A Defence of Schopenhauer's Metaphysics of Compassion

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Abstract

In his 1839 essay *On the Basis of Morality* [*Über die Grundlage der Moral*], Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) argues that compassion (*Mitleid*) is the foundation of morality: in his view, compassion is the sole moral incentive accounting for all moral conduct. In reaching this conclusion, Schopenhauer provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of compassion, appealing to diverse philosophical and religious ideas from both western and eastern traditions. Compassion, Schopenhauer argues, springs from human nature itself. By virtue of the existence of compassion, there is a "natural morality" (*BM*, §13, p. 121): a morality that is independent of human institutions and based merely on an innate natural disposition in human beings. Nevertheless, according to Schopenhauer, compassion defies a purely empirical explanation. For him, it is "the great mystery of ethics" (*das große Mysterium der Ethik*) (*BM*, §16, p. 144), one that can only be addressed through metaphysics. Schopenhauer provides an explanation for compassion by grounding it in his metaphysics of will.

Several respected Schopenhauer scholars—including David E. Cartwright, Frederick C. Copleston, John E. Atwell, Bryan Magee, Julian Young, Christopher Janaway, and others—have raised serious objections to this metaphysical theory of compassion. The main purpose of my thesis is to defend Schopenhauer's theory against its critics. I intend to demonstrate that Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion is not as unintelligible, or as inherently flawed, as some critics have held it to be.

My thesis is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1, I address David Cartwright's claim that Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion is incoherent, and then I critically evaluate Cartwright's attempt to provide a naturalized interpretation of Schopenhauer's theory. In Chapter 2, devoted to "internal criticisms", I address those objections that focus on the fact that Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion is seemingly inconsistent within other aspects

of his ethical philosophy. In particular, I examine (i) the seeming inconsistency between Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion and his theory of the cardinal virtue of justice, and (ii) the seeming inconsistency between Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion and his theory of salvation. Both criticisms, I argue, misrepresent Schopenhauer's position. In Chapter 3, I examine the most formidable "external criticism" to Schopenhauer's theory of compassion: the objection that Schopenhauer's theory, by virtue of its metaphysical foundation, reduces to a form of egoism (a position that Schopenhauer was at great pains to avoid). Here I focus in particular on Julian Young's recent articulation of the egoism charge in his 2005 book *Schopenhauer*.

In conclusion, I note that while it is beyond the scope of my thesis to offer any positive arguments in favour of Schopenhauer's theory, we can nevertheless affirm that his metaphysics of compassion is less susceptible to criticism than previously thought.

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature:

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Date: 28 October 2017

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Andrew John Cantwell
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Abbreviations

Works by Schopenhauer

BM *On the Basis of Morality*

FR *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*

PP *Parerga and Paralipomena*

WN *On the Will in Nature*

WWR *The World as Will and Representation*

With the exception of WN, I have used E.F.J. Payne's translations.

Introduction

In his essay *On the Basis of Morality* (*Über die Grundlage der Moral*) (1839) Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) argues that compassion (*Mitleid*) is the foundation of morality; that is, compassion accounts for all moral conduct. In reaching this conclusion, Schopenhauer provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of compassion, appealing to diverse philosophical and religious thought from both Western and Eastern traditions. Compassion, Schopenhauer argues, springs from human nature itself. By virtue of the existence of compassion, there is a "natural morality" (*BM*, §13, p. 121): a morality that is independent of human institutions (such as religion and the state) and based merely on an innate natural disposition in human beings. However, compassion defies a purely empirical explanation. In fact, Schopenhauer thinks it is "the great mystery of ethics" (*das große Mysterium der Ethik*) (*BM*, §16, p. 144) and can only be explained metaphysically. Schopenhauer provides a "final explanation" for compassion by grounding it in his metaphysics of will (*BM*, §21, p. 199). The crowning achievement of *On the Basis of Morality* is a highly original and complex metaphysical conception of compassion.

Several eminent Schopenhauer scholars— including David E. Cartwright, Frederick C. Copleston, John E. Atwell, Bryan Magee, Julian Young, Christopher Janaway, and others—have raised serious objections to Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion. My task in this thesis is to defend this conception; that is to say, I aim to demonstrate that Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion, upon which his metaphysical theory of compassion is built, is neither unintelligible nor fraught with inconsistencies. I will demonstrate why efforts to divorce Schopenhauer's metaphysics from his theory of compassion have hitherto been unsuccessful.

