MONASH University

Why All The Noise?

An exploration of auditory and durational encounters of four artworks at Dia:Beacon, New York State, USA; how these artworks and my practical research function as machinic systems of cinematic thought

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Abstract

My Thesis is by Practice and Exegesis. The Exegesis is a case study that interrogates my experiences of four post-minimal/post-conceptual artworks at Dia:Beacon in New York State during my visit in 2012. The four artworks, on long-term display, are: Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010); Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968); and Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005). With regard to each encounter, I investigate framings that oscillated between spatial and durational realms, including sounds, which resulted in incommensurable experiences.

My research examines the methodologies of the four artists through key concepts. Machinic and dialectic processes are examined through Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's model of the assemblage and then through Deleuze's cinematic theory. Durational and spatial incommensurability is investigated through Henri Bergson's theories of first-person experience, through Deleuze's cinematic theory, and through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the haecceity assemblage. I discuss Peter Osborne's notion of the transcategorical artwork in relation to Robert Smithson's artworks and his attitude to cinema, and then as a model for my own research.

Challenging ocular-centric readings through which these artworks are usually understood, I propose that these artworks can be further understood through durational experiences involving sound (listening to sounds and 'sounding' space) and through negotiating, translating and comparing spatial and durational framings. Further, I suggest that durational and sonic framings of each artwork were, for me, experienced through the prism of a cinematic consciousness. I investigate how sonic framings were part of my cinematic experiences of the works.

My Practice takes the form of an installation artwork, *The Long Take* that investigates intensive and extensive encounters with framed elements, whose shifting relations with the visitor causes experiences, and provides ways to think through images. My practical artworks that I created in response to uncovered research concepts, the four Dia:Beacon artworks and the methodologies I employ to analyse and understand them, are interrelated as they each employ machinic concepts of framing that embrace indeterminacy, challenge and incommensurability. These concepts are important to the visual arts, and I suggest, have even greater agency in artwork encounters that encompass durational and auditory framings.

Declaration of Originality

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

David Chesworth

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Introduction

As a young child, visiting department stores with my parents, I sometimes encountered large mirrors and became confused by the ambiguity of their reflected spaces, causing me to experience a dream-like disassociation from reality. Often my parents had to take me outside until the strangeness had passed and a 'normal' apprehension of the surrounding world returned. Over the years I have continued to be unnerved by ambiguous framings that appear to challenge or deny anticipated content. This includes perceptions of sounds, near and distant, whose source and cause is not known to me and can only be imagined. In my art practice, I use methods aligned with sound, music, video and installation art to continue to explore relations between content and its framing.

A 1981 Age newspaper article by writer and curator Paul Taylor contains the only surviving image from my installation *Transportation, Mirror View* (1981) at the George Paton Gallery, Melbourne. This is an example of my early work that explored framing relations involving sound and the reflected image (see fig. 1).

"Alternative Spaces"

AS some of the non-commercial galleries seem doomed, the Victorian Ministry of the Art's proposed "alternative space" is encouraging.

If it got enough money from both State and Federal governments and corporations and arts foundations, such a gallery could become the focus for our flourishing contemporary arts. It could have a vigorous temporary exhibition programme of "new music", painting, film, performance, photography, and other arts, with a high enough profile to attract people from everywhere.

A second suggestion is to found a new gallery — an "Institute of Contemporary Art" or "Museum of Modern Art" — to show temporary exhibitions and house a permanent collection of modern Australian art.

Our existing "alternative spaces" are largely unknown, partly because of poor press coverage.

The Clifton Hill Community Music Centre (ph. 481 8791) has been operating in an old organ factory for five years and may have to leave because of Government neglect of the building. In the past two years, the music, videos, performances and films at the centre have been among the most interesting in Melbourne, despite their casual presentation.

Its Wednesday evening programmes and 'New Music' magazine have fostered a sense of sub-cultural art activity similar to world-wide trends. It is reminiscent of what the sixties were supposed to have been like.

The George Paton Gallery also occasionally functions in the sense of an "alternative space" as does the commercial Art Projects. With monthly exhibitions of both serious and wryly intelligent works, including "Anti-Music", paintings, installations and photographs, Art Projects operates at a critical distance from the more established galleries and takes a hard line on the fickle aspects of the Australian art world.

In the past two years, Art Projects has set a precedent for a few venues in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Hepburn Springs which emulate it: V-space, V-space annex, Q-space, N-space, Handspace and Brisbane's Institute of Modern Art.

There is also the use of different venues by individuals and collective artistic groups. Most of these venues relate only marginally to traditional art spaces. They include, sometimes, the Ballroom of the Seaview Hotel in St Kilda, a new wave disco which also accommodates performance work that isn't shown at either commercial art or theatre spaces.

The Met in McKillop Lane in the city is another occasional space which recently held a season of Television Works, an art/cabaret work.

RMIT had a season of art-performances in May. Theatrical venues such as La-Mama in Carlton or Anthill in South Melbourne sometimes offer such work.

Footscray Community Arts Centre houses experimental music performances at 45 Moreland Street (ph. 689 5677), and the National Gallery of Victoria sometimes briefly exhibits the work of visiting artists. It also has a "survey" programme of contemporary art.

All this activity shows that Melbourne's art scene includes many artists who are not painters, photographers or sculptors but who come instead from areas of music, the theatre fringe, writing, dance and so on. While discussion of some of this can be found in the art magazines, re-

From the Noise and Muzak exhibition at the George Paton Gallery, Melbourne University Union — a student listens to the work of David Chesworth titled 'Transportation Mirror View'.

Different art will continue to appeal to different people for unaccountable reasons. That Melbourne has so many galleries promoting such a variety is encouraging.

Though much art continues to be made and marketed for museums and the houses of the wealthy, anyone with the time and inclination can visit galleries and other venues.

Melbourne is also witnessing the rise of new venues that do not cater for middle-class consumption but for sub-cultural entertainment. These, combined with the hope for a new gallery and the work of many access arts groups, paint a bright picture for the next couple of years.

Paul Taylor is the editor of the art journal Art and Text.

Princesses Shooting Lions in a Jungle from the Bundi School — from an exhibition of Indian Miniature Paintings at Australian Galleries.

Figure 1. The Age Newspaper article August 1981. Photo: David Chesworth

This exegesis is driven by my interest in framings that was brought to the fore during my visit to Dia:Beacon in 2012. Dia:Beacon is a large contemporary art museum housed in a renovated mid-twentieth century factory in upstate New York that exhibits minimalist, conceptual and post-minimalist art by significant American and European artists who were most active in the second half of the twentieth century (see fig. 2).

My research interrogates my encounters with four Dia:Beacon artworks and their ambiguous framings of minimal content. It is both an investigation of my experiencing and of the functioning of those artworks. Each artwork presents collections of geometric framed forms: paintings, mirrors, gravel piles and, in one case, subtle sounds, whose presence and subsequent sudden absence created perceptual confusion.

Figure 2. Dia:Beacon, main entrance. Deacon, New York, Photo: David Chesworth

'Encounter' is my preferred term to describe my engagement with these artworks that involved unexpected dynamic experiences that were spatial, durational, visual and sonic. Researcher and theorist Jon Roffe, discussing Gilles Deleuze's cinematic concepts suggests: "The threshold of shock or *encounter* is dynamic movement. Learning is key."[1] Here Roffe is referring to the act of learning that ensues from encounters within cinematic experience (cinematic experience will be discussed in Chapter 3). This exegesis analyses my encounters within each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks as I engaged with a succession of images and in which I felt a confusion of intentionality on the part of the artwork and became self-conscious as an artwork visitor. Art critic and historian Michael Fried, in his famous essay *Art and Objecthood,* uses the term 'beholding' to describe an encounter with "continuous and entire presentness", in which certain artworks present as "the perpetual creation of itself, that one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness."[2] In *my* encounters, these moments of 'presentness' also involved beholding my own complicity in the encounter. In all four cases at Dia:Beacon, the 'art object' was difficult to discern and was perhaps better thought of ephemerally as '*objecthood'* that manifested through the combination of affecting components: surfaces, materials, space, duration and sound.

In my encounter of Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon* and Gerhard Richter's *6 Grey Mirrors,* I viewed framed painting-like forms. There was an expectation that they would contain content, but the forms appeared to me to be empty.[3] When my

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[1] Jon Roffe, "Lecture, Deleuze Cinema 1 : The Movement Image," (Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy, 2014).

[2] Michael Fried, *Art and Objecthood - Essays and Reviews* (University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[3] I acknowledge that absolute experience of emptiness is impossible, for it requires that I suppress both external reality and my inner world, and it is impossible to suppress one without evoking the other. In addition, there is the argument that what is perceived as empty is never empty because it is always 'becoming'. There is however, a conceptual emptiness, which, for example, is symbolised by the figure zero. The colour white or black can also under certain circumstances be thought of as conceptually empty,

expectations were denied (or problematised), confusion occurred. On these occasions, I had a choice: I could continue to interrogate the spatial void to find content, or I could find more interesting content elsewhere, to fill the lacunae. [4]

Figure 3. Visitors in Gerhard Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* gazing into their mobile phones in search of content to fill the durational void that has opened up before them. Photo: David Chesworth.

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which I suggest is a direction that Robert Ryman allows visitors to take in relation to experiencing his paintings collectively within an exhibition. In the case of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, I take my encounter of the lack of, or reduction of, content within some artwork frames as an experience of emptiness and also as a concept of emptiness that is being intentionally flagged by the artists.

[4] It can be argued that the Richter and Ryman artworks are indeed full of content (as well as being triggers for metaphysical reflection). However, I suggest that these experiences of content need some prior knowledge or familiarity with the particular artworks and the artists' methodologies in order to provide a pre-existing context.

In this exegesis, I suggest that my encounters involved perceiving what I have termed *antinomic nexus events.*[5] These are experiences where—following Bergson's theory of first person experience—understandings of the spatial world and the durational world no longer make sense as an experiential composite; the spatial and durational realms of experience break apart creating a zone of experiential incommensurability.[6]

Antinomic nexus events are initiated in part by my encounter of each artwork's presentation of minimal content, which did not interest me and caused me to search elsewhere for meanings within framings situated within and beyond the artwork's notional framings. Further to this, occasional disturbing events, both sonic and visual, unexpectedly occurred in and around the artworks, creating effects and affects that further complicated my framing of the artworks. For example: In the space of Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors*, I inadvertently released a small stone that had caught in my shoe. The dislodged stone noisily hit the metal skirting board creating a loud sound that disrupted the perceived poise of Richter's artwork. Also, in my experiencing and framing of Louise Lawler's soundscape in Dia:Beacon's West Garden I was interrupted by a loud sound (which turned out to be an express train, unseen beyond Dia's high fence) as it approached and passed by at close range. When visiting Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon*, I felt that I was being surveilled by the 'empty' spaces within each painting's frame, but I also felt that I was being immersed in noise. My Robert Smithson encounter centred on one of his displayed artworks—*Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*—in which I encountered virtual spaces reflected in mirrors, and it felt as though I was looking into another experiential realm that was impossibly located within the gallery's

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[5] The Merriam-Webster dictionary describes antinomy thus: "Antinomic: a contradiction between two apparently equally valid principles or between inferences correctly drawn from such principles; a fundamental and apparently unresolvable conflict or contradiction." Merriam-Webster dictionary accessed https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antinomy (accessed 16/02/2017).
[6] Bergson's theory of first person experience is developed in Chapter 2.

wall.[7] I was affected by the sound of Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* that I heard throughout the Dia:Beacon complex, without, at the time, realising it was an artwork, and I had a separate encounter with another of Neuhaus's sonic artworks at Times Square in downtown New York, again, without realising it was an artwork. In both cases, I encountered the artwork's presence, as an expressive framing, without actually knowing that these experiences were intentional artworks.

In all cases, the artist's strategic deployment of artwork *components*—forms, materials, objects, frames, surfaces, monochromatic colour, and sounds—deliberately problematised my relation to the artwork. These components, acting on each other within a *machinic* system, appeared to interrogate the ontology of the artwork: that is, art's material and conceptual structures.

I apply the term *component* in this exegesis to any physical object, sound, mental process, frame, colour, surface, virtual or actual image that functions and interacts with other components within a system. *Machinic,* is a term that Deleuze uses to describe processes in the universe in which systems, rather than being closed and immobile, instead open out facets onto other systems, in which,

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[7] The term 'virtual' is used here in its most basic sense to describe a space or place that exists in effect or essence, if not in fact or actuality. In Chapter 3 the term is developed through the philosophies of Bergson and Gilles Deleuze in relation to the notion of a virtual image that is real (in its virtuality) but not actual, or physically present. Virtual realities discussed in this exegesis include: memory, imagination, image reflections and acousmatic sounds, also Deleuze's notion of the 'powers of the false' and time-images. In my experience of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, including the artists exhibition spaces, I sometimes imagined virtual presences in certain screen-like forms including Richter's and Ryman's geometric, painting-like objects. Elizabeth Grosz suggests that architectural framing sets the stage for virtual experiences, for it "produces the very possibility of the screen functioning as a plane for virtual projection, a hybrid of wall, window, and mirror." E. A. Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art : Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: New York : Columbia University Press, 2008).17.

> movement is established between the parts [components] of each system and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together, and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed. ... This is not mechanism, it is machinism.[8]

A machinic 'body' (in this case, an artwork) consists of co-joined multiplicities. Machinic systems are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Research questions.

The central research questions that propel this research are to identify and examine the quantitative and qualitative concepts and processes through which effects and affects occurred within my encounter of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, and how, consequentially, each artwork was sensed and understood. I also ask: what do durational/sonic experiences contribute to experience that spatial/visual experience alone might not? Where and how do these durational/sonic experiences occur in my artwork experiences and what relations do they trigger?

My investigation draws on many interconnected concepts, which I hope to present, consider and argue at each step of the way, in order to drive this written exegesis towards new understandings of my artwork engagements, and which I can further apply in my artwork practice. My research draws on the methodologies of the four artists, and on the philosophers Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I also draw significantly on Deleuze's cinematic philosophy to explore durational and spatial framings through concepts of the assemblage, cinematic experience, and haecceities (which is a particular kind of assemblage). I also draw on Peter Osborne's theory of a transcategorical artwork in relation to Robert Smithson's practice and my practical research.

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[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans., Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Cinema One : The Movement-Image (London: London : Continuum, 1986). 59.

My reason for choosing these philosophers, especially Deleuze, follows from my interest in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari encountered many years ago. In 1981, Film critic and artist, Adrian Martin gave me a recently translated copy of Deleuze and Guattari's *Rhizome* shortly after it was published in France and some six years before Brian Massumi's English translation of *A Thousand Plateaus* appeared.[9] The short text was a revelation to me and provided a methodological road-map that informed my performance/film work *Industry & Leisure* (1982) that I made for *Popism* at The National Gallery of Victoria in 1982, curated by critic, curator and *Art & Text* editor, Paul Taylor. It wasn't until 2014 that I was able to return to Deleuze's writings, when I had the opportunity to attend a year-long lecture series on Deleuze by theorist and researcher, Jon Roffe, and I came to understand that my own engagements with the world, including my art-making practice, aligned with many philosophical concepts espoused by Deleuze and Guattari, and by Henri Bergson, from whom Deleuze derived the ontological underpinnings of his cinematic philosophy. In this research I have come to a set of concepts by these philosophers that I can relate to my Dia:Beacon experiences and to my art-making practice. In particular, Deleuze's cinema philosophy has resonated with my understanding of experience, which hitherto has been largely intuitively conceived. Conducting the research through the prism of these philosophers has provided structure to my own thinking and has informed my methodological approach to making artworks.

As well an analysing the four Dia:Beacon artworks through these prisms of philosophical thought, I have created my own artworks that I have utilised as a practical research tool. My practical artworks were created during and alongside my philosophical research and are viewed, collectively as components of the installation *The Long Take*. As I see it, my research has developed trialectically, in the sense that the Dia:Beacon artworks, my

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[9] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1988).

philosophical research and my practical research present three sites of engagement that have continually informed each other. My artworks therefore, should not be understood as an outcome of my research but as a component of the research.

In the final analysis could not all three modes of investigation that I undertake be about entering, encountering and describing experience—and ultimately accepting that there are limits of knowing, and that there will always be zones of experiential incommensurability?

Chapter overview

In Chapter 1, I describe, what can be called, my *naïve* encounter with each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks detailing my physical experiences together with what I felt, imagined and thought during the encounters.[10] I then attempt to position the artworks by examining each artist's methodological concerns alongside relevant critical commentaries and appraisals. I describe and discuss specific antinomic events that occurred within and outside each artwork that further confused my encounters.

In Chapter 2, I investigate machinic methodologies. I discuss the dialectical relations within each artwork. I investigate my experience of 'antinomic nexus events' through Bergson's theory of first-person experience. Following Bergson, I suggest that after

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[10] 'Naivety' is a key word in Bergson's method of Intuition that underpins much of his philosophy. Deleuze in his introduction to *Bergsonism* briefly states three distinct acts that determine the rules of his Intuition method: "The first concerns the stating and creating of problems; the second the discovery of genuine differences in kind; the third, the apprehension of real time." Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism* (New York: New York : Zone Books, 1988). I follow a similar path of discovery in this exegesis as I seek to uncover, know and understand my experiences. Vladimir Jankélévitch in *Henri Bergson* informs us that Bergson's goal in his method of intuition is to "place us, once again, in the presence of immediately perceived qualities." See Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Henri Bergson*, ed. Alexandre Lefebvre and Nils F. Schott (Durham Duke University Press, 2015). According to Jankélévitch, Bergson's task is to attempt to "regain a naïve (or pure or exact) perception of ourselves in the light of the abstract and distancing nature of intellection." Alexandre Lefebvre quoted in "Introduction. Jankélévitch on Bergson: Living in Time", ibid., xxii.

enduring 'empty' artwork framings within the Dia artworks, my subsequent search for content within and beyond those framings occurred in the spatial register, in which durational and qualitative experiences were translated as imaginative, quantitative spatial experiences. I suggest that these intensive and extensive confusions occurred through machinic processes in which I, as artwork visitor, was complicit.

As a way of thinking beyond the redundant oscillation of dialectic, and as an attempt to understand the confusing antinomic events I encountered, I consider Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the *assemblage*.[11] Within the assemblage dialectic is conceived as a heterogenic component effective within acts of *deterritorialisation*.[12] Through *becomings* reterritorialisations take place within the assemblage, giving rise to differences, which leads to the creation of new thoughts.[13]

In Chapter 2, I discuss machinic concepts that foreshadow my discussion of cinema, via Peter Osborne's concept of the transcategorical artwork. Osborne suggests that Robert Smithson's artwork projects—such as *Spiral Jetty*—exist as several individual artistic components that can be understood as one transcategorical artwork.

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[11] Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the 'assemblage' is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

[12] 'Deterritorialisation' relates to the notion of 'territorialisation' created by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*. It is used here in relation to how framing creates a territory. If the framing is then broken or subverted, then the contained territory becomes deterritorialised (or decontextualised) and simultaneously can be reterritorialised (or recontextualised) within a new frame. This is a dynamic shift in perception that involves both space and duration and movements between the actual and the virtual. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1983). This discussion will be developed in Chapter 2.

[13] *Becoming* identifies an ontological state that privileges temporality over stasis and inertia and where there is endless movement in time. In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze suggests that becomings are paradoxes that "elude the present. ... Becoming does not tolerate the separation of the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to pull in both directions at once." Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (London: London : Continuum, 2003).,3. Becomings manifest through *differences* that occur within duration's flow in its open-ended movement towards change.

In Chapter 3, I discuss my Dia: Beacon experiences through the cinematic philosophy of Deleuze. I suggest that my framing of the four artworks assumed a *cinematic consciousness*.[14] I suggest that within my cinematic encounter I attempted to link and relate images that complied with my understanding of the world with images that challenged it. For Deleuze, cinematic framings set dynamic limits but that these limits are always moving, dovetailing and converging with each other.[15] Deleuze suggests that attempts to reconcile and make sense of framed images images takes place within a personal montage that directly leads to thought. I discuss how framings that did not belong within an artwork's notional frame could still be considered to have relations with the artworks, and so form part of the artwork encounter. I suggest that it was through encountering these relations and incommensurabilities between framings, some which occurred beyond the notional frame of the artwork—and which, were often durational and sonic— that non-ocular experiences of the four Dia:Beacon artworks occurred.

Also, in Chapter 3, I investigate how my encounters with each of the artworks became irrational, as I experienced antinomic nexus events, and as relations between framings broke down, whereby I no longer believed in the 'truth' of what I heard and saw. I investigate Deleuze's suggestion that within cinematic consciousness, when sonic and visual images become incommensurable, there is still a desire within cinematic montage to understand the false as a 'truth' and that this machinic process gives rise to new arrangements of images and new ways of thinking.

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[14] Deleuze suggests that cinematic consciousness is produced through viewing the word framed by the lens of a camera rather than framed directly through the human eye. As such, cinematic images are essentially non-human. Cinematic framing, which might not involve the human eye, is thus able present us with images that we ourselves could never conceive of, or deliberately frame. These images are juxtaposed and arranged by each of us within our mental montage, which Deleuze argues, is a form of thinking. Cinematic consciousness is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

[15] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 14.

In Chapter 4, I discuss intensive and extensive experience through sound and sounding. I discuss how sound, through its duration and its 'timefulness', enables a 'sounding' of the artwork's physical space and forms, which has the potential to provide spatial renderings and territorialisations of spaces and framings that exist outside the artwork's physical or visual frame. This leads to a discussion of the significance of two kinds of audition: *quantitative listening* and *qualitative sensing* of sound as a component of experience, both of which, I argue were significant in my Dia:Beacon artwork experiences.

In Chapter 4, I introduce and then explore Deleuze and Guattari's concept of haecceity, which broadly refers to a kind assemblage that is an individuation (a form of framing) that is composed of forces and powers between "things and subjects."[16] I suggest that haecceities, composed, from sonic and visual images, can be qualitatively sensed. Within the artwork assemblages haecceities acted as machinic components, as their subtle individuated framings of duration and space caused deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations within each artwork encounter. I suggest that I encountered these haecceities cinematically.

In Chapter 5, I discuss specific ways in which duration manifests both as a machinic component, and also composes with other components to form individuated haecceities within the four artworks. I introduce composer John Cage's composition *4'33"* as an important antecedent to Neuhaus's *Time Piece, Beacon* and to my experience of Robert Ryman's framing thresholds. Gerhard Richter's artwork is discussed in relation to its reflective visual and sonic surfaces and how the immediacy of the 'stone event' destabilised his dialectical method by introducing a sonic rendering of space through

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[16] Deleuze and Guattari tell us that haecceities are non-personal. Examples include: "a season, rainfall, wind, an hour, air polluted by noxious particles." Ibid., 204.

sound's 'timefulness' and in doing so, refuted the ephemerality of the post-object artwork encounter.

In Chapter 5, my analysis of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* is centered on understanding why it was that I encountered his non-site artwork as a reification of the concept of drone warfare. To this end, I compare Smithson's non-site framing concepts with 'systems' processes, in which alternative concepts of site exist in cybernetic oscillation, and one site is 'understood' through the other. I suggest that systems processes are alluded to in Smithson's non-sites but that the artist deliberately introduces experiential and conceptual paradoxes, which systems methodology normally seeks to eliminate.

In Chapter 6, I discuss how my practical research, realised in my installation artwork *The Long Take*, together with my philosophical research and my methodological research, functioned trialectrically as interrelated assemblages, where each assemblage enabled insights into the other two. I suggest that my Dia:Beacon experiences and my practical artwork (with its framed components), were utilised as 'cinematic thought machines', through which I could investigate and observe the machinic processes of cinematic consciousness.

In Chapter 6, I analyse each of *The Long Take's* artwork components as montage elements within a cinematic encounter. I discuss how relations between components have the potential to change, through becomings, as considerations of the artwork shift and oscillate between haecceity, movement-image and time-image. An analysis of one particular artwork component, *Earthwork,* enables me to conclude my investigation of my experience of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* and its relation to drone warfare.

Notes on Sound Methodologies

My discussion of sound underlying this exegesis draws on several key concepts elucidated by three theorists. The concept of *acousmatic listening* is discussed in reference to Brian Kane, who investigates the significance of sound through its physical manifestations and reifications in relation to auditory culture.[17] Sound's ontological framework is discussed via Christoph Cox, who, following Bergson and Deleuze, is concerned with durational flows, becomings and sound as an image, and tends to exclude cultural considerations. A brief discussion of sound's phenomenological behavior in spaces references the writings of Don Ihde.

Kane's discussion of what he calls "acousmatic listening" helps to elucidate my encounter of sonic experiences at Dia:Beacon where sources and causes could not be determined.[18] In his book *Sound Unseen,* Kane is concerned with sound's ontic status, which embraces the cultural, social, technological and political constitution of sound and listening. [19] Kane employs, what he calls, a "parsimonious model of sound" that has three components: source, cause and effect. Kane adds that,

> Just because a sonic effect is the result of a source and a cause does not entail that a listener is certain about the source and cause based on hearing the sonic effect alone. Typically the environmental situation will aid in determining the source and cause of the sound.[20]

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[17] An acousmatic sound's source and cause cannot be determined by the listener and can only be speculated through imaginative reifications.

[18] Further to this, it is often said that sound's length is long or short, or its pitch is high or low, and it should be pointed out that these are spatial terms that stand in for our qualitative sense of a sound's existence within time. Throughout this exegesis I have tried to avoid describing sound in terms that are spatial.

[19] Brian Kane, *Sound Unseen : Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice* (New York : Oxford University Press, 2014).

[20] Ibid., 7.

Kane suggests that our experience of an auditory effect is sometimes ambiguous and not always sufficient to determine its source or cause. This results in an "underdetermination" of source and cause that motivates a reification of the sonic effect. However, when source and cause are disregarded or not determined, then according to Kane, sound can be considered to become an object:

> By bracketing an effect from its source or cause, I transform a sound from an event into an object. The autonomy of a sonic effect is constituted only when the gap between the effect and its source or cause is disregarded.21

Kane suggests that the underdetermination of source or cause encourages imaginative supplementation where "the sonic body projected onto acousmatic sound is taken to be transcendent."[22]

Cox, on the other hand, is concerned with the ontology of sound. Cox calls his method,

> a materialist account able to grasp the nature of sound and to enable analysis of the sonic arts. ... This theoretical account can provide a model for rethinking the arts in general and for avoiding the pitfalls encountered in theories of representation and signification.[23]

Cox's position is particularly relevant to my investigation into artworks that question their ontological position through ephemeral experiences.

In this exegesis, I find it useful to consider sound to be both ontically accessible as a materiality, but also ontologically accessible as an image.[24] A consideration of ontic sound reflects what sound can do, and a consideration of ontological sound reflects what

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[21] Ibid., 8. It should be noted that Deleuze also discusses sound in relation to its source or cause in *Cinema 2*, where he also suggests that once sound and image become incommensurable that the sound acquires its own frame. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans., Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Cinema Two (London: London : Continuum, 2005).

[22] Kane, *Sound Unseen*, 9.

[23] Christoph Cox, "Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism," *Journal of Visual Culture* 10, no. 2 (2011)., 146.

[24] This will be discussed in relation to the cinematic philosophy of Deleuze, through Bergson. Within the context of sound ontic might also be considered a subset of ontology.

a sound can be. While I acknowledge that sound's cultural and representational status is of importance, my discussion of sound in this exegesis will concentrate on its ontological status.

A sound reaches our ears (without us needing to seek it out), whereby through either inadvertent *hearing* or active *listening,* it becomes an image in our minds; just as received optical information does. These images contain qualities and information, allowing us to discern signaletic, semiotic, semantic and causal information. This enables the perceiver to understand something about the world, through knowing where the sound came from, what caused it, where it has travelled on its journey to us and what the sound may signify:

> Sound, rather than being a destination, has been a potent and necessary means for accessing and understanding the world; in effect, it leads away from itself. A very nebulous notion of methodology, but also something that kicks in before methodology.25

Sound and soundscapes are therefore always telling us about the world and connecting us to materials and cultures that surround us. Recent important writers on sound include Jonathan Sterne and Michel Chion's study of sound in screen media.[26]

Our experience of music is also derived from this process of discernment, whereby sound as an object is no longer directly associated with its source and cause, but instead operates as an affecting coded object within "the virtual world of music composition."[27] Such is the case with Max Neuhaus and his use of sonic drones in *Time Piece Beacon* and

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[25] Douglas Kahn in conversation with Jonathan Sterne, quoted in *The Sound Studies Reader*, ed. Jonathan Sterne (New York: New York : Routledge, 2012).

[26] For example: Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision : Sound on Screen*, ed. Walter Murch and Claudia Gorbman (New York: New York : Columbia University Press, 1994); Jonathan Sterne, *The Audible Past : Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction*, ed. Press Duke University (Durham: Durham : Duke University Press, 2003).

[27] Kane, *Sound Unseen*, 8.

Times Square (1977–1992 and 2002-ongoing). Both artworks employ sonic drones that exploit music's ambiguous qualities.

In this exegesis, physical sound should be understood as always two things: materiality and image. Whenever I refer to 'images' in this exegesis it will (following Bergson) always refer to sonic *and* visual images.[28]

Noise

In the title of my exegesis I make reference to noise, and in my discussion of Robert Ryman I refer to a particular noise that existed virtually, as a memory of my experience of his artwork. Paul Hegarty in *Noise/Music: A History* suggests: "Noise is not an objective fact. It occurs in relation to perception—both direct (sensory) and according to presumptions made by the individual."[29] A determination of noise is thus highly subjective. The concept of noise is problematic, for to assign it a label causes noise to become a recognisable thing, and so it is no longer a noise.[30] As Douglas Kahn puts it: "Noise can be understood in one sense to be that constant grating sound generated by the movement between the abstract and empirical."[31] For, as Michel Serres suggests, noise disappears when it is transformed into an abstraction, as this conceptual coding is a form of masking that allows the reader to ignore it and comprehend the remaining information.[32] Therefore, sound considered as noise, including environmental sounds, is

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[28] The concept of 'Image' will be discussed in Chapter 3 through Deleuze's cinematic philosophy (following Bergson).

[29] Paul Hegarty, *Noise/Music : A History* (New York: New York : Continuum, 2007)., 3.

[30] This point is developed in Greg Hainge, *Noise Matters : Towards an Ontology of Noise* (New York : Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

[31] Douglas Kahn, *Noise, Water, Meat. A History of Sound in the Arts*, ed. Inc NetLibrary (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1999)., 25.

[32] Michel Serres, *Hermes : Literature, Science, Philosophy*, ed. Josué V. Harari and David F. Bell (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982)., 68. Paraphrased by Kahn.

often suppressed by the conscious mind.[33] However, this suppressed noise is still providing vital information to our brain, enabling us to maintain temporal-spatial awareness of the surrounding world. These sounds confirm our sensing of space and our relation to potential threats to our wellbeing. Thus, we are constantly, unconsciously monitoring our surroundings, identifying sounds through acts of acousmatic listening.[34] It is only when the noise's loudness breaks through our suppression threshold and interferes with our cognition that it actually becomes consciously perceived as noise. In some cases, as Kahn suggests, a disruptive noise can appear much louder than it really is.[35]

Noise permeates my research and writing throughout this exegesis. I discuss my sensing of noise and its manifestation being perceived as louder than it actually was. Noise is also invoked in relation to haecceities and in particular my experience, which I identified as 'becoming noise', within Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon.* Furthermore, I consider noise in relation to 'acousmatic listening' in my discussion of 'out-of-field' framings in Chapter 3, and in relation to haecceities perceived within Dia:Beacon in Chapters 4 and 5.

Some eighteen months into my research, while attending an informal discussion with fellow PhD visual-arts students, I was discussing my encounters at Dia:Beacon, when a colleague remarked on my acute awareness of the different sounds that manifested within the Dia artwork spaces. These were sounds that originated from within the

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[33] It is generally understood that there are levels of tolerance where noise, as unwanted sound, is purposefully suppressed by the brain and not consciously 'recognised'. See, for example Roy D Patterson and David M Green, "Auditory Masking," *Hearing*, (1995). 337-361.

[34] See Jens Blauert, *Spatial Hearing : The Psychophysics of Human Sound Localization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1997).

[35] Kahn, *Noise, Water, Meat,* 20. An example would be when travelling on a train and I am disturbed by sounds leaking out from a fellow passenger's headphones. The sound is not loud but nonetheless manifests as a disturbing noise.

artwork frames and from other spaces outside the frame. I was not consciously emphasising sound and its duration, it was just that my auditory awareness has always been an active component in my framing of the surrounding world. This exegesis therefore presents me with the opportunity to reflect on the affects and effects of sound and of durational experience, and to understand why these experiences became so noticeable to me during the Dia:Beacon encounters. What follows then, is an ontological discussion of my framing of auditory and durational experience and an exploration of concepts that might explain how temporalities and durations worked with and related to the objects, spaces, surfaces and perceived absences of content that I encountered within the four Dia:Beacon artworks.

Chapter 1: Four Artwork Encounters

"The site is evading you all the while its directing you to it."

Robert Smithson [1]

When I visited Dia:Beacon in 2012, I had no prior knowledge or experience of these works by the four artists (Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010); Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968); and Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005)). The locations of the artists rooms was indicted on a plan supplied with the entrance ticket (see fig. 4). Each artwork, in turn, presented framed surfaces where identification of representational and symbolic content was contestable. In the case of Gerhard Richter and Robert Smithson, images were also reflected in mirrors. I saw frames, but exactly *what* was framed became a matter of contention. The artworks appeared to frame emptiness. My encounters were unprejudiced, not comparable with past experiences, and can even be considered naïve.[2] The task of my research then is to identify what these four artworks were attempting to convey, and to identify concepts that elucidate what they *did* convey.

While I wasn't sure what I was experiencing as these encounters were taking place, I remember feeling the affects of each work, in what Deleuze refers to as a "bloc of

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[1] Robert Smithson and Jack D. Flam eds. Robert Smithson, *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings*, ed. Jack D. Flam and Robert Smithson, Collected Writings (Berkeley: Berkeley : University of California Press, 1996)., 218

[2] Refer to my discussion of Bergson's concept of naivety in the introduction.

sensations."[3] Affect cannot be described in detail, because it lies outside representation. Simon O'Sullivan reminds us that, "you cannot *read* affects, you can only *experience* them … that affects are imminent to experience."[4] This chapter discusses the affects and effects sensed and each artist's methodological approach that caused them.

Figure 4. Plan of Dia: Beacon (2016). Photo: David Chesworth

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[3] "By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, (as it is) to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another; to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. A method is needed, and this varies with every artist and forms part of the work." Gilles Deleuze, *What Is Philosophy?*, ed. Félix Guattari (New York: New York : Columbia University Press, 1994)., 167.

[4] Simon O'Sullivan and Jorella Andrews, *Visual Culture as Objects and Effects*, ed. Jorella Andrews (Goldsmiths, University of London and Sterberg Press, 2013)., 11.

Robert Ryman, Installation at Dia:Beacon (2010)

Figure 5. Detail of Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon*, Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 6. Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia Beacon,* The Greenwich Collection, Ltd. ©Robert Ryman/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. Photo: Bill Jacobson Studio, New York. Courtesy the Greenwich Collection, Ltd.

Figure 7. Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia Beacon*, The Greenwich Collection, Ltd. ©Robert Ryman/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. Photo: Bill Jacobson Studio, New York. Courtesy the Greenwich Collection, Ltd.

Within the Dia:Beacon complex all spaces are illuminated by natural light.[5] Robert Ryman's installation consists of three adjoining medium-sized square rooms and two smaller, narrow, rectangular rooms that can be encountered in succession. Approximately thirty, predominantly white, mostly square paintings are mounted individually and in groupings, using a variety of supports, often visible to the viewer. The paintings appeared to intrude into the rooms. Some painting displayed raised textures of paint, resembling rough white skin, while others contained small blotches of coloured pigment, or thin dark lines and markings that divided the painting's surface into simple geometric grids.[6] The subtle shadows of their surfaces suggested an almost sculptural 3D effect. To me, their overall appearance, when viewed from a distance, was of voided white spaces, suggesting partitions, empty screens, windows, thresholds, mirrors and membranes.

Looking back on my encounter I am mainly aware of my *journey* through Ryman's artwork spaces, where, on entering each room the starkness of the white paintings directly addressed me.[7] I don't recall spending much time looking closely at individual paintings. Rather, I stood back and observed them collectively as they loitered around the edges of the rooms. I didn't spend more than a couple of minutes in any of the rooms, but long enough to feel uncomfortable and intimidated. There were perceptions

[5] In experiencing the four Dia:Beacon artworks I consider the spaces where the artworks are situated as being part of the artwork. Ryman and Richter were consulted on the deployment of the architectural elements of their rooms. Smithson has a space in which several of his artworks are situated and, his death in 1973 meant he would not have had direct influence on this display. Neuhaus's sonic, spatial and durational artwork permeates much of the Dia:Beacon complex including the surrounding gardens. One can assume that all four artists were acutely aware that the spaces in which artworks are displayed are 'sites' that influence the artwork encounter.

[6] Many of these observation details were confirmed in a subsequent research visit to Dia:Beacon in 2016.

[7] While the overall quality of the colour was white, the surface of each painting displayed different qualities of whiteness (and other colours), different textures of paint and even graphic lines. But I was not aware of these details when I encountered Ryman's paintings collectively as I moved through his five white-walled rooms, where my sensing of the grouped paintings' whiteness also caused feelings of emptiness and voided space. The power of 'whiteness' will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

in play that I *felt*, but which I did not understand. The paintings appeared spectral and seemed to be observing me, or were screen-like, masking some hidden observer.[8]

The room sheet provided by Dia:Beacon positions Ryman's artwork as an enquiry into painting as both a medium and a verb.[9] Thus, I was immediately steered towards a dialectic appraisal. Ryman began his investigation into painting in the mid 1950s while engaged as a security guard at New York's Museum of Modern Art. According to Ryman, he literally went out one day and bought some white paint and a canvas and began painting. Operating from the premise of paintings as framed pictures, he began painting as an act of engaging with the painting's ontological and ontic framework:

> We have been trained to see painting as "pictures", with storytelling connotations, abstract or literal, in a space usually limited and enclosed by a frame, which isolates the image. It has been shown that there are possibilities other than this manner of "seeing" painting.[10]

He states that he investigates and challenges notions of what a painting might be as an artwork but also as a method; where "the how of painting has always been the image— the end product."[11] His artworks then, are accumulations of actions *(*as creative processes leave their mark on the surfaces and structural components) and perceptions, and the visitor can work with them in two ways: they can be *sensed,* as was the case in my encounter; and they can be *analysed,* which is what I am now doing retrospectively. Both outcomes serve Ryman's intention for the viewer to question the metaphysical status of painting.

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[8] My journey through the rooms reminded me of riding on a ghost train when I was young, an encounter in which there was a separation between my sense of the world and uncertain simple objects that appeared to be from another realm were orientated towards me, addressing me.

[9] Anne Rorimer, "Introduction: Robert Ryman, Installation at Dia:Beacon", Dia Art Foundation http://www.diaart.org/exhibitions/introduction/94 (accessed 18/4/2013).

[10] Robert Ryman, in *Wall Painting* (Chicago: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1979), 16.

[11] Robert Ryman, in Art in Process, vol. 4 (New York: Finch College Museum of Art/Contemporary Wing, 1969–70). Quoted in Rorimer. (Dia Beacon room sheet).

According to an anonymous exhibition review in the magazine *Time,* in 1968:

> Ryman's pictures are so unsettling; in fact, some who see them for the first time laugh outright. ... he covers rectangles of metal, canvas or paper with white paint and then, instead of framing them or stretching them, he mounts them as close to the wall as he can get them ... The effect is unnerving. The wall seems to have developed a gaping hole.[12]

That the exhibition of paintings initiated laughter, and yet also imaginative contemplations of spatial disruptions speaks to experiences that challenged visitors unfamiliar with his work, who according to this reviewer, deal with the encounter in two ways: through laughter, which is embodied by the visitor as involuntary affect; and through imagination, through which, the reviewer imagines spatial depths ("a gaping hole"). Viewing his paintings en masse, I too encountered similar experiences—some fifty years after those comments in *Time* were made.

This leads me to question the fundamental forces, situated outside of the viewing of the individual paintings, that Ryman's Dia:Beacon artwork draws on. For it was the multiplicity of painting forms and their overall whiteness that I responded to most of all.

In reference to his use of white paint, Ryman comments that, "the white is just a means of exposing other elements of the painting. ... White enables other things to become visible."[13] These elements are therefore revealed by the whiteness (and the lack of any conventional picture). Ryman, however, does not go so far as to suggest what these "other things" are.

That Ryman's paintings appeared to loiter around the walls caused the walls to become part of my encounter. Ryman himself is aware that his paintings extend beyond their

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[12] uncredited, "The Avant-Garde: Subtle, Cerebral, Elusive," *Time*, November 22 1968., 70.
[13] Ryman, in N Grimes, "White Magic," *Art News* Summer 1986, (1986). Quoted in Jean-Paul Criqui, "Signed Ryman," in *Robert Ryman Critical Texts since 1967*, ed. Vittorio Colaizzi and Karsten Schubert(London: Ridinghouse, 2009)., 222.

physical borders: "If you were to see any of my paintings off of the wall, they would not make any sense at all … unlike the usual painting where the image is confined within the space of the paint plane."[14] This connection of paintings with the wall is not just physical, as it also enters into relations with the room in which the painting resides, and by further extension, in to relations with the whole exhibition space, all the artworks, and the Dia Foundation. These additional sites become complicit in fashioning the encounter with Ryman's work that takes in various framing concepts.[15]

My experience of the spatial arrangement of Ryman's paintings was not centred on individual paintings but on their immersive totality. For me, the affect of this immersive whiteness suggested the sonic experience of an all-encompassing noise. This was a 'white-noise', which is a technical term for a noise comprised of all possible frequencies, heard simultaneously over a given bandwidth. White noise can be compared to the colour white, which contains all possible frequencies of the visual spectrum. The quality of white noise as a sound is as a featureless thick hissing that appears to surround the listener. White noise is omnipresent because, white noise, by its very definition, contains no information, and so, provides no sonic information that might provide perspective, direction or a sense of spatial volume. Noise does however contain duration and creates sensation. A succinct technical definition of white noise is "a stationary random process

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[14] Ryman in "Interview with Robert Ryman" Gary Garrels, *Robert Ryman* (Dia Art Foundation, New York, 1988)., 13.

