



**MONASH** University

**Understanding Indonesian Mediapolis:  
The Role of Social Media during the 2014  
Indonesia's Presidential Election**

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## **Abstract**

This research examined the use of social media in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia. In particular it scrutinized the role of social media to empower democracy due to their capacity to encourage constituents to engage in public debates on political issues and make informed voting decisions. The overarching question of this inquiry is: What was the role of social media during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election?

To answer such a question I adopted three major theories, namely mediapolis, celebrity, and intermedia agenda setting, as the key theoretical framework. They became analytical tools to scrutinize the dynamics of the contemporary public space of mediated communications in the country, particularly pertinent to the coexistence and interactions of social media, celebrity, and traditional media power in the election and how such accounts had ramifications on the capacity of social media to empower democracy in the country. For such a purpose, I applied content analysis as the main methodology for examining a set of social media and print media content related to the event comprising the campaign messages of the presidential candidates and the endorsement messages of the celebrity supporters via Facebook and Twitter as well as news articles reporting issues concerning social media and the presidential election in four prominent Indonesian dailies during the election campaign period.


The study found social media had four important roles in the election, namely as new space for election campaign endeavors for the presidential nominees, as key devices for the dissemination of endorsements among the celebrity supporters, as essential sources of ideas and motivations for the constituents to vote, and as the agenda setter of news reports among the traditional media on the issues pertinent to the election. Moreover, it also revealed, despite such important roles in the election, social media had limited capacity to empower democracy for three reasons. Firstly, campaign messages of the presidential nominees via social media were deficient in political issues and rational arguments. The deficiencies of both aspects hindered the constituents to be able to engage in public debates and to make informed voting decisions in the election, which were critical for empowering democracy. Secondly, despite that the celebrities, by means of

endorsements in social media, were able to encourage young constituents to vote, the endorsements were unlikely able to encourage the constituents to make an informed voting decision, which was essential to cultivate democracy. The success of their endorsements derived from the celebrity–fans relationships. The young constituents, who many of them constituted the fans of the celebrity supporters, voted in the election because their idols, the celebrities, encouraged them to do so. Lastly, despite social media were often being able to set the news agenda of the traditional media, they failed to challenge the ideology of traditional media. My research suggests they failed to challenge the inclination of the traditional media to be biased, which occurred due to their affiliation with the presidential candidates, in the election. An unbiased media environment was essential for democracy, therefore such a failure demonstrate the limited capacity of social media for the empowerment of democracy in the country. Further analysis suggests the limited capacity of social media to empower democracy was due to the similarities of ideological platforms and political agendas of the political parties backing the presidential candidates as well as the superiority of the traditional media over social media systems in the country.

## **Declaration**

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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## List of Abbreviations

ABC	: The Australian Broadcasting Corporation
AFI	: <i>Akademi Fantasi Indosiar</i> (Fantasy Academy of Indonesia)
APJII	: <i>Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia</i> (Association of Indonesian Internet Service Providers)
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Bappenas	: <i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Agency)
Bawaslu	: <i>Badan Pengawas Pemilu</i> (Election Supervisory Board)
BBC	: The British Broadcasting Corporation
BPS	: <i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i> (Statistics Indonesia)
CBS	: The Columbia Broadcasting System
CTC	: CT Corporation
DPR	: <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives)
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
Gerindra	: <i>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</i> (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
Golkar	: <i>Partai Golongan Karya</i> (Party of the Functional Groups)
Hanura	: <i>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</i> (People's Conscience Party)
ISP	: Internet Service Provider
JPG	: Jawa Pos Group
KDI	: <i>Kontes Dangdut Indonesia</i> (Indonesian <i>Dangdut</i> Contest)
KGG	: Kompas Gramedia Group
KPI	: <i>Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission)
KPK	: <i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i> (Corruption Eradication Commission)
KPU	: <i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i> (General Election Commission)

LPP RRI	: <i>Lembaga Penyiaran Publik Radio Republik Indonesia</i> (Radio Public Broadcasting of the Republic of Indonesia)
LPP TVRI	: <i>Lembaga Penyiaran Publik Televisi Republik Indonesia</i> (Television Public Broadcasting of the Republic of Indonesia)
LSI	: <i>Lingkaran Survei Indonesia</i> (Survey Circle of Indonesia)
MM	: Mahaka Media
MNC	: MNC Corporation
MOOG	: Multi-User Object Oriented Games
MPR	: <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's General Assembly)
MUI	: <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Ulama Council)
Nasdem	: <i>Partai Nasdem</i> (Nasdem Party)
NBC	: National Broadcasting Company
OECD	: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAN	: <i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
PD	: <i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democratic Party)
PDIP	: <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Pemilu	: <i>Pemilihan Umum</i> (General Election)
PKB	: <i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party)
PKS	: <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
PPP	: <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PSI	: Parasocial Interaction
PSR	: Parasocial Relationship
Puskesmas	: <i>Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat</i> (Community Health Center)
RCTI	: Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia
SBY	: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

SCTV	: Surya Citra Televisi
SMS	: Short Message Service
TMG	: Tempo Media Group
UCC	: User Created Content
UCG	: User Generated Content
Warnet	: <i>Warung Internet</i> (Internet Kiosk)

# Chapter 1 Introduction

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## 1.1. Background of the Study

This thesis originated from my curiosity on the importance and power of social media in Indonesian media and political settings that sprouted while I was working in the hub of the country's politics, in the Presidential Office, during President Yudhoyono's second term from 2009 to 2014. Back then I was serving at the Office of Special Staff to the President for Food and Energy Affairs. During the four-year tenure in the office my tasks were mostly media-related. One of them was to provide recommendations to the President's social media team on what topics to tweet on food and energy affairs.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often nick-named SBY, was an active social media user, especially on Twitter. His official Twitter account, @SBYudhoyono, was officially launched on 13 April 2013. A team in the Special Staff to the President managed and on regular basis sent messages from the account. However, President SBY himself also often tweeted through the account, which was marked with a signature \*SBY\* in the end of the tweets (Liputan 6 2013). The President's Twitter mostly tweeted political issues such as government policies but intermittently also tweeted issues about his personal life. The tweets from SBY always attracted the attention of the public and media. Consequently, Twitter has constituted a prominent element of Indonesian media and political spheres (McRae 2013a).

The other factor that had driven me even more to question the power and significance of social media in the country's media and political settings was when two other prominent political actors also took up the technology for their political purposes, following President SBY's step. They were Prabowo Subianto (nick-named Prabowo) and Joko Widodo (nick-named Jokowi), the candidates contesting in Indonesia's 2014 Presidential Election. They officially incorporated Twitter and Facebook into their campaign strategies in the political race (Abdillah 2014a, pp. 500-4).

The impacts of the use of such technology during the election period were considerable, comparable to such use by President SBY. Their messages in Twitter and Facebook always attracted the attention of the media and public in the country during the election campaign period. Sometimes they even attracted the attention of the foreign media and public such as exemplified by Prabowo's Facebook post showing a campaign music video from a prominent Indonesian musician, Ahmad Dhani. It attracted the attention of the media and publics due to the attire of the musician and legal status of the song. The musician performing in the video, Ahmad Dhani, wore Nazi-like military uniform and illegally used Queen's *We Will Rock You* song (Kristanti 2014).

The role of social media during election campaigns has attracted and become a source of much speculation among political analysts and election observers in recent years, especially due to Obama's success in the use of such communication technologies in the US presidential election in 2008 (Woolley et al. 2010; Vitak et al. 2011; Goodnow 2013) and 2012 (Bronstein 2013; Houston et al. 2013; Vargo et al. 2014). Scholars have also investigated similar topics within other democracies such as Australia and some European countries. There are several studies on social media within Australian politics such as the use of Twitter by Australian politicians (Grant et al. 2010), employment of social media by political parties and politicians in the 2010 Australian election (Macnamara & Kenning 2011), and political use of Twitter during the 2012 State of Queensland election (Bruns & Highfield 2013). Within European political realms, exemplars of similar studies are investigations on the use of Facebook and Twitter in the 2010 UK election (Baxter et al. 2011; Jackson & Lilleker 2011; Ampofo et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013), and Twitter as a political campaign device during the 2010 Swedish election (Larsson & Moe 2012).

The studies suggest social media had important roles during election campaigns such as for information dissemination, drawing financial support from the public and enticing people to join the parties or become volunteers (Baxter et al. 2011), in support of public discussions by extending such discussions via mediated public communication, i.e. Twitter (Larsson & Moe 2012), fund-raising actions (Talbot 2008, Qualman 2012), recruiting supporters (Bronstein 2013),

incorporating online with offline actions (Macintosh 2008), information diffusion (Macnamara 2008, Howell & Da Silva 2010), promoting political parties' leaders (Bruns & Highfield 2013), and conducting political dialogue with the constituents (Grant et al. 2010, Gibson & McAllister 2011).

Although still limited, the role of social media during election in non-western political settings, like in Asian countries, has also attracted scholars for such investigations as the 2008 and 2013 Malaysia general election (Gomez 2014, Gong 2011, Liow 2012, Sani & Zengeni 2010), Thailand's 2013 general election (Grömping 2014) and general election in Singapore (Lee & Kan 2009, Skoric et al. 2012, Sreekumar & Vadrevu 2013). Some of the studies found a very different role of social media in election period in the countries because of their different democratic structure and media system. The studies on the topic in the political settings of Malaysia and Singapore, where the government highly control the traditional media, for example, found that it was the opposition parties that predominantly adopted social media for election campaign endeavors. They adopted social media as a means to counter the political narratives of the ruling parties, which was unlikely possible by means of the traditional media. The ruling parties also used social media for such purpose, however, in general they relied more on the traditional media. In an Indonesian context, it was also suggested social media have been adopted for election campaign in election, such as during the 2014 presidential election (Aspinall & Mietzner 2014; Mietzner 2015; Fionna & Njoto-Feillard 2015). However, these studies only had limited discussions on their roles for election campaigns activities. A further discussion on the studies is in Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.

Intrigued by such personal experiences and existing inquiries on the functions of social media in contemporary media and politics settings, in this study I scrutinized the role of social media in Indonesia particularly during the 2014 presidential election. I analyzed how social media power functions, coexists, and interacts with the power of celebrity and traditional media within the country's public space of mediated communications and how such accounts had impacts on the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. I believe this research would add to the lack of

alternative understanding on the topic concerning non-western settings, particularly Indonesia.

## **1.2. Power Sharing in Indonesian Mediapolis: Social Media, Celebrity, and Traditional Media**

From my initial observation, I had a hypothesis that social media had an important role in the election but such an important role, particularly regarding their power to empower democracy, can only be explained by linking social media power to two other major powers operating within the Indonesian public space of mediated communications, namely celebrity and traditional media. Regarding celebrity power, it was suggested celebrities often had capacity to influence the fans due to the celebrity-fans relationship. Such influences can apply from styles of fashion, beliefs, to political stances (Rojek 2001, pp. 21-3). In the election both presidential candidates incorporated celebrity supporters in their campaign activities, including their campaign activities in social media. Their campaign messages containing endorsements from celebrity supporters attracted considerable attention of the public such as exemplified by Ahmad Dhani's aforementioned video. In addition, the celebrity supporters of both camps also personally showed such endorsements by means of their own social media accounts. As some of them had millions of fans in social media, such endorsements were also able to attract extensive attention of the public in the country. Under such a situation, the impact of social media campaign messages likely derived not only from the influence of the presidential candidates but it also derived from the celebrities. This might have occurred due to the capacity of celebrities to influence their fans, and many of them constituted constituents in the election. Such accounts demonstrate the important linkages and influences between the power of social media and celebrity in the election. Regarding traditional media power, it was essential because social media and traditional media coexist and often influence one another in the public space of mediated communication in Indonesia. Indeed, the penetration of online media such as social media among the population in the country was still far behind that of the traditional media. However, online media at times were able to set the news agenda of the traditional media (Sen & Hill 2002; Lim 2005a; 2005b). Such

accounts also demonstrate the important linkages between social media and the traditional media.

It was understood that only a few people such as media elites, politicians, celebrities, and scholars have the privilege to get their views disseminated via traditional media. Consequently traditional media, which constitute essential sources of information among the public and often shape their opinions, generally represent the views and interests of these factions. As prior to the social media era the traditional media constituted the only players in the public space of mediated communications, common people generally had very limited, if any, opportunity to have their views and interests disseminated in the public space of mediated communications, let alone to shape public opinion. However, the birth and propagation of social media has dramatically changed this situation. Besides facilitating users to access information, the new communications technologies also enable them to disseminate their own views. Thus, within the contemporary public space of mediated communications, not only the elites have the capacity to get their views heard, the general public or 'the people formerly known as the audience' also have a similar capacity by means of social media (Mandiberg 2012, p. 3). In this sense, social media have been able to democratize public space of mediated communications, in Silverstone's (2007) term it is also known as mediapolis, giving everybody's voice similar opportunity to get published and be heard. Further discussion on the concept is presented in the following chapter.

However, such a romantic view is inaccurate for two reasons. Firstly, despite that virtually everybody can post his or her messages in social media and get such messages heard by everybody else in social media, it does not mean everybody has similar opportunity to be heard. It is suggested the world's top ten social media accounts with the largest number of fans in Facebook (Statista 2018b) and Twitter (Statista 2018a) were those belonging to prominent figures such as celebrities and politicians. It implies that among billions of social media users, social media users are mostly only interested in 'listening to' the voices of such prominent figures. Thus, for the common users it is only a few friends in their social media networks who are likely interested in 'listening to' their voices. It

was suggested the average number of friends in social media such as Facebook was 155 people (Dunbar 2016). Under such circumstances within contemporary mediapolis, in which social media constitute popular means of communication among the public, the voices of common people or 'the people formerly known as the audience' are still unlikely to be heard and have capacity to shape public opinion. Instead, it is still the voices of celebrities or politicians that matter.

Such a situation occurred in Indonesian mediapolis during the 2014 presidential election. In the period politicians such as both presidential candidates Prabowo and Jokowi as well as their celebrity supporters were among those with considerable fans in social media. By June 2014, Prabowo had approximately 5.8 million fans in his Facebook page and approximately nine hundred thousand followers in Twitter whereas Jokowi had approximately one and a half million fans in Facebook and Twitter (Susilo 2014, Lestari 2014, Heriyanto 2014). Some of the celebrity supporters had much higher numbers of fans in social media. Sherina Munaf, one of the most popular female musicians in the country, for example, had nearly eight million fans in Twitter. In the election she endorsed Jokowi and showed her message of support through Twitter (Desyani 2014). With such magnitude of fans, both political figures and their celebrity supporters like Sherina would at least reach and be read by millions of fans within their networks. They were likely able to reach more people because many of their fans further shared their campaign messages to friends in their own networks. Moreover, the country's traditional media often reported campaign messages from the presidential candidates and messages of endorsements from the celebrity supporters in social media in the period. Consequently, their social media messages pertinent to the election were also able to attract the attention of the audiences of the traditional media, some of whom might not be active in social media.

Such accounts demonstrate campaign messages from the presidential candidates and messages of endorsements from the celebrity supporters constituted critical elements of Indonesian mediapolis during the election. Therefore, in order to reveal the role of social media in the election it is essential to scrutinize campaign messages from the presidential candidates as well as messages of

endorsements from the celebrity supporters disseminated through social media in the period. What is special of the Indonesian case is that unlike the candidate's message in traditional media channels, their message in social media could be considered as an entertainment rather than a political message per se. Such an entertainment content constituted a diversion or distraction that was vital to appeal to the population who responds more to social media's entertainment aspect rather than to an authoritative voice. Considering this, the study assessed the impacts of campaign messages of the presidential candidates as well as celebrity endorsements in social media and how such a phenomenon had impacts on the capacity of social media to empower democracy during the 2014 presidential election.

Secondly, it is suggested mediapolis comprises all types of the delivery platforms and channels of global media, both traditional and online media. Moreover, each type of media delivery platform and channel, which coexist and share space in mediapolis, often influence one another (Silverstone 2007, p. 138). Such a proposition is relevant to the situation of current settings of Indonesian mediapolis in which online media such as social media and traditional media coexist and often influence one another. For example, in the 1990s when the Internet penetration in the country was still very low it was suggested online media were often able to influence the news agenda of the traditional media. In the period the country's traditional media often reported prominent issues circulating in online media, therefore their content often reached and had potential to influence the audiences of traditional media (Sen & Hill 2002, Lim 2005b). Under such circumstances, the low penetration rate of social media in the country does not necessarily limit the reach and potential influence of social media.

In 2014 social media penetration among the populations in Indonesia was still lower than the penetration of the traditional media, especially television. By mid 2014 Indonesia had approximately 65 million Facebook users and 30 million Twitter users (Yang 2014, p. 1). With a population of approximately 252 million in 2014 (BPS 2015a, p. 76), the penetration rates of Facebook and Twitter among the country's population were approximately 25.8 percent and 11.9 percent

respectively. On the other hand, in 2012 the penetration rate of television among the population was 91.5 percent (BPS 2014b). The penetration of newspapers was much lower than television, approximately 17.7 percent (BPS 2014a). However, considering the capacity of newspapers to influence the news agenda of television (Golan 2006; Cushion et al. 2016), the transfers of issues from social media to the traditional media, which is known as the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon, was critical in the 2014 presidential election. They might have caused social media to reach and potentially influence wider public audiences in the country. It implies social media, through such intermedia agenda setting power, have potential capacity to shape public opinion.

Such capacity was critical in the assessment of social media capacity to empower democracy within the setting of the 2014 presidential election due to the situation of Indonesian mediapolis in the period. Indonesian traditional media outlets largely belong to a few media giants, dubbed *The League of Thirteen* (Lim 2012). Moreover, some of the media giants were active in politics or affiliated with political actors; therefore in election the media outlets also took stances in accordance with the stances of their respective political affiliates (Ida 2011, p. 22; Tapsell 2015; Aspinall 2014a, p. 98; Dhyatmika 2014). It also occurred during the 2014 presidential election. In the period, Indonesian media environment was highly polarized. Each of the presidential candidates received support from four media giants: MNC Group, Lippo Group, Visi Media Asia, and CT Corp supported Prabowo whilst Kompas Gramedia Group, Jawa Post Group, Media Group, and Tempo Media Group supported Jokowi. A more thorough analysis on the situation of Indonesian media landscape is presented in Chapter 2. Due to such a political affiliation the traditional media could not provide impartial political information to the public. Under such circumstances, social media capacity to set the agenda of the traditional media had potential to interfere and challenge the inclination of such biased political reports of the traditional media. It suggests intermedia agenda setting between both media types constituted a critical element of Indonesian mediapolis during the election. Therefore, in order to understand the role of social media during the election, it is essential to examine the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon between

social media and traditional media, especially concerning political issues pertinent to the election.

### **1.3. Media Power, the Public, and Democracy**

The media, especially print and broadcasting media, have potential power to influence public opinion (McCombs & Shaw 1972, Lippmann 1957). For political actors such power is essential, particularly in pursuing their political objectives in election period. Therefore media have become their key devices as well as strategies in such endeavors. The power of media has been so prominent and influential in politics that media institutions are often labeled as the fourth estate of democracy, along with formal political institutions of the executive, legislature, and judiciary (Schultz 1998).

Hitherto the power and influences of the media were mostly perceived and attributed to the mass media such as newspapers, radio, and television due to their capacity to address and influence the opinion of the mass audience concurrently (Lippmann 1957). However, since the emergence and propagation of social media in the 2000s such power has also been attributed to the alternative media due to their influences in contemporary politics, from election in North America, Europe, and Australia as aforementioned to political activism such as the 15-M Movement in Spain (Casero-Ripollés & Feenstra 2012), Occupy Wall Street Movement in the US (Suh et al. 2017), and the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa (Lotan et al. 2011; Howard et al. 2011).

A discussion on media power usually invites a discussion on the public (Lippmann 1957; Funkhouser 1973; Page et al. 1987; McCombs & Shaw 1972; McCombs 2004; Ross et al. 2015) or audiences (Webster 1998; Bowman & Willis 2003; Bruns et al. 2013; Dunlop 2013). It is because it is upon public or audiences that messages disseminated by the media might have impact. Some scholars such as Lippmann (1957) and McCombs and Shaw (1972) used the term public to refer to audiences. Public is also used to refer to citizens and consumers. For example, ACMA used the concept of public to refer to both citizens and consumers when it discussed Australian regulations on media and communications (ACMA 2010). Such accounts suggest that public can be used to refer to media audiences and consumers as well as citizens. Considering such

accounts in this study, unless specified, I used such terms interchangeably. Thus, the public here refers to Indonesian people as the constituents as well as media audiences and consumers.

In Western democracy, the media were seen as having vital functions to empower democracy regardless of what type of democracy is being discussed, be it liberal, deliberative, and direct democracy. However, each type of democracy assigns the media with different functions pertaining to their capacity to empower democracy (Schudson 2008 in Street 2011, p. 305). In this study I would only discuss capacity of the media to empower democracy within the scope of two types of democracy, namely liberal and deliberative democracy. In liberal democracy the media are supposed to facilitate the constituents to be well informed with the political issues relevant to their life. For example, they are supposed to provide sufficient and impartial information pertinent to political nominees and their respective political agendas in an election. Media provision on such political information enables the constituents to make informed political decisions on whom to vote for. Liberal democracy requires media systems that foster impartiality. The media shall not be biased toward a particular party and disregard the constituents' need for balanced information (Street 2011, pp. 306-7). The function of the media in liberal democracy as aforementioned is relevant to the study because it scrutinized the function of social media for the empowerment of democracy in an election period, during the 2014 presidential election.

In deliberative democracy the existence of balanced media reports on political issues is also vital to empower democracy. Deliberative democracy is a system of democracy in which constituents have rights and opportunity to channel their aspirations to political actors for the decision-making process pertaining to public affairs. For such purpose, constituents also require balanced information pertinent to political issues they want to address. Such information enables constituents to be well informed and able to participate in the decision-making process on relevant public affairs (Thompson 1995, pp. 249-58). The existence of robust public debates among constituents on political issues is essential for the empowerment of democracy (Sunay 2012) and, for such robust public debates to

transpire, constituents need to be well informed with relevant political issues that they obtain mostly from the public space of mediated communications, be it by means of traditional media or social media (Silverstone 2007, pp. 5-13). Considering such accounts, the function of the media in deliberative democracy is also relevant to the study. Some of the campaign messages from both presidential candidates were pertaining to political agendas. Their messages on such topics generally pointed out problems in the community such as economy, education, and the development of utilities and at the same time proposed the solutions. It implies such campaign messages were also vital for the constituents to engage in public deliberation on the country's public issues. Thus, from both perspectives the capacity of social media to empower democracy derived from their capacity to supply the constituents with information on political issues.

With regard to the 2014 presidential election, I argue social media had capacity to empower democracy but it was limited for three reasons. Firstly, social media supplied the constituents, mostly non-political messages. Such a situation originated from the implementation of the multi-party system. The new political system has driven the formations of hundreds of political parties. Despite such a large number of political parties, however they virtually have similar ideological platforms. Indonesian political parties can be categorized into three major ideological platforms, namely nationalist, religious, and nationalist-religious parties. Moreover, their political agendas are generally broad and vague (Ufen 2008). This makes the parties difficult to attract the constituents only based on issues concerning political agendas in an election period. In the presidential election, the political parties backing both camps virtually also had similar ideological platform and political agenda. As a result, both camps had to promote campaign messages based on non-political issues because it would be pointless for the public to distinguish party ideologies via social media engagement.

Secondly, social media became major sources of information pertinent to the election among the young constituents. Many of the young constituents who generally preferred to abstain from voting eventually decided to vote via social media. Voting participation is vital for democracy, therefore social media

capacity to encourage the young constituents to vote demonstrates democratic empowerment capacity of the alternative media. However, young voters were attracted more by celebrity loyalties than their party alignment. In this case, young voters might be misled by party ideologies.

The endorsements from the celebrity supporters through social media, which were able to encourage the young constituents to go to the voting stations and vote, were deficient in political issues. Instead, they mostly consisted of entertainment content such as music videos. Thus, despite that social media were able to encourage the constituents to vote, the new communication technologies failed to facilitate the constituents to make political decision based on rational arguments that is essential to empower democracy.

Lastly, the limitation of social media capacity to empower democracy also derived from their echo chamber function to the traditional media during the election period. In the election the traditional media were concentrated in the hands of a few media corporations and most of them took a stance in the election. They often reported prominent issues related to the election circulating in social media. It implies that traditional media's agenda setting function in social media. However, the traditional media inclined to report only the particular issues compliant with the political stances of the owners or their political affiliates in the election. The existence of balanced press is vital for political life of constituents. It gives the constituents opportunity to obtain balanced political information, which is vital for them to engage in public debates in political issues or to make political decisions such as whom to vote in election (Street 2011, pp. 303-5). The incapacity of social media to interfere with and challenge the inclination of the traditional media to be biased in the election was associated with the fact that social media was perceived not 'authoritative' by the public. I argue in this research, such circumstance occurred due to the superior power of the traditional media over social media in Indonesia, the lack of appropriate knowledge to engage 'actively' with social media platforms by the wider public, and the highly commercialized social media industry in the country.

#### **1.4. Method**

In this study I adopted content analysis to examine a set of social media and print media content related to the event. The former comprised the campaign messages of the presidential candidates and the endorsement messages of the celebrity supporters disseminated via Facebook and Twitter during the election period. The latter comprises the news articles reporting issues concerning social media and the presidential election in four prominent Indonesian dailies comprising *Kompas*, *Koran Tempo*, *Suara Pembaruan*, and *The Jakarta Post* in the period. I presented the detailed procedures of the methodology in Chapter 4.

#### **1.5. Thesis Structure**

The thesis consists of eight chapters within three main parts. Part I presents the research introduction (Chapter 1), reviews on the relevant literature in the field (Chapter 2 and 3) and the research methodology (Chapter 4). Chapter 1 contains background of the study, research statement, research significance, research methodology, and thesis structure. Chapter 2 reviews the concepts of mediapolis and social media as well as discusses the media environment in the country coming up to the election. The discussion on the concept of mediapolis elucidates the reasons for its adoption in the study for analyzing the current situation of the public space of mediated communications in Indonesia whilst the discussion concerning social media explicates their critical roles as elements of contemporary Indonesian mediapolis. The topic on the situation of the country's media environment elaborates media ownership and media polarization. Chapter 3 reviews the concepts of celebrity and intermedia agenda setting. Discussions on such topics comprise analysis of their histories pertinent to the topic of the study as well as their social and political significance in the current public space of mediated communications, both within global and Indonesian contexts. Chapter 4 discusses key methodological elements of the thesis including theoretical overview of content analysis and practical procedures of its application in this inquiry. The former covers the definitions, its major components, reliability issues, the strengths and limitations as well as the bases of its application in the study. The latter elaborates the data making and data interpretation procedures.

In Part II (Chapter 5, 6, and 7), I discuss the role of social media in relation to their use by the presidential candidates and the celebrity supporters as well as their interrelation with traditional media during the election campaign period and their impacts on the capacity of social media to empower democracy. Chapter 5 presents a narrative and analysis of the use of social media by the presidential candidates in the election with regard to the capacity of social media for empowering political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. It also provides evidence validating Silverstone's view maintaining that the contemporary public space of mediated communication is better viewed as mediapolis than public sphere. Chapter 6 presents narrative and analysis of the use of social media by the celebrity supporters in the election. It elucidates how the endorsements of celebrity supporters via social media might have been influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election and how such a phenomenon had consequences upon their capacity for the empowerment of political life of the constituents and democracy. Chapter 7 presents narrative and analysis of the transfer of issues from social media to the traditional media concerning the event and how such a phenomenon had bearing on the capacity of social media for empowering the political life of the constituents and democracy. Finally, in Part III (Chapter 8), I conclude the thesis with the summary of the study, position and contribution of the study, implications for policy and practice as well as its limitations and potential topics for further research on the field.

## **Chapter 2 Contemporary Indonesian Mediapolis and Social Media**

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This chapter reviews literature pertinent to the concepts of mediapolis and social media relevant to the assessment of the contemporary situation of public space of mediated communications in Indonesia. The discussion concerning mediapolis elucidates the reasons for its adoption as the major theoretical framework for analyzing the current situation of public space of mediated communications in Indonesia. It discusses two topics comprising contemporary Indonesian public space of mediated communication and centralization of media ownership and media polarization. Meanwhile, the discussion on social media explicates their critical roles as elements of Indonesian mediapolis since their adoption in the country in the 1990s. It covers three topics, namely social media in contemporary Indonesia, social media and democracy as well as social media and election campaigns. The topics are essential for building the narrative and analysis of the first case study that is on the use of social media by the presidential candidates during the 2014 presidential election, presented in Chapter 5.

### **2.1. Mediapolis**

Silverstone's concept of mediapolis draws on Hannah Arendt's political philosophy concerning the ancient Greek city-state, polis. She viewed polis as a communal space where political elites in Athens were engaged in public discourse concerning public affairs. She did not refer it as a physical space but as a public space of face-to-face communication (Arendt 1958).

Silverstone (2007) appropriates Arendt's polis, which is a public space of face-to-face communication, to mediapolis, which is a public space of mediated communication. He suggested mediapolis is singular. However, it encompasses all of 'the delivery platforms, channels and the cultures of global media' (p. 31). He suggests mediapolis is different from Habermas' public sphere. Habermas' public sphere is characterized by egalitarian participation, in terms of status of its participants and opportunities given to them to engage in public discourses. Public sphere also requires public discourse within its realms, using only

rational arguments. A mediapolis, however, neither requires such egalitarian participation nor rational arguments. Silverstone maintains such idealistic requirements are problematic. It is virtually impossible to make them happen in the complex settings of contemporary mediated space of communications. Therefore, the concept of mediapolis acknowledges inequality of participation within and across national borders, due to social, economic, cultural and political disparities. It also identifies the irrational arguments circulated in public discourse (Silverstone 2007, pp. 33-4).

The differences between public sphere and mediapolis due to both characteristics can be analyzed from the definition of public sphere. Habermas (1991) defines public sphere as

*'...the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason...' (p. 27).*

In the definition he referred the 'public' as a general category consisting of 'private people'. In this regard, Habermas in particular relates public sphere to a particular class of society, namely the bourgeois. The generalization implies that the people engaged in public sphere were homogenous. They have equal status. It disregards the probable differences among them, be they the educational, cultural, or economic background. He also underlines the use of reason as an important element of discussion in public sphere. Thus, Habermas suggests that the participants of public sphere have equal status and the discussions that take place in it always require reason.

Silverstone (2007) originally established and used the concept of mediapolis to discuss the moral dimension of the media. In his work *Media and Morality: The Rise of Mediapolis*, he primarily discussed mediapolis as a moral space, suggesting that 'the world's media [or mediapolis] are an increasingly significant site for the construction of a moral order' (p. 7). The moral dimension of the media mediates the relationship between 'self and other', be it between

politicians, politicians and constituents, or between constituents themselves (p. 22).

Since its establishment in 2007, there have been several scholarly publications discussing the concept comprising those commenting on and the ones adopting it as the framework for their media research. Among the former were the works of Orgad (2007), Dayan (2007), and Rantanen (2007). They primarily provided comments and reflective thoughts on Silverstone's moral views of the media asserted in the book. Among the latter were the works of Orgad (2011), Wessels at al. (2012), Lazaroui (2011), and Lindell (2015) in which they adopted the concept as their frameworks for analyzing the media from moral perspectives. Orgad (2011) utilized one of Silverstone's concepts concerning mediapolis, which is proper distance, to analyze the role of media as a means of estrangement, which is taking distance from ourselves to enable us to see ourselves as others, in the 2005 riots in France and the Gaza war in Israel in 2008–2009. Wessels at al. (2012) adopted mediapolis as their framework in an inquiry on the interrelations among media, media stories, and the positions of media users from which to engage with the stories in relation to genocide in Rwanda. Lazaroui (2011) used mediapolis as a lens in a discourse concerning the use of the Internet as references in contemporary journalism practices and the consequences for media ethics and truth in Europe. Meanwhile, Lindell (2015) used the concept of mediapolis to examine if the media were useful for the cultivation of cosmopolitanism values such as tolerance, hospitality, and reflexivity toward others. In this study, however, I adopted the concept to analyze the political dimensions of public space of mediated communications, in particular how mediapolis has become the nexus of struggles among social media, celebrity, and traditional media and how such struggles have impacted on the empowerment of constituents' political life and democracy during an election period.

Silverstone (2007) suggests the mediated world of the mediapolis is 'deterritorialized' and not contingent on particular regions. As he writes:

*The mediapolis is not dependent on a specific location. It is no longer even the equivalent of the city square in which presumptions of sameness outweigh those of difference. It does not need or depend on the nation state,*

*or arguably the regulation of specific institutions. It emerges in the interaction of human being within the space of mediated appearance, and in this deterritorialized, but intensely environment, it reproduces something of the polis... (Silverstone 2007, p. 31).*

However, he states that mediapolis enables 'a face to faceness' of mediated communication due to the interactive features of the contemporary media. Regarding this he states:

*Contemporary media [, which compose mediapolis,] enable a face to faceness which, both in broadcast and interactive modes (and of course the differences are not significant), involves the coming together of speech and action and, albeit in the symbolic realm of mediated representation, they reproduce, though of course in intensely technologically mediated form, the discursive and judgmental space of polis (Silverstone 2007, 29–30).*

That is to say, the mediapolis, whilst extended and mediated, privileges features of face-to-face communication, such as reciprocity, a high degree of contextual information, and interpersonal specificity.

Moreover, the media are not simply means of communication, but constitute an environment that cannot be separated from daily lives of people in contemporary society and their performance of identity (Silverstone 2007, p. 5). To the extent that face-to-face human interactions and daily lives of people are mostly embedded in specific locations, it is possible to speak of a nationally framed mediapolis that can be assigned to a specific geographical location, such as Indonesian mediapolis that is used in the study. In this regard, I define Indonesian mediapolis as the public space of mediated communication in which issues arising from face-to-face interactions within the geographical boundaries of Indonesia are projected, perceived and constructed. It comprises all media types, both traditional media and the Internet, containing information or issues about Indonesia. Such media need not operate exclusively in Indonesia as long as they are accessible to Indonesian people. Regarding the traditional media, in this study, unless specified, I refer to four Indonesian dailies comprising *Suara Pemanduan*, *Koran Tempo*, *The Jakarta Post*, and *Kompas*. Regarding the Internet, unless specified, I refer to two social media websites comprising Facebook and Twitter.

### **2.1.1. Contemporary Indonesian Public Space of Mediated Communications: Public Sphere or Mediapolis?**

Silverstone's mediapolis is better suited to examine the contemporary Indonesian public space of mediated communication than Habermas' public sphere. There are at least two reasons supporting such an argument. The first reason is the existence of inequalities among participants of the country's public space of mediated communications. Such inequalities, comprising inequality of access to and literacy with different forms of media, have been due to social and economic reasons. They especially occur between people living in the urban and rural areas as well as in the Western and Eastern regions of the country. A report from the OECD Development Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat revealed the people living in urban and Western Indonesian areas generally have better socio-economic infrastructures than the ones living in rural and East areas of the country. Such infrastructures comprise roads, air and seaports, schools, and telecommunications systems (OECD 2013, p. 32).

Disparities of access to the media of communications, with the exception of television broadcasting, are also still wide between people in both areas. The population in the country's urban and Western regions generally has better access to media than those in the rural and Eastern regions. For example, by 2013 only 2.3 percent of households in Papua, the most Eastern province in the country, had fixed line telephone, whereas the figure reached approximately 6 percent in the provinces in Java and 4 percent in Sumatera. Regarding the percentage of ownership of mobile telephones per household, there were approximately 40 percent in Papua and more than 80 percent in the provinces in Java and Sumatera. The percentage of Internet access per household was also considerably low in Papua, reaching approximately only 11 percent while it was more than 30 percent in the provinces in Java and more than 20 percent in Sumatera in the same period (BPS 2015a, pp. 384-6). Moreover, approximately only 10 percent of people in Papua read newspapers/magazines whereas the percentage reached more than 30 percent in some provinces in Java and Sumatera in 2014 (BPS 2014a). Such inequalities are prone to cause inequalities of participation among Indonesian people in the public space of mediated communications (or mediapolis) to conduct their everyday life, including

political life. The ones with socio-economic advantages likely have better capacity and opportunity to participate in mediapolis, that is, to access and use the public space of mediated communications, than the socio-economically disadvantaged ones.

The second reason is the use of irrational arguments in the country's public space of mediated communications, especially during election campaigns. Such irrational arguments manifested in the use of moral and or emotional judgements. For example, political actors have commonly incorporated performing arts as well as celebrities in political communications to persuade voters during election campaigns in the country (Lindsay 2005; Lindsay 2002; Heryanto 2010, p. 187). I am going to discuss such phenomena further in Chapter 3, especially the proliferation of social media in the country that has provided new space and methods of showing such endorsements. Celebrities no longer depend on campaign rallies to show their endorsements toward political actors. Instead, they use social media as space for such endeavors.

As Habermas' public sphere requires equality among the participants and the use of rational arguments, the situation of contemporary Indonesian public space of mediated communications does not fit such a concept. Instead, it is more compatible to Silverstone's mediapolis that acknowledges inequalities among the participants as well as the use of both rational and irrational arguments. Based on such an argument, I apply such a concept as a theoretical umbrella for this study. However, the concept alone is not sufficient for clarifying the roles of social media in the 2014 presidential election, particularly concerning their capacity to empower political life of the constituents and democracy. There are two other aspects of communications within Indonesian mediapolis influential toward the capacity of social media to empower democracy in the election, namely celebrity (Rojek 2001, Turner 2013) and intermedia agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw 1972, McCombs and Funk 2011). Therefore, I also adopt the theories on celebrity and intermedia agenda setting in the study. I further discuss both theories in the following chapter.

### **2.1.2. Centralization of Media Ownership and Media Polarization**

The situations of Indonesian mediapolis in the election were largely influenced by the political reform starting in 1998. Such reform has caused two important phenomena within the media system in the country that are relevant to this study, namely centralization of media ownership and media polarization. Soon after the new *Reformasi* government came to power, the media were liberated. The government annulled the media restrictions implemented in the New Order era. In the New Order period only those granted media licenses from the government were permitted to establish and operate media organizations. In 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid's Government annulled the licensing system. Under the new media regimes, anybody is permitted to establish and operate media organizations. No media license from the government bodies is required (Said 2009). As a result, the numbers of media outlets, both print and electronic, have increased considerably since then. The number of print media, which was around 300 during the New Order Government, increased to more than 1,500 (Haryanto 2011). The number of broadcasting media, both radio and television, also increased considerably. Within two years of the revocation of licensing system the government issued permits for the establishment of 1,000 new commercial radio stations and five new television stations (Kitley 2000, p. 215). However, the numbers of media outlets have changed considerably since then due to market competition. By 2014, the Press Council (*Dewan Pers*) reported the number of print media outlets dropped to 567, consisting of 312 dailies, 173 weeklies, and 82 monthlies. In contrast, the number of television and radio stations increased greatly. By 2014, there were 394 television stations and 1,166 radio stations in the country. In addition, the Press Council stated there were 211 online media in the period (Pers 2014).

Despite the large number of media outlets, the major media outlets, be they print media, broadcasting, or online media, largely belong to a few key players. Lim (2012) stated there were 13 key players in the media business in Indonesia. The key players, which she dubbed *The League of Thirteen*, consisted of the national public broadcasters LPP TVRI and LPP RRI along with 12 media conglomerates. Within the current media landscape, however, there is another key player I believe should be included into Lim's league, namely Tempo Media Group (TMG).

In the original list, Lim excluded *Tempo*, although she noted its importance as the key print media specializing in politics. Probably, it was because Tempo only operated two print media back then. Moreover, it was not a business conglomerate yet. Tempo had no business outside the media sector, which is not the case now. Currently TMG has been growing into a key player in the country's media landscape with several media outlets and platforms, from print, television broadcasting, and online media. It also has expanded its business into other sectors beyond media.

PT. Arsa Raya Perdana, prior to becoming TMG, started the media business with weekly *Tempo* in 1971. It transformed into TMG in 2001. Along with such transformation, it started publishing the daily *Koran Tempo* and later also established Tempo TV. Now TMG has been growing into a business conglomerate, expanding its businesses beyond media sectors, comprising creative industry (*Matair Rumah Kreatif*), Event Organizer (*Impressario* and *Tempo Komunitas*), trading (*Temprint Inti Niaga*), and property (*Temprint Graha Delapan*) (Media 2014). Thus, in contemporary Indonesia, apart from LPP TVRI and LPP RRI, there are 13 key players in the media business. They comprise MNC Corporation, Mahaka Media, Kompas Gramedia Group, Jawa Pos Group, Media Bali Post Group, Elang Mahkota Teknologi Group, Lippo Group, Visi Media Asia, Femina Group, Media Group, Mugi Reka Abadi Group, Citi Corp, and Tempo Media Group. They constitute the country's key media players because all of the national television stations and the top six dailies with the highest circulation in the country belong to them.

At present, Indonesia has 11 television stations. All them belong to five out of the 13 media conglomerates in the country. MNC Corporation operates *RCTI*, *Global TV*, *MNC TV* and *iNewsTV* (previously *SUN TV*). Emtek Group operates *SCTV* and *Indosiar*, Visi Media Asia operates *ANTV* and *TVOne*, CT Corp operates *TransTV* and *Trans7* and Media Group operates Metro TV. Meanwhile, six out of 13 media giants own the top six highly circulated dailies in the country. They comprise Kompas Gramedia Group (*Kompas*), Jawa Pos Group (*Jawa Pos*), Lippo Group (*Suara Pembaruan*), Mahaka Media (*Republika*), Media Group (*Media Indonesia*), and Tempo Media Group (*Koran Tempo*). Daily *Kompas* had a circulation of

600,000 copies daily and was followed by *Jawa Pos* (450,000), *Suara Pembaruan* (350,000), *Republika* (325,000), *Media Indonesia* (250,000), and *Koran Tempo* (240,000) (Lim 2012).

However, the country's radio broadcasting landscape is different. Radio station ownerships are not concentrated in the hands of the few media giants. By 2012, there were approximately 2,800 radio stations in Indonesia. Among the figure, approximate 700 consisted of community radio stations. Indeed, most of the media giants own several radio stations. However, overall they constituted a small fraction of the country's existing radio stations (Lim 2012, Juditha 2016).

Regarding online news media, as aforementioned, the Press Council stated Indonesia had 211 online news websites by 2014 (Pers 2014). Among these online news websites, the country's top five most frequently viewed news websites were *Detik.com*, *Kompas.com*, *Vivanews.com*, *Merdeka.com* and *Tribunnews.com* (Ambardi et al. 2014). Table 1 shows, except for *Merdeka.com*, they were also affiliated with the media giants. *Detik.com* belongs to CT Corp, *Kompas.com* and *Tribunnews.com* belong to Kompas Gramedia Group, and *Vivanews.com* belongs to Visi Media Asia. However, the popularity of the online news websites was still far beyond the popularity of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. It is because the top priority of Internet use in the country is for accessing social media. Accessing news websites constitute the fourth priority, following information searching and instant messaging (APJII 2015, p. 31).

As mentioned, the political reform in the late 1990s elevated media freedom in Indonesia. The existing media regulations lifted licensing systems for the establishment of print and broadcast media institutions, therefore virtually anybody can create media outlets of their own. At the same time, the country's new electoral system enacted a multi-party system, therefore virtually anybody is permitted to establish a political party of their own. See Chapter 3, section 3.3 concerning the enactment of a multi-party system in the country. Both regulations have triggered some media owners going into politics, either by forming new parties or affiliating with the existing ones (Tapsell 2015). For example, a media tycoon Surya Paloh founded the National Democratic Party

**Table 2-1 Key Media Corporations in Indonesia and Their Political Stances during the 2014 Presidential Election**

Media Group	Television		Radio	Print Media	Online Media	Group Leader	Political Stances
	National	Local/Cable					
MNC Corporation (MNC)	RCTI, Global TV, MNC TV, iNewsTV (SUN TV)	MNC Vision, MNC Play	Sindo Radio, Radio Dangdut, ARH Global Radio	Koran Sindo, Genie, Mom & Kiddie tabloids	Okezone.com, Sindonews.com	Hary Tanoesoedibjo	Prabowo-Hatta
Mahaka Media (MM)	-	Jak TV, Republika Media Visual	JakFM, Gen FM	Harian Republika, Golf Digest	Republika.co.id, jak-tv.com, 987genfm.com, 101jakfm.co.id	Erick Tohir	Unknown
Kompas Gramedia Group (KGG)	-	Kompas TV Network	Sonora Radio Network, Otomotion Radio, Motion FM, Eltira FM	<i><b>Kompas, The Jakarta Post</b></i> , Warta Kota, 11 local newspapers, 45 magazines and tabloids, five book publishers	Kompas Cyber Media (Kompas.com, Tribunnews.com)	Jakob Oetama	Jokowi-JK
Jawa Pos Group (JPG)	-	JPMC Network (40 local television)	Fajar FM	Jawa Pos, Indo Pos, Rakyat Merdeka, Radar, 151 other local newspapers, Mentari, Liberty, and 11 tabloids	JawaPos digital edition	Dahlan Iskan	Jokowi-JK
Media Bali Post Group	-	Bali TV network, Jogja TV, Semarang TV, Sriwijaya TV	Global KiniJani, Genta FM, Global FM, Lombok FM, Fajar FM, SuaraBesakih, Singaraja FM, Nagara FM	Bali Post, Bisnis Bali, Suluh Indonesia, Tokoh, Lintang & Wiyata, Mandala tabloids	Bali Post, Bisnis Bali	Satria Narada	Unknown
Elang Mahkota Teknologi (Emtek Group)	SCTV, Indosiar	O'Channel, Elshinta TV	Elshinta FM	Elshinta, Gaul, Kort, Mamamia	KMK Online	Eddy Kusnadi Sariaatmadja	Unknown
Lippo Group (LG)	-	First Media, BeritaSatu TV		Jakarta Globe, Investor Daily, <i><b>Suara Pembaruan</b></i> , Majalah Investor, Globe Asia, Campus Asia, The Peak	Jakarta Globe Online, BeritaSatu.com	James Riady	Prabowo-Hatta
Visi Media Asia (VIVA)	ANTV, TVOne	Channel (V)			Vivanews.com	Anindya Bakrie	Prabowo-Hatta
Femina Group	-		U-FM Jakarta & Bandung	Femina, Gadis, Dewi, Ayahbunda + others (total: 15)	Femina, GitaCinta, Ayahbunda, Gadis, Parenting Online	Pia Alisyahbana, Mirta Kartohadiprodjo	Unknown
Media Group	Metro TV			Media Indonesia, Lampung Post, Borneo News	Media Indonesia Online	Surya Paloh	Jokowi-JK
Mugi Rekso Abadi (MRA Group)	-	O'Channel	Cosmopolitan FM, Hard Rock FM, I-Radio, Trax FM, Brava Radio	Cosmopolitan, Cosmopolitan Bride, Cosmopolitan Men, Harpers Bazaar, Mother & Baby, Herwolrd Indonesia, Casa, Bali & Beyond		Dian Muljani Soedarjo	Unknown
CT Corp (CTC)	TransTV, Trans7	TransVision, CNN Indonesia			Detik.com	Chairul Tanjung	Prabowo-Hatta
Tempo Media Group* (TMG)	-	Tempo TV, Tempo Channel		Majalah Tempo, <i><b>Koran Tempo</b></i> , Koran Tempo Makassar, Tempo English, Travelounge, Komunika, dan Aha! Aku Tahu	Tempo.co	Goenawan Mohamad	Jokowi-JK

Source: Lim, (2012), *The league of thirteen: media concentration in Indonesia*, Participatory Media Lab, Tempe, AZ.

