided this afternoon by State Attorney's office. Action is prompted by information furnished by this office. It is expected several hundred will be arrested. No cooperation by Department of Justice." See MI - MSS, Reel 15.

¹³⁶ MI - MSS, Reel 23, File No. 10110-2601, dated 6 June 1927.

¹³⁷ Letter of Captain Charles H. Titus to Colonel W. H. Wilson, Executive Officer, MI, General Staff, 7 February 1933 (MI - MSS, Reel 23, File 10110-2700 1).

¹³⁸ Easley constantly petitioned the Department of War to increase the powers of MI, requesting that they support Congressional inquiries into communist subversion. The Federation was also determined to expose the perilous state of national security, induced by the emasculation of the Departments of Justice and Labor, effected in 1924. Easley wrote Secretaries of State, into the late 1930s, calling for an end to diplomatic relations with Russia. In 1937, Secretary of War Harry Woodring, frustrated by Easley's attentions, nonetheless told him "I cannot but feel, however, so long as patriotic organisations such as yours are in existence, that the information essential to combating subversive movements will be available to the Government in case of emergency." See Letter from Easley to Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War on 24 May 1930 (MI - MSS, Reel 23, File 10110-2630 1), Letter from Office of Chief of Staff to Easley, 10 May 1934 (MI - MSS, Reel 23 File 10110-2630 5), Letters from Easley to Secretary of War Harry Woodring and reply of Woodring to Easley, 25 June 1937 and 7 July 1937 (MI - MSS, Reel 23, File 10110-2620 7). On Archibald Stevenson see Polenberg, *Fighting Faiths*, 168 -

Although the intelligence community did accept information from members of the public, most operatives within the industry drew their data from their department chiefs, by whom it was compiled, analysed and distributed. The most important source of information, nationally, was the director of the BI, J. Edgar Hoover. From the time of the Scare, Hoover's GID and its Radical Department issued weekly and monthly reports on radical activity. "Negro Radicals," Mexicans, central and eastern Europeans, Japanese and Jews (whether in connection with labour groups or not) monopolised Hoover's attention. Activity by these minorities, particularly in connection with workers' or liberal causes, was always underscored. Prominent ethnic targets included the African-American leader Marcus Garvey and federal Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Few Anglo-Saxon "radicals" escaped attention. The decision of the State Congregational Christian Conference of Maine to defend the right to conscientiously object to bearing arms in war earned them a place in a June 1932 MI report on the "General subversive situation."¹³⁹ In the mid 1920s, the National Student Forum also attracted notoriety for opposition to militarism. This saw the head of the United States Army's Chemical Warfare Division collude with representatives of the powerful super-patriot lobby group, the ADS, to ensure that the Forum was exhaustively monitored.¹⁴⁰

The close association with business and patriotic organisations left intelligence agencies vulnerable to security breaches. So subtle was DW dissemination of anti-free speech propaganda that the ACLU was able to trace its information leaks to patriotic societies.¹⁴¹ More serious security breaches arose from a protracted affair surrounding a chart, received by security forces in 1923, depicting the integral involvement of the "Socialist-Pacifist movement" in international socialist networks. The chart was the work of a librarian at the Chemical Warfare Service in Washington, D. C. After receiving the chart, J. Edgar Hoover personally thanked the author, before passing a

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¹³⁹ MI - MSS, Reel 24, File 10110 2661 6, 16 June 1932. On Garvey see for example General Intelligence Bulletin 49, week ending 7 May 1921 and Extracts from General Intelligence Press Report, July 15 to August 15, 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18).

¹⁴⁰ Military Intelligence also referred its own officers and members of the public, concerned about the activities of the Forum, to the BI for further assistance and information. For while MI believed that Forum members were "not out and out Socialists or Bolsheviks," they were nonetheless certain that they were using the work of the latter." See MI Reports 2 February 1923, 10 February 1923 and 17 February 1923 (MI - MSS, Reel 22, File 10110 - 2423 15-17).

¹⁴¹ ACLU, *Free Speech* 1926, p. 3.

copy of the chart on to R. M. Whitney, Director of the ADS.¹⁴² The following year, the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service ordered the destruction of the chart, complaining of its "errors." Yet the chart entered the realm of legend in patriotic and intelligence circles and, in 1927, MI received a request from an Ida L. Jones, General Secretary of the YWCA in Fort Wayne, Indiana, to verify the existence of the "Spider Web Chart of interlocking directorates of certain organisations deemed dangerous, sinister and subversive." Jones was curious if the chart incriminated any specific organisations or persons and requested a copy of the chart for herself.¹⁴³ Besieged, MI was forced to inform Jones that MI didn't "make investigations of individuals or of organisations in time of peace," and didn't make "adverse criticisms of any individuals or organisations." There was "no truth" in the claim that the Division or the DW had ever "issued" the Chart and all copies of it had been destroyed.¹⁴⁴

A further serious incident involved MI's referral of a private patriot seeking information about the National Council for Prevention of War and other anti-war associations to the DAR. Unimpressed, the Executive Secretary of the NCPW wrote the Secretary of War, Patrick Hurley, asking if this action had his approval. Hurley replied that the offending letter had been "purely routine" and that the referral to the DAR "was given entirely with the idea of assistance." All the Council Secretary could do was register his disapproval of the "grossly improper" practice of the department making the DAR "in effect one of its official bureaus."¹⁴⁵ For MI, no disciplinary action followed, no policy changes occurred and government elites continued to treat sections of the civilian body with contempt.

Numerous other security practices reflected government agencies' disdain for democratic values. The interception of mail was also a "routine" matter until the Postmaster-General's censorship powers were repealed in 1930. Until then, the BI

¹⁴² Letters of J. Edgar Hoover, Special Assistant to Attorney-General to Mrs. Lucia R. Maxwell, 19 May 1923 and R. M. Whitney to Maxwell, 14 June 1923 (MI - MSS, Reel 19).

¹⁴³ Letters of Brigadier-General Amos A. Friez to Captain J. H. Bogart, Munitions Building, Washington D.C., 23 April 1924 and Ida L. Jones to Colonel James H. Reeves, MI, War Department, 26 April 1927 (MI - MSS, Reel 19).

¹⁴⁴ Letters of Colonel Stanley H. Ford, General Staff to Ida Jones 20 May 1927 and Jones to Reeves, 26 April 1927 (MI - MSS, Reel 19).

¹⁴⁵ Letter of Colonel William H. Wilson, General Staff, MID to Mrs. Paul B. Ryder, 6 April 1931, Letter of Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary NCPW to Secretary War Hurley, 15 June 1931, Letter of Hurley to Libby, 24 June 1931, Letter of Libby to Hurley, 22 July 1931 (MI - MSS, Reel 19, File

liased with the Postmaster-General's Department, creating lists of banned "radical" publications, generally printed in foreign languages or serving black communities.¹⁴⁶ The use of material procured through raids, expropriations and the post was upheld by the courts, although in 1932, the District Director of Immigration in Portland, Oregon was concerned to find that "the Courts [were] beginning to take exception to the practice, long in use, of using alternative charges in deportation hearings." Unfortunately for the officer, he would now have to make a "definite charge, or several charges, that fit the particular case."¹⁴⁷ The widespread use of spurious charges indicated the degree to which government agencies were prepared to sacrifice democratic principles for legal expediency. So virulent was their hatred for radicals that accommodations were made to allow the Fascist government of Italy to harass an Italian-American named Carlo Tresca, who published an anti-Fascist paper, *Il Martello*; Tresca and an associate were incarcerated for four months for advertising a book on birth control.¹⁴⁸

The means by which officials deported alien radicals have already been discussed at length. However, an additional tactic was adopted by authorities in the 1920s to facilitate deportation: undermining foreigners' efforts to secure naturalisation papers. Aliens applying for citizenship were subjected to loyalty tests. Their loyalty was determined entirely by hearsay. The BI ordered agents to sound out local "business people" to determine an alien's "general character, reputation and attitude during the war." Other relevant factors included marital status, occupation, the purchase of Liberty Bonds, membership in radical societies, length of residence in the United States, whereabouts of spouse, reasons for domicile and criminal record in country of

10110-1935).

¹⁴⁶ Postal officials gave clear recommendations and legal guidance for prosecution. For example, the BI received advice from W. H. Lamar, Solicitor of the Post Office Department, on "non-mailable" publications. The list included *Workman and Peasant* ... under Trading With the Enemy Act. Other issues under Espionage Act and Section 480 P.L. & R.; *Sonntagsblatt, Der New Yorker Volkseitung* under Espionage Act & Section 480 P.L. & R." See note of 21 January 1920. A note from 12 February 1920 proscribed *Vorbote* (Chicago), *The Communist, Chicago Socialist* and "the following songs: 'Funeral Song of a Russian Revolutionist,' 'Don't Take My Papa Away From Me,' 'The Advancing Proletaire,' 'We Have Fed You All a Thousand Years.'"

¹⁴⁷ Report of 4 October 1932 from District Director of Immigration Portland, Oregon, Raphael P. Bonham to Harry E. Hull, Commissioner-General of Immigration (MI - MSS, Reel 23, File 10110-2692 3). Bonham also noted a decision of the United States District Court in California legitimising the use of material seized without search warrants.

¹⁴⁸ This term included a commutation of the sentences by president Coolidge. ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, pp. 5 and 14. Tresca had been known to authorities since before the Great War, in part because he had been the consort of the noted feminist Wobbly, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.

birth. Finally, an agent was required to opine whether the alien would make "a desirable resident."¹⁴⁹

Anti-radical affairs were managed by bureaucracies and special interests. Their influence was critical to the treatment of political prisoners. When President Harding released a handful of IWW prisoners, criticism by the American Legion and the mainstream press was so savage that he and his successors until Roosevelt foreswore similar action. Wilson, Harding and Coolidge in particular were wholly unsympathetic to Wobbly prisoners, had "little knowledge of the cases ... and in a general way [reflected] all the current newspaper prejudices."¹⁵⁰ After December 1921 the Harding Administration offered to commute alien political prisoners' sentences but on the condition that they agree to leave the country. If prisoners secured release, the DL immediately rearrested those who were aliens. Following a judgment from U. S. Supreme Court Judge Taft the Department's absolute discretion to use ex-post facto legislation against aliens and find aliens "undesirable" on the basis of wartime convictions was reaffirmed. While some aliens received Presidential pardons, these were granted only to those who recanted their radical beliefs. For those deported, their agony did not cease with their expulsion, for the Department had difficulty deporting them to countries such as Russia, Armenia, Turkey, the Ukraine and Austria.¹⁵¹ Yet the Department persisted in attempting to deport aliens to these countries. One Ukrainian man was deported and returned to the United States three times. On each occasion he was issued with false papers supposedly issued by the "Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission" in the United States, a fictitious entity dreamt up by the Department. Where deportation was not possible, the Department became obstructive, refusing to cancel deportation orders or bail bonds.¹⁵² The net effect of these policies was a callous, needless destruction of families and the creation of

¹⁴⁹ included in file with Memorandum of Agent Edward Brennan, Chicago to Chief of BI, 3 August 1920 (BI - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 36). Before passing judgment the agent was advised to "interview at least two neighbors, that is two business people or persons residing adjacent to place of residence of subject whose names have not been given by him as references, for the purpose of establishing his general reputation and attitude during the war."

¹⁵⁰ ACLU, *A Year's Fight for Free Speech*, p. 14. President Wilson had great personal animus for IWW prisoners, because they had obstructed the war, and he belligerently obstructed their release until he left office. See Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 266.

¹⁵¹ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 205 and 59 - 65.

¹⁵² ACLU, *Free Speech 1926*, p. 7.

welfare dependency.¹⁵³

Deportation drives periodically erupted across the nation. In 1928 the BAF encouraged Los Angeles authorities to initiate fresh attacks on radicals as well as prosecute old cases. In 1931, when a DL scheme for the compulsory registration of all aliens failed to pass through Congress for the second time, vengeful mass raids were belatedly undertaken in its stead. It was only at this time that the Department ceased trying to deport political prisoners to their homelands, action which frequently brought them, as in the case of Spanish and Italian refugees, into mortal danger. And it was not until 1932 that alien political refugees were finally granted the right to seek asylum in the USSR. The use of deportation threats by employers in labour disputes was outlawed during 1933 - 4, as were raids on alien quarters. The secret service of the Immigration Bureau was then abolished and the right to fingerprint aliens revoked.¹⁵⁴

While the suppression of communism among alien radicals was undertaken by government departments and patriotic societies, the regulation of American citizens was a more complex matter which frequently saw local executives, pressure groups and constabularies play a larger role. Unwholesome meetings and rallies were closed by police, who also raided suspect organisations. Legal action was necessary to protect "radical" gatherings, particularly in Pennsylvania where hall-owners were required to submit the names and programs of prospective speakers to the superintendent of police.¹⁵⁵ In 1928, police broke-up more meetings, effected more arrests in free speech cases and enforced more injunctions than they had in any single year since 1921. Moreover, ACLU statistics of these civil rights violations excluded incidents perpetrated against African-Americans, who were most subject to attack;

¹⁵³ Authorities succeeded in deporting a Detroit man in May 1924, leaving his wife and children dependent on public and private charity. Another man, deported in 1920 following the Palmer raids, entered the United States through Mexico to reunite with his wife and children. He was arrested in Chicago for unlawful entry and re-arraigned for expulsion. ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, p. 11.

¹⁵⁴ ACLU, *The Fight for Civil Liberty 1927-1928*, "Sweet Land of Liberty," *Liberty Under the New Deal - The Record for 1933-34*.

¹⁵⁵ The existence of this law moved the Mayor of Johnstown to attempt to prevent local anti-Fascist meetings, in January 1924. And when the American Legion closed a memorial meeting for the recently-deceased Russian leader, Lenin, the Mayor declared that "all meetings of [such] character" - i. e. anarchist meetings - would, "in future ... be submitted to the Legion committees for approval before they [would be] permitted." At a Workers Party of America picnic in Pennsylvania a unionist was arrested for calling President Coolidge a "strike-breaker" and mounted police broke up the meeting.

records of these attacks, generally the most ferocious, were compiled by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Excluding the number of indicted strikers, which exceeded 2000, 1928 witnessed 418 prosecutions involving free speech and fifty-three reported break-ups of meetings, a four-fold increase on the previous year. After the alleged anarchists Niccolo Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were finally executed in Boston in 1927, a wave of prosecutions was initiated against the most vulnerable of the thousands who registered their disgust with the killings. On the anniversary of the execution, police in St. Louis broke up a memorial meeting with tear gas. A Boston man was imprisoned for criminal libel for holding a placard which called the Governor of Massachusetts a "murderer." The situation remained similar in 1929. The ACLU reported that police broke up fifty-two meetings, forty-



Figure 6: Hamilton Fish, Jr.
Source: Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, Records
of National Republic

three involving the Communist Party or its affiliates, but remarked that the figures probably failed to represent a quarter of actual incidents.

With the onset of the Depression, political oppression worsened. The number of prosecutions involving free speech, excluding strike cases, leapt from 228 in 1929 to 1630 in 1930. Interference with meetings more than doubled. Communist groups were savagely repressed, attacked for their own or union activities. The suppression of socialist meetings also increased. Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr.'s (see Figure 6) Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities and Propaganda in the United States helped foster this rabid anti-radicalism. The Committee sat for six months in 1930, interviewing 275 witnesses and holding hearings across the nation. It concluded that the communist menace was immense and dangerously unchecked and unanimously recommended the full reinstatement of powers surveillance bodies surrendered in 1924. While unsuccessful in its

legislative and administrative aims, the Committee emboldened police, district attorneys, patriots and militarists.¹⁵⁶ Into the new decade, repression of civil liberties remained severe. In 1931, police killed four workers during demonstrations against the Ford Motor Company at Dearborn, Michigan. In Chicago, eight demonstrators were wounded when police turned a machine gun against them. Even protestors at the Japanese Embassy in Washington and Consulate in Chicago, decrying the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, were brutally attacked by police. While the number of major prosecutions involving civil liberties fell, a huge increase in minor cases arising in strikes, particularly in industrial cities where Communists worked, occurred. The onslaught against labour and immigrants was only halted, to some extent, by President Roosevelt after 1933.

Thorough repression of ideas and thought in almost every sphere of American life underpinned this development of authoritarian power. The concept of "Americanisation" was foisted on the nation by great companies and legislative programs. Anti-communism also aggravated historic conservative antipathy for liberal and humanistic education.¹⁵⁷ Insulted and threatened by intellectual independence, reactionary education reformers worried that private schools operated by religious, labour and ethnic groups were in a uniquely advantageous position to engender revolution by unscrupulously manipulating their students.¹⁵⁸ The Lusk Committee was among the first to suggest that socialism had invaded disparate institutions such as the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society and various ecclesiastical bodies.¹⁵⁹ The Committee's seizure of correspondence of senior

¹⁵⁶ The ACLU judged its effect in stirring up prejudice, encouraging vigilantes and causing arrests "tremendous." See ACLU, *The Fight for Civil Liberty 1930-1931*, June 1931, pp. 4 - 5.

¹⁵⁷ *Revolutionary Radicalism - Its History, Purpose and Tactics, with an Exposition and Discussion of the Steps Being Taken and Required to Curb It*. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities in the Senate of the State of New York, Vol. I. Part I, p. 1112 (henceforth referred to as *Revolutionary Radicalism*). In 1909 a former Secretary of the Treasury and banker addressed college alumni, deploring the prevalence of socialism in the nation and in universities. He stated "four out of five commencement day orations are purely Socialistic. I have met many teachers of sociology in our schools and universities. With few exceptions these teachers are Socialists, though they hesitate to admit it and most of them will deny it. Unconsciously there is a great deal of Socialism being taught in these days from the pulpit."

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁵⁹ A typical case cited by the Committee referred to the activities of Dr. Harry Ward, chairman of the ACLU and prominent figure in the "Fellowship of Reconciliation," the "Emergency Peace Conference," the "Liberal Defence Union" and the YMCA, YWCA and Inter-Church World Movement. Ward's sentiments, particularly his approval of Wobbly philosophy, which he described as the "most ideal and practical Christian philosophy since the days of Jesus Christ," were frighteningly iconoclastic. *Ibid.*, p. 1116.

"Bolshevik" academics also illustrated travelers' allegiance to socialism, their ability to lead students astray and the easy acceptance socialist ideas enjoyed in the community.¹⁶⁰ The Committee also noted with disgust that the American Federation of Teachers ran an advertising exchange with the "self-confessed organ of Bolshevism, I.W.W.ism and revolutionary Communism," *Liberator*. The Federation's paper, *American Teacher*, worryingly, emphasised the necessity of educating America's youth about the ideals of industrial democracy.¹⁶¹

The prevalence of objectionable radicalism was serious enough to throw the integrity of public education institutions into question. The Committee, therefore, recommended that all schools or courses of instruction not regulated by the State Board of Education or "well-recognized denominations or sects" be placed under departmental supervision.¹⁶² Anxious to ensure that only strictly "loyal" citizens were employed as educators, the Committee recommended that the Department of Education "open and conduct special training courses for teachers [for] a duration of not less than one academic year."¹⁶³ In the short term, the Committee had to be satisfied with the introduction of compulsory oaths of loyalty for teachers. It also controlled students' access to speakers and lectures; organisations such as the ACLU were black-listed by the Board.¹⁶⁴

The Committee's findings stimulated similar responses across the nation. President Harding recommended that the Senate appropriate funds for "Americanization Work in the Public Schools of the District of Columbia."¹⁶⁵ The State of Oregon in November 1922 instructed all children within a specific age group to attend State public schools, while in Ohio, members of the Ku Klux Klan were elected to the State

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 1114. Evidence comprised materials such as correspondence between a professor of sociology at Ohio State University and a sociology lecturer at Cornell University, who also instructed at the famous, "socialist" Rand School for worker education in New York, as well as an offer from the president of De Pauw university of a lectureship to a man he knew to be a revolutionary socialist sympathiser or correspondence appearing to affiliate academics with the Tri-State Co-operative Society of Pittsburgh, a "Red" propaganda organization.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1118 - 9.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 17 - 18.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁶⁴ ACLU, *Free Speech* 1926, p. 22.

¹⁶⁵ *Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, 4th Session, Senate Document 320, *Americanization Work in the Public Schools of the District of Columbia*, Communication from the President of the U. S.

Board of Education.¹⁶⁶ Lusk-style bills were generally repealed within a few years but schools remained "the most sensitive of all institutions to the fear of criticism of being open to radical thought."¹⁶⁷ The administration of schools and universities was consistently compromised by private pressure groups, often with the connivance or direct approval of government. In California, school teachers were coerced into rescinding affiliation with the AFL, following an Education Board prohibition of school teacher unions. Across the Union, the AL orchestrated the dismissal of unreliable teachers.¹⁶⁸ Typical policy was demonstrated in November 1924 during American Education Week. Sponsored by the federal Board of Education, the official program encouraged compulsory patriotism. The AL and the National Education Association were listed as joint sponsors but the Legion dominated the agenda.¹⁶⁹ By 1925, more teachers were being dismissed for "unpatriotic" utterances and opinions than during any previous period. Several States required their Superintendents of Education to provide daily patriotic exercises for schools. Board of Education decrees in Washington, New York and Colorado made participation in patriotic activities compulsory. No change was effected by the early 1930s, when the States of Washington, Michigan, Montana and Delaware passed laws, formulated by the DAR, requiring teachers to swear oaths of loyalty.¹⁷⁰

Students' freedom of expression was also stifled. Student protest at New York's City College against compulsory military training prompted the college president to forbid student publications from discussing the subject. At the University of Illinois, the editor of the college magazine and a contributor were sacked at the behest of a delegation of local smelter owners, upset by critical comments.¹⁷¹ At the University of Minnesota, thirty-six students were expelled for objecting to military drills. Rebellious students at the University of Washington who published a reflection on Lincoln, entitled "Lincoln Applesauce," were expelled for a year. The president of the

¹⁶⁶ ACLU, *Free Speech in 1923*, p. 20. ACLU pressure helped bring the removal of the Klan members the following year.

¹⁶⁷ ACLU, *A Year's Fight for Free Speech*, p. 8.

¹⁶⁸ *Weekly Letter* 27, 24 December 1919. School teachers of Visalia voluntarily de-affiliated from AFL. The School Board of San Francisco, followed its counterpart in Los Angeles, prohibiting school teacher unions. San Bernardino's teachers' institute also condemned affiliation with AFL.

¹⁶⁹ ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, pp. 27 - 8. This erosion of government independence led many organisations to boycott the event in protest, including the conservative YWCA.

¹⁷⁰ ACLU, *Civil Liberty 1930 - 1931*, p. 13.

¹⁷¹ ACLU, *Free Speech 1925-1926*, p. 22 and *Free Speech 1926*, pp. 20 - 2.

University of Virginia even succeeded (temporarily) in ensuring that speakers not approved by the DAR or AL were not permitted on campus.¹⁷² Authorities also concluded they had a duty to correct "negligent" parents and religious groups. When fifty students members of a Jehovite sect in Denver, Colorado, refused to participate in compulsory patriotic exercises, the Board of Education suspended them. In one long-lasting conflict, a nine-year-old boy of Bellingham, Washington, was removed from his parents when they forbade him to salute the flag in school exercises. In June 1926, the Juvenile Court removed the boy permanently from his parents' custody and unsuccessfully attempted to secure his adoption by "a patriotic and Christian family."¹⁷³

As repression spread beyond the boundaries of academia, reactionary religious and political leaders seized their opportunity to reaffirm their ideological dominance. The city of Boston became a stronghold of anti-birth-control advocacy, where the right to promote contraception was prohibited by Mayoral decree.¹⁷⁴ In 1925, eleven States issued compulsory Bible-reading laws. The State of Tennessee legislated against the teaching of evolution and, after the law was upheld by the State's Supreme Court, the Mississippi legislature followed suit. Administrative regulations in other States produced similar outcomes. In Kentucky, two high school teachers were temporarily dismissed on charges of teaching evolution while a high school principal in Tennessee was forced to resign for defining the word evolution for his pupils. By the close of the decade police were raiding birth control clinics and confiscating the records of patients and employees.¹⁷⁵

Censorship also repressed civil liberties. The invention of the "talkies" in 1928

¹⁷² ACLU, *The Fight for Civil Liberty 1927-1928*, pp. 26 - 8. The President of the University of Virginia banned a planned address by Kirby Page, among others. For these actions, however, he was eventually forced to resign. Education authorities in Milwaukee and Pennsylvania were among those noted by the ACLU for their repression, while in Washington State, a high school teacher, whose definition of the word "Socialism" won a prize in *Forum* magazine, was threatened with job loss. Other State Boards of Education threatened teachers who supported students' liberal clubs with dismissal.

¹⁷³ ACLU, *Free Speech 1926*, p. 22 and *Civil Liberty 1927-1928*, and *The Story of the Acts of the A. C. L. U., 1928 - 1929*, June 1929. Legal action on behalf of the boy's parents was complicated by their refusal to appear in "earthly courts," which helped prevent them retake custody of their son from the Seattle Children's Home for some eighteen months. During this entire ordeal they had not once been permitted any contact with their child.

¹⁷⁴ ACLU, *Free Speech in 1924*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁵ ACLU, *Civil Liberty 1927-1928*, p. 24. The teacher was a fundamentalist but this did not save his career. Police raided a birth control clinic in NYC 15 April 1929 seized records and employees.

prompted eight States to introduce Censorship Boards. Public opinion was exhaustively monitored. Works such as the drama *American Tragedy*, a dramatised account of the lives of Sacco and Vanzetti, were banned for "obscenity."¹⁷⁶ Few stones were left undisturbed in the search for sedition. A barber from Lynchburg, Virginia, found himself in contempt of court for expressing sympathy with railway strikers.¹⁷⁷ Two young women running a Communist children's summer camp were convicted in 1930 of "desecrating" the American flag, after they refused to run one up for a mob.¹⁷⁸ Official authorities and special interests effectively coordinated the attack on subversives. Control of mainstream media greatly restricted the spread of information. For example, the director of the BI, William Burns was able to attack the ACLU on the radio and in public addresses for their defence of "reds." Yet when the ACLU sought a right of reply from the American Telephone and Telegraph Company they were refused.¹⁷⁹ Others to feel the weight of corporate repression included the Reverend Hermann J. Hahn, whose Depression-era broadcasts from Buffalo, New York, were abruptly cancelled after he advocated taxing the rich and the institution of federally-funded unemployment insurance.¹⁸⁰

The narrowing conception of "Americanism" which emerged in the wake of the Red Scare saw belligerent special interests crush traditional democratic values and, because deviance was defined not by criminal acts but by moral judgments and perceptions, ideals of rehabilitation and acceptance were abandoned and regarded as unachievable. Those deemed to have transgressed could not win back the trust of reactionaries. Political prisoners charged under wartime laws, for example, had to wait until the election of Roosevelt to be re-enfranchised. Wobblies from Centralia were only released on parole in 1933, while Tom Mooney approached his twentieth year of detention when Roosevelt took office. Persons regarded as friendly to radicals also suffered. The lawyer who represented the Centralia Wobblies was disbarred by the Washington State Supreme Court in 1925, on the grounds that his public speeches advocated IWW principles; five years elapsed before he was finally free to practice

Records remained in custody. See *Civil Liberty, 1930 - 1931*, p. 21.

¹⁷⁶ ACLU, *The Story of Civil Liberty, 1929 - 1930*, May 1930, p. 28. The unfortunate bookseller lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

¹⁷⁷ ACLU, *A Year's Fight for Free Speech*, p. 35.

¹⁷⁸ ACLU, *Civil Liberty, 1930 - 1931*, p. 14. They each served prison terms of three months.

¹⁷⁹ ACLU, *The Record of the Fight for Free Speech in 1923*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁰ ACLU, "Sweet Land of Liberty," p. 14.

his profession again.¹⁸¹

Careful review of the years following the Red Scare demonstrates how deeply ingrained anti-communist fear became in the United States during the 1920s. Oppression in industrial, religious, educational, artistic and political life continued to escalate and was increasingly institutionalised. Yet, as the introduction to this thesis shows, the underlying causes of the spread of anti-communism were complex and involved a number of political and psychological factors. In particular, the growth of anti-communism reflected the psychology, initiative and objectives of mobilised interest groups, rather than those of the mass public. This study, therefore, will now profile the special interests that dominated the political environment of the United States. This profile, rather than encouraging improper "explanatory generalizations" about mass political behaviour, will constitute "a collective portrait" of right-wing subversives and describe how they changed American democracy.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ ACLU, *Free Speech 1925-1926*, p. 15 and *Civil Liberty. 1930 - 1931*.

¹⁸² Davis, *Slave Power*, p. 62.

Chapter 2: *Dramatis Personae*: The Shapers of American Anti-Communism

The Construction of Anti-Communism in the United States: An Overview

It is one of the great ironies of anti-communism that the most disconcerting and prevalent image of the communist was that of the furtive schemer, for the conception of the communist movement as a web of interlocking agencies perfectly describes the forces of anti-communism. While anti-communists believed that communist activity depended on minuscule but dedicated and able cadres, the evolution and spread of anti-communism itself was contingent on the influence of a relatively small number of individuals and organisations. The history and character of this influence will be examined in greater detail in this chapter, which will delineate the significance of ties between governments, commercial interests, the mainstream media and patriotic societies. Relations between these bodies and wider society will also be explored.

While this chapter will introduce numerous key personalities of the American anti-communist milieu, it will only analyse the psychology of historical figures to a certain extent. More thorough analysis of the psychology underpinning anti-communist societies, or kinship groups, will be presented in the succeeding chapter. Generally eschewing a chronological approach, the survey will nonetheless commence with a review of the Wilson Administration's response to Bolshevism, along with the role of the press in disseminating this government's anti-Bolshevik propaganda, because the activities of both proved influential in shaping wider and future opinion. The attitudes of later significant politicians will also be canvassed, as will the role of dominant personalities within the state's intelligence and security bureaucracy, patriotic societies, including those of powerful businessmen and a variety of other anti-communists, such as church ministers and migrants. By focussing on the national network of anti-communists, avoiding misleading, generalisations, the chapter reveals important empirical information about the structure of anti-communism and the means by which political crusades can be shaped by small numbers of people in a democratic society.

Anti-Bolshevism is born: Red October, the Wilson Administration and American responses to Bolshevism in Russia

The political response of the United States government to Bolshevism was, from the first, remarkably consistent. Bolshevism was abhorred by the Wilson Administration and it spared little effort in trying to exterminate the doctrine. The majority of federal officials' opinions of Bolshevism were founded on preconceived ideas and prejudices. Few, including the President, were knowledgeable about the political environment of Russia, while fewer were inclined (or able) to empathise with the aims of Russian radicals. Official responses to Bolshevism betrayed a singular lack of sympathy and understanding, inadequate analysis, and a palpable condescension and contempt for peoples and causes regarded as definitively alien to the United States. Officials tended to demonise those they failed to comprehend or appreciate and not surprisingly, government policy comprised a series of ill-advised, petulant initiatives to destroy the Bolshevik regime.

The Wilson Administration had invested heavily in pre-Bolshevik revolutionary Russia. The United States government was the first to recognise Russia's Provisional Government, formed after the abdication of Czar Nicholas II in March 1917. Officials enthused about the prospects of Russia, believing it had demonstrated a readiness to climb the evolutionary ladder. The United States' Ambassador to Russia, David Francis typically regarded the March uprising as the "most amazing revolution in history" and a "fitting and glorious" addition to the American tradition of democratic revolt.¹ In Washington, the revolution signaled the time to enter the Great War, now more fervently regarded as a struggle between democracy and despotism, presenting the United States with an opportunity to establish democratic rule throughout the world.² Yet such ideas were not popular in Russia itself and the disappointment this engendered was sharpened by the fact that it surprised the government, which was wholly preoccupied by its antipathy to socialism and the pursuit of policies damaging to the Provisional governments. No single policy was more destructive in this respect than the Allies' insistence that Russia continue to fight Germany.

Such ill-advised, counter-productive policies were the result of the disproportionate

¹ Brian Moynihan, *Comrades: 1917 - Russia in Revolution*, Hutchison, 1992, p. 106.

² Kennan, *Soviet-American relations*, pp. 15 and 17.

influence of moral and philosophical, as opposed to diplomatic, considerations. The inadequacy of the United States' diplomatic service heightened this problem. The most senior American representative in Russia was underqualified and unable to articulate adequate, let alone expert, recommendations. Ambassador Francis could not speak Russian and was an inexperienced diplomat, isolated from embassy circles and important contacts and information. He frequently failed to consult experienced staff and reputedly indulged in a liaison with a French woman whom Russian secret police suspected was a German spy.³ Francis also nursed a singular hatred for socialists and was committed to supporting the Russian premier, Alexander Kerensky who led the second Provisional Government from July until November 1917.⁴ Entirely ruled by unexamined sympathies, Francis overstated the importance of political figures whom he admired.⁵ While this reflected his incapacity to apprehend and tolerate complexity and ambiguity, along with a compulsion to categorise opponents of respectable middle class politics as traitors, tsarists and madmen, it had the more serious effect of entirely distorting political analysis in Washington.⁶

Although a handful of representatives offered the government different advice, they divined that their recommendations were not valued. The most important of these advisers were the commander of the American Military Mission in Russia, Colonel William Vorhees Judson, and Raymond Robins, a senior appointee to and ultimately the director of the Red Cross Mission, who often acted as a conduit between the Bolshevik hierarchy and the State Department. Prior to Red October, Judson and Robins consistently maintained that entente with the Bolsheviks was the only practical and clear-sighted course of action. Judson argued that cooperation with the Bolsheviks, the strongest military force in the country, was the most efficient way to achieve long-term regional goals. He also rejected suggestions the Bolsheviks were in

³ Ibid., pp. 38 - 40. The British diplomat Bruce Lockhart opined that Francis had little "knowledge of anything beyond banking and poker" and suggested he would not have known "a revolutionary from a potato." See Moynihan, *Comrades*, pp. vii and 9.

⁴ Francis regarded radicals as the "gravest menace to Russia" and disparaged them for their "narrow partisanship, bigotry, fanaticism [and] Jesuitical casuistry." See Hoover Institution, Stanford University U.S. Consulate Reports, Petrograd Revolution, March - July 1917 - MSS, *Dispatches to the Secretary of State*, Report No. 304, Communiqué to the State Department, 15 May 1917.

⁵ For example, he informed the State Department that the spokesman for the moderates in the Duma, Vasily Shulgin, represented "the opinion of the entire middle class of Petrograd" and, indeed, "the opinion of the entire population of Petrograd except the socialists or those who are secretly working for or desire the return of the old regime." Ibid.

⁶ Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations*, pp. 44 - 5.

the pay of Germany. Indeed, he was concerned that Allied recalcitrance might drive Russia into the camp of Germany.⁷ Aware that President Wilson and his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, were anxious to give support to anti-Bolshevik forces, Judson cautioned that a Russian civil war would only benefit Germany.⁸

Judson's views proved unpopular with Washington for several reasons. Judson's preparedness to deal with the Bolsheviks was received coolly, for Wilson and Lansing maintained that the destruction of socialism was a greater priority than even the defeat of Germany.⁹ Lansing reputedly described Bolshevism as the "most hideous and monstrous thing that the human mind has ever conceived."¹⁰ For his part, Wilson, who had a feeble grasp of Russian history and culture, refused to treat with a clique of tyrants who had subjugated "the Russian people," whom he idealised beyond recognition.¹¹ Moreover, the President aimed above all to advance his Fourteen Points

⁷ Judson further described the Bolsheviks as "fanatics seeking peace and a social and economic revolution in the interests of the proletariat." Newberry Library, William Vorhees Judson - MSS, Box 4, Communiques sent from Russia to the War College, Washington D. C., 17 July 1917 - January 30 1918, Message 105, 24 November 1917.

⁸ Messages 169, 12 December 1917, 187, 17 December 1917, and 213, 28 December 1917 (Judson - MSS). While Judson did not believe the Bolsheviks could hold power indefinitely, he noted that they, of all Russians, were the most "hostile to the Central Powers." Further, he advised that that Russia would not be able to rejuvenate itself through the leadership of its "well-to-do educated classes." These "classes" were "becoming submerged" and the removal of the Bolsheviks would only bring renewed outbreaks of terror and force "many elements" to "actively seek German and Austrian assistance." See Message to Chief of Staff, Washington DC, 27 January 1918 (ibid.).

⁹ In furtherance of military aims, Judson attempted dialog with the Bolshevik leadership, meeting with Leon Trotsky, in December 1917. Yet Judson's views were not pleasing to the Secretary of State and he was brusquely upbraided by Lansing. The means by which the American public learned of these events illustrates their remoteness from sources of information and subjection to the political interests of governments and the mass media. Readers of the Chicago *Daily Tribune*, for example, were informed that the Bolsheviks were "trying to put one over on Colonel Judson," the paper remarking "It is to be hoped that Colonel Judson has been misquoted by the Bolsheviks for reasons best known to themselves." See newspaper clipping (probably Chicago *Daily Tribune*), "U.S. Colonel's Russian Note Stirs Up Row - Unofficial O. K. on General Peace Denounced", 4 December 1917 (Judson - MSS).

¹⁰ William Appleman Williams, "American Intervention in Russia: 1917 - 1920," in *Containment and Revolution - Western Policy towards Social Revolution: 1917 to Vietnam*, David Horowitz (ed.), 1967, p. 61.

¹¹ In a speech to Congress, on 2 April 1917, Wilson stated that "Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationship of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power was not in fact Russian in origin, character or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for the freedom of the world, for justice and for peace." Wilson later claimed to have learned from "everybody who [had] mixed with the Russian people" that they were "among the most lovable people in the world, a very gentle people, a very friendly people, a very simple people, and, in their local life, a very democratic people, who easily trust you, and who expect you to be trustworthy as they are." See Edward H. Egbert - MSS, and Notes from President Wilson's 1919 Mid-Western Lecture Tour, from a speech delivered in Billings, Montana, 11 September 1919 (Egbert - MSS).

peace plan and the League of Nations, neither of which had been embraced by the Bolsheviks.

Washington also assumed that commercial imperatives made cooperation with the Bolsheviks impossible. American industrialists had valuable investments in Russia which they expected the government to protect. Dominant ideological tenets governing American external policy also demanded the defeat of Bolshevism. The Open Door Policy, a marriage of industrial expansion and national imagery, expressed the United States' pursuit of unregulated investment and exploitation opportunities in foreign markets. For a majority of politicians and businessmen, "intercourse, from the standpoint of business" and "the making of contracts and the acquisition of property rights" was "the most important principle" of international relations. "No State" which destroyed "the foundations of honourable intercourse," like the Bolshevik government, which expropriated international property and repudiated foreign debts, was "entitled to a place within the family of nations."¹² Vested interests were therefore easily persuaded that anti-Bolshevism was high patriotism, regardless of the aspirations of "reform-minded nationalists [in] underdeveloped nations."¹³

The conflict between American and revolutionary conceptions of international relations was further exacerbated by widespread belief in the United States' status as a "unique ... unselfish, unambitious" nation "whose world goals [were] good for all people." Such identification of the national Self with "righteousness and wisdom" encouraged the perception that those challenging this notion were either "aggressors or appeasers."¹⁴ More often than not, such perception was transformed into crude nationalism, as expressed by former Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane in 1922:

When I say that Russia may go her own way, and Mexico hers, I say so with a sense that I have a right in Russia and in Mexico, and also a right to see that they do not go their own way to the extent of blocking my way to what of good they

¹² These words were uttered by Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York, associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, Republican presidential candidate, United States Secretary of State and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See Robert Freeman Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920 - 1942," in Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*, p. 69.

¹³ *Ibid.*

hold.¹⁵

Wilson's views on foreign policy, however, were complicated by his conviction that all peoples deserved "self-government." The role of the United States was to teach other nations how to elect responsible representatives and encourage international investment. Ideally this ruled out direct interference in other nations' political affairs.¹⁶ For Wilson then, the equation of Bolshevism with boundless, indefensible perfidy politically and psychologically justified his aid of the Allied invasion of Russia just three weeks after the Bolsheviks seized power. The United States was hardly a junior partner in these operations. After refusing to negotiate with the Bolsheviks or assist them in the fight against Germany (contrary to the wishes of the French government and the Bolsheviks themselves) the United States supported a host of futile operations which "intensified, enlarged, and extended the [Russian] civil war, thereby [increasing] the material and human costs of the revolution."¹⁷ Moreover, intervention profoundly disturbed Russian leaders' attitude toward the West and influenced their fateful decision to build socialism in one country, within a protective enclave in Eastern Europe.¹⁸

While military incursion was the most notable form of American interference with Russian affairs, the United States' propaganda campaign in Russia was hardly less subtle. Supervised by the CPI, propaganda was directed toward stiffening Russian war resolve and undermining Bolshevism. Humanitarian agencies assisted the CPI. The appointment of the wealthy copper magnate, stock market operator and financial promoter, William Boyce Thompson, as a special envoy to the American Red Cross Mission was particularly instrumental in the corruption of relief work. A self-promoting, principle-free careerist, Thompson irreparably damaged the Mission's reputation by attempting to shore up Kerensky's position with finances pledged by himself and the United States government.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁶ Williams, "American Intervention in Russia," p. 29.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 64 - 6.

¹⁹ Thompson felt his role was to secure support for Kerensky and the Russian war effort. Yet neither of these objectives constituted official Red Cross business. Indeed, the Red Cross Mission was probably unaware of Thompson's charter, which had not been formally arranged. Thompson concluded that Kerensky's difficulties could be solved through an influx of cash. He therefore pledged a personal loan

The integrity of American aid operations in Russia remained compromised by these objectives. Mindful that charities in Russia helped justify military intervention, Lansing engineered the appointment of the prominent engineer and philanthropist Herbert Hoover as director of a visiting economic commission to Russia in June 1918.²⁰ Lansing was convinced that the world was beset with two "great evils": Bolshevism and absolutism, embodied by the authoritarian, militaristic and expansionist regime of Germany. He adjudged Bolshevism "the greater evil," since it was "destructive of law and order," and argued that the West ought not "go too far in making Germany and Austria impotent." It was imperative to retain an effective bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism.²¹

Although less ruthless than the Secretary of State, nor so preoccupied with *realpolitik*, Herbert Hoover nonetheless partook absolutely in strident anti-Bolshevism. Compared with Lansing and the President, Hoover recognised that real social grievance underpinned radicalism.²² Bolshevism, he noted, found favour only among the miserable and desperate, long oppressed by despots. For this reason, Hoover didn't fear the spread of Bolshevism across the United States. However, the horrors he witnessed sharpened Hoover's instinctive distaste for Bolshevism, influencing his assessment of the Bolsheviks' responsibility for prevalent chaos. Hoover informed Wilson that "Bolshevik economic conceptions" had brought famine to hundreds of thousands of people. Bolsheviks, he opined, lived in a "land of illusion," imagining

of five million rubles for a government loan. As Kerensky was also loosely affiliated with the Socialist Revolutionaries, Thompson resolved to support that Party and, after unsuccessfully attempting to procure them funds from the United States government, "drew on his personal account with J. P. Morgan and Company for a cool \$1 million." Russian political circles regarded this subsidisation of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Kerensky with amusement but, tragically, it gave ammunition to the Bolsheviks, who accused the Party of prostituting the revolution. At a later date, the affair was revived by the Communist Party which tried Socialist Revolutionaries for being the "paid lackeys of capitalism." It is worth emphasising, then, that the narcissism and ambition of one American magnate helped to send many people to their deaths a few short years later. See Kennan, *Soviet-American relations*, pp. 54 - 7.

²⁰ Williams, "American Intervention in Russia," p. 59. Lansing reputedly stated, "armed intervention to protect the humanitarian work done by the Commission would be much preferable to armed intervention before this work had begun."

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²² Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Herbert C. Hoover - MSS, Box 157, Memorandum to President Wilson, 28 March 1919 (draft of a document sent to the President on 25 April 1919) (henceforth referred to as *Memorandum to President Wilson*, 28 March 1919). Hoover attributed the "swinging of the social pendulum from the tyranny of the extreme right to the tyranny of the extreme left" to generations of suffering and neglect, aggravated in the post-war environment by famine, which "further silhouetted the gulf" between the rich and the poor, "starved and driven mad in the presence of extravagance and waste" by the bourgeoisie and aristocracy.

they could perfect society "destroying the basic processes of production and distribution instead of devoting [themselves] to securing a better application of the collective surplus."²³ Such a cursory judgment myopically and somewhat conveniently disregarded the consequence of counter-revolutionary activity on Russian affairs and Bolshevik rule. It also depended on and conveyed the mistaken impression that the Bolsheviks believed that transition to a communist economy could be effected by destroying the resources of a previous system.

The evolution of Hoover's perception of Bolshevism is particularly indicative of the corrosive effect of latent prejudices and feelings on "rational" thought. Ultimately, the moral repugnance of Bolshevism diminished Hoover's capacity to recognise the determinative influence of material circumstances in shaping human behaviour. Faced with the ruin of Europe and the Russian Civil War, Hoover began to separate the unfortunate peoples he observed from himself and the United States, belittling their cognitive and ethical capacities. Emotionally and mentally distanced from debased behaviour, Hoover argued that the problems of Russia were borne of particular cultural, rather than universal, qualities. When speculating on the rise of Bolshevism and its potential extent, Hoover suggested that Bolshevik conquest of Europe was unlikely because Bolshevism was a purely Russian product: no other race manifested "such a denseness of ignorance and such impressionism as the Russian people." Peoples in Central Europe, by contrast, were capable of reaching "social solutions ... with infinitely less violence and destruction." Not only did they enjoy "better distribution of the land," they also possessed "greater intelligence."²⁴ The only universal quality of Bolshevism Hoover acknowledged was congenital degeneracy,

²³ Ibid. In April 1919, one month after Hoover drafted these comments, his contempt for the Bolsheviks was hardened by their decision to forestall the abolition of banks, money, agricultural and other property holdings. Hoover opined "the mixture of theorists, dreamers and murderers that have conducted the Communist Governments in Russia for eighteen months have now themselves to some degree realized the infinite calamity they have brought on their people and themselves are floundering around endeavoring to restore these normal processes of production and distribution. Russia was formerly not only a well-fed country but exported as much food as did the United States and yet her people are dying today in thousands from starvation for no other reason in the world than the fool idea that the organization of productive industry can be destroyed and the population still live." See Hoover - MSS, Box 157, "Preliminary Drafts on Bolshevik Manifestations," document for President Wilson, 25 April 1919 (henceforth referred to as *Preliminary Draft on Bolshevism*, 25 April 1919).

²⁴ *Preliminary Draft on Bolshevism*, 25 April 1919. Though it is only a subsidiary issue, Hoover's analysis of the position of Russian peasant farmers vis-a-vis their European counterparts was quite erroneous. They enjoyed a far more stable position than tenant farmers of Italy, Spain or Ireland. See Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, pp. 492 - 3.

manifested by "the criminal classes" in every society.²⁵ For Hoover, like Palmer, the Bolshevik was the Other.

It is a measure of the profound dread and disgust Bolshevism stirred in Americans that such a committed progressive as Hoover should find it beyond his capacity not to demonise and mystify its power.²⁶ Still able to recognise the United States' duty to provide essential relief to millions in need, Hoover even counseled against anti-Bolshevik military action, regarding the provision of aid as the best long-term political strategy.²⁷ Yet Hoover was one of only a handful of American officials who could master their anti-Bolshevik sympathies and distinguish humane from political and cultural objectives. This is more than can be said of Edward Egbert. Profoundly influenced by his friendship with Catherine Breshkovskaya, Egbert had been convinced, from the time of his arrival in Russia in mid-1917, that all radical socialists were the lackeys of the Kaiser and solely responsible for "practically all of [Russia's] political unrest."²⁸ After helping to poison Congress' perception of Russian socialists, Egbert successfully petitioned the President and George Creel to approve a propaganda campaign in Russia, supported by provisions of food, clothing and other supplies.²⁹

A true zealot, Egbert was bitterly disappointed by the small size of the American military force dispatched to Siberia and North Russia. This force, he felt, would achieve little but the betrayal of "the sentiments, desires and ideals of the very great majority of both the American and Russian people" for a democratic Russia.³⁰ Egbert's ultimate desire was to send a volunteer army to Russia. Yet his predilection for such flights of fancy did not prevent him from effectively promoting his cause and

²⁵ Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, pp. 492 - 3.

²⁶ Ibid. Bolshevik propaganda, Hoover felt, traveled "more rapidly even than the bubonic plague in a starving and suffering population."

²⁷ Humanitarian goals were not the only consideration underlying Hoover's views. He also doubted whether United States soldiers in Europe could "resist infection with Bolshevik ideas." See *Memorandum to President Wilson*, 28 March 1919.

²⁸ Letter from Egbert and Ben Williams to Senator John Sharp Williams of the Foreign Relations Committee, 7 August 1917 (Egbert - MSS, Folder H).

²⁹ The President advised Egbert to form a society for the relief of civilian sufferers and instructed him to consult Creel, so that the society might work with the CPI and the Red Cross. See Letter from Creel to Egbert 14 February 1918, Letter from H. R. Burton to Creel 12 March 1918 (Egbert - MSS, Folder H) and Letter from Egbert to Creel 14 February 1918 (Egbert - MSS, Folder J).

his Catherine Breshkovskaya Russian Relief Fund won the support of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the ADS, which commended his book *New Russia and World Peace* to educational institutions.³¹ Through personal contacts, Egbert constructed the Fund from the cream of society. Its executive committee comprised eminent judges, senior political figures, respected educators, noted religious leaders, senior Army officers and wealthy industrialists.³²

Catherine Breshkovskaya herself was Pan-Slavist, deeply anti-Prussian, messianic and something of a mystic. She propagated an image of the Russian soul as primitive, but incomparably pure, encouraging Americans to view Russia as a tragic, vulnerable victim of German expansionism. Yet the spirit of her conception of the Russian *Volk* was lost in translation, ensuring that her message reinforced Americans' unfounded notions of their own cultural superiority.³³ Moreover, supporters of the Fund were led to believe that the Russian masses and the American people were kindred spirits. Breshkovskaya's heartfelt yet sentimental appeal did not illustrate the complexities of Russia's political environment but, rather, suggested that "far away" there lived "a true and honest democracy ready to pursue her way side by side" with the United

³⁰ The deployments were dismissed by Egbert as "a pretence, a camouflaging demonstration to quiet the demand for action at home and the requests of the Allies." Letter of Egbert to Senator Hiram W. Johnson of the Foreign Relations Committee, 2 January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder J).

³¹ Letter of Elliot H. Goodwin, General Secretary United States Chamber Commerce to Egbert, 29 March 1918 and letter of Chas Stewart Davison, Chairman Board Trustees ADS to Egbert, 27 December 1918 (Egbert - MSS, Folder H).

³² Egbert served as the Fund's Executive Secretary, while the Treasurer was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Guaranty Trust Company. On the Advisory Committee sat Charles Evans Hughes. When the Fund became the American Central Committee for Russian Relief, in 1919, the prominent educator and former president of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, was its Honorary President. The Committee's Vice Presidents were Elihu Root, Samuel Gompers, John R. Mott (the religious leader, social worker, prominent member of the YMCA, Student Volunteer Movement and World Missionary Council and eventual recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize) and Cyrus H. McCormick, Jr., the president of the International Harvester Company, and son of a famous agricultural inventor and industrialist. Among the Committee's Honorary Members were Archbishops, Cardinals, Bishops, Metropolitans, two United States Army Major Generals and a Brigadier-General. The Chair of the Board of Directors was an expatriate Russian Princess and also sitting on the Board was Charles G. Dawes, the future Vice President, architect of the Dawes Plan for German reparations to the Allies and future recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. See *The Catherine Breshkovsky Russian Relief Fund - Prospectus of its Scope and Activities* and Letterhead for the American Central Committee for Russian Relief (Egbert - MSS, Folder L).

³³ A widely-circulated pamphlet penned by Breshkovskaya described the March Revolution as "perhaps the most beautiful and the most rational revolution in the world." This revolution, tragically, had been murdered by the "treacherous Bolsheviki," spreaders of "material...moral, spiritual poison." Breshkovskaya's description of the character of the Russian *Volk* stressed, "our masses, simple-minded, naive and credulous, tired out by their past misfortunes, became a prey to the base and rapacious instincts of selfish, ambitious and merciless people." See *A Message to the American People*,

States if desired.³⁴

"The Remedy" the Fund prescribed for Russia, the export of American education, appealed profoundly to American progressives. This alone, the Fund argued, could engender the kind of civic virtue its supporters imagined they embodied, making the creation of a republican structure in Russia possible. Americans had to realise that the "almost inconceivable" depth of Russia's systemic dysfunction had created a society where the "large majority [were] illiterate and so sunk in ignorance that they [would] listen to almost any energetic and plausible demagogue." Until the Russian people were "educated and well-grounded in the responsibilities of free citizenship," their culture would be "a menace to the world" and "the growing generation of Russians" would have "the sort of mental astigmatism [prevalent] in Germany."³⁵ While it would not be possible to educate the great mass of the population, the education of the orphans of the soldiers of the Great War was achievable. The Fund planned to establish an orphanage and school in territory held by the Russian "White" General Denikin, where instruction in modern farming, trade and elementary subjects would be offered. The graduates would venture into Russian society and transform it. Outstanding pupils, those "best fitted in character and intellectual capacity," would finish their education in the United States. Returning graduates to Russia would adopt American "technical and business methods," making America "instrumental in making English rather than German the commercial language of the new middle class of Russia"; the Fund would create a "class that will control the buying and selling for 180,000,000 people."³⁶

Such unwarranted, artless, self-righteousness was not confined to relief organisations, but was typical of American diplomacy toward Russia. The degree to which American intervention was glorified and depoliticised is indicated by remarks of Senator John Sharp Williams of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Catherine Breshkovsky "The Grandmother of the Russian Revolution", Introduction by George Kennan, Russian Information Bureau in the United States, New York, 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder F).

³⁴ Ibid. Breshkovskaya undoubtedly further inflated the cultural egos of her supporters when she added "[we] Russians, regard you as a people that have always cherished their liberty, that have always held high the standards of Democracy, that have never stood for despotism and oppression ... Our greatest, deepest, most immediate need is the creation of conditions under which the Russian people will be able to convoke an *All-Russian Constituent Assembly*."

³⁵ *The Catherine Breshkovsky Russian Relief Fund*.

³⁶ Ibid.

Rationalising the distribution of propaganda by the Red Cross, Williams stated:

Of course, [the work] would be an American propaganda, but [it] would be [disseminated] not [by] propagandists, but [by] humanitarians: just as Christ's cure of the sick and resurrection of the dead was, in the highest sense, propaganda work.³⁷

Not surprisingly, American conduct scotched bilateral relations. Yet not even the total failure of the Wilson Administration's diplomatic and military thrust into Russia effected a revision of strategy. Emotive, doctrinal opposition toward socialism prevented psychological and political adjustment.³⁸ Piqued by Russian disinterest in the United States and stinging criticism of American conduct, senior members of the federal executive resolved, during the period of uncertainty following Red October, to carry on fighting the Bolshevik regime by manufacturing anti-Bolshevik propaganda for domestic consumption.³⁹ Although neither Wilson nor Lansing believed that the Bolsheviks were the hirelings of the Kaiser, they nonetheless published the infamous Sisson papers, forged documents purchased in Russia, to encourage the notion. The ruse of German agency was spectacularly influential. The mainstream press overwhelmingly accepted the government's claims, vociferously denouncing Bolshevism and the role of Germany in Russia. While some papers, like the *New York Globe*, admitted that they could not verify the Bolsheviks' treachery, they still hedged their bets, suggesting that the Bolsheviks would transform not only Russia, but also Germany into "a cauldron of hellbroth" when they turned on their masters.⁴⁰ The suggestion that the Germans might have unleashed more than they bargained for was taken up by the Republican presidential candidate, Harding, who leveled the same charge at Wilson, stating:

³⁷ Letter of J. Williams to President Wilson, 6 September 1917 (Egbert - MSS, Folder H).

³⁸ The incongruity of American elites' attitudes about Russia becomes even more apparent, when one considers that Egbert and the patrons of the American Central Committee for Russian Relief never acknowledged that their dear "Babushka," Katherine Breshkovskaya, was a committed socialist. The question of how they could continue to support her policies, if the Bolsheviks were defeated, remained unconsidered.

³⁹ Ambassador Francis, for example, was somewhat bemused by socialists' rejection of Wilson's Fourteen Points speech and his general diplomacy. See Report 330, 15 June 1917 (U.S. Consulate Reports - MSS).

⁴⁰ Clipping from January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder D).

I do not forget that the Executive and the legislature during the war preached the doctrine of revolution in the Central Empires [suggesting] that revolution was necessary to bring about tranquillity in the world. You started a fire then that is difficult to put out now. If we must have anarchy on the one hand or hateful autocracy on the other, I choose autocracy.⁴¹

Under Harding, flirtation with internationalism would seemingly cease. Yet while Wilson remained president he did not lack support for intervention in Russian affairs. The *New York Post* urged the government on moral and strategic grounds to take immediate, decisive, military action, arguing that "the crimes of the bolsheviki in trying to spread their abominable doctrines" were so "atrocious" that Lenin and his cohorts had "long ago forfeited the right to exist." A policy of containment would be disastrous not only for Russia, but also for the world, as the Bolsheviks would be more easily beaten sooner rather than later.⁴² For the *Post*, there was no doubting the role of the United States in this matter. Whatever policies might be adopted, its primacy was essential; the future of the world depended on its moral leadership.⁴³

Lone voices offering more sober, informed analysis were ignored by the government and the broadsheets.⁴⁴ While political elites and editors remained unimpressed by contrary sentiment, they denied "the public" an opportunity to consider the facts, asphyxiating alternative information. In the post-war environment, even liberal attitudes to social reform were subjected to violent assault. Anti-communism soon dominated political discourse. Nobody was untouched by Red October. Complex tensions and commitments transformed a myriad of organisations and individuals into

⁴¹ *New York Times*, 21 January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder D).

⁴² *New York Post*, 22 January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder D).

⁴³ *New York Post*, 19 January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder D). The *Post* opined, "the necessities of humanity require that the world have both peace and liberty, and it has been found that these two blessings cannot be obtained without establishing the rule that governments shall exist only with the consent of the governed. That is the keel and foundation stone of America. It has outlived and outfought the powers of evil, and it survives, eternally vigorous because eternally true."

⁴⁴ An occasional minor newspaper article featured the more temperate views of non-noble Russian emigrés. A refugee Menshevik, Moissaye Olgin, dismissed the charge of German agency as nonsense and cautioned against military involvement, warning of the Bolsheviks' astute and practical use of power. Similarly, Jerome Davis, Acting Senior Secretary in charge of war work with the YMCA in Russia, argued that America should not intervene militarily. Intervention would engender "chaos" making the "Red Terror look mild in comparison," counter-revolution would only favour "former servants of the Czar" and Americans would not want the "starvation of hundreds of thousands of women and babies" - which would follow civil war and economic embargo - on their consciences. See indeterminate newspaper clipping, circa January 1919 (Egbert - MSS, Folder D).

The Shapers of American Anti-Communism

a multi-faceted conglomerate that dominated the spiritual, psychological and corporeal evolution of anti-communism. The average member of "the public" was surrounded at every turn by anti-communists demanding allegiance. Employers and labourers were urged to combat and reject Bolshevism. Religious communities were obliged to monitor the progress of Bolshevism among their number, as were immigrants of all stripes. Native-born citizens had to be wary of Bolshevism in their neighbourhood and in the nation. Anybody seeking to be entertained and informed was bombarded, through the print media, the wireless, the stage and the cinema, with the spectre of Bolshevism. Social pressure, while not totalitarian, was total and the pivotal conceptions of the doctrine were emanating from select groups deliberately perpetuating fear and loathing.

Anti-Bolshevism is Consolidated – The Rise of Anti-Communism in Legislatures and the Security Industry

While the federal government was the most visible proponent of anti-Bolshevism, numerous authorities followed its example. Congress, the Senate and the New York State Legislature were particularly anxious to repress radical socialism. Their role in the development of the philosophy and temper of anti-communism can hardly be underestimated. The tenets and conclusions of early legislative investigations into communism remained highly influential in the media and among patriotic and business groups until the creation of the House Un-American Activities Committee in the late-1930s. By gathering and distributing a mass of information, legislative committees gave enormous stimulus to anti-communism. They also helped powerful government cabals to seize policy and executive initiative. During and following the Red Scare, legislative hearings and investigations were convened by much the same individuals and interests.⁴⁵ Moreover, crucial testimony submitted to committees down the years came from the same sources; those associated with or employed by security, business and patriotic organisations that were largely unaccountable, operating beyond the control of the "public." In this political environment, individuals exercised considerable influence on social attitudes.

One of the most important theoreticians of anti-communism was John Trevor. An intellectual heavyweight in the intelligence community, who first rose to prominence as a special counsel of the Lusk Committee, Trevor made an enormous contribution to the doctrinal evolution and spread of anti-communism.⁴⁶ Pathologically suspicious of non-Anglo-Saxon migrants and liberal and pacifist associations, Trevor also dreaded infiltration by hostile foreign powers and was convinced that the United States had to permanently maintain extraordinary policing authorities. As Director of MI in New York City after the war, Trevor scrutinised urban radicalism at close quarters. A devotee of theories of innate racial hierarchy, Trevor regarded immigrants and radicals as inseparable. Their racial attributes and cultural customs made them politically unreliable and unsuitable for American citizenship. In a manifesto penned

⁴⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge was one senior, legislative power broker who regularly abetted anti-communism.

⁴⁶ Trevor regularly contributed essays analysing the state of radicalism in the United States to the BI, MI and other agencies including the INS, NI, the State Department and the United States Shipping Board. The Director of MI distributed materials by Trevor to all of these organisations, as he did in a generic letter dated 20 December 1919. See MI – MSS, Reel 14.

in late 1920 for policy-makers and the intelligence community, Trevor outlined the ramifications of his observations. Measuring the loyalty of ethnic groups according to preconceived prejudices, he considered all Irish migrants, whether naturalised or not, allies of the Central Powers, on account of their "antipathy for England." Similarly, he believed that Indian and Egyptian nationalists were vulnerable to German and Bolshevik exploitation. Russian Jews were intrinsically dangerous on account of their "almost universal" abhorrence for Russia's *ancien regime* and widespread exposure to German Marxist socialism. Persuaded by the Sisson documents, Trevor also considered socialism a perfect "disintegrative" weapon formulated by the German General Staff.⁴⁷

State security forces were undergoing rapid expansion and structural change at this time and this encouraged the permeation of Trevor's ideology through the intelligence community. While the institutional character and political strength of intelligence bureaucracies had long encouraged personnel to regard themselves as "heroic protectors of the public welfare," the need to bring greater consistency and discipline to bureaucratic operations forced the enlargement of the power of central authorities.⁴⁸ Expert and elite personnel therefore exercised strong leadership over their staff. As a leading anti-communist agent explained, around 1920 "most agents ... were raw recruits, knowing comparatively little about the radical movements and their methods." They were trained by "older hands [who] indoctrinated the green agents into the craft of trailing and investigating the enemies of the United States."⁴⁹

Under the tutelage of men such as Trevor, agents were guided by racial prejudice in identifying suspects and interpreting their activities.⁵⁰ Trevor also taught agents to observe the more unreliable element of the native-born population, pacifists and

⁴⁷ MI - MSS, Reel 15, File 10110 -1660 1, J. B. Trevor, *Introduction and Historical Review of Conditions and Agencies tending to create the present tendency toward Radicalism*, p. 5 (henceforth referred to as J. Trevor, *Historical Review of Radicalism*).

⁴⁸ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 15 and 72 - 3.

⁴⁹ Jacob Spolansky, *The Communist Trail in America*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1951, pp. 8 - 9.

⁵⁰ Agent Chas Furmann, for example, informed his superiors that a May 1919 meetings was attended by "Jews, Poles and Americans" and that "practically most of the talking was done in Yiddish and English." Moreover, an anonymous hand in central office had underlined the word "Jews." Another anonymous spy observing a gathering at a Labor Lyceum club noted that he was "the only Gentile in the audience," with the telling exception of a few Hindus. See Report by Chas Furmann on Socialist Meeting, 25 May 1919, Report of Inspector George J. Starr to Lieutenant W. L. Moffat, 4 May 1919

idealists, because he believed that they received generous financial support from races with "sentimental leanings": the anti-British, Germans, German and Russian Jews and the Irish. According to Trevor, small coteries led the pacifist-defeatist movement. He was particularly wary of the American Civil Liberties Bureau (the predecessor of the ACLU) which he believed coordinated the programs of numerous pacifist and radical organisations, including the SPUSA. Its significant allies included the American Peace Society and the Church Peace Union. While not quite the menace radicals were, Trevor was nonetheless convinced that pacifists:

distort the truth with such persistency that the most charitably inclined must waiver in crediting all of them with sincerity. Doubtless a number are sufficiently obsessed with their own conception of social idealism as to be genuinely sincere and unaware that they have been and are the unconscious tools of the personally ambitious or even of the enemies' agents in our midst.⁵¹

All industrial chaos and political turmoil in the United States was directly attributable to agitation by radicals and German agents and Trevor likened the threat of socialism to that of contagion, for if it was "permitted to persist" it would:

like disease neglected in the human body produce complications more serious for the continued existence of our body politic than perhaps local manifestations indicate to the casual observer.⁵²

While "experience ... demonstrated that repression without a removal of the causes of popular discontent merely [aggravated difficulties] ... feebleness accompanied by cajolery and gifts [would also] precipitate an acute situation."⁵³ Trevor therefore counseled against ascribing discord to case-specific causes and scoffed at "soft" methods of conflict resolution. What was required was the strengthening of the state's repressive powers, a revision of the too-liberal laws governing industrial protest, the clarification and codification of duties for separate intelligence agencies, a stay in the

and Anonymous report of 15 May 1919 regarding meeting of 11 April 1919 (MI - MS, Reel 14).

⁵¹ J. Trevor, *Historical Review of Radicalism*, pp. 4 - 6. Other organisations Trevor fancied as ACLU fronts were the American Union Against Militarism, the Emergency Peace Federation and the Women's Peace Party.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 1 - 2.

demobilisation of armed services and the removal of restrictions on surveillance of civilians in times of peace.⁵⁴

Many State and federal representatives welcomed such opinion and sought Trevor's advice. One important investigation influencing interpretations of Bolshevism was a Senate inquiry into the activities of the would-be Soviet Ambassador Ludwig Martens. Concerned by Martens' alleged production of propaganda, funding of Russian socialist groups, irregular consular practices and attendance of radical meetings, the Senate Committee could not prevent its fear from escalating into the realm of the fantastic. For example, after learning that Martens' couriers were travelling with the aid of falsified passports, contravening statutes governing "foreign intercourse" and the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Committee supposed that he regularly received bounteous sums of money (\$150,000 at the minimum) from Soviet superiors.⁵⁵ Martens' employment of over a dozen American citizens particularly galled the Committee, especially when it learnt that two of them were "connected" with the CPI.⁵⁶ Here was startling evidence that the Bolsheviks were successfully infiltrating government agencies and that Trevor's concerns about the state of the nation's security apparatus were entirely justified.⁵⁷

This impression was duly conveyed to the media. Details of the Committee's sources of information and its interpretation of presented "facts," however, were not widely available. Lack of scrutiny was critical in continuing legislative and bureaucratic investigations, for freedom from external review magnified paranoid feelings, inducing chronic credulity and impaired judgment. Security forces, for example, accepted the claims of a Hearst journalist and an Army Captain that the Bolsheviks had allocated \$600 million and an additional \$150 million in gold reserves for propaganda in the United States.⁵⁸ Military Intelligence and the BI also believed that

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 1 - 3, 16 - 19. For Trevor, the National Guard was a mere "janitor force," inadequate for combating the "60,000 individuals whose actions [had] brought their names upon [the] files" of the DJ.

⁵⁵ *Cong. Rec.*, 66 - 2, Senate Report No. 526, *Russian Propaganda*, 14 April 1920, pp. 5 - 6 (henceforth referred to as *Russian Propaganda*). Martens refused to submit accreditation for his "official" staff, including couriers.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 15. One of the "criminals" Martens assisted was Emma Goldman, whom Martens offered political asylum.

⁵⁸ Boston office report on Martens and Alleged Bolshevik Activities, 13 June 1919 and Report of W.

Martens was hijacking foreign-language newspapers and establishing a spy network in Chicago. The fear of such counter-espionage organisations also drew strength from reports from Siberia alleging that radicals there had planted moles in government offices, hotels, railroads and newspapers. Agents therefore concluded that a similar plan to bribe government officials and security personnel was being initiated in the United States. Bolsheviks could leap from Siberia to Chicago with terrifying ease.⁵⁹

Investigative committees habitually assumed that the principal aim of socialists was to inflict harm to America. Like A. Mitchell Palmer and the Lusk Committee, the Senate Committee investigating Martens failed to appreciate that the Russian Socialist Federation was more concerned with Russia than the United States. Had this notion been considered, the Committee might not have concluded that the Federation's attempt to found a technical school was nefarious.⁶⁰ However, mistrust of those who stood outside the narrow cultural mainstream was not likely to dissipate or moderate while policy continued to be formulated around the notions of men like Trevor.

Reactionary views of radicalism and race were also held by the United States' most important anti-communist *apparatchik*, J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover's psychological and ideological imprimatur dominated surveillance culture. Hoover tightly supervised recruitment and training in the BI, as well as the circulation of information within the agency. Bureau operatives were directed to forward reports immediately to Washington and refrain from maintaining independent files. Information was obtainable only from central records, on request. The Bureau's hierarchical structure therefore minimised agents' intellectual independence and ensured that they would single-mindedly pursue its leaders' objectives. An example of the personal control Hoover maintained was his assumption of total responsibility for the deportation of "enemy aliens" long before he was appointed Director. Having managed the logistics of the Palmer crusade, Hoover successfully demanded that all reports regarding "international and passport matters," especially alien applications for exemption from

L. Moffat to J. Trevor, 22 March 1919. Regarding media and spy activities see Reports from Chicago, 23 June 1919 and 29 May 1919 respectively, both furnished by Jacob Spolansky (MI - MSS, Reel 14). NB too that Lieutenant Moffat was the recipient of Inspector George Starr's report about "bourgeois" radical Jews in New Jersey, discussed in the previous chapter.

⁵⁹ Spolansky Report, 29 May 1919 (MI - MSS, Reel 14).

⁶⁰ *Russian Propaganda*, pp. 10 - 12.

Alien Enemy Status, be forwarded to him.⁶¹

The rise of Hoover as a super-bureaucrat resembles that of the Soviet dictator, Stalin. The career of Stalin needs little discussion here.⁶² It is sufficient to note that from an unglamorous and strictly organisational position, Stalin was able to stack the various echelons of the Communist Party with loyal appointees, ensuring his ultimate political and ideological authority. Hoover was not appointed Director of the Bureau until 1924, seven years after his initial employment. Yet as head of the GID and later, as Assistant Director, Hoover was able to create his extensive catalogue of radicalism and stamp his authority on the Bureau. Three successive directors, Bielaski, Flynn and Burns flowered and faded, brought down by unconstitutional excess while Hoover allowed them to articulate sympathies he found only too agreeable. He kept silent and followed political fashions, making pleasing overtures to government figures and receiving promotion in return. Hoover's public facade of compliance with the scaled-down role for the Bureau after 1924 permitted him to carry on his anti-communist activities, albeit with a reduced staff, essentially unaltered.⁶³ His apparent professionalism and organisational skills were widely interpreted as ideal management practice, in the best of American traditions.⁶⁴

Hoover's rise ensured that the professional practices and ideology of the Red Scare were institutionalised. Numerous case reports indicate this. Workers' demands for basic reforms such as an eight-hour day, a \$6 minimum wage, modern change houses and the right not to have to work alone were interpreted by Bureau agents as signs of

⁶¹ Memorandum of Special Agent in Charge in Chicago Edward Brennan to BI Chief Flynn, 3 August 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 18).

⁶² On the early career of Stalin see Figs, *A People's Tragedy* and Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*. Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror* delineates the middle period of Stalin's dictatorship of the Soviet Union. See Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Pimlico, London, 1992.

⁶³ Hoover's continued collection of intelligence data throughout the 1920s undermines Preston's assertion that the GID remained "idle" from 1924 - 39 and performed its "proper functions in law enforcement" during this period. See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 243.

⁶⁴ Among the powerful allies Hoover cultivated, Senator George H. Moses, the Chair of the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which investigated Ludwig Martens in 1920 was particularly supportive. Moses had a hand in Hoover's initial appointment and provided instrumental backing when he was campaigning to be formally appointed the Bureau's Director. Hoover's success in impressing Moses is indicated by the latter's petition to President Hoover, in 1929, recommending that Hoover continue as Director "by reason of his experience during the war and his acquaintance with all the subterranean methods of the Reds in the United States." Describing Hoover as "a most excellent public officer of high personal character, undeviating in the performance of his duties," Moses argued that the "morale of the Bureau" had been "very much raised and strengthened" under his stewardship. See Letter of Senator George H. Moses to president Hoover, 7 March 1929 (Hoover - MSS, Box 46).

IWW affiliation. Centres of alternative teaching, including independent bookshops, were raided and mailing lists seized.⁶⁵ Those who aided suspect organisations were regarded as disloyal and subjected to character assassination. For example, an agent in Montana remarked that a lawyer who had represented the IWW and "other kindred groups" was "yellow, [had] no back-bone [and] inclined toward radicalism."⁶⁶ The persecution of radical sympathisers proved effective in crushing reformist, let alone radical ardor. An agent in New Jersey noted that the efforts of local Hungarian communists to raise the membership of the IWW among workers had foundered, in part because of widespread knowledge of the murder of six incarcerated Wobblies awaiting trial.⁶⁷

Hoover instructed his operatives with care, leaving room neither for debate nor contradiction. His Bulletins delineated the structure of radicalism, typically being divided into sections devoted to:

- Organizations - United Communist Party; Communist Party; I. W. W.; Socialist Party;
- Miscellaneous.
- Individuals.
- Negro Activities.
- International.
- Russia.
- Mexican Activities.
- Greek Activities.

⁶⁵ In February 1920, for example, an agent from Salt Lake City concluded that striking electrical, mine, mill and smelter workers had to be affiliated with the Wobblies. The following month, the Utah office of the Bureau cabled headquarters for information about a list of local IWW members seized from a "radical book store." Report of Agent Burke, Utah, 13 February 1920 and Report of Special Agent in Charge, Utah, Floyd Jackson, 4 June 1920 (BI - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 36).

⁶⁶ Report of Agent D. F. Costello, Butte, Montana, 24 October 1920 (ibid.). Authorities had been warring with the legal firm concerned had quite a history. Butte's District Attorney Burton K. Wheeler and Special Agent E. W. Byrn had been "rigorously neutral" in enforcing federal laws, depriving irate representatives of the Anaconda Steel Company with an opportunity to deport significant numbers of Wobblies. Business interests retaliated by having Wheeler charged with dereliction of duty and disloyalty. Yet Federal Judge George Borquin dismissed the charges and interpreted the provisions Espionage and Selective Service laws strictly, avoiding excessive sentences. It was Borquin's son who was denounced in this agent's report. See Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 111.

⁶⁷ Report from Trenton, New Jersey, 30 December 1919 (BI - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 36). Five Wobblies perished in Sacramento, the remaining man in Newton, Kansas.

Regarding the Communist Party of America.⁶⁸

"Alien" or black "individuals" were always noted and their ethics and activities demeaned. Such persons attacked by Hoover in March 1921 included:

KATE RICHARDS O'HARE probably is the most active speaker of the week and has appeared in several cities under the auspices of the Socialist party [sic] chiefly...

DR. CHANDLER OWEN (colored), editor of the "Messenger" and a prominent Negro agitator has been speaking in New York City.

One ZAIKOWSKI naturalized American of Polish descent from Flint, Michigan is about to leave the country on a communist mission to Moscow. Upon arrival he will undergo special training for propaganda work.

TARAKNATH DAS is speaking in the middle west for the Friends of Freedom for India.

LEON GRIKSTAS is travelling through New Jersey and Pennsylvania in propaganda work among the miners. He carries with him pictures of conditions in other countries ...

JOHN BALDAZZI. Secretary of the Italian Defence League, was compelled to return to New York from Rochester, the police in the latter city having refused him permission to speak and escorting him to the railroad station.

MARCUS GARVEY is understood to have proceeded from Miami to Cuba whence he will visit Jamaica, Panama and other localities, returning to the U. S. in approximately two months.⁶⁹

For Hoover, only disloyalty could explain ideological disparity. He was simply bemused to find that the prominent New York Judge, George Anderson, who had "publicly stated several times...that 95% of the so-called German plots in the United States were bunk," was not on the general committee of the Peoples of America Society, an organisation headed by a who's who of America's liberal elite. When the

⁶⁸ General Intelligence Bulletin 27, week ending 25 September 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 17). "Miscellaneous" radical associations comprised the URW, Farmers' Combatant International, the Workers Defence Union, the Mutual Aid Society of New York, the Workmen's circle Medical Relief Committee for Russia, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and the People's Reconstruction League.

former administrator of Ellis Island, Frederic C. Howe, who was on the PAS's general committee, also suggested there was very little disloyalty in America. Hoover concluded Howe was "simply repeating" what Anderson had told him.⁷⁰ Hoover's only response to intelligent criticism or opposition was to excoriate liberals. His rhetoric indicates that he resented intellectual liberal elites for their arrogant, irresponsible refusal to trust him and accept, without demur or doubt, the prevalence of conspiracy in the United States. His attempts to disprove opinions contradicting his own depended not on specific rebuttals of various points, but rather on appeals to in-group loyalty and the inflammation of fear through specious and unsubstantiated statements. This is demonstrated by his (tortuous) disparagement of Howe, Anderson and the Peoples of America Society, of whom he stated:

Whether Mr. Howe's statements like these are the result of his supreme ignorance or his customary reckless disregard for the truth, is a problem. However, it is just such ludicrous statement [sic] as these that really render his careless mouthings of less effect among the many people who know what the actual conditions were...There is not a single person on the general committee who occupied a position which would permit them to know this amount of loyalty in the country, not even Anderson, altho [sic] he claims that his position as United States Attorney compelled him to know. We know however that less than 1% of the German plots in the U. S. ever came before either a U. S. Attorney or officials of the Department of Labor.⁷¹

It is not inappropriate to remark that if fewer than one percent of such plots were brought before the United States government then great doubt must be cast over the efficiency, not to mention loyalty, of the Bureau itself. Indeed, the Bureau's efficiency was often found wanting. One incident exposing its professional incapacity occurred in 1920, when the Director of MI, Brigadier-General C. E. Nolan, requested a numerical estimate of radical strength in the United States. Surprised by a solicitation for empirical data, Hoover could only regretfully report his inability to meet the request. Instead, Hoover advised Nolan:

⁶⁹ General Intelligence Bulletin 40, week ending 5 March 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 17).

⁷⁰ General Intelligence Bulletin 24, week ending 31 July 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 17).

⁷¹ Ibid.

We have found in the course of our work here that an estimate of the membership of the radical organizations is not a fair test of the amount of radical activity.⁷²

This reveals the supreme influence of Hoover's own psyche in his *modus operandi*. Empirical data was not a good enough "test of the amount of radical activity": Hoover trusted only his own, unique perception.⁷³ More often than not, his conclusions were ill-informed, erroneous and founded on baseless speculation.⁷⁴

Hoover compulsively indulged his peculiarly heightened sense of grievance against Others. His loyalties were set along race and class lines and his socio-political views were profoundly reactionary. He charged himself with protecting and advancing America's old establishment. In religious matters, therefore, he fought Irish Catholicism and Judaism.⁷⁵ Hoover also particularly loathed the prominent black nationalist Marcus Garvey. Bureau agents incessantly tailed Garvey and Hoover eagerly reported their findings. His need to discredit and smear the principles of black nationalism saw him level allegations of personal greed and corruption toward Garvey. A typical summary of Garvey's activities read:

Since the return to this country of Marcus Garvey, The Negro World, always to be noted as the mouthpiece of this much-mouthed personage, has fairly run riot in volubility. It is difficult at times to take this paper seriously, and yet its mere accomplishment of weekly twelve-paged appearance, devoted throughout to

⁷² Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Director of MI, Brigadier-General C. E. Nolan, 3 November 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 19).

⁷³ The strength of radical movements was also frequently measured through the dubious process of juxtaposing estimated membership numbers of radical organisations against that of "loyal" bodies, such as the A.I.. In this manner, the overall communist threat was gauged. The degree to which radicals were able to infiltrate the Legion was also regarded as a critical measure. This analytical process was further compromised by professional and psychological imperatives, as the Assistant Chief of Staff of MI, in Chicago, revealed when he informed his superiors the percentage figures of radical, organised wage earners in his area were "inclined more to a maximum than to a conservative estimate." Tripping over his own material, the officer also stated that "30% of organized wage earners" were "radically inclined" and "25% of radically inclined wage earners are radical." See Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, Chicago to Director MI, Washington D.C., 30 April 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 19).

⁷⁴ For example, in 1921 he informed his staff that Leon Trotsky had been arrested because his popularity was rivalling that of Lenin. See General Intelligence Bulletin 58, week ending 9 July 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18).

⁷⁵ General Intelligence Bulletin 68, week ending 3 September 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18). Hoover cursorily dismissed Irish people, writing "So obsessed is the Irish press by its hatred of England that it is generally foolish. To read "The Irish World" is to become informed that every American of any prominence is a traitor in the cause of England. To quote from it, or even refer to it, is usually futile for

Garveyism must be recognized as a noteworthy achievement. Charlatan, fanatic, and devote, [sic] with the negro's fondness for speechifying, Marcus Garvey is certainly fulfilling his mission to his own intense enjoyment and profit. "Africa for the Africans" and then contributions for Marcus Garvey, is the permeating plea of all of Garvey's numerous and lengthy harangues. In the thirty-six pages of the three issues before me there is nothing to report except, perhaps, the innate childishness of the negro mind which is apt to crop out even in the writings of their most educated class.⁷⁶

Hoover's reports on Garvey embody the structure and process of American anti-communism in miniature: the censorious, stentorian dictator, monopolising access to information, commands his loyal adherents from his lofty domain, instructing them how and what to think.

Paranoid feelings compounded Hoover's ignorance and he assumed communist activity was directed, first and foremost, against the United States. Obsessed with communist plots, Hoover worried that the Soviets were inducing inflation in the American economy and he claimed to have received reports of Bolshevik counterfeiting operations. From "an individual who rose to a high office among the bolsheviki," Hoover in 1921 learned that the Soviets had melted 19 tons of gold for minting in foreign currencies; plans had been formulated to mint a further 70 tons for distribution in the United States.⁷⁷ Hoover's fears were contingent on the total suspension of critical faculties and unexamined feelings of insecurity and hatred. Any observer capable of basic levels of detachment could have deduced that Russia, then in the throes of civil war, economic chaos and famine, could not possibly expend such resources attacking the United States. Moreover, the importance of manipulative lies and misinformation to Hoover is made clear by his dependence on unidentified and unverifiable sources such as anonymous Bolshevik "individuals" of "high office."⁷⁸

being without shading or sanity there is nothing rational to take hold of.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ General Intelligence Bulletin 49, week ending 7 May 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18).

⁷⁸ Ibid. Hoover claimed the Soviet's gold was sent to Switzerland where it was transformed into French, English, American and Italian money. "Recent reports" pointed to the acquisition of "a printing machine for printing American bank notes." Hoover also noted that the Bolsheviks were "not counterfeiting German money." This of course, made sense, for counterfeiting German currency, when that economy was in a state of hyperinflation, would indeed have been a novel way of improving Russian economic fortunes.

The quality of Hoover's domestic intelligence mirrored that of foreign "radical" affairs. For example, Hoover opined in September 1921 that "practically all of the activities of [local] major ultra radical groups" now centered "around the collection of funds ostensibly for relief work in Soviet Russia." Unionists and sympathisers were donating "one-half to one day's pay" to the cause, enabling the Furrier's Union to present over \$30,000 to Russia.⁷⁹ Investigation of radical individuals such as Bouck White, the former pastor of the defunct "Church of the Socialist Revolution" in New York, further demonstrated Hoover's unique grasp of threats to the United States. White was being observed by the Bureau because he had been:

arrested during the war for having burned an American flag and was tarred and feathered by his neighbours at Whitehall, New York for mistreatment of his wife, who refused to become identified with the radical movement.⁸⁰

Hoover's colleagues in MI welcomed his Bulletins and also monitored the growth, beliefs and activities of ethnic and radical associations while never managing to identify an actual legal transgression.⁸¹ The Office of the Chief of Staff routinely circulated lists of foreign language publications to MI stations and received returning surveys of the same.⁸² Army officers also produced studies on radicalism and subversives such as the National Council for the Prevention of War and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, suspected to be communist because "a Hungarian, Rossika [sic] Schwimmer" was prominent in the organisation. Not distracted by the ACLU's battle against "the abridgment of free speech," MI regarded

⁷⁹ General Intelligence Bulletin 68, week ending 3 September 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18). The needle trade unions were also reckoned to have donated "several hundred thousand dollars" to the U. S. S. R.

⁸⁰ General Intelligence Bulletin 53, week ending 4 June 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 18). White's wife was also reputedly "a French girl who was led to believe that White was a wealthy American, because of which she married him in Paris [yet] when they returned to America he carried her to his "Monastic retreat", which is nothing more than a shack in the hills."

⁸¹ A typical item received by the Director of MI from Hoover, in January 1926, was a survey which warned of Young Pioneer plans "to invade the capitalist schools for the purpose of forming school nuclei," to complement "factory and shop nuclei." The Pioneers were planning the "reorganization and Bolshevization of the Young Workers' League" with instruction on "school struggle and school work, child labor and the struggle against it, [and] opposition organizations (Boy Scouts)." See Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Director MI, 22 January 1926 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

⁸² A typical report of traitorous activities referred to the Union of Russian Citizens in St. Louis, 8 June 1920. List of foreign language publications (stamped 20 June 1920 by Office of Chief of Staff MI) and corresponding reports from Pittsburgh (22 April 1920), San Francisco (21 March 1920), Buffalo (17 April 1920), Philadelphia (8 April 1920). The fact that the Union of Russian citizens principally comprised Russo-Jews contributed considerably to official suspicion of their activities (all sources MI - MSS, Reel 19).

its national committee of "Communists, Pacifists, Socialists and Parlor Pinks" as a lobby group for the right to preach "Communism, Anarchy, Murder and overthrow of the Government," which had "its finger in every destructive (governmentally speaking) pie."⁸³ Like Hoover, MI expressed indignant frustration with those who refused to acknowledge the gravity of the communist threat and bow to their superior expertise and advice. Chastising the *Minneapolis Tribune* in 1926 for dismissing the threat of communist infiltration of the "Negro" community, an operative opined that "statements such as made by the Tribune are detrimental to the public interest because [they] are made without proper knowledge of the situation."⁸⁴

Possession of such "proper knowledge," according to high-ranking officers in the intelligence community, justified the extension of their influence into a myriad of non-official organisations. The career of Jacob Spolansky, a long-serving MI and BI agent, is instructive in this respect. A multi-lingual Ukrainian migrant, Spolansky came to the United States around 1910 and was recruited by the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff. Having attracted attention for chairing a Liberty Loan Committee, which made him "very familiar with the concentrations of aliens" in his adoptive Chicago, Spolansky oversaw "numerous military and civilian investigations relating to the war effort," liaising closely with the BI until the disbanding of his department in 1919.⁸⁵ Immediately joining the BI, Spolansky supervised recruitment and training for the Bureau. During the Palmer Raids in Chicago, Spolansky was involved in the arrest of 650 individuals, four hundred of whom faced deportation procedures.⁸⁶ An able propagandist as well as policeman, Spolansky was one of the first government agents to sell lurid details of his exploits to syndicated newspaper chains, a practice he began while enforcing Harry Daugherty's anti-communist ventures.

⁸³ Study on subversives by Major Richard A. Charles, MI Reserves, submitted to Chief of Staff, 6 June 1927 (henceforth referred to as Charles, *Study on Subversives*). First Lieutenant Ralph E. Duncan, undertook a similar study for a MI Luncheon in Chicago, 31 October 1923 (for both see MI - MSS, Reel 23).