[15] This aspect of framing will be discussed in detail in relation to the cinematic frame in Chapter 3. The word 'complicit' is apt if I consider Ryman's artworks to be engaging with a form institutional critique. Institutional critique covers aspects of research that parallels my research, however any comprehensive consideration of the practice falls outside of the scope of this study.

having a constant spectral density function."[16] In recollecting my visit this noise surrounded me and persisted within the Ryman exhibition.[17]

In 2016, I revisited Dia:Beacon, and again encountered the Ryman rooms, and I became aware of the sound of actual white noise that seemed to envelop me. What I had remembered as a noise-like experience was, in fact, actual. A white noise sound was emanating from a large air-conditioning system that was located just outside the southern entrance to Ryman's spaces.[18]

White noise possesses no information or structure and lacks any causal information. It also masks reverberations and echoes that might provide acoustic information about the shape and size of the room. The absence of temporal or spatial framings disorients the perceiver. White noise simultaneously fills and empties the space. On my return visit, I could hear sound but I could not sense its spatiality. This experience mirrored the disorientation that I experienced visually, generating a zone of incommensurability.

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[16] Robert Grover Brown, *Introduction to Random Signal Analysis and Kalman Filtering* (New York: New York : Wiley, 1983).
[17] I will develop the discussion of my perception of noise within Ryman's exhibition in Chapter 5.
[18] My encounter with noise in Ryman's exhibition is developed in my discussion of haecceities in Chapter 4.

Gerhard Richter, *Six Gray Mirrors* (2003)

Figure 8. Gerhard Richter, *Six Gray Mirrors*, 2003. Dia Art Foundation; Gift of Louise and Leonard Riggio and Mimi and Peter Haas. © Gerhard Richter. Photo: Bill Jacobson Studio, New York

Figure 9. Gerhard Richter, reflections in *6 Gray Mirrors.* Source: Dia:Beacon Website 2013

6 Gray Mirrors is situated in a single room at the centre of the vast Dia:Beacon building. The artwork resembles a uniform collection of paintings in a white-walled gallery. A prominent clerestory allows filtered natural light into the space through a series of opaque windows. Two of the four walls have large openings into adjoining gallery spaces. Two thin square pillars towards the centre of the room support the roof. Six identical large gray rectangular mirror/objects are mounted on the four walls; two mirrors on each of the longer walls, hung either side of the wall openings. Each mirror panel consists of two adjoining panels, mounted side-by-side. Within the room the serialised mirror elements appeared Minimalist and monumental. Their gray, shiny surfaces reminded me of industrial finishes used by Donald Judd.

Figure 10. Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors*. Photo: David Chesworth

As I moved within the room, the gray mirrors dimly reflected different portions of a world that lay beyond their rectangular frames (see fig. 9). After a while my attention shifted to sounds that were heard coming from the large expanses of the whole Dia:Beacon building. A *susurrus* was focused within Richter's space as sounds from throughout Dia:Beacon reflected off the hard surfaces of the mirrors, walls and concrete floor.[19] I perceived a soundscape that subtly scored a dual spatiality: one

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[19] 'Susurrus': a whispering or rustling sound. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/susurrus. This term is used to describe sounds that occur within the ambience of a place, particularly in a large encompassing environment, such as a forest or the seashore, or indeed the expanses of Dia:Beacon, where

could hear reflected sounds that described the physical dimension of Richter's room, *and* I could perceive sounds within the susurrus that sonically described other spaces beyond the artwork's frame, within the expanses of the Dia:Beacon building. This perception of one site through another site echoed the visual experience of Richter's artwork as the gray mirrors revealed virtual spatial expanses beyond Richter's actual room. The presence of reflected sound *and* reflective mirrors therefore complicated my encounter through its oscillation of sensory and conceptual reinforcements *and* disjunctions which were ultimately incommensurable. With the absence of anyone else in the room, and encountering the blankness of the wall forms, I felt that I was the focal point of the artwork's omnipresent and unknowable panoptic gaze.

The Stone Activation

While in Richter's mirror room, I became aware of a small stone lodged in the tread of my right shoe. I quickly scuffed my foot on the floor to free the stone. This barely considered action propelled the object across the polished concrete floor at great speed, where it struck a thin metal skirting-board along the wall's edge with unexpected force, causing a sharp, loud snapping sound that reverberated off all the hard surfaces. Initially, I was not sure what had happened. It was as though the room itself had produced a moment of self-articulation. The unexpected sound suddenly activated and destabilised Richter's room. The event coming from somewhere within the frame of the artwork challenged the coherence of the artwork's own careful attention to framing as it undermined the cool authority of Richter's display and its monumental unfolding of time. I became a spectator of an encounter between the

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individual sounds are not distinct but rather contribute to an overall whispering, rustling effect. The word is often used in prose and poetry.

artwork, and the stone event, and a spectator in a theatrical space in which Richter's

artwork, the stone event, and myself were all activators. The materiality of the stone's

action had undermined the artwork's own strategic, geometric deployment of

ephemeral surfaces. The stone event suddenly became more relevant to me than the

artwork as I tried to identify the sound's source or cause and whether the sound

indicated a threat to me, or to the space I was occupying.[20]

Richter's artistic methodology developed during his experiences in East and then

West Germany in the 1950s and the 1970s.[21] Richter first used glass in his artworks in

Four Panes of Glass, 1967, in which four large metal-framed panes of clear glass are

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[20] Listening acousmatically to a sound in order to work out its source is investigated by Kane in *Sound Unseen*, and will be explored further in Chapter 4.

[21] Robert Storr suggests:

> The drama of Gerhard Richter's artistic life has consisted of repeated encounters with totalising systems of thought that dictated how he should conduct himself and what his paintings should be. First, these ideological mandates were issued by authoritarian political regimes [including the Communist German Democratic]. By the time he had received art-world recognition in the late 1960s, they issued from the avant-garde in whose midst he had landed [on moving to West Germany... and they have sometimes exacerbated his deep-seated doubts. Robert Storr, *Gerhard Richter : Doubt and Belief in Painting*, ed. Gerhard Richter and Art Museum of Modern, Doubt and Belief in Painting (New York: New York : Museum of Modern Art, 2003)., 83.

Storr also suggests, that in the West, Richter encountered a dogmatic political Leftism, with its utopian view of change that came to a head globally in the May 1968 global student protests against conservative forces. In the West, there was still a push to embrace communism that Richter had himself already abandoned in East Germany. Also, I suggest that West Germany now supported American imperialism that had asserted itself globally following WWII, which had led to the outbreak of the then current Vietnam war, and gave further rise to tensions between the political Left and the capitalistic Right.

Storr writes that, in West Germany in the mid 1960s, Richter became exposed to, and found an affinity with, the rigorous reductionism of American Minimalism and Conceptualism by artists like Carl Andre, Walter de Maria, Dan Flavin, Sol LeWitt, Bruce Nauman, Robert Ryman and Lawrence Weiner, who were starting to be exhibited in West Germany. During this time, he was formulating new approaches to making art and the reserve of the American artists was much more appealing to Richter than the neo-Expressionism that was also emerging at that time. For Richter all these tensions and doubts tended to "generate into a source of energy [which] had a profound impact on the outward appearance and inner dynamics of his work." Ibid.

Significant to this discussion is the fact that many of his three-dimensional and non-photographic artworks from this period make use of images and constructions of curtains, doorways and windows in which the act of looking was *itself* framed.

suspended in a row, individually hinged on a central axis connected to floor to ceiling poles. In 1971 Richter spoke about the work:

> Perhaps doors, curtains, surface pictures, panes of glass, etc. are metaphors of despair, prompted by the dilemma that our sense of sight causes us to apprehend things, but at the same time restricts and partly precludes our apprehension of reality.[22]

The viewer can stare through *Four Panes of Glass* into what might be considered as the reality beyond. However, Richter's serial framing of the panes of glass creates a barrier that suggests that our viewing processes also involve *acts* of framing and selection, therefore imposing restrictions on direct access to reality. Thus, Richter seems to be suggesting that, in our attempt to understand a perception, it can useful to understand the means by which we experience, and how our points-of-view are mediated by physical and mental framings.

The act of apprehension was further challenged as his monochrome paintings and his mirror works, were combined as gray, mirrored surfaces. Richter described his gray mirrors as "a cross between a monochrome painting and a mirror, a 'Neither/Nor'— which is what I like about it."[23] Like the Ryman's Dia:Beacon artwork, here was another iteration of painting-like forms in which obvious content had been withheld. Compared to Ryman's use of white, which had the effect of emptying and voiding the frame, here, the gray colour dimmed the dynamic reflected image, so that my experience of the reflected (actual/virtual) world had reduced veracity. It was as though the gray colour had washed out reality, reducing its realism to a kind of intermediate state. The reflected images felt dream-like, memory-like. The reflections, including my own, appeared to be from elsewhere, beyond reality.

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[22] Richter, quoted in ibid., 86.
[23] Interview with Jonas Storve, 1991 in, Dietmar Elger, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, and Gerhard Richter, eds., *Gerhard Richter : Text : Writings, Interviews and Letters, 1961-2007*, ed. Dietmar Elger, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, and Gerhard Richter (London : Thames & Hudson, 2009)., 272.

Richter's artworks engage the viewer through the deployment of contradictory strategies; these manifest in his artworks as juxtapositions of, and between, perceptive, ideological, qualitative, structural, and textual oppositions. Storr suggests, that Richter's "principled refusal to take sides in a contest of destructive absolutes" reflects our contemporary predicament of how to engage with ideological and moral discourse and affecting forces.[24] Richter suggests that, through his artworks, he is "trying to bring together the most disparate and mutually contradictory elements, alive and viable, in the greatest possible freedom. No paradises."[25] Thus, Richter makes it clear that, for him, transcendence out of a predicament is never a desired or attainable outcome.

Hal Foster questions Richter's limbo-like stance:

> This intermingling of apparent opposites—painting and photography, crafted work and readymade image, abstraction and representation—is evident enough; the question is to what effects, and to what ends, it is performed. Do these opposites appear as antinomies that arrest his oeuvre in a static oscillation between different modes?[26]

The non-synthesising of tensions in Richter's dialectical strategies has preoccupied many critics including Hal Foster, Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Storr, and has driven much debate about the viability and purpose of contemporary painting and sculpture.[27] In seeking "no paradises," Richter suggests that he is far more interested in holding visitors in a limbo when experiencing his work, rather than empowering the visitor with an integrated or utopian outcome. This methodology goes some way

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[24] Storr was referring specifically to Richter's *October 18, 1977* painting series. I suggest the observation can be applied to Richter's practice as a whole. Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, 7.

[25] Interview with B. H. D. Buchloh, B. H. D. Buchloh, ed. *Gerhard Richter* (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2009)., 34.

[26] Hal Foster, "Semblance According to Gerhard Richter" in ibid., 115.

[27] For example see Buchloh's discussion of Richter's *Eight Gray* series. B. H. D. Buchloh, *Gerhard Richter : Eight Gray*, ed. Susan Cross, B. H. D. Buchloh, and Berlin Deutsche Guggenheim, Eight Gray (Berlin: Berlin : Guggenheim, 2002).

to explain the confusions I experienced in my encounter, and why I felt challenged when the stone in my shoe ruptured the artwork's dialectic.

The dilemma of *perceiving* is ever present in Richter's artworks, but with his glass and mirror pieces he seems to be questioning the even more fundamental act of *viewing*. For Richter, mirrors are used as devices to problematise the experience of viewing. A mirror is "just like a painting, it shows something that isn't there—at least not there where we see it."[28]

For this idea to succeed we must be prepared to question, as Richter does, that any belief in what we see reflected in mirrors is reality. In a 1993 interview with Hans-Ulrich Obrist, Richter describes the surfaces of his gray mirrors as pictorial spaces that are ever variable and subject to chance, and as a corollary that

> There is an allusion somewhere to the fact that every picture is a mirror … every picture has space and significance and is an appearance and an illusion … and in the Gray Pictures—these surfaces too have once more become illusionistic.[29]

To achieve this, Richter presents *6 Gray Mirrors*, as a gallery hang of painting-like art objects, but these can also be considered as serial components of a room-based artwork. In viewing the mirrors, the beholder engages in a series of perceptive strategies that causes a realisation that they are at once complicit in the transactions of viewing and perceiving. This becomes a self-reflexive and performative experience for the viewer. What Richter achieves here is analogous to 'breaking the fourth wall'

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[28] Interview with Jan Thorn-Prikker, 2004, Elger et al., eds. (A counter argument is that we humans are now used to seeing reality from the point of view of a camera, which, like the mirror, is not part of our body. This position will be discussed in Chapter 2)

[29] Interview with Hans-Ulrich Obrist 1993, in Gerhard Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting : Writings and Interviews 1962-1993*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Obrist and d'Offay Anthony (London: London : Thames and Hudson : Anthony d'Offay Gallery, 1995). My emphasis in italics.

in theatre, where the visitor is made aware of their presence in the transaction.[30] The mirrors become framing devices allowing the visitors to see themselves reflected back though the fourth wall and to contemplate their own space as illusionary.

The grayness of the objects adds another layer to his "Neither/Nor" concept of experience. Richter suggests that: "[Gray] makes no statement whatever; it evokes neither feelings nor associations: it is really neither visible or invisible. … It has the capacity … to make 'nothing' visible."[31] Storr refers to the distancing effect of gray: "Instead of creating the illusion that the thing represented and its environs are within our reach, such colour made them seem doubly remote."[32] An oscillation of site therefore, is in play as the viewer contends with painting-like objects, that instead of presenting framed content on their surfaces as might be expected, reflect back the viewer's gaze and their surroundings while distancing and de-signifying the reflected image through the use of the colour gray.

Buchloh suggests that Richter's earlier, similar work *Eight Gray* (2002) "de-privileges" vision.[33] Thus, what appeared as self-important monumentalism during my viewing of *6 Gray Mirrors* might just be a component part of Richter's strategy through which, the artwork suggests that a transcendental experience is available by looking into the mirrors, but in fact "the act of transcendental experience is manifestly denied."

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[30] The concept of the 'fourth wall' refers to an imaginary wall at the front of the stage in a traditional three-walled box set in a proscenium theatre, through which the audience sees the action in the world of the play. The audience is usually unacknowledged by the actors on stage, who consider them to be invisibly hidden behind the fourth wall. Occasionally in a play the script or the actors do acknowledge the presence of the audience and this is referred to as 'breaking the fourth wall'. Elizabeth Bell, *Theories of Performance* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles : Sage Publications, 2008)., 203.
[31] Letter to Edy de Wilde, 25 February 1975, Richter., 82.
[32] Storr, *Gerhard Richter*, 63.
[33] "It is a work in which the institutional restriction of art and its ensuing condemnation to a tautology have been formulated with a clarity that programmatically *deprivileges* vision rather than celebrating it." Buchloh, *Gerhard Richter : Eight Gray*., *Gerhard Richter: Eight Gray*, 28.

Instead of finding "paradise," we are made aware of the stark materiality of the painting-like structures, and, perhaps also, of art's fetish driven processes (cultural and institutional) that inevitably bestows other 'values' upon artworks.[34]

I suggest that this "de-privileging" also creates space for other forms of sensory perception to gain agency. Both the ever-present ambient sounds emanating from the Dia:Beacon complex, and the stone event (which produced its own instantaneous sound), described the literalness of the physical space, and in doing so de-privileges, challenges and reorients the visitor's sense of the virtual or "illusionary" space revealed in Richter's mirrors.

The stone event created a phenomenological destabilisation that also momentarily *de-privileged* the artwork's authority. The event destabilised the temporal/spatial 'stage' on which Richter's mirrors, the other visitor, and I, were all players; revealing to the performer/beholders an exciting temporal space of presence, activation and unknowability.

The stone's sonic outburst, while having no real-world referents and no apparent causality, was however, an event of undeniable certainty. It occurred in the present tense, with no ties to past or future. Thus, it could be argued, that the stone event provided a countering 'Is' to Richter's "Neither/Nor".

What then, did the stone event and the sounds that leaked in from other Dia:Beacon spaces contribute to or remove from my encounter with this Richter artwork? The world outside the frame already enters the artwork: sunlight makes the artwork visible and the mirrors strategically provide us with a means to observe a virtual space

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[34] Ibid., 28.

beyond the actual space of the room. Why did I find these sonic disruptions to the artwork engaging and enriching of the artwork rather than separate and distracting? What might be the status of sound within his work: both the unexpected loud outburst from the stone event within his space and the susurrus that leaks in from outside? How might these disruptions be conceived in relation to the framing of Richter's artwork and in relation to Richter's own strategies that are involved with problematising the frame? I aim to uncover some answers in the following chapters.

Robert Smithson, Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust (1968)

Figure.11. Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968). Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 12. Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968). Photo: David Chesworth

There were four Smithson artworks on display at Dia:Beacon in 2012: *Four-Sided Vortex* (1967), *Broken Glass Map of Atlantis* (1969), *Leaning Mirror* (1969), and *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968). All were floor-based artworks, and all utilised glass and earth materials. Smithson's space, located at the rear of the Dia:Beacon building provided open access to six other artwork spaces (see fig. 13). The absence of any skylight or clerestory made the space darker than many of Dia:Beacon's spaces. Twin sources of sunlight entered from other spaces; the light's angular beams lit the artworks theatrically (see fig. 14).

Figure 13. Dia:Beacon plan detail. Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 14. Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968), (rear wall). Photo: David Chesworth

I had never knowingly encountered a Smithson artwork before, and all four works interested me. However, I became particularly interested in *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* because the work employed an iterative series of mirror panels and engaged with the gallery wall. I felt that its connection with the wall implicated the exhibition space, whereas the other artworks were self-contained entities.

The artwork's seriality differentiated it from the agglomerated, unitary forms of the other three works. Six pairs of silvered mirrors, each about 50cm square, were arranged side-by-side, with one mirror in each pair set flush against the wall and its pair, cracked and

piled with gravel, lying flat below it on the floor, touching the other mirror at the intersection of wall and floor. From my standing position, I could see reflections in the six vertical mirrors of the room's concrete floor, which appeared to sit somewhere inside the walls beyond the knowable exhibition space. Spatial ambiguity was compounded: Was I viewing six separate versions of one space or six entirely separate spaces? The piles of gravel and their mirrored reflections delineated and confused the boundary between actual space and virtual space.

The artwork's title, visible evidence of dynamic modifications, and the seriality of the structures suggested industrial processes. It was as though the materials evidenced the aftermath of forces that had played out, perhaps in the process of making the artwork. The segmented and repetitive forms suggested multiple workstations. The mirrors were like a bank of TV monitors, suggesting systematic, surveillance of the virtual spaces.[35] The artwork led me to imagine mechanisms, technologies and images of drone warfare. It was as though I could gaze through the vertical mirrors and imagine distant desert locations; the piles of gravel peppered with shards of glass providing evidence of forceful processes.

Smithson's artworks, together with his commentaries and writings, inform us that dialectics feature significantly in his methodology:

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[35] There are no people seen in Smithson's artworks (other than occasionally himself or his co-workers, including partner Nancy Holt). His works tend to avoid the social sphere. His mirrors seem never to be intended for the reflection back of the image of the viewer. Rather, the reflections frame aspects of surrounding spaces. *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* acknowledges the space in the mirrors but does not attempt to frame any human presence. The visitor therefore, does not appear to be the primary subject of the reflection.

In terms of my own work you are confronted not only with an abstraction but also with the physicality of here and now and these two things interact in a dialectical method and it's what I call dialectic of place. It's like the art, in a sense is a mirror and what is going on out there is a reflection. There is always a correspondence.[36]

Convergences of mind and matter, chaos and form are the basis for Smithson's notion of a "dual unity" in which notions of boundaries and limits play a major role. He imposes them to shape art out of chaos.[37] Referring to his earthworks, he states: "You can't say it's all earth and you can't say it's all concept. Everything is [these] two things that converge."[38] Within what he sees as the earthly chaos of geological materials Smithson identifies entropic structures that he refers to as wrecked maps and rubbles of logic that reveal long-term processes. These processes, according to Smithson, challenge human conceptions of art: "The strata of the earth is a jumbled museum. Embedded in the sediment is a text that contains limits and boundaries, which evade the rational order, and social structures that confine art."[39]

Smithson envisaged strata of disrupted sediments as entropic abstract grids. By removing fragments from these grids and then re-sectioning them in gallery spaces he made structures that he termed *non-sites*.

The Non-Site (an indoor earthwork) is a three-dimensional logical picture that is abstract, yet it represents an actual site. ... It is by this three-dimensional metaphor that one site can represent another site which does not resemble it—thus The Non-Site.[40]

Smithson's aim was to push the limits of art beyond the demarcations of the physical geometry of canvases and stretchers to take in broader quantitative and qualitative

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[36] Smithson, *The Collected Writings*, 187.
[37] Smithson.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 110.
[40] Ibid., 364. (Smithson's own emphasis is in quote)

experiences. In his non-sites, he could push the limits of the gallery itself, as he explains:

> I became interested in bringing attention to the abstractness of the gallery as a room, and yet at the same time taking into account less neutral sites, you know, sites that would be neutralised by the gallery. So it became a preoccupation with place.[41]

Smithson sees boundaries and limits as contradictory thresholds. He observes: "One is always crossing the horizon, yet it always remains distant."[42] In his non-sites, both limited and unlimited boundaries co-exist and overlay each other (like the horizon), creating paradoxical dual-unities. His non-sites, derived from small sections of more extensive grid patterns or crystalline structures, function as containers. Both the container and the materials contained create a notional three-dimensional map, or a score of the larger site, but as the non-site is also operating as an opposing pole to the site (within Smithson's bi-polar scheme), the relationship between non-site and site is always problematic. Site and non-site engage in a continual oscillation, as their references swap between each other or are sometimes shared.

Thus, within his site/non-site, dialectic limits are simultaneously open and closed.[43] Closed limits are expressed primarily in his gallery-based non-sites, whereas open limits are the uncertain and random designations within the original exterior landscape sites. His site maps (of which the non-site is but one manifestation), provide boundaries and limits, but no precise pointers to location or destination, and so, "the site is evading you all the while it's directing you to it."[44]

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[41] ISmithson., 296.

[42] Smithson "Incidents Of Mirror-Travel In The Yucatan (1969)" in ibid., 119.

[43] Smithson "Smithson's Non-Site Sights/ Anthony Robbin (1969)" in ibid., 175.

[44] Smithson "Four Conversations" in ibid. 218.

Mirrors

For Smithson, art is "mainly an act of viewing, a mental activity that zeros in on discrete sites."[45] These sites though, can be physical or conceptual, or indeed, both. Mirrors, for Smithson, become dialectical devices that allude to concepts without necessarily depending on them, and also provide experience via physical reflection.[46] *Enantiomorphic Chambers* (1965) is an early mirror-based work in which Smithson sought to break down the viewing process and depersonalise the act of viewing.[47] Through making *Enantiomorphic Chambers* Smithson gained a "physiological awareness of perspective,"[48] in which he could "zero in on those aspects of mental experience that somehow coincide with the physical world."[49] *Enantiomorphic Chambers* splits the viewing act into "two separate things that relate to each other." He saw this early work as an embodiment of his dialectical thinking that would later emerge in his non-sites, which are not always there to be peered into, so much as contemplated, for all their paradoxical attributes and suggestive possibilities.[50]

Smithson prefers this notion of physiological awareness to any *concept* associated with the act of viewing. He saw concepts as providing a form of closure, which does not belong in his site dialectic: "I mistrust the whole notion of concept. I think that basically

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[45] Smithson, "Discussions With Heizer" in ibid., 246.

[46] Smithson, "Fragments Of A Conversation" in ibid., 190.

[47] *Enantiomorphic Chambers* (1965/2003) Steel and mirror, two components. Original artwork was destroyed. Remade exhibition copy Collection Estate of Robert Smithson.

[48] Smithson, "Pointless Vanishing Points (1967)" in Smithson., 359.

[49] Smithson ,"Four Conversations" in ibid., 208.

[50] For example, Smithson refers to mirrors used in the interiors of 1930s New York buildings as "dividing reality into perplexing, impenetrable, uninhabitable regions" and as being "pools of swarming ideas and neoplatonic archetypes and repulsive to the realist." Smithson "Ultramoderne" (1967) in ibid., 64. Mirrors also elude to the enantiomorphic nature of crystalline structures that feature strongly in his work.

implies an ideal situation, a kind of closure."[51] Instead, he places physiological awareness (experience) and concept at opposing poles of a bi-polar unity.[52]

Another dialectical tension is generated by Smithson's use of mirrors to play structural roles. Here mirrors become "controlling elements" physically supporting or being shored–up by other supports, such as walls or piles of dirt or even plants. This is apparent in both his interior and exterior works.[53]

Smithson's non-sites, with their paradoxical boundaries and limits, contain collected materials (such as rocks, sand, gravel and tar) sourced from parts of a corresponding larger exterior site.[54] According to Smithson these fragments are evidence of forces and entropic processes and also suggest structure. Smithson likes the "ponderousness of materials" as they add "weighty sensation."[55] For him, this sensation generates ideas: "Somehow to have something physical that generates ideas is more interesting to me than just an idea that might generate something physical."[56]

For Smithson, experience of actual things brings about an engagement with 'otherness'. Smithson's essay *The Crystal Land* (1966) is full of examples of how his physical

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[51] Smithson "Four Conversations" in ibid., 208.
[52] Smithson "Fragments Of A Conversation" in ibid., 190.
[53] For example, mirrors are used structurally in *Four Sided Vortex* (1965), *Eight Unit Piece* (1969) *Yucatan Mirror Displacements* (1969), *Non-site Essen* (1969), as well as in *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*.
[54] Often, as is the case with the non-site *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*, the referenced exterior site is unspecified. However an updated Dia:Beacon floorsheet now indicates anecdotally that the work "contains gravel collected at Bergen Hill, New Jersey." Lynne Cooke, "Introduction: Robert Smithson, Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust, 1968. ", Dia Art Foundation http://www.diaart.org/exhibitions/introduction/97 (accessed 19/4/2013). Smithson was very familiar with New Jersey. "Smithson's investigations of cultural "elsewheres" begins with New Jersey. He was born and raised there. His parents lived the rest of their lives there and he visited them regularly after he moved to New York in 1957." Ann Morris Reynolds, *Robert Smithson : Learning from New Jersey and Elsewhere*, ed. Robert Smithson (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2003)., 79.
[55] Smithson "*The Spiral Jetty* (1972)" in Smithson., 150.
[56] Smithson "Conversation In Salt Lake City: Gianni Pettena (1972)" in ibid., 298.

encounter with objects, scenes and images causes him to imagine images not of this world.

> The first time I saw Don Judd's "pink plexiglass box" it suggested a giant crystal from another planet … The quarry resembled the moon. … [W]e drove through the New Jersey Meadows, or more accurately the Jersey Swamps—a good location for a movie about life on Mars.[57]

This tendency to imagine images from elsewhere when encountering actual objects is also evidenced in Smithson's essay, *Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey* (1967) in which Smithson identifies urban infrastructures as artworks.[58]

How then, do these imaginative thoughts of 'otherness' and 'elsewhere' that I experienced relate to the physicality and materiality of the Smithson artwork encounter? The artwork's many mirrors are angled in such a way that the visitor sees the gallery floor reflected but not their own reflection. Is this where the visitor, who is thus unacknowledged by the artwork is still able to gain agency; through mind and body oscillating between conception and experience of site? Aren't Smithson's paradoxical framings therefore only isolating, exposing and portraying ontological confusions that are inherent in our consciousness of the world? I discuss some of these questions in the following chapters and to explore some of these ontological contradictions through my artwork practice. I will also argue that within Smithson's artwork, I intuitively and imaginatively recognised references to structuring systems that are currently in play in contemporary drone warfare.[59]

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[57] Smithson "The Crystal Land (1966)" in ibid., 7.

[58] Smithson "A Tour Of The Monuments Of The Passaic, New Jersey (1967)" in ibid., 68. These "monuments" are for Smithson representational: waste outfall pipes represent fountains, and other industrial forms suggest sexual penetrations (industrial 'raping' of the landscape?). In his essay, these representational descriptions sit alongside conceptual descriptions of entropic voids, infinite futures, and mirrored mappings of suburban forms. Art, for Smithson, is never just about concept and experience; it also breaks out into *otherness* giving rise to new thoughts and imaginings. And just as for Smithson on his *Tour of the Monuments of Passaic*, my experience of *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* generated thoughts and imaginings of industrial and surveillance processes.

[59] The connection between *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* and images that relate to warfare will be developed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this exegesis.

Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005)

Figure 15. The Western Garden at Dia:Beacon. Photo source: Unknown

My encounter with Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece: Beacon* will be discussed in relation to two other encounters that took place: one, earlier in the day at Dia:Beacon, and the other, a day later in New York's Times Square.

Before: 'The Train Event'

Exploring artworks in the spaces of Dia: Beacon led me to the West Garden, an outdoor courtyard to experience an artwork by Louise Lawler, *Birdcalls* 1972/81. The courtyard consisted of a formal arrangement of small trees and bushes, surrounded by gravel paths (see fig. 15).

A high metal fence with a hedge demarcated the exterior boundary of the courtyard. Through the metal palings of the fence I could see a thickness of bushes and trees, which masked the wide expanse of the Hudson River beyond.

Figure 16. West Garden, Dia:Beacon, looking towards river and concealed train line. Photo: David Chesworth

I had begun to listen to Lawler's curious sound-world of 'birdcalls' framed within the courtyard, when suddenly I became aware a dull roaring sound in the distance, which quickly became much louder and more defined, and then almost deafened me as the intense sound passed by, invisibly, just beyond the trees and bushes. The sound quickly diminished in volume and was gone. The experience was intense and physical. After the experience, I deduced that the sound must have been an express train passing close-by at great speed, but which was hidden from view, some one hundred meters or so behind the bushes and trees. This unexpected sound interrupted and confused my framing of Lawler's artwork (which was sonic work sited in a small tree). It was imperative that I listened and attempted to identify the sound to assess if it was indicating an impending threat to my safety. Thus, the sonic event had overridden my framing and experience of Lawler's artwork.

I documented a similar train event in the West Garden at Dia:Beacon during my revisit in 2016. Note the presence of Louise Lawler's *Birdcalls* (1972/81)

Link to video filmed and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/203780004/7232a0569a

During: *Time Piece Beacon* (2005 – present)

Later inside the Dia:Beacon building, as I was about to leave to catch the train back to Manhattan, and with my listening skills having now acquired some acuity, I became aware of a faint continuous sound emanating from somewhere inside the Dia complex. The sound was lurking quietly in the background. Its location or any causality that might help to identify the sound was hard to ascertain. The continuous tone had some musical characteristics, however it didn't resemble any musical instrument or composition I knew. The sound was slowly becoming louder and appeared to follow me as I walked through the building's interior. I couldn't tell whether the sound was from a single

distant source or many. I speculated that its source might be one of the exhibits that I had passed in my wanderings. As I didn't want to miss my train I left the building to make my way to the station. As I walked outside the Dia complex and made my way through the landscaped surrounds, the sound persisted. It now seemed to be emanating from the whole of the building. As I walked further away the sound became even louder, and was now apparently entirely occupying the Dia:Beacon building and its surrounds. As I walked out of the grounds and out of sight of Dia:Beacon, I could still hear the sound. Then, it suddenly stopped, creating a noticeable sense of emptiness. As I listened and looked at the world, it was as though it was being revealed to me for the first time.

Later, I discovered that the sound was part of the artwork *Time Piece Beacon* (2005) by Max Neuhaus. This work is based on an earlier project of his called *Silent Alarm Clock* (1979). In *Time Piece Beacon*, seven minutes before the hour, a sonic drone, designed to blend in with its surroundings, is gradually introduced throughout the Dia:Beacon complex and surrounding gardens. The idea is that as the sound imperceptibly increases in volume it remains unnoticed by the public, until, after a few minutes, the sound abruptly ceases. Visitors, who have become accustomed to the sound without consciously noticing it, experience its sudden absence and instantly become aware of the foregrounded ambience that remains. It is therefore the silencing of the sound that activates the visitor.[60]

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[60] I *had* become aware of the sound and sensed its powerful growing presence. I felt it was as though Dia:Beacon had itself become a huge oscillator that was proclaiming and framing the whole Dia:Beacon site. The continuous sound was monumental, bordering on transcendental. When the sound suddenly ceased, there was a sense that the building was alive and was simply pausing to catch its breath; preparing for its next exultation.

After: *Times Square* (1977–1992, 2002-present)

Two days later in New York's Times Square, I was standing on the pedestrian island amidst the chaotic noise of traffic and spruikers in order to take some photographs, when I became aware of a continuous sustained sound that possessed both mechanical and musical qualities. The sound was prominent against (or within?) the loud urban soundscape of traffic, sirens and human voices. I traced the source of the sound to a large metal air vent associated with the New York subway system and thought the sound might be the result of faulty machinery (as I had once encountered in a water feature in Sydney's Darling Harbour). The quality and intensity of the sound was provocative and purposeful. There was no signage and no physical mounting or framing that might indicate the presence of an artwork. It was only later, when researching what I had heard at Dia:Beacon, that I also learned that the Times Square event was another artwork by Neuhaus, *Times Square* (1977–1992, remounted 2002–ongoing).

All three auditory events, described above, were completely unexpected. They were transgressions that oscillated my framing of site: two involved Neuhaus's artworks altering the framing of a public space; the other (the train event) involved a non-art event breaking through or perhaps modifying the frame of an artwork. I would like to explore these auditory encounters further, firstly by investigating Neuhaus's methodology.[61]

Neuhaus coined the term 'soundscape' in the mid 1970s to describe "sound works without a beginning, middle or end, where the sounds were placed in space rather than

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[61] Many of my own artworks created with Sonia Leber, also involve the creation of sonic situations in public spaces that initiate a reframing of site on the part of unwitting participants. Examples include *5000 Calls* (2000), *The Gordon Assumption* (2004) and *We, The Masters* (2011). See Appendix 2

in time."[62] For Neuhaus, the artwork does not just comprise the soundscape itself, it also resides in the social and visual milieu in which the soundscape is situated:

> I create, transform and change spaces by adding sound … the installations are related completely to their location. I don't start to conceive of them until I'm in the actual context; and that context is not only aural but also visual and social.[63]

He wanted encounters with his artworks to be unanticipated by the visitor; an encounter "they could pass through at any time, not something they had to plan to go to."[64] The encounter then, often manifests for its audience as an unexpected event.

Neuhaus has stated that he uses sound "to change the way we perceive space."[65] This is not achieved through oppositional or confrontational methods, for, as he acknowledges, he is working in the public sphere: "I'm in their territory."[66] Rather, he creates sonic responses to the environment that is "pitched at the threshold of perception, at a point where people can notice them or not notice them. They [the sounds] are often disguised, almost hidden in their environment."[67] When the artwork *is* perceived, the ambiguity in what is heard challenges the perceiver to locate the sound event both physically and contextually: "Traditionally composers have located the elements of a composition in time. … I am interested in locating them, instead, in space, and letting the listener place them in his own time."[68]

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[62] In an interview with William Duckworth, in Max Neuhaus, Max Neuhaus, *Max Neuhaus : Inscription Sound Works*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Ostfildern: Ostfildern : Cantz, 1994). Neuhaus abandoned the term 'soundscape' in favour of the more prosaic 'sound works' in the mid-eighties due to a general and non-specific overuse of the term.
[63] Ibid., 42.
[64] Ibid., 43.
[65] In an interview with Wulf Hersogenrath, in ibid., 60.
[66] Ibid., 64.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Program note (details unspecified) in ibid., 34.

Neuhaus's soundscapes, while they have musical qualities, do not sound completely musical, nor are they locked into a telos as in conventional musical and text-based work. Instead, his soundscapes remain 'open' and available to be positioned contextually by the perceiver in their time. Thus, within the soundscape encounter, the perceiver assumes an active role, as a performer/participant and framer of the artwork.

Neuhaus thinks about his sound materially, as an object that he creates: "[In] Times Square it is a large block of sound that you walk into. Even though it is invisible and intangible, it is like a solid place in the middle of this open space."[69]

The shapes of the spaces he is working in, influence the resonances and qualities of the sound he is making. He says of his Times Square work:

> I think the easiest way to think about it is to think of the air confined by the walls of the complex chamber [the air vent chamber situated in the pavement] as a block of material, which the loudspeaker is vibrating. The vibration of that block of air is exposed through the opening of the grating in the sidewalk, as the work's sound.[70]

Other connections with sound's materiality include Neuhaus's deployment of sound over large geographical areas, where, due to the fixed speed of sound, closer sounds reach the ears before more distant sounds, thus affecting the listener's experience of perspective and giving a physical dimension to the block of sound that is experienced by moving though the site. Experience is paramount: "The works are not conceptual, they are experiential … affecting the way people perceive a space by adjusting or shifting its sound."[71]

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[69] Ibid., 98. As Kane notes, if a sound cannot be identified through its source of causality, it becomes an individuated object. See my discussion of sound terms in the introduction.
[70] Ibid., 66-67.
[71] Neuhaus, "Lecture at the University of Miami. Excerpts from Talk and Question Period" in ibid., 72.

His artwork has no physical frame and so manifests differently to a painting that sits visibly within a frame or a sculpture, or an installation artwork that occurs within a definable site. His artworks are often encountered in the public domain with no signage, which might provide some site and framing context: "The sound works are made up of sound topographies; instead of being spatially one dimensional like music, they have two or three dimensions—they have different sounds in different places."[72] In these situations, the work is encountered through framing these sonic topographies, which is deliberately problematic and contestable for its potential audience. Neuhaus's works manifest as continuous surfaces of sound, which sometimes change in intensity. Unlike conventional music, spoken word, theatre and the visual arts, his soundscapes do not have edges. Its temporal beginnings and endings can be indiscernible. His soundscape can feel continuous as his sound expands outwards from its points of origin, filling spaces like a gas (as well as being affected by the reverberant characteristics of the space). His soundscapes become part of our experiential world; spatial sonic boundaries are blurred and usually unnoticed.

Neuhaus's sounds are embedded as a layer within the overall soundscape of the everyday, becoming noticeable only when we adjust our perceptual thresholds of hearing in order to actively listen to a sound. This kind of oscillation of site is where Neuhaus's work hinges:

> Often the moment the listener first walks into the space, it is not clear that a sound is there. But as you begin to focus, a shift of scale happens … you move into another perception of space.[73]

There is a careful consideration of the quality of the sound he introduces: "I often make a sound which is almost plausible within its context when you first encounter it."[74] In *Time*

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[72] Neuhaus, "Lecture at the Seibu Museum Tokyo. Talk and Question Period" in ibid., 58.
[73] Neuhaus, "Notes on Place and Moment" in ibid., 97.

Piece Beacon, Neuhaus devised what he describes as "a continuous, gradual sound tapestry pitched at the upper limit of natural ambient sounds of the area."[75]

With *Time Piece Beacon* the introduced sound remains plausible until it suddenly ceases and it is the sound's *absence* that becomes implausible. According to Neuhaus, when the visitor realises that a sound (or a sound's sudden absence) is not plausible within the existing context, this is the point at which a reframing of the space occurs and they enter the artwork: "I call it the entrance, because if you do not go through this refocusing you do not get through to the work."[76]

Neuhaus's soundscapes are all pervading both spatially and durationally. They operate "as a unifier and communicator over a whole area simultaneously."[77] In the case of *Time Piece Beacon*, where the sound is not continuous, but suddenly ceases, my reframing of the surrounding environment includes thinking retrospectively about temporal relations with the world before, during and after my encounter with the implausible sound event.

Neuhaus suggests that an awareness of the implausibility of his introduced soundscapes enables entrance points into his artworks by shifting focus, scale and perception of the public space itself. At Dia:Beacon, I experienced other events that I would consider to be implausible, such as the 'train event' that occurred while listening to Louise Lawler's *Birdcalls*, sonic events within Richter's *Six Gray Mirrors* and the encompassing noise within Ryman's *Installation at Dia:Beacon.* These implausible events were significant in my encounter of each artwork and so beg the question: did these events function as "entrance points" or provide "shifts in focus" within the Richter, Ryman and indeed the

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[74] Ibid., 98.
[75] Author is uncredited, "Introduction: Max Neuhaus Time Piece Beacon, 2005.", Dia Art Foundation http://www.diaart.org/exhibitions/introduction/91 (accessed 18/4/2013 2013).
[76] Neuhaus, *Sound Works*, 98.
[77] Neuhaus., 100.

Lawler artworks? And how, in the case of Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* did the sudden removal of the sonic object manage to initiate contemplations of past, present and future experience?

Building on the events I experienced, and reflecting on Neuhaus's use of contextually implausible sound to cause contemplation of space and temporality, I will investigate ways in which sonic and spatial events changed or modified my perception of artworks that were already unnerving me with their framing of reduced content.