The data have been modified and updated to the newest situations of 14 December 2017 from the official documents of the corresponding media groups comprising MNC Corporation (MNC 2014), Mahaka Media (MM 2017), Kompas Gramedia Group (KGG 2017), Jawa Pos Group (JPG 2017a), Emtek Group (EMTEK 2014), Lippo Group (LG 2017b), Visi Media Asia (VIVA 2016), MRA Group (MRA 2017), CT Corp (CTC 2017), and Tempo Media Group (TMG 2015). Data concerning Media Bali Post Group, Femina Group, and Media Group remain unchanged, as while they had online news media, the three media groups had no official websites. The categorization of the political stances of the media groups was based on the affiliations of the key figures of the respective media groups. Such political stances could be explicitly stated such as demonstrated by Surya Paloh, Aburizal Bakrie, Hary Tanoesudibjo, Dahlan Iskan, and Goenawan Mohamad or implicitly stated such as concerning the stances of Jacob Oetama, Chairul Tanjung, and James Riady. The four print media outlets used as samples in the study are printed with italic and bold fonts.

(Aspinall 2014a, p. 98) and Aburizal Bakrie, a prominent businessman owning several media channels, became Golkar Party leader (Dhyatmika 2014, p. 16). Such situations have driven the country's media to be highly polarized, especially during election period. For example, in the 2004 and 2009 presidential election, the two media tycoons became political rivals because they were in different camps. Due to such rivalries, the media outlets in their ownership then also took stances in two different ways in accordance with the stances of their respective masters (Ida 2011, p. 22).

Such political rivalries continued to the 2014 presidential election in which Paloh's Nasdem Party was backing Jokowi, and Bakrie's Golkar was backing Prabowo. The political rivalries of both politicians have led to the polarization of the media in their ownership, too. During the election, for example, Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) gave an admonition to Bakrie's *TVOne* and Paloh's *Metro TV* as both television broadcasters had imbalanced news reports concerning both presidential candidates. *TVOne* reported more frequently about Prabowo than Jokowi. On the other hand, *Metro TV* reported more frequently about Jokowi than Prabowo. The tones of their reports were also unfair. They inclined to positively report the presidential candidate they supported but negatively report the other camp (Karana 2014).

Such a phenomenon also occurred in some other media owned by the other media giants who took a stance, explicitly or implicitly, in either camp such as daily *Koran Sindo*, *Tempo*, *The Jakarta Post*, and *Kompas*. *Koran Sindo* was in Prabowo's camp, which was in line with the political stance of the owner, Hary Tanoesoedibjo. On the other hand, *Tempo*, *The Jakarta Post*, and *Kompas* were in Jokowi's camp. *Tempo's* stance was in accordance with the founder and owner Goenawan Mohamad who endorsed Jokowi (Supriyono 2014). Meanwhile, *The Jakarta Post* and *Kompas* were in Jokowi's camp because the elite figures of both media supported Jokowi. Both media outlets belong to Kompas Gramedia Group, in which Jacob Oetama was the most prominent figure (Haryanto 2011, p. 106). In the election, Jacob Oetama never openly declared such support. However, it had become public knowledge both print media outlets were in Jokowi's camp in

the election (Manangka 2017). In addition, *The Jakarta Post*, through its editorial on 4 July 2014, explicitly declared such political endorsement (Perdana 2014).

Media outlets under Lippo Group and CT Corp were likely in Prabowo's camp as the key figures of both business conglomerates were close to the political parties, endorsing Prabowo in the election. James Riady (Lippo Group) was close to the Golkar Party whilst Chairul Tanjung was close to the Democrat Party (Lim 2012). But they both never openly showed their endorsements toward Prabowo in the election. There was no report concerning the affiliation or closeness of the key figures of Mahaka Media, Emtel Group, Media Bali Post Group, Femina Group, and MRA Group toward any political party or presidential candidate in the election. Therefore, their media outlets took no stance in the election.

Thus, during the 2014 presidential election, the Indonesian media environment was highly polarized. Each of the presidential candidates received support from four media giants. MNC Group, Lippo Group, Visi Media Asia, and CT Corp supported Prabowo whilst Kompas Gramedia Group, Jawa Post Group, Media Group, and Tempo Media Group supported Jokowi. Such situations are important to note with regard to the discussion on the roles of social media in the 2014 presidential election, especially concerning the interrelation between social media and the traditional media. The study found that the affiliations of these media giants with the candidates have caused a biased coverage concerning issues circulating in social media about them. They predominantly reported issues from social media that potentially would benefit the candidates they were backing. I further discuss the topic in Chapter 6.

## **2.2. Social Media**

Before discussing the three main topics concerning social media and their importance in Indonesian mediapolis, namely social media in contemporary Indonesia, social media and democracy as well as social media and election campaigns, I first discuss the terminology of social media to clarify its meaning in this study. There are five terms commonly used to refer to or associated with social media. They comprise user-generated content (UGC), convergence culture, participatory media, peer production, and Web 2.0. UGC is defined as media content generated from creativity of media users by means of digital

technologies (Lobato et al. 2011, pp. 900-1). UCG is also known as user-created content (UCC) (Vickery and Wunsch-Vincent 2007, p. 9).

Convergence culture refers to the new media, which social media are part of, based on the convergence of production and consumption modes. On the production side, only media professionals can produce content in traditional media settings. However, in social media environments both media professionals and amateurs (social media users) can produce content. On the consumption side, there are dichotomies of content producers and the audience in traditional media realms. Such dichotomies have collapsed in the social media environment because the audiences (social media users) can also produce content of their own (Jenkins 2006).

Mandiberg (2012) labels social media as participatory media by referring to Jay Rosen's *The People Formerly Known as the Audience* (p. 3). Rosen (2012) states there has been 'a shift of power that goes with the [media] platform shift' (p. 13). Such a power shift occurred due to the emergence of the Internet. In the pre-Internet era, only media organizations, political elites, and media professionals had voices in the media, as they were the sole media content producers. Meanwhile, the audiences, who had no capacity for such content production, hardly had any voice in the media. They constituted the recipients of whatever content produced by media organizations, political elites, and media professionals. Such a circumstance has changed due to the Internet. The new media have enabled 'the people formerly known as [solely] the audience' to produce their own content. They can now have their own voices in the media (Rosen 2012, p. 15). Such a term is also used in the discussion concerning participatory journalism where audiences of online media such as blogs and online discussion forums have also constituted participants (Bowman & Willis 2003).

Peer production is another term in social media. Benkler (2006) refers to it as collaboration among the Internet users in the creation of open source media software and online media content. The former includes *Linux* operating system, *the Apache* web server, and computer programming language *Perl*. Meanwhile, the latter includes content of online media such as online encyclopedia website

*Wikipedia*, Multi-User Object Oriented Games (MOOG) website *Second Life*, news website *Slashdot*, and free electronic book provider website *Project Gutenberg* (p. 59-90). Lastly, social media are often associated with Web 2.0. Tim O'Reilly refers to Web 2.0 as web applications having characteristics of being 'lightweight', enabling 'syndication', 'remixability', 'innovation in assembly', and able to operate different types of media devices. Web applications with such characteristics, totally or partially, constitute Web 2.0 whereas the ones without them belong to Web 1.0 (O'Reilly 2007).

Mandiberg (2012) argues such terms only capture partial features of social media viewed from a singular perspective. User-generated content (UGC) is viewed from media corporates' perspective whereas convergence culture is from media industries' stance. Participatory media is viewed from a political standpoint, peer production is viewed from the perspective of production process, and Web 2.0 is viewed from a computer programming outlook. Consequently, they fail to comprehensively define what social media really are (p. 1). Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) proposed a more comprehensive definition of social media based on two perspectives, namely the web application technologies' Web 2.0 and corporate media's UGC. They define it as 'a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content' (p. 61). They mention six categories of the Internet-based applications constituting social media, i.e. collaborative projects, blogs, content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social worlds (p. 59).

Meanwhile, Fuchs (2014) provides alternative definitions of social media beyond such perspectives. His definitions derive from social theories by which he assesses sociality of the Internet platforms. In particular, he refers to the notions of social facts from Emile Durkheim, social action/social relations from Max Weber, community from Ferdinand Tonnies, and co-operative labor from Karl Marx. He states that, based on Durkheim's social facts, the Internet and the entire platforms running on it are social media; based on Weber's social action/social relations, social media comprise online 'platforms that enable communications

over spatio-temporal distances'; based on Tonnies' community, social media comprise online 'platforms that enable social networking of people, bring people together and mediate feelings of virtual togetherness'; based on Marx's co-operative labor, social media comprise online 'platforms that enable the collaborative production of digital knowledge' (p. 45).

He further summarizes the four notions of sociality into three dimensions comprising cognition (Durkheim), communication (Weber), and co-operation (Tonnies and Marx). Based on such dimensions of sociality, he states the Internet platforms have been developing and changing their characteristics over the years. Initially, they solely had cognitive functions. They are labeled as Web 1.0. Then, they further developed and had cognitive and communicative functions. Such online platforms are labeled as Web 2.0. Lastly, some of the Internet platforms have further developed and have cognitive, communicative, and co-operative functions. These new breeds of online platforms such as Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Twitter and Wikipedia are labeled as Web 3.0 (Fuchs 2014, pp. 45-8).

Adopting the existing social media definitions stemming from such diverse perspectives, I define social media as the Internet platforms that enable the users to establish or maintain relationships and or co-operate with others over separate times and localities by means of content contributions. Based on such a definition, in this study, social media, unless otherwise specified, refer to social networking sites comprising Facebook and Twitter, which constitute the main subjects of investigation.

### **2.2.1. Social Media in Contemporary Indonesia**

Adoption of the Internet in Indonesia was initiated by the National Research Council in 1986 and formed into an information network named IPTEKnet. It commenced providing Internet access in June 1994, mainly for research and scholastic work. The first commercial Internet service provider was RADNET, founded in the mid-1990s. With the operations of IPTEKnet and commercial Internet companies like RADNET, demands for Internet soon increased in late 1995. It was claimed there were approximately 15,000 Internet users in the country by the end of 1995. The figure reached 40,000 subscribers at the end of

1996 (Hill & Sen 1997, pp. 72-4). The number of Internet Service Provider (ISP) continued growing and then they formed the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers (APJII) in 1996 (Hill & Sen 1997). The rapid emergence of ISPs did not automatically generate more Internet subscribers. Only the few middle class, mostly living in big cities in Java Island, could afford this new medium of communications. It was because mostly only in big cities could people get telephone connections, a prerequisite to connect to cyberspace in the period (Lim 2005a, p. 74).

Under such circumstances, the emergence of *warung Internet* / *warnet* (Internet kiosks) became important alternatives for affordable Internet access points. The Indonesian postal service company *PT. Pos Indonesia* pioneered *warnet* business by establishing *Wasantara-Net* in May 1996 (Hill & Sen 1997, p. 70). In the following years, the number of Internet users kept increasing and *warnet* became major entry points for Internet access among the Indonesian public, in particular young cohorts. By 2002, around 60 per cent of Internet users in Indonesia went online from *warnet* (Lim 2002). In 1998, the number of Internet users in the country was approximately half a million, climbing to one million in 1999 and 1.9 million in 2000. By mid-2013 APJII stated there were approximately 80 million Internet users in Indonesia and the number was projected to reach 139 million by the end of 2015 (APJII 2013).

Based on a study on 32 emerging and developing nations in 2014, the Pew Research Center suggested generally dominant Internet users are young people (aged 18–34 years old) with higher education levels (Poushter et al. 2015, p. 14). Moreover, people mostly used the Internet to access social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and other analogous platforms (Poushter et al. 2015, p. 25). Such findings are matching with Indonesian contexts. A survey examining the profiles on Indonesian Internet users in 2013 revealed the demographic group aged 18–35 years old constituted the largest percentage (82.8 percent) of overall users (APJII 2015, p. 12). With regard to the main purposes of using the Internet, the survey found that 87 percent of Indonesian Internet users went online to access social media websites. There were three other main purposes of using the Internet, i.e. for searching information (69 percent), instant messaging

(60 percent) and searching for the latest news (60 percent) (APJII 2015, pp. 24-30). Such accounts suggest the Internet, especially social media, has been burgeoning in Indonesia, in particular among the young demographic aged 18–35. Indonesia has become one of the five countries in the world with largest number of social media users. By mid-2014, the country had approximately 65 million Facebook users and 30 million Twitter users (Yang 2014, p. 1).

*The Burgeoning of Social Media and Media Consumption Shifts: Social Media as New Essential Elements of Mediapolis*

The burgeoning of social media in the country, I argue, has contributed to the changing patterns of media consumption among Indonesian people. Brian McNair, Professor of Journalism, Media and Communication from Queensland University of Technology, suggested proliferation of the Internet has shifted media consumption from predominantly traditional media to online media. He stated the print media have been in decline all across the globe including in the US, UK, and Australia. He supported his statement with some examples like the migration of print media into digital platforms online in the US and UK. In Australia, Fairfax has planned to take a similar step (McNair 2016). Such phenomena are not surprising as, a decade earlier, Wurff (2005) suggested newspapers had been suffering from declining readerships in some European countries such as Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal due to tight rivalries with online media and inability to attract new readerships from young people.

Broadcast media have also been enduring similar challenges. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) estimates terrestrial television broadcasting in the UK would not endure beyond another 15 years, due to proliferation of Internet technologies. It predicts everyone in the country would switch to the Internet to access television programs (BBC 2015; Ala-Fossi and Lax 2016). The Internet has also been challenging terrestrial radio broadcasting with applications such as podcast and radio on demand (Edmond 2015).


Such a phenomenon also has been undergoing in Indonesia. Traditional media, except television, have been declining in the past few years. Statistics Indonesia (BPS) states the consumption of traditional media among Indonesian people,

except television, have been declining since 2003. In 2003, 23.7 percent of the population read newspapers/magazines but the figure decreased to 17.66 percent by 2012. Radio broadcasts have also endured a decline. In 2003, 50.29 percent of the population listened to this medium of communication but the percentage decreased to 18.57 percent in 2012. However, television broadcasts have enjoyed an opposite trend. Proportion of the population watching television increased from 84.94 percent in 2003 to 91.68 percent in 2012 (BPS 2011a). On the other hand, the use of Internet in the country has been increasing. In 2007, only 2.69 percent of the population used the Internet but the figure increased to 17.14 percent in 2014 (BPS 2011b, p. 42; BPS 2015b, p. 25).

The coincidence of the decline of traditional media consumption, except television, on the one hand and the hike of the Internet use among Indonesian population on the other hand, indicates there has been a shift of media consumption in the country. The people likely have shifted their media consumption from traditional media, particularly print media and radio, to the Internet. Data from APJII corroborated this supposition. Based on its survey on the profile of Indonesian Internet users in 2012, APJII suggested the Internet became the second major source of information among Indonesian Internet users (80 percent) after television (88 percent), followed by newspapers (52.2 percent) and radio (29 percent) (Herawan & King 2013, p. 64).

Such circumstances demonstrate people in contemporary society, including in Indonesia, have increasingly shifted their media consumption patterns. In the past they were predominantly dependent on traditional media. However, at the present day they have been increasingly relying more on the Internet, especially social media. Therefore, social media have constituted essential components of mediapolis, including Indonesian mediapolis. Figure 2-1 illustrates the situation of contemporary Indonesian mediapolis with regard to the coexistence and interrelation between mainstream media and social media, especially within the contexts of the 2014 presidential election. Due to such circumstances, it is anticipated social media (and the Internet prior to social media) have contributed to some prominent social and political events in the country as explicated below.

**Figure 2-1 The Situation of Contemporary Indonesian Mediapolis**



*Social Media and Socio-Political Events in Indonesia*

The importance of social media in socio-political events in Indonesia can be traced back to the use of the Internet for supporting political activists against President Soeharto's New Order Government in the mid-1990s (Hill & Sen 1997, p. 76). Engagement of the public, in particular student activists, in political discourses via *Apakabar* mailing list and the propagation of *warnet* were two essential factors enabling such important roles. The mailing list, moderated by an American from Maryland, USA, became an essential means of political information dissemination and source of uncensored news among the dissidents as the traditional media were under siege by the ruling government. Propagation of *warnet* was claimed to have equipped political dissidents with an affordable and uncensored medium of communications (Hill & Sen 1997, pp. 70-1).

In a study with Indonesian political backdrop from the 1990s to the early 2000s, Lim (2006) demonstrated how the Internet facilitated political movements in the country leading to the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998. She suggested

it became a contributing factor to such political shifts, transforming Indonesia from an authoritarian to a democratic state (p. 6-10). However, Sen and Hill (2002) suggested the Internet also posed adverse consequences to the socio-political situation in the newly born democracy as it was employed by the public as well as a radical group *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Trooper) to bring a communal conflict in the Eastern part of the country into cyberspace. The public was soon engaged in debates online while *Laskar Jihad* urged people to join them fighting in battlefields in the conflicted region. As a result such uses widened the spectrum of the conflict from a locally contained area of the country to a global stage in cyberspace (p. 176-83).

Since the reform era started in 1998, there have been significant shifts in the use of the Internet in Indonesian contexts. While previously it was mostly used as covert communication channels and alternative political news sources among political dissidents, the Internet has transmuted such roles into socio-political devices employed by the government, political parties, politicians, and general public of Indonesia. Such shifts materialized partly due to transformations of Indonesian political systems and media spheres resulting from the reform movement. During the general election in 1999, the Internet was claimed to have played important roles so that the election was dubbed as 'the country's first online election' (Hill 2003, p. 531). It was not due to pervasive Internet utilizations by political actors for political campaigns but rather due to a successful adoption of the medium by the General Election Commission (KPU). Using existing national banking Internet networks, KPU processed the election results and displayed them publicly online on real time under public scrutiny so that the public acknowledged the election was fair (Hill 2003). In the period, political actors still ignored this medium. Only nine out of 48 contesting parties had already set up official websites (Hill & Sen 2000a, p. 131). In the 2004 general election, major use of the Internet remained similar, mainly used by KPU. Still, only few political parties owned websites during this event (Hill 2008, pp. 88-9).

During Indonesia's 2009 presidential election, however, the Internet – especially social media – started being utilized for political purposes. For example, a

Facebook group named 'Say no to Megawati' appeared during the event. However, it was unclear whether the Facebook group was affiliated to particular political actors or not. It criticized Megawati Soekarno Putri, one of the candidates, who was the country's President from 2001 to 2004. Such criticisms, which initially only circulated in social media, extended to offline milieus where significant damage was done to her political image (Nurhadryani et al. 2009, p. 220). It was not until 2014 that social media gained more attention and interest from political parties and politicians as tools for political campaigns. By then political actors incorporated Facebook and Twitter into their campaigning strategies during the 2014 Indonesian legislative election (Abdillah 2014b, pp. 4-8) and presidential election (Abdillah 2014a, pp. 500-4). I am going to discuss this topic further in the following section concerning the use of social media and election campaigns.

Within the reform era, social media also played key roles in four socio-political events beyond election campaigns. They comprise the use of Facebook in the Prita case in 2008, and anti corruption movement in 2009, the use of Twitter by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) during his presidential terms as well as the use of social media in the 2014 the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Firstly, social media became important elements in a movement to support Prita Mulyasari. She was nicknamed Prita, therefore the case is known as the Prita case. Prita was sentenced to a six-month jail term and fined 204 million Indonesian rupiah (AUD \$20,287) after being convicted of defaming a private hospital after she complained about poor service from the hospital. As the public perceived such a sentence was unjust, several Facebook groups emerged to support her. The prominent ones were two groups calling themselves *Dukung 204 Juta Koin untuk Ibu Prita Mulyasari* and *Coin for Prita Mulyasari*. The Facebook movements demanded the court annul such sentences and at the same time collected coins to pay the fines. Despite that she still received six months imprisonment, the movement was able to collect IDR 800 million in donations to pay the fine (Gazali 2014; Lim 2013, Gunawan et al. 2009). Secondly, social media again played an important role in another movement. This time the public used Facebook in an anti-corruption movement to support

Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto, two commissioners of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Both commissioners were involved in a legal case against a senior Indonesian police officer of the Indonesian Police (Polri), Susno Duadji. Polri was investigating a corruption case when Duadji found KPK tapped his telephone. The corruption case was regarding a bank named Bank Century. He was indignant about the tapping and became even more furious when KPK commenced an investigation on Duadji concerning the corruption case. A few days later, the Indonesian Police put both the commissioners into custody with an allegation of abusing power due to the tapping incident. Several Facebook groups emerged in support of the commissioners. The most prominent group was '*Gerakan 1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto*' which attracted more than a million followers within a few days of its launch. Soon, the traditional media also reported the case, which initially had only been prominent in social media. It even caused President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to intervene by setting up a special team to resolve the case. The power of social media was confirmed when the issue was resolved within a few months and the case against the commissioners was withdrawn (Molaei 2015, p. 103, Lim 2013).

Thirdly, social media, in particular Twitter, played important roles during President SBY's terms. The President has an official Twitter account, @SBYudhoyono and a team handling his Twitter account. However, the President himself often tweeted in person, which is indicated by \*SBY\* appearing at the end of the tweets. For example, he himself authored 71 out of 140 tweets in November 2013. He often used Twitter for disseminating political issues such as government policies. However, occasionally, the president also tweeted images about the personal life of his family. No surprise his tweets always attract attention of the public and media. Consequently, Twitter has constituted prominent element of Indonesian media and political spheres (McRae 2013a).

Lastly, social media were also prominent and played important role in the 2017 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta (*Pilkada DKI*). In the election, social media were prominent and playing important role because of their utilization by both camps, not only the running candidates but also their supporters, namely the

volunteering citizens, the buzzers, and celebrity supporters. Unlike the other examples discussed above in which social media were able to empower democracy, however, in the event social media was suggested to disempower democracy. Lim (2017) suggested that social media facilitated 'the practice of post-truth politics' in the election (p. 1). The alternative media still held their capacity to facilitate freedom of expression among the constituents. However, they also facilitated the dissemination of hate speech among the constituents. On the one hand, the constituents utilized social media to freely express and disseminate their political views to others. On the other hand, they also actively and freely used the alternative media to spread hate speech and silence to those with different political views. She suggested that the utilization of social media by the volunteering citizens, the buzzers, and celebrity supporters in the election had adverse impacts on equality and justice of the constituents on the opposite camp (Lim 2017).

Such accounts suggest that social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, have played important roles in social and political events in the country, both to empower and disempower democracy. Initially, always the public, not the political parties or politicians, took the lead in exploiting them for socio-political purposes. It seems, for the Indonesian public, social media have been attributed as a 'secret weapon' of the neglected and as such have been appropriated accordingly within contemporary socio-political milieus. However, such a situation has changed. President SBY's adoption of Twitter during his presidential terms indicates that the country's political actors have used social media as a means of political communication.

More recently, the use of social media in Indonesia has once again broadened. They have been incorporated in election campaigns both at regional and national level. At regional level the use of social media during the 2012 Gubernatorial in Jakarta Province was the most prominent example (Hamid 2014; Suaedy 2014). Meanwhile, the deployment of social media during the 2014 presidential election, which is the focus of this study, was an example at national level. In the 2014 presidential election, both of the presidential candidates incorporated them in their election campaign endeavors. At least three indications corroborate that

social media have become new spaces to conduct election campaign endeavors. Firstly, both of the presidential candidates owned and operated verified social media accounts, Facebook and Twitter, during the election. Prabowo Subianto was operating a Facebook page 'Prabowo Subianto' and a Twitter account '@Prabowo08' whereas Joko Widodo was on a Facebook page named 'Joko Widodo' and Twitter account '@jokowi\_do2' (Abdillah 2014a, pp. 500-4).

Secondly, their Facebook pages were created solely due to the election campaign endeavors. This view was based on their initial posts in the social media website. An analysis of their Facebook pages indicated their initial Facebook postings occurred not long before or even within the official election campaign period from 4 June to 5 July 2014. Jokowi Widodo started posting messages on his Facebook page on 12 June 2014, which was within the campaign period (Widodo 2014d) whereas Prabowo Subianto's initial Facebook post was on 11 May 2014, which was close to the official campaign period (Subianto 2014g). Lastly, both presidential candidates predominantly used their Facebook and Twitter accounts for disseminating political messages during the election campaign. I am going to present empirical evidence concerning this in Chapter 6.

The incorporation of social media by the presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election campaign was likely due to a combination of three factors. Firstly, Indonesia has large numbers of social media users. By mid-2014, Indonesia had approximately 65 million Facebook users and 30 million Twitter users (Yang 2014, p. 1). Secondly, social media users in the country were predominantly young people and at the same time approximately 30 percent of voters in the presidential election were young people. Approximately 82.8 percent of Indonesian social media users were young people aged 18–35 years old (APJII 2015, pp. 12-31). Meanwhile, an Indonesian social media analyst, as quoted by the BBC, estimated approximately 30 percent of the total voters in the election were young people aged below 30 (Lestari 2014).

Such estimation on the percentage of young voters is consistent with data from KPU and Statistics Indonesia (BPS). KPU stated the registered voters in the election were approximately 190 million people (Admin 2014). On the other hand, in 2013 BPS projected that by 2014 the number of population aged 15 to

34 years old would reach 84.5 million (Bappenas et al. 2013, pp. 49-52). The figure constituted 44 percent of the total registered voters as aforementioned. However, the suffrage only applies to those who are at least aged 17 years old, or less but already married. Therefore the percentage of young voters was likely lower, constituting approximately 30 percent of the overall voters.

Lastly, voting behaviors of Indonesian voters are unpredictable due to deficiencies of loyalty among political parties' supporters. Such a situation causes a high percentage of undecided voters. Mujani and Liddle (2010) stated loyal allegiances of Indonesian electorate to political parties had been decreasing since early 2000. A survey they conducted in 2004 suggests approximately 60 percent of constituents in the country still acknowledged being committed to a particular party. However, such proportion kept declining in other surveys afterwards and fell to 22 percent by 2009 (p. 41).

Previously, Tan (2006) raised a similar issue, stating Indonesian political parties found problems in retaining support from their constituents. She stated the relationships between political parties and their electorate was volatile. Based on two general elections, the 1999 and 2004 general election, Tan suggested the voting behaviors of Indonesian electorate have been substantially volatile. Therefore, approximately 20 percent of the voters did not decide their political stances, which political party to vote for, until close to the voting dates (p. 97-8). Such a situation had not changed considerably in the 2014 presidential election. Based on a national survey conducted in early June 2014, a month before the voting date, a prominent polling and political consultant agency in the country, Survey Circle of Indonesia (*Lingkaran Survei Indonesia / LSI*), suggested approximately 16.2 percent of the voters had not decided whom to vote for, either Prabowo or Jokowi. On the other hand, 45 percent of the voters had decided to vote for Jokowi and 38.7 percent for Prabowo (Alfaraby et al. 2014). Under such circumstances, it was no surprise both of the presidential candidates incorporated social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, in their election campaign endeavors. It is likely they attempted to reach and persuade young voters, who constitute dominant users of social media and 30 percent of the overall voters.

### **2.2.2. Social Media and Democracy: Empowering or Disempowering?**

There have been debates around the capacity of the Internet, especially social media, with regard to democracy, whether the new communication technology have the capacity to empower or disempower democracy. On such debates, the optimists maintain social media have capacity to empower democracy due to their attributes such as being cost-effective, anonymous, and interactive. Such attributes, they argue, have enabled social media to empower the people, either as consumers or citizens, in defending their rights against the authorities or private enterprises. Clay Shirky (2008), for example, exemplified how social media, due to their cost effectiveness, convenience, and interactivity, have helped people in coordinating, collaborating, and organizing collective actions, from criticizing an airline company to organizing street protests against the authorities. He maintained such collective actions could not have taken place prior to social media because they would have required enormous effort and resources. Thus, social media have empowered the people by providing practical means of communications for such actions. See also the works of Gerbaudo (2012) and Perea, Jensen and Jorba (2012) on this topic.

Hussain and Howard (2012) shared a similar view, asserting the democratic character of social media. They claimed social media have facilitated citizens and political activists in closed regimes such as in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan. 'The reference of Indonesia as a 'closed regime' is particularly intended to refer to the country's media regime under the New Order Government when the ruling Government had massive control over the media. The media regime in Indonesia at that era was 'closed', as it was heavily controlled by the ruling Government. Thus, the media regime in that era was comparable to those in the Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt during the Arab Spring.

The alternative media facilitated citizens and political activists accessing news information from foreign media and became secure alternative means of communications in the New Order period. Until recently, traditional media in the four countries have been centralized into a few hands of political elites and media firms. Therefore, the populations do not have sufficiently diversified news information, especially on political issues. Most of the time, sensitive political

issues are absent or under-reported by domestic media outlets. Such situations make news information from foreign media, which are shared and circulated via social media, become important. They provide more diverse news information, especially concerning political situations in the respective countries. Moreover, social media have also facilitated political dissidents to circumvent surveillance from the authorities on their communication activities due to their interactive and anonymous attributes.

Claims of social media success in democratic empowerment were commonly concerning political protests. The most prominent ones were probably those concerning the Arab Spring, in the Middle East and North Africa commencing in 2011. Many proponents of social media claim the new media, especially Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, facilitated political dissidents in their struggles against the authoritarian regimes in the regions (Wilson & Dunn 2011; Lotan et al. 2011; Khondker 2011; Howard et al. 2011; Ghannam 2011; Axford 2011; Shirazi 2013). Claims of their success have also been noted in other countries such as in China (Sullivan 2014; Esarey & Qiang 2008), Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Weiss 2014, Liu 2012), the Philippines (Soriano & Sreekumar 2012), and Spain during the 15-M movements (Perugorriá & Tejerina 2013; Casero-Ripollés & Feenstra 2012; Micó & Casero-Ripollés 2013). This is despite criticisms of such claims, especially regarding social media roles in the Arab Spring. Allagui and Kuebler (2011), for example, pointed to social, economic, and political factors comprising corruption, injustice, and dysfunction of governments in the involved countries as major stimuli of the political upheavals, not social media. Internet penetrations among populations in the countries experiencing the political turmoil were low on average. In addition, only the few elites of the populations had access to and used social media due to the 'digital divide', that is the gap between the ones who have access to information and communication technologies such as computers, telephones, and the Internet, and the ones who do not (Jones & Holmes 2011, p. 79; Brown 2015, p. 680).

Similarly, Comunello and Anzera (2012) argue social media alone would not have brought the revolutions due to the digital divide and the fact that the ruling regimes had control over social media. Regarding the latter, for example, they

pointed out the Egyptian Government shut down the Internet and blocked mobile telephone communications during the political protests. Under such situations, protesters could not have used social media for supporting their actions.

Beyond political protest as mentioned above, claims of such democratic potential have also been related to political communications, especially for empowering citizens in election campaigns. In this regard, social media interactivity has been claimed to empower constituents. They enabled electorate to communicate to politicians directly (Grant et al. 2010) or the candidates during election campaigns (Vitak et al. 2011) to convey their aspirations. Before social media, constituents could directly communicate with political elites, yet it would not be easy. With social media, however, constituents can directly chat with them. In contemporary politics owning and operating social media accounts have been imperative, therefore politicians increasingly have incorporated social media in their communication strategies. For example, during the 2008 USA Presidential election, Barack Obama, one of the candidates and then the elected President, created an online discussion forum via Twitter to engage with his constituents (Meckler 2011).

Such optimistic claims are also not free from criticisms. It is found that apart from the politicians and political parties' adoption of Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, by having accounts and tweeting, uploading videos or updating their status, they have not used them for genuine two-way communication. Social media were only used as tools to drive people to the politicians' and political parties' websites (Jericho 2012). In Australia, for example, politicians and political parties employed social media mostly for one-way promotional campaigns (Macnamara & Kenning 2011). Only very few two-way communications occurred between politicians and public (Macnamara & Kenning 2014). Such reluctance to engage in online discussions via social media is also found among politicians in Scotland (Baxter et al. 2011) and the UK (Jackson & Lilleker 2011).

On the other hand, the pessimists warn that the Internet, in which social media operate, constitute more as threats than safeguards to democratic life. In other

words, they have capacity to disempower democracy. Morozov (2011), for example, argues that not only political activists have taken advantages of the Internet for championing democracy. Authoritarian regimes have also been attempting to incorporate them into their arsenals to counter political dissidents through censorship and surveillance. In addition, they also have been attempting to depoliticize the population by flooding the Internet with entertainment content.

Regarding censorship by authorities, China, for example, has taken such measures by enacting regulations and conducting surveillance to unnerve the people discussing or posting dissenting voices against the government online (MacKinnon 2007; King et al. 2014). Other authoritarian regimes have also taken similar actions such as Russia, Moldova, Iran, Burma, North Korea, and Turkmenistan (Morozov 2011). Moreover, not only authoritarian regimes apply censorship measures: a known democratic country such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America do, too. The UK Government applied such measures during riots in 2011 (Casilli & Tubaro 2012).

Internet surveillance is another factor making it difficult to claim social media have democratic attributes. Governments and business organizations constantly collect and use data of social media users such as their personal information and online behaviors. They manipulate such data for security and marketing purposes (Lyon 1998; Uldam 2014; Hurley 2012; Couldry & Turow 2014; Fuchs 2011; Deibert 2015). Under such circumstances, social media users have inferior power in comparison to those holding and using data about them – the governments and business organizations. They become objects of scrutiny and probably manipulation. Thus, they apparently do not empower the people but rather they have disempowered them.

Lastly, domination of entertainment over political content in the Internet has further hindered capacity of social media to empower democratic life of the people. Morozov (2011), for example, noted the support of the Russian regime for the production and dissemination of entertainment content online. They comprise entertainment programs available in the country's Internet television and in its social media platform *RuTube*, which is the Russian version of *YouTube*.

He suggests such situations might have made young cohorts in the country be more occupied with entertainment than political issues. Thus, instead of empowering citizens against authoritarian regimes, as asserted by the optimists, social media too have been claimed by the pessimists to constitute tools for political disempowerment targeting young people.

Despite driven by political interest as occurred in Russia, domination of entertainment content in social media has been mostly due to profit orientations. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and Google+ have transformed into entertainment channels. They provide entertainment content such as games, video streaming, photo and video sharing services, and entertainment news, to retain and increase traffic into the websites (Mulvihill 2011). Although such endeavors are based on economic rather than political reasoning, it is likely that domination of entertainment content in social media brings similar political consequences. It detaches social media users from political issues and in the end disempowers the constituents and their democratic life.

Thus, based on the pessimists' arguments, it is hard to claim social media have capacity to empower democracy. There are at least three supporting arguments. Firstly, while in some political settings political dissidents were able to use social media as a means to avoid censorship and surveillance of the ruling government they opposed, in some other political settings authoritarian regimes have also been successful to apply censorship and surveillance on the use of social media by political dissidents. Secondly, availability of massive entertainment content will likely lead the users to be occupied with dumbing-down activities separated from political life. As Postman (1985) argued, people move away from political debates due to domination of entertainment in the media. Such a view is conceivable considering the media constitute an important source of information and knowledge on politics for constituents to engage in public debates on political affairs (Thompson 1995, pp. 255-8). This is despite arguments stating entertainment content in the media can enhance political knowledge of those normally disinterested in politics (Kim & Vishak 2008; Baum 2003). Lastly, as Fuchs (2011) states, the business model of social media places users as free labor working for media corporations. They generate content for the companies

owning the platforms for free whilst the companies profit from such content production. Within such an unfair business model, in which one party exploits the other party, it is problematic to attribute social media as having empowered the users. This is despite suggestions concerning social media potential to create a 'democratic enclave' in cyberspace (Liu 2012). The democratic enclave is 'space ... where the authoritarian regime's writ is substantively limited and is replaced by an adherence to recognizably democratic norms and procedures' (Gilley 2010).

Taking into account the views from both the optimists and pessimists, which were based on the existing research predominantly using the western settings, it is hard to determine whether social media tend to empower or disempower democracy. Hence, a further research on the topic from a different perspective and setting, like this study, is essential to provide additional insights to clarify their democratic function. In this study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, I focus the examination on the capacity of social media to empower democracy from the perspectives of deliberative and liberal democracy, namely their capacity to provide political information that enable the constituents to engage in robust public debates and make informed political decisions on whom to vote for in the election.

### **2.2.3. Social Media and Election Campaigns**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, since the success of Barack Obama in using social media for election campaign in the 2008 US presidential election, research on the adoption of social media in elections have been extensive. However, scholars mostly focused the investigations of the topic within western political settings, especially in the US, Australia, and several European countries such as the UK, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, and Finland. In the US setting, for example, Woolley et al. (2010) investigated the portrayal of two candidates of the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama and John McCain, in Facebook groups created by their respective supporters. They found the Facebook groups endorsing Obama had more members and were more active than the ones backing McCain. Moreover, overall Obama had a more positive image across Facebook groups compared to McCain. They suggested that such phenomenon

was partly because the young cohorts, who were the major Facebook users, mostly supported Obama.

Vitak et al. (2011), using the same presidential election setting, scrutinized the use of Facebook for political activities and its impact on political participation among the young cohorts. They suggested that political activities in social media such as Facebook could be a good indicator of other forms of political participation beyond social media among the young demographics. Meanwhile, Bronstein (2013) focused the investigation on the adoption of Facebook by the candidates of the 2012 US presidential election, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, for attracting voters. Her analysis of pages found that both presidential candidates predominantly used campaign messages containing emotional elements to attract voters. However, they rarely disclosed their private lives for such purpose. In addition, she found that the candidates also used Facebook for other purpose other than sending campaign messages, namely fund-raising and mobilizing supporters.

Houston et al. (2013) investigated the use of another social media platform, Twitter, in the 2012 presidential election. They assessed how the use of Twitter among the audience of a presidential debate on television influenced their attitudes. They found that the activity made the audience more engaged with, and paid more attention to, the debate. Shin et al. (2016) investigated Twitter and the spread of rumors in the 2012 US presidential election. The study found that Twitter constituted an effective tool for the dissemination of political rumors but was ineffective in countering them.

Another scholar, Enli (2017) scrutinized the adoption of Twitter in the following US presidential election of 2016 by the candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. She suggested that Twitter primarily constituted a political marketing tool, for broadcasting campaign messages. Both candidates hardly used it for establishing a two-way interaction with the constituents. The study also revealed that Clinton used the microblogging platform in a 'professional' way but the other camp, Trump, used it in an 'amateuristic' style. However, Trump's 'amateurish' campaign strategy in Twitter was able to challenge Clinton's 'professional' campaign. Lastly, she suggested that the use of Twitter by both

candidates in the election demonstrate the agenda setting impact of social media on the constituents. A number of other scholars such as Williams and Gulati (2007), Vernallis (2011), Hayden et al. (2013), Vargo et al. (2014), and Gerodimos and Justinussen (2015), and many others have done studies on the topic in the US politics.

In Australia, scholars have also investigated the use of social media in the country's election. Among the scholars were Macnamara & Kenning (2011), Bruns & Highfield (2013) and Bruns (2017). Macnamara & Kenning (2011) analyzed the use of social media among Australian political candidates and parties during the 2006 federal election, particularly concerning how they used social media to engage with the constituents. The findings suggested that, despite the availability of two-way communication features in social media, they mostly adopted the new media for one-way communication, that was to disseminate political messages to the constituents. In addition, although they allowed social media users to comment on their political messages they moderated the comments and rejected negative comments.

Bruns & Highfield (2013) examined the use of Twitter by politicians in the 2012 Queensland state election, focusing on the interactions between politicians and Twitter users. They suggested that political actors in Queensland started to adopt Twitter as a means of political communication in the election, however, the campaign strategy with the microblogging platform could not give a significant and direct influence on the result of the election. One of the reasons was due to relatively a small number of Twitter users among the constituents in the election.

Bruns (2017) examined the use of Twitter by politicians and political parties and the response they received from the public during the 2013 federal election. He found that more candidates from the ALP using Twitter than the candidates from the Coalition. It was despite that the Coalition had a greater number of candidates than the ALP. It implied that the ALP candidates were more proficient and active social media users than the Coalition's candidates. In aggregate, the number of tweets from the ALP candidates was also greater than the number of tweets from the Coalition candidates. However, in terms of the ratio of retweet

per tweet, the Coalition candidates were leading. 90 percent of the tweets from the Coalition candidates were retweeted while only 50 percent of the tweets from the ALP candidates were retweeted.

Scholars also have examined the topics with the settings of European politics such as in the UK, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Finland. Baxter et al. (2011), Ampofo et al. (2011), Graham et al. (2013), for example, assessed the use of Facebook and Twitter in the 2010 UK election. Baxter et al. (2011) analyzed the use of the Internet by political actors, namely the political candidates and the political parties, during the UK parliament election in 2010. They focused the analysis on the purpose of the use of websites and social media in the election. The analysis found that the political actors used the Internet for information dissemination as well as recruiting members and volunteers. Moreover, they suggested that the political actors were reluctant to engaged in political discussions with the constituents through online media.

Ampofo et al. (2011) scrutinized the use of Twitter by the constituents for political discussion during the 2010 UK general election, particularly concerning the results of public opinion pollings broadcasted in television in the period. They found some of the constituents using Twitter to help other users who confused about the polling results by providing further information and explanations. They also suggested the discussion on the topic via Twitter facilitated interactions between the political elites and constituents in the country.

Graham et al. (2013) also examined the use of Twitter within the same election setting. However, their examination focused on its use by the political candidates for election campaign purposes. The study revealed that the political candidates mostly used Twitter for broadcasting information. Approximately 64 percent of their tweets were in this category. Only approximately 26 percent of the tweets were for interactions. However, they mostly interacted with other politicians, not the constituents.

Meanwhile, Larsson & Moe (2012) examined the use of Twitter in another European country, Sweden. They examined its use as a political campaign device during the 2010 Swedish election. They found that the tweets concerning political issues pertaining to the election mostly derived from the country's

political elites and prominent journalists during the election period. Moreover, in general they used the microblogging service for disseminating political messages. The use of Twitter for political dialogue between political candidates and the constituents was minor.

Vaccari (2017) analyzed how the use of the Internet, including social media platforms, for political mobilization had impacts on the political engagement of the constituents in three European countries: Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom during the 2014 European election campaign. The study suggested that the Internet, including social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, was able to revive 'democratic citizenship'. The political mobilization by means of the online media was able to increase political engagement of the constituents in the countries during the election.

Strandberg (2013) examined the use of social media such as blogs, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections. He found that social media constituted important campaign device among the political candidates for their campaign activities. However, the impact of social media in the election on the voting behaviors of the constituents was minor because the use of social media among the constituents was low.

A few scholars also have analyzed the adoption of social media in election within the political setting beyond western country such as in Malaysia (Gomez 2014; Gong 2011; Liow 2012; Sani & Zengeni 2010), Singapore, (Lee & Kan 2009; Skoric et al. 2012; Sreekumar & Vadrevu 2013) and Thailand (Grömping 2014). I have discussed them in Chapter 1 so I would not discuss them further here.

This demonstrates that research on the topic of social media and election within the settings of western politics has been relatively more extensive than similar research in the non-western political milieu. In the Indonesian political setting, research on the use of social media in the election is even more lacking. It is likely because political actors did not seriously incorporate social media in their election campaign strategy, especially in presidential election, until in 2014. The 2014 presidential election marked the first time the candidates officially incorporated social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, in their campaign strategy (Abdillah 2014a). Some scholars also indicated the use of social media

in the election. However, they had a limited discussion on the topic due to an emphasis on other issues pertaining to the election such as concerning the Indonesian polity post the election (Aspinall & Mietzner 2014), populism and election campaigning (Mietzner 2015), and contestation of leadership in the election (Fionna & Njoto-Feillard 2015). Considering this, the study is important because it provides the existing research on the topic with additional insights from a non-western context, that is Indonesia.

### **2.3. Conclusions**

The analysis on the existing literature on the public space of mediated communications in Indonesia suggests contemporary public space of mediated communications is complicated due to the disparities in economy, culture and politics in contemporary society. Such disparities have resulted in inequalities of participation and the use of irrational arguments in public discourses within the public space of mediated communications. Therefore, such situations are incompatible with Habermas' concept of public sphere, which requires egalitarian participation and the use of rational arguments. Instead, such situations are more compatible with Silverstone's concept of mediapolis, which acknowledges inequalities of participation as well as the use of rational and irrational arguments as a combined result of economic, cultural and political factors. In applying it in Indonesia, I hope to contribute to understanding of how these forces are joining together in the shaping of election campaign.

Such analysis also suggests social media have increasingly constituted essential elements. Their rapid propagation in the country and their use by the presidential candidates for disseminating election campaign messages during the 2014 presidential election in the country signify such importance. Moreover, social media have a capacity to empower democracy due to their cost effectiveness, convenience, and interactivity. Such features have helped people in coordinating, collaborating, and organizing collective actions, from criticizing an airline company to organizing street protests against the authorities. However, such democratic capacity has been questioned due to the deficiency of political content in social media as well as the implementation of censorship and surveillance upon social media in some authoritarian countries. The deficiency of

political content in social media is especially relevant and become the focal point of the study pertaining to the capacity of social media to empower democracy in Indonesia during the 2014 presidential election. Lastly, such analysis suggests scholarly works concerning the roles of social media in Indonesian settings, especially concerning their role during the 2014 presidential election, are still sparse. In the following chapter, I am going to discuss two other key concepts relevant to the study, namely celebrity and intermedia agenda setting.

## **Chapter 3 The Dynamics of Indonesian Mediapolis: Social Media, Celebrity and Intermedia Agenda Setting**

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As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two other concepts essential in the discussion of the role of social media in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, namely celebrity and intermedia agenda setting. This chapter reviews the relevant literatures concerning both concepts. Discussion on such concepts comprises their histories, basic tenets as well as their social and political significance in current mediated communications, both at global and Indonesian contexts. In addition, it also presents the situations of society, economy and politics in the country around the election that are vital in the discussion of the role of social media. Altogether they are essential to build the narrative and analysis of the other case studies, namely the use of social media by the celebrity supporters for endorsing the presidential candidates and the interrelation between social media and traditional media during the event presented in Chapter 6 and 7 respectively.

### **3.1. Celebrity**

Rojek (2001) suggests celebrity derives from a Latin word ‘celebrem’ or French ‘celebre’. The former means ‘fame’ and ‘being thronged’ whereas the latter means ‘well known in public’. Further he defines it ‘as the attribution of glamorous or notorious status to an individual within the public sphere’ (p. 9-10). Meanwhile, Turner (2013) proposes three definitions of celebrity based on who uses the term. For a media person it refers to ‘a symptom of a worrying cultural shift: towards a culture that privileges the momentary’ whereas for celebrity consumers and investors it means ‘an innate or “natural” quality, which is possessed only by some extraordinary individuals and “discovered” by industry talent scouts’. Lastly, for cultural media studies scholars, they regard ‘celebrity as the product of a number of cultural and economic processes’ (p. 4).

This study adopts Rojek’s definition of celebrity, which refers to a well-known figure in the media sphere, as it serves best for discussing the topic. Rojek offers three typologies of celebrities including ascribed celebrity, achieved celebrity,

and attributed celebrity. Ascribed celebrities are those whose fame derives from the fame of their families whereas achieved celebrities are the ones who become famous because of their prominent achievements. Members of royal families are examples of the former whereas talented artists and sport champions are examples of the latter. Attributed celebrities are those whose fame derives from neither family nor personal achievements. They are famous simply because of receiving extensive media coverage. He also introduces two other types of celebrities, i.e. celetooid and celeactor. The former refers to anyone who gains huge media attention for a short period of time and is then quickly forgotten such as lottery winners and secret lovers of public figures. Celeactor refers to famous fictitious personalities in popular culture such as Batman, Superman, Lara Croft, and Indiana Jones (Rojek 2001, pp. 17-8). This study, however, only discusses the incorporation of achieved celebrities, namely successful artists, sport people, and preachers, who endorsed the presidential candidates in the election. These celebrity supporters, who had a large number of fans, used the celebrity–fans relationship to influence the constituents to vote for the candidates they endorsed.