⁸⁴ "Report On Radical Activities," Minneapolis, 2 February 1926 (MI - MSS, Reel 23). The report added "we differ radically with the Tribune's ideas. We claim that Communism has made great strides forward within the last two or three years, and if no further opposition is encountered than has been encountered up to the present time, then the prospect of Communism for the future is very rosy indeed."

⁸⁵ Spolansky, *Communist Trail*, pp. 6 - 7.

Like his superiors, Spolansky fiercely resented the financial strictures placed on the intelligence community and donated his services to Army and Navy Intelligence *gratis* for many years. While fiscal resources were constrained between 1924 and 1933, both agencies relied heavily on such assistance.⁸⁷ With employment opportunities in government limited, Spolansky and many of his colleagues worked for big business, "generating and intensifying industrial suspicions and hatreds," as Louis Post put it. Selling one's labour to such interests was a time-honoured custom among intelligence agents.⁸⁸ Spolansky first investigated the presence of Bolshevism at Botany Consolidated Mills in Passaic, New Jersey in 1926. He found Botany "literally infested" with communists determined to use "the unfortunate company ... as a laboratory [to] develop their tools of terror and at the same time show the Kremlin just how adept at revolution they had become." Spolansky duly advised the company they could not bargain with zealots "more interested in the political than in the economic side of the picture."⁸⁹

When communists disabled the auto industry in Detroit the following year, "frantic employers" commissioned Spolansky to conduct another inquiry. He soon reported that a thousand "militant, well organized and highly disciplined" radicals had secured "key jobs in every manufacturing plant of consequence." Divided into tiny "nuclei" of five to ten activists, they plunged the industry into chaos. Several "underground operational centers" staffed with experts on "Youth, Negroes, and Trade Unions rigorously trained in Moscow" waged "ceaseless war on Detroit industry." The Kremlin, Spolansky surmised, wanted technical information and hoped to discredit "leading personalities in the auto industry, particularly Henry Ford, the symbol of American individualism and might."⁹⁰ By early 1933, Spolansky had been engaged as a State trooper in Michigan, commanding a team employed by the Briggs Manufacturing Company to "maintain order during a Communist-inspired strike." Later that year, the Sheriff of Wayne County commissioned Spolansky to establish a

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9 and 16.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁸⁸ Louis Post, for example, commented that the GID was saturated with "labor spy interests" and subcontracting private detectives during the Palmer raids and that "evidence" procured by these sources was instrumental in securing Congressional funds for future anti-radical witch-hunts. See Post, *Deportations Delirium*, pp. 55 - 6.

⁸⁹ Spolansky, *Communist Trail*, p. 44.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 46 - 7.

County Detective Bureau "to expose the inroads of the Communists" in that "mammoth manufacturing area." In 1935, the president of Chrysler Corporation contracted Spolansky as a consultant on plant protection. After this he rejoined the Wayne County Police, as Acting Chief of Detectives.⁹¹ An anti-communist of national significance, Spolansky testified before the Fish Committee (in his capacity as a "Special Representative" of the National Metal Trades Association) and the HUAC, persuading communist turncoats to testify and rewarding them with attractive employment. He also boasted of being responsible for the deportation of 150 prominent communists.⁹²

The career of Spolansky demonstrates only a few of the activities of surveillance operatives in generating anti-communism. Agents eager to inform the general public about radicalism in their communities wrote their head offices asking whether lists of radical or revolutionary publications could be furnished to local newspapers.⁹³ The BI consistently used the press for self-promotion. Prior to the deportation exodus of 1920, the *New York Times* was informed that the Bureau intended to dispatch sixty thousand radicals to the Soviet Union. During the Boston New Year raid of 1920, agents marched over four hundred chained and shackled detainees through the streets, parading them before the press to furnish them with lurid photographs.⁹⁴ The "public" was further manipulated by partisan security leaks. For example, in 1920 the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration, Albert Johnson and the Commissioner-General of Immigration, with the connivance of the BI, informed the *New York Times* that Louis Post had improperly released "public enemies" and "fugitives from justice." Yet the "fugitive from justice" to whom they referred was a refugee from Czarist Russia who had committed no crime or misdemeanour in the United States.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 52 and 11.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 39 and 61.

⁹³ Letter from Southern Department HQ to Director MI, 12 July 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 19). Some agents hoped to be quoted directly by the press, for their own notoriety.

⁹⁴ Post, *Deportations Delirium*, pp. 81 - 2 and 99 - 100.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 218 - 9 and 227. Johnson and Caminetti, furious with Post for assuming control of deportation procedures, were attempting to have him framed for misconduct in office.

The Shapers of American Anti-Communism

Besides furnishing information to other government bodies and the press, security services habitually leaked information to the AL and other patriotic organisations,⁹⁶ who were easily persuaded that "disorderly radical elements" were threatening "American principles, Christianity and the home" with an onslaught of "introduced free-loving, irreligious, anti-American doctrines."⁹⁷ Intelligence agencies also established relationships with informants from business and government sectors, thereby disseminating their own peculiar, anti-communist psychology into the general populace. Official acknowledgment of the anti-communist threat encouraged fearful, super-patriotic reaction. The support given anti-communism by an unbroken succession of the highest executives and functionaries gave the cause great credence, while at a local level, government and policing agencies' inclusive practices made the crusade tangible to the general public. Anti-communist sentiment thus flowed down and then through political and social structures, ceaselessly reverberating between official and public individuals and entities. The effects of this process will now be outlined in detail by charting the influence of various government figures and agencies among patriots.

⁹⁶ See for example "Report On Radical Activities," Minneapolis, 2 February 1926 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

⁹⁷ The group making these claims was the American Anti-Socialist League of Brooklyn. See BI OG - MSS, OG 367198.

"Popular" Anti-Communism – Patriots and Anti-Communism

The anti-communist sentiments of prominent political and policing figures resonated widely and deeply in important quarters of the community. The political and ideological intractability of passionate anti-communists like Frank Kellogg, President Coolidge's Secretary of State, inspired patriots such as the Sentinels of the Republic, a subsidiary of the DAR, and Blair Coan.⁹⁸ Coan's 1925 monograph, *The Red Web*, owed much to Kellogg's verbal attacks on "propagandists" and the "considerable body" of citizens who, "in the name of liberty and reform," wished to destroy "guarantees of personal liberty" with the "substitution of class tyranny." Kellogg's decial of prevalent ignorance of "the amount of destructive revolutionary propaganda...secretly distributed by foreign influence" convinced Coan that "red hordes" and "pink phalanxes," who had destroyed the Attorneys-General Palmer and Daugherty and castrated the BI, planned to seize the federal government by working through the Democratic presidential candidate of 1924, Senator Robert La Follette.⁹⁹ The organ of the Sentinels, *The Woman Patriot*, also quoted Kellogg at length and was impressed by his admonition to those unsatisfied with life in America to "go where they [could] find a government which [did] satisfy them."¹⁰⁰

Another significant patriot influenced by government anti-communism was Walter Steele, editor of the *National Republic*. Steele uncritically absorbed their myths of anti-communism and disseminated them through his popular journal. He publicised the findings of the Fish Committee and called for implementation of its recommendations, including the exclusion of all immigrant communists, the deportation of all communists, the annulment of communists' naturalisation and the incarceration of all native-born Americans advocating a systemic change of

⁹⁸ Kellogg would not grant travel visas to foreign leaders and dignitaries whose political beliefs displeased him. The President of the Hungarian Republic, Michael Karolyi, was refused permission to visit his sick wife and was finally permitted to see her on the condition that he refrained from making political speeches while in the United States. This gagging of a foreign official was without precedent. Countess Karolyi herself was denied permission to conduct a lecture tour, for reasons the State Department would not divulge. Similarly, Kellogg revoked the visa of a Communist British MP attached to an Inter-parliamentary Union delegation. See ACLU, *Free Speech 1925-1926*, p. 9.

⁹⁹ Blair Coan, *The Red Web*, Northwest Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, p. 223.

¹⁰⁰ *The Woman Patriot*, Vol. 9, No. 13, 1 July 1925. The *Patriot* found Kellogg a worthy successor as Secretary of State to his immediate predecessor, Charles Evans Hughes; Hughes had submitted a 500-page alarmist report on communism in America to the Senate, in 1924. The fact that Hughes had such impeccable anti-communist *fides* illustrates the degree to which anti-communism permeated all political classes. For Hughes, it will be remembered, had been outraged by the excesses of A. Mitchell Palmer. He objected more to the methods than of cause of his predecessor.

government. Earlier, in the late 1920s, a Senator Blease drew praise from Steele for advocating the "voluntary" registration of aliens as a precautionary counter-espionage measure. Albert Johnson's Immigration Bill of 1929, extending the grounds for deportation and removing statutes of limitation on the deportation of aliens for illegal entry, also impressed Steele. President Hoover's Secretary of Labor, James Davis, won Steele's admiration by supporting "an entirely new code" of "selective immigration." Davis argued that because immigration officers were already "at work in foreign countries weeding out undesirable aliens," a "100 per cent selective policy" was needed in "the inspection system abroad, so that in all respects, immigration to the United States would be of the highest type available."¹⁰¹ Steele was also convinced of the necessity of citizens' "militant" national defence. As a spokesman for the patriotic group Columbia, Steele abjured loyal citizens to monitor goods entering their community, especially ammunition and dangerous pamphlets. He cautioned readers:

We must remember that back of the revolutionary movement in the United States stands a great workers' republic with more resources and a greater population than we have; that they are fanatical and, being Atheists, have no conscientious scruples in enforcing what they consider to be right. It may be that there are Communistic activities going on in your own neighborhood....strangers, male and female, black and white, and the various meetings which are being held throughout this vicinity should be closely checked to see if the poison of Communism is being spread.¹⁰²

Another patriot with journalistic experience was Fred R. Marvin. An outspoken critic of unionism, Marvin had been monitoring radical corruption of workers' organisations for decades. A correspondent for the *Boston Transcript* and the *New York Commercial*, his reports on radicalism were syndicated in a number of papers. When the *Commercial* contracted Marvin to form a department examining radical movements, the division rose to national prominence in patriotic circles and in 1925 Marvin became the editor-in-chief of the *Commercial*. At this time he formed his

¹⁰¹ Hoover Institution, Stanford University, National Republic - MSS, Box 72, Folder 3, *Daily Worker* 9 April 1929.

¹⁰² *An Analysis of Communism*, March 1931, essay for publication (National Republic - MSS, Box 72,

patriotic society the Key Men of America and established an organ for the association, the *Daily Data Sheet*, which was published daily, excepting Sundays and holidays.¹⁰³ Articles in his *Sheet* were grouped under headings such as "Immigration Activities," "Who's Who of Radicals," "Radicalism in Education," "Pacifism and its Allies," "Interrelationship of Socialism and Communism," "Liberalism and its Work," "Radicalism in Foreign Countries," "Subsidiary Movements," "Propaganda Methods," "Radicalism in Women's Organizations," "Political Prisoners and Amnesty Movements," "American Civil Liberties Union," "The Youth Movement," "Radicalism in Churches" and "Anti-Patriotic Movements"; doubting Thomases were directed to the "Q and A" section.

Marvin unfailingly championed the most reactionary politics. A committed nativist and supporter of immigration restrictions, he dismissed opposition to the Immigration Act of 1924 as the work of "hyphenated Americans ... Socialists, Communists and others" who sought to make the United States "a haven for political malcontents from every nation." He believed that "great hordes" of immigrants were "assimilable only to a certain extent" and that the "great majority" of citizens wanted to retain the nation's racial composition as it had been since "the time of the Revolution." Therefore, he urged this majority to "make their preference felt against the militant activities of the racial cliques."¹⁰⁴ Marvin could not tolerate liberalism either. When the Colorado Methodist Conference in 1927 declared its opposition to all war, decried American imperialism and militarism, criticised missionaries who accepted military protection from the U. S. Army and condemned militaristic boys' clubs, Marvin was outraged. The Conference's support for foreign regulation of external American investments, collective bargaining in labour and democratic control of industry was also, in Marvin's view, "pure, unadulterated Socialist utterance."¹⁰⁵

Folder 3).

¹⁰³ Loyola University of Chicago Archives, Dorr E. Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 8, Circular letter of H. A. Jung to "Members and Friends," 13 September 1927.

¹⁰⁴ Felt - MSS, Clippings - Box 8, Fred R. Marvin, *The Daily Data Sheet of the Key Men of America (Dealing with Radical and Subversive Movements)*, 23 and 29 July 1927 (henceforth referred to as *Daily Data Sheet*).

¹⁰⁵ *Daily Data Sheet*, 22 September 1927. Marvin spluttered, "When a church so far departs from its rightful place as to undertake to interfere with the affairs of the nation about which it cannot possibly have any reliable information, and so far departs from the function of the church as to openly denounce men who want to work without being forced to join some union, that church, and its leaders, frankly, although possibly not consciously, make themselves allies in the Socialist-Communist movement in the United States."

Marvin never substantiated his claims empirically. Like J. Edgar Hoover, he trusted his own intuition, arguing that the "disloyal" lacked "reliable information." His information came from other prominent anti-communists.¹⁰⁶ Marvin also encouraged citizens to police their communities. The campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti moved him to recommend his readers retain "for future reference the names of the most prominent individuals who took part in the program." He was himself a great crusader and published lists of protestors naming hundreds of college and university professors, social workers, writers and editors, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, businessmen and scientists. He also criticised anti-patriotic, African-American and industrial democracy societies for surrendering their organisations to radicals during the protest campaign.¹⁰⁷

While Marvin was influenced by ideas propagated by governments and the press, his career illustrates the significance of reciprocal relationships between governments, the military, industry, the media and patriots. Patriots periodically organised great functions bringing anti-communists from disparate regions and social classes together. One such function was the inaugural Annual Conference Dinner of Patriotic Societies, presided over by the Key Men of America, in New York in April 1927. The Conference's keynote speaker, Congressman Martin W. Littleton, savagely attacked a clique of government officials, whom he regarded as "principals" attempting to "vitiate the Supreme Court of the United States" and deliver "control of the Government" and "all industry" to communists.¹⁰⁸ Over five hundred people attended the occasion and resolved to give Littleton's message the greatest possible publicity.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ *Daily Data Sheet*, 12 September 1927.

¹⁰⁷ *Daily Data Sheet*, 22 and 24 August 1927. The *National Republic's* reports about "Christian Communism" found their way into five articles (under this title) by Marvin and similar information from the *Chicago Daily Tribune* entered the *Daily Data Sheet* on 4 August and 21 October 1927.

¹⁰⁸ *Radicalism in Washington*, Key Men of America, 1927, p. 11 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 13). This cabal comprised several Senators and Congressmen, including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Borah and was rounded out by the Director of the Popular Government League, Judson King, H. S. Raushenbush, Secretary of the Committee on Coal and Giant Power, "appointed by the League for Industrial Democracy," (LID) and former Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania. They were the willing tools of William Z. Foster, Morris Hilquit (chief of the SPUSA), Roger Baldwin, Norman Thomas (Executive Director of the LID), Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (seemingly holding no organisational position but nonetheless a "much-jailed Radical," William H. Johnston (organiser of the Conference for Progressive Political Action) and Robert Morss Lovett (President of the LID).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* The societies included the National Reserve Officers Association, DAR, ADS, United States Flag Association, War Mothers, National Order, Patriotic Builders of America and the BAF. At least

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Patriotic associations' considerable organisational resources helped them spread their message widely. The Advisory Council of the Key Men included the Secretary of the Associated Employers of Indianapolis, the Executive Secretary of the Employers' Association of Jackson, Michigan, the Manager of United Central Life Insurance Company in Denver, Captain Hopkins, a former MI staffer and representative of the Chicago Association of Merchant Tailors, the President of Westmoreland Coal Company in Philadelphia and Harry Jung, a former private investigator and a patriot of national repute. Representing kindred patriotic bodies were the President of the DAR, the President of the Women's Constitutional League of Virginia, the Secretary of the Allied Patriotic Societies of Washington, D.C., the Commander of the San Diego branch of the AL, the Chairwoman of the Americanization Committee of the League of American Pen Women, the Manager of the BAF and the chief of the Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs. The Legislative Agent of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and the Ohio State Grange was on hand, as was a delegate from the Teachers' Council of New York and the Dean of Indiana University School of Law. The Key Men's links with the military were particularly strong, including the Secretaries of the MI Association and the Reserve Officers' Association of Phoenix, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Chemical Warfare Reserve, the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Division and the Inspector-General of the United States Army. The Key Men's most influential member, arguably, was Albert Johnson.¹¹⁰

The most powerful patriotic organisation was the AL. It repressed communism and reformism as much through "legitimate" sponsorship of anti-radical associations and causes as through vigilantism. The roll call of public officials and private societies attending the 1933 Fifteenth Annual Convention of the Legion in Chicago indicates its influence. It included the Mayor of Chicago, the Governor of Illinois, the Governor of Indiana (himself an ex-National Commander of the Legion), the President of the

five of the societies listed current or former military men in their leadership.

¹¹⁰ Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 8 and Letter from Ralph M. Easley to Churchill, 13 April 1920 (MI Reel 19). Through contacts such as these, paranoid anti-communists like Fred Marvin effectively introduced their ideas to "the public." And Marvin's influence was far from unique. The NCF's Executive Director, Ralph Easley, recruited informants in the Inter-Church World Movement and YMCA and, in partnership with the State Department and MI, attempted to convince the YMCA's Director to drive treacherous citizens from its membership. One man affiliated with the YMCA identified by Easley was a certain Julius F. Hecker, whom Easley wanted dismissed from his overseas duties "on account of his supposed Bolshevist tendencies." Utterly convinced of the propriety and justice of his self-appointed, regulatory task, Easley regarded it as his civic duty to "wake up" various organisations so that they too

National Pressman's Union (a Tennessee Legionnaire, who also carried "the felicitations and good wishes of the organized labor movement of America" on behalf of the ever-supine AFL) and President Roosevelt. Foreign dignitaries, like Guglielmo Marconi, the inventor of the wireless and a representative of the Italian government, also paid their respects, as did emissaries of minority groups. Those outside the racial, religious and political orthodoxy were particularly anxious to convince the Legion they were good patriots. Dr. Emmet J. Scott, Secretary of Howard University in Washington D.C., and a former special assistant to the Secretary of War, assured the Convention it had no cause to fear "disloyalty" from African-Americans.¹¹¹

The Legion was proud of its record of "Americanisation." The Americanism Commission conducted major programs in three areas: education, youth activities and community service. The Legion promoted its education mission, in "cooperation with school officials throughout the nation," through ventures such as the AL School Award Medal, citizenship schools for the foreign-born, vocational guidance services for boys, Flag history, etiquette classes and observance of patriotic days. Other "advancement" schemes included an annual Junior Baseball program, which brought more than four hundred thousand boys into "Legion sponsorship."¹¹²

Across the United States, thousands of smaller societies spread anti-communism at a local level. One such association was the Westchester Security League (WSL) of New York, the brainchild of Mrs. Frank Hawkins, National Defence Chair of the DAR and subscriber to the *Daily Data Sheet*. Hawkins began her anti-communist career regularly addressing her DAR Chapter but she and a number of Daughters realised the need to devote more time to fighting radicalism and formed the WSL. The League was one of many patriotic groups dominated by deeply conservative women. Married League officers referred to themselves in the feminine form of their husband's names. Predominantly middle class, most of their husbands were businessmen and retired

would "kick out their Socialist, I.W.W.'ite and Bolshevist operators."

¹¹¹ *Summary of Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of The American Legion*, Chicago, Illinois, 2-5 October 1933 (National Republic - MSS, Box 32). Speaking of the profound gratitude "the colored people" of America felt "for the privilege of appearing" at the Convention, Scott assured the Legion, "whatever you may have heard to the contrary, I want to assure you that the efforts that have been made to subvert the loyalty of colored Americans have miserably failed, and it will continue to fail under the leadership of thinking colored Americans."

¹¹² *Ibid.* The Legion was convinced that "the principles of good sportsmanship" were "very closely allied to the principles of good citizenship."

military personnel. Convening monthly meetings, the League and allied organisations provided one another with guest speakers. Soon, the League was distributing material across the nation. The League joined the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defence (WPCND) and attended annual conferences in Washington, D.C., in 1926, 1928, 1929 and 1936.¹¹³ At such occasions, the League forged relationships with the Committee on American Education (affiliated with the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies) which broadcast weekly programs on the "Machinery, Principles and Aims of Our Government" in New York. The League also attended a mass meeting in Washington in April 1933, opposing the federal government's decision to recognise the USSR. Five thousand patriots attended the rally, sponsored by the AL. Delegates from 150 patriotic, fraternal, religious, labour, veterans and business organisations were present, along with Hamilton Fish, Jr., the Vice President of Georgetown University and the President of the AFL.¹¹⁴

Like the AL, the League was anxious about education. President Hawkins, leading by example, contacted a State high school after reading of its difficulties with Young Pioneers. With permission, she formed a student discussion group and, "as a reward for the best work in citizenship," took two of its members to Washington for the conference of the WPCND. So successful was this venture that the DAR soon "took over the enterprise," creating "many units ... in public schools" and new clubs for "Jr. American Citizens."¹¹⁵ The League also supplied schools and youth groups with subscriptions of approved literary matter, including Walter Steele's *National Republic*. A teachers' group challenging the Teachers' Union received information from the League every month, combating "Progressive Poison in Public Education," and a partnership was established with the Sons of the American Revolution to monitor "un-American" textbooks.¹¹⁶

The League was an important source of information for government and judicial

¹¹³ Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Westchester Security League - MSS, Box 1, Paper describing the history of the WSL, Mrs. G. Frank Hawkins. The League's close affiliates included the Army and Navy Club.

¹¹⁴ WSL Internal report c. 1935 (WSL - MSS, Box 1).

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ WSL, Inc. *Annual Reports*, 1934 - 1935 and 1935 - 1936 (WSL - MSS, Box 1). Two of the League's literature subscription gifts were bestowed on the reading rooms of Roosevelt High School, in Yonkers and the Coatesville, Pennsylvania YMCA. One student organisation supplied with materials by the League was the Student Americans of Columbus, Ohio.

authorities. Both the Dickstein Committee investigating subversive activities and Congressman Tinkham, who was sponsoring a bill to revoke Soviet recognition, utilised the League's resources, as did the Arizona State legislature when conducting "an investigation of disloyal activities." The League also furnished material to an Arizona judge then trying some alleged communists. The League even aided foreign anti-communists, liaising with the International Entente Against the Third International (based in Geneva) and other societies in Paris and London.¹¹⁷ At home, the League corresponded with other patriots, including the Christian Defence Movement, Walter Steele, Harry Jung, Fred Marvin and the BAF, while cultivating support from MI, the War Department and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce.¹¹⁸

Another of the League's contacts, Elizabeth Dilling, won a place of distinction among anti-communists by publishing a periodical pamphlet and, more important, an encyclopedia of radicalism, *The Red Network: A "Who's Who" and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots*. Dilling's circle of associates further demonstrates how closely connected leading anti-communist patriots were. For theoretical inspiration and material support, Dilling acknowledged her debt to the Lusk Committee, the Fish Committee, Fred Marvin (by then the National Secretary of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies), the BAF, Walter Steele and Harry Jung. Dilling was also a prized source of information. The national headquarters of the DAR published her articles and distributed her pamphlet. Her work was endorsed by the AL, the United States Army and Navy Officers' Club, Chicago MI, the Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs and the Women's Patriotic League. Dilling's influence permeated religious organisations including the Moody Church and Bible Institute and various Catholic, "fundamentalist and other anti-Bolshevik, anti-Atheist Churches."¹¹⁹ She also attempted to influence legislators and once crossed swords with Jane Addams at a Legislative Hearing in Chicago concerning prospective bills compromising the independence of universities and colleges in Illinois.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ *Annual Report 1934 - 1935 and Internal Report c. 1935* (ibid.).

¹¹⁸ *Internal Report*, and internal memo *Early contacts of W.S.L.* (ibid.).

¹¹⁹ Elizabeth Dilling, *The Red Network: A "Who's Who" and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots*, Published by the Author, Chicago, 1934, Dedicatory Page and p. 259.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 51. At the hearing, held in 1933, Addams argued that the global importance of socialism and communism made teaching students about them necessary. Dilling shifted the direction of debate towards the CPUSA's alleged propensity to commit violence.

While patriots such as Dilling, the WSL and the AL exercised great influence on government and society, other patriotic associations formed by businessmen and organisations made singular contributions to the enforcement of conservative and reactionary politics, particularly in the arena of industrial affairs. Boasting exceptional political contacts and generously funded by the communities for whom they lobbied, patriotic businessmen ensured that political and economic conditions remained firmly anti-communist and open shop. One of the most notable business lobbies was the BAF, whom Elizabeth Dilling credited with the maintenance of criminal syndicalism legislation in California into the 1930s.¹²¹

Originally established as the Commercial Federation of California by Harry M. Haldeman and Harry Chandler, who had both been prominent in Red Cross and Liberty Loan drives and the War Industries Board, the Federation was supported by a wide range of groups. Its State Executive Committee in 1920 comprised representatives of the Pacific Pipe and Supply Company, California Fruit Distributors, several lumber companies, the San Francisco Pacific Foundry Company and the Great Western Electric Chemical Company.¹²² Rapidly expanding beyond Los Angeles to northern California and other Pacific states, the Federation recruited expert personnel to facilitate its growth. A former field secretary of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce was engaged in October 1923 to form local chapters. Within months he established three fully staffed and "self-sustaining" chapters with a combined membership exceeding two hundred.¹²³ The Federation's "Workers' Message" department, meanwhile, issued weekly messages and special addresses on holidays and "the birthdays of American statesmen," distributing 1.4 million letters to 150 firms in "practically every line of industry." Authors of the messages included Senator George W. Cartwright.¹²⁴ An expatriate European noble, the Baroness de Ropp, allegedly spoke at over 150 schools, colleges, churches and clubs to approximately 165,000 people for the Federation, while another speaker reached 130,000 through Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, DAR and AL contacts. An enthusiastic reformer of education, the

¹²¹ Ibid., Dedicatory page. Dilling probably exaggerated the organisation's power only slightly.

¹²² BAF Organizational Profile, 27 December 1950 and *Weekly Letter* 53, 22 June 1920 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1).

¹²³ BAF, *1923 Resume of Activities*, p. 6 (ibid.). The branches were established in Anaheim, Alhambra and Santa Monica.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 1 - 2. In this connection it is worth revisiting the success enjoyed by a similar letter in California, *Straight Shooter*.

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Federation supplied (on request) anti-radical materials to the University of Southern California, UCLA, Stanford University and "various high schools."¹²⁵

The Federation's pamphlets enjoyed wide circulation not only in California but as far afield as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Denver, Cincinnati and Indianapolis. One subscriber distributed copies of the Federation's *Behind the Veil* to every member of Congress and the Senate and several legislators wrote back to commend the work. The *Weekly Letter* was used by groups such as the ADS, AL, DAR and NSL and also the American Bar Association and the federal Department of Education. The *Saturday Evening Post* spoke in glowing terms of the Federation, as did Californian newspapers and anti-communist publications like the *Boston Transcript*, the *New York Commercial and Buddy*, the official bulletin of the Disabled Veterans of the World War. The Zenith Radio Corporation of Chicago broadcast "whatever anti-red material" the Federation could provide to an estimated average audience of 8.5 million listeners throughout the United States, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Alaska and Central America.¹²⁶

A practical, representative organisation, the Federation fought with special vigour for appropriate representation of business in government and the destruction of unionism. In the Los Angeles County elections of 1918 the BAF endorsed 18 candidates, 12 of whom were elected. In similar ballots for the city administration and the Board of Education of Los Angeles, six of nine and four of seven candidates, respectively, won office. A "legislative bureau" formed by the Federation provided ideological guidance to the City Councilors and analysed over two thousand bills during the legislative session.¹²⁷

On the industrial front, the Federation prevented workers from affiliating with trade unions. When the firemen of Los Angeles organised and then sought registration with the AFL, representatives of the Federation persuaded them not to affiliate with the Labor Federation. In return, the BAF secured the firemen salary increases from the

¹²⁵ Ibid, pp. 1 - 2 and 6. These materials largely comprised the Criminal Syndicalism Act and guides to the Constitution, a compulsory part of the curriculum of all Californian schools.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 3 - 4.

¹²⁷ BAF Letter, which I dub "Mission Statement," c. 1919 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1).

City Council.¹²⁸ This success was repeated when the Federation prevented teachers from affiliating with unions. The Federation's approach to industrial negotiation was aggressive and threatening. Cajolery took a minor role next to bribery and threats of punishment.¹²⁹ The Federation's vigorous campaign brought further success when the School Boards of San Francisco and Los Angeles prohibited the formation of school teacher unions and San Bernardino's teachers' institute also condemned affiliation with the AFL. Various delegations of teachers, such as those of Visalia, proceeded to "voluntarily" renounce their association with the workers' movement.¹³⁰

Besides dominating industrial relations, the BAF influenced the treatment of communists and helped to make Los Angeles, along with Chicago, one of the two most important centres of super-patriot repression at the close of the 1920s. In Chicago the American Military Intelligence Association and Vigilant Protective Association, both led by Harry Jung, engineered criminal prosecutions against twenty-six communist leaders. In Los Angeles, the BAF exercised authority through the infamous "Red Squad" of the Los Angeles Police Department. The Federation persecuted dozens of radicals and was directly responsible for a raid on a children's camp in San Bernardino.¹³¹ The Federation was greatly esteemed as an informant and

¹²⁸ *Causes Leading to the Organization of the Commercial Federation and Accomplishments Thereof*, c. 1920 (ibid.).

¹²⁹ Collected lecture notes for Californian teachers warning against union affiliation, c. 1918 - 19 (ibid.). The Federation's speakers appealed to teachers to regard "the cause of education, like that of religion" as "too sacred to be dragged through the mire of labor disputes." Just as policemen were the "guardians of public safety," public school teachers were the "To ally themselves with trade unions would 'degrade the profession of educators' and betray community trust. Teachers were to 'trust the whole community' for the provision of better pay and conditions, rather than depending on 'the support of a small part of the population' and were urged, 'maintain your independence; do your duty; teach in your school room the justice and utility of America's institutions and the blessings of Liberty under the Law.' Idealistic appeals to teachers' patriotic duty and special role as 'guardians of...the morals of boys and girls' were clearly not regarded sufficient insurance of their industrial loyalty and the Federation advised teachers 'You have no need to organize to secure better pay; and the Commercial Federation warns them that they will do serious injury to both their own cause and that of education if they persist in doing so ... they will certainly be dismissed to make place for others who are faithful to the traditions of their profession ... Teachers, like soldiers, owe their first and only allegiance to the state [to organize] will be fatal to your future career as educators. Remember the case of the Boston and Washington policemen."

¹³⁰ *Weekly Letter* 27, 24 December 1919.

¹³¹ *ACLU, Civil Liberty - 1929-30*, pp. 30 - 1. By June 1933, the ACLU could report that no fewer than eight cases involving brutality by the Red Squad were awaiting trial. The suits were pending against the Squad Captain W. F. Hynes, six of his deputies and the BAF for a raid on the John Reed Club rooms in Hollywood and the destruction of club property; charges against Police Chief Steckel and Hynes for assault on battery of ACLU attorney Leo Gallagher at a City Council appearance; a suit by Friends of the Soviet Union against Mayor Porter of Los Angeles, Steckel, Hynes and the AL for breaking up a meeting at a high school; a suit by the Workers' United Front Election Campaign Committee against the same parties for the forcible closing of a banquet; a further suit against the same parties in behalf of

public relations ambassador by the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, James E. Davis. Davis wrote to the California Oil and Gas Association commending the Federation's "data and confidential information on Communism and allied activities ... built up ... over a period of a decade and a half." Its files were, he stated, "invaluable to the Police," because they furnished:

the background for necessary action...by augmenting [official] records ... limited by an inadequate financial appropriation and [unable to] cover over a continuous period of years the wide related educational field ... outside of Police domain.¹³²

For Davis, it was vital that the Federation continued to keep "abreast of the developments in the Communist program of destruction," so that "public sentiment" could be "built up to support...action and legislation to enable the authorities to handle it."¹³³

The proximate relationship between the Los Angeles Police and the BAF was far from unique and is illustrative of the extent and intimacy of reciprocal ties between regional and national authorities and patriots. Anti-communists in government knew precisely where to find critical support and repeatedly petitioned for assistance when they had to substantiate communist activity. The Fish Committee, for example, called on a "Who's Who" of America's anti-communists. The president and vice president of the AFL, Edward F. McGrady and Matthew Woll gave their time and evidentiary materials, as did John L. Lewis, the president of the UMW. The Vice President of Georgetown University, Reverend Edmund Walsh, who later voiced strident opposition to the recognition of the USSR in fora such as the 1933 rally attended by the WSL, was another witness. The Committee also interviewed Harry Jung, Walter Steele and representatives of the DAR and the BAF. Senior government support flowed from Charles G. Wood, the Commissioner of Conciliation with the DL, Robert F. Kelley, the Chief of Eastern European Affairs with the Department of State and J. Edgar Hoover. From police and intelligence ranks came testimony from the former

a man jailed on suspicion of criminal syndicalism and held without charges; a similar charge against Porter, Steckel and Hynes for unlawful search of premises by Ida Rothstein and the Japanese Press Association; two further suits for battery against Hynes and seven further suits for false imprisonment against Porter and Hynes. See ACLU, *Land of the Pilgrim's Pride - 1932 - 33*, pp. 33 - 4.

¹³² Letter from James E. Davis to COGA, 18 January 1936 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1).

Commissioner of Police in New York, Grover A. Whalen, Lieutenant Make Mills of the Chicago Police Department, Commander H. R. Hein of Naval Intelligence (NI), Jacob Spolansky and Captain William F. Hynes, Commander of the Los Angeles Police Department's "Red Squad." Witnesses of lower profile appeared from "all walks of life - priests, ministers, college professors, school teachers, Government, State and City officials, police officers, industrialists, farmers ... reserve officers, journalists, members of the Chicago Board of Trade, grain brokers, representatives of the lumber and manganese industries, of patriotic societies, including the American Legion and other veterans organizations."¹³⁴

As the anti-communist crusade progressed through the 1930s, experienced crusaders remained influential. The HUAC relied on "overwhelming" support from the BAF's Secretary, Margaret Ann Kerr.¹³⁵ The Federation shipped six cartons of material, including Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) registration lists, to the Committee in 1938. Indeed, as late as 1948 the Federation was dispatching membership lists of the CPUSA, dating from 1932, to the Immigration Department. The Federation's ties to the federal government demonstrates how strongly Cold War anti-communism was indebted to the civic and official security bureaucracy created after the Red Scare; old career anti-communists supplied crucial information and opinion to a new generation of anti-radical politicians.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ *Report of Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities and Propaganda in the United States*, Supplement to the *United States Daily*, Vol. V, No. 270, 19 January 1931, p. 3 (henceforth referred to as Fish Committee Report).

¹³⁵ Letter from Charles Kramer to Andrew J. Copp, 15 May 1935 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1). Senior counsel for the Committee, Charles Kramer, noted in 1935, that Kerr had "diligently and constantly engaged in the preparing of material for the consideration of the House Judiciary Committee [and] personally called on a very large number of the members of the House and Senate, and has so ably laid the matter before the various Committees and furnished valuable information for which we are all most grateful."

Big Business and Anti-Communism

While many in the business community were active anti-communists, some businessmen confessed to a degree of uncertainty as to how to respond to the problem of communism. Industrialists confronted a number of competing goals. First and foremost, the imperative of business was to generate profit, wherever possible. Second, long-standing faith in the reforming and redemptive power of (capitalist) industry persuaded several businessmen that trade rather than political solutions would best undermine communism. Nonetheless, some powerful business lobbies hysterically refused to countenance any form of intercourse with communists.

In spite of the fact that Russia had become communist, there was money to be made there and the question of whether or not trade was to be conducted with the Soviet Union divided business and governments after the Red Scare. Ivy Lee, a New York businessman and publisher of an independent pamphlet argued that America could "Cure Bolshevism in Russia" by developing trade links. He called on the U. S. Chamber of Commerce to establish a bureau in Moscow to facilitate such development. Like Edward Egbert and Herbert Hoover, Lee was convinced that economic progress would stimulate socio-political regeneration in Russia. The "disease of Bolshevism" had to be excised from the "Russian body politic" and this would come about when "the Russian people themselves" realised that only "so-called capitalistic methods" could bring them "peace, productivity and prosperity." Lee not only believed that trade was the last hope of defeating communism in Russia. He also maintained that trade alone could prevent the spread of socialism among "poverty-stricken people, especially of China and India."¹³⁶

America's greatest businessman, Henry Ford, agreed and established manufacturing plants in Russia. In June 1930 Ford explained to *Nation's Business* why he was helping the Soviets. He did not believe that the United States economy could flourish

¹³⁶ *Information*, Ivy Lee and Associates, 4 August 1927 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 2) (henceforth referred to as Ivy Lee, *Information*). Lee believed that "the most effective method of prevention, as someone stated to be the best cure for grief, is to be found in "the exclusive power of a new affection." That new "affection," for the people as a whole, can, it seems to me, be found in the opportunity to own and enjoy the results of their toil, to taste the joys of high wages, comfortable incomes, and the possibilities of possessing property. Once the Russian people - and particularly the Russian peasants - have tasted these delights, all the Bolshevik theories in the world would, through sheer action of innate human nature, perish from the face of the landscape because the law of nature is stronger than any written law."

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in isolation but rather maintained that continued American prosperity depended on the export of American technology to other nations, where it would create new markets and raise living standards. Yet many businessmen worried that extension of the "American economic system" might permit other nations to flood the United States with merchandise produced by cheap labour. Others feared that the Soviets were interested in what America knew, not what it manufactured and that it was "suicidal for American industry to cooperate in any way with Russia until her theory and form of government" changed. Ford discounted such views, maintaining that industry was "good for any people." The Russians had "sense enough to want industry" and demonstrated "excellent judgment in coming to America for their industrial method."

Ford's *weltanschauung* was simple and optimistic. Practical experience taught him that American industry destroyed all barriers, including the political. As he put it:

Russia is beginning to build. It makes little difference what theory is back of the real work, for in the long run facts will control. I believe it is our duty to help any people who want to go to work and become self-supporting.

The idea that various economies could indefinitely remain dependent on a few stronger ones was erroneous. American workers could not continue to be "the perpetual factory hands of the nations." Other economies would partake in "the benefit of a half century of [American] experience" and industrialise as it had. As universal growth depended "on the plain people entirely - the wage earners," price reductions and wage increases had to be constant, in America and abroad.¹³⁷

The Executive Committee of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, by contrast, could not embrace apolitical trade policy. It argued that "nothing but [a flood of harmful] propaganda" would flow back to the United States if trade with Russia continued. Anti-communist sympathy underpinned the Chamber's "unanimous" endorsement of federal government anti-trade policies and the Committee assured Lee that it resented his implication:

¹³⁷ *Nation's Business*, June 1930 (Felt MSS, Pamphlets Box 13).

that for commercial gain American business recognize, even to this extent, the soviet regime which by the pronouncements of its leaders and by its deeds has proved to be one of continuous tyranny, bad faith, confiscation of property, and denial of individual rights.

It was seemingly not possible to "bring the Russian people back to normal conditions through trade relations" while they were ruled by "such insincere, unrepentant and misguided rulers." The power of the purse, officially at least, could not override the appeal of a veneer of ethical cleanliness, let alone the known security of economic isolationism. The Chamber intoned:

trade relations prosper only when founded on mutual good faith and integrity and no such foundation exists today in the whole Soviet record of repudiation, of conflicting and confiscatory edicts, of bad faith, and misrepresentations in international relations and in the treatment of their own people...the motto of the National Chamber is that "if it is not for the public good it is not for the good of business."¹³⁸

Hypocritically, the Chamber divorced these sentiments from business in the United States. Anti-radicalism remained a tool of powerful interests against the weak in America. Neither governments nor patriots evinced sufficient courage or integrity to attack magnates like Ford, who traded both with the USSR and, later, Nazi Germany.

¹³⁸ Ivy Lee, *Information*.

"Popular" Anti-Communism – The Role of the Press and its General Effect on "Ordinary Americans"

Of all the influences affecting popular perception of communism, arguably the most important was the mainstream press. While governments and patriotic and business associations strongly influenced "the public," it was the press that linked governments and organisations to millions of citizens and most clearly controlled flows of information. The relationship between governments and the press was made still more proximate and significant when newspaper owners such as Warren Harding and A. Mitchell Palmer became public representatives.¹³⁹ When governments and patriots worked in concert with the press, independent and unorthodox opinion struggled for air. Technological circumstance ensured that most Americans were deprived of first-hand information about political events and ideologies. This was particularly so at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, when the public's grasp of the facts, let alone the dogma of revolution, was paltry. The average citizen depended entirely on government and the mainstream press to define and explain such events, unaware that both officials and editors were often little better informed than they were. Governments and the press were, in addition, ensnared in relationships of mutual dependency. Newspapers were beholden to governments for data they chose to release, while governments relied on press reports to supplement the knowledge deficient foreign consular missions and local agencies supplied.

Throughout the 1920s communism remained a prime news topic. Newspapers carried stories daily, especially tales of atrocities and depravity in Russia. A typical item published by the *Chicago Daily Tribune* in 1924 claimed that senior Soviet officials ran a prostitution and slavery ring, corrupting young girls with promises of government positions or placements in orphanages.¹⁴⁰ Such reports resonated deeply with readers, arousing profound fears of inversions of racial order. Reports screaming "HIGH OFFICIALS OF RUSSIA BACK WHITE SLAVERS" terrified Americans,

¹³⁹ While in his twenties Palmer purchased the publishing company which printed his hometown's two largest papers. By 1907 his consortium had seized ownership of its competitors too as the regional press became Palmer's "official organ." See Coben, p. 10. Harding, when standing for election to the Senate of Ohio sold his columns to political allies and industrial interests, accepting stock in a local brewery and \$10,000 from a farm implement company for publishing favourable articles. See Miller, *Star Spangled Men*, p. 197.

¹⁴⁰ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 23 February 1924 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 2). The report, emanating from Berlin, also alleged that the mistress of the President of the Third International, Grigory Zinoviev, was a key figure in this racket.

who projected their horror of Negroid revolution onto the USSR. They also reminded the public of the peculiar sexual degeneracy of communists, first described in wartime. Accounts of Bolsheviks' cruelty were also regularly circulated. The *Chicago Daily Tribune*, for example, printed an article in October 1924 titled "REBELS BURIED ALIVE AS REDS EXECUTE 20,000 - Dogs Feast on Bodies of Georgians." Twenty thousand people had lost their lives and a further fifty thousand had been deported to Siberia and "the famished Volga provinces" for supporting a revolutionary independence movement. Sub-headings read:

Many women, girls also executed... Families Show Grief; Executed.

Russia's secret police had reputedly issued orders "forbidding the family of a man to weep for him, and whole families" had been "executed for weeping," while the Bolsheviks' use of "Li the Chinaman" as their prime executioner further confirmed their perfidy. The ability of Russia's secret police, the GPU, to "Make Arrests, Conduct Trials and Execute Sentences" was deplored. One correspondent quoted a GPU man arguing that it was better for "a hundred innocent men" to suffer imprisonment than for "one dangerous man" to remain at liberty.¹⁴¹

Biographies of Bolsheviks rounded out an extremely unattractive portrait. The senior bureaucrat Alexei Rykov was profiled by the *Chicago Daily News* to demonstrate the fundamental ingratitude, ruthlessness and duplicity of radicals.¹⁴² The chief Bolshevik, Lenin, was widely reviled as the source of communists' moral putrefaction. Shortly after his death, the *Literary Digest* ran a feature on Lenin, drawing heavily on the analysis of an exiled academic, Pitirim Sorokine. Sorokine opined that Lenin's "one-sidedness" and "inability to grasp the essential features of a given situation" betrayed "intense bitterness and hatred." His Marxist writings were mere "beautifying veils" disguising "subconscious primitive animal impulses," for in

¹⁴¹ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 23 October 1924 and *Chicago Daily News*, 8 January 1925 (ibid.). News was also circulated of the spread of prison camps and the falling number of schools.

¹⁴² *Chicago Daily News*, 20 March 1924 (ibid.). The *News* described how in 1907, a member of the St. Petersburg Duma named Alexinsky had saved Rykov from imprisonment by appearing as a character witness for him in court. Eleven years later, when Alexinsky had been arrested for criticising the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and for disclosing communications between the Bolsheviks and Wilhelm II, Rykov refused to intervene on his behalf. Rykov's reputation for intellectual "independence and conciliatory spirit" were clearly "fictitious."

such types of "so-called super-idealists the most dangerous anti-social extremists" were "latent." Moreover, Lenin's very physiognomy divulged his degeneracy and Sorokine counseled:

Look at Lenin's face. Is it not the face [of an] 'inborn criminal' ... extreme cruelty, expressing itself in pitiless massacres, in relentless resolution to destroy all the world for his own personal reasons, is stamped upon these sinister features.¹⁴³

The pain of acknowledging the Bolsheviks' triumph in the Russian Civil War and eagerness to see socialism fail contributed to the proliferation of fanciful tales of Bolshevik dissension and abandonment of Marxism. Dispatches from the foreign correspondent of the *Tribune* stressed two main forces hastening Bolshevism's demise. The first was material deprivation and famine generating mass rebellion. On 17 March 1924, under the headline "MISERY, HUNGER, AND COLD STIR SERFS TO REVOLT - Famine Spreads as Reds Export Crops," John Clayton described a land stricken with starvation and industrial discontent. Workers were unsuccessfully begging the credit-hungry government to release export grain domestically, as strikes swept the provinces and demands for free speech and the release of political prisoners were issued. Three days previous, the same writer noted, under the heading "CHAOS, FAMINE LOOMS AS RUSSIA NEARS REVOLT: Masses Gird for War on Soviet Tyrants," that Lenin's New Economic Policy had failed to counteract the effects of corruption within the Party and inefficient manufacturing methods. The purchase of capital by needy peasants was thus made impossible while they continued to labour beneath punitive taxes and factory hands waited months for salaries, inflation preventing the sale of their goods.

While the incidence of terrible misery, neglect and terror in Russia was very real, the *Tribune* strayed into propaganda by suggesting that these conditions were creating democratic revolt. On 12 March, Clayton contributed another piece, "DEMOCRACY NEW BUT POWERFUL WORD IN RUSSIA - Peasant and City Man Waken to Slogan," which stated that insurrection was spreading from the "enlightened workers

¹⁴³ *Literary Digest*, 15 March 1924 (ibid.).

within the party [sic]" to the peasantry, "while the Red army of officers and soldiers [had] taken up the cry." Clayton fancied a "new movement" was being born:

Every popular movement in Russia must have a catch word on which the masses can fasten. It matters little whether they understand its meaning. The bolsheviks [sic] gained the confidence of the masses by their "dictatorship of the proletariat" phrase. The slogan of the new movement, which has so rapidly become a danger to the existing government, is "Democracy."

At the head of this "movement" stood Leon Trotsky, backed by "many" Party heavyweights. Although the Politburo was guarding Trotsky without formally placing him under arrest, for fear of public reaction, Trotsky had traveled to Yalta to give the movement new impetus. "Its roots stretch[ed] so deeply into the masses that it [had to] go forward." Clayton concluded:

Compromise is the only road open to the bolsheviks [sic] ... But even should the leaders accept certain propositions which might delay the storm they will not appease the demands of the masses, who have entered this fight determined to reach their goal of a democratic government.¹⁴⁴

Failure to understand Russia's treacherous political environment following Lenin's death, and the desire to witness the creation of republican government in Russia (through the reassuring emergence of a popular, hero figure), substituted for sober analysis. The press' treatment of Russian affairs hadn't developed since 1917 and the *Tribune* hedged its bets, suggesting that if the Bolsheviks proved immovable, the United States could at least take credit for their success, which was founded on American industrial expertise. It declared on 23 March 1924, "BRAINS 'MADE IN U. S.' RULE RUSSIA," adding:

The Communists will recognize private property - that is, present ownership of private property, not pre-revolution ownership ... Today the soviet government recognizes private property de facto, but not de jure. The only people who take

the revolutionary bogey seriously is the American people. The bolsheviks [sic] know that a Communist government is all right for Russia, but it would not work in another country.¹⁴⁵

The *Saturday Evening Post* conveyed similar impressions to different readers. For the *Post*, too, the death of Lenin stimulated intense speculation and review in a series of articles published between November 1924 and March 1925. These reports presented terrible pictures of Russian life. Every conceivable aspect of civic decline was described, from inefficient industrial practices to civil unrest and idiotic, corrupt leadership. Significantly, the *Post* worked to convince readers of the existence of anti-Bolshevik forces who could form a popular government. This legitimated anti-communism and kept alive hopes for the demise of Bolshevism through means not requiring morally troublesome and politically prohibitive external influence. Americans could be comforted that capitalism was the right and natural system of social organisation and that the Bolsheviks could only stave off its establishment through tyranny.

According to the *Post*, Russia's infrastructure was a shambles. Simple devices such as internal telephone systems routinely broke down and during the entire period of his stay in Moscow, *Post* correspondent Isaac F. Marcosson was unable to use his room's telephone. However, as he noted, "virtue [was] attached to this misfortune": his messages could not be tapped.¹⁴⁶ Marcosson directly attributed Soviet economic disrepair to ideological zealotry at odds with common sense and commercial "laws." The Bolsheviks' attempt to "stifle individual initiative" had been "inconsistent, almost paradoxical," for although the NEP had averted peasant revolts, stabilised the ruble and attracted foreign investment, the Politburo was determined to revoke it. Russia's rulers were turning their backs on that vital constituent of civilisation, capitalism. Marcosson explained:

¹⁴⁴ Trotsky's revolt had allegedly been "furthered in the army [by] loyal bands ... in many regiments ... stationed at railway junction cities and towns and other strategic points surrounding Moscow."

¹⁴⁵ The *Tribune's* expert source was Dr. Boris D. Bogan, the director of the American Joint Distribution Committee in Moscow, who was returning to the United States after two years abroad. According to Bogan, "many revolutionists who lived for years in America now occup[ied] important posts in the government and [were] introducing American methods."

¹⁴⁶ *Saturday Evening Post*, "After Lenine, What? Trotsky", 8 November 1924, p. 152.

the law of demand and supply and the system upon which a civilized world does business are apparently unable to cope with the fanaticism that rules Russia ... This state of affairs grows out of the fact that in Soviet Russia the economic is political, and vice versa. Get this into your mind and you can understand why private trade is being suppressed. Why? Simply because the merchant, through efficiency, fair dealing and providing the customer with what he wanted, made such inroads upon the structure on which the government is reared that, regardless of the consequences, he had to be doomed to destruction. Political expediency dictated the step. Having had a semi-lucid interval, the masters of Russia are now swinging the vast domain back toward the extremism which marked the first years of their stewardship.¹⁴⁷

Such analysis was not without merit. Political imperatives had hastened the death of the NEP and the Russian economy was a miserable wreck. The disparity between agricultural and industrial prices was ruinous, real wage levels were appalling, there were huge foreign trade and budget deficits and millions were unemployed. Worse still, workers paid for criminally negligent policy with their lives, executed for crimes such as "economic espionage" when production levels fell.¹⁴⁸ However, Americans were encouraged to regard these conditions as irrelevant to their own lives, even though in the United States the "economic" was also "the political, and vice versa." The artificial separation of American republicanism from capitalism implied by Marcossion was a key psychological and ideological foundation of anti-communism. Further, the hackneyed juxtapositioning of "fanaticism" with "efficiency, fair dealing" and customer service hardly described the complex relationships of black market economies such as the NEP. Nor did it characterise the "American" system which produced manifest inequalities, inefficiency and horrendous loss of life.

In any case, Marcossion exposed a host of other faults. The omnipresence of secret police was one. Anecdotes about surveillance described the appalling harassment of Soviet citizens. In one story, a "retired shopkeeper" dining at the Hermitage is accosted by a GPU agent and upbraided for having dined there "four times in the last nine days" and ordering "roast goose and champagne." He is warned that if he eats

¹⁴⁷ *Saturday Evening Post*, "After Lenine, What? The War on Capital", 15 November 1924, p. 8.

there again he will be arrested as a profiteer.¹⁴⁹ By introducing this story alongside details of reported rises in summary justice, Marcosson constructed a powerful image of a terrifying society whose population lived in mortal fear of unseen informants and remote despots. But if the intelligence agencies in the United States were less murderous than their Russian counterparts, they were certainly no less petty. Yet the *Post* didn't invite its readers to question the inherent dangers of state-sanctioned, covert surveillance. Instead, it merely condemned an alien Other.

Revelations about life in Russia were invariably accompanied by exposés of communist activities at home. A series in the *Chicago Daily News*, written by Jacob Spolansky, informed readers about the BI's raid on a communist convention in Bridgman, Michigan in 1922. It portrayed communists as argumentative, childish, indecisive, petty and compulsively factional. Editorial boards hungry for anti-radical print clamored for Spolansky's stories until mid-1927.¹⁵⁰ The appearance of such articles describing events already several years old amplified surrounding items referring to the domestic and global political environment. In this manner the "truth" was outlined, in repetitive, stylised and chilling "reports," emphasising the insidious ability of communists to profit from the misfortune of the underprivileged, corrupt the ideals of youth and inflame the racially-persecuted. This was the intent of the *Herald-Examiner* on 25 March 1924 when it declaimed:

MEMBERS OF BOARD WILL TAKE UP 'RED' CHARGES TODAY -
Schools Picketed, Anti-American Literature Distributed Among Pupils by Soviet
Organization, Officials Are Told - TEACHERS DRAWN IN PLOT - Hundreds
Used to Spread Pacifist Doctrines, U.S. Agents Ready to Prove; Plan Court
Action Against Communists.

PACIFISTS TOOLS OF MOSCOW, IS CHARGE - Capt. C. B. Hopkins Attacks
Colleges, Churches and Schools as Agents of Reds.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ *Chicago Daily News*, 17 October 1924 and *Detroit Saturday Night*, 30 July 1927 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 2). Among interested papers was the independent, Right-wing paper, *Detroit Saturday Night*.

The *Chicago Daily Tribune*'s Donald Ewing on the same day revealed that "the real source" of radicalism was "the pacifist movement being spread throughout the country under a cloak of Christianity and education." Whereas the loyalties of organisations such as the International Workers' Education Association and the League for Industrial Democracy were patently obvious, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America and the Women's International League for Peace and its thousands of "duped members" were "unwitting" mouthpieces for the Third International. Ewing savaged pacifists again on 1 April, in a piece titled "HOW WOMEN BLINDLY STAB THEIR COUNTRY WITH SLACKER OATHS," while also excoriating blacks and religious disloyalists.¹⁵¹

Specific incidents of domestic upheaval were also attributed to radical meddling. The Sacco-Vanzetti affair was widely portrayed as an issue of national sovereignty and integrity; while American institutions were being held to ransom by internationalists, the "public" expressed outrage at the nerve of "world radicals" (see Figure 7). The press even maintained that Sacco and Vanzetti were privileged to receive American justice. *Detroit Saturday Night* satirically juxtaposed "Justice in Cruel America and Lovely Russia" in cartoon format, with separate images depicting an American Judge, embroiled in sheets of papers covering the courtroom (bedecked with cobwebs to indicate the passage of time from the two's sentence to its commission) and a mass hanging in Russia, where heavily-bearded brutes order their charges "Hurry Upski" and "Make it Snappyovich"¹⁵² (see Figure 8).

¹⁵¹ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 28 March 1924, 1 April 1924 and 2 April 1924 (ibid.). Ewing's attack on African-Americans read: "SOVIETS SPREAD 'RED' DOCTRINES AMONG NEGROES - Use Religious Cloak in Large U. S. Cities." Damaging accounts of communist behaviour in China also appeared, in broadsheets such as the *New York Times*, and from there they passed into the publications of anti-communists like Fred Marvin, whose *Daily Data Sheet* of 25 July 1927 derived from the *Times*' reports. A series of articles syndicated by the *Chicago Daily Tribune* also inspired Marvin's *Data Sheets* of 9 and 19 July 1927.


¹⁵² *Chicago Daily News*, 26 July and 10 August 1927 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 8) and *Detroit Saturday Night*, 30 July 1927 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 2).



(Figure 7: The *Chicago Daily News* (10 August 1927) depicts the Sacco Vanzetti Affair as a battleground for the United States' threatened national sovereignty.

Source: Loyola University of Chicago, Records of Dorr E. Felt).

Justice in Cruel America and Lovely Russia



(Figure 8: *Detroit Saturday Night*'s interpretation of American and Russian justice.

Source: Loyola University of Chicago, Records of Dorr E. Felt).

If so inclined, citizens were invited to gauge their own and others' propensity to radicalism or conservatism with the help of a test provided by the *Literary Digest* (see Figure 9).

In the quest to propagate anti-communism, the press fashioned features from a diverse range of sources, including super-patriots. The *Herald-Examiner's* authority for its March 1924 story about Red corruption of educational institutions was Captain Hopkins, the president of Chicago's Military Intelligence Association, a civic organisation linked with MI. The *Chicago Commerce* culled its story "Beware of Soviet Propaganda, is Warning of Former Russian Agitator" from a pamphlet titled *From Anarchy to Reason - Not in Defense of Capital but of Sound Reason*. Its author, James B. Horn claimed that he was born in Russia and exiled to Siberia by the Czar, before escaping to the United States, where he fell in with socialists in New York before finally renouncing his radical past. The *Commerce* endorsed his "double purpose of fostering Americanism and combating the persistent propaganda of the soviet government." Warning that "subtle" propaganda was "accepted at its face value by agitators and sentimentalists," Horn recounted how he had rejected his former beliefs and adopted the American way. Yet his account of conversion from communism to Americanism is simply an unabashed, unsophisticated plea for the

Are You a Radical?

Your Answer to This Test Determines Your Mind's Slant
from *LITERARY DIGEST*

ARE you at heart a radical or a conservative, Red or reactionary?

Theodore F. Lentz, Director of the Character Research Institute at Washington University, St. Louis, has formulated a measuring-rod in the shape of a questionnaire to answer this query for you.

According to the Associated Press, it "comprises several hundred selected and 'weighted' questions," and was described last week by Professor Lentz to the American Psychological Association at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

"If you answer 'yes' to the following questions," says the dispatch, "you have a tendency to be radical:

"1. Alimony for divorced husbands is as logical as for divorced wives.

"2. The world needs a new religion.

"3. It was within the power of the diplomats of 1900 to 1912 to prevent war.

"4. Something more effective than our present brooms, mops, and vacuum-cleaners should be devised to clean our homes.

"5. One-fifth of the public-school budget could well be spent in educating parents to educate their children."

Conservative

On the other hand, the dispatch continues, "Yes" to the following questions indicates one is a conservative:

"1. It is bad for a married man to take another man's wife to the movies.

"2. Billy Sunday has done much to make religion a vital force in our lives.

"3. Not all international disputes should be settled by arbitration.

"4. Women in general are not as intelligent as men.

"5. College education is right in more ways than it is wrong."

Professor Lentz tried the test on 579 students. "There are a great many aspects to the studies which we have made of 437 reactions of these students ("nearly a quarter of a million reactions all told," he informs *The Literary Digest*.)

"The chief point of my discussion at Ann Arbor was to the effect that deductions of interpretations as to conservatism, or, for that matter, any other trait tendency of the individual, would give the appearance of specificity when based upon too few observations.

"The practice of the layman (and, in this connection, our

(Figure 9: Part of a questionnaire from the *Literary Digest* (reprinted in the 10 cent *Fact Digest*) enabling people to gauge their political orientation.

Source: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Records of National Republic).

open shop.¹⁵³ Almost certainly, Horn was neither Russian nor a former socialist. His text is characterised by intense diatribe free from theoretical analysis. The linking of free enterprise to human development and freedom is his only task, achieved without regard for historical or cultural specificity.¹⁵⁴

Horn's philosophical dissection of Russia's woes was so transparently nonsensical and crude that it aroused suspicions in the odd informed reader, one of whom wrote Horn's publishers asking for "conclusive evidence" of his Russian nativity, but the publishers denied the pamphlet was in their catalogue and regretfully added they could not assist his inquiries.¹⁵⁵ Yet thousands of readers of the *Commerce* who were not troubled by the character of Horn's writing likely accepted such reactionary opinion as "news." Indeed, the intensity and depth of anti-communist propaganda emanating from the press swayed even political moderates.

One citizen with a discerning interest in communism was Dorr E. Felt, an inventor and manufacturer from Chicago. A highly successful and patriotic businessman, Felt amassed a mountain of data pertaining to social radicalism. His principal sources comprised the nation's most successful weekly, the *Saturday Evening Post*, the high-

¹⁵³ *Chicago Commerce*, 16 April 1924 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 2). An example of Horn's prose states, "Early in the great world war...as an advocate of higher wages I saw my dreams realized, but only to be shattered by the counter realization that higher wages do not mean any more for the workers, as prices go right along with wages and no one is any better off...At last I began to understand that "Capital" is merely a different name for an industrial system under which effort, service and accomplishment are rewarded. I began to understand that only through maximum production can there be a greater distribution of clothing, food, housing and other material comforts."

¹⁵⁴ For example, Horn likened America's contemporary dilemma with that faced by England between 1875 and 1900, when the functions of government were greatly expanded "by revolutionists of the torch and bomb variety." Once again, that familiar, "subtle" army of "able speakers and astute writers" issued propaganda for "many years toward gradual extension of government authority in every line." The "ultimate aim" of this "insidious and well-managed campaign" was the "nationalization of all industry ... an end to private enterprise" and the death of "the spirit of individualism," which would "snuff out forever the torch of human ambition, just as it was snuffed out in Russia." Horn cautioned, "even the Labour Party in England has learned that there are bounds beyond which government activity can not go without national disaster. America is slowly learning the same lesson." See James B. Horn, *From Anarchy to Reason*, 1924, pp. 18 - 19 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 13) (henceforth referred to as Horn, *Anarchy*).

¹⁵⁵ Horn's analysis of Russian culture read: "To the Russian, freedom means his personal freedom, regardless of the comfort or convenience of anybody else. To an American, freedom means regulating his own conduct to give everybody else equal freedom. If Russia had had more men like Kropotkin, she would have had a different history. For years and the years the Russian people had been fed on the writings of Turgenev, Dostoievski, and later such men as Maxim Gorki. Kropotkin preached hopefulness, while the others preached helplessness, contending that effort was useless and that there was no reasonable way to improve social and industrial conditions. They preached the doctrine of inferiority - the religion of despair." Ibid., p. 10. See also letter from Dorr E. Felt to J. P. Horn & Sons., 15 April 1924 and letter from J.P. Horn, Jr. to Felt, 19 May 1924 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 2).

brow *Literary Digest*, local broadsheets and material published by fanatical anti-communists. These publications inspired him to author several pamphlets on economic and political subjects that betray prevalent conservative ideological conceptions.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, Felt became a subscriber to Fred Marvin's *Daily Data Sheet*, on the recommendation of super-patriot Harry Jung.¹⁵⁷ While the degree to which Felt was influenced by the press, governments and patriots cannot be quantified, their collective authority was decisive in transforming him and millions of others into ardent anti-communists.

No sector of American society remained untouched by anti-communism. Community leaders and representatives of every variety were convinced that communists threatened the nation and were infiltrating *their* communities. Pastors of the Santa Barbara Association and the California Baptist Convention, for example, were so concerned by "communistic inroads" into their organisations that they established committees in the mid-1930s to monitor the authorship and distribution of "communistic literature" among their brethren. The Social Action Committee of the Northern Baptist Convention denounced the National Council for Prevention of War, the Council for Social Action of the Congregational and Christian Churches and the Federal Council of Churches in America as "out and out [communists]" and "so-called Christian [communists]." Committee leader Rex A. Mitchell, utterly persuaded by the professional, anti-communist lobby, even called on all "ministers and patriots" to purchase "a copy of the 'Net Work' by E. Dilling."¹⁵⁸ Other ministers acting on their own authority also petitioned organisations such as the BAF for "data of the

¹⁵⁶ Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 13. Felt developed the world's first adding and listing machines, the Comptometer and Comptograph. In 1918 he served as a Regional Adviser of Resources and Conversion for the War Industries Board and traveled to England and France with a federal DL commission studying industrial conditions. Felt also served as the Director and President of the Illinois Manufacturers Association, the President (in 1920) of the Illinois chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, a Board member of the Chicago Association of Commerce and was Director of the United States Chamber of Commerce, in 1922. He is the subject of an entry in *Chicago and Its Makers - A Narrative of Events from the Day of the First White Man to the Inception of the Second World's Fair*, Paul Gilbert and Charles Lee Bryson with Wallace Rice and Caroline M. McIlvaine, Felix Mendelsohn, Chicago, 1929. His pamphlets include *College Made Utopias and Labor Unrest* and *An American's Impression of Present Russia*, penned (respectively) around 1920 and 1930, found in the box listed above.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. and Letter from Marvin to Felt 20 September 1927, thanking him for his subscription of 15 September 1927 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 8). See ACLU, *Civil Liberty - 1929-30*, p. 30, for details of Jung's former profession.

¹⁵⁸ Letter from First Baptist church, Paso Robles, California to Steele, uncertain date but after 1 June 1936 (National Republic - MSS, Box 72, folder 3). So great was Mitchell's faith in Dilling, that he dismissed critics of her work as "gangsters" who had also "discredited the Bible and the constitution."

industrial condition."¹⁵⁹

Anti-communism particularly affected the lives of recent and ethnic migrants and in the wake of the Red Scare anti-communists institutionalised repressive regulation of migrants' activities and beliefs. Prevalent perceptions of migrants' political and social unreliability ensured their subjection to compulsory and increasingly crude "Americanisation" programs. Even the pro-immigration business lobby, which expressed frustration with the identification of ethnic minorities with radicalism, affirmed the concept of "Americanisation."¹⁶⁰ The lobby was not successful in dissociating migrants from unrest and the threat of deportation. The powerful magnates who led the lobby were among a minority not psychologically and materially displaced by the fear of loss that migrants had come to represent. In any case, their defence of migrants was motivated as much by commercial imperatives as commitment to cultural diversity, tolerance and improved living standards.¹⁶¹

No Americanisation program was benign. Even the most "moderate" Americanisation activities abused their educative and civic purposes. They were designed, above all, to engender conformity and entrench the status quo; the first words of English students in Henry Ford's company schools learned were "I am a good American."¹⁶² All Americanisation programs demanded that migrants prove their loyalty and allay presumptive fears; programs that might loosely be termed "liberal" or "Progressive" wilted before the onslaught of hysteria and fanatical exclusionism. The preparedness of organisations such as the DAR and the National Americanization Committee to work through traditional Settlements to bring civic education to migrants was contingent on the perceived need to reform their racial tendencies. John Higham notes that progressive and liberal Americanisation organisations collapsed after the Great War. However, in intimating that liberals retreated from the battlefield, he somewhat

¹⁵⁹ Letter from Elmer W. Benedict, 16 March 1920 and Literature forwarded with reply, 29 March 1920 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1). One parson to reply was the parson of the First Congregational Church, Montevideo, Minnesota, on the recommendation of an acquaintance.

¹⁶⁰ Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, p. 232. The lobby, led by powerful magnates including Cleveland H. Dodge, E. G. Grace and Thomas W. Lamont who formed the Inter-Racial Council. The National Founders' Association issued similar critiques of anti-communist, nativist policy and behaviour.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. One organisation supportive of migrants, the American Constitution Association, was the organ of businessmen from West Virginia, formed in 1920 to serve coal operators and the open shop.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 248.

misrepresents the *Zeitgeist*.¹⁶³ Rather, initiative was seized by powerful, reactionary forces who dominated migrant education. The NAC, like the CPI, formed direct contacts with immigrant communities, supported by State Bureaus of Education. The CPI itself inveigled dozens of ethnic communities to form their own Americanising bureaus, which were formally attached to the Committee,¹⁶⁴ and also encouraged ethnic communities to suppress the NPL.¹⁶⁵

Assimilationist Americanisation was made irrelevant by the ascendancy of patriotic groups, revolutionised immigration policies and the repressive atmosphere of the 1920s, in which some of the largest and most prominent Americanisation efforts came from migrants anxious to demonstrate their "loyalty" and "gratitude." The ascendancy of the right forced migrants into ostentatious displays of loyalty as a permanent condition of citizenship. Many strident anti-radicals, notably the Italian-American Commissioner of Immigration, Anthony Caminetti, were recent migrants or hailed from conspicuous ethnic minority groups. Jacob Cash, an Eastern European Jewish migrant who served with American forces in the Spanish War, was another conspicuous ethnic loyalist. Prompted by "a deep sense of gratitude to the land which afforded him opportunity," Cash "resolved [to] strive to enlighten others, and make them feel a sense of their responsibilities to the land of their birth or adoption." To this end he formed the United States Patriotic Society, whose chief activity comprised the distribution of booklets which found ready support in the highest government and business circles. At the end of the 1920s, Cash had won the admiration of the late Theodore Roosevelt, Senator William E. Borah, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the Secretary of the DL, James J. Davis, Everett Sanders, the former private Secretary to President Coolidge, the Governors of Oregon, Vermont and Kentucky and numerous State and federal representatives. A host of judges also commended Cash, as did Chief Justice Taft of the U. S. Supreme Court. Never shy of expressing patriotism the AFL congratulated Cash on his determination to "offset Bolshevik propaganda." Business leaders, particularly in banking and insurance, were eager subscribers, as was the Americanization Secretary of the General Electric Company. Scout troop

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 254.

¹⁶⁴ Creel, *How We Advertised America*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920, pp. 198 - 9.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 179 - 81. This activity was undertaken at the behest of both major political parties. While the Committee attacked the League's patriotic records, League supporters were compelled by authorities to hold Liberty Loan rallies and Red Cross meetings. Their parades were broken up by

leaders, an administrator of an African-American orphanage, the International Baptist Seminary and the AL, DAR and DJ rounded out Cash's support group.¹⁶⁶

The existence of organisations such as Cash's illustrates the reach of anti-communism beyond those who formulated the doctrine. Cash spent thousands of dollars in his education efforts and individuals of innocuous professional standing like assistant bank cashiers were inspired to assist the fight. Membership rolls of the APL indicate that its numbers comprised real estate agents, farmers, credit agency representatives, town clerks, attorneys, sales managers, ministers, postal clerks and company managers; the Soldiers' and Sailors' Employment Bureau in California was only one of thousands of organisations persuaded by the BAF of the danger of "propaganda in the several State Universities."¹⁶⁷

There can be little doubt that anti-communists did persuade millions of "ordinary Americans" to personally invest in the repression of reform, cultural diversity and constitutional liberties. While this cannot be solely credited to anti-communists' efforts, the influence and co-dependency of a relatively small number of key individuals, industries and organisations has demonstrated how important they were to the creation and spread of anti-communism. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that anti-communism was the product of small cadres of subterranean fanatics, it is hard to substitute the image of interlocking agencies and protagonists marshaled into an effective fighting force. Anti-communism was organised from above, not below. Although it came to ride on the back (particularly) of the lower middle class, they were not its inventors and promoters. The issue of why and how the anti-communist lobby was able to manipulate the national political agenda is complex and cannot be so easily established as the pivotal connections between important anti-

Home Guards or townsmen and they were subjected to vigilante acts of assault and expulsion.

¹⁶⁶ *Makers of History - Preserve the Ideals for Which Our Ancestors Sacrificed Their Lives*, United States Patriotic Soc., Inc., 1929 (National Republic - MSS, Box 32).

¹⁶⁷ Membership records of the APL (BI - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 14, 15, 16) and Letter from W. S. Grassie to BAF, 27 March 1920 (Kerr - MSS, Box 1).

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communists traced above. It is to these questions that the next chapter of the thesis will turn.

Chapter 3: The Psychology of American Anti-Communism

Having examined the history of anti-communism and the identity of important anti-communists, this thesis will now analyse the psychology underpinning anti-communism, particularly that of influential kinship groups. The theory underpinning this analysis has been introduced earlier, but a few points about the theoretical structure of this section should be reiterated. Paranoid political movements develop sequentially and their evolutionary processes can be plotted to reveal significant characteristics of the paranoid slide into disfigured imaginative and emotional states. Sagan has described the descent into paranoid fear as follows:

Stage 1: Sufferers of paranoid fear become increasingly obsessed with issues of control. This is a manifestation of the failure to overcome primal fear of separation, resulting in paranoid distrust of Others, characterised by a siege mentality and hysterical preoccupation with the purity of the Self.

Stage 2: The paranoid *justify* their apprehensions, chiefly through the psychic process of projection. This prevents the paranoid from scrutinising their inability to trust Others.

Stage 3: The paranoid become fixated with separation from Others. This is the only means by which they stave off the slide into actual paranoia. Demarcation is effected by focussing on external attributes of Others, as xenophobia is directed "internally into society." The Self finds "security and comfort only in a homogeneous world" as democratic ideals become increasingly untenable.

Stage 4: The paranoid begin to construct kinship groups to replace democracy. Tribal bonds are elevated above abstract concepts of justice and law as the basis for society.

Stage 5: Anti-democratic, authoritarian impulses dominate the paranoid, because democracy threatens and undermines kinship groups. The means kinship groups employ to destroy democracy are not always uniform but they subscribe universally to the impulse to abandon democratic government.

This developmental sequence can be further divided into two categories, *defensive* and *offensive* psychic responses. Broadly speaking, the psychic modes of stages 1 – 3

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are defensive, whereas as those of stages 4 and 5 are offensive. The analysis that follows will be structured according to this schema.

Anti-Communists' Obsessional Fear of Conspiracy

A psyche seized by paranoid fear first manifests its condition in a fixation with control and corresponding fears of conspiracy; the paranoid's capacity to trust declines as space and boundaries are vigilantly patrolled. The history of anti-communism's genesis in anxiety about aliens and radicalism shows that it is archetypal paranoid behaviour. The paranoid quality of anti-communism is made more apparent by the manner of anti-communists' responses to social difficulties, particularly worsening problems of social opportunity. Anti-communists interpreted mass immigration and economic unrest as products of social corruption engendered by alien racial influences and their faith in the potential cohesiveness of community collapsed. By contrast, they denied the diminution of equity in American life and increasingly censured those disadvantaged by structural socio-economic forces as the latter's frustration and grievance with the failure of progressive reform mounted. Failing to address or acknowledge the inherent faults of a free market capitalist economy, they mounted a search for traitors and pariahs, the paranoid's required victims.

Two additional characteristics of anti-communist behaviour betrayed paranoid influence. First, the sheer breadth of anti-communists' suspicion indicates that their fear was insatiable and supra rational. Second, the severity of anti-communist reaction shows that anti-communists were not content merely to defeat enemy forces, they wanted to purge them from the national community. For example, anti-communists persecuted unorthodox political beliefs and associations but also fought other marginalised constituents' efforts to win greater economic and political power. Agrarian and industrial reformers were oppressed along with radicals as reactionary elements strove to destroy the idea of mediation of free market capitalism, while radicals and ethnic minorities were subjected to even fiercer repression. The treatment of these people was contingent on many factors, but few would dispute that they were punished for supposed moral transgressions and made into scapegoats for other people's shattered optimism.

The IWW, for instance, was resented not just because of its power, but also because of its unorthodoxy. Its intractable opposition to the Great War excited fury, but Wobblies' repudiation of conventional morality was also important in provoking

Wobblies rejected dominant notions of social order and ethic of advancing one's social position through hard work. Moreover, they exposed the escalating political and economic problems of the United States by emphatically refusing to accept the American dream. Faced with iconoclasts, the IWW's isolationism and dissociation from society, through methods of persecution of the Wobblies was justified by claims of their

isolation of Wobblies, immigrants and radicals reflected an alienation. While their difference to mainstream America was evident in the paranoid strange appearances, languages and beliefs, it is hard to explain why anti-communists' sense of mistrust was so great. Fear of assault, the most important and persistent political extremism, never dissipated after the outbreak of the war. Fear was both cumulative and absorptive. Immigrants continued to be regarded as untrustworthy, while war made German immigrants, for a time, the paranoid's paramount enemy. Other groups obsessively monitored the movements of "reds" in the war years.¹ With the rise of the Bolsheviks and the paranoid fell prey to new fears.

One of the characteristics of paranoid fear is that it is first expressed as a vague sense of uneasiness from without, before it becomes identified with a myriad of specific fears. The paranoid registers their anxiety and only then search for its cause. Communists and few organisations better demonstrate this than the House Committee. The Committee's official Report begins with the premise that the country is threatened by "various" unnamable forces "seeking to undermine the government ... but also the very structure of American

life. Its enemies, it was certain, were those whose enemies had recently been its friends. Now now dividing America, the Committee. Having articulated its list of many culprits: left-wing radicals, unionists were denounced. Indeed the Committee's sessions of unrest brought about or declared that domestic terrorism did not merely blame the country could not survive outside the country. These were confirmed when it was disturbed it more than the disfranchised residents; it was scripted foreign-language agents such as a ploy to "disrupt" and warily noted its Jewish subsidiaries.⁵

The Committee could not stop. It was an attack on radicals. Conventional "boring from within" by radicals was only the most famous; in this manner.⁶ The radicals were now attempting to be called:

ve Movements Abroad and At

It was that radicalism was supported by Red October, highly esteemed because they were the party of the party."

¹ Connection with anything "German" attracted the League's attention. For example, a woman from Shelbyville County, Tennessee, married to a German who had returned in 1912. Having started for Germany a day before war was declared, she was convinced the League that it was necessary to intercept her mail. O. Plazotta, 3 April 1918 (B1 - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 14, 15, 16). The Red Cross volunteer did not reassure the League of her virtue.

not with the idea of obtaining what is demanded but for the express purpose of failure - a failure that will leave the workman poorer and more embittered, will increase class hatred and make the workmen feel that only by violent revolution can they gain their demands.⁷

Events abroad further convinced the Committee that the substitution of traditional bargaining practices with general strikes was part of a "big destructive program" of internationalists to destroy "present organised society."⁸ Another front activity "absolutely integral and fundamental" to socialists' "triangular" plan of global conquest was pacifism. Rejecting the notion that pacifists "opposed wars between all nations," the Committee argued that they covertly furthered Americans' "class consciousness" to help bring on "relentless class warfare."⁹

The pacifist movement was merely the thin edge of liberal or "pink" treachery. The Committee also found that "various so-called schools of social reform, masquerading under different names" and operated by "various subversive organisations" were training "agitators" to undermine "respect for the institutions of the United States."¹⁰ The most pernicious of these schools was the Rand School of Social Science, an independent reading and instruction centre associated with welfare organisations such as the Neighbourhood Houses of New York. Disloyalty permeated formal educational institutions also. The Committee worried that "revolutionary Socialist ideas" were becoming increasingly prevalent among intellectuals, "university men" and their students. "Every single purely literary review" published in America over the previous two years, it maintained, was socialist in character and "four out of five [university] commencement day orations" in the same period were also "purely Socialistic."¹¹ University discussion fora were spreading socialism, mutating from discussion groups into advocacy and propaganda organisations,¹² while an advertising

⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 17 - 18.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 1113 and 1112. Journals exemplifying this intellectual movement, notably *Nation*, *New Republic* and *Dial* were excoriated by the Committee.

¹² The Committee based its conclusions in this matter on the activities of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society of New York. Since 1905, the Society had steadily planted chapters in a plethora of colleges and universities. It published a monthly magazine, special pamphlets and books, sent representatives on

arrangement between a "self-confessed organ of Bolshevism, I. W. W. ism and revolutionary communism by violence" and *American Teacher*, the official organ of the American Federation of Teachers, signified the invasion of the secondary education sector by Bolsheviks.¹³

The Committee discerned further danger in the clergy. Across the nation, ecclesiastical support for revolution was growing. Pastors were affiliating with "pacifist and radical societies" and some reputedly even described the philosophy of the IWW as the age's most perfect and practical expression of Christianity.¹⁴ The church's malaise seemingly reflected its subversion by internationalists. This view was substantiated by a joint report of the National Catholic War Council and the Social Service Commission of the Episcopal Church on economic restructuring presented to the National Catholic Convention in October 1919. The Committee deduced that the report had been influenced by the Labour Party of Great Britain because that Party strongly advocated economic reform involving extensive centralisation and public ownership.¹⁵ Like notable contemporaries such as the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and later patriots whom it greatly influenced, the Committee also believed that only treachery or, at best, gullibility could account for the desire of some elements of American industry to trade with the Bolsheviks.¹⁶ Those not entirely corrupted by greed had been duped by propaganda "skillfully employed" by Ludwig Martens and others. So successful had Martens been that State and federal

lecture tours, and convened conferences and conventions. Notorious affiliates of the Society had spoken in 120 colleges to 50,000 students, including eighty economics classes. Ibid., pp. 1118 - 20.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 1115 - 6. Two notable Red cloisters were the Union Theological Seminary and St. Stephens College at Annandale, both in New York. St. Stephens College's instructor in economics, Lyford P. Edwards was believed to be a member of the SPUSA and to be giving courses on "the I. W. W., on Syndicalism, Socialism, and Bolshevism." The instructor in Christian Ethics at the UTS was Dr. Harold Ward, a former professor of social science at the Boston School of Theology and Chairman of the ACLU. It was he whom the Committee believed to have made shocking remarks about IWW philosophy.

¹⁵ Ibid. This paper, the Committee stated, had "affected not merely the Socialistically inclined members of the clergy of the various Christian denominations, but also to a great extent the intellectuals of various radical and sentimental groups."

¹⁶ Some of those later patriots included, as previously noted, Walter Steele but also the APL, whose president William Green remarked in the early 1930s that Reds traded with the United States on and for credit only. Once American businesses had been fleeced, the Soviets would promptly switch their economic allegiances to Germany. See Untitled WSL Pamphlet, 1932 (Westchester Security League - MSS).

legislators were being "bombarded" with requests to reopen the lines of communication and commerce.¹⁷

It is apparent then, that the Committee's paranoid fears were boundless. It compulsively ascribed its sense of unease and the nation's problems to whatever enemies it could identify. Further interesting characteristics of its archetypal, paranoid anti-communism need to be emphasised. Its suspicion of African-Americans demonstrates how anti-communism melded with more ancient paranoid fears. Next to labour unions, the Committee regarded the nation's black population as the most vulnerable to communist contamination. While the Committee conceded that African-Americans had "just cause of complaint with the treatment they received" in the United States, it was more concerned that "various revolutionary agencies" were exploiting "such complaint" with "thorough skill." In recent years there had been a "marked increase of radicals ... trying to recruit negro followers ... stimulate race hatred and ... so-called class consciousness in their ranks."¹⁸ Radicals were not alone in tapping the well of black "resentment." A raft of "well-to-do liberals, Socialists and other radicals among whites" were fanning the flames of revolution, supporting African-American "uplift organisations."¹⁹ The Committee was particularly disturbed that African-American activists were increasingly informed by radical theory and evincing pan-Africanism.²⁰ This was a clear sign that the "Pan-Negro movement" was "looking to the consolidation of the Negro race throughout the world" and, moreover, advancing a "broader movement," the "International League of the Darker Races," which sought to unify "the darker races, such as the Japanese, Hindus, etc., with the whites."²¹

The Committee's unease with African-Americans, while similar to its unease with European migrants and radicals, was deeper on account of white America's long struggle with the burden of slavery. The Committee members were entirely

¹⁷ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 645 - 6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1476. The importance of black radicalism to the Committee is attested by its devotion of an entire chapter of its Report to "Propaganda Among Negroes."

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1476 - 1512. The black militancy that the Committee found so objectionable and threatening was voiced in journals such as *Messenger*, edited by Chandler Owen and A. Philip Randolph, who also lectured at the Rand School. Marcus Garvey was also feared and detested by the Committee.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1517 - 9.

accustomed to the idea of living *with* an enemy and guarding the Self against them. For hundreds of years, as David Brion Davis puts it, African-Americans had symbolised "sinful passion instincts" and Southerners were particularly aware of the need to "guard their collective soul from being secretly seized from within and possessed."²² Still regarded by many as inferior, African-Americans terrified white Americans who feared that they might be subjected to a literal or metaphoric slavery, expressed in the horror of miscegenation. This fear endured among anti-communists long after the Lusk Committee gave it expression and later anti-communist leaders continued to anticipate violent insurrection from black America. The Fish Committee claimed to have unearthed evidence of widespread communist recruitment of "American Negroes" and averred that such recruits were transported to Russia for revolutionary education.²³ The United States Legation in Riga informed the Secretary of State in 1932 that the Soviets were producing a film, *Blacks and Whites*, depicting "the class struggle in America, the exploitation of the Negro people through the days of slavery to the present, and the growing recognition of the necessity for solidarity between the Negro and white worker."²⁴ The single-minded quality of Marxist black radicals horrified J. Edgar Hoover too, who commented that they refused to acknowledge the primacy of racial and national identity and could not be induced to indulge in the distraction of anti-Semitism.²⁵

The Lusk Committee's fear of radicalised African-Americans was distinctive also for its relative hysteria. In claiming that the United States had failed to prevent fiendishly "skilled" propagandists infiltrating black communities, the Committee heightened its own sense of powerlessness. This is a consistent element of paranoid fear; anti-communists could not help but convince themselves that they could not defeat the

²² Davis, *Slave Power*, p. 37.

²³ Fish Committee Report, p. 9.

²⁴ Bulletin of Radical Activities (i. e. the inaugural issue of the General Intelligence Bulletin, 1 - 17 January 1920, p.15) (MI - MSS, Reel 16) and Letter from U. S. Legation, Riga, received by MI, 8 July 1932, File 10110-2683 1 (MI - MSS, Reel 23). The film would have sound and English dialog and radicals from across the world were collaborating on the picture.

²⁵ Supplement to General Intelligence Bulletin 53, week ending 4 June 1921, pp. 31 - 2 (MI - MSS, Reel 18). Hoover was particularly shocked by an editorial piece in *Messenger* discussing the Ku Klux Klan, that "entirely [abandoned] the traditional negro point of view as to that organization"; nowhere in the editorial was the very word "negro" mentioned, *Messenger* seemed to regard the Klan "solely" as part of the "joint Northern and Southern capitalistic club held over the working class." Worse, Henry Ford's admonition to the community to note the poisonous, essentially-Jewish character of Bolshevism, went unheeded. Indeed, the paper rather ridiculed Ford, and found his charges "mostly true but highly immaterial."

communist Other, reading foul play into the most mundane or "normal" situations.²⁶ Heightening their sense of Self-impotence, anti-communists fell prey to hysterical fear. The Lusk Committee concluded that the radical black journal *Messenger's* advocacy of the use of physical force for self-defence demonstrated African-American activists had the clear intent to "stimulate mob violence and race hatred." Similarly, the Committee pronounced Marcus Garvey a "spectacular ... violent agitator."²⁷ Such over-reaction was the inevitable result of obsessive rumination on conspiracy and as anti-communism became more entrenched in American life, the dimensions of paranoid fantasy grew.

Charles Carpenter, the president of an oil and beltings distribution company and a subscriber to Fred Marvin's *Daily Data Sheet* voiced one such notable fantasy. Convinced that liberal churches comprised a vital arm of the Comintern, he argued they were exploiting their prestige and special legal status by spreading propaganda. Not being subject, like the commercial sector, to prohibitions against forming combines, churches were forming revolutionary "combinations," so Carpenter called for the restructuring of the administration of religious institutions along commercial, anti-trust lines. He also exhorted America's "intelligent people" to save it from the ecclesiastic-communist axis, suggesting that they had already noted the churches' resort to "the dirtiest of political methods" and were consequently swelling "the ranks of non-church goers," deserting corrupted institutions.²⁸

The tendrils of communism were believed to reach further into the vitals of American community. In 1932, the Prosecuting Attorney of Wayne County, Detroit averred that communists were "playing havoc" with the city's utilities:

fixing gas and electric meters so they do not register in the homes of

²⁶ For example, the Committee interpreted the URW's decision to omit references to its alleged commitment to violent revolution as proof that radicals possessed a freakish ability to second-guess and circumvent prosecution. See *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 862. Similarly, John Trevor believed a conspiratorial clique in the media was planning to force the issue of recognition of the Bolshevik regime before President Wilson and the Congress; apparently it did not occur to him that these authorities might have to consider such an important political issue in the normal course of their duties. See Communique from Director MI, Brigadier-General M. Churchill to Captain John B. Trevor, 27 May 1919 (MI - MSS, Reel 14).

²⁷ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. 1, Part I, pp. 1476 and 1512.