Schopenhauer's views on compassion have often been noted and praised. Contemporary moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum acknowledges Schopenhauer as a "major exponent" of compassion

(Nussbaum, 1996, p. 28). Iris Murdoch commends Schopenhauer's *On the Basis of Morality* (Murdoch, 1992 p. 43, p. 63), whilst Lawrence Blum, often cited as a modern-day luminary on compassion, claims to be inspired by Schopenhauer's proposition that compassion is central to morality (Blum, 1980, p. 507). Philosopher Richard Reilly even claims to "follow Schopenhauer's lead" in his book *Ethics of Compassion* by arguing that compassion is the foundation of all moral worth (Reilly, 2008, p. 1). Yet none of these thinkers adopt or advocate Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. *Prima facie* this situation appears anomalous: Schopenhauer's insights into compassion are worth mentioning, or even meritorious, yet his theory of compassion is, for all intents and purposes, non-existent in contemporary ethical theory. One often hears of "Kantians" (deontologists), "neo-Aristotelians", "Benthamites" (utilitarians) and so on, but never of "Schopenhauerians"— or of any ethical theory specifically based on Schopenhauer's theory. Even in ethics of care and agent-based ethics— virtue-based ethical theories in which compassion is a core concept—Schopenhauer's theory is not embraced.

For every commentator who acknowledges or praises Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, there is one, if not more, who censures it. This is generally for one reason: the metaphysics undergirding the theory. Schopenhauer repeatedly and vigorously stresses that compassion cannot be accounted for merely in terms of an empirical explanation. In *On the Basis of Morality*, he rejects a psychological account of compassion proposed by the Italian philosopher Ubaldo Cassina (1736-1824), and, in the process, effectively rejects all empirical accounts of compassion. For my part, I think there are compelling reasons for both Schopenhauer's insistence on a metaphysical explanation and his rejection of an empirical explanation for compassion. However, to be clear, I am not motivated in this thesis to offer *positive* reasons for embracing Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion; rather, by demonstrating that the metaphysical conception is not inherently flawed, I intend to defend it against substantive, enduring criticisms.

In this Introduction, I will begin by situating Schopenhauer's work in its original intellectual context and briefly outline Schopenhauer's motivations for writing about compassion. I will then explain what compassion is for Schopenhauer, whilst distinguishing compassion from similar, but distinct concepts. Finally, I will outline why Schopenhauer thinks compassion can only be explained metaphysically. This material will form the groundwork for the remaining thesis, and will be expanded upon in coming chapters.

In *On the Basis of Morality*— the text which contains Schopenhauer's main treatment of compassion— Schopenhauer confronts a formidable problem, a problem intrinsic to human nature. Responding to a prize question advanced by the Royal Danish Society of Sciences in 1837,[1] Schopenhauer addresses the primary problem of morality. He tasks himself with discovering none other than the "objectively true" foundation of morality (*BM*, §1, p. 39). From the outset, Schopenhauer believes himself to be hampered by the Society's stipulations. He must present the moral foundation in a self-contained monograph wholly independent of a determinate metaphysical system. For this reason, Schopenhauer is compelled to use what he terms an analytical approach to ethical theory, as opposed to a synthetical approach. The synthetical approach proceeds from an established system of metaphysics and derives an ethical system from it (the procedure he uses in *The World as Will and Representation*) whilst the analytic approach involves tracing the "facts either of external experience or of consciousness" (*BM*, §1, p. 42) back to an ultimate source, namely, the foundation of morality.[2] As a result, Schopenhauer must find this source in the human mind, "which, must then remain a fundamental fact, a primary phenomenon, without being further traced to anything else" (*BM*, §1, p. 42).