### **3.1.1. Celebrity–fans Relationship, Influences, and Young People**

Rojek (2001) states mass media become a major means that link celebrities to their fans. It is because celebrities and their fans rarely meet in face-to-face situations. Through the mass media the fans can relate themselves to celebrities and often have psychological attachment with them. He suggested such attachment might have caused celebrities to have influences upon their fans. For example, fans often imitate styles of fashions worn by the celebrities they admire or even adopt their beliefs. However, the degrees of such influences vary depending on the degree of attachment between the fans and the celebrities. Also, the degree of such attachment varies depending on the degree of the fans' relations with their families and friends. The more the fans are detached from their families and friends, the more likely they are more attached to celebrities they admire (p. 21-3).

There are two prominent concepts that can explain celebrity–fans relationship and how mediated communications facilitate celebrities to extend their

influences toward their fans, i.e. parasocial relationship (Rojek 2001, pp. 45-7) and identification (Kelman 1958). Parasocial relationship (PSR) suggest 'a mediated performer' can extend influences upon 'a media user' and such influences might extend beyond immediacy of the media program in which the performer appears (Dibble et al. 2016, p. 21). Horton and Strauss (1957) developed PSR from the concept of parasocial interaction (PSI) established by Horton and Wohl (1956). Examining audience-participant shows, they demonstrate how PSR occurs. They suggest that like conventional social interactions (face to face interactions) that over time may develop into a social relationship, PSI, too, after undergoing 'certain status processes' over time may develop into PSR (p. 587).

Rubin and McHugh (1987) also attempt to explain how such a phenomenon transpires. Adopting uncertainty reduction theory (Berger & Calabrese 1975), they state PSR develops through three stages. It starts with an audience's attraction toward a particular television personality due to his or her personal traits and profession. Such attraction then leads to PSI between the fan and the celebrity such as manifested by contented feelings aroused from watching shows in which the celebrity he or she admires performs. Lastly, the fan feels that such relation is important, therefore he or she decides to maintain such a relation, which is parasocial, such as by prioritizing to watch the celebrity's show more than other activities (Rubin & McHugh 1987, p. 280). Both explanations from Horton and Strauss (1957) and Rubin and McHugh (1987) suggest three significant points. Firstly, a media audience (fan) can form interactions with media personality (celebrity) through media consumption (parasocial interactions). Secondly, over time such parasocial interactions may develop into a parasocial relationship. Lastly, through a parasocial relationship a celebrity might extend his or her influences upon his or her fans beyond the immediacy of the shows in which the celebrity performs.

Meanwhile, the concept of identification suggests an individual may voluntarily accept influences from another person or group of people based on the person's or group of people's attitudes in order to form or sustain a relationship with the person or group (Kelman 1958, p. 53). In the context of relationship between a

celebrity and a fan, the fan is the party who may identify the celebrity's attitudes and conform to them accordingly.

Both PSR and identification similarly suggest celebrity may extend influences upon fans. However, they are distinctive in terms of how such influences transpire. On the one hand, the PSR concept suggests such influences are essentially similar to influences resulting from a conventional (face-to-face) relationship. The way a celebrity may influence fans via mediated communications is equivalent to the way a person may influence another person in a conventional social relationship. Thus, the celebrity's influences upon the fans may transpire due to the increasingly developed relationship between them through multiple interactions via mediated communications. On the other hand, the concept of identification suggests a celebrity may extend influences upon a fan because the fan often identifies himself or herself with the celebrity in order to create and maintain a bond with the celebrity. Manifestations of such identification include adopting values, beliefs, or attitudes of the celebrity. Thus, in the PSR concept, a celebrity may influence a fan's values, beliefs or attitudes due to the existing relationship between them (actually it is likely only the fan who perceives the existence of such relationship) whereas in the concept of identification a celebrity may influence a fan's values, beliefs, or attitudes because the fan aspires to create or maintain (as if one already existed) a relationship with the celebrity.

Whichever concept actually works, existing studies show celebrities do have influences due to their endorsements in the media, be it to promote products or political actors. For example, advertising campaigns of Nike involving celebrities including Michael Jordan, Spike Lee and Bo Johnson in the late 1980s and early '90s achieved a great success. Sales of Nike increased sharply due to such campaigns (Rojek 2001, pp. 91-2). Oprah Winfrey's endorsement of Obama during the 2008 US Democratic presidential primary is suggested to have contributed an additional one million votes for him (Garthwaite & Moore 2013, p. 355).

Moreover, it is suggested celebrity endorsements have been mostly influential toward young people. Existing literatures on influences of celebrities in some

countries in North America, Africa, Asia, Australia, and Europe suggest celebrities are mainly influential toward young cohorts. For example, studies on influences of celebrities' endorsements in Australia, China, India, South Africa, and the US suggest that they are influential toward purchasing behaviors among youths (Chan et al. 2013; Jain et al. 2011; Dix et al. 2010; Chan and Prendergast 2008; Bush et al. 2004; Dhurup & Mafini 2015).

Other studies on the influences of celebrities in the US and Canada suggest they have impacts on voting behaviors of young demographic groups (Austin et al. 2008; Payne et al. 2007; Jackson 2007) while studies concerning influences of celebrities toward young people in the UK and Canada suggest they have impacts on young people's identity development (Boon & Lomore 2001; Cocker et al. 2015; Allen & Mendick 2013). Such accounts suggest celebrities constitute effective endorsers, be it in fields of economy, politics, and psychology. However, the effectiveness of their endorsements varies depending on the number of fans and the demographic group targeted. The power of celebrities to influence the fans, especially young people, is relevant to this study because both presidential candidates received endorsements from celebrities. Moreover, the young constituents, who constituted fans of the celebrity supporters and were prone to celebrity endorsements, made up approximately 30 percent of voters in the election. These young people also constitute the majority of social media users. As a result, the endorsement of celebrity supporters via social media in the election had a critical impact in the election.

### **3.1.2. Celebrity and Election Campaigns**

Celebrity has become an essential part of modern politics, especially during election campaigns such as presidential election campaigns. Incorporation of celebrities in presidential election can be traced back to US politics in the early twentieth century. In the period, it was stated Warren Harding, then the US President from 1921–1923, incorporated movie stars to gain support from American electorate. During his presidency he attracted the constituents by having relationships with movie stars and often invited them to the White House. Some of the US Presidents such as John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon followed his step. Kennedy was close to celebrity figures such as Frank Sinatra, Sammy

Davis Jnr and Marilyn Monroe and often invited them to the White House. Nixon used a similar strategy in incorporating celebrities for his political benefits. Since then endeavors of exploiting celebrities for political gain have become common practices in the US politics, especially during presidential election. Some of the US Presidents such as John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton were among those who incorporated endorsements from celebrities in their efforts to ascend to their presidential posts (Rojek 2001, pp. 123-4; Brownell 2016).

Such practices persist to current politics in the US. Barack Obama incorporated celebrities in his endeavors to ascend to the top political leadership of the US in 2008. As previously mentioned, Obama incorporated celebrity figures in the 2008 US presidential election. The strategy was successful. One of the celebrities, Oprah Winfrey, was able to contribute an additional one million votes for Obama in the 2008 US Democratic presidential primary. The analysis was based on the number of subscriptions to Oprah's magazines and sales of books she recommended (Garthwaite & Moore 2012)

Pease and Brewer (2008) also scrutinized Oprah's influence on the popularity of Obama in the 2008 US presidential election. In particular, the study scrutinized if the news concerning her endorsement influenced the constituents to be more sympathetic toward Obama. It suggested the news about the celebrity endorsement had a direct no influence on the constituents' attitude toward the candidate. However, the news about Oprah's endorsement toward Obama led the constituents predict that he would win and therefore they would prefer to voting for him in the election.

Celebrities again played their roles in the 2016 US Presidential election, which was still underway during the writing of this project. Dozens of celebrities were reported backing Hillary Clinton, a Democrat candidate. Stars like Katy Perry, Demi Lovato, Elton John, and Morgan Freeman were among her supporters. Meanwhile, the star of reality TV Duck Dynasty, Phil Robertson, was backing Clinton's rival Ted Cruz. Bernie Sanders received support from rock and roll musicians Neil Young and Red Hot Chili Peppers as well as a rapper, Killer Mike.

A famous wrestler, Hulk Hogan, as well as a politician from Alaska switching to TV host, Sarah Palin, advocated Sanders' Republican rival Donald Trump (US election 2016: serenades, selfies and other endorsements 2016).

After the 2016 US presidential election, Nownes (2017) conducted experiments to examine the influence of celebrity endorsements on the emotions of the constituents, especially the enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety toward Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election. The study suggested that celebrity endorsement decreased the constituents' anger and anxiety toward the candidate considerably and might influence their voting behavior. In the experiment he used factual information, which was like a news report, about celebrity endorsement toward Clinton.

So far, the US political milieu is the most prominent example of such practices and existing studies on the topic were mostly related to the country. It does not imply that such practices have not occurred elsewhere. Although limited, existing literatures on the topic suggest that such practices have also happened in political settings beyond the US. However, incorporation of celebrities in political campaigns in other settings were not necessarily concerning presidential election as not all countries adopt political systems similar to the US systems. For example, Rojek (2001) also highlighted similar endeavors made by several British politicians to involve celebrities for political benefits. Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom such as Harold Wilson, Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair were among those who made such attempts. He suggested the celebrities were present with politicians in public meeting, campaign rallies, and media interviews (p. 124).

Henneberg and Chen (2008) reported several celebrities also participated in a political contest in Taiwan, during Taipei City Councilor elections in 2002, by providing endorsements to the competing candidates. They explored how the candidates used celebrity endorsements in the election. It was suggested the candidates deployed celebrity politicians such as party chairpersons, ministers, and Members of Parliament in the election. The celebrities disseminated their endorsements through campaign rallies, door-to-door canvassing, leaflets, and

television events. However, the study did not mention if the celebrity endorsements had an impact in the election.

Mishra and Mishra (2014) also affirmed such practices occurred in the political settings of India. They scrutinized the influence of the credibility of celebrities, both national and local celebrities, on the credibility of political brand being endorsed. The national celebrities comprised the country's famous entertainers whereas local celebrities were the local politicians, academics, and prominent figures at the local club or supermarket. In this research, which was experimental, the constituents were exposed to celebrity endorsements disseminated by means of advertisements in the traditional media. They suggested that the credibility of celebrity endorsers had influence on the credibility of the political brand being endorsed. Moreover, the findings revealed that national celebrities were more influential than the local ones.

The deployment of celebrities in election campaign also occurred in Indonesia. It was suggested it can be traced back to Indonesia's first election in 1955. Feith (1957) observes political actors incorporated entertainers in election campaign efforts in Indonesia's first election, particularly during campaign rallies (p. 21). Lindsay (2005) stated such tactics persisted until the 1999 general election. Initially such undertakings involved artists of traditional entertainments, such as *ketoprak*, *wayang*, and *ludruk*. However, since 1971 they have incorporated non-traditional entertainers including the country's most famous musicians, comedians, and dancers in campaign rallies. In the 1971 election, political parties, in particular the government's party Golkar, started deploying such non-traditional entertainers. Golkar's incorporation of entertainment was remarkable and well organized. It was reported it hired more than 300 artists and organized them in teams as part of its campaigning endeavors. It required 14 aircraft to transport the artists on campaign safari to perform at campaign rallies across the country. The artists were known as *Artis Safari*. In the five following election from 1977 to 1997, Golkar continued adopting such campaign strategies. Another political party also implemented this strategy although it was not as massive as Golkar's effort. For example, United Development Party (PPP) recruited the country's most popular *dangdut* musician Rhoma Irama in the

1977 election (p. 38-9). Rhoma Irama played such a role in support of PPP in the following election until the 1992 election (Frederick 1982, p. 129). During the 1997 general election Rhoma Irama again played such a role but this time he shifted the endorsement from PPP to Golkar (Bodden 2005, p. 20).

Lindsay (2005) suggested the proliferation of celebrities' involvement in Indonesia's politics commenced in 2004, especially during the legislative and presidential election. However, their involvement materialized in two distinct forms in both elections. In the legislative election celebrities participated in politics as political contestants competing for political posts as members of parliaments whereas in the presidential election they acted as political endorsers toward their favorite presidential candidates (p. 36).

Within the reform era, Indonesia has undergone a major transformation with the implementation of direct election systems. It comprises direct election of members of parliament, heads of local governments, and the president (Qodari 2010, p. 122). It was suggested the new electoral systems generate a phenomenon of 'entertainment and celebrity-driven' politics. Such a phenomenon manifested in two forms, namely migration of celebrities into politics and amalgamation of entertainment performances in election campaigns. Regarding the migration of celebrities into politics, for example, several celebrities, mostly from show business, competed for legislature posts in the 2009 election. 18 out of 61 celebrities were successful and elected as members of parliament. A few celebrities also attempted and succeeded to ascend into governmental executive posts at district and provincial levels (Heryanto 2010, p. 186-8). A famous actor, Rano Karno, was elected as the Vice City Mayor of Tangerang in Banten Province in 2008 (Masaaki & Hamid 2008, p. 137) and another famous Indonesian movie star Dede Yusuf became the Vice Governor of West Java Province in the same year (Van Klinken 2008, p. 378). Regarding the amalgamation of entertainment performances in election campaigns, it was suggested political actors have commonly organized entertainment performances in election campaigns in attempts to pursue support from electorate. Therefore, the deployments of entertainment elements in election

campaigns have made celebrities essential elements of election campaigns in current political realms of Indonesia (p. 187).

Such practices even have widened in terms of the celebrities involved and manifestations of such practices. In the past, most of the celebrities involved were entertainers, in particular musicians, such as exemplified by Golkar's *Artis Safari* and PPP's Rhoma Irama. At present, however, not only musicians play such roles. Celebrities from other occupations such as athletes and celebrity preachers have been involved in political campaigns in the country. In the 2014 presidential election, celebrity athletes and celebrity preachers participated in election campaign activities endorsing Prabowo and Jokowi. For example, a number of national athletes calling themselves *Atlit Nasional Pendukung Jokowi* (the National Athletes Supporting Jokowi) gathered and declared their support for Jokowi in Jakarta in May 2014 (Asril 2014). Prabowo also received such support from the country's athletes and former athletes organized themselves as *Paguyuban Atlit Mantan Atlit* (the Union of Athletes and Former Athletes). They gathered and declared such support in Gelora Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta (Pramita 2014). Regarding involvement of celebrity preachers in the election campaign, the support of Abdullah Gymnastiar, nick-named Aa Gym, for Prabowo is an apparent example. Aa Gym declared his endorsement while giving short preaches in Sunda Kelapa Mosque in Jakarta. At that time Prabowo and Hatta were praying in the mosque before heading for KPU to register their running in the election (Iqbal 2014). In Indonesia, some Muslim preachers often appear in the media, especially on television, and are considered celebrities such as Aa Gym, Arifin Ilham, Yusuf Mansur, and Jefry Al-Buchori (Julian 2012; Watson 2005).

In the past, celebrities showed their endorsement of political actors in election campaign rallies. They were physically present in such activities such as in the case of *Artis Safari* and Rhoma Irama for endorsing the Golkar Party and PPP respectively. At present, however, celebrities do not have to show up in such election campaign rallies. Instead, they can just show such endorsements in social media. Endorsements of celebrities might show in social media messages of the political actors they support or the celebrities' own social media messages.

For example, a group of prominent Indonesian badminton athletes consisting of former world champions Rudi Hartono, Icuk Sugiarto, Taufiq Hidayat, and Susi Susanti, showed their endorsement toward Jokowi by means of social media messages. Jokowi tweeted a poster containing their endorsements on 18 June 2014 (Widodo 2014u). Prabowo also received such endorsement from a national car-racing champion, Moreno Suprpto, and celebrity preacher, Arifin Ilham. The celebrity athlete showed up in a video of endorsement posted in Prabowo's Twitter on 5 July 2014 (Subianto 2014p) whereas Prabowo posted a statement of endorsement from Arifin Ilham in his Facebook on 7 July 2014 (Subianto 2014e). Such accounts suggest celebrities have constituted essential elements of the country's politics, especially in election. Their involvement in politics manifests in two forms. Firstly, they run for political posts, either legislative or executive. Secondly, they become endorsers for political actors in election. Regarding the latter, which is the focus of the study, they are involved in such endeavors through campaign rallies and through social media.

These phenomena suggest incorporation of celebrities in election campaigns, initially applied in the US, has permeated into other settings and such a strategy has been adopted differently. In the US, for example, political actors generally relied on entertainers. In Taiwan, political actors incorporated celebrity politicians for such a purpose whereas in India, they incorporated celebrity entertainers as well as the prominent figures in the local community. Meanwhile, Indonesian political actors deployed entertainers, athletes, and celebrity preachers. Moreover, the studies demonstrate celebrity supporters usually show their endorsements in public meeting and campaign rallies, through the traditional media by means of news report and advertisements as well as by means of social media.

Research on the topic of the incorporation of celebrity along with social media is still rare. It is interesting considering that both celebrities and social media have constituted important strategies in elections in many countries. Moreover, studies that separately examine either the incorporation of celebrities in election or social media in election have been extensive, especially in western political settings. Considering this, I scrutinize the adoption of social media in tandem

with celebrities during the 2014 presidential election to show the manifestations of such practices and their political impacts in the election. I discuss the topic in more detail in Chapter 6.

### **3.2. Intermedia Agenda Setting**

This section examines the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon between social media and traditional media in Indonesian mediapolis. Firstly, it presents a brief review on the development of intermedia agenda setting concept, which is developed from agenda setting theory. Then, it examines intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media in various settings including in Indonesia. Discussion on such a phenomenon illuminates how social media and traditional media coexist and interconnect in current setting of Indonesian mediapolis. An important point revealed from such analysis is that the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon in Indonesia has extended the reach, and possibly the influence, of social media content beyond social media users.

#### **3.2.1. Development of Intermedia Agenda Setting Concept**

Concepts of intermedia agenda setting theories derive from agenda setting theory established by McCombs and Shaw (1972). They propose mass media have the power to influence public agendas concerning what issues should be considered important. When mass media highlight an issue as important, usually by frequent and abundant space for its coverage, accordingly public audiences will usually perceive the issue important (p. 176). Rogers et al. (1993) state this theory stems from Cohen's *The Press and Foreign Policy* (1963). It is also related to Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922). Despite the absence of Lippmann's work as a reference in their seminal work in 1972, McCombs discussed it in his further works (see McCombs 2001, p. 285; 2004, p. 1; 2005, p. 552; McCombs et al. 1997, p. 703). Funkhouser (1973) also conducted research resembling McCombs' and Shaw's yet it was published later. In addition, he did not specifically term his finding as agenda setting. Therefore, McCombs and Shaw have been the ones widely acknowledged as the founders of the concept.

Agenda setting theory develops into some variants including the second level agenda setting, agenda melding, the third level agenda setting, and intermedia agenda setting. The second level agenda setting theory suggests that mass media

are able to shape public audiences' manner in perceiving an issue (Golan et al. 2007, pp. 439-40; Kim et al. 2002, p. 7; McCombs et al. 2000, p. 77). Meanwhile, agenda melding explains the reason an individual is affiliating with particular groups is in order to join an agenda (Ragas & Roberts 2009, p. 46; Shaw et al. 1999, p. 2). The third level agenda setting demonstrates the combination of the prominence of an issue and its attributes exhibited by news media have the power to influence public audiences' opinions (Son & Weaver 2006, p. 174; Vu et al. 2014, p. 669). Lastly, intermedia agenda setting states important issues can transfer from one to another type of media of communications (McCombs & Shaw 1993, p. 61; Boyle 2001, p. 26; Roberts et al. 2002, p. 452; Golan 2006, p. 323).

Investigations regarding diffusion of issues from one media type to another initially were conducted among traditional media outlets such as between wire services and local news media (Whitney & Becker 1982), and between newspapers and television (Golan 2006). However, the emergence of the Internet has broadened the investigation scopes to include intermedia agenda setting between online media and traditional media (Lee et al. 2005; Sikanku 2011) and among online media (Lim 2006a).

Proliferation of social media further extends the scope to include intermedia agenda setting between traditional media and social media. Studies on the topic suggested that intermedia agenda setting between social media and the traditional media had different impacts. Farrell and Drezner (2008) suggested that blog content often permeated and were able to set the agenda of the traditional media in the US. It happened because of high readership of blogs among journalists and politicians. Due to such a high readership, prominent issues in blogosphere often attracted politicians and journalists and then set the news agenda of the media (pp. 28-9). However, Lee's (2007) inquiry demonstrated a contrasting result, indicating that blogs followed the agenda of traditional media. He suggested that it happened because bloggers generally had a limited resource for gathering their own information. Consequently, in the US the content of blogs most of the time derived from the traditional media. Meanwhile, Meraz (2009, p. 701; 2011a, p. 107) found traditional media and

blogs have shared agenda setting power. Skogerbø and Krumsvik's (2014) analysis of the impacts of Facebook and Twitter upon traditional media agenda in Norway suggested the impact was minor. They suggested that such a minor impact was due to the unique characteristic of media landscape and political setting in the country. In Norway politicians, especially the local ones, are easily accessible to journalists. In addition, the country's local politicians did not use social media as the primary element of the election campaign strategy. This makes journalists generally contact the politicians in person rather than by means of social media to get information on political issues. However, inquiries concerning influences of social media upon traditional media in the UK and Netherland generate contrasting conclusions. It was suggested that Twitter were able to shape traditional media content. Such a phenomenon occurred because the newspaper industry in both countries was in crisis so that they had less time and limited resources for newsgathering. To overcome such a situation, the journalists used Twitter as news sources, especially political news (Broersma and Graham 2012).

The findings of the studies suggest that the influence of social media toward the traditional media due to intermedia agenda setting is not conclusive. In a particular setting, such as in UK and Netherland, social media were influential toward the content of the traditional media whereas in other setting such as in Norway they had minor influence on the content of the traditional media. In the US, some studies even suggested two different outcomes. Moreover, the studies suggest that the differences of influence of social media toward the traditional media might be due to differences of political system and media environment. As Indonesia have different political and media system, the influence of social media toward the traditional media might also be different, especially during the 2014 presidential election. The following section reviews intermedia agenda setting between social media and the traditional media in Indonesia.

### **3.2.2. Intermedia Agenda Setting of Online Media and the Traditional Media in Indonesian Mediapolis**

Transfers of prominent issues between online media and traditional media have been noted in some socio-political events since the adoption of the Internet in

Indonesia in the 1990s, prior to the emergence of social media. For example, print media in the country often sourced politically sensitive information disseminated by the *Apakabar* mailing list. Indonesian journalists often used the mailing list as a source of their news reports because it constituted a rich information pool of news about Indonesia. They could easily find information about Indonesia from various sources such as newspapers, broadcasts, commentaries, opinions and political gossips in the list (Sen & Hill 2002, p. 8). Due to its rich information about Indonesia, especially the politically sensitive ones, *Apakabar* became a key source of information among journalists in the country in the period (Lim 2005a). A similar situation occurred during the Moluccas conflicts in the early 2000s. Online news reported on *Laskar Jihad*'s website was often sourced by print media during the conflicts. It is even stated many times they just published verbatim copies of the website's articles without examining their validity. The website had such a powerful influence on the traditional media because many websites of the traditional media were dependent on its content regarding news about the conflict (Lim 2005b, pp. 22-3).

Along with the emergence and widespread adoption of social media by Indonesia's population, social media were also reported to have influenced traditional media, especially concerning their content. In several socio-political events, traditional media reported issues that initially were only prominent and circulating in social media. An example is related to the Prita case as aforementioned. Sympathy relating to her injustice was initially only prominent in social media, among Facebook users, but due to the prominence of the topic in the social media website, the traditional media reported on the issue. As a result the issue became prominent in both online and offline media spheres (Mirawati 2011, pp. 5-8). Such a phenomenon also occurred during the 2014 presidential election. For example, a print media outlet in the country, *Tempo*, in its website reported a message from Twitter. The message contained an endorsement from Sherina Munaf, a prominent celebrity in the country, toward one of the presidential candidates, Joko Widodo (Desyani 2014). Another message of endorsement disseminated via Twitter from an American musician, Jason Mraz, also became a topic in another daily's website, *Republika* (Faqih 2014a). Such a

phenomenon demonstrates intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media has been common phenomenon in Indonesian mediapolis including during the 2014 presidential election. It also suggests the capacity of social media to influence the traditional media has been due to the dependence of journalists on online sources such as social media. Such dependence might occur for two reasons. Firstly, sometimes they can find sensitive political issues more easily from the public online than from the public in person. In the 1990s, for example, it would be difficult for journalists to find people discussing politics, especially to criticize the government, in public and reported such a discussion in the news. The public generally would rarely do such an activity because its political consequences. However, the journalists could find the public discussing politics and criticizing the government in the Internet more easily. The public was brave enough to discuss politics and criticize the government in the Internet because they could be anonymous online. Secondly, with the popularity of social media in Indonesia, journalists often find an important 'event' online such as the movement of Facebook users for backing Prita aforementioned. As a result, for journalists social media have become a 'place' to find 'events' for their news.

Considering such accounts, I analyzed the transfer of prominent issues from social media to traditional media to explicate whether content of the former had influences on the latter during the event. The occurrence and magnitude of such issue transfers can be used to assess their reach, and potentially to influence citizens during the election. In turn, such influences can be used to illuminate possible ramifications to the outcome of election campaign endeavors waged by the presidential candidates as well as their potential roles in Indonesian mediapolis. I limit the scope of the study only on the role of social media. Accordingly, the analysis focused on their influence toward the traditional media, not the other way around. It could have been done but it is beyond the scope of the study.

### **3.3. The Settings and the Candidates of the 2014 Presidential Election**

This subsection presents a short summary of social, economic, and political situations of the country approaching the 2014 presidential election and the

candidates competing in the event. Social and economic topics comprise the success and challenges of SBY's Government in both sectors whereas topics on politics comprise the shifts of Indonesian electoral systems, the political situation around the presidential election, and major determinants of Indonesian voting behaviors. Topics regarding the contesting nominees present short summaries of their political careers and uses of social media in the election.

### **3.3.1. The Situation of Social and Economic Sectors**

Data from Statistics Indonesia suggest the incumbent government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) had been successful in improving the country's social and economic situations since he took office for the second term in the end of 2009. It was suggested that Yudhoyono was able to bring the country to be more thriving than any of the previous presidents (Hill 2015). In social terms, the government was able to decrease infant mortality rate from 29.3 (per 1,000 live births) in 2010 to 26.6 in 2014 and increase life expectancy rate from 69.8 years to 70.6 years in the same period. Literacy rate also increased from 92.9 percent of the population in 2010 to 95.9 percent in 2014. At the same time, unemployment rate decreased from 7.1 percent in 2010 to 5.9 percent in 2014. The percentages of poor people also decreased from 13.3 percent of the population in 2010 to 11.2 percent in 2014 (BPS 2015a, p. 2).

In the economy, the government was able to maintain its economic growth well. Some indicators of the economy suggest economic growth. For example, the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 6,864.1 trillion rupiahs in 2010 to 10,542.7 trillion rupiahs in 2014. Reserve asset position also increased from 96.2 billion US dollars to 111.9 billion US dollars in the same period. The government was also able to increase both foreign and domestic investments in the country. Realization of foreign investments increased from 16.2 billion US dollars in 2010 to 28.5 billion US dollars in 2014 whereas domestic investments increased from 60.6 trillion rupiahs to 156.1 trillion rupiahs (BPS 2015a, p. 2). Indonesia even became the country with the fourth highest economic growth among the G20 countries in the period (Howes & Davies 2014, p. 158). Such achievements were remarkable in the situation of global economic downturn in the period.

Despite such progress, however, the country was also facing challenges. Deficiency of infrastructure developments is one of such challenges. It is suggested SBY's Government had insufficiently invested and developed infrastructures such as roads, railways, and seaports, therefore they had substantial social and economic impacts (Ray & Ing 2016).

Other challenges the country was facing were poverty and unemployment. Despite economic progress achieved by SBY's administration that was able to decrease poverty and unemployment rates, the numbers of poor and unemployed people were still huge (Manning & Miranti 2015). In 2014 the country had an unemployment rate of 5.9 percent. At the same time, 11.2 percent of the populations were below the poverty line (BPS 2015a, p. 2). With the population approximately 252 million people at that time (BPS 2015a, p. 76), the figures mean that 14.8 million people were unemployed and 28.2 million people were poor.

Such accounts suggest that approaching the presidential election, in general, the country has been enjoying stable growth in the economy and social life. However, the country has also been facing some challenges such as poverty, unemployment, and deficiencies in infrastructure. Such challenges are worth noting because they constituted key themes raised by both presidential candidates in their election campaign messages in social media. However, as they had relatively similar political agendas to tackle such challenges, their social media campaign messages on the topics were unlikely able to help the constituents to decide their voting decisions. Instead, the endorsement of the celebrity supporters that might have helped the constituents to decide which candidate to vote for. It was because both presidential candidates disseminated endorsement from different celebrities in their social media messages during the election. I discuss the topic in Chapter 6.

### **3.3.2. The Electoral Systems and Political Situation**

There are two aspects of Indonesian politics essential to discuss concerning the role of social media in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia: the electoral systems and the country's political situation around the election.

### *The Electoral Systems: Direct Election and Multi-Party Systems*

The current Indonesian electoral systems were born from the country's major political reform commencing in the late 1990s. The resignation of President Soeharto on 21 May 1998, after ruling the country for almost 32 years, marked such political reform (Liddle 2002, p. 385). The reform has considerable ramifications upon the country's electoral systems due to the enactment of direct election system and multi-party system. The current direct election system replaces the New Order's representative election system. In the representative system, during the election, whether general election or the election of the head of local government or the presidential election, the constituents voted for political parties, not the individual Member of Parliament or the candidates of the head of local government or the presidential candidates. It was the political parties that would then elect them based on the results of the election. Under the new system, the direct election system, the constituents directly vote for the individual Members of Parliament, the head of local government, and the president (Qodari 2010).

The electoral systems generate two phenomena in the Indonesian polity, i.e. professionalization of politics (Qodari 2010) and 'entertainment and celebrity-driven' politics (Heryanto 2010, p. 188). Professionalization of politics is marked by a more central role of political surveys and political consultants in election campaigns. Political parties' elites incorporated results of political surveys and strategies prescribed by political consultants as devices to influence potential voters in their favor. Political actors and political consultants used political surveys not only as means to gauge electability of politicians or political parties but also to influence public opinion (Qodari 2010, p. 127). As a result, political consultants along with their polling results have been increasingly playing central roles in the Indonesian polity (Qodari 2010, p. 138).

The 'entertainment and celebrity-driven' politics was marked by the migration of celebrities into politics and incorporation of entertainment acts in election campaigns another phenomenon emerging in the current Indonesian political milieu (Heryanto 2010, p. 188). Pertaining to the former, political endeavors of 61 celebrities comprising actors, musicians and comedians running for

legislative positions in the 2009 election is a recognizable exemplar. Despite that only 18 made their way into the parliament, some of them were more successful than existing senior politicians. Another evidence is the achievements of a few figures from the entertainment industry securing executive positions at provincial and district level. Regarding the latter, it is exemplified by politicians' endeavors to incorporate elements of entertainment such as celebrities in attempts to gain public support during the election campaigns (Heryanto 2010, pp. 186-7). The 'entertainment and celebrity-driven' factor is important to note with regard to the discussion on the involvement of celebrity endorsements in social media by both the presidential candidates and the celebrity supporters in the 2014 presidential election that is going to be discussed in Chapter 7.

Regarding the multi-party system, it replaces the New Order's tri-party system. Under Soeharto's Government, from 1977 to 1997, only three political parties were allowed to participate in general election. The implementation of the multi-party system gives opportunity for the formation of unlimited numbers of political parties. As a result more parties participated in the subsequent election. There were 48 political parties participating in the 1999 general election (King 2000, pp. 89-91). This figure became 24 parties in 2004 and 38 parties (plus six local parties in Aceh) in 2009 respectively (Mujani & Liddle 2010, p. 36) and 15 in the 2014 general election (Aspinall 2014a, p. 97). As discussed in the foregoing chapter, the implementation of multi-party system in tandem with the revocation of media restrictions has serious implications on the country's media environment, especially during the 2014 presidential election. They have driven media polarizations in the country during the election.

#### *The Political Situation: Communal Conflicts, Corruption and Voting Behaviors*

As a newly born democracy, politically Indonesia has been relatively stable, especially during the two terms of SBY's Government commencing in 2004. The government was able to maintain open and stable democratic life in the country (Aspinall, Mietzner & Tomsa 2015; Howes & Davies 2014, p. 158). Despite such success, however, the country was still facing two major political challenges, i.e. communal conflicts and corruption among political elites (McRae 2013b, pp. 297-301). Regarding the former, communal conflicts occurred in some regions of

the country such as West Java, West Kalimantan, Lampung and Madura during the period of 2009 to 2014 (Wilson 2015).

Regarding the latter, some key political elites around SBY were involved in corruption cases. Two elites of SBY's *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party / PD), Anas Urbaningrum and Muhammad Nazarudin along with a minister in his cabinet Andi Malarangeng (Minister of Youth and Sports), were jailed for a corruption case concerning the development of a major sport complex in 2011. Two other ministers in his cabinet, i.e. Jero Wacik (Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources) and Surya Dharma Ali (Minister of Religious Affairs), also had to resign due to corruption cases (Aspinall & Mietzner 2014). Thus, approaching the presidential election, in general the country had an open and stable democratic life yet it had been facing communal conflicts and problems of corruption among the political elites. Problems of corruption are worth noting because they became major themes promoted by both presidential candidates in their election campaigns.

Some studies on Indonesian voting behaviors suggested there have been five major factors influencing people's choice of political actors since the country's first election in 1955, comprising ethnicity, religious orientation, party affiliation, political figure, and political agenda (Liddle 1970; King 2003; Liddle & Mujani 2007; Mujani & Liddle 2010). A study scrutinizing Indonesian election from 1955 to 1999 suggested that ethnicity and religious affiliations played major roles in Indonesian electorate's voting behaviors. For example, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) obtained 79 percent of the total votes in Bali and the Golkar Party obtained 66.5 percent of the total votes in South Sulawesi in the 1999 election. It is suggested such a phenomenon was due to the ethnicities of political elites of the parties. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chair of PDI-P, was of Balinese descent whereas B.J. Habibie, a senior Golkar Party politician, was an indigenous person of South Sulawesi Province. It also revealed the traditionalist Muslims (*santri*) inclined to vote for an Islamic party (the Development Unity Party/PPP) while the *abangan* and non-Muslims tended to vote for the secular-national parties such as Golkar Party and PDI-P (King 2003, pp. 141-63). *Santri* were Muslims practising Islamic teachings consistently, and

*abangan* were those proclaiming Muslims but still practising animism (Geertz 1960).

However, later studies suggested religious affiliation no longer became a major determinant of Indonesian electorate in deciding which parties or politicians to vote for. In the 1999 Indonesian parliamentary election and 2004 presidential election it is suggested Indonesian electorate was influenced largely by party affiliations and political figures. In the 1999 election, members of a particular party mostly voted for the party they affiliated with than the other parties. In the 2004 election, electorate mostly voted for a presidential candidate based on his or her personal charm than his or her party affiliation. Religious orientation still had an impact on voting behaviors yet it was minor. Such an impact, in particular, applied to Indonesian Muslim voters during the legislative election. The more religious Muslim voters were, the more likely they voted for Islamic parties such as PKB and PPP than secular-nationalist parties such as PDI-P. However, such a tendency did not apply in the presidential election (Liddle & Mujani 2007, p. 845).

Following the 2009 Indonesian legislative and presidential election, Liddle and Mujani (2010) again examined voting behaviors of Indonesian electorate. They stated there were two main factors influencing electorate's behaviors in the election, namely political figures and political agenda. In the parliamentary election, Indonesian constituents' votes toward a particular party were mostly due to their preferences for the party leader and its political agenda. In the presidential election, the constituents' voting preferences were mostly due to the candidates' charm and political agenda rather than the political parties the constituents were affiliated with. They also suggested religions had minor impact, which was similar to the 1999 and 2004 elections (p. 37). Regarding minor influence of party affiliation toward voting behaviors of the country's constituents, it was suggested this especially occurred among young cohorts. The young cohorts generally have low affiliation toward political parties was due to their disappointment and distrust toward political parties and the parliament (Yanuarti 2016).

Another factor contributing to the voting behaviors of the country's constituents is vote buying. Political parties or candidates often give money or goods to the constituents in exchange for votes. Such dirty practice usually occurs on the early morning of the voting date so it is generally known as *serangan fajar* (dawn attack). Despite that the constituents usually take the money given to them for such purposes, they rarely vote for the political parties or political candidates giving away the money. It is suggested only approximately 30 percent of the constituents taking the money actually vote for the respective political parties or candidates (Aspinall et al 2017; Aspinall 2014b; Ida 2014). However, approaching the 2014 presidential election the constituents have increasingly been appalled by such practices. For example, thousands of people in Klaten, Central Java, publicly declared to prevent such practices from happening in their region (Gultom 2014). Similar public denunciation of money politics, especially *serangan fajar*, also occurred in other regions such as Semarang, Central Java (Adhitya 2014), Malang, East Java (Istiawan 2014), and Jakarta (Madani 2014). Considering such factors, the influence of vote buying toward the voting behaviors of the constituents might have been minor in the election.

### **3.3.3. The Contesting Candidates**

The presidential election was conducted in the middle of 2014. The campaign period was from 4 June to 5 July, whereas the voting dates were on 9 July 2014 for domestic voting stations and on 4 to 6 July 2014 for overseas voting stations (KPU 2014b). Two pairs of candidates ran for the presidential and vice presidential post in the election. Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo – Hatta) constituted contestant number one whilst Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi – JK) constituted number two. Despite that the contestants consisted of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the following discussions are predominantly pertaining to the presidential candidates because they constituted the main subjects of investigation in the study. There will be some discussions on the vice-presidential candidates but they are minor.

#### *Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo – Hatta)*

Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Hatta Rajasa were nominated by six political parties comprising Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra),

Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN), United Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB) and Functional Group Party (Golkar) (KPU 2014a, p. 9). Prabowo Subianto, nick-named Prabowo, is a retired army general and former son-in law of President Suharto. After the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, he lived in Jordan as a businessman. His business includes oil, gas, palm oil, pulp, mining, and fisheries. He returned to Indonesia in 2001 and went into politics. Initially he joined with the Golkar Party but then he established Gerindra in 2008 (Gerindra). He paired with Megawati Sukarno Putri in the 2009 presidential election as Vice President candidate but they failed (Amri & Susila 2009). Therefore, the 2014 presidential election was the second time he competed in a presidential election but this time he ran as the presidential candidate. Prabowo projected himself as a populist and strong leader. His populist attitude, for example, was exemplified through his involvement in a farmer organization. He was elected the chair of the Association of Indonesian Farmers (HKTI) in 2004. Meanwhile his strong leadership predominantly derived from his long service in the military during President Suharto's New Order Government (Mietzner 2014, pp. 113-4). The former army general was alleged to involve in human rights violations in the New Order era, which was in the kidnapping of political dissidents. He was then retired from the military after the case and lived overseas (Mietzner 2015; Hedstrom-Wiggins 2015; Haseman 1999; Suryadinata 1999).

Meanwhile, Hatta Rajasa was a former chairman of PAN (2010–2015). His political career began in the 1999 election when he was elected as Member of Parliament in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's General Assembly (MPR) from PAN. Hatta several times served as minister including the Minister of Research and Technology (2001–2004), Minister of Transportation (2004–2007), and the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (2009–2014) (Syahni 2014).

During the election campaign Prabowo–Hatta promoted their political agenda in the forms of visions and missions. They envisioned bringing Indonesia into a united, sovereign, just, prosperous, and dignified country. They proposed eight political agendas to achieve such a vision covering four sectors comprising

economy, social, politics, and environment. In economy, they promised to develop a strong, sovereign, and populist economy, creating self-sufficiency in food and energy, and accelerating the development of infrastructures. In social sector, the agenda is development of human resources through reform of educational and health care systems whereas development of good governance and clean government constitute the key agenda in political sector. Lastly, in environmental sector the agenda is stated in broad terms, namely to preserve nature and the environment (Subianto and Rajasa 2014). In the election Prabowo operated two social media accounts for his campaign endeavors, i.e. *Prabowo Subianto* (Facebook) and *@Prabowo08* (Twitter). By due June 2014, the retired general had approximately 5.8 million fans in his Facebook page (Heriyanto 2014, Susilo 2014) and approximately 900,000 followers in Twitter (Susilo 2014; Lestari 2014).

*Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi – JK)*

On the other hand, Joko Widodo and his running mate Jusuf Kalla were nominated by five parties, namely Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), National Democrat Party (Nasdem), National Awakening Party (PKB), People's Conscience Party (Hanura) and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) (KPU 2014a, p. 19). Joko Widodo was not really a PDI-P politician. The party nominated him as the presidential candidate but he was not the party's cadre. He was formerly the City Mayor of Surakarta, Central Java Province (2005–2012) and then Governor of DKI Jakarta Province (2012–2014). He was at the second year of his term as the Governor of DKI Jakarta when he was nominated for the presidency. Before entering politics, Jokowi ran a furniture business. His political career started as the City Mayor of Surakarta in 2005. His name became known after he successfully reshaped Surakarta (also known as Solo) into a city of culture and tourism. Such a success led him to be nominated, and later elected, as the Governor of DKI Jakarta Province in 2012 (Wijaya 2016a). Jokowi projected himself as a populist and modest leader. Such populist stance was generally associated with his pro-poor social welfare programs during his tenure as the City Mayor in Solo and as the Governor of Jakarta. Meanwhile, his modesty was exemplified by his choice of clothing and humble manner. He loves wearing

cheap clothing and visiting unfortunate people in slum areas (Mietzner 2014, pp. 115).

Muhammad Jusuf Kalla, known as Jusuf Kalla or is often called JK, originates from South Sulawesi. He was the Vice President of Indonesia in 2004–2009 during the first term of SBY's administration. During JK's vice presidential tenure, he also held position as the Chairman of the Golkar Party. During the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2000), JK served as the Minister of Industry and Trade. Then, he became the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare during President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Government in 2001–2004 (Wijaya 2016b).

Regarding the visions and missions, Jokowi–JK envisioned Indonesia as a sovereign and independent country based on a spirit of mutual cooperation. They promoted nine political agenda *Nawa Cita* (Nine Purposes) to incarnate such a vision. The *Nawa Cita* covers three sectors comprising politics, economy, and society. In politics, the agenda consist of protecting the country and citizens, creating effective and clean government as well as reforming legal and law enforcement systems. In economy, the agenda focuses on development of villages and remote areas, improvement of national productivity and competitiveness, and development of a self-sustaining economy through the development of strategic domestic sectors. Lastly, improvement of the quality of life of Indonesian people, revolutionizing national character, and forging plurality constituted the main agenda (Widodo and Kalla 2014). In the election Jokowi also operated two social media accounts for his campaign endeavors, i.e. *Ir. H. Joko Widodo* (Facebook) and *@jokowi\_do2* (Twitter). By June 2014, the former city mayor had approximately one and a half million fans in Facebook and Twitter (Susilo 2014; Lestari 2014; Heriyanto 2014).

This suggests three important points. Firstly, both presidential candidates originate from two different socio-political backgrounds. Prabowo is from the upper class and the inner circle of the country's political elites whilst Jokowi is from common people outside the country's political elites. Secondly, both of the presidential candidates basically had similar political agendas. They focused on three sectors, namely politics, economy and society. Lastly, they both operated

social media accounts, Facebook and Twitter, in their campaign endeavors in the election.

Regarding their fans in social media, Prabowo was leading in Facebook but Jokowi was leading in Twitter. However, despite that they had verified accounts, the number of their fans in social media were not significant, especially Jokowi, and might have only been able to reach a tiny fraction of the approximately 190 million constituents. Therefore, if their social media messages in the election might have been influential, such influences had to be from other aspects beyond the number of their fans in social media. Later, I am going to demonstrate how two aspects originating from social media, i.e. celebrity endorsements and intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media, might have contributed to the critical influence of social media in the election. In the 2014 presidential election, Joko Widodo–Jusuf Kalla won by securing 53.15 percent of the total votes over Prabowo Subianto–Hatta Rajasa who gained 46.85 percent of the total votes (KPU 2014c).

### **3.4. Conclusions**

Existing studies show celebrities do have influence due to their endorsements in the media. The fans of celebrities and young people are the ones commonly prone to endorsements from celebrities. Such influences apply to various fields from commercial marketing to political marketing. Not surprisingly, regarding the latter, celebrities have constituted vital elements of contemporary politics across the globe, especially during election campaign period. Such a phenomenon also constitutes a common feature of Indonesian politics. In fact, it is traceable to the first general election in the country in 1955. In the past, celebrity supporters generally showed their endorsements through music or other types of arts performances during campaign rallies. In the 2014 presidential election, several celebrities were involved in such political campaign endeavors. They showed their endorsements of the contesting candidates. In the event, however, besides using conventional strategy by participating in campaign rallies, they used a new strategy for such a purpose, that is by means of social media. Based on such circumstances, the study assessed the dissemination

of celebrity endorsements of the presidential candidates by means of social media.

Pertaining to the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon, which is the transfer of prominent issues from one media to another media type, existing studies suggested such a phenomenon often occurs between social media and traditional media. Content of social media often transfer to traditional media in many different countries and across different media types. Such a phenomenon has also occurred in Indonesia. Analysis of such a phenomenon in the country's political and media settings suggests such transfer of content from social media to traditional media has widened the reach, and likely the influences, of social media content beyond social media users. Based on such accounts, this study examines the issues circulating in social media concerning the presidential election that transferred to and might have influenced the content of traditional media during the 2014 presidential election campaign and the political impacts of such transfers of issues. Assessments on the use of social media by celebrities for endorsing the presidential candidates and the influences of social media content toward traditional media are vital to understand contemporary settings of Indonesian mediapolis. They are in addition to an assessment of the use of social media by the presidential candidates during the event as discussed in the previous chapter.

Regarding Indonesian situations coming up to the presidential election, it shows in general the country had been enjoying progress in the economy and social sectors, despite some challenges of deficiencies in infrastructures and ethno-religious conflicts. The country had also been enjoying progress in the political sector. Approaching the presidential election, Indonesia had an open and stable democratic life. However, the country also had challenges in the sector comprising communal conflicts and corruption among the political and bureaucratic elites. With regard to voting behaviors, existing studies suggest political figures and political agenda have constituted two key factors driving behaviors of Indonesian electorate.

The analysis also demonstrates the 2014 presidential election was a political race between two contradictory candidates in terms of their social and political

backgrounds as well as personal characteristics. Prabowo Subianto presented himself as a populist and strong leader. He originates from the circle of social and political elites in the country. Meanwhile, Joko Widodo presented himself as a populist yet modest leader. He originates from the common class of society. However, in terms of political agenda stated in their visions and missions, both presidential candidates had common agendas, namely politics, economy, and social sectors. In the election, both Prabowo and Jokowi officially operated social media for their election campaign endeavors. In terms of fans in social media, Prabowo was more prominent in Facebook whilst Jokowi was more prominent in Twitter.

## Chapter 4 Methodologies

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This chapter discusses key methodological elements of the thesis comprising theoretical overview of content analysis and practical procedures of its application in this inquiry. The former covers the definitions, its major components, reliability issues, the strengths and limitations, bases of its application in the study, and ethical issues on the use of social media content in this study. The latter elaborates data making and data interpretation procedures. Data making presents sampling technique and samples, collection of samples, and coding procedures whilst data interpretation elaborates how the data produced from the analysis were used to facilitate answering the given research question in the study.