²⁸ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Radicalism in Churches," Vol. I, Serial No. 198, 23 September 1927.

Communists, particularly those unemployed.

Their "expert plumbers" either fixed:

the meters so they [did] not register or [piped] and [wired] around the meters so gas and electricity [was] obtained without passing through the meters.²⁹

Security professionals were in the thrall of similar fantasies, as a 1920 document on "International Movements or 'Isms'" from the Directorate of MI reveals. A product of extreme paranoid suspicion, the memo indicates that the Directorate anticipated attack from several "important movements" including:

Anarchism	Labor
Bolshevism	Pan-Latinism
Islamism	Pan-Orientalism
Jewry	Socialism

Other "important international intrigues" causing concern comprised:

International Jewry	Pan-Latinism
Japanese-Siberian	Bolshevist-German-Islamic
Japanese-Russo-German.	³⁰

Military Intelligence's susceptibility to paranoid fear remained acute. In late 1930, the organisation was panic-stricken by its failure to capture propagators of communism such as the Soviet über-agent Carl Mostavenko. A White Russian "with years of

²⁹ Letter from Prosecuting Attorney, County of Wayne, Detroit, Michigan to Major General George Van Horn Mosely, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army, 10 August 1932, File 10110 - 2685 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

³⁰ Memorandum from Director MI to Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 14 October 1920, File 10110-2048 (MI - MSS, Reel 19). The Lusk Committee articulated a similar fantasy to that of MI, claiming that the Bolsheviks ran a university in Moscow in which "men from every part of the world, belonging to every conceivable nationality, [were] educated in the essentials of Bolshevik propaganda." The Committee believed that as many as sixty "Hindu" and forty Chinese dialects were used at the college. Revolutionaries from Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Korea, Japan and China had established connections with the Third International. The greater ramifications of three particular alliances were most disturbing; the connection of the Soviet to the "Pan-Turkish movement," Indian independence groups and to China. See *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 243 - 4.

terrorist exploits to his record," Mostavenko was thought to be one of eleven members of a "Grand Committee of Decision of the Third International of Moscow," directing the "propaganda and terrorist activities of the G. P. U. throughout the world": like the Ku Klux Klan, which was subconsciously impressed by the titles and regalia of the Catholic Church, MI endowed the Third International and its "Grand Committee of Decision" with similar, cabalistic qualities.³¹ Mostavenko was described as a fearless fanatic possessing superhuman powers of persuasion. He was also degenerate and derived sexual pleasure administering cruelty. A fomenter of chaos and death, his reach was limitless. Military Intelligence believed he had been a close associate of Bela Kun, orchestrated armed clashes between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem and had even "prepared the revolutionary program in India, in large part succeeding in offsetting the passive, civil disobedience program of Mahatma Gandhi." A master of disguise and an "accomplished linguist," he spoke "twenty languages fluently." Moreover, he had a phantom-like capacity to escape justice. When arrested in Palestine, he "successfully converted" his captors "to bolshevism" and "mysteriously" disappeared. Military Intelligence also thought it important to note that Mostavenko's mother had lived in America for several years and used to send him candy in the Soviet Union.³²

Military Intelligence worried that Mostavenko had recently left the Soviet Union, posing as a "German tourist bound for the United States. As the "practical leader in America of the Moscow secret police," he was entrusted by the Politburo to disburse \$1.5 million "for propaganda and sabotage." Since his arrival, he had organised an arson campaign that had devastated timberland and farming ranches in California; MI had "no doubt" that he had perpetrated other outrages elsewhere.³³

To those not afflicted with paranoid fear, such embroidered fantasies are quite ludicrous, yet they were widely subscribed to in American society. Moreover, while fears about fictitious individual communists such as Mostavenko were contained

³¹ Even moderately informed observers of Soviet affairs, which the MI *should* have been, knew that the Comintern exercised no authority over the Russian secret police.

³² Report on 'Mostovenka,' HQ 8th Corps Area Office of Corps Area Commander, filed 15 September 1930, File 10110 - 2617 9 and Letter to Second Assistant Secretary of Labor W. W. Husband, 25(?) October 1930 and letter from W. W. Husband to Colonel F. H. Payne, Assistant Secretary of War, 6 November 1930, File 10110 - 2617 17 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

³³ Ibid.

within particular institutions, other novel fears were popularised by the highest sectors of government and the mainstream press. The Fish Committee, for example, was convinced that communism was the most modern guise of the occult sect known as the Illuminati. Like fear of African-Americans, fear of the Illuminati dated back hundreds of years. The doctrine of Illuminism originated in Bavaria, formulated by Adam Weishaupt, professor of law at the University of Ingolstadt. A "naïve and utopian movement" that aimed to bring social order through increased devotion to reason, this manifestation of "Enlightenment rationalism spiced with an anticlerical animus" was soon crushed by reactionary authorities in its native region. However, it attracted some followers in Masonic lodges and thereby spread across the globe. A monograph published by a prominent Scottish scientist first alerted Americans to Illuminism in 1797. The author of the volume, John Robison, maintained that the Illuminati, "while resolutely anti-Christian, were also heavily infiltrated with Jesuits."³⁴

In the mid-1920s, Fred Marvin seized on this anti-clerical, subterranean clique and transformed it into a "well-knit, well-organized, well-managed and apparently well-financed movement" at the centre of Jewish-Bolshevik-Internationalist conspiracy.³⁵ Claiming that Weishaupt was dominated by his tutor and friend, "an oriental Jew known as Kolmer," Marvin stated that the Illuminati was not merely anti-Catholic but also "anti-civilization and Christianity." Resolving to destroy government, patriotism, property rights, inheritance, religion and family relations, the Illuminati built itself into an "advanced propaganda" organisation through "deception, fraud, intrigue, secrecy and conspiracy." Going underground after its proscription in Bavaria, the Illuminati set about advancing "the world revolutionary movement." The Order's leaders decreed its name could never be used openly again, to preserve the illusion of its destruction. This practice had proved so successful that the world mistakenly took Karl Marx to be the founder of socialism.³⁶ Yet Marx had merely reactivated the doctrines of the Illuminati, which he had discovered in libraries in London. He may have purported to be working for the advancement of the international proletariat, but

³⁴ Hofstadter, *Paranoid Style*, pp. 10 – 11.

³⁵ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 236, 9 November 1927.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

he was a follower of Weishaupt, encouraging the dreams of "honest visionists" and the schemes of "fanatics," flattering:

the vanity of ambitious individuals, by working on unbalanced minds, by playing on such passions as greed of gold or power.³⁷

Marvin's interpretation of the history of radicalism found its way into the report of Congressman John E. Nelson of the Fish Committee, who further adorned the myth of the Illuminati's control of the Comintern. The date of the Illuminati's foundation, 1776, led Nelson to believe that divine will had created American republicanism at the precise same time as Jewish-international-anarchism. The two belief systems were "diametrically antagonistic and mutually exclusive," fated to duel until one party's extermination. The global reach of communism demonstrated how dangerous the Illuminati remained and the United States, the historical, spiritual bulwark of "noble and constructive principles of representative government and individual liberty," had to remain vigilant and fierce in self-defence.³⁸ Nelson, therefore, was seduced not merely by the notion of interlocking directorates of international conspirators, but also by the fantasy of the Self's heroic quest to resist its own annihilation.

Further inventory of anti-communists' fantasies of conspiracy can add little to that already described. It is sufficient to summarise their consistent qualities as elaborate and feverish products of historical and cultural fears, as well as anxiety and fears particular to the paranoid position. The popularity they enjoyed is not easily explained, however, and it cannot be assumed that the dissemination of these fantasies was, in both logistical and psychic terms, a simple task. Fantasies of conspiracy were a device anti-communists used to try to master their internal and external environment and the next section of this thesis will describe the primary processes supporting that device.

³⁷ *Daily Data Sheet*, Vol. I, Serial No. 239, 10 and 12 November 1927.

³⁸ Fish Committee Report, p. 15.

Anti-Communists Justify their Fear

Anti-communists' paranoid fantasies were designed to make the disavowal of communism credible and defensible. Conspiratorial fantasies disavowed the message of communism and its messengers and acolytes. This disavowal was justified by contrasting communism and communists with 100% Americanism and Americans. Communists were portrayed as foolish, perverted creatures whose intentions and nature threatened the future of mankind. Such portrayals formed a veneer for a variety of psychic processes which dominated anti-communists' imagining of communism. Communists were invested with a host of projected attributes, principally their motives, values, abilities and perfidiousness, by anti-communists. Paranoid anti-communists were also obsessed with gathering and citing "facts" that proved the veracity of their projected fantasies. Moreover, they vigorously denied contrary facts and beliefs as well as communists' very humanity. Those anti-communists who found that they could not prove communists' villainy in these ways had recourse to hysterical bouts of Self-justification.

Anti-communists' projected fantasies about communists decried either what communists *did* or what they *were*. Developing the notion that communists spread propaganda, Fred Marvin declared that communists were directly responsible for the introduction of propaganda as a political method into the United States. He explained:

the word "propaganda" is rather new to the American people although not at all new in Socialist circles. It came into general existence during the World War when ... the Central powers had engaged in a tremendous and well financed campaign to change the beliefs of the American people on the question of responsibility for the World War.³⁹

Similarly, Marvin's fear of communist "combinations" underpinned his belief that the ACLU was the "clearing house of [all] Communistic, Socialistic and pacifistic activities." Moreover, this comptroller of domestic revolution survived off the "vast

³⁹ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 227, 28 October 1927.

sums of money" bequeathed it by infamous parlour-Reds, such as Charles Garland⁴⁰ (see Figure 10).

The Fish Committee, anxious about workers' loyalties, made comparable claims about communists' "shop nuclei" undermining "practically all" the nation's manufacturing sectors. Noting communist agitators' unique ability to harness and amplify labourers' resentment and rage, the Committee spoke of one lone "skilled" communist pushing a Brooklyn shoe factory to strike action, "where previously there had been no pronounced difference between employer and employees in reference to work and wages." Communists' freakish capacity to corrupt workers was also in evidence in Passaic, New Bedford and Gastonia, where they persuaded 40,000 workers to take strike action.⁴¹

Anti-communists' projected hostility also led them to imagine that communists were fostering "hatred" of the United States and American traditions, particularly in foreign ethnic communities. The Lusk Committee, as has been noted, was disturbed by African-Americans' "hatred" and "resentment" and the Fish Committee later worried about communist youth camps' promotion of "class hatred" to aliens, the foreign-born, African-Americans, Japanese, Chinese and Jews. In these camps, communists "[warped] the minds of immature children whose parents fled from countries where they were oppressed" and prevented them from ever being able to appreciate the benefits of life in "a land of freedom and of equal opportunity."⁴²


The conviction that communists had succeeded in undermining the foundations of American life in turn induced suspicion about any proposed reform to political or economic practices. Patriots denounced initiatives such as "proportional representation, equal suffrage" and the direct election of federal Senators as Bolshevik front schemes.⁴³ Further, the realisation that communists had made converts in the United States prompted anti-communists to rationalise this misfortune. The attraction

⁴⁰ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Liberalism and Its Work," Vol. I, Serial No. 145, 22 July 1927 and Dilling, *Red Network*, p. 163.

⁴¹ Fish Committee Report, p. 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴³ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 228, 29 October 1927 and "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 239, 12 November 1927.



The Body of ANARCHY lurches forward by using first the leg of SOCIALISM and then the leg of COMMUNISM.

COMMUNISM is supported by the foot named INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE.

SOCIALISM is advanced by the foot called AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION.

The sustaining blood stream of this hideous destroyer is provided by the Garland Fund and other financial aids for radicals.

THE LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY — the diseased Gall Bladder — is the organ developing the unhealthy doctrines that pollute our educational institutions.

ADEPTS, those having guilty knowledge of the purpose of ANARCHY, constitute one arm of the demon.

DUPES, the gullible and unsuspecting victims of "A NEW SOCIAL ORDER," make up the other arm of ANARCHY.

THE PARLOR PINK appears as one face but the GUTTER RED is the true visage of the monster ANARCHY.

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THE PAUL REVERES

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

120 South La Salle Street

CHICAGO

(Figure 10: The conviction that American left-wing organisations were controlled by international socialism was an article of faith among patriots. The Chicago-based Paul Reverses, like Fred Marvin, were certain that the ACLU and the Garland Fund were part of the one international organism.

Source: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Records of National Republic).

of liberal intellectuals to left-wing doctrines was dismissed by the Lusk Committee as sentimental frailty.⁴⁴ The Committee also argued that errant clergy were venal. Aware that they were losing custom, some congregations were prostituting themselves to cash in on fashionable notions. The Committee, therefore, invited the churches to adopt its primitive psychological stance and rejoin the Self: as socialists were sworn enemies of the church and "99 per cent" atheistic, the clergy ought to reciprocate socialists' hostility. Indeed there was "no possible excuse" for them not to do so: those that did not had "already lost their belief in God."⁴⁵ Other anti-communists like Elizabeth Dilling didn't trouble to account for recalcitrants' beliefs. They were singularly focussed on destroying their message. The fight against communism had to be reduced to its simplest level, the contest between right and wrong. It was all very well, she stated, to:

believe in the altruism and personal sincerity of the intellectual radical leader, [or] admire his learning or personal charm, just as we believe in the sincere religious devotion of the Hindu who, according to his religion, offers his baby girls for vile sex degradation and physical injury, jabs nails into himself, and offers bloody human sacrifices to his god "Kali," but we need not follow either.⁴⁶

The most favoured means of dismissing contrariness in wayward Americans was to suggest that such people would support anti-communism, if they had access to the same "knowledge" and information as anti-communists. The Lusk Committee, for example, chastised "the more conservative elements" of the State for opposing its education reforms. Such opposition arose on account of these elements' "lack of understanding of the bill and the necessity for its enactment."⁴⁷ Harry Jung regularly resorted to this argument. Urging trade partners to acknowledge the dangers of communism in 1927, Jung warned:

Communist doctrines have been implanted in schools, and colleges, tending to break down the morale of our youth. This is done so insidiously as to have an overwhelming appeal for many of our youthful idealists and is being aided and

⁴⁴ See footnote 15.

⁴⁵ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. 1, Part I, p. 1117.

⁴⁶ Dilling, *Red Network*, p. 257.

abetted by the liberal teachers, professors and the clergy. No matter what way we turn, the imprint of the hand of Moscow is in evidence. Those unacquainted with the intricacies of this movement, fail to recognize these signs and, in their lack of accurate knowledge, scoff at their very existence.⁴⁸

James Horn went further, claiming that those who rejected anti-communists' advice lacked "knowledge in the history of human progress and human nature." For Horn, this lack of knowledge was the source of "all destructive thoughts." The plight of Russia demonstrated the ultimate price of such folly, Horn commenting that it was only in a nation where men:

did not know the simple truth that nations must develop according to nature's laws could government be controlled by one Czar such as Nicholas, or by many Czars such as the Council of People's Commissars. The remedy for Russia against the Czar was a little knowledge. That knowledge gave the Russians many Czars for one. The remedy for Sovietism is more and more knowledge, and the Russians are rapidly acquiring that knowledge.⁴⁹

Such advice was reserved only for native American citizens. The communistic impulses of ethnic minorities and radicals in the United States was attributed to quite different and more sinister causes. Their predilection for chaos and terror was the product not of judgment but ineradicable, inherent perversity. This perversity was found to be evident in radicals' sexual behaviour; charges of sexual depravity stuck fast to those who transacted business in an unconventional manner and were instrumental in justifying persecution. Clayton Townley and Charles Garland, for example, were attacked as propagators of free love.⁵⁰ Patriots denounced Garland's American Fund for Public Service as a "Free Love Fund," alleging that he had established a "free love farm" to pursue "his individual ideas of liberalism ... with sixteen women companions."⁵¹

⁴⁷ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 17 - 18.

⁴⁸ Harry A. Jung, "Communism in American Industry," from unknown journal titled *INDAC* October 1927 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlet Boxes 2 and 8) and (for quote) Circular Letter by Jung to the members of the NCPIA, 13 September 1927 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 8).

⁴⁹ Horn, *Anarchy*.

⁵⁰ Fite and Peterson, *Opponents of War*, p. 65.

⁵¹ Dilling, *Red Network*, p. 163 and *Daily Data Sheet*, "Liberalism and Its Work," Vol. I Serial No.

Communists' depravity was made further apparent by their utter lack of principle. Isaac Marcossou regarded communists as congenital cynics and opportunists who respected no tie or loyalty. Lev Kamenev's betrayal of his brother-in-law, Trotsky to Stalin and Zinoviev proved that "a little thing like family connections [cut] no ice in Bolshevik politics."⁵² Paradoxically, however, anti-communists reserved particular contempt for radical aliens who failed to honour the (resented) customs of their heritage, thereby dishonouring their ethnic origins and beliefs as well as the laws and morals of the United States. The Fish Committee laid great stress on the fact that the founders of communism were "apostate Jews"; the fathers of Bolshevism were not simply accursed Jews, they were not even *good* Jews. This fact was held against not only Marx and Engels, but also the Jews of the Bolshevik leadership, and confirmed the congenital fanaticism and intractability of all communists.⁵³

Although Bolsheviks claimed to be students of dialectical materialism, anti-communists often dismissed their intellectual capacities, preferring to regard them as cabalistic. Jacob Spolansky popularised this notion in a series of articles in the *Chicago Daily News* describing communists' exotic ritual dances, performed under cover of darkness in secluded forests. A typical story, published on 17 October 1924, spoke of:

"REDS" IN THE WOODS WORK DAY AND NIGHT TO END DISSENSION -
Dramatic Scenes in the Chicago Forest Preserve at River Forest as Communists in
Secret Convention Iron Out Differences - Quarrels, Fist Fights and Weird
Ceremonies Witnessed by Government Agents Hidden in the Leaves - Song
Signalizes Reconciliation.

Spolansky's revelations confirmed important suppositions about communists, demonstrating that even among their own, they were compulsively oppositional, querulous and harboured grudges. During secret conferences they argued "over everything ... the selection of committees ... the name to be adopted for the party." Dispute reigned, "each point" being "sufficient cause for eight or ten speeches and at

145, 22 July 1927.

⁵² *Saturday Evening Post*, "After Lenine - What? Trotzky," p. 152.

⁵³ Fish Committee Report, p. 15.

least one violent quarrel, followed by general wrangling." Then, when:

night fell the delegates would seat themselves in a crescent about a small hillock which served as a dais, and from this slight elevation, one after another, the delegates addressed the convention ... then followed the weird ceremony ... they sang like a group of school children learning a hymn - softly and earnestly, "Arise thou oppressed workers, arise!" - the official song of the international. Then solemnly they marched through the darkness toward the labor group, still singing, the song growing in volume as they progressed - to inspire the others to decide for unity. As they approached they were met with cheers from the majority of the labor group. These, like little children, took hands and danced about the small circle of "obstinates" who still continued their arguments hotly, their voices rising to a shout in order to be heard.⁵⁴

It was widely contended that biological causes lay at the root of such behaviour; Blair Coan wrote of Bolshevism as "a mental disorder."⁵⁵ It was, moreover, regarded as an essentially Jewish phenomenon. This "fact" could always be recalled when the behaviour of communists confounded explanation. Some, such as Herbert Hoover, accounted for Jews' connection with Bolshevism philosophically. Jews, he surmised, had suffered "tyranny, repression and race injustices." In addition, the "high intellectuality of the race [and] deep resentment at injustice" prompted Jews to "attempt to better the condition of their people." Yet life experience had "embittered" their "souls" and they had "loosened the plague of social arson on the entire world."⁵⁶ Although Hoover maintained that Jews could not be blamed for creating Bolshevism, he was forced, ultimately, to acknowledge them as the source of the bacilli, "social arson." Other anti-communists were not so careful to distinguish Bolshevism's cause from its effects and even Hoover counseled against using American troops to stem the tide of socialism in central Europe, because he doubted whether soldiers, in that environment, "could resist infection with Bolshevik ideas."⁵⁷ It was an unquestioned truth in anti-communist milieu that Bolshevism had super-ideological capacities,

⁵⁴ *Chicago Daily News*, 17 October 1924 (Felt - MSS, Clippings Box 2).

⁵⁵ Coan, *Red Web*, p. 231.

⁵⁶ *Preliminary Draft on Bolshevism*, 25 April 1919. Hoover described Bolshevism, in these papers, as "the penalty that the Gentile is paying for his injustice of the past."

⁵⁷ *Memorandum to President Wilson*, 28 March 1919.

derived from its tainted racial source; it could disfigure even the soundest minds. Anti-communism's marriage with anti-Semitism, therefore, contributed greatly to anti-communists' fear of irresistible corruption.

While knowledge of communists' intrinsic racial and character defects was important to anti-communists, political and psychological imperatives made them search for other "proofs" to substantiate their fears. To combat devilishly capable propagandists and saboteurs, anti-communists found hard data and "facts" invaluable in their crusade to save those members of the Self willing to be saved. Consequently, they searched exhaustively for information about the communist Other and never lost an opportunity to publicise such information when found. The Fish Committee, for example, was at pains to stress that approximately seventy percent of communists in America were "aliens and [knew] but little of the history of the government of the United States, and [spoke] English with a foreign accent, if at all." This "fact" helped make the Committee's further claims of communism's inherent foreignness "self evident."⁵⁸ Fred Marvin, similarly, maintained that interlocking communist organisations were responsible for "ninety percent" of radicalism in the United States.⁵⁹

Such estimates were rarely sourced to any form of empirical material and typically were drastically inflated, plucked by a patriot or security functionary to enhance their claims. Military Intelligence in Minneapolis in 1926 stated that three million individuals in the United States were "actively and avowedly radical" and "connected with [communist] organizations and in sympathy with such," a figure that did not include "Socialists or parlor Bolsheviks." The agency added that the split of the communist movement into "Legal" and "Illegal" parties (the Workers Party of America (WPA) and the CPUSA, respectively) made accurate estimation of communist numbers "almost impossible," for the activities of the "underground element" were "guarded with the greatest caution," withheld even from "the oldest Communists." This suggestion that the radical movement boasted three million open followers was absurd. Even at the height of its electoral popularity in 1916, the

⁵⁸ Fish Committee Report, p. 8.

⁵⁹ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Liberalism and Its Work," Vol. I Serial No's. 141 and 142, 18 and 19 July 1927 respectively.

SPUSA's presidential candidate, Eugene Debs only managed to poll a million votes. Even the author of the report's confidence in these figures was limited; he was prepared to vouch only that they were "based upon facts" which were "nearly correct."⁶⁰ The Fish Committee held the Bolshevik threat to be quite as grave as Minneapolis MI. Yet, after gathering evidence for six months, the Committee could conclude only that between fifty thousand and two million communists lived in the United States.⁶¹ The Committee's perception of strike activity was similarly distorted by its refusal to analyse the underlying conditions of particular strikes. Instead it merely aggregated the number of strikes in a given period as "proof" of communists' corruption of labour organisations.⁶²

Anti-communists' obsession with facts and details derived from greater needs than propaganda and self-assurance. The association of communism with sexual license was an act of voyeurism. As Hofstadter notes, whereas anti-Catholicism was "the pornography of the Puritan," anti-communists:

developed an immense lore about libertine priests, the confessional as an opportunity for seduction, licentious convents and monasteries and the like.⁶³

The wealth of "information" about communists was also made possible and demanded by expanding mass media; anti-communists had a greater forum for their invective than their paranoid predecessors and a larger audience.⁶⁴ In addition, their "passion for factual evidence [was] not, as in most intellectual exchanges," designed to put "the paranoid spokesman into effective two-way communication with the world ... least of all those who [doubted] his views." Anti-communists had "little real hope that [their] evidence [would] convince a hostile world." The effort of amassing it was "a defensive act [shutting] off [their] receptive apparatus and [protecting them] from

⁶⁰ MI Report from Minneapolis, 9 March 1926, p. 2, File 10110-2564 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

⁶¹ Fish Committee Report, p. 5. The Committee was unable, it seems, to moot a more precise figure.

⁶² Ibid., p. 8.

⁶³ Hofstadter, *Paranoid Style*, pp. 21 - 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 24. Hofstadter notes that "the villains of the modern right are much more vivid than those of their paranoid predecessors, much better known to the public; the contemporary literature of the paranoid style is by the same token richer and more circumstantial in personal description and personal invective. For the vaguely delineated villains of the anti-Masons, for the obscure and disguised Jesuit agents, the little-known papal delegates of the anti-Catholics, for the shadowy international bankers of the monetary conspiracies."

having to attend to disturbing considerations that did not fortify [their] ideas." Paranoid anti-communists were not "receivers," they were "transmitters."⁶⁵

Interestingly, anti-communists were particularly fond of amassing such evidence from communists themselves. Walter Steele, for example, quoted Moscow Communist Party boss Molotov extensively to support his contention that the Soviets were deliberately destroying the global economy.⁶⁶ Similarly, the Fish Committee concluded that the CPUSA was a lynchpin in communists' scheme for global conquest because Stalin had encouraged an American delegation to the Comintern to further "Bolshevise" their party. The Committee also accepted, without demur, the State Planning Commission of the USSR's claim that production targets of the first Five Year Plan had been achieved by the end of the Plan's fourth year.⁶⁷ The WSL explained its parasitic dependence on Red rhetoric thus:

since it is vital to know the nature of the enemy's attack, this phase of our effort has increased until it is almost the largest part of our current program, so important has it become ... to know the "pro" side of the story as well as the "anti" side.⁶⁸

In this context it is worth noting the "special authority accorded" those renegade communists who returned to the fold of the Self and whose pronouncements were so valued by anti-communists. This authority, Hofstadter suggests "derives from the obsession with secrecy so characteristic" of paranoid political movements. Ex-communists having "been in the secret world of the enemy," could bring "final verification of suspicions which might otherwise have been doubted by a skeptical world." Moreover, a "deeper eschatological significance [was] attached to the person of the renegade." In the:

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

⁶⁶ Essay titled "An Analysis of Communism," by Walter Steele, written March 1931 (National Republic - MSS, Box 72, Folder 3). Steele claimed that the Molotov speech he based his article on was taken from official records of the proceedings of the 1929 Fifteenth Congress of the CPUSSR.

⁶⁷ Fish Committee Report, pp. 4 and 11.

⁶⁸ Single, untitled sheet c. 1930 (Westchester Security League - MSS, Box 1, Folder titled "WSL Organisation").

Spiritual wrestling match between good and evil which is the paranoid's archetypal model of the world struggle, the renegade is living proof that all the conversions are not made by the wrong side. He brings with him the promise of redemption and victory.⁶⁹

While this observation is singularly relevant to the critique of anti-communism after the Second World War, when far more ex-communists were more visible in the anti-communist milieu, it remains important in accounting for the efforts of inter-war anti-communists such as James Horn to pass themselves off as former communists.

Anti-communists, however, saw themselves as receivers, not transmitters. This prompted the denial of contrary facts and beliefs or alternative explanations. The Lusk Committee, for example, shirked the tasks of checking abuses of power and investigating the need for economic reform, instead channeling its insecurity exclusively into divisive activity. Although the Committee's Report ran to over four thousand pages, criticism and analysis of systemic problems in American society was limited to a mere two paragraphs of a General Introduction.⁷⁰ An association of expatriate Russian businessmen, the Russian Economic League, similarly struggled to divorce capitalism from its relationship to socialist revolution. While attempting to account for the success of Bolshevism in its homeland, the League could not help but concede that "the causes of sympathies for Bolshevism" were rooted "in the great mistakes and even crimes of the bourgeois order of things." Nonetheless, it maintained that these "great mistakes" and "crimes" in "the bourgeois order of things" were not "connected with the nature of it."⁷¹ Bureau of Investigation agents also took refuge in denial. One agent observing eight thousand "radical labor agitators" at an unemployment rally wanted to demonstrate that the meeting had been called on false pretences. He therefore suggested that the only way to discern the real purpose of the "exercise" was to "disregard" the entire question of "labor conditions." This made it

⁶⁹ Hofstadter, *Paranoid Style*, p. 35.

⁷⁰ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 9 - 10. Considered the problem of inflation, the Committee noted the contributory importance of profiteering and "improper and useless handling of manufactured products and raw materials in the course of their distribution," but found it was simply "unable" to investigate these matters. Instead, the Committee expressed "regret" that no proper inquiry into living standards had occurred and "emphatically" criticised property owners and commercial operators reaping "inordinate gain" from an atmosphere of general disquiet.

⁷¹ Pamphlet of the Russian Economic League (Egbert - MSS, Box 1).

possible to see that the rally was really designed to gather together "a large number of people to discuss labor conditions generally and more particularly socialism."⁷²

Farcical trials of radicals for breaches of criminal syndicalist and wartime statutes represented a more extreme form of anti-communists' denial of the problems of the Self. While government officials contemptuously dismissed civil libertarians' concerns about breaches of justice in investigations and court proceedings, alleged political miscreants were hauled before judicial authorities to face certain punishment. The purpose of trying such reprobates, as William Preston remarks, was to manufacture "a sense of public reassurance." Like "old-fashioned morality plays these dramas underlined ... acceptable values and consigned offenders to limbo," satisfying the clamor for retribution in "colorful, well-publicised surroundings." According to a DJ agent, there was no possibility that trials of Wobblies might produce miscarriage of justice; the trials were simply not "an instance in which there [was] any danger of doing injustice to innocent citizens."⁷³ Another important motivation for these acts of Self-persuasion was the attraction of obtaining moral as well as legal sanction for repression. These show trials served precisely the same function as those convened in the Soviet Union, to extract the confession of the damned. Admission of culpability strengthened anti-communists' political position, and reassured those who examined their feelings. This was why officials pardoned and released only those political prisoners who recanted their beliefs after the Red Scare.

While show trials were a ruthless and cynical form of repression, they nonetheless required a degree of orchestration and emotional control that was quite beyond many hysterical anti-communists. Their need to find conspiracy was so great it destroyed their critical faculties, as they denied the lack of evidence for intrigue. According to a DJ agent, there was no possibility that trials of Wobblies might produce miscarriage of justice; the trials were simply not "an instance in which there [was] any danger of doing injustice to innocent citizens." The conspiratorial "fixed mental attitude" of BI agents often made them incompetent. Louis Post remarked that during their investigation of the mysterious bombings of 1919, Bureau agents "predetermined to

⁷² Report of W. W. Grimes regarding Samuel Beardsley and Robert Fechner, New Haven, Connecticut, 17 February 1919 (BI OG - MSS, OG 363159).

⁷³ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, pp. 141 - 2.

seek a particular origin" and ignored evidence and suspects that did not "[promise] to lead back to an anarchistic conspiracy."⁷⁴ In the New Year raids of 1920, for example, the Bureau claimed to have discovered four bombs in communists' possession, but a Senate Sub-Committee investigation in 1921 established that the Bureau had merely discovered iron balls; the Bureau quickly "lost" these balls before the Sub-Committee could examine them. Bureau operatives' ineptitude and ideological fanaticism also embroiled the agency in pointless molesting endeavours. Firearms the Bureau allegedly confiscated from communists during the New Year raids were taken from the property department of an amateur theatrical troupe.⁷⁵ The Chicago branch of the Bureau closed down a Russian school that offered technical training in applied mathematics, mechanical drawing and auto design. Teachers and students' books and papers were confiscated while they were arrested; their algebraic formulas were considered sinister.⁷⁶

Other anti-communists dispensed with manipulating inconclusive information to justify their endeavours, instead rationalising that the connection between ethnic communities, intellectuals and radical conspiracy was so obvious as to make redundant the collection of evidence. John Trevor articulated this belief stridently in a report on Indian radicalism and its relationship with international communism, remarking:

It cannot be proved [sic] but it is a moral certainty [that] money was given to the Hindus in Mexico by agents of ... Albert DeSilver, director, National Civil Liberties Bureau, W. E. B. DuBois, negro, director of the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ... Frederic C. Howe, too well known now to need comment [and] Frank P. Walsh, American spokesman for the Irish cause at the Peace conference in Paris.⁷⁷

In claiming that evidence of conspiracy was expedient to its verification, Trevor merely expressed one manifestation of paranoid anti-communists' incapacity for self-

⁷⁴ Post, *Deportations Delirium*, pp. 44 - 5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 93 - 5. With the exception of the drama society's "firearms," the Bureau seized a total of four guns from the three thousand "dangerous radicals" it arrested.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 127 - 8.

⁷⁷ *Historical Review of Radicalism*, p. 10.

reflection. Like other forms of denial it reflected an overwhelming need to project anxiety. Anxiety sometimes arose on account of a dimly-acknowledged sense of personal complicity in the commission of civil rights outrages. Patriots knew they had done "radicals" great harm and concluded that they were at risk of vengeful acts, including assassination. Driven by such feelings, the Prosecuting Attorney of Wayne County in Detroit wrote the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army, warning that the lives of prominent industrialists Henry Ford and Alfred Sloan were imperiled, as were those of legal officers who escaped indictment after killing four communists at the Dearborn plant in March 1932. Jacob Spolansky's regular media exposés had blown his cover as a secret agent and the Attorney advised that he too had been marked for death, along with Congressman Martin Dies, Hamilton Fish, Jr., J. P. Morgan and General Douglas MacArthur.⁷⁸

Besides projecting feelings associated with the repression of radicals, anti-communists also projected their fundamental incapacity to trust others onto "the people," whose reliability and judgment they questioned. The Lusk Committee believed that the average labourer was easily persuaded to lay down his tools, abandon his responsibilities and risk the future on the wager of revolution. The Committee's misgivings about the effects of radical propaganda on workers led it to conclude that workers' "moral responsibility" had indeed been destroyed by that propaganda.⁷⁹ Ole Hanson also despaired of the "marked detrimental effect ... bolshevism, I.W.W.'ism, One Big Unionism, etc." had on "the people." Bolshevism, Hanson averred, "made revolutionist's [sic] of loyal men and women ... destroyed love of country in the hearts and minds of thousands [and] made many efficient, contented, and well-paid workers inefficient, complaining fault-finders."⁸⁰ Convinced that workers were "striving to find some way of having and enjoying without working

⁷⁸ Letter from Prosecuting Attorney, County of Wayne, Detroit, Michigan to Major General George Van Horn Mosely (M1 - MSS, Reel 22). Dies was the proponent of a new immigration bill forcing the deportation of radicals without proper residency papers and went on to win great fame with patriots as a leading anti-communist.

⁷⁹ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. 1, Part I, pp. 9 - 10. Under the influence of socialists, the Committee claimed, working men and women were rejecting "the motto 'a fair day's pay for a fair day's work' ... [striking] for higher and higher wages, shorter and shorter hours and [slowing] up at the same time the working pace, ignoring the quality of work they [turned] out and in every way possible lowering production."

⁸⁰ Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, pp. 287 - 8. Hanson also claimed Bolshevism had "impregnated the minds of a great number of workers of our country with its doctrines of sabotage" and "taught men to loaf on the job and defraud not only their employer, but civilization and

and producing," Hanson attributed this moral failure to:

all ism philosophy, where work [was] looked upon as an evil.⁸¹

Anti-communists' desperate need for psychological and social structure was similarly expressed in the belief that communist cells were rigidly hierarchical. This need prompted Fred Marvin to conceive of the communist Illuminati as being split into groups of "dupes" and "adepts," or "real leaders," who controlled the movement, manipulating recruits through every chicanery, facilitating the construction of an organisation where inducts with completely antithetical views stood side by side (unconsciously) fighting for their leaders' goals.⁸² Military Intelligence similarly argued that the activities of the "illegal" underground wing of the communist movement, the CPUSA, were "guarded with the greatest caution" and withheld even from "the oldest communists" of the "legal" wing, the WPA.⁸³

A related projected perception of anti-communists saw them translate their limitless insecurity into misanthropy and cynicism. Many maintained that avarice, sloth and sensualism were the primary impulses of those outside the Self. Ole Hanson regarded socialism as an expression of the universal desire for an easy ride. Socialists' conceptions of paradise were moulded only superficially by cultural influences. The "Esquimaux" socialist who dreamt of "a place of warmth with plenty of whale oil to drink," the American "Indian" socialist who contemplated "happy hunting grounds" and the "Mohammedan" socialists who envisioned debauchery among "wonderful houris [sic] and thousands of slaves" all agreed that nirvana was a place "where there [was] but little to do and an eternity to do it in."⁸⁴ Fred Marvin agreed that venality was the *raison d'être* for communism and, projecting his disbelief in altruistic idealism, he stated that communists foolishly overlooked "the all important question of human traits ... greed, envy, avarice, malice, lust, etc." Unwittingly portraying his

themselves."

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 289 - 92. The proofs of Hanson's contention included evidence that Lumber camps were producing barely sixty per cent as much as they had several years before, "under very much poorer working conditions."

⁸² *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 236, 9 November 1927. Communists had managed, Marvin added, to enlist both the "religiously inclined" and atheists, as well as "pronounced royalists" and revolutionaries.

⁸³ Report from Minneapolis, 9 March 26, p 2, File 10110-2564 (M1 - MSS, Reel 23).

⁸⁴ Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, pp. 101 - 9.

own psychic association of egalitarianism with tyranny, Marvin's imagined that a communist world would be a nightmarish place, devoid of benign others, in which the human race would be divided into "two classes ... the working class and the capitalist class." Although the former class would comprise only "those who [laboured and] spent the results of their efforts as they went along ... accumulating nothing," communists would assist them at the expense of "those who [had] worked, showed thrift and skill, saved some of their earnings ... carefully invested [them] and so risen financially above those in the first named class." Communist success would depend on propaganda exploiting vulnerable people's "outstanding traits," readily furnishing:

those who have not been successful in life with suggestions that the reason they are not successful is because of our form of government, some of our institutions, the so-called capitalist class, or something of that character. The individual who has not been successful, who feels he is not getting out of life all that is due him, and who is not going to accept a suggestion that his troubles lie with himself, [will] readily accept these false suggestions on the part of the trained Socialist propagandist.⁸⁵

Arguably, anti-communists' pessimistic views, while in part the product of shared internal struggles, were also sharpened by prevalent Social Darwinist beliefs. The impact of the Great War and the rise of communism ushered the final collapse of belief in a "changeless Newtonian universe" and increasing acceptance of notions of competition in nature and civilisation. The perception that "man struggled in [the] universe [with] other animals," having "his life determined ... by forces over which he had little control" heightened paranoid anti-communists' sense of powerlessness and sharpened the battle between rival systems of belief and nations.⁸⁶ While intellectuals were more likely than patriots to take a "deterministic and relativistic view of man and the Godless universe,"⁸⁷ patriots nonetheless unconsciously detected the absence of a "National Father" or "God" ready and able to "guarantee" the socio-

⁸⁵ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. I, Serial No. 277, 28 October 1927.

⁸⁶ Gilman M. Ostrander, "The Revolution in Morals," in Hoff Wilson (ed.), *The Twenties*, p. 130.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

economic order with which they identified; this was the function anti-communist kinship groups were formed to perform.⁸⁸

Fundamentally, anti-communists' denial and projected anxiety, whatever its form, pushed them toward the splitting of American society or the Self. The demarcation between the Self and its Others represented the crudest type of denial, where anti-communists measured American society against that of its competitors on a metaphoric scorecard. Just as they demonised individual communists, anti-communists denounced the ideal of communism and its practical results. This necessitated exaggerating the virtues of the Self, as well as its uniformity. Compelled to seek "security and comfort in a homogeneous world" that could not possibly be created, anti-communists convinced themselves that national salvation, paradoxically, required a revolution of an authoritarian, anti-democratic character; those who could not trust democracy believed they could trust government of, by and for themselves.

⁸⁸ Hage, *White Nation*, p. 217.

Splitting the Self and the Other and Rejecting Democracy

The vessel carrying paranoid anti-communists' hopes for security, prosperity and power, the United States, was regarded as a unique nation deserving not only loyalty but also reverence. Indeed, anti-communists thought the protection of the United States the paramount task of *all* civilised peoples. Portraying the nation as near-perfect, they argued that the United States required the most stringent guardianship from its citizens who were to help expel foreign notions and peoples.

Super-patriots habitually spoke of the United States as, in the words of Elizabeth Dilling, "the miracle of modern times." The United States' capitalist economy and system of government had made it "the greatest success in history" and "the envy of every nation on earth." Anti-communists maintained that America alone provided its citizens with unprecedented prosperity and equity. Its citizens wanted for nothing and the strength of their civic feeling was so strong as to guarantee the absence of continued misfortune.⁸⁹ The "republican form of government in the United States" was even spoken of as the predestined result of the "slow process of civilization," and as "a plan of human association ... far greater and much better than any heretofore devised and practised." American conditions uniquely "encouraged maximum initiative and maximum output" and rewarded the "industrious in proportion to skill and application." Moreover, American life was founded on the two most important principles underpinning "progress and civilization," namely increased production levels per individual and increased incentive per individual.⁹⁰

Such idealisation of the United States helped anti-communists conceive of the nation as an intrinsically whole and pure object. This justified their belief that the American economic system was a complete entity that had to purge itself of unwanted foreign baggage so that it could continue to grow and triumph. The Fish Committee was one authority influenced by this reasoning, which encouraged it to declare that the disproportionate number of the "foreign-born" in the CPUSA proved that the Party and communism itself were not really a part of America.⁹¹ Ten years earlier, the Lusk

⁸⁹ Dilling, *Red Network*, pp. 94 and 14. Dilling maintained that "the spirit of Christian (not atheist) mercy, deeply ingrained in the American people," ensured that no American "who [asked] for aid" would starve.

⁹⁰ Horn, *Anarchy*.

⁹¹ Fish Committee Report, p. 4. The Committee also maintained that the CPUSA had "but little contact

Committee similarly removed unwanted "agitators" from the metaphoric boundaries of the nation, categorising organisations supportive of major reform as "socialist labor parties of quasi-political character."⁹² This practice of delineating the structure of the United States and its legitimate constituent elements was widespread in the anti-communist milieu; it was an essential step in the process of justifying anti-democratic, authoritarian behaviour. Once they had separated the United States from their communist Other, anti-communists compared the qualities of American and communist societies to justify their absolute division. They extolled the virtues of American conditions and policies while demonstrating the miserable and brutish realities of communism.

The self-interested nature of this process of classification made anti-communists' attacks on the injustice and horror of life in Russia transparent and crude. Often they condemned unorthodox or contrary ideas, rather than demonstrably harmful or inequitable practices. This tendency was manifested by Elizabeth Dilling who interpreted Soviet taxation, particularly the use of income tax to help fund Workers' Clubs, public housing and cooperative stores, as an inexcusable imposition and fetter on individual rights.⁹³ Isaac Marcossion shared Dilling's affront and illustrated the collapse of Russian life by describing the folly of inappropriately reversing class and natural order. Marcossion's readers were directed to reflect on the calamities suffered by the former aristocracy and bourgeoisie, who alone received his sympathy. They learned that merchants, Russia's entrepreneurs, were being destroyed by the Bolsheviks because they threatened the communist basis of the economy. Indeed, in Russia all private trade was being crushed. In the cities, the public was forced to use inefficient, government-run cooperative stores while private shopkeepers were subjected to punitive taxes and their children threatened with expulsion from school. Rural properties, meanwhile, were being redistributed to benefit the "usually

or influence with the great masses of the workers in American industries," which further confirmed its communism's separateness.

⁹² *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 13. The Committee maintained that the great majority of American workers, in contrast with their European brethren, practiced "political non-intervention" and trusted in the benefits of republicanism. The policies and conduct of the staunchly anti-socialist AFL represented this phenomenon.

⁹³ Dilling, *Red Network*, pp. 12 - 13. Dilling also ascribed other horrific communal practises, including the conversion of "suburban homes formerly owned by well-to-do families" into Workers' Clubs, to communist-engendered social decay. Betraying her class prejudices, Dilling complains that Workers' Clubs were filled with "workers in undershirts [sitting] around ... hammering grand pianos."

shiftless" rural proletariat, the masses of peasants on whom the Bolsheviks relied for support, at the expense of those farmers who had brought their farms "to a high state of efficiency." These policies were creating a "rural proletariat" that illegally hoarded its produce, enriching itself at the expense of the starving, urban middle class: disgracefully, "old paintings, works of art, beautiful furniture, and even jewels" were now hanging "in the houses of the peasants."⁹⁴

Like his fellow anti-communists, Marcossou couldn't contain his hatred for the communist notion of equality. Soviet equality, he spluttered, covered "a multitude of sins and likewise an immense amount of dirt and smell." The rise of Bolshevism, he maintained, brought about not merely the abolition of:

royalty, aristocracy and a few other trifles like property rights. It set up an astounding and equally devastating human level, which is just another name for mediocrity.⁹⁵

Such snobbery was common among anti-communists and formed a smokescreen for their fear of Self disintegration. Their fragile concept of Self necessitated differentiation from "inferior" peoples. The Fish Committee, like Marcossou, expressed this horror of equality, denouncing American communists' "open advocacy" of "complete social and racial equality between the Whites and Negroes even to the extent of intermarriage." The Committee even refused to accept that anybody could genuinely believe in equality and projected this prejudice onto communists, whom it believed were cynically using the doctrine of equality as a recruiting ploy.⁹⁶ Marcossou himself dismissed the idea of equality by mocking communists' beliefs and the social conditions those beliefs produced. Moreover, he concluded that if Russians could tolerate life under a communist government then that was all they deserved. Only those "survivors of the aristocratic families and the members of the intelligentsia, whose plight [was] tragic beyond words," escaped his

⁹⁴ *Saturday Evening Post*, "After Lenin - What? The War on Capital," pp. 140 and 8 (quotes).

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁹⁶ Fish Committee Report, p. 9. The Committee's contention was proven by American communists' construction of "a Negro work department" and recruitment of "a national Negro organizer," entrusted with the task of engendering in "Negro workers ... class consciousness ... which [tended] to develop race feeling with the view of utilizing racial antagonism." Through this ingenious scheme "the Negroes [were] made to believe that the Communists [practiced] complete racial and social equality."

censure.⁹⁷

Marcosson's separation of Russian from American life depended on empathic impotence and tolerance of double standards. While he was anxious to condemn the Bolsheviks' dictatorial ways, he was also determined to deprive the Russian masses of any measure of sympathy, because he needed to castigate them for "choosing" the wrong path, and repudiating partnership with the United States. In effect, the vulnerable and weak in Russia, as in the United States, bore the brunt of his fear, frustration and fury. Marcosson's position, in this respect, was entirely representative of the anti-communist milieu and as the crusade of anti-communism aged, its proponents went on to divorce not only communists but even the entire Russian people from the boundaries of humanity. An example of such splitting appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1930, in a story entitled "The Red Flag in the Workers' Paradise," by F. Britten Austen. The piece represents a compendium of anti-communists' projected fears and a culmination of the splitting process and for these reasons, I will examine it in detail.

Austen depicted the revolution as corrupt and immoral, deriving from the ambition of debased, misguided, working class activists. His main protagonist, a Muscovite factory worker Ivan Ivanovitch Kozlov, greets the revolt with mindless fervour. Rushing home to share the news with his young family, Kozlov rejoices that Russia now "belonged" to the working class, "their class alone, reigning with limitless power as the Czars had ruled." Quickly brainwashing his daughter and son, he teaches them to say:

Long live Lenin! Down with the *bourjoui*! All power to the proletariat!⁹⁸

The manner in which Ivan treats his children reveals much about the psychology of revolutionaries. Selfish, degenerate and foolish, they destroy their inheritance. Sure

⁹⁷ *Saturday Evening Post*, "After Lenin - What? The War on Capital," pp. 143 - 5. Marcosson solicited the pathos of his audience by relating stories of aristocratic landholders reduced to penury. He also illustrated the murderous influence of the secret police with a tale of a poor, beautiful, young girl, born to a "former wealthy merchant" who was executed by the Bolsheviks, after being forced by the GPU to spy on a foreign embassy, where she gave piano recitals.

enough, Ivan's Russia quickly falls apart. Transport ceases to function, shops are looted and barred up and piles of dead men litter the streets. The Kozlovs live in "squalid" conditions and Ivan believes this justifies thieving, so he brings home jewelry from "a fine *bourjoui* house." His wife, Maria Petrovna Kozlova, is horrified. Maria embodies the old Russia, pious, honest, simple and family-orientated. She refuses the "gold trinkets," stating "that isn't right Ivan Ivanovitch! God forbids us to steal!" Ivan is unimpressed. He admonishes Maria, "don't let me hear any more of those superstitions! We have deposed the *bourjoui* God. He doesn't exist anymore!"⁹⁹

Austen revisits the Kozlov family in 1923. The revolution has devoured its children. Every day, "[aching] with fatigue," Ivan labours in an "insufficiently illumined ... squalid factory," for piecework wages. He earns less than 60% of his pre-war wage and payments are "months in arrear." By some "miracle," his family survived recent famines. He and his fellow workers are denied a voice in the management of their lives; they are dominated by the Party and subordinate trade unions. The experiment in worker management of industry has failed. Under worker control, industry has "been much damaged." Management is a burden. Ivan and his "comrades" hurriedly flee their workplace at the end of the day, fearful of orders to remain and plan economic strategy. Cooperative ownership has brought unwelcome intrusion into private life. An interminable harangue at the Workers' Club is the lot of the worker in his free time and trade union officials and factory managers regularly force their labourers to demonstrate, marching "for hours about this, that or the other happening in some foreign country."¹⁰⁰

The destruction of industry is compounded by the ruin of social custom. Nobody is addressed by their name and patronymic, or as "Mr." or "Mrs." Everybody is "comrade X." Informality has reached obscene proportions. Everybody's personal life is everybody's business and people sacrifice personal morality for revolutionary change. One day after work, Ivan is accosted by a Party man, Strubin, who is concerned by Ivan's *bourjoui* marital behaviour. They talk:

⁹⁸ *Saturday Evening Post*, "The Red Flag in the Workers' Paradise," F. Britten Austen, 4 October 1930, p. 33 (National Republic - MSS, Box 72, Folder 3).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 37 and 54.

"I got a divorce today," [Strubin] remarked.

Ivan was but mildly interested. Strubin was always marrying and getting a divorce; one just went to the registrar and asked for it. It was the easiest thing possible.

"Was that Lydia?" he asked.

Strubin laughed. "No. Lydia was last month. This was Marousia. She doesn't know yet." He laughed again.

"Why do you marry them?" asked Ivan. "You always divorce them a week later."

"It makes it more regular, as I'm a Party man."

Finally, Strubin arrives at his purpose. He questions Ivan:

"You've never divorced, have you?"

Strubin's inquiries give Ivan pause for thought. He ponders the wisdom of a divorce. His wife has "become very plain featured, worn and haggard, and her temper ... abominable." Worse, she is a poor citizen:

always quarrelling with [their daughter] Nadeshda and [son] Nikolai ... holding up her hands in horror when they came home from school full of their atheist doctrines. "Your revolution is just wickedness!" she would scream. Several times she had got into trouble with the house committee about it. It had cost him more than one bribe to hush things up.

It would be simple for Ivan to procure the necessary papers. Strubin advises him:

"If Maria Petrovna makes a fuss, denounce her to the house committee for creating a counter-revolutionary disturbance. I did that when Nasha wouldn't go."¹⁰¹

The roots of this madness and dysfunction lie deep in Russian culture, it is all most Russians know. Ivan reminisces about his own childhood in his native village, where

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 54.

peasants habitually drank themselves to the point of unconsciousness, after dancing and singing.¹⁰² Tragedy then befalls Ivan. He is arrested by the GPU in the dead of night and whisked away to prison. He languishes there for the next six months, fearing insanity, accused of colluding with counter-revolutionaries. He eventually realises that Strubin has set him up to advance his own career. Such are the perils of a system that makes war on its own citizens.

By 1927, Ivan is free again and if his own hopes of increased prosperity have been dashed, he at least takes pride in his daughter, a paragon of (corrupted) communist virtue. Nadezhda is an atheist and is conformist, arrogant, insolent and impertinent. A member of Komsomol (the Communist Youth League) and a patron of the "anti-God center," she will soon be off to university and a student hostel. She will rise in the Party. She worries that because her younger brother has missed "anti-God meetings" he might be expelled from Komsomol and this will reflect poorly on the family. Nadezhda's boyfriend, Dmitri Somenov, "an insolently self-assured young man," dresses "typically" for a communist in a "black leather jacket, breeches and spurs." He strides into the Kozlov's home "as if he [owns] it, ignoring Ivan's polite salutation" and is manifestly unwilling "to bother with mere nonparty people." Somenov sees Maria Petrovna's Orthodox icons in a corner of the living room and rudely upbraids Ivan. His contempt for Ivan is total. Ivan, by contrast, is supine and totally debased. He "cringingly" clutches at Somenov and "humbly" explains that his daughter is right to excuse him for this counter-revolutionary behaviour; it is his wife who is "obstinately superstitious." As the couple sweep out of the apartment, Ivan is awed by the formidable creature that is his daughter:

Very different was she from the sluttish working-class girls of his own youth. This was what the proletarian dictatorship had produced - hard, self-reliant, smart, her head filled with all sorts of exciting things far beyond his atavistic stupidity.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 58.

If there is any redemption to be found in Ivan's world it will come from his more "intelligent," younger, masculine child. Nikolai seeks to break through the ideological fog enveloping their lives. He wants to see the world for himself and draw his own conclusions from experience. He tells his father:

"I'm getting sick of this anti-God propaganda ... it's all so crude. It's just obscenity ... as one grows up father ... there's a lot of things a fellow wants help about. One can't help asking oneself questions ... [the Party] doesn't believe in a fellow thinking things for himself. Comrade Vashka told me the other day that I was still fettered by *bourjoui* ideology. That's nonsense ... it seems to me that a proletarian ought to be encouraged to think."¹⁰⁴

Pure and gifted Nikolai is doomed. His inquisitiveness and love for knowledge and justice bring him death. It occurs on one of Ivan's few days off work, when Ivan wakes in the knowledge that he will soon have to march in a mass protest against the execution of "two comrades named Sacco and Vanzetti," about whom he knows nothing. In the communal kitchen below, he hears his wife arguing with other women, "each using her little primus stove; all of them flatly [declining] to use the communal cooking range." Nadezhda arrives home and reveals she is pregnant. Just as Maria Petrovna prepares to celebrate, her daughter coldly advises her that she has visited "Comrade Sonia" at the state abortion clinic and will have the pregnancy terminated the following day. She scolds her weeping mother:

"There's no need to throw up your hands, mother. I'm merely stating a fact. We're emancipated nowadays from your old *bourjoui* superstitions. All the girl students have babies - or don't have them." She smiled again queerly. "It's their own affair. This is my affair. It doesn't call for sentimentalism. It's just a matter of physiology."¹⁰⁵

Making it clear that she won't jeopardise her professional career, Nadezhda warns her parents that Nikolai's apathy for Party duties will bring him trouble. Ivan is confident

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Nikolai knows what he is doing but states he knows nothing of his son's whereabouts or inner thoughts. Nadezhda is not surprised. Which member of the younger generation would seek counsel in from their parents, she asks him. "None of the old ideas count any more," she states. Just as their daughter berates them for dealing with speculators in the early 1920s, and complicity in the retreat from "Communist principles" which had necessitated the NEP, a neighbour arrives to tell the Kozlovs some shocking news: Nikolai has been shot by the GPU for associating with Menshevik counter-revolutionaries. Maria Petrovna immediately faints. Ivan is relieved that the rest of the family is not under suspicion, but Nadezhda, an inhuman monster, is triumphant:

"Plotting counter-revolution you say? Serves him right!"

"Nadeshda!" [Ivan] could not help that protest. "You forget he's your brother!"

"Brother!" she said, in bitter scorn. "I have no brother who was a counter-revolutionary. We of the Party know no family. We know only comrades in the world revolution. And we exterminate traitors."

[Ivan] shuddered. Never would he understand these young people.¹⁰⁶

Before leaving, Nadezhda reminds her father to participate in the Sacco/Vanzetti demonstration to avert suspicion. Ivan leaves Maria Petrovna in the care of a neighbour and prepares to go out. In a passage of breathtakingly crude propaganda, Austen describes Ivan's response to his son's execution to illustrate the unbridgeable difference between communists and citizens of a capitalist republic:

As he hurried down the stairs he thought of Nikolai. He would never see him any more. A despicable *bourjoui* emotion blurred his sight with tears, choked his throat ... An hour later he marched in the long procession under great double banners inscribed DOWN WITH THE AMERICAN CAPITALIST MURDERERS! ... They marched, thousands upon thousands of them, in broad ranks, in endless serpents arriving and merging into one great mass, tramping in disciplined unison, left, right, left, right. In that mass his own individuality was swamped, blurred. He was one infinitesimal component in an immensity far

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 61 and 64.

transcending himself, part of the mass, the mass that was marching blindly, irresistibly, to a world victory. That sense of collective strength sustained him, weary though he was, made him think of Nikolai as something extraneous to it, something justly exterminated because he was hostile to that mass. It was odd that he should feel like that, for underneath it all he was heartbroken for Nikolai. That was because he was one of the old generation, who could never become fully revolutionary.¹⁰⁷

Austen's account of the total degeneracy of Russian life confirmed (and encapsulated) anti-communists' belief that communism utterly destroyed appreciation of religion, marriage, family, friendship, order, prosperity, privacy, achievement, knowledge, and justice. This meant that there could be no basis or justification for any form of relations between communists and the people of the United States. Consequently, communists' feelings and needs could be disregarded. Therefore communism both abroad and at home was attacked, as communists were mentally excised from the United States. The process of intellectual and emotional expulsion soon encouraged anti-communists to attempt to physically purge the nation of such unwanted elements. Anti-democratic fantasies gave birth to authoritarian practices as anti-communist societies or kinship groups were specially formed to achieve this task.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

The Anti-Communist Tribe Displaces the Democracy

Ultimately, all paranoid anti-communist activity and rhetoric encouraged the destruction of democratic social structures and their substitution with a system of government by kinship groups. Anti-communists' kinship groups were formed to bring back meaning and a sense of belonging to collective society. As has been noted, anti-communists' antipathy for democracy was essentially an internal psychic response. Their sub-conscious conviction that society should ideally be authoritarian was strengthened by their (projected) belief that the communist Other was wholly inclusive and prepared to enlist any who might further its cause; the agencies and directorates assaulting the capitalist world were the products of this proclivity. As communists trawled the dregs of society, anti-communists determined to do the opposite.

Kinship groups aimed to reconstruct social organisation on the basis not of justice and abstract rights, but tribal bonds. With such far-reaching and radical ambitions, anti-communists intuited that their mission had to be depicted as a crusade for the soul of humanity. The Lusk Committee therefore spoke of the socio-political "situation" afflicting the United States as one transcending the state, "reaching down to the fundamentals of man's nature and the organization of society"¹⁰⁸ And the Committee, like its successors, solicited the total allegiance of "loyal Americans" and projected its need for authoritarian "leadership" onto the nation, claiming that a communal moral crisis was exposing the United States to Bolshevik onslaught. Maintaining that the nation needed "a leadership" that understood the necessity of reviving "religious and moral standards as the basis of any political and economic program," the Committee volunteered its services in this capacity, arguing that it alone possessed the "complete knowledge" to establish "absolutely necessary" reforms. Ostensibly, the Committee grounded its fight against socialism in democratic action. The community, it stated, would be "appealed to ... given the facts ... made to see the causes and remedies ... made to band itself together as a civic force." However, only the new hierarchy, purporting to comprise a meritocratic body of public representatives, but in fact constituting a kinship group of "leading men," would really be entrusted with the

¹⁰⁸ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 14. The Committee tried to convince "every man [holding] any position of authority or influence, to take every possible step, not only to understand the

organisation and command of the crusade for righteousness. In this manner, the Committee hoped it could achieve the impossible: total control of the Self's external environment.¹⁰⁹

For kinship groups, seizure of power was a compulsive act borne of distrust of others. Paranoid anti-communists feared not only disloyal American citizens but also weak-minded, honest constituents who had been and would continue to be misled by "astute, hardworking, clearheaded revolutionists" and "turned to purposes of contamination."¹¹⁰ Moreover, anti-communists worried that democratic government and judicial procedures were easily abused by traitors and lawyers and would forever obstruct the purification of the Self. It was essential, therefore, that the kinship groups alone formulated and enforced state policy. Like Platonic philosopher kings, the kinship groups would, in the words of the Lusk Committee, stamp out "disjointed, unprincipled, unpractical or sentimental altruism" and other harmful beliefs, making the errant, particularly those "in university, in church, in philanthropic [and] social circles ... understand the realities and dangers of [their] efforts" and lead them "to the camp of constructive action."¹¹¹

As kinship groups conceived of themselves as leaders and educators, they were not prepared to consult with those outside their inner circle. Consequently their policies and methods were decidedly authoritarian, produced in a rarefied atmosphere of concentrated fear and unmediated mutual reinforcement. The particular behavioural patterns of kinship groups can be observed in one of the more important of such groups, the federal policing structure. Attorneys-General, relying on the advice of cliques within the DJ, assimilated their unique, distorted views. A. Mitchell Palmer's response to the 1920 rail strike shows how this occurred. Although rail unions' grievances had been ignored for several months and union members had been threatened with injunctions and arrested, Palmer was persuaded that the strike was the work of communists. Yet the senior officials of the DJ who advised Palmer were themselves unduly influenced by railroad managements, who sent them lists of

cardinal facts of the situation but to devote his thoughts and his acts to a crusade in support of every agency, every policy, that will counteract and defeat this movement."

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 15.

alleged radical strikers, and union officials, who denounced strike action for fear of being discredited by successful direct action. They were also influenced by a proclamation of the impotent and irrelevant CPUSA, which called on rail strikers to revolt, long after the strike had begun. Indeed, the DJ was the only authority, besides the CPUSA, to be persuaded of the Party's importance to industrial relations.¹¹²

Those who associated with senior officials of the DJ became "extraordinarily susceptible to fear and extravagant patriotism." Palmer, for example, was increasingly convinced of the danger of revolution the longer he remained in office. While fear of a major rail strike made some political sense, his belief that three foreign political groups with a combined membership of thirty-seven constituted a continuing danger to national stability reflected extreme and deepening paranoid fear.¹¹³ Minor agents in the policing apparatus were also progressively seized by such delusions. The Assistant Chief of Staff of MI in New York was alarmed by the collection of fifteen dollars at "a mass meeting" of communists in a Brooklyn Labor Lyceum, a sum that he believed would be invaluable in financing revolution.¹¹⁴

Because kinship groups were impervious to their external surrounds and preoccupied with allaying anxiety, they acted without understanding their rights and obligations, and even their objectives.¹¹⁵ Plunging themselves into repressive operations, they worried about justifying them after their commission. Kinship groups persuaded themselves that their operations were above board or denied their unconstitutional character through semantic and psychological games; denial made the moral justification of their programs possible, and moral rights and duties were taken by kinship groups to be the ultimate sanction of conduct, superseding arcane legal bonds.

The Wilson Administration's chief dispenser of information, the CPI, was particularly adept at such denial. In part this was because it was led by advertising men. As anti-

¹¹² Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, pp. 184 - 7.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 207 - 9.

¹¹⁴ Report of New York MI Chief of Staff, Parker Hitt to Director MI, Washington D.C., 18 June 1921 (MI - MSS, Reel 15).

¹¹⁵ A. Mitchell Palmer, for example, never learned that the New Year raids and arrests of members of the CPUSA and the Communist Labor Party were carried out under the erroneous assumption of J. Edgar Hoover that membership of such parties constituted a deportable offence. See Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, p. 224.

communism evolved, some advertising professionals would play important roles in kinship groups, on account of their expertise in self-promotion, as well as their lack of scruple and political sophistication. This special combination of qualities made them exceptional creators, distributors and justifiers of anti-communist propaganda.



Figure 11: George Creel
Source: George Creel, *How We Advertised America*

Practiced in the art of manipulating public perception, they were also confirmed cynics. The founder and chairman of the Committee, George Creel, was an apostle of cultural homogenisation, a characteristic paranoid behaviour (see Figure 11). He and government elites spoke of the Committee as an embodiment of and a force for democratic action. However, its purpose and methods were, on the contrary, wholly anti-democratic. As Secretary of War Newton Baker put it in 1920, nothing less than "the whole business of mobilising the mind of the world so far as America's participation in the war was concerned was in a sense the work of the CPI" and it was hoped that this would make "democratic institutions deal with information safely."¹¹⁶

Creel's technique of mobilising "democracy" sought not the incorporation of multiple voices in consultation but, rather, managing the mind and manpower of the masses under strict supervision. He made the people the federal government's helpers and guardians, on its terms, generating:

no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America's cause that [could] weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination.¹¹⁷

In spite of claims that the Committee was popularising "the tremendous truth" that the fight against Germany was "a fight for all that life has taught decent human beings to hold dear," its chief objective was to make all Americans and particularly "foreign-

¹¹⁶ Creel, *How We Advertised America*, pp. xiii - xiv.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

language groups" feel "a compulsion from within" to pursue the government's will.¹¹⁸ In other words, to enforce a massive, elitist drive for conformity. The Committee did this with unprecedented thoroughness, "persuading" community leaders of almost every nationality and religion to popularise the war effort and financially support Liberty Loan and Red Cross drives.¹¹⁹ The Committee also created a domestic propaganda fleet of "Four Minute Men," who gave four-minute-long speeches to public assemblies across the nation.¹²⁰ In the Committee's short existence it recruited 75,000 speakers, who delivered over seven million speeches to 135 million people in lodges, fraternal organisations, unions, granges, churches, synagogues, Sunday schools, women's clubs and colleges. Speakers were drawn from the organisations to whom they spoke while their speeches were prepared by government officials under the supervision of Professor Guy Stanton Ford, Dean of the University of Minnesota.¹²¹

Publicly, the Committee was disingenuous about its conduct in the United States and abroad. The Committee's Foreign Section, responsible for the distribution of external propaganda, was described by Creel as being:

designed to clear away all points of misunderstanding and misconception that prevailed, or might prevail ... in regard to America, its life, work, ideals, and opinions.¹²²

Revolutionary Russia was the Section's most important theatre of operations. High government officials doubted the capacity of those outside the government kinship group, including the YMCA, the Red Cross and other aid groups, to make "Russia understand America," and instructed the CPI to undertake a "continuous educational

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 184 and 17.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 184. Offering minority groups "co-operation ... supervision [and] counsel," the Committee cajoled these communities into developing their own loyalty leagues.

¹²⁰ Private, patriotic kinship groups soon followed the lead of the Committee, as the NSL and the AL set up their own "Flying Squadrons" of speakers. See Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, p. 256.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 85 - 97. A youth branch of Junior Four Minute Men distributed more than 1.5 million copies of a specially-produced War Savings stamp bulletin and the Committee organised prizes for the Junior Fourth Liberty Loan contest and Junior Red Cross Christmas roll-call, and published a School Service bulletin twice monthly, which was posted to registered subscribing schools. Each regional bureau averaged a distribution of information in the larger, national papers of 873 articles per month, an aggregate of fifteen thousand articles, media space which, if purchased, would have cost the federal government a quarter of a million dollars.

campaign under a central control." Edgar Sisson (see Figure 12) was dispatched to Petrograd to coordinate the project. Untroubled by political and ethical considerations, or by uncertainty, Sisson exploited all publicity opportunities. When "official newspapers" in Petrograd "refused to print" or distorted President Wilson's messages to the Russian people, Sisson determined to pepper the city's billboards with the President's message, in spite of being advised that such action "would be regarded as a challenge by the Bolshevik government." This view, however, "did not appear reasonable" to Sisson.¹²³ The Section also distributed inflammatory, fraudulent materials, including *The German Plot to Control Russia*, a reprint of the "Sisson Papers," across huge swaths of Russian territory. When the Bolsheviks closed the Committee's Moscow and Petrograd offices, the Committee relocated to Siberia. Other items it produced included *The Friendly Word*, providing news of international war negotiations, Presidential speeches and local contributions describing American activity in Siberia, *Letters of an American Friend*, "expressing the friendly interest of America in the democratic progress of the Russian people and explaining the principles of American democracy," *America and Peace* and the *Development of Education in the United States*.¹²⁴



Figure 12: Edgar Sisson,
CPI Director in Russia
Source: George Creel, *How
We Advertised America*

Creel was determined not to miss proselytising opportunities arising with the collapse of imperial Europe and the Committee ensured that the peoples of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Germany and the Ukraine learned about *How the War Came to America*, *German War Practises in Conquered Territory*, *German Intrigue in the United States*, *America's War Aims and Peace Terms* and *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*. As Creel saw it, the United States had to "drive home, once and for all, the idealism of America and the blood-guilt of Germany" to the "Poles, Czechs, Austrians, Hungarians, and Jugoslavs [who] were crystallizing into new

¹²² Ibid., p. 243.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 376 – 7. Sisson regarded these and other activities an unqualified success, despite the fact that his distribution of propaganda in Moscow quickly brought on riots.

political shapes." For Creel:

nothing seemed more desirable than that these [peoples] should have the facts in the case in order that their determinations might form along lines acceptable to the new world.¹²⁵

While Creel assured foreign governments that CPI bureaus would conduct their affairs "openly" and do "nothing contrary to the wishes of [specific] governments or violative of [the CPI's] neutrality," the Committee regularly abused these promises. In Russia the Committee brought prohibited material before the populace, screening motion pictures under false titles.¹²⁶ The distribution of written material also reflected the senior priority of propaganda work. For Russian audiences, the Committee produced over 500,000 copies of *The Friendly Word*, 150,000 copies of *Letters of an American Friend*, 100,000 copies of *American Activity in Siberia* and a further 100,000 copies of *The German Plot to Control Russia*. Yet the Committee produced only 24,000 copies of a handbill combating a typhus pandemic in Siberia.¹²⁷

Ultimately, only arguments of self-persuasion distinguished the CPI's "educational" activities from propaganda. Creel himself reasoned that the success of the Committee lay in the "friendship and support" of other nations gained "by continuous presentation of facts." It did not spread propaganda:

for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption.¹²⁸

For the paranoid, the identity and character of the perpetrator of propaganda, rather than its actual content, determine its perfidy. Like many anti-communists, Creel didn't like to think of his organisation as a propaganda machine and he refused to acknowledge the common bond uniting the Bolshevik and United States governments

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 393 - 7.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 417 - 21.

¹²⁶ The film *Uncle Sam Immigrant*, for example, was screened under the title *All for Peace*, itself a shortened title for *All for Peace Through War*. The Committee's Russian representative remarked of this substitution, "we left it to the audience to find that out for themselves." Ibid., pp. 243 and 378.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 393 - 5.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

in their desire to control the beliefs of their citizens. However, in unguarded moments he unwittingly revealed repressed or disavowed feelings about the Committee, as when he described it as:

a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure in advertising.¹²⁹

Little else could so graphically illustrate the paranoid's incapacity for reflection, self-certainty and their conviction that clashes of belief systems can be reduced to competition in spreading "tremendous truth." In order to function as cohesive units, the CPI and other kinship groups depended on their members' sharing the capacity for intellectual and ethical self-deception.

The practicing of denial and self-persuasion was essential to kinship groups' formulation and implementation of authoritarian programs. Having isolated themselves from external opinions and forces, kinship groups were obliged to operate in both a furtive and dictatorial manner, like the cells of communist terrorists whom they despised. The Lusk Committee summarily tried and convicted its enemies, seized and published citizens' private correspondence, procured search warrants for raids on alleged radical premises and was responsible for the arrest and criminal conviction of several constituents.¹³⁰ Moreover, the Committee condemned its victims without benefit of a public hearing and failed to seek or gain the public's consent for its activities. It evinced no trust in the public's judgment nor any respect for its sovereignty. Instead, it relied on semantic dexterity and prevalent fear to justify its actions, juxtapositioning suggestive but essentially baseless and provocative "information" about criminal "Russian activity" with its refusal to open its proceedings to scrutiny. In its report on "Activities of the Russian Soviet Regime and its Sympathizers in the United States," for example, the Committee attempted to persuade the public of the probity of its conduct by claiming that it had been forced "to withhold from the report much of the evidence which has come into its hands, for the reason that it [would] be necessary to employ it in criminal prosecutions." The

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 20 and Vol. II, Part I, p. 750. Among those prosecuted by the Committee was Harry M. Winitzky, the Executive Secretary of the New York Local of the CPUSA, who was apprehended on a charge of criminal anarchy and sentenced to serve in the New York State Penitentiary for not less than five years and no more than ten.

The Psychology of American Anti-Communism

Committee then added that it was publishing its findings, "simply to indicate briefly some of the phases of Russian activity" in the United States.¹³¹

Little could better illustrate kinship groups' expectation that citizens should unquestioningly support them, while they concerned themselves with the enforcement of the law. Like Creel, the Committee was also disingenuous about its determination to control the processes by which radicals would be persecuted and eliminated, as well as the recitude of the underhanded methods it employed to these ends. Denying responsibility for provocative activity, it tacitly admitted its desire to foment public witchhunts; claiming that its examination of the "Spread of Socialism in Educated Circles through Pacifist, Religious [and] Collegiate Societies" was sourced exclusively to "original documents" that came "into its possession through subpoenaed files," the Committee professed that it was not questioning "the motives of any person or the patriotism of the persons named, but [was] in all instances" permitting "documents to speak for themselves."¹³² The Committee realised that it was the context in which such documents were discussed that was paramount. Any mention of the Emergency Peace Federation, the American Neutral Conference Committee, the People's Council of America, the American League to Limit Armaments and the People's Freedom Union, in a sub-section dedicated to tracking the "Spread of Socialism in Educated Circles" could not fail to reflect badly on them. And while it is highly improbable that the Committee possessed any original documents supporting its contention, for example, that Roger Baldwin, had advised revolutionaries to "have plenty of flags and seem patriotic in everything," the Committee could be confident that its strategic placement of its allegation would damn him.¹³³

Some kinship groups were not so backward as the CPI and the Lusk Committee, however, in admitting to the elitist nature of their projects. Business groups in particular, free from the vicissitudes of political office, regularly proclaimed their God-given right to stand atop society, rationalising the maintenance of rigid social and commercial hierarchies as the workings of Natural Order. James Horn, for

¹³¹ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 657.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 969.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 1088. The Committee defamed Baldwin as "a radical to the very bone, with a strong leaning

example, likened "the operation of industry" to "the operation of [human] bodies" and used biotic metaphors to illustrate the importance of stratification in preventing social collapse.¹³⁴ *Straight Shooter*, similarly, blended folksy homilies with simplistic language to persuade workers to accept other "truths" about industrial relations and the distribution of wealth and resources. *Shooter* emphasised two points: first that capitalism was "natural" and second, that economic success depended on native intelligence as well as work ethic. *Shooter* defended capitalism through "historical" allusions, convincing skeptics that they too, as much as plutocrats, were capitalists. Capitalism, *Shooter* explained, was an age-old economic practice which had facilitated the development of civilisation:

CAPITAL is what men and women have SAVED and ACCUMULATED. One wise man said, "CAPITAL is what was LEFT OVER from YESTERDAY ... If there was no CAPITAL we would all be living in the jungle or the wilderness like savages, without houses, or clothes ... Every man who saves becomes a CAPITALIST, great or small. The system that permits men to save and give employment to others is called CAPITALISM."¹³⁵

Anxious to correct the "misconception" that capitalism enriched an undeserving few at the expense of the masses, *Shooter* added that the capitalist instinct was a gift given only to a special few, enabling them to raise the living standards of all. "Thousands of years ago," *Shooter* noted:

men and women lived under the shelter of rock and caves. They used stones and clubs and sticks ... to catch fish and game. Each man kept all that he produced. But they often went hungry, for they had no CAPITAL ... It took thousands of

towards the I. W. W."

¹³⁴ Horn wrote "Every one of us possesses white marrow which is called the brains and directs all our bodily activities. It is surrounded by thick bones to protect it from outside injuries and the brain cells are consuming more blood than the rest of the whole body. Suppose the cells of our stomach and digestive organs were to strike against the brain cells because they are consuming more blood than the rest of the whole body. Suppose the cells of our stomach and digestive organs were to strike against the brain cells because they are getting the best of everything, what would happen? The body would become paralyzed and death would occur within a few hours. The same happens in industry. We must have more blood for the brain cells and protect them with our life because they turn the wheels of industry. We must have palaces for those who direct and supervise just as well as the men sitting at the machines." See Horn, *Anarchy*.

¹³⁵ Kerr - MSS, Box 2, *Straight Shooter*, Sheet 5.

years to learn to tame sheep and goats and to keep them in herds. Nearly all of these early savages and barbarians lived from hand to mouth, consuming each day what they had in hand, just as most of us do now. Here and there was one who strived and saved, denying himself many things to-day, in order that he might have more to-morrow ... such men increased their herds until they were able to employ a neighbor's son to help to herd them. The owner of the sheep was benefited and the neighbor's son was better off. As the owner of the sheep grew richer, more neighbors' sons had jobs ... Did the owner of the sheep and the neighbors' sons look upon each other as enemies? No. Each needed the other and the world needed both. And so it is to-day.¹³⁶

The idea that capitalists' inordinate share of surplus product immiserated employees was regarded by business, then, as demonstrable nonsense. Rather, the capitalist was best understood as a "tall man" who could reach far up into a tree, "gathering the most fruit." Those who worked for capitalists were "shorter men [jostling] and [competing] with each other for the fruit that hangs lower down." This did not mean that the tall man was immeasurably better off than his smaller companions. While the tall man "[gathered] all the fruit he [could] reach," "human nature" dictated that he could "eat no more than the short man"; God "in His wisdom" had:

so limited the use of wealth, that no man can use more than his share, whether he be rich or poor. The tall man eats all that nature allows one man to consume, then he hands the surplus on down to the shorter men below, by giving them employment and opportunity, just as the old sheepowner used to do.

Social betterment was available to all if "the shorter men" followed the example of their taller friends. In time they too would "strive and save and give employment to others." Then everyone would be "prosperous and happy."¹³⁷

Business interests and anti-communists were able to evince such elitism, in part, because the spirit of their propaganda resided so comfortably with the American cult of individualism. The promise of equality of opportunity at the heart of American

¹³⁶ *Straight Shooter*, Sheet 11.

national identity had always been made on specific, onerous conditions, for while the United States owed, as Herbert Hoover put it, its people the duty of keeping "the social solution free from frozen strata of classes" and stimulating individual endeavour "through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding," citizens were entitled to "equality of opportunity" only to the degree which their "intelligence, character, ability, and ambition" warranted.¹³⁸ The notion of inherent inequality was, therefore, intrinsic to traditional expressions of American political ideology, and this belief in inequality was indispensable to kinship groups urging the populace to abandon the "mistaken idea that 'The majority must rule.'"¹³⁹ Anti-democrats like Fred Marvin claimed that it was no longer possible for a "democratic form of government" to manage the affairs of a community the size of the United States, let alone other smaller, less important nations. For Marvin, the only acceptable form of "pure democracy" were "old time town hall meetings in small communities." For the United States to be calling on its citizens "to vote directly upon every sort of proposal" with the Soviets menacing the world was lunacy producing "nothing but dangerous confusion."¹⁴⁰

Congressman Martin Littleton similarly associated democracy with unacceptable risks to national security and prosperity, and took umbrage with the "not finally affirmed but supposed" idea that "the consent of the governed" best guaranteed "life, liberty and happiness" for all. He felt that the equation of public sovereignty with the public's welfare had produced nothing but a period of "Moral Statesmanship," something closely analogous to what contemporary conservatives refer to as "political correctness." Littleton censured democratic societies for being too absorbed with "sweet moralities" rather than economics. In his view, it was "easy" to concern

¹³⁷ *Straight Shooter*, Sheet 42.

¹³⁸ Excerpt from *American Individualism*, pp. 9 - 10, contained in folder titled "Compilation of Public Statements on Various Selected Subjects, 1920 - 1932" (Hoover - MSS, Box No. 157). While Hoover's biographer, Joan Hoff Wilson, claims that Hoover's unfortunate use of clichés and common terms such as "American individualism" complicated his attempt to explain clearly the subtle difference between the uncontrolled, individual acquisitiveness and open-ended national expansion so characteristic of nineteenth-century America and his dream of a humane, voluntarily controlled capitalistic system based on cooperatively sharing the abundance produced by technology, his views were nonetheless generally interpreted as supporting crude and aged justifications of social stratification. See Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover*, p. 27.

¹³⁹ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Radicalism in Churches," Vol. I, Serial No. 198, 23 September 1927. Charles Carpenter, the man who uttered this phrase, wondered how long "the ignorant" were to be indulged in their "ignorance" by the "intelligent" and argued it was time right-thinking elements took firmer control of the nation.

oneself primarily with "those things which are right and wrong ... because everybody [had] an opinion about that." Such opinions did not "take much information" to form.¹⁴¹ But a government's first duty was to secure the people's life, liberty and happiness, not their consent. For Littleton, democracy's sensitive treatment of minorities and other dangerous practices, such as the preservation of the right to free speech, portended disaster. Free speech, he claimed, had drawn Britain into the Great War.¹⁴² Military Intelligence was also convinced of the calamitous influence of democracy. Security personnel believed that "sweet moralists" and pacifists not only undermined the "natural patriotic spirit and feeling among nationals" but also imperiled kinship groups' control of foreign policy. Pacifists, according to Major Richard Charles, even gave foreign regimes "the impression that a considerable number of people" advocated "their cause" and that they could, by taking advantage of the sovereign power of the voters over the government, "curtail the demands" made on them by the United States and "compel the acceptance of programs or demands ... without regard to their justice or our interest"; democracy upset the proper functioning of government above the will of the people.¹⁴³

Beneath the frustration anti-communists expressed with democracy stood a powerful feeling underpinning and continually fuelling the kinship groups' authoritarian impulses: resentment. Fearing loss of control and confronted with different interpretations of communal belonging, members of kinship groups amplified one another's outrage with those who refused to recognise or challenged their expertise, righteousness and right to rule. Resentment was particularly prevalent in the security industry and business groups. The BAF, for example, evinced choleric temper fighting workers' attempts to seize a greater share of the control of industry, chastising "Cabinet officers" for failing to "understand how hopeless it [was] for the government to seek through legislation and investigation to reduce the high cost of living." The Federation also petulantly warned "the country" was best advised to turn

¹⁴⁰ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Questions and Answers," Vol. 1, Serial No. 239, 12 November 1927.

¹⁴¹ *Radicalism in Washington*, published by Fred Marvin, p. 7 (Felt - MSS, Pamphlets Box 13).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 10. In his novel interpretation of history, Littleton exclaimed "the Londoners thought they could stand it for a hundred years, and they let them talk in Hyde Park for a hundred years, but they had to stop them after a century. Why? Because they were undoing their country. England has learned it, and learned it how? Learned it by the endless crosses that mark the last resting places of the beautiful boys they gave to the war."

¹⁴³ Charles, *Study on Subversives*.

the reigns of government over to business men, then "paying a stiff price for [their] expertise," who knew "much more about running the country than politicians."¹⁴⁴

While kinship groups' mistrust and resentment of outsiders was boundless, they nonetheless demanded of their members the most complete loyalty, particularly to the group's leaders. This demand for unmitigated faith from the kinship group's rank and file was entirely consistent with anti-communists' vision of a strictly hierarchical society and with their desire to make government the business of a brotherhood. Kinship group leaders expected their followers to accept their political message by virtue of their respect for authority, which ran in a clear chain of command from the kinship group's executive to the federal government. For the BAF, it was enough to assure its members that its information was gleaned from "Government channels of a most authentic nature"; it was not necessary nor advisable for its management to divulge further or specific details.¹⁴⁵

While anti-communist kinship groups sought unquestioning devotion from other elements of the Self, they also sought to confirm their belief in the universal human need for imperious leadership, inventing stories of radical associations' preference for rigid hierarchy. Indeed, anti-communists were so convinced of communists' regard for order that they feared that communists' superior organisation threatened the Self. Such organisation was visible to Fred Marvin, for example, in colleges and theological seminaries, whose radical students spread "the gospel of discontent" among the workers who looked up to them as "missionaries."¹⁴⁶ Although anti-

¹⁴⁴ *Weekly Letter* 24, 3 December 1919, "High Cost of Living." Determined to punish those who failed to heed employers' advice, the Federation suggested this remedy "It might serve for the good of the cause if one or two small plants in the country should be leased for a year to employees to operate. They would be certain to find that modern industry cannot be conducted successfully without a different quality of brains than that which is necessary to swing a hammer or operate a machine." See *Weekly Letter* 14, 25 September 1919, "Workmen Wary."

¹⁴⁵ *Weekly Letter* 25, 10 December 1919, "German Conspiracies." The comforting presence of the federal Administration behind the Federation's executive helped bolster its claim that joint German-Bolshevik conspiracies to organise a general strike enveloping Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland and "the great Industrial District of Pennsylvania" believable. The executive also averred that the German and Bolshevik governments had donated fifty and ten million dollars, respectively, to the scheme.

¹⁴⁶ *Daily Data Sheet*, "Liberalism and Its Work," Vol. 1, Serial No's. 141 and 142, 18 and 19 July 1927 respectively. Marvin's projected hierarchy of subversion found further expression in a "small group of men and women" whom he alleged were chieftains of interlocking agencies controlling the "destinies of ninety per cent" of the nation's subversive associations and individuals. The interlocking agencies included the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Church League for Industrial Democracy.

communists professed hatred for communists' deceptive methods, they nonetheless drew great inspiration from their example, although this fact was seldom acknowledged. Mrs. Hawkins of the WSL indicated that she was aware of this irony, and the discomfort it caused her, however. So uncomfortable was Hawkins with the knowledge that the League's behaviour resembled that of communists that she felt compelled, describing the formation of her League, to place the word "organisation" within quotation marks, indicating how tainted the very concept had become through its association with radicalism.¹⁴⁷

Even if the similarity between anti-communist and communist kinship groups was generally denied, the efficacy of communist "organisation" was not and anti-communist kinship groups insisted that their members observe communist-like discretion to protect their organisations. They were instructed to close ranks and keep vital information within the group. The BAF instilled these values into its members by stating beneath the letterhead of every issue of its *Weekly Letter*:

These letters carry in part confidential information intended for members only.
Please keep them away from the press.

The Federation also published articles warning of the danger of loose talk and "irresponsible gossip," scolding a member's wife who suggested (after talking with her doctor) that the Southern California Edison Company had bought lights from the Western Electric Company at inflated rates and secretly invested the rebate, ensuring that the Railroad Commission and the public remained ignorant of their dividend. Assuring readers this was not true, the *Letter* intoned:

The doctor [should] stick to his clinic ... Remember the Reds never Sleep.
Impress upon your office force, your family and your neighbours to beware of
the conveyers of false witness.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Untitled sheet c. 1930 (Westchester Security League – MSS). The full phrase Hawkins uses states that her colleagues and she "talked of 'organisation.'"

¹⁴⁸ BAF *Weekly Letter* 14, 25 September 1919.

Kinship groups' demands on their members inevitably extended beyond surveillance of fellow citizens to include snitching. Anti-communists particularly observed "prior" or "habitual" offenders, such as anti-war protestors who supported trade with Soviet Russia.¹⁴⁹

This vengeful storage of information by kinship groups across the nation reflected their desire to see a powerful state intelligence network institutionalised. This desire became particularly acute after 1924, when reduced funding for federal agencies appeared to patriots to fatally cripple the Self's defensive capabilities. Not surprisingly, those kinship groups actually charged by government with the task of exterminating radicalism were particularly anxious to assume powers placing them above the jurisdiction of the democracy. Before concerning themselves with the larger society, kinship group elites first sought to bring their own organisations under authoritarian control. Military commanders, for example, had long been concerned about communist infiltration and perversion of the armed forces and while they could order prospective recruits to produce "proof of [their] good moral character," they wanted to introduce more definite regulations to prevent the enlistment of "persons of communist affiliations." Yet much to their chagrin, they found it difficult to reform the enlistment process.¹⁵⁰ J. Edgar Hoover, too, was disgusted by the "absence of any Federal statute prohibiting the so-called Communistic or radical activities," which complicated preventing the distribution of communist literature in government agencies. These limitations of administrative power did not force security elites to recognise that their desire to control the ideological convictions of men in the armed services was inappropriate; rather, they viewed legal impediments as unfortunate and transitory obstacles to be overcome.¹⁵¹ Hoover's public response to the reform of the BI in 1924, for example, illustrates this. Noting that "the activities of Communists and other ultra-radicals" had not "constituted a violation of Federal Statutes," Hoover concluded that the DJ "theoretically, [had] no right to investigate such activities."