Chapter 2: Machinic Framing Systems

Machinic framing refers to processes in a 'body' (in this case, an artwork) that consists of co-joined multiplicities. The artwork's function and meaning is not defined by any underlying material truth or identity, but by a synthesis of heterogeneities through forming assemblages with other bodies including the artwork visitor. Deleuze argues that the material universe is not a universe of mechanisms, but of machinism;

> Mechanism involves closed systems, actions of contract, immobile instantaneous sections". Whereas within a machinism there is "movement which is established between the parts [components] of each system and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together, and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed. ... It is a mobile section, a temporal section or perspective. It is a bloc of space-time. ... There is even an infinite series of such blocs ... This is not mechanism, it is machinism.[1]

Encountering the four Dia:Beacon artworks: Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010); Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968); and Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005), I became aware of frames and less aware of content. I became drawn to interactions between framed forms, materialities and surfaces deployed by the four artists. I felt that an artwork's function and meaning was not defined by any underlying material truth or identity, but could be thought of as a flow of heterogeneities that formed assemblages with other bodies, including the artwork visitor.

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[1] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 59

Dialectic[2]

In my description of my 'naïve' encounters with the artworks during my initial visit in 2012, I have attempted to reconcile my physical experiences with retrospective thinking about the artworks. My expectation that Gerhard Richter's framed mirror objects (that resembled paintings) would contain content was thwarted by the dialectic of looking into his mirrors and seeing only ambiguous grayness and opaque reflections that blurred any clear image. Benjamin H.D. Buchloh describes Richter's gray mirrors as antinomic: voids, yet also, sites for transcendental experience; and serialised forms, which are also monumental.[3] Robert Ryman's dialectic was revealed through how his paintings behaved differently when encountered in groupings. Dialectic is also apparent through the paintings' simultaneous presentation as records of their own making yet also as a

[2] The kind of dialectic method I have been referring to here is generally understood as the Hegelian dialectic in which *thesis* and *antithesis* are presented, and to which thought processes are applied in order to *synthesise* aspects of opposing views toward a resolved outcome. Hagel's actual terminology for this process was *abstract-negative-concrete*, in which the task is to make contradictions explicit and to move towards the *concrete* by finally overcoming the *negative,* while preserving useful portions of the *abstract*. A criticism of this dialectical method is that *antithesis* or the *negative* component of dialectic is often a subjective position that suits the users own purposes, and which does not necessarily rely on a rigorous logical premise. Karl Marx's *dialectical materialism* is his critical response to Hegel's dialectical idealism. He posits an alternative dialectical model in which thought processes are, in fact, merely reflections and translations of the existing material world: Marx says: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition," in *Capital a Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Frederick Engels(Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1873). At Dia:Beacon, the four artworks each presented me with a *universe* of materialities and expressive forms and deployed strategies to which I could apply the two forms of dialectic: Hegel's, with its nested abstractions and negations, and the making of a concrete world through processes of 'thinking' it into being; and Marx's dialectical materialism, in which I translate materialities into thoughts, whereby my consciousness was shaped by and reflected each artwork's universe.
[3] Benjamin H.D. Buchloh describing the dialectic in *Eight Gray* (2002), a similar, earlier work to *6 Gray Mirrors*. Buchloh, *Gerhard Richter : Eight Gray*., 15-16.

collective expressive materiality. There is also his painting's ambiguous relation to the walls to which they are fixed. Max Neuhaus's artwork involved dialectic through its creation of an absence of presence and conversely a presence of absence, whereby duration and spatiality separately competed for my attention. Robert Smithson creates antinomies through his non-site framings within which virtual spaces beyond the knowable gallery are also framed, and also through the ambiguous purpose of his framed materials, through which earth and concept converge.[4] Thus, in all four artworks I found myself caught within framed 'absences' and 'presences' through which I attempted to reconcile experience with thought, whereby I questioned just where and in which experiential realm my encounter with expressive forces was really taking place.[5]

The four Dia:Beacon artworks deploy strategies of antinomic confusion that take place within fundamental experiential registers of temporal and spatial experience. As such, they are irresolvable and preclude synthesis.[6] Thus the encounter remains in a state of limbo, where its affects, sensations and concepts are caught in a perpetual antinomic loop, so that synthesis and new outcomes are forever thwarted.[7]

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[4] "Dialectic can be thought of that way: as a bipolar rhythm between mind and matter. You can't say it's all earth and you can't say it's all concept. It's both." Smithson, *The Collected Writings*, 187.

[5] For, as I will discuss in the following chapters, experience was sometimes spatial and at other times durational, sometimes visual and at other times sonic. Experience was often a combination of all these components.

[6] I will discuss these experiential confusions in more detail through Bergson's concepts of first person experience at the beginning of Chapter 2.

[7] This kind of art-machine is also perpetuated when an art gallery archives and monumentalises artworks; processes that are very much in play at Dia:Beacon.

Bergson's thesis on first person experience

In his book *Bergsonism*, Deleuze summarises the premise of Bergson's thesis on first person experience suggesting, "experience always gives us a composite of space and duration."[8] This composite can be expressed as a duality: *space*, as the perceived physical world (extensity); and *duration* as our internal life (intensity). Another way to describe this composite is that of the quantitative (what can be measured in space), and the qualitative (sensations that we feel over the passing of time).

Within this composite, Bergson suggests that there can be confusion between measurable space and sensed duration, whereby we tend to treat *duration* (in which we feel) in terms of *space* (which we measure). Bergson illustrates his point by referring to clock-based, chronological time, where the minutes and seconds are seen to pass as arbitrary yet standardised movements in space on the clock dial, rather than being sensed as pure duration.[9]

According to Bergson, space is an exteriority without temporal succession. It is homogenous, discrete and divisible. We can cut space up into smaller pieces and if we add those pieces back together we get to the space as it was. Duration is a heterogeneous flux and not divisible like space. It is a unit on its own. In encountering a social gathering or walking down the street, qualitative changes in feelings take place over the duration of this experience as new sights and sounds are encountered. Thus, duration can contain many different qualities and is divisible into those qualities. However, unlike space, if you divide duration, you cannot put the pieces back together again. Bergson considers

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[8] Deleuze, *Bergsonism.*, 37.
[9] Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will : An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, ed. Frank Lubecki Pogson, 3rd ed. ed. (London: London : G. Allen, 1913)., 107-108.

that while space is an actual multiplicity that can be measured externally, duration is a virtual multiplicity that is sensed internally.

In the four Dia:Beacon artworks, I was confronted with unexpected absences of content and unexpected and unknown sonic events. These exposed me to sensations that were experienced durationally: surprise, boredom, frustration and a desire to search for meaning and interest elsewhere. Enduring the framed, 'empty' spaces led to spatial imaginings of the 'depths' of perceived voids and virtual spaces. Following Bergson, I understand this search for content as imaginative, quantitative masking of my qualitative endurance of the artworks' 'blank' screens. Duration was sensed qualitatively but misrecognised quantitatively. Differences in kind (my feelings of boredom, confusion, frustration, amusement, self-consciousness and lack of agency) were thus translated from experiences within duration into imagined spatial components through an imaginative re-framing. Therefore, the feeling that the four Dia artworks were gazing back at me (as I recounted in Chapter 1) was, I believe, due to the translation of pure durational experiences into imagined spatial experiences.

There were also juxtapositions of images that were confusing and were encountered as 'antinomic nexus events' that challenged my ontological understanding of the 'artwork.'[10] 'Antinomic nexus events' can be thought of as moments of simultaneous temporal and extensive perception where I was confused by a dialectic of incommensurable framings— spatial, durational, geometric, visual, sonic—in which subject/object, interior/exterior, real/virtual, physical/conceptual registers seemed to coexist. This caused the artworks to

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[10] Such as when first encountering Richter's multiple iterations of painting-like mirrors, where it is difficult to discern between concepts of mirror and painting or to understand the purpose of multiple iterations, and to reconcile conceptual sense making with the feelings evoked while being surrounded by the artwork.

be experienced simultaneously in two or more ways: such as spatially, within one perceptual register, and durationally within another perceptual register. According to Bergson events like these result from breakdowns in the fundamental composite of experience: space and duration. Examples in my encounter include virtual images in mirrors, empty framings, and the sudden removal of a continuous sound in the Neuhaus work.

In my experience of the four artworks I was aware that the world outside the frame was intervening by introducing experiences and sensations that couldn't be controlled from within the artwork's oscillating dialectic. During my visit, these interventions took the form of sonic leakages and sudden unexpected events that drew my attention away from the artwork's nominal framing and dialectical concerns. It is my encounter of these interventions and my attempt to understand their effects and affects that form part of this research.[11]

The Assemblage

Through the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari I would like to discuss a model for how to understand my encounter with the four Dia artworks that incorporates complex dialectic and antinomic experiences. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari suggest that the establishment of boundaries, such as those encountered in the framing of an artwork, creates territories that differentiate its contents from the milieu.[12]

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[11] These encounters also include my experience of 'becoming noise' in my Ryman encounter, the 'stone in shoe event' in my Richter encounter, the various sonic interventions throughout Dia:Beacon including Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon,* and my imaginations of drone warfare in my encounter with Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust.*

[12] The term *milieu* is based on Guattari and Deleuze's definition. Several aspects of the milieu are as follows:

The milieu exists within a fundamental stratification (strata) of forces and flows.[13] The territory, thus framed, becomes expressive. A territory comes into being whenever the capacity for expression breaks away from the strata. This act is called *territorialisation*.

> There is a territory precisely when milieu components ... cease to be functional to become expressive ... . What defines a territory is the emergence of matters of expression (qualities).[14]

Smithson's notion of his artworks has similarities to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of stratification; both are seen as jumble of forces and flows.[15] Smithson's non-sites can also be thought of as the framing of a milieu into territories, which become expressive. Ryman's paintings, each of Richter's reflected forms, and Neuhaus's territorialised public spaces can each also be thought through Deleuze and Guattari's notion of expressive territories.

> From chaos, *Milieus* and *Rhythms* are born ... every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions ... The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another, they are essentially communicating. The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus' answer to chaos. What chaos and rhythm have in common is the in-between—between two milieus, rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 364.

[13] And further:

> The strata are phenomena of thickening on the Body of the earth, simultaneously molecular and molar: accumulations, coagulations, sedimentations, foldings. They are Belts, Pincers, or Articulations. Summarily and traditionally, we distinguish three major strata: physicochemical, organic, and anthropomorphic (or "alloplastic"). Each stratum, or articulation, consists of coded milieus and formed substances. *Forms and substances, codes and milieus* are not really distinct. They are the abstract components of every articulation. Ibid., 584. authors' emphasis.

[14] Ibid., 366.

[15] Smithson notion of strata, while involving forces and flows, is also as a museum of sedimentary texts, which evade rational order. See, Smithson, *The Collected Writings,* 110.

In *A Thousand Plateaus,* territorialising acts are seen as components of a more complex *machinic* organisational structure, the *assemblage.* Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the assemblage can be applied to all things. There is a sense in which every*thing* is an assemblage, and 'assemblage' is the name for a thing:

> There are various kinds of assemblages, and various component parts ... the analysis of assemblages, broken down into their component parts, opens up the way to a general logic ... In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations [mélanges] of bodies, alloys [alliages]; but you also find statements [énoncés], modes of enunciation, and regimes of signs.[16]

S*trata* allow a point of view on a world that consists of basic forms, and flows, but assemblages provide another point of view that is far more complex. The assemblage has two dialectical axes (see fig. 17). On one axis: one pole represents *alloys,* and the other pole, *expressions.* These poles are independent of each other, yet both are always present. On the other axis: one pole, *territory* points towards structure and totalised homogeneity, the other pole, called *the abstract machine,* points towards change, heterogeneity and what Deleuze and Guattari call *deterritorialisation.*

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[16] Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness : Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995,* ed. David Lapoujade (New York : London: Semiotexte: MIT Press distributor, 2006)., 164.

Strata

territorialisations
of the milieu

unchanging and
homogenous

sharply defined identity

Territorialisation ——— framing

(artwork components
perceived objects)

(paint, colour, materiality,
sounds, titles)

Alloys ⟵━━━━━━━━ **Assemblage** ━━━━━━━⟶ Expressions

abstract machine

heterogeneity

opens on to change

indeterminacy of
boundaries

Deterritorialisation ——— becoming

Figure 17. Diagram of the components of an assemblage. Diagram: David Chesworth adapted and developed from blackboard sketch by Jon Roffe.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest: "Every assemblage is basically territorial."[17] Within a territory there is an investment in things staying a certain way. It establishes habits, and structural inertia. However, in an assemblage, on the opposite pole of this second axis, the abstract machine opens the territory to variation and change via deterritorialisation

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[17] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*

effects. The abstract machine is where new territory is individuated through movement towards change. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari regard territorial change, along the territorial/abstract machine axis, as fundamental to the individuation of an assemblage; it's what makes a thing unique. That territory is individuated through movements towards change suggests that my encounters with framed territories (artworks) were not static unchanging experiences, but rather, were, and continue to be, dynamic becomings. Thus, it is through my negotiations of the artwork assemblage that my experience is continually derived.[18]

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that territorialisation is an act of framing (within an assemblage), and the fundamental act of art making:

> The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or make a mark. Property, collective and individual is derived from that even when it is in the service of war or oppression. Property is fundamentally artistic because art is fundamentally poster, placard.[19]

Similarly, the four artworks under discussion create boundaries: there is the physical or conceptual boundary of the artwork itself but also within that boundary there are other framed elements. These elements serve as the "poster, placards" where, in the case of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, their apparent lack of content, draws attention to or exposes

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[18] As Elizabeth Grosz notes: "The force of temporality is the movement of complication, dispersion or difference that makes any becoming possible" Elizabeth Grosz, "Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming," *Parallax,* 11, no. 2 (2005). It is through becomings that our life varies through difference as it lives in synch with time. Thus, within becoming I needn't be caught within dialectical extremes; for there will always be movements along and beyond its resolute conceptual pole. Becoming overcomes all antinomies of events that might cause stasis, for as Vladimir Jankélévitch suggests, in his book *Henri Bergson,* becoming's continuity "necessarily presupposes the fundamental heterogeneity of the states it organises." Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Henri Bergson*, ed. Alexandre Lefebvre and Nils F. Schott (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 32. Thus, becomings can't be held back; they are relentless. They can however, be organised, structured, utilised and instrumentalised.
[19] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 368. authors' emphasis.

me to their territorialising and deterritorialising potentialities. Thus, the artworks as assemblages operate as dynamic territories that tend towards stability and expressive homogeneity but also potentially open out onto heterogeneous deterritorialisations leading to possibilities for change. Indeed, another assemblage can deterritorialise territories belonging to a particular assemblage.

In my dialectical experience of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, glass, mirrors, introduced sound, monochrome paintings and unanticipated sonic and visual events, were territorialised material bodies (alloys and expressions) where deterritorialisations also occurred. Artwork components were set up by the artists in such a way as to allow me to see their surfaces as territories, but these surfaces also remained open to impregnation or permeation by other things. For example, Richter's gray mirrors were not completely reflective and their overwhelming grayness resulted in ghostly, opaque images, which, rather than territorialising my reflection, instead deterritorialised my reflected image as a tracing, or reterritorialised it as spectral haunting within the artwork assemblage. Smithson's silver-backed mirrors were angled so that they didn't reflect back and territorialise the image of the viewer; instead, they deterritorialised the viewer's gaze, allowing the viewer to see and reterritorialise reflections of virtual spaces. The four Dia:Beacon artworks are also deceptively dynamic, oscillating between poles on the territorial axis: between the apparent stasis of a territorialising frame and the abstract machine, where the heterogeneity of the frame is revealed as it multiplies, dissipates or merges. Meanwhile, the other axis of the artwork assemblage, its alloys (artwork components) on one pole and its expressions (gravel piles, paint, frame, colour, emptiness of surfaces) on the opposite pole, have been so pared back that alloys and

expressions are confused, whereby oscillations of the expressive/functionality pole of the assemblage occurs.[20] Thus, nested acts of deterritorialisation within individual artwork components, led me to attempt to reterritorialise 'empty' surfaces and spaces with imagined images of surveillance and spectral *fabulation*.[21]

In Neuhaus's artworks at Dia:Beacon and Times Square, the artist's continuous, introduced sound *affects* through its territorialisation of social urban space, so that, when it ceases, it causes a deterritorialisation of that space. Neuhaus's continuous ambiguous sounds are composed by the artist analysing and then responding compositionally, creating a sound that 'fits in' with the local sonic ambience. The composed drone is at first experienced as "plausible" background sound as it is territorialised within the ambience of the public realm. However, the moment the sound is *consciously* heard, its plausibility becomes questioned (this questioning, according to Neuhaus, provides an entry point into his artwork). The ambiguity of the sound creates an oscillation of territorialising and deterritorialising forces, which occurs along the expressive axis of the assemblage. When Neuhaus's sound suddenly ceases, then the territory expresses itself very differently. Neuhaus comments: "For the few seconds after the sound has gone, what could be described as a transparent aural afterimage is superimposed on the everyday sounds of the environment."[22] The remaining soundscape

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[20] This occurs through territorialisations, deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of the frame.
[21] According to Bergson the 'fabulation function' which was not his concept alone, and which he refers to as the "myth-making function," is a particular function of the imagination that creates "voluntary hallucinations." The function takes our sense that there is a presence watching over us and invents images of gods and spectres. "The universe is a machine for the making of Gods" says Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, ed. R. Ashley Audra, Cloudesley Brereton, and W. Horsfall Carter, Morality and Religion (London : Macmillan, 1935)., 275.
[22] Neuhaus. *Inscription, Sound Works, 53.*

has become deterritorialised. In my own case, I still heard sounds of the public domain, but I now actively listened to and experienced the territory differently than before, as I attempted to reterritorialise the space in order to reassemble an understandable world.

Several events occurred that disturbed my experience of the four Dia:Beacon artworks: the stone event (during my encounter with Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors*); the train event (in the West Garden at Dia:Beacon, when I was experiencing Louise Lawler's *Birdcalls)*; plus Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*. All manifested primarily through the sonic. Framing was not demarcated by visual boundaries, but rather by perceptual and contextual *thresholds* within the assemblage's abstract machine.[23] The stone event directly engaged me from within the artwork frame, whereas others felt like they came from outside the artwork, and, their relationship to the artwork was ambiguous. Each intruding sonic event paid little heed to existing frames as each brought with it its own intensities and expressive qualities; territorialising the artwork as it occupied space and time.

Thus, an artwork's territorial frame can be porous and open to deterritorialising events, especially sonic events. Consider the train event that took place in Dia:Beacon's West Garden, where a new and unexpected sound suddenly entered the artwork's sonic and spatial territory. Its deterritorialisation seized my immediate interest. I could not conceive of what this new sound meant to me, or to the world around me, but my body was already concerned with whether or not the sound posed an immediate threat. With the sudden emergence of a new territorial frame, was a corresponding deterritorialisation of the artwork's frame. The artwork's boundaries had been penetrated by another

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[23] I will examine these particular events in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

deterritorialising frame and the artwork no longer functioned as a contained expressive territory; another emerging assemblage had subsumed the existing one.

Each artwork expresses differently as artists bring their own political and methodological interests to bear. Richter frames his artworks whereby visitors can identify political and cultural structures that influence conventions of looking and seeing, that ultimately positions the viewer's engagement with images. Smithson, who had less interest in such historicist approaches, frames his sites physiologically, employing grids and structural overlays and displaying samples of material collected from sites; creating a dialectic of experiencing and thought. His site/non-site artworks make use of frames and boundaries (like the mirrors in *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*), but he does so in order to demonstrate that framing is inherently paradoxical and contestable. Thus, it is my negotiation of the contradictions encountered in Smithson's framings that provides his artworks with its temporal structure. Neuhaus, by problematising framing, and through his manipulation of our relations with temporality, sets out to "change the way we perceive space." He shifts our spatio-temporal framing of the world by introducing spatialised compositional elements and then "letting the listener place them in their own time," which directly calls on the visitor to participate in marking out the artwork's boundaries. Ryman's exposure of a painting's framing, materiality and positioning within the institution, benefits the visitor who has prior insight into the historical and institutionalised processes that are in play in the making, exhibiting and viewing of art. Or, as in my case, the pure affect of his white paintings assembled together triggered different experiential registers that delved into confusions of space and duration.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that framings of territory are deliberate acts of art making for the purpose of signalling (expressing) territory to those who encounter the artwork. In these four artworks, oscillations shift the frame between territories through acts of

deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Within this system, dialectic operates, not as an end in itself, but as a machinic component within the multiplicity of forces and tendencies of an assemblage. Each artwork then, can be thought of as a kind of machine that is constructed from its physical and conceptual components, including dialectic, that will inevitably complicate and confuse the experience for visitors like me, who, on encountering each artwork's deterritorialising effects and affects, involve ourselves in reterritorialising the artworks' sites.

Theorist and writer Simon O'Sullivan, suggests that artwork components envelope the visitor (who is a participant and also an assemblage) with "a set of capacities to affect and be affective." That in fact, "'art' might be the name for ... these encounters, a meeting, or collision, between two fields of force, transitory but ultimately transforming. ... The encounter between participant and artwork is as productive, albeit in a different sense, as that between artist and material."[24] In my encounter with the four Dia:Beacon artworks, I had a desire to rearrange the components of my encounters into something that would reveal meaning and an understanding of each artwork's underpinning methodology. Within this process I suggest that I too became a component of the artworks. O'Sullivan suggests that the participant becomes a "subject-machine," a kind of sense-making machine operating within the framings of artworks that challenge these sense-making and signifying processes. This is not to say that there is ever any end point or arrival point, where these artworks are revealed in their completeness, rather, in each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, as assemblages, antinomic experiences are encountered in the abstract machine, simultaneously opening-up and closing-down relations between

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[24] Simon O'Sullivan, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari : Thought Beyond Representation* (Basingstoke: Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)., 21.

different artwork components (mirrors, gravel, frames, the rooms, monochrome colour, sounds, reflections and surfaces).

O'Sullivan suggests that such an encounter with art requires a "machinic understanding,"

> one in which we are less involved in questions of definition and more with notions of function [where] we no longer ask the interminable question: 'what does art, what does this artwork, mean? But, rather, what does this art, this artwork do? … Indeed, aesthetic might be understood as simply the name for an affective deterritorialisation.[25]

Machinic processes describe the means by which these deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations take place within the artwork experience. Machinic processes also provide the means for artworks to challenge our habitual responses within both the artwork and the larger world, in which both artwork and visitor are situated.[26]

All four artworks caused me to explore proliferations of connections among the natural *and* technical power of their components through acts of creatively juxtaposing materialities, modes and habits of experiencing together with a rethinking of subject/object relations. This machinic act of 'making sense' utilised territorialising acts of framing, together with my acts as participant in deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of framings. Smithson's artworks, in particular, are constructed using natural *and* technical forces that play on juxtapositions between concepts on one hand and experience on the other.

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[25] Ibid., 22.
[26] Later in the chapter I will elucidate how this happens through cinematic concepts.

The Cinematic and Robert Smithson's Transcategorical Framings

Drawing on the philosophy of Henri Bergson, Deleuze develops a cinematic philosophy, whose machinic processes cause us to 'think' through cinema. As cultural theorist and Deleuze scholar Claire Colebrook writes:

> [Deleuze's] entire corpus is dominated by the concept of a life that is 'machinic': a proliferation of connections among natural and technical powers. The eye that encounters the cinematic screen forms a machine, but so does the hand that encounters the earth and acts as a tool; the flows of genetic material that make up any life-form are machines precisely because the forms they compose can reconfigure and reconnect to produce other forms. … [For Deleuze,] humanity is transformed through the machines it produces and encounters; 'man' becomes a quite different machine when he couples with the cinematic apparatus.[27]

A commonality between all four Dia:Beacon artworks is that each, through territorialising acts of framing, together with my deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of those framings, caused me to experience a proliferation of connections among the "natural *and* technical powers" of each artwork's components.[28] This occurred through acts of creatively juxtaposing materialities, modes and habits of experiencing together with a rethinking of subject/object relations, as a kind of machinic

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[27] Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze : A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006)., 9.
[28] Ibid.

process of making sense, an idea that will be developed through the concept of montage in Chapter 3. Smithson's artworks, in particular, are constructed using "natural *and* technical powers" that play on juxtapositions between concepts on one hand, and experience on the other. How this takes place and what it achieves will be unpacked shortly, and developed in the following chapters.

Smithson considered his engagement with cinema as problematic, for he had difficulty resolving cinema's concept of the master frame (the projected image) with his idea of experience (where artistic frames break down, are multiple, change or dissolve). However, rather than precluding him from working with the medium, instead, as philosopher Peter Osborne argues in his book *Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art,* Smithson employs cinema itself as tool within a transcategorical artwork engagement.[29]

I suggest the machinic components of the cinematic can also be used to articulate a systematic oeuvre such as Smithson's. Indeed, Deleuze suggests that the cinematic can provide a means to *think* about all sorts of matters beyond film, utilising

> concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others. ... It is at the level of the interference of many practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all the kinds of events.[30]

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[29] Peter Osborne, *Anywhere or Not at All : Philosophy of Contemporary Art* (London Brooklyn, NY : Verso Books, 2013).
[30] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 280.

As Colebrook suggests in her previously quoted text, our engagement within machinic assemblages including cinema, *transforms humanity*.[31]

The process (or system) of display in Smithson's non-site artworks including *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust,* involved the collecting of material fragments from land-based sites, (sometimes remote and difficult to access) and framing the fragments within art gallery contexts.[32] Smithson uses the non-site as a physical structuring device in dialectic between representation or concept of a site and its experience. A Smithson non-site artwork is a site that appears to reference another site. It is therefore an artwork that potentially encompasses more than one actual site.[33]

Smithson made films, took photographs, wrote essays and gave interviews in relation to some of his non-sites. Peter Osborne identifies how problematisations found within Smithson's dialectic of his site/non-site, and his creation of additional films and texts challenges the ontology of 'artwork' and is indicative, critically speaking, of the post-conceptual status of contemporary artwork.[34] Osborne proposes an alternative "transcategorical" framing of Smithson's artworks.[35] That is, to consider Smithson's later artworks, particularly his land art and non-sites, as not definable within a conventional medium such as sculpture, as his work has often been described.[36] For, according to Osborne, within Smithson's artworks we find,

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[31] Colebrook., 9.
[32] See my discussion of Smithson's non-sites in Chapter 1.
[33] Please refer to my discussion of Smithson's methodology in Chapter 1.
[34] Osborne., 108
[35] Ibid.
[36] Especially by critics in the decade following Smithson's death, like Robert Hobbs in Robert Carleton Hobbs, *Robert Smithson--Sculpture* (Ithaca: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1981)., and Rosalind Kraus

... extreme tension between, on the one hand, the complex rationality or intellectual logic of its construction—that is, its deliberate, staged crossing of categories (its transcategorical character) and, on the other, its final staging of determinate breakdowns or meltdowns of categorisation in various different ways, into a state Smithson described as 'pure perception.'[37] [My italics]

Osborne considers "pure perception" to be one pole of Smithson's dialectic, and it is interesting in this discussion that Smithson considers cinema as expressive of this "meltdown of categorisation."[38] In his short essay, *A Cinematic Atopia* (1971) Smithson suggests that cinema's "power to take perception elsewhere" causes experiences of confusion, where cinema's ultimate framing of site (what Deleuze refers to as its 'frame of frames') is only able to impose a kind of limbo, which is also a finality, which stupefies the viewer:[39] "the sites in films are not to be located or trusted. ... We are lost between the abyss within us and the boundless horizons outside us. Any film wraps us in uncertainty."[40]

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inRosalind E. Krauss, *Passages in Modern Sculpture* (London: London : Thames and Hudson, 1977). Osborne suggests that Kraus's later semiotic essay,*Rosalind Krauss, "Sculpture in the Expanded Field," October 8, (1979). ,* while it posited *non*-sculptural positions in relation to certain Smithson artworks, these were limited to landscape and architecture, that were "categories understood to have generated the possibility of sculpture in the first place" and that the 'expanded field' "quickly reverted, institutionally, to being treated as an expanded field *of* sculpture" Osborne., 103-104.

[37] Idem Osborne., 108.

[38] Smithson himself makes similar claims about his own artworks. Please see my discussion of Smithson's method in Chapter 1.

[39] Smithson's argument is not fully developed and quickly disintegrates into (familiar Smithson-like) 'entropic' logic. Smithson does not appear to be familiar with film theories available in his day, and Marxist, feminist, semiotic film theories and Deleuze's own cinematic philosophy were yet to emerge. Robert Smithson, "A Cinematic Atopia (1971)" in *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings*, eds. Jack D. Flam and Robert Smithson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996)

[40] Ibid., 141.

Smithson's scepticism about cinematic experience is evident when he states that in film: "All is out of proportion. Scale inflates or deflates into uneasy dimensions."[41] Here, Smithson is possibly articulating what Deleuze sees as the cinema frame's deterritorialising affect on the image. Deleuze puts the same idea a different way, suggesting that it is the cinema screen's "frame of frames" that "gives a common standard of measurement to things which do not have one."[42] This shifting of images into uneasy dimensions appears to unnerve Smithson. This is probably understandable considering his practice. For, it would be hard to imagine any singular cinematic frame, and its standardising effect ever encapsulating the elusive dialectics of his non-sites. As far as Smithson is concerned, spatial concepts and materialities of site operate within a completely different ontology to the cinematic, where the cinematic represents just one of Smithson's two dialectal poles: the extreme manifestation of "pure perception" that captures everything, including "boundless horizons." Smithson considers it a problem if only one pole of the conceptual/experiential axis (is) available to the viewer, since, "he would be the hermit dwelling among the elsewheres, forgoing the salvation of reality. Films would follow films, until the action of each one would drown in a vast reservoir of pure perception."[43]

Rather than film itself, I suggest it is the notion of what Deleuze calls the "frame of frames" that appears to trouble Smithson, for, it should be remembered that Smithson's

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[41] Smithson.
[42] The cinematic 'frame of frames' deterritorialises its images as each loses its coordinates of its previous territory. Deleuze says "the screen, as the frame of frames, gives a common standard of measurement to things which do not have one—long shots of countryside and close-ups of the face, an astronomical system and a single drop of water—parts which do not have the same denominator of distance, relief or light. In all these senses the frame ensures a deterritorialisation of the image." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 14-15.
[43] Smithson., 141.

opinions were formed in relation to a traditional cinema viewing experience, where the screen sits isolated from the rest of the world surrounded by the darkness of the cinema space.[44]

Smithson's notion of the cinematic frame then, is possibly about as far as we can get from Deleuze's concept of the cinematic frame, whereby juxtapositions and changing relationships between temporalities and movements *within* the cinematic frame, and how they relate to what is outside the frame, becomes the basis for a whole cinematic taxonomy.

However, in spite of what Smithson says about cinematic experience, he still made films. If we take on board Osborne's notion of the "transcategorical" artwork and the example he discusses—Smithson's *Spiral Jetty*—then the film version of *Spiral Jetty* can be considered a separately framed component of the single artwork that is *Spiral Jetty*. Thus, according to Osborne, the artwork might include *Spiral Jetty* the film; the actual, physical spiral jetty in Utah; essays about it; and photographs documenting it. Osborne suggests that these are all individual components of the one artwork. We can also consider each of them as framed components with relations to what is within their framing but also to

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[44] We increasingly encounter the cinematic image in our everyday urban lives as we walk about the city, shop, take public transport and encounter screens of moving images advertising various products and services; at home and at work as we view television, computer screens and iPhones and when we attend seminars and lectures. In these instances, the frame of frames is no longer surrounded by darkness, thus its role as a 'pure' frame of frames is contestable. It should be noted that, in practice, Smithson often incorporated films in his work, and made several stand-alone film projects. Of particular note in this discussion is his film *Swamp* made with partner Nancy Holt, (recently rescreened in a brightly lit gallery setting at the 2015 Venice Biennale), in which both Holt and Smithson are walking within a dense swamp and surrounded by tall reeds. As Holt holds the camera and films, Smithson directs her, calling out actions without controlling the frame or knowing exactly what Holt is filming. Here, Smithson lurks outside Holt's framing but still attempts to influence and control the ultimate 'frame of frames.'

what is outside their framing within the framing of the other components, and in other frames nearby.[45]

Osborne argues that Smithson's transcategorical artworks should not be thought as consisting of, say, a main artwork with supplementary films and essays, which he suggests is how *Spiral Jetty* is often described, but also, neither should each component necessarily be considered an artwork in its own right, as argued in the Dia Art Foundation book on *Spiral Jetty*.[46] Rather, Osborne implies that all elements should be considered as interconnected components of the one artwork.[47] Osborne writes: "In Smithson's own words from his conversation with Dennis Wheeler from 1969, his work is a kind of "ensemble of different mediums that are all discrete" functioning in "different degrees of abstraction."[48]

Thus, within Smithson's site/non-site artworks, if considered from a "transcategorical," "post-conceptual" position, the two vastly different attitudes regarding the framing of a site (Deleuze's cinematic and Smithson's non-site) actually converge in their use of machinic processes that are deployed within and without framings of artwork components.

This convergence is elucidated through my artwork component, *Earthwork* and the installation *The Long Take* in which it sits, and where I attempt to develop Smithson's notion of the non-site, through the cinematic, by exploring the references to both

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[45] And, perhaps, not to draw too long a bow, these relations can extend to subsequent artworks made by contemporary artists such as say, Tacita Dean's audio artwork *Trying To Find The Spiral Jetty* (1997).

[46] *Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty* (Dia Art Foundation and the University of California Press, 2005).

[47] Osborne., 106

[48] Smithson. "Four Conversations", 208. Quoted in ibid., 112.

framing and drone warfare, that I experienced in my encounter with *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust.*

In this chapter I have described how a machinic paradigm can elucidate how an artistic encounter can draw on the functionality of an artwork's objects, materials, surfaces and voids in the production of sensations and affects. I have investigated these engagements through systems of strategic functionality involving artwork and visitor. These systems include *dialectic* processes and *machinic assemblages* with their deterritorialising *abstract machines,* and Osborne's assessment of Smithson's artwork that bestows machinic functionality upon individual artwork elements, which Osborne suggests, are components of a larger *transcategorical* artwork.[49]

The next chapter will investigate how the four Dia:Beacon artworks' deployment of reduced content, my evocations of virtual imaginative spaces and the framing of unexpected sonic events within those artworks were experienced cinematically. I will look specifically at concepts of duration, framing, movement-image, time-image, montage, and the role sound played in my experiences.[50]

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[49] I would like to note that there is perhaps a danger in privileging concepts over art's qualitative experiences. Too much analytic emphasis on machinic functionality, which abstracts process, may down-play the very sensations and affects that these 'art-machines' produce. By being retrospectively quantified within an index of outcomes and categorised as acts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, components are no longer accessible durationally as the becomings that they were. This is a tendency I notice in Rhizomes, Machines, Multiplicities and Maps' in Simon O'Sullivan's Art Encounters: Deleuze and Guattari. See, O'Sullivan., *Art Encounters*, 9.

[50] Although the role of sound within my artwork experiences will mainly be discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Cinematic Framing – The Power to Take Perception Elsewhere[1]

For Gilles Deleuze, cinema presents a kind of machinic assemblage in which confusions within the heterogeneity of duration and movements within space, and the sensations and effects they produce, become images that directly provide a means to evaluate through thinking *directly* through the relations of framed images, rather than by further translating images into languages and symbols.[2]

In this chapter I want to suggest that my experiences within the spaces of the four Dia:Beacon artworks involved a particular consciousness derived through perceiving a *metacinematic universe*.[3] Deleuze derived this term from Henri Bergson's concept of a universe in which we are surrounded by images of movement, that for Deleuze creates "*a machinic assemblage of movement-image*s ... it is the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema."[4] I propose that each of the four artists developed strategies of encounter

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[1] Smithson, "A Cinematic Atopia", 138.

[2] D.N. Rodowick writes: "Deleuze argues that the image must be considered ... as an ensemble or set of logical relations that are in a state of continual transformation. ... What was "in" the shots was less important than understanding how they were linked, grouped, and interconnected and what these connections implied for a theory of sense". David Norman Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (Durham, NC: Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1997)., 6.

[3] The four Dia:Beacon artworks under discussion are: Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010); Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968); and Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005).

[4] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Author's emphasis in italics.

that they deployed within framings of their four artworks, and that these deployments contributed to machinic encounters that were experienced cinematically.

Central to the idea of *cinematic consciousness* is Deleuze's concept that the brain is the screen on which images—both virtual and real—play out. Deleuze's notion of cinematic consciousness draws on concepts posited by Bergson. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson counters what he saw as the Kantian dualism—that the world can only be known through either of two irreconcilable principles: realism or idealism—by suggesting another approach; that *everything* is image.[5] Bergson states that our body is also an image and always central to a universe of images that surrounds it. The body "occupies the centre; by it all the others [images] are conditioned; at each of its movements everything changes, as though by a turn of a kaleidoscope."[6]

Movement-images

Bergson, building on his theory of first person experience, suggests that time tends to be subordinated into perceptions of space through images of movement, so that time itself is experienced indirectly as movement.[7] Bergson writes: "There is no perception which is

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[5] In Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, ed. M. E. B Dowson et al. (London : New York: London : G. Allen & Co., Ltd. New York : Macmillan Co., 1913).:

> The aim ... is to show that realism and idealism both go too far, that it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception, which we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they. Matter, in [my] view, is an aggregate of `images.' And by 'image' [I] mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing;*—an existence placed half-way between the `thing' and the 'representation.' ... For common sense, then, the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image.

[6] Ibid., 12.

[7] Please refer to my discussion of Bergson's theory of first person experience in Chapter 2.

not prolonged into movement."[8] These experiences, according to Bergson, are *movement-images*.

However, Bergson suggests that what is distinct about our own body image, is that we come to know our bodies from both these external movement-image perceptions, but also through our internal affections: He writes:

> I find that they [affections] always interpose themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements, which I am about to execute, as though they had some undefined influence on the final issue. I pass in review my different affections it seems to me that each of them contains, after its kind, an invitation to act, with at the same time leave to wait and even to do nothing. [9]

Deleuze builds on Bergson's idea that three types of images coexist within the movement-image: perception-images and action-images, which are directed towards extensive experience; and affection-images, which occupy the interval between perception-image and action-image and which are directed at intensive experience.[10] Deleuze suggests that these three avatars of the movement-image are active in narrativising films. In his two cinema books Deleuze formulates a taxonomy of non-linguistic signs that occupy spatial and temporal realms of the movement-image and the time-image. Situated in and around the framed image and its unfolding flux of duration, these signs make use of limits, gaps and delays that ensue in experiencing images, in which we absorb affect and create new images of thought. "These components of the movement-image, from the dual point of view of specification and differentiation, constitute a *signaletic material* which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal (oral

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[8] Bergson, *Matter and Memory.*, 111.
[9] Ibid., 1–2.
[10] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 65.

and written)." [11] Just as these component images of the movement-image provide a framework to our encounter with films, and with everyday activities and experiences, I suggest, they also provided a framework for my encounter of the four Dia:Beacon artworks.

These image encounters engage with our sensori-motor schema. [12] In *Memory and Matter*, Bergson suggests that our sensori-motor processes, which draw on memory and habit, play an essential role in our day-to-day understanding of our metacinematic universe.

Bergson suggests that as well as actual and virtual images that surround us, we also experience virtual images from memory. Our memory takes two forms: the first is involuntary memory that provides background meaning, and is going on all the time in our minds, otherwise nothing would make sense; for example; when reading a book or walking around the home; the second is voluntary memory. These are virtual images of past experiences that we intentionally recall. Within any present situation we are always reaching back into memory to access these virtual images, which then become part of our present experience. According to Bergson, these memories are usually readily incorporated into our sensori-motor schema.

Through these sensori-motor processes, our everyday experiences of the world are governed by common sense responses to stimuli, where perceptions (perception-images) are felt and thought about (through affection-images) and responded to (via action-images) out of necessity for our continued survival or satisfaction. In this process, our sensori-motor schema filters out or ignores perceptions, which are of no immediate value

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[11] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 29.
[12] 'Sensori-motor schema' is Deleuze's term that embraces Bergson's sensori-motor processes.

to us. Such perception-images are territorialised as cliché, which Deleuze suggests, tends towards "a civilisation of the image."[13] Sometimes, however, we encounter perception-images we don't immediately understand, which confuses our sensori-motor schema, and a gap of indecision opens up between our perception-images and any action-images that might ensue, whereby we experience an affection-image. Here our body absorbs the perception-image as affect, which causes us to think about how to respond to the perception-image with an appropriate action-image. Bergson suggests that our brain exploits this gap, allowing us to consider our affections, through thought (that includes memory), in order to respond in a way that ensures our survival. Because of this, affection-images, when they are encountered within a film or artwork, play crucial roles, as its perceiver is affected in different ways. I suggest that the four Dia:Beacon artworks produced affection-images through deliberate gaps and reductions in framed content that caused periods of indetermination in my encounters. It was these gaps and their affectations that I 'filled' with qualitative responses and imaginative, quantitative, spatial representations.14

The Shot

In cinema, according to Deleuze, "the shot *is* the movement-image."[15] It expresses how individual components change as they move within the frame and in time. It is a unit of movement that varies in its extent between the elements of frame and montage (elements and montage will be discussed shortly). The shot, as a movement-image, calls

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[13] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 21. This could also be considered as a tendency to territorialise the image as cliché. Cliché's are images of the world that don't trouble us, as we know and understand them and they are no threat to our immediate survival. For, if we had to analyse every image we perceive we would be bombarded with all manner of images that would require our constant attention.
[14] See my discussion of Bergson's theory of first person experience in chapter 2.
[15] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 22.

on three interrelated forms of movement: the set of elements enclosed within the frame; the mobile cut, in which the set expresses movement between sets; and in relation to the *'open whole'* itself, which is all time, and which sits outside frames and sets.[16] The shot then, is a slice of duration that translates these elements as it also modulates the 'open whole.'

A shot's perceptive challenge depends on whether the particular image accords with our sensori-motor schema (which is usually the case when viewing conventional narrative films and in our usual day-to-day experiences), or, whether the shot's image confronts our sensori-motor schema, forcing us to make new connections through thought. Every cinematic shot can involve encountering many images, engaging the viewer in an evolving dialectic within a dynamic montage—a becoming that changes relations and meanings and continually modifies the 'open whole'.