### 4.1. Content Analysis

As there are different variants of content analysis it is essential to review their definitions and clarify the one adopted for the study. Since its codification in 1948 many scholars have developed and offered different definitions. For example, Berelson (1952) defines content analysis as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of manifest content of communication’ (cited in Drisko & Maschi 2015, p. 3). Stone et al. (1966) refers to content analysis as ‘any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text’ (cited in Weber 1990, p. 82).

Neuendorf (2002) states content analysis is a quantitative technique of analysis to summarize messages based on scientific method. In particular, she mentions several essential elements of such scientific method comprising ‘attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing’ (p. 10). Meanwhile, Krippendorff (2013) defines content analysis as ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use’ (p. 24).

Drisko and Maschi (2015) categorize content analysis into three typologies including basic content analysis, interpretative content analysis, and qualitative content analysis, therefore they present three definitions. Basic content analysis is defined as 'using quantitative analytic techniques that only or predominantly address literal communication content' (p. 3) while interpretative content analysis refers to the one that '[goes] beyond literal codes based on manifest content alone' (p. 65). Concerning qualitative content analysis they define it as 'a systematic method for searching out and describing meanings within texts of many kinds' (Drisko & Maschi 2015, p. 87). They state Krippendorff's content analysis falls into interpretative content analysis (p. 58).

This study applied content analysis as defined by Krippendorff (2015), which is also equivalent to interpretative content analysis as defined by Drisko and Maschi (2015, p. 65). This variant of content analysis was chosen due to its characteristic that enables examinations of latent as well as manifest content. Such characteristics were suitable for the study that scrutinized the conduct of public communications by means of social media and print media. Within such settings it was unlikely the messages were neither entirely explicit (manifest content) nor implicit (latent content). They must be a combination of both manifest and latent content. Therefore, application of interpretative content analysis, which enables us to capture manifest and latent messages, is considered the most suitable technique.

#### **4.1.1. Major Elements of Content Analysis**

Content analysis has two major elements comprising data making and data interpretation. Data making refers to constructions of data sets from relevant texts for analysis. It encompasses two key procedures, namely sampling and recording/coding. Sampling is a research procedure to limit 'observations to a manageable subset of units that is statistically or conceptually representative of the set of all possible units, the population or universe of interest' (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 83-4). Recording is an activity of content analysts in interpreting a particular text and put it into a proper and durable record for further analysis whereas coding refers to a recording activity that is based on a set of given criteria. Despite such differences the term *coding* is often used to refer to both

activities (Krippendorff 2013, p. 127; Leslie 2016, p. 145). This study also uses the term to refer to both activities. There are two other procedures in data making process, namely unitizing and data reduction. However, as they are inseparable elements of sampling and coding procedures the discussion on both elements constitute, often implicitly, an integral part of the discussions on such procedures.

The other major element of content analysis is data interpretation. It refers to a procedure of drawing a conclusion or explaining a particular phenomenon based on the data generated from the sampled texts to answer given research questions. For such interpretation procedures content analysts require relevant concepts or theories to validate the drawn conclusion or explained phenomenon based on the data extracted from particular texts to address the given research questions. Such data interpretation technique is called abductive inference (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 42-3). I present further details of the data making and data interpretation technique applied in the study in sections 4.2 and 4.3.

#### **4.1.2. Reliability**

Data reliability is essential to any research technique because unreliable data cannot lead to trustworthy conclusions. Therefore researchers, including content analysts, must be able to demonstrate that their data are reliable. To achieve data reliability content analysts are required to show two empirical evidences in the data making procedures. Firstly, they must demonstrate the data making procedures have embraced all known possible measures to eliminate bias. Such measures include rigor and transparent elaborations of the choice of sampling techniques, samples, sampling procedures, data collecting procedures as well as development of coding categories and coding procedures. Secondly, they must demonstrate their data 'mean the same thing for everyone who uses them', which is done by conducting intercoder reliability tests (Krippendorff 2013, p. 267).

Pertaining to such accounts this study shows both empirical evidences concerning data making procedures. It provides rigor and transparent elaborations of the choice of sampling technique, samples, sampling procedures, data collecting procedures along with the development of coding categories and

coding procedures. It also applied intercoder reliability tests to ensure its replicability. Further discussions on such undertakings are elaborated later in the chapter in section 4.2.3.

#### **4.1.3. Strengths and Limitations**

Content analysis has two advantageous features compared to other research techniques, namely being unobtrusive and able to generate data from unstructured materials (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 45-8). The unobtrusive nature of content analysis benefits researchers because it prevents the potential of interference toward the subjects being researched as well as the results of the research. This analysis technique has an unobtrusive characteristic because in conducting a research content analysts work with texts. They have no direct interactions with the person who produced or was related to the texts. It is different from other methods such as experiments or observations in which to obtain the necessary data the researcher must interact directly with the respondent. Under such circumstances the researchers can potentially interfere with the subjects being researched as well as contaminate the research outcomes.

Its capability to generate data from unstructured materials also benefits researchers because unstructured materials retain originality of ideas in the sources of data as they are. It is different from other types of research methods that use structured materials such as surveys, questionnaires, and interviews. A disadvantage of the use of such structured materials is a potential reduction of authenticity concerning the concepts or aspirations collected from the respondents. Such a condition can occur, for example, concerning structured materials obtained from an interview. In an interview respondents know that they are being interviewed for a research. Under such a situation, they might assume that the research results might affect them. Therefore the respondents possibly are unwilling to provide genuine information asked by the researchers through such interviews. It could be they just give answers they think will not adversely affect them. Such accounts are problematic and might affect the research results because the genuine information hidden from the researchers might have significant value in the study.

Despite such strengths, he also mentions its limitation, especially concerning the techniques to validate the conclusions. It is often difficult or even impractical to validate answers to given research questions because such answers are based on indirect observational evidence. It occurs especially when the research questions pertain to events in the past or future (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 44-5).

#### **4.1.4. The Relevance to the Study**

There are two reasons justifying the adoption of content analysis as the method of analysis in the study. Firstly, it is suggested the technique of analysis is among the primary devices in communications and media research (Zamith & Lewis 2015; Lacy et al. 2015) to scrutinize content of traditional media (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 10-22) and online media (Herring 2010, p. 1). Secondly, it is also suggested content analysis is a suitable method for exploratory and descriptive studies (Drisko & Maschi 2015, p. 32; Krippendorff 2013, p. 1).

A number of recent studies concerning social media have adopted this technique of analysis. For example, Gazzar (2013) implemented qualitative content analysis to examine the role of social media in the formation of public opinion towards Islamists in Egypt. It demonstrates how social media users in the country express, form, frame, and disseminate their views concerning the Islamic movement in the country through Facebook and Twitter. Despite the absence of an explicit statement about the nature of the analysis, it is evidently a descriptive study. Woolley, Limperos, and Oliver (2010) also adopt this method of analysis in their scrutiny on how social media users described the 2008 US presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, in Facebook groups during the event. This descriptive study applies quantitative content analysis in pursuit of its objective. Some other scholars also apply this method of analysis to examine social media, to name a few, including Kharroub and Bas (2015), Ramanadhan et al. (2013), Velasquez (2012), and Zhou (2009).

The study scrutinized the content of social media and traditional media to investigate the use of social media by the presidential candidates and the celebrity supporters as well as interrelations between social media and traditional media in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia. In addition, the nature of the study is explorative and descriptive with the main objective to

identify the role of social media during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election to better understand the current settings of Indonesian mediapolis. Considering such accounts the application of content analysis fits the nature and purposes of the study.

#### **4.1.5. Ethical Issues on the Use of Social Media Content**

This inquiry used social media content as a major subject of examination to answer given research questions. Scholars have different views on ethical issues pertaining to the use of social media content in research. For example, Rooke (2013) proposes four major ethical considerations in social media inquiries, i.e. security, anonymity, and safety of research subjects as well as use of the data. He states social media content are legally open to the public. It is because a new user is usually obliged to give his or her consent that the content he or she provides can be used by the social media website he or she joins with other third parties. The content include parts of personal information. Denial to accept such terms and condition results in denial of membership in the social media website. He also states that security settings of social media websites such as Facebook by default are set that everyone can access information and content provided by the users. Under such circumstance, users often do not realize that the information they provide is open to the public. Concerning such accounts, he maintains social media researchers are obliged to protect social media users whose information is used as subjects of a study by removing any information that can lead to them.

Moreno et al. (2013) also have similar views and propose the importance of protecting social media users' privacy, consent, and confidentiality. They discuss such issues in relation to three distinct social media research types including interactive research, survey/interview research, and observational research. This research is an observational research, therefore their views on such ethical matters are relevant and worth taking into account. They underscore three major ethical issues in an observational study of social media including users' rights to choose privacy settings, privacy policies from social media websites, and legal considerations. However, they suggest social media researchers are not obliged to obtain consent from social media users whose information and content are used as subjects of his or her study (p. 709).

This inquiry used publicly available social media content comprising content of Facebook and Twitter related to the election. None of the data collected came from closed groups (e.g., invitation-only Facebook groups). It was suggested such content were in the public domain, therefore their use for research purposes did not violate users' privacy (Moreno et al. 2013, p. 709). Accordingly, such use did not require consents from the users whose content were used in the study (Attard & Coulson 2012, p. 501). Despite this, I believed researchers are obliged to protect the users' confidentiality to prevent any harm to them. Therefore, in this study I tried my best to protect social media users' privacy involved in this inquiry by keeping their identities anonymous. The identities related to users as displayed in social media are never mentioned in any part of the thesis. It applies especially to the social media users other than both of the presidential candidates and the celebrities involved in the election campaigns. It is because the presidential candidates and celebrities involved in the election campaign are major elements of the research, therefore some elements of their identities must be disclosed to make discussions of the findings relevant.

In addition to the fact that social media user posts in relation to the 2014 presidential election campaign were already in the public domain, it should also be pointed out that many identities of the social media users involved in this study were pseudonyms anyway. Thus, it is believed that such measures have sufficiently protected the privacy of the social media users involved in this research. The use of samples obtained from social media resources for the research has also met the requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* and been granted a certificate of approval from Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (Project Number: 0920).

#### **4.2. Data Making**

Krippendorff (2004) suggested 'reading [text] is fundamentally a qualitative process, even when it results in numerical accounts' (p. 26). He further suggested the use of a quantitative approach (such as by means of frequencies of particular themes from texts) instead of qualitative approach (such as by means of quotes taken from texts) is a matter of convenience. Thus, interpretation of texts by means of a qualitative approach is appropriate for content analysis (p.

88-9). Such a proposition is in accordance with Drisko and Maschi (2015) stating interpretative content allows an analyst to incorporate both quantitative data such as statistical figures and qualitative data such as narrative quotations derived from the examined texts (p. 79).

Based on such accounts, in this study I used both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data were generated through sampling procedures on the relevant texts. They comprise textual data (written messages in Facebook and Twitter as well as the newspaper articles), visual data (images disseminated via Facebook and Twitter), and audiovisual data (videos disseminated via Facebook and Twitter). For analysis purposes, the visual and audiovisual data were transformed into texts through descriptions and transcriptions. Meanwhile, the quantitative data comprise the data generated from the quantification of qualitative data. The quantification of qualitative data requires a further procedure of data making, namely coding. The following sections elaborate sampling technique and samples, collection of samples, and coding procedures to generate both data types.

#### **4.2.1. Sampling Technique and Samples**

Krippendorff (2013) states application of content analysis does not require examination of 'accurate representations of the textual universe' but it requires only 'the texts of interest [which] are relevant to the research question and help to answer it fairly' (p. 114). The procedure of selecting such relevant texts is sampling. There are several sampling techniques commonly applied in content analysis including *random sampling*, *systematic sampling*, *stratified sampling*, *varying probability sampling*, *cluster sampling*, *relevance sampling*, *census*, and *convenience sampling* (for more details see Krippendorff 2013, pp. 116-22). This study adopted *relevance sampling*; that is, a technique for selecting samples based on the relevance of particular texts within the study. Such relevance usually relies on some criteria such as types of sources, situations, periods of time, and genres (Krippendorff 2013, p. 120). This technique is also known as *purposive sampling* (Drisko & Maschi 2015, p. 70).

In this study I used three case studies to examine the role of social media during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. As such case studies required texts

from particular sources (from social media and mainstream media), in particular situations or periods of time (during the 2014 presidential election), and with a particular genre (politics/election campaign), therefore I used *relevance* or *purposive sampling* technique as it was considered the most suitable one. Below are the three case studies along with their corresponding samples and the reasons for their selections.

*Case Study 1: The use of social media for the dissemination of election campaign messages by the candidates during the 2014 presidential election*

I selected content of Facebook pages of the presidential candidates and their tweets as samples, especially the ones disseminated from 19 May–9 July 2014, for the first case study. The selections are grounded in three reasons. Firstly, Facebook and Twitter are the two most prominent social media platforms used among Indonesian Internet users, including young voters (see more details in Chapter 2). Therefore, inclusion of both social media websites in a discussion on such a topic in Indonesian settings would best serve its purposes. Secondly, both of the presidential candidates, Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo, owned Facebook pages and Twitter accounts and officially operated them for campaign activities during the election. Their Facebook pages are *Prabowo Subianto* (Subianto 2014m) and *Joko Widodo* (Widodo 2014d) whereas their Twitter accounts are *Prabowo08* (Subianto 2015) and *jokowi\_do2* (Widodo 2014q). Lastly, both Prabowo and Jokowi used social media intensively during the period of time (19 May–9 July 2014). Therefore, analysis of their social media content on the period would be most productive. The time frame is based on the candidates' registration date to the Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) and the voting date. Jokowi registered his candidacy to the KPU on 9 May 2014 (Firdaus 2014) whereas Prabowo did on 20 May 2014 (Aritonang 2014a). The election date was 9 July 2014. Considering this, the content of messages disseminated through both social media in the period would be the most relevant samples in the first case study.

*Case Study 2: The use of social media for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements during the 2014 presidential election*

For the second case study I selected social media content disseminated by the presidential candidates containing celebrities' endorsements and content of the social messages of the celebrities explicitly endorsing the presidential candidates during the campaign period as the samples. The former comprises the presidential candidates' Facebook and Twitter messages mentioning names of celebrities or containing statements of support from celebrities. The latter comprises celebrities' Facebook posts and Twitter messages conveying such endorsements that were reported in print media or the websites of print media during the campaign period. They were selected as the samples for the second case study because such endorsement messages constituted the most appropriate texts for such analysis.

*Case Study 3: Intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media during the 2014 presidential election*

For the third case study, I selected articles from four Indonesian newspapers concerning social media and the presidential election during the election campaign period from 4 June to 5 July 2014 as the samples. This is despite television constituting the most prominent media among other types of traditional media including radio and newspapers in the country. The selection of the content of newspapers instead of television as the subject of analysis regarding transfer of content between social media and traditional media was based on two grounds. Firstly, collecting content of television news programs during the election campaign period would be arduous as they were past events. While it is still possible to acquire materials of the programs from the Internet or the television stations' archives, such undertakings would require a lot of resources beyond the capacity of this project.

Secondly, existing studies suggest there are correlations between content of news in newspapers and television news programs. For example, Golan (2006) states the content of *New York Times* concerning foreign affairs influenced content of the evening news in three television stations including ABC, CBS, and

NBC. Cushion et al. (2016) found a similar phenomenon during the 2015 UK General Election. They state approximately 30 percent of the evening news content in BBC, ITV, Sky News, Channel 4, and Channel 5 were similar to the news in several morning dailies including *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Independent*, *Daily Express*, *The Guardian*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, and *The Sun*. Such accounts suggest that prominent issues reported in newspapers are likely also reported in television news programs. In addition, the 2014 presidential election constituted the most prominent event in Indonesia at that time. Due to such prominence, the media, both television and newspapers, similarly provided extensive coverage on issues related to the event. Therefore, it is relevant to use content of newspaper articles on the event as subjects of analysis in the third case study.

I selected four prominent Indonesian national dailies, i.e. *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* to serve such a purpose. The selection of the newspapers was based on their circulations or specialization on politics. It is in accordance with the context of the study that examined the mediated space of mediated communication or mediapolis. Thus, it examined the influence of Indonesian newspapers in the election based on their potential influence. The potential influence was based on the numbers of their circulation and their news specialty. The higher numbers of circulation a newspaper has, the more influential it is. Moreover, newspapers with specialty in politics likely had more reports on the election than the regular newspapers. Therefore, they likely attracted more readerships and became important source of information among the public in the election. Considering this, the selection of the samples was based on the number of circulation and their specialty in politics, not their affiliation with the presidential candidates. That is why I selected four prominent Indonesian national dailies, i.e. *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* to serve such a purpose.

*Kompas* is ranked as the most prominent national daily newspaper in the country with the highest circulation rate at approximately a half million copies (Kompas 2014). *Suara Pembaruan* came at the third position with a circulation rate of approximately 350 thousand copies following *Jawa Pos* (a circulation rate

at 450 thousand copies) in 2010 (Lim 2011, p. 13). *Suara Pembaruan* was sampled instead of *Jawa Pos* due to technical considerations. Monash library's database had no access to the archives of *Jawa Pos*. Obtaining access to the newspaper from other sources was possible but it was not feasible due to limitation of resources. *Koran Tempo* is an Indonesian national daily that claims to specialize in politics, economy, and corruption coverage. A similar media company publishing Indonesia's prominent political magazine *Tempo* publishes this newspaper. The magazine was established in 1971 but was closed down by the New Order Government in 1994. It was re-established in 2001 along with *Koran Tempo* (Tempo 2015). Weekly *Tempo* was acclaimed for its high quality of journalism equal to *Kompas* (Nugroho et al. 2012, pp. 38-51; Steele 2003). Despite the daily's moderate circulation of 80–90 thousand copies (Ario 2015), it was selected as a sample for this study because politics is one of its specialties. *The Jakarta Post* is the largest national English newspaper in Indonesia. It was the only English daily in the country before the establishment of *Jakarta Globe* in 2008. Its circulation rate was approximately 90 thousand copies whereas *Jakarta Globe* was 60 thousand copies (Lim 2011, p. 13). Considering this, the four newspaper contents are considered the most suitable and feasible samples used for analysis in the third case study.

#### **4.2.2. Procedures of Samples Collection**

*Case Study 1: The use of social media for the dissemination of election campaign messages by the candidates during the 2014 presidential election*

This case study required the messages of Facebook and Twitter disseminated by the presidential candidates in the election campaign period as the samples. For such a purpose, firstly it retrieved Prabowo's and Jokowi's Facebook pages and saved them into PDF files. The retrieval took place several months after the election campaign period passed, which was on 24 February 2015, because I had not begun this research project until the end of 2014 and only had opportunity and resources at that time. This procedure is intended to maintain the appearances of the pages exactly like they looked during the time of retrieval. Although some images and written messages on the pages were not displayed perfectly as what were shown on the screen, the PDF versions can preserve most

general appearances of the Facebook and Twitter pages. Secondly, it manually copied each of their Facebook posts from 19 May to 9 July and saved them into tables using Microsoft Excel. Posts containing images and videos were retrieved and saved separately in JPG and MP4 files respectively. I did the second procedure to ensure that the whole content of their posts was retrieved properly to complement the PDF versions that have imperfections.

Initial analysis on the samples found the Facebook messages consisted of two types. The first type comprised texts or still images only. The second type comprised a combination of texts and still image or video. In the first type of such social media messages, the themes were considered to reside in the texts or images. For example, was Jokowi's Facebook post on 24 June 2014. This post consisted of only an image without a textual message. The image shows Jokowi was leaving a mosque after Friday prayer, waving to people around him. Many people were also waving their hands to Jokowi. He was wearing his signature attire, a red and blue checked shirt and black fez (Widodo 2014l). The theme of such a message, whatever it was, had to reside in the image as it was the only message available.

In the second type of social media messages, the themes were considered to reside in both the textual messages and visual images. They often conveyed two separate topics. For example, Prabowo tweeted a textual message along with a video showing some celebrities' testimonies of why they were in support of the retired general. In this tweet, the textual message conveys courtesy from Prabowo toward his celebrity supporters appearing in the video. Meanwhile, the video message exhibiting endorsements from the celebrities explicitly conveyed Prabowo's personal image such as his competence, honesty, and decisiveness (Subianto 2014). Considering such accounts, I analyzed the texts, images, and videos independently because each of them potentially conveys a distinct topic. There were 70 Facebook posts from Prabowo (38 texts, 16 still images, and 16 videos) and 99 posts from Jokowi (52 texts, 32 still images, and 15 videos) becoming the subjects of analysis.

Lastly, for the purpose of analysis, the images and the videos were described and transcribed. Whenever applicable, descriptions of the images focus on four key

features including: 1) the written texts such as political slogans and the candidate's political agenda, 2) the attributes of people such as their names, professions, sexes, and attire worn, 3) the names of the places or locations, and 4) the events such as a public campaign or an impromptu visit to a traditional market. Transcriptions of the videos mainly focus on the verbal messages and the textual messages they displayed. The retrieval procedures for collecting data from the presidential candidates' Twitter messages (tweets) replicated the ones used for Facebook. Overall 222 content of Twitter messages from Prabowo (198 texts, 11 still images, and 13 videos) and 62 content of Twitter from Jokowi (49 texts, 5 still images, and 8 videos) became the subjects of analysis.

*Case Study 2: The use of social media for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements during the 2014 presidential election*

As mentioned in case study 2, I used celebrity endorsements disseminated via the presidential candidates' social media accounts and the ones disseminated via the celebrities' own social media accounts as the samples. Regarding the former, I used the samples collected in the previous procedures. Then, I analyzed the presidential candidates' Facebook and Twitter messages mentioning names of celebrities or containing statement of support from celebrities. Such procedures found ten celebrity endorsements toward Prabowo consisting of seven Facebook contents (one text message and six video messages) and three Twitter contents (three video messages). Similar procedures on the samples concerning Jokowi found ten celebrity endorsements consisting of eight Facebook contents (three videos and five posters) and two Twitter contents (a poster and a video).

Regarding the latter, I used endorsements of celebrities in social media that were reported by the media. During the election campaign period, the media frequently reported celebrities supporting the presidential candidates. Occasionally, such reports quoted the social media messages showing such endorsements and even provided screenshots of the celebrities' original messages. For example, the media reported that celebrities such as Luna Maya (actress and TV personality) gave her support for Prabowo (Nasrul and Putra 2014) whereas Sherina Munaf (musician/actress) and Afgansyah Reza (musician) were in support of Jokowi (Desyani 2014; Angelina 2014). The media

also reported Jokowi received similar support from international celebrities including an English musician Sting (Putri 2014), an American musician Jason Mraz (Syailendra 2014), a rock band from the UK, Arkarna, and former guitarist of Guns N' Roses, Ron 'Bumblefoot' Thal (Shaidra 2014a). Such procedures found two celebrity endorsements toward Prabowo and five celebrity endorsements toward Jokowi. They were all in textual formats and disseminated via Twitter.

Both procedures produced 13 celebrity endorsements for Prabowo consisting of eight Facebook contents (two text and six video messages) and five Twitter contents (three video and two text messages) and 17 celebrity endorsements toward Jokowi consisting of 11 Facebook contents (five videos and six posters) and six Twitter contents (four text messages, a poster, and a video). For the purpose of analyses, the images were described into texts and the videos were transcribed. Descriptions of the images included elements of textual messages and names of the celebrities. Transcriptions of the videos also included voices and names of the celebrities. I identified 68 celebrities involved in such endorsements consisting of 32 Prabowo supporters and 36 of Jokowi's.

Then, I analyzed whether the celebrity supporters had verified social media accounts in Facebook and Twitter or not. I did it by searching their names in the respective social media websites and Google. The verified accounts were used because they can be used to confirm that they were really related to the respective celebrities. Facebook and Twitter state they verify the accounts of prominent users such as musicians, movie stars, politician, and athletes to ensure that the accounts belong to them. They indicate an account has been verified with a blue badge next to the account name (Facebook 2015; Twitter 2016). Such analysis found 16 out of 68 celebrities had verified social media accounts, either in Facebook or Twitter or both, consisting of five of Prabowo's celebrity supporters and 11 of Jokowi's. The numbers of fans of the celebrity supporters, which comprise the number of followers in Twitter and likes in their Facebook pages, were then recorded. The numbers recorded were those shown on the day of retrieval. The textual messages, descriptions of images, transcriptions of videos, and the numbers of celebrity supporters' fans of both presidential candidates then became the subjects of analysis.

*Case Study 3: Intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media during the 2014 presidential election*

This case study used newspaper articles concerning social media and the presidential election from four major dailies in the country comprising *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* as the samples. I collected the relevant articles of *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* via Factiva database at Monash University library. A set of key words and particular search criteria were used to obtain relevant articles published 6 June–5 July 2014. It employed seven key words combined with Boolean search operators *and* and *or*: ‘Prabowo *and* Jokowi *and* social media *or* media sosial *or* Facebook *or* Twitter *or* YouTube’. It also set some particular settings including *date range*: 6 June 2014 to 5 July 2014, *source*: Indonesia, *language*: Indonesian and English, and *sort results*: the oldest first. The term ‘media sosial’ is an Indonesian term for social media. It is commonly used in Indonesian media to refer to social media although at times they also use the term social media. The search with such key words and criteria produced 498 articles from 10 different media outlets: 263 out of 498 articles were from the three media outlets including *Suara Pembaruan* (48), *The Jakarta Post* (81), and *Koran Tempo* (134) whereas 235 articles were from other media outlets. The later sources are not itemized here because they were irrelevant.

Regarding samples from daily *Kompas*, the database had no archives of its editions of the period of time, therefore I obtained the samples manually from the print editions available at Monash library. A set of procedures was established for collecting relevant materials from the printed editions of daily *Kompas*. Firstly, the analysis only applied to the articles of the newspaper’s editions from 6 June to 5 July 2014 within two sections, namely the headline section (the first page) and the politics and law section (*politik dan hukum*). Secondly, the analysis only included the articles containing one or more keywords concerning the presidential election comprising *Prabowo*, *Jokowi*, *calon presiden/capres* (presidential candidate), *pemilihan presiden/pilpres* (presidential election) along with key words concerning social media comprising *media sosial* (social media), *Facebook*, *Twitter*, and *YouTube*. Such examination

produced 30 articles for further analysis. Overall, both sampling procedures produced 94 articles from the four dailies comprising *Kompas* (30), *Suara Pembaruan* (32), *The Jakarta Post* (26), and *Koran Tempo* (6) as the subjects of analysis.

#### **4.2.3. Coding Procedures**

Coding procedures consisted of two elements, namely development of coding rules and intercoder reliability tests. The development of coding rules is essential to provide the analysts with a set of coding categories and coding procedures. I developed them to provide detailed guidance for coders of what they should and should not do in the analysis of samples to minimize subjective interpretation during the coding processes. Meanwhile, intercoder reliability tests are essential to increase reliability of the research by providing empirical evidence that the coding rules have produced consistent outcomes even if different coders have executed them. The following two sub-sections present the details of the development of coding rules and the intercoder reliability tests applied in this study.

##### *Development of Coding Rules*

Coding rules consist of two elements, namely coding categories and coding procedures. In order to be able to generate valid data, a content analyst must develop a set of relevant and well-defined coding categories. Relevant coding categories guarantee that they are able to generate appropriate data required to answer given research questions. Well-defined coding categories prevent coders from making too many subjective interpretations during the coding process due to unclear descriptions of coding categories (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 126-8). To establish a set of relevant coding categories, I developed coding categories based on three foundations including the given research questions, relevant existing scholarly works, and immersion into the samples.

Research questions imply what kinds of data to look for in the samples. When the kinds of data to look for are determined, then relevant coding categories can be developed more easily (Neuendorf 2002, p. 107). Thus, the given research questions become a guide to determine what coding categories to develop. For

example, in the first case study the research question was concerning how the presidential candidates used social media for sending campaign messages during the election period. Based on such a question, it developed coding categories concerning themes of campaign messages such as *personal image* and *political agenda*. At the same time, the development of both coding categories were also based on existing scholarly works, as they also suggested that *personal image* (Kriesi 2012; Seawright 2013) and *political agenda* (Nadeau et al. 2010; Levine et al. 2011; Charteris-Black 2006; Chin 2016; Gascoigne 2008) commonly constituted key messages in election campaigns.

In addition, I developed some coding categories by immersing into the samples, which is known as grounded variable identification. Such technique of coding category development is suitable when existing theories or studies cannot provide a comprehensive description of the sample content (Neuendorf 2002, pp. 102-4). For example, I used such a technique for developing coding categories regarding characteristics of the presidential candidates' personal image such as democratic, modest, and religious. The technique of developing coding categories based on immersion into samples was used because despite that there were relevant studies concerning characteristics of personal image promoted in the election campaign, the three personal traits were never mentioned. For example, existing studies on the subjects mention other traits including sensitivity to national problems, trustworthiness, experience, assertiveness, enthusiasm, high skills in public speaking, honesty, high moral integrity, having ideas to solve national problems, calmness, and cautiousness (Trent et al. 2013; Trent et al. 1993) and physical features (Stulp et al. 2013).

The other element of coding rules is a set of coding procedures. Coders require a set of rigorous and easy to follow procedures in order to produce reliable data. I developed a set of coding procedures to assist coders in the coding process. Details of the coding categories and their descriptions as well as the coding procedures used for the study are presented in the coding book (Appendix 1).

#### *Intercoder Reliability Test*

As previously mentioned I conducted intercoder reliability tests to ensure that the data making procedures produced reliable data. The tests measured the

degree of agreements of coding procedures' results from two coders who applied similar coding procedures on similar sampled texts. Such a procedure is also known as intersubjective agreement and parallel-forms reliability (Krippendorff 2004, p. 215). In this study I applied intercoder reliability tests by means of Krippendorff's  $\alpha$  (alpha) coefficient (Krippendorff 2011; Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). Krippendorff (2013) suggest data reliability is achieved if the intercoder reliability coefficient is higher than 0.667 (p. 325). Meanwhile, Lombard et al. (2002) state that a coefficient of 0.80 is generally acceptable and 0.70 is acceptable for exploratory research (p. 600). As it is an exploratory study, it aims at achieving Krippendorff's  $\alpha$  coefficient at a minimum of 0.70.

Referring to Krippendorff (2013) and Neuendorf (2002), I conducted two types of intercoder reliability tests: pilot and final tests. The pilot test was conducted during the development of coding rules to ensure that the coding rules were reliable to code the samples. When the test result of a particular coding category had achieved the designated value (0.70), then the coding category was considered ready for the actual coding. However, when the test result of a coding category failed to achieve the designated value, I revised the coding procedures on the respective coding category. After such revision, it was retested until the value was achieved. A few coding categories required retest during the pilot test but none of them required more than one retest. Regarding the number of items used for pilot test and final test, I referred to Lombard et al. (2002). They stated generally a pilot test requires a minimum of 30 items randomly selected from the samples whereas a final test requires a minimum fifty items or ten percent of the whole samples (p. 601). Further details on the outcomes of reliability tests are provided in Appendix 2.


#### **4.3. Data Interpretation**

Krippendorff (2013) suggests content analysis research questions cannot be answered solely from the data generated from the texts being analyzed. Content analysts have to go beyond them to answer the research questions. They do so by making inferences from the texts based on given particular contexts. In this regard contexts refers to relevant knowledge of the researcher that is chosen to be applied to the data. The relevant knowledge includes 'scientific theories,

plausibly argued propositions, empirical evidence, grounded intuitions, or knowledge of reading habits’ (p. 37-8). He explained further that by means of such particular contexts, content analysts have to establish an analytical construct, which is the analysts’ understandings of the contexts to explain how the texts can lead to plausible answers for given research questions. Based on data generated from the texts, the established contexts, and the analytical constructs, content analysts draw inferences to answer the research questions (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 40-3).

I used the country’s settings of social, economy, and political based on the existing literatures as well as the ones based on my personal experiences upcoming to the 2014 presidential election as the contexts for establishing an analytical construct and drawing inferences for answering the research question

**Figure 4-1 Analytical Construct of the Study**



in the study. Figure 4-1 shows an analytical construct for data interpretations applied to the study.

In interpreting the data findings to answer given research questions, I incorporated both quantitative and qualitative data when required. I used quantitative data as the main device to support arguments leading to answers of the research questions. However, when required, I supported the quantitative

data with qualitative data to further elucidate such arguments. Such a situation occurred, for example, when an argument requires a further elaboration such as providing a quotation of the relevant texts to support or clarify the argument. Thus, qualitative data were supplementary to the quantitative data.

## **Chapter 5 Online Election Campaign: Social Media, Mediapolis, and Empowerment of Democracy**

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As discussed in Chapter 2, mediated communications, in this context those conducted via social media, have capacity to enhance democratic life of constituents. They have such capacity because they constitute important sources of information and knowledge for constituents to engage in public debates on political affairs (Thompson 1995, pp. 255-8). However, Morozov (2011) maintains mediated communications, especially those via the Internet in which social media operate, hardly have such capacity due to the deficiency of political issues that can trigger healthy political debates among citizens. Their content has been largely dominated by entertainment and other content irrelevant to politics.

This also highlights that the contemporary public space of mediated communication is better labeled as mediapolis than public sphere. One of the bases of such a view is concerning the rationality of arguments used in public discourses within the public space of mediated communication. The public sphere requires the use of rational arguments that refute irrational arguments. On the other hand, mediapolis acknowledges the inevitable manifestations of both rational and irrational arguments in public discourse within public space of mediated communication due to complicated settings of contemporary society (Silverstone 2007, pp. 33-4).

Guided by such propositions, this chapter examined the use of social media by the nominees of the 2014 presidential election to elucidate the role of social media with regard to their capacity to empower political life of the constituents and democracy in the country as well as to assess Silverstone's view suggesting that contemporary public space of mediated communication is better viewed as mediapolis than public sphere. For such purposes, I scrutinized two aspects of the presidential candidates' campaign messages, namely the themes and the rationality of their arguments.

### 5.1. Campaign Message Themes and Empowerment of Democracy

This section elucidates the major campaign message themes of the presidential candidates promoted via social media in relation to the capacity of social media to empower democracy in the election. Overall Prabowo and Jokowi promoted seven major themes of social media messages during the election period comprising *political agenda*, *personal image*, *courtesy*, *campaign information*, *persuasion*, *endorsement claim*, and *other*. However, among the seven themes only three constituted campaign messages, namely *personal image*, *political agenda*, and *endorsement claim*. The themes were considered campaign messages because they implied the contesting candidates disseminating such themes to persuade the constituents to vote for them in the election. The other four themes comprising *courtesy*, *campaign information*, *persuasion*, and *other* were not categorized campaign because they implied the presidential candidates disseminating such themes for purposes other than persuading the constituents to vote for them.

*Personal image* comprises messages conveying one or more specific personal characteristics of the presidential candidates. For example, on 5 July 2014 Prabowo posted a video on Facebook showing endorsements from some celebrities. Some of the celebrities in the video explicitly mentioned his personal characteristics such as *decisive*, *patriotic*, and *strong leader* as their reasons for backing him (Subianto 2014c). Prabowo likely promoted his personal traits to attract the constituents to vote for him in the election. Accordingly, such a theme constituted a campaign message.

The theme on *political agenda* comprises messages conveying one or more specific political agendas the presidential candidate was promoting. For example, on 14 June 2014 Jokowi posted his political agenda on *economy* and *social welfare* (Widodo 2014f). The former city mayor likely promoted his political agenda to persuade the constituents to vote for him in the election, therefore the theme was considered a campaign message.

*Endorsement claim* theme comprises messages mentioning claims of support for the presidential candidates from different segments of the public. They encompass *celebrity*, *political figure*, *religious leader*, *general public*, *youth*, and

*social media users*. For example, on 14 June 2014 Prabowo posted a video of endorsement from Diego Maradona. In the video the retired soccer player expressed his statements of support for Prabowo (Subianto 2014h). The candidate likely also used his claim for being endorsed by some segments of the public to convince the constituents that he was the most proper candidate for the top political post in the country. Therefore the theme was also considered a campaign message.


The theme on *courtesy* comprises messages conveying birthday wishes, season greetings, and condolences. During the election campaign period, other important events beyond the election also occurred in the country such as the Islamic holy month *Ramadhan* and the death of a prominent Indonesian Muslim figure KH. Idris Mazuki from East Java. In the period, Prabowo and Jokowi used social media for disseminating messages related to such events. For example, Prabowo conveyed *Ramadhan* greetings for the Muslims in the beginning of the holy month via Facebook (Subianto 2014l). Jokowi did a similar thing via his Facebook page (Widodo 2014n). Prabowo also used social media for expressing his condolence on the death of the religious figure (Subianto 2014q). Such accounts suggest that the candidate disseminated the messages with this theme for a purpose other than persuading the constituents to vote for them. Accordingly the theme was considered a non-campaign message.

*Campaign information* theme comprises messages concerning the presidential candidate's past activities and voting procedures. For example, on 27 June 2014 Jokowi posted an image in Facebook concerning his activity during the campaign period. The image shows he was having a meeting with his social media team (Widodo 2014p). This suggests the candidate likely intended to update the constituents with information concerning his campaign activities. There was minimal, if any, evidence that he used such messages to persuade the constituents to vote for him, therefore the theme was categorized as non-campaign message.

The theme on *persuasion* embraces messages persuading others to take particular online and offline actions. The online actions comprise sharing particular messages from the presidential candidates to friends and families as

well as visiting the links of online sources provided in the message. The offline actions comprise participating in fund raising actions, and attending election campaign rallies. For example, on 22 June Jokowi posted a video on his Facebook page showing a music video dedicated by several celebrities backing him in the election. Along with the video Jokowi wrote a message asking his friends in Facebook not to forget to vote for him and to share the video (Widodo 2014k). This also suggests the candidate used such messages to persuade the constituents to participate in campaign activities but not to persuade the constituents to vote for him based on such messages. Accordingly, the theme was considered non-campaign message. Lastly, *other* theme comprises messages beyond *personal image*, *political agenda*, *endorsement claim*, *courtesy*, *persuasion*, and *campaign information* themes. There was only one message under such a theme, namely a tweet from Prabowo on 2 July 2014. In the tweet he responded to a Twitter user concerning an issue beyond the six themes (Subianto 2014n). Accordingly, the theme falls into non-campaign message.

**Figure 5-1 The Presidential Candidates' Message Themes in Social Media**



The analysis found Prabowo publicized seven social media message themes encompassing *personal image* (17.1 percent), *political agenda* (20.2 percent), *endorsement claim* (13.8 percent), *courtesy* (17 percent), *persuasion* (15.1 percent), and *campaign information* (16.6 percent) and *other* (0.2 percent). On the other hand, Jokowi publicized six social media message themes. They consist of *personal image* (15.4 percent), *political agenda* (24.7 percent), *endorsement*

*claim* (10.1 percent), *courtesy* (14.5 percent), *persuasion* (9.8 percent), and *campaign information* (25.4 percent). Such findings also show both presidential nominees promoted the three major campaign message themes, namely *personal image*, *political agenda*, and *endorsement claim*. Such accounts suggest both presidential candidates attempted to persuade the constituents, especially social media users, with the three major campaign themes in the election. The promotion of such campaign message themes is consistent with existing studies suggesting the importance of personal image (Kriesi 2012; Seawright 2013), political agenda (Nadeau et al. 2010; Levine et al. 2011; Charteris-Black 2006; Chin 2016; Gascoigne 2008), and celebrity endorsements (Lindsay 2005; Frederick 1982; Bodden 2005; Rojek 2001; Henneberg & Chen 2008; Mishra & Mishra 2014) in contemporary election campaigns. The following sub-sections further analyze the key topics on the three themes and the impacts of messages with such themes upon the empowerment of political life of the constituents and democracy in the country during the election period.

#### **5.1.1. *Personal Image***

A further analysis on the social media message themes concerning *personal image* found ten topics comprising *competent*, *decisive*, *democratic*, *honest*, *intelligent*, *modest*, *patriotic*, *physical appearance*, *religious*, and *strong leader*. See the coding book in Appendix 1 for the definitions of the topics. Regarding the topic *competent*, for example, Jokowi on 18 June 2014 tweeted a poster displaying endorsements from several celebrity athletes. One of them was a former world badminton champion, Taufik Hidayat. In the poster, the champion stated he was endorsing Jokowi because of his achievements in his previous career (Widodo 2014u). Such a message implies Jokowi was attempting to show he was a *competent* leader.

Meanwhile, a Facebook post from Prabowo on 1 July 2014 exemplified the *decisive* key topic. He posted a poster showing a female store attendant from Eastern Indonesia, where socio-political conflicts sometimes occur, along with a statement conveying her expectation for a peaceful and conflict-free Indonesia. She explicitly said Prabowo was a *decisive* and charismatic leader who could bring her expectation into reality (Subianto 2014a).

Another tweet from Prabowo on 3 July 2014 exemplified the key topic of *democratic*. In the tweet he said 'It is my breath, it is my value, it is my ideal. Democracy is a value I highly advocate' (Subianto 2014o). Such a message shows his attempt to portray himself as a *democratic* leader. Prabowo likely promoted this topic to challenge the allegations of human rights abuse during his career in the military as well as the accusations that he would become an authoritarian leader once elected the president (Aspinall 2015).

Meanwhile, another Facebook post from Prabowo on 15 June 2014 became examples of two other key topics, namely *patriotic* and *intelligent*. In the post he shared an article from a journalist concerning the career and personal traits of the retired general. Among the personal traits the journalist explicitly mentioned about Prabowo were *patriotic* and *intelligent* (Subianto 2014i).

Regarding the key topics of *honest* and *modest*, a Facebook post from Jokowi on 13 June 2014 was among the messages with such topics. He posted a video promoting him as an *honest* and *modest* leader who was ready to lead Indonesia (Widodo 2014e).


Meanwhile, his Facebook post on 27 June 2014 exemplified the *religious* key topic. He posted a poster showing Jokowi posing with two Muslim clerics in a mosque. Jokowi was wearing his signature red and blue checked shirt and black fez. At the bottom corner there is a quote stating that mental revolution is in line with moral education taught by the Prophet Muhammad, the Prophet companions, and Moslem scholars (Widodo 2014p). Such a message implicitly states he is a *religious* person who was close to Muslim clerics and observing Islamic teachings.

Regarding the key topic on *physical appearance*, Prabowo's Facebook post on 2 July 2014 was among the messages with such a topic. He posted a video of endorsement from a celebrity politician, Ridwan Kamil. In the video he mentioned several reasons for backing Prabowo in the election. One of them was due to *physical appearance* of the retired general. He was good looking, therefore he was ideal to be elected the president (Subianto 2014b).

Lastly, concerning the key topic of *strong leader*, a tweet from Prabowo on 5 July 2015 constituted an example of the topic. Prabowo tweeted a video showing statement of endorsements from celebrities. In the video, one of the celebrities, Wulan Guritno (actress), explicitly stated Prabowo was a *strong leader* (Subianto 2014p).

Overall, Prabowo promoted nine topics concerning *personal image* on his social media messages in the election. They consist of *competent* (6.7 percent), *decisive* (14.6 percent), *democratic* (14.3 percent), *honest* (9.1 percent), *intelligent* (10.2 percent), *modest* (3.8 percent), *patriotic* (18.7 percent), *physical appearance* (1.5 percent), *religious* (8.2 percent), and *strong leader* (13 percent). On the other hand, Jokowi promoted nine topics on his social media messages on *personal image* in the period. They comprise *competent* (22.6 percent), *decisive* (3.8 percent), *honest* (15 percent), *intelligent* (1.4 percent), *modest* (27.9 percent), *patriotic* (5.2 percent), *physical appearance* (5.2 percent), *religious* (13.6 percent), and *strong leader* (1.4 percent).

**Figure 5-2 The Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Personal Image**



Prabowo promoted four key topics consisting of *patriotic* (18.7 percent), *decisive* (14.6 percent), *strong leader* (13 percent), and *intelligent* (10.2 percent) (see Figure 5-2). In this analysis, a topic of social media messages concerning a theme is considered a key topic within such a theme when it makes up ten percent or more of the overall social media messages concerning the corresponding theme. Such a percentage was used as it was suggested it constituted the approximate

figure indicating the minimum significant level of public attention (McCombs 2004).

The prominence of *patriotic* topic might have been a response to unpatriotic conduct of the country's political elites, especially SBY's inner circle, in corruption cases. For example, two elites of SBY's *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party / PD), Anas Urbaningrum and Muhammad Nazarudin, were jailed due to a corruption case regarding the development of a major sport complex in 2011. Three ministers in his cabinet including Andi Malarangeng (Minister of Youth and Sports), Jero Wacik (Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources), and Surya Dharma Ali (Minister of Religious Affairs) also had to resign due to other corruption cases (Aspinall & Mietzner 2014). Such corrupt practices were unpatriotic because they have caused financial loss and damaged the country's reputation. Indonesia suffered huge financial loss due to corruption. A study on the trend of corruption in Indonesia by Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) found that from 629 corruption cases processed by law enforcement in 2014, they had caused the country potential losses of approximately IDR 5.29 trillion (ICW 2014, p. 40). Moreover, corruption also has damaged the country's reputation. In 2014, Transparency International (2014) categorized Indonesia as one of the highly corrupted countries in the world (p. 3). The retired general likely used the topic to convince voters that he was a patriotic leader and would not be involved in such corrupt practices if elected.

The prominence of two other topics, *decisive* and *strong leader*, might have been a result of the often-perceived indecisive and slow actions of the ruling government. SBY's administration was often claimed as indecisive and slow in taking actions (Aziz 2011). Both topics were likely used to convince voters that the retired general had a new type of leadership, which was contrary to the existing one. Meanwhile, the prominence of *intelligent* topic was an attempt to contrast him with Jokowi who was often claimed to be less intelligent. In the period, the media often compared their intelligence. Such comparison was often associated with their foreign language skills, especially English. For example, a few days before the official election campaign commenced, a news article in an online news outlet in the country compared such skills. It claimed Prabowo was

a proficient speaker of English, German, and French whereas Jokowi was not even fluent in English. It provided a video showing Prabowo and Jokowi speaking English on different occasions as evidence (Kusumadewi 2014).

On the other hand, Jokowi promoted four key topics consisting of *modest* (27.9 percent), *competent* (22.6 percent), *honest* (15 percent), and *religious* (13.6 percent). The prominence of *modest* and *honest* topics likely resulted from public aversion toward the country's elites, in particular politicians and government officials. Such aversion derived from their policies that often prioritize the interests of the elites rather than the public. For example, SBY's administration was criticized for its plan to raise the salaries of governors, regents and mayors. The critics argued the existing salaries of the government officials were already high. In addition, they received many benefits such as household expenses, medical expenses, clothing expenses, and operational costs (Gatra 2013). Such a controversial plan instigated public aversion because a majority of the population was still suffering from economic hardships. By 2014, the country's unemployment rate was at 5.9 percent and 11.2 percent of the population was poor (BPS 2015a, p. 2). With the population of approximately 252 million people at that time (BPS 2015a, p. 76), the figures mean there were 14.8 million unemployed and 28.2 million poor people. Under such circumstances, the prominence of *modest* and *honest* topics seems to send messages to the voters that Jokowi was unrelated to the elites. Therefore he would not act like the elites who were more interested in personal than public interests.

Regarding the key topic *competent*, it might have been due to doubts of many people over his competence for the country's top political leadership. For example, National Survey Circle (LSN) claimed 67.8 percent of Jakarta residents were unconvinced Jokowi was ready for such a position (Rimadi 2014). Such doubt also came from the PDI-P's elite circle. PDI-P was the key party nominating him for presidency. Guruh Soekarno Putra, who was the brother of PDI-P's chairperson Megawati Soekarno Putri, protested his sister's decision for nominating Jokowi for presidency in the election (Malau 2014). Thus, he likely promoted such a topic in social media during the election campaign period to refute such doubts.