¹⁴⁹ The BI, for example, continued to monitor the Union Brotherhood of Carpenters of Charleston, West Virginia, the New York Cloak and Suit Operators Union, the Citizens Amnesty Committee of Palo Alto, California, and the Reverend Harold Stratten, Minister of the Harvard Congregational Church in Boston. See BI OG - MS, BS 202600 - 1282 - 2 and OG 180980.

¹⁵⁰ Letter of Brigadier-General Andrew Moses, Assistant Chief of Staff to Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, c. 1935 (MI - MSS, Reel 22).

¹⁵¹ Letter of J. Edgar Hoover to Brigadier-General Harry E. Knight, G-2, MI, War Department, 3 February 1936, File 10110 - 2452 747 (MI - MSS, Reel 22).

Hoover's use of the word "theoretically" betrays his belief that regardless of the technical interpretations of its legal rights, his kinship group had a superior moral right to act as it saw fit to defend "the nation."¹⁵²

The psychology of J. Edgar Hoover is probably the best case example of the role of kinship groups in creating and nurturing paranoid egomaniacs and presenting them with opportunities to act out internal psychodramas. Hoover approached his work with puritanical zeal and self-righteousness, unfailingly seeing himself as the nation's chief moral enforcer and equating his ideals with the nation's well-being. Although he was an adept politician, he was fortunate in finding employment in an organisation whose influence was expanding. At the very start of his professional life, Hoover was given great power, which he expected to rapidly amplify. He reveled in the task of suppressing radicalism, showing initiative far beyond the call of duty. He frequently became intoxicated with his own potency. At the height of the Palmer raids, when the Bureau arrested "approximately 3500 aliens" for membership in prohibited political parties, Hoover was ecstatic and simply assumed that two-thirds of the arrestees would be expelled. A further indication of Hoover's psychology can be gleaned from the fact that he wrote to MI of the "pleasure" he took in sending them regular reports "on the radical activities." In using such a value-laden term, Hoover showed that he enjoyed persecuting and enforcing great prosecutorial endeavours; it fed his sense of Self.¹⁵³ The passage of time in no way dimmed his repressive zeal, nor blunted his ambition. His sense of purpose and confidence in his professional security was so great by the time of Herbert Hoover's Presidency that, in the wake of the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, he wrote the First Lady to suggest that the Bureau immediately fingerprint her grandchildren, to help ensure that in the event of their kidnapping by subversives, they might be detected more swiftly.¹⁵⁴

The hierarchical structure and atmosphere of anti-communist kinship groups not only promoted individual paranoid feelings but ensured that organisations reflected the psychology of their leadership cadres. Patterns of institutional fanaticism and

¹⁵² Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 243.

¹⁵³ Bulletin of Radical Activities, "Radical Organisations," No. 1, 1 - 17 January 1920 and Letter of Hoover to Brig.-General Churchill, 4 February 1920 (MI - MSS, Reel 16). Hoover could have, by contrast, in typical administrative fashion, noted that he was sending MI reports "as requested" or "as required."

lawlessness were established within the BI, for example, during its first significant assignments in the Red Scare, when the Bureau committed innumerable violations of its obligations as well as countless acts of sadistic cruelty. State-employed foot soldiers of anti-communism behaved as their officers commanded, disregarding the law and dismissing the humanity of alien radicals, prizing ends over all means. Information to substantiate arrest warrants were frequently extracted through third-degree treatment, after arrests were made. Recommendations from immigration officers to dismiss particular deportation cases were re-routed by the Bureau to more sympathetic immigration officials. One detainee reported that the Bureau's detectives leveled revolvers at his head, threatening to shoot him if he did not answer questions regarding his alleged membership of the CPUSA to their satisfaction. The Bureau also interfered "without the least shadow of lawful authority, with the postal rights of aliens held at Ellis Island."¹⁵⁵

Although the Bureau was, at this time, able to expedite its business largely unobstructed, the agency was still sensitive, like all kinship groups, about unwelcome criticism and scrutiny, from attorneys representing aliens, "unreliable" public officials and civil liberties groups. The Bureau, therefore, began to lobby for its assumption of extraordinary legal status; senior bureaucrats were anxious to place the DJ outside the jurisdiction of the courts, so that "officers of Executive Departments [would not] be compelled to testify with reference to confidential matters." Noting that another kinship group, the Treasury Department, enjoyed this protection from the law, Bureau officials recommended immediate passage of legislation granting DJ agents identical powers. Such reform was advocated "upon the theory" that Bureau agents were "prosecutors," placed by the "nature of their duties ... to all intents and purposes in the same status as Attorneys."¹⁵⁶ By suggesting that Justice Department agents shared the legal status of District Attorneys and ought to be allocated powers of summary justice, Bureau officials were, in effect, seeking to acquire powers that would make their kinship group comparable to Bolshevik secret police agencies. Yet this fact went unrecognised in intelligence and patriotic communities who continued to regard

¹⁵⁴ Letter of J. Edgar Hoover to Mrs. Hoover, 14 March 1932 (Hoover - MSS, Box 46).

¹⁵⁵ Post, *Deportations Delirium*, pp. 129, 204, 215 and 293.

¹⁵⁶ Addenda to General Intelligence Bulletin 1, 5 May 1920, "Memorandum on the Agents of the Department Refusing to Disclose to the Courts Confidential Information," Warren W. Grimes, pp. 1 and 9 (MI - MSS, Reel 16).

enlargement of the powers of the secret service imperative. Moreover, decreased funding, while depleting the manpower of security kinship groups, in now way altered their authoritarian culture. Security services were able to operate largely free from governmental encumbrance or supervision as senior officials flagrantly abused their powers and the spirit of the law.¹⁵⁷

While kinship groups offered participants the psychological comfort of camaraderie and potency, they also heightened members' fear, for the collective need to justify collective anxiety placed greater pressure on members than their own individual feelings could. Kinship groups *forced* members into extreme and paradoxical forms of behaviour, such as fomenting "treachery" in the ranks of the "disloyal." Many aliens arrested for membership of proscribed associations, for example, were damned by evidence procured by *agents provocateurs*. "Radical" aliens did not attract attention themselves through their activities; rather, kinship groups set out to discover their perfidy. So desperate were kinship groups to confirm their fears that they habitually employed aliens with criminal records to infiltrate and radicalise corporate clients' workforces.¹⁵⁸ Driven by paranoid fear and responsive only to political exigency, kinship groups operated without a semblance of philosophical coherence. This is why theatrical troupes were arrested for possession of stage props resembling firearms and individual "radicals" were repeatedly indicted, without success, before baseless suits were abandoned.¹⁵⁹ This also explains why only aliens were detained by kinship groups during the Red Scare. The authorities' disinterest in detecting actual crimes was manifest in their practice of releasing citizens taken during the raids; it was acknowledged that their prosecution would not bear fruit. Those who fell under the power of kinship groups, however, suffered the full wrath of their obstructed bloodlust.

¹⁵⁷ The Bureau of Immigration's Secret Service, for example, remained determined to arrest and deport alien members of proscribed associations. The Service also acted as a strike-breaker, turned a blind eye to threats by employers to use the Service to deport recalcitrant workers and monitored the trials of radical strikers with a view to deportation. One railworker was even sent by the Service to an insane asylum for his political views. The Service also found the fingerprint technology of the BI useful and it routinely took prints of aliens, regardless of proof or history of legal transgression. See ACLU, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, p. 15 and *Liberty Under the New Deal - The Record for 1933 - 1934*, p. 17.

¹⁵⁸ This practice was widespread in the DJ during the Palmer raids. One *agent provocateur* with a criminal record rose through the ranks of the CPUSA to become the treasurer of his Local. See Post, *Deportations Delirium*, p. 82.

Mired in the quagmire of the paranoid position, anti-communist kinship groups visited sadistic cruelty on their victims. Most deportees aboard the *Buford*, for example, were kidnapped and given no opportunity to communicate with their families before their departure, in total violation of the orders of the Secretary of Labor. Security agents habitually subjected detainees to physical and mental torture. A school teacher arrested in the raid on the Russian People's House in New York was bashed in the face and had his spectacles destroyed when he protested the BI's actions. Aliens detained at the Deer Island Immigration Station in January 1920 endured a lack of heating and proper toilet facilities at the height of winter. Worse, "one of the captives dashed out his brains in a corridor by plunging headlong from the fifth floor above ... in the sight of fellow captives who inferred from their own experiences that he had been crazed by his." Bureau of Investigation agents were also unperturbed by the suffering their arrests inflicted on the children of detained aliens. One female prisoner was separated from her daughter, aged six, who was "turned adrift at midnight to find her way home in a remote part of the city, alone"; her mother remained captive for a month.¹⁶⁰ Agents nonetheless found time for mirth in the course of such work. While raiding offices of the Communist and Communist Labor parties in New York, BI operatives took down a portrait of Marx and painted his nose red as one agent:

used the mutilated portrait as a mask, and thrusting a cigarette through the pictured lips into his own, made a caricature of the found of Socialism seem to smoke gaily as its wearer paraded about the place.

For Louis Post, such behaviour reflected "in vulgar vaudeville humour the spirit of the delirious crusade to which it was incidental."¹⁶¹ Post, errs however, in describing such conduct as "incidental" to anti-radical crusading; on the contrary, it was absolutely integral to it, for the capture and expulsion of "communists" was kinship groups' primary objective and they measured their success as much by the manner of its accomplishment, as by the number of enemies dispatched. To a significant extent, such behaviour derived from unconscious psycho-sexual impulses and both anti-communist crusaders and those who lauded their activities associated vigorous

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 32 - 35, 98 and 100.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 106 - 7.

repression with virility and valour. For them, the Self's protection was more important than maintenance of justice and if kinship groups had to act forcefully and decisively in such matters, then so much the better.¹⁶²

The psychological fulfillment anti-communists derived from crusading fuelled kinship groups' inexhaustible appetite for social purification and to satiate that appetite, kinship groups oppressed tens, if not hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens in the kind of mass persecutions readily associated with Bolshevism.¹⁶³ Kinship groups' desire to purge society was universal. The only issue dividing kinship groups was the question of how the Self was best cleansed and analysis of anti-communists' solutions to this problem is the subject of the final section of this chapter.

¹⁶² A. Mitchell Palmer, for example, was widely exalted for his violent strikebreaking. The Board of Trade of Asheville, North Carolina described Palmer as "a lion-hearted man, with a great nation behind him" and credited him with bringing "order out of chaos." For the Board, Palmer had shown "that the United States is not a myth, but a virile, mighty power which shows itself when a man who measures up to the duties of the hour is at the helm." See Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer*, p. 184.

¹⁶³ After the Palmer raids, for example, some five thousand applications for the deportation of alien radicals were submitted to Louis Post. From 6 March until 10 April 1920, Post laboured through a (Cheka-like) backlog of 1600 cases. Of these 1600 petitions, 1140 were cancelled; not one of the remaining 460 persons who were deported had committed any crime against the state. See Post, *Deportations Delirium*, pp. 158, 165 and 168.

Anti-Communism and the Triumph of Paranoid Authoritarianism

Ultimately, all anti-communist kinship groups became opponents of democracy. This was the inevitable cul-de-sac of their failure to negotiate their paranoid fear. Yet advocacy of authoritarianism rarely harmed kinship groups politically. On the contrary, paranoid anti-communists won great power. In spite of piecemeal reforms and obstructions, they were able to play out their psychodramas on the public stage, into the 1930s and beyond. Moreover, they persuaded thousands of "ordinary" citizens as well as politicians and business magnates to participate in their crusade. Inflamed by paranoid fear, significant numbers of people were impressed and reassured by kinship groups' authoritarian behaviour and anti-communists solicited public participation in their political program, while taking care to control, as best they could, its direction. Yet a degree of uncertainty about how public support should best be galvanised and incorporated troubled anti-communists. Two major approaches were adopted, comprising the effort to expel and monitor radical persons and the more ambitious effort to eradicate "false" beliefs from the community through "educative" means. In practice, these "hard" and "soft" approaches were not dissimilar; both were founded in defensive, paranoid psychology and imprisoned anti-communists in a debilitating psychic quagmire.

In psychological terms, the impulse to exclude and expel Bolshevism from the United States was perhaps the more simple response. The careers of A. Mitchell Palmer and three successive Directors of the BI were built (and eventually foundered) on the policy of physically purging the population. Long after these prominent extremists lost national support, their activities and ideology remained influential, especially the idea that social protest emanated from manipulative, unrepresentative, disloyal factions that could be crushed with resolute regulatory action. While government officials had considerable discretion to act in this manner, the ignominious fate of Palmer and his BI chiefs, together with legal restrictions, confined their attacks on radicals to aliens and isolated industrial disputes. Other anti-communists not constrained by administrative, political or legal encumbrances dreamed of greater purges. Having resigned his Mayorship of Seattle and embarking on a lucrative, national lecture tour, Ole Hanson called for increased control of the nation's immigrant intake and of the political behaviour of as its native stock. Demanding that alien, naturalised and native-born anarchists, "bolshevists," and "agitators" be

deported, Hanson also wanted the United States to call a complete moratorium on immigration, taking only those who were expressly needed. Further, he argued that immigrants refusing to become citizens should be banished.¹⁶⁴ Such ideas spread beyond the extreme right. Herbert Hoover also supported such national security measures as the forcible removal of "criminal aliens" through strengthened deportation laws and the stringent observation of settling migrants.¹⁶⁵

Paranoid anti-communists' desire to shape the nation's racial and political shape was only salved by measures such as the National Origins Provision of the Immigration Act of 1924; the crowning achievement of John Trevor and Albert Johnson, the Act ensured that the proportion of ethnic groups vis-a-vis the total population of the United States remained at 1890 levels. Fred Marvin, for example, believed that the nation's salvation lay in compulsory registration and surveillance schemes of unnaturalised migrants. Claiming that "many European countries" had "long maintained a registration of alien traffic," Marvin declared that the unique racial "composition of the country together with its enormous volume of alien traffic" made "this kind of registration" more "necessary" than anywhere else in the world. He therefore urged patriots to help defeat "groups" of "dangerous aliens ... hyphenated American cliques threatening political reprisals [and] minority cliques and racial hyphenates" protesting such schemes, by registering their support for authoritarian immigration regulation with Congress.¹⁶⁶

The Fish Committee was a keen supporter of such exclusionary and repressive measures. One of the first national government bodies to collate the "data" and findings of the anti-communist industry, the Committee strengthened not only the cause of immigration restriction, but also the campaign to revive surveillance and policing powers that had been in abeyance since 1924. Like Marvin the Committee

¹⁶⁴ Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, pp. 293-4.

¹⁶⁵ Hoover - MSS, Box 157, folder titled *Compilation of Public Statements on various selected subjects, 1920 - 1932*. Hoover issued two statements to Congress on the subject of deportation. In a Message to 3rd Session, 71st Congress, on 2 December 1930, he stated "I urge the strengthening of our deportation laws so as to more fully rid ourselves of criminal aliens" and in a similar Message, on 8 December 1931, he declared "the deportation laws should be strengthened. Aliens lawfully in the country should be protected by the issuance of a certificate of residence." Hoover's belief in "criminal classes" has been discussed earlier in this thesis.

¹⁶⁶ *Daily Data Sheet*, Vol. 1, Serial Numbers 158, 6 August 1927, 159, 8 August 1927 and 199, 24 September 1927.

recommended the strengthening of immigration law to prevent the admission of communists into the United States and facilitate the deportation of "all alien communists." It proposed that naturalisation procedures be amended to prevent communists from securing citizenship and sought to empower the federal government to summarily disenfranchise citizens known to be communists. Aliens who had traveled to Russia would similarly be denied re-entry to the country and the distribution of printed material "advocating revolutionary communism" would be prohibited. Finally, the CPUSA itself would be "excluded from or denied recognition as a political entity."¹⁶⁷

It was axiomatic that these measures would require the substantial enlargement of the powers of the BI. Indeed, for the kinship groups, this was a significant motivating factor in their proposal. If the BI's responsibilities were enlarged, permanent additional appropriations to the agency would become mandatory and would enable its "skilled agents" to "*devote their entire time* to investigating and preparing reports on the personnel of all [objectionable] entities, groups [and] individuals."¹⁶⁸ Other reactionaries, like Ralph Easley of the NCF, also wanted "the Secret Service of the State Department" to assume authority over "domestic questions," the "Treasury Department's bureau" to monitor "subversive activities" and the War and Navy Departments, in times of peace, to "function in that direction, beyond watching conditions in their own institutions."¹⁶⁹

This brand of naked repression was founded on the notion that Bolshevism could be eradicated through the elimination of subversive persons. Notwithstanding the violent nature of such repression, it was in some ways more benign an attack on republican government than kinship groups' efforts to dominate education and civic reform. Kinship groups' desire to control the thoughts and practices of American citizens was arguably more anti-democratic than the suppression of "quasi-political" groups and

¹⁶⁷ Fish Committee Report, p. 14. The Committee was also preoccupied with more obscure aims, including legislating to prevent the spreading of "false rumors for the purpose causing runs on banks" and ending the use of "secret codes or ciphers with any government with which the United States has no diplomatic relations, and its trade relations."

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. In sanctioning funding increases for the BI, the Committee demonstrated its imprecise knowledge of department jurisdiction for immigration and its support for the unconstitutional ambition of other kinship groups within the BI and the DL.

¹⁶⁹ Letter from Ralph Easley to Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War, 24 May 1930, File 10110-2630 1 (MI - MSS, Reel 23).

suspicious ethnic communities. While the aims of reformist anti-communists were more ambitious than those of the proponents of crude, repressive schemes, reformist anti-communists were no more optimistic about the human condition, nor more tolerant of difference, than their brethren. Measures such as the Lusk Committee's Soviet-style Education Act reflected nothing less than a crisis of confidence in the wisdom and efficacy of liberal education. The Committee's attack on liberal education was, therefore, more serious a repudiation of the United States' socio-political structure than the Palmer raids, which focussed entirely on those elements of society adjudged alien to the national community. The Education Act assaulted social sectors and ideals that were previously considered integral to the nation and encouraged widespread, authoritarian interference with education. By the time Lusk-style education acts were repealed in the mid-1920s, repressive policies violating the integrity of educational institutions as well as general freedoms of speech and conscience had been firmly entrenched by extremist kinship groups.

While the reforming ambitions of anti-communists varied considerably, paranoid incapacity to tolerate difference invariably found expression in attempts to flush the United States of all traces of foreignness. Following the Great War, continuous repression was exerted against the use of foreign languages.¹⁷⁰ Anti-communists' discomfort with migrants' unfamiliar languages and customs centred on their sense of alienation and diminished influence within what they considered to be their personal and cultural space. This stimulated feelings of resentment, revived memories of infantile helplessness, and prompted the equation of difference with hostility. Profoundly unsettled and humbled by unwelcome sensations of estrangement and exclusion, anti-communists negotiated their loss of "governmental belonging" poorly. This is why the APL and MI pursued innocuous individuals such as a "pro-German salesman," who reputedly met his brother in his own apartment to speak in the German tongue.¹⁷¹ And while George Creel despaired that many anti-communists failed to distinguish between the languages of "Allied and neutral countries" and

¹⁷⁰ The Governor of Iowa, it will be recalled, attempted to extinguish the use of foreign languages in his State. His actions inspired other governors to initiate "sudden and fundamental changes ... not only in schools, churches, and the press, but in the whole social structure." See Creel, *How We Advertised America*, p. 174.

¹⁷¹ Case 2952 "Herman F. Hiller" (BI - MSS, Box 1, A1, Entry 14, 15, 16).

"enemy languages," he was, nonetheless, convinced of the righteousness of the principle guiding their actions. There could, he wrote:

be no denial of the evil that was attempted to be cured. In our schools, our churches, our press, and in our social life, *English should be the one accepted language*, and this must of necessity be our goal.¹⁷²

It is not surprising that this initiator of a great homogenisation drive took such a view. However, kinship groups soon found that great operations such as that overseen by the CPI's were only possible during times of war, when they were invested with extraordinary powers. Nonetheless, anti-communists remembered the might and precedent of the CPI and their ambition to create new organisations to engender mass uniformity was checked only by practical, rather than ethical, obstacles. The Lusk Committee, for example, was a State body and could only administer regional services such as education. It was powerless to control the flow of immigrants and could not hope to effect the broad social reconstruction later advanced by the Fish Committee. But freedom from responsibility encouraged kinship groups to conceive grandiose plans. Ole Hanson believed America could continue to receive immigrants, if the state properly financed civic education and established:

in the hotel and lodging-house districts schools and libraries ... if necessary with sawdust on the floor, where entertainments, moving-picture shows, instructive lectures, etc., depicting American history [could] be given.¹⁷³

Judge Martin J. Wade of Iowa also believed that comprehensive and far-reaching Americanisation programs could save the United States. Persuaded that economic dislocation, suffering and meddling socialists and anarchists had aroused in America "to a degree never before existing ... many elements of human passion," particularly "selfishness and greed," that "under the influence of Christian civilization had long been dormant," Wade worried that "the souls of millions" were not being treated to "one single word of pride or affection" for their country. He therefore urged for "some way" to be found for kinship groups to "get a hearing with [the] poor people,"

¹⁷² Creel, *How We Advertised America*, p. 174.

namely labourers and farmers, who were "being deluded." "Truth and enlightenment" had to spread beyond the nation's schools. A grass-roots movement delivering "without expense ... wholesome literature" answering falsehoods about "socialism, anarchy, bolshevism and treason ... in detail" was required.¹⁷³ Wade did not suggest who might fund such a venture and neither he nor Hanson seem to have worried that their schemes threatened much-cherished American individualism. Wade preferred instead to wallow in a sea of sentiment and impossible idealism, warding off intrusive reality, imagining Americanisation could be:

sympathetic and generous, free from suspicion of being representative of anything of politics, or politicians, classes, or trades, or interests [holding] out the hand of fellowship and brotherhood [lighting] the fires of hope in the heart [inspiring] faith and confidence [and bringing] to those souls now wandering in darkness that this is now, and always has been, and always will be the land of opportunity for the humble as well as for the exalted.¹⁷⁵

Other kinship groups worked feverishly to enforce the ideological conformity of which Hanson and Wade dreamed. The BAF, for example, combated all forms of collectivism, coercing, intimidating and enticing trade and professional associations not to affiliate with trade unions and "communists."

Propaganda was the most favoured instrument of reformist anti-communists. It was often formulated and disseminated with more subtlety than the CPI had shown. Anti-communists manipulated and exploited public sentiment by controlling the flow of information in the public realm, but also through semantic conventions with which that information was presented. To communicate their beliefs, anti-communists used a host of stock phrases and concepts. James Horn's writing manifested many of these phrases and ideas, inviting readers to attribute the nation's ills to the misguided and unseen machinations of subversive minority groups. Horn emphasised the invasive threat of Big Government attacking the essence of Americanism and warned of the proliferation of "special bodies ... empowered to regulate all sorts of matters" and

¹⁷³ Hanson, *Americanism versus Bolshevism*, p. 248.

¹⁷⁴ *Cong. Rec.*, 66-2, Document 167, *Shall We Have a School of Americanism?*, by the Honourable Martin J. Wade, pp. 6 - 7.

fostering the birth of "commissions and bureaus for almost every conceivable business activity." Horn also persuaded "ordinary Americans" to conceive of themselves as a "silent majority" of "thoughtful" yet victimised prepared to give kinship groups their total support. His assertion that anti-communists enjoyed popular support was completely unverified and Horn closed off debate about the matter by declaring that the fact was so "well known" as to render doubt about his claim pointless.¹⁷⁶

Anti-communists invariably referred to traitorous and foreign hostile forces in the abstract, thereby lending their statements a convincing air of certainty. This is why Horn called agitators for Big Government "apostles of destruction," personalising and marginalising a fictitious, projected concept. Similarly, anti-communists habitually praised the intellect and innate sense of those who supported their contentions and sneered at those who supported different ideas. Horn described antagonists as:

well-meaning but badly informed people who don't realise the ultimate purpose, but believe they see idealistic benefits in features of the program of socialisation.¹⁷⁷

While anti-communists also liked to allege that communists committed heinous crimes in America, they anticipated that fostering mistrust in the community would engender fervent anti-radicalism. Accusations of unsubstantiated perfidy were casually inserted into rhetoric then quickly passed over and left to fester. Horn employed this technique with reference to post-war disturbances caused by radicals, writing of strikes, demonstrations and "every other kind of violent effort" used to disrupt business and extend government ownership of resources. In addition, anti-communists used vague language to imply the great depth and extremism of radical circles. Horn again suggested that "many of the men who helped foment ... disturbances openly admitted" that they aimed to extend government control of the economy, while refusing to indicate precisely to whom he referred. In addition, Horn and other anti-communists cultivated the notion that their moral and intellectual

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 7 - 8.

¹⁷⁶ Horn, *Anarchy*.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

acumen derived from "special knowledge" befitting them for leadership, urging the public to follow "men who [had] had opportunity to study ... anti-social enterprises in different industries ... in different states."¹⁷⁸

Few kinship groups used deceptive language as freely as the Fish Committee. One of the Committee's main priorities was to assemble a body of material proving the duplicity of communists and documents allegedly procured from communists, treated with great license, helped the Committee source a fearsome litany of crimes to radicals. Armed, the Committee spoke of communists "boring from within a number" of major unions and "fomenting ... violent and destructive" strikes, "culminating in riots, violence, destruction of property, assaults and murders necessitating the calling out of troops [in] a virtual state of civil war." The Committee also claimed that it was "self-evident" that communism was inseparable from inferior races and pointed to the alleged percentage of aliens and foreign born in juvenile and adult radical parties, neglecting to supply evidence for such contentions.¹⁷⁹

Anti-communist propaganda was also designed to portray reactionary patriots as defenders of the United States' democratic heritage. Anti-communists strategically exaggerated their identification with the "American people," often at the climax of speeches or articles, to give an impression of sympathy with populist sentiment. Yet such appeals to the sovereign people were the sole manifestation of anti-communist support for democracy. Only at the conclusion of their rhetorical tirades would anti-communists suddenly voice their commitment to democratic order. In Blair Coan's *The Red Web*, for example, the "American people," for the first 230 of its 231 pages, are regarded with suspicion and derided as a disloyal, fickle "mob," unworthy of holding the franchise, let alone power. But in the final paragraph of his book, Coan abruptly placed the future of America in the hands of the "mob," stating that "the American people" held the power to determine "the kind of government – red, pink or red-white-and-blue" that would reign in the United States.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Fish Committee Report, p. 8. The Committee averred that "not more than five percent" of America's Young Pioneers were the children of "native born Americans" and that "ninety percent" of the Pioneers in New York were Jewish. In all it reckoned that "a very large percentage ... probably

Just as anti-communists noisily paid lip service to popular sovereignty, they tried also to give their beliefs an aura of sacredness, personifying revered concepts and institutions and endowing them with internal, extra-human value and defining essences. The personification of an entity was often denoted by the use of capital letters, particularly when using such words as "Constitution," "United States Government," "Capitalist" and "Republican." This convention was neither a historical hangover, nor a stylistic practice of little significance, but represented the desire to counteract the erosion of meaning and order by the forces of modernism and, especially, the might of atheistic revolutionary communism. The author and psychologist James Hillman has written extensively of the significance of words and his analyses help illumine the purpose of anti-communists' practice of such semantic contrivance. Words, Hillman contends, are "independent carriers of soul between people" whose meaning can never be fully comprehended, nor mastered. Rather, words "like angels ... have invisible power" over their users and their own "mythologies ... histories and vogues," as well as "guarding, blaspheming, creating, and annihilating effects."¹⁸⁰

It is an historical fact, however, that since the Reformation, the practice of investing words with multiple meanings and concepts with spiritual values has been in decline. The substitution of "large, abstract" concepts with "small, concrete, particular, single-meaning names [with] no inherent substance of their own," set in train hundreds of years earlier, was especially manifest in modern culture and anti-communists regarded communism as a primary manifestation of modernism. Modernists "mocked and scorned ... Gods, demons, saints, the forces of nature [and] the substantives of metaphysics." They destroyed "the personified word," replacing "lower-case letters. ... in a full democracy of the word, all equal, none more noble, more privileged, none with divine right." Anti-communists keenly felt and feared the loss of "the eighteenth century's poetic capitals and the nineteenth-century's oratorical ones, used to imbue with power and substance such jingoes as Liberty, Progress, and Empire."¹⁸¹ Their practice of capitalising specific words reflected their desire to reify the "angelic power" of the "person in those words," to re-place American society not only within

eighty percent" of Pioneers were aliens or foreign born. It also stated that "approximately seventy percent" of the CPUSA comprised foreigners.

¹⁸⁰ James Hillman, *Revisioning Psychology*, New York, Basic Books, 1975, pp. 9 and 5.

its historical traditions but also within a universal order, where its institutions became more than just frail, human constructions and part of the cosmic plan of God.

The pressure anti-communists felt to establish ideological control in this fashion was heightened by the fact that their leaders were hopelessly limited in their understanding of historical processes and social structures. Their rhetoric betrays their desire to make complex theory and phenomena conform to their own infeasible, simplistic notions. Elizabeth Dilling, for example, seemed to believe that she could separate revolution from class issues by use of uncomplicated and forceful language alone. Therefore, she conceived of political and industrial conflict as a struggle between the great American working class and the shapeless coalition of malcontents and muddle-headed idealists forming the ranks of the Reds. Whereas American workers cherished petit-bourgeois, 100% American ambitions, Reds were:

drawn from all classes, from the dumbest type of "proletarian" bum who anticipates revolution as a diverting opportunity to vent his envy and hatred by looting and murder, all the way to the befogged capitalist type with "suicidal tendencies" who helps finance the Red movement and whose sons acquire their warped theories from Red capitalist-supported college professors, and the idealistic sincere humanitarian type who believes the Red road is the right road and who beckons others to follow him over the precipice into Bolshevism.¹⁸²

Dilling was entirely unable to situate argument within empirical or logical frameworks, or avoid nonsensical, rambling diatribe. Perhaps dimly aware of her limitations, she quoted more scholarly authors to support her beliefs. Yet these writers also differentiated the Self from communists through essentially-irrelevant, moral censure. The author of "Russian Revolution - Do We Want It Here?" argued that perpetual tension between the search for greatness and Progress, and the tendency to internal decay, had determined the life of all civilisations. The signs of degeneration were readily apparent to observers, "unblinded by propaganda." The "famine" which was attendant with communist revolution, for example, was such a sign of degeneration. But while Dillings' source noted the symptoms of social collapse, he

¹⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.

had greater difficulty ascribing causation. The dictates of ideological dogma and propaganda forced him to formulate explanations which didn't so much analyse the particular causes of social breakdown in Russia as justify the United States' continued, total opposition to communism. The writer attributed Russia's woes to "the loss of private ownership which always fosters personal interest and initiative," made apparent by "the dirty drab dilapidation in Russia, with its uncurtained, broken windows and unrepaired roofs."¹⁸³

The level of education and analysis in official intelligence circles was similarly low, as a lecture delivered by MI Lieutenant Ralph Duncan to peers in 1923, demonstrates. Duncan's comprehension of the processes of revolution and revolutionary insurrection was crude and nonsensical, and his grasp of contemporary, global history feeble. For example, he understood the "six principal aims of communism" to be the:

Abolition of private property ... all rights of inheritance ... the family ... marriage ... religion ... and cities and towns.

Duncan claimed that these facts were garnered from a document he called the "Socialist Manifesto." While he could not explain why communists sought to abolish "cities and towns," he nonetheless asserted that communists planned to seize control of the United States by dividing "the voting population...into three principal groups...the Women, the Farmers and Labor," educated and mobilised for revolt. Untroubled by the fact that such a scheme would needlessly exclude huge sections of the populace, Duncan turned to global politics, arguing that communism led "inevitably to a state of anarchy." To substantiate this claim, Duncan recalled "the fate of the Russian people" and the "conditions under the socialist dictatorship in Germany." Whether he imagined he was referring to the short-lived socialist government of Munich or the Weimar Republic can never be established. However, it is not inappropriate to conclude that he had no real idea. His sole task was to motivate others to fight "the insidious, intellectual poison of communism," which was "mutually exclusive [and] wholly incompatible" from "Christian civilisation." The

¹⁸² Dilling, *Red Network*, p. 257.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

problem of verifying his assertions and organising them into a coherent structure was of secondary importance, and quite clearly beyond him.¹⁸⁴

The failure of anti-communists to think through their beliefs was especially manifest in their habit of cultivating horror and outrage with conditions thought to be unique to Soviet Russia but which also existed – in a very real sense – in the United States. Propaganda decried living conditions in Russia, the dearth of quality goods and services, the shocking levels of inflation, the general deprivation of infrastructure, agriculture and industry, the censorship of opinion, the subjugation of trade unions, the deportation of millions of kulaks and ethnic minorities, the corrupt wealth of Party members and the ubiquity of the dreaded secret police. Yet, the lives of millions of Americans were similarly impoverished by mass unemployment, enormous disparities of wealth and opportunity, the destruction of labour representation through state-sanctioned strike-breaking and deportation, and the continued censorship of public letters and opinions conducted by a secret police apparatus whose legal status and political function closely mirrored that of the OGPU. These were unpalatable facts anti-communists were not prepared to acknowledge and they attempted to brush them off with disingenuous, semantic contrivances. This behaviour is typified by the Fish Committee's portrayal of federal government efforts to suppress labour organisation as an act of benevolence, rather than anti-democratic repression. Rationalising that the Secretary of Labor had "endeavoured to protect" workers from communists, the Committee found that the Secretariat of the Department was alone among administrative branches of government offering any "defence ... against communist attacks on industry."¹⁸⁵

Ten years earlier, the Lusk Committee similarly described its Education Act as a pastoral gesture. Making no allowance for the detrimental effect of repression, the Committee didn't consider that students of crude and compulsory civics classes might resent such courses, or interpret them in an undesirable manner. The damage to the morale of teaching, student, ethnic and labour communities also escaped notice. Moreover, the Committee singularly failed to recognise the similarity of its anti-

¹⁸⁴ "Communism – A World-Wide Program of Conquest and Revolution," by 1st Lieutenant Ralph E. Duncan, AG – ORG, for MI Association of 6th Corps Area, Chicago, 31 October 1923, File 10110 – 2517 (MI – MSS, Reel 23).

radical measures and the "educational" activities of the much-hated Bolsheviks.¹⁸⁶ Yet the Committee's horror with the Bolshevik's indoctrination of their subjects was rather incongruous, given that its Education Act gave the state unprecedented control of education and the dissemination of knowledge, and empowered the state to summarily dismiss any teaching professionals deemed not to have "satisfactorily" shown their "obedient...support" of the nation's "government and institutions." Moreover, the Committee's justification for its education policy could hardly have been more "Bolshevik," for the Committee decreed:

No person who adheres to the Marxian program, the program of the Left Wing of the Socialist Party in this country, should be allowed to become a teacher in the public school system, and if discovered to be a teacher, should be compelled to sever his connection with the school system, for it is impossible for such a person to carry out the purpose of the public schools.¹⁸⁷

Although public schools had a duty to express "the country's ideals, the purpose of its institutions and the philosophy of its life and government," such a sensitive task could clearly not encompass deep contemplation of social systems and history, and could only be entrusted to elites, who could brook no murmur of dissent nor any hint of ambiguity.¹⁸⁸

Anti-communists were not entirely unaware of their intellectual deficiencies, however, and they believed themselves to be at a particular disadvantage in the comprehension and propagation of social theory, compared with their enemies on the left. This perception, another manifestation of paranoid feeling about imagined, supreme capabilities of an Other, was critical in fostering resentment of intellectuals

¹⁸⁵ Fish Committee Report, p. 8.

¹⁸⁶ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 341 - 4. Indeed, the Committee specifically condemned the Bolsheviks' "Political Propaganda and Educational Activity in the Villages," which was being disseminated through popular literature and newspapers "especially prepared for this purpose...sold at very low prices in schools, reading huts and in all Soviet stores." The Committee also decried the supply of villages with communist reading rooms, and the cooperative scheme of local party organisations and provincial and county departments of education, who were organising "collegiums of propagandists," giving "periodical readings" to the illiterate. Theatres, concerts, motion pictures and exhibitions were also being used to instruct the general public, and all religious instruction and counter-revolutionary propaganda issued in the "guise of religious sermons" was being suppressed.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1118. The Committee, in this instance, was quoting the associate superintendent of schools in New York, Dr. John L. Tildsley.

and antipathy for humanistic education. The pacifism of many intellectuals also infuriated anti-communists, who were personally insulted and destabilised by others' apparent lack of need for regressive and defensive political structures.

Elizabeth Dilling forcefully expressed two elements of anti-communists' anti-intellectual distemper in a discussion about "so-called" Christian Pacifism, which indicated her extreme discomfort with the psychological atmosphere of a liberalism that substituted faith with relativity and disputation. Further, Dilling felt the keenest hatred for Christian Pacifists because she believed they had stolen what was rightfully hers: exclusive identification with the legacy of Christ. So she turned to the Bible to justify the exclusion of the Other. Citing II Corinthians 7:14 and Matthew 12:29, she cautioned the "righteous" to avoid "communion with darkness." Yet "sincere Christian pacifist" instead:

buried [their heads] in the sand ... blindly ignoring the fact that those most dominant in influencing, financing, boring from within, if not actually controlling the great majority of pacifist societies are Socialists and Communists who appear in the clothing of sheep crying "Peace! Peace!" ... like ravening wolves ... agitating [for] "class struggle," "class war," civil wars and bloody revolution."¹⁸⁹

Anti-communists' envy of intellectuals also prompted them to suspect the Red and Pink intelligentsia of improperly influencing government and disenfranchising mainstream America in the process. The WSL articulated this concern to Congress in 1934. Although worried that governments weren't taking the counsel of patriots seriously enough, the League was unable to sustain this charge and the vague, tortured quality of its rhetoric seemingly expressed its members' fundamental anxiety. Requesting Congress to make an "investigation ... broad and comprehensive enough to give the American people a complete picture of the radical movement," the League complained:

We feel that it, the radical movement, is greater and more dangerous than you seem to believe. During the past year the American people have had some

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

intensive education as to the fundamental changes in principles of Government, as favoured by many professors. The citizens have a right to know where those changed principles may lead them.¹⁹⁰

A sense of inferiority, resented and denied, underpinned the anxiety of the League. Occasionally, however, the intellectual poverty of anti-communism was directly addressed by its proponents. J. Howard Rhodes, an advertising executive engaged by the League to assist with its publicity, acknowledged his kinship group's educational deficiency and counseled patriots to improve their intellectual training, remarking:

It is all right to stir up these young socialists, but some of the "stirrers" should be prepared to snap back the answers to floor them, otherwise the members of the WSL will be put down as "red-baiters" or fanatics. The "liberal's" [sic] like nothing better than to try to make their opponents look ridiculous. See what they did to the Liberty League; to the Daughters of the American Revolution and others who have opposed them ... We "conservative's" [sic] have everything in our favour but skill in the art of disputation ... It takes a Jew to beat a Jew.¹⁹¹

Yet while some anti-communists recognised the need to improve their education, efforts at self-improvement failed to match ambition. Anti-communists' defence of capitalism continued to rest on the total denial of structural dysfunction in the economy, made possible only by comparing the United States favourably with the USSR, never by measuring the equity and prosperity of America against its own ideals and laws. Various criticisms were recognised by the right to be damaging and embarrassing; the inequality of the economy was especially disturbing. The stock response of anti-communists to such criticism was to claim that "millions of Americans, a greater proportion of the population in any other country," had invested in their nation, in "farms, homes, property, stock, savings or a business of some

¹⁸⁹ Dilling, *Red Network*, pp. 61 - 3.

¹⁹⁰ Letter of WSL to Henry T. Rainey, Speaker of House of Representatives, 31 March 1934 (Westchester Security League - MSS, Folder titled "WSL Correspondence").

¹⁹¹ Letter of J. Howard Rhodes to Mrs. Phelps, c. 1937 (ibid.).

sort."¹⁹² The gross size of the economy was also emphasised, as was pride in the abstract achievement of national strength.

While intellectual myopia helped anti-communist kinship groups rationalise the proposed abandonment of democracy, it could not paper over other deficiencies in their political and psychological program. The kinship groups' failure to create viable alternative means of government, national democratic traditions and elements of their own dogma still forced them into a reluctant dialog with communism and other ideologies. The burden of democracy and the legacy of republicanism compelled them to acknowledge others' political rights, even though they denied others' capacity to responsibly and morally exercise those rights. The tension between, on one side, the psychological need to establish absolute control by and for the kinship group, and, on the other, traditional obligations of openness and power sharing, was critical in producing instability and inconsistency at the heart of the anti-communist movement, preventing paranoid kinship groups from fully realising their authoritarian schemes. Moreover, it remained difficult for anti-communists to repress discomfort aroused by injustice caused by their fanaticism and criticism of their rigid defence of unmediated capitalism.¹⁹³

Although kinship groups could refuse or fail to recognise the psychological and ethical pressures concomitant with the abandonment of democracy, they all had to live with the fact that their ideological shift proved ineffectual in solving numerous socio-political problems. So long as anti-communists persuaded mainstream America to compulsively identify "Americanism" with "rugged individualism" and government regulation, let alone ownership, of business with socialism and social decline, the peaceful resolution of issues like industrial relations remained impossible. This contention is demonstrated by the fate of President Wilson's abortive Industrial Conference of 1919. While the Conference identified structural forces promoting industrial unrest, its executive committee foreswore taking practical action, such as legislating wage-protection guarantees or compulsory arbitration. The Conference's

¹⁹² Dilling, *Red Network*, p. 92. From an article included in the book, titled "Capitalism - Hewer and Chiseler."

¹⁹³ This is why Herbert Hoover claimed that "human progress" depended not merely on "altruism" but also "enlightened self-interest." Such a statement represents conservatives' struggle to dissociate

goals were vague and conservative and the executive committee sought refuge in myth and nostalgia, formulating an unworkable, uniquely "American" scheme, based on "American experience" and meeting "American conditions," preventing government from intruding on the regulation of workplace conditions and wages.¹⁹⁴

Measures used to manage the deportation of undesirable aliens similarly foundered because of imprecise wording in their formulation, which suggests an ambivalence in their purpose. The function of law, it should be remembered, is to bring order though clear, unequivocal strictures that, as far as is possible, restrict grounds for uncertainty in their correct application. However, legislation calling for the deportation of aliens found to have committed crimes "involving moral turpitude" within five years of their arrival could not be applied consistently, nor in the manner that anti-communists desired. According to Congress, which was anxious to preserve the United States' image as a haven for political refugees, the concept of "moral turpitude" applied to lawless behaviour implicit in common felonies, but not political crimes. So by the post-war period, the DL, in its endeavours to expel political miscreants, was forced to conclude that "moral turpitude" could only comprise an act "activated by malice" that contradicted the "moral sense of the community." Such an act, moreover, couldn't be the "outcome merely of natural passion ... weakness of character [or] mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind." Defying objective interpretation, the law became worse than obsolete. It could be used by lawyers to stymie the expulsion of foreigners and was an administrative nightmare for government.¹⁹⁵

Anti-communist kinship groups' actions, besides being impractical, generally came too late to effect desired change. For example, legislation expediting the deportation

individualism from the inequity it engendered and the selfishness it implied. Address titled "Americanism and the World," 29 October 1919 (Hoover - MSS, Box 152).

¹⁹⁴ Resolved to dissociate the American economy from systemic problems, denying the restriction of free speech in the United States, the Conference decided to seek to establish the "right relationship" between employers and employees, which it proposed to effect through fostering "unity of interest," "organised cooperation" and the "human relationship" of small industry. The Conference also hoped that management and labour would come together in "joint action" to satisfy "common interests"; managers would fraternise with workers and labourers would strive to gain "knowledge of the industry" and "understand their relation to the joint endeavour." The body it proposed would oversee industrial relations, the National Industrial Board, would impose "no penalties other than those [of] public opinion." See *Report of the Industrial Conference*, 6 March 1920 (Hoover - MSS, Box 336, Folder 1C).

of undesirable alien internees only passed through Congress after no such internees were left to deport. In this respect, the legislation proved as useful as the Immigration Act of 1903 that penalised membership in anarchist organisations fifteen years after they essentially vanished from the political landscape.¹⁹⁶ These laws were enacted by men under the paranoid impression that the Self retained the power to seize control of a situation that had long slipped from its grasp. The Education Act of 1924 is another prime example of such reactive, tardy activity. According to Ghassan Hage, the attempt by Congress to regulate the flow of ethnic groups in the United States is best understood as a "ritual of empowerment," through which anti-communists renewed their belief in their capacity to "make decisions about [Others]." Although the Act can be interpreted as a measure that enabled kinship groups to redesign the human landscape of the nation, its capacity to achieve this aim was in fact severely limited by the fact that the migration battle had been lost decades earlier. All the Act accomplished, essentially, was a reshuffle of the cards already in the deck. By 1924, the immigration horse had well and truly bolted.¹⁹⁷

By and large anti-communists surrendered to their aggressive psychological impulses, in any case, rather than examining them, and the social harm they caused didn't diminish their ardour. These matters were dissociated from their cause. At most, the countless acts of legal and psychological abuse performed by anti-communists occasioned among a minority of them an abstract sense of regret.¹⁹⁸ And while some anti-communists were given to occasional moments of remorse, such sentiment was overshadowed by the more dominant characteristics of their crusade: ferocity, ignorance, viciousness, vengefulness and incapacity for reflection. The intellectual, moral and psychological paralysis of anti-communism, engendered by kinship groups

¹⁹⁵ Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters*, p. 248.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 251 and 21.

¹⁹⁷ Hage, *White Nation*, pp. 240 - 1. Hage makes a similar point about the efficacy and purpose of the "immigration debate" in contemporary Australia, which hinges around the supposition that the forces of cultural and ethnic orthodoxy are still able to manipulate, like pieces on a chess board, the migration of peoples to Australia.

¹⁹⁸ George Creel, for example, acknowledged that the drive for 100% Americanism occasioned a "nightmare of solicitation, selfish purposes, and personal aggrandisements," perpetrated exclusively by "native," witchhunting, WASP Americans but he still took the greatest pride in the CPI's Americanisation achievements. Moreover, Creel prosecuted Americanisation believing that it had "been years since the melting-pot [did] any melting to speak of" and that the United States had brought immigrants "only in the most haphazard way into touch with the bright promise of American life." See Creel, *How We Advertised America*, pp. 171 - 3.

between 1917 and 1935, continued to dominate politics in the United States for the remainder of the twentieth century.

The effects and legacies of anti-communism were manifold and varied. The ascendancy of paranoid fear and notions in vital government, business and cultural sectors of the national community heightened the influence of aggressive ideology over the United States' international and internal affairs. Anti-communism, more than any other force, influenced United States foreign policy, transforming the nation into a defensive fortress. Within the nation, worsening problems of social inequality were more strongly denied as minority communities and causes were blamed and persecuted for systemic economic and political dysfunction. The civil liberties of United States citizens and residents were diminished by legal fiats, administrative procedures, show trials and "patriotic" vigilantism. In a climate of repression, fear and conformism, the intellectual, cultural and spiritual health of the nation suffered. While anti-communism activity failed to assuage the anxiety of its proponents, the very notion of society in the United States was critically undermined. Faith in America's democracy – that is, in the judgment and ability of its citizens – and the notion that the United States, by holding to its democratic traditions, could overcome its difficulties, faltered. Instead, anti-democratic excess initiated an extended period of political and cultural repression that reached its apotheosis in the Cold War.

PART II

Chapter 1: The History of Australian Anti-Communism, 1917 - 1935

The impact of the Bolshevik revolution on Australian society in many respects resembled its affect on the United States. When revolution transformed Russia, anxiety about Australia's racial, economic and political security was rampant. As in the United States, fear and prejudice, stirred by the passions of war, stimulated the growth of anti-communism. Following the revolution, government, security forces and patriots strove to repress the political left and social elements perceived to be alien to the national community. However, conditions peculiar to Australia curtailed the power of bureaucrats, policemen and patriots. Obstructed by social and legal impediments to extreme repression, Australian anti-communists evinced less zeal than their American confreres and were less successful in seizing control of national ideology.

The machinery of anti-communist repression was established earlier in the United States than in Australia. Whereas Australians were just as inclined, and perhaps more so, to insulate their country from foreign peoples and ideas, Australia was distant from Europe, less obvious a destination for immigrants and more difficult to enter, on account of its strict, racially-based immigration quota system. The Australian government, therefore, only began to create apparatus for political repression a full decade after Congress enacted its 1903 Alien Anarchist Law. External threats to socio-political cohesion only assumed practical significance immediately prior to and during the Great War, when conflicts and economic organisation suddenly and radically escalated. Australian authorities prepared to fight their enemies with intensified vigour and new instruments. Punitive legislation, enforced by military and state policing bodies, targeted workers, Irish Nationalists, Germans, industrial radicals and "Boisheviks."

The IWW was the first organisation subjected to covert surveillance and political suppression. By early 1914, the Wobblies' unorthodox beliefs and the large number of foreigners in its ranks had attracted the attention of authorities. Radical exiles from all

over the British Empire had joined the organisation, inspired by its American parent.¹ While the IWW was monitored, governments could combat its unwelcome message, for some time, only through general measures regulating public opinion. The government of New South Wales, for example, imprisoned Wobblies for addressing public meetings, selling literature and taking collections without proper authorisation or license.²

National commitment to war enabled the federal government to enlarge its domestic powers. Policing agencies were strengthened while the government of the eventual Labor defector, W. M. Hughes, began to use legislation in early 1916 to expand its repressive functions. The War Precautions Act (WPA), introduced in 1914, empowered the government to suppress all opinion likely to prejudice recruiting or harm the war effort. The vaguely worded Act gave the government enormous discretion in its application and it censored and suppressed criticism of its conduct and policies under the cloak of patriotism and military necessity.³ While persons deemed to have broken War Precautions laws were severely punished,⁴ the Act did not stamp out opposition and the federal government continued to suffer setbacks in its prosecution of the war, particularly the damaging defeat of the first referendum on conscription for overseas service in 1916. Anxious to demonstrate his anti-radical *fides* to his Nationalist Party (NP) colleagues, Hughes formulated, in consultation with the State Premiers, the Unlawful Associations Act (UAA).

The UAA allowed authorities not only to imprison individuals obstructing the war but also to proscribe associations doing the same. Proscribed organisations were prohibited from distributing material through the post and their property could be

¹ Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, pp. 37 – 8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 120 and 123.

³ Police habitually removed materials contravening the Act, including political posters and literature, and arrested persons disseminating illegal propaganda. The Acts were used to suppress various protest movements, including that led by the prominent suffragette and Socialist Party of Victoria organiser, Adela Pankhurst, who led a number of demonstrations in Melbourne in August and September 1917 against rising living costs. Pankhurst was charged on several occasions, both under the WPA and the UAA for addressing meetings in excess of twenty people and for making speeches "encouraging the injury of property." See Smart, "Feminists, Food and the Fair Price," pp. 113 – 31.

⁴ The prominent Wobbly Tom Barker was fined £20 and threatened with an additional fine of £200 and a prison sentence of six months hard labour for publishing material prejudicing recruitment. He was later convicted for publishing additional prejudicial material and opted to endure three months jail rather than pay a £100 fine. See Francis M. Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance, 1916-1932*:

confiscated. Members were also barred from employment in the Commonwealth civil service. In July 1917 the Act was strengthened, making crimes under the Act punishable only by imprisonment and enabling the government to summarily declare associations unlawful. Like criminal syndicalism legislation in the United States, the Act introduced guilt by association and criminal penalties for the expression of ideas into the legal system and those attending prohibited organisations' meetings or possessing their literature could be punished as severely as those who wrote or distributed such material. Legal convention and tradition was further flouted by the retrospective application of the Act; those charged with opposing the war as much as two and half years prior to the passing of the law were prosecuted under its provisions. In practice, the UAA was often used alongside the WPA to secure double convictions. One Wobbly speaking on the Sydney Domain was sentenced in October 1917 to six months imprisonment with hard labour for speaking on matters pertaining to the IWW and to an additional three months detention for being a member of that union.⁵

Police and surveillance forces were critical not only to the implementation of new legislation but also to its creation, for the federal government would not have amended the UAA unless its confidence in the power of its policing arms was substantial. Moreover, it wouldn't have created the law unless it was convinced that there was a significant traitorous presence in Australia, and security services did much to encourage this belief. Intelligence and police agencies also profited by the split of the federal Labor Party and the removal of Labor from government. Important elements of the Party had been displeased by prosecution of anti-conscriptionists and once their influence diminished, conservative authorities were freer to pursue their objectives.⁶

The surveillance of domestic communities commenced with the monitoring and eventual internship of German and Austrian immigrants and citizens by Military Intelligence (MI). Until early 1916, the observation of Germans and aliens formed the bulk of MI's work, but the split of federal Labor and escalating community

Reactions to Radicalism during and after the First World War, PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1979, pp. 290 – 2.

⁵ Ibid.

antagonism prompted the agency to observe a myriad of political associations opposing the war. They included anti-recruitment groups opposed to compulsory military training for youths, Trades Hall Councils, Labor parliamentarians, intellectuals and peace groups. "Aliens" were also monitored. Italian and, most notably, Russian communities quickly joined Germans and Austrians as objects of official suspicion. Military Intelligence mutated into an enforcer of partisan policies, and this role became integral to its operational purpose and psychology. Prime Minister Hughes used the organisation to spy on and threaten his political rivals, as well as seize materials critical of his government. Military Intelligence also raided the premises of suspected Irish Nationalist leaders.⁷

The increased activity, responsibility and politicisation of MI was typical of the whole intelligence community. The Censor's Office, for example, devoted itself to the censorship of mail and "radical" publications. Working in close collaboration with MI, State police and the Commonwealth Crown Prosecutor, the Censor compiled lists of radicals, and opened their correspondence, before referring to these bodies hundreds of cases involving infractions of WPA and UAA laws, complete with evaluations of the threat of each case.⁸ The Office was particularly concerned with the surveillance and suppression of industrial unionists, anti-conscriptionists and suspect racial and cultural groups. The Censor also prevented labour groups from communicating with international *confreres* by confiscating imported materials and obstructing the passage of outbound packages. In addition, the Censor assumed immigration duties, alerting the Home and Territories Department to applications for citizenship from undesirables. The Office also involved itself with domestic politicals, suppressing a Queensland MP's inquiry into the living conditions of interned Germans and Austrians, assisting efforts to crush the New South Wales General Strike of 1917, monitoring the correspondence of strike leaders and ensuring that no information favourable to the strikers was disseminated. And while the Censor

⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 28 – 9, 41 – 2 and 235 – 41. Among those Hughes directed MI to investigate was J. H. Catts, an MP and vociferous critic of the Prime Minister.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 96 – 8.

habitually opened Labor parliamentarians' mail, it never subjected any NP member to such treatment.⁹

The importance of suppressing left dissent was even more important for the Counter-Espionage Bureau (CEB), an organisation attached to a British body that eventually became MI5. Formed in 1916 to coordinate the activities of Military and Naval Intelligence (NI) and the Censor's Office (also subsidiaries of parent organisations in Great Britain), the Bureau had so little work during the war, besides persecuting Wobblies, that its existence was imperiled.¹⁰ The Bureau set about justifying its existence by compiling lists of prospective alien deportees under the Aliens Restrictions Order. It must be emphasised, then, that the Bureau, like the Censor's Office and MI, had to create its own work and it relied on the materialisation of Bolshevism to do this. Moreover, like the BI in the United States, the CEB established its importance by fashioning new duties and responsibilities from the administrative and psychological practices of the Great War. Working with other official, as well as non-official anti-radical organisations, the Bureau continued to observe entrenched enemies while increasing the number and variety of its targets.

The most immediate and obvious function of the surveillance bureaucracy during the war was the implementation of suppressive legislation. However, from the first, the prosecution and persecution of social undesirables involved resorting to extra-legal measures. The infamous trial of the IWW Twelve, a group of Sydney Wobblies arrested for arson and treason in 1916, reveals the lengths to which authorities traveled to crush political opposition. During the preliminary stages of their arraignment, the Twelve were refused bail and their right to communicate with legal counsel. An investigator appointed by the NSW Labour Council found, moreover, that State witnesses had submitted perjured evidence, while authorities had fabricated

⁹ Ibid., pp. 124 - 30 and 139 - 50. The Censor's Office provided the federal government with optimum assistance in the persecution of radicals. When the Australian Labor Party, Social Democratic League, Anti-Conscription League, Peace Society and the Australian Union for Democratic Control held a conference in Sydney in February 1917, adopting a united peace policy, the Censor urged the government to wait until they amalgamated into a single group before proscribing them under the UAA. The Office further impeded the cause of anti-conscriptionists by preventing the spread of information concerning the war during the second referendum. Labour unions were prevented from corresponding with Upton Sinclair and the Rand School of Social Sciences, among others.

evidence. One police officer testified that evidentiary material used in the trial had been planted and that police had silenced their snitch with a two thousand-pound reward. In addition, Major Steward, chief of CEB, and the N. S. W. police hierarchy, instructed police officers raiding the homes of Wobblies and the organisation's premises to seize common-place materials, such as "cotton waste or phosphorous," that could be construed as suspicious.¹¹ When the Twelve were sentenced, the presiding judge advised the jury, prior to their deliberation, that the IWW had no place in Australia, as there was no class conflict in the antipodes. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hughes placed himself in contempt of court, under parliamentary privilege, by inflaming opinion against the Twelve while the trial proceeded.

After the trial's conclusion, the authorities continued to harangue the Wobblies. An eighty-five year old man in the Twelve had his old-age pension terminated and was soon after sentenced to six months hard labour for "agitation," or contributing to IWW activity during the general strike. The intelligence sector, meanwhile, continued to supply employers with lists of Wobblies so that they could be dismissed under the UAA. Individual radicals were condemned to unemployment and the organisation itself consigned to oblivion.¹² Although the WPA and UAA expedited much persecution, authorities were loath to abandon other means of combating radicals. Newcastle police rid their region of Wobblies by charging them with spurious offences such as offensive public behaviour, obstructing traffic and assault. Unable to pay their fines, Wobblies were imprisoned, and on release fled the district, never to return. This practice remained popular into the 1930s, long after the effective demise of the organisation.¹³

The means by which the IWW was destroyed established important precedents in political repression. The Wobblies were the first social rebels to be formally accused of sedition. Before the close of the war, federal intelligence agencies engineered

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 182. Cain suggests that the prosecution of the IWW gave the CEB new impetus and purpose, at a time when it was desperately needed, due to the overlapping of duties between the various intelligence bureaus.

¹¹ Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, pp. 207 – 14 and 240 – 1 and Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 275. The snitch discussed here was later beaten to death by police in 1921.

¹² Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, pp. 210 – 3.

¹³ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 272.

another show-trial of Irish Nationalists. Working in concert, the CEB, NI and MI raided Nationalists' premises and after examining seized evidence, principally a twenty-pound contribution to an overseas arms purchase, they concluded that the Irishmen were purchasing armaments from Germany and smuggling them to Ireland via the United States. They recommended the indictment of the leaders for incitement to treason, sedition, communicating with enemy spies, causing disaffection with the King and prejudicing recruitment. The transparency of the exercise prompted the New South Wales government, bending to public pressure, to conduct an inquiry into the case. However, the CEB, after assisting the Attorney-General's Department in preparing for the inquiry, also involved itself in the selection of a High Court Justice to head the inquiry and the inquiry duly found that the Irish captives were compelled to answer criminal charges.¹⁴

The response of Australian conservatives to Bolshevism closely mirrored that of Britain and the United States. On one level, the repudiation of Bolshevism was dictated by self-interest. Australia was outraged when the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the war against Germany. Consequently, the allegation that the Bolsheviks were in the pay of Germany was widely believed and negative publicity about Russia chiefly emphasised the appalling treatment of Allied subjects in Bolshevik territory.¹⁵ Only after the failure of intervention in the Russian Civil War did criticism of Bolshevism focus on its depravity, impracticality and fearsome influence.

Australian conservatives had particular cause to fear Bolshevik doctrines. The electoral and industrial power of labour in Australia exceeded that of virtually any other nation. In the exceptionally divisive atmosphere of war, with Labor split, unprecedented strike activity and mass disaffection with living standards, the prospect of radical revolution seemed real to many. The labour movement appeared increasingly militant and its initial reception of the Bolshevik revolution was enthusiastic. Labour papers distrusted the "capitalist press" and its news of Russia. *Labor Call*, the organ of the Victorian Trades Hall Council, regarded Russia as the

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 235 - 41. The inquiry was finally headed by a N. S. W. Supreme Court Justice.

¹⁵ The Melbourne *Argus* for example, ran a series of stories about Russia in 1918, under headlines such as "Russia - Allies to the Rescue," "Bolshevik Evil - War Against Allies," "German Gold for Bolsheviks" and "Bolsheviks - Ghastly Incident - Allied Subjects Starved," on 29 July, 24 August, 16 September and 3 October 1918.

world's first true democracy and urged Australians to nationalise land and adopt other Bolshevik policies. The federal Labor parliamentarian, Frank Anstey, gave fiery speeches denouncing capitalism, in support of socialist revolution. And in 1918 the All-Australian Congress of Trade Unions (ACTU) ratified the resolutions of the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland Trade Union Congresses to adopt a "revolutionary" political program to bring about the universal "abolition of capitalist ownership of means of production." This led to the adoption by the ACTU of One Big Unionism, the amalgamation of all existing unions into a single super-organisation.¹⁶

Fundamentally, Australian conservatives' fear of Bolshevism rested on the same foundation as American anti-communists'. Yet subtle and specific influences produced differences. The high incidence of strike activity and the radicalisation of labour stimulated intense anxiety over the future of Australia's capitalist economy. The dread of labour embracing industrial radicalism or socialism was perhaps more acute, or grounded, because the power of labour and evidence of labour's support for revolution were more palpable. Consequently, Australian conservatives seldom distinguished economic doctrines like One Big Unionism, syndicalism, anarchism and socialism. The idea that these doctrines were identical was unshakeable, and the fear of small radical cabals infiltrating, subverting and uniting the entire labour movement was particularly powerful.

In the political arena, Bolshevism similarly represented a vague conglomerate of hostile causes. The Melbourne *Argus* articulated the uncertainty and horror Bolshevism provoked when it opined, "the Bolshevik in Melbourne is pursuing the same policy as the Bolshevik in Central Europe or Ireland." The paper even described the German Socialist League as "Sinn Feiners" and Bolsheviks.¹⁷ The notion that foreigners were responsible for the radicalisation of labour and that radicalism and socialism were inherently foreign to Australia also enjoyed great currency. However, while objectionable political views were attributed to specific racial and cultural

¹⁶ *Labor Call*, 31 January and 7 February 1918 and Vere Gordon Childe, *How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers' Representation in Australia*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1964, pp. 166-9.

¹⁷ *Argus*, 7 June 1919. Australian conservatives were fiercely anti-Irish and identified Sinn Feinism, more than any other cause, with Bolshevism. Irish Republicanism was considerably more threatening to Australian elites than to American, because identification with British Imperialism was much more integral to their construction and maintenance of identity.

groups, the high profile participation of Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Celts in labour and radical activities, and the small size of non-Anglo immigrant communities, ensured that identification of inferior, racial elements with communism was considerably less intense in Australia than in the United States. In the antipodes there were no obscure, mysterious groups of foreign-born anarchists detonating bombs in the homes of federal Attorneys-General or Wall St. financiers. Nonetheless, the association of political and racial perfidy was very real and bipartisan support for the White Australia Policy remained firm. Only iconoclasts like the Wobblies and, later, the Communists, spoke out against doctrines of racial inequality. In Australia, the challenge for anti-communists was more to continue to keep out unwelcome influences rather than revolutionise the nation's immigration policy and cleanse the community of millions of unassimilable citizens.

The key similarity in the creation of anti-communism in Australia and the United States was the degree to which psychological instability dictated the perception and responses of anti-communists. Australian anti-communism was a defensive, resentful reaction to the onslaught of modernism on social order. For Australian conservatives, Bolshevism embodied the assault of the lower orders on nature's hierarchy of merit and worth. Cherished doctrines of genetic inequality had rarely been so forcefully challenged. The very structure of society was imperiled by atheistic destruction of religion, devaluation of the family unit and notions of equality, threatening to spread from the economic into every facet of social existence. The signs of decay varied from Cubism, to free love, to feminism.¹⁸ Australian conservatives believed that the Bolsheviks were committing "wholesale slaughter of the *bourgeois* or middle class," and that murder and lynching was "a Bolshevik pastime."¹⁹ They learned that industry had collapsed with the execution of engineers and company directors, that the state sanctioned bank robbery and that hordes of vagrant scum, aided by sadistic bands of Chinese henchmen, roamed the country, killing the clergy and raping nuns. Australian newspapers also informed shocked readers of the establishment of Commissariats of

¹⁸ John F. Williams has written persuasively of the identification of Bolshevism with Modernism by Australian cultural elites. See Williams, *Quarantined Culture*. Reports decrying Bolshevik free love and its connections with feminism were commonplace in the Australian media. See, for example, *Argus* 21 January and 27 March 1919.

¹⁹ *Argus*, 25 January 1919 and 12 September 1918.

Free Love across Russia, where "respectable women" had been "flogged for refusing to yield."²⁰

The same currents of anarchy were seemingly manifest in Australia. In Darwin, for example, a largely "Greek and Russian" mob in Darwin had expelled the Northern Territory government in December 1919.²¹ Although *Liberty and Progress*, the organ of the Victorian Employer's Federation, rationalised the phenomenon of Bolshevism as a new manifestation of age-old parasitism, its normalisation of the doctrine made it appear far more rampant than it really was.²² The *Argus* similarly suggested that the word "Bolshevism" referred to any "wild cat" or "extremist" prepared to go "the whole hog" in pursuit of their goals and claimed that the banks of the Yarra in Melbourne were lined with Bolsheviks, including atheists, anarchists, "peanut vendors," "bootmakers," "poets," Russian nationals and women with tertiary educations.²³

Anti-communist activity in Australia was less intense, constant and brutal, and more opportunistic than that in the United States. The means by which communists were deported from Australia illustrates some important, distinguishing characteristics of antipodean anti-communism. During the war years, and the short, sharp Red Scare of 1919, approximately one hundred people were expelled from Australia; in contrast, thousands of "alien radicals" were ejected from the United States. Moreover, the manner of expulsion in America was more cruel. Although anti-communism remained a powerful force in Australian politics, repressive action was to a much larger degree restricted by the possibilities of specific circumstance. Sudden flurries of anti-communism flared around extraordinary incidents, such as the 1923 Melbourne police strike and the Red Scare of 1919, when the federal government and the intelligence

²⁰ The *Argus* typically roared "Bolsheviks - Women Nationalised - Also Children" on 21 January 1919. See also 12 September 1918, 11 January, 8 March, 14 April, 23 April, 1 October 1919 and 3 January 1920.

²¹ The expelled Administrator of the Northern Territory, Gilruth opined before a Royal Commission inquiry that Bolshevik elements of the population, of foreign extraction would likely have conducted a revolution had he not agreed to withdraw from Darwin. See Gavin Souter, *Lion and Kangaroo: The Initiation of Australia 1901 - 1919*, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1976, p. 301.

²² *Liberty and Progress*, 25 June 1920. The journal's editor claimed "A burglar or footpad is a first-class Bolshevik. A socialist who does not recognise individual property rights is a Bolshevik. An employee who gives an equivalent of four hours' work and receives or demands eight hours pay is a Bolshevik."

²³ *Argus* 7 June and 27 March 1919.

community was at war with the Queensland Labor government and radical sections of the populace expelled the conservative administration of the Northern Territory. Thereafter, however, only sporadic disturbances, like the police strike, the 1925 waterside workers' strike, international communist conferences and the election of the Lang Labor government in New South Wales alerted the casual observer to the communist threat to national life.

At the time of the Bolshevik revolution, only one Labor government held office in Australia, in Queensland, and it was there that conservatives anticipated Bolshevism might establish a foothold. Disloyalty and sympathy for revolution appeared rampant in the northern state. During the war, the Queensland government had established what might be termed a system of small-scale state socialism; the government purchased and ran butcher shops, timber works, mines and a hotel. A state police union was also established, which led the Governor-General to remark that the police were at the "beck and call of the Labor Caucus" and that future military strife between the state and the rest of the federation was expected. Indeed, the Governor-General maintained that Bolsheviks ran the Queensland government, Germans ran the state's agriculture and Sinn Feinists the public utilities. There was a strong union presence in the state and the Wobblies were successful in rural areas. Further, Queensland played host to the largest number and variety of foreign-language communities in the nation.²⁴

Conservatives were also disturbed by Queensland authorities' recalcitrant support of the WPA and UAA. While state police didn't obstruct the statutes, they did refuse to enforce some of their provisions, such as the ban on displaying red flags. The failure of Queensland police to press charges against a heckler who bespattered Prime Minister Hughes with an egg at a rally in Warwick in 1917, prompted an hysterical Hughes to form the Commonwealth Police Force (CPF). Hughes imagined that the Force would concentrate its efforts in Queensland, where state police were "honey-combed with Sinn Feiners and I.W.W." and failed to enforce laws, "openly [resisting] them."²⁵ Intelligence services were similarly convinced of the treasonous nature of the

²⁴ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 32, 40, and 295 - 6.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 296 and 317. Hughes claimed that his judgment of the Queensland police's loyalty was formed "quite apart from the Warwick incident."

Queensland regime and deplored Queensland Premier T. J. Ryan's public protest against the deportation of Italians and the treatment of interned prisoners under the WPA. For the CPF, Ryan's shameful conduct was "the first instance of a Premier leading a meeting of protest against the actions of the Commonwealth Government." Worse, Queensland officials, notably the uniformly "Irish" Queensland police, left disloyal reprobates free to air their heresies, unmolested.²⁶

Objectionable races were also being permitted to cause mayhem and spread immorality in Queensland. Petr Simonov, the unofficial consul of the new Bolshevik government, addressed meetings of thousands of workers in Brisbane, while in the district of Cairns, a spate of strikes and arson was breaking out among cane cutting crews, who principally comprised, according to the CPF, "Spaniards, Italians, Japanese, and Chinese." Further, these guest workers challenged government policy by convening protest meetings against the deportation of members of the IWW.²⁷ Armed with such evidence of treachery and revolt, the federal government and the intelligence community commenced their anti-communist campaign in Queensland. Military Intelligence had already taken the rare step of stationing a permanent post in the rural locale of Townsville and attempted to secure *agents provocateurs* in the Queensland One Big Union (OBU) and IWW. Military Intelligence also worked closely with anti-radical groups like the Queensland Loyalty League and the newly-formed Returned Soldiers and Sailors Imperial League of Australia (RSSILA), accepting lists of "dangerous" people to be observed and storing them in official security files. In addition, MI explored the possibility of recruiting anti-radicals from rifle clubs.²⁸

The marshalling of anti-radical sentiment soon culminated in violence on 23 March 1919, when a procession of labour and political organisations marching through Brisbane was attacked by a mob of returned soldiers. The procession degenerated into

²⁶ Report, by CPF Commissioner Jackson, regarding Premier Ryan's meeting for Italian deportees and Interned Prisoners, 27 August 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Folder 1). Ryan was incensed by the imprisonment of a man, jailed on the testimony of two anonymous informants and without a formal charge, for distributing copies of Hansard. One of the disloyal reprobates whom the CPF despised was Percy McDonald, a returned soldier who regularly spoke out against the war and Labor "rats." See CPF report and memorandum regarding Percy McDonald, 16th and 19 September 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Folder 1).

²⁷ Report on Bolshevism and Anti-Imperialism, Brisbane, 29 August 1918 and CPF Sydney report 1 October 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Folder 1).

²⁸ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 33 - 40.

a riot in which nearly twenty people were seriously injured. The following day, numerous anti-radical meetings were convened by, among others, Major H. B. Taylor of the Censor's Office, Brigadier-General Spencer Brown, president of the East District RSL, a prominent journalist with the *Brisbane Courier*, and Major Bolingbroke of the Australian Imperial Forces. A crowd of seven thousand "loyalists" assembled at the offices of the *Daily Standard*, organ of the Brisbane Trades Hall Council, to be addressed by Taylor and Bolingbroke, after which returned soldiers smashed the windows of the office.²⁹

In Melbourne, the federal government, the newly-formed Commonwealth Investigation Branch of the federal Attorney-General's Department (the CIB), MI, the Censor's Office and the CPF concluded that Brisbane had been rocked by a Bolshevik-inspired riot, formulated and led by Russians. They resolved to rid Australia of its foreign, radical menace. Military Intelligence, the CIB and CPF were instructed to furnish lists of "undesirable" Russian aliens to the federal Ministry of Defence, to conduct raids on "clubrooms used by Russian Association" and collect evidence of perfidy and lawlessness for submission to the Crown Solicitor. Although the Russian Association was only one of many groups protesting the WPA, Russians' houses were raided, their property confiscated and earmarked individuals rounded up and sent to Darlinghurst Detention Barracks, to await transportation to Sydney and eventual deportation. Meanwhile, those returned soldiers arrested for shooting at police on 23 March were released with small fines, while fourteen Australian radicals were imprisoned for six months under the red flag provisions of the WPA.³⁰

Like their American counterparts, Australian authorities relied heavily on the weapon of deportation to fight Bolshevism. The procedure was first invoked against the IWW, when a dozen foreign-born Wobblies were deported for breaches of the UAA. The Australian government was undoubtedly influenced in its use of deportation procedures by the United States, which was in the habit of deporting some of its undesirables to Australia. However, the practice was even more arbitrary in Australia, as at this stage defendants could not appeal the purely administrative deportation

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 301 - 3.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 303 - 7 and 323 - 25.

procedures.³¹ Shielded from judicial interference, the government moved to physically expel "Bolshevism" from Australian shores. This vital task was administered by the most senior federal executives. Security services maintained constant lists of the numbers and precise nationalities of miscreants deported under the UAA, observing from where undesirable citizens were coming and guarding against individuals' attempts to re-enter the country.³² State officials readily supported federal authorities in these endeavours, ensuring that no suspicious persons warranting deportation were overlooked.³³

The deportation of undesirable alien radicals ceased at the end of the Red Scare and the practice fell into disuse for several years as the domestic industrial and political situation calmed. Nonetheless, the government preserved some of its extraordinary war-time powers, retaining its authority to deport foreign and native-born individuals under an amended Immigration Act of 1920 that outlawed advocacy of the "overthrow by force or violence any established government of the Commonwealth or any State or any other civilised country or of all forms of law"; presumably, agitating against the Bolshevik government was now a criminal offence. This power remained largely dormant, however, and wasn't invoked until the mid-1920s, when conflict on the waterfront prompted the Bruce federal government to revive the practice of show-trials to flush the "Bolshevik" element of Australian labour from cover so that it might be driven into the sea. Again convinced that Australia's industrial peace and prosperity was threatened by radical, non-British citizens, the government resolved to take preventive action against specific individuals rather than charge transgressors under specific regulations after infringements occurred. Prime Minister S. M. Bruce directed his Attorney General to indict the President and Secretary of the Seamen's Union, Tom Walsh and Jacob Johannsen (or Johnson), both foreigners, born in Ireland and the Netherlands, for inciting workers to strike.

³¹ Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, p. 218.

³² AA, B741/3, V/44.

³³ The Premier of New South Wales, W. A. Holman, for example, confidentially wrote Acting Prime Minister William Watt in May 1919 to draw his attention to the "position of wives and dependents of persons described by [the] Russian Consul [as] Bolsheviks about to be deported." Pointing out that his government was temporarily providing for these "Bolsheviks," Holman requested information about how Watt proposed to deal with the situation. "At least two of [the] applicants' wives [were] highly intelligent, educated women," Holman warned and it was "undesirable" that they should remain in Australia "receiving subsistence from [the] State Government and perhaps acting as channel of

Having arrested Walsh and Johannsen, the government set about creating the conditions to secure their conviction. On 25 June 1925, Bruce introduced into Parliament a proposed amendment to the Immigration Act of 1901 – 24 which would empower the Governor-General to order the deportation of any persons not born in Australia whose continued presence was detrimental to peace, order and government. Before the Bill was signed into law, the CEB, which had mutated into the Commonwealth Investigation Branch (CIB) of the Attorney-General's Department in 1919, was frantically, but unsuccessfully, labouring to produce, with the connivance of the Commonwealth Shipping Board, evidence to show Johannsen had fostered strikes and lockouts.³⁴

As in previous show-trial cases, justice was expedited with perjured testimony and political witch-hunting.³⁵ Nonetheless, the government's plan to resurrect deportation as an effective administrative procedure for repression was defeated, for on 11 December 1925 the High Court ruled that the amended Immigration Act was unconstitutional, as the Commonwealth government did not possess the power to remove "the liberty of the subject" from the States.³⁶ The resort to expulsion as a means of cleansing the nation was effectively quashed. Strengthened Crimes Acts of 1926, 1927, 1928 and 1932 attempted to compensate for this, empowering the government to imprison members of unlawful associations for between six months and one year. The amendment of 1932, proscribing "the doing of any act, having, or purporting to have, as an object, the carrying out of a seditious intention," gave the government still greater control over the spread of communist ideas, as distributing materials discussing revolution or other "seditious intention" could be construed as coming within the purview of the Act.

communication either with [their] husbands or other Bolsheviks in Russia, America or elsewhere." See AA, A1, 1919/5701.

³⁴ CIB Director Jones's Report to Secretary, Attorney General's Dept., 30 June 1925 (AA, A467, Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

³⁵ A Royal Commission was called into the affair and personal correspondence of the new Attorney-General, ex-NI chief John G. Latham, indicates that he used suspect testimony, including that of a foreign-born seaman named James Bede Andresen, to whom he gave false assurance of government protection. Letter from Latham to Sullivan Brothers, Solicitors 22 June 1929, Letter from James Bede Andresen to Latham, 11 May 1930, Letter from Latham to Andresen, 24 May 1930 (NLA, MS 1009, Series 44).

³⁶ C. H. M. Clark, *A History of Australia: Vol. VI – "The Old Dead Tree and the Young Tree Green," 1916 – 1935*, Melbourne University Press, 1987, p. 242.

The issue of deportation never vanished, however, and confusion reigned regarding the government's deportation powers. Moreover, the suspicion that the federal government was not doing its full duty and was conspiring to cover up this fact lingered. A prominent patriotic society from Sydney, the New Guard (NG), attempted to pressure the government into adopting more strident policies by requesting its stooge, Minister for the Interior Archdale Parkhill, to ascertain in 1932 "how many persons ... of the total number of deportations" had been "sent overseas" or "merely shipped from one Australian port to another." The Guard wanted to know how many of those dispatched abroad had been expelled "because of Communist activity" or "because of irregularities [having] nothing to do with Communism under the immigration laws; Chinese [sic] for instance." Hinting that official conspiracy was obfuscating government failure to pursue electoral promises to "deport foreign Communists," the Guard asked whether the Commonwealth had, "or could easily furnish" the "power to deport foreign-born Communists with criminal records in Australia." In fact, the Guard knew that "foreign-born Communists" were "immune from procedure under the immigration laws," but, burdened by paranoid fear, was wont to overlook this.³⁷

Although governments could not drive communists from Australia, efforts were made to control their movements. Foreign-born communists could be refused entry into Australia or deported for political activity. The British communist Dora Montefiore was only admitted after she surrendered her passport to authorities and promised not to conduct propaganda exercises and a handful of other communists were expelled once their political affiliations were verified.³⁸ Australian communists hoping to travel abroad expected official obstruction. In 1927, Australian delegates to the inaugural Congress of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union were denied passports; they made their way to Shanghai clandestinely. The following year, responding to reports that the 1929 Pan Pacific Trade Union Congress (PPTU) would be held in Australia, several federal Senators attempted to sabotage the Congress. There was also an uproar in the press when a handful of Australian communists obtained passports to attend

³⁷ *Liberty*, Vol. 1 No. 5, 17 September 1932, p. 2 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152 – henceforward referred to as *Liberty*, 17 September 1932). *Liberty* submitted these questions directly to Parkhill in a letter dated 30 September 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1932/1471). Parkhill duly referred the matter to Latham and after consultation with the Attorney General, reassured the New Guard that none of the deportees had merely been transferred across Australian cities.

Congresses of the Comintern, Red International Labour Union (RILU) and PPTU. The government was no doubt pleased that the *Argus* described the ACTU, which had sponsored delegates to the PPTU, as the "recently created Soviet of Australian trade unionism." It would perhaps have been less enthusiastic, however, about the paper's inference that by failing to prevent the delegates from departing Australia, the government had betrayed its "moral responsibility not to allow the name of Australia to be associated with gatherings which ... are simply hotbeds of subversive agitation for the perversion of trade unionism to the purposes of class war." Prime Minister Bruce duly informed the *Sydney Morning Herald* that the Department of Home and Territories would not have been able to prevent the issuance of travel permits, even if it had known of the delegates' communist credentials. The Ministry could only refuse to issue papers on the specific request of the country of destination. Because the Nationalist government in China had made no such representations to the British Empire, as they did in 1927, there were no grounds for refusal. While British authorities could indulge in political adventurism in these matters, conniving, for example, with the arrest of PPTU delegates in China in 1932, such games were beyond the reach of Australia, particularly as Australian authorities achieved only moderate success in securing their own borders.³⁹ Not only did the government fail to prevent Australians from travelling to conferences of the Comintern, PPTU, RILU and the International Lenin School, they also failed to obstruct radicals' use of false identities in facilitating their return to Australia.⁴⁰

Unable to control human traffic, anti-communists invested considerable resources in control of public discourse instead. This was attempted in several ways. The recourse to brutish, violent repression enjoyed a significant revival during the great Depression. Faced with street protests and anti-eviction pickets, manned by groups such as the Unemployed Workers Movement (UWM) and the communists, State governments attempted to quash dissent by charging activists with unlawful assembly, loitering, offensive behaviour, insulting police, resisting arrest, assault and vagrancy. State legislatures augmented the powers of police to prevent public assemblies and

³⁸ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 101.

³⁹ *Argus* 6 January 1928, *Sydney Morning Herald* 7 January 1928, Folder of documents relating to the arrest of PPTU Secretariat members in China, 1932 and Hansard, Senate debate 17 May 1928, pp. 4943-56 (AA, A981/4, Item COM 4).

⁴⁰ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 176.

police established special squads to crush protest and liaise with the CIB in the surveillance and prosecution of communists and radicals. By November 1930, over fifty communists in Sydney had been imprisoned. The police also worked, usually clandestinely, with Right-wing paramilitary groups such as the Old Guard (OG) in Sydney and the League of National Security (LNS) in Melbourne (which was in fact commanded by the Victorian Commissioner of Police, Major-General Thomas Blamey).⁴¹ Vigilante action often involved physical and psychological torture. Communists were chased from or fled rural locales and a Sydney UWM activist "had the word RED burned into his forehead with acid."⁴² Another noted labour identity, Jock Garden, was bashed in his home by eight members of the Fascist Legion, a secret inner group of the NG, who dressed themselves in KKK-style garb.⁴³

Pressure was also exerted on professionals and white-collar workers dabbling in radicalism. Public servants who traveled to the Soviet Union as delegates to the Friends of the Soviet Union were sacked from their positions while membership in the Communist Party of Australia cost a Melbourne doctor his position at St. Vincent's Hospital.⁴⁴ In New South Wales, during the state election campaign of 1932, employees were threatened with dismissal for voting for Labor and received propaganda in their pay packets from organisations such as the Sane Democracy League (SDL), imploring them not to vote for "civil war."⁴⁵ State governments in Victoria and New South Wales, in 1931 and 1932 respectively, calmed conservative alarm and prompted the disbanding of Right-wing patriot groups. Particularly in Victoria, the police no longer required their assistance;⁴⁶ Blamey continued to crush

⁴¹ Police in New South Wales had a long-standing arrangement not to refer to the OG in official reports. Senior Police officials regarded partnership with the Guard both desirable and necessary on account of the modest size of the force. The superintendent of the NSW Police Criminal Investigation Branch, William J. MacKay and the NSW Commissioner of Police Childs, for example, entered into a verbal arrangement of mutual cooperation with the Guard in the early 1930s, when the force numbered approximately 3,500. See Andrew Moore, *The Secret Army and the Premier - Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South Wales, 1930 - 32*, New South Wales University Press, Sydney, 1989, pp. 132 - 3.

⁴² Ibid., p. 130 and Macintyre, *The Reds*, pp. 207 - 13.

⁴³ Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 177.

⁴⁴ Macintyre, *The Reds*, pp. 215 - 16.

⁴⁵ Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 231. Sane Democracy League Pamphlets read "Can I take a chance that I may vote for civil war?"

⁴⁶ It must be stated, however, that the New Guard unsuccessfully attempted to prolong its existence, briefly surviving as the Centre Party until its disastrous showing in the May 1935 NSW state election finally brought its demise. Ibid., 239.

public assemblies until mid-1933, when new legislation permitting street meetings that did not obstruct traffic finally came into effect.⁴⁷

Another weapon used against Bolshevism was propaganda. Anti-communists relied on the media for crucial support. During the war, the press urged patriotic citizens to physically attack Wobblies and media descriptions of the Wobblies' "practice of industrial sabotage made it appear synonymous with violence against people." Both Prime Minister Hughes and New South Wales Premier Holman did their utmost to encourage the impression that the Wobblies were "Imperial Wilhelm's Warriors." Anti-Wobbly propaganda reached a crescendo during the trial of the Twelve, when politicians and the media regularly assailed the organisation, charging it with sedition, arson, sabotage and willfully serving the interests of alien powers.⁴⁸

The Russian Revolution and post-war conditions encouraged further outpouring of attack from conservative quarters on various causes and associations. The mainstream press divined in the radicalism and militancy of the labour movement "a crime against society" and a deplorable want of "loyalty ... high endeavour ... wisdom ... self-restraint, effort and endurance and self-denial ... and obedience."⁴⁹ The popular, populist journal *The Bulletin*, was just one publication regularly portraying industrial turmoil as the result of labour's "marriage" with foreign radicalism. Isolated incidents were divorced from specific contexts and interpreted as portents of mass insurrection. The *Argus* saw the signs of Bolshevism in petty crime, labour go-slows, atheism, anarchism, modern art and literature and feminism, all of which represented a rejection of the "great edifice" of western civilisation and a relapse into "the primeval savagery of human nature."⁵⁰ The mainstream press also supported anti-communism by keeping right-wing patriotic organisations out of the news. The Fairfax family, who owned the Sydney Morning Herald and the Melbourne Age, moved in the same

⁴⁷ Macintyre, *The Reds*, pp. 232 - 3.

⁴⁸ Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, pp. 189, 206, 204 and 211. The Wobblies in fact abjured vigilante violence as unscientific, inefficient revolution.

⁴⁹ Dan Coward, "Crime and Punishment," in *Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p. 51 and *Argus*, 20 July 1918.

⁵⁰ *The Bulletin's* depiction of the Seamen's Union's strike of 1919 is a case in point, where a union member is seen marrying a swarthy, unkempt, racially-foreign wretch to a dismayed, chaste and pure, white-cloaked maiden, who is "Labor." From Brian McKinley, *A Documentary History of the Australian Labor Movement, 1850 - 1975*, Drummond, Melbourne, 1979, p. 617 and *Argus*, 1 May 1920 and 5 April 1919.

elite social and business circles as the leaders of the OG and the Guard probably maintained a permanent contact on the *Herald's* editorial staff. One of the *Herald's* leader writers, Fred Cutlack, was also a firm enemy of labour and a member of the conservative Constitutional Association. Leading patriots' familiarity with newspaper proprietors and journalists protected them from public exposure into the 1940s and beyond.⁵¹

Outside the mainstream media, men like General Sir Brudenall White questioned the ethics of labour action and claimed that the left aimed only to further the interests of their class, singularly jeopardising national harmony and prosperity.⁵² Small-time press hacks wrote inflammatory pieces, attributing industrial and social disturbance to corrupt unions like the Australian Workers Union (AWU), which allowed an "amazing number of foreigners ... to take out [membership] tickets." Around agricultural districts, Italians allegedly ran "amok," violently assaulting individuals at random, while hordes of "men of a most pronounced revolutionary type," mostly Russians, poured into the same areas. They were sensationally described as having "no religion" and "disordered minds [telling] them that everything standing for order should be swept away."⁵³ Slightly less visible propaganda was simultaneously distributed by social and business elites who formed their own patriotic associations. They were vociferous critics of labour, Irish Republicanism and "Bolshevism," three forces identified as most injurious to the British Empire. Generally of Protestant heritage, they were passionately sectarian; the industrialist and political powerbroker Herbert Brookes, fanatically so.⁵⁴

Business elites, despairing of the power of labour, conducted studies of economic and political conditions abroad. Australian attitudes, laws and institutions were held to compare very unfavourably, particularly with those in the United States. The absence

⁵¹ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 121 – 3 and 244. Cutlack was also a close friend of C. L. A. "Aubrey" Abbott, scion of the NSW landed aristocracy, OG leader and future federal MP. Moore writes that he possessed "a clear sense of [just] how much 'the public' was entitled to know" about the extra-legal political activities of Australia's elite conservatives.