Within the cinema shot, movement is an attribute of framed elements (people, cars, wind in trees, a glass on the table) but also of the camera itself, which presents movement disengaged from bodies, most noticeably, when tracking or panning. This movement may also be independent of any specific film character or point of view. Thus, the shot provides a temporal perspective that according to Deleuze is autonomous and "acts like a consciousness."[17] Deleuze argues, "the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero; it is the camera—sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman," one that takes on inhuman and superhuman functions or

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[16] The 'open whole' is a term Deleuze borrows from Bergson that describes 'universal becoming.' It is duration within which every other duration exists. It is therefore a duration that exists within all framings of duration and which itself, cannot be framed.

[17] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 20.

qualities.[18] This image is inhuman because the camera's lens functions as an eye that can attain angles and perspectives that the human eye could never achieve. But most significantly, unlike the human eye, the camera does not possess a functioning sensori-motor schema, and so, the camera eye does not filter images, like a human eye/brain does. Cinema, therefore, has the capacity to make images that humans might never envisage or select by themselves.

In respect of my encounter with the four artworks at Dia:Beacon, I contend that the shot is equivalent to my movements within the spaces of each artwork. For, objects (framed elements) were perceived as movement-images that changed as I moved past them, becoming closer and further away at different times. Some images accorded with my sensory-motor schema, and others challenged it, causing me to think about what I had perceived. When I encountered framings that appeared 'empty', it was as though my act of looking no longer privileged me as subject.[19] Deleuze writes:

> It is a case of going beyond the subjective and objective towards a pure Form, which sets itself up as an autonomous vision of content. We are no longer faced with subjective or objective images; we are caught in a correlation between a perception-image and a camera-consciousness, which transforms it (the question of knowing whether the image was objective or subjective is no longer raised).[20]

Therefore, the artworks presented framed territories of images, either conceived by my own act of framing or the artwork's framing (it no longer seemed to matter). Framing isolated the territorialised elements from the rest of the world, causing the elements to become expressive. However, it remained unclear *what* was being expressed. My sensori-

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[18] Ibid., 20.
[19] Bergson suggests that our privileged status is conceived through the idea that the world surrounds each of us, centering us within its enveloping universe of images.
[20] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 74.

motor schema became confused: the framed elements were not representational. Instead, in my experience of them, the frames were like screens, whereby the emptiness that I perceived in them became expressive of *actual* emptiness. Deleuze elucidates:

> This in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of the image and movement leads us to conclude immediately that the movement-image and matter are identical. ... The movement-image and flowing matter are strictly the same thing.[21]

Frames Within Frames at Dia:Beacon

According to Deleuze (following Bergson), images, when framed, become relatively closed systems that in different ways set physical and dynamic limits. Frames separate elements but conversely, they also bring things together. Within frames other sub-framings can take place around certain elements, so that frames can be nested within frames. Frames can also dovetail and converge in ways that bring about qualitative changes within the duration of a shot.[22] We witness in the frame movement directed at the elements within that frame, but also movements directed to what is just outside the frame, or *absolutely* out of frame, in the 'open whole'.

As I journeyed through each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, I experienced framed images within a continuous shot. This included the geometric screen-like framings of Dia:Beacon's exhibition spaces, individual paintings, gray mirrors and mirrors containing

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[21] Ibid., 59.
[22] An analogy is a cell, whose wall encloses a living system of proteins and enzymes within its boundary. Sometimes breeches in this boundary occur resulting in an interaction with other things. Also, cells co-operate, and in so doing, express themselves in a completely different way.

piles of heaped gravel. Each framing contributed expressive content in relation to other framings, including unanticipated audible and optical events that occurred inside and outside each framing that challenged my sensori-motor schema. I suggest that the artworks, in their framing of reduced and problematic content, called into question the validity of my capacity to frame the world according to my sensori-motor schema and that as a consequence I viewed the artwork with a consciousness that was more aligned with that of an impersonal camera framing (which does not possess a sensori-motor schema and so cannot reject the images as non-relevant), than a human being's subjective framing. Thus, I became (partly) inhuman within these artworks. I will develop cinematic consciousness with my Dia:Beacon experiences later in this chapter.

Time-Image

As well as the movement-image, with its avatars (the perception-image, the affection-image and the action-image), Deleuze postulates another kind of image in cinema: the time-image. The time-image challenges the sensory-motor schema because time is no longer subordinated to movement, as in the movement-image, but rather, is exposed directly to the viewer as a multiplicity.

Deleuze argues that the time-image came to the fore following the upheaval of WWII after which, audiences, who had experienced horrific images of suffering and the inconsistencies of the logic of war, no longer believed in the narrative power of movement-image cliché's.[23]

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[23] Writers such as David Deamer have identified that referencing the emergence of the time-image to a particular historical event like WWII is problematic in that it invites tying the movement-image to prior dominant ideologies and psychoanalytical subjects of desire whereby the time-image (which I will soon

Following the war, neo-realist films portrayed everyday life events and their associated minutia in the actual time of their occurrence (rather than being suggested by the use of cliché images and conventional editing techniques, revolving around ellipsis or the condensation of time). Links between subject matter and actions became less defined. Durational experience started to supplant the Newtonian logic of the movement-image. Rather than perceiving and resolving experience as a linear narrative that passes, film audiences started to encounter films in which irrational links between images, and time-images presented multiple images in which discernibility between virtual and actual is called into question. Cinema theorist David Rodowick explains:

> The narrative sections of the film are disconnected spaces, divided into blocks of time linked in a probabilistic manner. … The spectator's apprehension of what comes next is equivalent to a dice throw. Time no longer derives from movement; "aberrant" or eccentric movement derives from time.[24]

In time-images, multiple images simultaneously suggest present, past and future temporalities. Time-images present a universe in which we might perceive and individuate experience, but for which we, as humans, no longer function as its correlational nexus. Deleuze suggests that,

> we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask.[25]

My participation within each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, could be likened to that of a film viewer, but also, simultaneously, as a character embedded within a time-image

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discuss) becomes regarded as a revolutionary image that is an outgrowth from the movement-image and is somehow more developed and sophisticated. For further discussion see, David Deamer "Cinema, Chronos/Cronos: Becoming an Accomplice to the Impasse of History" In *Deleuze and History*, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 161.
[24] Rodowick., 4-5.
25 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image., 7.

film. I became, what Deleuze calls, a seer or voyant, where I witnessed images but couldn't initiate an action-image as a consequence.[26] This is an "autonomous vision of content" whereby cinema, in taking the power of perception from our sensori-motor schema, has what Smithson saw as "a power to take perception elsewhere". It is the power of the time-image; through which, like the film actor, the beholder is also removed from their privileged position at the centre of a surrounding universe of images.

I suggest this effect is possibly what unnerved Smithson with regard to his own cinematic experience discussed in the previous chapter. The difference between Smithson's conception of his non-sites and Deleuze's concept of the time-image is perhaps that cinema's 'frame of frames' acts as the principle territorialising site in which images within become deterritorialised, whereas Smithson's artworks maintain multiple (and paradoxical) concepts of the 'frame of frame' that operate within a machinic ensemble.

Montage

According to Deleuze, following WWII, audiences of certain new films started to engage with kaleidoscopic worlds of images "through montage, the mobile camera and the emancipation of the view-point, which became separate from projection."[27] Cinematic montage began to liberate the viewer from perceptions that were wholly subjective, spatial and which operated through a temporality translated through images of movement. Within this new kind of montage, perception occurs through images located within time itself, rather than spatially arranged within movement. Cinematic montage allows this development to occur. For, while in cinema we see a series of images one after

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26 "This is a cinema of the seer and no longer of the agent." Ibid., 2.
27 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image., 3.

another, these images need not relate to each other in chronological time. In a cinematic consciousness, one image does not necessary occur before another and does not need to be in a sequential order for montage to make sense. Rather, the images become components of montage that play out dialectically. Each image portrays a change within the 'open whole', not in historical time. And so, while framing still "turns towards the object," montage now allows for "the determination of the whole … by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities."[28] As cinema theorist Felicity Colman notes, montage serves "to produce a range of effects and affects," and it achieves this through editing together "quite disparate things—sound, music, objects, people, places."29 Deleuze suggests that "time is indirect in montage."30 Montage then, is a non-chronological becoming: an unfolding, a durational, encounter with, objects, materials, frames, spaces and images.

Montage can be present even within single shots, where there are no cuts, and objects, actions and movements continually enter the frame, one after the other, such as a tracking shot or a long panning shot. Within each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, I suggest that I derived images from encounters that accumulated into a montage that juxtaposed dialectically. Thus, I arranged these images within a cinema consciousness; causing me to *think* through the apparatus of cinema. According to Colman, within our thinking, montage made from disparate images can variously "perform a cliché or

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[28] False continuities are an act of the 'open whole'. False continuities introduce breaks in the continuity of the image through editing in which separate, unrelated events can be cut together. Deleuze suggests that false continuity is a dimension of the 'open whole,' "which escapes sets and their parts. … It realises … this elsewhere, or this empty zone, the 'white on white' which is impossible to film." This elsewhere is an aspect of the out-of-field, which is an important concept in my discussion and will be discussed in detail shortly. Ibid., 28.
[29] Felicity Colman, *Deleuze and Cinema : The Film Concepts* (Oxford : Berg, 2011)., 59.
[30] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*., 34.

metaphor of sound-imagery, or [alternatively] engage in creative or destructive aesthetic-political ends."[31]

I suggest, that cinematic thought became the domain of my engagement of the four Dia:Beacon artworks, where, images would either accord with my sensori-motor schema or were perceived as time-images, which forced the sensori-motor schema to make new connections through montage, and the introduction of any new image caused the 'open whole' to change. Colman refers to a "ripple effect" in cinema where a particular image encounter within a film's montage might not immediately make any sense to us but might have repercussions later on in the film.[32] An image identifies an issue, which then contrasts with other images, which either compliment or challenge it. A viewer's encounter with a particular film's style of framing, shot and montage therefore "enables a *becoming* of situations, conditions, characters or things."[33] As I journeyed through each of the four artworks, I encountered perceptions of geometrical framed surfaces that appeared to be empty, other surfaces reflected virtual images of the gallery space or suggested hidden depths and surveiling screens. In the case Neuhaus's sonic drone, here was an audio image that did not appear to be locatable or attributable to a physical cause or action that might otherwise identify it. Many of these images did not make sense at the time, but accumulated within a non-linear montage that informed my thinking (and continues to inform) through dialectic processes.

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[31] Colman, *Deleuze and Cinema*, 58.
[32] Ibid., 35.
[33] Ibid., 43.

In a conventional cinematic experience the film screen is surrounded by a dark void that enables the screen to act as a deterritorialising "frame of frames."[34] But in contemporary life, there are many kinds of cinematic experience, where the world outside the frame remains visible and audible, and the integrity of a singular "frame of frames" is contestable, in that every perception we experience can be considered as part of a metacinematic world. Thus, I am no longer the subject peering into a frame of frames where a universe of images is in a constant flux of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation; rather, I am engaged as a machinic component already *within* the universe of images, as I constantly shift relations between poles of subjectivity and objectivity.

Times Square, the famous New York City intersection and precinct is a prime example from everyday urban life, where the pedestrian is surrounded by a kaleidoscopic array of real and virtual images to a point approaching individual indiscernibility. This has become a fitting site for Max Neuhaus's artwork, *Times Square*, which emanates a sonic drone from a subway air-vent, and whose source and cause is indiscernible.[35]

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[34] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 14.
[35] Refer to my discussion of Max Neuhaus's *Times Square* in Chapter 1.

Figure 18. Times Square. Still image from video documentation. Photo: David Chesworth

As I walked within the bustle of Times Square, I encountered a multitude of transient visual and sonic images, all vying for attention. Frames were nested within other framings, or morphed into each other as they increased or receded in size and intensity. My own movement created movement-images in the manner of a cinematic continuous tracking shot. As I moved through, I glanced at and heard some of these framed images briefly, whereas other images remained indiscernible.

The following is a link to my documentation of Times Square in New York, in which is heard Max Neuhaus's audio artwork, *Times Square*. The artwork's loudspeakers are located under the air vent grills servicing the New York Subway. (June 2016).

Filmed and edited by David Chesworth. Link to documentation video
https://vimeo.com/189082107

Deleuze suggests that this movement can be considered from a dual point of view as, both "the translation of parts of a set which spread out in space, [*and*] the change of the whole, which is transformed in duration."[36] Thus, I experienced the parts spatially as a movement-image as I moved through the square, and also as a time-image as time presented in heterogeneous strands of duration. Within this experience, Neuhaus's continuous omnipresent sound could be heard. It was reminiscent of a church bell, but without the striking part of its sound, so that I only heard its endless sustaining ring. This sound was both spatial *and* durational; its force permeated all images: visual, sonic, actual and virtual. In doing so it provided a sonic rendering of the 'open whole', as a universal becoming.

Cinematic Encounter Framed *Within* Four Artworks At Dia:Beacon

According to Deleuze and Guattari the architectural frame of a building or room, as it differentiates itself from the rest of the world, behaves like an artwork. Elizabeth Grosz, in her discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the frame notes:

> The emergence of the "frame" is the condition of all the arts and is the particular contribution of architecture to the taming of the virtual, the territorialisation of the uncontrollable forces of the earth. ... With no frame or boundary there can be no territory, and without territory there may be objects or things but not qualities that can become expressive, that can intensify and transform living bodies. Territory here may be understood as surfaces of variable curvature or inflection that bear upon them singularities eruptions, or events. [37]

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[36] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 20.
[37] Grosz., *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth.*, 11.

The Richter, Ryman and Smithson artworks at Dia:Beacon exist within dedicated rooms. The room's architectural frames territorialise the elements contained within. Like the cinematic frame, the architectural frame acts as a 'frame of frames' that effectively removes the rest of the world from the visitor's engagement, and what remains within the frame becomes expressive but is also deterritorialised from the rest of the world. At Dia:Beacon, the artist room, as a 'frame of frames', contains other framed objects that resemble screens or paintings, and, in the case of Smithson: gravel, mirrors, cracks and dust. At Dia:Beacon I was intently surveilling framed images and the frames themselves in anticipation of expressive content. When this was not immediately forthcoming, my subsequent sensing of virtual presences and imaginative endurances supplanted the non-delivery of expectations.

As I moved through the Ryman and Richter artworks, and through Dia:Beacon itself, attempting to find the elusive source of Neuhaus's acousmatic sonic drone, and as I contemplated Smithson's artworks within his space, I accumulated a non-linear montage of actual and virtual images. These images no longer correlated to my subjective point-of-view, but to a camera-consciousness, which, as Deleuze indicates, is "no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into."[38] It is these attempts to make mental connections between iterations of minimal forms, reflective, muted surfaces and virtual images that I vividly recall in my encounters at Dia:Beacon. These were the machinic processes of my engagement.

Claire Colebrook writes:

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[38] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 23.

> Movement is no longer the movement from some fixed point of view [but rather] one moving life, a whole composed of movements of different speeds. ... If the human eye only sees movement in relation to its own centre, the cinematic eye can open on to movements no longer folded around the bodily observer.[39]

Within each artwork, multiple images, temporal heterogeneities and antinomic framings were encountered as time-images. The four Dia:Beacon artworks described a particular kind of time-image: a *hyalosign*.[40] In films, time-images can appear as dreams or flashbacks or shots of objects and sounds that are yet to be explained. However, usually, at some stage in the film these images *are* explained and thus the time-images are recuperated into the narrative. But hyalosigns (also called crystal-images) are time-images that cannot be recuperated into our sensori-motor schema, precisely because there is no actual image reference that allows the visitor to distinguish real and virtual images.[41] Claire Colebrook suggests that the crystal image "presents an image of an object and its potential at the same time." The image becomes both a disclosure (in the actual) and liberation (through the virtual) from a "closed exchange."[42]

I suggest hyalosigns were perceived in my encounters at Dia:Beacon within relations between certain framed components, such as: the opaque reflections (framed in Richter's gray mirrors), in noisy becomings (framed in Ryman's installation), or as an unnerving sonic 'after-image' following the disappearance of the persistent but barely noticeable sonic drone framed temporally in Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*. In Smithson's *Gravel*

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[39] Colebrook., *Deleuze, A Guide*, 57.
[40] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*., see Glossary.
[41] There is also a danger here, for, if the time-image's effects and affects are overlooked in the encounter, then its images can be misrecognised by our sensori-motor schema and resolved instead as movement-image clichés.
[42] Colebrook uses money as an example of the image of an object that is coded into relations, but also has potential in the virtual, a potential which exists in time. Colebrook. *Deleuze, a Guide*, 92.

Mirrors with Cracks and Dust, I was unsettled by the virtual 'landscapes' perceived within the receding and impossible depths of the gallery wall, which were caused by the visual displacements of the mirror's reflections. The Richter's and Ryman's geometric painting-like forms suggested panoptic screens, as a form of hyalosign. These images, with their reduced content were unable to be recuperated into my sensori-motor schema, as I couldn't resolve them (or their function) into movement-images; instead, they were experienced as machinic components that contributed to my experience of the artworks as time-images. As such, the artworks engaged as a cinematic apparatus within which I could think and imagine.

Sometimes, I suggest, I did not encounter 'empty' frames as perception-images, but rather, as affection-images.[43] In cinema, Deleuze considers the close-up of the face is the primary form of the affection-image, "the affection-image is the close-up and the close-up is the face."[44]. He suggests that 'empty' shots can also perform a similar function to the face.[45] Deleuze refers to these 'empty' frames that are a form of affection-image as *any space whatevers*.[46] I suggest that I encountered these kinds of spaces in all four

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[43] Deleuze considers the face as the primary form of affection-image in film, especially when used as a close-up shot. Deleuze suggests that "it is the face, with its relative immobility and its receptive organs, which brings to light these movements of expression while they remain most frequently buried in the rest of the body." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 66. The face (as affection-image) is a component of one of my video artworks, which occurs alongside other images in my practical research.

[44] Ibid, 87.

[45] I discuss Deleuze's notion of the face as an affection-image in Chapter 4 in relation to my artwork *FaceTime*.

[46] An 'any-space-whatever' is a term derived from the French anthropologist Marc Augé who used the term 'non-space' to describe anonymous spaces that people transit through, and where they become depersonalised. Deleuze develops the term. "Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite

Dia:Beacon artworks: in the voids of missing content and 'empty' surfaces, and in virtual images. My endurance of these affection-images gave rise to thoughts, including spatial imaginings.

Cinematic Encounter Framed Outside Four Artworks At Dia:Beacon

At the outset of my research, one of my main questions was: what *were* those unanticipated, unrecognisable and unassimilable sonic and visual disturbances that appeared to come from outside the artwork that impacted the artwork's own framing?[47] And what were they *doing* to my understanding of frame? Their forces were impacting on the existing framing of my perception-image but bore no apparent linkage between perceptions and any possible causality and subsequent action. Deleuze, in his cinema books, refers to such sonic events as *sonsigns*.[48] Sonsigns, and their optical equivalent, *opsigns,* are hyalosigns in which a pure force of duration and thought becomes perceptible.[49] Deleuze suggests they have two poles: "objective and subjective, real and imaginary, physical and mental," but that these poles tend towards indiscernibility; they can be interchangeable.[50] A sonsign or opsign is "something intolerable and unbearable … too powerful, or too unjust and sometimes too beautiful, which outstrips our sensory

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number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*.,109.

[47] Disturbances include, the train event that took place while viewing Louise Lawler's artwork, the shoe even that took place while visiting the Richter installation, and Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* in which a sound suddenly ceased.

[48] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*., 18.

[49] Ibid., 69.

[50] Ibid., 9.

motor capacities"[51] During my Dia:Beacon visit, the unidentifiable sound of the unseen train, the stone that suddenly and noisily activated Richter's room, Neuhaus's ambiguous continuous sound that became apparent and then suddenly disappeared, could all be considered sonsigns, as all were disruptive, unrecognisable events that challenged the framing of Dia:Beacon artworks. These events also challenged the artwork's framed surfaces, which I perceived as being empty or having minimal content, but framing still implied an expressive territorialisation of the milieu.[52]

These sonsigns, that came from elsewhere, beyond the frame, actualised as deterritorialising events that could not be incorporated spatially or chronologically into relations with existing artwork frames or surfaces. However, sonsigns and opsigns *can* be incorporated into the non-linear montage of cinematic encounter. These sonic affects and effects were most impactful, however, as *noosigns*. Deleuze defines a noosign as "an image, which goes beyond itself towards something which can only be thought."[53] Within the four Dia:Beacon artworks sonic images, as sonsigns and as noosigns, were experienced as disruptions that dynamically connected what was already framed with other becomings of frame.

Out-of-Field Framing

Within a cinematic consciousness there is another aspect to framing that is significant to my Dia:Beacon encounters: out-of-field framing. According to Deleuze, "all framing

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[51] Ibid., 18.
[52] Within the frame I encountered surfaces that were empty of apparent content. Here, 'emptiness' was virtual, not actual, and as such they were perceived as real images of emptiness.
[53] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. See Glossary

determines an out-of-field."[54] This refers to both what is *relatively* outside of frame and what is *absolutely* out of frame. Deleuze, through Bergson, suggests that what is relatively 'out-of-field' is contained in the set of a larger frame with which the first frame communicates, and then that larger frame can itself also be contained within an even larger frame with which it, and all sub-frames communicate. And so, while each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks ostensibly acts as an all-encompassing 'frame of frames' in relation to the set of objects they frame, this 'frame of frames' can be re-thought to exist as an element within, say, a set of all the Dia:Beacon artworks that is framed by the Dia:Beacon building, which is itself framed within the larger frame of Dia Foundation, and so on to infinity.[55] All these frames communicate with each other to varying degrees.[56]

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[54] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 16.

[55] See my discussion of Ryman's Installation at Dia Beacon in Chapter 1.

[56] Specific relations between framings at Dia:Beacon is potentially an enormous area of investigation and discussion involving social, institutional, gender, economic, hermeneutic concerns that could well be explored within an institutional critique paradigm. Such a detailed discussion falls outside the scope of this study which is investigating the ontological status of the four Dia:Beacon artworks.

Figure 19. Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia Beacon,* single painting detail. Photo: David Chesworth

I have made video documentation consisting of shots of individual paintings within Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon,* filmed and edited 'in camera' on an iPhone. These short takes present the paintings cinematically as movement-images. Out-of-field sounds recorded at the same time by my iPhone are also noticeable. Thus, this clip presents

recto experiences (inside the frame), and verso (experiences in the out-of-field), where there is incommensurability between what is heard with what we see.[57]

Link to video filmed and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/201814678/2788033fb6

The *absolute* 'out-of-field' is the 'open whole' (which is the universal becoming). The 'open whole' operates like a thread that connects to everything and is always present in all frames.[58] According to Deleuze (following Bergson), anything that happens within a frame modifies the 'open whole', which is not just outside the frame but is beyond framing itself.[59] In this sense Deleuze suggests that "the 'out-of-field' refers to what is neither seen nor necessarily understood, but is nevertheless always present."[60] Both terms of the 'out-of-field', *relative* and *absolute* are operative in this account of my experience of each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks. For, when I was within the "frame of frames" of each work, connections (specifically, perceptions of events outside the artwork's notional 'frame of frames') sometimes felt *relative* in relation to perceived

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[57] Individual paintings filmed this way can be experienced as any-space-whatevers. Refer to my discussion of any-space-whatevers in Chapter 3 under the heading "Cinematic Encounter 'Within' Four Artworks At Dia:Beacon."

[58] "The whole is therefore like a thread which traverses [framed] sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realised, of communication with another, to infinity". Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 16-17. (Deleuze borrows this concept from Bergson)

[59] "Thus, the whole is the Open, and relates back to time or even to spirit rather than to content and to space. ... One should therefore not confuse the extension of sets into each other with the opening of the whole which passes into each one." Ibid., 17.

[60] Ibid., 16.

smaller and larger framings, such as by existing just inside and just outside the frame of each of the artworks; but, also, they felt *absolute,* relating to the 'open whole.'[61]

A particular example of this is the train event that I experienced on the periphery of the Dia:Beacon complex, while attempting to engage with Louise Lawler's outdoor artwork, *Birdcalls*. Her artwork is a sound installation in which the framing is sonic and thus not strongly delineated by physical boundaries. The train's sound was unrecognisable and as soon as it was perceived it became *relative* to my framing of the artwork. Its trajectory gave the impression that the sound was quickly hurtling towards me, situated as I was *within* my framing of the artwork. However, the sound's intensity was increasing at such a magnitude that I could perceive no relation between it and the environment surrounding me. It appeared to exist in another experiential realm and thus to have an *absolute* relation to the open-whole; it was as though its effect would be felt by everything in the universe. Similarly, Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon,* which consisted of a continuous sound slowly increasing in intensity (that I also heard in Dia:Beacon's gardens as I left to catch the train), was perceived *relatively* (in relation to the entirety of the Dia complex), but, in its omnipresence, it also appeared to be penetrating the whole world, and so its subsequent sudden cessation created an absence that was both durational and spatial that affected, not just my conscious environment, but changed my sense of the *absolute* 'open whole.'

Frames of *relatively* out of-field and *absolute* 'out-of-field' provide very different registers of experience. Rodowick explains:

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[61] This effect was perceived as a kind of chaotic and confusing oscillation of framings.

> The out-of-field is actual and actualisable: it serves to continually produce new spaces. But the [open] whole is neither spatial nor actual; it is temporal and virtual. It is the dimension of change itself in the form of a becoming.[62]

Each of the four artworks enabled experiences of the 'out-of-field', some that tended towards the actual and spatial (such as the sounds of Dia:Beacon's ambiences), and others that tended towards to temporal/virtual (such as my experience of 'becoming noise' in Ryman's Installation at Dia:Beacon). Neuhaus's artwork is particularly significant in that it appeared to create an ambiguous intermingling of 'out-of-field' experience that was relative *and* absolute.[63]

Deleuze suggests that in cinema, what is framed, as 'out-of-field' can become "concrete" (actual) images, as it becomes a field. In films this can happen by inserting shots of the 'out-of-field' into the film's montage, which then gives the imaginary a concrete form.[64] However, in the 'out-of-field' there need be no real differentiation between the imaginary and the actual. This is because the 'out-of-field' simply designates that which exists elsewhere, and this *can* be considered real in its virtuality. Given that the 'out-of-field' can be an intermingling of relative (spatial) and absolute (durational) forms, Deleuze suggests that "the 'out-of-field' can reference that which is neither seen or understood [remaining] a disturbing presence, one which cannot be said to exist, but rather, to 'insist' and 'subsist', a more radical 'elsewhere' outside homogeneous space and time."[65]

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[62] Rodowick., 48.
[63] Refer to my discussion earlier in this chapter of Neuhaus's *Times Square*, and how his sonic drone evoked the 'open whole'.
[64] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 17.
[65] Ibid., 16-17.

Remembering my visit to Dia:Beacon, I recalled a virtual, 'out-of-field' noise that existed in relation to the 'frame of frames' of Ryman's installation space. Retrospectively I framed this 'becoming noise' in what Deleuze calls the "more radical Elsewhere outside homogeneous space and time … by which the closed system opens on to a duration which is immanent to the whole universe." This 'becoming noise' was thus immanent to the 'open whole'.[66] In my subsequent revisit to Dia:Beacon this noise turned out to be an actual ("concrete") sound. Remarkably, I therefore experienced the noise in two entirely different ways: temporally/virtually, and then actually/spatially.

Artwork relations involve an intermingling of relative and absolute forms of the 'out-of-field', whose containments and fluxes have capacities to initiate qualitative differences in kind. For example, the sounds of visitors throughout the Dia:Beacon complex becomes concentrated within the Richter's installation space, creating an intermingling between the *relative* 'out-of-field' and Richter's framed space. This brings other spaces of Dia:Beacon into the context of the artwork, spaces such as Dia:Beacon itself, and the relations between it and the township of Beacon, and the nearby railway line. Thus, in my experience, artwork components intermingled with 'out-of-field' framings, which also became artwork components. In my experience, it was the dialectical tension between what was framed within the artwork and what was framed sonically in the 'out-of-field' that activated each artwork through durational becomings. In the case of Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*, his introduced sound leaked into various public spaces and into other artwork spaces (seemingly from some 'other' experiential register), creating what can be thought of as an 'out-of-field' territorialisation of these spaces.

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[66] The artworks that form my practical component develop this proposition: *Another Rite of Spring* and *Earthwork*.

Viewed this way, I can articulate an artwork ontology in which certain framings provide what Smithson suggests is cinema's "power to take perception elsewhere," beyond what is available through conventional physical framings and the expressive 'empty' surfaces that are before me.

The Powers of the False and Presentness

In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze suggests that while characters in a film are fictitious, we actually believe in them as though it was the truth: "This is a *truthful* narration, in the sense that it claims to be true, even in fiction." [67] This as an aspect of what Deleuze refers to as the *Power of the False*. When I visit an art gallery, including Dia:Beacon, I encounter art by particular artists by means of journeying between the artworks. My journey through the Dia:Beacon complex forms a narrative that, not unlike a traditional film narrative, "develops according to the regularities of the sensori-motor schema."[68] Dia:Beacon's layout facilitates an easy journey between encounters, where the geometry of walls, ceilings and floors and my sense of gravity maintain the 'truth' of Euclidean space. Time passes by, translated spatially as a series of movement images. Or, as the director of Dia Art Foundation Michael Govan suggests in relation to Dia:Beacon: the building "provides tools and clues to keep [visitors] oriented."[69] However, within certain artworks, (as within parts of certain films) I am confronted with time-images, in which these 'truths' are challenged. Rodowick suggests that when this happens:

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[67] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*., 127. My emphasis.
[68] Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema*, ed. Gilles Deleuze (New York: New York : Routledge, 2003)., 147.
[69] Michael Govan quoted in Matthew Thomas Simms, *Robert Irwin : A Conditional Art* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 2016)., 257.

> Framing, which assured the unfolding of continuation images in space according to the chronological succession of presents, gives way to a series of deframings where time interrupts space as aberrant movements.[70]

This deviation can occur in a particular artwork experience in which time-images persist throughout that particular encounter, after which, I return to the narrative of my movement-image journey. This is also evidenced in conventional narrative film whereby cuts between images are perceived as rational (and don't concern our sensori-motor schema), but when time-images are encountered, cuts can become irrational. When this occurs, there is an oscillation between understanding the artwork as a "frame of frames" and the artwork becoming a time-image in which all framings become de-linked from each other and the hierarchies of framings break down, and relations between framings are no longer discernable. I suggest that this occurred when encountering the four Dia:Beacon artworks, which as time-images presented as antinomic nexus events 'par excellence' within my narrative journey.

Within films and within everyday experiences the relationship of image to sound is usually a rational one, in that what we are hearing usually corresponds to what we are seeing. Where this is not the case, then the sound might point to a source and cause that is 'out-of-field', which is still actual and understood. However, Deleuze suggests that sometimes the relationship between sound and image becomes irrational, whereby what I see and what I hear become incommensurable.[71] Deleuze suggests that these two coexisting images (visual and sonic), while irrational, are still complimentary but that: "Instead of being a component of visual space, sound becomes autonomous, thus

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[70] Rodowick., 144.
[71] The sound becomes acousmatic whereby its source and causality and its very existence in relation to the visual image cannot be resolved. See my discussion of sound in the Introduction.

transforming the 'out-of-field'."[72] Sound is usually an extension of the visual space in which it is perceived but when our sensori-motor schema is challenged then, Deleuze suggests, sound can become independent of visual space; not tied to perceived movements and actions:

> The sound must itself become an image instead of being a component of the visual image; the creation of a sound framing is thus necessary, so that the cut passes between the two framings, sound and visual: hence even if the out-of-field survives in fact it must lose all power by right because the visual image ceases to extend beyond its own frame.[73]

What this describes within the context of the four Dia:Beacon artworks is a shift, wherein experiencing a time-image the sonic frame is no longer perceived as an 'out-of-field' of the frame of the artwork, and that instead, there is a separate framing, which cannot be resolved within the artwork's frame but to which it remains complimentary.[74] Deleuze suggests that: "The incommensurability of the images denotes a new relation not an absence."[75] I suggest, that when sound and image become incommensurable, the framed surface perceived as 'empty' becomes an affection-image that complements the sonic image. In such a case, and in my experiences, the veracity of the sonic image took precedence over the visual image. Examples include Richter's screen-like mirrors within my experience of the 'stone-event', Ryman's paintings and Ryman's rooms when experiencing my 'becoming noise' event, and my observation of the external surrounds of Dia:Beacon immediately after Neuhaus's sonic drone ceases.

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[72] Rodowick.

[73] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 278.

[74] Kane makes a similar claim when he suggests that when the source and course of a sound cannot be determined then the sound becomes an independent object. See my discussion of sound methodologies in the Introduction.

[75] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 279.

My experience of sound in each example causes a visual image to become framed as an any-space-whatever: an empty or disconnected space, which takes on a new value, for it cannot show what is being sounded but can still provide a complementary visual expression to what is being perceived sonically. Deleuze implies that this is what occurs when experiencing a time-image. For a time-image cannot possess an 'out-of-field.' 'Off-screen' space or sound beyond a notion of the 'frame of frames' disappears, as each image has become autonomous within its own frame. Each image no longer has rational spatial or durational relations with other images. In the case of something like the 'stone in shoe event'; it has no relations to the framed set of images or the 'out-of-field'. It has to become thought for the first time.[76]

Therefore within the narrative of my journey within Dia:Beacon, oscillations between movement-images and time-images at the level of the abstract machine, involved multiple becomings of deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations that took place *within* experiential states and *between* experiential states. Sometimes I was aware of the many relationships between framings: relative and absolute, and at other times I experienced time-images where these relations broke down. According to Deleuze, within the time-image, the 'interstice' replaces the 'out-of-field.' This interstitial gap maintains free and indirect relations between the two images (sonic and visual).[77] Deleuze suggests that in cinema these incommensurable images become noosigns, which

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[76] This discussion connects with my installation artwork created with Sonia Leber *This Is Before We Disappear From View* (2013), which was installed in an empty coal bunker on Cockatoo Island at the 19th Biennale of Sydney. Visitors entering the artwork relate sounds heard from the single visible loudspeaker in the space and also the sounds from speakers hidden beyond the wall.
The space of the work—the coal bunker—can be compared to Govan's description of the Dia:Beacon building that "provides tools and clues to keep [visitors] oriented."
http://leberandchesworth.com/installations/this-is-before-we-disappear-from-view/
[77] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*.

are images that can only be thought; and also *lectosigns*, which are images that must be read. I suggest, that within the experience of an artwork, this occurs when engagement is narratively driven and involves the 'power of the false.' For, this is the realm in which I am prepared to read fiction as the truth. It is, I believe, where my experiences of drone warfare in Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* and 'becoming noise' in Ryman's *Installation at Dia:Beacon* reside.

Throughout this chapter, through Deleuze's cinema philosophy, I have attempted to describe relations between artwork elements and experiences within and outside the artwork frame, some of which presented as antinomic nexus events that were incommensurable. Concepts discussed include: the time-image and its relation to the movement-image, affection-images and any-space-whatevers; the incursions of sonsigns and opsigns and noosigns that carved out pure sensations and space and time for thought within the frame and its empty surfaces; nested framings, including the relative and absolute forms of the 'out-of-field'; and oscillations between belief in truth and fiction within the power of the false. I suggest that through montage, images and their forces and powers are juxtaposed, giving rise to new images of thought.

In the following chapter I will investigate framings of the four Dia:Beacon artworks in relation to temporality and sound. I introduce Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the haecceity as a way to articulate relations between the artworks and my quantitative and qualitative sensing of sonic materialities.

Chapter 4: Sonic Framings

In this chapter, I investigate 'soundings' (sensing, measurement, imagining and conceptualising) of spaces and frames that involve sound and durational elements existing outside an artwork's notional frame, in the 'out-of-field', which Deleuze suggests is "neither seen or understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present."[1] I also investigate unexpected sounds that occurred within the artwork's frame.

I begin by briefly examining some basic phenomenological aspects of *perceived* sounds. I look at how a space is rendered sonically through perceptions of sound though its materialities and its 'timefulness' as it reflects off the surfaces of objects. I propose that certain sounds through their durational persistence are *qualitatively* sensed as affecting forces.[2] I will attempt to explain how *qualitatively* perceived sound can compose with objects and things within a haecceity, which is a particular kind of assemblage postulated by Deleuze and Guattari that operates as an individuating, framing experience. These investigations will reference the confusions of duration and space discussed in Bergson's theory of first person experience; becomings of territorialisation and deterritorialisation; and movement and time-images within cinematic experience.

In my 'naïve' encountering of Robert Ryman's, Gerhard Richter's, and Robert Smithson's artworks the apparent 'emptiness' of each framed space was underscored by their literal

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[1] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Please refer to my discussion of Deleuze's cinematic 'out-of-field' framings in Chapter 3.

[2] Drawing on Bergson and Deleuze, I suggest that we hear certain sounds qualitatively, by which I mean they are heard but our sensori-motor schema ignores them, as they are deemed unimportant or non-threatening to our continued existence. We have not therefore necessarily listened attentively to the sounds but nonetheless remain sensitive to their qualitative effects. See my discussion of the sensori-motor schema in Chapter 3.

silence. However, I became aware that, while the artworks were silent and empty, the artwork spaces were 'inhabited' by sounds, leaking in from elsewhere from within Dia:Beacon and beyond the artwork's 'frame of frames'. Some of these sounds were acousmatic in that I could not determine their source or cause. I experienced their effects as dynamic presences within the artworks, but without any visual referent. My desire to listen acousmatically in order to try and understand these sounds was yet another enquiry into the invisible.[3] My awareness of these sounds created a paradox. For, as the spaces of the artworks framed before me were expressing absences and muteness, the invisible spaces, located 'out-of-field' were expressing their *presence* via sound.

How do these sounds, as 'out-of-field' experiences actually relate to the artworks? In Deleuze's cinema theory the 'out-of–field' is "perfectly present" in relation to the cinema's screen's frame of frames. Can they therefore also be experienced as part of the artworks' frame of frames too?

Philosopher Don Ihde suggests that from a phenomenological point-of-view, "sounds are 'first' experienced as sounds of *things.*"[4] Ihde discusses how the 'sounding' of something can describe to us some characteristics of a thing's shape and materiality. He suggests that when an object comes into contact with another object, we hear a 'duet', in which the sounding of the edges of both objects enables us to get a sense of at least one object's shape, and through its resonating body we get a sense of its materiality.[5] A secondary experience of sound is gained by locating the sound *relatively* within the "global" character of primary experience, which *situates* that sound within its surrounding

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[3] Refer to my discussion of Kane's notion of acousmatic listening in the introduction.
[4] Don Ihde, *Listening and Voice : A Phenomenology of Sound* (Athens: Athens : Ohio University Press, 1976)., 60.
[5] For example, when an object is struck by another object it causes a vibration of the materials that make up the object's form and we can hear whether the object is say, metallic or wooden. Kane discusses this in relation to 'acousmatic listening' in the introduction.

environment. This makes any 'pure' experience of sound impossible.[6] For, a propagating sound inevitably takes on characteristics of the space in which it propagates, as it reflects and reverberates off its surfaces.[7] Sounds therefore can describe aspects of the physical world outside our visible frame, that we might never actually see or visit. In his cinematic philosophy, Deleuze refers to these perceived spaces as the 'out-of-field.'[8]

Ihde suggests that a person who is blind experiences the world through feeling it with their cane and also through hearing. Their tapping, which strikes surfaces, gives an often slight but nevertheless detectable voice to things through an *echo,* which provides an auditory surface-aspect.[9] Experience of these echoes reveals *auditory* space. The slight echoes and very brief delays in reflected sound enable the blind person to sense the presence of surfaces and their relative distances from them.[10] For, in the phenomenon of the echo, the speed of sound as it travels through space is apparent to us as a sonic delay in the time it takes to travel to us from its source, and this gives us a measure of that space. This is an auditory rendering of space, in which, Idhe suggests: "The space of sound is *in* its timefulness."[11] For, sound *describes* space through the time it takes to travel in that space. Thus, within Dia:Beacon, enduring sound's movement in space enabled me to discern spatial dimensions sonically, including spaces in the 'out-of-field'.

Sounds echoing off surfaces that frame a space can help the listener discern its shape and size and even the materialities of its surfaces. This was noticeable to me when sounds

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[6] Ihde., 61.

[7] A reverberation is created through a thickening of sound through its many dispersed echoes.

[8] Please see my discussion of Deleuze's cinematic 'out-of-field' framings in Chapter 2.

[9] For example, a concrete pavement sonifies differently than the wooden boardwalk, and in hearing this, a blind person knows they have reached a certain familiar place on their journey.

[10] It is our intuitive understanding of the effect of the speed of sound that enables us to sense how far a sound may have travelled. In the case of an echoing sound, we are able to roughly gauge where a surface that the sound has bounced off is located in space, in relation to the position from where the sound originated.

[11] Ihde., 69.

from the vast spaces of Dia:Beacon leaked in to Richter's space and reverberated its hard walls and floor, and where, in the reverberation, I could sense two spaces: that of Richter's room, and also the larger expanse of Dia:Beacon.[12] Thus my sonic experience within Richter's artwork included sounds that leaked in from outside his artwork thus also rendering auditory spaces in the 'out-of-field' that exist outside the physical viewable space where I was located.

When the stone hit the skirting in Richter's space I perceived auditory space that revealed the surface-aspects of Richter's room that provided me with a detailed sonic impression of its interior dimensions. Thus, in my *hearing* of Richter's artwork space, sound, in its reflective 'timefulness', provided an alternative spatial presence; one that should be able to correlate with my visual sense of space but is from a completely different experiential realm.