Lastly, the prominence of *religious* topic was likely due to rumors about Jokowi's religious affiliation. During the election campaign period, rumors said Jokowi was a Christian-Chinese descendant (Hearman 2014). Such a rumor had potential to affect his electability among the country's voters who were predominantly Muslim. Thus, he promoted the key topic via social media to negate such false rumors concerning his religion. For example, on 6 July 2014, he tweeted a photo showing him performing an *Umrah* pilgrimage to Mecca as evidence that he is a Muslim (Widodo 2014s). Jokowi also disavowed such rumors beyond social media. For example, he visited several Islamic boarding schools in West Java. During the visit he clarified that he was truly Muslim and requested the public not to believe in such accusations (Khairany 2014).

Such accounts demonstrate both presidential candidates publicized different key topics concerning their *personal image*. Topics regarding personal image did not constitute rational arguments but irrational arguments. Rational arguments are those providing supporting evidence that stimulates thinking process. On the contrary, irrational arguments are those providing hints for stimulating emotions based on moral and emotional matters. I would discuss the topic on rationality of arguments further in section 5.2.2. Accordingly, the differences of such key topics between both candidates suggest they encouraged the constituents to compare and discuss the contesting candidates and eventually to vote for them based on moral and emotional cues. Strong democracy requires healthy political life of the constituents and such healthy political life requires healthy political debates among the constituents. Moreover, healthy political debates require the use of rational arguments not the irrational ones. Under such circumstances the dissemination of social media messages regarding *personal image* topics of the candidates was unlikely to empower political life of the constituents and democracy in the election.

#### **5.1.2. Political Agenda**

Regarding social media messages concerning *political agenda*, the analysis found nine topics. They comprise *change*, *clean government*, *defense and security*, *economy*, *foreign affairs*, *good governance*, *human rights*, *upholding national interest*, and *social welfare*. See the coding book in Appendix 1 for the definition

of each topic. Regarding topics on *change*, for example, Jokowi promoted the *Revolusi Mental* (Mental Revolution) movement through a Facebook post on 16 June 2014. *Revolusi Mental* was the key prominent political concept he promoted in the election. He maintained such a movement was required to *change* the situation of the country, especially concerning the lacking of productivity, competitiveness, and national dignity (Widodo 2014h). Meanwhile, a tweet from Jokowi on 1 June 2014 concerning corruption in the country and his agenda to eradicate such problem exemplified the key topic on *clean government*. In the tweet he said 'Corruption is a parasite in this country. This is my vision of mission for corruption eradication in Indonesia!' (Widodo 2014r). Regarding the key topic of *defense and security*, for example, Jokowi tweeted three messages on 23 June 2014. In one of the tweets he said 'Good morning, maintaining state sovereignty is unconditional and we are ready to take firm action to safeguard state sovereignty' (Widodo 2014v).

Another message from Jokowi, this time via Facebook, constitutes an example of the key topic on *economy*. On 20 June 2014, he posted his vision and mission on *Restorasi Maritim* (Maritime Restoration). The program aimed to develop sea lane as the backbone of the country's transportation system (Widodo 2014j). During the election, he offered such an agenda as one of the key solutions for accelerating the development of the *economy*, especially for the Eastern parts of the country such as Papua, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara. The development of sea transportation systems would improve the flows of goods and services between Java and the regions, which would be good for improving the *economy* in the regions.

Regarding the key topic on *foreign affairs*, Jokowi's Facebook post on 1 July 2014 exemplified the topic. In the post he said that 'The principle of Indonesia's foreign policy is independent and active. Therefore, we must show a clear attitude to international issues' (Widodo 2014a). Another Facebook post from Jokowi exemplified the key topic on *good governance*. On 15 June 2014, he posted a message containing his vision and mission to make a working government (Widodo 2014g). In the period, many critics accused SBY's Government of not functioning properly. They even mocked his administration

as an autopilot government, implying the country would still be running without its existence (Ali 2014). Thus, Jokowi seemed to promise changing such situations, to establish a government that was really working.

Meanwhile, concerning the key topic on *human rights*, another Jokowi's Facebook post on 30 June 2014 exemplified such topic. In the post he said:

*I had a dialogue with Dionisius Utomo Rahardjo, the father of Petrus Bima Anugrah, and Fitri Nganthi Wani, Wiji Thukul's eldest daughter. Both of their families were political activists who disappeared in 1998. They refuse to forget and expect human rights violations to be resolved in Indonesia (Widodo 2014o).*

Petrus Bima Anugrah and Wiji Thukul were among the political activists missing during the political turmoil in the country in 1998. Through the message Jokowi seemed to promise a political agenda, which was to investigate such human rights violation.


Regarding the key topic on *upholding national interest*, Prabowo's tweet on 24 June 2014 exemplified the topic. In the tweet he said 'Our friends who live in the rich mining resources regions, every day witness our wealth being transported abroad' (Subianto 2014u). Such a tweet implied his concern and disappointment toward the existing government for letting foreign corporations drain the country's resources. It implied the government had failed to uphold the country's national interest.

In addition, in a Facebook post on 6 July 2014 he implicitly highlighted another key topic on *social welfare*, especially access to education. It contained a video showing concerns and wishes from a female lecturer. She was concerned about educational problems of children, especially those living in remote areas where schools were limited. Moreover, she was also concerned about the dropped out children in big cities due to economic difficulties. Such situations had forced them onto the street for busking instead of going to school. She was praying that God would send a leader, which was implicitly Prabowo, to solve such problems (Subianto 2014d).

Such analysis demonstrates Prabowo promoted seven topics of social media messages concerning *political agenda* theme, comprising *change* (4 percent), *clean government* (3.2 percent), *defense and security* (9.1 percent), *economy* (22.5

percent), *good governance* (4.8 percent), *upholding national interest* (43.1 percent), and *social welfare* (13.2 percent). On the other hand, Jokowi publicized nine topics of social media messages on the theme, comprising *change* (14.5 percent), *clean government* (7.8 percent), *defense and security* (8.8 percent), *economy* (35 percent), *foreign affairs* (3.8 percent), *good governance* (6.8 percent), *human rights* (6.8 percent), *upholding national interest* (3.8 percent), and *social welfare* (12.7 percent). However, each of the candidates only promoted three key topics on the theme. Prabowo promoted *upholding national interest* (43.1 percent), *economy* (22.5 percent), and *social welfare* (13.2 percent) whilst Jokowi promoted *economy* (35 percent) and *change* (14.5 percent), and *social welfare* (12.7 percent).

**Figure 5-3 The Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Political Agenda**



The key topic on *economy* was likely due to the country's problems in the sector oncoming to the election. In the period, Indonesia was among the few countries able to maintain its economic growth after the world financial crisis in 2008. The country even managed the fourth highest economic growth among the G20 (Howes & Davies 2014, p. 158). Nonetheless, such achievement did not necessarily satisfy all of the public because the country was still facing many problems in the economy. Among the major problems were lack of infrastructures such as roads, railways, and seaports (Ray & Ing 2016) as well as high unemployment rate and poverty (BPS 2015a, p. 2).

Regarding *social welfare*, it was concerning the government's meager achievements in the social welfare development programs, especially in education and health sectors. Poor condition of school buildings was among the problems in the education sector in many parts of the country including in the capital city, Jakarta. For example, the Head of Education Department of Jakarta Province stated hundreds of public school buildings in Jakarta were in poor condition (Julaikah 2013).

Regarding the health sector, in general Indonesia has a relatively good health care system. Every sub-district has a Community Health Centre (*Puskesmas*) and every district has a public hospital. However, most people living outside the urban areas cannot get access to health services easily. *Puskesmas* and public hospitals are usually located in the sub-district and district capital. Therefore, in many regions, especially outside Java, people have to travel tens of kilometers to the nearest *Puskesmas*. The situation often worsens with the poor transportation systems available (Suharmiati et al. 2012). In addition, health services in many *Puskesmas* and hospitals were still poor due to human resources problems. They include low productivity and unbalanced distribution of medical personnel in urban and rural areas (Kadar et al. 2013, pp. 263-4).

Beside the two topics, each of the presidential candidates had another key topic comprising *upholding national interest* (Prabowo) and *change* (Jokowi). The key topic concerning *upholding national interest* was due to Prabowo's concerns about the leakage of the country's wealth due to foreign investments under the existing regime.

Indonesia is rich in natural resources. However, the people have not benefited much from such resources because the government often gives priority to foreign companies for their exploitation. As a result, the multinational corporations have commonly benefited more from the country's natural resources than the Indonesian people. This especially occurs in the exploitation of oil and gas. For example, SBY's administration gave the exploitation rights of a half of Blok Cepu oil field to ExxonMobil, a US oil company, for 30 years. Meanwhile, the national oil company Pertamina was granted the exploitation rights of the other half of the oil field (Davidson 2015, p. 118). Had the

Indonesian people been the priority, the government would have given Pertamina more exploitation rights than ExxonMobil.

In addition, such a key topic was also likely due to concerns on the claims of Indonesian cultural heritage by a neighboring country, Malaysia. Several times, the neighboring country claimed the ownerships of some Indonesian cultural art forms as its own, such as some traditional dances, songs, and the fabric painting arts, *batik* (Nesadurai 2013; Prihandoko and Syailendra 2012). Such claims have become widely known issues and concerns among the Indonesian public.

Pertaining to the key topic on *change* that Jokowi raised in the election campaign, it might have been due to public disappointment concerning political, economic, and social situations in the final months of SBY's administration. Regarding political disappointment, in the initial days of his second presidential term, observers believed and expected he would perform major reform in politics, especially to eradicate corruption. However, such expectations never came to reality. Instead his inner circle, including the elites of his party and a few ministers in the cabinet, were involved and found guilty in corruption cases. Regarding public disappointment in the economy, the government was unsuccessful in the development of infrastructures, leaving many roads and ports in poor condition. Moreover, economic disparity between the poor and the rich was widening. Regarding social matters, in general the public was dissatisfied with the government due to its failure to deliver satisfactory basic services such as education and health care in many parts of the country (Aspinall & Mietzner 2014). In addition, many political analysts also criticized that Yudhoyono's Government was not successful in fostering the country's democracy post the fall of the New Order Government in 1998. The development of democratic life was stagnant and in some areas has worsened. The proposal to revise the direct election systems of the head of regional governments, at provincial and district level, to return to the previous systems by which they were elected by the Regional House of Representative (DPRD) became evidence of such a regression in the country's democracy. The other indications were the efforts of the Parliament to weaken the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the passing of a new bill on mass

organizations that threaten the freedom of association among the people (Fealy 2013). Thus, Jokowi likely used the key topic, *change*, to address disappointment of the public regarding such situations in a generic term. Through such a topic he seemed to promise he would change such disappointing situations once elected president.

Such accounts demonstrate both presidential candidates publicized virtually comparable topics concerning *political agenda* in social media during the election. Even their key topics on the campaign message theme were also comparable. Two of their key topics were identical, namely *economy* and *social welfare*. Only one key topic was distinct in both camps, namely *upholding national interest* (Prabowo) and *change* (Jokowi). Considering this, the use of social media by the presidential nominees, even with the promotion of issues on their *political agenda*, unlikely could have successfully encouraged healthy political debates among the public to happen. They both had comparable political agendas, therefore the constituents had limited topics to discuss. Instead, their debates about the nominees were likely more regarding their *personal image* because, as mentioned above, they had different topics on the theme. Under such circumstances, even with the dissemination of social messages with topics on *political agenda* the capacity of social media to empower the constituents' political life and democracy was minimal.

#### **5.1.3. Endorsement Claim**

A further analysis on the social media message concerning *endorsement claim* theme found six topics. They consist of *celebrity*, *religious leader*, *political figure*, *general public*, *social media users*, and *youth*. The topics refer to categories of supporters claimed to have given their endorsements toward the presidential candidates. See the coding book in Appendix 1 for the definition of each category. Concerning *endorsement claim* from *celebrity*, for example, on 6 July 2014 Jokowi posted a poster of endorsement from Afghansyah Reza, a prominent musician in the country. In the post Jokowi said "'Soul Mates Will Surely Meet," Afgan said. Many people also believe it. We meet in determination to build a great Indonesia' (Widodo 2014c). Afghansyah Reza, nick-named Afghan, was one of the Indonesian celebrities endorsing Jokowi. He is a famous musician producing

many hits. One of them is entitled *Jodoh Pasti Bertemu* (Soul Mates Will Surely Meet). The quotation of Afghan's hit was likely to imply that Jokowi had received an endorsement from the *celebrity*.

Meanwhile, Prabowo's Facebook on 25 June 2014 exemplified social media messages with the key topic of *religious leader*. In the post the retired general extended his gratitude toward the endorsements of three prominent Moslem clerics in the country, namely KH Maimoen Zubair, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, and Mohammad Mahfud MD (Subianto 2014k).

Regarding *endorsement claim* from *political figure*, on 5 July 2014 Prabowo posted an image showing his meeting with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The image displays Prabowo holding a microphone speaking while the President looked like he was seriously paying attention to him (Subianto 2014c). Prabowo likely used the image for conveying a message that the most prominent *political figure* in the country, the President SBY himself, was on his side in the political race.

Meanwhile, concerning the key topic of endorsement claim from *general public*, on 7 July 2014 Prabowo posted survey results from 16 polling organizations in his Facebook page. All of them claimed Prabowo-Hatta were more popular among the public than Jokowi-JK in the period. In average, the polling suggested 54.3 percent of the public supported Prabowo-Hatta whilst the other 37.6 supported Jokowi-JK. The polling also suggested 8.1 percent of the public had not decided their stances (Subianto 2014e).

Another Facebook message from the retired general on 20 June 2014 exemplified the key topic concerning endorsement claim from *social media users*. In the post, he declared the increasing numbers of friends in his Facebook account. He said:


*There have been more than six million friends following my Facebook. Six million is not a small number. There are so many expressions of support and prayers that I receive every day here. I thank you for the support. Thank you for the prayers. Once again, thank you. It is an honor for me to be able to communicate directly with you through this social media (Subianto 2014j).*

Thus, he used the statistics concerning his fans in Facebook to validate the claim of wide support from *social media users* toward him.

Lastly, concerning the key topic endorsement claim from *youth*, Jokowi's Facebook message on 25 June 2014 exemplified this. He posted five images of young people claimed to be his supporters from Canberra. One of the images showed a group of young people posing in front of Parliament House in Canberra. They were showing v-shaped fore and middle fingers to indicate their support to contestant number 2, Jokowi – JK. Another image displayed a pin inscribed *Sahabat Muda Jokowi & JK* (Young friends of Jokowi and JK) and a web address of the group at [www.gerakcepat.com](http://www.gerakcepat.com) (Widodo 2014m).

The analysis demonstrates Prabowo promoted six topics of social media messages on *endorsement claim* theme comprising *religious leader* (3.2 percent), *political figure* (12.9 percent), *celebrity* (35.5 percent), *general public* (22.6 percent), *youth* (3.2 percent), and *social media users* (22.6 percent). On the other hand, Jokowi disseminated three topics on *endorsement claim* consisting of *celebrity* (29.4 percent), *general public* (41.2 percent), and *youth* (29.4 percent). Such analysis shows Prabowo promoted four key topics, namely *celebrity* (35.5 percent), *social media users* (22.6 percent), *general public* (22.6 percent), and *political figure* (12.9 percent) whilst Jokowi promoted three key topics comprising *general public* (41.2 percent), *celebrity* (29.4 percent), and *youth* (29.4 percent).

**Figure 5-4 The Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Endorsement Claim**



Pertaining to the key topic on *celebrity*, it was related to the increasing importance of celebrity in the country's political setting as mentioned in Chapter 3. Both presidential candidates likely attempted to augment their electability by

showing evidence that they received endorsements from celebrities. As discussed in Chapter 3, celebrities have constituted inseparable elements of election campaigns in the country, especially in campaign rallies. Such practices also occurred in the 2014 presidential election. However, in the event the celebrity supporters not only showed their endorsements in campaign rallies; they expressed such endorsements via social media. Such practice was a new phenomenon, as it has never happened in the previous election. Considering such accounts, I am going to further discuss the importance of celebrity endorsement in social media during the election in the subsequent chapter.

Regarding the prominence of the topic on *general public*, it was likely due to the nature of the election, which was a direct election. Within the reform era Indonesia has undergone a major transformation in electoral systems that is the implementation of direct election systems including the election of members of parliaments, heads of local governments, and the president (Qodari 2010). Under the previous electoral regime, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected the president and vice president (Croissant & Schachter 2010, p. 183). Therefore they required votes from the members of MPR, not from the people. Under the new electoral regime, however, they require votes from the electorate instead of the members of MPR. Thus, Prabowo and Jokowi likely used the assertion of large support from the *general public* for attracting political support from the voters in general. Concerning the key topic on *political figure*, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, political figures constituted major determinants of voting behaviors among Indonesian electorate. Therefore, Prabowo likely attempted using endorsement claims from political figures for their political advantages in the election.

Beside these topics, each of the presidential candidates had other key topics comprising *social media users* (Prabowo) and *youth* (Jokowi). The use of *social media users* as a key topic of *endorsement claim* was apparently due to large numbers of social media users in the country in the period as mentioned in Chapter 2. By mid-2014, the country had approximately 65 million Facebook users and 30 million Twitter users (Yang 2014, p. 1). Prabowo likely used the assertion of large support from *social media users* as bait for attracting political

support from such a group. Meanwhile, the key topic on *youth* was due to considerable percentages of voters from young demographics during the election. As discussed in Chapter 2, the young demographic below 35 years old constituted approximately 30 percent of the overall voters. Similarly, Jokowi's assertion of support from youth was likely used for attracting votes from young people.

Such findings suggest both Prabowo and Jokowi attempted to convince the constituents in social media that they were the most suitable candidates for the presidential post with the evidence that many groups in society comprising celebrities, social media users, general public, and political figures supported them. The use of social media for disseminating messages conveying endorsements from some prominent elements of the society, again, shows social media had minor capacity to encourage robust political debates among the constituents concerning the election. Political endorsements from elements of society are essential for a political actor such as a presidential nominee as they can help him run the administration more effectively once elected. The more segments of society support a political nominee, the more effective he will be able to run the government as more support means less resistance from them and a more stable political situation. However, such endorsements had minimal impact for encouraging healthy political debates among the public about the candidates. Healthy political debates require rational arguments, for example, the messages concerning the political agenda of the candidates. As previously discussed, the messages containing endorsements were categorized as irrational arguments. Considering the basis, social media messages concerning endorsements unlikely able to encourage healthy political debates which require rational arguments.

For example, an endorsement from Afgan toward Jokowi disseminated on Jokowi's Facebook page attracted large number of social media users. More than seventy four thousand users liked the post, almost three thousands users shared it to their social media friends, and more than four thousand people commented on it. An analysis more than two hundred 'Top Comments' of the post revealed that political debates about the presidential candidates occurred between the

supporters from both camps. Facebook provided three options of viewing comments on a Facebook page, namely 'Top Comments', 'The Oldest Comments', and 'All Comments'. 'Top Comments' is used to view friend's comments and the most engaging comments. Comments under the category usually consist of one or more sentences. 'The Oldest Comments' is used to view all comments about a particular post starting from the oldest comment. 'All Comments' is used to view all comments starting with 'Most Relevant' comments first. At present day (February 2019) the options have changed into: 'Most Relevant', 'Oldest', and 'All Comments'. The functions remain the same. In the study I only examined 'Top Comments' as the sample for analysis. The comments in the category usually consist of one or more sentences therefore they could indicate the occurrence of discussions among the users about the post and serve the purpose of study.

The analysis found 234 of the comments about the post fell under 'Top Comments' category. It also revealed that most of the comments were from Jokowi's supporters. Among 234 comments under 'Top Comments', 63 comments or 27 percent of the comments in the category were in support of Prabowo whilst 171 (73 percent) users were in support of Jokowi. Moreover despite the fact most of the users explicitly declared their stance in supporting either of the camps, most of them did not provide arguments for why they supported the candidates or if they provided arguments, they were irrational. As discussed earlier, rational arguments are the messages providing supporting evidence that stimulates thinking process, for example the political agenda of the candidates. By contrast, irrational arguments are the messages providing hints for stimulating emotions based on moral and emotional matters, for example messages concerning the personal image of and endorsement toward the candidates

A commenter with Facebook handle Indra Fedrianza, for example, explicitly supported Jokowi but he did not provide any argument of his support. In the comment he wrote, "Smart people may vote for Prabowo. However, smart people with conscience would vote for Jokowi". Another user, Irfan Kaka Kurniawan, also explicitly declared his support toward Jokowi. However, the argument he used was not rational. He said, "One finger was identical with giving order. It

denotes an authoritarian. Two fingers denote peace.” He likely meant that he did not support Prabowo, who was the candidate number one, because he was authoritarian figure. He attempted to support the argument by suggesting that one finger (he likely meant the index finger) was used to point at people to give orders. On the other hand, he supported Jokowi, who was the candidate number two, because he was a man of peace. The commenter justified his argument by suggesting that two fingers (he likely meant the index and middle fingers) were used to form the V sign. The V sign is usually used to denote victory. However, it is also commonly used to denote peace among the youths in Indonesia.

It demonstrates that the message containing endorsement from the celebrity was unable to trigger a healthy political debate. Despite that the message containing celebrity endorsement were able to encourage discussions about the candidates, most of the commenters did not provide arguments why they supported the candidates or if they provided arguments, they were irrational. Thus, the social media messages about *endorsement* were not able to encourage healthy discussions about the candidates in the election. If the Facebook post contained the political agenda of the candidate, the contents of the comments might have been different. They might have contained the users’ comments about the political agenda. Therefore the discussions through the comments would be more rational, that is about the political agenda. Under such circumstances, the dissemination of social media messages conveying endorsement claims caused social media to have minimal capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the election.

Another important point from such a finding is the fact that both presidential candidates prominently showed they received endorsements from celebrities because they likely believed in the importance of celebrity endorsements to attract voters in the election. It was not surprising both camps incorporated a considerable number of celebrities in their campaign endeavors during the election. Pertaining to this, I am going to further examine the importance of celebrity endorsements in the election, especially concerning the influence of such endorsements via social media and their impacts on the capacity of social

media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country, in Chapter 6.

Overall the analysis of social media campaign message themes of both presidential nominees demonstrates they disseminated seven major themes. However, among the seven themes only three constituted campaign messages, namely *political agenda*, *personal image*, and *endorsement*. Further analysis of the three campaign messages found campaign messages under *political agenda* theme constituted rational arguments whilst the ones under *personal image* and *endorsement* themes constituted irrational ones. Moreover, the analysis shows that irrational campaign messages were more prominent than the rational ones in social media.

However, it is important to note that the categorical dichotomies of political and non-political messages were created in the context of political discussions that can empower the constituents in the election. They were used to identify the campaign topics disseminated via social media that have potential to encourage robust public debates pertaining to the election. As already previously discussed (see section 1.3.), the constituents require political issues such as the political agenda of the contesting candidates to enable them to engage in such robust discussions. Issues on personal image and endorsement certainly also had political dimension in the campaign period. Thus, in the context of this discussion they were excluded as they had minimal role for such a purpose.

Robust democracy requires robust public debates on political issues among the constituents. And for such robust public debates to transpire the constituents require knowledge about political issues. In such a situation the use of social media by both presidential nominees for dissemination of more non-political than political campaign message themes diminished the opportunity of the constituents to obtain political knowledge relevant to the election. Even the disseminations of political campaign messages also were unlikely to help the formation of such robust public debates. Both candidates promoted relatively comparable political agendas, therefore the constituents did not have much to discuss on such topics. Consequently, instead of discussing political issues, the ones concerning a political agenda, the constituents likely discussed the

candidates regarding non-political issues – the ones concerning their personal image and endorsement claims. However, one of the objectives of the thesis is only to analyse the potential of social media to encourage political debates among the constituents by examining the themes of the campaign in social media. The thesis did not analyse whether political debates among the constituents did take place due to the dissemination of campaign messages via social media in the election. It is beyond the scope of the thesis.

## **5.2. Rationality of Arguments and Empowerment of Democracy**

This section discusses the rationality of arguments of the candidates' social media messages in relation to the capacity of social media to empower democracy as well as to assess Silverstone's view suggesting that the contemporary public space of mediated communication is better viewed as mediapolis than public sphere. For such purposes, I divide the discussions into two parts. The first elucidates how I categorized the political messages in social media into two categories, namely argument and non-argument, whilst the second part elucidates how I assessed the rationality of social media messages under the argument category into two categories, namely rational and irrational arguments. Such analysis then became the basis for discussing social media capacity to empower democracy and the relevance of mediapolis concept to this study.

### **5.2.1. Argument versus Non-argument**

There are many definitions of argument but the ones that can best serve the discussion here are those from Holopainen (2007) and Vorobej (2006). Holopainen defines argument as "a reason that produces belief regarding a thing in doubt" (p. 12). Meanwhile, Vorobej refers to 'reasons or evidence' to 'convince certain targeted individuals' (p. 3). Drawing from such definitions, this study defines an argument as an expression used by an individual for convincing or persuading other individual(s) to believe in him or her and act in accordance to his or her aspiration by means of a justification. In reference to such a definition, a political message theme disseminated by the presidential candidates in social media constitutes an argument if it was likely used for persuading social media users to support or vote for them by means of a justification. Thus, a political

message functioning other than for such a purpose was categorized as non-argument or non-campaign message.

As aforementioned, the political messages of the presidential candidates in social media consisted of five themes, i.e. *political agenda*, *personal image*, *campaign information*, *persuasion*, and *endorsement claim*. In the following analysis, I examine the definitions of the themes to determine if the political messages under such themes constitute arguments (campaign message) or non-arguments (non-campaign message). The definition of each theme became the subject of analysis because it contains a summary of the common traits shared by all of the political messages under the themes, especially concerning function and justification. Accordingly, the definition of a theme can indicate whether or not it functions as a means of persuasion. Such a definition can also indicate whether or not it has any justification, such as reasons or facts, for supporting such a persuasive function. A theme was categorized as an argument when it constituted a persuasion and had a justification. A theme was categorized as a non-argument when it constituted a persuasion but had no justification. The result of such analysis is listed below.

- a. *Political agenda*. The theme comprises social media messages conveying one or more specific *political agenda* of the presidential candidate covering *change*, *clean government*, *defense and security*, *economy*, *foreign affairs*, *good governance*, *human rights*, *upholding national interest*, and *social welfare*. Such a definition suggests the presidential candidates used *political agenda* theme for persuading social media users, who were potential electorate, to support or vote for them. Thus, it functions as a persuasion. Moreover, the definition also shows the theme provides justifications for such persuasion consisting of the nine specific political agendas. Therefore, the theme concerning *political agenda* constitutes an argument.
- b. *Personal image*. Such an analysis is also applicable to *personal image* theme. It functions as a persuasion to support or vote for them. Prabowo and Jokowi used their personal traits as justifications why the electorate should

vote for them. Therefore, *personal image* theme also constitutes an argument.

- c. *Endorsement claim*. The theme comprises political messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from *celebrity, political figure, religious leader, general public, youth, and social media users* without any reference to their *personal image* and *political agenda*. The definition shows Prabowo and Jokowi used *endorsement claim* theme for persuading the constituencies to support or vote for them. Moreover, the theme had a justification for such persuasive purpose, namely the claims of support from those parties. Thus, *endorsement claim* theme also constitutes an argument.
- d. *Persuasion*. The theme comprises messages persuading others to take particular online and offline actions. The online actions comprise sharing particular messages from the presidential candidates to friends and families or visiting particular links of online sources provided in the message. The offline actions comprise participating in fund raising actions, attending election campaign rallies, and voting for a particular presidential candidate. The definition shows it functions as a persuasion. However, there is no justification in such persuasion. Therefore, *persuasion* theme constitutes a non-argument.
- e. *Campaign information*. The theme comprises messages containing information about the election campaign such as the presidential candidate's past activities and information about the procedures of casting votes in the polling station. The definition shows the *campaign information* theme provides information. It does not constitute persuasion, let alone an argument. Thus, the theme on *campaign information* constitutes a non-argument.

Such analysis demonstrates three out of the five political themes, both in Facebook and Twitter, constituted arguments or campaign messages. They comprise *personal image, political agenda, and endorsement claim*. On the other hand, the other two themes, namely *persuasion* and *campaign information*, constituted non-arguments or non-campaign messages. The following analysis

further examined the three campaign messages to see whether they constitute rational or irrational arguments.

### **5.2.2. Rational and Irrational Arguments**

According to classical studies on Athenian oratory, rationality of argument is related to the use of *logos* (rational justification) and *alogon* (art). The former emphasizes the use of supporting evidence whereas the latter emphasizes emotions (stimulated by arts) to make such argument convincing. Thus, when an argument provides supporting evidence that stimulates the thinking process it is considered rational. On the contrary, when it provides hints for stimulating emotions it is considered irrational (Powell 2007; Gagarin 2007).

This is congruent with a psychological perspective, especially concerning the process of reasoning and decision-making. Sosis and Bishop (2014), for example, suggested rational reasoning requires a 'cognitive mechanism' that involves 'logic or probability'. It implies rationality is related to knowledge, especially facts or supporting evidence that enable logical process. An example of such logical process is decision-making by referring to particular statistics or a phenomenon. Accordingly, the process of reasoning and decision-making that is based on other aspects beyond knowledge such as emotional and moral judgement is considered irrational. Based on this, for the purpose of the analysis, I define rational argument as the one employing facts or reason to convince others whereas an irrational argument is the one grounded in hints of emotional and moral judgements.

Such a definition suggests the rationality of such themes is determined by the nature of given justifications or reasons manifested in the campaign messages under such themes. If the campaign messages under such a theme contained fact or reason, then the theme was categorized as a rational argument. On the other hand, if the campaign messages under a theme contained elements other than fact or reason, then the theme was categorized as an irrational argument. For such a purpose, a social media message from each of the themes was examined as a sample of the analysis.

Firstly, the analysis is concerning the rationality of campaign messages under *personal image* theme. The following message originated from Prabowo's

Twitter on 17 June 2014. It was a retweet from one of his supporters, Ahmad Heryawan, a politician from PKS Party who was also the Governor of West Java Province. Heryawan's tweet, which was then retweeted by Prabowo, said 'From personality perspective, I perceive Mr. @Prabowo08 as a person with a strong character, brave, and decisive. Indonesia requires such personal qualities #JabarPro1' (Subianto 2014r). Prabowo likely retweeted such a message for persuading the electorate to vote for him based on his personal qualities. Such a message shows Prabowo provided the electorate with hints of emotional and moral judgements (that he was a strong, brave, and decisive person) to vote for him. Whether he truly had such qualities is irrelevant. The provision of such emotional and moral hints has caused such a message to fall into the category of an irrational argument. This suggests campaign messages under *personal image* theme consisted of irrational arguments.

An analysis of a campaign message under *political agenda* theme demonstrates contrasting outcomes. It constitutes a rational argument. On 23 June 2014, through Twitter Prabowo said 'We may have the best tanks and fighter aircraft for national defense. However, the best national defense are people's prosperity and welfare' (Subianto 2014t). In this message, Prabowo implicitly stated his political agenda comprise development of *defense and security*, *economy*, and *social welfare* sectors. His mentions of tanks and fighter aircraft signify his *political agenda* on *defense and security* whereas people's prosperity and welfare signify his *political agenda* concerning *economy* and *social welfare* respectively. See Appendix 1 for further details on the categorization and definition of such themes. The message shows he provided reasons (*defense and security*, *economy*, and *social welfare*) in his persuasion toward the electorate to vote for him. Therefore, the message constitutes a rational argument. Such an example demonstrates that *political agenda* theme constitutes a rational argument.

Lastly, the analysis is concerning a campaign message under *endorsement claim* theme. Jokowi tweeted a message with *endorsement claim* theme on 27 May 2014. He tweeted 'Slank is an example of Mental Revolution among the Youth' (Widodo 2014w). In this message, Jokowi mentioned *Slank*, a famous rock band in the country, as an example of a manifestation of his political slogan *Revolusi*

*Mental*. *Slank* was the most popular rock band in Indonesia with millions of fanatic fans known as *Slankers*. Since established in 1983, it has produced 28 albums. Many of its songs became hits and inspired the country's music lovers. The band used various themes for its music such as romance, criticisms of the government, and environmental issues. Due to its achievements it has received various national and international awards and became Indonesia's highest-paid music act in 2008 and 2009 (Wahyu 2015).

Despite their current positive image due to such success as well as their boldness to criticize the government and their interest in environmental issues, the band used to have a negative image. The musicians in the band had a history of drug abuse. However, they finally managed to free themselves from such problems and even provided free rehabilitation for drug addicts in their home base in South Jakarta. As a result, the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) appointed the band as an ambassador for anti-drugs campaigns (Maullana 2016). Such transformation likely made Jokowi label *Slank* as an example of Mental Revolution and mentioned the band in his tweet. In the election, the band also endorsed one of the presidential candidates, Jokowi. For this purpose, the band created and disseminated music videos in social media (Anjungroso 2014) as well as participated in the election campaign rallies to support Jokowi (Qodir 2014).

Thus, Jokowi tweeted the message as an implicit persuasion toward social media users, especially *Slank's* fans, to vote for him. He implied they should vote for him because their idols were also in support of him. In this instance, he used emotional judgement, which is the celebrity-fans relationship between *Slank* and its fans, as justification for such a purpose. As the justification is concerning feelings, not reason or fact, it constitutes an irrational argument. Such an example suggests the campaign messages under *endorsement claim* theme constitute irrational arguments.

In summary, Prabowo and Jokowi disseminated three arguments or campaign message themes in social media for persuading the electorate to vote for them comprising *personal image*, *political agenda*, and *endorsement claim*. One of the campaign message themes, namely *political agenda* constitutes rational

argument whereas the other ones, which are *endorsement claim* and *personal image*, constitute irrational arguments. Such findings suggest the inevitability of both rational and irrational arguments in public discourses within the country's public space of mediated communications. In the election campaign both presidential candidates used both types of arguments in their campaign messages in Facebook and Twitter. Such accounts validate Silverstone's view concerning the inevitability of both rational and irrational arguments in public discourses within contemporary public space mediated communication. Accordingly in this study I adopted the concept as the theoretical umbrella for scrutinizing current settings of public space of mediated communications in Indonesia.

Moreover, the findings also suggest social media had capacity to empower political life of the constituents and democracy but such capacity was limited. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the domination of non-political content (which are the irrational arguments consisting of issues on *personal image* and *endorsement claim*) over political content (which is the rational argument comprising issues on *political agenda*) in social media generally leads the users to be separated from political life. Such deficiencies of content on political issues prevent them from being able to engage in robust political debates that are essential for political life. This is due to the essential function of the media as major source of information and knowledge on politics for constituents to engage in public debates on political affairs (Thompson 1995, pp. 255-8). Regarding political knowledge essential for constituents to conduct their political life, Moy et al. (2005) name two kinds: knowledge concerning political institutions and knowledge concerning current political events. The former refers to the ones concerning the structure of political organizations and how they function whilst the latter refers to the ones concerning the political actors and their political standpoints on particular political issues. The analysis revealed social media messages of both presidential candidates contained information relevant to political knowledge that is their *political agenda*. However, such information is less prominent than the one irrelevant to political knowledge, namely topics regarding *personal image* of and *endorsement claim* toward the presidential candidates (see Figure 6-1 for details). Under such circumstances social media,

by which such campaign messages disseminated, had limited capacity to facilitate the constituents to engage in public debates on political issues in the election. It follows they had limited capacity to encourage robust political debates among the constituents which were essential for empowering democracy. Thus, they had such capacity but it was limited.

### **5.3. The Impediment of Social Media Capacity to Empower Democracy**

As previously discussed, with regard to the use of social media for the dissemination of campaign messages by the presidential candidates, they had limited capacity to empower democracy due to their limited capacity to encourage the constituents to engage in robust public debates. Such a situation happened because they contained more of non-political than political campaign messages (or in Silverstone's term more of irrational than rational arguments). In addition, the candidates promoted nearly comparable political campaign topics. This implied that the factors impeding social media from having capacity to empower democracy related to the decisions of the candidates to disseminate such campaign messages. Thus, in order to find out the factors impeding social media capacity to empower democracy it is vital to scrutinize why the presidential candidates disseminated more social messages with non-political issues than the political ones. Moreover, it is also essential to scrutinize why they promoted comparable topics on political agenda. I argue that both phenomena resulted from the homogeneity of ideologies of the political parties backing both presidential candidates as well as a similarity of political agenda of both camps. The similarity of both aspects stemmed from the multi-party system implemented since 1998, poor institutionalization and the centrality of patronage among Indonesian political parties as well as the personality-based electoral system of the country since 2004. I would further discuss them below. Because of the similarity of both aspects, each of the camp promoted other topics beyond political agenda to attract voters, namely the personal image of the presidential candidates and claim of endorsements toward them such as from celebrities, religious leaders, political figures, social media users, and the youth.

The enactment of the multi-party system was much celebrated among the Indonesian public, especially those having interest in politics. The system allows

anybody to establish political parties and gives opportunity for the formation of unlimited numbers of political parties. It takes only the signatures of a minimum of 50 people aged at least 21 years old to form a party. No wonder prior to the 1999 general election, which was the first election after the New Order, Indonesia had more than 200 political parties. However, only 48 parties were eligible to compete in the election because most of them failed to meet the given additional requirements such as the number of branch offices in provincial and district levels (King 2000, pp. 89-91). The figure dropped considerably in the two following elections in 2004 and 2009 to become 24 and 38 respectively (Mujani & Liddle 2010, p. 36) and increased to 15 in the 2014 general election (Aspinall 2014a, p. 97).

Despite that their numbers were numerous, as mentioned in Chapter 1, their ideological platforms were lacking in diversity, consisting of only three categories, namely nationalist, religious, and nationalist-religious parties. The parties with religious platforms, especially Islamic parties, generally fell into two further categories comprising traditional and modern Islam. Moreover, they generally had broad and vague political agendas (Ufen 2008). The three ideological platforms of the current political parties were the development from the two major ideological platforms in the 1950s, namely nationalist and religious (mainly Islam) Mietzner (2008 p. 436). Barrett (2011) categorized Indonesian political parties into two major groups, namely the unitarian nationalist and multifocal nationalist. The unitarian nationalist party, like PDIP, support a 'centralistic' state with uniform institutions whereas the multifocal nationalist party, like PAN and PKS, support a multifocal nationalist vision among diverse groups in the community based on their regions, traditions, and beliefs (p. 88). Due to such lacking of ideological platform diversity and broadly stated political agendas, the constituents generally had difficulties in deciding which party to vote for. For example, the Asia Foundation (2003) found that more than 60 percent of Indonesian constituents were not able to differentiate the existing political parties based on such aspects (p. 100).

Such situation also occurred in the 2014 presidential election. The political parties backing both candidates had comparable ideological platforms and

political agendas. In the election political parties with nationalist, religious, and nationalist-religious platforms supported both camps. As mentioned in Chapter 3, six political parties comprising Gerindra, PKS, PAN, PPP, PBB and Golkar Party were backing Prabowo–Hatta whilst five parties comprising PDI-P, Nasdem, PKB, Hanura, and PKPI were endorsing Jokowi–JK in the election (KPU 2014a, p. 19). Two parties backing Prabowo had nationalist-religious ideological platforms (PAN and Golkar Party), three parties had religious platforms (PKS, PPP, PBB), and one nationalist platform (Gerindra). Political parties endorsing Jokowi's camp also consisted of those with such ideological platforms comprising PKB, Nasdem, and PKPI (nationalist-religious) and PDI-P, Hanura, and (nationalist) (Nurjaman 2009). Under such circumstances, it was not surprising both camps promoted such comparable political issues.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, during the election campaign Prabowo's camp promoted eight political agendas covering four sectors comprising economy, social, politics, and environment to achieve if elected president (Subianto and Rajasa 2014). On the other hand, Jokowi's camp promoted nine political agendas *Nawa Cita* (Nine Purposes) covering three sectors comprising politics, economy, and social (Widodo and Kalla 2014). Despite differences in their mission statements, the analysis of their political agendas suggested they were fundamentally comparable. The analysis on their political agenda disseminated via social media corroborated this. Both camps promoted three key topics regarding their political agendas. Two out of the three key topics were identical, namely *economy* and *social welfare*. Only one key topic was distinct, namely *upholding national interest* (Prabowo) and *change* (Jokowi).

The other three factors that have caused the political agenda of Indonesian political parties comparable and shallow were poor institutionalization, the centrality of patronage and, since 2004, the personality-based electoral system. Regarding the institutionalization of Indonesian political parties, Tan (2006) suggested that Indonesian political parties had undergone 'deinstitutionalization' since the implementation of direct election systems in 2004. The institutions of political parties have become less important. Instead, it is the political figures that count and matter in elections. They constitute the

primary element of political parties that can attract voters. As a result, ideological platforms and political agenda of the political parties have become less prominent messages in their campaign. The importance of patronage among the countries political parties also contributes to the shallowness of their political agenda in elections. Tomsa (2014) describes the phenomenon as a form of party system fragmentation and suggested it was caused by three key factors, namely the application of an open list system in the 2009 election, the non-existence of parliamentary threshold for the local political parties, and the normality of switching among politicians from one party to another if it suits their interests. Simandjuntak (2012) suggested that, many of the political elites preferred using ethno-religious sentiments and money politics to their political agenda for attracting voters. Thus, the political elites became the patron and the voters became the clients. It applied especially in the elections of the head of local governments. Aspinall (2014) also noted that the model of patron–client between the political elites and voters also occurred in the legislative elections, especially after the implementation of an open-list form of proportional representation in 2004. In the new systems a political candidate does not automatically secure a seat in the House of Representative even if his or her party secure sufficient votes for the seat and the candidate listed as candidate number one on the form. Any candidate from the list, not necessarily the one on the top of the form, can secure the seat if he or she can obtain more votes. Thus, the elections have become personality-based because the political parties attract voters with the figures on the list. As a result, the political agenda of the parties have become less important in elections.

With similarities in political agendas and ideological platforms of the parties backing them, each camp inevitably required campaign issues beyond both features to persuade the constituents in their favor. Each camp inevitably required convincing the constituents that its candidate was different from and better than the other one concerning such features. In this regard, personal traits of the candidates as well as the public figures backing them became essential topics for such a purpose. Regarding the former, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, Prabowo attempted to convince the constituents that he was a different type of leader compared to Jokowi. Taking advantage of his military background,

he attempted to convince them that he was a *patriotic, decisive, intelligent* and *strong leader*. Such characteristics are often linked to military personnel. Jokowi had a similar strategy. Taking advantage of his career in politics and business as well as his social background, he attempted to portray himself as a *competent, modest, honest, and religious* leader. He generally linked his 'competence' to his experiences and achievements as the City Mayor in Solo and Governor of Jakarta Province as well as a furniture businessman whilst he associated the other three personal traits with his origin as the one from outside the country's elite circles. He was just *wong cilik* (common people). Regarding the latter, the retired general claimed endorsements from prominent public figures comprising *celebrity, social media users, general public, and political figure* whilst the former city mayor claimed support from *general public, celebrity, and youth*.

Such accounts demonstrate that the implementation of the multi-party system has successfully encouraged the establishment of many political parties. However, the new system is not quite successful to encourage the establishment of many parties with distinct ideological platforms. This situation has caused the political parties, including those backing the presidential candidates, to have relatively similar ideological platforms and political agendas. Due to the similarities of both aspects, both camps promoted campaign messages beyond political issues to attract voters in social media. Non-political issues such as *personal image* of and *endorsement claim* toward the presidential candidates even constituted more dominant campaign topics. Under such circumstances, campaign messages with political issues, which were essential to encourage the constituents to engage in public debates, were lacking in social media. As a result, social media failed to encourage a robust public debate among the constituents, which was essential for empowering democracy. It means social media to have a limited capacity to empower democracy in the election.

#### **5.4. Conclusions**

The analysis on the use of social media during the 2014 election campaign period with regard to their capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy produces three key findings. Firstly, the present-day setting of Indonesian public space of mediated communication is better

portrayed as Silverstone's mediapolis than Habermas' public sphere. The manifestations of both rational and irrational arguments in the campaign messages of the presidential nominees validate such a proposition. The situation is compatible with mediapolis but incompatible with public sphere. Mediapolis acknowledges that the use of both rational and irrational arguments are inevitable and do not hinder ideal public debates. However, public sphere necessitates the use of only rational arguments but disavows the irrational ones for ideal public debates.

Secondly, the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy was limited in the country, especially during the election. Political issues and rational arguments (both refer to issues concerning the candidates' *political agenda*) constituted minor elements of the campaign messages in social media. However, non-political issues and irrational arguments (both refer to issues pertaining to the candidates' *personal image* and *endorsement claim*) were slightly more dominant.

Last but not least, such analysis suggests the similarities of political agenda and ideological platforms of the parties backing the candidates in the election constituted the key factors encouraging both camps to promote topics other than political issues in social media. Both camps promoted issues such as the ones pertaining to the candidates' personal traits and the public figures backing them to persuade the constituents in their favor. Such a phenomenon stemmed from the failure of the implementation of the multi-party system in the country to encourage the formation of a large number of political parties with diverse ideological platforms and political agendas. The following chapter further elucidates the power of social media as a means for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements, their impacts upon the popularity of the presidential nominees and the empowerment of democracy as well as the reasons for the occurrence of such accounts and impacts.

## **Chapter 6 Celebrity Endorsements, Social Media and Empowerment of Democracy**

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As discussed in Chapter 3, celebrities have constituted an important element of modern politics across the globe, especially to promote political actors in election campaigns (Garthwaite & Moore 2008; Garthwaite & Moore 2013; Pease & Brewer 2008; Daunt 2012; Henneberg & Chen 2008; Mishra & Mishra 2014; Rojek 2001). This occurred due to the power of celebrities to influence their fans (Rojek 2001, pp. 91-2). Such practices are also common in Indonesia. Celebrities have constituted vital elements of election campaigns for attracting voters since the country's first election in 1955. They usually participate in campaign rallies to show their endorsements of political actors (Lindsay 2005; Frederick 1982; Bodden 2005). In the 2014 presidential election celebrities again were involved in such political endeavors. Many celebrities exhibited their endorsements of the two candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi (Asril 2014; Pramita 2014). In the event, however, the celebrity supporters not only showed such endorsements conventionally, through campaign rallies. They also showed such endorsements in a new mode, through social media (Desyani 2014; Angelina 2014; Faqih 2014a; Irwansyah 2014).

Moreover, it is suggested that young people are inclined to be susceptible to endorsements from celebrities (Chan et al. 2013; Jain et al. 2011; Dix et al. 2010; Chan and Prendergast 2008; Bush et al. 2004; Dhurup and Mafini 2015). In the country young cohorts constituted the dominant users of the Internet (APJII 2015, p. 12) and in the election they made up approximately 30 percent of the overall voters (Lestari 2014). Under such circumstances celebrity endorsements via social media had potential impacts on the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election, especially among the young constituents.

This chapter elucidates how the endorsements of celebrity supporters via social media were influential on the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election and how this had consequences for the empowerment of political life of the constituents, especially the young ones, and democracy. For this purpose, it assesses the number of fans of the celebrity supporters, especially the young

domestic celebrities, from both camps and the factors expediting their influences in the election. Assessment of the former was used to indicate if such influence occurred whilst the latter shows how such influence happened. The outcomes of both analyses then became a basis for elucidating how celebrity endorsements had impacts upon the capacity of social media to empower political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. Prior to discussing both topics, as a start, this chapter begins with an overview of the celebrities backing both the nominees, particularly their social media acumen which is essential for further discussions on both topics.