⁵² Williams, *Quarantined Culture*, p. 108.

⁵³ Report of Director CIB to Secretary Attorney-General's Department, 20 January 1922 regarding article in *Smith's Weekly*, 7 September 1921 (AA, A981/4, Item COM 10).

⁵⁴ The most casual glance at the writings of Brookes and the publications of the Victorian Protestant Federation (VPF), of which Brookes was President and a founding member, confirm these assertions.

of a political labour movement led Australian conservatives to believe that workers in the United States were more mature than their Australian counterparts, and that industrial and political harmony reigned undisturbed by redundant, obstructive and divisive labour parties.⁵⁵ Australian tertiary students fared little better in conservatives' eyes, repressed by institutional control and censorship. Moreover, they were excoriated for their anti-imperialism and communism. The London *Times* and the *Age*, for example, reported a "furore" at Oxford, surrounding the "proselytising" of "Indian undergraduates" by a Rhodes scholar from Queensland. Investigation by the *Age* indicated a pattern of radicalism among Australian Rhodes scholars, as at least three Rhodes scholars to Oxford had attracted notoriety for Bolshevism.⁵⁶

As the 1920s progressed, conservative propaganda consistently emphasised two essential messages: first, Australia could not relax its defence against the perennially opportunistic Bolsheviks and, second, the threat of Bolsheviks seizing control of the Australian labour movement was constant. Australia's remoteness made it comparatively easy for conservative interests to disseminate information and "news" it deemed fit for public consumption with neither fear of contradiction nor concern for veracity. Having no foreign correspondents of their own, Australian papers, indeed, the federal government, relied exclusively on British and American newspapers and embassies. "Stories" published by the *Times* warning of the Red Army's imminent plans for revolutionary conquest in Asia, for example, were influential.⁵⁷ Such "reports" emanated from correspondents in locales such as Germany and Finland and could not be authenticated (Australian authorities had no desire to do this, in any case) and were circulated periodically to keep the public apprehensive of the Bolshevik menace. Patriotic societies also printed lurid accounts of life in the Bolshevik state,

See NLA, MS 1924, Collection Area 20 (VPF) Folder Items 165 - 206 (Printed Material and Press Cuttings).

⁵⁵ T. R. Ashworth, former President of the Victorian Employers' Federation was convinced of these facts in the wake of the British Seamen's Strike of 1925. He published his views, through the Citizens League of Australia, in booklet form, under the title of "Pamphlets for the People No.1, *Communism in Australia - The Lesson of the British Seamen's Strike and Other Papers* (NLA, MS 1009, Items 27/118, hereafter referred to as Ashworth, "Communism in Australia"). Much of his work was syndicated in the *Melbourne Age*, *Brisbane Courier*, *Adelaide Advertiser* and *Hobart Mercury* (NLA, MS 1009, Items 27/118, Folder 5).

⁵⁶ "COMMUNISTS AT OXFORD - PROPAGANDA AMONG INDIAN STUDENTS," in *Times* 17 December 1925 and "OXFORD COMMUNISTS - Rhodes Propagandists - Australians' Activities," in *Age* 21 January 1926 (NLA, MS 1009, folder 5).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* and *Times* 22 May 1924.

analogous in style and effect to those circulated by the *Saturday Evening Post*.⁵⁸ Australian papers were equally lax with the truth commentating on the domestic political scene. Allegations of "Red Plots" to capture the Australian Labor Party (ALP) surfaced, as they did in February 1927 in the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Argus*, whenever sufficient time between such "reports" had elapsed.⁵⁹

The bulk of printed political matter in Australia was stridently anti-communist and injurious to the left. Yet anti-communists remained nervous, in spite of the amount of anti-communist propaganda circulated by the press, politicians and private associations. They were convinced that systematic spreading of propaganda was essential for Australia's protection and strove to create official and public counter-propaganda agencies. T. R. Ashworth, one-time President of the Victorian Employers' Federation, argued that the establishment of a civic association akin to the NCF would bring vital "educational influence to bear directly upon Communists," fostering "class goodwill and co-operation...against class strife."⁶⁰ Harold Jones, chief of the CIB, agreed. Jones believed that anti-communist propaganda would be most effective if it was administered by a private organisation, which the government could support by giving it "free use of all the information at its disposal." Such a "scheme of counter propaganda" would ideally be national in scope and coordination, derive its funding, resources and intellectual capital from private elites, "industrialists, manufacturers, and all wealth-owning members of the community," as well as the press, and utilise modern technology, principally the cinema, like the Bolsheviks.⁶¹

Another means by which anti-communists attempted to control public debate was censorship, which also continued and developed after the Great War. Following the cessation of military hostilities in Europe, the Censor's Office's continued to intercept private mail, apprising authorities of the activities of "radicals" and "undesirables."⁶²

⁵⁸ *Liberty*, Vol. 1 No. 7, 15 November 1932 (henceforward referred to as *Liberty*, 15 November 1932) "First Impressions of Russia," pp. 11 - 12 (AA, A432/86, Item 1932/1471).

⁵⁹ "RED PLOT - To Capture Labour - A.L.P. ATTACKS MR. WILLIS," in *Sydney Morning Herald* 23 February 1927 and "SYDNEY LABOUR 'REDS' - CONTROL OF MOVEMENT - Communist Plot Alleged," in *Argus* 23 February 1927 (AA, 1606/1, Item B5/Part 1).

⁶⁰ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 4 (quote) and 75 - 8.

⁶¹ "Communism in Australia - Its Genesis and Development," report by H. Jones submitted to Prime Minister Hughes, c. 1922, pp. 11 - 14 (NLA, AA 1538, Item 21/156).

⁶² One victim of the Censor was Fred Williams, a fifth-year medical student at the University of Melbourne, denounced as a "pacifist tool," for forming a Social Questions Society. Williams' activities

The suppression of film and literature was also extensive and was supervised by the highest echelons of government. As Attorney General in the Bruce Government, John G. Latham took a keen interest in censorship, advising the Prime Minister on one occasion to carefully scrutinise the titles and content of "Russian propaganda films" awaiting public exhibition.⁶³ By the 1930s, CIB chief Jones had assumed responsibility for much of the decision making.⁶⁴ The practice of censorship was arbitrary, subjective and open to consistent political abuse. The partisan Censor's Office stifled protest and alternative thinking, suppressing the Russian-language paper *Knowledge and Unity*, for example, "on account of its disaffected tone."⁶⁵ A Commonwealth Government Gazette of February 1918 indicates the depth and variety of material removed from circulation "in the interests of public safety." Items like the *American Independent*, *American Sunday Magazine*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Good Housekeeping*, *Harpers Bazaar* and *Motor Boating* were banned alongside dangerous political material such as *A Criminal History of the British Empire*, *Goodwill - A Journal of International Friendship*, *Navy of Today* and the *Selected works by Voltaire de Cleyre* (edited by [Alexander] Berkman).⁶⁶

The breadth and character of censorship did not change after the revocation of the WPA under which these titles were banned. The Customs and Crimes Acts of the Hughes Government, which prohibited the importation and distribution of literature advocating the "overthrow by force or violence" of the government of Australia or of "any other civilised country or of all forms of law," "the abolition of organised government," "the assassination of public officials," or "the unlawful destruction of property," gave authorities great repressive latitude. Their power remained intact well into the 1930s, as authorities suppressed domestic and imported "seditious" publications, including *Red Leader*, journal of the militant Minority Movement, a communist group emerging from the miners' unions, and anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi

were reported to the University's Registrar and Professorial Board, which censured Williams and warned other Universities to act against related groups. Intelligence file M471 regarding Fred Williams, c.1918 (AA, B741/3, Item V/273).

⁶³ Communique of Latham to Bruce, Censorship of Russian films, 6 June 1928 (NLA, MS 1009, Series 41, Folder 5). Among the films Latham thought unsuitable were Eisenstein's *The Armoured Cruiser Potemkin*, Pudovkin's *The Mother* and a film about *Sacco and Vanzetti*.

⁶⁴ Hall, *The Secret State*, p. 25.

⁶⁵ CIB report on Alex. Michael Zuzenko, 16 August 1922 (NLA, MS 1538, Series 21, Folder 2).

⁶⁶ *Prohibited Publications*, Fraser and Jenkins, Melbourne, c. February 1918 (AA, B741/3, Item V/233).

material of the Comintern.⁶⁷ The censorship powers of the government contributed not inconsiderably to the organisational and intellectual poverty of the communist movement in Australia and by the mid-1920s the authorities' confiscation of over one hundred titles and publications left antipodean radicals with a "dearth of Marxist and Leninist texts."⁶⁸

Having read the contents of imported material, Customs authorities handed suspicious items to the Attorney General's Department's committee responsible for the review of revolutionary and seditious literature. Only after clearance from the Department would materials reach the Book Censorship Board. Moreover, the Department reviewed "revolutionary" and "seditious" publications without public scrutiny. Curious members of Parliament could only obtain lists of material excluded for "obscenity" and "blasphemy" if they took the trouble to make specific requests and the political bias of censorship was strongly entrenched within bureaucracy.⁶⁹

The suppression of undesirable doctrines, effected through imprisonment, fiduciary burden, deportation and censorship, was made possible by incessant covert surveillance of the civilian body. While the practice of clandestine observation began during the Great War, the subjects of police investigation did not materially change in the post-war era. Peace with Germany officially brought an end to the observation of citizens with Germanic names and business ties, but German names were still found in records on "aliens" and "foreigners." However, they dropped back into the field of a myriad of nationalities under permanent surveillance. While Russian nationals and Jews received a disproportionate amount of attention, the doctrine of communism was sufficiently universal to ensure that no specific ethnic, industrial or political association would be considered impervious to the forces of international revolution.

⁶⁷ A departmental note regarding the history of the relationship between censorship regulations and communism was written c.1935. A seized copy of *Red Leader*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 4 September 1931, notes the destruction of 3000 copies of a previous issue by postal authorities. A departmental memo from 1934 notes the intention of the office to ban Comintern publications (AA, A467, Item Bundle 20/SF7/4).

⁶⁸ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 102.

⁶⁹ A protracted dispute regarding the power of censorship authorities ensued in late 1933. Hansard on 20 - 21 October and 16 November 1933 shows the government divulging the process of censorship (obtained from record in file) and Senator Rae conducted a month-long correspondence on with the Minister for Trade and Customs T. White. Rae's request for a list of prohibited seditious and revolutionary literature was repeatedly refused by the Minister. See letters of 27 and 31 October and 14 November 1933 (AA, A425/127, Item 1943/4949).

Authorities, therefore, constructed lists of foreigners living in specific districts. They remained wary of Central, Southern and Eastern Europeans and maintained consistent vigil against their infiltration into the armed services, the Commonwealth and State public services and the labour movement. Regular reports on the state of *Communism in Australia* were made by the CIB to Attorneys-General. One report, dated 22 June 1927, demonstrates the particular attention authorities paid to regional variations in the strength of the communism, communist's ties to the Russian Association in Queensland, their involvement in industrial disturbance and relationship with the ALP and trade unions.⁷⁰ It was also customary for public service recruitment boards to defer the employment of persons of ethnic extraction or suspicious political affiliation until they were approved by security personnel in the Attorney General's Department.⁷¹ Empowered by the Aliens Registration Act of 1920, the CIB exhaustively surveyed the distribution of aliens in Victoria, carefully noting the precise number and occupational activities of members of each ethnic community.⁷² Other intelligence services also monitored immigrant radicals.⁷³ This activity was undertaken to prevent the entry of undesirable persons into the nation, or to establish whether immigrants were entitled to reside in the country if their affiliations were suspicious.⁷⁴

The fear of communist infiltration of the defence forces was also strong. The Navy was a permanent site of anxiety.⁷⁵ When a Naval Intelligence report in July 1928 informed the Admiralty and the federal Cabinet that sixty three "avowed" communists and a further eighty-four "probationary members" of the Australian Communist Party were employed within the fleet, it was suggested that the Royal Australian Navy employ a special officer to remove communist seamen and prevent recurrent lapses in

⁷⁰ AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286.

⁷¹ Correspondence between Inspector Roland Browne and CIB chief Harold Jones in 1922 pertains to the prospective appointment of an individual to the Queensland Post-Master General's Office. Jones reminds Browne that State Public Service Commissioners routinely refer to the SIB for advice regarding appointments (AA, B741/3, Item V/390).

⁷² AA, B741/3, Item V/393.

⁷³ See for example AA, B741/3, Items V/5047 and V/201.

⁷⁴ In one case, a suspect named William Harris (who had changed his surname from Hirschman) had resided in Australia for twenty seven years, but "on account of his admitted close association with the Socialist Party since his arrival in Australia in 1892, and on account of his close association with a Russian Bolshevik named PETRUCHENIA," MI deemed it appropriate to "verify" the existence of his marriage and birth certificates with the Registrar. See AA, MP16/1, Item Y19/33 [Victoria].

security.⁷⁶ Other divisions of the armed forces were equally fearful of being "white-anted." Army elites were particularly concerned that trade unionists might seize arms from drill halls. Brigadier Cass, regional Army commander in Adelaide, implored the Military Board in Melbourne in September 1930 to employ extra watchmen and install flood-lights at his barracks, to guard against "the expressed intention of the Communists to obtain arms." Similarly, when three communists joined the Broken Hill rifle club in 1931 the Chief of General Staff wrote the Secretaries of the Departments of Defence and the Attorney-General to inquire if communists could be prohibited from joining such fraternities.⁷⁷

Just as the intelligence community targeted the same peoples after the Great War, old procedures of surveillance remained. The intelligence community saw itself as a link in a global, counter-revolutionary chain. Logistically and doctrinally, various agencies, with the exception of forces employed by State and federal Attorneys-General, were heavily dependent on British organisations. Australian authorities, including the High Commission in London, were alerted by British agencies to watch for dangerous groups and associations in transit and in Australasia. The arrangement was supposedly reciprocal; British authorities were keen for news of radicals who had emigrated or traveled to the antipodes and evaluated the general prospects for communism in the region, but New Scotland Yard complained of the consistent failure of the SIB to share information.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, information was exchanged, and not only with Britain; State police forces and the CIB, often without the express knowledge or permission of the government, liased with authorities in the United States, New Zealand, Japan, South Africa and Canada, engaging in reciprocal man-hunts for radicals, circulating radical publications and exchanging information about legislative and administrative methods of controlling communism.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ The Brisbane CIB office, for example, warned of communists' attempts to distribute propaganda among the personnel of a British squadron and of "sabotage" contemplated by Russian Bolshevik activists in the region in 1924. See AA, B741/3, Item V/386.

⁷⁶ *Report on Communism in Australia*, Part 2 "Communism in Australia as regards the Navy and other Defence Forces," 24 July 1928, p.1, Letter from Secretary Attorney-General's Department to Director Naval Intelligence, 9 October 1928 and letter from Secretary of Department of Defence to Secretary Attorney-General's Department, 31 December 1928 (AA, 467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

⁷⁷ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 58 and 60 – 1.

⁷⁸ Report 919, High Commission, London to Department of External Affairs, 23 August 1928 (AA, 467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

⁷⁹ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 339 – 42. The South African government, for example, wrote the Sydney police force for information on legislative controls on "Bolshevism and

Besides working with international partners, the intelligence community enlisted the services of patriotic societies. John Latham habitually solicited materials for court proceedings and other general surveillance purposes from groups like the OG, the NG and the LNS.⁸⁰ Having been taken into governments' confidence, patriotic societies expected to influence official anti-radical policy. During civil disturbances in Queensland in 1919, for example, federal authorities were provoked into action by patriotic and business societies like the National Democratic Council, the Queensland Loyalty League, the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and the RSSILA.⁸¹ And the Commonwealth Police in Brisbane, which received information from the National Political Council, even "considered it advisable" to regularly divulge details of official operations to its president, a member of the Sugar Producers' Association.⁸²

The susceptibility of returned servicemen to Bolshevism particularly concerned the intelligence community, encouraging agents to spy on the Returned Soldiers National Party and establish strong links with other servicemen's organisations to prevent their infiltration by radical organisations. The CPF even recruited eleven former servicemen from Queensland into its ranks.⁸³ Sporadic public disturbances stimulated similar efforts to purge and reconstitute the rank and file of State police services. This had been considered necessary, periodically, since 1917 when defence reserves or special constables were enrolled in capital cities in response to sectarian strife.⁸⁴ The Melbourne Police Strike of 1923, hysterically described by the *Argus* as a "Bolshevik Orgy," similarly prompted government and military authorities to recruit a special constabulary force. The units of this force were disbanded, however, between January and May 1924, in accordance with the Unlawful Assemblies and Processions Act of 1915, although some members were recruited by Victoria Police under same Act.⁸⁵

other Revolutionary Movements," and the police obliged with a report profiling the WPA and UAA, and the precise role of MI in their enforcement, without going through the offices of the federal government. AA, CP78/23, Item 1918/89/753 contains files demonstrating the efforts of the Censor's Office, through the Governor-General and the British Embassy, to alert American authorities to the activities of some of its "disloyal" citizens.

⁸⁰ Letter of H. C. Cropper to Latham, 20 February 1932 and reply, 23 February 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152) and Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 110. Moore writes that Latham knew the leaders of the OG and the LNS "intimately" and appointed them to important government positions, such as cultural attache to Japan.

⁸¹ AA, MP 367/1, Item No: 512/1/898 [VIC].

⁸² Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 319 – 20.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 229, 245 – 6 and 319.

⁸⁴ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 18 – 20.

⁸⁵ *Argus* 5 November 1923 and VPRO, 1226, Item 123.

Later, in 1931 in South Australia the Citizens' League, organised by Colonel W. M. Waite, was authorised by district city councils and business associations to be sworn in as a special constabulary in the event of extraordinary tumult. It was armed by the State government and amounted to about eight companies of men, commanded by former military officers. Like the Victorian Special Constabulary though, it would only respond to official requests for assistance, and these seem never to have eventuated.⁸⁶ While special constabulary forces were short-lived, they directly inspired and mutated into covert patriotic paramilitary organisations. The special force established in Melbourne in November 1923, for example, survived as the "White Guard" under the leadership of General Sir Brudenall White, the then recently-retired Chief of Staff of the Australian Imperial Forces and Chairman of the Commonwealth Public Service, before being reborn as the LNS in 1930.⁸⁷

The range of activities of governments, security agencies and patriotic organisations described in this chapter demonstrate how serious a source of anxiety anti-communism was in Australia. Anti-communist and civic repression left deep impressions on society in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution. Political dissent was suppressed by brute force, punitive legislation, administrative practices, censorship, propaganda and covert surveillance. Nonetheless, the impact of anti-communism on Australians' civil liberties should be distinguished from its effect in other societies, for the coincidence of related forms of repression cannot of itself indicate whether such repression produced similar social outcomes. Physical observation and censorship of opinion, for example, is often less terrifying than persecution of a more material nature and in general terms, Australian anti-communism, when contrasted with comparable activity in the United States, appears relatively modest and circumscribed, in both breadth and character.

While federal governments from 1915 – 1929 and 1932 – 1941 were staunchly anti-communist, the successful implementation of official anti-communist measures was frustrated to a considerable degree by State Labor governments, like those of Queensland and New South Wales, in the early-to-mid-1920s and early-1930s. Although Premiers Ryan, Theodore and Lang were not sympathetic to communism,

⁸⁶ Report from Adelaide CIB to Melbourne HQ, 4 March 1931 (A369, Item D585).

they were determined to obstruct the eradication of civil liberties by state agencies that were partisan and sometimes acting on the initiative of their own former "rat" colleagues. It was clear to Labor Premiers that the strengthening of the state's anti-communist apparatus through vaguely defined sweeping legislative powers, could all too easily legalise and institutionalise anti-labourism. This is why Premier Ryan protested abuses of the WPA and UAA, decried draconian internship and deportation procedures, refrained from encouraging the State police to cooperate with MI in the application of federal laws, and closed down hotels in Brisbane from 25 – 28 March 1919 in response to Right-wing and military anti-Bolshevik agitation.⁸⁸ Similarly, in 1932, CIB Chief Jones declined to raid the headquarters of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and the homes of its leading members because he knew that the New South Wales police would not assist the Commonwealth in such an endeavour.⁸⁹

Anti-communists were also restrained by other factors. Unlike government agencies in the United States, the authorities of the Crown were required to go through elaborate procedures to secure search warrants. Moreover, fewer officers were sympathetic to anti-radicalism or willing to overlook legal procedures. Bureaucratic and executive control of the law was, therefore, comparatively weak. Neither the federal Attorney-General, nor the commander of the state's premier counter-intelligence agency, the CIB, could direct their departments or the process of politico-criminal prosecution with the same degree of authority as the BI and other American agencies. Further, the importance of the courts in limiting the repressive powers of the federal government and its bureaucracy cannot be overstated. The decision of the High Court in 1926 to deny elected governments the power to outlaw specific political movements and doctrines destroyed an avenue of repression that American anti-communists enjoyed. The Court absolutely affirmed the separation of powers between legislatures and the judiciary; Australian authorities could not rely on or use the courts, however sympathetic an individual judge, in the same way as their

⁸⁷ Hall, *The Secret State*, p. 20.

⁸⁸ CPF report on Premier Ryan's meeting regarding Italian deportees and Interned Prisoners, 27 August 1918 and CPF report and memorandum regarding Percy McDonald, 16 and 19 September 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Folder 1) and Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 295 and 302.

⁸⁹ It was John Latham who was most anxious for these raids to go ahead but Jones advised him of the futility of initiating raids, stating "Another difficulty with the State Police is the fact that the information on which warrants to search are issued has to be made before a Justice of the Peace, who cannot always be selected." See Letter from Jones to Latham, 24 February 1932 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

American counterparts. The High Court protected the Constitution over and above all other considerations. Even during the height of anti-communist repression in the early-1930s, governments were able only to use general policing and legal procedures.

The institutional nature of Anglo-Australian democracy also restricted public officials' anti-communist crusading. In government and the public service, officials' commitment to established procedures, transparency and due process of law ensured that the structures supporting parliamentary democracy were preserved above the interests of the government of the day. These values terminated potential government action on several occasions. For example, in 1917 the Governor of Victoria received a request from the State Treasurer to sign a proclamation authorising the military to quell civil disturbances in times of emergency, of which he disapproved. The regal representative noted that the process of declaring a state of "domestic violence" was complicated and time-consuming, requiring the final assent of the Governor-General in Council, and that the rationale for such a declaration, that of "urgency," was not "one of great cogency." In his view, the military had no experience with domestic tumult and would likely aggravate trouble. Dismissing the possibility of a state of emergency as "contingent and remote," the Governor opined that nothing would more likely produce the kind of disturbance feared by Treasurer McPherson than the decree for which he petitioned.⁹⁰

The integrity of Australian democracy was more strongly challenged in the early 1930s when a plethora of patriotic and business associations and military figures petitioned General Sir John Monash, then Chair of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, to establish a dictatorship. Monash refused to do so, arguing that national salvation lay in education programs that would facilitate greater public understanding and participation in the parliamentary process. As a senior public servant, Monash believed that he was "absolutely precluded from any public action or any public declaration of ... views which could conceivably place [him] in antagonism with any section of public opinion." He was also convinced that "anything in the nature of an attempt at action outside of constitutional methods [was] doomed to failure and

ignominy." Significantly, Monash found ready support for his views among friends and colleagues such as Sir Robert Gibson, CEO of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Australian democracy was less likely to be seriously threatened while many bureaucrats and officials remained committed to the separation of powers integral to a Westminster parliamentary democracy.⁹¹

Widespread institutional and cultural antipathy compounded the legislative and administrative constraints circumscribing extra-legal anti-communism. Frequently, Australian authorities were restrained by their lack of jurisdictional influence, on account of their subordinate role within the British Empire. The administration of travel documents, for example, was a complicated affair which involved the Home and Passport offices of the Imperial government and the ambition of Australian authorities to prevent local communists from travelling abroad was frequently frustrated by their inability to revoke Empire-wide travel endorsements issued by the Imperial Passports Office. While the Office was not in the habit of granting endorsements to known communists, the huge breadth of its jurisdiction made policing difficult. Moreover, non-issuance of passports on political grounds depended on official protests being made by the government of countries to which the particular communist intended to journey, and if no requests for cancellation or refusal of travel papers were issued, the Home authorities were not inclined to act.⁹²

The international flow of finance also obstructed the suppression of communism, though the CIB more successfully starved the Australian communist movement of international funding than physical movement. Through the High Commission in London, the transfer of moneys through British banks was prevented and, on at least one occasion in January 1925 the CIB persuaded the Governor of the Commonwealth

⁹⁰ Memorandum from Governor of Victoria to the Premier, c. 23 December 1917 (VPRO, 1172, Item 8).

⁹¹ NLA, MS 1009. For quotes see Box 100, folder 741, Letter of Monash to Stewart, 31 July 1930 and Box 101, folder 748, Letter of Monash to Barclay Smith, 3 December 1930 and Letter of Monash to Robert Knox, 12 November 1930 (respectively). Various petitions and letters to Monash are contained in Box 45, Series 1A, Folder 417, Box 47, folders 431, 432, 433. I was directed toward the existence of these documents by Geoffrey Serle, *John Monash: A Biography*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982.

⁹² John Latham was furious when three communists secured papers to travel from Australia to the PPTU conference of 1929 and he conducted extensive correspondence with R. G. Casey in London and H. Jones of the CIB to investigate and clarify preventive measures. See correspondence between

Bank of Australia to peruse the Bank's records for evidence of funds flowing from Russia, through the Bank, to the CPA. Yet even this action was ineffective, for no remittance slip for any such direct transaction could be located. Failures in policing funds transfers continued into the 1930s, when the CIB advised the Attorney-General's Department that contemplated raids of the Young Communist League would prove fruitless as only the "power to deal with banks and other financial associations" would allow the government "to effectively attack the Communist Party."⁹³

Many in the policing fraternity held reservations about the effectiveness of raids. During the waterside workers' dispute in 1925 the Inspector General of the New South Wales police, while stating he would conduct raids on the written request of Prime Minister Bruce, indicated that they would be "ineffective" and would fail to "add to [the] knowledge" of communists' activities. Further, the displeasure of the State police at being asked to participate in a "frankly political" operation was made clear to the Sydney office of the CIB.⁹⁴ It was, therefore, difficult for the authorities to maintain a united front against communism while State police defied the will of elected administrations. Moreover, the fact that the Bruce government was so dependent on such operations demonstrates that its repressive power was quite circumscribed. Finally, some of the government's own measures directly hindered the prosecution of communists, by obstructing the collection of incriminating evidence. For example, after the Bruce government enacted its Crimes Act in 1926, CIB chief Jones regretfully informed the Solicitor-General Robert Garran and John Latham that the new Post and Telegraph Regulations of the Act were preventing the Bureau from

Latham and Jones from 9 - 12 July 1929 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). See also footnote 35.

⁹³ Regarding the action taken with regard to British banks see Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 103. Regarding CIB's correspondence with the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia see Report of Sydney Office to Melbourne HQ CIB, 14 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154 Part 1). Regarding the YCL see Report of CIB Director to Secretary Attorney General's Department, 22 January 1932 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). It is worth noting that the authorities also instructed the Governor of the CBA to search for funds transfers to Jacob Johannsen.

⁹⁴ Report of Sydney Office to Melbourne HQ CIB, 14 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154 Part 1). The CIB officer opined that Bruce's request for a raid, "being frankly political, was not one calculated to appeal to" the Inspector General of the N. S. W. police.

gathering evidence to incriminate the IWW because their postal boxes had been cancelled.⁹⁵

Among anti-communist elites, what might be termed a crisis of will further confounded the annihilation of communism. With the federal government's coercive powers restricted by the High Court, federal authorities and sympathetic state governments looked to one another, expecting other parties to take action and maintaining fanciful ideas of their capacity to do so. An example of this clash of interests occurred in 1933, when the new conservative Premier of New South Wales implored the federal government to outlaw the CPA. Acting Prime Minister John Latham reminded the Premier that no federal legislation authorised such action, but State governments, by contrast, were "not trammled" by "constitutional difficulties" and could "legislate directly and to the point," declaring "specified organisations and their assemblies to be illegal," and attaching to "membership or attendance such penalties as [thought] proper." Indeed, Latham urged state authorities to end the use of the "Communist Hall" and put a stop to "public meetings ... in the streets, or in parks ... and to organisations like the Communist Sunday Schools." Latham's attempt to enlist the Premiers' support was, however, contrived to spread the odium of his failure to suppress communism. He was well aware of the difficulties involved in enforcing such restrictions and the only precedent he could offer for action, namely the Victorian government's outlawing of venues for illegal gambling, was feeble.⁹⁶

Australian communism was able to survive, then, because of the relative powerlessness of the state; the federal government and intelligence bureaus lacked muscle. The CIB could not arrest suspects and had to relay information to State authorities who were not always ready to assist and frequently gave only negligible assistance, and then reluctantly. This circumstance contrasts strongly with the situation in the United States, where anti-communists used powerful legislation, the

⁹⁵ Minute Paper from Director CIB to Solicitor General, 22 March 1926 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

⁹⁶ Letter from Latham to Stevens, 6 April 1933 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF10/15). The High Court's ruling in the Thomas Walsh case closed off the possibility of a legislature declaring an organisation to be unlawful as well as administrative deportation on the charge of obstructing interstate or external commerce, owing to the impossibility of proving such. See Additional Memorandum on "Communism and Revolutionary Activities," supplied by Attorney General's Department to Premiers' Conference 1934 (above collection file).

BI, MI, the courts, the secret service of the Department of Labor, the Post-Master General's Office, and the ancillary support of state and county police, and super-patriotic groups to destroy radicalism. There was another important distinction between the two nations' legal environments. In the United States, individual judges and officials could exercise power with considerably more discretion than their Australian counterparts. They were also far more accountable to local super-patriots and other pressure groups, and were less protected than Australian judges, whose authority descended, unbroken and above the realm of government, from the Privy Council in London.⁹⁷

The peculiar relationship between Australian government authorities and patriotic organisations also influenced the character of repression. Whereas American patriotic societies exerted enormous influence on law and order and the circulation of ideas, most Australian patriots did little but urge officials to take action on their behalf. The Australian equivalent of the American Legion, the RSL, confined its anti-communist activity to resolutions, sometimes forwarded to Prime Ministers, denouncing "communistic propaganda" and its effects on the nation.⁹⁸ Similarly, when news of the Fish Committee's findings filtered through to Australia in mid-1933, patriots, speaking through municipal councils, merely called on governments to act.⁹⁹ While private citizens and associations made important contributions to Australian anti-communism, their activities seldom provoked the detention or deportation of "communists." Their social impact was paltry compared with that of their American cousins.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ This is not to suggest that Australian judges did not sometimes aid anti-communists if it was in their power to do so. Andrew Moore notes that in April 1932 a member of the OG arrested for being in possession of a loaded, unlicensed rifle while attending a speech by "Jock" Garden was acquitted of charges of intent to cause bodily harm when a magistrate accepted that the man's threats "were only jocular." See Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 204. Similarly, in 1919, six men charged with causing grievous bodily harm to a federal Labor MP had their charges changed to assault and were then let free on condition of paying a £5 fine at a time when radicals were being jailed for six months for carrying a red flag. See Terry King, "The Tarring and Feathering of J. K. MacDougall: 'Dirty Tricks' in the 1919 Federal Election," in *Labour History* No. 45, November 1983.

⁹⁸ The RSL forwarded such a petition to Prime Minister Lyons after its Eighteenth Congress, in 1933. See Letter from RSL to Prime Minister, 29 November 1933 (NLA, A467, Item Bundle 20/SF7/40).

⁹⁹ The fact that several dozen councils of Sydney wrote federal parliamentarians requesting the proscription of the CPA at this time indicates that a campaign of solicitation was embarked upon, but this seems to have represented the limit of patriotic action. See AA, A1606, Item B5 Part 1.

¹⁰⁰ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 308 – 9 and ML, Francis Edward DeGroot Collection, Series A4946 – 2. Recall also John Latham's plea to the New Guard to furnish him with legally admissible evidence of radical criminal behaviour.

The relationship of patriotic societies, Australian governments and intelligence agencies was further inhibited by the official observation and prosecution of "loyalists" when they appeared to endanger the state. When a number of "law and order" paramilitary societies emerged in the early-1930s, the CIB investigated their existence in urban and country regions and military authorities expressly forbade their staff from joining private martial societies.¹⁰¹ Similarly, CIB operatives were instructed not to have any dealings, "directly or indirectly," with any non-official paramilitary movement "unless instructed" by the Attorney General. These strictures convinced patriotic societies that official authorities presented a potential threat to their existence, for the CIB learned that secret army members were instructed neither to associate with federal agents nor to divulge any information to them.¹⁰² It was only the "establishment" patriotic groups, chiefly the OG and the LNS, that were largely immune from state surveillance, on account of their affinity with government and security mandarins, who trusted them not to interfere with the state affairs unless they were called upon to help stave off communist revolution.

In spite of the fact that one of these "loyalist" associations was commanded by a commissioner of police, most of them were excluded from the process of government. The NG, moreover, was outraged by its subjection to police and military surveillance and was also angered by the federal government's refusal to open deportation procedures to public scrutiny.¹⁰³ But these right-wing groups would not consistently contravene the law nor exert pressure on governments by directly opposing elected authorities. The conduct of Thomas Blamey as commander of the LNS and Commissioner of Victoria Police perhaps best illustrates this point. In March 1933, the Chief Secretary of the Victorian government amended legislation governing public assemblies to permit street meetings not obstructing traffic. While the amendments passed through Parliament and awaited the Governor's signature, Blamey continued to crush community meetings, frequently over the authority and

¹⁰¹ Those servicemen found to have joined such organisations would not be expected to resign their commissions, however.

¹⁰² Letter of Adjutant General Military Board to Director CIB, 6/3/31, Letter of CIB Director Jones to Inspector Roland Browne, 5/2/31 and Letter of Browne to Jones, 24/1/31 (AA, A369, Item D585).

¹⁰³ The Guard wanted access to the identities of deportees, together with information surrounding the cause for their expulsion. See Letter of H. C. Cropper to J. Latham, 29 February 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152) and Letter of Archdale Parkhill to R. E. Lane, shortly after 4 October 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1932/1471). See also Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 152.

objections of suburban councils. Yet as soon as the amendments became law in July, Blamey meekly abandoned his crusade, failing even to pursue radicals covertly.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, the OG may well have deposed NSW Labor Premier Lang in 1932 had he not been dismissed from office, yet once he was removed and a conservative government elected, the Guard dissolved, satisfied that its services were no longer required; it had no interest in substituting Australia's democratic system of government with more restrictive models.¹⁰⁵

The political strength of the labour movement was also a critical restraint on the ties between the state and private patriots. Conservatives in Australia served under electoral pressure far more severe than that experienced in the United States. So rather than forging an alliance with the NG, the Lyons Government was forced to conduct an inquiry into improper connections between the Defence Department and the Guard. Moreover, in sharp contrast with the legal treatment of anti-communist vigilantes in the United States, three Guard members were sentenced to three months' imprisonment for assaulting the prominent labour leader "Jock" Garden.¹⁰⁶

With their eyes cast toward remote external arenas thought to portend the Australian future, Australian anti-communists attempted to transpose the actions and doctrines of foreign anti-radicals onto their domestic environment. Their misunderstanding and misapprehension reflected the anxiety of those who believed their destiny was being determined by distant events about which they could do very little; such a belief was firmly rooted in broader Australian experience. Australian anti-communists, therefore, were *reactive* as opposed to *pro-active*, and this significantly differentiated Australian and American anti-communism. Australian anti-communists responded to specific disturbances and controversies, many of which were international in scope, rather

¹⁰⁴ Macintyre, *The Reds*, pp. 215 – 6.

¹⁰⁵ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 209 – 24 and 34.

¹⁰⁶ *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 31 August 1932, p. 54 (henceforward referred to as *CPD*, contained in AA, A432/86, Item 1932/1471). It should be noted, however, that the Labor governments were deprived of knowledge of more important patriotic organisations, chiefly the OG, by CIB Director Jones and NSW Police CIB superintendent MacKay. Nonetheless, the validity of the point stands because the OG was most anxious to ensure that its manoeuvres remained unknown among the general public, so it prevented Parliamentary inquiries into the NG from proceeding, to suppress knowledge of the existence of the OG and of the NG's connections with the conservative United Australia Party. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 134 – 5 and 235 – 7.

than anticipating them.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Australian anti-communists were more wary than their American confreres of public opinion and its possible impact on their professional security. This helps to explain the CIB's disinclination to raid the waterside workers' union in 1925; the director of the Bureau in Sydney even suggested that previous raids "might have seriously damaged the prestige and future activities of [the] Department."¹⁰⁸ Australia's anti-communists lived with the realisation that the nation's legal structures were not easily altered to suit their designs; appearing too eager to change democratic convention could easily convince electorates to remove them from power or punish governments that allowed them free rein.

Notwithstanding these fetters upon anti-communist activity, the Australian anti-communist experience closely resembled the American in several important respects. Anti-communism in Australia was primarily advanced by small but influential special interest groups, some of which were directly inspired by American counterparts. These groups were deeply affected by paranoid fear and generally believed that Australia's survival depended on their increased control of the political system. Australian anti-communist kinship groups functioned in much the same fashion as comparable American groups and also succeeded in foisting their objectives (albeit in a less spectacular and fundamental manner) on Australian democracy, as I demonstrate in the next chapter.

¹⁰⁷ The federal government's response to press reports that three Australian delegates had succeeded in travelling to Vladivostok to attend the 1929 conference of the PPTU is one of many incidents which demonstrates this fact. An embarrassed and vengeful Attorney-General Latham could only instruct CIB Director Jones to inquire whether any of the three had made misstatements in connection with their papers, so that they might be prosecuted on their return. See Letter of Latham to Jones, 8 July 1929 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

¹⁰⁸ Report of Sydney Office to Melbourne HQ CIB, 14 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154 Part 1).

Chapter 2: *Dramatis Personae*: The Shapers of Australian Anti-Communism

Official Anti-Communists - The King's Armies

In Australia, as in the United States, anti-communism was largely promoted by "networks" and "interlocking directorates" of select individuals and groups. The majority of Australia's most influential anti-communists worked in government. They were a tight-knit group of individuals who knew one another personally, held positions of responsibility for extended periods and shared a strong rapport and understanding. In certain respects, official and bureaucratic control of anti-communism exceeded that of American authorities: while these bureaucrats and parliamentarians wielded less power than their American counterparts, but benefited from comparable job security and, because fewer intelligence agencies and patriotic civic associations operated in the antipodes, the importance of this handful of professional anti-communists was exaggerated.

As the Great War closed, Australian intelligence services were rationalised by a clique of administrators and politicians anxious to preserve existing agencies' powers and institutional qualities. This was achieved through perpetuating wartime operational practices. Intelligence forces remained under the command of high-level officials who oversaw the recruitment of agents and directed field activities. In this manner, an emerging centralised federal bureaucracy marshaled power of a similar nature, but not degree, to that of the United States' secret services. With strong hierarchies within the security bureaucracy established, senior officials set about clarifying and coordinating the duties of respective agencies. Formal investigation procedures and channels for communication were formulated in a series of conferences in 1918. By 1919 the CIB had assumed responsibility for internal surveillance and was liaising effectively with MI, the Censor's Office and British authorities.¹

¹ Prior to the substitution of Major George Steward with Major Harold Jones at the helm of the Counter-Espionage Bureau, the predecessor of the CIB, tension between agencies was prevalent. Naval Intelligence and other officials were angered by Steward's failure to consult with them during investigations. See Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 17, 49, 210 – 13 and 226 – 9.

Various wartime surveillance practices continued in the postwar era. Central intelligence offices began producing catalogues of radical persons and causes and encouraged field officers to consult with headquarters prior to pursuing cases. Military Intelligence also began publishing a weekly intelligence bulletin, classifying suspects, clarifying the agency's general duties and noting radical persons and organisations to be observed and prosecuted. Typically, these reports discussed aliens who had changed residence without informing authorities or disappeared from official attention, in addition to drill shirkers and citizens attending political rallies and meetings. Bulletins were supplemented by fortnightly reports regarding "pacifist and disaffected persons and organisations," distributed by the Censor's Office. All these reports were forwarded to the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor. Although publication of the bulletin ceased in May 1919, it was revived four years later; the hiatus, in any case, did not seriously affect the collection of information about radicals. Similarly, while drastic cuts to the CIB's office staff in 1919 curtailed the scope of the Branch's operations, they did not influence their character. Agency directors, who enjoyed uninterrupted tenure of office, safeguarded the institutional properties of intelligence services.²

The intelligence agencies, prized by government elites, were entrusted with the task of crushing civic dissent. Prime Minister Hughes was so dependent on the CIB's predecessor, the Counter-Espionage Bureau, that the Governor-General remarked that Hughes extended the Bureau's Director "a greater measure of his confidence than to anyone else;" the Director was "virtually his Secretary" as well as his "Secret Agent."³ This close relationship between the executive and surveillance bodies was, to a considerable degree, facilitated by personality factors. W. M. Hughes was an archetypal paranoid politician: vindictive, often hysterical and inclined to treat the business of government as a personal affair. Hughes took great interest in directing covert investigations and regarded the intelligence community as an extension of his individual authority. Indeed, the very existence of the CEB was initially a closely-guarded secret of Hughes, his Minister for Defence and the agency itself, and much of its activity was undertaken at the behest of these two politicians. The secret services were used by the Prime Minister to crush personal as well as political opposition.

² Ibid., pp. 21 – 2, 50 and 144.

Hughes' dissatisfaction with the Sydney Censor prompted his substitution with a more pliable appointee who would ensure no further "hostile personal reference[s]" to the Prime Minister were issued. Hughes' creation of the CPF was also a direct response to the insults he had received in Warwick.⁴

In his dealings with the public, Hughes frequently demonstrated his paranoid feelings. He had an absolutist, either/or *weltanschauung*; enemies were denounced with hyperbole, any and all civic dissent indicated "latent rebellion" and "the only alternative" to granting government greater police powers was to invoke a state of martial law. Hughes disdained to share information with his parliamentary colleagues, let alone the electorate. He preferred unquestioning obedience: answering inquiries regarding his allegation that the IWW had sunk a naval vessel and shot a government agent in Brisbane, Hughes offered no evidence, but rather demanded his word be accepted "beyond all question."⁵ George Steward, the Director of the CEB whom Hughes chose to help found the intelligence industry, possessed many of his bosses' qualities, being described by contemporaries as "exceedingly jealous," "domineering," "quarrelsome and suspicious."⁶

The men appointed to command and staff surveillance organisations were uniformly conservative, hailed from military and legal backgrounds and were generally acquainted with each other. Hughes formed an anti-radical clique comprising his Solicitor-General Robert Garran and two senior Ministers, W. A. Watt and G. F. Pearce, to assist policing of national security. Garran was responsible for overseeing the prosecution of the WPA and UAA. Such was his influence that Hughes later declared that prior to the repeal of the legislation, the nation had been run by himself, Garran and Garran's fountain pen. Garran also facilitated the creation of a political division in NI and appointed as its senior operative, John Latham, who relinquished a lectureship in law at the University of Melbourne to accept the position. He, in turn, selected Thomas Bavin, an anti-radical corporate lawyer and sitting conservative

³ Ibid., pp. 176 - 7.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 176 and 113.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 379 and 79.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 176 - 7. A sense of Steward's nature can be gleaned from reports submitted to Hughes, questioning the political and moral character of appointees to NI and family members of policemen, as well as that of members of Irish National and Russian Associations. See NLA, MS 1538, Series 21, Folder 1.

NSW MP, to become the NI Officer for Sydney: Bavin was one of few men to have access to the Prime Minister's safe of secret documents. The relationship of conservative government ministers and bureaucrats with the CEB/CIB and the Censor's Office was equally intimate. The Director of the Adelaide branch of the Censor was a sitting federal Nationalist Party MP and, like the Prime Minister, a Labor defector.⁷

The Directors of MI and the CIB were well-acquainted former colleagues. The Director of MI from 1916 to 1919, Major E. L. Piesse, practiced law in Melbourne. After the war he became a special agent attached to the Prime Minister's Department, charged with monitoring radicalism in the Pacific, a post he held until 1923. The new Director of the CEB (and then CIB), Major H. E. Jones, had worked in the Tax Department in Melbourne and held his post until after the Second World War. Both men were former members of the Australian Intelligence Corps. George Steward had also been a member of the AIC and was Official Secretary to the Governor-General. The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, was also a powerful and partisan political and security official. He considered the protection of British imperial interests his primary duty and to this end he conducted informal political surveillance and acted as a conduit between the Imperial Government and MI5. Fiercely anti-radical, Munro-Ferguson regarded the IWW as a "German financed" threat to the Australian political system and the British war effort. With a private secretary as commander of the nation's premier intelligence agency, the Governor-General was privy to classified information and partook in paranoid perceptions of radicalism. Steward's professional double act did not trouble Munro-Ferguson and when he advised Hughes, in August 1917, to substitute Steward as head of the CEB, he was motivated only by concern that the burgeoning workload of the federal secret service could no longer be serviced by the Secretary to the Governor-General.⁸ Munro-Ferguson himself, sometimes in consultation with the Prime Minister but just as frequently not, forwarded material seized by Australian Censors to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British Ambassador in Washington, D.C., to aid American authorities' prosecution of "disloyal" citizens.⁹ Further, the Imperial

⁷ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 69, 86 – 8, 204 and 248.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 44 – 5, 81 – 5 and 218.

⁹ Letters from Deputy to the Governor-General to Secretary of State for Colonies, 1 August 1918, from

Government frequently sent intelligence material directly to the Governor-General, bypassing Australian authorities, requesting that he observe particular individuals, including Petr Simonov.¹⁰ Into the 1920s, the Governor-Generalship remained an important intelligence post as future regal representatives and their Official Secretaries repeatedly "dabbled" in Australian security matters.¹¹

When recruiting staff, the directors of MI, the CIB and the Censor's Office looked for the same qualities as their masters. They sought men with solid backgrounds, integrity and sound judgment. Employees of the Censor were drawn from commercial and professional ranks. Zealously monitoring the attempts of foreign firms to displace British mercantile interests, they "unquestioningly believed" Australia was best served by remaining "the preserve of British trading firms"; the term "anti-British" was often used by the Office to describe individual citizens' political heresies. Intelligence operatives in the employ of MI and the CIB were usually career army men. When staff cuts were imposed on the industry in 1919, those who could returned to the armed forces.¹²

The federal electoral dominance of conservatism throughout the 1920s assisted the preservation of the intelligence community's war-time culture. However, political support wasn't essential to anti-communism's survival in surveillance agencies. While the Scullin Labor Government did not prosecute radicals with the same energy as the Bruce Government, Labor governments in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia drafted punitive laws during the Depression. The Victorian government empowered a police commissioner, who moonlighted as commander of the State's largest civic militia organisation, to suppress communists and other "disaffected malcontents" and the Minister for Police in New South Wales, while crying foul of

the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 August 1918 and from the Governor-General to the British Ambassador, Washington, D.C., 27 August 1918 (AA, CP78/23, Item 1918/89/753). Typically, American citizens who upset Munro-Ferguson had protested the suppression of free speech, or unsanitary conditions in military training camps, or professed socialist beliefs or an intention to desert from the army.

¹⁰ Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General, 14 September 1920 (NLA, MS 1538, Series 21, Folder 1).

¹¹ Captain George Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, the Official Secretary to Munro-Ferguson's successor, Lord Forster, besides conducting intelligence, was a fervent white supremacist and anti-Semite, who published monographs on the influence of "Jewish" Bolshevism and was eventually imprisoned during the Second World War as a security risk. See Hall, *The Secret State*, pp. 14 - 15.

¹² Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, pp. 47 - 8 and 96.

the NG's vigilante violence, released communists' names and addresses.¹³ More important than the states' support for anti-communism was the continued power of Garran, Latham and Jones within the security forces. While Latham was briefly removed from power, from 1929 to late 1931, Garran and Jones remained in their posts. Together the three men formed an influential, long-lived coterie which replaced that formed with Hughes and drew other officials, such as R. G. Casey, Australia's High Commissioner in London in the late-1920s, into its orbit. These career anti-communists ensured that the institutional character of Australia's intelligence service remained resolutely anti-Bolshevik and hidden from public scrutiny.¹⁴

¹³ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 213.

¹⁴ In this respect it is important to reconsider the federal government's refusal to open the processes of censorship to the Senate in 1933. The Hughes Government evinced similar contempt for Parliament when it refused to release details of the Commonwealth Police Force's funding or operations. See previous chapter and Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 320.

Official Anti-Communists - The King's Men

Arguably the two most important contributors to early Australian anti-communism, Harold Jones and John Latham, shared a psychological commitment to the destruction of communism that was obsessive and paranoid. While they had many *confreres* in the armed services and intelligence community, these two men particularly influenced official anti-communist activity. Latham formulated legislation to prosecute communists while Jones supervised its implementation. Both required and demonstrated patience and persistence, weathering temporary and sometimes frustrating exigencies, but never losing sight of final objectives. Even though their more ambitious plans were ultimately obstructed, they immiserated thousands of communists and activists, subdued the radical left through the constant threat of violence and imprisonment and established a strong culture of anti-communism in the government's security departments.

John Latham stood at the forefront of the movement suppressing extra-parliamentary protest. Like John Trevor, he was an anti-radical theoretician whose advice and services were widely sought. Not without ambition, Latham refused a safe seat in the Legislative Council of Victoria and a place on the Supreme Court Bench in favour of a seat in the federal House of Representatives. Immediately on taking office, he helped S. M. Bruce displace Hughes as Prime Minister and became his Attorney-General. Thereafter, he worked closely with Jones, expanding the CIB and formulating anti-radical and anti-labour initiatives for the Bruce Government, including reforms to the Arbitration and Crimes Acts. He also engaged in street-level anti-radical endeavours, serving as a legal adviser to the Special Constabulary Force led by former MI officers Sir John Monash and Sir James McCay that suppressed the Melbourne police strike of 1923.

Latham's research of communism was exhaustive. He insisted on being apprised of all available intelligence relating to communism, perusing countless security files, complete transcripts of the conferences of the CPA and radical newspapers.¹⁵ He

¹⁵ On 22 June 1927, for example, Latham received from Jones an extensive report into the state of "Communism in Australia," with extensive analysis of the proceedings of the CPA's national conference of 1926 and its relevance to communism in Australia in general (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). A folder filled with copies of the CPA's journal *Workers' Weekly* is contained in NLA, MS 1009, Series 27, Folder 2.

observed external developments, particularly legal doctrines used in prosecuting communists in Great Britain, and investigated the possibilities of applying offshore precedent in Australia. He was also aware of prominent businessmen's analyses of the American political system and particularly noted the beneficial effects brought by the lack of a political labour party.¹⁶ Latham had the successful politician's capacity for ruthlessness and lack of scruple. Like A. Mitchell Palmer, Latham and his partner Garran hunted for, rather than reacted to, infractions of the law, oblivious to the irony that they were acting conspiratorially, rather like communists.¹⁷

In his search for materials, Latham cultivated relationships with patriotic hard-Right militia groups, which he took great pains to safeguard, sometimes in the face of considerable abuse. In spite of the fact patriots' impatience and rudeness frequently frustrated him, Latham was comforted by their presence.¹⁸ Latham also used corrupt, tainted evidence in proceedings against radicals, a fact suggested by correspondence surrounding the prosecution of Jacob Johannsen, dating from 1929 and 1930, in which Johannsen's solicitors indicated that a Crown witness was prepared to affirm that he had given false evidence for the government.¹⁹

Although it was right-wing militia groups which most endangered Australian democracy, Latham failed to perceive this. He refused to apply provisions of the

¹⁶ See Article in *London Times*, "Sentences on Communists - All Found Guilty, 3 December 1925 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27, Folder 2) and Ashworth, "Communism in Australia."

¹⁷ In November 1928, for example, Jones, Garran and Latham delayed a series of raids on the CPA until after the federal election of 19 November, to "avoid charges of electioneering." Further, they held off on charging CPA leader Jack Kavanagh with violations of the Crimes Act, in the hope that raids would produce enough evidence to convince the courts to rule that the entire organisation itself had no lawful right to exist. See Memoranda from Garran to Latham 8 and 9 November 1928 and from Jones to Garran 9 November 1928 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

¹⁸ Latham pursued a protracted correspondence with Harold Chisholm Cropper, a grain commission agent "in charge of transport arrangements for the New Guard" in Paddington, Darlinghurst, Edgecliffe-Woollara, and Darling Point, from February 1932 until March 1933, in spite of Cropper's repeated assertion that he was "taking a more or less weak attitude towards Communism." While Latham tersely reminded Cropper of his considerable contribution to anti-communism, citing his reforms to customs, immigration, naturalisation, crimes and industrial arbitration regulations, he could not bring himself to advise Cropper to desist his petitions. See correspondence from 15 February 1932 to 4 April 1933, for quotes see letters from Cropper to Latham 29 February and 28 April 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152).

¹⁹ Letters from Latham to Sullivan Brothers, Solicitors, Sydney, 22 June 1929 and from James Andresen to Latham, 11 May 1930 and from Latham to Andresen, 24 May 1930 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 44). Induced to leave a job with the railways in New Zealand to testify, Andresen afterward suffered constant assault from unionists, and was driven out several towns in North Queensland. Latham, nonetheless, answered Andresen's plea for assistance by coldly disavowing any responsibility for his plight. Andresen asked Latham to secure him passage from Australia.

Crimes Act relating to sedition to patriotic associations, in spite of their frequent acts of brutal, lawless violence, strident support for Fascist and other anti-democratic doctrines and their threats to cause loss of life and a change in Australia's system of government; this willful inattention to the prosecution of the law was noted by the labour movement.²⁰ And Latham's reluctance to prosecute the NG was typical of conservative officials, including Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, who retreated from a promise to convene a Royal Commission into the association, fatuously claiming that his government could "do no more than inquire into the association of its own officers in the Defence Department" with the Guard.²¹ Significantly, Latham's unwillingness to apply the Crimes Act in instances where it was most applicable and likely to bring convictions was matched by a determination to flout the spirit of the law by coercing members of the public to stop leasing communists commercial properties.²²

The threat of communism aroused in Latham paranoid feelings far stronger than those experienced by most of his colleagues. This is indicated by his often contradictory but always passionate responses to revolutionary radicalism. S. M. Bruce, for example, cared little about the beliefs of radicals and was probably unperturbed by their presence, so long as their political influence remained marginal. While Bruce consistently rattled the anti-communist sabre during union-busting action on the waterfront and in important public speeches, his anti-communism was incidental to his broader reform ambitions and was chiefly an electoral ploy.²³ Latham, by contrast,

²⁰ Comments by Cropper that continued extension of the right of public assembly to communists would soon "develop into loss of life" would have substantiated a prosecution under the Crimes Act, had they been uttered by a communist. The labour paper *Labor Daily*, on 18 January 1933 noted the government's conspicuous failure to indict the New Guard's leader, Eric Campbell for stating that the New Guard could "make or unmake Governments at the polls," that the Guard would turf Prime Minister Lyons and NSW Premier Stevens from office if they failed to deliver on their "promises" and that the Guard remained poised to use violence to achieve its goals "if necessary." See Letter from Cropper to Latham, 29 February 1932 (AA, A A432/86, Item 1933/152) and *Labor Daily* (found in NLA, MS 250, Item 1).

²¹ CPD, 31 August 1932, p. 54.

²² Questioned about this practice in Parliament, Latham remarked he considered it "fair to give the owners of ... halls an opportunity to cease committing breaches of the law before prosecutions were launched against them," adding "I am not particularly concerned whether the notice is described as a warning or a threat. In the existing circumstances, I am quite prepared to have it regarded as a threat to enforce the law of the Commonwealth." Ibid., 8 September 1932, p. 320.

²³ Dispatches from New Scotland Yard, passed on by the High Commission in London, rarely troubled Bruce, who routinely forwarded them to Latham. In this respect, Bruce's preparedness to allow his subordinates to pursue the donkey-work of anti-communism contrasts markedly with Hughes' direct administration of the secret services. See correspondence to and from the London High Commission (NLA, MS 1009, Item 41/6). An example of Bruce's professional but dry anti-communist

was determined to cleanse the nation of the very notion of radicalism. Historian Frank Cain has suggested that Latham was "more alarmed by remarks having deeper implications ... than by openly hostile statements made against employers or governments."²⁴ Latham was more deeply disturbed by persons professing a hatred for capitalism than he was by those who strongly opposed his own government. Robert Garran, too, believed that it was more important to purge Australia of obnoxious doctrines than obnoxious doctrinaires and, as late as 1934, he and Latham were hoping to enact legislation which would "get away altogether from [specific] association[s], and centre on preventing and suppressing *unlawful revolutionary* plans and propaganda [covering] all *means* of prevention and suppression."²⁵

Although Latham sought to attack communism at its core, the means by which he attempted this demonstrate that he did not appreciate the psychological and sociological roots of revolution. Latham's essential pessimism about the capacity of individuals to reform their character, and his inability to critique himself, strengthened his belief in the efficacy of repression as a practical method of achieving order. Latham manifested the paranoid tendency to Other those whose opinions differed from his own, denying their potential and right to exercise political choices. He believed his draconian reforms to industrial arbitration and the Crimes Act, for example, were necessary for the protection of the labour movement from its own leaders and communist *agents provocateur*.²⁶ He also argued that communists were "not open to intellectual conviction" and required "criminal conviction." For Latham, the very impulse to become a communist was simple and he regarded communists as:

individuals who specialise in trouble making. At present they believe in Russia because Russia is in favour with trouble makers and is more particularly an enemy of Great Britain and the Empire.²⁷

Latham's paranoid logic dictated that communism be remedied by measures crude

electioneering is a speech he gave on 9 September 1925 in Dandenong, published in pamphlet form by the National Publicity Bureau (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4).

²⁴ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 76.

²⁵ Memorandum from Garran to Latham, 9 February 1934 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF10/15). These discussions were conducted in preparation for the impending Premiers Conference.

²⁶ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 76.

²⁷ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 103 and NLA, MS 1009, 27/5/169 respectively.

enough to appeal to Lenin's acolytes. It is significant, however, that in spite of the severity of his actions and their palpable success, Latham remained intensely fearful that his enemies could revive at any time. Consequently, he restlessly explored further avenues of repression, postulating means by which the government could resurrect the practice of deportation after the High Court's ruling in the Johannsen case.²⁸ His passion for repression also prompted him to propose even less practical illegitimate action. Moreover, he was inclined to take personal umbrage with communists who evaded prosecution and he possessed a vindictive thirst for revenge.²⁹

Like most Australians of the time, Latham associated racial with political pedigree, finding external signs of perfidy a reliable index of an entity's or individual's essential nature. When industrial trouble struck, regardless of the immediate cause, Latham habitually instructed the CIB to verify whether any "persons," and more specifically Russians, had advocated "sabotage" in union meetings and establish whether there was any evidence of communications between strikers and Russia.³⁰ The protection of Australia's racial integrity was an additional motive for Latham's continued interest in deportation. He regarded Australia's situation as unique, for whereas in "other countries" only "aliens" and "foreigners" were deported, Australia had to contend with the possibility that "foreigners" who were British citizens, like "Indians and Chinese," might be communists.³¹

Latham's principal anti-communist *confrere*, Harold Jones, was, if anything, even more paranoid. While he lacked Latham's intellectual precision, he was dogged and devoted, jealously guarding the prestige of his department, Jones ensured not only its survival but also its continuing, expanding influence. His understanding of communism was complicated by the fact that he had been entrusted to direct an organisation whose very *raison d'être* presumed the existence of powerful, external and hostile enemies. Like J. Edgar Hoover, he had a strong professional and personal

²⁸ NLA, MS 1009, 27/5/170.

²⁹ Recall, for example, Latham's ridiculous suggestion to New South Wales Premier Stevens to close down communist meeting halls through legislation similar to that used by the Victorian government to crush illegal gambling rackets and his determination to prosecute delegates to the PPTUS on their return to Australia, for giving false statements to the Passports Office.

³⁰ Latham issued this particular order during the Queensland railways dispute in September 1927. See Letter from Latham to Jones, 22 September 1927 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

³¹ NLA, MS 1009, 27/5/170.

interest in cultivating anti-communism and promoting his agency as the most effective and important weapon for its subjugation. The surveillance industry's culture, combined with Jones' personal disposition to paranoid feeling, had two significant effects: first, it prompted the CIB to severely exaggerate the size and influence of its antagonists and second, over his long reign as Director, Jones' own paranoid tendencies progressively exacerbated. Jones' fear of communism was deepened because his agency essentially played a lone hand in national defence against radicals. Moreover, while anti-communism directly fostered the development in the United States of State Department agencies and other organisations to augment the BI and MI, Australia was very slow to develop a foreign affairs executive and policy infrastructure with whom the CIB could share and develop its programs.³²

The intelligence of the CIB more often than not rested on shaky foundations. Like the BI, its "information" typically derived from rumour, innuendo, informants and the press. Much "proof" of conspiracy comprised vague, generic, doctrinal utterances of communists themselves, for the institutional paranoia of the CIB dictated that the words of the communist Other were taken at face value. Stuart Macintyre captures the character of the Branch, describing the distant relationship between its operatives' appreciation for facts and their boundless enthusiasm and noting that the CIB 'had followed the preparations [to form the CPA] keenly but [with a] zeal [which] so far outran its intelligence as to associate almost every dissident in Australia with the occasion.'³³ Jones himself was habitually given to hyperbole, claiming on one occasion that there was "abundant evidence" to show that "ceaseless" communist propaganda was "making converts all over Australia," even among children, while "the loyalty of [the nation's] best [was] being strained to breaking point," as

³² The office of External Affairs in Australia played a negligible role in policy development and execution until the mid-1920s. Prior to the Great War the Prime Minister assumed almost full responsibility for directing foreign affairs and the office was actually abolished in 1916. The Department of Defence then began to monitor immigration and the administration of New Guinea, while MI was chartered to gather intelligence on the East. By 1919 the newly created Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department had taken over this intelligence role but it had no executive functions and didn't formulate policy so a foreign section was added to the Prime Minister's Department to help administer New Guinea in 1921. However, it was not until 1924 that a senior clerk attached to Imperial Foreign Office was stationed in Australia, in Melbourne, and an Australian High Commission established in London. See J. R. Poynter, "The Yo-Yo Variations" and review by W. J. Hudson, "The Yo-Yo Variations: A Comment," *Historical Studies*, Vol. 14, 1969 - 1971. The regular Army and State police forces did not begin to collect security information of this nature in a systematic fashion until the mid to late 1930s. See Francis Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1983, pp. 252 - 6.

"thousands" of normally patriotic citizens wavered in their devotion to King and Empire."³⁴

Like J. Edgar Hoover, Jones was not unaware of the problem his department faced due to its inability to substantiate the danger of revolution. He, too, justified his activities and theories through "moral certainties" rather than confirmed events. For example, in a report on the state of communism in New South Wales presented to Prime Minister Bruce in January 1925, Jones, seemingly aware that the pitiful condition of the CPA would be unlikely to inspire fear in the nation's leader, took the liberty of supplying Bruce with duplicate police and CIB reports dating back to 1921. These additional materials, he suggested, would enable the Prime Minister to "more readily" appreciate "the subsequent progress of the movement." Moreover, just as Hoover had remarked that "estimate[s] of the membership of the radical organisations [were] not a fair test of the amount of radical activity," Jones reminded Bruce that "a portion" of the Branch's "most valuable knowledge consisting of first-hand information," was "unsupported by documents" and could "only be utilised as a guide in connection with the consideration of more material forms of evidence." The importance of this "guiding" information is suggested by documentary evidence, which indicates that unverifiable "knowledge" was crucial to the functioning and survival of the Branch. Indeed, Jones went so far as to suggest that the Branch's inability to furnish any information of "real legal value" should not affect evaluation of its role or efficiency, because "the more secret forms of Intelligence ... inevitably" depended on the collection of "purely informative" facts from clandestine sources who required protection if their work was to continue; the issue of whether in fact their activities should have continued never crossed Jones' mind.³⁵

Periodically, Jones expressed frustration with those who didn't fear the communist menace as they ought. In particular, he lamented "useless" government policies that attempted to arrest the growth of communism through "spasmodic displays" of repressive fervour.³⁶ A systematic program of repression, comprising pro-active

³³ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 13.

³⁴ CIB reports on communism, 3 and 11 November 1921 (NLA, MS 1538, Item 21/2).

³⁵ Report from Jones to Bruce, 12 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/1).

³⁶ Letter from Jones to Major Longfield-Lloyd, Sydney CIB, 19 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/1).

legislation and regulations and enforced by specially designed government agencies was instead required. Ideally, Jones imagined the federal government could declare the CPA unlawful under the WPA Repeal Act. However, recognising that this would likely be impossible, he advanced the creation of an official counter-propaganda agency. Such an agency would conduct an "organised crusade" requiring the "whole-hearted" support of the state police forces, support Jones conceded was not forthcoming.³⁷ Mindful of the need to provide a counter-propaganda agency with funds and power, Jones canvassed alternative logistical arrangements in a lengthy report to Prime Minister Hughes. "As communism [had] already spread to every part of Australia," counter-propaganda also required national coordination and the government could turn to the nation's economic elites for funds. Jones reasoned:

As the industrialists, manufacturers, and all wealth-owning members of the community are directly involved, they, if properly seized of the danger, would readily find ample funds to carry out a big and vigorous scheme commensurate with the danger.³⁸

Consistent with his paranoid perception, Jones looked to the Other for guidance on how to run effective "agit-prop" operations. It was "highly desirable" that the government's message "be disseminated among the workers by agents in their own ranks" and "make use of cleverly designed and drawn pictures to convey information and indelibly portray certain ideas." Moreover, the government could not afford to overlook the propaganda potential of modern technology, for as the Bolsheviks had shown, "magnificent work could be done on the screen."³⁹

Jones' plans to combat communism involved a stricter surveillance of both the circulation of people and ideas. To this end, Jones assumed power over censorship of perceived "radical" publications in the mid-1930s.⁴⁰ Yet this triumph only partially satisfied his desire to monitor political developments. Jones maintained that "certain correspondence," particularly of members of the CPA, should be "discreetly"

³⁷ CIB report on Communism in Australia, 8 August 1921 (henceforward referred to as CIB report on Communism in Australia, 8 August 1921) (NLA, MS 1538, Item 27/2).

³⁸ H. E. Jones, "Communism in Australia - Its Genesis and Development," 7 September 1921 (henceforward referred to as H. Jones, "Communism in Australia") (NLA, MS 1538).

³⁹ Ibid.

censored by the CIB.⁴¹ Like Latham, Jones remained troubled by inherently unreliable citizens, especially "aliens." The "formation of alien groups" by the CP indicated to him that communists, too, were aware of the malleability of aliens' minds and had once more seized the propaganda initiative from the government. The government could fight communist recruitment of foreigners by strengthening requirements for obtaining and keeping citizenship. Australia, he stated, had "more than [its] fair share of militants immune from deportation" and needed to fix a policy "with regard to all non Australian-born subjects that good character for three years is not a sufficient period of probation." Too often, "aliens" were "given the benefit of the doubt" regarding their right to assume naturalised status. However, if the "Commonwealth in all cases of doubt were given the benefit [then] the alien would be quicker to realise that naturalisation was something more than a matter of form and the necessity for obtaining a fuller realisation of constitutional government." The closer regulation of alien immigrants' activities was, moreover, "an avenue through which counter-propaganda could be dispensed with considerable advantage" and raids on alien communist groups, followed by publications of lists of alien communists subject to prosecution under the Immigration Act, would "do more to prevent the growth of these alien groups than anything else."⁴²

Jones' perception of the ethics of his anti-communism was founded in his capacity for denial and inability to reconcile feelings of conflict. He liked to imagine his schemes for "systematic" counter-propaganda could achieve a supra-political character, describing them as a program for "national, not political propaganda." And he clung tenaciously to his dream of creating a national counter-propaganda agency, advancing the idea to successive governments during the 1920s. This determination to implement this policy was driven by invariable and acute paranoid fear that made him attribute to Australian communists great powers of conspiracy, as a counter-point to their slavish devotion to foreign doctrines.⁴³ The possession of power and obsession

⁴⁰ Hall, *The Secret State*, p. 25.

⁴¹ CIB report on Communism, 3 November 1921 (NLA, MS 1538).

⁴² Letter from Jones to Longfield-Lloyd, 19 January 1925 (AA, A8911, Item 154/1).

⁴³ Ibid. Jones remarked to his Sydney colleague that since 1921 he had been "striving" to persuade governments to adopt his scheme for counter-propaganda as "a starting point" from which the construction of "some strong and effective guard against the dangers which are threatening the civil and eco life of Australia" might be made. He also regarded suggestions that raids on the quarters or persons leading the communist movement might produce incriminating evidence as flawed, for underestimating their "mentality" and training. The Party in Australia, "as in other countries," worked under

with conspiracy affected Jones' temperament and professional behaviour. He became more secretive and jealous of his colleagues, like his disagreeable predecessor, George Steward.⁴⁴

Just as Jones denied the political bias of his anti-communist activities, his inherent reactionary sympathies led him into dereliction of duty as he failed to observe private militia associations. Departmental correspondence dating from the early 1930s indicates that Jones had long been aware of the existence and composition of such paramilitary organisations, their leadership links with standing military officers and their possession of armaments, secured with police connivance. Although connection with the military and possession of firearms were clear and serious breaches of the law, Jones endeavoured to protect these organisations;⁴⁵ in sharp contrast with CIB reports regarding communists, which vomit names and unverified accusations, there is a distinct absence of identities and addresses in files relating to Right-wing associations. Jones found the activities of such groups perfectly understandable and he reasoned that "the present condition of affairs throughout Australia, with the possibilities of civil commotion at any place and at any time, has forced responsible organisations and citizens to create some form of protection, apart from the ordinary official side." The formation of paramilitary societies represented the simple desire of "a body of people" to "[band] together in all branches of activities to safeguard constitutional Government." In this respect, they were following the fine example of the APL.⁴⁶

the "Rules for Underground Party Work," published by the Comintern and would never allow the seizure of damaging materials.

⁴⁴ NLA, MS 1009, Item 41/6/217 - 18. In a communique marked "Personal and Confidential (non-official)," Casey wrote Latham on 26 March 1929, complaining that Jones' consistent failure to "answer Scotland Yard's most reasonable and elementary queries about individuals and activities in Australia," was placing him "in a rather humiliating position." He requested that Latham persuade the CIB Director to alter his conduct and Latham seems to have been successful in changing Jones' practices, as a further letter from 25 June 1929 indicates.

⁴⁵ The LNS was one loyalist organisation to benefit from Jones' protection. Against the recommendation of Inspector Roland Browne, Jones refused to inform Frank Brennan, the federal Attorney-General of the then Labor government about the activities of the League, in part because Brennan was Catholic. See Michael Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop - Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931*, Mc Phee Gribble/Penguin Books, Melbourne, 1988, p. 61.

⁴⁶ CIB Report from Inspector Roland Browne, 24 January 1931 and reply to Browne from Jones (for quotes), 5 February 1931 (AA, A369, Item D585). On another occasion Jones advised the Attorney-General not to concern themselves with Latham's troublesome correspondent, H. C. Cropper, suggesting that his conduct was provoked by "daily ... utterances of Communist speakers and sympathisers" which had "repeatedly led to riotous scenes both in Sydney suburbs and country." See Report from Jones to Secretary Attorney-General's Department, 2 March 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item

While he took a rather benign view of the OG and the LNS, Jones invested communists with a myriad of projected perversions. Indubitably, Australian communists were as fiendishly clever as their foreign compatriots. "Posing as interested, but impartial observers" they infiltrated labour ranks and bored them from within, using front operations such as the Workers' Education Association. This was not surprising, given that the strong men of the Party chiefly comprised "ex-IWW men and aliens," people addicted to chaos and revolution. A powerful, Moscow-funded-and-instructed cabal, the "Secret Seven," a group of Russians and Wobblies, trained the Party to form cells within rival labour organisations and undertake campaigns of sabotage, using "the Germ Cell System in operation in Europe." Although communists themselves referred to infiltration units as "germ cells," the term exercised a particularly strong hold on paranoid conservatives; it seemed to capture, precisely, communists' unique capacity to corrupt society.⁴⁷

One area of industry in which Jones apprehended the destructive power of the communists was shipping. Communist control of the Seamen's Union had long facilitated the unhindered passage of activists and materials. Their dominance had so grown that they were now in the position to "allow the entrance or arrange the departure of any person at will" from the Commonwealth, even abandoning the pretence of using "bona fide seamen" as couriers, carrying instead "extremists ... as "seamen" with a total disregard for honesty and a contemptuous flouting of the ...". Delegates to and from Russia were thus "carried nominally as seamen," enjoying free passage while the "Government [paid] them wages they [did] not earn."⁴⁸ "Authentic information" demonstrated a further "world-wide" scheme "emanating from Russia ... calculated to use unemployed as a lever to turn the workless into an active revolutionary force." Evidence suggested that the unemployed were "being made pawns in the Communist game, not only in England, but universally" and Australia

1933/152). Moore also notes that Jones likely colluded with Richard Casey in forwarding important logistical information from the state-organised, British strikebreaking force, the Supply and Transport Organisation, to the OG in 1926. Five years later both Jones and William MacKay indicated to the Guard that their respective organisations would be placed at its disposal, should political conditions demand this. Jones had no illusions about the strength of the Guard and advised Attorney-General Latham after the sacking of the Lang Government that it would not be necessary to mobilise additional paramilitary forces in NSW as the Guard remained ready for action "at short notice." See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 63, 135 and 188.

⁴⁷ CIB report on communism, 8 August 1921.

would "sooner or later come under the same domination."⁴⁹

Jones' anxiety for the loyalty of the unemployed hinted at his broader paranoid mistrust of the Australian "people," whom he regarded as vulnerable and gullible. Projecting his own intellectual snobbery and equation of social position with worth and competence, Jones was markedly disturbed by the potential of visiting lecturers, men of "education and ability," to "do more harm in a week than all the "soap box orators" could do in a year." Such lecturing had "already resulted in weaning the loyalty of thousands of persons of both sexes in Australia who by training and instinct would be eminently loyal and desirable citizens."⁵⁰ Jones' projected *weltanschauung* and psychic conflict also coloured his analysis of communists as individuals and political activists. His Empire-centrism clouded his perception of the structure and objectives of the CPA, which he surmised answered to the Communist Party of Great Britain and followed its doctrinal lead.⁵¹ At a human level, meanwhile, communists' pathology and racial make-up revealed a core of inherent depravity. Tom Walsh, for example, had remarkable "potentiality for evil."⁵² Similarly, groups agitating for "the destruction of the existing social conditions" invariably comprised "quite sincere" but deluded intellectuals and

all the rag and bobtail, the mischievous and the evil ... the whole underworld whose two ambitions are to avoid honest work and to despoil those who have acquired anything [as well as] professional agitators of various degrees of badness.⁵³

Jones traced Australia's internal turmoil directly to German and Russian sources. "German psychology," he remarked, was "a remarkable thing." Germany had not hesitated to let loose a "hellish flood of sedition and barbarism" in the pursuit of

⁴⁸ NLA, MS 1538, CIB report on communism, 9 March 1922 (henceforward referred to as CIB report on communism, 9 March 1922).

⁴⁹ CIB report to Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Supplementary to 7 September - 27 October 1921 (NLA, MS 1538).

⁵⁰ One such man Jones feared was Professor W. T. Goode, who visited Russia, in 1918, as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*. See CIB report on communism, 8 August 1921. Similar views are expressed in Jones, "Communism in Australia."

⁵¹ CIB report on communism, 3 November 1921 (NLA, MS 1538).

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ H. Jones, "Communism in Australia."

"momentary objective[s]" and had opened the "floodgates" of revolution "with the dire consequences now seen in every country in the world." Consequently, "a number of ... potentially dangerous ... individuals and groups," particularly Russians, who were "always restless, and by reason of their illiteracy and their early training ... unable to understand and appreciate the wonderful conditions under which they lived and worked in Australia," had been "spurred to life." Together with "other elements having grievances ... the poor, the workless, and not least, the parasites and outcasts," these elements were now leading an assault on established order.⁵⁴

Jones' "reports" on communists were anything but professional analyses of data. Rather, they were a vehicle for expressing censorious, misanthropic criticism of habitually-objectified sections of the community. Jones' enemy Others were solely responsible for his existential torment. They were unthinking, fanatical devotees of their perverted idols, stripped of any form of moral agency; the CPA, for example, "handed itself over, body and soul, to carry out the will and orders of Moscow." Jones' ferocious denunciation of Others reflects the paranoid inability to appreciate or accept difference, manifested in outrage demonising and dehumanising an Other while bemoaning their unwillingness to share the Self's moral codes. Jones' anti-communist rhetoric demonstrates rage with the Other for exposing vehemently denied weaknesses in the Self. His furious protestations about the "wonderful conditions" unappreciated by Russians in Australia, his suggestion that the unemployed were "pawns" in a global communist power-play, and his extraordinary anger with Tom Walsh's seamen for being totally dishonest revolutionaries, when they could hardly have been expected to have been anything else, found expression in a mindset equating all forms of extra-parliamentary social protest as incremental stages of insurrection.⁵⁵ Jones cloaked the failures of the Self by ascribing domestic tumult to the interference of congenital miscreants, denounced as irredeemable "parasites and outcasts," and "insolent," "bold" and "arrogant" extremists.⁵⁶

Under the leadership of Latham and Jones, CIB operatives and government

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Jones ascribes his projected fantasy of conquest by the Other to Russians resident in Australia, to whom the events of 1917 "meant only one thing, a desire to see the same conditions brought to Australia."

⁵⁶ Ibid. and see also CIB report on communism, 9 March 1922.

functionaries, affected by peculiar institutional psychological conditions, encouraged their bosses. The perception of communists as a foreign malady with almost supernatural powers for destruction enjoyed wide currency. While reservations about the extent and nature of certain anti-communist activities were, from time to time, expressed, the essential impression of communism of the agencies' elites was unthreatened.⁵⁷ The commander of the CIB's Sydney division, for example, had no doubt that the waterside dispute of the mid-1920s was the direct result of communist agitation intended to precipitate revolution. Like Jones, he did not require incontrovertible evidence of this. It was "of course plain" that industrial troubles of recent years had been:

inspired by the thoughts arising out of Communist teachings and propaganda ... in the general sense ... neither [implying] nor [proving] direction from such source.

The lack of clear signs of a direct communist influence on the waterside workers could not shake his faith that the "communist movement alone, more than any other," was Australia's most important "menace, capable ... of inflicting an industrial matter without directly taking a hand in it beyond cheering it on."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Victorian CIB inspector Roland Browne was one operative to express frustration with the activities of the LNS and its commander, whom he accused of stirring up precisely the brand of social discontent they desired to suppress. Browne stated of Blamey, "he more than any other is responsible for giving the public something to talk about and exaggerate to hysteria and nonsense and I think it would be a good thing if he were told so." See Report from Brown to Jones, 7 March 1931 (AA, A369, Item D585).

⁵⁸ Letters from Sydney CIB commander Longfield-Lloyd to Jones, 15 and 19 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/1).

Citizen Anti-Communists - Clubs for "law and order"

Non-official militia and civic associations made important contributions to Australian anti-communism. While they never wielded the power of their American counterparts, nor succeeded in so closely allying themselves with state authorities, these organisations nevertheless enjoyed close relationships with governments. Their influence, however, was inconsistent. The extent of private societies' anti-communist activity, rather like that of Australian governments, depended on temporary exigencies; although their anxiety was constant, it was only during periods of emergency that such anxiety was translated into concerted action.

Political militia groups had a long history in the antipodes. Throughout the nineteenth century, wealthy interest groups sporadically raised forces to protect property and existing order, with government approval. After Federation, the federal Police Offences Act of 1901 was used to justify the establishment of special constabularies and militia. Conservative forces that mobilised in response to the Bolshevik revolution rose from older societies and followed their example.⁵⁹ The Red Scare moved non-official anti-communists to band together in greater numbers and with greater fervour than any previous political crisis. The threat of Bolshevism particularly encouraged them to influence policing operations. In Queensland, anti-radicals influenced not only the composition of the CPF but also its activities. Associations like the Queensland Loyalty League and the National Political Council submitted secret reports of the activities of suspected subversives to authorities and advised where decisive action was required. In exchange for such services, these societies were granted access to government intelligence.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 13 – 14. Perhaps the first non-official militia group was formed in 1800 when Governor Hunter of NSW called on the prominent surgeon and landholder William Balmain to organise the Sydney and Parramatta Loyal Associated Corps. Sixty years later, prominent grazing families raised similar units. In the twentieth century special police squads were formed during a 1912 general strike in Brisbane, that drew members from the Legion of Frontiersmen, an Empire-wide paramilitary organisation formed after the Boer War. Some Frontiersmen later joined the OG. Stuart Macintyre also notes that Freetraders had used the mantra of anti-socialism for political gain in the first decade of the twentieth century. See Stuart Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia: Vol IV, 1901 – 42*, OUP, Melbourne, 1986, pp. 92 – 3.

⁶⁰ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 319 – 20. This was a particularly useful trade-off to men like the President of the National Political Council, a wealthy sugar producer with a direct interest in anti-communist measures, which he hoped would impact upon the local labour movement and industrial arbitration rulings.

Federally, an initiative to found a national, loyalist, surveillance authority, to be led by official appointees but staffed largely with private auxiliaries, was encouraged by the wealthy businessman and industrialist, Herbert Brookes, son-in-law of former Prime Minister Alfred Deakin and an influential political powerbroker who was instrumental in the formation of Hughes' coalition government. Inspired by the efforts of the APL, Brookes envisioned establishing a similar organisation that would become the country's principal anti-radical force, commanded by the Minister for Defence, the head of the CIB and a private citizen who held the respect of loyalists. To further this project, Brookes convened a meeting in November 1918 with acting Prime Minister W. A. Watt, George Steward, E. L. Piesse and the Commissioner of the Queensland Police, F. C. Urquhart.⁶¹ Mindful of the hatred secret police forces attracted "in other lands," these men hoped the open involvement of the public with the League would protect it from ignominy. And, by "reason of its operating in alliance with an acknowledged public Department," the League would "not bring upon itself any suspicion - which could not be avoided if the organisation were ... purely voluntary." By marrying private and public sectors, the League would also "enable the Government to come openly to Parliament for funds for 'investigation' purposes," avoiding the need to "ask for a secret service vote," a vote which "would probably be regarded with repugnance."⁶² Urquhart, the future Administrator of the Northern Territory, was especially enthused by the idea. He created a volunteer auxiliary and advised Brookes that "upwards of thirty societies" had "given their adhesion to a 'Limited Loyalty League,'" a fact seemingly confirmed by the State Censor, who reported the existence of a "Grand Executive" of loyalist societies formed to control a myriad of organisations, representing about 160,000 voters.⁶³

The Australian Protective League was loosely based around the structure of its American forebear, but designed to function in the antipodean environment. Inherent financial and labour constraints dictated that the League would be a far smaller

⁶¹ Some of these men, along with Senator George Pearce, the Minister for Defence, and others had already been meeting with one another since November 1917 for this purpose. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 22 - 5.

⁶² Letter from Brookes to Senator Pearce proposing establishment of a Federal Investigative Department, 29 November 1918 (NLA, MS 1924/17/2).

⁶³ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1972, pp. 308 - 13 and 323 for paragraph content, excepting Brookes' letter. This Grand Executive comprised members from the QLL, Overseas Club, Royal Society of St. George, Navy League and the RSL.

organisation than the APL. It would not be able to police sweeping initiatives like "Slacker" raids, but, comprising specially-selected members of the public, it would be similarly entrusted with official duties by the state: the "small, permanent, skilled" ranks of the CIB would closely supervise the League, which would effect arrests "after consultation" with the Branch.⁶⁴ Brookes and his colleagues were keen to enlist the services of Australia's business community. The observations of the Ministry of Defence's special emissary to the United States, Robert D. Elliot, who conducted a fact-finding investigation into the American Protective League in 1917, indicated that citizens working in the professions, real estate, finance, insurance, transport, industry and even in hospitality could make a great contribution to law and order.⁶⁵ It might be contended that Elliot's report gave critical stimulus to Australian intelligence authorities' interest in obtaining from banks confidential information about communist finances. Certainly, Elliot's report encouraged Brookes to nominate five men, solicitors, aldermen, academics and businessmen, as potential League members, while a Defence Ministry functionary drew up a list of the men who, "under proper safeguards," would observe "enemy activities."⁶⁶

In spite of these promising beginnings, and conservatives' uniform desire to construct a strong, permanent semi-civic authority, the League soon foundered. The fate of the League was prophetic for future patriotic organisations. Uncertain of their legal security and uneasy with extra-legal vigilantism, most private fraternities never quite felt able to conduct their campaigns without regard for the authority of governments. Their strong commitment to inherited social and legal hierarchies that dominated the state, along with an awareness of the strength of counter-conservative forces, encouraged them to regard themselves as necessary adjuncts of government. Unlike

⁶⁴ NLA, MS 1924/17/9 – 11 and 14.

⁶⁵ Report from Robert D. Elliot to Minister for Defence, 29 November 1917 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43). Elliot was a Melbourne businessman and former member of the AIC. Both he and Henry Braddon, son of a former Premier of Tasmania and a prominent financier, were involved in the putative stages of the formation of the Australian Protective League. Braddon, who would later become an important member of the Old Guard, probably also investigated the APL in the United States, when he served as an Australian trade commissioner. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 4 and 25.

⁶⁶ Letter from Herbert Brookes to Senator Pearce and Departmental Memorandum to Pearce, both 2 May 1918 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43). The Departmental Memo list included names such as Brookes, Robert Elliot, E. Joske, Registrar of the Dental Board of Victoria, Archibald Strong, Professor of English at the University of Melbourne, John Clayton, of Collins House, a certain McLachlan, General Secretary of the Society of Australian Engineers, O Morrice Williams, of the London Bank, Professor Picken, of Ormond College, J. Davies, Secretary of the Commercial Travellers' Association,

the AL or the DAR, they neither sought to, nor could force the arm of governments; for the most part they worked directly with constitutional authorities and the majority of groups, which were small, in fact did little else but petition official action.⁶⁷ Even the practical ambition of the most militant loyalist organisation, the NG, extended no further than the desire to hospitalise "extremists" from the labour movement and a more fanciful wish to force the removal of the State Labor Government. And while the OG made preparations, with federal authorities (several Guards were in fact members of the Lyons government) and the NSW Police, to overthrow the Lang government, they nonetheless did not precipitate Lang's fall and promptly disbanded after his removal. Moreover, the Guard actively suppressed the NG, mindful that its inflammatory demagoguery was more likely to imperil civic order even than Lang himself.⁶⁸

While personality clashes undermined the success of the League, other factors were crucial.⁶⁹ Most important, agreement could not be reached regarding the degree to which the League ought to be voluntary; while Watt and Elliot believed that the logistical burden of organisation necessitated a strong private involvement, and no doubt Watt was eager to apportion responsibility for the League beyond the government, G. R. Finchen, Manager of the National Bank, was concerned to confine knowledge of intelligence and propaganda within a narrower sphere of interest and argued against mass mobilisation.⁷⁰ So although there was no shortage of interest in action, conservative elites were unwilling to act decisively, conscious that the law was against them and hamstrung by their commitment to British constitutional traditions and the appearance of law and order.

Notwithstanding the demise of the League, anti-radicals were free to air their views, particularly as security services were disinclined to regard reactionary organisations

F. P. Brett, of Blake and Riggell Solicitors, C. S. Crouch, Secretary of the British Medical Association and Alderman W. W. Cabena, of Balaclava.

⁶⁷ Both the Australian Protective League and the LNS did this at opposite ends of the 1920s.

⁶⁸ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 186 – 7, 198 and 234.