Many artworks at Dia:Beacon, including the Richter, Ryman and Smithson works, are situated within discrete physical rooms. Following Deleuze and Guattari's model of the assemblage, the rooms frame the artwork from the milieu, which causes its territorialised contents to become expressive.[13] However, as I have recounted, the room's physicality did not completely isolate me from deterritorialising forces and affects of the assemblage's abstract machine that counters territorial tendencies by opening out towards heterogeneity and change.

Paradoxically, as the physicality of architecture frames-out the world, it also *reflects, focuses* and reterritorialises any sounds that manage to leak in from elsewhere. Sounds,

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[12] Occasionally, during my visit, Dia:Beacon's hard, reflective surfaces caused isolated voices, footsteps and thuds to be consciously perceived as they reverberated over large distances, throughout the building's open-plan layout, briefly clothing space with temporal sonic materialities. These reverberating presences provided an auditory image of the large interior spaces that were otherwise invisible to me.
[13] Please refer to my discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the assemblage in Chapter 2.

as they echoed and reverberated enabled me to territorialise those unseen spaces and durations lurking in the 'out-of-field'. Thus, while, as a visitor, the artworks visual framings of 'emptiness' decentered and deterritorialised me, my becoming sonic awareness of 'out-of-field' framings caused the artwork itself to become deterritorialsed; this effect describes the assemblage's abstract machine, that allows becomings and potential reterritorialisations of the artwork's frame.

So far, I have described a sound's duration as it travels within space following Ihde's phenomenological description. However, sound has another durational property. A sound, to exist, must do so within the time of its own durational utterance that is unique to itself. Thus, sound 'clothes' duration with a qualitative material presence. Sound is framed by its duration, just as *that particular* duration is framed by the sound. Several unrelated sounds, heard concurrently, therefore sonify (following Bergson) duration's inherent plurality. Thus, experiencing a soundscape of many sonic components makes tangible the temporal flux of duration.

In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson suggests there are two ways that perception of sonic duration can manifest: as singularly quantifiable or as collectively qualitative. Bergson illustrates how this can happen.

The hour strikes on a neighbouring clock, but my attentive ear does not perceive it until several strokes have made themselves heard. Hence, I have not counted them; and yet I only have to turn my attention backwards to count up the four strokes, which have already sounded and add them to those, which I hear. If then, I question myself carefully on what has just taken place, I perceive that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even affected my consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each one of them, instead of being set side by side, had melted into one another in such a way as to give the whole a peculiar quality. ... In a word, the number of strokes was perceived as a quality and not as a quantity it is thus that duration is presented to immediate consciousness, and it retains this form so long as it does not give place to a symbolical representation derived from extensity.[14]

Thus, within a particular sound or cluster of sounds, experiential components can either be separated by measurable degrees, or mixed together as a quality.[15] At Dia:Beacon, individual sound events, when I encountered them, tended to be either easily quantifiable: a cough, a shoe squeak, a slamming door or train horn; or were qualitatively sensed within a kind of susurrus, such as when I sensed distant muffled, agglomerated footsteps and vocalisations of visitor groups or the hiss of air-conditioning, or heard the subtle hum of Neuhaus's sonic drone in *Time Piece Beacon*. I suggest that both kinds of audition: quantitative and qualitative, are significant components of my Dia:Beacon artwork experiences. Both are examples of durational framing: in which quantitative sounds are recognised as distinct events; and sounds heard qualitatively (not actively listened to) are still felt.[16] Both kinds of audition occurred at Dia:Beacon at various times throughout the day.

Dia:Beacon's Sonic Haecceities

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[14] Bergson, *Matter and Memory.*, 127.

[15] In Chapter 2, I discuss Bergson's theory of first person experience, where he suggests that experience consists of a composite of space, that can be measured in degrees and duration that cannot be measured but is experienced as a quality. Bergson suggests qualitative experience is sometimes misinterpreted as quantitative experience.

[16] It was during my subsequent visit to Dia:Beacon that I realised that these subtle sonic presences existed and had agency, and I made an effort to consciously listen to them and seek their cause.

Deleuze and Guattari's concept of haecceity, which refers to a kind of individuation, provides a conceptual model for how qualitative audition can compose with other framed elements to create affects and effects. "There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it."[17] Deleuze and Guattari suggest that a haecceity possesses "a perfect independence lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject."[18] I suggest that haecceities were experienced within my cinematic consciousness during my visit to Dia:Beacon; that haecceities were sensed, durationally and territorially.

Haecceities are non-personal individuations: a season, rainfall, wind, an hour, air polluted by noxious particles, the hum of a refrigerator. In *A Thousand Plateaus* under the aptly titled sub-heading "Memories of a Haecceity", Deleuze and Guattari explain:

> They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. ... not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfills. ... Tales must contain haecceities that are not simply emplacements, but concrete individuations that have a status of their own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects.[19]

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that haecceities are "molecular" in that they comprise machinic components within the assemblage. Dia:Beacon's haecceities involve the sensing of sound comprised of excited pressure waves of "movement and rest," some of these movements are literally air molecules, sensed as they impacted on my ear drums. Haecceities are not things in themselves; rather they are a particular kind of assemblage: a "composition" of objects and things into events. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that

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[17] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 304.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

there are "assemblage haecceities" and "interassemblage haecceities ... which also mark the potentialities of becoming within each assemblage."[20]

I suggest that my engagement with any artwork, if framed durationally, can be considered an "interassemblage haecceity" that has "capacities to affect and be affected," and where, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, my temporal and spatial encounters take place through sensing and containing "concrete individuations that have a status of their own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects."[21] For example, haecceities create individuations that are durational and can occur each time air-conditioning systems throughout Dia:Beacon turn on and off, venting cool air. The flow of vented air is felt, and also creates an audible hissing sound; a 'white noise' that sonifies and thus frames the spaces of Dia:Beacon at certain times throughout the day (particularly in the warmer afternoons).

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[20] Deleuze and Guattari also suggest that:

> It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by [...] speeds and affects independently of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane. It is the wolf itself, and the horse and the child, that cease to be subjects to become events, in assemblages that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life. The street enters into composition with the horse [...] and the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other. (ibid., 306).

[21] All quotes ibid., 304.

Figure 20. Air-conditioning vents outside the southern entrance to Ryman's exhibition spaces. Photo: David Chesworth.

Link to video documentation, of white noise emitting from large air ducts outside the southern entrance to Ryman's exhibition spaces comprising five conjoined rooms. https://vimeo.com/204822733/f495f92602

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that haecceities don't do anything by themselves; rather, they are compositional and "direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects."[22] In my Dia experiences, haecceities were composed from machinic artwork components together with components in the artwork's out-of-field. These compositions were experienced subtly and qualitatively, on the margins of conscious perception, and in

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[22] Ibid., 304.

ways that contradicted my encounters of physical and spatial aspects of the artworks. Thus, my sensing of these haecceities contributed to my experiencing of 'antinomic nexus events.'

Haecceities compose *with* things—objects or subjects—but are not those things. I suggest also that they become more noticeable and very real as they become memories and thus virtual; and it is in this sense that they frame duration, virtually, as memories of periodic experience.[23]

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[23] While haecceities are not part of Deleuze's cinematic theory, it is apparent to me that haecceities share, with movement-images and time-images, the temporalities of Chronos and Aion. Haecceities are temporal (and sometimes spatial), but their temporality cannot be explained in the Bergsonian sense, rather a haecceity's duration might be considered virtually, through thought and memory. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of haecceity draws on the Stoics conceptualisations of time through the dual concepts of *Chronos* and *Aion.* In *Logic of Sense,* Deleuze introduces two theories of time based on the Stoic notion of Chronos: the time of bodies, the time of presence, where the past and future only exist as previous presences and anticipated presences; and Aion, an eternity which cannot be present except in the instant, that sits between past and future and which is without thickness or extension. Deleuze explains:

> Thus, time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. First, it must be grasped entirely as the living present in bodies, which act and are acted upon. Second, it must be grasped entirely as an entity infinitely divisible into past and future … . Only the present exists in time and gathers together or absorbs the past and future. But only the past and future inhere in time and divide each present infinitely. These are not three successive dimensions, but two simultaneous readings of time. (Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*.

In *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari discuss Aeon and Chronos in relation to the temporalities of haecceities.

> *Aeon*: [is] the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened. [And] *Chronos*: the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form and determines a subject. (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 305).

Chronos and Aion do however describe behaviours of time within Deleuze's concepts of the movement-image and time-image. As David Deamer comments: "It is the Stoic theory of time that can be seen ultimately to underpin Deleuze's division of the movement-image and the time-image in cinema with respect to history. The movement-image is time as Chronos, the time-image is time as Aion." David Deamer. "Cinema, Chronos/Cronos: Becoming an Accomplice to the Impasse of History," in *Deleuze and History*., 170. I suggest that when considered strictly from a classic filmic point of view, a haecceity's affect and effects, however present and persistent as a nested frame within a movie's frame, are always too subtle

Figure 21. Gerhard Richter. *6 Gray Mirrors*, Photo: David Chesworth

6 Gray Mirrors' out-of-field sounds comprise human vocalisations, footsteps and unidentifiable sounds occurring outside Richter's artwork. These sounds are are reflected and concentrated within the space of his artwork. Sounds also compose with visual and physical components of the artwork forming haecceities. I have included a link to video documentation in which we can hear out-of-field sounds. A train horn is heard at 0:11. Between 3:30 and 4:20 a train can be heard passing close by near the Western Garden. Between 5:50 and 7:20 Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* can be heard as the drone enters the room that frames Richter's artwork.

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to be sensed and differentiated from the intensities of visual and sonic images also nested within a film's limiting and deterritorialising 'frame of frames'.

Within my Dia:Beacon artwork encounters, that included my sensing of Dia:Beacon's ambient spaces, I consider that these subtle haecceities were indeed part of my cinematic experience as framed sonic materialities of the cinematic 'out-of field.' Their temporal framings dovetailed into framings within which artworks were nested, and in doing so, haecceities individuated and composed events that I perceived durationally and spatially in relation to the artworks. Haecceities, sensed as particular nuanced compositions, became an important machinic component of the cinematic consciousness of my artwork experiences.

For example, within Neuhaus's artwork *Time Piece Beacon,* the artwork's relations of intensities of excited air parallel that of air-conditioning. There is only a difference in the sonic quality of air movement that separates the artwork's functionality from that of the utilitarian air-machines. It was the activated molecular sonic qualities and the perceptual confusions that Neuhaus's sonic drone introduced as they composed within haecceities, which as it persisted, drew my attention to *Time Piece Beacon's* sonic presence. I wasn't aware of the artwork's existence up to that point.

In the following chapter I will expand on my discussion of haecceities in relation to all four Dia:Beacon artwork encounters, while also drawing on Bergson's spatial/durational composite and Deleuze's cinematic consciousness, to explore relations sensed through quantitative and qualitative listening and imagining.

Chapter 5: How Duration Manifests Within The Four Dia:Beacon Artworks

Max Neuhaus's temporality – before, during, after

Memory is crucial to our internal relations, for it provides past experiences that we can compare with our current experiences. Memory is also necessary for awareness of duration's persistence as experiences pass from our present into our past. However, in Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* my memory could not be relied on, which was disconcerting. I never actually heard Neuhaus's introduced drone begin, rather, the sound became apparent to me as it became louder and registered on my conscious sense of hearing. Prior to hearing the sound, I suggest that it was persisting as a compositional element within a haecceity that I had been sensing. Deleuze and Guattari suggest: "A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome."[1] Even as the drone became louder I didn't necessarily perceive it as a discrete thing. That the sound *was* present to me, even if I was not actively listening to it, only became evident when it suddenly ceased and I noticed its absence. Or rather, I noticed the absence of *something,* which I suggest was the haecceity's affect.

The sudden removal of Neuhaus's introduced drone caused an antinomic nexus event, whereby my relations to the surrounding universe became ambiguous as a new haecceity composed that framed the durational void that remained.

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[1] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 307.

Thus, in *Time Piece Beacon,* duration was experienced in two ways: first, when I retrospectively contemplated one haecceity that had passed in relation to another that replaced it; and second, once Neuhaus's continuous sound ended, I lost my sensing of the *continuum* provided by the drone and I became aware of my immediate spatial surroundings and relations to an unfolding heterogeneity of durations, articulated through the sounds of distant traffic, birds, voices, insects, wind, and train horns.[2]

When Neuhaus's introduced sound ceased, my sensori-motor schema became troubled by its removal, for the subtle sonic element had been contributing to my territorialisation of the surrounding milieu. The sonic void that followed the drone's removal activated a framing; a becoming that might in the future reterritorialise both present and past experiences.

Within my Neuhaus encounter different perceptions oscillated between opposing poles of audition: qualitative hearing/quantitative listening, presence/absence, knowable sound/acousmatic object.[3] My perception of haecceities within which some sounds were

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[2] In Bergson's philosophy of duration, he suggests that we experience the world as images enfolded around us, thus, centering each of us in our relation to the world. See my discussion of cinematic experience in Chapter 3.

[3] Dialectic also called on different ontological framings: musical/non-musical. The musicality of Neuhaus's minimalist sounds is contestable, Neuhaus's choice of sound quality in his composed drones questions its own ontological status. In *Time Piece Beacon* his introduced sound exists *as* and *within* a perceptive threshold, where it is barely audible as an event in itself. The sound starts so quietly that it could be argued that there is no beginning, but rather, the sound becomes noticed as already present and already territorialised within the surrounding sonic environment. The sound therefore doesn't present as material that is coded as a foregrounded, deterritorialising event, which would be the case if the sound was obviously musical. Instead the drone functions as a machinic component that composes with other components. However, his sounds (both *Time Piece Beacon* and *Times Square*) do have musical qualities that contest the ontological boundary between music's deterritorialising effects and sound's territorialising effects.

A continuous composed sound, such as that used by Neuhaus, can be described as a drone. In music, a drone is a continuous durational sound whose sonic qualities change minimally over time whereby the drone appears potentially endless, as it does not move towards a final outcome. A drone has no telos. Traditionally a drone tends to support other melodic content (such as in classical Indian music or the

sensed played an important role and contributed to my experience of antinomic nexus events.

The two haecceities that occurred within *Time Piece Beacon* involved past, present and future durational experience; the artwork was able to frame pre and post-cognitive moments of sensation. There was a pre-cognitive sensation that was not consciously recognised by me but sensation was felt through its affect. Therefore, I had a memory of having a sensation but I could not access what that sensation was.

John Cage's 4' 33" as an antecedent to *Time Piece Beacon*

Christoph Cox, in his chapter on Neuhaus's artworks, notes an antecedent to *Time Piece, Beacon* in the music and polemics of composer John Cage. Neuhaus, as a young, successful virtuoso avant-garde percussionist, had performed many of Cage's compositions. In the 1960s, at the height of his career, Neuhaus abandoned concert music and began to develop ideas expounded by Cage, who posited a "refiguration of musical time."[4] According to Cox:

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sustaining notes heard in Scottish bagpipes). A drone itself can be quite complex and rich in harmonics and containing tiny shifts in intensities, pitch and periodicities that constantly interpenetrate each other. Cox points out that Neuhaus's drones have these qualities that ideally and sensuously embody Bergson's notion of duration's heterogeneous flux. See Christoph Cox, "Installing Duration: Time in the Sound Works of Max Neuhaus," in *Max Neuhaus: Time Square, Time Piece Beacon*, ed. Lynne editor Cooke, Karen J. editor Kelly, and Barbara editor Schröder (Dia Art Foundation, 2009)., 125.

In my installation artwork, *The Long Take,* contains a specially created sonic drone that evokes durational flux and lives within a haecceity which, on being sensed, creates a durational framing of the artwork assemblage. Its periodical comings and its sudden goings potentially trigger deterritorialising 'antinomic nexus events. If perceived by the visitor these events cause them to contemplate past, present and future experiences and engage in acts of reterritorialisation of the newly perceived space. *The Long Take* is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

[4] Ibid., 114.

John Cage notes that the essential formal aspect of European art music is the production of "time-objects" that bind musical flow within definite temporal limits and tend to give it the narrative shape characteristics of traditional conceptions of time and history. Against this notion Cage sought a different conception of time, one that transcends human construction.[5]

Cox sees the oppositional relation between Cage's preferred "purposeless process" to the traditional narratively driven "time-object" as analogous to Bergson's space/time composite, in which experience of time tends to be subordinated to space.[6] Cox references John Cage's 'silent' composition *4'33"* (1952).[7] In this well-known work Cage utilises both kinds of time: quantitative time, where time is subordinated to space (this is disclosed in work's title, *4'33"*, which, in the way it is written as numerals, refers to both temporal *and* spatial measurement); and qualitative time, which is revealed in the ensuing silence of the piano during the performance, and which is marked by the heterogeneous flux of environmental sonic events, all framed within the four minutes and thirty three seconds of measured time.[8]

Neuhaus' installations and sound-works extend Cage's *4'33"* engagement with the open flux of durational time, beyond the context of music, into the experience of the everyday lived environment. Interestingly, Neuhaus possibly devised the first sound-walk, now a sound-art staple practice, with his work, *Listen* (1966), in which audience members

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Please refer to my discussion of Bergson's theories of experience in Chapter 2.

[7] Pianist David Tudor first performed Cage's composition for piano, *4'33"* in a concert in 1952. The work consists of three movements in which the performer is instructed to perform on the piano but not to play any notes. This is conveyed to the performer in the score by the inclusion on the page of each short 'movement' of the musical term "tacet". Tacet is Latin for "It is silent." In the performance the musician performs the conventions and gestures relating to a performance; entering the performance space, opening the piano lid and the musical score, turning the pages of the score, (each movement has a duration adding up to four minutes and thirty-three seconds of overall duration); however, the performer does not play the instrument.

[8] Cox also briefly considers the "nonpulsed time" of Minimalist music. "Minimalist compositions dispense with narrative and teleology and show no interest in charting the progress of a hero, whether it is the composer, the solo instrument, or the listening subject." Cox, *Installing Duration*, 117.

toured city environments, listening aesthetically to the sound worlds they encountered.[9]

This decision to work in the physical, urban world and in public spaces, led Neuhaus to work with pre-existing spaces that he could, as an artist, transform with sound. This artwork context in which the framing is sonic and involves experiences that are both durational and spatial, is where both *Time Piece Beacon* and Neuhaus's other USA-based public artwork, *Times Square,* are situated.[10]

Robert Ryman: haecceities and becomings within white paintings and white noise

During my initial visit to Dia:Beacon, I experienced Ryman's paintings in *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010), as white and empty. Inspecting Ryman's paintings closely (which I had the opportunity to do on a subsequent visit), I experienced each painting's different approach to expressing white through paint textures, colour variations, and the undulations and fine lines of bristle and spatula marks. For me, these different marks comprised 'whiteness' through their powers to differ. I didn't see an *essential* whiteness; rather I saw all the potentialities of white within the paintings' power to compose and vary that whiteness within a haecceity. Colebrook discusses the power of colour to vary

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[9] Neuhaus devised *LISTEN: Field Trips Through Sound Environments* in 1966, by putting into action an idea suggested earlier by artist LaMonte Young. Michael Nyman in his celebrated book *Experimental Music Cage and Beyond* writes:

> This was one of 'six sound orientated pieces for situations other than that of the concert hall' that Neuhaus arranged between 1966 and 8. [...] An audience expecting a conventional concert or lecture is put on a bus, their palms are stamped with the word *listen* and they are taken to and around an existing sound environment such as a power station or an underground railway system. Michael Nyman, *Experimental Music : Cage and Beyond*, 1st ed. ed. (London: Cassell and Collier Macmillan, 1974)., 88.

This is considered by Christoph Cox and others to be one of the first 'sound walks'. A 'sound walk' involves participants walking through environments, often urban listening primarily to sounds rather than concentrating of visual information. If properly prepared, participants find this a liberating experience as they become aware of sonic framings of space, and the quantitative and qualitative nature of different sounds. Artists such as Hildergard Westerkamp and Janet Cardiff often use sound walks as an artistic medium, within their highly evolved practices that utilise sound.

[10] See Chapter 1 where I discuss my experience of *Times Square.*

and differ, drawing on Deleuze's philosophy in *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*:

> In the case of a canvas of colour, thinking colour itself, in its perceivability, releases us from the idea of a world of neutral substance that is then overlaid by qualities: not a world that is 'in itself' and which is then related to a viewer through perceptions. Rather, the isolation of percepts allows us to live in a world that is relation and variation, where predicates or qualities are the outcome of encounters. There is not a space that is then covered by white paint; white is not the colour of some underlying substance. Spaces are affected by the varying of some power— powers of colour, of texture, of line.[11]

Thus, my perception of whiteness, and through this perception, my perception of emptiness, is through expressions of these composed forces within Ryman's paintings.[12]

In my experience of Ryman's paintings, the materiality of paint and surfaces, composed with the affecting qualities of the colour white that is suspended within the paint, actuating, what art historian Suzanne P. Hudson calls, "the sensible qualities of the paint":

> Ryman came to insist on the realness of paint (white or otherwise) not as pure colour but as a marker of its effects. A painting would be an orange painting or a white painting because of the demonstrable behaviour and sensible qualities of the paint that was used to actuate it. Colour here is not an abstract essence or language game but the physical effect of the paint in which it is suspended.[13]

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[11] Colebrook. *A Guide for the Perplexed*, 105.
[12] Black paintings and white paintings, even as expressive forces, can be considered conceptually empty. In a note in my Introduction, I discuss how emptiness can be conceptual rather than literal; that black or white paintings can be considered conceptually empty.
[13] Suzanne Perling Hudson, *Robert Ryman : Used Paint* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2009)., 61-62.

This is a composition of affects and forces of colour with the thing it is suspended in: paint as such it composes a haecceity. It is notable that Deleuze and Guattari suggest in *A Thousand Plateaus* that the "intensity of white" is an individuating haecceity.[14]

Becoming noise

But how did such an encounter also suggest auditory noise? Was my perception of noise virtual or actual? Where did this noise come from? I suggest two answers.

In 1968 an unnamed art critic in the American magazine *Time* spoke of how Ryman's paintings made people "laugh outright."[15] Robert Storr has also commented that Ryman's white paintings can be "a trap … for those made chatty by silence."[16] Both anecdotes are perhaps trivial, however, they do illustrate that Ryman's paintings problematise the artwork engagement for naïve visitors. In the two brief examples, visitors make their own vocal expressions, possibly to mask the confusion of their encounter as the viewing experience triggers an active engagement with exposed duration. Laughter or chatter compensates for the lack of content. These utterances are effectively the visitor's attempts to reterritorialise the perceived spatial and temporal lacunae. Similarly then, I suggest that my perceiving of Ryman's paintings' whiteness, and my awareness of a formless decentring noise, could have been my own act of reterritorialising the durational experience of Ryman's installation, not with chatter or laughter, but with a fabulated virtual 'becoming noise.'

In recollecting my experience of hearing the noise, I have described it as a constant hissing sound known technically as 'white noise.'[17] However, this description

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[14] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*, 305.
[15] Uncredited. "The Avant-Garde: Subtle, Cerebral, Elusive." *Time*, November 22 1968, 70.
[16] Robert Storr, "Robert Ryman: Making Distinctions," *Art in America* 74, no. 6 (1986).
[17] Refer to my description of my encounter with Ryman's artwork in Chapter 1.

demonstrates Bergson's theory that we often confuse a qualitative experience as being quantitative. For, my description of *noise* makes noise a measured, quantified thing.[18] My acknowledgement of noise therefore is a translation of my qualitative experience into a *virtual* extensity.[19]

The *actual* reason behind my experience of 'becoming noise' became apparent when I revisited Dia:Beacon in 2016 as part of my research and realised that there is in fact an actual presence of white noise in his spaces. What I had previously considered as a *virtual* 'becoming noise' was an *actual* 'becoming noise'. This sonic, machinic component was not perceived consciously at the time of my initial encounter; rather, I suggest it had been qualitatively sensed as a component of a composed haecceity (that included the whiteness of Ryman's paintings as a component). The haecceity was composed from components within the artwork and the air-conditioning, existing in the artwork's out-of-field frame.

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[18] It is worth noting that if noise *is* a thing, it has become quantified and then can no longer be considered noise.

[19] In Chapter 2, I discuss Bergson's philosophy of first person experience, where the space duration composite of experience can become confused, whereby we mistake a durational experience for a spatial experience. Also, refer to my description of noise in the Introduction.

Figure 22. Southern entrance to Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia Beacon.* Photo: David Chesworth

I have documented my journey through Ryman's artwork rooms, beginning from the south entrance (fig. 21), where large air-conditioner vents are located (fig 19). The air conditioning sound diminishes in intensity as I move through his rooms, away from the source.

Link to video documentation filmed and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/205212126/99c1c19418

Both answers to what caused my experience of 'becoming noise' within Ryman's artwork

address the proposition that my Dia:Beacon experiences were framed durationally,

through acts of 'sounding', and acts of listening. In the case of the two anecdotes, the

"chatty" and "laughter" vocalisations were expressive acts of *sounding* where durational

experience was clothed with vocalised material presences. In the case where white noise

was actually present within the artwork's 'out-of-field', and was sensed as a component of a haecceity, this reflects how our sensori-motor schema manages our relations with the world, ignoring perceptions that do not interest it, and yet allowing hearing to still take place qualitatively, and where it creates an affecting presence.[20]

In relation to the discussion of how duration manifests within Ryman's artwork, I would like to return to John Cage's *4'33"* as an example of how an artwork can bring on a shift in framing thresholds. Both artworks (Cages' *4'33"* and Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon*) set up conventional exhibition framings that are problematised through their exposing of durational experience. In *4'33"* the framing of the work oscillates: on the one hand, the framing of the work remains sited within a classical music performance context, where we see a performer arrive on a concert stage and prepare the piano for performance; but on the other hand, the content is not what a naïve audience expects. Within the durational framing of the performance, instead of seeing the piano being played and hearing coded music emanate from the instrument, the audience sees the performer sitting still, and the piano remains silent. In the ensuing shock of the absence of content the audience's framing is challenged, (in a way that is similar to my encounter of the Ryman artwork), whereby the audience's attention potentially shifts beyond the framing of the silent and immobile performer, to an awareness of the sonic ambience evolving around them. In both artworks (Cage's and Ryman's), the onus has fallen on the audience to reterritorialise the threshold of the deterritorialised experiential frame. This potentially involves their subjective and objective (qualitative / quantitative) positioning in relation to framing, as well as their relation to their sensing of the 'open whole' of experience (a 'universal becoming' that, Deleuze, following Bergson, suggests, cannot be framed). A reassessment by each audience member's sensori-motor schema must take

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[20] Refer to my discussion (via Bergson) in Chapter 4, of how a particular sound or cluster of sounds, can be experienced as measurable degrees, or mixed together as a quality.

place in order for other content, such as surrounding environmental sounds—usually dismissed as irrelevant—to become *meaningful* as content. A telos is no longer in operation within the artworks although telos framings persist (the pianist is still sitting at the piano and the paintings still hang on the gallery walls at comfortable human viewing height). I suggest that both Ryman and Cages artwork are encountered as time-images.[21]

Immersed in this haecceity within Ryman's artwork, that was composed from whiteness as colour and whiteness as sonic noise, there was an absence of abstraction and symbolic information. What remained was a pure form of sensation in which I only sensed my internal durational and spatial being.

I have previously suggested that I translated my durational experience of Ryman's paintings into spatial fabulations of surveillance and depth. It was only when I recollected my encounter that I remembered (or imagined) that my experience also included noise. Thus, noise was an antinomical presence that was both actual *and* imagined.

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[21] Like Cage's concert hall performance, Ryman's installation also maintains conventions of highly coded strata. In Ryman's case concentrating on visual display: framed paintings, hanging supports, natural lighting, gallery-space and a space provided for visitor engagement. And, as in *4'33"*, one important and anticipated component within the expected frame, symbolic content, is reduced or missing. Ryman's framed paintings, for the most part, do not contain texts, images, figures or representations, just as Cage's three-part score contains no coded music, just the term "tacet" (meaning "do not play"). Like Cage's score, and like the performance of each of its three silent movements on the concert stage (as a frame of frames), I experienced Ryman's individual paintings within the frame of frames his installation. And just as, within the durational framing of Cage's performances, where 'out-of-field' sounds of the surrounding environment are sensed and framed, so I framed the 'out-of-field' sounds sensed with Ryman's installation, including the white noise of air-conditioning.

Could this noise be considered a sonification of Ryman's paintings? Ryman is adamant that the markings and brush strokes in his paintings are not abstract.[22] Therefore we can assume that Ryman does not consider his marks to function as symbols. If not symbols then Ryman's surface textures are, in fact, a form of noise.[23] When viewing Ryman's surfaces, singularly and up close, one observes on the scored surfaces a 'noise as sensation' rather than 'noise as abstraction.' When I viewed Ryman's paintings collectively within the installation, I suggest that it was this surface-born 'noise as sensation' that sonified as it composed with the air-conditioning sound into the durational and spatial haecceity that I perceived.[24]

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[22] Robert Ryman, "On Painting," in *Robert Ryman*, ed. Christel Sauer and Urs Raussmüller (Schaffhausen, Switzerland: Hallen für neue Kunst, 1991), 57–67.

[23] See my discussion of noise under the heading Notes on Sound Methodology in the Introduction.

[24] It can be argued that there are other durations adumbrated within Ryman's paintings that have expressive possibilities. For example, each painting could be read and played as a graphic score. His paintings can also be considered as recordings of their own making. These recordings can be reactivated whereby the spatial recordings once again become durational. These are interesting considerations, however they fall outside the scope of this exegesis.

Gerhard Richter's Durations: Neither/Nor, Is

Gerhard Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* was continually being *scored* by various disruptive, dynamic sonic forces: by a small stone; visitor/invigilator vocal exclamations and movements; and by subtler affecting sonic materialities, which were not quantifiable as individual events, but rather, as a susurrus or sonic atmosphere, as they composed with other materials, forces and objects and were sensed qualitatively as haecceities.

Richter's mirrors presented framed optical perspectives that were always distanced from me, and where I had to direct my gaze at them/into them. Sound, on the other hand, traveled directly to my ears, immersing me. Listening and hearing has the effect of bringing me into direct relations with an outside world.[25] Sound, through its 'timefulness' sonically rendered spaces otherwise invisible to me within Richter's space. Thus, sound contributed further antinomic complexity to the virtual spaces that I was experiencing visually through mirrors, opaque reflections and screen-like surfaces.

Echoes and reverberations of sound within Richter's room *situated* my relations within unseen spaces and durations in the 'out-of-field'. So that, while the artwork's deliberate mirror framings decentered me, new out-of-field framings caused reterritorialisations that recentered me, and my relations with the artwork within the heterogeneous flux of the out-of-field.

The 'stone event' that occurred during my encounter of Richter's artwork caused another kind of activation. Like the tapping of a blind person's cane, the stone initiated a sound

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[25] These relations are very much in play in Richter's, Ryman's and Neuhaus's artwork. In my experience Smithson's, artwork, my attention was drawn to framing concepts not so much through sound, but through how I conceived of his non-site limits and demarcations and through contemplations of material temporalities.

that quickly travelled throughout Richter's room in all directions from its source. The sound bounced off the walls, creating echoes within a reverberation that I perceived after the initial sound. The 'timefulness' within the delays in the reflected sound, like echo-location techniques, created a sonic image of Richter's room. For a brief moment Richter's space was sonically translated into pure duration, until the intense reverberation faded.[26]

Figure 23. Shoe with stone. *Gerhard Richter, 6 Gray Mirrors*, photo: David Chesworth

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[26] The sonic characteristics of the reverberating sound were a consequence of the delays of the sound as it bounced off the surfaces of Richter's room and travel through the air to my ears. See my discussion of sound's phenomenological properties earlier in this chapter.

Here I have provided video documentation of a re-enactment of the stone event that took place within Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors*. In the video, the ephemerality of the mirror encounter is refuted by the materiality of the stone.

Link to video filmed and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/190216710/3cecb4357f

The unexpected sound destabilised the coherence and authority of Richter's artwork. Auditory framing had collided with visual framing, creating perceptual confusion and an exciting temporal space of *presentness* and unknowability.

The occurrence of the stone event initiated an almost instantaneous auditory rendering of space that re-established actual space and undermined the virtualities of the mirrors. Sound's agency, in this case, was mostly instantaneous whereas my visible, spatial encounter had been durational. It is through this paradox that the stone event became an 'antinomic nexus event' that challenged Bergson's experiential composite of duration and space.[27] For, I was already enduring the temporality of Richter's artwork, which was then confused by the immediate presence of the stone's sound, and its rendering of auditory space through its temporal 'timefulness.'

As I suggested in Chapter 1, the stone event destabilised Richter's "Neither/Nor" dialectic. For it introduced the present moment in a direct way as the sudden sonic event surrounded and immersed me, activating air molecules that made physical contact with my eardrums. The experience could be compared to adding the word "Is" to Richter's

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[27] An "antinomic nexus event" is my term that describes my experience of the artworks where, as Bergson suggests, the experiential composite of space and duration through which we conceive of the world's reality, breaks down, whereby I experience conflicting conscious perceptions reality through the different registers of space and duration that do not correlate. I introduce this term in Chapter 1.

dialectic: "Neither/Nor". "Is" stands for the present moment. It also stands for the object, reintroduced as an agent to challenge the ephemerality.

Richter's space played out through the multiplicities of duration that my encounter exposed. As well as the present moment, it also included perceptions of 'out-of-field' that were quantitative and qualitatively perceived. Sounds from other artworks such as Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* composed with components within Richter's artwork forming a haecceity. The haecceity drew my attention away from the virtualities of the mirror forms before me, *and* from specific 'out-of-field' framings. For the haecceity resided within and as part of Richter's artwork. It was as though his mirrors were listening surfaces; their ears cocked on angles, sensing presences within and beyond their own frames.

Figure 24. Dia:Beacon interior viewed from within Gerhard Richter's, *6 Gray Mirrors*,
Photo: David Chesworth

I have included a link to video documentation of 'out-of-field' sounds within Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors,* including the audible presence of the droning sound from Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*. Neuhaus's sound, which is softly present and utilises mid to low frequencies, could be considered music-like, if not *musical*. It is present from the beginning of the documentation and ceases at 1 min 24 seconds.

Link to video filmed and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/199645216/df4dbdfeca

It is ironic that the stone event only happened because I (unknowingly) instigated it, and yet it felt that the 'antinomic nexus event' that it caused was directed at me. Consequently, I was present both as the proxy agent of the encounter but also as a recipient of that agency. The stone's 'sounding' against the metal skirting board became an avatar of my own objecthood. Its literal impact on and subsequent reflection off the artwork's surface sonified my own agency within the artwork. It was both the cause and effect of my astonishment of the *actuality* of the encounter. The materiality of the stone thus refuted the ephemerality of the post-object artwork encounter.

This complex antinomic event goes to the very heart of the artwork's ontological status. The event reveals, materially and signaletically, the coexistence of duration and space, of theatricality *and* beholding moments that were available to me within my encounter of Richter's artwork.

Robert Smithson's durational framings – instant, entropic and cyclic

Robert Smithson's artwork also involved an encounter with complex antinomies. In, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* duration manifests in a kind of cybernetic oscillation between different conceptions and experiences of site. I compare this framing to systems processes used in drone warfare. In the case of Smithson's artwork, I suggest that this oscillation is deliberately thwarted by the artist's use of framing incongruities and paradoxes.

Smithson suggested that: "Every object, if it is art, is charged with the rush of time even though it is static."[28] Time for Smithson is both an experience and a concept that manifests as historic time, in the instant, and through notions of future time. Duration manifests in Smithson's artworks in different ways: in the duration of the encounter, through imagined durations, duration embodied in the immediacy of material presence, and as slow, entropic geological durations unfolding deep within materials.

In *Entropy and the New Monuments* (1966), Smithson was critical of recent architectural "science fiction" concepts that he thought were present in artworks by certain artists: Donald Judd, Dan Flavin, Robert Morris, Sol Le Witt, Frank Stella and fabricators Paul Thek and Craig Kauffman. Like Smithson, these artists were challenging the ontology of the 'artwork' through recent minimalist and conceptual practices. In their work, he saw time portraying a new kind of monumentality:

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[28] Quoted in "Introduction: Reading Robert Smithson" in Smithson. Introduction., xix.

Instead of causing us to remember the past like the old monuments, the new monuments seem to cause us to forget the future. Instead of being made of natural materials, such as marble, granite, or other kinds of rock, the new monuments are made of artificial materials, plastic, chrome and electric light. They are not built for the ages, but rather against the ages. They are involved in a systematic reduction of time down to fractions of seconds, rather than representing the long spaces of centuries. Both past and present are placed into an objective present. This kind of time has little or no space; it is stationary and without movement ... it is anti Newtonian, as well as being instant, and is against the wheels of the time-clock.[29]

These observations foreshadow properties that Deleuze attributes to time-images within his cinematic philosophy.[30] This is even more apparent as Smithson continues:

Flavin makes "instant-monuments" .... The "instant" makes Flavin's work a part of time rather than space. Time becomes a place minus motion. ... [T]ime as decay or biological evolution is eliminated by many of these artists; this displacement allows the eye to see time as an infinity of surfaces or structures, or both combined. ... The concealed surfaces in some of Judd's works are hideouts for time.[31]

For Smithson, the work of these artists compresses the long durational spans of geological time and entropic forces that impact natural materials. Instead, their industrial transformations of man-made materials into fresh, shiny surfaces evidence a "near instance" of time and a different kind of entropic process, one that is moving towards a future, static, uniformity.

Many of the artists have provided a visible analog for the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which extrapolates the range of entropy by telling us energy is more easily lost than obtained, and that in the ultimate future the whole universe will burn out and be transformed into an all-encompassing sameness.[32]

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[29] Robert Smithson, "Entropy and the New Monuments." In ibid.,11.
[30] This includes where he writes that time appears disconnected on multiple surfaces and where indirect representations of time through movement have been eliminated. This also the time of Aion. Chronos and Aion are concepts of time discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to haecceities, movement-images and time-images. Aion time and to a lesser degree Chronos time is also apparent in Smithson's non-sites. My limited word count does not allow me to explore these aspects more fully in relation to Smithson.
[31] Smithson.
[32] Ibid.

As well as *experiencing* time, the visitor to a Smithson artwork initiates a *conceptual* engagement with time as they contemplate evidence of the forces of time within natural strata. Here the artwork provokes thought in a way that might be comparable to how Deleuze suggests cinematic images are thought and read.

Smithson's complex conceptions of time have been shaped in part by the writings of George Kubler. Kubler opposed a teleological view of an evolution of the world's cultural artefacts where, as he saw it, formalist criticism operated via an underlying biological metaphor. His influential book *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things* (1962) presents a contemplation of time that is linked to changes that occur in "linked sequences or series."[33] Kubler identified, what he called "prime objects" and subsequent iterations of those objects in subsequent eras as "replications." Kubler's morphology of duration includes "continuous classes, arrested classes, extended series, wandering series, as well as guided and self-determining sequences. Several formal sequences may coexist within one object."[34] This suggests a systematic quantification of time through retrospective ordering. According to art historian Pamela Lee, "Kubler speaks to the impossibility of fully inhabiting the temporal plenitude of one's art-historical moment."[35] Lee quotes Kubler,

> we cannot clearly decry the contours of the great currents of our own time: we are too much inside the streams of contemporary happening to chart their flow and volume. We are confronted with inner and outer historical surfaces. Of these only the outer surfaces of the completed past are accessible to historical knowledge.[36]

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[33] George A. Kubler, *The Shape of Time : Remarks on the History of Things* (New Haven, Conn.: New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1962).

[34] George Kubler, "The Shape of Time. Reconsidered," *Perspecta* 19, (1982)., 114.

[35] Pamela M. Lee, ""Ultramoderne": Or, How George Kubler Stole the Time in Sixties Art," *Grey Room* No. 2 (Winter, 2001), (2001)., 56.

[36] Kubler., 62.

For Lee, this "begs the question of time for Kubler *and* Smithson. Might this invocation of Kubler point to a model of time whose contours were not wholly accessible to the presentness that the artist inhabited?[37]

This inaccessibility of time maybe a problem for the artist, but what of the time experience that becomes available to the *visitor* within the time of the artwork itself? By this I mean both duration experienced within the artwork encounter and the artwork encounter in relation to 'out-of-field' experiences, such as—in the case of Smithson—the relation between a non-site and site? And how might this duration that the contemporary visitor experiences then relate to the artist's notion of duration?

My experience of duration as a component within *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* was through my interaction with its components, such as gravel, mirror objects, and the mirror's reflected virtual images that exposed 'antinomic nexus events'. Viewing these actual and virtual images and materialities that seemed to be caught in limbo between past and future teloses revealed: forces had acted on the mirrors, cracking them; dust had gathered, over time or perhaps as the residue of some recent powerful event; and rocks, industrially reduced into gravel piles, appeared to await some future purpose.[38] Present time was experienced in the time-images reflected in the mirrors that revealed physically unreachable virtual spaces and a presentness lurking both within and beyond the artwork.

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[37] Lee, ""Ultramoderne": Or, How George Kubler Stole the Time in Sixties Art.", 57.
[38] Smithson's attitude to dust in relation to time is indicated in his conversation with Dennis Wheeler:
"Wheeler: ... It is a very tortuous intense relationship between yourself and time ...
Smithson: ... The intensity of the focus shatters any kind of answer that you might provide. The ineffable aspect of it just breaks down into all these fragments, and yet they're there. It's like a handful of dust or anything. Like Eliot said ""I'll show you fear in a handful of dust"" Smithson quotes from T. S. Eliot's poem *The Waste Land* (line 30) "Four Conversations Between Dennis Wheeler and Robert Smithson" in Smithson., 228.