### 6.1. Social Media Acumen of the Celebrity Supporters

Among the 32 celebrities supporting Prabowo, 23 of them (71.9 percent) had social media accounts, either in Facebook or Twitter or both. The remaining nine (28.1 percent) celebrity supporters had no social media account in Facebook or Twitter. Among the 23 celebrities possessing social media accounts, only five celebrities (15.6 percent) had verified accounts, either in Facebook or Twitter or both.

**Table 6-1 Social Media Acumen of the Celebrity Supporters**

Possession of Social Media Accounts	Prabowo		Jokowi	
	Number of celebrities	Percentages	Number of celebrities	Percentages
Verified social media accounts	5	15.6%	11	30.6%
Unverified social media accounts	18	56.3%	21	58.3%
No social media account	9	28.1%	4	11.1%
<b>Total celebrity supporters</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>

On the other hand, 32 out of 36 (88.9 percent) celebrities backing Jokowi had social media accounts either in Facebook or Twitter or both. The remaining four (11.1 percent) celebrities had no social media accounts in Facebook or Twitter. Among the 32 celebrities possessing social media accounts, 11 celebrities (30.6 percent) had verified accounts, either in Facebook or Twitter or both. This study only analysed the celebrity supporters possessing verified social media accounts. The celebrity supporters with unverified accounts were excluded because there

was no guarantee the social media accounts seemingly linking to the celebrities were genuinely related to them.

**Table 6-2 Prabowo's Celebrity Supporters in Social Media**

No.	Celebrities	Profession	Verified Social Media Accounts	Country of Origin
1.	Luna Maya	Actress/musician/TV host	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
2.	Raffi Ahmad	Actor/musician/TV host	Twitter	Indonesia
3.	Arifin Ilham	Celebrity preacher	Facebook	Indonesia
4.	Ridwan Kamil	Celebrity politician	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
5.	Diego Maradona	Soccer player veteran	Facebook	Argentina

Table 6-2 shows Prabowo had five celebrities backing him who operated verified social media accounts, either in Facebook or Twitter or both, comprising Luna Maya (actress/musician), Raffi Ahmad (actor/musician/TV host), Ridwan Kamil (celebrity politician), Arifin Ilham (celebrity preacher), and Diego Maradona (soccer player veteran). The ones backing Prabowo are mostly national celebrities. Only one of them is foreign: Diego Maradona, who is an Argentinian.

**Table 6-3 Jokowi's Celebrity Supporters in Social Media**

No.	Celebrities	Profession	Verified Social Media Accounts	Country of Origin
1.	Cinta Laura	Actress/musician	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
2.	Afgansyah Reza	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
3.	Sherina Munaf	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
4.	Marcello Tahitoe	Musician	Facebook	Indonesia
5.	Kaka Slank	Musician	Facebook	Indonesia
6.	Abdee Slank	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	Indonesia
7.	Slank	Rock band	Facebook	Indonesia
8.	Jason Mraz	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	USA
9.	Ron 'Bumblefoot' Thal	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	USA
10.	Sting	Musician	Facebook & Twitter	UK
11.	Arkarna	Rock band	Twitter	UK

On the other hand, Table 6-3 shows Jokowi had 11 celebrity supporters operating verified social media accounts in the election comprising Sherina Munaf (musician), Afgansyah Reza (musician), Cinta Laura (actress/musician), Slank (rock band), Kaka Slank (musician), Abdee Slank (musician), Marcello Tahitoe (musician), Jason Mraz (musician), Sting (musician), Arkarna (rock band), and Ron 'Bumblefoot' Thal (musician). Most of the celebrities endorsing

him were also national celebrities. However, Jokowi had more foreign celebrity supporters backing him than Prabowo did. Thus, Jokowi had more celebrity supporters who were active in social media than Prabowo did. The former had 11 celebrity supporters whilst the latter only had five celebrity supporters. The former city mayor also had more foreign celebrity supporters than the retired general. Despite that the foreign celebrity supporters were excluded from the analysis concerning the number of their fans, they constituted essential elements of the popularity of the presidential candidates in the last few days upcoming to the voting date. I am going to discuss this topic further later in this chapter.

## 6.2. Celebrity Supporters' Fans and Popularity of the Presidential Candidates

This section elucidates how the number of fans of the celebrity supporters in social media, especially whose of the young domestic ones, had impacts upon the popularity of the presidential nominees in the election. As discussed in Chapter 3, celebrities have potential power to influence their fans due to celebrity–fans relationship. Thus, the more fans a celebrity supporter had, the more people (the fans) would have been susceptible to the celebrity's endorsements. This focused on the young domestic celebrities because the fans of young celebrities most likely consisted of young cohorts who made up 30 percent of the entire voters in the election. Moreover, the fans of domestic celebrities most likely consisted of Indonesian people who likely constituted voters in the election.

**Table 6-4 The Number of Fans of the Celebrities Supporting Prabowo (in Million)**

No.	Celebrities	Age* (Years Old)	Fans in Twitter	Fans in Facebook	Total
1.	Luna Maya	33	10.2	2.5	12.7
2.	Raffi Ahmad	27	6	-	6
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>16.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>18.7</b>
3.	Arifin Ilham	45	-	5.3	5.3
4.	Ridwan Kamil	43	1.3	1.9	3.2
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>1.3</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>8.5</b>
	<b>Total</b>		<b>17.5</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>27.2</b>

\* Age by the year of the presidential election in 2014

In total the celebrities backing Prabowo had approximately 27 million fans in social media. Among the celebrities backing Prabowo, Luna Maya was the most

popular one in social media. She had a total of more than 12 million fans in Facebook and Twitter. Raffi Ahmad followed her with more than six million fans in Twitter. Celebrity politician and the City Mayor of Bandung, Ridwan Kamil, had the least fans, approximately three million fans in Facebook and Twitter. Such figures were lower compared to the fans of Arifin Ilham, who had 5.2 million fans in Facebook.

**Table 6-5 The Number of Fans of the Celebrities Supporting Jokowi (in Million)**

No	Celebrities	Age* (Years Old)	Fans in Twitter	Fans in Facebook	Total
1.	Sherina Munaf	26	9.5	2.5	12
2.	Afgansyah Reza	25	8	1.6	9.6
3.	Cinta Laura	21	2.3	4.2	6.5
4.	Marcello Tahitoe	31	-	0.3	0.3
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>19.8</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>28.4</b>
5	Slank	NA**	-	6.7	6.7
6	Kaka Slank	40	-	0.3	0.3
7	Abdee Slank	46	0.3	-	0.3
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>0.3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7.4</b>
	<b>Total</b>		<b>20.1</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>35.8</b>

\* Age by the year of the presidential election in 2014


\*\*NA (Not Applicable). Slank and Arkarna were excluded, as they were not individuals.

On the other hand, in total the celebrities backing Jokowi had more than 35 million fans in social media. Among the celebrities supporting Jokowi, Sherina Munaf, nick-named Sherina, was the most popular one. She had a total of more than 12 million fans in both Facebook and Twitter. Afgansyah Reza, famously called Afgan, was at the second position with more than nine million fans in both Facebook and Twitter. Slank, a legendary rock band in the country, followed him with 6.7 million fans in Facebook and then was followed by a talented female artist, Cinta Laura. She had 6.5 million fans in both Facebook and Twitter. The other three celebrities comprising Kaka Slank, Abdee Slank, and Marcello Tahitoe had the least fans, fewer than 500,000 people. Thus, in aggregate, the celebrities backing Jokowi had more fans in social media than the ones backing Prabowo. The ones backing Jokowi had more than 35 million fans whilst the ones supporting Prabowo had approximately 27 million fans.

Moreover, the data show that, in aggregate, the number of fans of the young celebrities (aged 35 years old or below) in both camps considerably

outnumbered the fans of the older celebrities (above 35 years old). In total the two young celebrities backing Prabowo, Raffi Ahmad and Luna Maya, had more than 18 million fans in social media. The figure constituted 68.9 percent of the total fans of the celebrity supporters in social media backing him. On the other hand, the four young celebrities backing Jokowi, consisting of Cinta Laura, Afgansyah Reza, Sherina Munaf, and Marcello Tahitoe, had a total of 28 million fans in social media. The figure constituted 79.4 percent of the total fans of the entire celebrities In his camp.

**Figure 6-1 The Fans of the Celebrity Supporters Based on the Celebrities' Age**



Such accounts indicate the majority of fans of the celebrities backing the presidential candidates predominantly also consisted of young cohorts. At least three reasons support such a proposition. Firstly, beyond social media realm, the young celebrities have been famous among the country's young cohorts. Their popularity among the young people in the country derives from the popularity of their music, soap operas, or TV shows which mainly target such demographic groups. Therefore, the majority of their fans predominantly consisted of the young demographic group. For example, Raffi Ahmad and Luna Maya were the main hosts in a TV show *daHsyat* (Rayendra 2013). The show was very popular, especially among the young people, in the country. It received several awards as the most popular music TV program (Yuwono 2013). Due to the popularity of the show the hosts, Raffi Ahmad and Luna Maya, then also became popular among the show's audiences, who were predominantly the young cohorts. Such accounts also apply to Afgansyah Reza, Sherina Munaf, and Cinta Laura. Their music or soap operas, which targeted young audiences, also had great success (Prathivi 2013; Kiehl 2014; Wardhana 2015). They had been famous and had a

large number of fans, mostly young people, in the country. Thus, beyond social media, the young celebrity supporters already had a large number of fans predominantly consisting the country's young cohorts.

Secondly, fans often have psychological attachment with the celebrities they admire (Rojek 2001). Due to such attachment the fans tend to maintain their connections with them such as by watching their shows, attending their concerts, and following their everyday life through the media. Accordingly, when the celebrities they idolize go online to social media, soon the fans will likely follow them in social media, too. Thus, the celebrities' online-fans (fans in social media) most likely consisted of their offline-fans (their fans due to their TV show or music) who followed them into social media. As the offline fans mostly consisted of young cohorts, so did the online ones.

Lastly, the majority of social media users in the country consisted of young cohorts. APJII (2014) stated approximately 82.8 percent of Indonesian social media users were young people aged 18–35 years old (p. 12-31). Under such circumstances, the people who were following the celebrities in social media most likely consisted of the people from such an age group because they constituted the main users of social media.

With a considerable percentage of young voters in the election, approximately 30 percent, the endorsements of the young celebrities via social media might have had critical ramifications upon young constituents. They were able to reach and might have been able to influence substantial numbers of the young voters who happened to be their fans in social media. As highlighted in Chapter 3, fans often have physiological attachment to celebrities through mediated communications. Such attachment has caused celebrities to have power to influence their fans. Such celebrity–fans attachment derive from a parasocial relationship (Rojek 2001, pp. 45-7) and identification (Kelman 1958) between fans and celebrities. As endorsements from a celebrity are mostly influential toward his or her fans, not others, the power of a celebrity to influence is hypothetically proportionate to the number of fans the celebrity has. The more fans a celebrity has, the more people will be susceptible to the celebrity's influence. In the context of the presidential election, the more fans the celebrities backing the presidential

candidates had, the more people they might have influenced to vote for the respective presidential candidates they endorsed.

It suggests the discrepancies of the number of fans of the celebrity supporters of both presidential candidates might have had considerable impacts toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. In this regard, social media enabled the celebrity supporters backing Jokowi to reach and might have influenced more constituents than the ones backing Prabowo in the election. By default, Facebook users receive updates from friends in their network (Singel 2009). Twitter users also automatically receive tweets from other users they follow (Dredge 2014). Thus, when a celebrity supporter, such as Sherina Munaf who had more than nine million followers in Twitter, tweeted that she supported Jokowi, soon her entire nine million fans in Twitter would know it. Considering fans of celebrities incline to be susceptible to their endorsements, such endorsement might have had critical impacts. But with potential power to influence their fans the celebrity supporters such as Sherina would not necessarily be able to make all fans agree with such endorsements and eventually vote based on such endorsements. There were other aspects that might have also contributed to the voting decisions of the celebrities' fans. As discussed in Chapter 3, existing studies suggested there were two aspects influential toward the voting behaviors of the constituents in the country, namely party affiliations (Liddle & Mujani 2007, p. 845) and party leaders (Mujani & Liddle 2010, p. 37).

However, had both aspects been influential, they likely had been more influential toward the voting behaviors of the older voters (aged above 35 years old) and occurred long before the voting date. As mentioned earlier, loyalty of Indonesian constituents toward political parties has been decreasing since early 2000. In 2004, approximately 60 percent of constituents in the country acknowledged being committed to a particular party. Then the figure dropped to 22 percent in 2009 (Mujani & Liddle 2010, p. 41). Moreover, it was suggested young cohorts have been the majority of the constituents with low loyalty toward political parties. Such low attachment toward political parties was due to their disappointment and distrust toward political parties and the parliament (Yanuarti 2016). Under such circumstances, had affiliations to political parties

and party leaders had influence toward the constituents, they would have occurred predominantly toward the older constituents, not the younger ones. Moreover, had both aspects been influential, such influences would have occurred long before the voting date. It was because information concerning which political parties and political party leaders were backing both presidential candidates had become public knowledge months before the voting date.

Considering that the young constituents tend to have lower attachment to political parties and political leaders, in the election they had to have based their voting decisions on other aspects such as the presidential candidates' political agenda and personal image. As discussed in previous chapters, both constitute key aspects influential toward the voting behaviors among the country's constituents. However, again, had political agenda and personal image of the nominees been influential upon the young constituents' voting preferences, they would have settled their political stances by the end of the election campaign period. The campaign rallies and campaign messages in the media during the election campaign period could have adequately informed them about both aspects to make voting decisions. However, a considerable percentage of young constituents still could not decide who to vote for in the end of the campaign period. Based on surveys in the beginning of July 2014, which was a week before the voting date, it was suggested the number of undecided voters was approximately 7.5 percent of the entire voters (SMRC 2014; Alfaraby & Sopa 2014). The undecided voters in the period were the ones who could not decide their voting preferences based on the four common voting considerations comprising political parties, political leaders, political agenda, and personal attributes of the presidential candidates. Thus, the undecided voters most likely consisted of young voters.

Under such circumstances, the endorsements of the young celebrity supporters in social media, whose fans were predominantly young cohorts and active in social media, might have been critical toward the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election. The fans, some of them potentially among the undecided voters, might have used the endorsements of the celebrities as resources for their judgement in deciding whom to vote for in the election,

supplementing the four common aspects. This is in accordance with Silverstone's suggestion concerning the function of mediapolis, in which social media constitute its elements, in today's society as 'resources for thought, judgment and action, both personal and political' (Silverstone 2007). In this regard, the young constituents might have used mediapolis, especially social media by which the endorsements of the celebrity supporters were disseminated, for such a purpose. In this particular situation, social media constitute the key aspects influential upon the constituents' voting behaviors because the other four aspects, namely political parties, political leaders, political agenda, and personal attributes of the presidential candidates, failed to convince them. However, as previously noted, the celebrity endorsements via social media alone would not have had such influence. The following section discusses three factors expediting the influence of celebrity endorsements via social media on the popularity of the presidential nominees in the election.

### **6.3. The Impacts of Celebrity Endorsements and the Contributing Factors**

As aforementioned, the celebrities backing Prabowo had approximately 18 million fans whilst the ones backing Jokowi had more than 28 million fans in social media. Thus, in aggregate the celebrities backing Jokowi had approximately ten million more fans than the ones backing Prabowo in the election. Considering the influence of celebrities on their fans, such substantial discrepancy of the number of fans between the celebrities backing both presidential nominees might have been substantial too. In this regard, celebrities backing Jokowi might have been able to persuade considerably more people to vote for the former city mayor than the ones backing Prabowo. Hence, such celebrity endorsements might have substantially enhanced the popularity of Jokowi but not Prabowo.

However, I would not attempt to assess the magnitude of such impacts quantitatively, such as how many fans of the celebrity supporters might have turned into real votes for each of the candidates or how many additional votes the presidential candidates might have gained due to such endorsements. Such an attempt is unfeasible with the available data at hand. Moreover, had I attempted to collect more data, I doubt it would have been possible to obtain the


required data for a purpose such as finding the identities of the entire fans of the celebrity supporters in social media and the precise turn out rates of young voters in the election. Regarding the former, it is practically unfeasible to find the data that can show the identities of the entire fans of the celebrity supporters in social media. Many fans of the celebrity supporters set their personal information in social media in private mode or the settings open for public but the personal details were incomplete or bogus. Regarding the latter, I found the Electoral Commission could not provide data concerning the exact number of the young voters who really cast their votes in the election due to technical reasons (Bhakti 2014, p. 180). In the absence of such data, an assessment on the magnitude of impact of the number of fans of the celebrity supporters in the election would be unfeasible. Considering this, instead the study elucidates how celebrity endorsements in social media might have been influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election based on other non quantitative data, namely equal popularity of both presidential candidates, timings of the celebrity endorsements in social media, and key celebrity endorsement messages in social media.

#### **6.3.1. Equal Popularity of both Presidential Candidates**

Three months prior to the election date, Jokowi-JK was considerably more popular than Prabowo-Hatta. A prominent polling organization based in Jakarta, Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting (SMRC), suggested the popularity of Jokowi-JK among the constituents was at 50.8 percent whereas Prabowo-Hatta was at 33.2 percent by April 2014. However, oncoming to the voting date, the gap was narrowing. Jokowi-JK's popularity was constantly decreasing, to 48 percent in May 2014, 47.8 percent in early June 2014, and 46.5 percent in the third week of June 2014. However, in early July 2014 the situation changed, Jokowi-JK's popularity slightly recovered to 47.6 percent. Meanwhile, the popularity of Prabowo-Hatta was increasing steadily from 33.2 percent in April 2014 to 39.2 percent in May 2014, 41.5 percent in early June 2014, and 44.9 percent in the third week of June 2014. In early July 2014, when Jokowi-JK's popularity recovered slightly, their popularity remained stable at 44.9 percent (SMRC 2014). Such accounts suggest, in the last two months prior to the voting

date, Jokowi–JK’s popularity had constantly been decreasing at the rate of 1.6 percent per month. On the other hand, Prabowo–Hatta’s popularity had constantly been increasing at the rate of 5.9 percent per month. Thus, in the last few days coming to the voting date, the popularities of both presidential contenders were virtually equal at 44.9 percent (Prabowo–Hatta) and 47.6 percent (Jokowi–JK). There was only a difference of 2.7 percent.

**Figure 6-2 Trend of the Popularity of the Presidential Candidates**



Note: The figures concerning the popularity of the presidential candidates prior to the voting date were based on the data surveys from SMRC whilst their popularities on the voting date were based on the official election results from KPU.

Surprisingly, on the voting date on 9 July 2014 (based on the results of the election), Jokowi–JK’s popularity, which had been decreasing steadily for two months, increased considerably to 53.2 percent. It was a sharp increase of 5.6 percent from the last polling. At the same time, the popularity of Prabowo–Hatta, which previously had an increase rate at 5.9 percent per month, only increased slightly by two percent from the last polling to 46.9 percent (KPU 2014c). As a result, Jokowi–JK became the victor in the election. Had the popularity trends of both presidential nominees persisted, the election outcomes would have been different.

The changing trend of the popularities of both contenders, especially in the last few days up to the voting date, was important to note because of three reasons. Firstly, within the period, both political contenders and their supporters had stopped all forms of conventional campaign activities such as rallies and campaigns through traditional media. It was because the official election campaign period, scheduled from 4 June to 5 July 2014, had concluded. No more campaign activity in such forms was allowed.

Secondly, in the absence of such conventional campaign activities, the celebrities backing Jokowi had been intensively showing their endorsements until the voting date. The celebrities backing Prabowo did not take this strategy. There was no indication of intensive dissemination of celebrity endorsements toward Prabowo in the period. With a virtually equal popularity between both candidates and the absence of conventional campaign activities, such intensive publication of celebrity endorsements, especially the ones toward Jokowi, might have been influential toward the popularity of both presidential nominees. They might have constituted key resources of judgement for the constituents, especially for the undecided voters, on whom to vote for in the election.


Lastly, as aforementioned, some polls suggested the percentage of undecided voters was still considerable in the last few days coming to the election. It was approximately 7.5 percent of the total voters. The figure was much larger than the popularity gap between both contenders, which was approximately 2.7 percent. In such a situation, whichever candidate was able to win the hearts and minds of the undecided voters, who were predominantly young cohorts, would win the election. The following subsection discusses such a phenomenon, which constituted another aspect essential to the impacts of celebrity endorsements upon the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election.

### **6.3.2. The Timings of Celebrity Endorsements in Social Media**

Prabowo and Jokowi publicized celebrity endorsements both through campaign rallies and via social media messages. Publications of celebrity endorsements through campaign rallies commenced before the official campaign period, which started on 4 June 2014. However, soon such offline activities ended when the campaign period concluded on 5 July 2014. For example, as early as May 2014, a month before the election campaign period, a number of celebrity athletes gathered and declared their support for Jokowi in Jakarta (Asril 2014). About the same time, Aa Gym, a prominent celebrity preacher in the country, also declared his endorsement of Prabowo. It occurred on the day the retired general and his running mate Hatta Rajasa officially registered their candidature to KPU on 20 May 2014 (Iqbal 2014). The last campaign rally involving celebrity supporters took place in GBK Stadium in Jakarta, on the last day of the election campaign

period, 5 July 2014. Slank and hundreds of artists voluntarily held a music concert entitled *Salam Dua Jari Concert* to show their support for Jokowi (Qodir 2014).

**Table 6-6 The Timings of Celebrity Endorsements toward Jokowi and Prabowo**



However, it was not the case with publications of celebrity endorsements via social media. Such activities still continued after the official election campaign period concluded on 5 July 2014. In Jokowi’s camp, such activities even had been intensifying since then. Not only did the presidential candidate disseminate the celebrity endorsements via their social media account, the celebrity supporters also personally disseminated the messages of endorsement personally via their social media accounts. Jokowi started posting celebrity endorsements via social media a week after the official campaign period, on 12 June 2014, in Facebook. He posted a music video from Slank and several artists performing a campaign song, *Salam Dua Jari* (Widodo 2014d). On the following day, he disseminated the video via Twitter (Widodo 2014t). A few days later, on 18 June 2014, he posted another endorsement from a Hip Hop musician, Marzuki Mohamad, on Facebook (Widodo 2014i). Then, the former city mayor disseminated endorsements from other celebrities every few days until 6 July 2014, a day after the election

campaign period concluded. The last endorsement he posted was from a famous pop musician, Afgansyah Reza (Widodo 2014c). A few days prior to the voting date some prominent celebrity figures personally disseminated their endorsement messages toward Jokowi through social media such as Afgansyah Reza and Sherina Munaf. On 3 July 2014 Afgan (Reza 2014) and Sherina (Munaf 2014) tweeted an endorsement message toward Jokowi. A day prior to the voting date, again some celebrities expressed their endorsements of the former city mayor via social media. They were four foreign celebrities comprising Jason Mraz, Sting, Arkarna, and Ron 'Bumblefoot' Thal. I further discuss the endorsements from the foreign celebrities later in this section.

Likewise, Prabowo initially disseminated celebrity endorsements via social media approximately a week after the commencement of the election campaign period. He posted a music video from Ahmad Dhani via Facebook on 11 June 2014 (Subianto 2014f) and tweeted the video on 19 June 2014 (Subianto 2014s). Between the periods, the retired general posted a video of endorsement from former world soccer player, Diego Maradona, on 14 June 2014 (Subianto 2014h). He continued disseminating celebrity endorsements via social media until 7 July 2014, two days before the voting date. The last endorsement he posted was an endorsement from a celebrity preacher Arifin Ilham (Subianto 2014e). In the period, two celebrities also disseminated their endorsements toward Prabowo. They were Raffi Ahmad and Luna Maya. On 8 July 2014, Raffi Ahmad tweeted an endorsement of Prabowo saying 'Open your heart and mind. Let's vote smartly and wisely. For IndONEsia' (Ahmad 2014). Such a message implicitly showed his support for Prabowo, as indicated by the capitalization of three letters in the word Indonesia, namely O, N, and E. The three letters, ONE, refer to the presidential nominee number one, Prabowo. Meanwhile, Luna Maya tweeted a message expressing that she had just voted, along with a photo showing her ink-stained forefinger as evidence (Maya 2014).

Such accounts demonstrate the publications of celebrity endorsements had been intensifying, especially in Jokowi's camp, in the last few days toward the election date. There were several publications of celebrity endorsements toward Prabowo in the period but they were less intensive. Such different intensity of

celebrity endorsement publications might have had substantial impacts. In the period the undecided voters could be the determinants of who would win the election, as their percentages were larger than the discrepancy in the popularity of both candidates. Thus, whomever candidate was able to secure more votes from the undecided voters would win the election. In the absence of conventional campaign activities, the undecided voters, who predominantly consisted of young people and likely relied on social media as a source of information, found Jokowi received more intensive endorsements from celebrity figures than Prabowo. Accordingly, the situation had driven more undecided voters to swing to Jokowi's camp than to Prabowo's, making him the victor.

### **6.3.3. Key Celebrity Endorsements Messages in Social Media**

The last aspect expediting the impact of celebrity endorsements in social media on the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election was the key messages of the endorsements. There were four key messages of endorsements from the celebrity supporters influential toward the popularity of presidential candidates in the election. Three of them were promoted for supporting Jokowi, comprising messages about *Salam Dua Jari* music concert, Twitter hashtag #FinallyVotingJokowi, and endorsements from foreign celebrities. The other one was promoted for backing Prabowo, namely Ahmad Dhani's music video campaign.

#### *Salam Dua Jari music concert*

On the last day of the campaign period, Slank and hundreds of artists voluntarily held a music concert to show their support for Jokowi. The concert, entitled *Salam Dua Jari Concert*, took place in the largest sporting venue in the country, GBK Stadium in Jakarta (Qodir 2014). The voluntary concert was a great success as it was able to attract enormous audiences. Daily *Koran Tempo* reported more than 80,000 people crowded into the stadium. The report highlighted enormous support from the public toward Jokowi as exemplified by voluntary participation of hundreds of celebrities as well as large audiences attending the concert (Atmasari 2014).

**Figure 6-3 Jokowi was Among His Supporters in GBK Stadium during *Salam Dua Jari* Concert**



Source: Facebook post of Joko Widodo on 5 July 2014

The concert constituted a key message of celebrity endorsement in social media because the concert was able to attract the attention of social media users. On the day of the concert Jokowi and some celebrity supporters shared some pictures of the event in social media, therefore soon the pictures and comments regarding the event were widely circulating among social media users. Jokowi disseminated the concert via Facebook on 5 July 2014, showing a picture of him among the crowds in the stadium (Widodo 2014b). Joe Taslim, a famous Indonesian actor, was among the celebrities participating in the concert. He took pictures of the event and, later in the day, through his Twitter account @Jota tweeted a picture of the concert. Soon more than 2,000 people retweeted the picture (Taslim 2014). The media reported the event for a few days, prior to and after the concert, underscoring the participation of hundreds of celebrity figures that indicated high public support for Jokowi. *Koran Tempo's* report concerning the concert mentioned above exemplified such media attention. Due to such publications, both in social media and traditional media, not only the people attending the concert had become aware of such celebrity endorsements toward Jokowi. The wider public in the country, both social media users and audiences of traditional media, had also become aware of such endorsements. Accordingly, the celebrity endorsements in the concert in the stadium were able to reach and

potentially were influential toward political stances of the constituents beyond the ones attending the concert.

*Twitter hashtag #AkhirnyaMilihJokowi*

On 3 July 2014, a few celebrity supporters from Jokowi's camp declared their endorsements by means of a Twitter hashtag *#AkhirnyaMilihJokowi* (*#FinallyVotingforJokowi*). The hash tag was initially tweeted by Joko Anwar, a movie director who was in support of Jokowi. The movie director then asked other celebrities supporting Jokowi to tweet the hash tag. Among the celebrities were Sophia Latjuba, Sherina Munaf, Andien, Mira Lesmana, Glenn Fredly, dan Afgansyah Reza who had large number of fans in social media. (Irwansyah 2014). As a result, soon hashtagged messages of endorsements circulated widely among social media users. The hashtag even became a world trending topic in Twitter for two days, in the first day it was initially disseminated and the following day. Ganing Permata, a media analyst from [www.awesometrics.com](http://www.awesometrics.com), stated more than 90,000 people mentioned the hashtag 12 hours since its first dissemination on 3 July 2014. *Awesometrics* is a website based in Jakarta specializing in media brand reputation analysis. The analysts said by 12.00 pm, Jakarta time, on the following day, there were 182,000 mentions of the hashtag (Sutriyanto 2014). Such wide circulation of the hashtag messages were likely due to large numbers of fans of the celebrity supporters such as Sherina and Afgan sending such endorsements. As aforementioned both celebrities had millions of followers in Twitter.

The publications of celebrity endorsements by means of the hashtag were able to reach large numbers of young voters because, as aforementioned, the majority of the fans of celebrity supporters such as Afgan and Sherina and the country's social media users have been predominantly young cohorts. As the undecided voters in the period also predominantly consisted of young cohorts, the publications of celebrity endorsements, especially via the hashtag *#AkhirnyaMilihJokowi*, became vital resources of judgement among them to decide whom to vote for in the election. A survey by Politicalwave conducted a day prior to the voting date among the undecided voters suggested that many of them would be *golput*, which is the deliberate act of abstaining from voting.

However, those initially intended to be *golput* finally voted in the election. Moreover, 91 percent of those almost to be *golput* finally voted for Jokowi whilst nine percent voted for Prabowo (Irwansyah 2014). It demonstrates that celebrity endorsements via social media like through the dissemination of #AkhirnyaMilihJokowi hashtag had an impact on the voters. Those initially intended to be *golput* were finally using their voting rights and they predominantly voted for Jokowi.

A further analysis of the comments concerning Jokowi's Facebook post on 6 July 2014 containing endorsement from a famous male singer, Afgansyah Reza also provided evidence on the issue (Widodo 2014c). The post contained a poster showing the picture of the singer with a quote stating the reason why the singer supported Jokowi. He said that Jokowi was not a leader who likes to give promises. He delivered the results. Therefore, the singer was eager to support him for a better Indonesia. One of the commenters of the post, Hethonk Thea, said, "In the past I used to be *golput* in the presidential elections. But now I have decided to vote because I am convinced Indonesia will be better. God willing." The comment shows that the commenter changed his political stance in the election, from a *golput* to a voter. It also suggests that his argument for deciding to vote was similar to the singer's, namely for a better Indonesia. The similarity of the reason for supporting Jokowi was likely not a coincidence. As discussed in Chapter 3, fans of celebrities often imitate styles of fashions worn by the celebrities they admire or even adopt their beliefs and political views. Thus, it was likely that the commenter's decision to participate in the election and to vote for Jokowi was influenced by Afgan's political stance in the election. The commenter might be one of Afgan's fans.

#### *Endorsements from foreign celebrities*

Apart from domestic celebrities, both presidential candidates also received backing from foreign celebrities. Prabowo received an endorsement from the world soccer player veteran from Argentina, Diego Maradona. The retired general posted a video showing endorsement from Maradona on his Facebook page on 14 June 2014 (Subianto 2014h). Such endorsement attracted large numbers of social media users. It received almost 200,000 likes, 17,000

comments and 4,000 shares. It also attracted the media. Daily *Kompas*, for example, in its website reported Prabowo was grateful for such endorsement (Ihsanuddin 2014a). Despite such considerable attention from social media users and the media, such endorsement likely had minor influence on his popularity in the last few days coming to the voting date. The publication of the endorsement occurred far beyond the period in which celebrity endorsements were mostly influential.

Jokowi also received support from foreign celebrities comprising Sting (musician / UK), Arkarna (rock band / UK), Jason Mraz (musician / USA), and Ron 'Bumblefoot' Thal (musician / USA). However, he never publicized the foreign celebrity endorsements through his campaign messages in Twitter or Facebook. Instead, the foreign celebrities themselves personally publicized such endorsements through their social media accounts. Sting posted his endorsement via Facebook whilst the other three celebrities sent their endorsements via Twitter. The four celebrities disseminated such endorsements on the same day, 8 July 2014, which was just a day before the voting date (Shaidra 2014a). Thousands of people soon retweeted and shared the foreign celebrity endorsements, therefore they attracted wide attention of social media users (Panji 2014). Such endorsements also attracted the country's public attention beyond social media users as the major traditional media outlets in the country such as *Republika* (Faqih 2014b), *Tempo* (Syailendra 2014), and *Kompas* (Maulana 2014) reported them.

The endorsements of foreign celebrities toward Jokowi might have been more influential than the one toward Prabowo because they were disseminated beyond the official campaign period in which a considerable percentage of constituents were still unsure of whom to vote for. These undecided voters were still considering whom to vote for and required a justification to make such a decision. Under such circumstances, the endorsements of foreign celebrities of Jokowi became a justification and were critical in their voting decisions. On the other hand, the endorsement of a foreign celebrity toward Prabowo became less influential because it occurred far before the voting date.

### *Ahmad Dhani's music video campaign*

Regarding Prabowo, however, there was only one key celebrity endorsement that was likely influential on his popularity in the period. It was a music video from a prominent musician in the country, Ahmad Dhani. In the election he was one of the key celebrity figures backing the retired general. However, he was not included in the previous analysis because, despite that he was very famous in the country, he had no verified accounts in Facebook and Twitter. Prabowo initially disseminated the music video via Twitter on 19 June 2014 (Subianto 2014s) and then he shared it via Facebook on the following day (Subianto 2014j). In the video, Dhani was performing a song entitled *Indonesia Bangkit* (Indonesia Awaken), which was an adaptation of Queen's song *We Will Rock You*. The musician modified its lyrics to support Prabowo. The music video campaign was successful to attract public attention but in a negative and unexpected way due to Dhani's attire worn in the video and the song he used.

In the video Dhani was wearing military uniform resembling the commander of the Nazi Schutzstaffel (SS), Heinrich Himmler. A German media outlet *Der Spiegel* initially criticized the appearance on 24 June 2014 (Kristanti 2014). Soon the country's national media picked up the issue, therefore the video also received similar criticisms from the public (Noviandari 2014). Besides the controversial attire, the media also condemned Dhani for modifying and using the song illegally. It was reported Queen never authorized Dhani to use the song for such a purpose. Due to such controversies, *Time* labelled the video as 'one of the worst pieces of political campaigning ever' (Kwok 2014). The media even linked the video with the threat of the rise of an authoritarian regime. *Kompas*, for example, reported concerns of an American journalist, Allan Nairn. The journalist claimed if Prabowo were elected the president he would form an authoritarian government. He justified the claim with human rights violations allegedly linked to Prabowo during his service in the military (Ihsanuddin 2014b).

Such controversies became a hot topic for days in the media, even until 4 July 2014. It was no surprise they were claimed to have made Prabowo furious (Yusuf & Trianita 2014). The publication of such a controversial video campaign in the media was claimed to have instigated adverse consequences toward

Prabowo's popularity in the period (Parlina & Aritonang 2014b). Apart from the controversial video campaign, there was no other prominent publication of messages for endorsing Prabowo in social media.

Such accounts demonstrate, in the absence of conventional campaign activities, publications of celebrity endorsements in social media had been intensifying in the last few days approaching the voting date. For Jokowi, such publications had likely improved his popularity because they were more frequently than the ones concerning Prabowo. Moreover, he had more key messages of such support and all of them generated positive nuances, suggesting the widespread public support for him. On the contrary, for Prabowo, such publications were unlikely to have substantial influences for improving his popularity. They were less frequently than the ones concerning Jokowi. The timing of such publication was also not appropriate. It occurred far beyond the critical period, in which endorsement of celebrities was critical to persuade the undecided voters. Moreover, there was only one key message of such endorsement. To make it worse, it unintentionally generated negative nuance, suggesting the retired general an autocratic figure (Aspinall 2015; 2014; Ihsanuddin 2014b).

#### **6.4. Celebrity Endorsement, Young Constituents, and Empowerment of Democracy**

This section provides indications how celebrity endorsements via social media had been influential upon voter turnout of young constituents and how it had impacts on the capacity of social media to empower political life of the constituents and democracy in the election. With regard to the functions of social media as means for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements in the election, I argue social media had capacity to empower democracy. However, such capacity was limited. For such purposes, I provide evidence indicating high voter turnouts of young constituents that can substantiate the influence of celebrity endorsements through social media in the election and then elucidate the consequences of this on the capacity of social media to empower democracy.

Voting is not compulsory in Indonesia, therefore the registered voters, including the young constituents who were most likely susceptible to the celebrity endorsements in social media, eventually might have or have not used their

voting rights in the election. Under such circumstances, data concerning the participation rates of the young constituents are essential to corroborate that celebrity endorsements were able to drive the undecided voters, who predominantly comprised young constituents, to vote. If such data show the majority of young voters turned out and cast their votes in the election, they indicate the celebrity endorsements might have been influential on the young constituents in the election.

Such data alone cannot be used to confirm that celebrity endorsements had been sufficient to convince the young constituents to vote in the election, especially for Jokowi. There were other aspects also influential upon the voting behaviors of the constituents such as party affiliation, party leader, personal image of the candidates as well as their political agenda. However, as previously discussed, such factors likely had little influence on the undecided voters during the last few days upcoming to the voting dates when the official campaign had concluded. In the period it was celebrity endorsements that counted.

The analysis of the comments of Facebook users concerning the endorsement of Afgan posted on Jokowi's Facebook page as discussed above provided evidence and indicate the impacts of celebrity endorsements via social media in the election. The analysis demonstrates that two of the commenters confessed that they used to be deliberately abstaining from voting or *golput* in the previous elections. However, they decided to vote in the 2014 presidential election. One of them explicitly declared he would vote for Jokowi because he believed that his action would contribute to the betterment of the country. His argument for voting for Jokowi was similar to Afgan's statement of endorsement in the Facebook post. The celebrity said that he was endorsing Jokowi because he wanted Indonesia to be a better country. His reason to vote for Jokowi was similar to Afgan's statement of endorsement in the Facebook post. The celebrity said that he was endorsing Jokowi because he wanted to participate in the restoration of Indonesia. Thus, the celebrity implied that he was endorsing Jokowi because he believed that the candidate would be able to bring Indonesia into a better situation. The similarity of their reason was unlikely a coincidence.


As discussed in Chapter 3, fans often imitate celebrities, be they their attires, beliefs, or political stance. There are two concepts can explain the influence of celebrities on their fans, namely parasocial relationship (PSR) and identification. The PSR concept suggests that a celebrity may influence a fan's values, beliefs or attitudes due to the existing relationship between them (actually it is likely only the fan who perceives the existence of such relationship). The concept of identification suggests that a celebrity may influence a fan's values, beliefs, or attitudes because the fan aspires to create or maintain (as if one already existed) a relationship with the celebrity. Considering both theories, it was likely that the commenter's decision to vote for Jokowi was likely due to the celebrity's political stance in the election. Another commenter of the Afgan's statement of endorsement with Facebook handle April Hamaro supports the argument. In the comment he said, "Afgan, we would vote for a similar candidate. Ehmm... Wishing the best for Jokowi". The statement shows that the commenter was happy and attempting to tell the celebrity that they were in the same camp. It suggests that the commenter might be Afgan's fan and he wanted to let the celebrity know that he followed his endorsement. Thus, the frequent publication of celebrity endorsements via social media, from which most young constituents obtain information, likely constituted the major resources of judgment among the undecided voters. Accordingly, high participation rates of young voters indicate such influences might have occurred.

Unfortunately, the Electoral Commission (KPU) could not provide data concerning the participation rate of voters based on age groups in the election (Bhakti 2014). In the absence of such data, I used relevant data from two national exit polls conducted on the voting date. Two institutions conducted the surveys, namely the Centre for Research, Development, Education and Training of Indonesian Public Service Radio (*Puslitbangdiklat LPP RRI*) and *Indikator Politik Indonesia* (IPI). Both exit polls suggested the participation of the young voters, especially the first time voters, was high.

*Puslitbangdiklat LPP RRI* conducted the exit poll by randomly interviewing 3,755 voters who had just cast their votes in 1,591 villages covering 429 districts in the entire 33 provinces in the country. Ten questions concerning the election were

asked of the respondents and one of them was concerning their age. The findings of the survey suggest the participation rate of the young voters aged below 30 years old constituted approximately 40 percent of the total voters. Moreover, the participation rate of the first time voters, who were the ones aged below 20 years old, was considerable, constituting 9.96 percent of the overall voters in the election (RRI 2014).

**Figure 6-4 Participation of Voters Based on Ages (LPP RRI)**




Notes: The graph sourced from RRI 2014, *Laporan Hasil Quick Count Pilpres 2014 LPP RRI*, Puslitbangdiklat LPP RRI, Jakarta with adaptations on the language use (originally in Indonesian) and graphic for clarity.

The other exit poll was conducted by a political consultant organisation based in Jakarta, IPI, in cooperation with *Metro TV*. Adopting proportional random sampling method, IPI selected 2,000 voting stations from which it further selected the respondents randomly. In total 1,904 voters were interviewed in the polling. Its margin of error was 2.2 percent at the research significance of 95 percent. Regarding the participation rate of voters based on their age, the polling results suggest the young people aged 25 years old or younger constituted 19.3 percent of the entire voters. Meanwhile, the participation rate of the voters aged 21 years old or younger, who constituted the first time voters, was approximately ten percent of the overall voters (IPI 2014).

As IPI included the voters aged 30 years old in the same group with the ones aged 26 to 40 years old, the participation rate of the young voters aged between 26 to 30 years old was unknown. However, the figure was likely large as the participation rate of the demographic group aged 26 to 40 years old was considerably high, constituting 35.8 percent. If the demographic group was divided into three equal groups, i.e. 26–30 years old, 31–35 years old, and 36–40 years old and each group had equal participation rate, then the participation rate

of the voters aged 26 to 40 years old would be approximately 11.9 percent of the overall voters. If the figure was added up with the figures from the other two groups of young voters, i.e.  $\leq 21$  years old (10.3 percent) and 22–25 years old (nine percent), the three groups would have composed approximately 30 percent of the overall voters. Thus, both exit polls suggest the participation rate of the young voters aged 30 years old or younger was considerably high, between 30–40 percent. Meanwhile, the participation rate of the first time voters constituted approximately 10 percent of the overall voters.

**Figure 6-5 Participation of Voters Based on Ages (Indikator Politik Indonesia – Metro TV)**



Notes: The graph sourced from IPI 2014, *Laporan Exit Poll Pemilu Presiden RI 2014*, Indikator Politik Indonesia, Jakarta with adaptations on the language (originally in Indonesian) and graphic for clarity.

On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter 2, KPU stated the registered voters in the election were approximately 190 million people (Admin 2014). With the country's population aged between 15 to 34 years old at approximately 84.5 million people in 2014 (Bappenas et al. 2013), the figure constituted 44 percent of the total registered voters in the presidential election. However, the suffrage only applied to those who were aged 17, or less but already married. Therefore the percentage of young voters had to be much lower. It could be approximately 30 percent of the overall voters as some political analysts suggested (Lestari 2014). In addition, KPU stated the first time voters, those aged between 17 to 21 years old on the voting date, constituted 11 percent of the total registered voters (Mahamel 2014).

In reference to the percentages of registered voters from KPU, which was 11 percent for the first time voters and approximately 30 percent for young voters, both exit polls suggested the voter turnouts of both demographic groups were considerably high. Puslitbangdiklat LPP RRI and IPI suggested the voter turnout

of the first time voters was approximately 10 percent. The figure indicates the majority of the registered first time voters went to the voting stations and voted. Regarding the voter turnout of young constituents (below 30 years old), they suggested it was approximately 30 percent. Such a figure also indicates the majority of the registered young voters cast their votes in the election. With the margin of error of 2.2 percent at the significance level of 95 percent, the figures from the surveys suggest the voter turnouts of both demographic groups were relatively high.

Such accounts produce two important findings concerning the capacity of social media, through which the celebrity endorsements disseminated, to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy. Firstly, the influence of celebrity endorsements via social media upon the voter turnout of young constituents was based on emotional judgements originating from the celebrity–fans relationship. As such emotional judgements were unlikely to have provoked healthy political debates among the constituents concerning the candidates or facilitated the constituents to make informed voting decisions, from this perspective, social media had minor capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country in the election.

Secondly, it suggests celebrity endorsements via social media were able to increase the voter turnouts among young constituents. They had successfully encouraged young constituents to go to the voting stations and vote. The rate of voting participation constitutes important indicators of the vigour of democracy. The higher the rate of such political participation in a country, the more vigour the democratic life in the country has. Democracy has been facing challenges due to decreasing voter turnouts or rate of voting participation worldwide. It was suggested globally voter turnouts has declined considerably since the 1990s, from 76 percent in the 1980s to 70 percent in the 1990s and 66 percent in the period of 2011–2015 (Solijonov 2016). Indonesia has been among the countries with such challenges. The increasing number of *golput*, which is the deliberate act of abstaining from voting, indicates such challenge in the country. Voting is not compulsory in Indonesia, therefore being *golput* has no legal consequences. The numbers of people being *golput* have been increasing in the last two decades

and can be traced back to the 1990s. Approximately nine percent of the registered voters were *golput* in the 1992 general election. They were predominantly young cohorts, especially university students. It was suggested approximately 15–19 percent of university students in the country chose to be *golput* in the election (King 1992). Percentages of *golput* among the constituents have been increasing since then from 12.07 percent in 1997 to 10.4 percent in 1999, and 23.34 percent in 2004, and 29.01 percent in 2009. During the New Order era, such a phenomenon was instigated by the constituents' disappointment at constant interventions of the government in the elections in favour of the government's party, Golkar. However, since 2004 *golput* has been caused by disappointment and distrust of the constituents toward political parties and the parliament in general. They believed legislators from whichever parties elected would not do any public good, therefore it was better not to cast any vote (Yanuarti 2016). In addition, there have been some other factors contributing to the decreasing rate of voting participation such as forgetting the voting date, just migrating to a new region, therefore unable to cast the vote in the new residence, and travelling on the voting date (Nurhasim 2014). In recent years the latter cases, despite their act of not voting not being deliberate, are also considered as *golput*. Thus, *golput* has a new meaning. It is the act of abstaining from casting a vote in the election no matter whether such act is intentional or unintentional.

In the 2014 general election, the Electoral Commission (KPU) stated that the *golput* reached 24.89 percent of the total registered voters. KPU registered approximately 185.8 million voters but only 124.9 million votes were valid (Adam & Mukti 2014). In the 2014 presidential election, such a phenomenon got even worse. From 190 million registered voters only approximately 133 million votes, which was 70 percent of the entire voters, were valid (KPU 2014c). It means the *golput* comprised approximately 57 million people or 30 percent of the entire voters (Admin 2014).

However, such a phenomenon was paradoxical with the findings of the exit polls from LLP TVRI and IPI suggesting high rates of voting participation among young constituents. The figure of the *golput* from KPU included both those who were

deliberately abstaining from voting due to political reasons (mostly young constituents) and those due to other reasons (could be from any demographic group). It was suggested that *golput* acts due to the latter had considerable impact on the increase of the figures of *golput* in the election. The most prominent cause was the shortage of ballot papers that happened in many voting stations across the country on the voting date. Such situations occurred due to technical problems during printing and distribution processes. Two days prior to the voting date most ballot papers had arrived at the offices of the Local Electoral Commission (KPUD) ready to be distributed to voting stations. However, they found large numbers of ballot papers were unusable because of being torn, cut inappropriately, and in poor color quality. As a result, on the voting date many voting stations had shortages of ballot papers. Such situations happened in many regions in the country such as in Central Java, West Java, Yogyakarta, West Sulawesi and Banten Provinces. In Banten, for example, the shortage was approximately 24,000 ballot papers. Such a situation also occurred overseas such as in Hongkong and Saudi Arabia (Noor et al. 2015). KPU never declared the precise number of shortages of ballot papers in the election. However, such accounts suggested the figures of *golput* due to such incidents were considerable.