⁶⁹ Frank Cain writes that George Steward worked to sabotage the scheme. See Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 311.

⁷⁰ Notes regarding Meeting in Prime Minister's office for APL, 29 May 1918 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43, C 571/1/374). Chief of General Staff Legge was also concerned that the League would have to be absolutely above party prejudice.

as unconstitutional or hazardous.⁷¹ Herbert Brookes was a prominent member of several anti-Catholic and anti-communist associations, including the Victorian Protestant Federation, the United Protestant's Club and the Loyalist League of Victoria, which he served as Secretary and Treasurer. These societies strove to "resist any encroachment on the rights and privileges of the people by any ecclesiastical or civil organisation" and spied on Catholics, widely esteemed to be as politically unreliable as Bolsheviks. Members of these societies hailed from a variety of occupations, the members of a country chapter of the Loyalist League including several farmers and storekeepers, a stationmaster, butcher, baker, blacksmith, timber merchant and a draper, as well as a Methodist missionary, and the Shire's Secretary and Court Bailiff. But their leadership typically derived from the same strata as that of the Protective League: on the Advisory Committee of the Loyalist League sat educators of Wesley and Scotch Colleges and Melbourne Grammar School, as well as Brigadier-General James Burston and Robert O. Blackwood.⁷²

The influence of these groups is difficult to quantify, but for the most part they were unable to directly control anti-communism outside of the mainstream media and propaganda, and were largely dormant throughout the 1920s. Sporadically, private citizens participated in political repression with anti-communist overtones, as in late 1923, when the Victorian government formed an emergency special police force in response to the Melbourne police strike. The suppression of the strike, however, was entirely consistent with conservative paramilitary tradition. The special police force comprised a broad range of people, in terms of occupation and class, but not ethnicity, under the command of military elites. The predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant members of the special squads were not empowering themselves in a popular and populist movement, in the manner of American Legionnaires. The special force manifested no serious challenge to the structure of society, answered to the

⁷¹ Captain Woods of MI, for example, responded in 1919 to official concern that Queensland patriots might be arming themselves through rifle clubs by stating 'our work is only concerned with the disloyal associations, we do not worry ourselves about what the loyal societies are doing,' intimating that they could not be stopped from forming a Grand Executive and finally questioning why the state would desire to prevent this from occurring. See Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 323.

⁷² NLA, MS 1924/20/165 – 206. See *Constitution of the Victorian Protestant Federation (VPF)*, "God, King and Empire," Adopted August 1918 and *The Vigilant*, IX, 5, 14 December 1931, Item 21/109 and List of Loyalist League Members, 5 November 1919. A typical report of the *Vigilant*, featured in the above issue, denounced "Rome's Domination of the Parliamentary Labour Party."

government and promptly disbanded in accordance with standing prohibitions on the armament of civic personnel in times of peace.⁷³ And although the Chief of General Staff, General Sir Harry Chauvel, recommended that the government establish new artillery bases in Melbourne, Sydney, Newcastle and Brisbane, capable of supporting their own transport requirements, antipathy toward the expense and perhaps the nature of such recommendations led to their rejection. The federal government settled, instead, for an amendment to the Australian Military Regulations, providing for the use of the military after proclamation of a Riot Act.⁷⁴

For much of the remainder of the 1920s, private anti-communists were essentially estranged from official anti-communism. Repressive activity was specific and did not amount to advocacy for the kind of systemic anti-radicalism desired by Jones and Brookes. Although the pioneering anti-communist organisation, the Sane Democracy League, published books and pamphlets, formed local auxiliaries, organised a corps of speakers and aired its views in newspapers and on radio, most interest groups merely supported government attacks on particular unions and organisations.⁷⁵ Shipping company bosses, for example, assisted the federal government in prosecuting Johannsen and Walsh. The AWU and the Graziers' Association colluded in the suppression of radical agricultural workers in Northern New South Wales and Southern Queensland. While the Depression undoubtedly intensified fear of revolution, few civic associations took the law into their hands. Rather, they urged authorities to proscribe the CPA.⁷⁶ Similarly, patriotic associations did not attempt to implement reforms advocated by Senator W. G. Thompson, who called on the federal

⁷³ Those men enrolled in the special force hailing from country districts included farmers, engineers, an umbrella frame maker, butchers, graziers, a wireless operator, an accountant, grocers, carpenters, cooks, salesmen, clerks, a lands officer, manufacturers, a railway detective and a mercantile marine officer. Their names indicate they were principally of WASP origin, with a few exceptions. In city districts all manner of professions were represented; jewellers, clerks, draftsmen, tailors, engineers, ex-Army men, bank officials, detectives, public servants, artists, students, hoteliers, journalists, hairdressers, architects, lawyers, doctors and dentists. Members from wealthy suburbs such as Brighton, Canterbury, Camberwell and Surrey Hills also offered the use of their cars, if required. See VPRO 1226, Item 123.

⁷⁴ Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 55.

⁷⁵ Richmond, "Response to the Threat of Communism," p. 74.

⁷⁶ The Advance Australia League and the Graziers' Vigilance Committee were two associations to do this. See Letter from Advance Australia League (AAL) to Acting Prime Minister, 18 December 1930 and Letter from Graziers' Vigilance Committee to Prime Minister Scullin, 28 May 1931 (AA, A1606/1, Item B5 Part 1). Co-signing with the AAL were the Liberal Federation of South Australia, the South Australian Labor Party, the Country Party Association of South Australia, the Australian Natives' Association, the Navy League, the Citizens' League and the Glenelg Optimists Association.

government to follow the lead of the of Fish Committee and "deport alien communists ... exclude communist immigrants ... deny citizenship to communists [and] suppress communist publications." Instead, they flooded authorities with petitions calling for the same, while industry groups, notably large insurers, patronised the All for Australia League, which spawned the United Australia Party that seized power from Labor in the 1931 federal election.⁷⁷

Governments seldom found non-official vigilante action necessary to maintain law and order, particularly in major urban centres, where police squads were widely employed. Australian authorities neither solicited nor encouraged non-official activity with the enthusiasm of their American counterparts. Information supplied by informants was gratefully accepted, but there was no question that outsiders would be made privy to classified information.⁷⁸ Such an attitude contrasts strongly with American officials, who were far more prepared to share their information with patriots. A further and significant check on vigilante anti-communism was the antipathy of parliamentary labour forces to private militia associations. Conservative politicians subjected to fierce criticism regarding the mutual ties between the NG and the Army couldn't doubt the potential electoral damage of fostering too close a relationship between themselves, the Army and the paramilitary Right.⁷⁹ The federal ALP, for example, attacked the federal government's defence expenditure in 1932, claiming it was intended to enable a "complete showdown and crushing of opposition by force of arms ... of any State Government acting contrary to its conception of what

⁷⁷ AA, A1606/1, Item B5 Part 1, including Memorandum from Secretary of Attorney General's Department to Secretary of Prime Minister's Department, 30 June 1931. Thompson made his plea on 23 June 1931. The petitions were formulated in conjunction with dozens of municipal councils in Sydney. Two large insurers that supported the All for Australia League were Australian Mutual Provident, which encouraged its employees to enroll in the League, and National Mutual, which advertised in the League's publications. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 47.

⁷⁸ This is indicated by correspondence between Jones and Latham regarding a naturalised immigrant from Moscow who offered the CIB a list of communist operatives in Australia. While Jones acknowledged the efforts of the informant, requested further information and offered him the Department's gratitude, he was "unable to suggest" that the man "be placed [directly] in touch with any" branch of the government. See Letter from Jones to Latham, 22 January 1932 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). Jones argued that it was "not desirable that [the informant] should know where the interest in these matters lies."

⁷⁹ Old Guard elements of the Army were also keen to ensure that the NG was kept at arms length from the military. When Sydney police discovered that a field brigade commander had invited the New Guard's leader, Eric Campbell, to attend a social event in barracks, the officer's divisional commander stripped him of his commission. This disciplinary action was later upheld by a court of inquiry presided over by a senior figure in the conservative King and Empire Alliance, Major-General Charles Rosenthal. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 38 and 186-7.

is right." Commenting on the association of the "Commonwealth Defence Forces" with the Guard, Senator J. P. Dunn warned the government that its "death-rattles" were "being heard in the highways and by-ways" of the nation and that the next Labor government would "profit by the lessons of the past, and overhaul [the] military machine and not with a feather duster." Similarly, when R. E. Lane, a member of the federal House of Representatives and a senior Guard, protested the deprivation from "private individuals and organisations ... of the right to set the law in motion against extremists who advocate the overthrow of the present system of government," the other side of the House immediately denounced the Guard as a prime example of the kind of "extremists" Lane decried.⁸⁰

There were, nonetheless, a handful of associations prepared to safeguard the community. Among them were the high-brow Australian Citizens' League and more middle-class assemblies, such as the All for Australia League, which enrolled over 100,000 members and called on the services of various secret armies of ex-servicemen. The power of the League was keenly felt in rural areas where members and sympathisers helped police attack local UWM chapters.⁸¹ In the Riverina, a "separatist" movement arose in 1931. It quickly assumed considerable influence in southern New South Wales and demanded a declaration of independence for the region from the State. The movement was anti-communist in-so-far as it regarded the Lang State Government as dominated by Reds.⁸² In major cities, fraternities such as the Citizens' League in South Australia, reckoned by the CIB to comprise about 13,000 members and to have contributed 1000 men to special constabulary forces, and the LNS in Melbourne, with an estimated membership of 30,000, had no intention of countenancing separatism. They were determined to purge Australia of separatists, starting with six hundred professional communist agitators reputedly operating in the country. The LNS prepared to defend the General Post Office, Central Telephone Exchange, the offices of the *Herald* and broadcasting, power and light stations from a Bolshevik coup. Directed by senior commanders associated with the Chamber of Commerce, and boasting organised transport and rifle divisions, as well as a cache of

⁸⁰ CPD, 3 November 1932, pp. 1824-1826 and 22 November 1932, pp. 2610.

⁸¹ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 194.

⁸² The movement called for the formation of new provinces, entirely autonomous in domestic affairs and subservient only to the federal government with regard to external affairs. See CIB Report from

machine guns, CIB agents feared that the League would cause the community considerable harm, not least because it comprised "a steel hammer to crush a nut" and antagonised "the decent unemployed ... bitter [at] the very idea of a secret force being organised to combat something which they have no intention of doing." Harold Jones had detailed lists of the League's members, officers and drill halls, but did not regard the League as dangerous. The clubs for "law and order" were safe so long as governments received no recommendation from the CIB to prosecute them.⁸³

The OG, of all patriotic associations, was particularly safe from official censure. As large as the LNS, it had a huge membership base in rural areas and was run by "the cream of the AIF ... Sydney's hegemonic class [and] the colonial-pastoral banking alliance." Financed by banks and supported by industrial and agricultural powers, its executive committee boasted that it could force the Lang government from office if it so chose, by exercising "their powers as directors of the financial institutions on which the State government depended."⁸⁴ However, little was known of this secretive organisation and it was publicly overshadowed by the NG, founded and chiefly active in Sydney. The brainchild of Eric Campbell, a businessman and retired Colonel, the Guard committed itself to the overthrow of the Lang Government and the annihilation of communism in Australia.⁸⁵ Although its leader and some of its members were stimulated by the possibilities of Nazism and, more especially, Fascism, interest in these doctrines remained theoretical. On a practical level, the Guard's activities were limited to (often vicious) vigilante attacks and surveillance of individuals and associations. While its leadership did not comprise the cream of Australia's elites, as Campbell and his clique were *nouveau riche*, the Guard's senior ranks represented entrenched conservative and Imperial commercial interests. The Guard's Finance Committee was described by *The Red Leader*, the official organ of the Miners' Union's Militant Minority faction, as "the mouthpiece of British imperialism." The

Riverina to Director, 11 April 1931 (AA, A369, D585). Some of the legislation "of pure sovietism" decried by the Riverina movement included the Industrial Bill and the Three Year Plan.

⁸³ See Report from Browne to Jones, 7 March 1931 (with attached confidential reports from informants, dated 6 and 14 March 1931) and Memorandum from Jones to Browne, 5 February 1931 (AA, A369, D585). The LNS also mobilised its rural chapters, which were widely scattered across the State of Victoria. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 13.

⁸⁴ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 88 - 113. The mining giant BHP, the Producers' Advisory Council and the Graziers' Association were among the powerful companies and organisations that supported the OG.

⁸⁵ Campbell formed the Guard after he was invited to leave the OG in the OG in January 1931. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

Committee included several managers of large British insurance companies, as well as J. Scott-Fell, a member of the wealthy Scott-Fell ship-owning family, Charles MacDonald, Chairman of the Northern Coal Owners' Association and President of the Employer's Federation of New South Wales, and S. Bennett, the newspaper magnate and the proprietor of the James R. Patrick interstate shipping line.⁸⁶

In spite of the clear pedigree of the Guard's upper echelon, the organisation claimed that its rank and file principally comprised unionists, or "the better class workers," alienated by labour leaders in the pay of Moscow, who were deserting their traditional representative bodies. Through its journal, *Liberty*, the Guard posed as the champion of workers who were being used, coerced and misled by an upstart, "loudmouthed" junta (see Figure 13). *Liberty* discerned a state of tyranny in the Australian labour movement, where unionists were "compelled to provide finance for Union activities of a kind [detested] told what papers [to] read, what shops [to] patronise, what people [to] hate [and] how fast, or rather how slowly [to] work." Now, an organisation was standing up to remind the workers that the Self, the Australian state that was such an important part of the British Empire, was indivisible, as much for themselves as for the Lords and the power from which the Australian unionist inherited "his native soil"; the Guard aimed to give workers their inheritance back.⁸⁷

Membership rolls of the Guard indicate, however, that its working-class fidelity was purely rhetorical. Rank and file Guards, while hailing from a variety of occupational backgrounds, were mostly *petit-bourgeois* in outlook. Large numbers of military personnel were enrolled, as were clergymen, engineers, law students, auctioneers and a master mariner. Outside the professions, tradespeople and caretakers were solidly represented, but very few, if any, claimed to work in union trades.⁸⁸ As one of its

⁸⁶ *The Red Leader*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 25 September 1931, p. 4 (AA, A467, Item 20/SF7/4). The *Leader* believed the composition of the Guard's upper echelons determined its "antagonism to the political agents of its capitalistic opponent, the Australian manufacturer [and] the Australian Labor Party." Military Intelligence even suspected that the newspaper magnate Clyde Packer may have been a member of the Guard. Labour ranks were somewhat mistaken in thinking that the NG, as opposed to the OG, was the "mouthpiece of British imperialism" and Moore describes its leadership as comprising "ruling-class understudies" and "small businessmen of no particular social distinction, some even [bankrupt and] with stains on their character." See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 145 and 153.

⁸⁷ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 4.

⁸⁸ NLA, MS 250, Folio 3. H. C. Cropper in his correspondence with Latham also claimed "sixty percent" of the Guard's members were unionists, in a letter of 15 September 1932. Yet in an earlier letter of 13 May 1932, when offering the Attorney-General the services of 200 Guards for vigilante,

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NEXT MOVE IN DOLE WAR

COMMUNISTS WANT WORKLESS TO STARVE

THE Communist-led Unemployed Workers' Movement has lost its leading position on the Northern Coalfields, as it was bound to do in the end. Its success at Glebe and Lithgow will be short lived. The more honest recipients of the dole, as well as the better-class workers, will not support the criminal tactics of the pro-Russians, whose antics all them with disgust. Thus concludes the latest strategic move of the Communists, but they are already hatching the next facinorous.

The plan now sponsored by them and backed by the Trades Hall, is to organise a huge petition, which they think the employed workers, in addition to the unemployed, can be induced to sign. When some sort of a petition is got together, their intention is to organise a march on Parliament House, and to bring about "one-day stoppages" in all industries.

Councils of Action are being formed in important industrial concerns, notably at Eveleigh workshops and the power house at White Bay, and Ultimo. Spying and intimidation are the methods of these councils or committees. The honest, loyal worker dreads them, realising that trade union officialdom is really behind them.

Unfortunately, the decent workers cannot trust the Trade Union leaders determinedly to set their faces against Communist domination, and are afraid that those who resist the Communists to-day may suffer if ultimately the Union leaders openly fall in with the would-be revolutionaries and allow them to control employment. This eventuality is a foregone conclusion.

(Continued on Page Two.)



NEW GUARD CLASS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.

This class of students finished the first term of a course in political economy under Mr. J. H. White, B.A., LL.B., on November 14th. Chosen largely from members of the Sydney Training Unit, these students may be expected to deliver a strong message to future New Guard candidates.



FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENT-ELECT OF U.S.A.

Surging his election-night rally out over the heads of 12,000 farmers gathered together at Topeka, Kansas, in the course of the election campaign.

STILL MEDDLING

One Day of Government Enterprise.

Extracts from "Sunday Sun" and "Guardian," 15/11/32.

TRANSPORT.
The Transport Advisory Committee will recommend the pooling of Government and private interests.

"But if that means a transition period during which Government revenue will suffer, the recommendation will meet with strong opposition."

RURAL BANK.
"Before the end of the year the Rural Bank will be recommended by the State Government on lines which will enable it to engage in straight-out banking business."

"The opinion of competent observers is that unless the Rural Bank is placed on a new basis it will become, within twelve months, one of the greatest white elephants in the State's history."

TIN HARES.

"All the sporting clubs are vying on permits, and it is almost certain that the whole question of applications for licenses will be re-opened."

COMMONWEALTH LOANS.

"Because a large amount of available money for investment has been diverted to the new internal loans, the Stock Exchange was quiet last week."

"Banks have furnished the principal weakness, as dividends continue to be reduced."

EAST-WEST RAILWAY.

"Built at a cost of nearly £5,000,000 the Trans-Australia railway last year failed to return working costs and interest by more than £250,000."

TARIFF BOARD.

By way of a change, a news item announced that Mr. Boppell was coming from Adelaide, representing the Chamber of Commerce, to take up cudgels with the Government because it had removed the Tariff Board from political control.

So this is Democracy.

(Figure 13: *Liberty* (15 November 1932) decries communists' cynical manipulation of Australia's working classes and unemployed.

Source: Australian Archives, Record Series A432/86, Item 1932/1471).

anti-communist duty, Cropper spoke only of recruiting men "of excellent type in every respect - (mostly business men)." (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152).

more famous members, Francis De Groot, recalled, most of the Guards were "retired Army and Navy non-commissioned and petty officers," working as caretakers of metropolitan banking and insurance buildings.⁸⁹ Yet De Groot gilded the Guard lily somewhat, as Andrew Moore has commented, for the Guard counted many "small capitalists ... reliant on bank credit [crushed by] the fierce competition of larger and more established firms" and susceptible to "body blows meted out by labour" among its foot soldiers. The Guard's Local organiser in Campbell's suburb of Turramurra was an unemployed engineer reliant on dole and family endowments to support his wife and fourteen children; in other suburbs the Guard was even forced to door-knock for funds.⁹⁰

Typically for an antipodean patriotic league, the Guard was a deeply hierarchical organisation, modeled on the armed services. A total of six tiers of authority existed, descending from the "Chief Commander" to his second in command, and then to an "Inspector General," "Mobile Brigade Commander," a "Chief Director," several Department Chiefs, a "Mobile Battalion Commander," an "Inspector General" of mobile forces and an "Inspector General" of civil forces. Below all these sat the fourth-tier divisional and mobile company commanders and fifth-tier locality commanders and then the rank and file members, who, while dimly aware of their leader Campbell, were probably uncertain of the identity of most of the Guard's various commanders.⁹¹ Real logistical authority within the organisation resided with the General Council, entirely staffed with military personnel, including Major G. D. Treloar, attached to the Australian War Memorial, who served as Chief of Staff, Colonel H. J. Wright, of Davis Gelatine Australia Limited, Major R. G. Anderson, also of Davis Gelatine, who was Director of Ordinance and Captain T. A. Robinson of Australian Cement Manufacturers, who was Director of Engineers. The other positions on the Council were Directorships of Transport, Supplies, Signals and Intelligence.⁹²

⁸⁹ ML, Series A4946 - 2, Pocket Year Book 1955, Francis De Groot, *The Opening of The Sydney Harbour Bridge*, NSW Government Statistician, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 145 and 163.

⁹¹ Moore notes that this was also the case in the OG. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁹² New Guard Command List and General Council, 5 April 1932 (ML, Series 4951 and 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579). Current and former Army personnel were generally prominent in the leadership of large loyalist groups. The LNS is thought to have been commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas Blamey and a number of senior ex-Army officers, including the then Colonel Francis Derham, an eminent

Whenever the Guard attempted to carry out its program of action, it behaved in the inconsistent manner typical of Australian right-wing "loyalist" groups. On one level, the Guard functioned as a crude vigilante force, fighting with groups such as the UWM and communists and enforcing municipal bans on communist activity. The Guard also observed suspicious persons and organisations about whom it submitted reports to the police and the CIB. The Intelligence Directorate of the Guard instructed its operatives to classify information within three categories: information useful to the police but not to the Guard, information which the police couldn't use but which the Guard could, and information useful to the Guard's "Vigilance and Publicity Committee." Specifically, Guards were to observe "militant unions and organisations" and "Socialistic [and] Communistic activities." In addition, they were to locate "known hostile residents," with a view to isolating them if the opportunity and necessity arose. Local Special Constables were to be enrolled as Guards, if possible, and the intelligence corps was also required to compile lists of Justices of the Peace, indicating their sympathy or antipathy to the Guard, shops stocking arms and ammunition, and foreigners, whether newly-arrived, resident or seeking naturalisation. "Considerable discretion" was to be exercised gathering information about foreigners. Like the CIB, the Guard's Intelligence Directorate established central information catalogues to which agents were encouraged to defer. However, because it was a voluntary fraternity, the requirement for centralised operation was more gently and democratically stated; Guards were told that expert information from headquarters would assist them in their further investigations.⁹³

The Guard's Intelligence division was mired in the paranoid position. Projected fantasies of communist conspiracies were received from dubious sources and uncritically accepted. For example, the division was induced to believe that Eric Campbell's life was to be threatened at the opening of the Sydney Harbour Bridge in January 1931 at the behest of Jock Garden, by an informant in the UWM. Similarly, the division was certain that seemingly innocuous associations and meeting places belonged to and housed Bolsheviks. The St. Peters district officer submitted a report alleging that the local Commonwealth Bank head officer was a communist. Other

Melbourne lawyer, company director and future Major-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Herring, future Chief Justice of Victoria. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 55.

⁹³ ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579, Item 147 - 8.

agents carefully observed the Humanitarian Science Movement and "Red" chess players. Operatives in Paddington believed that "Ossies Fruit Shop" was a "hot bed" of communists, and in Cowra, a roving piano tuner was supposed to be travelling country districts as a communist organiser.⁹⁴

In spite of its endeavour, the Guard nonetheless maintained that its capacity to serve the state was being restricted. Uncertain of their standing with authorities, Guards felt restricted in their vigilantism. R. E. Lane, the federal Parliamentarian and editor of *Liberty*, demonstrated the hesitancy of the Guard's leadership in a letter written to federal Attorney-General John Latham, in 1932. Lane stated that he had recently attended a function at what he called "Soviet Hall," "The Workers' Dramatic Club," anxious to catch activists in the act of breaching the revised Crimes Act. Although "disappointed in that on this occasion nothing seditious was said," Lane promised to make a "round tour" of half a dozen halls in the city, with witnesses, noting "seditious utterances."⁹⁵ Clearly, Lane was unwilling to stray beyond the boundaries of the law and prevent, disrupt or destroy "communist" meetings. So while he protested the unfairness of regulations which prevented "a private individual or ... organisation ... which [desired] to uphold law and order ... from initiating a prosecution without the consent of the Attorney-General," the Guard did not try to force governments to change this policy.⁹⁶

A likely cause for the Guard's crisis of will and infirm purpose was the fact that the Guard was in many respects a very traditional socio-political club. The Guard conducted activities of a bourgeois character, establishing libraries, card, games and reading rooms, organising educational classes and publishing book reviews (see Figure 14). The NG did not force radical right-wing agit-prop on its members; instead, classes in political science gave classical education, schooling pupils in the works of Plato and Aristotle, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, and more modern texts such as A. V. Dicey's *Law of the Constitution*. And at street level, attending inter-denominational church services was the most radical paradigm shift the Guard contemplated. Outside Campbell's paranoid inner circle, sympathy for conventional

⁹⁴ Ibid., Items 226, 215, 185, 179, 27 and 12 respectively.

⁹⁵ Letter from R. E. Lane to Latham, 30 November 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/1471).

⁹⁶ CPD, 22 November 1932, p. 2610.

values, and perhaps an indigenous antipathy for extremism, made the prospect of Fascism, let alone Nazism, unpalatable. One of *Liberty's* literary reviewers, P. H. Coates, demonstrated this in his comparison of the works of the contemporary German philosopher Oswald Spengler with Sir Arthur Salter, an English economist:

[Spengler's] chord of pessimism and despair comes like the wail of the banshee or the howl of the bunyip from desolate swamps. One is thankful to close the book and to take one up such as ... "Recovery," by that typical Englishman, Sir Arthur Salter [who] strikes a note of optimism in showing that the hope – indeed the assurance – of ultimate success ... in solving the [economic problems] facing us, is in its nature capable of human solution.⁹⁷

Australian kinship groups like the NG sought not to abolish democracy but rather to be reassured of its "sensible" survival. Provided governments respected social and political norms, they would receive loyalists' support, as the attitudes of a senior LNS member demonstrate. In a private meeting with a delegate from the Guard, the League member indicated that his organisation saw no need to stand in firm opposition to the State Labor government, because, unlike the government of Jack Lang, it comprised "a pretty decent crowd." However, an additional factor contributing to the paralysis of ambition among loyalists stemmed from their inability to overcome sectarian rivalry, as well as a lingering sense of insecurity about their operations. The same Guard delegate to the LNS had difficulty in learning much about the League, forming an impression that the secrecy of the association made its members "very reluctant to discuss any matters of policy." While he expressed hope that the League "would be very much more open in their conversation" with the Guard's "higher officials," the wariness he encountered contrasted strongly with the affinity of American patriots, who eagerly shared information and correspondence and placed great importance on the cultivation of alliances.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, pp. 14 and 16 (for Coates) and *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, pp. 3 and 5.

⁹⁸ Report of New Guard operative's liaison with Melbourne elite secret force, 19 October 1931 (ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579). It is worth re-emphasising, too, the efforts of the OG to strangle the NG. In rural areas, Old Guards attended NG meetings and dissuaded people from joining what they warned was "an illegal organisation," while the OG's financial contacts deprived the NG of funds. See Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 155.



**Listen-in to Test Cricket
Listen-in to Eric Campbell**

Both are cementing the
day of Empire.

**BUY YOUR RADIO
FROM**

Castle Radio Co.

DISTRIBUTORS OF

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RECEIVING SETS

SPECIAL TERMS TO NEW GUARDSMEN.

UNRIVALLED SERVICE

Note the Address—

127 Castlereagh Street—Sydney

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(Figure 14: The conservative nature of the NG is demonstrated by the Castle Radio Company's advertisement with *Liberty*, stressing traditional values of test cricket and empire to appeal to Guardsmen for their business.

Source: Australian Archives, Record Series A432/86, Item 1932/1471).

The relationship of business groups with the NG further suggests why its activities were comparatively circumscribed, and why the broader business community did not manifest a more potent anti-communist edge. While many senior businessmen enrolled with the Guard, they did so essentially as private citizens and did not bring professional resources to the order. And because Australian loyalist groups either worked under guidance or deferred almost entirely to governments, there was little room for strong business involvement in anti-radical activities. Certainly, various industry sectors and companies were fiercely anti-labour and fought workers'

industrial and political organisations. But they were most inclined to attempt this through propaganda.⁹⁹ One group of businessmen, insurance agents, were particularly eager to contribute to state propaganda. While not evincing the same preparedness for independent action nor the ambition of George Creel, the executive committees of the Insurance Institute and the Actuarial Society of New South Wales similarly imagined that they had unique abilities to make propaganda on a "grand scale." These men believed they were "peculiarly fitted for such a class of work ... the nature of their occupation [training] them to be diplomatic and keen students of human nature." With their "persuasive ability to enhance ... arguments," they were equipped to combat "enemy misrepresentation" and would "unearth the nests of enemy spies and sympathisers unsuspected by the Government." A small advisory body of "Insurance Officials" could assemble a huge distribution army; experience in Britain demonstrated this, as one major company commanded a force of 20,000 agents. The scheme was not designed principally to be anti-communist (the war was still raging) but it was emphasised that conditions in Russia made immediate action imperative. The insurance men were disappointed, however. After initial signs of enthusiasm their scheme was quashed by Defence Department mandarins in mid-1918.¹⁰⁰

With the opportunity to create propaganda in official relationship with governments lost, business resorted to other customary means of exerting pressure: lock-outs, wage reductions and police enforcement of unpopular industrial regulations. Yet industrial violence in Australia never approached American levels; just one striking worker lost his life to industrial conflict in the 1920s.¹⁰¹ A critical contributing factor to American

⁹⁹ The mining industry, for example, in the *Industrial Australian and Mining Standard*, decried "The Menace of Soviet Russia" and accused "Official Labour," the ACTU, of betraying "the Cause of White Australia" by affiliating with the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS). See issues 17 March 1927 and 26 July 1928 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/6).

¹⁰⁰ See Petition from committees to Prime Minister Hughes, 22 November 1917, Letter from Secretary of Department of Defence to Secretary for Governor-General, 11 January 1918, requesting the regal representative to inform Home Authorities of such plans, Letter from Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department to W. R. Dovey, Managing Director of Assurance and Thrift Assoc. Ltd., 14 January 1918, assuring Dovey that a cablegram was sent to UK, Cablegram from Secretary of State for Colonies, 12 February 1918 acknowledging plans for the scheme, "welcomed in principle [but] not free from difficulty," Cablegram from SSC to Secretary of Department of Defence, 7 May 1918, stating the suggestion to use insurance agencies was "regarded as valuable and is being put into effect," Memo from the Hon. G. Swinburne, Business Board to Secretary of Department of Defence, 25 May 1918, reminding him to bring before next meeting Council Defence proposal of insurance agencies. It was here that the scheme seems to have foundered, for no further mention of it occurs (all documents from AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

¹⁰¹ Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 156.

The Shapers of Australian Anti-Communism

anti-communism's intensity and strength was the success industrial interests experienced in discrediting the very notion of worker organisation. In Australia, by contrast, the legitimacy of labour organisation was unshakeable. Even the NG found it expedient to champion the cause of "better" or "legitimate" majority elements of labour. Australian anti-communism, by its very nature, had far more circumspect aims and, therefore, fewer targets. Australian anti-communists could not expect to crush trade unionism. Moreover, many did not even want to. Among prominent businessmen, subscription to paranoid, anti-democratic views did not necessarily endanger philosophical acceptance of the right and, indeed, necessity, for labour organisation. This was true even for T. R. Ashworth, who was firmly in the grip of the paranoid position.

A confirmed racist and eugenicist who passionately endorsed notions of inherent moral and intellectual capability, Ashworth feared that Australia might not learn from the experience of the United States and obstruct mass immigration, which had "lowered the average quality of the American citizen." Ashworth maintained that Australia should admit "only the superior racial strains," ensuring national development progressed "less rapidly but more surely," by preventing the importation of "the feeble-minded strains," that introduced "increasing insanity and excessive criminality" to a community. American experience also illustrated Australia's urgent need of eugenic programs. In the United States, "nearly two millions of defectives" required institutional care; "at least half [owed] their defects to inheritance" and were expected to "reproduce their kind." The "tide" of offspring produced by defective stock was "decreasing the proportion of the so-called normals [sic], who [appeared] in huge numbers just above the institutional line, and who [reproduced] at least twice as rapidly as those at the other end of the scale of intelligence," making the need for eugenics "unquestionable."¹⁰²

When he considered the relationship of human nature with politics, Ashworth found further troubling evidence of the destructive import of unequal native gifts. Most thought and action, far from being rational, arose "from mental complexes known as biases...the intensity" of which depended "primarily on ... natural mental

¹⁰² Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 43 and 60.

inheritance." Some men, were "naturally broad-minded, others narrow-minded." The President of the Australian Seamen's Union, Tom Walsh, who led a major strike in support of British colleagues, was an archetypal example of the congenitally narrow-minded individual. Walsh's conduct demonstrated his ability to "see one side of a question only," itself the result of intensely-narrow upbringing. "Had Tom Walsh been brought up in an aristocratic home in Belgravia," Ashworth reasoned, "the same narrowness of inherited mentality which made him a Communist, would have [made him] a hard-shell Conservative." Seemingly untroubled by his theoretical inconsistency, which suddenly situated Left perfidy in the effects of nurture, when he had been so emphatic that it lay, in fact, with nature, Ashworth continued to explain how such an individual, who had grown up mixing "only with his own class [retained] the bias begotten of early associations." By contrast, "one who, through churches, sporting associations and other institutions, [mixed] with members of other classes [became] broad-minded." Ashworth's conception of natural order amounted to little more than a pseudo-scientific rationale for class and racial hierarchy. Yet while professing elitist misanthropy, Ashworth freely conceded a permanent place for "combinations of workmen" in Australia, recognising that "individual bargaining" brought economic advantage only to the employer and that "collective bargaining" was "the natural remedy for this injustice."¹⁰³ In crucial respects, this suggests that Australian industrial and political conflict was for the most part a struggle to define a structure of class interests and balance about which there existed a far broader sense of consensus than in the United States.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 8 and 15. Ironically, by 1930 Tom Walsh had become an ardent anti-communist and 1931 he joined the NG. He resigned the following year, however, after being advised that the organisation was fascistic. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 64 and 185.

Citizen Anti-Communists - The Mainstream Press and Anti-Communism

Anti-communism received its most obvious and perhaps influential support from the media. Owned and operated by conservatives, the mainstream press hailed governments' anti-communist endeavours and goaded them on to more strident action. Popularising political notions damaging to labour and radical groups, the major newspapers unstintingly encouraged readers to regard draconian legislation as panaceas which would rid Australia of civic conflict caused by obnoxious, alien races and doctrines. The media invited Australians to split their society into mutually exclusive sectors of the upright and the damned. Journalists and editors carefully used vague, malleable descriptive terms when arousing primal tribalism. Individuals, cultures, races or associations were damned by generic inferences. The *Argus*, for example, argued that the Crimes Act targeted a group of miscreants whom it literally described as "them," and lauded the Act for:

wiping out *their* pernicious, foreign-born associations which have been proved to be *their* breeding-grounds, as well as by direct punitive action against those whose connection with *such* associations can be traced.¹⁰⁴

Readers were also encouraged to regard these "pernicious associations" as responsible for a variety of seemingly-disparate ills plaguing the "nation," an entity which suddenly assumed an air of solidarity and mutual need. With false certitude the *Argus* averred that it had:

long been apparent that ... action was necessary. Industrial disturbances too wide in scope to be effectively dealt with by any one State have been entered upon and maintained with malignant pertinacity. Their prejudicial effect upon the general interests of the community, the stubborn resistance to constitutional means of settlement, and the proved association of the leaders and chief agitators with such organisations as the Communists ... all go to show that they have been not simply industrial struggles but deliberate blows struck in the Bolshevik campaign to destroy the British Empire by paralysing its trade. To fight this menace, energetic action on an all-Australian basis was clearly required, and the measure now

¹⁰⁴ *Argus*, 29 January 1926, [My emphases] (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4/118, Folder 3).

introduced should go far in drawing the fangs of these enemies to all that Australians hold dear.¹⁰⁵

The *Age* concurred, applauding the Bruce Government's effort to rid Australia of "professional disturbers of industrial peace." Any form of opposition to anti-communism was greeted with universal horror and condemnation. The *Argus* "confidently expected [the] great outcry about the supposed infringement of [liberties]" with which the federal Opposition greeted the Crimes Act and it dismissed Labor's complaints as "illogical" and "noisy."¹⁰⁶ The *Morning Post* attributed labour opposition to the Act to workers' support of communists, who had bored "every trade union" and the ALP from within.¹⁰⁷

After its controversial ruling in the Walsh case, the High Court was subjected to strident criticism by an indignant *Age* no longer confident that the government could contain communism. Unwilling to accept the Court's judgment, the paper mischievously opined that the issue of whether the nation might be able to deport undesirable aliens for political beliefs remained "in such a state of confusion and complexity that nobody can say with any certainty exactly how this law stands today." Nonetheless, the editor chided the Court for the democratic implications of its ruling, complaining that:

the position taken by the court was that once a man had established a home in Australia - become domiciled in legal parlance - he ceased to be an immigrant. The mere acquisition of a house and his act of installing himself there were apparently enough for him to shed his character as an immigrant, even though he was a Marxian fanatic and doctrinaire wrecker of the worst species. The court ignored the aspect of a newcomer's social-political tendencies, and allowed it to be assumed that the efficacy of protective laws must exert their full force before the immigrant established himself in the Commonwealth.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ *Age*, 18 January 1926 and *Argus*, 29 January 1926 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4/118, Folder 3).

¹⁰⁷ The *Post* also found the collapse of the alliance between Tom Walsh and Jacob Johannsen suspicious and untoward, commenting when proceedings were taken to deport them, Messrs. Walsh and Johnson were bosom friends - comrades in distress. To-day they are leaders of rival factions in a dispute over Seamen's Union money. See *Morning Post*, 12 and 14 February 1926 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4/118, Folder 3).

¹⁰⁸ *Age*, 18 January 1926 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4/118, Folder 3).

The press enthusiastically supported anti-democratic opinions of men such as T. R. Ashworth. First the *Age* and then the *Brisbane Courier*, *Adelaide Advertiser* and *Hobart Mercury* published large tracts of Ashworth's work, verbatim. The *Age* evinced particular ardour for Ashworth's theory of inherited "intensity of biases" and lamented the impediment placed on democracy by the Australian labour movement's singular insistence that it run its own political party.¹⁰⁹ Ashworth was far from alone in equating class position and occupation with ethical and intellectual capacity. A few years earlier, *Liberty and Progress* frequently espoused the Aristotelian and Social Darwinist theory that not even "the best form of state" could "make the mechanic a citizen," because mechanics and labourers could not "pursue the things which belong to excellence"; some were best fitted by nature to labour with their bodies, others to toil with their brains.¹¹⁰ Indeed, frustration with the defeat of the second conscription referendum and the general mood of labour moved the journal to repudiate democracy. Concluding that the political weaknesses of democracy, such as susceptibility to partisan manipulation, inefficient administration, complacency and sloth, would prove fatal, it warned:

It will be well for Australia if the experience of the war years teaches a great part of her people the weaknesses of democracy, first among which may be to put faith in glib talk and the dropping of ballot papers into boxes.¹¹¹

Attributing the rise of class conflict to the ignorance of lower-class voters, the Federation argued a restriction of franchise was necessary:

The majority of the Australian people are not yet educated up to that standard of nationhood which can justify their claim as democrats. They have powers beyond their mental and moral range.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ *Age*, 23 November 1925 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4/118, Folder 5) and Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 3. The paper was, of course, impressed with the American labour movement's comparative wisdom and restraint.

¹¹⁰ This is a quotation from Aristotle cited by Sagan, *Honey and the Hemlock*, p. 141. *Liberty and Progress* demonstrated its agreement with the great philosopher on 25 April 1919 and 25 November 1918.

¹¹¹ *Liberty and Progress*, 25 April 1918.

¹¹² *Liberty and Progress*, 25 January 1917.

While the *Argus* was a little more circumspect, recommending that democracy be abolished only in the Northern Territory, the mouthpiece of Victoria's landed wealth, the *Pastoral Review*, more emphatically repudiated the notion of sharing power with workers. "Human nature," it asserted, "is selfish and never changes." Democracy, therefore, would always prove unworkable because:

Selfishness allows of no discipline or sacrifice, therefore a Democracy must always end in chaos and ruin. Democracy is a slow poison, it is a gradual dragging down to a one sordid condition; it raises the scum to the top and puts the brains of a community at the bottom.¹¹³

In addition to defiling public confidence in democratic government and the labour movement, the media often more directly influenced anti-communism by supplying, both unwittingly and consciously, the intelligence services with "information." For example, on 17 March 1925, the Melbourne papers the *Herald* and the *Evening Sun* claimed that China and Japan were ferrying Russian revolutionaries to Australia, through immigration channels. Spurred into action, the CIB found that an associate of a Commercial Representative of New South Wales had "informed" the press that on a voyage from Tokyo to Sydney in 1924 he witnessed a distressingly high number of Russians board the *Mishima Maru* in Nagasaki and Hong Kong. The investigating agent reported that the Representative's "long experience of the Russian bolsheviks [sic] in his home land, China, and Japan" had convinced him that "no country was safe wherever they were permitted to have access, as their sole objective was the acquisition of other people's property by revolutionary means." In spite of the fact that the Russians on board the *Mishima Maru* had been "particularly well behaved and inoffensive during the whole of the voyage," this did not dispel fears of smuggling rackets. The "disciples of sovietism," after all, were highly trained, fanatics and immigration routes were vital channels for the submission of instructions and finances from Moscow. So although he regarded the press account of the affair "rather extravagant," Harold Jones nonetheless concluded there was "no doubt

¹¹³ *Argus*, 12 July 1919 and 15 October 1919 and *Pastoral Review*, 16 January 18.

something" in allegations that Japan was dumping revolutionaries in Australia and he averred that this was "a question of which [his] Department [had] not lost sight."¹¹⁴

This incident offers important insights into the organisational and psychological processes that helped shape Australian anti-communism. Acting on the prejudiced, unverifiable assertion of business elites and the media, and spurred on by an historic paranoid fear of invasion, the CIB commenced a major investigation, requiring the resources of three State offices, into the arrival, via an Asian sea-link, of communists in Australia. Although there were no indications that the Russian immigrants were communists, as a racial and cultural Other, their apparent good intent was meaningless and Australia could ill-afford to rely on China and Japan to vet prospective immigrants. The CIB also imagined that Australia's situation was uniquely perilous; it faced treachery on all sides and had to be extra vigilant. Besides illustrating the heightened emotional state of the CIB, this episode also reveals the deficient professional standards prevalent within intelligence services. Frequently, press reports were the point at which intelligence investigations commenced. The capacity of the industry to "discover" information unaided was minimal.¹¹⁵

The media sometimes more directly influenced governments' anti-communism. The managing editor of the *Sun* thought it pertinent to advise Prime Minister Bruce in January 1928 how he could better secure his secret agencies from communist infiltration. The editor's concern was aroused after he met a casual employee of the Branch who had, in spite of his lowly status, been entrusted with the filing of "all manner of confidential enquiries [sic] and investigations made on behalf of [the] Government." He informed Bruce that the man had proven his intimate knowledge by giving him "the full particulars of my own representations to you respecting the disclosure in the Domain of a private wire which we had sent to Newcastle";

¹¹⁴ Reports from Detective Rowe to Jones, 19 March 1925, Jones to Inspector Lloyd, Sydney, 28 March 1925, Inspector Lloyd to Jones, 9 April 1925 and Jones to Office, 22 April 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/Part 1). Class prejudice played its part in determining this outcome, for the N. S. W. Commercial Representative, John Bligh Sutter, was a member of a "well-known, respectable family from Bathurst." Therefore, the essential truth of his observations couldn't be doubted.

¹¹⁵ The CIB's dependence on the media is further demonstrated by its investigation, in 1924, into the affairs of the Australia-Russia Trading Committee; the Committee had been the subject of a report in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Similarly, CIB inquiries into communist sponsoring of immigrants at Labour Exchanges began with a story run by the *Herald*. See Report from Sydney CIB to Melbourne

immediately thereafter, a note was issued from the Prime Minister's Department to the Solicitor-General, demanding explanation from the Directorate of the Investigation Branch.¹¹⁶

The influence of the press over the public also proved decisive. It was chiefly through the media that anti-communist foot soldiers, the municipal councils, working-class conservatives and mistrustful informants, obtained "information" about communists in their midst. Years of inflammatory reports charmed an anonymous "Mother of five Babies" from the Maroubra district of Sydney, who wrote Prime Minister Lyons to complain of the danger presented by youth camps in the region. Communism, she suggested:

doesn't effect the adult so much but to the young mind it certainly a menace. [sic] We have the spectacle of young children camping near Bankstown under the control of communist leaders. The children are taught from the onset - disloyalty to our Sovereign and the teaching of Christ Our Divine Saviour in the hands of these blasphemers becomes a sacrilige [sic] and strangely the child mind is susceptible to these teachings.[sic]

This "Mother," therefore, begged her "Noble Leader" to "have courage to deal drastically with this red menace."¹¹⁷ Relentless media propaganda similarly led the Neagle family of East Hawthorn in Melbourne to interpret Francis De Groot's patriotic act at the opening of Sydney Harbour Bridge, as the fine action of "a military gentlemen slashing a blue ribbon with a flashing sword [which could] not bear comparison with a Communist slashing you with a butcher's knife or a razor."¹¹⁸ Propaganda made the media the most important moulder of public opinion about communism, far more influential than the clubs for law and order.

HQ, 10 March 1924, responding to stories printed on 7 March 1924 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/Part 1). The earlier action responded to a story of 27 September 1923.

¹¹⁶ Letter from the Managing Editor, *The Sun* to S. M. Bruce, 6 January 1928 (AA, A67, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

¹¹⁷ Memoranda from Attorney-General's Department to Solicitor-General, 18 February 1932 (AA, A67, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). As an afterthought, the woman added that an "agitator" was "living on the reserve near the cliffs in a shack by itself on the South Side of the Bay" and had in his possession "a large quantity of explosives buried in tins around the shack." This was "obviously" why he lived "away from the rest of the village." And for further evidence of the man's treachery, the authorities could note that his wife told fortunes for a living.

Citizen Anti-Communists - Men of Empire

In spite of the fact that Australian kinship groups wielded less power than their American counterparts, their contribution to Australian anti-communism remains vital and their structure, activities and purpose require analysis comparable with that given to American kinship groups. In sharp contrast with the patriotic milieu in the United States, anti-communist ranks in Australia were almost exclusively masculine. The substantial contribution made by women to American anti-communism was missed in Australia. Groups such as the NG and the SDL made half-hearted attempts to harness the female support by forming women's auxiliaries.¹¹⁹ But the culture of the Guard was so patronising it is difficult to imagine that the auxiliary was successful. While the Guard felt obliged to offer women some civic education, the idea of entrusting them with important tasks was unthinkable, as the organisation still regarded female suffrage as a painful necessity.¹²⁰ The lack of organisation among women in the right was far from unique. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the CPA, while less overtly condescending, just as forcefully excluded women from positions of influence. The failure to mobilise female opinion was endemic in Australian political culture.


The loyalist clubs were organisations formed by and catering solely for men, who were highly conscious of the role club membership played in affirming their masculinity. The loyalist clubs allowed men to gather together, as brothers rather than citizens, to solve the nation's problems. Francis De Groot understood the NG as a fraternity which bound its members together with bonds stronger than those of citizenship. Many of the Guards were former servicemen, who, like De Groot, felt they had "spent the best years of [their] lives and lost so many friends defending what is now called "our way of life" that [they] had no intention of handing over Australia to the tender mercies of the rubbishy kind of people who aspired to rule [them]." With

¹¹⁸ Letter of 21 March 1932 (ML, Series A4949 - Reel [CY] 3092).

¹¹⁹ The organising secretary of the SDL's women's auxiliary, Ms. M. Preston-Stanley, was the first female MP in NSW, holding a seat for the conservative United Australia Party from 1925 - 7. See Richmond, "Response to the Threat of Communism," p. 80.

¹²⁰ *Liberty*, September 1932, p. 9. A staff writer of *Liberty* was worried that women, "delightfully feminine creature[s], so unversed in commercial matters, [were] compelled to express [their] views, through the ballot box, upon the management of the nation's business." Even more "repellent, was the thought that, as a qualified elector, she was really under obligation to learn how to use her vote in the best interests of the country. To look at her, and then to imagine her as an amateur student of self-government was unbearable!"

a heightened and aggrieved sense of insecurity, these men reassured one another of their moral superiority and right to act as they saw fit.¹²¹ Yet in spite of the affirmation mutual society brought Guards, the role of the organisation was entirely negative. Loyalists knew exactly what they stood *against*, this was what brought them together. They were fired by a "determination that Russian Communism was not going to obtain any foothold in Australia."¹²² However, when it came to establishing what they stood *for*, few patriots could articulate any ideas. Most sought simply to maintain "good," conservative constitutional government, social hierarchy and order. Their overarching concern was to create an environment which would assuage their rampant anxieties.



(Figure 15: The casual nature of some loyalists' identification with contemporary European extreme right-wing movements is demonstrated by a pamphlet of the National Labor Party, which associates the Nazi swastika with a floral motif.

Source: National Library of Australia, Records of Herbert Brookes.)

Structurally, patriotic societies resembled the Army because its structure best embodied the psychic order its members craved. However, loyalists coveted more than feelings of in-group solidarity and security. Some sought emotional and sexual gratification in fraternities that perpetuated British public school, not to mention Fascist, values¹²³ (see Figure 15). This is demonstrated by the ideas of the loyalist C. Leslie Cother, who wrote John

Monash in 1929 to interest him in his putative *Knights of the Empire* society.

Like all loyalist societies, the *Knights* would be ranked in strict hierarchy.

Cother envisioned that the society would

¹²¹ De Groot averred that Guards were all "men of the highest character." See De Groot, *The Sydney Harbour Bridge*, p. 2.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 1 and 9.

¹²³ Cathcart also speculates on the influence of public (now referred to as private) schools on Australian anti-communism. These schools exposed their students to kinship group psychology from an early age, educating them believe that they were born to rule, and even encouraging them to conceive of themselves as God-ordained guardians of social order. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, pp. 101 – 16 and 167.

comprise "Pages," boys aged fourteen to sixteen, "Men-at-arms," "Lads" aged sixteen to nineteen, "Squires," "Lads" aged nineteen to twenty-one and "Knights," men aged twenty-one and above. Above these soldiers would sit the "Great Knights" and their "Lord Knight," in State groups, and, finally, the "Supreme Knight." Ideally, the Governor-General would become the Supreme Knight and the State governors the Lord Knights. Pages would learn "absolute obedience to Parents, and loyalty to the British Crown" and Men-at-arms would be "trained in arms under competent instructors [and] take an oath of allegiance to the British Empire, absolute obedience to the laws of the Country, and to the Supreme Council of King Arthur." Squires would progress to "receive instruction in Civics" while Knights would "place some portion of [their] time and money, if so required ... to the services of [the] country."¹²⁴

Cother intended to offer the office of "Great Knight" to "men who [had] performed great deeds, such as Messrs. Kingsford-Smith and Ulm" and "Captain Hinkler." Their presence, he maintained, "would do much to stimulate a healthy hero worship." Further revealing his need for masculine emotional support, Cother suggested that the Pages "be trained in physical culture and encouraged in manly sport," an idea with obvious homoerotic overtones. Cother also believed that *Knights* would ideally keep their membership secret, "not from any other object than to make the oath of allegiance demanded more solemn and binding on the member"; in other words, to solidify the member's sense of exclusivity and interdependence. While Cother was certain the *Knights* would draw members "from all sections of the Community," forming "an effective secret service ... of trained men for defence [to answer] communistic propaganda," he was uncertain which social elements to exclude. Like most loyalists, his conviction that external qualities indicated political integrity threatened to collapse under the weight of cultural and religious diversity. Cother conceded membership would probably be limited to "British-born subjects," as the admission of "naturalised Australian Citizens" was "open to objection." But his search for certainty, manifested in his identification with traditional structures, was rendered impotent by national development. We can only surmise the horror he would have felt, had his scheme reached fruition, when an Australian-born Jew, Sir Isaac

¹²⁴ Letter from C. Leslie Cother to John Monash, 8 June 1929 (NLA, MS 1884, Item 43/396).

Isaacs, would had to have been invited to assume the role of Supreme Knight.¹²⁵

Loyalists' conviction that they alone could guide the state was an extension of their absolute identification of themselves with justice and nobility. The capacity to deny the less-edifying elements of their behaviour assumed grotesque proportions in loyalist leadership ranks. Herbert Brookes, for example, imagined that although the Australian Protective League would be observing citizens for signs of "disloyalty," its claim to be "wholly non-political and non-partisan" was perfectly proper. Similarly, while the League exhorted its members not to "apply the name of democracy to a mere section of society," it maintained that such a commitment to the collective couldn't possibly obstruct the need to give total allegiance to the nation's elected officials. When faced with opposition from the labour movement, the League sank even further into denial. Strident protest of the conviction of the Wobbly Twelve prompted the League to suggest that in spite of the fact that a myriad of labour bodies were agitating for the Twelve's release, it was "probable" that the leaders of the ALP believed them to be guilty but were not challenging the opinion of agitators in the rank and file. And the League claimed its anti-OBU stance was motivated by the desire to protect the interests of the labour movement, as unionised opponents of the scheme required "outside assistance."¹²⁶ The NG commander, Eric Campbell, even suggested that his organisation had "strangely" transcended prejudice, when he stated:

In the New Guard we undertake what we consider to be our duty not to please people or gain popularity or advantage of any kind, but, strange as may seem, because we have a high sense of our responsibilities to the Empire and a genuine regard for our children's birthright.¹²⁷

These claims of Self-purpose rationalised loyalists' determination to drive the Other from the community. This was the intention of Campbell, who warned "all Socialists" that "in addition to neutralising their efforts," the NG would "within a space of months ... through [its] influence and moral force ... cast [them] from the boundaries

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ NLA, MS 1924, Items 17/9 - 11, 66, 116 and 128.

¹²⁷ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 6.

of our State."¹²⁸

Loyalists' division of society depended on the capacity for chronic conceptual as well as moral simplification, permitting them to continue their activities without needing to question their legitimacy. De Groot, for example, was confident he had returned from the War "with a fairly good appreciation for world affairs" and this, combined with his studious perusal of the press, convinced him that it was "the intention of the Communists to take over the State of New South Wales as the first Communist State in the British Empire."¹²⁹ Another Guard, Harold Cropper, was also certain that he possessed special knowledge qualifying him to speak with confidence about public affairs, as well as represent "public opinion." Writing John Latham, he asserted:

I am in a very favourable position to know just how serious the menace is, and I put it definitely to you that unless men like Garden, Grant, Kavanagh, Chapman, and numerous others are cleared out of the country and their property confiscated, they will continue underground to do their deadly work, and with men like Lang, Gosling in the country they may eventually wreck the whole economic life of Australia.

Cropper even advised the Attorney-General that:

public opinion is now so outraged that unless such a course as I mention is taken by your Government, to whom thousands are anxiously looking for definite and permanent relief from the "Red" wreckers and destroyers of liberty who are actually governing this State ... there is not a shadow of doubt that there will be a physical clash of serious dimensions in the near future.¹³⁰

Despite their certitude, Australian anti-communists' rhetoric betrays clear signs of urgency. Writing for the NG, A. C. Willis, a former Agent-General for New South Wales, voiced loyalist's dread of subterfuge and intrigue. Stripping away the "camouflage" of the ALP's "demand for nationalisation of credit" to reveal a

¹²⁸ Quoted in *The Red Leader*, Vol. 1, 6, 25 September 1931, p. 1 (AA, A467, Item 20/SF7/4).

¹²⁹ De Groot, *They Sydney Harbour Bridge*, pp. 1 - 2.

¹³⁰ Letter from Cropper to Latham, 20 February 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152).

"stepping-stone to the socialisation of industry and private property," Willis declared that Labor's communist plan to first inflate then "violently" deflate the currency would enable them to "force all people owing money to the bank to surrender [their] assets to the [nationalised] banks." In this manner, a new socialist state would be created and foisted on the public by a cabal who enunciated "humanitarian" and democratic slogans, but were "gulling the innocent." Campbell also warned the Guards not to trust Labor, and particularly Jack Lang, whose rule was an "ultra-Socialist, immoral expression of mob tyranny." The editorial staff of *Liberty*, too, reminded readers of Soviet perfidy, reporting the formation of a Special Commission for the Suppression of Religion which was closing all churches as well as religious educational institutions, forcing the deportation of "servants of religious cults" and producing over one hundred "atheistic [propaganda] films."¹³¹

Harold Cropper voiced additional fears. Attributing to Bolshevism biological, corrupting capacities, Cropper called communism a "human cancer" and complained to John Latham that his request for legal proof of communist treachery was "surely [tantamount to stooping] on all fours with a doctor asking for proof that influenza really exists, when an influenza epidemic is with us." While the federal government failed to take "definite and effective" action, the Reds were "working underground," as they were "in other countries." Because Australia, uniquely, lacked a "military organisation ... to assist police," it was "not impossible" that communists would "gather strength to give ... authorities "a rough time." Latham, Cropper suggested, would best consider:

how many people were imbued with the Hitler methods [that is, enamoured with dictatorship] whilst Scullin and Lang were in power and that spirit still smoulders in many quarters.¹³²

Loyalists' anxieties were greatly exacerbated by press reports. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, legitimated paranoid fear of communists' corruption of children on 29 February 1932, roaring:

¹³¹ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, pp. 1 - 4.

¹³² Letters from Cropper to Latham, 29 February, 28 April, 30 May and 3 August 1932 respectively (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152).

"POISONED MINDS - Child Communists - SPEAK IN THE DOMAIN"

Skillfully juxtaposing saccharine, sentimental references to childlike qualities with the brainwashed and abused product produced by communists, the *Herald* described how two youths:

preached Communism and sneered at the British Empire[having] graduated from a society of babes, aged from 5 to 8 years ... In halting speech, punctuated with embarrassed lapses of memory [pouring] forth the poison with which their childish, immature minds had been filled. They strained to remember a jumble of truths, half-truths, and nonsense. And while this tragedy of exploited youth was going on, some in the audience saw fit to applaud these immature conscripts to the Red cause, who had been robbed of their heritage of childish carelessness and joy and been warmed and cramped in mental outlook.

Not surprisingly, the day this piece was published Cropper was induced to write one of his many entreaties to Latham. Moreover, the central image of the *Herald's* article, a suffering, persecuted Self, captured the essential feelings of neglect, abuse and betrayal subconsciously registered by anti-communists. Francis De Groot believed that the Lang Government's closure of the Savings Bank was a communist plan to punish the "many thrifty people who had no access to their savings." As a signatory to a petition to George V, along with 400,000 other New South Welsh citizens, De Groot alleged the Lang Government had:

protected Communist and other disloyal elements among the people of this State ... neglected to prosecute and punish numerous persons guilty of sedition and disloyalty ... freely made available certain School buildings under its control and management, to Communists and other disloyal persons ... caused to be appointed to the Legislative Council ... certain men who have openly expressed disloyal and seditious beliefs ... repudiated its just debts [and] enacted Legislation to which the vast majority of the Electors have the greatest objection, as amounting to a destruction of the sanctity of contract, and unwarranted interference with the liberty of the subject.

De Groot also believed that the State police, chiefly comprising venal and unprincipled Scots and Irishmen, operated in the "Chicago" style. Politically opportunistic, they supported Lang so long as they were satisfied with their pay and conditions. De Groot's antipathy for the State police was grounded in a sense of outrage that the police had not only refused the Guard's assistance but even observed and sometimes arrested Guards. De Groot himself was tailed after presenting the petition to the King to the Governor of New South Wales.¹³³ Cropper also saw communists behind the police, which explained why - "under instructions" from "several Ministers of the Crown [and] rebels" - they failed to arrest communists. He, too, was infuriated by police surveillance of the Guard and stopped just short of accusing John Latham of treachery, advising him to cease "taking a more or less weak attitude towards Communism"; both De Groot and Cropper were seemingly unaware that W. J. MacKay, the superintendent of the NSW Police CIB, regarded the Guard as "a godsend" that he could hound to "soften his anti-working class reputation ... redeem his career prospects with a Labor government" and protect the Old Guard from its fractious rival.¹³⁴

Patriots were so surprised and aggrieved to find themselves subject to the laws of the land, effectively in the same position as communist traitors, that they contemplated the benefits of dictatorship.¹³⁵ Growing weary of the madness of democracy, remarking that "Charles I lost his head for less than Lang has done and said," Cropper was convinced that existing authorities could not "adequately deal with the low down cunning of the men who would Sovietise Australia" and that "many thousands of decent citizens ... would [rally] behind one *suitable* strong man to clear up the disaster facing us." A dictator could cleanse Australia by establishing a special "penal settlement" or concentration camp for communists, such as that (allegedly) operating in New York. De Groot's petition to George V to "graciously ... cause the dissolution" of the Lang Government indicated that although he was more

¹³³ De Groot, *The Sydney Harbour Bridge*, pp. 1 and 4 - 6 and ML, Series 4951 and 4952, [CY] Reel 2579, Petition to George V (henceforward Petition to George V). De Groot's sympathies in this respect are particularly interesting given that he may have been spying on the Guard for MI. See Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 153.

¹³⁴ Letter from Cropper to Latham, 29 February 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152) and Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 151.

¹³⁵ Although patriots not belonging to the leadership of the OG were more prone to feel disconnected from the political system, there were still many within the OG who harboured revolutionary thoughts. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 204 - 5.

constitutionally conservative than Cropper, he shared the emphatic need for reassurance that loyalists imagined a benevolent, father-figure/dictator would provide.¹³⁶ Many ex-soldiers, who presumably overlooked or remained ignorant of his Jewish background, hoped that John Monash would place himself in this role, assuring him how strongly they felt "the real need of [his] leadership." Mary Sadlier-Forster, of Melbourne, felt similarly, and wrote Monash, stating:

I saw in Friday's paper that Mussolini has done in Italy what I have contended for some time should be done here. There has to be one man in charge to do a thing like that. Napoleon - Mussolini, yourself!

Sadlier-Forster saw evil designs in the appointment of Isaac Isaacs as Governor-General. Disavowing any objections to the man himself, she worried that:

this appointment ... in its suddenness - may I think, easily prove to be the bone of contention which will bring about the clash between the rival factions here ... on the principal [sic] involved.

However, Sadlier-Forster could draw some comfort from this prospect, stating:

While I am one of those who deeply regret anything which appears to be weakening the ties between Australia and England - on all grounds, loyalty, self interest, etc. - I am also one of those who believe that what is written, will be. If this step leads ... to your taking charge - as I still believe will come about - then I am glad and may you be ready for it when it comes.

Others, including "a number of Sydney business men [sitting] among the ruins of their businesses," believed the pressures of economic collapse and "political incapacity" were bringing the country "rapidly" toward a point of crisis. Robbed of their faith in democracy by the "criminal folly of politicians," they looked, in "despair" to Monash "as the most outstanding figure to save [their] fair young nation from the political

¹³⁶ Letters from Cropper to Latham, 30 May and 26 September 1932 and 22 March 1933 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152) and Petition to George V.

brigandage into which it [had] fallen."¹³⁷

One man ostensibly prepared to fill the leadership void was Eric Campbell. An admirer of Mussolini and Hitler, Campbell's misanthropy induced him to abjure democratic government, which he believed imperiled the state by placing its destiny in the hands of its least-educated and upright citizens. History, Campbell believed, revealed that, "by slow degrees," democratically-elected governments "became more popular [and] less representative and responsible" with every expansion of the franchise; more popular on account of greater participation, more irresponsible on account of the "gradual introduction of parties and mob tactics," which, in turn, encouraged politicians to "learn the power of oratory on the unthinking crowd and [exploit] the gullibility of human nature in the mass, especially when offered something for nothing." As Campbell saw it, democracy and the "materialism of post-Renaissance philosophers" had shown demagogues that "greed was the greatest stepping stone to the popularity of the mob and consequently to parliamentary majorities." Australia had "inherited the system of over-developed so-called Democracy in its worst socialistic form." The subjugation of the democracy by the forces of socialism was manifest in "three main activities": parliamentary legislation, the creation of bureaucracy and consequent "meddling with business."

Elaborating these ideas, Campbell revealed a pathological distaste for community. He believed that the welfare state permitted the morally unworthy to place the burden of their existence on the shoulders of the *boni*. The redistribution of wealth effected through taxation took "money from people who ... earned that money by hard work and thrift ... giving it to [those] who, by bad fortune or laziness or other disability, real or imagined [were] in poorer circumstances." Legislation facilitating this process was "the coin in which the votes of the greedy [were] bought." The cost of internal treachery and the drain on the economy presented by the "intermeddling [non-producing] pettifogging" bureaucracy, was so great that it dwarfed the indemnity Australia would have had to pay Germany had that nation won the Great War. To

¹³⁷ Letter from W. H. Stewart to Monash, 24 July 1930, Letter from Sadlier-Forster to Monash, 24 November 1930, Letter from Sadlier-Forster to Monash, 5 December 1930, Letter from Barclay Smith to Monash, 19 December 1930 respectively (NLA, MS 1884). Cathcart notes that the South Australian Citizens League and the Western Australian Liberation League also supported a Monash dictatorship. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 41.

Campbell, anybody "content to see" government intervention "in all [these] unwanted activities" was "clearly and decidedly a Socialist." However, a ready solution to communism was available to Australia; Fascism, or "the principle of industrial corporations."

The "overwhelming success" of Mussolini's reforms greatly impressed the supreme Guard. Its system of governing through industrial councils comprising "a combination of employers and employees" ensured that "millions of pounds of wealth" were not paid to "Parliaments to waste in largesse," but were "conserved for distribution among those who [earned] it." If Campbell wasn't exactly advocating the creation of a Platonic realm of Philosopher-Kings, he certainly aimed to "cut out the absurd system of picking members of Parliament by the aggregate vote of people living higgledy-piggledy in residential areas." Attributing Australia's woes to inherent moral failings and cognitive incapacity, Campbell claimed that the "political administration" of the nation would have to be removed from party politicians, who merely aspired to be rulers and lacked "the requisite qualifications" for government. Rather, "the general rank and file, good fellows as many of them may be, [belonged] to the lower mediocrity." Further describing parliamentary democracy's inversion of the hierarchy of humanity, Campbell opined:

Any system that causes mediocrists [sic] to emerge as rulers, and all too often unmoral [sic] mediocrists at that, is doomed to fall and to crash its country while demonstrating its own insufficiency.

Australia had to create a society where the *boni* could protect the Self from its *untermenschen*, "thieves and vagabonds [and] vote-catching politicians." If government posts were not remunerated, then they would "automatically fall into the hands of those who were most worthy of seeking to administer and make laws." Australia could also establish a "Charter of Liberty," defining "the basic and unalterable rights and liberties of the individual," the "basic principles of both capital and labour" and the "functions and limitations of the Cabinet and Parliament, respectively." Campbell was unaware that the Industrial Arbitration Commission and High Court already performed these tasks, denying men like John Latham the power he would have liked them to possess. In any case, Campbell was most enthusiastic

about the Fascists' abolition of elections that had enabled the Italian government to represent:

all classes of endeavour, all trades and professions ... free from the degradation of talking down to the mob once in every three years and battenning upon their greed ... Its Cabinet ... free from control of party and unaffected by the rise or fall of Governments [retaining] the essential spirit of private enterprise while postulating the supremacy of the State.

Yet this was "for the present ... a far-distant dream" in Australia, a dream Australians, or its *plebs*, at any rate, could not "hope to attain until [their] cultural outlook" and "sense of civic responsibility" was "greatly improved." But as an archetypal paranoid, Campbell was certain destiny and God himself was on *his* side and "Our plan," he stated, was:

gradually unfolding [and] based on the firmest of all foundations, justice truth and objective morality [recognising] the spiritual significance of life and the omnipotence of Divine Providence.

However, for all his swashbuckling rhetoric, Campbell's political allegiances were thoroughly traditional, reflecting both his denial of contemporary global political circumstances and the paralysis of ambition typical of Australian anti-communists. Campbell's future Fascist Australian state would not even claim an independent role in world affairs. Imagining that Fascist Australia's relations with its Home Country would not suffer, Campbell remained content to disavow real political obligation and hide behind the skirts of a crumbling Empire that was hurling its children from the filial nest. The Westminster Statute conferring independence on British Dominions was five years old, and unratified, and Campbell continued to dream of placing "on every man the responsibility of being in every way a worthy citizen of a great Empire."¹³⁸

The inability and unwillingness of loyalists to imagine an independent Australia gave

¹³⁸ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, pp. 6 – 7 (all quotes).

The Shapers of Australian Anti-Communism

Australian anti-communism a character quite different from American anti-radicalism. Loyalists' devotion to the British Empire circumscribed their political goals. Unlike American anti-communists, Australian patriots did not imagine they could make the world in their image; there was important tradition and precedent to follow and higher authorities to satisfy. Australian anti-communists' preoccupation with the Home Country also robbed them of the single-minded purpose of their American counterparts and they were distracted by extraneous issues which were not nearly so significant in the United States.

One such issue was that of sectarianism. While anti-Catholicism had a time-honoured place in American political culture,¹³⁹ it rarely intruded upon the anti-communist activities of zealots like Elizabeth Dilling, the BAF and J. Edgar Hoover. For Herbert Brookes and the LNS, however, anti-communism was a minor concern in comparison with anti-Catholicism. The dominance of Brookes' sectarian passion suggests that anti-communism was perhaps a less visceral concern for Australia's patricians (among Brookes' anti-Catholic *confreres* were the industrial magnate J. A. M. Elder, Sir John Grice and Justice W. L. Baillieu) than for *nouveau riche*, would-be-dictators like Campbell.¹⁴⁰ To be sure, they were firm anti-communists, but anti-communism had to compete for their attention.

Herbert Brookes' paranoid fear manifested itself in much the same fashion as Eric Campbell's. However, unlike the Guard commander, but like many of his subordinates, including De Groot and Cropper, Brookes' more-total identification with Britain dictated that he express his sense of cultural superiority and plans for political reform through a conventional paradigm. His capacity for denial was acute and his confidence in the racial supremacy of Anglo-Saxons and the cultural supremacy of Britain was unbridled. He imagined that the British Empire was the greatest civilising force ever created and even regarded George Washington as the quintessence of British culture. In 1932, the bicentennial year of Washington's birth, the VPF published Brookes' *A Great Colonial Englishman - George Washington*, in

¹³⁹ Anti-Catholicism had as long and fervent a history in Australia as in the United States. In the mid-nineteenth century, militant Protestants attempted have Irish Catholics repatriated and their schools and churches closed. Immigration quotas also ensured that arrivals from England and Scotland outnumbered those from Ireland. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 131.

¹⁴⁰ NLA, MS 1924, Items 21/83 and Moore, *Secret Army*, p. 125.

which the United States' most celebrated political icon was subsumed into the pantheon of British heroes, becoming:

the greatest and truest of Colonial Englishmen and the finest flower of English civilisation of the eighteenth century British Empire - an Empire which easily transcended anything of the kind that had existed up till that time in the history of the world.

Brookes' use of the word "transcended" was anything but incidental. This was precisely how he viewed British heritage, a heritage possessing an indefinable essence elevating it above other cultures. The rise of Britain, Brookes explained, had been stimulated by its precocious abandonment of feudalism, which had created a bourgeoisie keen to invest in overseas colonies, as well as a class of yeoman, farmers and labourers "without ties to the soil or institutions or classes ... also eager to seek fresh fields and pastures new." The "freer position of women" in Britain had also fostered the Empire's expansion and British women made "an admirable partner for the settler, the hunter, and frontiersman." Being "skilled in many crafts," these women, "both as mothers and wives ... along with [their men] constituted a unit that was capable of subduing the wilderness or the forest under conditions of perfect freedom." It was this liberty which "in great measure accounted for the success of the Anglo-Saxon settlements as opposed to the Latin" in the Americas, along with the "peculiar genius of the English people ... for political and religious freedom." The British race's enjoyment of liberty, however, did not preclude it from being able to follow worthy leaders and Brookes' affection for authoritarian leadership was expressed in his idolisation of Washington, a "strong man" and father figure who suddenly emerges, fully-formed and "majestic," more than half-way through his narrative. The "living embodiment" of "forward-looking Colonial principles," Washington singularly "glorified" and "made fresh" his community. Indeed:

No one amongst the two million and more colonists approached him as a full-orbed personality, not even such giants as Benjamin Franklin, Jefferson,

Hamilton, and the rest.¹⁴¹

Terribly for Brookes, forces threatened to destroy this perfect British Self, the most horrible being Catholicism, particularly Irish Catholicism. Projecting his inability to tolerate diversity, Brookes believed that Australia, as the most isolated and distant outpost of Britain, was uniquely threatened by the potential loss of its "British citizenship." She could not rely on other British colonies to defend the Empire. India, "with its own chequered and various history ... its religious epics [and] dreams of gorgeous dynasties ... reaching back centuries," could not be "expected to share with" Australians, "the children of the United Kingdom, the same thrill that we experience when we read the moving epic of our Island story." Similarly, while the Irish Free State followed Britain's lead "in material things," it was "peopled by subjects in the main claiming a dual allegiance"; in matters spiritual they looked to Rome. The Irish did not and could not "share [Australians'] delight [and] zeal for the long line of those we reverence as political and religious emancipators."¹⁴² The proliferation of independence movements in these nations confirmed their Otherness, but while events in India did not materially effect Australian patriots, those in Ireland did, and with a large Irish Catholic population present in Australia, loyalists were certain they enjoyed ready assistance.

Brookes never lost his belief that the Sinn Fein had subverted Australian society. Perpetually fearful of Catholic treachery, Brookes received requests from colleagues for "entirely confidential" information, including data which might indicate the amount of war pensions applied for and granted to Catholics. These colleagues were actively involved in the production of anti-Catholic propaganda, publishing pamphlets such as *The Enemy Within Our Gates*.¹⁴³ Long after the war, Brookes' suspicions lingered and the VPF compiled "a complete set of Electoral Rolls for Victoria ... with all Roman Catholic names crossed out, so that at a minute's notice [it could], through

¹⁴¹ Herbert Brookes, *A Great Colonial Englishman - George Washington*, pamphlet published by the Victorian Protestant Federation, 1 September 1932, pp. 3 - 5 and 13 - 14 (NLA, MS 1924, Items 20/165 - 206).

¹⁴² *The Empire and the Imperial Issue*, Address before Royal Empire Society by H. Brookes, issued by the VPF, c. 1932, p. 13 (NLA, MS 1924, Items 20/165 - 206).

¹⁴³ Letter from E. H. C. Oliphant, Critchley Parker Publishers to Brookes, 14 April 1917 and Rev. T. E. Ruth, *The Enemy Within Our Gates*, Patriotic Pamphlets No. 29, Critchley Parker Publishers, 31 March 1918 (NLA, MS 1924).

the post, communicate with all Protestants in all, or any particular electorate." The Federation's organ, the aptly-titled *Vigilant*, noted with distaste in December 1931 that "Rome's Domination of the Parliamentary Labour Party" had engineered an increase in Catholic representation in the Cabinet of Catholic Prime Minister Joseph Scullin. Catholics occupied such vital positions as Treasurer (E. G. Theodore), Attorney-General (Francis Brennan) and Minister for Markets and for Transport (Parker J. Moloney). Further, there were five Catholic Ministers in the Lang Cabinet. These "Romanised" Ministers destabilised the public service and defrauded the Treasury, appointing disloyal Catholics to the Department of Relief Work and employing them as dole inspectors. Despairing of the "apathy" of the public, *Vigilant* urged Protestants to "awaken ... and free the country from the domination of the Roman Catholic Church in politics."

For the Federation, adherence to Catholicism was simply irreconcilable with "modern ideas of liberty." To support this contention, *Vigilant* cited a letter from Pope Boniface VIII to King Philip of France, written in the late-thirteenth century, in which Boniface demanded spiritual and temporal allegiance from the King. Little had changed, for the Archbishop of Malta had recently claimed that clerics could not be summoned before judicial courts without ecclesiastical consent; "no wonder," then, that nations rose against the Papacy. Anti-Catholicism in no way compromised Brookes and his colleagues' capacity to serve the state. There was no inherent contradiction between pledging to "uphold civil and religious freedom and equality for all citizens," resolving to "resist any encroachment on the rights and privileges of the people by any ecclesiastical or civil organisation" and vowing to "expose the errors of Roman Catholicism, and educate Protestants in the history and principles of Protestantism"; these were all fundamental objects of the Constitution of the Federation.¹⁴⁴

The forces of anti-Catholicism and anti-communism were frequently allied, one and the same. The psychological dictates of both philosophies were identical. They expressed elites' rage and frustration with a political environment functioning beyond their control. Both movements were manifestations of a desire to wrench control of

¹⁴⁴ *The Vigilant*, Vol. IX, 5, 14 December 1931, pp. 4 – 5 and IX, 7, 15 February 1932, p. 17 and

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that environment *back* from the unworthy, overwhelming commitment to democratic principles. Yet it was difficult to translate anti-Catholic prejudice into concrete forms of official repression and discrimination, for Catholicism was far more entrenched in Australia than socialism. Anti-Catholicism, therefore, remained an additional simmering cause for civic dissent, which, like anti-communism, never seriously threatened the fabric of the state.

External Influences on Australian Anti-Communism

Remote, small and economically vulnerable, Australia was accustomed to observing international currents for guidance. Anti-communists, too, took inspiration from beyond their shores. Various ideas and organisations offered important direction. A number of international agencies, including the Entente Internationale contre le IIIe Internationale, existed solely to combat communism and they drew modest but ready support from the antipodes, while news from the United Kingdom was always keenly scrutinised. The federal government, for example, received advice from British authorities regarding the recruitment of temporary special forces to perform strikebreaking and anti-revolutionary tasks.¹⁴⁵ Increasingly, anti-communists also noted events in the United States.

Australia's geographical isolation markedly affected local anti-communism. It ensured that anti-communists shared the misapprehension and misinformation of their international colleagues and made them more dependent on external sources of material. News traveled incomparable distances to reach Australia and had every chance of becoming exaggerated, vague and misunderstood. If the United States government's capacity to gather intelligence in Europe was hampered by the amateurishness of its foreign diplomacy, then the Australian government's ability to do the same was even more compromised by its total reliance on external consulates and journalists. Even after its tiny foreign affairs department was established, the Australian government was obliged to glean its knowledge of communism from the British Government and the foreign press. Non-official anti-communists were also strongly affected by information empty of analytical content; fear and isolation made Australians prize whatever material they could obtain.

Much of the information anti-communists received had little practical impact. The material of the Entente Internationale reached only small numbers of concerned and educated readers. Publishers affiliated with the Entente attempted to distribute their material off the back of local content, including a speech delivered by Prime Minister Bruce in 1925. This speech was sold as a pamphlet titled *Bolshevism in Australia* and

¹⁴⁵ Another European anti-communist text read in Australia was "The Revolutionary Technique of Bolshevism," which was taken from the right-wing journal *Revue des deux Mondes* in 1927 and

at the rear of the pamphlet was an advertisement for *Bolshevism's Terrible Record*, a book authored by a Swedish jurist, "issued under the auspices" of the Entente (see Figure 16).¹⁴⁶ The Entente also influenced some official anti-communists, like Richard Casey, who dispatched the Entente publication, *An Aspect of the Disarmament Problem: the "Proletarian War"* to the federal government. The pamphlet emphatically warned against sympathy with pacifist groups, the dupes of the Soviet Government and the Third International, who had sworn to destroy capitalism and democracy by encouraging proletarian revolt, disarmament among Western nations and the destruction of colonial ties in the European empires.¹⁴⁷

The influence of the British Government was far more significant, however. Material such as *Communist Papers - Documents selected from those obtained on the arrest of the Communist leaders on the 14th and 21st October, 1925*, published by the Government Stationary Office, were released to help muster Australian support for British policy. From such intelligence, Australian authorities learnt that the Soviets regarded the British Empire as vulnerable to destabilisation on account of its high level of industrialisation and reliance on colonial trade interests. Therefore, communists would bore into the Western labour movement and encourage nationalist movements in countries of special political and commercial importance to Britain. The Australian government was also sent data such as complete transcripts of the Congressional proceedings of the Comintern.¹⁴⁸ But the government's impression of communism was moulded more by press reports than official communiqués. From sources like the *London Times* and *National Review*, Australian officials apprised themselves of communist activity in Britain and Europe. This heightened their anxiety about national security and they anticipated treachery and tumult from the same quarters; agitators spreading "alien" propaganda and preaching "class hatred," labour leaders encouraging the rank and file to "believe that Bolshevism [was] really [a] kind of triumph of Labour government" and the foolish elements of the populace who, in "democracies [with] a broad franchise," overpowered the "sane, sober element" and

translated into English by General Macarthur Onslow and G. H. Leibius. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 52 and 61.

¹⁴⁶ NLA, MS 1009, 27/4/116.

¹⁴⁷ AA, A981/4, Item Com.1/1.

¹⁴⁸ External Affairs Department report, 23 September 1925 and Letter from Casey to Prime Minister Bruce, 7 February 1929 (AA, A981/4, Item Com.1/1). The countries regarded as particularly important to Britain comprised Turkey, Persia, India and China.

BOLSHEVISM IN AUSTRALIA.



Sir Mon. R. M. BRUCE, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia.

SPEECH

by the
PRIME MINISTER
at
DANDENONG

On Wednesday, 9th September, 1925.

NATIONAL PUBLICITY BUREAU,
20 Queen Street, Melbourne

BOLSHEVISM'S TERRIBLE RECORD

An Indictment

BY
MAÎTRE AUBERT
Of the Geneva Bar

*Issued under the auspices of the Entente
Internationale
contre le III^e Internationale*

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(Figure 16: The National Publicity Bureau's publication of Prime Minister Bruce's speech "Bolshevism in Australia," which carried an advertisement for "Bolshevism's Terrible Record" inside its rear cover.

Source: National Library of Australia, Records of John G. Latham).

supported demagogues promising impossible utopia.¹⁴⁹ British press reports also suggested to John Latham how the anti-communist crusade might best be fought in Australia; however, Australian governments were also influenced by the British government's use of the Supply and Transport Organisation, a huge government-supported paramilitary league, in quelling "Bolshevik" civil insurrection.¹⁵⁰

Gradually learning to shift their gaze from Britain, anti-communists also studied events in the United States. Press reports of anti-communist activity in America periodically influenced the public and government officials. Richard Casey sent Prime Minister Bruce materials from the American journal *Foreign Affairs*. Herbert Brookes, in his capacity as Commissioner-General for Australia in the United States, also sent Prime Minister Scullin a series of articles published in February 1930 in the New York *Herald-Tribune*, which "set forth the results of a survey of Communists and their activities in New York City."¹⁵¹ Garbled news of the proceedings of the Fish Committee also inspired dozens of municipal councils in Sydney to urge the federal government to grant itself authoritarian powers they believed American authorities possessed. The SDL similarly drew Prime Minister Lyons' attention to resolutions of an anti-communist convention in New York in 1932, where leading anti-communists had called for the re-establishment of powers enabling the BI to "scrutinise and keep under constant supervision" communists, as well as exclude the Communist and Workers' Parties of America "from all right to organise and function as political parties." The League also commended to the Prime Minister the convention's calls for strengthened immigration and deportation procedures and restrictions, and total abstinence from any form of trade in goods or information with Russia.¹⁵²

Neither the League nor the municipal councils of Sydney seemed to appreciate the

¹⁴⁹ See especially London *Times* 5 March 1927, featuring speech by Prime Minister Baldwin (for quotes) and 30 May 1927, regarding "BOLSHEVISM IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL - CONCERTED GOVERNMENT ACTION" and *National Review*, July 1929, "The Future of Communism in Britain" (AA, A981/4, Item Com. 6).

¹⁵⁰ Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 34 - 5 and 62 - 4.

¹⁵¹ Herbert Brookes, Commissioner-General in USA to PM Scullin, 13 February 1930 (AA, A984, Item Com. 33).

¹⁵² Report from Secretary Attorney-General's Department to Secretary Prime Minister's Department, 30 June 1931 and Letter from SDL to Prime Minister Lyons, 11 July 1932 (AA, A1606/1, Item B5/1) and Letter from Casey to Prime Minister Bruce, 7 February 1929 (A981/4, Item Com. 1/1). Among the leading American anti-communists at this convention were Congressman Martin Littleton, Major-

complex juridical differences that obstructed the wholesale importation of American-style regulations.¹⁵³ The potential of American-style anti-communist legislation, nevertheless, was not lost on senior government officials and bureaucrats. Preparing to brief the 1934 Premiers Conference, Solicitor-General Garran and John Latham noted the considerable power possessed by the United States Congress in the administration of deportation, particularly with relation to the expulsion of alien radicals. The supposed capacity of United States officials to decide deportation cases without being required to observe judicial authority seemed to offer Parliament a different administrative model which would permit it to circumvent the power of the High Court. The two men resolved to solicit the support of the Premiers for new federal legislation empowering Parliament to summarily proscribe specific associations. Such legislation, moreover, would, like comparable American regulations, "attach the epithet "unlawful" not to [a specific] association, but [rather] to its objects" and outlaw:

Any body of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, declared by or in pursuance of a law of the Commonwealth to be an association having an unlawful object.¹⁵⁴

Garran and Latham's failed bid to introduce such administrative provisions did not dissuade others from studying American anti-communists' methods. Although Eric Campbell was primarily inspired by Mussolini and Hitler, he adopted rhetorical and semantic conventions of the American Right. Campbell identified strongly with individualism and private enterprise and thought it "lamentable" that Australians, "members of a virile and proud Nordic race," were "forced ... to accept public charity in the form of the dole." He wanted, instead, to create, through a compulsory land settlement scheme relocating the urban poor and unemployed to the countryside, conditions which would restore individual "morale, independence, courage and enterprise." Campbell's notion that national salvation lay in the formation of a landed

General James G. Harbord, Theodore G. Risley, of the Department of Labor, Congressman Edward Eslick, of the Fish Committee and Hamilton Fish, Jr.

¹⁵³ Senator W. G. Thompson, who also pleaded with the federal government to adopt the Fish Committee's resolutions regarding deportation administration, in June 1931, also likely failed to appreciate this. See footnote 67.

¹⁵⁴ Memorandum regarding "Communism and Revolutionary Activities," for Premiers Conference of 1934 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF10/15).

yeoman citizenry ennobled by self-sufficiency owed much to American political mythology. His habit of denouncing the ideas of his enemies by using the epithet "so-called" when referring to them was also a custom appropriated directly from American sources.¹⁵⁵

American ideas also influenced businessmen. T. R. Ashworth found in the United States sufficient evidence to justify abolishing political labour parties. Travelling to America in 1923, Ashworth met with labour leaders like Samuel Gompers, John Lewis of the UMW, Victor Olander of the Illinois Labor Federation, and Andrew Furuseth of the Seamen's Union, and had an opportunity to become acquainted with the social philosophy of industrialists like Edward A. Filene. Impressed with what he witnessed, the principal factor convincing Ashworth that social conditions in the United States were superior was the prevalence of anti-communism, which he judged gave American society a unity and cohesion much needed in Australia. However, Ashworth's boundless admiration for American labour's anti-communism encouraged him to make superficial and entirely untested conclusions about social harmony within the United States. Ashworth believed that the absence of political labour parties indicated that they were not required; their absence had prevented the rise of the "hatred" arising from "conflict" so often stimulated by labour parties and militant unions. While Gompers, Lewis, Olander and Furuseth were all "stalwart battlers for trades union interests," their uniform opposition to political labour parties had ensured that the trade unions were "not being run in the interests of politicians" and could "take a strong stand against the Communist." Unlike the "revolutionaries" Tom Walsh and Jacob Johannsen, "revolters [striking] against their own union," American labour leaders "realised that the Communists [were] the greatest enemies of Labor" and they did not permit them to "white ant" the movement. In Australia, communists were "not only tolerated, but allowed to dominate union policy." The "degradation of the trades unions in Australia" was needlessly "brought about by the virus of politics."¹⁵⁶

Ashworth was just as impressed by the use of "joint stock corporations" to effect a

¹⁵⁵ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 7. Regarding Campbell's admiration of Hitler, Campbell liked to boast of his swashbuckling nature, which did not permit him to brook the use of "so-called tactful statements ... honeyed phrases ... the hush-hush policy [or] so-called tactful utterances." This, he averred, signified "a fear-complex ... the price that any nation paid for [being] the sacrifice of its entire moral strength."

"transfer of industrial ownership from the few to the many," transforming American labourers from economic saboteurs into shareholders and investors. By opposing "public enterprise, compulsory arbitration" – practices Ashworth, elsewhere, endorsed as essential to industrial peace – "the formation of a parliamentary labour party [and] Communists and revolutionaries of every description," American labour leaders had successfully made capitalists of their rank and file, directing members to become stockholders in the nation's public utilities. The had created economic prosperity Australia could only envy and Ashworth lamented:

Since the war there has been neither social nor economic advance in Australia, despite a succession of good seasons. Only by a spendthrift policy of borrowing, largely from abroad, have we been able to prevent real wages from falling ... [Yet] since the war the United States has been simply bounding ahead socially as well as on the economic side.