Smithson's use of the term 'non-site' within a title appears to be positing a question as to its validity as a thing. And, as a visitor I find myself questioning where the work actually *is*. For, a non-site appears to be negating itself while at the same time potentially documenting, sampling, mapping and thus quantifying another site, which serves to introduce confusions and paradoxes of framings. Smithson writes: "The non-site itself tends to cancel out the site. Although it's in the physical world, it's not there."[39]

Smithson never suggested he was trying to represent the remote site, but rather that he was "taking [an] unbounded area and transferring it into a boundary situation" where the non-site "tends to obliterate the land expanses."[40] Thus the non-sites try to frame that which is unframable.

When displayed in art galleries, such as at Dia:Beacon, Smithson's non-sites are enacting a display that parallels institutional scientific displays of specimens that we are familiar with in museums. Vladimir Jankélévitch, after Bergson, remarks that such scientific representations are presenting the observer or visitor with an understanding of the world, but one that is retrospective and immobile.

As Jankélévitch explains, science is retrospective in that it draws on static concepts in which the whole is broken down into parts in order to understand it: "When presented with problems, the natural reaction of the intellect is to dismember its objects to

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[39] Ibid., 218.

[40] Smithson continues:

> Then there's a kind of balance between the containment and the aspect of scattering, there's an overlap, you know you are being directed to sites that are in no way graspable in terms of preconceived systems. There is no way to locate the point even though there is an indication of the point ... so that the non-site just directs you out there, but once you get there, there's no destination. Ibid.

In some of Smithson's non-sites this illusion is reinforced through photo documentation and maps with isomorphic lines and diagrams, such as *Map for Double Nonsite, California and Nevada*, 1968 and *Photo documentation of Nonsite "Line of Wreckage" Bayonne, New Jersey*, 1968, and even *Spiral Jetty*, 1970.

understand them." Thus, as abstracted parts they can be analysed "within accomplished science, from a prior analysis; or, rather, they are less concrete "parts" than they are *elements* that are elaborated, derivative, reflexively extracted from a primitive totality in the course of solving a problem."[41] The sense of a totality derived from analysing extracted parts is understood through what Jankélévitch refers to as "the illusion of retrospectivity."[42] I suggest that Smithson's non-sites also exploit this notion.[43]

Smithson says that his non-sites are engaged in staging a "suspension of any destination."[44] Within this suspension, I suggest that duration exists as a kind of quantitative presence within which I might attempt to reference what *was* and what *might be* and what *is* outside of its own framing.[45]

Smithson's contradictory representations of time and space suggest appearances and experiences, however they appear to be set-up only to challenge concepts extracted from

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[41] Jankélévitch. author's emphasis.
[42] Ibid., 16.
[43] Drawing on the philosophy of Bergson and Arthur Schopenhauer, Jankélévitch suggests that this methodology enters into the conceit of knowing how the parts of the world fit together, and of their ultimate purpose. This instils teleological astonishment in which humans enjoy their superiority through being able to break the world down into its component parts. Teleological astonishment is a term coined by Schopenhauer in *The World As Will and Idea Vol. 3.* According to Jankélévitch the term describes our admiration

> of the perfection of the works of life excites in us, and which invites us to assign to them transcendent finality. If the complication of organisms seems marvellous to us and if the all-natural simplicity of their functioning disconcerts us to such a degree, it is because, without noticing it, we imagine them to have been fabricated piece by piece the way we ourselves fabricate our machines … in thus reducing the operation of nature to a procedure of the mechanical type, our intellect, in a way, admires itself. It is in fact one of the intellect's most absurd manias to thus create within things a certain complicated order for it to then enjoy the spectacle. Ibid., 114.

[44] Robert Smithson. "Fragments of an interview with P.A. [Patsy] Norvell (1969)." In Smithson., 192.
[45] Smithson's non-site's framed images exist in a suspended state that approaches the temporality of the "near instances" deployed and frozen in the artworks he critics in *Entropy and the New Monuments,* where he suggests: "This kind of time has little or no space; it is stationary and without movement." Smithson, "Entropy and the New Monuments." in ibid., 11. In his non-sites though, Smithson uses this frozen image of time, which I suggest is the time of Aion, strategically, to contrast with other concepts and evidences of time suggested in the remote sites and in his use of geological materials.

those sites.[46] I will shortly discuss other examples of how this occurs, when I suggest that systems methodologies are adumbrated within Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (I will also suggest that my experiencing of Smithson's Dia:Beacon artwork as a structure analogous to drone warfare is based on extracting concepts from remote sites).

Smithson (possibly influenced by Kubler) suggests: "The deeper an artist sinks into the time stream the more it becomes *oblivion*; because of this he must remain close to the temporal surfaces."[47] Just what Smithson means by remaining "close to temporal surfaces" is never made clear, but I suggest it could be the temporality that the visitor directly experiences in materials, through which contemplations of relations between non-site and the remote site occur. Art historian Gary Shapiro suggests that, in the encounter, Smithson is "attending to actual, experienced time rather than to an ideological time that is constructed through the grand narrative of history." Shapiro reminds us that Smithson was (and still is) sometimes considered a minimalist, and, like all minimalists he "attempted to emphasise the time of art's process, *including* its performance and reception."[48] I suggest that if Smithson makes use of "experienced time", he does so within dialectic with conceptual time, and that I, as a non-site visitor, play-out this temporal dialectic through imaginative relations between the non-site and the remote site.

Art critic Jack Burnham, writing in 1968, in light of Michael Fried's critical analysis of minimalism, suggested that an artwork's temporality and its emerging theatricality could

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[46] "The investigation of a specific site is a matter of extracting concepts out of existing sense-data through direct perceptions." Robert Smithson, "Towards The Development Of An Air Terminal Site" in ibid., 60.
[47] Robert Smithson. "A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects." in ibid., 113.
[48] Gary Shapiro, *Earthwards : Robert Smithson and Art after Babel* (Berkeley: Berkeley : University of California Press, 1995)., 39. (my emphasis)

be considered "preparatory steps toward the acceptance of a systems perspective."[49] For Burnham, systems processes included notions of artworks that were no longer reliant on the static art object, but instead were involved in a constant interplay and interdependence between artificial systems modeled on natural models of matter-energy-information exchange.[50] "These new systems prompt us *not* to look at the "skin" of objects, but at those meaningful relationships within and beyond their visible boundaries."[51] The art object was thus considered by Burnham to be on its way out, to be replaced by a "systems consciousness." I will suggest that in the case of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust,* "systems consciousness" is adumbrated in it durational and spatial framings.

Art historian Edward Shanken, in his introductory essay in *Systems*, suggests that synonymous with systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of cybernetics developed by Norbert Wiener.[52] First used by the US military in WWII, cybernetics can be described, in simple terms, as a scientific method employing the mathematical study of feedback loops that are used to regulate systems and behaviors and to predict future outcomes. Pamela Lee notes: "The capacity to foresee-or foreread-the actions of the

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[49] Jack Burnham, *Beyond Modern Sculpture : The Effects of Science and Technology on the Sculpture of This Century* (London: London : Allen Lane, 1968)., 368.
[50] Burnham suggests that:
> ...the cultural obsession with the art object is slowly disappearing and being replaced by what might be called "systems consciousness." Actually, this shifts from the direct shaping of matter to a concern for organising quantities of energy and information. Seen another way, it is a refocusing of aesthetic awareness-based on future scientific-technological evolution-on matter-energy-information exchanges and away from the invention of solid artifacts. ... The downfall of the sculpted object will represent one of many climactic symbols for our civilisation-among them a realisation that the old form-shaping approaches are no longer sufficient. By rendering the invisible visible through systems consciousness, we are beginning to accept responsibility for the well-being and continued existence of life upon the Earth. Ibid., 369–370.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Edward Shanken, A, "Introduction - Systems Thinking / Systems Art," in *Systems*, ed. Edward A. editor Shanken(London : Whitechapel Gallery, 2015)., 13.

enemy is a projective capacity, and, as such, one could say that cybernetics subscribes to the time of *prolepsis,* the future tense."[53] Cybernetics is a system that governs itself, so that the inevitable entropies that emerge within any system are kept in check by a constant feedback of information that is used to regulate possible future outcomes. Norbert Weiner saw cybernetics as having broad social and scientific applications such as in computing, biological modeling and communications:

> Society can only be understood through a study of the messages and the communication facilities which belong to it; and that in the future development of these messages and communication facilities, messages between man and machines, between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are destined to play an ever-increasing part. [54]

Jack Burnham forecast that cybernetics would offer opportunities to explore artworks from the perspective of a "systems consciousness … beyond visible boundaries." Smithson himself was aware of systems theory, which had begun to enter popular consciousness in the two decades following the end of WWII.[55] He makes reference to cybernetics in relation to ancient pyramids, computers and codes in his essay *The Artist As Site-Seer; Or, A Dintorphic Essay (1966-67).*[56] However, he remained skeptical, considering systems as, "another abstract entity that doesn't exist. … If you make a system you can be sure the system is bound to evade itself, so I see no point in pinning any hopes on systems."[57] Which is not to say that Smithson didn't incorporate aspects of systems methodology within his artworks. Curiously, his criticism of systems as non-existent, as "being bound to evade itself," bears similarities to what he saw as the relations of a non-site to site,

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[53] Lee, ""Ultramoderne": Or, How George Kubler Stole the Time in Sixties Art.", 58-59.

[54] Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings - Cybernetics and Society* (London: Free Association Books, 1989).

[55] Lee identifies similarities between the temporal and communicative logics of Kubler's theories and Wiener's cybernetic method, and suggests that Wiener's cybernetic ideas may have influenced Smithson via Kubler.

[56] Smithson. *"The Artist As Site-Seer; Or, A Dintorphic Essay."* in Smithson., 340.

[57] Smithson. "Fragments of an interview with P.A. [Patsy] Norvell (1969)." In ibid., 194.

where a non-site "evades you all the while its directing you to it."[58] Therefore it might not surprise us that Smithson was suspicious of systems theory, for its methodology attempts to iron-out all entropies and paradoxes that were so essential to his concept of non-site/site relations.[59] Smithson's interest was always in the processes of disintegration of structures not their preservative functions.

I previously suggested that Smithson employs strategies of display that reference scientific quantifications and representations but that he does so in order to subvert this reading. I would also like to suggest that, whether intentionally or not, systematic and cybernetic regulatory frameworks, appear to be adumbrated within his non-sites and have become 'available' to the contemporary visitor, including myself, who is now attuned to recognising the structure or effects of these systems, that are adumbrated within contemporary algorithms.[60] Thus, I suggest that Smithson's non-sites make available to us the idea of systems, but that this idea is ultimately subverted by his deployment within his non-sites, of perceptual and conceptual paradoxes and confusions. In my experience of *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust,* correlations between Smithson's non-sites and cybernetic systems were apparent to me in two ways: through my perception of a kind of cyclic temporality, where one site constantly referenced the other; and through the artwork's resemblance to the structure of contemporary drone warfare.

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[58] Smithson quoted in "Four Conversations Between Dennis Wheeler and Robert Smithson". In ibid., 218.
[59] It is worth noting that Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* relies on a cybernetic feedback system to maintain the loudness of its introduced sound whereby the intensity of each iteration of the sonic drone is automatically set in relation to Dia:Beacon's current ambient noise levels. Dia:Beacon's ambient noise levels fluctuate from hour to hour and this is sensed by microphones whereby the drone's volume is automatically adjusted so that his introduced sound maintains a consistent presence in relation to ambient sound levels. This information was conveyed to me by a Dia:Beacon staff member, when I enquired about its apparent soft volume level during my revisit to Dia:Beacon in 2016.
[60] Osborne suggests Smithson is "systematically orientated" in his transcategorical practice and also notes the conceptual logics that inform his non-sites. Osborne., 110-111.

In a cybernetic system, feedback loops constantly present past outcomes as a means to govern the present moment and its futurity.[61] My encounter with *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*, also involved regulatory aspects in which my experience and conception of the non-site with all its complexities informs my attempts to conceive of and experience a remote (or non-existent) site. The feedback I get from contemplating the notional site assists in re-negotiating relations with non-site, and so on. Through this engagement, conceptions and experiences of virtual and actual realities of time and space, oscillate between the two sites. Both sites appear to exist for me as suspended presences. Smithson suggests: "There is a one-to-one relation, but at the same time that one-to-one equation tends to evade connection so that there's a suspension." Thus, there is an expectation of a correspondence between sites that is inferred but that Smithson constantly subverts: "The location is held in suspense. The non-site itself tends to cancel out the site. Although it's in the physical world, it's not there … so it's a matter of losing your way rather than finding your way."[62]

The visitor thus, experiences a suspension of temporality and spatiality as they attempt to locate and understand one site (usually the gallery-based non-site) by referencing the other site (usually remote and inaccessible). Two kinds of temporality are suspended: the 'non-site' as a display of (scientifically) quantified segments that are frozen as concepts and evoking illusions of retrospectivity; and the 'site' as involved in various entropic processes and in a state of (virtual) becoming. Both temporalities are suspended within what can be described as a cybernetic oscillation of reference and control (where one site is referencing and controlling the other). Smithson's suggests: "The sites are receding

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[61] This system also mirrors the functioning of our sensori-motor schema that learns and adjusts future responses and actions via a memory of past experiences. See my discussion in Chapter 3.

[62] Smithson quoted in "Four Conversations Between Dennis Wheeler and Robert Smithson" in Smithson., 218.

into the non-sites, and the non-sites are receding back into the sites. It is always back and forth."[63]

As a visitor to *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust,* as a non-site, I shift between attempts to regulate one conception of site (whether site or non-site) through the other (each as an ontologically different composite of space and duration). Within the non-site encounter experiential contradictions and paradoxes render this negotiation ultimately frustrating and futile (or maybe fascinating and stimulating), as Smithson's framings remain open to becomings of active thought rather than closed and frozen within conceptual absolutes.

Thus, I am not suggesting that Smithson was directly influenced by Weiner's cybernetic ideas; rather that the cybernetic model, with its self-regulatory feedback loopings, is a structure that was apparent to me in his non-site/site dialectic. Smithson negates and confuses this structure (whether intentionally or not) by introducing paradoxes and contradictions that cybernetics normally removes. For, systems methodologies, as a scientific method of self-regulation and management of environments, with its ability to eliminate paradoxical, contradictory and entropic states, was always going to be too successful and complete as a regulatory methodology for Smithson's purposes.[64]

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[63] Smithson quoted in "Fragments of an Interview With Patsy Norvell" in ibid., 195.
[64] My discussion of the cybernetic aspect of Smithson's non-sites/sites concerns how I, as a contemporary visitor, encountered his work. I suggest that what I brought to the encounter was contemporary experience of cybernetic processes adumbrated within systems that surround us in the everyday world. For, these processes underpin many algorithms that regulate the way we all live and interact on social media, engage in marketing, and through economic, political, business and environmental forecasting. Cybernetic and systems processes, now subsumed within the notion of the algorithm, are more prevalent today than ever. My argument is about how the encounter was significant to me as it revealed the systems thinking that underpins contemporary conceptions in a world that oscillates between experiences and feedback we get from the world when we engage with it.

I will now discuss my naïve encounter, with Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*, in which I imagined the spatial-temporal framework of drone warfare. I would like to speculate that this was due to the artwork physically and conceptually exhibiting adumbrations of cybernetic modeling. This was perhaps apparent in the artwork's deployment of screen-like mirrors to frame and reflect multiple versions of the virtual site (rather than, the mirrors being used to subjectify the visitor, as in Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors*); and through the use of gravel, dust and cracked mirror surfaces, that were suggestive of an accumulation of repeating actions and forces. These objects presented as a series of physical structures that embodied ideas of feedback and replication. They also enabled me to imagine a structure whereby virtual sites existed elsewhere, beyond the actual, which gave rise to thoughts of drone-warfare. I suggest that this was because cybernetic adumbrations were apparent in the topography of actual and virtual images of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust.* That Smithson's version of cybernetic systems is inherently flawed is in keeping with his desire to use both concepts and sensations, but to evade conceptual closure. "I mistrust the whole notion of concept. I think that basically implies an ideal situation, a kind of closure." Rather, Smithson preferred art to be viewed through "an ensemble of different mediums that are all discrete functions with different degrees of abstraction." [65]

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[65] Both quotes are from Smithson., 208.
See also my discussion of Smithson in Chapter 2 in which Peter Osborne discusses the transcategorical nature of Smithson's artworks in which multiple elements should be considered as interconnected components of the one artwork.

Figure 25. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Cockpit Block 50 Ground Control Station, Photo sourced online from http://www.guns.com/2014/06/18/enhanced-drone-cockpit-gives-pilots-better-view-of-battlefield/, Retrieved 27/10/2017.

In Figure 25 we see a photograph of a ground station 'cockpit' made by drone-maker General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. Comparisons with Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Crack and Dust* (fig. 26) show similarities in that multiple screens reveal virtual desert-like landscapes which are viewed from above. Another comparison can be made between Smithson's artwork and a photograph taken at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, USA, where drone sensor operators are trained. In Figure 26 a drone pilot (on the left) and a drone sensor operator practice on a simulator.

Figure 26. Robert Smithson, Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust, Photo: David Chesworth

Figure. 27. A ground station cockpit simulator at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, USA,
Photo: Gilles Mingasson for Der Spiegel: https://s-media-cache-
ako.pinimg.com/originals/d4/78/68/ Retrieved 22/11/2016

In Smithson's artworks', time can be portrayed within extreme durational poles: entropic processes and the instant, both, which are difficult for humans to actually experience without reverting to conceptual and retrospective contemplations of duration. However, the temporality within the cybernetic feedback loops adumbrated within Smithson's site/non-sites *are* accessible to human time, as it maintains the artwork's transcategorical presentness. It is also virtually available within the heterogeneous temporalities of multiple site framings.

I suggest the staging of antinomies is a core experience of all the artworks under discussion in this exegesis. This occurs through each of the artist's creation of

paradoxical perceptions and meanings deployed in dialectic that never synthesises. In all four artworks, dialectic apprehends and then *contains* visitor's experience in a limbo-like state in which our subjectivity and objectivity oscillates. According to Deleuze and Guattari, dialectic plays out as a component of the abstract machine of the assemblage through which deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations occur. Within my cinematic encounter I suggest that my perceptions of duration was sometimes confused and framed spatially in movement-images and time-images. As well as spatial framings of duration I have suggested that perceptions of sound also frame durations that manifest as becomings within time-images and compose with objects and other forces as haecceities. In the case of Smithson's *Gravel Mirror with Cracks and Dust,* duration is framed conceptually and experientially within adumbrated feedback systems as I continually oscillate between conceptions of non-site and site.

I conclude that framed durations were major components of my experiences of the four Dia:Beacon artwork; that they were active as becomings within the machinic assemblages of each artwork; and that it was my cinematic engagement with each artwork's contrasting and competing framing ontologies that enabled me to accumulate a montage dialectic that gave rise to thought.

Chapter 6 will apply my research into durational experience to a discussion of how my practical research relates to both my theoretical research and the Dia:Beacon artwork encounters.

Chapter 6: Cinematic Thought Machines

The primary observation to make regarding the relation of my practical component to my written exegesis is that it has functioned in a similar way to the four Dia:Beacon artworks; as a *cinematic thought machine*.[1] The four Dia:Beacon artworks *and* my own artwork undertake this role from very different framings and sites. Each of the artworks—the result of different artist methodologies—with their nested framed sets, are, for me, examples of machinic assemblages, within which, I experienced *relations* between their component parts. Gilles Deleuze, in *Cinema 1* informs us that "Relation is not a property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also inseparable from the Open [Whole] and displays a spiritual or mental existence."[2]

I originally considered that my research was occurring along two independent and parallel paths: theoretical and practical, with points of intersection occurring at particular times during the research. However, I have come to realise that my theoretical and practical research can be considered as two activities that can be placed on two poles of an equilateral triangle, where the third pole is occupied by my *encounter* of the four Dia:Beacon artworks.

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[1] The four Dia:Beacon artworks are: Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010); Gerhard Richter, *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Smithson, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* (1968); and Max Neuhaus, *Time Piece Beacon* (2005). My practical research project is *The Long Take* (2016) (installation, comprising 4 x single channel HD videos with no audio, one single channel HD video with stereo sound, and a two-channel soundscape, duration 15-minute loop).
[2] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 10.

Figure 28. Research assemblages as thought-machines and subject-machines, Diagram: David Chesworth

In the diagram in Figure 28 each of the three diagrammatic points on the triangle represents an assemblage. The triangle shape shows potentials for relations between all three assemblages through deterritorialising and reterritorialising becomings and the generation of thought through montage. Osborne suggested that Smithson's artworks, such as *Spiral Jetty* (that exists in several iterations and in different expressive mediums) be conceived as one transcategorical artwork comprising interconnected components, in an "ensemble of different mediums that are all discrete."[3] Similarly, this PhD project could be considered as a transcategorical work in which an ensemble of methodologies,

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[3] In Smithson., 208. Quoted in Osborne., 112.

concepts and experiences interconnect and combine, and each assemblage represented on the triangle provides a different way of accessing the project's components.

My practical artwork, containing several nested artwork components, evolved during the first half of my research period. I installed the artwork some eighteen months prior to the completion of the research, as a single installation in a gallery space, for private viewing over several days. I was able to experience the artwork—its affects and effects— during this period. These images have remained available to me as memories, and through documentation, during my ongoing research into framing and duration. Thus, my artworks, the Dia:Beacon artworks and my philosophical research were all contemplated relationally as machinic components of the research project.

Discussing my artworks at this stage in this complex research provides a way of adding to the reader's accruing montage of image elements, providing a new entry point into my transcategorical research project and ensuring a further becoming of the research encounter.

Practical Research: *The Long Take* (2016)

The title of my installation artwork *The Long Take* references the filmic term for a single cinematic shot lasting longer than is usual. Within a long take it is the camera's movement and the viewer's witnessing of objects entering and leaving the frame that facilitates the creation of montage. *The Long Take* also references an essay by director and writer Paolo Pasolini, with Norman MacAfee and Craig Owens, which will be discussed shortly.

The Long Take presents a collection of framed images, pointing towards and referencing my exegesis, and aspects of the Dia:Beacon artworks. In this sense, *The Long Take* can be considered a kind of non-site. *The Long Take* comprises five video artworks: *Earthwork*, *FaceTime*, *Consciousness at the V&A*, *Time Mirror* and *Another Rite of Spring.* They are nested within the installation's 'frame of frames'. Each is a movement-image and also a time-image, with the potential to engage spatially and durationally with other images operating within and outside their framings, in the out-of-field, including the open whole. Three of the five component videos are mounted on the wall (like the painting objects I encountered in Richter's and Ryman's Dia:Beacon artworks), one video screen leans against the wall, while another rests horizontally on the floor with its image facing upwards, reminiscent of the arrangement of elements in Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust.* One video, *Another Rite of Spring,* has a significant soundtrack that is quietly introduced into the installation space. As the sound gradually becomes louder it frames its own duration and composes with components of other nested artworks creating a haecceity. When the sound abruptly ceases, the sonic void reveals another haecceity as ambient sounds emanating from *The Long Take's* 'out-of-field' become apparent (the ambience of the surrounding environment). After a short while, the sound

from *Another Rite of Spring* is quietly reintroduced into the space and the cycle begins again.[4]

The Long Take's arrangement of components mirrors the components within the four Dia:Beacon artworks, which can also be considered components within the 'frame of frames' of Dia:Beacon. In *The Long Take* (mirroring my experience at Dia:Beacon), durational experience is encountered in relation to movement as the visitor moves through the space; a machinic encounter that accumulates movement and time-images. The visitor potentially creates montage, which can function cinematically as a direct thought.

As well as cinematic experience, and the encounter of images within montage, the visitor's encounter of images within *The Long Take* can also considered through Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the machinic assemblage, through which, each artwork component, as an assemblage, territorialises the milieu while each assemblage's abstract machine creates a tendency (through perceived indeterminacy of boundaries) towards deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of materials and expressions through heterogeneous becomings.[5]

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[4] *Another Rite of Spring* references Neuhaus's idea of the silent alarm clock that he employed in *Time Piece Beacon.*

[5] Comparisons between the assemblage and the cinematic montage, and how entangled or how separate these two concepts are, within my artwork encounters is worth considering but deviates from my main discussion. See my discussion on the assemblage in Chapter 2

Individual artworks as components of *The Long Take*

The videos that became the artwork components of *The Long Take* are the result of methodological process that I was researching at the time. I didn't fully understand these framings or know what they would achieve at the time of their making. They are not a demonstration of concepts but rather activities that gave rise to thinking about concepts. Here, they are retrospectively examined as methodological processes and as components of montage that accumulates when encountering *The Long Take*.

Consciousness at the V&A

artwork and installation component

Single channel HD video (no audio).

7 minutes

Link to video https://vimeo.com/189094389/1c745fb0bf

Figure 29. Still frame from *Consciousness at the V&A*, (2016). Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 30. **Still frame from *Consciousness at the V&A*, (2016). Photo: David Chesworth**

Holding an iPhone in my right hand and filming randomly, I walked through the Medieval and Renaissance gallery at London's V&A Museum passing statues and reliefs. My gait set up a slow cadence with my arms swinging loosely by my side. I made arbitrary decisions about where I would walk within the gallery. I didn't aim the camera at anything in particular, I didn't even discern which way up the camera was. Subsequently the camera made framings that were not geometrically grounded or framed in relation to gravity and that appear strange to the viewer. As my sensori-motor schema didn't filter these images, these framings, according to Deleuze, are derived from a cinematic consciousness that is non-human and inhuman. Thus, the artwork mirrors the visitor's experiencing of *The Long Take,* where, instead of human consciousness, it is "camera consciousness" that is actively framing.

What the viewer sees when the video is replayed is a single shot that constitutes a point-of-view that does not belong to a bodily observer; and yet for the viewer there is still

some desire to derive narrative intentionality and meaning, through montage, by juxtaposing and interpreting the different kinds of images encountered in the temporal flow. Cinematic montage (as thought) potentially reveals novel image relationships and unexpected framings of images of the exhibition that the viewer could and would not frame with their own eyes.[6]

Objects within the V&A's Medieval and Renaissance gallery comprise human figures, ornaments and crucifixes that have been removed from their original framing contexts in churches and cathedrals, now re-hung on the museum walls, displayed on plinths or hung on long supporting cables from the roof, giving the impression of being suspended in the air.[7] As the camera doesn't differentiate between statues and human forms, statues can appear human-like while humans who are gazing at the statues and friezes can appear statue-like, undifferentiated from other figures made of stone, wood and glass. The camera's eye extends the now unaligned gazes of both humans and sculptures into empty spaces.

The iPhone's geometric frame conforms to the swing of my arm rather than to gravity and so both humans and sculptural figures are filmed on similar angles that unify their movement-images. All figures, including humans, have become part of V&A's framed collection in which the past and present co-exist.

Consciousness at the V&A replays the recorded image at a slower speed, and so time inside the "closed set" of the gallery is slowed down, further enhancing the strangeness of

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[6] This is because the human eye might not have regarded these images as at all relevant or interesting to frame. Please see my discussion of the sensori-motor schema in Chapter 3.

[7] Most objects are now framed and displayed on plinths, inside glass cabinets and hung on walls and have lost their original display contexts. However, some of the human figures remain framed within their original physical frames, which forms part of the object, in which case the human figure remains enclosed within its own hermetic, spatial and temporal narrative.

a world observed through camera consciousness. This allows the viewer to perceive extra detail in the images and the opportunity to further explore novel relationships between the framed objects, which, resulting from the slow motion, have assumed a floating, spectral presence. [8]

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[8] Walter Benjamin suggests that the use of slow motion in film "not only reveals familiar aspects of movements, but discloses quite unknown aspects within them—aspects which do not appear as the retarding of natural movements but have a curious gliding, floating character of their own. Clearly, it is another nature, which speaks to the camera as compared to the eye." Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (United States: Prism Key Press, 2010). My emphasis.

Time Mirror

artwork and installation component

single channel HD video (no audio).

5 minutes

Link to video https://vimeo.com/188794205/6642b4baa1

Figure 31. Still frame from *Time Mirror* (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

I came upon *Time Mirror's* single image at the entrance to the Underground in London's crowded Oxford Circus. I immediately perceived the image cinematically and started filming as soon as I could frame a steady shot. The ten-second shot that follows shows commuters on their homeward journey coping with a sudden temporal and spatial interruption.

In contrast to *Consciousness at the V&A,* here, my framing expresses a static act of territorialisation. The shot is a movement-image, as time is translated through the subtle movements of individual temporalities. But it is also a time-image that reveals time directly through collective, individuated temporalities. Each person in the crowd, suddenly detached from their previous task, now engages in their own reterritorialisation of the unanticipated temporal interruption: either by reading, listening to music in headphones, or checking text messages; a few are converse, while others are occupied by internal thoughts. They are reterritorialising a haecceity, as they sense a particular composition of affects, sensations and objects.

We also observe a slow-moving glint of reflected light as it hits the stationary crowd. This light image is what Deleuze refers to as an opsign that enters the frame from elsewhere and *scores* the scene.[9] This light seems to belong to a different experiential realm to the objects in the scene. Its movement provides an image of time in the out-of-field (the open whole) that challenges the conventional movement-images of the framed world.

According to Deleuze, the camera "does not just present images, it surrounds them with a world," and so, in this case, it is possible that this world in which movement has been

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[9] My discussion of the four Dia:Beacon artworks has considered the influence of opsigns and sonsigns. See Chapter 2 for more.

withheld, together with probing, glinting light invites the viewer's participation in thought and reflection on the framed image's expressive components.[10]

In the video, the shot is repeated many times. A few seconds of black footage appears at the end of the shot. This sudden absence of content complicates the montage. It mirrors the interruption that has occurred to the crowd on the stairs. For, inserting black frames presents the viewer with emptiness and indeterminacy, and what Deleuze calls "false continuity." Deleuze asserts,

> False continuity is in its own right a dimension of the Open [Whole], which escapes sets and their parts. It realises the other power of this-out-of-field, this elsewhere or this empty zone, this white on white which is impossible to film.[11]

The viewer *must* contemplate their relation to this void: whether to endure it or to move on in search of content elsewhere, outside the framing of the artwork. The use of the black frames causes this artwork to enter relations with my encounter of Richter's grey mirrors, Ryman's white paintings and Neuhaus's sudden removal of content in *Time Piece Beacon*.

As *Time Mirror's* ten-second image continually repeats, it allows the viewer to observe and endure multiple experiences of the image. However, the repetition is false. For on each repetition I have reversed the shot, so that time plays forwards the first time it is seen, and then backwards when it is repeated, and the next time, forward again, and so on. As there is little overall movement, this effect is hardly noticeable. In applying these variations, I was interested in how the time of the artwork might be perceived and if a viewer might sense differences in the repeating image. Does the viewer experience this as pure repetition or do they perceive difference within the work's becoming? Bergson

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[10] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 68.
[11] Deleuze quoting J. Narboni, Sylvie Pierre and J. Rivette in 'Montage', Cashiers du Cinema, no. 210, March 1969. In Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 28.

argues that no two experiences, no matter how similar, are ever the same, because the second experience contains the memory of the first experience and the third experience the memory of both previous experiences in a constant state of becoming.[12]

In *Cinema 1,* Deleuze discusses the cinematic theories of filmmaker and writer Pier Paolo Pasolini. In Pasolini's article *Observations of the Long Take*, he, suggests that, cinema always "reproduces the present," which constitutes the viewers' reality.

> It is impossible to perceive reality as it happens *if not from a single point of view,* and this point of view is always that of a perceiving subject and even if that point-of-view is abstract and non-naturalistic ... the result will be seen and heard as if by a flesh-and-blood subject (that is, one with eyes and ears). Reality seen and heard as it happens is always in the present tense. The long take, the schematic and primordial element of cinema, is thus in the present tense. Cinema therefore reproduces the present.[13]

Pasolini speculated about filming a long continuous shot (a long take) simultaneously from the point-of-view of many cameras and then playing each point-of-view film back

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[12] As Bergson explains:
> To say that the same inner causes will reproduce the same effects is to assume that the same cause can appear a second time on the stage of consciousness. Now, if duration is what we say, deep seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments of a life-story ... [D]uration is something real for the consciousness which preserves the trace of it, and we cannot here speak of identical conditions, because the same moment does not occur twice. It is no use arguing that, even if there are no two deep-seated psychic states which are altogether alike, yet analysis would resolve these different states into more general and homogeneous elements which might be compared with each other. This would be to forget that even the simplest psychic elements possess a personality and a life of their own, however superficial they may be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a new feeling. (Bergson, *Time and Free Will : An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.*

[13] Pier Paolo Pasolini, Norman Macafee, and Craig Owens, "Observations on the Long Take," *October* 13, (1980). Author's emphasis. It is worth noting that Pasolini's need for a "flesh and blood subject" reflects a different approach to Deleuze's concept (after Bergson) of a cinematic consciousness, which can be "sometimes inhuman or super human," where "the shot itself acts like a consciousness." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 20.

one after the other. He suggested that this creates a special montage, in which we experience,

> a multiplication of "presents," as if an action, instead of unwinding once before our eyes, were to unwind many times. This multiplication of "presents" abolishes the present, empties it, each present postulating the relativity of all others, their unreliability, imprecision, and ambiguity. ... Each of these presentations of reality is extremely impoverished, aleatory, almost pitiful, if one realises that it is only one among many.[14]

In *Time Mirror,* it is not the same event filmed from different locations but a single shot that is repeated over and over but with subtle timing variations, and sometimes the complete reversal of the image. The entry and exit points of each shot have split-second variations, which re-direct the viewer's attention to specific movements within the image. If viewing film "always reproduces the present," does viewing *Time Mirror* with its repeating image therefore involve the viewer's constant validation of the image's actual presentness?

According to Deleuze there remains in the viewer a desire to construct a classical narrative that accords with our sensori-motor schema. It is "a truthful narration, in the sense that it claims to be true, even in fiction."[15] Deleuze comments:

> A new status of narration follows: ... narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying. ... It is a power of the false, which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts.[16]

Thus, *Time Mirror* presents a time-image as truth becomes indiscernible. As the individuals on the steps remain within their own temporal flux, the repetition of the image throws the viewer into a temporal flux as falsifying images create a time-image

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[14] Pasolini et al., "Observations on the Long Take.", 4.

[15] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 127.

[16] *Compossible* is a term coined by Leibnis to suggest that it is possible to predict future outcomes that are equally possible, but they will not be possible in the same world. Thus, they are incompossible with each other. See also ibid., 130.

that continually provokes an enquiry into where the actual and virtual reside. Thus, *Time Mirror* exists within temporal uncertainty and I will shortly return to this discussion in relation to another component artwork: *Another Rite of Spring*.

The heterogeneity of the images is evident in how each of the crowd's participants manages their own temporality within the flow. As a time-image, the work delineates different qualities arranged spatially (quantitatively within the frame) and accumulated durationally (within the consciousness of the viewer). As well, both the reflective glint of light and the blank black frames *score* the image with opsigns; events of indetermination, gaps that provide within the visitor's montage, spaces for the emergence of imagination and thought.

FaceTime

artwork and installation component

single channel HD video (no audio)

4 minutes

Link to video https://vimeo.com/189088187/4f879f1219

Figure 32. Still frame from *FaceTime* (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 33. Still frame from *FaceTime* (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 34. Still frame from *FaceTime* (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

In *FaceTime* the viewer sees a close-up of a face set against a dark background. The face is actively engaged: sometimes looking directly at the viewer and at other times at unseen things beyond the frame's edges. The face is responding qualitatively to what it is experiencing or thinking. For Deleuze, in cinema, the face close-up shot is the principal affection-image.[17] The affection-image resides within and exploits the gap between the perception-images and action-image. It occupies this interval, where it "surges in the centre of indetermination."[18] *FaceTime* explores the expressive pole of the affection-image through particular intensities of the face, which expresses internal thoughts and feelings but also reflects and expresses the out-of-field and the open whole. Deleuze tells us:

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[17] For Deleuze, "the affection image is the close-up and the close-up is the face." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 87.

[18] Ibid., 65. See my discussion of the affection image in Chapter 3.

[In cinema] there are two sorts of questions, which we can put to a face, depending on the circumstances: what are you thinking about? Or, what is bothering you, what is the matter, what do you sense or feel?[19]

Deleuze states that the film frame *always* deterritorialises the image, but he suggests that the close-up of the face is a special kind of deterritorialisation in which the affection-image "has the power to tear the image away from spatio-temporal coordinates in order to call forth the pure affect as the expressed."[20] And so, the face reacts to what it experiences and thinks, while at the same time is removed from the world that surrounds it. In the context of my installation, *FaceTime* creates a spatio-temporal gap that becomes a reflective space for the viewers who might qualitatively reflect on the close-up.

The facial close-up converts external movements observed in space into movements of expression. In perceiving these external movements Deleuze suggests the face, "relates movement to a quality as lived state."[21] This is a temporal experience in which quantitative spatial coordinates that *the face* sees (but we can't) are translated or *lived* via the face's qualitative temporal becoming. Deleuze suggests that the face can express as a unified surface (such as when expressing wonder), but also as a collection of intensive traits, which use particular parts of the face—the subtle movement of an eyebrow, the lips or frowning—to express certain desires.[22] Thus, *FaceTime* can serve as a component of the artwork, through which viewer, who endures the face's differences in kind, might

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[19] Ibid., 88.
[20] Ibid., 96.
[21] Ibid., 65.
[22] Ibid., 88.

possibly derive a qualitative reading of the entire installation that exists in the frame's 'out-of-field.'[23]

Deleuze suggests that other objects and spaces can 'stand-in' for the face, and also function as an affection-image. A painting can become "faceified and in turn it stares at us—it looks at us, even though it does not resemble a face."[24] At Dia:Beacon, Ryman's white paintings appeared to behave like this as I journeyed through Ryman's room. In my own experiencing of *The Long Take*, as part of my research, *FaceTime* formed relations with my experience of Ryman's white paintings in his *Installation at Dia Beacon*.

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[23] Deleuze writes: "[Soviet film director and theorist Sergei] Eisenstein suggested that the close-up was not merely one type of image among others, but gave an affective reading of the whole film. This is true of the affection-image... ." Ibid., 87.
[24] Ibid., 88.

Earthwork

artwork and installation component

single channel HD video (no audio)

12 minutes

Link to video https://vimeo.com/188772824/efe25b1ea3

Figure 35. Still frame from *Earthwork*, (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 36. Still frame from *Earthwork,* (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

Earthwork directly references and attempts to develop the non-site methodology of Robert Smithson, and is the pivotal antinomic component of my installation. My experience of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* caused me to think of drone warfare.[25] Such an imaginative interpretation of an artwork is not in itself unusual, but as this was a Smithson artwork my response troubled me. For, I felt it lay outside the intended parameters of the artists intended engagement.[26] *Earthwork* results from further investigations of my response.

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[25] See my extensive discussions on Smithson in the previous chapters.

[26] My imaginative interpretation of his artwork does, however, have parallels to Smithson's own essay, *A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey* (1967), in which he imaginatively interprets urban and industrial infrastructure while on a day trip through the disturbed landscape of New Jersey. Smithson "A Tour Of The Monuments Of Passaic", New Jersey (1967). in Smithson., 68.

Earthwork's single screen is positioned flat on the floor, towards the centre of the installation space, its screen facing upwards. The visitor, looking down on the screen, gets a bird's-eye view of a suburban landscape of destroyed buildings, damaged roads, fences and gardens. The image suggests a familiar world that has undergone massive disruption. It is unclear whether accident, entropic forces, or warfare has caused this. The visitor's viewpoint of the framed image as it slowly meanders across the landscape is like an image filmed from a drone. With the advent of domestic drone-craft this image is becoming familiar to us. However, it might also bring to mind US military footage released by WikiLeaks under the title *Collateral Murder,* that was filmed from the point-of-view of a helicopter gunship that targets a group of people walking down a road in Bagdad, Iraq, and who are subsequently fired upon from the helicopter and killed.[27] It is also reminiscent of news footage of remote vision taken by military drones while firing missiles at human targets in the Iraq desert. In *Earthwork,* the footage is not of a desert location but rather of a middle-class suburb in a western city that could well be my own city. There is temporal ambiguity. The destruction creates a sense that something has already happened but the panning and scanning within the frame suggests that something else is about to happen.

Superimposed within *Earthwork's* image of a devastated landscape is another smaller image that presents the viewer with an alternative framing and reading of the site. This image also appears to be surveilling, and reveals diagrams and symbols of what might be location coordinates. The superimposition of this image within the other image suggests that there might be some correlation between them. It could be that they are both referencing the same site, where the smaller nested image is offering quantified, symbolic concepts of site. It appears that the two images are trying to 'line-up' with each

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[27] "Collateral Murder - Wikileaks - Iraq", WikiLeaks https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rXPrfnU3G0 (accessed 6/05/2017).

other, but never do. This brings to mind Smithson's comment: "The site is evading you all the while it's directing you to it."[28]

This confusion of temporality and multiple framing relations renders *Earthwork* as a time-image. For Deleuze notes:

> This is what happens when the image becomes time-image ... The screen itself is the cerebral membrane where immediate and direct confrontations take place between the past and the future, the inside and the outside, at a distance impossible to determine, independent of any fixed point. The image no longer has space and movement as its primary characteristics but topology and time.[29]

Further scrutiny reveals that the ruined landscapes are actually two scale-models of suburban housing estates, (which were found discarded at a suburban rubbish tip).[30]

Earthwork has similar material components to Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*. We see gravel, cracks and dust, and the second smaller image is mirror-like, as it creates a virtual space. *Earthwork* develops structuring concepts and forces found in *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust,* and in Smithson's conception of site/non-site dialectic, where, on one pole, Smithson applies concepts and schematics: grids, crystalline structures, strata; and on the other pole, he allows for experience itself, through encountering the materiality of objects and entropic processes; experiences that Smithson tends to describe in psychological terms.[31] However, Smithson's dialectic of site

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[28] Smithson., 218.
[29] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*., 125.
[30] Like *Consciousness at the V&A,* I filmed holding my iPhone camera at arm's length and moving the camera randomly over the two housing estate models. I made no attempt to plot a journey or to frame images through the viewfinder, as I had no desire to fully determine exactly what was filmed (although I did consciously point the camera downwards over the models). I sometimes moved between the two separately framed models, revealing the edges of each site and the gravel-strewn ground in-between. The damage to the models is reminiscent of the entropic forces of nature, and was presumably caused by rough handling and their subsequent exposure to the weather.
[31] See my discussion on Smithson in previous chapters.

is never simply oppositional, for one pole (such as the conceptual, schematic pole) is often nested as a component in our encounter of the other pole (the psychological or experiential), and visa-versa. Therefore, Smithson's 'site' is encountered as an assemblage by simultaneously referencing the two poles through an oscillation between arrangements (concepts) and derangement (psychological, experiential).[32] This strategy sets up and reveals paradoxes and antinomic experiences. Robert Hobbs suggests that Smithson's sites are deliberately confusing in that,

> rather than an "either/or" situation, [Smithson] created a "both/and" proposal where the "both" is "either/or", the "and" adds up to confusion, and the combination of the three terms is equally valid and useless at the same time.[33]

Thus, as visitors, we experience constant becomings involving deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of site.