Under such circumstances, the considerable percentage of *golput* might have been due to non-political reason that could relate to any demographic group and not necessarily due to the political ones (usually relate to young voters). Thus, the considerable percentage of *golput* in the election does not necessarily negate the outcomes of the exit polls from *Puslitbangdiklat LPP RRI* and IPI suggesting high voter turnouts of young constituents in the election. Such accounts suggest, on the one hand, social media, by which the celebrity supporters disseminated their endorsements, were able to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy due to their capacity to encourage the participations of young constituents. On the other hand, they failed to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy due to their inability to encourage public debates on political issues and facilitate the constituents to make informed voting decisions.

## **6.5. Conclusions**

The analyses on the use of social media for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements found Jokowi had more celebrity supporters who were active in social media than Prabowo did. Moreover, in aggregate, the young celebrities backing Jokowi had more fans in social media than the ones backing Prabowo did, with a difference of ten million people. In the election, Jokowi won the election over Prabowo with a difference of eight million votes. Thus, the nominee supported by the celebrity supporters with more fans secured more votes in the election with almost similar figures.

Considering the networking capacity of social media (Shirky 2008; Gerbaudo 2012; Perea et al. 2012), which enable celebrities to link with the fans, as well as the power of celebrity to influence the fans (Rojek 2001; Garthwaite & Moore 2013), such correlation indicates the endorsements of celebrity supporters via social media might have been influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. The networking capacity of social media had enabled the celebrity supporters to reach millions of their fans beyond the reach of conventional campaign strategy.

In tandem with their power to influence the fans, their reach to millions of fans might have resulted in the influence of the celebrities toward millions of voters in the election. The more fans the celebrity supporters had, the more people they likely influenced to vote for the candidate they endorsed. Other factors such as party affiliations, personal image, and political agenda of the presidential candidates might have been influential toward their popularity, too (Liddle 1970; King 2003; Liddle & Mujani 2007; Mujani & Liddle 2010); however, the influence of such factors, if any, would likely have occurred during the election campaign period, in which they were mostly promoted. Accordingly, in the last few days coming to the voting date, in which promotion of such aspects through election campaign activities had ended, they likely had minor influence.

In the absence of political information from conventional campaign activities, the constituents, especially the undecided voters, might have used social media as resources of judgement on who to vote for. In particular, they might have used issues resulting from the celebrity endorsements disseminated via social media

for such a purpose. This was relevant to Silverstone's (2007) views concerning the essential function of mediapolis as the 'resources for thought, judgment and action, both personal and political' of people in contemporary society (p. 5). However, the endorsements of celebrity supporters via social media alone would not have been influential in the election. At least three factors contributed for such influence to occur. They comprise equal popularity of the presidential candidates, the timing of celebrity endorsements in social media, and key messages of celebrity endorsements in social media.

This suggests celebrity endorsements via social media had assisted the young undecided voters to finally decide who to vote for in the voting date. In other words, social media through their content, which were endorsements of the celebrity supporters, had facilitated young constituents to make political decisions based on emotional judgements originating from a celebrity-fans relationship. Such cues were unlikely to have provoked healthy political debates among the constituents concerning the candidates or facilitated them to make informed voting decisions. From this perspective, social media had minimal capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country in the election.

However, such a phenomenon also suggests social media, through their content of endorsements of celebrity supporters, were able to increase voting participation, especially among young constituents, in the election. From this perspective, it is appropriate to suggest the new communications technologies had the capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. In the following chapter, I am going to further discuss intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media concerning the issues pertinent to the presidential election and their impacts upon the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country.

## Chapter 7 Intermedia Agenda Setting Power of Social Media and Empowerment of Democracy

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Silverstone (2007) suggests traditional and online media that coexist and share space in mediapolis often influence one another (p. 138). This implies content of one media type often transfer and set the agenda of another media type. Such a phenomenon, which is known as intermedia agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw 1993), often occurs among traditional media (Golan 2006; Whitney & Becker 1982) as well as between traditional media and online media (Lee et al. 2005; Sikanku 2011; Sayre et al. 2010; Broersma & Graham 2012). During the 2014 presidential election, such a phenomenon also occurred in Indonesian mediapolis. In the period some issues regarding the election initially circulating in social media transferred to the traditional media. As traditional media constituted major sources of information among the Indonesian public (BPS 2011a; Herawan & King 2013), such a phenomenon had facilitated the issues to reach a wider public. In addition, as most of the time traditional media have the power to tell the public *what to think about* and *how to think about* an issue (McCombs & Shaw 1972; 1993) such a phenomenon might have influenced public opinion on issues.

In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3, some key figures of major media institutions in the country have been either active in political parties or closely connected to them and caused Indonesian mediapolis to be highly polarized (Tapsell 2015; Aspinall 2014a; Dhyatmika 2014). Some media outlets were in Prabowo's camp and some others were in Jokowi's camp (Karana 2014; Supriyono 2014). Due to such media polarizations, the intermedia agenda setting phenomenon between social media and traditional media was highly induced by the political stances of the traditional media. Holding the power as 'the Gate Keeper' (White 1950) the traditional media inclined to report only the issues from social media potentially benefitting the presidential candidates they were supporting. Under such circumstances, the transfer of issues from social media to the traditional media concerning the presidential candidates likely had potential impacts on *what* and *how* the public thought about the candidates and

eventually had impacts on their popularity among the constituents in the election. This chapter elucidates the impacts of intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media on the popularity of the presidential candidates and the consequences of such a phenomenon on the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in Indonesia during the election.

### **7.1. Major Issues Transferring from Social Media to the Traditional Media**

An analysis on four major newspapers in the country comprising *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* within the period of 6 June to 5 July 2014 found 94 news articles reporting issues concerning social media and the presidential election. See Chapter 4 on the detailed procedures of analysis. A further analysis on the articles revealed there were five major issues of media reports concerning the presidential election originating from social media. They comprise *election campaign*, *endorsement toward the candidates*, *popularity of the candidates*, *smear campaign*, and *other*. The issue on *election campaign* comprised news articles about social media in relation to the presidential election campaign in general such as the shifting of election campaign activities from campaign rallies to social media campaign (Sarnia 2014), mobile application competition to support the presidential election (Jong 2014b), the use of Twitter bot during the campaign (Ana 2014), and the use of social media for commenting on the presidential debates (Jong 2014a). The *endorsement toward the candidates* issue comprised news articles concerning endorsements toward the presidential candidates by their supporters in social media such as by means of tweets and Facebook posts (Parlina & Jong 2014) or videos in YouTube ('Prabowo's young supporters create version of hit song' 2014).

The issue on *popularity of the candidates* consisted of news articles on the popularity of the presidential candidates based on their prominence in social media such as based on the number of likes on their Facebook pages and followers in Twitter ('Prabowo presiden Facebook, Jokowi presiden Twitter' 2014) as well as the prominence of Twitter's trending topics about them ('Debat ketiga, lagi-lagi Jokowi meraih hati netizen' 2014). Meanwhile, the issue on *smear campaign* comprised news reports concerning the circulations of rumors

or material inciting rumors in social media discrediting the presidential candidates or their allied political parties. It comprised the ones specifically referring to particular presidential candidates (Perdani 2014) and the ones commenting on *smear campaign* in general without any specific reference to the presidential candidates (Pangaribuan 2014). Lastly, the *other* issue embraced reports on social media and the presidential election beyond the four categories mentioned. An example of a news report on such an issue is the one concerning friendship breakups in social media due to political differences in the election ('Pemilu 2014 merusak banyak hubungan perkawanan' 2014).

A further analysis on the articles revealed the frequency of such intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon varied among the four print media. The frequencies of such a phenomenon were measured based on the number of news articles in each of the media within the election campaign period. Such a phenomenon occurred relatively more frequently in *Suara Pembaruan*, *Kompas*, and *The Jakarta Post* than in *Koran Tempo*. There were 32 news articles on in *Suara Pembaruan*, 30 news articles in *Kompas*, and 26 news articles in *The Jakarta Post* within the period. However, there were only six news articles in *Koran Tempo*.

**Table 7-1 Major Issues Transferring from Social Media to the Print Media**

No	Major Issues	Kompas		Koran Tempo		Suara Pembaruan		The Jakarta Post		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
1	Election campaign	3	10%	2	33.3%	3	9.4%	4	15.4%	12	12.8%
2	Endorsement toward the candidates	6	20%	-	-	3	9.4%	3	11.5%	12	12.8%
3	Popularity of the candidates	2	6.7%	2	33.3%	5	15.6%	2	7.7%	11	11.7%
4	Smear campaign	17	56.7%	2	33.3%	19	59.4%	17	65.4%	55	58.5%
5	Other	2	6.7%	-	-	2	6.3%	-	-	4	4.3%
	Total	30	100%	6	100%	32	100%	26	100%	94	100%

Such analysis also showed the frequency of each issue varied among the four print media. In *Suara Pembaruan*, the most frequently reported issue was *smear campaign*, consisting of 19 articles or 59.4 percent of the entire articles in the five issues in the newspaper. The other three issues followed it consecutively comprising *popularity of the candidates* (five articles / 15.6 percent), *election campaign* (three articles / 9.4 percent), and *endorsement toward the candidates*

(three articles / 9.4 percent). The least frequent issue reported was *other* (two articles / 6.7 percent). In *Kompas*, the issue on *smear campaign* also constituted the one reported most frequently (17 articles / 56.7 percent). The other four issues followed it consecutively comprising *endorsement toward the candidates* (six articles / 20 percent), *election campaign* (three articles / 10 percent), *popularity of the candidates* (two articles / 6.7 percent), and *other* (two articles / 6.7 percent). In *The Jakarta Post* the most frequently reported issue was also concerning *smear campaign* (17 articles / 65.4 percent) and was followed by issues on *election campaign* (four articles / 15.4 percent), *endorsement toward the candidates* (three articles / 11.5 percent), and *popularity of the candidates* (two articles / 7.7 percent). Meanwhile, in *Koran Tempo*, the frequencies of the three issues comprising *smear campaign*, *election campaign*, and *popularity of the candidates* were equal. Each of the issues occurred twice (33.3 percent).

When the news articles on each issue in the four print media were summed up, the results show *smear campaign* still constituted the most frequently reported issue among the five issues. It made up approximately 58.5 percent of the articles (55 out of 94 articles) reporting the entire five issues in the four newspapers. The other two issues comprising *election campaign* and *endorsement toward the candidates* were the second most frequently reported ones. Both constituted 12.8 percent of the articles (12 out of 94 articles) in the four newspapers. It was followed by the other two issues, i.e. *popularity of the candidates* and *other*, constituting 11.7 percent (11 out of 94 articles) and 4.3 percent (four out of 94 articles) of the articles in the four newspapers consecutively.

Such findings demonstrate social media were able to set news agendas of the print media during the period, especially on the five issues. They also show issues on *smear campaign* dominated the issues transferring from social media to the traditional media, comprising approximately 60 percent of the entire issues. The other four issues, namely *election campaign*, *endorsement toward the candidates*, *popularity of the candidates* and *other*, were very much less prominent, comprising approximately ten percent or less of the entire issues. The considerable prominence of issues on *smear campaign* transferring from social media to the traditional media had potential political ramifications in the

election, especially toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. Some issues on *smear campaign* concerning both presidential candidates initially were only circulating and became subjects of discussions in social media. Had the media not reported such issues, they would have remained circulating in social media and only been known to a limited number of people, namely social media users. However, as the media picked up such issues in their news reports, the wider public beyond social media users became aware of such issues and used them as subjects of discussions. This was despite that some of the issues were later found to be just rumors such as concerning the involvement of military personnel to support Prabowo's campaign (Babinsa case), Prabowo's health, Jokowi's link to the communist party (PKI) as well as Jokowi's ethnicity and religious affiliation. All the spread of such smear campaign issues related to a particular candidate had potential adverse impacts upon the popularity of the respective candidate. On the other hand, the spread of issues on the popularity of a particular candidate, namely *endorsement toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates*, had potential positive impacts upon the respective candidate. This was due to the power of traditional media to set the public agenda – that was the capacity to tell the public *what think about* and *how to think about* an issue.

The thesis did not analyse the ways the news media reported the smear campaign issues. Instead the focal points of the analysis on the topic were on the topics of the smear campaign and their frequencies during the election campaign periods. The method of analysis was based on the agenda setting theory of mass media established by McCombs and Shaw (1972). They propose mass media have the power to influence public agendas concerning what issues should be considered important. When mass media highlight an issue as important, usually by frequent and abundant space for its coverage, accordingly public audiences will usually perceive the issue important (p. 176). See section 3.2.1 on page 62 for further discussion on the topic. I believe that the ways the news media reported the smear campaign issues, which are absent in the thesis, should not be neglected. However, they are not included in the analysis because they are beyond the scope of the study


As previously mentioned, among the five major issues concerning the presidential election, three of them were specifically pertinent to the presidential candidates. They comprise *smear campaign*, *endorsements toward the candidates*, and *popularity of the candidates*. Most of the time the media reports on such issues were associated with particular presidential candidates. Meanwhile, the media reports concerning the other two issues, namely *election campaign* and *other*, never specifically referred to the presidential candidates. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the image of political nominees has often constituted an important element influencing constituents' voting behaviors. As the first three issues were linked to the presidential nominees, they also linked to their image. Accordingly, they had potential impacts on the voting behaviors of the constituents and eventually on the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election. Based on this, in the following subsection, I further analyze the first three issues. The analysis compares the number of news articles on each of the three issues linking to each of the presidential candidates in all four print media. It also identifies specific topics on each of the three issues linking to each of the presidential candidates. Such analyses are then used to elucidate how the transfers of such issues were influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election, which is going to be discussed later in the chapter.

#### **7.1.1. Smear Campaign**

Analysis on the articles reporting *smear campaign* issues found approximately 54.8 percent of the articles were linked to Prabowo whereas 38.7 percent of the articles on such issues were associated with Jokowi. Meanwhile, approximately 6.5 percent of the articles were about *smear campaign* issues in general without specific reference to the presidential candidates. A further analysis of the articles on *smear campaign* linked to Prabowo found eight topics. They consisted of *Ahmad Dhani's video*, *Babinsa case*, *dismissal from the military*, *dirty campaign practices*, *demonization of Prabowo*, *Prabowo's health*, *no blessing from SBY*, and *unfriendly encounter with Jokowi*. All these topics implied a negative image of the retired general from various perspectives. The topic on *Ahmad Dhani's video* comprised news articles reporting condemnations over Ahmad Dhani's music video in YouTube for supporting the retired general. As discussed in the

preceding chapter, the video, which was initially only circulating in social media, attracted the attention of the public and media due to controversies concerning Dhani's Nazi-like attire and copyright issues of the song used in the video. The media reports on such issues often implied an association between the video, especially the Nazi-like attire Dhani wore in the video, and Prabowo's personal image. Prabowo is often claimed to be a tyrannical figure (Aspinall 2015; Mietzner 2014) and the video was often used to corroborate such a claim. For example, an article on the issue in *Suara Pembaruan* quoted a tweet from a prominent movie director in the country, Joko Anwar, concerning the video. He said 'Does Prabowo's campaign song performed by Ahmad Dhani reflect the leadership style of Prabowo? Only God knows' ('Setelah Gallop Poll, kini tim sukses Prabowo menjiplak musik Queen' 2014). The tweet likely implied that Ahmad Dhani's Nazi uniform was suggesting the celebrity was the supporter of the despotic ideology of the Nazis. It followed that as Ahmad Dhani was backing Prabowo the celebrity likely endorsed him because he was a despotic figure.

**Figure 7-1 The Transfer of Smear Campaign Issues concerning the Presidential Candidates**



Regarding *Babinsa case* topic, it embraced news articles reporting rumors circulating in social media claiming that Prabowo's camp had breached the election campaign rules. He was accused of using the military, which was against the law, to gain political benefits in the election. An example of such a news report was an article in *Kompas* reporting a complaint of a resident in Central Jakarta for being intimidated by an Army Non-Commission Officer (*Babinsa*) to support Prabowo in the election ('Gerak politik Babinsa diselidiki' 2014). The media also reported another complaint regarding such an incident occurring in

Yogyakarta (Perdani 2014). Before being picked up by traditional media, the issues were initially only circulating in social media and likely only social media users knew about such issues. However, due to reports in the traditional media the wider public likely became aware of the issue. This was despite that later, after conducting an investigation, the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) declared such allegations were just rumors (Shaibra 2014b).


The topic on *dismissal from the military* comprised news articles reporting the circulations of two documents in social media related to Prabowo's dismissal from the military. They consisted of the letter of endorsement from the Officers Ethics Council (DKP) for Prabowo's dismissal from the military due to abuse of authority and violations of standard operating procedures while holding leadership in the Special Force of the Army (Kopassus) and the Decree from President B.J. Habibie concerning his dismissal from the army in 1998. An example of such media reports was an article in *Kompas* on 11 June 2014 reporting the circulation of the two documents in social media ('SBY: Itu bukan rahasia' 2014). In the period many claimed the documents proved that Prabowo was dishonorably discharged from the military, therefore due to such a bad track record he was unfit for the presidential post. This was despite that Prabowo was actually honorably discharged from the military (Murphy 2000).

The topic on *dirty campaign practices* comprises news articles reporting allegations toward Prabowo for carrying out dirty campaign practices. The media reported two issues. Firstly, it was concerning circulations of a bogus polling result in social media, mostly among Prabowo's supporters, claiming the higher popularity of Prabowo-Hatta over Jokowi-JK. The phony polling result originated from an article on CNN's website. In the article, the US based news outlet claimed the report was based on a polling conducted by US survey company, Gallup Inc. Later, Gallup denied having conducted such polling and CNN soon removed the report from its website. Despite that CNN was the one initially publishing the phony polling data in the incident, it was Prabowo who received harsh criticisms from the media and social media users. They accused him of using dirty tricks to win the election (Aritonang 2014b). Secondly, it was concerning a claim from *Tempo*, the country's most prominent political

magazine, claiming somebody hacked its Facebook account and illegally posted messages containing support for Prabowo. *Tempo* condemned such an act and stated it was unethical and violated the law (Trianita 2014). The one responsible for such illegal action was never found. However, as such an act attempted to imply that the magazine had been backing Prabowo, some might have assumed the perpetrators would have been from Prabowo's camp.

Regarding the topic on *demonization of Prabowo*, it consisted of news articles reporting the attack toward Prabowo from Wimar Witoelar, the spokesperson of former President Abdurrahman Wahid, in social media. In the election Witoelar stood in Jokowi's camp. During the election campaign period, he demonized Prabowo and several political elites of the political parties backing the retired general through a picture disseminated via his Twitter and Facebook accounts. In the picture, entitled 'Gallery of rouges: The awakening of bad guys', he grouped the presidential nominee with some political elites supporting him in the foreground whereas in the background he displayed the former President Soeharto, Osama bin Laden, and the 2002 Bali bombers: Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Mukhlas. Such action received condemnations from Prabowo's supporters, in particular the second largest Islamic organization in the country, Muhammadiyah. It condemned the message because Witoelar also put Muhammadiyah's insignia in the picture. Later, Witoelar publicly apologized for such action and closed his social media accounts (Saragih & Parlina 2014).

**Figure 7-2 The Transfer of Smear Campaign Issues concerning Prabowo**



The topic on *Prabowo's health* comprised only an article reporting rumors widely circulating in social media claiming Prabowo had a stroke and was hospitalized in Singapore. Later it was found to be a hoax ('Mahfud MD bantah Prabowo sakit stroke' 2014). Meanwhile, the topic on *no blessing from SBY* consisted of an article reporting an attack toward Prabowo through a video on YouTube. It showed Hermawan Sulisty, a political analyst from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), suggesting the reason why President SBY never openly declared his support for Prabowo. This was despite that SBY's Democrat Party was backing Prabowo in the election. Based on the claim of the analyst in the video the media reported SBY gave no blessing to Prabowo in the election because they had not been in a good relationship since they were both cadets at the Military Academy back in the 1970s (Parlina & Aritonang 2014a).

Lastly, the topic on *unfriendly encounter with Jokowi* consisted of an article concerning a video on YouTube showing Prabowo's unfriendly attitude toward Jokowi. The video showed the encounter of both presidential candidates during a presidential debate session. In one scene of the video, it showed Prabowo was avoiding a friendly cheek kissing from Jokowi (Aritonang & Saragih 2014).


Figure 7-2 shows the topic on *Ahmad Dhani's video* constituted the one most frequently reported. Twenty-nine percent of the articles on *smear campaign* linked to Prabowo reported the topic. Subsequently it was followed by the other seven topics comprising *babinsa case* (25.8 percent), *dismissal from the military* (19.4 percent), *dirty campaign practices* (9.7 percent), *demonization of Prabowo* (6.5 percent), *Prabowo's health* (3.2 percent), *no blessing from SBY* (3.2 percent), and *unfriendly encounter with Jokowi* (3.2 percent).

On the other hand, analysis on the articles on *smear campaign* linked to Jokowi found four topics. They consisted of *circulation of Obor Rakyat tabloid*, *criticisms against Jokowi's Santri Day*, *allegations of corruption case against Jokowi*, and *allegations of closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)*. The topic on *circulation of Obor Rakyat tabloid* comprised news articles reporting the circulation of *Obor Rakyat*, a newly published tabloid allegedly aimed to tarnish Jokowi's reputation. The tabloid predominantly contained smear campaigns directed toward Jokowi originating from social media. For example, Jokowi was

dubbed as merely the puppet of PDI-P's chairperson, Megawati Soekarno Putri. The tabloid also claimed the former city mayor was a Christian-Singaporean Chinese descendant (Tyson & Purnomo 2016; Purba 2014). Despite the news articles were about the circulation of the tabloid, they were categorized into the topic on *smear campaign* because the articles generally provided details of the *smear campaign* topics circulating in social media reported in the tabloid. Accordingly, such news articles facilitated the transfer of *smear campaign* issues attacking Jokowi in social media to the traditional media.

The topic on *criticisms against Jokowi's Santri Day* consisted of news articles reporting criticisms circulating in social media toward Jokowi's political agenda for enacting 1 Muharram, which is the first date in Islamic calendar, as *Santri Day* during the election campaign period. *Santri* refers to students of Islamic boarding schools, *pesantren*. Jokowi most likely proposed such a political agenda to attract the majority of the country's constituents, the Muslims. In response to Jokowi's proposition, a politician from Prosperous Justice Party (the party was in Prabowo's camp), Fahri Hamzah, attacked the idea via his Twitter account, @Fahrihamzah. He ridiculed Jokowi, stating the former city mayor would promise all days in a year to everybody in order to win the election. He even explicitly called Jokowi insane (Sundari 2014).

**Figure 7-3 The Transfer of Smear Campaign Issues concerning Jokowi**



The topic on *allegations of corruption case against Jokowi* consists of news articles reporting the circulation of a letter in social media to suggest Jokowi had requested a suspension from detention to the Attorney General due to a corruption case against him. In the period, a high official in DKI Jakarta Province was becoming a suspect in a corruption case concerning the procurement of buses for public transportation in the capital city. The procurement occurred during Jokowi's tenure as the Governor in the province. During the election campaign period, rumors were circulating in social media accusing him of being involved in the corruption case. The letter was part of such rumors in social media. However, no evidence could link Jokowi to the corruption case (Shambazy 2014). Jokowi's camp denied such allegations and reported the case to the police (Pratomo 2014).

The topic on *allegations of closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)* consisted of news articles reporting rumors in social media claiming Jokowi was linked to the banned Indonesian Communist Party. For example, an article in *Suara Pembaruan* reported a tweet from an elite politician from Prabowo's Gerindra Party, Fadli Zon, claiming that Jokowi's concept of Mental Revolution stemmed from communist tradition ('Sebut revolusi mental ide komunis, Fadli diserang soal ziarahi kuburan Karl Marx' 2014).


The figure 7-3 shows *circulation of Obor Rakyat tabloid* and *criticisms against Jokowi's Santri Day* constituted the two most frequently topics reported. Approximately 38 percent of the articles on *smear campaign* linked to Jokowi reported both topics. Subsequently they were followed by the other two topics comprising *allegations of corruption case against Jokowi* (14.3 percent) and *allegations of closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party* (9.5 percent). Overall, such findings demonstrate intermedia agenda setting between both media on *smear campaign* issues were predominantly linked to Prabowo (54.8 percent). The ones linked to Jokowi constituted much less proportion (38.7 percent). Moreover, Prabowo was linked to more topics on *smear campaign* than Jokowi. There were eight *smear campaign* topics about the retired general but only four topics concerning the former city mayor.

### 7.1.2. Endorsement toward the Candidates

A further analysis on the articles concerning *endorsements toward the candidates* found 53.3 percent of the total articles on the topic were linked to Jokowi whereas the ones linked to Prabowo made up 46.7 percent. The media often reported issues concerning *endorsements toward the candidates* from their supporters in social media. There were two prominent topics concerning such issues, namely the use of social media for campaign activities among common supporters and celebrity supporters.

Regarding the topic about the use of social media for campaign activities among the general public supporters, for example, the media reported campaign activities of Marina Kusumawardhani, one of Jokowi's dedicated supporters, in social media. The media reported the young female supporter was working for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna before she decided to return to Jakarta to become a full-time supporter of the former city mayor. In her endeavor to back up Jokowi she established a website [www.generasioptimis.org](http://www.generasioptimis.org). She incorporated a video game, videos, animations, comic strips and smartphone applications, all featuring Jokowi-JK, in the website to attract voters in their favor. She claimed the viewership of the videos had reached 300,000 times in just two days. In addition, approximately 8,000 people had downloaded the video game entitled 'Jokowi Go' in the same period (Dewi & Widhiarto 2014).

**Figure 7-4 The Transfer of Issues on Endorsements toward the Candidates**




Regarding the topic on the use of social media for campaign activities among celebrity supporters, for example, the media reported both presidential candidates received endorsements from celebrities through music videos in

social media. They reported Jokowi receiving endorsement from a Hip Hop musician, Marzuki Mohamad, and a prominent rock band, *Slank*. They both showed such endorsements through music videos disseminated in social media. Marzuki dedicated a music video entitled *Bersatu Padu Coblos Jokowi* (United to Vote Jokowi) and *Slank* created a music video entitled *Salam Dua Jari* (Two Finger Salute). On the other hand, Prabowo received an endorsement from Ahmad Dhani, a famous musician in the country, who uploaded campaign music videos in social media for such purposes (Wibisono 2014). Figure 7-4 shows the media reports on *endorsements toward the presidential* issue were more predominantly linked to Jokowi (53.3 percent) than Prabowo (46.3 percent).

### 7.1.3. Popularity of the Candidates

A further analysis on the media reports concerning *popularity of the candidates* found 91.7 percent of the articles were linked to Jokowi and 8.3 percent were linked to Prabowo. The media featured the popularity of the presidential nominees mostly based on two bases, namely statements from social media analysts and data from their own analyses upon social media conversations concerning the election.

**Figure 7-5 The Transfer of Issues on Popularity of the Candidates**



Regarding statements from social media analysts, for example, *Suara Pembaruan* in an article on 18 June 2014 dubbed Prabowo as the president in Facebook whilst Jokowi as the president in Twitter. The newspaper made such a claim based on data from a social media analyst based in Jakarta. The analyst stated Prabowo was more popular in social media, especially Facebook, than Jokowi. In the period, Prabowo had almost six million fans in Facebook whereas Jokowi had

less than two million fans. In Twitter, however, Jokowi was more popular than Prabowo. The former city mayor had more than one and a half million followers whereas Prabowo only had approximately 800,000 followers ('Prabowo presiden Facebook, Jokowi presiden Twitter' 2014).

Regarding data deriving from internal analysis of the media upon social media conversations concerning the election, for example, on 3 July 2014 *Koran Tempo* reported high popularity of Jokowi among Twitter users. It reported a Twitter hash tag *#AakhirnyaMilihJokowi* (*#FinallyVotingforJokowi*) became the world number one trending topic in Twitter in the period. Jokowi's celebrity supporters created the hash tag to show their support during the election campaign period. The newspaper also mentioned several prominent Indonesian celebrities with the hash tagged messages such as from a female musician, Sherina Munaf. On her account @sherinasinna Sherina tweeted, "No more apathy to the country. Come on! I *#FinallyVotingforJokowi*" (Primandari 2014). Previously, *Koran Tempo* also reported Jokowi's high popularity based on a Twitter trending topic linked to Jokowi's birthday on 21 June 2014. The media outlet claimed messages under three hash tags comprising *#JokowiBday*, *#HUT53Jokowi*, and *#HBD\_JOKOWIsahabatrakyat* were among the most popular trending topics in Twitter in the period (Suryanis 2014). Figure 7-5 shows intermedia agenda setting between social media and print media on issues related to *popularity of the candidates* were more predominantly linked to Jokowi (91.7 percent) than Prabowo (8.3 percent).

Overall the analyses on the three issues pertinent to the presidential candidates demonstrate news reports of the print media concerning social media and *smear campaign* issues were linked to Prabowo whereas the ones concerning *endorsement toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates* were linked to Jokowi. It was suggested there was no conclusive evidence concerning the impacts of smear campaigns on the popularity of political actors in the election. Some research found they brought adverse impacts toward the respective political actors but some research also found the opposite outcome. Some other research even found they had no impact on the political actors targeted by such campaigns (Sigelman & Kugler 2003). Despite such inconclusive impacts of

smear campaigns, however, generally political actors are apprehensive toward dissemination of smear issues against them in the media, especially during election campaign periods. They are likely concerned about the potential adverse impacts of such smear campaign issues on their popularity in the election. Accordingly, smear campaigns are usually considered unethical and such practices are opposed in election campaigns, including in Indonesia. In the election period, the General Electoral Commission (KPU) even explicitly demanded both camps to stop using smear tactics in the election (Insetyonoto 2014). Under such circumstances, the presidential candidates would likely have attempted to prevent smear campaign issues linked to them from appearing in the media in the election period. Similarly, the media backing the candidates would likely have avoided reporting smear campaign issues related to them. On the contrary, the presidential candidates would likely have attempted to promote positive issues related to them to appear in the media such as the ones pertinent to *popularity of the candidates* and *endorsement toward the candidates*. Likewise, the media backing the candidates would likely have also attempted to disseminate news reports on such positive issues pertinent to the one they supported in the election.


As the analysis demonstrates the news articles on *smear campaign* in the four print media were more often linked to Prabowo than Jokowi whilst the news articles on *popularity of the candidates* and *endorsement toward the candidates* were more often linked to Jokowi than Prabowo, such accounts suggest the country's traditional media generally inclined to be more supportive toward Jokowi but they were less supportive toward Prabowo in the election. But was it likely the case? Which media were in support of each of the candidates? Did the political stance of the media in the election, as discussed in Chapter 3, influence the selection of issues related to both presidential candidates originating from social media in their news reports? The following section addresses such questions to demonstrate how media polarizations had caused the traditional media to selectively report only the issues benefiting the candidate being endorsed.

## 7.2. Selections of Issues and Political Stances of the Traditional Media

As aforementioned, despite research having no conclusive finding on the impacts of smear campaign on political actors, it is generally believed news reports on negative issues concerning a political nominee potentially give negative impacts on the respective nominee whilst the ones on positive issues likely give positive impacts. Accordingly, a media outlet backing a particular presidential candidate would likely report the particular presidential candidate more frequently concerning positive issues (such as *endorsement toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates*) but less frequently concerning negative issues (such as *smear campaign*) and vice versa. Thus, when a media outlet more frequently reported a presidential candidate in relation to positive issues such as *endorsement toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates* but less frequently reported the presidential candidate in relation to negative issue such as *smear campaign*, the media outlet likely was backing the respective presidential candidate in the election and vice versa. Based on such accounts this section analyzed the inclination of the four media outlets regarding their reports on each of the three issues pertaining to both presidential candidates and linked such inclination with their political stances toward the presidential candidates in the election. The following are the findings of such analysis on the four media outlets.

*Kompas*

**Figure 7-6 Distribution of Issues concerning Social Media and the Presidential Candidates in *Kompas***




The analysis of the articles in *Kompas* shows the percentage of the news reports on negative issue (*smear campaign*) pertaining to Jokowi was lower (35.7 percent) than the ones pertaining to Prabowo (64.3 percent). On the other hand, the percentages of the reports on positive issues (*popularity of the candidates* and *endorsements toward the candidates*) pertaining to Jokowi were higher than the ones pertaining to Prabowo. Kompas' reports on *popularity of the candidates* were all pertaining to Jokowi. Meanwhile, 55.6 percent of the reports concerning *endorsements toward the candidates* were pertaining to Jokowi whilst 44.4 percent of such reports were related to Prabowo.

Such findings suggest *Kompas*' coverage on the issues concerning social media and the presidential election were biased, inclined to endorsing Jokowi's camp. This was in line with the political stance of *Kompas* in the election as suggested in Chapter 2. In the election, despite Jacob Oetama, the prominent figure in the Kompas Gramedia Group that operates the newspapers, never openly declaring his alliance with Jokowi's camp, the public generally believed he was taking a stance on the former city mayor's side (Manangka 2017).

#### *Koran Tempo*

**Figure 7-7 Distribution of Issues concerning Social Media and the Presidential Candidates in *Koran Tempo***




The analysis of the articles in *Koran Tempo* shows the news reports on negative issue (*smear campaign*) pertaining to both presidential candidates were balanced (50 percent each). However, concerning the reports on the positive issue (*popularity of the candidates*), they were all pertaining to Jokowi. Such findings suggest *Koran Tempo*'s coverage on the issues concerning social media

and the presidential election were biased, inclining to endorsing Jokowi's camp. Despite that the reports concerning issues with negative tone (*smear campaign*) were balanced, the ones with positive tone (*popularity of the candidates*) were entirely regarding Jokowi. Such a finding is in accordance with the political stance of *Koran Tempo's* founder and owner, Goenawan Mohamad, in the election. As mentioned in Chapter 2, he was taking a stance in Jokowi's camp.

#### *The Jakarta Post*

The analysis of the articles in *The Jakarta Post* also found similar results. Its news reports on the positive issues (*popularity of the candidates* and *endorsement toward the candidates*) were mostly pertaining to Jokowi. The reports concerning *popularity of the candidates* were entirely pertaining to Jokowi whilst the ones concerning *endorsement toward the candidates* were more predominantly about Jokowi (66.7 percent) than Prabowo (33.3 percent). On the other hand, reports on the negative issue (*smear campaign*) were more predominantly pertaining to Prabowo (75 percent) than Jokowi (25 percent).


**Figure 7-8 Distribution of Issues concerning Social Media and the Presidential Candidates in *The Jakarta Post***



Such findings suggest *The Jakarta Post's* coverage on the issues concerning social media and the presidential election were biased, inclining to endorse Jokowi's camp. Again, it is not surprising because the newspaper was operating under the management of Kompas Gramedia Group, similar to daily *Kompas* that took sides with Jokowi's camp. *The Jakarta Post* even explicitly declared such political endorsement through its editorial on 4 July 2014 (Perdana 2014).

The analysis of the news articles in *Suara Pembaruan* also found they were biased, inclining to endorsing Prabowo. Its news reports on the issue with negative tone (*smear campaign*) were more predominantly related to Jokowi (64.7 percent) than Prabowo (35.3 percent). It was despite that the reports on the positive tone issues (*popularity of the candidates* and *endorsement toward the candidates*) were mixed. On the one hand, the reports on the issue concerning *popularity of the candidates* were more predominantly pertaining to Jokowi (83.3 percent) than Prabowo (16.7 percent). On the other hand, the ones concerning *endorsement toward the candidates* were more predominantly pertaining to Prabowo (66.7 percent) than Jokowi (33.3 percent). Such findings suggest *Suara Pembaruan's* coverage on the issues concerning social media and the presidential election were also biased, inclining to endorse Prabowo's camp. Such a situation is in line with the political stance of the elite figure of Lippo Group, under which the newspaper was operating, James Riady. He was close to the Golkar Party, one of the political parties endorsing Prabowo in the election (Lim 2012).

**Figure 7-9 Distribution of Issues concerning Social Media and the Presidential Candidates in *Suara Pembaruan***



Overall, the analysis on the transfer of issues from social media to the traditional media pertaining to the presidential candidates demonstrates three out of the four country's major print media were in Jokowi's camp in the election. They comprised *Kompas*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post*. Only *Suara Pembaruan* was standing for Prabowo's camp. Such findings corroborate the country's

environment in the election presented in Chapter 2 suggesting that the media were polarized because some key figures of the country's media organizations took stances on either side of the contesting candidates. Jacob Oetama, the key figure in Kompas Gramedia Group that publishes daily *Kompas* and *The Jakarta Post*, was in Jokowi–JK's camp. Goenawan Mohamad, the key figure in Tempo Media Group that publishes *Koran Tempo*, took a similar stance. On the other hand, James Riady from Lippo Group that publishes *Suara Pembaruan*, was in Prabowo–Hatta's camp. Moreover, the analysis shows such political stances of the media have caused biased reporting concerning the key issues circulating in social media pertaining to the presidential candidates. The media backing Jokowi frequently reported issues potentially benefiting his camp whilst at the same time reported issues potentially scathing of his opponent. The media backing Prabowo acted in a similar way.

Such situations likely had considerable political ramifications in the election, especially toward the popularity of both presidential candidates. In contemporary society, people predominantly rely on mediapolis, in which print media constitutes its main element, as their resources of judgment for making decisions in their everyday life, including political life. In this regard, the news agenda of the four print media, which constituted the country's highly circulated and respected media, likely became key resources of judgements and shaped opinions for the majority of people in the country about the contesting candidates. It is especially also because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the majority of Indonesian people relied on traditional media. Eventually such shaped opinions became bases for their decisions on whom to vote for in the election. The following section further elaborates the impacts of traditional media reports on the three key issues originating from social media on the popularity of the presidential candidates, and their consequences on the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in Indonesia.

### **7.3. Biased Reporting of the Traditional Media and Empowerment of Democracy**

Mass media have potential power to influence the public agenda concerning what issues are considered important. When mass media highlight an issue as

important, by frequent and abundant space for its coverage, most of the time public audiences will perceive the issue as important (McCombs & Shaw 1972). In line with such a notion, in election periods the more articles comprised a particular issue regarding the election, the more likely the public will think the issue is important with regard to the election. Accordingly, such an issue will likely become the key agenda and attract most of attention regarding the election. In this regard, the media have the power to tell the public *what* to think about the election. In addition, the more articles cover an issue in relation to a particular political nominee, the more likely the public will think about the particular nominee in relation to such an issue. In this regard, the media have the power to tell the public *how* to think about the nominee. In the context of the presidential election, for example, the more frequently the media reported smear campaign issues concerning the election, the more likely the public would think smear campaign was *the* important issue regarding the election. Moreover, the more frequently the media reported smear campaign issues regarding a particular candidate, the more likely the public would think smear campaigns were *the* important issues regarding the respective candidate.

In the preceding chapter, I mentioned voting behaviors among Indonesian constituents have mostly been dependent on personal image and political agenda of political actors (Mujani & Liddle 2010). Under such circumstances, what the constituents thought about the personal image and political agenda of the presidential candidates likely contributed to the shaping of their opinions about the presidential candidates and eventually they were essential in their decisions on which candidate to vote for in the election. In other words, the opinions of the constituents about the presidential candidates were likely critical toward their popularity in the election.

In today's politics, the majority of constituents rarely know political nominees through face-to-face interactions. Instead, they know them through mediated communications, from the media. What they know (or think they know) about political nominees usually originates from what the media reported on them. This is in accordance with Silverstone's (2007) view on the role of the media in present day society suggesting that for most people they often become

‘resources for thought, judgment and action’ in their personal and political affairs (p. 5).

Some constituents might have an opportunity to meet political nominees during election campaign rallies. However, had such interaction happened, it would likely have been short and insufficient to know the nominees well. In an election, therefore, constituents usually get acquainted with and know about the political contenders through the media. It was the case with the majority of Indonesian constituents during the 2014 presidential election. Both presidential candidates could not meet face-to-face with approximately 190 million constituents, residing in thousands of islands across the country, during the 32-day campaign period. In such a situation, issues in the media concerning the presidential candidates, such as the ones transferring from social media, likely became important resources for their thoughts concerning the presidential candidates and contributed to shaping their judgements about them. Accordingly, they might have contributed to shaping their political preferences, of whom to vote for, in the election. In other words, intermedia agenda setting between both media types concerning issues pertaining to the presidential candidates might have been influential toward their popularity among the constituents in the election.

In this regard, tone and the degree of association of an issue with a political nominee were critical in shaping the constituents’ political stance toward the nominees. When the media frequently reported a particular political nominee concerning negative issues, such as smear campaign, the constituents would likely have thought about the nominee mostly regarding such negative issues. Accordingly, their knowledge about the nominee would have been predominantly related to such negative issues. And when the media frequently reported a particular political nominee mostly regarding positive issues, such as the popularity of the nominee, the constituents would likely have thought about the nominee mostly concerning such positive issues. It follows that their knowledge about the nominee would have been predominantly related to such positive issues.

Bearing this in mind, data concerning prominent issues in the traditional media, especially the ones related to the presidential candidates transferring from social media during the campaign period, are useful for assessing the potential impacts of such issues on their popularity in the election. I am not suggesting the three issues resulting from intermedia agenda setting between both media types have constituted the only aspects influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. Other aspects, such as party affiliation, personal image, and political agenda of the constituents as well as endorsements of celebrity supporters as discussed in the previous chapter, might have been influential, too. However, the three issues were also related to such aspects. As previously discussed, among the topics of the three issues were ones related to personal image and political agenda of the nominees. What I am suggesting is the three issues resulting from intermedia agenda setting between both media types likely became additional resources of judgements for the constituents in their voting decisions. Moreover, such transfers of issues occurred among the country's most highly circulated and respected dailies, namely *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post*. Accordingly, they became major references for trustworthy political news among most Indonesian people in the period. Under such circumstances, the tone of such issues, whether negative or positive, and the degree of their associations with the presidential candidates, whether closely or hardly associated, might have contributed toward their popularity in the election. Now, let us examine the three issues more closely.

### *Smear campaign*

As aforementioned, most media reports concerning *smear campaign* originating from social media were more frequently linked to Prabowo than to Jokowi. Moreover, more issues on *smear campaign* were linked to the retired general than to the former city mayor. Thus, regarding issues on *smear campaign* the media provided the constituents with a lot of information about Prabowo but much less about Jokowi. Under such circumstances, the constituents likely had more knowledge about the retired general than about the former city mayor on the issue. As issues concerning *smear campaign* were predominantly negative, they might have caused the constituents to link Prabowo mostly to such negative

issues. On the contrary, the constituents possessed less information about Jokowi concerning such negative issues. Such a situation might have been influential toward the popularity of both presidential candidates among the constituents in the election. For Prabowo, it was politically disadvantageous because such transfers of issues likely caused the constituents to predominantly think about and link the retired general with negative issues. In other words, the constituents' knowledge on Prabowo might have been predominantly regarding negative issues. Accordingly, they might have reacted adversely toward him in the election. On the contrary, such a situation was politically advantageous for Jokowi. Indeed, such transfers of issues also likely caused the constituents to link the former city mayor with negative issues but such associations was likely much less. In other words, the constituents' knowledge on negative issues related to Jokowi was limited. Accordingly, such limited associations of negative issues toward him might have led the constituents to react less adversely toward him in the election. Such accounts suggest intermedia agenda setting between both media types concerning *smear campaign* issues might have influenced adversely the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election. However, such issues likely had more adverse impacts toward Prabowo than Jokowi.

#### *Endorsement toward the Candidates*

The analysis concerning intermedia agenda setting occurring between both media types on issues regarding *endorsements toward the candidates* found they were more predominantly linked to Jokowi than Prabowo. In such a situation, the constituents likely had much more information concerning Jokowi but much less about Prabowo about the issues. As the information was predominantly positive, such transfers of issues likely caused the constituents to link Jokowi mostly to such positive issues. But the constituents likely possessed less information about Prabowo on such positive issues. Consequently, had such transfer of issues caused the constituents to link Prabowo to positive issue, such association would have been much less. Such situations were likely influential on the popularity of both presidential candidates among the constituents in the election. For the former city mayor, the transfer of issues on *endorsement toward the candidates* might have been advantageous. They might have made the

constituents predominantly think about and associate the former city mayor with such positive issues, that he received wide public support. Accordingly, such associations might have led the constituents to react positively toward him in the election. On the contrary, for the retired general such transfers of issues might have been less advantageous. Such transfers of issues might also have made the constituents link Prabowo with such positive issues but such associations might have been less. In other words, the constituents might have thought he received less public support compared to Jokowi. Accordingly, such associations might have led the constituents to react less positively toward him in the election. Such accounts suggest intermedia agenda setting between both media types concerning issues on *endorsement toward the candidates* might have influenced positively toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. However, such issues likely had more positive impacts toward Jokowi than Prabowo in the election.

#### *Popularity of the Candidates*

The findings demonstrate issues concerning the *popularity of the candidates* in social media transferring to print media were more predominantly linked to Jokowi than Prabowo. As the issues were predominantly positive, such transfer of issues might have caused the public to link Jokowi mostly to such positive issues. But the public might have possessed less information about Prabowo on such positive issues. Consequently, if such transfer of issues had caused the public to link Prabowo to such positive issues, the public's association of such accounts might have been much less. Similar to the two previous topics, this suggests intermedia agenda setting between both media types concerning issues on *popularity of the candidates* might have been influential on the popularity of the presidential candidates. In this regard, it might have influenced positively toward the popularity of the presidential candidates. However, the transfer of issues on *popularity of the candidates* likely had more positive impacts toward Jokowi than Prabowo in the election.

In the election Jokowi was more popular than Prabowo. The former city mayor secured more votes than Prabowo did and was elected the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The intermedia agenda setting phenomenon between

social media and traditional media on the issues concerning the presidential election, to some extent, likely had consequences on the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election. Such an intermedia agenda setting phenomenon in tandem with the polarization of traditional media caused Jokowi to be less associated with negative issues but highly associated with positive issues whilst Prabowo to be highly associated with negative issues but less associated with positive issues in the election period. Accordingly, such a situation might have increased the popularity of the former city mayor over the retired general.

Democracy can be sustained robustly when two preconditions exist, namely equal rights among the constituents and the availability of truthful and fair information. Therefore, in order to flourish democracy requires balanced media. They should never intentionally prioritize particular individuals or groups or interests over others because this would impair both elements and eventually impede the democratic process (Street 2011, p. 25). Based on this, the findings suggest that despite social media having capacity to influence the traditional media through such transfers of issues, they failed to drive the news agenda of the traditional media to be fair and detached from their inclination to be biased due to their political stances in the election. As a result the constituents, who mostly relied on traditional media, were not able to obtain accurate and objective information related to the election. Accordingly their political decisions were likely also biased in accordance with the dominant biased information and narratives from the traditional media. Such a situation was counterproductive to the political life of the constituents in the election and eventually disempowered democracy in the country. From this perspective, social media had limited capacity to empower democracy because they failed to counterbalance the inclination of biased reporting among the traditional media in the country.