This convinced him that:

the economic freedom of the worker will be achieved by a sounder application of the principles of individualism, and private ownership of property, and not by an extension of public ownership.¹⁵⁷

In view of these "facts," it appeared that "the American trades union policy [was] right on ... possibly all of the ... vital issues on which it [differed] with Australian official trade unionism." And the American labour movement didn't totally abjure political action; they monitored legislative and administrative activity, but "instead of acting through one of the political parties," they influenced the "policies of both." The party in power in the United States knew that "if it refuse[d] reasonable demands" it would have to face "an adverse trade union vote," and this produced a "net result" giving American Labor "quite as much real political power as Australian Labor." However, it wielded that power in a "much more social form."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 14.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 42 - 3.

The Shapers of Australian Anti-Communism

While Australian labour could learn from the United States, so too could Australian business, particularly from men like Filene and Henry Ford: business could do its part to steer Australia from a chaotic plunge into Bolshevism. Filene had proven himself more than a businessman, addressing social questions in his book *The Way Out*, in which he postulated a three-stage developmental sequence for revolution. Each stage was distinguished by peculiar characteristics and ushered in a new phase of disorder. The first stage, Ashworth reported:

is marked by the immoral content of the oppressor, by that blind satisfaction with the status quo felt by men who are indifferent to everything save their own comfort. The second is marked by the moral discontent of the oppressed, by the legitimate protest of the men upon whom the status quo rests heavily. The third is marked frequently, although not always, by the immoral discontent of the men who seek to exploit the legitimate discontent of their time in the exclusive interest of themselves or of their class.

Tragically, experience in America demonstrated that discontent was rarely recognised until it reached the third stage, "as a clearly formulated and ably organised propaganda ... captured by doctrinaires and demagogues." America's businessmen were among the "chief sinners" contributing to this tragedy, neither anticipating revolution nor working to more effectively ameliorate the plight of the unfortunate. Filene was convinced that mass production and distribution was the key to greater wages, shorter hours and lower prices. Like Ford, he suggested that social progress depended on improving the purchasing power of "the masses," so that they could "absorb the supplies of mass production." It was time, Ashworth averred, that Australian business followed this wise counsel.¹⁵⁹

Yet Australian businessmen could not afford to relax after they had adopted Filene's and Ford's ideas. They needed to follow the American lead in the social, as well as economic realm, by creating "an educational organisation, analogous to the National Civic Federation," which would "stimulate the development of psychic and physical machinery side by side ... securing moral, along with material progress." The

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

successful function of such educational societies revealed that Australia, too, could avoid "class strife" and concentrating power "in the hands of extremists" by bringing all classes together in a "general political program." Ashworth greatly overstated the democratic character and function of the Federation, because he thoroughly concurred with its view that the "the public" should form the sole focus for social reform. Censuring the integrity of "the people," the Federation argued that they required firm moral guidance and support to counter:

the growing confusion in the public mind resulting from erroneous information upon economic and political subjects; the lack of a widespread understanding of the principles underlying representative government; and the failure of citizens generally to fulfil their obligations.

While Ashworth found the Federation's efforts to instruct "the people" in subjects including "Revolutionary Movements," "Industrial Relations" and "Civics" laudatory, he ignored the import of its elitist structure and its association with leading, conservative organisations. Impressed to find "women's clubs ... patriotic societies, fraternal insurance lodges, church and college clubs, teachers' association, labor, agricultural, commercial and bankers' organisations" combining their resources, Ashworth did not recognise that the Federation was a vehicle for broadcasting the anti-communist, anti-democratic views of men like Archibald Stevenson, John Trevor, Jacob Spolansky and J. Edgar Hoover. The Federation "made available" to its students the "experience" of men like the Counsel to the Lusk Committee, the author's of the Committee's findings and, in cooperation with the BI, "testimony and exhibits in the Communist cases at Bridgman, Michigan, and the I. W. W. cases at Chicago."

Ultimately, however, Ashworth, who expected social salvation to come from the action of society's leaders, not its "people," the elitism of the Federation was not problematic but, rather, wholesome. Quoting the Australian-born poet Charles Mackay, he urged his readers to commence "a similar campaign" in Australia:

There's a light about to glow,
There's a flower about to blow,

There's a midnight blackness changing into grey,
Men of thought and men of action,
Clear the way!

Aid the dawning, tongue and pen,
Aid it hopes of honest men,
Aid it paper, aid it type,
Aid it for the hour is ripe,
And our earnest must not slacken into play
Men of thought and men of action,
Clear the way!¹⁶⁰

Such uncritical interpretation of American patriotic organisations was something of a tradition in Australia by the time Ashworth penned his work. Several years earlier, Herbert Brookes had been similarly impressed with the democratic *fides* of the APL. Relying entirely on the report of Robert Elliot, Brookes and his colleagues absorbed Elliot's limited comprehension of the structure of United States intelligence services, and the legal status and function of the League. Elliot mistakenly believed that the League was the "Citizen Section" of the "United States Secret Service," directly "responsible for the quietness of the German and Irish sympathisers of the Central powers." Elliot also understood the League to have been formed with the approval of the Department of Justice, which continued to closely supervise its activities. Yet Elliot did not understand to whom the League answered, for there was no such organisation as the "United States Secret Service." Nor was the League's affiliation with official authorities as clear as Elliot indicated. While the activities of the League were endorsed by government authorities, there was no question that they had been incorporated into the structure of government as Elliot understood them to have been. They were subcontractors, to whom the Administration found it convenient to assign quasi-legal vigilante assignments it could not enforce, due to lack of manpower.

Brookes and Elliot readily attributed to the League an unqualified official character because they projected their own juridical norms and ethics onto a foreign culture

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 75 – 8. Also on the NCF's Executive Committee was Matthew Woll, president of the International Photo Engravers' Union and Gompers' successor as chief of the American Federation of Labor.

they failed to analyse. Wanting to protect "law and order," they were excited by any organisation seemingly devoted to orthodox "good" government, propriety and civic values. With the League's founder, Chas Daniel Frey, promoting the League's high ethical standards and professional management, Elliot's inspection halted at the shop-front window. He expressed only unbridled admiration for the structural breadth and character of the League. Concern for the League's legal conduct was needless. A "corps of competent lawyers" supervised the use of authority and evidence, assigning individual attorneys to specific investigations and preparing final briefs for the BI. The police section of the League, similarly, comprised men "especially qualified by experience and ability to conduct important investigations ... willing to give all their time if necessary, to the Public Service."

The League's Intelligence Bureau also enlisted only the most "responsible persons" in the financial, business, or industrial sectors, "whose sworn duty" was to "promptly report ... any and every case of disloyalty, industrial disturbance or other matter likely to injure or embarrass the Government of the United States." Reassuringly, they always did this "through the proper channel[s] only." In this manner, crucial information could be gleaned from "banking, business [and] industrial establishments." The League, moreover, policed itself with stringent, internal security measures. League members performed their duty on a voluntary basis, but the Bureau of Membership stringently evaluated the suitability of each potential member before they were enrolled. If there was the "slightest doubt" about the "suitability or loyalty of any applicant," they were not recruited. All members swore oaths of allegiance to the nation and proudly wore their "badge of authority" when on duty. In the event that a member was accused of unseemly conduct, the Bureau conducted a formal investigation which, if evidence of improper behaviour was confirmed, would result in the resignation of the disgraced brother.¹⁶¹

Elliot's glowing assessment of the League had little basis in fact. There is precious little evidence of legal "expertise" determining the League's operations. Yet the appearance of legal probity and qualification was crucial to Australians' admiration of the organisation, respectful as they were of hierarchy and adept elite leadership.

Moreover, the "Public Service" Elliot imagined the League served, did not resemble the independent bureaucracy to which the Australian Protective League was to be devoted; the protection of government bureaucracy could not have been further from the minds of thousands of League operatives. The relationship of official police agencies and the League was also neither as proper nor direct as was believed. In practice, the League frequently declined to defer to the authority of the state, which was unable (and unwilling) to closely direct its activities. Worse, having quickly swelled to enormous size, the League could not monitor the character of its members as it claimed. Further, the inherent corrupting effects of supra-legal status on the League's members was entirely discounted; Australian loyalists simply warmed to the notion of invading confidential banking and industrial records.

Overall, the glowing impression Australian loyalists had of industrial and political life in the United States, in specific, prescribed areas, stimulated the amplification of elitism, anti-democracy and anti-labourism in Australia. Nonetheless, the influence of American patriotic associations on their Australian brethren remained largely theoretical. It is testament to the extraordinary power of anti-communism, however, that it encouraged Australia's loyalist leaders to look to environments other than those of Britain for solutions to the Red Menace.

¹⁶¹ Report from Robert D. Elliot to Minister for Defence, 29 November 1917 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

Chapter 3: The Psychology of Australian Anti-Communism

Turning the Kinship Group *into* Society

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the extent to which antipodean anti-communism was shaped by the indigenous environment, external anti-radicalism and universal psychological factors. While following the form of the corresponding chapter relating to American anti-radicalism, new themes introduced or thrown into greater relief by Australian anti-communism will also be analysed. In this fashion, it is hoped that a rounded picture of the psychological and cultural dynamics of anti-communism will emerge.

Australian and American experiences of anti-communism were not radically different. The evolutionary path of anti-communism in Australia was remarkably similar to and powered by the same psychic forces dominating American anti-communism. Yet strong correlations of experience in Australian and American anti-communism do not arrogate the importance of specific conditions influencing the psychological form of anti-communism in different contexts. Domestic juridical and administrative structures greatly affected Australian anti-communism and Australian loyalists' overarching commitment to British Imperial power complicated and even crippled their hopes of revolutionising their nation's system of government. Australian anti-communism's relative lack of ferocity also reflected the absence in Australia of organisations like the BI and the Lusk Committee, which profoundly influenced domestic ideology and government. This was in spite of the fact that Australian anti-communists, less effectively mobilised and more timid than their American counterparts, were more dependent on the leadership of officials. In turn, the more rigid separation of government from the public prevented Australian loyalists from influencing governments in the manner of American patriots. The effect of these conditions was to prevent the temperature of Australian anti-communism from reaching higher levels.

Even Australian anti-radicals' most frightful abstract impressions of communism were not quite as horrific as American patriots', the degree of difference being subtle but not unimportant. For example, eye-witness accounts of life in Russia printed in

Liberty closely resembled those of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Both publications reckoned that revolution brought decline to Russia. Both also felt that the Russian people were, nevertheless, in no way entitled to sympathy: their low intelligence and moral character determined their fate and they were, in any case, mobilised to destroy capitalism and democracy. However, while *Liberty* chastised Russians for being an "easily bluffed ... sheepish lot [with] no fight ... no organisation [and] no leaders," it stopped short of denying their humanity.¹ By contrast, the *Post* suggested that the corrupting effect of socialism was strong enough to destroy even the love of a father for his son. Similarly, "aliens" in Australia did not lose their legal nor human status as readily as they did in the United States, where it would have been inconceivable for leading anti-communists to evince concerns such as those of the Australian Protective League, which called on loyalist organisations to ensure that "great care" be taken of immigrants so that they experienced neither "unnecessary alarm [nor] apprehension as to the fair manner in which they [would] be treated."²

This concern for the treatment of immigrants derived from various concerns peculiar to Australia. Immigration was regulated not only by Australian but also by British authorities and Australian governments were obliged to operate within a multi-jurisdictional imperial structure. They were bound to shelter British citizens, regardless of colour or creed, and were also pressured to adopt policies that were not popular in the antipodes; disagreement over Australia's refusal to relax its White Australia immigration program brought Australia into direct conflict with Britain and the United States. Further, while Australians would likely have felt threatened by mass immigration, they were acutely aware of the need to entice European migrants to help guarantee the still-tenuous white colonisation of the continent. Authorities, therefore, could ill afford to sort and limit white peoples hoping to settle in Australia, particularly as victory in the Great War appeared Pyrrhic; fear that Britain's powers were waning and that Germany, the Bolsheviks and Japan remained potent threats was widespread and political optimism was in no way revived by the rise of the United States.³

¹ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 12.

² NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/14.

³ Williams, *Quarantined Culture*, p. 110, Poynter, "The Yo-Yo Variations" and Douglas Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship: Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870 - 1914," *Historical Studies*, vol. 14, April 1970, pp. 511 - 25. The pressure to populate the continent did not stop some commentators from

Structurally, Australian anti-communist organisations, like their American counterparts, were formal, hierarchical and disciplinarian. Indeed, Australian organisations were arguably more hierarchical than American groups: certainly they consistently abjured vigilante action, willingly deferred to constituted forces of law and order (or crumbled before them) and did not flout the law in the manner of some American patriots.⁴ In addition, Australian kinship groups were more prim than American associations, as comparison between the American and Australian Protective Leagues demonstrates. The very act of joining the Australian League was conceived as an act of supplication rather than empowerment, for its membership application form read:

Dear Sir,

I *beg* to make application for enrolment as a Volunteer in the Australian Protective League.⁵

While both Leagues found it politic to encourage their members to abjure the use of "intoxicating liquors," the Australian League was more anxious for its men to reflect on "The Australian's Creed," which likened Australia's "free, equal and democratic Constitution" to the government of "a family, providing protection for life, labour and liberty, adapted and adaptable to the needs of a growing people." Protection of the

agitating for the implementation of quarantine measures to prevent people of low station and radical left-wing views from migrating to Australia, but they did not influence policy to the degree that like-minded American activists did. See Williams, p. 150.

⁴ Australian loyalists' unwillingness to take decisive action in civic and political matters is demonstrated by the conduct of a special force of 500 men (that eventually mutated into the OG) formed by Sydney loyalists in 1925 to help enforce the federal Peace Officers Act which empowered the national government, in a fashion similar to that of State governments, to assemble civilian auxiliaries in times of emergency. The commanders of this force issued a circular to members advising them that "the civil police, whilst assured of your support and assistance, must be regarded as the force to take the initiative." The group's leaders, it was pointed out, would "maintain the closest liaison with civil police and render all assistance without usurping the usual powers and duties of the civil police" and Australian kinship groups indeed never behaved like members of the APL, who used their membership to extort money from suspects in exchange for favourable reports, as well as to gain free entry to theatres, subways and parking lots. Nor did they behave like one APL member of North Carolina, who ranged "through the back country ... like a latter day Jesse James, dressed in an old Texas ranger uniform, carrying a high-powered Winchester rifle and ... pocketing the \$50 bounty that was payable for each 'slacker'." On the odd occasion loyalists groups did confront police, they were generally taught "stern [lessons] in the verities of state violence," from which they emerged chastened and tamed. See Moore, *Secret Army*, pp. 23, 56 - 9 and 185 - 6.

⁵ Application for Enrolment as a Volunteer in the APL [My emphasis] (NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/16). Interestingly, the convenors of the Australian League were so impressed by the APL that they forgot which official organisations existed in which nation, mistakenly suggesting that their fraternity would

Constitution was a national, imperial and racial duty; "great men" of the race, most notably the Anzacs in the recent war, had "laboured exceedingly" to bequeath Australians their federation. But besides dedicating themselves to Australia, League members were reminded that they owed the British Empire and the leaders of their kinship group comparable loyalty. They were required not only to affirm Australia's "ability to work out its own industrial and political salvation without the interference of alien agitators," but also to promise to "execute" the commands of their superiors, respect internal rules of conduct, report "any and all violations thereof" and refrain from exhibiting or disclosing their membership except to "duly authorised" government or League officials.⁶

Another document endorsed by the League, the "Australian Decalogue," further illustrates the stiff, conventional character of anti-communist loyalism. Expressly Biblical in its semantic structure and expression, the Decalogue is rigidly hierarchical and demands fealty due the Ten Commandments for the nation's elected officials. The ninth "Commandment" of the Decalogue even reminds League members not to rise above their station:

Thou shalt not bear false witness nor suffer false witness to be borne against any of thy country's public men.

While the Tenth intones:

Thou shalt not covet any position for which thou art not fit, nor any office of which thou art not worthy, nor any wealth for which thou wilt not work, but shalt dedicate and devote thy life and thy labour to the well-being of the whole community, doing unto others as ye would that others should do to you, that love may be the fulfilling of the law.⁷

These documents point to a distinct quality of Australian anti-communist associations. While leading American anti-communists expected the public to respect their

"operating under the direction of the Commonwealth Bureau of Investigation"; presumably they were referring to the Commonwealth Investigation Branch.

⁶ Ibid and "The Australian's Creed" (NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/65).

authority, the members of a majority of anti-communist organisations met as equals and concerned citizens. Although they pledged allegiance to higher powers such as God and the United States Constitution, they didn't humble themselves before the state as did members of the Australian Protective League. Acculturated to prize the liberties of an individual above the interests of a government, American anti-communists would have found their Australian *confreres'* personal subjection to the collective mystifying, if not abhorrent. Although many Australian organisations were neither as elitist nor priggish as the Protective League, even the NG proclaimed its "unswerving loyalty to the Throne," identifying itself completely as a bulwark of the British Empire.⁸ In short, Australian and American anti-communist fraternities were distinguished by their *real* and *perceived* levels of empowerment. Australian kinship groups imagined that their proper place was within an imperial structure and this, combined with domestic political conditions, constrained their ability to act. They were hamstrung by psychological and political weaknesses that were both self-imposed and a reflection of their real political situation. This difference between the two anti-communist movements also reflected differences in national political experience and traditions. Historically, Americans had viewed themselves as revolutionaries, as citizens of a nation that shaped the world. Australians, by contrast, believed that they were bringing a superior culture, of which they were only one component part, to the world's furthest reaches.

As important as these distinguishing characteristics were, ultimately, American and Australian anti-communist kinship groups were more similar than dissimilar, because they both served the same psychological purpose. Although Australian anti-communists hoped to serve their kinship group, they also sought to enlarge their sense of moral superiority and security.⁹ Their sense of moral superiority, like American anti-communists', was manifest in their contempt for perceived enemies and those who rebelled against authority; such people were dehumanised and derided while the

⁷ "The Australian Decalogue" (NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/66).

⁸ New Guard Recruitment Form (NLA, MS 256, Item 1).

⁹ The importance of this is attested by Francis De Groot, who rationalised his symbolic decision to interrupt the opening ceremony of the Sydney Harbour Bridge on horseback, stating "from the earliest days the mounted man has had a moral ascendancy over another on his flat feet." See De Groot, *The Sydney Harbour Bridge*, p. 10.

need to quell them was reduced to a technical task.¹⁰ Australian kinship groups, like American groups, also reserved special censure for their own "traitors" or those undeserving of inclusion. Members of the LNS, for instance, were warned to report incidences of "loose talk" which might compromise the organisation. Failure to comply, it was claimed, would bring "severe penalties," including ostracisation.¹¹ Away from the battlefield of urban streets, anti-communists preserved their sense of Self-importance, nurtured a disdain for outsiders and sought to regiment society through a variety of endeavours, including much-lauded programs of civic and patriotic instruction. T. R. Ashworth, for example, envisioned that an Australian counterpart to the NCF would "keep other people as well as Communists in their place." Specifically, it would prevent a recurrence of civic support for industrial insurrection, such as that voiced by "a leading Melbourne business man ... a rector in Brisbane and an Archdeacon in Sydney" during the international Seamen's strike in 1925.¹²

Paradoxically, while kinship groups aimed to establish the exclusive social control of extraordinary and "highly-qualified" men, they were, in fact, extremely easy to join. For all their rhetoric about restricting franchise to those "capable of responsibly exercising it," kinship groups constructed their collective identities around the most superficial and common criteria; proof of worthiness for inclusion rested with one's race and social standing, determined on the basis of religion, education and occupation. The identity of the Self, in practice, was conferred entirely by an individual's *external* appearance. Anti-communists' need for psychic reassurance was

¹⁰ Members of the LNS, for example, were advised, "Never shout at men in the mobs. Save all your wind. Remember, they love using the boot. When you get the chance do the same, only don't let it be seen if possible - newspaper men are always knocking about - 'It was not me, Governor' and 'Don't hit me boss' and pleading is always a great stunt when they are on the run. Don't take any notice of this ... It is not necessary to strike down upon the head, but the most effective blow is sideways across the face above the ear ... Keep your head, don't get excited and *hit hard* and *often*." See "Baton Charge" (AA, A369/1, Item D585). A similar circular issued by the NG discusses the value of Lachrymatory gas in suppressing disloyal tumult. A "most effective weapon to use against unprepared men," the gas promised to render enemies of the Guard "absolutely helpless, and completely at [their] mercy." Such gas bombs were, in the long-term, "perfectly harmless," yet "many prisoners could be taken in this way." See Circular on Street Fighting Tactics (ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579, Item 146 - 9).

¹¹ Report from R. Browne to H. Jones, 7 March 1931, with information derived from an informant's letter dated 6 March 1931 (ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579).

¹² Such men lacked "the common sense to see through the absurd misrepresentations" of fact "placed in front of them" by strikers. Future peace and prosperity demanded the isolation of the "soft-headed

so strong that provided another individual sufficiently resembled the Self's ideal image, their uprightness and worthiness remained unquestioned. These men and women who harboured such deep mistrust for substantial segments of society, incongruously conferred the deepest trust on other sections of the community, almost without psychological resistance. Rather, it was all the more eagerly given, on account of their acute need of mutual support and solidarity. The organisational structure, membership and customs of Australian kinship groups demonstrate this. The conveners of the Australian Protective League, for example, placed great emphasis on the worth of exterior identification, such as "badges of authority" and "tickets of membership," and proposed to construct their association from "leading citizens of Melbourne," including solicitors, aldermen, academics, businessmen, bankers, mining operators, doctors, insurance managers and members of prominent civil organisations.¹³ The LNS was also certain that recruiting according to this criteria would ensure that it comprised only those "men...whose integrity [was] beyond question."¹⁴

The conviction that surface appearance indicated internal nature dominated Australian kinship groups' perception and determined who they trusted. Senior social position conferred either special privileges or immunity from suspicion. For example, in 1919 MI operatives disclosed confidential information, including details of their relationship with State police, to elite businessmen and loyalists.¹⁵ In 1928, when the Institute of Pacific Relations attracted the attention of security services, John Latham confidently proclaimed the association above suspicion, once he ascertained the identity of its senior figures, men and women "of the most reputable character," including the noted jurist and diplomat, Frederic Eggleston.¹⁶ Anti-communists' racially and class-based *esprit d'corps* even determined the security-risk classification

clergyman who indulges in fatuous sentimentality" from industrial disputes. See Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 30.

¹³ Report from Robert D. Elliot to Minister for Defence, 29 November 1917, Letter from Elliot to Minister Defence, 25 April 18, Letter from Herbert Brookes to Senator G. F. Pearce, 2 May 1918, Department of Defence Memorandum to Acting Prime Minister Watt, 2 May 1918 and Notes for APL Meeting in Prime Minister's office, 29 May 1918 [C 571/1/374] (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

¹⁴ Letter from Inspector Roland Browne to Director CIB, 31 July 1931 (AA, A369/1, Item D585).

¹⁵ The officers considered that "the influential position" such men held made it "advisable" they knew "exactly how matters stood." It is also worth emphasising that at this time the Commonwealth Government steadfastly refused to divulge the cost of its new federal police force. See Cain, *The Origins of Political Surveillance*, 1979, p. 320.

of radical individuals. Jack Kavanagh, the working-class, Scottish Secretary of the CPA, was unflatteringly described by NI as "both an altruist and a fanatic," while Esmonde Higgins, editor of the CPA's *Worker's Weekly*, holder of an MA degree and son of the prominent Industrial Arbitration Court Justice, H. B. Higgins, was far more charitably considered simply "altruistic."¹⁷

A myriad of individuals, ethnic groups and associations not of "reputable character" had no hope of winning unquestioning trust from Australian anti-communists. "Aliens," or non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants, were considered to hold, at best, a mortgage on membership of the Self. Facility with foreign languages was *prima facie* suspicious. Surveillance of citizens with exotic or Irish names absorbed significant resources of anti-communist organisations like the NG's intelligence branch, which feared individuals with such names as Belotti, Diehlisen, O'Loughlin and Kleber Claire. The Guard observed meetings in private addresses, particularly if foreign languages were being used.¹⁸ Other kinds of association attracted the suspicion of the Guard. Not all communists could be presumed to be grubby, bearded and foreign and Guards were just as watchful of "well-dressed gentlemen," such as those who met in locations as innocuous as a mixed confectionery shop in Sydney, if they happened to be linked with dangerous communist front organisations such as International Prisoners Relief.¹⁹ Anglo-Celtic ethnicity was also no insurance against suspicion, if one had a dubious political history and hailed from the lower classes. For example, a certain "Miss McNamara," a teacher at Petersham Intermediate High School and supposed relative of Premier Lang, was reckoned to distribute "Communitic literature" to her charges.²⁰ Labourers working in trades notorious for parasitism were also regarded as prime communist recruits. Dock workers were among those believed to be "avowed reds." In "many instances" they drew "dole and child endowment" and through nefarious means ensured that they "regularly" secured employment "in

¹⁶ Letter from J. Latham to R. G. Casey, Australian High Commission, London, regarding Institute of Pacific Relations, 3 August 1928 (AA, A981/4, item Com 1/Part 1).

¹⁷ Naval Intelligence "Report on Communism in Australia," 24 July 1928 (henceforward NI, "Report on Communism") (AA, A467, item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

¹⁸ At 73 Crown street, Petersham, in Sydney, Guards noted that an elderly couple stood "guard on [the] Verandah ... practically every night," while a dozen or fifteen communists conspired in a foreign tongue. See Reports No's. 243, 1 February 1932, 220, 23 February 1932 and 107, 6 October 1931 (ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579).

¹⁹ Ibid., Reports 215, 5 March 1932.

²⁰ Ibid., Report 22, 11 December 1931.

preference to loyalist men."²¹

The government's security forces were also cheaply persuaded that ethnicity or political belief revealed perfidy. This was even the case when authorities possessed reliable information indicating that foreign-language ethnic groups were neither responsible for nor participating in industrial or political disturbance. For example, when an inflammatory article, published in early 1922 in an independent journal, decried the "objectionable [foreign] element" among striking cane workers in the district of Innisfail, Queensland, the CIB, which had concluded that strike activity had been confined to "Australians and Britishers," nonetheless believed that "the poisonous preaching of ... revolutionaries and other Communists" was having "bad effects" among non Anglo-Saxon migrant groups in the area. This conclusion was endorsed in spite of the fact that the immigrants were "regarded as being generally very much against the IWW and the Communists."²² Well into the 1920s, the CIB kept meticulous record of the numbers of aliens in specific districts, their occupations and addresses. Pejorative terms and classifications indicate that the Branch took a dim view of immigrants' contribution to Australian life. Russians, for example, numbered a "few merchants (Jews), hawkers, some tradesmen and [a] labourer," while most "Turks, Armenians etc.," were merchants and "hawkers," although "some" were labourers. Syrians lived in "ones and twos," failing to assimilate, while Victoria's solitary Mexican florist and Peruvian labourer also did not escape notice (see Figure 17).²³

Even the highest professional qualifications seldom saved "aliens" from official surveillance. When caught up in war hysteria, state police, MI, the Customs Office and the Censor all devoted considerable resources to observing an industrial chemist and United States citizen who had business affairs in Ceylon. Chiefly because he was "a full-blooded German," had worked in the United States and continental Europe and spoke "several languages," Herbert Hastings was earmarked as a suspected industrial

²¹ Ibid, Report of uncertain file number, dated 23 January 1932. The reporting Guard concluded that their mysterious fortune derived from treachery and corruption. He believed that there had to be "some influence at work to afford the Communists the preference for employment in this sphere."

²² Report from Directorate CIB to Secretary Attorney-General's Department, 20 January 1922 (AA, A981/4, Item Com 10). The independent journal was *Smith's Weekly*. The migrant groups concerned included Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, French, Austrians, Germans, Russians and Maltese.

²³ CIB Census on Distribution of Aliens in Victoria, 6 April 1923 (AA, B741/3, Item V397).

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AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	Merchants, tradesmen and laborers in Melbourne. Few in country.
ARGENTINE	All in Melbourne.
BULGARIANS	1 tradesman, rest laborers in South Melbourne.
CHILEANS	Laborers in Melbourne.
CHINESE	Mostly market gardeners and furniture makers, some tobacco growers, storekeepers and importers forming a community in Melbourne, in very small numbers around larger towns of Victoria as gardeners, storekeepers, and tailing miners.
CUBANS	All in Melbourne.
HOLLANDERS	A few merchants, the rest tradesmen and laborers almost all in Melbourne.
ITALIANS	Merchants, fruit vendors, some tradesmen and musicians rest laborers - 80% in Melbourne. Community in Melbourne. Some miners at Bendigo and some agricultural laborers all over Victoria.
JAPANESE	Few merchants, some cooks and laundry men. All in Melbourne.
MEXICANS	One florist in Melbourne.
NORWEGIANS	Clerks, tradesmen and laborers, few merchants - 90% in Melbourne, the rest agricultural laborers all over Victoria.
PERSIANS	One female in Melbourne, 1 male roving in Victoria.
PERUVIANS	Laborer in Melbourne.
ROMANIANS	Business men, tradesmen, laborers in Melbourne.
RUSSIANS	Few merchants (Jews), hawkers, some tradesmen and laborers, small community in South Melbourne, some hawkers and laborers all over Victoria.
SEMIANS	Tradesmen in Melbourne.
SPANIARDS	Cooks, tradesmen and market gardeners in and around Melbourne. Few gardeners in Bendigo district.
SWEDS	Merchants, tradesmen, coastal seafarers, laborers few agricultural laborers, etc. in the country.
SWISS	Merchants, cooks, tradesmen and laborers, most of them in Melbourne. A few vigneron and agricultural laborers in the country.
TURKS, ARMENIANS ETC.	Merchants, hawkers and some laborers, nearly all in Melbourne.
SYRIANS	Merchants, hawkers, mostly in Melbourne (small community) in ones or twos in most towns in Victoria.

Figure 17: The CIB ignored few, if any, ethnic communities and their activities in Victoria
Source: Australian Archives, Record Series B741/3, V/393.

anarchist and arsonist.²⁴ Citizens connected with international associations or societies were also assumed to be disloyal. Imagining that international ties compromising national prosperity and integrity could only be made by the left, the CIB considered suspicious the Pan Pacific Women's Conference of 1928. A flurry of internal memoranda profiled individual delegates and dozens of press clippings discussing the event were filed by the Branch as Harold Jones pondered the significance of delegates' connections to organisations such as the War Service Welfare agency, the Ex-Servicewomen's Association of Victoria, the Peace Society, the Sisterhood of International Peace and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: the fact that one delegate's expenses were partly paid by the ACTU increased his misgivings.²⁵ Jones' mistrust was aroused by his antipathy for female political mobilisation. Anti-communists regarded politically-active women, particularly pacifists, as vital pillars of the Comintern. An internal Navy report of 1928 typically attributed "a great deal of [communist] propaganda work," particularly "pacifist and anti-war propaganda," to the "womenfolk of the community – housewives and factory employees."²⁶

The psychological and arbitrary nature of kinship group fear was also apparent in their frequent and paradoxical recruitment of foreigners to spy on ethnic communities. Although aliens were not as crucial to Australian kinship groups anti-communist activity as they were to American anti-communist organisations, their contribution was nonetheless important.²⁷ A certain J. Toman was "instrumental" in establishing a branch of the NG in Goulbourn. A multi-lingual Czech, Toman's "extensive knowledge of Communist tactics and organisations" made him an "eminently" suitable candidate for employment in the Guard's intelligence branch. However, on account of his nationality, it was thought prudent to bar him from holding executive office.²⁸ Government authorities were also prepared to employ non-Anglo Europeans when necessary. John Latham used Scandinavian seaman James Bede Andresen's

²⁴ AA, B741/3, Item V/96. Major F. V. Hogan, of the CEB remarked that Hastings' "knowledge of explosives" made his observation particularly necessary, while police Sergeant Kane commented, in the archetypal paranoid style, "I have always felt convinced that the man is an enemy spy. He is a bundle of duplicity and falsehood."

²⁵ AA, B741/3, Item V5296.

²⁶ NI, "Report on Communism," 4 July 1928.

²⁷ One need only recall the career of Jacob Spolansky to appreciate this fact.

²⁸ Report No. 205, 12 March 1932 (ML, Series 4951 & 4952 - [CY] Reel 2579). Toman was also appointed to his intelligence position in the "face of opposition from the Country Defence League."

likely-perjured evidence in the show-trial of Jacob Johannsen.

The capricious and internally-driven nature of kinship groups' mistrust is also illustrated by debate within the intelligence industry and government bureaucracies concerning the employment of foreigners in the public service. Although it was acknowledged that there was no evidence of treachery among foreigners employed by the state, even during the Great War, Inspector Roland Browne of the CIB argued that people of exotic extraction should be barred from various types of employment. Attempting to conceal projected unease and prejudice, Browne suggested that appointing non-Anglo-Celtic men and women to bureaucratic positions invited public fear and hysteria, particularly during periods of anxiety.²⁹ There was no suggestion from Browne that either he or "the public" should learn to become less fearful of difference. Instead, foreigners were to pay for not being able to assuage the terror of the paranoid and Browne recommended that the CIB be given control of recruitment of aliens and naturalised persons. Browne's concern was superfluous, however, for Harold Jones informed him that Public Service Commissioners in Victoria and other States already availed themselves of security profiles before they employed prospective candidates.³⁰

The idea that kinship groups could guide an errant "public" was their ultimate *raison d'être*. Yet that very notion itself was elitist, presumptuous and, moreover, constantly undermined by a paranoid insecurity that prevented Australian anti-communists, as much as their American brethren, from ever really believing in their preventive efficacy. Nonetheless, within the kinship groups, the simplistic supposition that moral leadership could stem the tide of revolution died hard. In part, such a view depended upon a propensity for conceit and a tendency to chronically simplify social analysis, reducing problems and solutions to a handful of remediable causes. Robert Elliot, for example, felt able to conclude that the APL had been solely:

responsible for the quietness of the German and Irish sympathisers of the Central

²⁹ Browne commented that the Great War had taught Australia that "it [is] not advisable to have aliens or even naturalised aliens in the Public Service [for] even the best of them come under suspicion in times of stress." See Report from Inspector Roland Browne to Director Jones, 22 November 1922 (AA, B741/3, Item V/390)

³⁰ Ibid and administrative note by Jones, 25 November 1922.

powers [in the United States].³¹

For Elliot, it was possible to suppress forces producing political tumult through decisive, enlightened action. Further consideration of the complex socio-economic factors affecting civic disturbance was unnecessary; Australian anti-communists imagined that they could stay revolution as they might close a leaky faucet.

Conceit encouraged anti-communists not only to overstate their power but also their connection to the state. While they liked to imagine that their kinship groups and the state were inseparable,³² their efforts to prove this frequently threatened to bring them embarrassment and even criminal punishment. The NG fancied it could continue to assault its enemies with impunity, before its members were incarcerated for vigilante violence. And the Australian branch of the Navy League brazenly announced that it was officially patronised by the Governor-General, when permission to make such a claim had been expressly refused.³³ However, kinship groups' conceit concealed rampant anxiety. So long as anti-communists maintained so low an esteem of their fellow citizens, they fought a losing battle in the war to convince themselves that they were safe from Bolshevism. The optimism of men like Elliot and Ashworth crumbled in the face of general contempt for a "public" that seemed beyond salvation. This was a conclusion reached by the security services, for example, who surmised that Australian workers had been rendered so feeble by the onslaught of "steady and insidious" Soviet propaganda that the great "bulk of the industrial life of the community" now thought "only along the lines of lawlessness and revolution."³⁴ The need to project internal angst onto society constantly forced Australian anti-communists, in the manner of American anti-radicals, to persuade themselves that their crusade was achievable and desirable, in spite of their doubts of its ultimate

³¹ See Report from Robert D. Elliot to Minister for Defence, 29 November 1917 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

³² In this context it is worth revisiting Cathcart's comments about Australian conservatives who viewed themselves as "possessors and guardians of a mystery which cannot be explained or rationalised ... [regarding] their own account of history, social practice and morality, not as theories, but as a profound inward knowledge." This knowledge led them to believe that the state could not simply be safeguarded and run by administrative procedures, but had also to be entrusted to a select elite. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 167.

³³ AA, A2880/2, Items 3176370[1] and 3176596[2]. The League advertised the Governor-General's support on its letterhead.

³⁴ Report on Australian Communists active in global revolution to R. Garran, 22 September 1925 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

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success. Their task of self-persuasion was a huge psychological burden.

The Need to Justify the Self

Australian anti-communist kinship groups revitalised members' sense of purpose and confidence, in themselves and in the (restricted) collective. The flexing of political muscle by these groups also related to issues of masculine identity. Entirely masculine in structure and ethos, kinship groups' desire to carve the social landscape reinforced traditional concepts of masculine pro-activity; its members went out and *did*, shaping the nation's destiny like the coal miner hewing a rockface. Social and emotional construction-work to the NG, for example, was markedly important. Its membership *lied* emphasised fraternal courage and endeavour, proclaiming:

We guardsmen now as - sem - bled, Are guards - men of our land -
Stir yourselves each one of you, Re - cruit on ev' - ry hand.
To do our du - ty is our aim. Pro - claim Aus - tra - lia's might.
And swell our force a mill - ion fold, And stand for what is right.

So guardsmen stand to - geth - er, One for all and all for one,
We must win through we guards - men, Should dan - ger ev - er come.
With grand de - ter - mi - na - tion, We'll show the world we're true.
And firm in our en - deav - ours, Re - solved to dare and do.
Guards, God save our King!³⁵

Eric Campbell and senior staff at *Liberty* believed that they had to free society from psychological bondage and abasement, mobilising Australia's "better" and "loyal" citizens to rid the country of its "socialistic," "corrupt" system of government. While Campbell called on citizens to choose between the policies of Jack Lang and himself, between "individualism and radical socialism ... morality and corrupt materialism,"

³⁵ *The Song of the New Guard*, words by Sydney Calland, music by Celene Hooper, Sydney, 1931 (NLA, MS 250, Folio 1). The Song continued:

To guard this fair Aus - tra - lia, And all we hold most dear,
Is the du - ty of us guards - men, With - out flinching or fear.
So come what may we - re rea - dy to pro - tect our land so fair.
We stand u - nit - ed for our cause, Let en - em - ies be - ware!

We of the New Guard are al - ways at the ready -
In case of danger in our midst we'll all be firm and steady -
So when we get our or - ders, we'll make our voi - ces ring.
I'm a loy - al guardsman, one of the Guards. God save our King!

Liberty forecast the demise of democracy, stating:

Sooner or later the present dilly-dallying party-political process will have to be dragged to the rails and kicked overboard. The time has arrived when all loyal citizens can and should, in their interests, read the signs of the times and take their stand boldly on the side of right.

Campbell's exhortations to "the public" were, however, undermined by his contempt for those who disagreed with him. Campbell habitually expressed vicious and universal hatred that probably offended and alienated much of the general "public" as well as fellow Guards. They, too, incurred Campbell's wrath; he found it "paradoxical" that the very people who found the "extremism of Labour most intolerable" had demonstrated not fighting spirit, but "weak moderation" and "futile passivity." He accused the majority of employers, "between their moaning and grumbling," of following "the line of least resistance" and allowing themselves to be "bullied into a state of hesitancy and timidity." Nor were farmers and graziers spared Campbell's fury, for they had "floundered" in "moderate pacifism," failing to combat "militant, mulish Labour and its legislation [and] low commodity prices." Irrately projecting frustration borne of his own political impotence, Campbell upbraided loyalists' failure to find "the courage to sponsor publicly the vigorous remedial action which alone can save private enterprise."³⁶ Mired in the paranoid position, Campbell ultimately found his reliance on his kinship group vexing, as it was impossible for it to satisfy the standard of devotion and allegiance he demanded.

Other anti-communists not so close to sliding into paranoia retained some confidence in their capacity to protect the state from ruin. This confidence could be expressed in general terms, such as total, uncritical identification with British culture. Herbert Brookes and the VPF lauded the monumental achievements of Britain and the NG continued to look to Britain to lead the world to prosperity.³⁷ By consciously prizing their heritage, loyalists imagined that they, too, could share in the glory of Britain, perched at the pinnacle of evolution. Yet leading anti-communists, encouraged to

³⁶ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 4.

cultivate their self-righteousness by kinship group structures, strove to amplify their personal influence by excluding non-elites and the uninitiated from information and policy control. As they conferred trust through kinship rituals, they equated preservation of hierarchy, professional seniority and social standing with fidelity. The establishment of the CEB illustrates how enlarging the power of key officials was represented and justified. Writing the Victorian Premier in March 1917, Prime Minister Hughes advised him of the formation of the Directorate of the Bureau in Melbourne and solicited the assistance of the Victorian Police Commissioner in the Directorate's operation. Hughes also suggested that the Premier permit the Commissioner to sit on the Directorate.³⁸ The Prime Minister hoped to persuade the Premier that he might, in this fashion, give his government some control over the CEB, but Hughes notably failed to emphasise the authority the CEB and the federal government would gain over the Victorian constabulary and government through this arrangement; the concentration of power into the hands of elites was intended to appear both consultative and mutually-beneficial.

Occasionally, government kinship groups widened the sphere of administrative influence. However, the enlistment of the public in official activities occurred on the government's terms; by appearing to band the Self together by making it more inclusive, elites could change the culture of the Self while ostensibly fighting the Other. This might be said to have occurred in the early years of the Second World War, when MI published a public instruction booklet, authored by press and broadcasting executives. The pamphlet invited the public to become "Voluntary Censors" in the war against the nation's enemies. Intelligence, it stated, was "a battle of wits waged incessantly along the line of communication ... not confined to the Intelligence officers of the Services." Civilians, too, were to consider as soldiers engaged in "a war of words" and were urged to:

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 2. The Guard was confident that the "splendid effort of the British Government in restoring confidence in Sterling," in the early-1930s, would enable the United Kingdom to "assume the monetary leadership of the world."

³⁸ Letter from Prime Minister Hughes to the Premier of Victoria, 8 March 1917 (VPRO, Series 1172, Item 8). Hughes also commended the scheme for its cost-efficiency.

Make the enemy work for his information - make him sweat to get it out of Australia - and so there will be more chances of catching him - and less chance of the information reaching his employers in time to be useful.

Military Intelligence explained that this was:

the motive behind many a Press and Radio Censorship decree [and] apparently purposeless restrictions.³⁹

Explicit reference to dangerous enemy Others remained a potent method of co-opting public support for "apparently purposeless restrictions" of democracy.

Many within kinship groups, however, were never reconciled to public participation in their activities. Such sentiment prevailed in leadership cadres of the Australian Protective League and the NG. Discomfort with sharing knowledge and power with the uninitiated fuelled the desire of extremists to place Australia under the command of a supreme father figure or dictator. Men like Harold Cropper suggested abolishing democracy in favour of dictatorship and Eric Campbell believed that he was ready to step into the breach. In a 1933 interview for the *Sydney Sun*, Campbell averred that he, unlike the British Fascisti, whom he derided for clothed themselves in blackshirts "for the pure swank," was especially qualified to seize power bring Australia order. Power, he suggested "must emanate from a single man." And because he already held supreme power in the Guard, Campbell proposed that the nation extend control of the federal government to his experienced hand.⁴⁰

Campbell and like-minded paranoid "loyalists" saw in the *form* of European authoritarianism the psychic stability they desperately sought. Campbell indicated this in another interview for the *Sydney Mail*, which also featured a portrait of the would-be dictator sporting both a moustache and haircut in the style of Hitler. In this

³⁹ *Keeping Information from the Enemy - How Intelligence Works - and with Special Reference to the Tasks of Publicity Censorship*, pp. 3 and 13 (AA, A6335/6, Item 36). The pamphlet must date from 1940 at the earliest. Although there is no date of publication, it is likely to have occurred in 1941 because the Introduction makes reference to "the experience of the last eighteen months of war."

⁴⁰ Under the headline "NEW MUSSOLINI - Campbell On Campbell - 'I ALONE ORDER,'" Campbell asserted "I alone give orders, and the New Guard execute them to the letter." See *Sun*, 6 April 1933 (NLA, MS 250, Folio 1).

interview, Campbell claimed that the Nazis were "orderly, patriotic and determined" and had "helped Germany to find her soul." The Fascists, similarly, had brought "cleanliness and apparent prosperity" to Italy; the stylish demeanour of the Italian people demonstrated the sense of pride their government had imparted to them. Campbell also remarked to the *Sydney Morning Herald* that Nazism and Fascism were "essentially the same" and illustrated the "application of the same principle to two different nations." As he was incapable of analysing Fascism and Nazism systemically, Campbell collapsed them into a mental construct of his own design.⁴¹

The strident anti-democracy of Campbell presented some image problems for other anti-communists. Commenting some twenty years after the demise of the Guard, Francis De Groot preferred to emphasise the fraternal, democratic quality of the brotherhood. Contradicting his former leader, De Groot recalled:

it was the easiest thing to join the New Guard, no oaths, penalties, we were most democratic, and as such, wide open to infiltration from without, but most of us trusted each other, and there were always ways of using the others.⁴²

Negotiation, therefore, of the tension between assuaging the need for security and retaining the respect of a public accustomed to parliamentary democracy was a difficult task for anti-communists. This was particularly so when the laws or conventions of parliamentary democracy threatened to bring kinship groups into conflict with the public interest. In such circumstances, kinship groups' efforts to account for their anti-democracy became desperate. Controversy exposed the febrile nature of kinship groups' claims to be justified in advancing undemocratic power. One notable controversy was that of censorship. In late 1933, strident opposition to the summary and draconian character of censorship forced the federal government into making extraordinary admissions about its rationale for kinship group authority. Concerned by Parliament's lack of knowledge about materials banned in its name, federal Labor Senator Arthur Rae called on T. White, the Minister for Trade and Customs, to release lists of prohibited publications. Rae's request began a series of

⁴¹ *Sydney Mail*, 21 June 1933 and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 August 1933 (NLA, MS 250, Folio 1). Campbell was also, by his own account, in the "vanguard of a crusade of moral regeneration," which would "break the fear complex [and] prove that the British race [did] not deteriorate under southern skies." See *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 6.

⁴² De Groot, *The Sydney Harbour Bridge*, p. 9.

exchanges between himself and the Minister prompting the Minister to expound novel theories of administration to obstruct investigation of departmental procedures.

White first deflected Rae by refusing to disclose requested particulars, on the grounds that releasing such information would draw undue attention to its content. When this disingenuous response was met with indignation, White suggested that Rae should trust in the judgment of the Censorship Board, a benevolent body of learned men that had society's best interests at heart and reviewed material "in an impartial and disinterested manner." Hoping to win Rae's confidence, White appealed to his sense of corporate loyalty, inviting him to trust the kinship group (the state and its servants) and advising him that "Crown Law authorities rarely" disagreed with the rulings of the Department. Rae found White's arguments unconvincing and inadequate, associating the government's collegiate anti-democracy with global repression. Mindful that the German Chancellor Hitler had recently instituted all-encompassing censorship regulations, Rae caustically remarked that these too had probably been established "on the advice of 'impartial and disinterested' advisers," an indignant Rae wrote White:

it is repugnant to every canon of democracy and every element of civic freedom that what we shall read, and thereby very largely what we shall know and what we shall think, shall be at the mercy of customs officials who are not chosen for their positions on account of their highly literary or judicial qualifications.

In a final appeal to the Minister, Rae attempted to force him to recognise the fundamental political principles he believed were in jeopardy, remarking:

Of course I know you have the *power*, though I deny the *right*, of refusing my request, but I shall not relax my efforts to expose and eventually overthrow such a pernicious exercise of despotic power.

Rae's entreaty fell on deaf ears; White merely reiterated that the government's censorship procedures were objective and clear enough to prevent partisan abuse. To prove this, he revealed the six categories under which materials were proscribed. They comprised:

- (a) overthrow force violence established government of Commonwealth or State or any other civilised country.
- (b) overthrow force violence all forms law.
- (c) abolition organised government.
- (d) assassination of public officials.
- (e) unlawful destruction property.
- (f) seditious intentions expressed or seditious enterprises associated.

Most literature, White stated, was prohibited under provisions (a) through (c) and these criteria were determinable from context; an "intelligent person" did not require a judicial qualification to decide whether or not the proscription of an article was required. Further demonstrating his incapacity to conceive the issue in abstract, principled terms, White argued that censorship could be reduced to a technical process for which one qualified as for a vocation. Commenting on Rae's implication that customs officers were "not competent to decide whether a publication [came] within the terms of the [censorship] Proclamation," White assured him that the "officials who carry out duties in relation to the prohibitions of literature" possessed "distinct literary qualifications, and in some cases ... a knowledge of three or four European languages." These "distinct literary qualifications" reassured the Minister that he could "more safely allow the decisions on these matters to rest with Government officials than with any so-called independent body." The final confirmation of White's incapacity to substitute his faith in his kinship group for democracy came with his reduction of the debate to a matter of moral character. White terminated correspondence with Rae by impugning his patriotism, stating:

I think that the final fundamental difference between us on this subject is whether this class of literature should or should not be allowed free circulation in Australia.⁴³

Censorship continued to rest on a set of assumptions about the indivisibility of the Self made redundant by Bolshevism and doctrines of social protest. Elites unilaterally

⁴³ Correspondence from Senator A. E. G. Rae to T. White, Minister for Trade and Customs, 27 October 1933, from White to Rae, 31 October 1933, from Rae to White, 14 November 1933 and from White to Rae, 14 November 1933 (AA, A425/127, Item 1943/4949).

prohibited the exhibition of filmed material deemed "blasphemous," "indecent," "obscene" or "likely to be injurious to morality, or to encourage or incite to crime." Further, the Censorship Board proscribed material it regarded as "offensive to the people of any friendly nation" or "to the people of the British Empire" and even felt qualified to ban matter which was "undesirable" to "the public interest," a concept that was, by definition, uncommonly subjective and malleable.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Letter from Department of Trade and Customs to Hurlstone Park Baptist Literary and Debating Society, 9 February 1934 (AA, A425/127, Item 1943/4949). The Hurlstone Park Baptist Library and Debating Society was one public organisation that discovered for itself, the arbitrary nature of the Censorship Board's power and procedures, when it petitioned the Board to release materials that interested them.

How the Kinship Groups Interpreted their Failure to Shape the World

Kinship groups' determination to cling to power generated conflict. Kinship groups were challenged by rival politicians, "radical" unions and intransigent intellectuals who frustrated their members' already fragile psychological equilibrium. Confronted with a world that would not conform with their desires, embittered kinship groups projected their rage toward Others, principally Labor voters, Catholics and communists. They held grudges against these Others, were incensed by them, demanded impossible moral conformity from them and rejoiced in any pain they experienced. Their frustration, exacerbated by political impotence stirred up powerful feelings of rage disposing them to equate difference with illegitimacy and perfidy. Those who held political opinions contrary to their own were regarded as criminals while inferences and "moral certainties" established connections between miscreance, unionism, foreignness and radicalism. Commonwealth Police reports; for example, spoke of certain districts harbouring "a great number of disloyal and lawless people of the IWW and Sinn Fein type."⁴⁵ Australian Protective League intelligence similarly stated not only that the IWW comprised "extremist" anarchists, socialists and militants of the working class movement," but also that "their attitude generally was of a seditious, hostile, and disloyal nature." Moreover, it described the IWW as a "criminal" organisation. This characterisation was "justified" by "subsequent events" and "serious crimes" that the League argued were "clearly" attributable to "leading members of the IWW."⁴⁶

Having established the treachery of their enemies, Australian anti-communists paradoxically maligned Others' lack of shame or horror for their actions. The CIB expressed indignation with the CPA in 1932 for its tactical response to the strengthened Crimes Act. Expecting the Party to fold before the legislation, the Branch reported with disgust that the Party was "conveniently" subdividing into a number of organisations.⁴⁷ Some years earlier, federal police in Queensland also complained that traitors addressing a public rally did not make disloyal utterances under the letter of the law, but deviously "cloaked" their statements with "double

⁴⁵ Report from Sydney Office of CPF, 1 October 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Folder 1).

⁴⁶ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/125.

⁴⁷ These organisations included the Friends of the Soviet Union, the League Against Imperialism, the Minority Movement of the miners' union, Workers International Relief and the International Seamen's

meaning.”⁴⁸ Anti-communist manifested particularly absurd double standards judging the conduct of Russian radicals living in Australia. Activists like Simonov, already regarded as “tools” of the “German General Staff,” were chastised for being “political exiles ... cleared-out of Russia for spreading revolutionary propaganda.”⁴⁹ Considering that these Russians were exiled for protesting the rule of a regime routinely denounced in Australia, such criticism represented considerable hypocrisy. Moreover, it was the product of racialism. Mistrust of the Russian “type” prevented analysis of their beliefs. They were dismissed as congenital malefactors, unable to “appreciate” the advantages of Australia’s social system and as likely to harm it as they were Czarist autocracy.

If kinship groups were outraged by pervasive and obnoxious ideologies, they were particularly galled by Others who proudly proclaimed heresy. T. R. Ashworth, for example, deplored the “Hate Propaganda” of radical labour which belittled and lampooned employers, depicting them as “Fat ... drinking champagne and feasting [while] contrasted with ... decrepit creature[s] taking bone[s] out of a dustbin.”⁵⁰ Harold Jones, similarly, found Tom Walsh’s habit of “arbitrarily, even insolently” flaunting his success in radicalising the Seamen’s Union intolerable. The CIB also complained that the organ of the CPA, the *Workers’ Weekly*, was “insolent and defiant.”⁵¹ Years earlier, MI was equally dismayed by Russian “Bolsheviks” who “deliberately defied” police during the infamous anti-WPA rally in Brisbane in 1919 and “gioried in their victory.”⁵²

Anti-communist fury was further provoked by nonsensical exasperation with persons or nations who were not outraged with the Other on the Self’s behalf. In the latter stages of the Great War, the Australian Censor’s Office expected itself and United

Club. See CIB Report on Communist Activities 39, 31 July 1932 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF 10/15).

⁴⁸ Report of Commissioner Jackson for Attorney-General’s Department, 18 June 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Item Folder 1).

⁴⁹ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/127.

⁵⁰ Ashworth, “Communism in Australia,” p. 29.

⁵¹ See NLA, MS 1538 CIB report on Communism, 9 March 1922, pp. 3 and “Intelligence Notes of General Interest” No. 7, 11 September 1925, Paragraph 32 (henceforward Intelligence Notes, 11 September 1925) (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF 42/64 286). The Branch report of September 1925 found the *Workers Weekly* “most obnoxious” for calling on the “Labour movement to declare “black” the deportation tribunal and Bruce’s Federal Fascist police.”

⁵² Report on loyalist demonstration, Brisbane, 24 March 1919 (AA, MP 367/1, Item 512/1/898).

States authorities to achieve exact accord regarding whom they would regard as seditious. The Censor accordingly identified for the United States Army its anti-British personnel who were corresponding with Australians. Offended by Irish American servicemen who viewed England as "the only enemy Ireland ever had," the Censors hoped that American authorities would punish such sentiment. Perhaps mindful, however, that support of Irish Republicanism might not incur the wrath of the United States General Staff, the Censor attempted to make trouble for the men, alleging that they were preparing to desert.⁵³

Australian anti-communists' sense of grievance also found expression in hatred for the welfare state, regarded as an unjust burden on upright citizens, who were providing for society's parasites and idiots. Eric Campbell decried the "charity" of Australia's "subsidies and safeguards for the proletariat." In "no other part of the world," he claimed, was the individual "so spoon-fed" as they were in the antipodes. The citizens of New South Wales were so favoured by the baby bonus, Family Endowment, free education, wage protection, unemployment insurance, free hospital care, free old-age pensions and even state-funded burials, that they were not required to protect or preserve their own interests. From birth until death, the state purchased their necessities. If workers were careless enough to meet with an accident in the course of their employment, their employer was required to subsidise their existence in the form of a compensation benefit. Unions also afforded workers protection from "dismissal for inefficiency or offences," while labourers received a family wage automatically upon reaching the age of twenty-one, regardless of marital status. The "cumulative" effect of this bestowment of "privileges" was appalling, for it degraded the "two great instincts" of "the British race," the "instinct of self-preservation and the paternal instinct." The "instincts" of "private charity" and "self-reliance" were also being "stifled at the source."⁵⁴ While decent, independent men and women built the nation, their efforts were made increasingly futile by the growing deadweight of those unable to survive without the social security system

⁵³ The observed men generally expressed no such intention, merely affirming their hopes for discharge from service in a long, terrible war which showed little sign of ending. See Despatch from the Governor-General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 August 1918, featuring report from 19 July 1918 regarding correspondence between "Pat" Connolly, 15th Co., 153rd Depot Brigade, Camp Dix, New Jersey and W. V. Connolly, North Quay, Brisbane (AA, CP78/23, Item 1918/89/753).

Australian anti-communists, like their American brethren, not only expected their opponents to conform to their political demands, but also steadfastly refused to be measured against their own ethics. Those on the left were required to *prove* that they did not support alien, hostile forces; if they neglected to abjure the Other, unequivocally, then they had to anticipate a charge of treachery. So, in 1918, when the Premier of Queensland, T. J. Ryan, "made no attempt to repudiate his connection" with the ACTU, which had affirmed its support for the OBU. Herbert Brookes and the Protestant elite concluded that he was disloyal.⁵⁵

Industrial, commercial and conservative political leaders, by contrast, were immune from suspicion and vigorously protected from "unfair" criticism. T. R. Ashworth spoke out against attacks made on the rich and employers for not contributing to society. The "Idle Rich," he claimed, were "often judged too harshly." Allowance had to be made for the "unwholesome" effect, "upon both intellect and character," of the influence of "idleness and luxury from childhood." As the "Idle Rich" possessed "qualities, which, if properly directed, [could] be directed into a valuable social asset," it was not proper to condemn them. Ashworth also spoke out against defamation of employers, which tended to "justify the utterly biased story of traditional wrongs that [had] done so much to poison the minds of wage-earners" against their bosses. Bemoaning the "remarkable lack of information regarding the extenuating circumstances" which had to be "taken into account before judgment [could] be passed upon the business men" of an earlier, isolated period, Ashworth reminded his readers that employers "at the end of the eighteenth century had [had] little knowledge of the unwholesome character of work-rooms and houses simply because [modern] sanitary science ... did not exist." They did not deserve to be despised for extracting profits from hellish workplaces. Similarly, they could not be reproached for exploiting their labour force, for they "had no proper conception of the injustice of individual bargaining because ... collective bargaining was not discovered until much later." Employers of previous eras were "ignorant" of the misery they inflicted and their "apparently callous conduct was the result of the age in which

⁵⁴ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 4.

⁵⁵ Report regarding Trade Union Congress, 25 August 1918 (NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/83). Brookes rhetorically asked, "Would a loyal man who had delivered an address to such a body have allowed the Public to believe that he sympathised with it in any way?" Note well his capitalisation of the word "Public" too.

[they] lived." Yet "Communists," in their "class hate propaganda," "sentimentalist[s] who desire[d] a cheap and easy method of airing [their] virtue" and Labor politicians playing upon the "untrained emotions of uneducated people in order to secure votes" all insisted on portraying employers as "inhuman monster[s]." Such an "apparent want of charity," Ashworth concluded, arose from:

thoughtlessness and lack of information, with perhaps just a spice of that vanity which impels us all at times to show how superior we are. By unjustly inflaming the feelings of an audience against business leaders of the past these ... people are helping to intensify the bias against those of the present, and although it is their special mission to promote good will, they are, in fact, albeit unconsciously, accentuating class strife.⁵⁶

Ashworth made moral lepers and the Other responsible even for the Self's conduct and appearance.

Such willful disingenuity among anti-communists must have been somewhat galling to those subjected to surveillance, particularly as they were chastised for being unable to examine themselves from outside "their own point of view."⁵⁷ Along with political radicals, ethnic minority groups were victims of rank hypocrisy. Authorities, for example, regarded Australian Italians not only as hot-tempered troublemakers but also as ingrates and traitors. Regarded as incapable of true loyalty to Australia, they were damned for repudiating any obligation to the Italian government, even though they were naturalised Australians. So, in February 1918, when the CEB received word that Italians were taking out Australian citizenship, the Bureau suggested that they were doing so "so as to avoid being called upon to assist their own country." Reporting that approximately one hundred and fifty Italians living in Melbourne were incensed by instructions to serve notice at the Italian Consulate-General for army service, officer H. W. Sainsbury opined that the men, "composed mostly of fish hawkers and

⁵⁶ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 49 - 50.

⁵⁷ Harold Jones' report on "Communism in Australia," 22 - 23 June 1927, pp. 8 (henceforward H. Jones, "Communism in Australia," 23 June 1927) (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

fruiterers [and] all a very ignorant type," were being stirred up against the Consul by a personal enemy.⁵⁸

By reasoning in this fashion, Sainsbury demonstrated the total lack of empathy, sympathy and comprehension customary in kinship groups. Failing to appreciate that loyalty had, in some cases, to be earned rather than simply given on account of an abstract identification with nation or race, anti-communists could only disparage migrants' behaviour. In this specific case, the authorities felt no compulsion to ask why these people had abandoned Italy. Anti-communist conceptions of citizenship reduced it to a state of inflexible obedience; one simply obeyed the law because it was inherently just and right. The kinship groups did not consider laws as expressions of social structures; this was a particularly negligent oversight, given their predilection for comparing other judicial and political systems unfavourably with the Westminster system.

This episode involving the intelligence forces and Italian migrants highlights a broader current of paranoid anti-communism: moral ruthlessness. Perceived transgressions of the law were never forgotten nor forgiven by Australian kinship groups, who maintained meticulous count of offences committed against the Self, anticipating perfidy from the same quarters. The IWW was one group never permitted to live down its ignominy. Reports in the possession of Herbert Brookes, for example, stated that an inventory of the "prison record of the IWW" would require a substantial monograph. The reports also placed great emphasis on the incarceration of "virtually all the [organisation's] principal leaders," following the "famous Fire Dope trial" of the Twelve. The Wobblies' foreign origins and record further damned it, for the incarceration of the union's "founder," Eugene Debs, Big Bill Haywood, the General Secretary, "as well as two or three members of the United States Executive" for twenty years on charges of "disloyalty" reflected poorly on Australian industrial radicals.⁵⁹ Anti-communists' store of stock comments delineated the foul character of their foes. A Wobbly who spoke before a disloyalty meeting in the Brisbane Domain, had been "recently fined," whereas "five charges [had] been laid" against a man who

⁵⁸ Report of 13 February 1918, regarding "Discontent of Italian Residents" (AA, B741/3, Item V/122).

⁵⁹ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/92 - 115, regarding the IWW.

criticised the findings of a New South Wales Justice's inquiry into the treatment of interned Irishmen.⁶⁰

Anti-communists also rejoiced in the misery of Others. As Australian loyalists recited the atrocities committed by the United States government against Wobblies, they evinced little concern for the horrible severity of anti-radical punishment. References to Joe Hill, the "principal poet" of the IWW, merely noted that he had been "shot for treason at Salt Lake City in 1916" and that his "songs of violence" were "frequently heard in the Brisbane Government Domain."⁶¹ Australian anti-communists were so unperturbed by the judicial murder of a man for writing songs that they gleefully abetted the persecution of other American "radicals," forwarding information to United States authorities. This is demonstrated by the Censor's treatment of correspondence between W. Bullen, of San Francisco, and H. E. Boote, of Sydney. Bullen complained to Boote that America had taught him "what sort of tyranny [could] be carried on under Democracy." Everything and everybody was made to serve capitalists and trusts, as "working men [had] to take an oath to serve their employers faithfully." Labourers had been "given the choice of buying Liberty Bonds or losing their jobs and if they [chose] the latter [were] hounded as spies [and] tarred and feathered, even hanged." Young men of all races were being drafted into unsanitary camps where thousands expired from disease. Those who had attempted escape had been "shot down like dogs," while "scores ... committed suicide to escape." Bullen also reported that elections in Wisconsin had been upset by the threat of martial law in the event of socialist victories, and that men had been gaoled for defaming the present and even past Presidents. The general populace was terrorised by loyalist vigilantes not above hanging "disloyalist" agitators, while the rich were exempt from service.

Conditions in the United States convinced Bullen that it was vital that Australia was not "penetrated" by "Americanism" and it was a pity, he remarked, that "the working men of Australia [expressed] so little appreciation of the real freedom they ... enjoyed under British rule - a freedom ... found nowhere else." These sentiments infuriated the Censor, who dismissed Bullen's esteem for British government as "a sop" to

⁶⁰ CPF reports, Brisbane, 26 August 1918 and Sydney, 1 October 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Item Folder 1).

authorities. Certain that Boote would "make use" of Bullen's damning descriptions of the United States, he wondered how Bullen could be punished, finally concluding:

if conditions are such as the writer mentions in America, no doubt he has laid himself open to imprisonment for the term of his natural life at least. Perhaps American authorities might be interested in him.

A report was therefore forwarded to the Governor-General, who passed it to the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., which in turn wrote the regal representative to confirm American authorities' receipt of the information; belligerence and wounded Self-esteem prompted Australian anti-communists to condemn an Other on the other side of the globe to a fate they did not bother to determine.⁶²

⁶¹ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/92 – 115.

⁶² Letter from Governor-General to British Ambassador, Washington, D.C., 27 August 1918 and reply from British Embassy, 21 October 1918 (AA, CP78/23, Item 1918/89/753).

The Special Role of Semantics in Establishing the Veracity of the Self's *Weltanschauung*

Like American anti-communists, Australian kinship groups' political and moral universe rested not on empirical proofs but on "moral certainties." In order to justify their beliefs and behaviour, Australian anti-communists also developed a new discourse, in which semantic conventions and associated, implied meanings established the perfidy of the Other. This discourse also confirmed the virtue and rectitude of the Self, by solidifying the Self's denial of its own subjectivity, and expressed anti-communists' need to punish errant souls for the failures of the Self.

The ghastly nature of the Other was demonstrated in a variety of ways. The character of the Other was sullied by the strategic insertion, within narrative, of pejorative epithets, the cumulative impact of which was devastating. Habitual use of adjectives and phrases poisoned the image of the Other in the minds of readers or listeners. Anti-communists and sections of the public remembered tales of the Other's depravity, and recurrent use of stylised language revived memories of previous outrages and prepared people for fresh appalling news. This was particularly true of periodically recycled "reports" concerning the sexual perversity and family-destroying practices of the Bolshevik government.

It was also true of security service intelligence. Reports about Irish Republican organisations described them as "very rabid." A CIB profile of Jack Kavanagh similarly noted that he had been "very unfavourably reported upon by Canadian authorities" and was a "very seditious ... agitator by nature." Kavanagh was depicted as a shrewd man of limited courage with loose sexual morals "probably not too greatly disposed to expose himself to risk," by agents who disapproved of his elopement to Australia with a woman and two children whom he had not fathered.⁶³

Harold Jones' fertile imagination and acute insecurity led him to decry communists' "ceaseless" and "aggressive" spreading of propaganda, and fear the success of their "insidious teachings" that were "slowly permeating the core of Labour and loyalty."

⁶³ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/138 and Memorandum from CIB to Solicitor-General, 8 November 1928, containing security profile of John Kavanagh, compiled 19 March 1926 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

Communist agitators, Jones wrote, operated as a disease, forming "germ cells...nuclei and party groups" in "industrial centres," where "large groups of aliens gravitate." The Russian Association was believed by Jones to attract the "most dangerous aliens in Australia," as well as "all the disloyal and disgruntled Australians, Britishers and foreigners." Concurrently, "small but aggressive and truculent groups" of "communists, sympathisers and extremists" exercised "a pernicious influence out of all proportion to their number." The most dangerous communist cell, a shadowy, supreme council dubbed the Secret Seven, "exerted a distinct influence for evil" and employed "foreigners with bad reputations." T. R. Ashworth, meanwhile, christened Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx's "henchman." And the British Government highlighted the sexual ties that bound Others together in a 1919 report titled *Intercourse between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein*.⁶⁴

Anti-communist rhetoric also exaggerated the powers of the Other, particularly its capacities and fanatic work ethic. Harold Jones, unable to conclusively demonstrate the political influence of communists, averred that they "largely controlled" the Seamen's Union. He also had "no doubt" that the CPA's responsibility for Australia's "Labour troubles" was "very real indeed."⁶⁵ The leaders of the Australian Protective League also shared this assessment of the Others' subversion. Archibald Strong, professor of English at the University of Melbourne, for example, declared in May 1918:

the enemies within our gates [have] been working with subtleness and thoroughness.⁶⁶

This acute fear of clandestine treachery fostered the perception, heightened by

⁶⁴ H. Jones, "Communism in Australia," 23 June 1927, pp. 1, 2 and 6, Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 72 and NLA, MS 1538, Item 21/193.

⁶⁵ Jones believed that the Party's power was manifest during the 1925 seamen's strike. He suggested that "although communists may not have been actually responsible for the declaration of the strike," they had "led and pushed the men to the lengths to which they went and no doubt endeavoured to lure them to open revolution." This prompted Jones to conclude that the strike had "unquestioningly" been "engineered by communists." And he had "little doubt" that "the majority of troubles in industrial life in Australia ... were directly caused by the propaganda disseminated on behalf of and by the communists." The CPA had "better educated leaders than hitherto, and consequently [was] more subtle and dangerous" and while the Party had experienced "no numerical growth," its propaganda was "more cleverly disseminated" and was "gaining sympathisers, if not members." See H. Jones, "Communism in Australia," 23 June 1927, pp. 1 and 3 - 4.

feelings of loathing, that the Other entirely lacked principle. However, this perception was problematic, for it made it difficult for anti-communists to account for community support for radicalism. Australian loyalists, like their American *confreres*, resolved this dilemma by denying that some members of the Self had any form of *conscious* accord with the Other, or casting those same citizens from the realm of the Self.

A variety of stock epithets stripped the Other of honour and virtue. Working-class opponents of the Great War, for example, were described by Commonwealth Police as "pimps." Bolshevism was regularly termed a "Cult" by R. S. MacLeod, a concerned citizen of Melbourne, who warned Prime Minister Bruce that the fight against communism was being undermined by the London Passports Office, which carelessly issued papers to the cult's leaders.⁶⁷ The semantic dexterity required to repudiate the connection between the Self and the Other grew as the psychological strain of the task increased. The leaders of the Australian Protective League, for example, were so disturbed by the magnitude of community outrage regarding the show-trial of the IWW Twelve, that they maintained that "Labor Officials" in charge of the myriad of workers' organisations protesting the convictions concurred with the court's findings, but were unwilling to oppose their constituents and, therefore, remained silent.⁶⁸ The League's chiefs thereby legitimated impugned judicial practices, reassuring themselves that the "responsible" elements of the working class, its leaders, were not renouncing the government's corrupt conduct. A clique of conservative federal Senators opposing the proposed 1928 Congress of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat demonstrated comparable discursive adroitness, denying that the Congress would enjoy *bona fide* trade union support. Troubled by the New South Wales Labor Council's and the ACTU's affiliation with the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS), and also by union backing of anti-imperialist independence movements in Asia, the Senators averred that such conduct reflected the usurpation of power from within the union movement by an unrepresentative and

⁶⁶ APL Meeting Notes 29 May 1918, reference C 571/1/374 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

⁶⁷ CPF reports regarding Percy McDonald, 16 and 19 September 1918 (AA, A9650/1, Item Folder 1) and Letter of R. S. MacLeod to Prime Minister's Department, 29 October 1925 (A981/4, Item Com 10).

⁶⁸ NLA, MS 1924, Item 17/116. The League claimed it had "evidence" to show that "Labor Officials had an opinion differing from that which they publicly expressed as to the criminal tendencies of" the IWW.

spurious cabal in the pay of Russia. Senator J. E. Ogden claimed that "the rank and file of Labour in Australia" disapproved of the politics of their councils but were unable to change official policies while their "leaders" failed to "speak their minds." Senator H. S. Foll maintained that the "rank and file" realised "only too well" how their councils were "damaging the [union] movement" and confounding the "true objective of Labour in Australia," by supporting causes harmful both to the Home Country and allies of Australia, while Senator G. F. Pearce was "quite satisfied that the overwhelming majority" of unionists had "no sympathy whatever" with such objectionable politics. "No one," he argued, who stood for what "trade unionism really means could countenance anything of the kind." Pearce, instead, saw this disloyalty as the work of foreign agitators, whose presence was morally certain. The statements of "a Labour leader in New South Wales," Pearce suggested, indicated that funds for such propaganda had been furnished to the Labor Council and the ACTU by Russia, and while Pearce could not "recall the [leader's] name," he swore he had read such statements in the press "recently."⁶⁹

While Australian conservatives cast labour associations and migrants from the Self with less haste than their American counterparts, there were occasions when opposition to their just and proper designs was strident enough to make the salvation of the errant impossible. In such circumstances, anti-communists freely attacked the Other, declaring it morally corrupt to the point of incapacity. Prime Minister Bruce asserted this during his battle with waterside workers and seamen. Bruce argued that various labour organisations were, "by studied misrepresentation," taking advantage of an international labour dispute to destroy government control of industrial arbitration and foist communism on Australia. Commanded by "unscrupulous men," a renegade faction of the British Seamen's Union and their Australian *confreres* were violating "the most sacred principles of unionism," assuming the authority of the Union's elected leadership and taking unsanctioned strike action. Worse, the dispute crossed national boundaries, harming Australian shipping lines not party to the dispute. Although Bruce attacked the febrile structure of the union movement, he blamed labour leaders for the chaos. He invited legitimate union leaders to "protect trade unionism from betrayal by its own," but concluded that unionists had shown

⁶⁹ Hansard for 17 May 1928, pp. 4955 and 4944 – 45 (AA, A981/4, Item Com 4).

themselves incapable of self-regulation; its leaders lacked "the courage" to fight those "determinedly setting themselves to betray" their organisations and they had also failed "to protect the people of Australia" from "extremists" that "defy ... Governments and dictated to them."⁷⁰

Bruce's descriptions of perfidious communist seamen were most colourful. Congenital power-mongers and unscrupulous manipulators, communists could be found "wherever there [was] strife - national or international." As "paid agents" of the Comintern, these "harbingers of hate [and] disseminators of poison" would "white-ant" any organisation to create "unrest, upheavals ... strikes ... misery and suffering" that prepared "the way for ... socialist revolution." Invoking the language of merit and fearful resentment, Bruce spoke of communists inflicting "unmerited sufferings" on "tens of thousands of [Australian] men, women and children." However, Bruce, not unlike American leaders, was also appalled by communism's promise of total social equality. This threatened not only the living standards of the able and dedicated, but also left Australia vulnerable to race suicide. As communists recognised "no distinction of nation, race or colour," Australia could expect its racial essence to be irreversibly diluted when communists seized power. Internationalism would witness the destruction of commercial, political and, finally, sexual and racial borders, and antipodean Britons would be dragged down to a lower state of existence. Already, the reach of communism was incomparable: communists had been "instrumental in bringing about the recent troubles in China," were "behind the trouble in Afghanistan" and "their blood-stained hands [had been] seen in Morocco [and] Mexico." But Bruce feared that communists had "a malign hatred of the British Empire ... a sure and stable rock in a world faced with chaos." This was why they had undermined Britain in India and Egypt.⁷¹ These concluding remarks of Bruce demonstrate the circular nature of paranoid fear. In his final denunciation of the malevolent Other, he blames communism for the failing powers of the British Empire; these are words of a Self in denial.

Australian anti-communists conferred an Other humanity only when that Other

⁷⁰ "Bolshevism in Australia," speech by S. M. Bruce, 9 September 1925, published by the National Publicity Bureau, pp. 1, 9 and 14 (NLA, MS 1009, Item 27/4).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9 and 6.

sufficiently resembled the Self. In this respect, antipodean loyalists were in accord with their American brethren; both respected a handful of Russian communists, but only because they were educated and sophisticated, permitting Western observers to identify with their activism and attribute them *petit-bourgeois* mentality. British intelligence services, for example, attacked the senior Bolshevik, Lev Kamenev, as a "notorious plotter ... obliged to leave England hurriedly in September 1920." But Kamenev's reputation contrasted sharply with that of Anatoly Lunacharsky, the inaugural and long-serving Commissar for Education. The son of "an Imperial Privy Councillor," Lunacharsky was regarded as a cultured philanthropist, not a "Communist fanatic." He had been known to express "bitter disappointment with the results of the Soviet experiment" and was "one of the few Bolsheviks [to] have worked hard, in the face of immense difficulties, to create rather than to destroy."⁷² It was appropriate to evince a degree of empathy for Lunacharsky because he appeared to strive for the same goals as anti-communists did, merely striving to reach those goals in a different manner. Lunacharsky's ethnicity also endeared him to anti-communists; unlike Kamenev, he was not a Jew.

The semantic means by which Australian anti-communists denied the subjectivity of their opinions was also identical to that of United States patriots. The cardinal purpose of this rhetoric was to make unsubstantiated and often paranoid assertions appear self-evident. So anti-communists developed a special vocabulary to attack the ingenuity of the Other. The CIB depended on these semantic conventions to justify its continuing existence. Its chief and agents quickly became accustomed to describing alleged revolutionaries as "well known" subversives. This both exaggerated the communist threat to Australia as well as the professionalism and knowledge of the security forces. The CIB showed itself as adept as American MI in creating fantastic, perfidious communist super agents.⁷³

⁷² Intelligence Profiles of International Communist leaders, inventory date 17 September 1928 (AA, A981/4, Item Com 1, Part 1).

⁷³ One allegedly "well known" super-radical was Konrad Byss, a town councillor of Zurich and Secretary of the Workers' Union of Zurich, who reputedly supervised large sums of money for Bolshevik propaganda and (improbably) transported revolutionary, anti-British literature to Ireland. This "extreme revolutionary," Harold Jones averred, was, in addition to being a Bolshevik stooge, a "well known" German agent. There was little, it seemed, this super-agent Byss could not do; like Carl Mostavenko he served a myriad of perfidious causes. On the basis of this report, Jones hoped to ensure Byss would be barred from entry into Australia, should he attempt the same. See Security Order from

Another convention of anti-communist rhetoric was the claim that a kinship group or patriot represented the indignation of millions of silent, faithful citizens. Harold Cropper claimed that he was privy to the opinions of "many other citizens," "many hundreds of loyal citizens," and even "thousands of loyal citizens" of New South Wales.⁷⁴ Subtle semantic manipulation was also widely practiced. The use of quotation marks in connection with communist, pacifist, labour and other associations was particularly popular, as in the United States. By placing the names and subdivisions of objectionable organisations within quotation marks, anti-communists hoped to rob lawful organisations of their probity and legitimacy. This semantic policy was used by Harold Jones in a report to Prime Minister Bruce in January 1925. Sending various materials to the Prime Minister, including a copy of the Constitution of the CPA, Jones placed the word "Constitution" within quotation marks.⁷⁵ This was the only entity mentioned in this manner and Jones likely anticipated this singular semantic treatment would encourage the government to regard the Party as specious and not entitled to the protection of the law.

Besides boasting popular representation, loyalists emphasised their special expertise in political leadership. The NG justified its support of Fascism on the grounds that, like Mussolini, they possessed special knowledge, enabling them to discern, with unusual perspicacity, the nation's ills. Therefore, they alone should prescribe remedies. Anticipating opposition to Fascism, P. H. Coates, writing for *Liberty*, argued that "those who care[d] to apply the pragmatic test by studying [Italy's] development [would] be astonished at what has been achieved [there] in so short a period." Only businessmen, Coates implied, knew how to judge governments' performance without becoming distracted by social and political ephemera. In order to sustain his claim, however, Coates fell back on other semantic tropes, arguing that there was "little doubt" that Mussolini had prevented the "Fascist revolution" from descending into "a welter of bloodshed" and that "it was sufficient" to point to Fascism's destruction of "class-consciousness ... substituted by class-collaboration"

H. E. Jones, prohibiting issuance of landing visas for the U. K. or its Dominions, 10 September 1919 (AA, B741/3, Item V/201).

⁷⁴ Letters from Cropper to Senator G. F. Pearce, 15 February 1932 and to Attorney-General John Latham, 29 February 1932, 22 February 1933 and 28 April 1932 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/152).

⁷⁵ Summary report from Jones to Prime Minister Bruce, 12 January 1925 (AA, A8911/1, Item 454/1).

to justify the "pragmatic" appraisal of Fascism's astonishing national "development."⁷⁶

T. R. Ashworth also advanced the idea that loyalists with a business background should guide the nation's polity. Accordingly, he disparaged those who neglected to endorse business' conduct, particularly in matters of industrial arbitration. When "two clergymen" and a prominent Melbourne-based educator submitted an article to the press in support of the international seamen's strike, Ashworth was infuriated. In his view, "soft-headed" clergymen indulging in "fatuous sentimentality" were best advised to keep their political opinions to themselves. Their propensity to make "misleading statements ... favouring the strikers" necessitated Ashworth's writings, to "correct the wrong impressions" circulated through such "mis-statements." A "want of intimate business knowledge," even among "sincere Labor men," he suggested, was pushing workers and the left in general to "provoke [class] antagonism by misrepresentation"; Ashworth cloaked his desire for increased elite control of the economy within an appeal for greater "objective" professional authority.⁷⁷

Similar word-play disguised the security services' psychological and professional imperatives, as reports of F. C. Urquhart demonstrate. Writing the Minister of State for Home and Territories in August 1921, in his capacity as Northern Territory Administrator, Urquhart described the policies and activities of alleged traitors within quotation marks and prefaced his own assertions with embellishments to make them appear objective and truthful. Urquhart was enraged by the militancy of unions in Darwin, particularly the dock-workers led by H. G. Nelson. Nelson, he averred, had wrested control of the Darwin jetty from the company leasing the port and established a tyrannous system of "Job Control," allocating jobs only to union men in preference to scab or rival workers. Incensed by Nelson's defence of his constituent's employment and wages, Urquhart referred to Nelson's policy of "Job Control" within quotation marks and recounted further anecdotes questioning Nelson's integrity. Job Control, he stated, amounted to corruption and anarchy. Two men were regularly given the work of four, and the union wrung "extortionate wages, overtime and absurd privileges" from Northern Agency, while a "system of loafing and going slow

⁷⁶ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 3.

on the jetty [baffling] description" ensued, disgracing "any men calling themselves 'workers.'"

Urquhart further described Job Control as a "system of tyranny," "terrorism" and "downright cruel persecution." Nelson allegedly disturbed public meetings, imposing the "practical denial of free speech" on Territory citizens. The union's paper, *The Northern Standard*, a "so-called" labour paper, comprised the "most scandalous and lying attacks upon the Federal Government, this Administration and individuals" and was "mendacious and scurrilous." Nelson also controlled the courts, a fact Urquhart emphasised with strategic quotation marks, claiming:

It is well understood that no Unionist (unless just at present he happens to be a taxpayer) will be convicted of any offence by a Darwin jury, while it is equally certain that on any trumped-up charge against any non-unionist a verdict of "guilty" will surely be returned.

Urquhart's contentions could not stand without semantic buttressing and he had to allege that perjury and corruption of juries was "common knowledge." He also claimed that he had been "reliably informed" that Nelson had forced dozens of union men opposing his leadership from employment. Urquhart's informants themselves were described as "most respectable married [men] with children" and "excellent character" and Urquhart adorned his tale of union despotism, relating incidents of "unionists [coming] by night to see [him] privately [asking] for [his] advice and assistance ... in visible terror all the time lest their visits ... should be known." Labour rule thus cloaked the land in darkness and fear, abolishing the rule of law and civilisation.⁷⁸

Other security forces boasting a monopolistic hold on "reliable" information included the foreign intelligence division, which asserted in 1925 that it had received "reliable and confidential information" pointing to the circulation, by "Marist missionaries," of "dangerous and extensive German and anti-British propaganda" in New Guinea. In

⁷⁷ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 30, 3 and 47.

⁷⁸ Report from Office of Northern Territory Administrator to Minister of State for Home and Territories, 4 August 1921 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

1928, the CIB spoke of holding "very reliable information from a delicate source" exposing a communist scheme to siphon funds from Moscow to Australia. The Branch's "delicate source" apparently "intimated" that the Australian communist Esmonde Higgins was "in communication with a person well connected in Communist circles in England," who had, on Higgins' behalf, approached "Harry Pollitt (a notorious and influential British Communist) to use his influence with Moscow and have Higgins called to Russia."⁷⁹

Another shared relationship of Australian and American anti-communism was the conception of the fight against communism as a "natural" struggle. The *Argus*, for example, prated about the unnatural qualities of communism. On 6 February 1926, it stated that the Soviet's regulation of its citizens' sexual conduct had "struck a snag - human nature." The Soviet had apparently prepared a "marriage law" that had "gone through all its preliminary stages in subordinate committees, and had come up to Parliament [sic] for final and unanimous approval." There, however, it foundered, encountering "the hostility of the married peasant women representatives." These women repudiated loose marriage regulations, which accorded all forms of cohabitation equal legal status, and denounced the state's encouragement of divorce, claiming that this had weakened the position of women, destroyed families and littered the countryside with vagrant children and deserted or divorced wives. The *Argus* found the incident "a most interesting revelation" and treated it as an opportunity for anti-intellectual, anti-feminist, anti-progressive, racist diatribe, establishing the correctness of its *weltanschauung* and the perils of communism. "Human nature," it declaimed:

asserts itself amid all the sophism of rationalist or doctrinaire teachers. The non-rational factor in life, as in Nature, is stronger than all the reasoning of those who would guide themselves by reason alone. In fact, mere reasoning is futile against the great, solid facts upon which the centuries stand ... This sexual anarchy is the greatest of all the sins from the viewpoint of mere humanity. Cruelty to animals, perhaps, comes next; but this handing over of women and children into a kind of hell of cruelty and lust is the one "unforgivable" sin so far as the human race is

⁷⁹ Intelligence Notes, 11 September 1925, sub-report No. 33 and CIB memorandum to Attorney-

concerned ... a woman who teaches or spreads latitude in these dangers of sex is the most calculous and selfish of her kind. Doctrinaires fancy themselves clever and superior, but they are merely decadents and half-breeds, making a mess of our culture, our civilisation, and our morality ... the disease of self-opinion and opposition in the semi-educated has produced more cruelty than all the despotism of the tyrants. The men and women who think they can live by a formula are the very ones who breed anarchy. They have a vision of pure rationalism of heaven. but it turns out to be the cruelty and turmoil of hell. But not in Russia only are things Russian being taught and done.⁸⁰

Eric Campbell's attempts to demonstrate the injustice of taxation, democracy and the welfare state were even more prosaic. In one of his "Slashing Broadcasts" on Sydney radio, Campbell outlined the "naked truth" of Australia's system of government. Democracy could not be relied on "to win the country back to individualism as opposed to collectivism." With bureaucracy "stacked full of Bolsheviks, Socialistic interference" with government was total. Loyal citizens could not afford to be distracted by the "catch-cry set up by Socialists," pitting labour against capital. Rather, "all classes of producers" had to unite "against the utterly disproportionate number of non-producers who merely [fed] on the first fruits of industry." Like *Straight Shooter*, Campbell recounted a fable of modern urban life in Sydney, to illustrate his point, asking listeners to imagine:

If you were to see a man in Martin Place staggering under a load obviously too heavy for him, and another man manacled with heavy chains to impede his progress what would you as a person of common sense do if you wished to help them? Of course you would lighten the load of the one, and remove the chains of the other. And so it is with industry. It is no good begging the question or paltering with the problem. Industry can never recover while it carries on its back the weight of the expense of social services, or it is manacled by the chains of Socialistic interference.⁸¹

General regarding Russian funds for CPA, 24 August 1928, Ibid.

⁸⁰ NLA, MS 1009, Item Series 27, Folder 5. Much of the information used by the *Argus* derived from the correspondent of the *Times*.