Before answering the Society's question directly, Schopenhauer dedicates over one-third of *On the Basis of Morality* to critiquing Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) ethical theory (the "negative" section of *On the Basis of Morality*). Kant's ethical foundation, Schopenhauer tells us, "must be removed

before we pursue a different course" (*BM*, §2, p. 47). Critiquing Kant's ethics is the direct route to Schopenhauer's own ethical foundation since "opposites illustrate each other" (*BM*, §2, p. 47). Drawing predominately on Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*) (1785), Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for providing no genuine moral incentive or motive that accounts for moral conduct. Morality, for Kant, a normative or prescriptive enterprise, is strict adherence to the moral law (the categorical imperative) found *a priori* through reason alone. Hence, Schopenhauer thinks, morality for Kant "does not rest on anything empirical, that is, on anything either objective in the external world or subjectively in consciousness, such as feeling, inclination, or impulse" (*BM*, §6, p. 70). In fact, Kant's ethical theory, Schopenhauer thinks, reduces to egoism: Kant's notion of an "ought" is only intelligible in the context of promised rewards and threatened punishments. Consequently, there are no "categorical imperatives" ("absolute oughts"), only "hypothetical imperatives" (*BM*, §4 p. 55). That is, all commands of reason are conditional, understood in terms of "Do x, *if* you desire to attain result y or evade consequence z". Pure practical reason (*reine praktische Vernunft*), Schopenhauer thinks, is non-existent.[3]

In section II (the "positive" section) of *On the Basis of Morality* Schopenhauer unveils his theory of compassion. In stark contrast to Kant's non-empirical, rationalistic and normative method, Schopenhauer's method of ethical theorising is empirical, explanatory and descriptive; ethical theory must "indicate, explain, and trace to its ultimate ground the extremely varied behaviour of men from a moral point of view" (*BM*, §13, p. 130). As such, the foundation of morality can be discovered only empirically since "only the empirical, or what is assumed as having a possible empirical existence, has reality for man". Hence "the moral stimulus or motive must indeed be empirical" (*BM*, §6, p. 75).

After examining the issue of moral skepticism (§13), detailing the anti-moral incentives of egoism and malice (§14), and positing the criterion of moral conduct (§15), Schopenhauer introduces his concept of compassion. Compassion, he tells us, is "the immediate *participation* [*Unmittelbare Teilnahme*], independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the *suffering* of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it" (*BM*, §16 p. 144; Schopenhauer's emphasis). The distinctive mark of compassion, Schopenhauer argues, is that "another's suffering in itself and as such *directly* becomes my motive" (*BM*, §18, p. 163; Schopenhauer's emphasis). Compassion thus consists in a "wholly direct and even instinctive participation in another's sufferings" (*BM,* §18, p. 163).

Schopenhauer's definition of compassion generally comports with our modern understanding of compassion insofar as it comprises a fellow-feeling that is "other regarding". That is, compassion is a feeling or an emotion[4] that is shared between all "fellows" of the human race and is prompted by someone other than the person who experiences it. The "fellow-feeling" dimension of compassion is evidenced by the German noun *Mitleid* that Schopenhauer employs for compassion*: Mit* meaning "with", and *Leid* meaning "to suffer". The English noun "compassion", having its roots in both Late Latin and Old French, additionally shares this notion of "fellow-feeling".

However, compassion, for both Schopenhauer and modern understanding, embraces more than just an "other-regarding" feeling of "suffering together with" another. It additionally has an important and distinctive *conative* element: in compassion, the compassionate agent desires to assuage or end another's suffering. These two chief constituents of compassion— a feeling of another's suffering, and a desire to alleviate or end this suffering— are generally recognized by all (Eastern and Western) scholars of compassion (Blum, 1980, pp. 508-511; Cartwright, 2012, pp. 259-260; Snow, 1991, pp. 196-197; Lazarus, 1991, p. 289; Nussbaum, 2001, p. 306; Kimball, 2004, pp. 304-305; Reilly, 2008, p. 33; Bein, 2013, p. 2).