Previously online media had such a capacity in the country. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the 1990s online media were sometimes able to promote politically sensitive information regarding the elites of the New Order Government into the traditional media. In the period online media (back then social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter did not exist) were able to interfere with and

challenge the news reports of the traditional media that were generally biased toward the government. At times several sensitive political issues from online media, such as concerning corruption among the ruling elites from the *Apakabar* mailing list, were able to transfer to traditional media (Sen & Hill 2002, p. 8; Lim 2005a, p. 106). Such capacity, although limited, was important in the period because such different information and narratives about the ruling elites had empowered the political life of the citizens. They triggered the constituents to discuss politics with different topics and nuances, not only about the success of the ruling government as commonly induced by the media but also about the corrupt acts of the ruling elites. Eventually such discussions led to the increasing dissatisfaction and resistance of the public to the authoritarian government. Such dissatisfaction and resistance contributed to the burgeoning political activism against the ruling government in the period that contributed to the fall of the New Order Government in 1998. From that point Indonesia has transformed into a new democracy and the people have enjoyed democratic freedom since then. Such accounts suggest in the past that online media had capacity to counterbalance the biased inclination of the traditional media, which was vital to empower democracy.

However, the capacity of social media to challenge the biased narratives of news agenda dominating the traditional media did not happen in the election. Despite that some issues did transfer and became the news agenda of the traditional media, they were not able to interfere with biases. The traditional media maintained their biased reports on issues regarding the presidential candidates in accordance with their political stances in the election. Thus, in this sense, social media failed to challenge and interfere with the biased news agenda of the traditional media, which was detrimental for democracy. Such a finding contradicts claims of the optimists suggesting social media enable the public (of course those who had access to the Internet) to produce their own news and disseminate to anyone across the globe. They claimed, social media had capacity to challenge the narratives of traditional media reports whenever they were biased in favor of particular groups or interests. Why did online media such as social media have limited capacity to influence and counterbalance the inclination of the traditional media to be biased in the election? What factors

could potentially diminish such power they seemed to hold in the 1990s? The following section identifies factors impeding social media from having such capacity so that they had limited capacity to empower democracy.

#### **7.4. Social Media, Traditional Media, and Empowerment of Democracy**

The preceding sections elucidate intermedia agenda setting power of social media upon the traditional media and their capacity to empower democracy. It suggests despite such intermedia agenda setting power, social media had limited capacity to empower democracy during the election period. It happened because they failed to interfere with and challenge the traditional media for being biased toward either of the two contesting camps. Such a situation was detrimental for democracy because it hindered the constituents from obtaining impartial political information pertinent to the election, which was vital to make informed voting decisions. Back in the 1990s during the New Order Government the situation was different. In the period online media were able to challenge the news reports of the traditional media that were generally biased toward the government. At times online media were able to ensure sensitive political issues were reported in the traditional media. Both accounts demonstrate that the intermedia agenda setting power of online media to interfere with and challenge the biased environment of the traditional media was more superior within the New Order era than *Reformasi* era, that was during the 2014 presidential election.

People might argue that the conclusion was overstated, especially because the penetration of the Internet was still limited in the New Order period. Moreover, there are claims that elections were often rigged to favor the Government party. The power of alternative media was limited during the New Order era. The situation was due to the still low adoption of the Internet among the population because of technological and economic difficulties. Only the few elites in the big cities had access to the Internet because Internet service was still expensive for the average people. However, the obstacles did not prevent the Internet to contribute significantly to the media and political settings of the country in the period. The emergence of Warnet helped the people, especially students and political activists, to connect to the Internet to obtain and share sensitive

political information. Prominent scholars on Indonesian media and politics such as Lim (2005; 2006) Hill & Sen (1997; 2000; 2005) maintained the essential role of the Internet in the era, especially to counter the narrative of the New Order Government in the traditional media, which were largely under its control. Thus, despite highly controlled environment of the traditional media and low adoption of the Internet among the population, the alternative media were able to play an important role in the period. It was despite that the New Order's blatantly rigged elections. The scholars suggested the Internet was influential in the period because its capacity to facilitate university students and political activists in Indonesia to obtain and disseminate politically sensitive information absent in the traditional media. The politically information was then able to trigger discussions among the public about politics and contribute to major political shift in the country in 1998. Thus, the rigged elections that made the Government party, Golkar, won in the elections during the New Order era was irrelevant to the topic.

Considering this, in order to identify what factor(s) impeded social media from interfering with and challenging the biased media environment during the presidential election, it is essential to identify and compare the factor(s) enabling online media to have such capacity in both periods. For such purpose in this study I focused the examination on two aspects pertinent to the operation of the media in the country, namely the country's media and political systems. The media system is essential, as it becomes the basis for the operation of the media, whilst the political system is vital as the intermedia agenda setting phenomena being investigated are pertinent to politics. Moreover, Indonesian media operated under different media and political systems in both periods, therefore such impeding factor(s) might be related to them.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the New Order Government tightly controlled the media through a licensing system. The government mostly only granted media licenses, both television and print media, to those who were parts of or affiliated with the ruling government. Therefore they generally became the mouthpiece of the government. In television broadcasting sector, up to the late 1980s Indonesia only had one television station, namely TVRI. The national broadcaster was part

of the Department of Information, therefore the country's television-broadcasting media was truly the mouthpiece of the government up to the period. Even when the government permitted the establishment of private television networks comprising TPI, Metro TV, Lativi, Global TV, TransTV, and TV-7 later in the period they generally also represented the government's voice because the owners of the new broadcasting stations were a few figures from the circle of the ruling political elites (Kitley 2000, pp. 224-6; 2002).

In the print media sector, the ruling government also operated some major print media comprising *Suara Karya*, *Berita Yudha*, and *Angkatan Bersenjata*. *Suara Karya* (Labor Voice) was affiliated with the government party, Golkar, whilst *Berita Yudha* (Military News), and *Angkatan Bersenjata* (Armed Forces) were affiliated with the Army. However, the situation of the print environment was slightly different. Besides those operated by or affiliated with the government the country had several media outlets operated by figures beyond the circles of the ruling political elite. Among the prominent ones were the daily *Kompas* (Compass), *Sinar Harapan* (Ray of Hope), *Merdeka* (Freedom), *Duta Masyarakat* (Society's Emmissary), *Pelita* (Lamp) and the weekly *Tempo* (Time). A few of the media unaffiliated with the government at times had courage to criticize the government, therefore they received severe consequences such as what happened to the daily *Sinar Harapan* and weekly *Tempo*. *Sinar Harapan* lost its license and was closed down due to its criticisms of economic policies of the government whilst *Tempo's* license was cancelled for two months due to a critical report regarding the 1982 general election. As a result although these non-partisan media were not standing on the government's side, they applied self-censorship and prevented themselves from offending the ruling government to keep their media business running (Hill 1992). Such accounts suggest the previous media system caused the media, especially those unaffiliated with the ruling political elites, to have limited freedom. They could not express any view different from the government's, be it their own views or views of others. Moreover, such a system made the media vulnerable. They might lose their licenses and be out of business at any moment.

Such situations changed dramatically due to the step down of the New Order government and the accession of the *Reformasi* Government to power in 1998. Soon after taking power the new government liberated the media by annulling the licensing system. Under the new system the media are powerful and have much freedom. They are powerful because without the licensing system the authorities virtually cannot stop their business operation. They have much freedom because they do not have to promote the aspirations of the ruling government. They are free to raise the aspirations of whomever they want, even if such views were critical toward the government, without fear of losing their license. However, such freedom granted by the new system does not necessarily make Indonesian media less biased.

As discussed in the foregoing chapter, the implementation of a new media system and multi-party system have encouraged some prominent media elites to form or affiliate with political parties. Under such situations the media become a political apparatus of their owners or their political allies to serve their political interests. As a result most of the time the media are biased. Thus, while the new system has given much freedom to the media, such a biased media environment continues to prevail. The difference is only regarding the subjects to which they are biased on. Under the previous systems they were biased toward the government and the ruling party Golkar whilst under the new systems they are generally biased toward the political allies of their owners.

Such accounts suggest now and then the factor driving the media to be biased grew out of their own interests. Under the previous system the media, especially the ones unaffiliated with the ruling elites, were generally biased for survival reasons whilst under the current system, such as exemplified during the election, the media were biased to serve the political interests of the owners or their allies. Thus, it suggests in both periods the media have never truly represented public interests. During the New Order era, although the country had several media outlets whose owners were unaffiliated with the government, most of the time they preferred playing safe. Despite that they were apprehensive toward the government they were reluctant to criticize the government for their own interest, to survive. Even the ones having enough courage to criticize the

government and got their licenses cancelled such as *Sinar Harapan* and *Tempo* might have also been critical toward the government for their own interest. They might have just wanted to obtain more freedom, to be able to express whatever views they want and to be free from business uncertainty due to the licensing system. Or they reported such sensitive political issues because of their news worthiness, which was vital for their readerships. Thus, they might not have criticized the government for the sake of the public.

In the period parts of the public especially political activists and university students were apprehensive toward the government due to discontent on the situations of politics and economy in the country. Regarding politics, they were frustrated with the government policies to depoliticize the public as well as corrupt behaviors of the ruling elites. Regarding economy, such dissatisfaction originated from the widening gap between the poor and the rich and the accumulation of wealth among the circles of the ruling elites. Due to such discontent political activist and university students often went to the streets protesting against the government (Cohen 1993; King, BA 1992, pp. 157-60; Suryadinata 1999)

In such situations therefore, when the media were being critical toward the government, they seemed to have been representing the aspirations of the resentful public. Nonetheless, it might not have been the case. They might simply share a common antagonist but they had their own interests. In the period, on the one hand, the media were apprehensive toward the government due to its tight control of over them through the license system. They wanted the government to change the system so that they could have freedom of the press. In this regard the criticisms of the media toward the government could have been manifestations of their protest concerning the situation they were enduring. Thus, they largely derived from the interest of the media, not the public. On the other hand, the public was apprehensive toward the government due to dissatisfaction upon situations of politics and economy in the country. They wanted the government to do something so that they could have a much better situation. Due to such dissatisfactions the public, especially political activists and university students, criticized the government through rallies and

other protest activities. In this regard the criticisms of the public toward the government were due to the situation the public was enduring. Thus, they largely derived from the interests of the public. Such accounts demonstrate that when the media criticized the government such as by reporting sensitive political issues originating from online media they might have done so in pursuit of their own interests. They might not have taken such actions purely to serve public interests. They might have used such a strategy to amplify the aspirations of the public so that the government would hear the public and force the government to make changes in the existing political and economic situations. Such changes, especially regarding the improvement of the political system, were partly relevant to their interest. In this regard, public demands for more freedom in politics implied they also demanded to have a more free press system, which was congruent with the interest of the media. Such accounts demonstrate that during the New Order period online media had capacity to interfere with and challenge the biased environment of the traditional media because the online media users and the media elites shared common interests.

In the 2014 presidential election the situation was different. In the period media were operating under the new system. They had more freedom to express their views. However, the media environment continued to be biased. The media continued to be biased not because they feared losing licenses but because they feared their owners or political allies losing their political interests. Thus, within both circumstances the media have been biased for the sake of their own interests.

Within the new media system they have much freedom and should not fear being put out of business due to cancellation of licenses. Under such circumstances, had the media constituted the defenders of public interests during the presidential election, they would have disseminated information concerning the presidential candidates impartially. Such impartial information was vital for making the public well informed about the candidates so that they could have made informed voting decisions. But it did not happen. Despite having capacity to be impartial they opted to be biased toward the owners or their allies. As a result they were biased toward either of the contesting candidates. Such

accounts suggest the intermedia agenda setting power of social media upon the traditional media had limited capacity to interfere with and challenge the biased media environment in the period because the social media users and the media elites had different political interests. In the election the interest of the traditional media was to promote the candidate whom the owners or their political allies were endorsing whilst the interest of the public was to obtain impartial information concerning both candidates to enable them to use their voting rights more judiciously.

Such analyses demonstrate that intermedia agenda setting power of social media upon traditional media to interfere with and challenge the biased media environment, which was vital for empowering democracy, was due to a discrepancy of interest between the public of social media and the media elites during the election. As the traditional media had their own interests, the public of social media had limited capacity to interfere with and challenge the biased environment of the traditional media. Some major issues pertinent to the presidential election were able to transfer into the traditional media. However, such transfers of issues failed to challenge the bias. The traditional media only reported the issues from social media potentially serving their interests. The media backing Prabowo only reported issues benefitting the retired general whilst the media backing Jokowi only reported issues benefitting the former city mayor. This implies that the failure of social media to interfere with and challenge the traditional media was due to superior power of the traditional media. Thus, the factor impeding social media to empower democracy was due to superiority of the traditional media system over social media system.

## **7.5. Conclusion**

The analysis demonstrates five key issues related to the presidential election initially only circulating in social media were able to transfer to the traditional media, namely *smear campaign*, *election campaign*, *endorsement toward the candidates*, *popularity of the candidates* and *other*. Among the five issues three of them were specifically pertinent to the presidential candidates, comprising *smear campaign*, *endorsement toward the candidates*, and *popularity of the candidates*. Overall the issues with negative tone (*smear campaign*) were

predominantly associated with Prabowo whilst the ones with positive tone (*endorsement toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates*) were predominantly associated with Jokowi. Such different degrees of association of the issues to each of the presidential candidates were likely influential toward the popularity of the presidential candidates in the election, impairing Prabowo but benefitting Jokowi.

It also demonstrates the traditional media were biased in their reports concerning the three issues. Such biases were in accordance with their political stances toward the presidential candidates in the election. As mentioned in Chapter 2, daily *Kompas*, *Koran Tempo*, and *The Jakarta Post* were in Jokowi's camp whilst *Suara Pembaruan* was in Prabowo's camp. Thus, the news reports concerning *smear campaign* issues in the three print media were more frequently pertaining to Prabowo than Jokowi whilst the ones concerning issues on *endorsements toward the candidates* and *popularity of the candidates* were more frequently pertaining to Jokowi than Prabowo. On the other hand, the news reports concerning *smear campaign* issues in *Suara Pembaruan* were more frequently pertaining to Jokowi than Prabowo. The intermedia agenda setting phenomenon on such issues had political impacts on the popularity of the presidential candidates and the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. On the one hand, such transfers of issues were mostly about smear campaigns toward Prabowo but on the other hand they were mostly concerning the endorsements toward and popularity of Jokowi. As a result, it had adverse impacts on Prabowo's popularity but positive impacts on Jokowi's.

Moreover, the analysis demonstrates such transfers of issues failed to interfere with and challenge the politically biased traditional media in the election. The traditional media had the power to determine what issues in social media to be become their news agendas in the election period. They only reported the issues potentially supporting their own interests or their political allies. Accordingly, the traditional media failed to provide the constituents with accurate and fair political information, which was essential for the constituents to conduct their political life in the election. Under such circumstances, despite social media

having capacity to set the news agenda of the traditional media, they had minimal capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. This suggests the failure of the intermedia agenda setting power of social media to interfere with and challenge the bias of the traditional media environment, which was detrimental to democracy, was due to the superiority of the traditional media system over social media system in the country.

## Chapter 8 Conclusions

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In this chapter, I review the key findings of the three foregoing chapters and interpret such findings regarding contemporary situations of Indonesian mediapolis and the capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. I then use such findings and interpretations to suggest the significance of the study, the implications for policy and practices, limitations of the study, and potential topics for further research.

### 8.1 Summary of the Study

As elucidated in the introduction, the study was inspired by my personal experience to witness the use of social media in Indonesian politics from the country's political hub, the presidential office, during President Yudhoyono's second term from 2009 to 2014. During my tenure at the Office of Special Staff to the President for Food and Energy Affairs I witnessed how the principal political figure in the country incorporated social media for political purposes and how social media have become essential in Indonesian media and political landscapes. In his second term President Yudhoyono started to be active in social media, especially Twitter and Facebook. As a result, soon the new communication technologies became essential elements of Indonesian politics. They became important political references for the media and the public.

Yudhoyono's take-up of social media for political purposes soon also inspired the country's political actors to adopt them to serve their political interests. Among those following the steps of the President were the nominees of the 2014 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo. In the election they officially incorporated Facebook and Twitter into their election campaign strategies. Prior to the election, media and political commentators forecasted social media would play critical roles in the election due to the large proportion of young voters, who constituted major users of social media, in the election. Driven by such accounts, this study explored the dynamics of social media in the contemporary public space of mediated communications and the conduct of political life in contemporary Indonesia. For such a purpose it scrutinized the use

of social media for political endeavors among the presidential candidates, celebrity supporters, and constituents during the 2014 presidential election to reveal how and to what degree social media had capacity to empower political life of the constituents and democracy in the country.

In pursuing such objectives I adopted the concept of mediapolis from Roger Silverstone (2007) as the major theoretical umbrella to probe the country's contemporary public space of mediated communications in which social media constituted its essential elements. However, the concept alone was insufficient to achieve such an objective, therefore the study then also incorporated two other concepts, namely celebrity and intermedia agenda setting. Altogether the three concepts helped this study in elucidating the roles of social media in the election particularly pertinent to their capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in Indonesia.

To establish connection, relevance, and applicability of such concepts in the study, I dedicated two chapters (Chapter 2 and 3) of the thesis to review the relevant literatures pertinent to such concepts. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literatures concerning the concept of mediapolis to assess the contemporary situation of public space of mediated communications in Indonesia. Such analysis demonstrated complicated settings of contemporary public space of mediated communications in Indonesia due to prevalent social and economic disparities, especially between the urban and the rural as well as those living in the Western and Eastern regions of the country. Such disparities have resulted in inequalities of their participations in public discourses with the public space of mediated communications and inevitable use of irrational arguments in such public discourses. This is incompatible with Habermas' concept of public sphere but compatible with Silverstone's concept of mediapolis. For this reason, in this study I applied mediapolis as the major theoretical umbrella for an investigation of Indonesian public space of mediated communications. It also validates that social media have constituted vital elements of Indonesian mediapolis. Considerable penetration rates of the new communication technologies among the population, especially among young constituents, and their important roles in prominent social and political events in the country prior to the election

verified such importance. Such analysis also presents debates on the potential power of social media, whether it empowers or disempowers, democracy. The optimist points out social media have the capacity to empower democracy due to features such as the cost effectiveness, convenience, and interactivity. They claim these features have considerably assisted political activists and dissidents to coordinate, collaborate, and organize collective actions in their struggles against authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the pessimists maintain, social media have limited capacity to empower democracy due to their deficiency of political content as well as the implementation of censorship and surveillance upon social media in some authoritarian countries.

The succeeding chapter, Chapter 3, reviewed the relevant scholarly works pertinent to the other two concepts, namely celebrity and intermedia agenda setting. Regarding the former, it highlighted the power of celebrities to influence their fans and the applications of such potential power in political marketing, especially during election campaign periods, across the globe. It also noted such common practices in Indonesian politics, which could be traced to the country's first general election in 1955. In the country's politics celebrity supporters commonly participated in election campaign rallies to show their endorsements toward political actors. However, in the 2014 presidential election, celebrity supporters adopted a different strategy for such endeavor. They used social media for showing such endorsements in the election.

Regarding the latter, it noted that transfers of issues from online media into traditional media, especially regarding political issues, have been common in many countries, including in Indonesia. Such a phenomenon is vital in the Indonesian setting because the majority of the population still relies on the traditional media for obtaining political information. Under such a circumstance transfers of issues pertinent to the election from social media to traditional media potentially widened the reach, and likely the influences, of social media power. It is partially due to the power of the traditional media that they are often successful in telling the public *what to think about* and *how to think about* an issue. Some political issues initially only circulating among social media users were able to transfer into the traditional media and were likely able to influence

the audiences beyond social media users. Considering this, to better understand the roles and capacity social media have to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in Indonesia it is vital to assess the use of social media among the celebrity supporters and intermedia setting power social media had on the traditional media in the election.

In addition to both topics, in Chapter 3, I also presented a brief overview concerning the presidential candidates, the situations of social, economy and politics as well as the media environments of the country prior to the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. It suggested the 2014 presidential election was a political race between two contradictory candidates in terms of their social and political backgrounds as well as personal characteristics. It also showed that both Prabowo and Jokowi officially adopted social media as means for the dissemination of campaign messages in the election. In terms of fans in social media, Prabowo was more prominent in Facebook whilst Jokowi was more prominent in Twitter. Regarding the country's situations on social, economy, and political sectors, the analysis suggested the sectors had been generally undergoing progress. Meanwhile, with regard to the media environment, it showed the country's major media outlets, be they print media, broadcasting, or online media, were highly polarized toward both camps in the election. This happened because some key figures of the major media in the country had been either active in political parties backing the presidential candidates or closely connected to them. The subsequent chapter, Chapter 4, detailed the key methodological elements of the thesis covering the definitions, its major components, reliability issues, the strengths, limitations, relevance, and practical procedures of its application in this inquiry.

The discussion of the first finding chapter, Chapter 5, validated the study's proposition regarding the situation of contemporary public space of mediated communication in contemporary Indonesia, suggesting it was better portrayed as Silverstone's mediapolis than Habermas' public sphere. Therefore the former was adopted as the theoretical umbrella in this inquiry. Such validation was based on the inevitability of both rational and irrational arguments in the campaign messages of the presidential nominees. The chapter also demonstrated

limited capacity of social media to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country, particularly during the election period. Social media messages of both presidential nominees were deficient in political issues or rational arguments (both refer to issues concerning the candidates' *political agenda*). Instead, they contained more of non-political issues or irrational arguments (both refer to issues pertaining to the candidates' *personal image* and *endorsement claim*). The dominance of non-political issues or irrational arguments over political issues or rational arguments was due to the similarities of political agenda and ideological platforms of the parties backing the candidates in the election. Due to the similarities of both aspects, the political parties backing the candidates had to promote other topics beyond political agenda to attract the constituents.

The subsequent finding chapter, Chapter 6, which analyzed the use of social media for dissemination of statements of endorsements among the celebrity supporters, revealed social media had capacity to disempower but at the same time to empower democracy. The disempowering capacity of social media derived from the exploitation of celebrity-fans relationships by the celebrity supporters in their endorsements via social media. They mostly contained messages conveying moral and emotional judgements such as through music videos than rational arguments. On the other hand, the empowering capacity of social media derived from the capacity of celebrity endorsements in social media to encourage the constituents, particularly young cohorts who constituted the majority of social media users, to turn up and vote on the election date.

Finally, Chapter 7, which investigated intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media during the election campaign period, revealed social media were able to set the news agenda of the traditional media concerning several key issues related to the presidential election. However, such capacity to influence did not necessarily enable social media to interfere with and challenge the biased inclination among the traditional media. Despite such transfers of issues, the traditional media persisted to be biased in accordance with the political stances of the owners. In the election period the majority of the traditional media took political stances either in the camp of Prabowo or Jokowi.

In the period, penetration of social media among people in the country was still limited and traditional media still constituted major sources of political information among Indonesian people. In addition, the four print media analyzed in the study were among the highly circulated and well-respected print media in the country and likely had considerable power to shape public perception on such issues. Thus, the failure of social media to challenge the favoritism of the traditional media impeded the constituents from obtaining fair information regarding the contesting candidates. Such a situation was counterproductive toward democracy. Accordingly, such analysis demonstrated social media had limited capacity to empower the constituents to conduct their political life appropriately in the election, therefore they failed to empower democracy. Further analyses suggested it was due to the superiority of the traditional media system over social media in the country.

Taking account of all the findings in the three chapters and the given research question on the role of social media during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, the study concludes social media had important roles in the election and such roles exhibited their capacity to empower democracy. They functioned as new spaces for election campaign endeavors among the political actors, as key devices for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements toward the contesting candidates in the election, as essential sources of ideas and motivations for the constituents, and as the agenda setter for news articles in the traditional media. Social media functions as new spaces for election campaign endeavors among the political actors and as key devices for the dissemination of celebrity endorsements but demonstrate they were deficient of political issues and rational arguments. Both aspects are critical for the constituents to engage in public debates and to make informed voting decisions in the election. In this regard, therefore, social media had limited capacity to empower democracy. On the other hand, social media's role as essential sources of ideas and motivations for the constituents, especially the undecided voters, demonstrates the new communication technologies were able to encourage voting turnouts. Accordingly, they demonstrate their capacity to empower democracy. However, the last but not least role, which was as the agenda setter of news of the traditional media, demonstrates that social media failed to interfere with and

challenge the inclination of the traditional media for being biased in the election. Thus, again social media had limited capacity to empower the political life of the constituents and democracy in the country. The limited capacity of social media to empower democracy rooted from the implementation of the multi-party system as well as the superiority of the traditional media system over social media system in the country.

## **8.2 Significance of the Study**

The significance of this research is on its analysis of the political ramifications of new communications technologies, in particular social media, on the empowerment of political life of constituents and democracy during the election period from multidisciplinary perspectives and beyond developed democracies in Western countries, namely Indonesia. The significant aspects of the study are, first, its innovative use of the concept of mediapolis to analyze public space of mediated communications beyond its original function. It adopted the concept of mediapolis from its original function as a device for examining the media and morality (Silverstone 2007; Orgad 2011; Wessels at al. 2012; Lazaroui 2011; Lindell 2015) to a device for examining the media and political undertakings. Applying mediapolis concept, the study analyzes and presents how public space of mediated communications within the traditional and social media coexist and influence one another. Its analysis also reveals how such coexistence and influence occurred with the involvement of celebrities and how they might have impacts on democracy in Indonesia, particularly for empowering the political life of the constituents during the 2014 presidential election.

Secondly, the significance of this study is its novel approach in analyzing the capacity of social media in the empowerment of political life of constituents and democracy, which is one of the major domains of media studies, by linking such analysis with the perspectives from celebrity studies (the influence of celebrity in politics) and journalism studies (intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media). Existing research concerning the impacts of social media in politics usually scrutinized and displayed their unique technological affordances such as their capacity to ease networking, collaboration, and organizing collective action (Gerbaudo 2012; Perea at al 2012; Shirky 2008). In

addition, existing research on the influences of celebrities in politics generally focused their examinations on involvement and impacts of celebrities in conventional campaign activities such as campaign rallies (Pease & Brewer 2008; Rojek 2001; Frederick 1982; Mishra & Mishra 2014) whereas research on intermedia agenda setting power of social media upon traditional media commonly assessed how such a phenomenon occurred and which media had more dominant power to influence (Skogerbø & Krumsvik 2014; Meraz 2011b; 2009). This thesis, however, pulled the three strands of research together under the umbrella of mediapolis for analyzing the role of social media as well as their coexistence and influence to the traditional media to reveal their consequences upon the empowerment of political life of the constituents and democracy in contemporary society, especially in the 2014 presidential election.

Lastly, the research is significant because existing studies concerning applications of social media in election campaigns mostly used Western democracies. To name a few they include the studies within the political settings of the US (Woolley et al. 2010; Vitak et al. 2011; Bronstein 2013; Goodnow 2013), Australia (Macnamara & Kenning 2011; Bruns & Highfield 2013), and Europe (Baxter et al. 2011; Jackson & Lilleker 2011; Ampofo et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013; Larsson & Moe 2012). On the other hand, studies on the topics within the political settings of Asian and African countries are limited such as concerning the elections in Malaysian (Gomez 2014; Gong 2011; Liow 2012; Sani & Zengeni 2010), Thailand (Grömping 2014) and Singapore (Lee & Kan 2009; Skoric et al. 2012; Sreekumar & Vadrevu 2013). Moreover, to my knowledge, there are a few empirical studies looking at how political actors use the Internet, including social media, for election campaigns with the backdrop of Indonesian politics, especially during presidential election. The existing research concerning the Internet and politics in Indonesia such as the works of Hill and Sen (2000b; 2005; 1997), Lim (2005a; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2013), and Hill (2012) predominantly scrutinized the Internet in relation to political activism in the country. A few studies concerning the 2014 presidential election such as the ones of Aspinal and Mietzner (2014), Mietzner (2015), and Fionna and Njoto-Feillard (2015) did mention the important role of social media in the election; however, they had limited discussions on the topic. Thus, this study contributes

to the existing research on the Internet and politics in the country by providing additional insights on the capacity of social media for empowering political life of the constituents and democracy during the 2014 presidential election.

### **8.3 Implications for Policies and Practices**

The study has at least two implications upon policy and practices related to the use of social media in the country's election. The first implication is related to the existing regulations on election campaign activities. The second implication is related to the practices of political actors in using social media for their election campaign activities. Regarding the first implication, the study demonstrates election campaign activities via social media by the presidential candidates and the celebrity supporters occurred before, during, and after the official campaign period of the 2014 presidential election. Such activities even occurred during the blackout period, the last few days between the end of campaign period and the voting date. In the blackout period all forms of campaign activities, except the ones via social media, were not allowed. The campaign activities through social media in the blackout period occurred because in the election the existing regulations had no provision on the use of social media for election campaign activities.

Considering the important roles and potential political impacts of social media in the 2014 presidential election, as shown in the study, it is expected they will continue to have such roles and impacts in the country's future elections, be they presidential elections, general elections, or the elections for the head of local government. Accordingly, it is essential the regulations pertaining to election campaign activities provide guidelines on the use of social media like the ones applied to traditional media. The government has enacted two new regulations on elections after the 2014 presidential election. They are Law number 7 year 2017 on General Election (*Undang – Undang RI Nomor 7 tentang Pemilihan Umum* 2017) and the Regulation of General Election Commission number 4 year 2017 on the Election of the Heads of Local Governments (KPU 2017). Both regulations include social media among the means of official campaign activities. However, they regulate political campaign activities via social media as if such activities were analogous to the ones conducted via traditional media. Therefore,

their effectiveness is questionable, especially concerning the mechanism for supervision.

For example, the new regulations require political actors and their campaign teams to register the social media accounts they will officially use for campaign activities during an election (KPU 2017, Article 47(3)). Such a requirement obviously aims to limit the number of social media 'outlets', which are the official social media accounts, used for such purposes to make the supervision on campaign activities of the contestants in social media practical. Such conditions mean the Electoral Supervisory Board only requires watching the campaign messages in the registered accounts to determine whether or not the contestants' campaign activities in social media comply with the regulations.

Political campaign activities via traditional media are relatively easy to supervise because the number of campaign advertisements is usually limited. The number of media outlets used for the dissemination of such campaign advertisements is usually also limited. Accordingly, it is relatively easy to identify who disseminates a particular campaign message via a particular media outlet, be it through television, radio or newspapers. Thus, when a campaign message violates the existing regulations, the authority can easily identify and hold someone responsible for such violation.

However, supervision of political campaign activities conducted via social media is much more complicated. Despite the regulations requiring political contestants and their campaign teams to register their social media accounts dedicated for such campaign activities, the policy will not make the supervision of campaign activities in social media easier. In an election, not only the contesting candidates disseminate campaign messages via social media, their supporters usually do, too. Dissemination of messages, including campaign messages, via social media is easy and cheap. Virtually everybody with access to the Internet has such capacity. Consequently, there will be large numbers of campaign messages circulating in social media from large numbers of social media accounts beyond the registered ones in an election. Under such circumstances, apart from the registered social media accounts of the political contestants, it is hard to monitor who sends what campaign messages. Such a

situation is problematic, especially when there is a violation of campaign regulations from the social media accounts other than the registered ones. Who should he held responsible for such action? Should the individual linked to the account be held responsible? Or should the political candidate be held responsible for such action?

The fact that the new regulations have officially acknowledged social media among the media platforms for election campaign activities is a progress. However, as the new regulations still treat social media like traditional media they cannot sufficiently tackle some issues I have just mentioned. It would not be easy and I cannot propose a precise formula on the subject. However, such amendment is vital because social media will inevitably continue to play an important role in the country's elections. The best guiding principle for such amendment might start from acknowledging distinct characteristics of both media. They have distinct formats, audiences, and logic. From such differences then, the existing regulations should decide what can and should be regulated, what kind of supervisory mechanisms can be used, which institutional body is to supervise, and what legal consequences are for violation of such regulations.

Regarding the second implication, the study demonstrates social media constitute essential resources for 'thought, judgment and action' for the voters on which candidates to vote for. This function was especially essential for the young-undecided voters in the blackout period in which conventional campaigning has ended. It suggests Jokowi might have benefited from such a function due to enormous circulation of positive messages concerning him in social media. In the absence of conventional campaign activities in the period, the celebrities backing the former city mayor were able to dominate the social media sphere with positive messages endorsing Jokowi. They comprised messages concerning *Salam Dua Jari* music concert, Twitter hashtag *#AkhirnyaMilihJokowi*, and messages of endorsements from a number of prominent foreign celebrities. Due to the dominance of such positive messages in social media, the young-undecided voters might have become more favorable toward Jokowi than Prabowo. As the dominant users of social media, especially

Facebook and Twitter, they might have used them as their resources for 'thought, judgment and action' in their voting decisions in the election.

Based on this, the study suggests political actors should improve their strategies in incorporating social media in their campaign endeavors in future elections, especially to persuade young voters. They should implement them more carefully and professionally for maximum outcomes. The incident concerning Ahmad Dhani's video intended to support Prabowo is a perfect example of why precautious and professional conduct of election campaigns via social media is essential. The use of Nazi-like uniform and illegal use of copyright materials shows such careless and unprofessional acts. Due to such an incident, instead of receiving sympathy and support Prabowo received harsh criticism potentially being harmful to his popularity.

#### **8.4 Limitations of the Study**

Despite that the best attempts have been made in order to produce the best outcomes, this research has limitations. Firstly, despite mediapolis comprising all media types and platforms, the subjects of examination of the study only comprised a small part of them. The examination on social media only used content of two social media platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter, as samples of the study whilst the examination on traditional media only used content of print media, especially newspapers, as samples for the study. The selection of such samples was based on relevance and practicality. Hence, the findings of the study might only be relevant to such particular media types and platforms and not generalizable to other media beyond them.

Secondly, the study attempts to illuminate the current situation of Indonesian public space of mediated communication. For such a purpose, it examined Indonesian mediapolis with regard to a particular event (the 2014 presidential election) and within a particular time frame (during the election campaign period). The study purposefully limits the analysis to a particular event and moment due to limitation of resources. As this study is only a snapshot of a particular event and within a particular period of time, the outcomes of the study might only be relevant to a particular setting and might not be generalizable to other settings.

## **8.5 Potential Topics for Further Research**

Based on the findings of this study, at least four research topics need to be further pursued to better understand the current situation of Indonesian mediapolis. The first topic is concerning the use of social media in other political events in the country such as the regional election, general (legislative) election, and the oncoming presidential election. Research of such topics is essential to enrich the repertoire on the incorporation of social media by political actors in various political events in the country. As the application of media and communication technologies varies in terms of the ways they are used and the impacts resulting from such applications, research on the topic with various political events is essential to better understand the contemporary situation of Indonesian mediapolis, especially the role of social media in the country's politics.

Another potential topic to be pursued is concerning the influence of campaign messages in social media toward the voting behaviors of social media users. This study provides empirical evidence that the political nominees have incorporated social media for the dissemination of campaign messages during the election campaign period. However, its scope has not covered how the campaign messages via social media might have impacts on the voting behaviors of the country's constituents. Knowledge on this is essential to further understand the impacts of their applications upon the dynamics of the country's politics.

The third topic potentially to be pursued is concerning the use of social media as space for political engagement among the country's constituents. While this study has analyzed the use of social media for political engagement among the constituents, its focal point of investigation was only on celebrity supporters. Its scope has not covered the use of social media for political engagement of common people such as concerning political discussions in social media during election campaign periods.

Lastly, the topic potential to expand this study is intermedia agenda setting between social media and traditional media beyond print media, especially television. Due to resources restrictions, this study focused the investigation between social media and print media. This is despite the Indonesian population

relying more predominantly on television than print media for political information. Accordingly, an analysis of such a topic concerning both media types is essential to better illuminate the situation of contemporary Indonesian mediapolis.

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# Coding Book

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This document contains information about coding procedures including coder qualifications and descriptions of coding categories applied in this project. The relevant texts being coded are not included in the coding booklet. Each relevant text is going to be provided at the beginning of coding activity for each type of analysis.

## **Coder qualifications**

To ensure that a coder is able to understand the samples and follow the given procedures easily he or she is required to have the following qualifications:

1. Must be a native speaker of Indonesian.
2. Must hold a graduate diploma at the least.

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## **Task 1: Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Themes in Social Media**

**Unit of Sample:** Facebook and Twitter Messages of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014.

**Unit of Analysis:** Individual message in Facebook and Twitter including text, image, and video.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

### **Coding Procedures**

Classify individual messages in Facebook and Twitter into one of the seven categories of themes including *personal image*, *political agenda*, *endorsement claim*, *courtesy*, *persuasion*, *campaign information*, and *other*.

### **Descriptions of the Social Media Message Themes**

1. *Personal image* category comprises messages conveying one or more specific personal characteristics of the presidential candidate including: *competent*, *decisive*, *democratic*, *honest*, *intelligent*, *modest*, *patriotic*, *physical appearance*, *religious*, and *strong leader*. Such characteristics can be explicitly and implicitly stated in words or statements from the candidates or their supporters.
2. *Political agenda* category comprises messages conveying one or more specific political agenda of the presidential candidate comprising: *change*, *clean government*, *defense and security*, *economy*, *foreign affairs*, *good governance*, *human rights*, *upholding national interest*, and *social welfare*. Such political agendas can be explicitly and implicitly stated in words or statements from the candidates or their supporters.

3. *Endorsement claim* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from *celebrity, political figure, religious leader, general public, youth, and social media users* without any reference to their *personal image* and *political agenda*. Such endorsement claims can be explicitly and implicitly stated in words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. Interactions of the presidential candidates with prominent public figures via social media such as by mentioning his or her name are also included in this category. Such interactions likely imply closeness and support from the prominent figures.
4. *Courtesy* comprises messages conveying birthday wishes, season greetings, and condolences. Messages conveying greetings, gratitude, requests for best wishes or prayers from the candidates fall into this theme if they are intended solely for such purposes. For example, a statement saying “Good morning all my friends” falls into *courtesy* theme. However, a statement saying “I request for your prayers so that the presidential debate session tonight will run well. Be sure to watch because I am going to elaborate my vision and missions on infrastructure” does not fit to the *courtesy* theme. It is because the former is solely greetings whereas the latter implicitly conveys a persuasion to watch the debate session than just to call for prayers. The presidential candidates’ replies to their fans’ messages containing trivial matters are also included in this category as they likely function as devices to maintain courtesy with their followers in social media.
5. *Persuasion* comprises messages persuading others to take particular online and offline actions. The online actions comprise sharing particular messages from the presidential candidates to friends and families or visiting particular links of online sources provided in the message. The offline actions comprise participating in fund raising actions, attending election campaign rallies, and voting for a particular presidential candidate.
6. *Campaign information* comprises messages containing information about the election campaign such as the presidential candidate's past activities and voting procedures. The messages containing information about the presidential candidate’s future activities fall into *persuasion* theme. They are

likely implicit persuasions toward social media users to participate in such activities.

7. *Other* category comprises messages that do not fit to *personal image*, *political agenda*, and *endorsement* categories.

## **Task 2: Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Personal Image**

**Unit of Sample:** Facebook and Twitter Messages of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014.

**Unit of Analysis:** Words, phrases, and sentences in the Facebook posts and tweets under *personal image* theme.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

### **Coding Procedures**

Identify the messages under *personal image* theme for ten sub-themes including *competent, decisive, democratic, honest, intelligent, modest, patriotic, physical appearance, religious, and strong leader*. Each of the Facebook and Twitter messages under such a theme must contain at least one of the sub-themes.

### **Descriptions of the Personal Image Themes**

1. *Competent* comprises messages conveying the candidate's experiences, achievement, and good track record in their previous career in politics, business, military, or other posts. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, "Jokowi was awarded as the third world-best city mayor in 2010" or "Prabowo is an experienced leader in military and business as well".
2. *Decisive* comprises messages conveying the candidate's assertiveness. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, "Prabowo is a decisive and charismatic leader" or "Infuriated by the National Electricity Company (PLN) attitude that turned the public lights along the Slamet Riyadi road off, Solo City Mayor, Joko

Widodo, quickly visited PLN branch office to pay the overdue electricity bills from September to December 2011”.

3. *Democratic* comprises messages denoting the candidates’ support for democracy or democratic values. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example "I am in support of democracy" or "I respect different views".
4. *Honest* comprises messages conveying the candidate's trait of trustworthiness. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example “Jokowi–JK are clean, modest, and honest leaders” or “Prabowo is not a good pretender”.
5. *Intelligent* comprises messages denoting the candidate's traits of intellect. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, “Jokowi is a smart person” or “Prabowo looks more like a thinker”.
6. *Modest* comprises messages denoting the candidates’ characteristics as ordinary people such as for being humble and dressing or behaving like common people. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, “Indonesia needs a leader like Jokowi, modest and close to people” or “He never felt uncomfortable for having a meal among common people. Close to people”.
7. *Patriotic* comprises messages denoting devotion of the candidate's affection to his country or the people expressed explicitly and implicitly. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, “His love to the country surpasses his ego” or “I was born here (in Indonesia). I was raised here. I was educated here. And I am totally Indonesian”.
8. *Physical appearance* comprises messages mentioning physical attributes of the candidates such as skinny or handsome. For example, “He has a skinny body and plebeian facial features” or “He is handsome”.
9. *Religious* comprises messages displaying the candidate's religious identity and degree of observance. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, “He is a pious person”

or “*Bismillah*, I am preparing for an *Umrah* pilgrimage to the Holy Land, wish me luck”.

10. *Strong leader* comprises messages conveying the candidate's strong leadership. It can be explicit and implicit words or statements from the candidates or their supporters. For example, “Indonesia needs a strong leader” or “He is very open-minded, willing to listen to advice from various parties. But he cannot be dictated to by anyone”.

### **Task 3: Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Political Agenda**

**Unit of Sample:** Facebook and Twitter Messages of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014.

**Unit of Analysis:** Words, phrases, and sentences in the Facebook posts and tweets under *political agenda* theme.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

#### **Coding Procedures**

Identify the messages under *political agenda* category for nine sub-themes including *change*, *clean governance*, *defense and security*, *economy*, *foreign affairs*, *good government*, *human rights*, *upholding national interest*, and *social welfare*. Each of the Facebook and Twitter messages under such a theme must contain at least one of the sub-themes.

#### **Descriptions of the Political Agenda Sub-Themes**

1. *Change* comprises messages conveying the candidate's intentions to bring changes for the nation in general terms beyond sectors in the political agenda categories such as *Indonesia bangkit* (Indonesia arise) or *revolusi mental* (mental revolution).
2. *Clean government* comprises messages conveying the candidate's plans to eradicate corruption, support law enforcement as well as promote transparency and accountability.
3. *Defense and national security* comprises messages denoting the candidate's political agenda concerning defense and security issues such as socio-political conflicts, territorial disputes, the development of weapon systems for TNI, and welfare of TNI/Polri personnel.

4. *Economy* comprises messages conveying the candidate's agenda concerning the economy such as development of infrastructures, aid for farmers and fishermen's programs, poverty eradication, and other relevant issues on economy.
5. *Foreign affairs* comprise messages conveying the candidate's views on foreign affairs such as concerning relationships with the neighboring countries or issues on Palestine.
6. *Good governance* comprises messages conveying the candidate's intentions to form good governance such as promises for better public services and deregulations.
7. *Human rights* comprises messages conveying the candidate's views on human rights issues.
8. *Upholding national interest* comprises messages denoting the candidate's intentions to protect national interests such as concerning protection of national resources, cultures, and industries as well as Indonesia's political stance on particular international affairs for the best interest of Indonesian people. It also comprises intentions to leverage the country's position at regional and international stages in terms of economy, social, and culture. Such messages can be either the statements of the presidential candidates or of others supporting them.
9. *Social welfare* comprises messages denoting the candidate's political agenda concerning social welfare. They comprise general statements about social welfare or statements related to a number of issues concerning public services, access to public health care system, schooling, and religious affairs.

## **Task 4: Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Endorsement Claim**

**Unit of Sample:** Facebook and Twitter Messages of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014.

**Unit of Analysis:** Words, phrases, and sentences in the Facebook posts and tweets under *endorsement claim* theme.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

### **Coding Procedures**

Identify the messages under *endorsement claim* category for six sub-themes comprising *religious leader*, *political figure*, *celebrity*, *general public*, *youth*, and *social media users*. Each of the Facebook and Twitter messages under such a theme must contain at least one of the sub-themes.

### **Descriptions of the Endorsement Claim Sub-Themes**

1. *Religious leader* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from prominent religious figures other than celebrity preachers.
2. *Political figure* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from prominent political figures in the country.
3. *Celebrity* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from celebrities such as prominent artists, athletes, and celebrity preachers.
4. *General public* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from the general public such as from individuals, volunteers, and participants of a campaign rally. Social media

messages containing survey results showing high electability of the presidential candidates are also included in this sub-theme.

5. *Youth* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from young demographic groups. Both Prabowo and Jokowi specifically claimed they received support from young people.
6. *Social media users* comprises the social messages mentioning claim of support for the presidential candidates from social media users such as based the number of likes in Facebook, followers in Twitter, and hash tags showing support in Twitter.

## **Task 5: Analysis of Newspaper Article Themes concerning Social Media and the Presidential Election**

**Unit of Sample:** Newspaper articles.

**Unit of Analysis:** Sentences and paragraphs in the articles concerning social media and the presidential election.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

### **Coding Procedures**

Classify the articles into one of the four themes including *election campaign*, *endorsement*, *popularity*, *smear campaign*, and *other*.

### **Descriptions of the Newspaper Article Themes concerning Social Media and the Presidential Election**

1. *Election campaign* comprises articles that report about social media in relation to the presidential election such as the shifting of election campaign activities from campaign rallies to social media campaign, mobile application competition to support the presidential election, the use of Twitter bot during the campaign, and the use of social media during the presidential debates.
2. *Endorsement toward the candidates* comprises articles that report endorsements toward the presidential candidates by their supporters in social media such as by means of tweets, Facebook posts, or videos in YouTube.
3. *Popularity of the candidates* comprises articles that report the popularity of the presidential candidates based on their prominence in social media such as based on Twitter's trending topics, the number of likes on their Facebook pages as well as mentions and followers in Twitter.

4. *Smear campaign* comprises articles that report the circulation of materials or rumors in social media that discredited the presidential candidates or the supporting political parties. They comprise the ones specifically targeting the presidential candidates and the ones without referring to specific presidential candidates.
5. *Other* comprises articles that report social media and the presidential election beyond the four themes previously mentioned.

## **Task 6: Analysis of Newspaper Articles Topics concerning *Smear Campaign***

**Unit of Sample:** Newspaper articles.

**Unit of Analysis:** Sentences and paragraphs in the articles concerning social media and the presidential election under *smear campaign*.

**Sample ID:** Fill in the sample's ID number, as indicated on the sample ID table.

**Coder ID:** Fill in the Coder's ID, 1 for the First Coder and 2 for the Second Coder.

### **Coding Procedures**

Identify the issues on *smear campaign* into one of three topics comprising *Prabowo*, *Jokowi*, and *unspecified*.

### **Descriptions of the Newspaper Article Topics concerning *Smear Campaign***

1. *Prabowo* comprises reports concerning smear campaigns in social media that are specifically mentioning Prabowo.
2. *Jokowi* comprises reports concerning smear campaigns in social media that are specifically mentioning Jokowi.
3. *Unspecified* comprises reports concerning smear campaigns in social media that are not specifically mentioning a specific presidential candidate.

## Appendix 2 Intercoder Reliability Test Results

### Intercoder Reliability Test Results

No	Items of Analyses	Pilot Test	Final Test
1.	Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Themes in Social Media	0.840	0.856
2.	Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Personal Image	0.911	0.903
3.	Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Political Agenda	0.874	0.918
4.	Analysis of the Presidential Candidates' Message Topics on Endorsement Claim	0.909	0.890
5.	Analysis of Newspaper Article Themes concerning Social Media and the Presidential Election	0.802	0.904
6.	Analysis of Newspaper Article Topics concerning Smear Campaign	0.794	0.833