Campbell's fable also required the support of manipulative phrases: his views derived from "facts" and "definite, irrefutable evidence." But in seeking to account for the lamentable state of affairs estranging him from power, Campbell blamed:

idle, pleasure-loving, fear-ridden people, who compose the majority of Australians at the present time, and the Governmental institutions which are the necessary reflection of the low state of the morality of the people.⁸²

Campbell's denunciation of the aberrant parts of the Self was a logical *cul de sac* for his paranoia. Such vindictive rhetoric was the final destination of much anti-communism and their shared discourse reflected this. Citizens were repeatedly derided for their lack of "knowledge" and for taking direct action in their own interests, which made them "impatient" and "agitators." T. R. Ashworth declared Australian unionists' "brains [had] been stupefied by the poison-of-hate propaganda," which made them "welcome ... parasites as friends." Like Campbell, he argued that improved wages and conditions for seamen had eroded their morality, while exorbitant "wages, accommodation, victuals, sick pay and holiday" payments had impoverished ship-owners and operators. And he attributed the problem of economic dysfunction to the "many wage-earners susceptible to the hate poison of the Communists."⁸³

Anti-communist censure of aberrant Selves differed little from that of the Other, leaving them in the same moral and political position. Both were subjected to character assassination and separated from the Self, as venal cowards deserving of their low, debased condition. The NG equated the people of Russia with gullible sheep and official organisations' appraisal of Russians were comparable. A British External Affairs Department analysis of living standards in Russia in September 1925 found that the people of Russia, eighty percent of whom were based in the countryside and living at subsistence level, "more easily tolerated a Communist regime than the more civilised rural population of other countries," as their "standard

⁸¹ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 6.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 25 – 8 and 53.

of life" had "merely sunk a little lower."⁸⁴ Identical opinions were prevalent among elites in the United States; Herbert Hoover speculated that the rise of communism would more drastically harm the peasant population of Hungary than Russia, on account of their superior education and morality. International official opinion, then, was hardly more sophisticated or enlightened than that of the *Argus*, which at the climax of the Great War censured Russian peasants as:

parasites of the days of peace ... flabby in the time of trial [and running] from the battlefield when he hears that someone is stealing his land.⁸⁵

The essential purpose of anti-communist semantics and constructed fantasies was to justify the authoritarian measures they hoped to institute; the constant and desperate character of their rhetoric points to the persistent unease they felt, for they could not conquer fear of the Other. It also expressed the political disenchantment of the Australian right which had mutated into profound misanthropy centering on Others. Depressed and shocked by prolonged "economic uncertainty, class conflict, modernity and war," and their perceived loss of control of the Self, anti-communists seethed with rage and resentment. Projecting their sense of diminished hope, they relentlessly sought scapegoats on whom they could blame their ills.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ External Affairs Department report, 23 September 1925 (AA, A981/4, Item Com 1, Part 1).

⁸⁵ *Argus*, 3 August 1918.

⁸⁶ Peter Cochrane, "'How Are the Egyptians Behaving?': Herbert Brookes, British-Australian," *Australian Historical Studies*, p. 312. Cochrane describes this resentment of Australia's liberal (and not so liberal) as a violated sense of national "stewardship." Dismay with the failure of New Liberalism and the rise of political labour before the Great War was only sharpened by post-war events.

The Unconquerable Fear of the Other

Intense fear was the primary stimulus for forming kinship groups. However, group members found that restrictive societies did not quell their fears. Embroiling oneself in the peculiar psychological atmosphere of kinship groups brought associated costs; the bonds of mutual reliance kinship groups placed on members actually *increased* the importance of communal trust and, therefore, stress from fear of betrayal. By fraternising with others in the paranoid position, kinship group affiliates reinforced and amplified one another's neuroses. Frequently, the effect of kinship group membership was the destruction of the Self's commitment to its own professed *mores*, for while kinship groups boasted of their internal democracy and cohesion, their behaviour was generally negative and non-constructive, meting out repression rather than bettering the Self.

Kinship groups produced feelings of heightened anxiety and self-persecution, a fact suggested by the comparatively extreme paranoia of professional communist watchers. Australian kinship groups suffered as much as their American brethren, as the rhetoric of the CIB demonstrates. In the early 1930s, community apprehension surrounding alleged attempts by communists to infiltrate educational institutions erupted. On 3 October 1933, the *Sydney Morning Herald* informed shocked readers that a number of children aged between eleven and fifteen had read speeches during an anti-war rally, denouncing the British Empire, "the capitalistic system" and the "defence measures of the Federal Government." The speeches, which highlighted the government's failure to help veterans find unemployment, or pay their medical insurance, had been "obviously prepared by their superiors." This assessment was accepted by the Loyal Order of Covenanters, which petitioned federal Attorney-General John Latham to prosecute hall owners leasing their facilities to such traitors.⁸⁷ The CIB, however, concluded that the affair was far more serious and argued that:

The nature and manner of the delivery of these youthful speeches showed that the speakers were not reciting memorised sentences, but were in fact expressing

⁸⁷ Letter from Loyal Order of Covenanters to Attorney-General John Latham, 4 October 1933, regarding article in *Sydney Morning Herald* titled "ANTI-WAR - Schoolboys' Speeches - COMMUNIST OATH" (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/1588).

opinions with a natural ability which showed schooling in such matters from the earliest years of understanding.

One youth from Queensland had apparently:

delivered his speech with excellent ability and command of language, and provided a striking example of the unrestricted teachings of the Young Communist League and Communism over past years now bearing fruit in the rising generation.⁸⁸

The CIB maintained that the rally demonstrated rampant subversion of the public education system and that the rally was not an anti-war demonstration but a communist propaganda stunt; one of the Branch's "experienced observers assessed the gathering as being fully eighty percent Communist." The remaining twenty percent of the audience allegedly comprised "that element which blindly believed the conference possessed a purely and simply altruistic motive."⁸⁹ While both the media and the intelligence community were distressed by an assembly of several hundred people gathering for a suspicious cause and portrayed protagonists in an unflattering and treasonous light, only the CIB, with the stronger investment in anti-communism, concluded that the event had represented the rise of powerful communist brainwashing techniques, as opposed to adroit political opportunism.⁹⁰

A paranoid sense of persecution further induced dedicated anti-communists to monitor the most far-flung corners of the globe, from where they anticipated imminent attack. Accordingly, the CIB compiled lists of dangerous Bolsheviks in the Far East, received from British authorities in Singapore. Approximately one hundred activists were catalogued. For the most part they resided in Vladivostok, Japan or China and were Slavic and Asian, although several German, Dutch, Italian and

⁸⁸ CIB Memorandum for Secretary to the Attorney-General, 24 October 1933 (AA, A432/86, Item 1933/1588).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ This incident is merely one that illustrates how kinship group paranoia was frequently greater than that of broader society. Military Intelligence frequently demonstrated judgment as warped as that of the CIB, advising acting Prime Minister Watt in 1919 for example that a "violent section" of striking seamen were "nearly all armed [with] a supply of bombs from jam tins in reserve." Not surprisingly, Watt chose not to act on the report, which he described "superficial and almost valueless." See Hall, *Secret State*, p. 17.

English names appeared; among their number was Kirby Page, so despised by American anti-communists.⁹¹ It is difficult to imagine what *practical* importance such information held for Australian authorities. While it is understandable that they anticipated the need to guard against the activities of some activists, particularly in the wake of the Great War, the Branch's preservation of intelligence that soon proved useless reveals the degree of paranoid fear that resided within the organisation.⁹²

Other government kinship groups evinced an over-developed sense of persecution. The Navy, too, wrestled with fear of subversion that was exaggerated by liasing with the CIB. In 1924, the CIB warned the Navy that local Russian communists might target Navy personnel for ideological conversion and attempt to sabotage vessels.⁹³ Still mistrustful of Russian *émigrés*, the Branch reckoned that the Australian Navy was so powerful an institution as to demand communist attention. Four years later, a "Report on Communism in Australia," submitted to the Director of NI by the Naval Chief of Staff, concluded that communism represented a grave threat to Naval forces. Significant danger lay in ports, where Navy personnel could fall under the influence of members of the Marine Transport Workers Club or the Federated Seamen's Union, both under radical control. The MTW Club had apparently been formed by a man named "Brodski," a "naturalised Australian citizen of Russian birth ... probably of Semitic origin," and Harry Glover, "an Australian-born ex-fireman." Flourishing under the support of the "Militant Minority Movement" and open to the general public, the Club had an "abundant" supply of "literature of a radical nature" and could "commit itself to financial obligations of ... magnitude." The Seamen's Union, although divided into extremist and moderate factions, was "virtually" controlled by the "Sydney extremist Branch" and had a "proved ability to enlist in most cases the support of practically all waterfront industrial bodies."⁹⁴

The security forces' fear of these two associations was directly attributable to the poor quality of their intelligence, which was so unburdened by empirical data as to *demand*

⁹¹ CIB Intelligence Circular, 30 August 1919, extracted from information current to 30 November 1918 (AA, B741/3, Item V/180).

⁹² The retention of data about Page, who was most unlikely ever to threaten Australian loyalist interests, is particularly indicative of the role fear played in the Branch.

⁹³ Confidential orders from H. Jones to Inspector Mackiehan, Brisbane, 9 April 1924 (AA, B741/3, Item V/386).

⁹⁴ NI, "Report on Communism," 24 July 1928, pp. 2 – 9.

the free exercise of imagination to extract some value from them. Naval Intelligence, relying heavily on the "research" of the CIB, was uncertain of the most basic details of what it observed. It could not even give the man "Brodski" a Christian name. He was thought to have been born in Odessa, taking Australian citizenship in 1908, and to have served with the AIF before deserting in Egypt. From 1923 to 1925, he apparently lived in Hamburg for six months and in Moscow for eighteen months, where he "probably" became "familiar" with "the leaders of the U. S. S. R." This "Brodski" was likely Bob Brodney, born Arthur Tennyson Brodzky, in 1896, in Melbourne. Brodney had lived in San Francisco, New York and London before returning to Australia in 1918. The following year he became an organiser for the Australian Socialist Party. Active in the formation of what would become the CPA, he had, by 1925, fallen out with the Party.⁹⁵

Having made activists like "Brodski" appear fearsome,⁹⁶ NI strove to underplay the strength of the MTW Club and the non-revolutionary character of the Seamen's Union. While the CPA's withdrawal of support for the Club was acknowledged, NI opined that that "withdrawal" was "considered to be only temporary." The Union, meanwhile, which, it will be remembered, had the "proved ability to enlist in most case the support of practically all waterfront industrial bodies," had somehow failed to gain the support of the Marine Cooks in a recent strike. Intelligence concluded that this failure was isolated, "due to the fact that unemployment was rife at the time through general trade depression," making the precipitation of "general strike" inopportune.⁹⁷

Within the Navy itself, NI believed that sixty-three "avowed Communists" were career seamen, while another eighty-four personnel were "probationary members" of the CPA. Naval authorities were not concerned that communists were injecting members into the force "in any organised attempt to bring about disaffection." Having "no definite evidence" of this they believed that "the majority were already Communists prior to their entry in the Navy." Nonetheless, the claim that precisely

⁹⁵ Ibid and Macintyre, *The Reds*, pp. 13 and 113.

⁹⁶ "Report on Communism in Australia," 24 July 1928, pp. 2 - 9. Brodski was described as a man of "forceful character [with] untiring energy," he realised "the value of publicity, utilising it successfully wherever possible."

⁹⁷ Ibid.

one hundred and forty-seven communists were serving with the Navy, at a time when the CPA, nationally, could boast only three hundred members, was absurd.⁹⁸ NI insisted, nonetheless, that its information was:

not the result of hearsay on a single occasion and [could] be regarded as authentic.⁹⁹

Awkwardly projecting fear, it claimed:

The R. A. N. is very much before the mind of the Communist Party, which looks upon the Navy as the strongest Imperial, and consequently anti-Communitic, force. The fact that a certain percentage of ratings serving in the R. A. N. are R. N. personnel is regarded by the Communist Party as a deliberate contrivance on the part of the Imperial Government to ensure a steadying effect on the more democratic members of the service.¹⁰⁰

NI argued that the Navy could not afford to relax internal surveillance of the rank and file and protested the weakening of the Naval kinship group's rituals, which jeopardised the organisation's integrity. This was how the recent substitution of a "system of direct entry recruits" for a youth apprenticeship scheme was interpreted. Communists had met this "abandonment of Boys' Training" with "much secret acclaim," realising:

the futility of infecting with Communistic ideas anyone who from boyhood has been brought up in an environment free of class-consciousness and industrial discord, and who, from early beginnings, has had instilled in him the traditions of the Naval Service.¹⁰¹

Now it was "reasonable to expect," that the "revival system of adult or near-adult entry" would give the Party "further opportunity to plant moles in the Writer and

⁹⁸ Macintyre estimates that circa December 1928, the CPA had a total of three hundred card-carrying members. Macintyre, *The Reds*, p. 150.

⁹⁹ NI, "Report on Communism," 24 July 1928, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Signal Branches of the Service, giving them unprecedented access to classified information.¹⁰²

Mired in the paranoid position, NI concluded, contradictorily, that the supreme importance of the Navy made it an essential target for communists, while doubting the Navy's capacity to serve as the Self's vanguard. Communists allegedly regarded infiltration of the Navy as more urgent than subversion of the Army and Air Force, as they were "insufficiently developed to be taken seriously." The permanent regular divisions of the Army were "too small to be of much consequence" and because the Army relied so heavily on citizen auxiliaries, "constituted without distinction of class," they contained "a large number, if not a majority, of trades unionists ... susceptible to Communistic or extreme radical influence." Baldly stated, the Army comprised "the very persons likely to cause industrial upheaval." Naval Intelligence's opinion of the Navy was matched by its regard for the importance of Britain and, by extension, Australia, to the Soviet Union. It claimed that the Comintern concentrated the bulk of its global propaganda on "Great Britain and the Dominions" and, moreover, that the Soviets' greatest fear was of a British-Germanic anti-Russian alliance. The United States was thus reckoned to concern the Soviets less than Australia, Canada, South Africa or New Zealand. This general esteem for the Navy and the Empire in part derived from NI's paranoid identification of itself as the centre of the communist Other's aggression. This fear, along with the troubling recognition that communists were probably justified in assuming that Naval servicemen "would refuse to take part in any offensive action against militant civilians," served to undermine NI's confidence and sense of security.¹⁰³ Undoubtedly the Navy's new recruiting policy helped to confirm this attitude among communists.

Another broad conviction prevalent among kinship groups was the belief that the Other would make Australia suffer for its goodness. This fear, too, was related to the paranoid identification of the Self at the epicentre of the Other's designs. Australia's virtue and nobility was regarded as being so great that Others would inevitably seek to live there. The CIB, for example, was certain that Leon Trotsky was anxious to emigrate to Australia. Although Trotsky had made no official emigration request, he

¹⁰² Ibid.

was expected to do so, as he had already twice sought permission to enter the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁴ The Other also took advantage of Australia's goodness in its protectorate, New Guinea, where the CIB collected disturbing "evidence to show that the easy-going ways of many officials" in the province were "having a distinctly bad effect on the natives." A Branch informant explained:

the natives who have been allowed to become familiar with whites very quickly become impertinent. This has been pointed out by various people in and from New Guinea, and by at least one letter in the press.¹⁰⁵

Further, "the natives" were "coming under the influence of something akin to communism." "Reliable information" suggested that "the natives who [served] on the boats engaged on the island trade [had] already been influenced by white seamen to make demands in the most approved communist manner." While there had been, "up to the present...no evidence of direct communist propaganda," it was "very clear that any laxity of discipline or undue familiarity [was] paving the way for communist propaganda [to] set foot in the Islands." These circumstances had arisen because:

the natives, having been used to strict discipline under the Germans, mistake undue leniency and mistake kindness for weakness.¹⁰⁶

In effect, the independent behaviour of supposedly racially-inferior peoples so threatened paranoid Australians' psychic security that communists and Germans became scapegoats for the Other's imagined ingratitude to the Self.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 6 - 7 and 5.

¹⁰⁴ CIB circular c. February 1931 (AA, A369, D585).

¹⁰⁵ Intelligence Notes, 11 September 1925.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Other scapegoats of paranoid Australians, decried for their ingratitude, included colonised peoples rebelling against imperial control. Herbert Brookes, for example, castigated "the Egyptians" in 1932 for "striking at the friend that rescued them from chaos and lifted them onto a plane of undreamed material well-being." Interestingly, Elizabeth Dilling also argued that "the happiest event" to have "befallen Egypt" was "British 'imperialism' and 'capitalism,'" which had brought civilisation to the "sore-eyed fellaheens" who dwelt by the Nile "in mud huts" like those "pictured on the walls of King Tut's tomb." See Cochrane, "How Are the Egyptians Behaving?", p. 304 and Dilling, *Red Network*, pp. 94 - 5.

One of the ironies of Australian anti-communists' paranoid fear is that their fantasies of self-persecution and subversion were so pedestrian as to accurately, if unwittingly, reflect the relative global insignificance of Australia. They also reflected the unconscious recognition of how unlikely revolution was. Consequently, responses to the threat of the Other could manifest a remarkable lack of urgency. Irrespective of perilous circumstance, anti-communists found the need to follow procedure and preserve authority paramount, as in January 1924, when CIB headquarters in Melbourne received a "very urgent" telegram (already five days old) from the Sydney office, warning that Clarence Wilbur Baker, a dangerous radical, was sailing from Sydney to Melbourne, in disguise as a "pantryman with credentials from [the communist activist Rubin] Herscovice [en route] to Moscow." Incredibly, the office expressed regret that their telegram had:

probably caused some inconvenience in arriving probably during the afternoon of a Saturday, yet the matter was so important as to render its communication by telegram imperative.¹⁰⁸

The officer cannot have comprehended how paltry he had made the fear of communism appear.

The temperate character of Australian anti-communists' anxiety in some degree reflected their relatively modest sense of self-empowerment and exclusive legitimacy. Suffering paralysis of ambition and firmly ensconced within an Imperial structure that necessarily relegated their prestige, Australian anti-communists' confidence never matched that of their American *confreres*. It is difficult to believe that the subordinate position of Australian intelligence forces did not diminish their enterprise and confidence. In spite of British authorities' assurances to the contrary, the flow of intelligence from Britain to Australia was not entirely reciprocal and this likely influenced the CIB, which was remiss in sending information to NSY; it took the rebuke of Australia's High Commissioner in London to coax Harold Jones into making regular reports to the Yard. The discharge of information from England, moreover, could be so agonisingly slow as to seem tardy. One missive from London

concerning links between British and Australian radicals, although sent in August 1928, related to an earlier exchange of information awaiting consideration since March 1926. Moreover, this same communiqué suggested the low esteem in which British authorities held their Australian counterparts, for Richard Casey reported that he had been asked to remind the Branch that enclosed intelligence should "be treated as very secret."¹⁰⁹ It was almost as if Scotland Yard thought their colonial brothers could not be relied upon to observe even the most basic procedures of security work.

Australian kinship groups, like their American counterparts, persuaded themselves that they could purge Australia of Others without compromising the integrity of the nation's governmental and social traditions. To this end, they developed a language to euphemise and affirm the legitimacy of purging activity. This language described the treachery of Others while ignoring the morality of kinship group conduct. CIB reports submitted to John Latham during his first term as Attorney-General, for example, suggested that various branches of the ALP needed to be cleansed of gangsters, racketeers and aliens who hid behind its skirts. The 1928 reports argue that the New South Wales Executive of the Party organised gangs in municipal elections to impersonate voters, paying unemployed wharf labourers two shillings a head to vote under false pretences. In addition, the reports averred that men attached to the Executive ran rackets with "Jew money-lenders," advancing "money on people's furniture" and confiscating and selling that furniture if payments were not received.¹¹⁰

Proposed purges were frequently trivial and uniformly mean-spirited. While in opposition in the early 1930s, John Latham attempted to whip up public fury against the federal Government for failing to ban the publication and distribution of leaflets urging Australians not to fight Chinese communists and to oppose Western interference in China. Propaganda of the "Hands Off the Chinese Soviets" movement was "being circulated in many quarters." Contending that the issue of Chinese nationalism had "nothing to do with any question that [exercised] the minds of the

¹⁰⁸ Telegram from Sydney CIB to Melbourne Headquarters, 2 January 1924, originally wired 29 December 1923 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154, Part 1).

¹⁰⁹ Reports from Office of the High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia, London, Report No. 919, 23 August 1928 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

¹¹⁰ CIB Report c.1928, "Who's Who of the 'Cleaners Up' of the Willis Executive of the ALP." It was claimed that "on several occasions" beds had even been "sold from under sick women" (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

people of Australia generally," Latham denounced pro-nationalist material as "remarkable propaganda" and argued that such "propaganda" was "directed towards incitement to violence." Latham's demand was not only hypocritical - he of all people knew the legal and practical impossibility of such a task - but unnecessary. For, as his government opponents noted, the prohibition of material urging Australians not to fight a war in China was pointless; widespread outrage about the shabby treatment of Australia's Great War veterans made the prospect of floods of volunteers signing up for duty in Asia unlikely.¹¹¹ Moreover, Australians' racial antipathy, so keenly endorsed by Latham, made such a response impossible.

While the kinship groups could not always furnish substantive details about the causes and effects of the ruin wrought by the Other, they were always certain that the Other was a palpable, noxious presence in the community. And although they were seldom able to positively identify those in league with the Other, they never lost the conviction that indiscriminate, summary measures were necessary and would see justice done. Such faith enabled the Fremantle City Council in June 1919 to cable Acting-Prime Minister Watt to urge him to deport "disloyal and alien elements ... to suppress disloyalty and lawlessness." The Council's justification for such action lay in the manifestation of "the IWW and Bolshevism" in "recent industrial disputes in Brisbane and Fremantle" and other, unnamed locations, "elsewhere in Australia." ¹¹⁰ the Council couldn't name specific incidents and areas where radicalism had caused havoc, they were certain that it was "elsewhere" from themselves and that two concrete cases of industrial turmoil pointed to revolution.¹¹²

The kinship groups' impulse to purge the Self invariably led anti-communists toward anti-democracy. It was the purging impulse that led the Melbourne-based Council of Combined Empire Societies to petition the federal government in September 1933 to suspend the juridical and civic rights of certain citizens. While the Council appreciated the difficulties the government would encounter in taking steps "which might tend to restrict freedom of speech," it nevertheless felt that the immediate passage of "legislation making it compulsory for all printers and publishers to print

¹¹¹ Excerpt from Hansard, dated 29 October 1931 (AA, A1606/1, B5 Part 1).

¹¹² Letter from Fremantle City Council to Acting-Prime Minister Watt, 4 April 1919 (AA, A456/3, Item W26/241/51).

their names and address upon all propagandist literature of whatever nature" was essential; the circulation, "throughout the Commonwealth," of "vast quantities of unsigned Communistic literature" warranted the removal of legal protection for disloyal citizens who aided the Other.¹¹³ Without thinking about what such abrogation of political custom would mean for the Self, the Council sought to construct a list of the unworthy, to be subject to retribution; the Self, it seemed, could only be purified by a purge.

The carelessness and ease of the Council's abandonment of democratic principles was common. Indeed the very act of forming kinship groups repudiated Australia's system of government, and kinship groups could only continue to function so long as they denied their illegal character and the broader implications of their activity. They inflicted great harms on democratic society that were attributed to the communist Other and they arguably made the greatest contribution to the corruption and destruction of the public's sense of mutual trust and community. The kinship groups' *raison d'être* was to divide society into two antithetical parts, to acknowledge and make formal a partition in society which was already "self-evident." For paranoid anti-communists, their kinship groups merely made the battle between the Self and the Other overt; they were flushing the Other from cover and aiding the Self's preparation for battle through initiative. The great paradox of the kinship groups was, however, that while they amplified and were imprisoned by extraordinary levels of public mistrust, they fervently hoped that the righteous elements of the Self, who were not found exclusively in the kinship group, *could* be mobilised and would prove reliable.

The kinship groups' disavowal of the rule of law was fundamental and extensive. Fear of communism could even justify the abrogation of cardinal tenets of capitalist society, such as commercial confidentiality and the sanctity of contract.¹¹⁴ Nor were

¹¹³ Letter from CCES Secretary, Dorothy P. Penberthy to Prime Minister Lyons, 21 September 1933 (AA, A467, Bundle 93/SF 42/8).

¹¹⁴ Federal authorities, it will be recalled, successfully deprived the CPA of funds legally transferred through British banks and inveigled the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia to peruse the Bank's records for evidence of Russian funding. Harold Jones, moreover, had not been satisfied to be granted such authority intermittently; he sought nothing short of the power of permanent and unlimited access to the records of banks and other financial institutions. This is discussed in the first Australian chapter.

kinship groups troubled by the institutionalisation of clandestine surveillance and character assassination, which masqueraded as intelligence, thus failing to appreciate their role in "Sovietising" Australian society. This was how official and private kinship groups gathered the information which gave their paranoid thought the "evidence" it required. Such information was seldom analysed and was, more often than not, utterly without substance. Numerous case files indicate the degree to which the CIB, for example, was compromised by its reliance on innuendo. On 10 March 1933, Harold Jones informed the Department of the Attorney-General that he had identified two members of a communist cell in the Melbourne Metropolitan Tramways. The suspects were James and Alfred Byham, the latter being an employee of the Tramways. Although neither man had previously come under the notice of authorities as "members or sympathisers of the Communist Party," Jones affirmed:

there is a very militant section in the Metropolitan Tramways, and one of the men may be connected with it.¹¹⁵

Jones' intelligence had been gleaned from a private citizen named Bennett. Bennett had written Jones on 19 November 1932 to inform him of the activities of "a nest of Communist Vipers whose headquarters [were] situated in Cedar St., [in the Melbourne suburb of] Caulfield." In that nest, Bennett claimed, there were:

at least two brothers ... named Byham, one a Tramway employee and the other out of work but looking well dressed and prosperous probably with the command of foreign money.¹¹⁶

According to Bennett, the men were carrying on "an active propaganda belittling everything British and annoying and bullying all loyalists and making their lives a burden." They "hatched up ... any old lie" to exacerbate social conflict and had convinced "the young and thoughtless to join them." Disturbingly, they had also corrupted young maidens.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Report from H. E. Jones to Secretary of Department of the Attorney-General, 10 March 1933 (AA, A467/1, Item Bundle 93/SF 42/55 32/1766).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

The investigation of the Byham brothers exposes with unusual clarity the magnitude of kinship groups' contribution to public paranoia and how greatly their psychological and professional survival depended on the Other. While the Branch ultimately may not have molested the Byham brothers, the fact that "intelligence" of such poor and dubious quality became the basis of extended investigations is significant. Further, it is remarkable that the prosecutorial mind of the kinship groups' leaders leapt into overdrive before any evidence of perfidy was collected, or a situation adequately examined. Prior to the Branch even verifying the existence of the Byham brothers, and Alfred's employment with the Tramways, Jones was speculating about the activities of a supposed "very militant section" in the organisation, whetting the appetite of his superiors for future inquiries and repressive action and demonstrating his Branch's defensive value.

Anyone who has read hundreds of intelligence files compiled by organisations such as the CIB, the Australian Protective League and the NG cannot help but be struck by their lack of critical commentary. The leaders of these kinship groups seemed so intent on uncovering perfidious Others that they seem rarely to have considered the quality of information they were receiving. Nor did they appear to analyse the motives or reasoning faculties of their informants and agents. There is no evidence to suggest that Harold Jones ever scrutinised his data or sources, or actively discouraged exaggeration and cruder forms of misinformation. He also failed to make appropriate allowance for the influence of fear, spite and other corrupting emotions within kinship groups and private citizens volunteering information. There is no sign in official records that he ever troubled to account for why a man like Bennett would denounce men like the Byhams. This negligence permitted and encouraged the continued erosion of community and civic values. The case of the Byham brothers suggests that as the Bolshevik revolution and the Great War receded into history, the kinship groups did little to adjust to the new world order. Australians could continue to impugn their fellow citizens with fatuous and fanciful claims as they had during the feverish period of war.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Bennett also opined that "the women" among their followers were "the most unscrupulous."

It is perhaps understandable that informing flourished during the war.¹¹⁸ Fear of treachery and conformist pressures of patriotism corrupted ethics and social solidarity at this time. In an atmosphere of mistrust, innuendo was rife and character assassination could attract official reward. Fifteen years later, the same social conditions were common. Whether or not informants merely sought to harm others for personal reasons, or sincerely believed that the objects of their hatred were agents of the Other, the fact that they found appreciative audiences indicates that anti-communist kinship groups succeeded in introducing Bolshevik-style disharmony into Australian society; under official and other elite forms of patronage, citizens were encouraged to regard one another as enemies and to use extra-legal measures to bring them harm. And rather than facing their fears openly, kinship groups hid in dark places, plotting furtively in the manner of Bolshevik conspirators. The Australian Protective League met clandestinely in the offices of the nation's elected leader and the LNS skulked in Melbourne's outer suburbs, drilling its men to combat revolution.¹¹⁹

The kinship groups' perpetuation of anti-democratic practices did not result from compulsive fear and resentment alone. Indeed, disavowal of democracy, liberalism and progressivism became an irrational administrative habit. The effects of this behaviour were particularly influential in the administration of censorship. Interpretation of censorship procedures had always been conservative and draconian, partly because their origins lay in the Great War, when the peculiar influence of then Prime Minister Hughes was strongly felt. Yet the cessation of hostilities and years of peace brought no change in the structure of censorship, or relaxation of its stringency. From the first, the Censor's Office was politically compromised by its links with conservative government and its exclusive class-biased recruitment policy. In addition, the act of repression became second nature to the Office, which regarded suppression rather than review of material as its primary function. With each passing

¹¹⁸ One incident of paranoid and spiteful war-time spying occurred within citizen's forces attached to the AIF, when a private in the 14th Army Services Corps informed MI that a Captain E. P. Jones, who had recently been appointed transport officer to the 54th Regiment of Citizens' Forces, had told him he was not interested in his office but was "after German gold." The private also intimated that Jones had received a pay-off the previous day and expected similar sums in future. See Report extrapolated from letter of 28 May 1918 (AA, B741/3, Item V/25).

¹¹⁹ Regarding the activities of the LNS see CIB Report from Inspector Roland Browne to Harold Jones, 7 March 1931 (AA, A369/1, Item D585).

year, the Office's role as a bulwark of cultural and political conservatism solidified. Censors took it upon themselves to "protect" the community and its more unreliable elements from the danger of intellectual freedom, notwithstanding the fact that they repeatedly acknowledged that much of the material they prohibited was inoffensive and harmless.

An incident typifying Censorial practice involved suppression of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace. In February 1918, the Censor's Office seized a letter from Rosa Manus, the Secretary of the ICWPP, who resided in Amsterdam, addressed to Eleanor Moore, the Secretary of the Sisterhood of International Peace, who lived in Melbourne. The letter discussed a proposal of the ICWPP to coordinate the international conferences of the ICWPP and the SIP later in the year, so that the two Congresses could frame a united policy and program platform. Although the activities of the two Congresses appeared innocuous, the Censor nevertheless confiscated their literature, explaining:

There is probably no great objection to the efforts of this Peace Body in the abstract, but it is probably wiser to prevent circulation of such literature at the present time, for which reason I am holding the circular.¹²⁰

Over five years later, when the Office was deliberating whether to ban a number of foreign-language labour papers, their rationale was identical, even though there was no question that the decision could be justified by the need for war-time solidarity and loyalty. The papers included an Italian gazette, *L'Edilizia* (The Builder), a Russian publication titled *Our Truth*, *Der Rote Bergarbeiter* (The Red Miner) from Germany and *L'Information Sociale* from France. *L'Edilizia*, an "organ of the Italian building trade," was regarded "purely [as] a labour paper and [was] not [considered] offensive." Similarly, *L'Information Sociale*, which discussed general "social problems" was judged "not exceptional." But *Our Truth* was described as being "decidedly Bolshevik," although it contained "no specifically violent items." *Der Rote Bergarbeiter* was also viewed as a "frankly propagandist 'Red' paper." While similar to another German labour paper, *Rotes Gewerkschafts, Der Bergarbeiter* was

¹²⁰ Censor's Report, 6 February 1918 (AA, B741/3 Item V/270).

regarded as more dangerous because it was more "outspoken and much stronger." The Censor conceded that he could find no "specific incitement to violence" in any of these various publications, yet he was inclined to "pass" only *L'Edilizia* and *L'Information Sociale*. The others were referred to the Comptroller-General of the Customs Department. While it was a foregone conclusion that the remaining papers would not pass a second administrative hurdle, the Censor had been forced to forward them because they offended "only against the spirit of the [laws]." He was not able to quote any "specific references" indicating a legal infraction, but this would not matter.¹²¹ The materials were buried by bureaucracy and were never retrieved. By 1934, the Censor's Office was still confiscating all but the most conservative political literature. Under the Customs and Crimes Acts, the Office removed from circulation a variety of anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi publications, some of which had been issued or subsidised by the Comintern, not because they were regarded as dangerous, but because the Censor wanted to preserve his administrative power. The literature was banned, even though it could do "little harm in the Commonwealth," because it fell "within the terms of prohibition."¹²²

There were some activities advocated by anti-communists, however, that even kinship groups could not justify on the grounds of administrative necessity. The most extreme repressive measures popular among anti-communists threatened to take the Self deep into the realm of the Other. As the violent suppression of disloyalty and coordinated propaganda campaigns were being advocated, anti-communists moved to assuage psychological misgivings aroused by this repudiation of democracy. Private kinship groups sought, in the wording of their constitutions and declarations, to resolve the ambiguity of giving loyalty to the King, which entailed supporting the democratic national Constitution, and overriding that Constitution to better protect the kinship group and good government. The NG was one group that hoped that a clear statement of its objectives would clarify and justify its political program. It also hoped that by setting down its cardinal aims in a single document, inherent contradictions of its program would dissolve or escape attention. The Guard's Recruitment Form affirmed that the organisation was "All for the British Empire" and would give "Unswerving

¹²¹ Memorandum from Sydney CIB to Collector of Customs, Sydney, 9 August 1923 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154 Part 1).

¹²² Censor's Office note, c. 1934 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 20/SF 7/4).

loyalty to the Throne." To give itself a populist edge and a feeling of self-empowerment, the Guard also swore to abolish "machine politics" and establish "sane and honourable representative Government throughout Australia," while upholding "the full liberty of the [individual] subject" and not depriving any citizens of their legal rights. Yet after it enshrined this populist and democratic sentiment, the Guard progressed to guarantee it would suppress:

Any disloyal and immoral elements in Government, industrial and social circles.

The question of how such suppression would not deprive individual citizens of their "full liberty" was not answered or, perhaps, considered.¹²³

The LNS also hoped dexterous word play would conceal the contrary nature of its ideals. The organisation claimed it had formed "for the purpose of assisting constitutional authority in the maintenance of law and order." It also affirmed its members would not be required "to carry out any action which [would] place [them] beyond the Civil law." Yet the League imagined these policies were compatible with whatever actions might become "necessary for the safeguarding of life and property." Regardless of the League's pledges, there were indications that its members had every intention of practicing their own brand of democracy within and without the organisation. Roman Catholics were strictly barred from membership, in part because they were believed to have been smuggling arms into Australia.¹²⁴

Australian kinship groups, like their American brethren, did more than deny the anti-democratic nature of their project. Under certain circumstances they unabashedly endorsed authoritarian undertakings, seemingly convinced that a questionable deed was made legitimate provided they performed it. The kinship groups were particularly keen to legitimate their propaganda. The Australian Protective League, for example, proposed establishing a propaganda service to revive the "war spirit" of 1915. Acting Prime Minister Watt imagined that the League could form a Writers Corps comprising "skilled men" of the press to write public education pamphlets, bringing the "facts" of

¹²³ Recruitment Form of the New Guard (NLA, MS 250, Folio 1).

the war and other matters, in "proper form," before "the Australian public." Watt also believed that the League should be aggressive on the street, holding public meetings, recruiting able speakers for duty on the Yarra Bank and in the Sydney Domain, striking at the enemy on its territory.¹²⁵ Harold Jones also had ambitious propaganda plans and petitioned successive governments to fund an official national counter-propaganda agency, which would draw support both from State and federal police forces and the private sector. Enthusiasm for propaganda spread beyond political and industrial elites; the executive committees of the Insurance Institute and the Actuarial Society of New South Wales also expressed a desire to form a propaganda service with the federal government.

Like the Bolsheviks, kinship groups were determined to utilise technology in the battle for the people's hearts and minds. Harold Jones noted the Bolsheviks' trailblazing use of cinema and the NG embraced the wireless to project Eric Campbell's "epochal" message.¹²⁶ With semantic skill, the Guard also sanitised the quality of its propaganda. Propaganda, *Liberty* stated, could be a force for great social construction and would not sully the loyalist cause. Events in both Italy and Russia had shown:

what a great aid propaganda [could] be to any Government which [had] to mould public opinion and to ask the people to place the welfare of the State above their own personal interests.¹²⁷

The example of Russia, "in particular," demonstrated that "Australians scarcely [knew] what propaganda [was]." Australia had not yet been, and would not be, in any way corrupted by government or loyalist propaganda and Australians could rest assured that their superior intelligence and moral fibre would lead them to respond to healthy propaganda appropriately, for:

¹²⁴ "Constitution" of the LNS, submitted by Inspector Roland Browne to the Attorney-General's Department, 31 July 1931 and CIB Report from Inspector Roland Browne to Harold Jones, 7 March 1931 (A369, Item D585). See also Hall, *The Secret State*, p. 21.

¹²⁵ Meeting Notes for API., 29 May 1918, file reference C 571/1/374 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

¹²⁶ *Ibid* and *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 14. Wireless manufacturers' advertisements in the Guard's paper emphasised the special capacity of their product to spread "right" thinking. The Castle Radio Company, which offered "Special Terms to New Guardsmen," urged readers of *Liberty* to "Listen-in to Test Cricket" and "to Eric Campbell"; both were "cementing the ties of Empire."

¹²⁷ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 4.

if the Soviet could convince so many Russians that a fallacious [five year] plan was right, then surely Australians [could] be led to support ... plan[s] that [were] actually sound.¹²⁸

The "plan" of the Guard was to give Australians a "common-sense education in political economy." Such "common-sense education" amounted to support for the political and economic status quo, which the Guard described as the natural and proper interdependence of all classes in the community. The Guard intended to "forcibly" show that disrupting the status quo, or resisting "just and proper obligations in a time of adversity [injure] the national welfare" and pushed the nation toward "ruin." The Guard would:

awaken their conscience; appeal to their self-respect and patriotism; [and] do all this intensely, persistently, by dignified psychological propaganda.¹²⁹

If it did this "with half of the Soviet's thoroughness ... many Australians [would] respond – certainly a sufficient number to bring the others into line."¹³⁰

T. R. Ashworth also believed that loyalist propaganda was ennobling. He imagined that he could accentuate propaganda's wholesomeness by giving it a less obnoxious-sounding name. Accordingly, he described beneficial propaganda as "education" and endowed it with a variety of pedagogical qualities. Ashworth's underlying motive was to conceal his projected need for hierarchy and order beneath the respectable cloak of "education." Yet he, like the Guard, believed enough people in the public could be redeemed to make propaganda worthwhile. He also maintained, unlike the Guard, that the Other could be reached and made virtuous. For even "the most extreme Communist," he wrote, "[was] not entirely devoid of reason." Ashworth attributed "much of [the communist's] unreason" to "sheer ignorance" and spoke of the need to:

bombard his mind with the sound propaganda of a civic educational organisation, and, resent and resist as he may at the start, in the end he will be influenced to

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

some extent. You may not make of him a normal citizen, but you can assist in developing whatever potentiality for useful service he may happen to possess. Instead of the trade union mind being moulded by the Communist, the Communist mind should be moulded by the trade unionist and others prepared to assist in the good work.¹³¹

Ashworth envisioned that a "civic educational organisation," constructed along the lines of the NCF, would supervise this "bombardment," but could not demonstrate how his propaganda scheme differed ethically or systemically from that of the Bolsheviks. He could only denounce the Others' propaganda and exalt his program of education at opposite ends of his text, sixty pages apart. He also argued that communists possessed a "secret power" to exploit the natural "variations in intensity" of people's "biases." The communist, he suggested, "inculcates class hatred by a continuous flow of propaganda and by class strife." There was, therefore, "a noteworthy parallel between the methods of the German authorities prior to the war and those of the [contemporary] Communist." Collapsing projected enemies into a conglomerate Other, Ashworth proceeded to attack the propaganda program of Imperial Germany. "The minds of the German people," he explained:

were deliberately moulded by the Government through the schools, press and army, with the avowed purpose of creating an intense German sentiment. Then a conflict was started and the feelings of people culminated in the Hymn of Hate. Similarly the Communists have their schools and propaganda.¹³²

Perhaps mindful that such a program was indistinct from his own, Ashworth differentiated them, by arguing that the Other relied more heavily on a greater weapon than propaganda; the general strike. "Conflict" produced by such strikes was the communists' "chief weapon." When communists "engineered a strike," he maintained, "bias [was] generated in the minds of" another collapsed enemy, "the great mass of trade unionists." Engineered strikes gave Jock Garden and "his 1000

¹³¹ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 21 - 2.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 15 - 16.

stalwarts," control of "400,000 Australian trade unionists," whom they had succeeded in making "passion's slaves."¹³³

The Australian Protective League also had ethical concerns about propaganda. While Archibald Strong was certain that the only way to "overcome" the "big wave of Bolshevism" was to organise a "counter wave" of similar proportions, the League believed that it would not have to resort to coercive methods to get their message across. Rather, it fancied it was possible to relate the "truth" to the public in such a way that would force even the Other to acknowledge it. The nation's enemies simply had to be "met in their own meetings and their misstatements refuted." A "campaign of ... persuasion, not abuse" would enjoy success, because one had, "of course ... to assume [that] the average citizen ... had been mislead [by] extremists." Like Ashworth, the League affirmed its ultimate faith in the political sense of "the people," but it did so conditionally, regarding those who did not agree with themselves as foolish, errant children who, while not "hard or disloyal," needed close shepherding.¹³⁴

John Latham and Robert Garran considered making even more serious changes to Australia's system of government. Guided by (what they imagined to be) American administrative procedures, they attempted to transfer control of deportation and proscription of unlawful associations exclusively to the federal government. These two men, both eminent jurists, sought to radically erode the powers of the judiciary in the Westminster system they so often claimed they prized. They also attempted to introduce authoritarian regulation of opinion by outlawing support for particular doctrines as opposed to organisations.

The efforts of anti-communists to revolutionise Australian political culture must be considered particularly remarkable when one considers how aware they were of the abject weakness of the forces they so feared. By ignoring and dismissing the voluminous "reliable information" indicating how unlikely revolution in Australia was, anti-communists revealed yet another significant dimension of their paranoid

¹³³ Ibid. This segment of Ashworth's work was also published in the *Age*, among other broadsheets, on 23 November 1925, under the headline "AMERICAN PROGRESS - Sound Trade Union Policy."

¹³⁴ Meeting Notes for APL, 29 May 1918, file reference C 571/1/374 (AA, B197/0, Item 1851/2/43).

fear. Government authorities were generally apprised of the consistently pitiful condition of the CPA. They possessed copies of the Party's membership records, gleaned from communists' own papers. These records, which included entire transcripts of the Party's annual national Conferences, portrayed a political movement struggling for survival. The 1928 Conference papers, for example, indicated that the total membership of the central Sydney branch had diminished by a third over the previous year; at the end of 1928 the branch had just eighty members, of whom only forty were "tolerably active." The Melbourne branch had only forty-eight enrolled members, all of whose membership dues were in arrears. The Western Australian branch was so starved of funds it could not even afford to send a delegate to the Conference. While it nominally had fourteen members, just four were dedicated. Only the Brisbane branch recorded annual growth, swelling from fourteen to forty-four affiliates. However, fifty percent of these members were unemployed and could not pay their dues. Yet these numbers do not reveal the full misery of the Party, for its capacity to undertake activities was failing. The Melbourne branch reported that police persecution had discouraged attendance at organised, street meetings for the unemployed and its Sunday evening meetings had been discontinued owing to a lack of speakers.¹³⁵

The CIB was equally aware of the condition of suspected communist allies and front operations. A 1932 report noted that the League Against Imperialism enjoyed the support of "very few local Communists" and that its literature was "prepared from abroad." Logically, this suggested that the League had failed to establish itself in the Australian labour movement. The CPA's subsidiaries were also failing to tread water, financially and politically. It had been hoped, for example, that the *Young Worker*, the official organ of the Young Communist League, would become a weekly publication. Yet in its first year of existence, the CIB reckoned that it published perhaps six editions. Its articles were supposed to be written by youth activists but were clearly drafted by adults, and its circulation was tiny. Cross-referencing also established that the bulk of the editing and printing of radical organisations was performed by a

¹³⁵ Transcript of Eighth Annual Conference of CPA (1928), sent by Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General and Prime Minister, 4 April 1929 (henceforward Transcript of CPA 8th Annual Conference, 1928) (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286).

handful of dedicated Party members. It was clear that the Party could barely keep a handful of in-house publications afloat.¹³⁶

In the face of this evidence, the kinship groups had to *work* at being frightened, extracting whatever fearsome information they could from their data. So it was noted that the Sydney branch of the Party, in spite of its decimation from 1927 to 1928, still retained the services of "over twenty active propagandists." Another 1932 CIB report suggested that while the total number of Party members in New South Wales could not have exceeded "about five hundred ... this total [did] not include the lukewarm type and [was] confined [only] to the definite adherents to the Communist principles."¹³⁷ This implied, of course, that any number of stragglers, who were basically invisible, but still dangerous, could be furthering the Party's cause. Anti-communists also interpreted data regarding the Party's dismal electoral results fearfully. T. R. Ashworth noted communism's singular electoral poverty but still warned Australians not to be complacent or mislead by such results. "It is all very well," he stated:

to the insignificant vote that the Communists poll [but] Bolshevism is indirectly poisonous in the political field [and] in the industrial field ... Bolshevism is all-powerful.¹³⁸

Yet even when economic dislocation was at its most severe in the early 1930s, the Party failed to impress voters. The CIB noted that in the New South Wales State election of 1930, E. C. Tripp, the communist who contested the seat of Parkes, polled just 381 votes. Across the State, a mere ten thousand votes were registered for the Party.¹³⁹ At this stage, especially, the Party never enjoyed even the modest electoral victories of socialists in the United States.

¹³⁶ Memorandum from Harold Jones to Attorney-General Latham, 8 January 1932 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF 10/15).

¹³⁷ Transcript of CPA 8th Annual Conference, 1928, sent by Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General and Prime Minister, 4 April 1929 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286) and CIB Document regarding CPA, office marking reads "Appendix B," c. early 1932, p. 5 (AA, A981/4, Item Bundle 28/SF 10/15).

¹³⁸ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," p. 19.

¹³⁹ CIB Memorandum regarding "Recent Events," c. February 1931 (AA, A369, Item D585).

Kinship groups generally failed to perceive how little troubled by communism they were. The Navy's response to investigations into the prevalence of communism in its organisation strikingly demonstrates this. While Navy chiefs conceded that they might found a special office to observe the political temper of the fleet, they believed such an office could be run effectively by just one man. The Admiralty was most concerned to ensure that political investigations were supervised by a central figure, rather than by vessel commanders, who perhaps could not be relied upon to police such matters with appropriate professionalism.¹⁴⁰ It is difficult to believe, then, that subversion of the fleet was regarded as remotely possible. If it were, the Navy would have taken more decisive steps to prevent such an occurrence.

Kinship groups' fear came chiefly from within. It was their activities and interpretation of information which inflamed their fear of revolution. The formation of the CEB, for example, likely did as much to inspire fear than dispel it. When Prime Minister Hughes wrote the Premier of Victoria in March 1917 to inform him of the creation of the Bureau, he made particular mention of its future role in investigating espionage and combating hostile, alien secret agents.¹⁴¹ Yet the appearance of "Foreign Secret Service agents" in Australia was essentially unknown and one must question how seriously the Premier might have taken the threat of foreign subversion without stimulus from Hughes.

It was almost impossible for anti-communists to accept that they had exterminated an Other. The spectre of the IWW, for example, remained haunting. CIB files from September 1925 indicate that although the Branch believed the IWW was "defunct in name, the members and sympathisers of [the] organisation [had] really continued its activities under other auspices." The Branch suspected that radicals who denounced

¹⁴⁰ Letter from RAN Admiralty (although the Minister for Information's signature is also recorded at the bottom of the document) to Directorate Naval of Intelligence, 9 October 1928 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF 42/64 286). The letter remarked that it was desirable to make "one naval officer, and one naval officer only, responsible for the actual investigation of cases of Communism in the Australian Navy; our experience has shown, in work of this character, the desirability of concentrating all such investigations into one channel, and of not allowing individual Commanding Officers to carry out independent enquiries." [sic]

¹⁴¹ Memorandum from Prime Minister Hughes to Victorian Premier, 8 March 1917 (VPRO, Series 1172, Item Unit 8).

the IWW were misleading authorities. Their need to detect Others convinced them that Jack Lang's denunciation of the Wobblies was also an act of deception.¹⁴²

The CIB's analysis of the intimacy of former Wobblies and communists was so dominated by overarching fear that the Branch didn't notice the great fluctuations of fortune experienced by the IWW. Verity Burgmann establishes that the Wobblies largely failed to perpetuate their beliefs and tactics in the labour movement and among political radicals. Contrary to intelligence assumptions, disenfranchised Wobblies did not gravitate to the CPA. The majority of Wobblies threw their support behind OBUism, in preference to communism. This was logical, for the Wobblies abjured political agitation in favour of direct industrial action and many found the doctrinaire atmosphere of the Communist Party, along with its singularly political focus, abhorrent. Many Wobblies actually worked to undermine the influence of the Party and the prominent Wobbly Charlie Reeve almost single-handedly destroyed the Adelaide branch of the CPA in 1923, when he persuaded most of the branch's militants to quit the Party.

But while the Wobblies experienced some triumphs countering the growth of the CPA, their commitment to OBUism diminished their influence. The OBU movement struggled to find broad post-war support in a time of rising living standards and was increasingly dominated by the conservative AWU, whose policies and anti-democratic, hierarchical structure brought it into direct conflict with the IWW.¹⁴³ When the ACTU won supreme representative power of the union movement in 1927, OBUism finally died.¹⁴⁴ Then depression finally killed off the Wobblies. The CPA, adopting Stalin's policy of hard-line opposition to reformism, succeeded in attracting a moderate number of Wobblies to its cause. Yet the Party did not succeed so much in recruiting the elements of the IWW, as outlast the organisation. Very few Wobblies

¹⁴² As Lang had "deliberately insulted the Commonwealth and acted in support of the Communist Party," there was no reason to believe he did not also support the IWW. Jock Garden was at least "more honest" about the association between Wobblies and communists, and the Branch could not be persuaded that "so many erstwhile IWW's" did not "work for ... the Party." See Intelligence Notes, 11 September 1925, section 29.

¹⁴³ Burgmann, *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism*, pp. 253 – 267. AWU policies that did not appeal to Wobblies included the endorsement of race-based employment barriers.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* The ACTU, which had not supported OBUism since 1921, was organised around traditional craft/skills-based unions. It did not embrace the unified, total-industry model of the Wobblies and was

ever joined the Party or remained members for long.¹⁴⁵ Ultimately, circumstance and macro-political trends extinguished the Wobbly's flame, a fact that could never be deduced from the archives of the CIB, which steadfastly maintained that IWWism was wreaking great and fresh havoc through the CPA.

The tendency of the CIB to regard the IWW as a living menace exemplifies the kinship group's inability to analyse the position of the Other. Analysis and Othering were mutually exclusive. John Latham's paranoid fear made him unable to accept the efficacy of his own Crimes Act. While he reported to NSY that the Act had "almost completely stopped revolutionary activities" and encouraged a spate of resignations from the Party and front organisations, Latham remained convinced that a number of those resignations were disingenuous and, moreover, that communists were boring from within the ALP with renewed vigour.¹⁴⁶ Harold Jones, similarly, could never accept a peace organisation at face value. It was Jones' belief that Soviet Russia controlled all peace groups and although he could furnish no evidence for this, he argued instead that Russia had "indirectly launch[ed] and foster[ed]" the movement. International pacifism was nothing other than a clever front which distracted Russia's enemies from its unprecedented military build-up with ostensibly high-minded, altruistic rhetoric. Pacifism, if unchecked, would "so thoroughly undermine ... the loyalty of the armed forces of the land...that in a time of emergency it [would become] an additional source of trouble to authority, instead of assistance."¹⁴⁷

Australian anti-communists' inability to conquer their fears was facilitated by their general conceit and lack of education. Unaccustomed to robust intellectual exercise, or to having to substantiate their *weltanschauung*, Australian anti-communists, like their American brethren, felt threatened by the superior intellectual learning of the Left. While they felt obliged to manufacture scholarly rhetoric to support their views,

only federated in its upper echelons, which encouraged unions under its charge to become bureaucratic and elitist.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. A list of known communists in New South Wales, compiled for the State's legislative assembly, in 1931, found that of 159 names, only three were former Wobblies.

¹⁴⁶ Correspondence Note between Attorney-General Latham and New Scotland Yard, uncertain date (Post Crimes Act 1926), document file number 169 (NLA, MS 1009, Folder 5).

¹⁴⁷ Report of Harold Jones to the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department, 11 July 1934 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF42/64 286). Jones advised his Attorney-General in July 1934 to be wary of the Victorian Council Against War, because "to anyone not well informed" it would appear to "earnestly" support "the international abolition of war and its accompanying horrors."

they manifestly lacked the skill to accomplish the task. Further, the pseudo-certainty and conservatism of kinship groups meant that anti-communists' more fatuous fantasies not only survived but flourished, when they might have perished in a different milieu. Consequently, anti-communist rhetoric was anti-intellectual but also incompetent. Paranoid anti-communists could not construct critiques of Others that did not collapse beneath their own inconsistencies. And even when they managed to articulate substantive criticism of communism, their uncomprehending, demonising, blurred interpretation of events led them to trivialise the carnage wrought by that particular Other.

Generally, Australian anti-communists expressed themselves poorly. Their deficient linguistic skills illustrate the desperate emotional quality of their crusade. A petition of the Council of Combined Empire Societies, sent to federal Senator A. J. MacLachlan in May 1934, exemplifies their communicative ineptitude. Concerned by the "menace of Communism," the petition protested:

the inaction of the Government despite its very definite promises during the last election to effectually [sic] deal with it. Under a new guise the Communists are drawing many people to their meetings, held as Anti-War lectures and in other ways they are preying upon the people.¹⁴⁸

Depending on untested, unverifiable assertions, the Council's petition almost tripped over itself in its eagerness to prove that its disparate contentions could be attributed to one cause.

Anti-communists' inability to command their native tongue hinted at more general incomprehension. This lack of comprehension particularly influenced their antipathy for migrants. At the close of the Great War, the authorities' obsessive mistrust of certain racial groups prompted them to compile an inventory of all alien Turkish males in the country. A subsequent report evolved into more than a census; it provided loyalists with an opportunity to clarify what made them superior to the Other. Its content, however, demonstrated little but rampant conceit and uninformed

¹⁴⁸ Letter of CCES to Senator A. J. MacLachlan, 4 May 1934 (AA, A467, Bundle 93/SF 42/8).

speculation. When constructing his list of "Turks," Harold Jones divided that community into seven categories. They included:

Mussulmans ... comprising all races believing in the Mohamedan [sic] religion ... Albanese ... some tribes ... Bedouins ... Arabs ... Kurds ... Turcamans [sic] and Turks ... also known as Osmanlys. [sic]

These disparate, misnamed ethnic and political groups were thought to belong to a single entity. Their loyalty to Australia was viewed through a "Turkish" prism, in spite of Jones' awareness that minority groups in the Ottoman Empire had suffered "great persecutions" and hated the Ottoman regime. Unlikely as they were to support the Ottomans, they were still regarded as "Turks." Yet Jones was certain that other peoples living in the Ottoman realm had the greatest love for Britain. Armenians, he wrote, had "always esteemed" Great Britain, the United States and Imperial Russia. The Syrians also esteemed Britain, the United States and France, as did "the Jews." So Jones identified ethnic groups about whom he knew next to nothing as security risks while imagining that his own culture was held in the highest regard by other communities whom he regarded as respectable.¹⁴⁹

Australian anti-communists' anti-Semitic prejudices also induced them to believe fantastic stories of collusion between Jews and communists. The CIB concluded in 1933 that a club formed by Russian and Polish Jews in Melbourne, named "Gezerd," was a front communist propaganda organisation. The Branch's suspicion was aroused by news that the assistant secretary and "other" members of Gezerd sat on the executive committee of the Friends of the Soviet Union. While the club had lain "dormant" from early 1932 until February 1933, it had been reactivated by Russia as a "counterpart of the Zionist movement" to drum up support for Russia, on account of the Soviet's determination to found a "Jewish province or Soviet State within Russia." The Branch reckoned that the Soviets had established a Jewish National region in Khabarovsk, Eastern Siberia, which would be called Biro-Bidjan and become an autonomous Jewish Republic. Gezerd's interest in the scheme was evident in its donation of fifty pounds toward the establishment of the autonomous state, and the

further donation of "a valuable microscope to the Biro-Bidjan hospital." The suspicious political bent of Gezerd was further confirmed, in April 1933, by its organisation of anti-Nazi meetings.¹⁵⁰ This investigation of Gezerd emphasises the importance of innuendo, trivia and cultural ignorance in anti-communist thought. The Branch's "not unfounded" suspicions of Gezerd's revolutionary intent rested on the monolith of "valuable" microscopes and fifty-pound donations. These things were unlikely to finance revolution. They simply helped justify the suspicion that naturally surrounded any society comprising foreign-born Jews that met to discuss Russian affairs and read Russian-language newspapers.¹⁵¹

Australian anti-communists' deficient knowledge of specific cultures was exacerbated by their simplistic grasp of history. Anti-communists contended that history demonstrated the historic mission of the Self to lead and shape global civilisation. A variety of historical experiences and sources were used to illustrate the truths of this contention. *Liberty and Progress* argued that compulsory unionism in ancient Rome so crushed individual initiative that it caused the fall of the Empire; the *p'ebbs*, accustomed to being provided for by the state, lost the will and capacity to defend themselves. The *Argus* similarly suggested that the Gracchan corn dole, instituted in 123 B. C., corrupted the people of Rome to the point of degenerate weakness.¹⁵² The NG also drew on the lessons of antiquity. However, *Liberty* attacked the idea of democratic government above that of the welfare state. It claimed that the experience of Athens revealed the debasing evil of democracy. In the fifth century B. C., the Athenians "for a brief moment [had been] perhaps the most civilised and free people in history," when "an extraordinary number of individuals who possessed in the highest degree the qualities we call original genius" dominated "public affairs." Yet, the reign of these men was undermined and finally destroyed by their fellow citizens, members of the Athenian "popular assembly"; extension of the franchise to "all freemen" and the growing power of the popular assembly "brought about the loss of Athenian liberty." The story of Athens thus showed that:

¹⁴⁹ Circular from Commonwealth Government, Request for list of all Turkish alien males in districts, 14 August 1918 and replying report from Harold Jones, 21 August 1918 (AA, Item B741/3, V/53).

¹⁵⁰ Notes on Communism No.'s 45 and 46, dated 30 April 1933 and 31 May 1933 respectively (AA, A467, Item Bundle 28/SF 10/15, Sub-Item 11).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* The fact that Melbourne Jewish community leaders' disapproval of the club was a matter for public record also did nothing to dissuade the CIB from cultivating its conspiracy theories.

¹⁵² *Liberty and Progress*, 25 January 1919 and *Argus*, 24 May 1920.

The greatest assurance of freedom for the people is not universal franchise, not the elevation of the proletariat, but intelligent leadership.¹⁵³

For the *Argus*, too, history was against democracy and radical revolution. In January 1919, the paper equated the mission and fate of the Spartacan slave rebellion with that of the socialist Spartacus League in Germany. It explained that when the gladiator, Spartacus, rose against Rome:

politicians, businessmen, and militarists were all alike dominated by ... Sinn Feinism ... all seeking their own personal advantage, unhampered by any regard for the constitution ... or the common good.¹⁵⁴

Like all rebels, "loud-voiced agitators and political adventurers," Spartacus found ready support "among the discontented masses," but soon found that he did not really lead his forces and that they were "leading him to his and their own destruction." This was also the experience of the Spartacus League and the Bolsheviks, who failed to comprehend that "freedom thrust upon a people is not understood" and induces senseless, anarchic "rage for abolition." People, the *Argus* implied, had to be gradually prepared for the perils of freedom and not violently assume them.¹⁵⁵

Imperviousness to anachronism enabled anti-communists to make novel assertions such as these. So urgent was their pursuit of immediate certainty that political phenomena were simplified to confirm the fundamental difference between the Other and the Self. This was how T. R. Ashworth interpreted the Russian revolution. Russia, he maintained, had been made singularly vulnerable to communism by its racial essence and cultural heritage, for "only in backward Russia did Communism gain a foothold and there only for a limited period." Russians, he added:

belong to the East rather than to the West. Bolshevism is largely a reaction of the Eastern mind, disposed to collectivism and inured to despotism, against the individualism of Western thought and life. It has been remarked that portraits of

¹⁵³ *Liberty*, 15 November 1932, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ *Argus*, 25 January 1919 and 18 January 1919.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Lenin indicate the Mongol type.

Ashworth further suggested that revolution in Russia was "natural and inevitable." Russia was ruled by despots because its people were "illiterate" and "incapable of self-government." Russians had been governed in this manner for centuries, despite earnest attempts by rulers such as Catherine the Great to prepare them for "complete political and economic liberty." The "prejudices of the nobles" and the "barbarism of the peasants ... had [always] stood in the way" of progress. This was still the case, as the Bolsheviks made "a stupendous effort to raise themselves to the cultural level of advanced countries."

Ashworth's desire to demonstrate the fundamental rightness of capitalism also prompted him, in the manner of American anti-communists, to overstate the Bolsheviks' recognition of Western wisdom. Supposedly recognising the folly of communism, the Bolsheviks had begun adopting Western economic policies. Ashworth, therefore, could afford to acknowledge the basic humanity of the Russian people and sympathise with:

the pathos of grown men with plastic minds seeking to remedy their educational deficiencies when given the opportunity to do so for the first time ... characteristic of the efforts of a the nation to jump from a backward to an advanced stage of civilised development at a single bound.¹⁵⁶

Anti-communists claimed the support of history to legitimate their political program. Yet their arguments about more contemporary matters also foundered for lack of cohesion because their intense emotional commitment to anti-communism prevented them from being able to concentrate on single strands of thought. It also obstructed their collection and analysis of theoretical evidence. But, most important, anti-communists could not resist the temptation to digress and prove "moral certainties."

Eric Campbell, for example, claimed that the New South Wales Government confiscated the produce of private businesses through taxes levied on flour mills,

¹⁵⁶ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 35 - 40.

which vested "the ownership of flour in the Government." Millers were being forced to sell their flour to the government at £8/10/- per ton and repurchase them at £10 per ton.¹⁵⁷ For Campbell, a sales tax rate of less than 25% proved that socialists ruled the State. Ashworth's speculations, too, rested on specious evidence. Ashworth was better educated and more cultivated than Campbell and could distinguish various schools of radicalism. Yet when he profiled these groups' beliefs he couldn't refrain from lapsing, abruptly, into anti-communist diatribe, denouncing "actual organised Communist parties," which sowed "the seeds of hate instead of those of love." Initially, Ashworth could conceive of the philosophical opposition of communists and capitalists as one of degree rather than kind. Most capitalists and socialists, he maintained, believed in the necessity for some "public ownership of the means of production." "Railways, post offices, tramways, waterworks and a score of other undertakings" were, after all, "carried on in Australia with public capital" and "very few Socialists" desired to nationalise all industry; many maintained, for example, that farming was best left to private enterprise. "The practical question [was] – Where [was] the line to be drawn?" However, after dispassionately analysing the communist/capitalist dispute, Ashworth felt obliged to immediately insist that the extent to which the state could assume ownership and supervision of the economy depended "upon the efficiency of public departments and...in turn...the general level of social morality."¹⁵⁸

Although Ashworth could distinguish schools of social radicalism he struggled to demonstrate how the American labour movement's comparative political weakness made the United States a more equitable society. Determined to prove that direct political representation of labour was injurious, he found his proofs in the writings of American political scientist James Bryce. Bryce contended that the United States was impervious to "class strife and revolution" because "the cleavage between political parties [was] 'not horizontal according to social strata, but vertical.'" Social peace was also contingent on the continued absence of a strong "Labor party." This theory was enough to justify Ashworth's distaste for labour parties. However, Ashworth neglected to extrapolate Bryce's differentiation of "horizontal" and "vertical" class segregation and analyse the theories' potential relevance to Australia. Rather, he

¹⁵⁷ *Liberty*, 17 September 1932, p. 6.

merely cited Bryce because his theories supported his feelings about Australian democracy. Ashworth then felt free to bemoan the existence of the ALP, which had presented the carrot of political power before the trade union movement, encouraging its leaders to concentrate on securing parliamentary representation, rather than police their own organisations. This was why trade unions were being "dragged at the heels" of communists, who "destroyed discipline" in the Queensland Railways, "paralysed" Australian shipping, "subjected ... producers to serious loss" and made "mob rule" dominant "for a time in Queensland ports and in Fremantle."¹⁵⁹

In general, anti-communists failed to produce a contemporary political philosophy that could compete with Marxism. Their rhetoric did little but denigrate the intellectual heritage of the Left and usually failed to challenge the tenets of radical thought. Ashworth, for example, criticised radicals for failing to allow for the impact of their innate biases in analysis. The "conception of the interaction of man with social machinery," he commented:

is a synthesis of various one-sided interpretations of history which have been developed to account for social progress. The most famous of these is the materialist interpretation associated with the names of Karl Marx and his henchman Engels, who ... had no proper conception of an interaction between mind and matter; or between social machinery acting on mind and physical machinery acting on matter.¹⁶⁰

Ashworth could, therefore, only deny that Marx analysed the complex interplay between psychic and material environments. So while this obscure ex-President of the Victorian Employers Federation upbraided one of the most influential figures of his time, he was incapable of debating Marx in a dialectical fashion.

If anti-communists trivialised the significance of social radicalism, they also trivialised the impact of revolution on the people of Russia. The Australian press, like American media, continued to circulate stories of moral outrages being committed in

¹⁵⁸ Ashworth, "Communism in Australia," pp. 31 – 3.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

Russia, which invariably focussed on the issue of sexual license and its ruinous effect on Christian family values. Stories describing the Bolsheviks' use of Chinese henchman also received great attention, for this demonstrated the Bolsheviks' preparedness to sully their racial purity. In general, anti-communists concentrated not on economic or political imperfections or injustices, but on ethical beliefs and practices most offensive to Western morality. While the capacity of commentators to analyse events in the Soviet Union was hampered by rigid censorship, Western rage with Soviet Russia was always most strongly expressed in relation to sexual obscenity or the failure to practice racial exclusivity. The forced mass collectivisation of agriculture and the deportation and starvation of millions never made as good copy, nor attracted as much censure, as the establishment of Commissariats of Free Love. The chief crime of Russia's communists, in Australian eyes, was to have transgressed "universal" truths and mores. The crimes they committed against their own citizens were less significant, for anti-communists viewed the people of Russia with condescension and contempt, making sympathy and empathy problematic, if not impossible.

Anti-communists' intellectual pedantry inevitably manifested itself in intelligence and security work. Surveillance and intelligence reports of Australian authorities exhibit an extraordinary lack of analytical skills, general knowledge and an obsession with trivia. The intelligence services' administrative vigour was slack. Routine investigations dragged on for months. Military Intelligence's inquiry into the sale of Bolshevik literature in the Coles Book Arcade in Melbourne demonstrates their slothful practices. The investigation began on 4 April 1919, when Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Alston wrote MI to inform them that they should investigate the sale of radical materials at the Arcade. The following day, Alston received notification from MI that the matter would be followed up. Yet it wasn't until 5 May that MI finally began their investigation and duly found literature of a "Socialist and Bolshevik nature" on sale in the Arcade.¹⁶¹ So, although MI and other groups professed great concern with the proliferation of communist propaganda, they were prepared to allow sedition to continue unchecked for months after they were notified of its occurrence.

¹⁶¹ Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Alston to Intelligence Section, General Staff, 4 April 1919, Reply from Intelligence Section, 5 April 1919 and Report of Intelligence Section, 5 May 1919 (AA, MP 16/1,

As has been noted, kinship groups' investigations frequently failed to furnish even the most basic information about their foes. When reviewing the operations of the Comintern in Australia in 1932, the CIB was not even certain if "Jock" Garden had been expelled from the PPTUS or still sat on the executive.¹⁶² Information the authorities actually possessed, moreover, rarely passed through critical filters. The federal government's knowledge of communism in the United States, for example, comprised little but mainstream press reports sent by Richard Casey and Herbert Brookes from their posts in London and Washington. Not only was the Australian security industry unable to effectively penetrate Australian radical circles, it was isolated from the corridors of power in Great Britain and the United States. While the personnel of the CIB and MI cannot be held responsible for this, their political insignificance demonstrably diminished the quality of their work.

Anti-communist belief in superficial remedial action also prompted the kinship groups to emphasise the banal and trivial throughout their investigations. One anti-communist who believed in the efficacy of external regulations on radical conduct was an anonymous loyalist who opined in April 1918:

Something would be gained in preventing the spread of sedition if the Government would visit on every new arrival in Australia making a solemn declaration of allegiance to the King, before being allowed to land. This declaration should be clearly worded in order to exclude all evasion.¹⁶³

Another anti-communist who worked for the Sydney CIB believed that the federal government could effectively combat public "disloyalty" by erecting a flagpole in the Domain. This, he affirmed:

would have a good effect and might be made a standing memorial to the men who fought in the great war ... and the Navy could be instructed to see that the British flag was flown therefrom every day - Sundays included. Such a step

Item Y19/179). The section did not stop the trade in radical literature, judging that it had "no power ... to interfere" in the matter.

¹⁶² CIB Report, c. 1932, titled "Appendix B - Headquarters of Comintern, Australian Section" (AA, A432/86, Item 1932/1471).

would greatly please and create a profound impression upon the people and it has the further advantage of being by no means costly.¹⁶⁴

Such incisive reflection, borne of keen powers of perception, enabled anti-communists to identify the crucial beliefs, characteristics and habits of their foes. New Scotland Yard, for example, instructed the CIB to watch for emigrating communists like Richard Hall, a coal hewer who was "always well dressed [and walked] very slowly."¹⁶⁵

Anti-communists also possessed a sharp eye for treason, as the Censor's Office revealed in 1918. In March of that year, the Office prohibited a monograph published in 1915 by a Dr. Albrecht Penck, an academic detained in Australia at the outbreak of the Great War. Penck's book, *Von England Festgehalten* (Captive of England), unsettled the censor for several reasons. He feared that "it might be used to ill purpose by extremists of either kind; the unthinking rabid anti-German[s]" who could use it to attack the loyalty of Australians who treated the German Scientists so well, while "pacifists [could] use it to show what worthy people the Germans [were]." The author had also made "more or less derogatory remarks about the recruiting of the British Army, the spirit of the English people and the former treatment of interned Germans."¹⁶⁶ Yet the Censor also took objection to a passage in the book, in which Penck described his enjoyment of traditional German architecture in South Australia and a chance meeting with a German-born naturalised Australian with whom he shared reminiscences. This, it seemed, was a sign of treachery and ingratitude and compromised Australia's national security.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Anonymous Letter to Benjamin Hoare Lacy, 11 April 1918, in the possession of W. M. Hughes (NLA, MS 1538, Series 21, Folder 1).

¹⁶⁴ Report from Sydney CIB to Melbourne HQ, regarding Disloyalty in the Domain, 17 May 1921 (AA, A8911/1, Item 154/Part 1).

¹⁶⁵ Reports from the Office of the High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia, for the Department of External Affairs, Whitehall Gardens, London, Report No. 916, 23 August 1928 (AA, A467, Item Bundle 94/SF 42/64 286).

¹⁶⁶ Letter from George Steward to Prime Minister Hughes, 14 March 1918, containing the report of G. C. Nicholson, Censor, Sydney (NLA, MS 1538).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* The offending innocuous passage read "I was delighted to see on a hill the ruins of a windmill. Then I got sight of Hahndorf below. At one of the first houses I halted. It looked like a house in Schleswig; it had a hipped roof, of corrugated iron, it must be admitted, not of shingles, and a little arbour, such as one sees often enough in front of houses in the Riesengebirge. It was covered with climbing roses in flower. There were flowers in blossom in the garden. As I was photographing the owner came up. We spoke at first a few words in English, about the weather ... Then we both fell into

Another investigation demonstrating anti-communist paranoia and incompetence concerns that of a German-born alleged Bolshevik named Gustav Niedrig. Investigation of Niedrig began in September 1925, when the CIB learnt, from the plain-clothes division of the Victorian Police (who themselves were advised by the Italian consul, who had translated a telegram intercepted in Cairo) that Niedrig, a painter aged twenty-seven, had sailed for Melbourne in December 1924. Allegedly a member of "the Russian Polish Bolshevik Club," he was travelling to Australia to "make propaganda" and was to be arrested on sight. Despite the fact that this information was already ten months old and was regarded by Harold Jones as likely derived from forged documents, the Branch nevertheless decided that the affair warranted a national inquiry: there was, after all, a "probability" that Niedrig might have settled in Australia. While the Brisbane, Sydney, Hobart and Adelaide offices of the Branch were unable to locate Niedrig, Inspector R. W. Weddell, in Perth, informed Jones of Niedrig's arrival in Fremantle on 12 December 1924. Niedrig's forwarding address indicated he was bound for the Port Melbourne home of Mendel Zovel.¹⁶⁸

The headquarters of the CIB swung into action, in November 1927, paying a visit to the home of Mendel Zovel. At the house, a Moses Rabinov informed the Branch's officer that he had never heard of Niedrig. The Branch then concluded that Mendel Zovel might well have been Mendel Joel, who had "already been the subject of a report in connection with an admission." Inquiries made at the Carlton home of Joel's sister established that Joel had departed for Sydney and was not expected to return for two months. Joel's sister had never heard of Niedrig, but gave the authorities a postal address to contact her brother. At this point, Harold Jones took it upon himself to question Mendel Joel regarding the whereabouts of the elusive Niedrig. On 12 November 1927, he wrote:

German. He related that he had come in his childhood from Schleswig. The old man's heart was delighted by the German victories over the French, and the memory of 1870 awoke in him."

¹⁶⁸ Report from Plain-Clothes Branch of Victoria Police, 23 September 1925, forwarded to CIB 26 September 1925, Communique from H. Jones to Attorney-General's Department, 5 October 1925, Report of Queensland Inspector W. A. Mackieham to H. Jones, 10 October 1925, Report of Western Australian Inspector, R. W. Weddell to Jones, 13 October 1925, Reports from Adelaide, Sydney and Hobart CIB offices, 19 October 1925, 22 October 1925, 17 November 1925 respectively and Report of CIB clerk to Inspector Roland S. Browne, 12 November 1927 (AA, B741/3, Item V/5047).

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Dear Sir,

I am desirous of ascertaining the present address of Mr. Gustav NIEDRIG, a Polish subject, who came to Australia at the end of 1924 from Egypt.

Mr. NIEDRIG gave his address at that time as care of yourself at Mr. RABINOV's house at Port Melbourne.

I should like to see Mr. NIEDRIG in connection with a personal enquiry [sic] for him received from overseas, and shall be glad if you will let me know where he now is, or what was his last known address, or where he was employed.

For your convenience in replying, I enclose a stamped and addressed envelope.¹⁶⁹

Jones' letter to Joel sheds little light on the question of why, after two years, the CIB suddenly acted on its information about Niedrig's whereabouts. Whether it had just cleaned out its files in a slow period or was justifying its revenue levels, the ineptitude of the Branch was glaringly exposed; the chief of the nation's premier intelligence agency was reduced to writing disingenuous, formal petitions for assistance from Jewish migrants, in the vain hope that they would, unsuspectingly, deliver their friends and relatives into the hands of the authorities. The operations of the Branch were so imprecise as to lack any clear objective. Headquarters stumbled from task to task, guided by innuendo, hearsay and third-hand documents. The investigation of Niedrig finally drew to a close in 1937. Having learned in May 1934 that Niedrig was an inmate of Callan Park Mental Hospital in Sydney, the Customs Department attempted to secure his passport, "with a view to [his] deportation from the Commonwealth." Jones wrote the Melbourne office of the Branch to locate that passport the following month. The wheels of bureaucracy and foreign diplomacy continued to turn slowly until January 1937, when the Polish Consul-General wrote the Branch to inform them that his government would accept Niedrig for repatriation, upon delivery of all his papers for appropriate perusal.¹⁷⁰ After twelve years of intermittent devotion, the CIB had finally succeeded in deporting the dangerous radical Gustav Niedrig, now an institutionalised, mentally-ill man. If such triumphs were typical of the CIB's career, it is no wonder that anti-communists so acutely lacked psychic security. Deep down, they must have comprehended the futility of

¹⁶⁹ Letter of H. Jones to Mr. Mendel Joel c/o Mrs. Rosen, 12 November 1927, Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Memorandum from Customs Department to CIB, 30/5/34, Memorandum from Jones to Melbourne office CIB, 6 April 1934, Letter from Polish Consul-General to Harold Jones, 7 January 1937, Ibid.

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their efforts, which completely failed to assuage their fear of the Other.

Conclusion

At the outset of this doctoral thesis I suggested that a comparative analysis of American and Australian anti-communism, examining the period from 1917 – 35 and utilising psychological theories, could make an important contribution to the history of both societies. It is now appropriate to review the aims and findings of this project and speculate on conclusions to be drawn from the material it presents.

Anti-communism was one of the most significant political ideologies affecting both the United States and Australia during the twentieth century. Its extraordinary influence on politics and society over a sustained period of time makes its comprehensive study essential. However, historical understanding of anti-communism and its impact on both these nations has been hampered, in general, by two major historiographical traditions. First, its evolution has been ignored or overshadowed by events occurring after the Second World War. Second, the methodological focus of existing historiography has been too narrow; many historians have directed their attention toward economic, political and other “rational” concerns, neglecting the psychological dimension of extreme political behaviour. And while scholars such as Richard Hofstadter, David Brion Davis, Eli Sagan and Joel Kovel have advanced the study of political extremism with psychohistory, they too have largely confined their inquiries to single national experiences.¹ These practices have encouraged problematic perceptions that require reassessment.

One of the most significant and alarming perceptions fostered by much anti-communist scholarship is that anti-communism (and by extension, other political dogma) flourish in democracies like the United States and Australia because they correspond with the needs and desires of a majority of the nation's citizens. By accepting and supporting this assumption, various historians have prevented the study of anti-communism from engaging directly with substantial issues with which it must be associated: namely, the nature of power in democratic societies and the means by which select individuals and groups have used phenomena such as anti-communism

¹ Although Sagan does relate American to Athenian political experience, he chiefly compares the two to substantiate his ideas of the permanence of pathological political behaviour in human affairs. This thesis, by contrast, more thoroughly compares the psychological and political experiences of two societies more closely related in time and spirit.

to seize political power and effect critical social change. Much of the existing historiography of anti-communism has, rather, encouraged the "American [and Australian] people" to accept the legitimacy of and even responsibility for anti-communism and its momentous consequences. The "people" are blamed for the production of a culture of surveillance, intervention and conformism that fundamentally mistrusts their capacities and their ability to withstand extremism. This perception has obscured the degree to which anti-communism was rooted in paranoid behaviour, thereby conveying the impression that anti-communism and government policies and actions associated with it were more the result of considered and consultative processes rather than the activities of mobilised (and, I argue, often disturbed) individuals and organisations.

In both Australia and the United States, anti-communism was the chief *raison d'être* for a number of government institutions that attempted to revolutionise the lives of citizens. These institutions alienated citizens from government and delivered control of policies vital to the functioning and direction of the state to anti-democratic, unrepresentative organisations. Practices and attitudes established in the early period of anti-communism came to be reflected in the behaviour of various administrative agencies, including drug and law enforcement, internal security and immigration. Anti-communism proved to be a central arbiter of the relationship between governments and citizens in Australia and the United States, even though it has not been sufficiently analysed by historians in this light. That relationship has been progressively characterised by governmental mistrust, antipathy and an abstract (rather than concrete) sympathy for citizens. This is why it is important to analyse why, how and where such sentiment was manufactured.

In general terms, American historians have more thoroughly inventoried the effects of early anti-communism on national and political life than their Australian counterparts. Nonetheless, they have fostered, perhaps unintentionally, the notion that anti-communism was not fully institutionalised until after the Second World War. While scholars such as Gilbert C. Fite and H. C. Peterson and William Preston, Jr. have carefully delineated significant, lasting developments of the period, general and even specialist studies of the subject (notably Robert K. Murray's) undermine their work in this respect. This thesis, therefore, has attempted to demonstrate how all critical

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supports for anti-communism were erected during the interwar period. Such supports included government agencies - be they bureaucracies, legislative councils, judicial and executive authorities - which were designed and equipped to monitor the political tendencies of the civilian population. The centralisation of administrative procedures affecting the demographic and ideological composition of the United States, particularly immigration, censorship and freedoms of belief and speech, was also effected during this interwar period, and supervised by new government agencies and select groups of citizens incorporated into the state's legal apparatus. These developments constituted the elevation of expanding bureaucracies over democratic institutions and a diminution of citizens' individual rights. Such anti-democratic tendencies were primarily justified by the need for conformity, loyalty and security. The "Jazz Age" of the 1920s, consequently, did not witness a return to a state of normalcy but, rather, the emergence of an enduring culture of intimidation, conformism, superpatriotism and fear, now popularly dated to the Cold War.

While many American historians have shied away from drawing conclusions about the significance of early anti-communism to the evolution of American democracy, Australian historians have similarly neglected to consider the broad effect of anti-communist repression on Australian democracy or explicitly relate anti-communist repression to notions of democratic citizenship. The fact that anti-communism in Australia was less vicious, extensive, constant and influential than it was in the United States has had the unfortunate effect of encouraging antipodean historians to understate the significance of government agencies, policies and conservative loyalist groups on society, particularly with reference to the failure of the political left at this time. The lack of historical analysis of the role of anti-communism in the interwar period in Australia is particularly curious, given Australian historians' more overt appreciation of class politics.² Australian historiography and popular memory of Cold War anti-communism overshadows that of interwar anti-communism. Australians are familiar, at least by name, with the national security agency that has functioned since the Second World War, but they remain ignorant of its predecessor. Similarly, very few Australians are aware of the existence, let alone the activities of interwar right-

² Both Burgmann and Macintyre, in their profiles of the Australian IWW and Communist Party, pay insufficient attention to the broader impact of anti-communism on the failure of radical left ideology in

wing, loyalist paramilitary forces.³ In this respect, this thesis has an important and obvious corrective task to perform in drawing attention to the significance of early anti-communism in Australia.

The tendency of both Australian and American historians to confine their consideration of anti-communism largely within national borders has been a further impediment to understanding the phenomenon. The importance of social currents or feelings such as post-war exhaustion, fear of recurrent crisis and disenchantment with Progressivism and New Liberalism becomes more apparent when measured against similar trends in other societies, particularly if they comprise similar ethnic groups and are governed by comparable political systems. Indeed, it is only through comparison that the relationship of national political systems and their citizens can be more concretely defined. Comparative history enables the historian to better appreciate the relevance of social phenomena such as racial and cultural prejudices, and traditions of government and citizenship, in specific national environments. Comparing anti-communism with earlier forms of political extremism in the United States, and with anti-communism in Australia, reveals that anti-communism was a more durable and powerful centripetal force for paranoid fear than any pre-existing ideology in American life. Moreover, comparative analysis of government institutions and traditions also brings greater knowledge of the relationships binding executive, legislative and judicial arms of government, as well as heightened awareness of the relationship between "the public" and national organisations and customs.

Another significant methodological benefit of comparative history, in relation to the problem of anti-communism, is that it discourages the use of arguably misleading and meaningless concepts like "the American people," thereby encouraging closer analysis of the structure of power in the United States and the effects of interwar anti-communism on American traditions and methods of government. The value of comparative history in measuring the impact of anti-communism on Australian government traditions and methods is equally great. In short, comparative history

Australia, preferring to concentrate on the destructive effect of rivalries between the IWW, the CPA, mainstream trade unions and the ALP, and the effect of Stalinisation within the CPA.

³ Recall, for example, the fact that the United Australia Party, which seized power from the federal Labor government in late 1931, was formed off the back of the All for Australia League. This would likely surprise many. See Cathcart, *Defending the National Tuckshop*, p. 37.

assists the task of precisely identifying *who* used anti-communism to change state and society. In the United States, as this thesis has demonstrated, a select group of politicians, bureaucrats and security advisers, judges, media concerns, business interests, civic associations and patriots largely created and fostered anti-communism. Similarly, in Australia, a handful of politicians, intelligence and state police personnel, leading businessmen, journalists and patriots advanced anti-communism. Moreover, as this thesis has striven to show, it was anti-communism that propelled these vested interests into positions of power from which they exercised considerable dominance over the future direction and atmosphere of politics.⁴

As we have seen, the degree to which anti-communism dominated politics and society in the two nations differed considerably. The vested interests promoting anti-communism in the United States were more effectively mobilised than their Australian counterparts, and comprised a larger cross-section of society. A far greater proportion of political and judicial office bearers in the United States were able and inclined to profit from anti-communism. The American business lobby also brought a greater number and variety of commercial interests into the anti-communist crusade, and Americanisation programs helped engender, with intensity unmatched in Australia, political and cultural conformity both in the general populace and among migrants. Proponents of anti-communism in the United States, moreover, enjoyed more prestige and authority than Australian anti-communists because they were better protected by and more thoroughly controlled the political process. It was the devolution of real power into local and regional communities, as much as the growth of the national security apparatus, that made this possible. Australian government forces simply could not influence the populace to a similar degree; some, as we have seen, did not even desire to, being unsympathetic to conservative causes and determined to preserve the separation of powers between government and the judicial system.

The study of early anti-communism is not merely important because of continuing historical problems in its evaluation. While the origins of anti-communism remain obscure and misunderstood, its consequences are inevitably made less apparent;

⁴ In Australia lingering fear about the power of Germany and Japan was another leading justification

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appreciation of its influence suffers as the process of its development is misconceived and understanding of subsequent anti-communism is imperiled by ignorance of its rise and development. Undoubtedly, in both national communities there is a reluctance to comprehensively re-evaluate the rise and import of anti-communism. Contemporary institutions that benefited from anti-communism are not inclined to jeopardise their own power or existence by arousing widespread interest in their formation. Such interest necessarily focuses public attention on the powers these institutions have preserved. However, citizens of the United States and Australia can ill afford *not* to understand the history and legacy of anti-communism.

Government agencies established in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution to monitor political tendencies of civilians in the United States and Australia continue to function. If they are less obviously partisan than they were during the interwar and Cold War years, the suggestion that they can remain unaffected by entrenched political biases and institutional traditions of paranoid behaviour must be greeted with scepticism. For while governments' control of censorship and political debate has dramatically diminished in recent years, the authority government agencies continue to exercise remains considerable. Fetters on individual rights instituted during the early anti-communist era in the United States are enshrined in modern legislation such as the federal 1996 Omnibus Terrorism Bill that permits the government to deport aliens without having to disclose evidence brought against them and to levy huge fines against those supporters of political groups deemed to be "foreign terrorists."⁵ The Australian government, too, has considerable discretion over immigration and deportation proceedings and charges of racial, political and cultural prejudice and other forms of paranoid behaviour consistently dog its administration of such matters. The historical role of these organisations as shackles upon democracy requires greater, not circumscribed, examination and publicity.

The most important legacy of anti-communism is the political triumph of capitalism, nationalism, conservatism that has now mutated into the ascendancy of globalisation and consumerism. In both Australia and the United States, and indeed throughout the western world, communism remains a dirty, tainted word; the ignominy of

for the political ascendancy of the right.

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communism continues to besmirch and undermine genuine economic and social reform across the world. The triumph of capitalism and political conservatism has also encouraged an unhealthy acceptance of various problematic government institutions and traditions that are the direct result of complacency, ignorance and paranoid fear. It is my sincere hope that this thesis will encourage citizens of both the United States and Australia to more thoughtfully consider the evolution and structure of their democracies and, ultimately, question the extent to which popular participation in government or, "real" democracy, has in any sense been achieved.

⁵ Joel Kovel, "So You Want to be a Senator?," www.neravt.com/left/kovel.html.

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