Osborne discusses the oppositional poles of Smithson in relation to his notion of postconceptual art:

> One may interpret the site/non-site relation as the spatial aspect of that more general dialectic of the aesthetic and conceptual that constitutes postconceptual art, ontologically.[34]

In *Earthwork,* the damaged urban landscape is a "deranged" site, on which, superimposed, we see a smaller non-site as an arrangement of *concepts.* Both images of site create an oscillation between what Smithson calls "the indeterminate certainty" of site, and the "determinate uncertainty" of the non-site.[35] The complexity of this paradox

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[32] Smithson has referred to time as being "deranged." Smithson, "The Domain Of The Great Bear" in Smithson., 33.
[33] Hobbs., 23
[34] Osborne., 109.
[35] Listed as item five in Smithson's list "Dialectic of Site and Nonsite". Smithson, 'The Spiral Jetty' (1972) in Smithson., 152.

is compounded in *Earthwork,* as both sites (site and non-site) occupy the same frame, but where one site is nested spatially within the other, thus complicating any spatial or temporal verification of site. I would like to think that the visitor's engagement with *Earthwork* involves attempts to correlate the two images or have an awareness that the artwork is attempting to correlate the images within one site. The non-site's thwarting of site correlation reflects Smithson's desire to frustrate these kinds of systematic process even though, as I have argued, they are structurally adumbrated within *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust.*

Thus, Smithson's sites are encountered in a temporal oscillation that simultaneously references the two poles: that of the conceptual and of the aesthetic (or of arrangement and derangement). Necessary to this strategy is the application of pre-existing images of thought (concepts), which means that these non-sites are available to be understood through retrospection on the one hand (through attempts to combine already understood and scientifically quantified parts and concepts), and through direct experience (aesthetical, affective and psychological) on the other. Our encounter with *Earthwork* and with Smithson's site/non-sites then, are through becomings in which antinomic experience within duration and space play-out within the flux as images of thought. It is in this way *Earthwork* and Smithson's non-sites, including *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* function as time-images when encountered cinematically.

An important second reference within *Earthwork* develops Smithson's paradoxical "indeterminate certainty" and "determinate uncertainty" through *Earthwork's* reference to experiences and concepts of contemporary military warfare. *Earthwork* presents an unnerving image that is reminiscent of contemporary media images of military drone surveillance and systematic bombing of targets. In drone warfare, as currently enacted by Western powers in the desert theatres of war in the Middle East, the staging of this kind of aggressive encounter involves interconnectedness of systems that include feedback

loops of concepts of site and non-site as curated framed spaces.[36] According to Cian Westmoreland, an ex-US Air Force communications expert: "A military drone is like a vacuum sucking up data." This data consists of all visual and electronic mediated communications from the site.[37] These data are delivered to a remotely located ground-based control centre, known as a SCIF (Secret Compartmentalised Information Facility), which is a kind of self-contained non-site, where the data is collated and analysed.

Outcomes, derived from analysing this data, become concepts, which inform "actions" upon the actual site, often via missiles delivered from the same drones that are surveilling the remote desert sites. These drones are operated by ground-based drone pilots, located thousands of miles from the actual site such as in the USA or the UK.

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[36] Drone warfare images were not familiar in Smithson's time, as unmanned aerial vehicle warfare was yet to emerge. Which is not to say that the strategies that enabled concepts of drone warfare were not familiar to Smithson. The study of systems methodologies such as cybernetics, which informed developments of military technologies and strategies in WWII (and which are now very apparent in the 'asymmetrical warfare' methodology of drone warfare) were also of interest to Smithson and may have informed approaches to his work—especially his non-sites. In Chapter 3, I argue that the adumbration of cybernetic methodologies within *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* may have influenced my imagining of the work as a monument to drone warfare.

However, Smithson often viewed his earthworks from the air, and so had a familiarity with this aerial point-of-view. His film, *Spiral Jetty*, contains images of the jetty, surveilled and shot from a helicopter. These enabled perspectives of his earthwork that were unavailable by other means. Smithson died while viewing potential sites for *Amarillo Ramp* (1973) from an airplane which crashed. Further to this context, TV images of the Vietnam War, which included shots filmed from helicopter gunships were beamed to lounge rooms in the 1960s and 70s.

[37] The quote and additional information in this paragraph is not widely available to the public, and was provided by Cian Westmoreland, who was involved in building a critical component of the global communications infrastructure underlying the drone program. He presented on a panel convened on July 30th at 2016 Melbourne International Film Festival in conjunction with the screening of a new film on drone warfare called *National Bird* that traces Westmoreland's story and that of two other military involved in the US drone surveillance program who became whistle-blowers, exposing some of the methods and technologies behind contemporary drone warfare. The panel also included Lisa Linga former US Air Force technical expert and whistleblower, who worked on the Drone Surveillance System, University of Melbourne's Dr Suelette Dreyfus and Melbourne PhD researcher Alex Edney-Browne. The talk was presented in partnership with the Transformative Technologies Research Unit and the Screen and Cultural Studies Program in the University of Melbourne's Faculty of Arts, with support from the Department of Computing and Information Systems. http://miff.com.au/program/film/talking-pictures-national-bird-in-conversation

The parallels between drone warfare's methodology and Smithson's site and non-site dialectic are apparent to me. My suggestion is that concepts of site and non-site also exist as transcategorical components within the ontology of warfare. Both drone warfare and Smithson's notion of non-site/site make use of systems theory to regulate a site through non-site correlations. The difference is, in warfare, this regulation is used to reconnoitre, verify and curate the remote site through action-images, whereas with Smithson, systems are employed to set up expectations of correlations that are ultimately thwarted by his antinomic framings.[38]

Figure 37, Diagram of adumbrated systems, Diagram: David Chesworth

Figure 37 shows a diagram that compares systematic processes adumbrated within three models: drone warfare methodologies, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* and *Earthwork*. All examples can be thought through the prism of the non-site/site dialectic

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[38] Please refer to my discussion of Smithson in relation to systems theory in Chapter 5.

where one site is positioned and verified through the other, and remote site conceptions are formed through representations and by experiencing materialities sectioned from the site and quantified at the non-site.

It was my experiencing of Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*, which gave rise to 'images of thought' that brought to mind military engagement. I suggest this occurred because the framing of Smithson's non-site and its representations of site included adumbrations of systems and cybernetic processes (which included my experiencing of materials and the mirrors reflections of virtual images). Implying non-site/site relations and the subsequent breaking down of those relations appears to be the desired outcome in Smithson's methodology. This is, of course, not the desired outcome of military warfare, where the verification and quantification of site constantly feeds back into reconceptualisation of the site via the non-site.

Thus, *Earthwork's* two images of site: one framed within the other, can be thought of as alluding to systemised relations between non-site/site. *Earthwork* attempts this by representing relationships between actual and virtual sites similar to those encountered in a theatre of war. In my artwork, the actual site is the destroyed suburban Western landscape (supplanting the location of the Iraq desert), and the virtual site is represented by the smaller nested image of data sets and mappings that suggest representations and conceptions of the actual site based on collected data.

As I have previously suggested, the relationship of non-site to site involves negotiations of conceptual and experiential poles. I suggest that this process is analogous to a certain kind of warfare methodology. In drone warfare, territory is no longer physically captured, but rather it is deterritorialised, ostensibly by the opsigns and sonsigns of wars missiles and bombs, and is ultimately reterritorialised. The actual site in drone warfare is 'curated' using concepts derived at the non-site (the SCIF) from abstractions collected from drones that surveil the actual site. The damage and loss of life is very real and

horrific, as is the ultimate outcome, which potentially is the destruction (deterritorialisation) of the territory itself as a concept and material place (hospital, school, restaurant, wedding reception, bazaar, compound, etc.).

Within the context of the cinematic, the movie screen cannot physically frame Smithson's notion of site, because he considers this would reduce the site to pure perception and thus pure duration.[39] Osborne has suggested that instead, Smithson's artwork, considered as transcategorical, exists as a postconceptual ensemble constituted from the interconnectedness of several coexisting sites and non-sites, and other iterations of site such as photographs and maps.[40] In many ways this idea resembles Deleuze's concept (after Bergson) of nested sets of framed experience that that we find inherent in classical narrative cinema, where narrative is driven by the movement-image and, "there is always a thread that connects a glass of sugared water to the solar system, and any set whatever to a larger set."[41] This is what I want *The Long Take* visitors to potentially experience; that is, several framed sets nested within each other. *Earthwork* consists of nested framings, and *Earthwork* itself is nested within the haecceity of *Another Rite of Spring* (which is a durational framing), and all are nested within the frame of frames of the installation space through which we experience movement-images and time-images.

Thus, in both Smithson's *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*, and in my own artwork *Earthwork,* nested frames contain sets of objects that are experienced as a montage of antinomic images.[42] Movement creates juxtapositions of these images that oscillate

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[39] See my discussion of Smithson in relation to the cinema frame in Chapter 2
[40] "Transcategorality: post conceptual art" in Osborne., 99.
[41] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*., 16.
[42] This is how I believe I experienced *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust*. The *Earthwork* site, like Smithson's site/non-sites, displays images and concepts that require our imagination but not our physical

between movement-image and time-image: facets, which allow the visitor to experience an artwork through what Smithson calls "a kind of ensemble of different mediums that are all discrete" functioning in "different degrees of abstraction."[43] This is the conceptual logic of the non-site that Osborne identifies as "transcategorical and postconceptual."[44]

Finally, *Earthwork* presents a time-image that evidences the effects of time's potency. It is a time-image whereby, like Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*, it potentially causes the viewer to contemplate events that *have* happened, those that *might* happen and events that *are* taking place as time continually *scores* the image.

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presence. Our imaginative response obscures our durational engagement perpetuating the dominance of space over temporality.
[43] Robert Smithson "Four Conversations Between Dennis Wheeler And Robert Smithson" in Smithson., 208.
[44] Osborne., 112.

Another Rite of Spring

artwork and installation element

single channel HD video, sStereo audio 12 minutes

Link to video https://vimeo.com/190327166/ab8eb0f42d

Figure 38. Still frame from *Another Rite of Spring*, (2016), Photo: David Chesworth

Another Rite of Spring provides the pivotal durational experience of *The Long Take*. This work attempts the incompossible: to conceptually and experientially perpetuate a sonic event in the present moment. In doing so, it poses the open-ended question: what kind of temporalities manifest within this kind of proposition? For, this is a sonic image that

might be considered simultaneously actual and virtual, as it attempts to be entirely present to us both in the moment and through its extended presentness.[45]

The work derives its sonic materialities from the well-known orchestral composition *The Rite of Spring* (1911), by the Russian composer Igor Stravinsky, which is generally considered to be a masterpiece of modern orchestral music. *The Rite of Spring* was originally notable for its complex dissonant harmonies and its use of pagan melodies and polyrhythms that challenged the musical and temporal norms of Western music. *Another Rite of Spring* presents every musical note of Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring* chronologically, as it occurs during a normal orchestral performance, however, as each note, occurs, it is suspended in time, so that each sound sustains continuously in the present moment. Thus, the work attempts to freeze the telos of music and instead deliver presentness in the manner of Pasolini's concept of cinema's presentness rather than in say, Deleuze's 'powers of the false', in which, within cinema, the audience accepts a falsehood as the truth, in order to preserve narrative coherence. *Another Rite of Spring* also references Fried's idea that presentness "at every moment of the work is wholly manifest."[46]

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[45] *Another Rite of Spring's* conceptual underpinnings has similarities with artist Pierre Huyghe's concept of the "open present." Amelia Barikin in her book *Parallel Presents, The Art of Pierre Huyghe*, discusses Huyghe's concept, which has its antecedents in Pasolini's idea that a cinematic shot might have multiple viewpoints on an action via many cameras filming the same action at the same time from different viewpoints. Barikin discusses Huyghe's conceptual attempts to multiply time through juxtaposing multiple perspectives. She notes, referencing Pasolini's essay *Observations on the Long Take*: "Pasolini referred to this kind of "temporal multiplication" as "writing the historical present", and identified it as a symptom of montage. As soon as montage intervenes", he notes, "the present becomes past, a past that, for cinematographic and not aesthetic reasons, is always in the present model." Amelia Barikin, *Parallel Presents : The Art of Pierre Huyghe*, Art of Pierre Huyghe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press, 2012)., 66.
[46] Fried. *Art and Objecthood*, 267.

In *Another Right of Spring,* the listener is denied a perception of each musical component's individual durational life and the expressive qualities that would result. Rather than each note occurring and then receding into the past as memory, which then informs our musical becoming; here, each note persists, compressed into the present tense. This creates another kind of becoming, one that renders musical flux into a singularity, a sonic block, so that the original narrative becoming is no longer available to the listener.[47] This methodology mirrors my experience of the accumulation of whiteness as a becoming noise in Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon* and the introduced drone in Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon.*

The resulting sonic block of 'presentness' introduces antinomic problems, for the sonic block, as a becoming singularity, is also simultaneously durational and spatial. Therefore, the work's movement towards a singularity of presentness can only be experienced as a becoming, which is durational and creates difference, as new instruments and musical densities accumulate and the sonic block thickens, whereby new qualities emerge.

There is therefore an incompossibility of two kinds of presentness: one being the singularity of *Another Rite of Spring* in the present moment, the other being presentness as a becoming, as all the present moments accumulate. This antinomic nexus is experienced through the power of the false, in which both presents are equally available within montage. Therefore, the choice of which presentness is true and which is false becomes a conceptual one that the visitor, if so inclined, must negotiate in relation to antinomic temporal realms.

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[47] See my discussion including Cox's references to John Cage in relation to Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* in Chapter 5.

As the accumulating sound(s) expands spatially into the installation's room there is also an antinomic nexus between concept and experience, whereby time as a becoming singularity is also experienced as spatial extensity. So that where, according to Bergson, time is usually misinterpreted as spatial experience, here time is spatial through its becoming.

Another way to consider the role of *Another Rite of Spring* as a component of *The Long Take*, is to consider it as a compositional component of a haecceity that has both temporal and spatial characteristics (which haecceities like wind and rainfall also possess). Like the yearly seasonal differences that we feel in the air as winter turns to spring, *Another Rite of Spring* also activates the air and in doing so individuates itself within time as it composes within space and with other components framed within the artwork. As a haecceity, the persisting block of accumulating sound agitates air molecules within the installation space. This mirrors how Dia:Beacon's air-conditioners agitated the air at particular times during the day and which I *felt* when experiencing Ryman's spaces. It also references the introduced drone in Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* that was sensed qualitatively within a haecceity. Like a non-site, *Another Rite of Spring* creates a haecceity, which conditions the air around us, as does the haecceity of springtime.

The duration of *Another Rite of Spring* is the length of the first movement of Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring*. At the end of the movement there is a sudden cessation in sound in which the visitor experiences its absence. The event references the experience of Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*, whose continuous introduced sound also suddenly ceases after a period of time. This cessation of durational presentness conveys a sudden 'emptying' of space that the sound previously occupied and creates a new spatial and durational awareness through a new haecceity, as we hear sounds from the artwork's out-of-field: traffic and other street sounds, as the other video artworks continue to play

silently. After a short period, *Another Rite of Spring* begins again, repeating Stravinsky's opening phrases, which once more, accumulate as another durational and spatial haecceity starts to take hold.

Cinematic encounter outside *The Long Take*

The Long Take acts cinematically as a 'frame of frames' that deterritorialises its nested framed images. The work is also an assemblage constructed from, and complicated by, the interaction of its components parts through which the visitor attempts to reterritorialise new assemblages. The visitor becomes a machinic component that imposes limits by reterritorialising frames, and creates a montage of the encountered dialectic of images. Within the artwork the visitor becomes a thought machine. As Simon O'Sullivan describes it: "Art is produced by the coupling of two very specific kinds of machine,": the "art-machine" and also the human "subject-machine," whose limits curtail the art-machine's "ever expanding circuits of effects."[48] The interest for me, in my own artwork making, is how these relations might vary with each visitor as a "subject machine" who engages with it.

Deleuze suggests that "the techniques of the image always refer to a metaphysics of the imagination: it is like two [or more] ways of imagining the passage from one image to another."[49] In *The Long Take* we pass between images as we encounter different framed components: the close-up of a face; a group of commuters standing stationary on a stairway; a camera's consciousness within the Medieval and Renaissance gallery of the Victoria and Albert Museum; a moving image from a drone aircraft over a damaged town; and a scratched TV screen through which we hear a continuous sound that gradually increases in intensity before abruptly ceasing. These component artworks close

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[48] O'Sullivan. *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari*, 22.
[49] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 58.

off the set of elements contained within their frames. These frames are never completely closed however. Deleuze (through Bergson) suggests that, like a fine thread, the 'open' attaches each framed set to the 'whole' of the universe. [50] Thus the components can always relate to each other through the *absolute* out-of-field of the 'Open Whole'.

The sound of *Another Rite of Spring,* persists in the relative out-of-field framings of the other component artworks. It has a sonic frame that is predominantly durational but is also spatial. Its presence establishes an affecting haecceity within *The Long Take*, as it composes with other components. It establishes a different rite of spring.

The Long Take potentially has another framing in an out-of-field, which when *Another Rite of Spring* suddenly ceases, sound's leaking into the artwork from outside its frame are revealed. This potential affecting haecceity becomes available to the visitor as, on encountering the removal of the sound, they reterritorialise the artwork's framing. It is within these dynamic negotiations of framing that *The Long Take* relates to my experiences within Dia:Beacon, where deterritorialising sounds leaked into artworks from elsewhere. Relations between my own artwork and the Dia:Beacon artworks developed during my research, as my own artwork enabled me to experience and understand framing concepts that helped me to articulate the machinic processes of the Dia artworks. [51]

Within *The Long Take* there is an additional sonic component that consists of occasional sudden sounds of vehicles. These sounds act as sonsigns as they score the visitor's experience with a pure sound image that has no relation to other artwork components. [52] According to Deleuze a sonsign and its visual equivalent, an opsign "breaks the sensori-

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[50] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 10.
[51] Please refer to diagram earlier in this chapter (fig. 28).
[52] Deleuze sonsigns and their visual equivalent, opsigns are discussed in Chapter 3.

motor links, overwhelms relations and no longer lets itself be expressed in terms of movement, but opens directly on to time."[53] This component references the 'shoe event' that I experienced within Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors,* whereby its sudden occurrence, in the present moment, challenges and confuses my sensori-motor schema; for in having no immediate context, the sonic or visual image deterritorialises the visitor's framing of the artworks through durational and spatial experience.

Whereas sonsigns and opsigns function within or just outside an artwork's existing frame, other experiences in an artwork's 'out-of-field' are more distant, and vary between spatial/actual, and to the temporal/virtual experiences in the open whole (the universal becoming that itself cannot be framed).[54] By experiencing and then analysing the four Dia:Beacon artworks and by creating my own corresponding artwork that is also available to me to be experienced and analysed, I have come to realise that these framings are never fixed, that there is always a negotiation between what I experience, which may shock me and challenge what I understand through memories learned through the sensori-motor schema. The durational gaps of indeterminacy that arise in these sonsign situations are encounters that give rise to affection images and images of thought.

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[53] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.*, 218. See also my discussion of Sonsigns and Opsigns in Chapter 3.
[54] See my discussion of the open whole in Chapter 3.

Conclusion: Leaking and Gaps Subvert Framings

At Dia:Beacon, sounds leaking into frames and gaps in content within a frame revealed pure duration, causing ambiguous framings of the artworks. I have often utilised framing antinomies in my own practice. It is therefore, appropriate that, in turn, the incommensurability of different understandings of framing became the subject (or frame) for this research.

Framings impose limits on an artwork's content and isolates it from the world, but as I have discovered, this is never fully achieved, as there are always other framings that the artwork can relate to, some of which are within the artwork's notional frame and others that exist outside of it. Some of these framings were dynamically active, and took me outside and beyond the dialectical discourses strategised and propagated within these artworks. The question to me, has been whether these disruptions were incommensurable with the artwork or can be considered as components of my artwork experience, and if so, what do these disruptions contribute?

To try and answer this question I explored several framing models. In Chapter 2, I referred to Henri Bergson's theory of first person experience, in which temporal experience is sometimes mistakenly framed as spatial experience. I then introduced Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the assemblage and its complex interplay of territorial forces, where the act of framing upon the milieu bestows expressive qualities upon that which is framed—even if the frame is perceived as 'empty'. Dialectic, which I identified as a major component within my Dia:Beacon experiences, subsists within the assemblage. But, rather than sustaining a static antinomic loop, dialectic instead functions as a machinic component that acts dynamically within becomings, and in combination with other components, to cause deterritorialisations and

reterritorialisations of frame. Thus, the assemblage is a framing ontology that privileges the temporal over stasis and inertia.

I then examined framings within machinic processes: first, within the concept of the assemblage and its axis of alloys and their expressions and its territorial axis between stasis and inertia (with its tendency towards new becomings of framing through deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation); and second, through Deleuze's cinematic philosophy in which different framings act upon each other. Deleuze's cinema philosophy draws on Bergson's movement-image, which develops Bergson's idea that duration tends to be translated into spatial experience. Deleuze also posits the time-image, in which, he suggests, pure durational experience comes to the fore, whereby we no longer experience a world based on a narrative held together by translations of time into spatial movement-images; rather, we are removed from our privileged position at the centre of a surrounding universe of images and we must renegotiate our relations to images through time.[1]

Within Deleuze's cinematic philosophy, contrasting movement and time-images present as a dialectic within non-linear montage, which we mentally reassemble in thought. For, as these images shift and reassemble in becomings, new thoughts arise. Thus, as I travelled through each Dia:Beacon artwork, I encountered a succession of movement-images and time-images as though within a single cinematic shot—a *long take*—which accumulated as metacinematic montage.

Sound was also an image that figured significantly within this dynamic. Importantly, for sonic framings to be sensed, I needed to orient myself towards temporal framings while

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[1] All framings become de-linked from each other and hierarchies of framings break down, whereby relations between framings are no longer discernable. See my discussion of the time-image in Chapter 3.

maintaining an awareness of the spatial.[2] The four Dia:Beacon artworks, I argue, initiated just such an engagement with both temporal frame and spatial framings. In my experience, sound quantitatively and qualitatively occupied and described multiple ambiguous spatial and temporal frames. For example: sometimes sounds were sensed occurring outside the artwork, in what Deleuze calls the 'out-of-field', as sounds emanating throughout Dia:Beacon and its surrounds leaked into the artwork frame. This susurrus contained a temporal flux of events and activities, as well as echoes and reverberations of unseen spaces. Thus, while an artwork's geometric and material framings were decentering me, other 'out-of-field' framings caused reterritorialisations that recentered me, and my artwork relations, within the heterogeneous flux of the world outside the artwork frame. I conclude that at Dia:Beacon, out-of-field sonic framings allowed me to territorialise spaces that were virtually present to me. These spaces also deterritorialised the artwork's notional frame. Thus, sound provided further antinomic complexity to the virtual spaces that I was experiencing visually through mirrors, opaque reflections and screen-like surfaces. In this way sound rendered new and alternative experiences within these artworks that were unavailable to ocular-centric encounters.[3]

I suggest that haecceities can be considered a particular qualitative manifestation of Bergson's time and space composite (that he considers fundamental to first person experience).[4] I conclude that my experiences of haecceities—while not formally part of Deleuze's cinematic theory—occurred within a cinematic consciousness, as the notional frame of frames of each of the four Dia:Beacon artworks entered into dynamic compositional relations with other frames, including sonic and out-of-field framings. Haecceities, as individuations, provide a conceptual model for how qualitative audition

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[2] Refer to my discussion of John Cage's composition *4'33"* in Chapter 5 in relation to framing thresholds.
[3] Refer to my discussion and conclusions in regard to my encounter with Richter's artwork in Chapter 5.
[4] Refer to my discussion of Bergson's theory of first person experience in Chapter 2.

can compose with other framed components to create affects and effects. I conclude that my sensing of haecceities is another way in which durational encounters revealed experiences within these artworks that were unavailable within a purely ocular-centric encounter.

The powers and forces of events (that were mainly sonic), surprised and unnerved me as they leaked into and out of physical frames, and made me interrogate how they affected me and my relation to the artwork. Deleuze, in his cinema philosophy, calls these events sonsigns and opsigns. These are time-images in which a pure force of duration and thought becomes perceptible.[5] These sounds also, through their 'timefulness', articulated 'nested' perceptions of space (as one space was perceived within the other), as was the case in my experience of Richter's artwork, thus challenging the authority of the artwork's 'frame of frames'.[6] I suggest that this is another example of sound providing new experiences within the artwork encounter that exists outside of ocular-centric framing.[7]

Thus, sound was an essential element of my experience of the artworks, through its temporal framing: its sonifying of space, as a sonic image, and an object through which forces and affecting powers were communicated.

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[5] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*, 69. Please refer to my discussion of Deleuze's cinema philosophy in Chapter 3.

[6] Here, I am referring to the experience in which I heard sounds from throughout the Dia:Beacon complex that had become focused within Richter's space. These sounds, reflecting off the hard surfaces in their 'timefulness', enabled me to perceive two spaces at once: the expanses of the whole Dia:Beacon complex and the spatiality of Richter's room. Refer to my discussion of 'timefulness' in Chapter 4.

[7] The 'stone event' was one such experience in which auditory framing collided with visual framing, creating perceptual confusion between presentness and unknowability, which then destabilised the monumental authority of Richter's artwork. For sound, through its phenomenological timefulness, created a sonic rendering of Richter's space, which undermined the virtualities of his large gray mirrors. Here sound's agency, was instantaneous. The immediacy of the sound created an 'antinomic nexus event' that challenged Bergson's experiential composite of duration and space.

Another finding is that memory was, and remains a crucial component of my durational experiences at Dia:Beacon: both in relation to *experiencing* during my encounters, as I sensed the passing of time; and where, according to Bergson, memories form part of our perception of the present. But also as a store of virtual realities and imaginings that are sometimes applied to reify the sonic image.

As the four Dia:Beacon artworks are relatively simple forms with minimal content, it has been relatively easy for me to reconstruct each artwork in my mind from images in my memory. However, Bergson suggests that revisiting memories tends to render them as fixed images, without movement. It is also difficult to regain and describe past perceptions of naïve experience, especially the affects of that experience. Thus, retrospectively assigning concepts to 'fixed' memories of my experiences has been a challenge to this analysis.

Gaps in my understanding, as framed in the Dia:Beacon artworks, can be thought of as gaps in directed thought (for I am not told by the artwork what to think). I suggest that this opens up access to new undirected non-logical thought, through which original creative discoveries, ideas and understandings can occur. I suggest that the four Dia:Beacon artworks employed particular strategies of encounter, through which I experienced these gaps and antinomic nexus events, which caused new thoughts to arise.

Thus, in these artwork encounters there is a dialectic of machinic images (visual and sonic, movement-images and time-images) that I can draw on and where cinematic montage becomes as a direct tool of thought through which I work out my own logic. My artwork *The Long Take* is also available in this way: as a 'machine for making sense.' For *The Long Take* manifests contrasting machinic processes within its visual, spatial, sonic and durational components, and the resulting dialectic of images is encountered through becomings within montage of undirected thought.

In everyday life, framing constantly subjectifies us. We are framed but we also like to place ourselves within frames that are occupied by others. Facebook is just one manifestation of this cybernetic framing, within which, users are held in endless feedback loops of self-confirming presence. Considered in this way, framing is a conservative concept as it provides a way to keep us contained, and we tend to relate to people who share the same views and concepts as ourselves. It keeps us from seeing outside the frame. Art installations also centre us, whereby we can become preoccupied with our own subjectivity. Artworks, such as the four Dia:Beacon artworks, attempt to decenter us from our privileged position, but in doing so they paradoxically become machines for self-confirming presence. Smithson's framings of his non-sites and sites exploit this paradox, for it is the viewer's negotiation of the contradictions encountered in Smithson's framings that provides his artworks with their temporal structure.

However, *hearing* and *listening* is another matter, for these are fluid durational becomings through which framing can qualitatively change. My awareness of acousmatic sound leaking into my frame, or of disconcerting sonsigns that suddenly privilege time over space, indicates an awareness that the frame has already changed. Experiencing duration through listening to our surrounding environment is a 'becoming' that necessitates that we bypass immediate understanding and content fulfillment, and open ourselves to new logics of thought.

In 2014 there was an advertising campaign, organised by the RSL (The Returned Service's League of Australia) that invited the public to phone a special paid phone number to access a recording of the minute of silence, including on the days leading up to Remembrance Day (normally a minute of silence is observed by members of the public at 11am on the day). This transaction involved the customer exchanging money for the novelty of experiencing a one-minute framing of pure duration. The 'pay-off' for the client is that audiences, having exchanged money, might actually experience the value of

the minute by qualitatively reflecting on those who have fought and died for us in wars (see fig. 39).

Figure 39. A poster for *The Minute of Silence*, Photo: Gary Warner (used with permission)

Figure 40. Robert Smithson, *Dead Tree* (1969) at the 2015 Venice Biennale, with photographers. Photo: David Chesworth.

At the Venice Biennale in 2015, I noticed visitors photographing their reflection in a 'mirror displacement' arranged within Smithson's *Dead Tree* (1969), an artwork reconstructed for the Venice Biennale's *All the World's Futures*, curated by Okwui Enwesor (see fig. 40).[8] The group of photographers had to stoop down and precisely adjust their positioning as they attempted to center themselves within the mirror's frame.

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[8] Smithson often used the displacing effects of mirrors by positioning mirrors so that they directed unexpected or random reflections towards the viewer. One example is his *Yucatan Mirror Displacements 1-9* series (1969). The viewer of the artwork was usually deliberately excluded from these reflections.

Their playful act can also be considered as an act of renegotiating and reclaiming subjectivity within the artwork encounter, which are the very relations that Smithson's artwork attempts to displace.

In the Dia:Beacon artworks, visitor self-absorption figures strongly. When subjectivity is problematised, we feel a strong need to renegotiate our understanding of the world so that our centeredness within the universe of images that surround each of us, is maintained. Indeed, this human need has provided the main impetus for my research. For speculative realist philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, human subjectivity is a symptom of what he calls correlationism.[9] His term describes a propensity for the world in all its facets and complexities to be seen, described and so 'known', solely through human perception and interaction. The Dia:Beacon artworks play out through this correlational circle, where, as a visitor, objects and ephemeral experiences (that Fried calls *Objecthood*) are oriented towards us; or we imagine what is deliberately withheld from us. We attempt to know and understand things through our perceptions and reasoning, and if we don't understand, then our imagination can fill in the gaps. Speculative Realist philosophy posits an approach to analysing experience that favors respect for the agency of objects within the world and their shifting qualities, as an alternative to experiences of objects described through their direct consequence on human subjective and objective relations.

This desire to rediscover and *project* objects or indeed *objecthood* is possibly a strategy already imbued within the minimalist roots of these Dia artworks. For, these are, for the most part, post-object works, in which the ephemeral has replaced the object. Nonetheless, as I experienced at Dia:Beacon, the object, once re-introduced, is injected

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[9] Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude : An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency* (New York : Continuum, 2008).

with agency that can quickly undermine the ephemeral. This can happen via the materiality of sounds leaking into a frame from 'elsewheres', and also, in my case, by an object that had wedged itself in the sole of my shoe.

Meillassoux speculates on an un-correlated ancestral time that humans cannot access. It is worth speculating on whether, in my Dia visit, certain events took place, which I, as a human, did not access—if such a speculation is possible.

The stone event in Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* goes some of the way. The small stone caught in my shoe gets accidently flicked against the gallery wall making a sudden sound that sonically scores the artwork's surface. The cause of this object-on-object event is the stone and the artwork *acting on each other*; that I happened to experience it as a sonic event within an artwork engagement is inconsequential to the action itself. Many sounds we experience have a non-human causality (such as the sound of wind caused by air acting on leaves and ocean waves crashing on the beach), but while sounds of wind and ocean have become imbued with meanings for humans, the stone-on-metal event at Dia:Beacon withheld its meaning. What the stone in shoe event did do however, was to emphatically introduce the ontic materiality of the *unknowable* object into the ephemeral artwork encounter, and this occurred in the realm of the sonic.

Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* possibly goes a step further in revealing a non-correlationist realm of 'experience'. For, when the introduced sonic drone abruptly ceases, I was left with a memory of 'something' that existed only through my perception of its absence. Only retrospectively then, did I become aware of the existence of something (in this case a sound). Was Neuhaus's sonic drone, then, an un-correlated sound that existed without us ever having accessed it? Not necessarily, for the sound, while not consciously heard, was, I argue, still sensed as a compositional component of a haecceity.

We might consider Richter's gray mirrors. Placed as they are in a geometric grid within Richter's artwork space, each mirror faces-off against a mirror on the opposing wall. There is potentially an uncorrelated time-image in each mirror consisting of infinite reflections of the opposing mirror. However, Richter doesn't allow this, for each mirrors' grayness gradually absorbs the opposing reflection. Also, the mirrors are mounted so that each is angled, slightly obliquely to the wall, so that they don't entirely reflect the opposing mirror. The mirrors therefore function with degree of human intent: to appear to look or listen outwards, in an image that is reminiscent of a radio telescope that is listening into space.

Perhaps then it rests with Smithson's artwork. As a non-site, *Gravel Mirrors with Cracks and Dust* always evades attempts to correlate it with an actual site. It is deliberately non-correlational. Its mirrors do not acknowledge the visitor's presence, angled, as they are, to reflect empty floor and wall spaces. Smithson employs both antinomy and frame to set up correlational expectations only to ultimately subvert them.

Ultimately, my analysis of the four Dia:Beacon artworks together with the filming, assembling and subsequent analysis of my installation artwork, *The Long Take,* demonstrates to me that, as a human, I am constantly constructing the world that surrounds me through perceptions, thoughts and actions, involving visual and sonic framings that compete for attention, and that this task is always tenuous and can quickly become undermined as I encounter antinomic experiences that reveal incommensurabilities of space and duration. Thus, as an artist who has always been preoccupied by visual *and* sonic framings, my research has been a revelation, in understanding that both limits *and* antinomies are always active components within experience.

In my encounters at Dia:Beacon it was within duration that I sensed sounds, as they occupied and framed those durations. Sounds were sometimes deliberately listened to

and sometimes indirectly sensed within haecceities. Within the artworks, sounds sometimes articulated actual sources and causes, whereas other sounds triggered sensing and imaginings of spaces, heterogeneous temporalities, and qualitative becomings.

Through my encounters with the four post-minimalist and post-conceptual artworks I considered machinic processes, whereby artwork components that incorporated objects, materials, affects and forces (including duration, sound and haecceities), continually acted on each other within my experiencing.

Thus, my research has enabled me to articulate new interpretive frameworks through which the four Dia:Beacon artworks and my own artworks can be understood. Concepts uncovered in this research, including those that sit within Deleuze's cinematic theory, have provided me with new ways to understand encounters, experiences and thinking that will inform my ongoing art practice across sonic and visual mediums in the visual arts.

David Chesworth

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APPENDIX 1–3

Appendix 1

Essay published in on-line, peer-reviewed journal *Seismograf. Special issue*: *Sound Art Matters.* November 2017.

Appendix 2

Artworks with notes that were part of my research but were not submitted due to lack of space

Appendix 3

Components of *The Long Take* exhibited publicly as stand-alone artworks by Sonia Leber and David Chesworth artwork that references the thesis research.

Appendix 1

Essay published in on-line, peer-reviewed journal *Seismograf. Special issue*: *Sound Art Matters.* November 2017.

Of interest to exegesis readers is the subsection also titled *A Temple of Haecceities* which backgrounds and discusses the Dia Foundation's early ties to religion and how this may have influenced the design of Dia:Beacon.

Abstract:

Dia:Beacon is a large contemporary art museum in upstate New York that exhibits minimalist, conceptual and post-minimalist art by significant American and European artists, who were most active in the second half of the twentieth century. This paper investigates sonic and durational experiences that formed a major part of my encounter with three artworks: Gerhard Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003); Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010) and Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* (2005). I explore how framed experiences of sound and duration (which I qualitatively endured), enable experiential insights not readily available through spatial and visual modalities.

A Temple of Sonic Haecceities

Enduring Richter, Ryman and Neuhaus at Dia:Beacon

Dia:Beacon is a large contemporary art museum in upstate New York that exhibits minimalist, conceptual and post-minimalist art by significant American and European artists, who were most active in the second half of the twentieth century. These works, with their framings of reduced content, caused spatial and durational encounters that emphasised different acts of *experiencing*. The title of this paper alludes to my perceiving of sounds and pure durational experiences that were surprising, occasionally disconcerting and even distracting to me. In retrospect, I consider that my endurance of these temporal encounters opened up an awareness of the role of sound in durational framing within my experiences of the artworks and thus, within experience itself. This essay considers insights revealed through durational and sonic experiences of the Dia:Beacon artworks that might not be available through spatial and visual modalities. The artworks are Gerhard Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* (2003), Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia:Beacon* (2010) and Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* (2005).

Figure 1. Gerhard Richter, *Six Gray Mirrors,* 2003. Dia Art Foundation; Gift of Louise and Leonard Riggio and Mimi and Peter Haas. © Gerhard Richter. Photo: Bill Jacobson Studio, New York**.**

Gerhard Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors* is situated in a single room in which six large gray mirrors hang as rectilinear repetitions on the four walls. They have a uniform, industrial finish, reminiscent of a Donald Judd artwork. The forms are called mirrors but also reminded me of paintings. Their opaque, grayness reflected a distanced virtual world that included my reflection and the opaque clearstory windows within his space. Their large forms appeared minimalist and monumental. With the absence of anyone else in the room, seeing myself dimly reflected in the gray mirrors I felt that I was the focal point of an omnipresent and unknowable panoptic gaze.

After some time, I became aware of sounds coming from beyond Richter's room. These were sounds of other visitors moving in unseen spaces, the periodic hissing of air vents, doors slamming and sounds emanating from other artworks throughout Dia:Beacon. I also heard the rumble of trains passing close by.

While encountering Richter's installation I became aware of a small stone lodged in the tread of my right shoe. Without thinking, I quickly scuffed my foot on the floor to free the stone. This barely-considered action propelled the stone across the polished concrete floor at great speed. The stone hit a thin metal skirting board along the wall's edge with unexpected force, causing a sharp, loud snapping sound that reverberated off all the hard surfaces. Initially, I was not sure what had happened. It was as though the room itself had produced a moment of self-articulation.

Robert Ryman's Installation at Dia:Beacon

Figure 2.

Figure. 3.

Figure 4. *Figures 2,3,4.* Robert Ryman, *Installation at Dia Beacon,* installation detail, Dia:Beacon. The Greenwich Collection, Ltd. ©Robert Ryman/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. Photo: Bill Jacobson Studio, New York. Courtesy the Greenwich Collection, Ltd.

Robert Ryman's *Installation at Dia:Beacon* is spread over five rooms, variously sized, that can be visited in succession. Thirty-two predominantly white paintings hang on white walls, individually and groups. One large painting sits on the floor. Ryman's title suggests that the artwork is an installation in its entirety; nonetheless it consists of an installed collection of paintings. For a naive visitor, that is, someone who (like me) was relying on intuition rather than any prior knowledge of what to expect, it was apparent that many of the paintings surfaces had no discernible figure, symbol or expressive content. Their framed spatial voids caused confusion. The 'empty' paintings appeared to be collectively surveilling me. It was unnerving.

The experience of whiteness was immersive. Ryman comments in a 1986 interview in *Art News* that, "the white is just a means of exposing other elements of the painting ... White enables other things to become visible" (Colaissi & Schubert 2009). The colour white, then, allows the viewer to look through and beyond or into the paintings' surfaces, in search of these "other things". For me, the effect of this whiteness was both spatial *and* durational. It also suggested the experience of noise; 'white noise' in particular, which, technically, is a type of sound comprised of all possible frequencies heard simultaneously, over a given bandwidth (Brown 1983). White noise can be described as a featureless thick hissing that appears to surround the listener. White noise can be compared to the colour white, which itself contains all possible frequencies of the visual spectrum. White contains no information, and so, provides no sonic perspective, direction or sense of depth. It is uncoded and is omnipresent. Noise does however contain duration and creates sensation. Thinking back, I wasn't sure if I'd actually heard the noise or imagined it retrospectively.

Figure 5. Entrance to Dia:Beacon. Photo: David Chesworth

Max Neuhaus's Time Piece Beacon

Later in the afternoon just as I was leaving Dia:Beacon to catch the train back to New York City, I became aware of a faint continuous sound emanating from somewhere inside the Dia complex. The droning sound was lurking quietly in the background. Its location or cause was hard to pin down. While the drone had some musical characteristics, it did not resemble the sound of any musical instrument or sound-making device I was familiar with. It was gradually becoming louder, and appeared to follow me as I walked around. I couldn't tell whether the sound was from a single distant loud source, or from many

sources close by. I didn't want to miss my train, so I left the building to make my way to the station. As I walked outside the building and through the landscaped gardens I could still hear it, now apparently leaking out from the building. As I walked further away the sound appeared to become even louder. It was as though the whole building was emanating sound. I walked from the grounds, out of sight of the building and could still hear the sound. Then the sound suddenly stopped, creating a gap in my experiencing of the world round me. There was a sense that something was missing. As I listened and looked at the world, it was as though it was being revealed to me for the first time.

Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* occurs seven minutes before each hour, when a drone, designed to blend in with its surroundings, is gradually introduced throughout the Dia:Beacon complex and surrounding gardens. The idea is that as the sound imperceptivity increases in volume it remains unnoticed by the public, until, after a few minutes, the sound abruptly ceases. Visitors, who have become accustomed to the sound without actually consciously noticing it, experience its sudden absence and instantly become aware of the foregrounded ambience that remains. It is therefore the silencing of the sound that activates the visitor.

One factor that links these three works is their framing of apparent 'emptiness'. Philosopher Henri Bergson argues that gaps in our experiencing concern us as it impedes our knowledge of our surrounding world and its potential threats. We, and all animals, have developed brains that exploit this centre of indetermination. The brain *occupies* this gap as our thinking empowers us to make nuanced responses in order to act and adapt to new circumstances that will guarantee our survival. When encountering these three artworks at Dia:Beacon, the lack of translatable content within my framing of each artwork created such gaps in my experiencing. In order to maintain experiential continuity, I searched elsewhere for content, looking and listening beyond the 'empty' surfaces of the artworks. Often, in Richter's space, when visitors sat on the benches

provided for contemplation, they pulled out and gazed at their mobile phones in their apparent search of content.

In my encounter with *6 Gray Mirrors,* time passed as I experienced a gap in content, and my attention turned to ambient sounds entering Richter's room from spaces elsewhere in the Dia:Beacon building. Also, in Ryman's *Installation at Dia Beacon*, as time passed it felt as though Individual 'blank' paintings loitering in groups were staring back at me. I imagined hidden depths behind their voided surfaces. Added to this was a feeling that the whiteness of the exhibition had taken the form of a persistent sonic noise.

Both Ryman's and Richter's deployment of minimal content has the effect of foregrounding the framings themselves, rather than what is framed. In the case of Richter's installation, the mounted forms, each orientated slightly differently, were clearly alluding to an art exhibition. However, there was little to be gained by viewing each one independently. Even in their capacity as mirrors, I could only make out dim gray reflections. Collectively, Richter's mirrors were like membranes through which I felt the artwork was sensing and surveilling its own space.

Richter says, of his gray mirrors: "I'm trying to bring together the most disparate and mutually contradictory elements, alive and viable, in the greatest possible freedom. No paradises" (in Buchloh 2009, p.34). Thus, Richter's "freedom" avoids any transcendent trajectory or outcome. This denial of outcome consigned my encounter to a kind of perceptual limbo. It was as though all three artists weren't so much interested in content, but rather, wanted to make me aware of my own act of *experiencing*.

Bergson's Space/Duration Composite

Bergson, in *Time and Free Will,* suggests we perceive experiences as a composite, where the two essential components of experience: duration and space, are blended, so that we don't really notice them as separate components (Bergson 1913). Within this composite,

Bergson argues, duration, which is qualitative and space, which is quantitative can be confused, whereby we tend to treat *duration* (in which we have time to feel a succession of differences in kind) in terms of *space* (which can only be measured). Bergson suggests that the advent of clock-based time is one example of this, where the minutes and seconds are seen to pass as arbitrary yet standardised movements in space on the clock dial. Thus, the clock dial quantifies, spatially, our qualitative sensing of pure duration.

Perhaps then, my self-conscious feelings that the artworks were surveilling me—together with my brain's search for meaningful content that took me beyond the artwork frames into imagined voids and virtual spaces—was my imaginative masking of my *endurance* of the artworks' empty screens and their lack of content. My time spent within the artwork experience was sensed qualitatively but misrecognised quantitatively via spatial imaginings of depths, voids, and virtualities (Here, the term 'virtual' is not referring to cyberspace but to an imaginary, speculative space or place that exists in effect or essence, if not in fact or actuality). Differences in kind experienced through duration became *confused* within the experiential composite and were translated spatially as imagined extensities (hidden spaces) within the artworks' site.

Bergson's theory may also be applied to our understandings of sound within experience. Sound *lives* within a duration and frames duration with its material presence. Several sounds when occurring concurrently score duration's inherent plurality. Most sound that I experienced at Dia:Beacon was via acousmatic listening, where I felt the effect of a sound without necessary knowing its source or cause. Brian Kane in his book *Sound unseen: acousmatic sound in theory and practice* (2014, p. 147) refers to a sound's "acousmaticity" in which a sound's source or cause is "underdetermined". This opens up a gap between a sound's effect and its source or cause, which can be unsettling, especially in relation to the spatial and visual world that we are simultaneously perceiving. This can lead to experiential antinomies, where what we see and what we

hear doesn't necessarily correlate. There is a human desire to close this antinomic gap by searching for possible sources and causes. Kane suggests:

The security at work in territorial listening depends on the rapid reduction of a sonic effect to its potentially predatory source, but acousmatic underdetermination forecloses the easy attainment of such security. There are always degrees of acousmaticity. (Kane 2014, p. 149)

Kane (partly echoing Bergson's theory of a space/duration composite) points out that we sometimes draw on our imagination to invent a sound's source or cause when it is not visually apparent to us. One historical example Kane provides is of the ways in which the noises that accompanied natural events, like earth tremors, "often embellished natural events with ominous forces and supernatural causes" (2014, p. 4).

In *Sound Unseen,* Kane refers to Michel Chion's theory of the cinematic *acousmetre,* which is sometimes employed in films, and which exploits the anxiety arising from the gap of understanding that ensues through acoustic underdetermination. The acousmetre is a sound, often a voice, that "floats or drapes itself around the on-screen characters" (2014, p. 149). According to Chion the acousmetre has three powers and one gift:

First, the acousmetre has the power of *seeing all;* second, the power of *omniscience;* and third, the *omnipotence* to act on the situation. Let us add that in many cases there is also a gift of *ubiquity*—the acousmetre seems to be able to be anywhere ..." (Chion 1994, p. 129-130)

I suggest that the acousmatic nature of certain sounds that leaked into the Richter and Ryman artwork frames—in particular, the sound of Max Neuhaus's drone, which can be heard within Richter's artwork—operated as a kind of acousmetre. However, these ideas don't quite explain my experiences at Dia:Beacon. For while I felt surveilled within these

artworks and sensed affect, I don't think these feelings can be explained away by referring to lurking phantoms and the acousmetre.

A Temple of Sonic Haecceities

The three Dia:Beacon artists create antinomic experiences through their use of objects that are simultaneously painting-like and mirror-like, also through experiences where temporal and spatial realms do not correlate, and where the *actual* competes with the *virtual* for attention. These complex artwork framings are nested within the larger frame of Dia:Beacon itself. Dia:Beacon opened in 2003 and is housed in a large single story building that was formerly a box-making and printing factory for Nabisco. Its floor and basement area, covering almost thirty thousand square meters, has been transformed into showrooms for artists. Landscaped gardens surround the building (In the West Garden we can experience Louise Lawler's *Bird Calls* (1972), a soundscape of bird sounds derived from the names of famous contemporary male artists). Artist Robert Irwin, together with architecture firm OpenOffice, is credited with the overall design. According to Dia's former director Michael Govan, who oversaw Dia:Beacon's construction, "Irwin helped Dia consider the design of the Beacon project in experiential and environmental terms as a totality" (Govan 2015). In another discussion Govan suggests that "the result was intended as a series of immersive experiences of individual artists installations surrounded by Irwin's mediating exterior" (Cook & Govan 2003, p. 39). The idea was "to not control the path of the visitor but to provide tools and clues to keep them oriented" (2003, p. 38). As a "totality" Dia:Beacon demonstrates that it is also an installation with similar intensions to the installation artworks contained within. For, as Claire Bishop (2005, p. 6) reminds us, "in a work of installation art, space and the ensemble of elements within it, are regarded in their entirety as a singular entity".

Dia:Beacon's architectural spaces and the artworks they contain appear to activate each other as the Dia:Beacon site engages with what Miwon Kwon (2002, p. 13) describes as

Minimalism's challenge to the "hermeticism of the autonomous art object" and subsequent deflection of an artwork's meaning to its space of presentation. Here the site perhaps goes a step further in neutralising what Kwon calls the "idealist hermeticism of the space of presentation itself" (2002, p. 13). This neutralisation is apparent in the use of open-plan design and by a reliance on sunlight, which enters all gallery spaces via factory skylights plus new large windows retro-fitted to the existing perimeter walls. Rooms and objects are bathed in sunlight from a realm beyond the artwork's frame. Dia, in fact, is a Greek word meaning 'through' or 'conduit' (Merriam-Webster dictionary).

Dia:Beacon is a quiet space, exhibiting stillness. Its visual and sonic ambience reminded me of being in a church or a museum. Its long galleries serve as ambulatories that enable temporal, processional contemplations of large minimalist artworks, often spread out across the floor, by artists such as Dan Flavin, Walter De Maria and Robert Irwin. This church-like ambience is no accident. Dia founders and original benefactors had ties to religion, some to Catholicism, others to Sufism, a form of Islam. Religious artworks were purchased and commissioned by Dia benefactors (the Rothko Chapel paintings, for example). In 1980, The Dia founders opened a Sufi mosque in a Chelsea building, originally intended as an art gallery, complete with Dan Flavin light works. Dia's idea was to use art to provide a kind of religious experience, to transform the world. These connections can be explored further in Bob Colacello's Vanity Fair essay, *Remains of the Dia* (1996).

Many artworks at Dia:Beacon have their own dedicated, chapel-like rooms that separate them from other works and the world-at-large. This includes the Richter and the Ryman installations. Cultural theorist Claire Colebrook writes:

A picture in a gallery or even a stained-glass image in a cathedral may well have been isolated from the world of functional action and knowledge so that art in general is expressed in distinction from the world of habit, connections and work. [T]he power of

art [is] to stand alone, to be released from the human eye's tendency to synthesise its experiences into a world of its own. (Colebrook 2006, p. 65)

Often though, when visiting individual artist rooms within Dia:Beacon, I was aware of distant sounds whose reverberation sonically rendered the whole building's voluminous form. As visitors congregated in various parts of the building, their audible expressive presence was dynamic and sometimes chaotic. Instead of perceiving these sounds as individual quantified events I sensed them collectively as a singular, heterogeneous susurrus. As this susurrus leaked into artwork spaces, through gaps and doorways, it denied the artwork its complete isolation. The susurrus reframed my experience of the artworks as it introduced the sonorities of a lurking world into the artwork's frame.

Not everyone noticed the susurrus, but it was present in all the Dia artwork spaces. I wasn't always listening to these sounds; they didn't preoccupy me. If anything, I sensed them as a quality, which is to say, I *heard* them, but as they were judged as non-threatening, I did not consciously *listen* to them. They did not attract my conscious attention as quantifiable events. However, they were nonetheless sensed as part of my artwork encounter, and contributed to a particular kind of durational framing; a 'becoming' that implicated the temporal flux of a surrounding evolving world. These kinds of framings, I suggest, can be called haecceities. In *A Thousand Plateaus* under the telling heading "Memories of a Haecceity", Deleuze and Guattari explain:

They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of *movement and rest* between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. [...] not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfills ... Tales must contain haecceities that are not simply emplacements, but concrete *individuations* that have a status of their own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 304)

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Deleuze and Guattari suggest that haecceities are "molecular" in that they comprise machinic components that act on each other in different ways. Dia:Beacon's haecceities involve the sensing of sound comprised of excited pressure waves of 'movement and rest', and so these movements are between components but also between molecules of air, sensed as they impacted on my ear drums. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that haecceities are not things in themselves; rather they are composed from their components: objects, sounds, experiences, virtual images and events. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 304) suggest that a haecceity, as an individuating composition, possesses "a perfect independence lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject". Haecceities are non-personal: "a season, rainfall, wind, an hour, air polluted by noxious particles" (1988, p. 304). Perhaps, to this, I can add the sound of a refrigerator motor as it softly permeates the house.

I suggest that an engagement with any artwork, if framed durationally, can be considered as a haecceity that has "capacities to affect and be affected" (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 304). As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, temporal and spatial encounters with haecceities take place through sensing "concrete individuations that have a status of their own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects" (1987, p. 304). At Dia:Beacon, these "things" and "subjects" are the artwork components and the building itself. I suggest that the susurrus that leaks into the artwork, whether quantitatively listened to, or sensed as a quality, became an important component of Dia:Beacon's haecceities. These sounds, as I have described, include the collective noises of human gatherings, but also, the periodical noises of Dia:Beacon's air-conditioning systems that individually turn on and off throughout the day, or the sounds from distant artworks that leak into the frames of an artwork.

These sounds possess 'acousmaticity', where their identity is underdetermined. Thus, they can sometimes be sensed as panoptic, omniscient, and omnipotent, like an

acousmetre. One artwork that demonstrates these qualities is Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon*, both when Neuhaus's sonic drone is listened to, and when its quality is felt as it leaks into other artist's rooms. It was in this sense that my experience of Neuhaus's artwork, and even the sounds of air-conditioning, sometimes combined with artwork components to form haecceities. The only difference between Neuhaus's sonic drone and air-conditioning is their respective qualities and intensities of air movement. Thus, haecceities, while often quite subtle, can contribute provocative and ambiguous qualities and affects to an artwork experience.

I suggest that haecceities, especially those that included a sonic component, actively reframed my experiences at Dia:Beacon, as their added underdetermined acousmatic sounds imparted qualities and implicated invisible territories outside the artwork's frame. It can therefore be argued that it wasn't each artist's space that registered as a whole unit of experience, but rather, Dia:Beacon itself, which behaved in its entirety like an installation artwork, just as its designer, artist Robert Irwin had intended.

The question then, is how did antinomic experiences that resulted from the breaking down of Bergson's space/duration composite, and which were delivered through a sound's acousmaticity, the acousmetre and the haecceity, impact on my experience of each of the three artworks? How did each of the three works embody one or more of these concepts?

Neither/Nor/Is - Richter's *6 Gray Mirrors*

While *enduring* Richter's artwork and its reduced content, my attention (or rather, my brain's search for content) shifted from the virtual spaces reflected in the gray mirrors to the virtuality of Dia:Beacon's sonic ambience that entered Richter's space via its two large entrances. Within Richter's room, hard surfaces focused and resonated this susurration. Thus the Richter's room reverberated its own *spatiality* and *within* this

focused ambience I could also discern the susurrus marking the larger institutional expanses of Dia:Beacon that were dynamically unfolding beyond the artwork. The soundscape subtly scored two worlds, where one spatial/durational composite was enfolded within the other.

This antinomic perception sonically replicated (and literally echoed) the functioning of Richter's six monumental mirror/painting forms, whose visual reflections created virtual spatial images situated beyond Richter's actual room, whereby the room had two extensities: an actual one and a virtual one. Thus, in my experience of Richter's work, my perceptions provided overlapping composites of duration and space, rendered in different experiential modalities: one in the visual realm and one within the sonic. This sensory (and conceptual) disjunction is precisely what made Richter's artwork so engaging for me.

Additionally, the sonic event, caused by the stone caught in my shoe, *scored* the complex susurrus persisting in Richter's room. When the stone hit the metal skirting board of Richter's room, in an instant the room's extensity lived within the sound's duration, framed in a beholding moment until the intense, short reverberation faded. The unexpected sound, heard acousmatically, interrupted established auditory and visual framings—real and virtual—creating a perceptual confusion and an exciting temporal space of *presentness* and unknowability. The artwork's prior staging of coherence and authority was destabilised as Bergson's experiential composite of space and duration was further split into realms of antinomic uncertainty.

Richter describes his gray mirrors dialectically as "a cross between a monochrome painting and a mirror, a 'Neither/Nor' – which is what I like about it" (Elger, Obrist, & Richter 2009, p.272). The sonic outburst of the stone flung from my shoe, however, was an event of undeniable certainty that was apparent to me in the present moment. I had no recourse to images in memory that might explain the event. The previously existing

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virtual worlds within the susurrus had now been replaced by a more urgent need to negotiate the threat of the sudden sound's intense presence and the underdetermined acousmatic gap that had opened up. The stone event's immediacy destabilised Richter's balanced contemplative dialectic of "Neither/Nor", to which I might now add the word "Is": Neither/Nor/Is.

There are several antinomic positions in play here. As it was me who inadvertently released the stone, I was thus present both as the proxy agent of the event but also as the recipient of the event's agency. The stone's 'sounding' against the skirting board became an avatar of my own objecthood, as the stone's impact on and subsequent reflection off the artwork's surface sonified my own agency within the artwork. The materiality of the stone's acousmatic sound (as well as the stone's actual materiality) refuted the ephemerality of the post-object artwork encounter. The stone event revealed the coexistence of duration and space, and the coexistence of theatrical *and* beholding moments. All these registers were simultaneously available to me within my encounter of Richter's artwork.

Becoming Noise - Ryman's Installation at Dia Beacon

My lack of interest in the content of Ryman's paintings during my 'naïve' walkthrough caused me to experience them as what Deleuze (1986, p. 109) calls 'any-space-whatevers', whereby, I lost my grip on the coordinates of the paintings' surfaces. Deleuze develops the term in *Cinema 1*: "Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible" (Deleuze 1986, p. 109). The paintings, as any-space-what-evers appeared as anonymous screens, thresholds or sensing membranes, which I looked

through, beyond or within. I imagined extensities of concealed presences, sensed surveillance and fabulated spatial voids. Thus, my endurance became spatial.

The whiteness of Ryman's paintings, together with their reduced symbolic content persisted throughout my encounter, causing my awareness to shift from individual, quantified spatial framings to a single, spatial and durational framing that encompassed all his paintings and the white rooms that contained them: a haecceity. I remembered my experience of Ryman's artwork, strangely, as a kind of noise.

Paul Hegarty (2007, p. 3) in his book *Noise/Music: A History,* suggests; "Noise is not an objective fact. It occurs in relation to perception–both direct (sensory) and according to presumptions made by the individual". A determination of noise is thus highly subjective. The concept of noise is problematic, for to assign it a label causes noise to become a recognisable thing, and so it is no longer a noise. As Douglas Kahn (1999, p. 25) eloquently states; "Noise can be understood in one sense to be that constant grating sound generated by the movement between the abstract and empirical". This process of 'becoming noise' activated the whole of Ryman's artwork as a single any-space-whatever, whereby virtual noise replaced my initial sensing of the artwork's emptiness and silence. I remembered (or imagined) this noise as a sensation where signaletic and symbolic information was absent. I could no longer perceive depth, nor could I sense external temporal flux. What remained was a pure form of sensation in which I only sensed my internal durational and spatial being. Thus, within my encounter of Ryman's artwork were encounters of various 'any-space-whatevers': the individual paintings, the overall whiteness of Ryman's rooms, and my qualitative sensing of 'becoming noise', which all became components of a haecceity.

But did my experience of 'becoming noise' manifest *virtually* or *actually* within this any-space-whatever? It is worth taking the time to answer this in two different ways. In 1968 an unnamed art critic in the magazine *Time,* spoke of how Ryman's paintings made

people "laugh outright" (1968, p. 70-77). Art critic Robert Storr has also commented that Ryman's white paintings can be "a trap … for those made chatty by silence" (Storr 1986, p. 74). Both anecdotes are perhaps trivial, however, they do illustrate that Ryman's paintings succeed in problematising engagement and confusing 'naïve' visitors. In these two brief examples, the visitor's vocal expressions are possibly attempts to mask the confusion of their encounter; where a painting's frame, perceived as empty of content, has confused subject/object relations. The Ryman viewing experience was not passive and spatial as the visitor might expect; rather the paintings' perceived lack of content caused the visitor to experience an active *durational* engagement, and whereby sensing an experiential void, they contribute their own expressive vocal content in order to 'fill' the void. Such utterances are effectively attempts to reterritorialise the perceived spatial and temporal lacunae. Could it also be that at Dia:Beacon, my own encounter of Ryman's paintings' whiteness, which left me searching for content, and the noise I seem to remember as being present, was *my* attempt to reterritorialise the durational experience of the any-space-whatevers of Ryman's installation; not with chatter or laughter, but with a memory, a haecceity containing a *virtual* 'becoming noise'? If so, then my experience of noise can be thought of as my translation of the emptiness of Ryman's white paintings from a qualitative, durational experience into quantitative white noise.

The second answer to the question regarding whether the noise was a *virtual* or *actual* thing became apparent when I revisited Dia:Beacon in 2016. Encountering the Ryman rooms again and listening more intently this time, I became aware of the actual presence of noise. Indeed, there was actual 'white noise' that slowly increased in intensity as I walked through the spaces. On investigation, I discovered noise emanating from a large air-conditioning duct located just outside the southern entrance to Ryman's spaces. What I had hitherto considered as a *virtual* 'becoming noise' was, in fact, an *actual* 'becoming noise'. For the noise of air conditioning (which is actually occasionally quite intense in certain parts of Dia:Beacon) had been sensed qualitatively as a compositional

element of an individuated haecceity. My Ryman experience thus included sonic and durational components that were situated outside the artwork's physical framing, and which had become components of a haecceity that composed and persisted within the artwork experience.

Figure 6. Large air-conditioning vents outside the southern entrance to Ryman's exhibition spaces. Photo: David Chesworth.

Before, During, After – Neuhaus's Durations

Max Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* is heard just before each hour and is experienced throughout the Dia:Beacon complex and gardens. The work is remarkable in how it caused me to negotiate spatial and durational framing. Cox, writing about *Time Piece Beacon* draws on Michael Fried's critique of minimalist art, in which Fried accuses

Minimalist artworks of having a theatrical and durational presence within the space of the encounter (Cox 2009). Cox also makes interesting comparisons between Max Neuhaus's and John Cage's compositional methodologies, by discussing how Cage's *4'33"* also problematises Bergson's durational spatial composite, including the title, in which the duration of the work is quantified. Cox considers the Neuhaus artwork a prime example of the type of installation artworks starting to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s that transition beyond a reliance on the art object, and that these works instead emphasise ephemeral occurrences within duration and space, artists like Dan Graham, Robert Morris and Bruce Nauman, for example, and conceptualist artists like Joseph Kosuth and Lawrence Weiner. This is also apparent in Richter's experiments with framings of glass and mirrors begun in the 1960s, which culminated in his Gray Mirror artworks. For Cox, this ephemerality is particularly apparent in *Time Piece Beacon*, where, "[the] temporality and ephemerality of sound allow it to bypass objecthood and the instantaneity of opticality" (2009, p. 122). *Time Piece Beacon* primarily engages not with objects and our gaze, but with our sense of lived time and duration.

Memory is crucial to our experience of duration, for we are aware of duration's persistence as it passes from our present into our past. However, in *Time Piece Beacon* I found that my memory could not be relied on, and this was disconcerting. In my experience, I never actually heard Neuhaus's introduced drone begin, rather, the sound became apparent to me at some point as it became louder and registered on my conscious sense of hearing. I suggest that prior to consciously listening to it, the sonic drone, as a seemingly innocuous compositional element, was, in fact, being sensed as an affecting quality. Even as the sonic drone became louder I didn't necessarily perceive it as a discrete thing. That the sound *was* present to me, even if I was not consciously aware of it, only became evident when it suddenly ceased and I noticed its absence. Or rather, I noticed the absence of *something,* and I could not say what this was. Only retrospectively was I aware of the sound's existence although I had previously felt its affecting force

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within a haecceity. Thus, I was left with a memory of something through a perception of its absence, not its presence.

With the sudden removal of Neuhaus's introduced drone, I had a new sensation that was individuated within a new haecceity. A durational void emerged as Bergson's experiential composite broke down into its component parts of duration and space. The spatial realm suddenly provided me with a confusing quantitative expression of the qualitative sonic void. As well, I was left with a memory of the previous haecceity (when the sonic drone *was* sounding).

Thus, in *Time Piece Beacon,* duration was experienced in two ways: firstly, where I retrospectively contemplated one haecceity that had passed in relation to another that remained; and secondly, once Neuhaus's continuous sound ended, I lost my sensing of the continuum provided by the drone and, perhaps for the first time, became aware instead of my immediate spatial surroundings and relations to the unfolding flux of durations articulated through different sounds: sounds of unseen traffic, birds, voices, insects, wind, and train horns.

When Neuhaus's introduced sound ceased, I became troubled by the removal of a sonic element that was, as a component of a haecceity, contributing to my territorialisation of the surrounding milieu. The perceived sonic void that followed the drone's removal suddenly deterritorialised and foregrounded heterogeneous sonic unfoldings in the surrounding environment, and I was also left anticipating some future change that might explain my present and past experience, and perhaps provide closure to my current and on-going temporal frame. Within this encounter, different perceptions dialectically oscillated between different kinds of audition: qualitative hearing/quantitative listening, presence/absence, knowable sound/acousmatic listening. It also called on different ontological framings: space/duration, musical sound/non-musical sound. These

oscillations contributed to an awareness of having experienced two separate and different haecceities.

The two temporal haecceities that occur within *Time Piece Beacon* caused antinomic experiences of past, present and future. In doing so the artwork was able to frame pre and post-cognitive moments of sensation. As there was a pre-cognitive sensation that was not consciously sensed by me, I had a memory of having a sensation but I could not access what that sensation was.

While Neuhaus's drones are certainly minimalist, their status as music is contestable. Neuhaus's makes choices of sound qualities in his drones (that, he says, he carefully composes) that seem to question its own ontological status. For, in *Time Piece Beacon*, his introduced sound exists as and within a perceptive threshold, where it is barely audible as an event in itself. The sound starts so quietly that it could be argued that there is no beginning but rather the sound is noticed as already present and already territorialised within the surrounding sonic environment. The sound therefore doesn't present as a foregrounded, deterritorialising event, which might be the case if the sound were perceived as musical. However, when I listen to his drones carefully, I notice that they contain rich interior harmonic unfoldings that are undeniably musical. This is apparent both in his Dia:Beacon artwork and also in his New York-based installation artwork *Times Square.* His drones therefore have an ambiguous quality that exists on the boundary between a sound's territorialising capabilities and music's deterritorialising effects.

Concluding Remarks

The staging of antinomies is a core experience of these three artworks. This occurs through each of the artists' strategic deployments of forms and forces that initiate paradoxical perceptions and meanings through dialectic that never synthesises. Within

the spatial/durational composite articulated by Bergson I confused durational experience with spatial experience. Within Chion's audiovisual complex I listened (and sensed) acousmatically. Both durational and spatial confusion and acousmatic listening resulted in the fabulation of surveilling extensities.

While acousmatic listening and its relation to frame is deliberately exploited in cinema, at Dia:Beacon it occurs inadvertently by hearing and actively listening to sounds leaking in and out of framed sites. Acousmatic sounds entering the artwork's frame, from outside, problematised my framing of the artworks. This is because acousmatic listening enacts relations *between* the framing of the artwork and a world existing outside the frame where the outside world, through the sonic realm becomes implicated in the artwork experience.

Ultimately, these artworks demonstrate that we are constantly constructing the world around us as we reconcile different perceptions, thoughts and actions. These processes are complex and tenuous, and can easily become challenged and undermined by antinomic framings of experience. What my research has shown is that in my experience of these three artworks many antinomic framings occurred through the temporality of my encounters and through the sonic materialities that became part of a durational framing of these artworks.

Haecceities can be considered a particular qualitative manifestation of Bergson's time and space composite that he considers fundamental to first person experience. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that haecceities compose *with* things—objects or subjects—but are not those things; rather they contribute subtle, affecting framings of experience that can be sensed. At Dia:Beacon haecceities created moods that contained and directed affects and forces. These haecceities persisted in the virtual, as memories of what occurred, and it is in this way that they framed duration: as individuated memories of sensed durational experience.

Haecceities, as individuations, provide a conceptual model for how, in my experience at Dia:Beacon, qualitative audition composed with other framed components to create affects and effects. This caused notional artwork framings: the rooms in which the Ryman and Richter art works are exhibited, enter into dynamic compositional relations with sonic framings and in so doing reveal virtual spaces that are not visible. Thus, my sensing of haecceities resulted in experiences within these artworks that were unavailable within a purely ocular-centric encounter. Sound was therefore an essential element of my experience of the artworks: through its temporal framing, its sonifying of space, as a sonic image, and as a component of haecceities through which subtle forces and affecting powers were communicated.

Speculative Realist philosophy posits an approach to analysing experience that favors respect for the agency of objects within the world, and their shifting qualities, as an alternative to experiences of objects described through their direct consequence on human subjective and objective relations. For speculative realist philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, (2008), human subjectivity is a symptom of what he calls correlationism. His term describes a propensity for the world in all its facets and complexities to be seen, described and so 'known' solely through human perception and interaction. We know things via our perceptions and subsequent reasoning. The Richter, Ryman and Neuhaus artworks play out through this correlational circle, where, as a visitor, objects and ephemeral experiences that Fried derides as "objecthood" were oriented towards me, or, in the emptiness of the frames I *imagined* what was deliberately withheld.

This desire to rediscover and *project* objects (and indeed *objecthood)* is possibly a strategy that is imbued within the minimalist roots of these Dia artworks. They are, for the most part, post-object works, where the ephemeral has replaced the object. As I experienced at Dia:Beacon, the sound object, once it is injected with agency, can quickly undermine the ephemeral. This can happen via the materiality of sounds leaking into

frame from 'elsewheres', and also, as in my experience at Dia:Beacon, by an object-on-object encounter, such as the 'stone in shoe event'.

The small stone caught in my shoe gets accidently flicked against the gallery wall making a sudden sound that scores the artwork's surface. The source and cause of this object-on-object event is the stone and the artwork *acting on each other*. That I happened to experience it as a sonic event is inconsequential to the action itself. Many sounds we experience have a non-human causality (such as the sound of wind, heard as moving air acts upon the leaves of a tree, and ocean waves), but where the sound of wind and ocean is imbued with meaningful affect for humans, the sound of the small stone hitting a metal surface withheld both ontological and ontic meaning from me. What the 'stone in shoe event' did do, however, was to emphatically introduce the materiality of the *unknowable* acousmatic object into the ephemeral artwork encounter.

Neuhaus's *Time Piece Beacon* possibly goes further in revealing a non-correlationist realm of 'experience', for when his introduced drone abruptly ends I am left with a memory of 'something' that existed only through my perception of its absence. Only retrospectively then, am I aware of the existence of the artwork, not as an artwork framed from the world, but as a component of the world experienced as a haecceity. As such, Neuhaus's drone is potentially an un-correlated sound that exists in the virtual without ever being accessed as an actual thing. Thus, in experiencing *Time Piece Beacon*, I felt the sense of loss of something that I never was able to subjectify or objectify. In doing so, Neuhaus's 'silent alarm clock' provides a wake-up call; alerting us to processes, existences and trajectories that by-pass human subjectivity and objectivity.

David Chesworth

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Appendix 2

Artworks that were part of my research but were not submitted due to lack of space but which were exhibited publicly.

36 Dia:Beacon Room Tones, replayed in random patterns (2017)

HD Video, stereo audio, headphones, 12 minutes

Score instructions (To be shown on wall label):
Divide the floor plan of Dia:Beacon into 36 equal parts (or the number of artist currently exhibiting).

In each location make a short sound recording of the room tone. Rearrange the recordings into different sequential patterns and replay.

Figure 7. Still from *36 Dia:Beacon Room Tones.* Photo: David Chesworth

Link to video of artwork, filmed, recorded and edited by David Chesworth
https://vimeo.com/202737384/3066b0a570

(NB: Listen in headphones. Set audio replay at a low level approximating a natural listening level)

36 Dia:Beacon Room Tones was exhibited, 1 August– 5 November 2017 at The Ian Potter Museum of Art. The University of Melbourne in the group exhibition *The Score.* Curated by Jacqueline Doughty.

36 Dia:Beacon Room Tones emerges from recordings made at 36 locations that fall, more or less, within the spaces and rooms of the 36 post-minimal and post-conceptual artists that were on display at Dia:Beacon. The work can be thought of as a collection of room presences, framed as a changing pattern of durations, that translate the 'totality' of Dia:Beacon.

The recordings are, in one sense, empty. However, given the ephemeral nature of many of the minimal and conceptual artworks at Dia:Beacon, these 'empty' sounds are full of potentialities. The work calls into question our tendency as 'viewers' to frame artworks visually and spatially and ignore the presence of sound and the effects of acoustic experience.

The term 'room tones' refers to room sounds that exist in a room in its dormant state. Room tones are often recorded by the sound recordist when making a film or video. Room tone recordings are essential during the film post-production process, especially in dialogue editing, where their distinctive room 'presences' can be used to smooth any durational gaps and edit points.

When listening to this work in a gallery space, there is an oscillation/translation in the visitors' experience. The visitors 'view' the space and activity in the Ian Potter museum, while they listen to another set of gallery spaces at Dia:Beacon.

Other Golosa [other voices] (2016)

HD video, stereo audio, 4:50 min, 2016

Figure 8. Still from *Other Golosa.* Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 9. Still from *Other Golosa.* Photo: David Chesworth

Figure 10. Still from *Other Golosa.* Photo: David Chesworth

Other Golosa was exhibited 5 July- 8 October November 2017 at Heide Museum of Modern Art Melbourne in group exhibition *Call of the Avant-Garde: Constructivism and Australia Art.* Curated by Sue Cramer and Lesley Harding.
Conceived and edited by David Chesworth. Filmed by Sonia Leber and David Chesworth.

Notes:

Other Golosa [Other Voices] visits a number of spaces haunted by voices from discrete sites of writing, utterance, and encounter. In a dilapidated theatre where the Russian Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky once performed, a record player sits amongst the debris. We hear Mayakovsky's children's poem 'What is good and what is bad' recited in a child-like voice.

In a Russian prison, inmates recite Mayakovsky's breakthrough 1915 Futurist poem 'A Cloud in Trousers'. Over 100 years since its authorship, inmates take on the muscular language as they learn new ways to express, using all the vocal grit and power Mayakovsky once employed to shake the manners of Imperial Russia. Written to be spoken aloud, Mayakovsky's language continues to inject a sense of shock and anarchy.

> In his youth Vladimir Mayakovsky was a political activist who, when in prison for subversive political activities, turned to writing poetry. After his release, he wrote futurist poetry and became Russia's most celebrated twentieth century poet and a passionate supporter of the Communist Party. He also became, along with Yuri Gagarin, a kind of communist macho role model. Later he became increasingly disillusioned with the party and eventually took his own life.

Radio transmissions bring a disembodied song into another room, the source of which appears to be the Russian space capsule Vostok-1 suspended in orbit. From the vastness

of space, the first cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, is heard signing a popular song '*The Motherland hears, the Motherland knows'* (this is the actual voice of Gagarin). His territorialising song transmits on a line of flight, from the past into the present, where Gagarin's voice literally hangs by a wire as his territorial refrain, contrived by, and for the State is deterritorialised, is abstracted through the degradation of noise inherent in the old radio transmission technology. Can this voice territorialise a future that has long passed?

The vocal recitals attempt to reterritorialise their spaces of utterance. Along each journey, the expressive grain of the voice is mediated through the distortions of materials, technology, and time. Doorways, archways, rooms, the prison, windows, the record player and the loudspeaker/light object are portals allowing ideological flows between framing thresholds.

Within the debris filled room the voice recording, scored spatially onto a record's surface is translated back into its durational form, amplified and given resonance. The large dilapidated imperial and soviet architecture, once a communist party meeting place and a venue where Mayakovsky once performed, provides territorial resonances to the recording's political utterances.

The poems have several temporalities within them: its time of writing, utterance, recording and encounter; all of which are expressive territorialisations. Non-Russian speakers experience some of the poem's expressive qualities through the reciter's voice. The film is a time-image, where places: outer-space, a Russian jail, radio transmissions, as an audio recording embodied onto acetate, a recital heard in the meeting rooms of the former Communist Party, are expressions of past, present and future times.

The prisoners from Rostov-on-Don's 'Strict Regime Prison' recite Mayakovsky's early futurist poem *Cloud in Trousers* (1914), which was ground breaking in its use of the

language of the streets to uncover new expressive freedoms, discarding the idealistic and romantic poetic clichés prevalent at the time. The prisoners are taking part in a program run voluntarily by theatre director Olga Kalashnikova. This prison program is the only one of its kind in Russia. The program's aim is to introduce prisoners to new ways of expressing themselves. Here, there is a subtle irony in that Mayakovsky's futuristic poetry, while explicitly embracing personal freedoms, is now embraced within contemporary Russian ideology. The prisoners recite a language, which was originally highly deterritorialised (a minor language), in its countering of major language norms, but which is now redeployed within a major language as an instructional template to assist in the remediation of prisoners through the reterritorialisation of self-expression.

> A minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialisation. (See Deleuze's discussion in "what is a Minor Literature" in , 16.)

All acousmatic presences then, are deterritorialised utterances that act to reterritorialise the spaces in which they resonate. At the outset, the expressive qualities of Mayakovsky's poems as a minor language creates a deterritorialised space within language. In this work the poems reterritorialise new assemblages within the prison and within the dilapidated performance sites. *Other Galosa,* as an abstract machine, causes Mayakovsky's poetic utterances to spill between framings on lines-of-flight that deterritorialise and reterritorialise through the writer, utterer, mediator, and in our viewer encounter.

Both Vladimir Mayakovsky and Yuri Gagarin are still highly revered in Russia today. Many Russians consider them contemporary Russian icons, which gives them a status corresponding to religious icons. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, *On Several Regimes of Signs*, Deleuze refers to a peculiar signifying status of the religious icon. This form of icon (which forms a major aspect of Russian Orthodox religion) stands in for God but also manifests the actual presence of God. In an icon, you can't separate the signifier from

what is signified. The word God is, according to Deleuze, a master signifier ("a despotic signifier") that sits outside the chain of signification and interpretation, because everyone has faith in what the term God stands for.

Deleuze suggests that our use of language is always in the third person. This is because language is political and never belongs to the individual. In *Other Galosa* language is delivered in the form of a recital – that is, from a pre-prepared text. None of the actual voices speak convincingly from the position of "I". As such, they are all versions of the acousmatic voice of the "despotic signifier" in the form of a Russian soviet icon (Mayakovsky and Gagarin).

In the final shot the now silent record player remains situated within a milieu filled with the debris of consumerism. Consumer detritus lies in a weary state, *signifying.* What it is signifying is open: that the consumer market that now exists in Russia is itself a deterritorialised space; or how contemporary Russia exists in relation to the decayed fabric of the former Soviet Union; or perhaps how Russia, in its fervour for and embracement of late capitalism, is simply awash with the debris of consumerism (the accumulation of rubbish is the result of nomadic hoarding by a squatter, whose corpse had been recently discovered amongst the debris).

Mayakovsky's 'voice' then, exists as an idea that is passed around – third person to third person. Just as the rooms are damaged and *scored*, so the performers *score* Mayakovsky. Ultimately, all lines-of-flight are captured and absorbed. Mayakovsky's poetry has been reterritorialised within the State. We see that prisoners, who, running out of learned text, again become silent; Gagarin's orbital space flight, following the completion of his vocal recital, falls back to earth. The record player eventually winds down and becomes silent.

Appendix 3

Components of *The Long Take* exhibited publicly during the research period as stand-alone artworks.

Earthwork

The Long Take artwork component *Earthwork* exhibited by artists Sonia Leber and David Chesworth, 18 August-8 October 2017 at 4A Centre of Contemporary Asian Art, Sydney and Perth Institute of Contemporary Arts in group exhibition *I Don't Want To Be There When It Happens*.
Curated by Mikala Tai and Kate Warren.

Time Mirror

The Long Take artwork component *Time Mirror* exhibited by artists Sonia Leber and David Chesworth, 1 October- 13th November 2016 at CCP Centre for Contemporary Photography, Melbourne in group exhibition *The Documentary Take*.
Curated by Naomi Cass.

Recent artwork by Sonia Leber and David Chesworth that has drawn on the thesis research.

Myriad Falls

HD Video, 7min, 2017
Artists: Sonia Leber and David Chesworth

Figure 11. Still from *Myriad Falls*. Photo: Sonia Leber

Figure 12. Still from *Myriad Falls*. Photo: Sonia Leber

Link to video of artwork https://vimeo.com/202175860

In Myriad Falls, sensed time is disrupted via the mechanics of time-keeping, cinematic time, and natural forces. The artwork uncovers a circular machine, designed to activate an array of self-winding wristwatches. As it replicates the complex arm movements of watch-wearers, the spiraling action of the device appears to be tossing time into the surrounding world.

Under a pressure test, we see an original scuba-diving watch, made to withstand huge underwater forces. As the pressure bubbles appear and aggregate, we register each change as a marker of time.

Similarly, from simple beginnings, a complex sonic drone slowly builds throughout the soundtrack, where each sonic element is periodically added to the accumulating of moments of time. Is time a single measurable event or is time made up of an infinite number of durations? Can time be fully sensed or can it only be lived in parts?

We encounter a floral clock. Its flowers and plants, through their seasonal growth, manifest another kind of duration. The plants and the time-telling hands move about in disarray, as strong winds present yet another invisible durational force.

Birdsong appears across a blank screen. The periodical patterns of Australian Chiming Wedgebills present a multitude of individual patterns; each producing a related call, as an individual rendition within its own timeframe.

Exhibitions: The Real and Other Places presented by Centre for Contemporary Photography, Melbourne, at Photofair Shanghai, China (2017)