In this thesis I am primarily concerned with Schopenhauer's conception of compassion, yet it is important here to briefly distinguish compassion from the related, but distinct, feelings of "pity", "sympathy" and "empathy".[5] Like compassion, these feelings are referred to as "fellow-feelings" which are "other regarding" (Snow, 1991, p. 195) and the terms "compassion", "pity", "sympathy" and "empathy" are often used synonymously, even by philosophers. However each refers to a distinct experiential or psychological state of being. The assertions "I have pity for you", "I have compassion for you", "I have sympathy for you", and "I empathize with you" all token distinct experiential states. Pity and sympathy generally denote a feeling of sadness *for* another; specifically, for another's suffering or misfortune (*Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2010). Empathy can be divided into emotional (affective) empathy and cognitive empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2011). Emotional empathy denotes the ability to *share* another's feelings; to feel *with* another (Aaltola, 2014, p. 77; Maibom, 2017, p. 22). In emotional empathy one's feeling is engendered by another's: it is a vicarious experience (Hoffman, 1977, p. 713; Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015, p. 411). Cognitive empathy is the capacity to merely comprehend— recognize intellectually— another's mental state (as the other experiences it) (Aaltola, 2014, p. 77; Spaulding, 2017, p. 13). It is thus a cerebral phenomenon, or experience, as opposed to an emotive one; there is no fellow feeling or emotive response involved. Emotional empathy can be felt with respect to another's pain or happiness (Cartwright, 1981, p. 26; 2012, p. 260), and cognitive empathy can be intellectually experienced with respect to another's positive or negative state. Sympathy, unlike pity, can additionally denote an intellectual understanding of another person's predicament; one "knows what another is going through." In this capacity sympathy is not a fellow-feeling and closely resembles cognitive empathy. Moreover, one can sympathize (understand, or agree) with a belief, an idea, or a principle or cause (*Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2010). Like emotional and cognitive empathy, sympathy can be felt with respect to another's pain or happiness[6] (Cartwright, 1981, p. 26; 2012, p. 260). Pity, unlike both sympathy and empathy, very often has a negative connotation insofar as it can

embody an attitude of condescension towards another (Leidecker, 1960, p. 236; Blum, 1980, p. 512; Snow, 1991, p. 195; Cartwright, 1982, pp. 41 & 43; 1988, p. 559). Finally, pity, like compassion, can only be felt with respect to another's pain (Cartwright, 1988, p. 558).[7]

These fellow-feelings (and the differences amongst them) will be explored later. For now, it is sufficient to note that compassion— the object of Schopenhauer's inquiry— is the only fellow-feeling that has a conative element: the desire to help another.

By identifying compassion as a feeling, Schopenhauer locates compassion in the "mind of man"; that is, in human consciousness. Compassion is empirically discoverable. Yet how does compassion account for all moral conduct? That is, why is compassion the foundation of morality? Compassion, Schopenhauer argues, acts as one of three incentives (*Triebfeder*)[8] that account for all human conduct. Whereas the incentives of egoism (*Egoismus*) and malice (*Bosheit*) desire one's own well-being and another's misfortune respectively, the incentive of compassion exclusively desires another's well-being. Since the criterion for moral conduct is "the absence of all egoistic motivations" (*BM*, §15, p. 140), and since compassion is the only non-egoistic incentive and malicious conduct is antithetical to morality, Schopenhauer finds compassion to be the necessary and sufficient condition for moral conduct. He consolidates this finding by arguing that compassion undergirds what he calls the two cardinal virtues: the virtue of justice and the virtue of loving kindness. They are cardinal in the sense that all the other virtues derive from them. These virtues correspond to (what he argues is) the universally accepted moral principle: "Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can" (*BM*, §6, p. 70).

Now to say that compassion resides in human consciousness does not explain compassion *per se*. Although Schopenhauer believes he sufficiently answers the Royal Society's prize question by finding the foundation of morality in "facts either of external experience or of consciousness" (*BM*,

§1, p. 42), compassion itself, Schopenhauer thinks, is an *urphenomenon*: it explains all moral conduct (that is, all moral conduct is engendered by compassion) yet compassion itself remains unexplained; it "lies before us like a riddle" (*BM*, §21, p. 199). Schopenhauer is adamant that the explanation for compassion "can be arrived at only metaphysically" (*BM*, §16, p. 147) and will posit (in a highly attenuated form, so as to not overstep the bounds of the Society's question) a metaphysical explanation for compassion as the foundation of morality.

Schopenhauer first asks: how can another's suffering move one's will directly; that is, how can one will exclusively for another (desire something elusively for another) and thereby be stimulated to act for another wholly independently of one's own desires? (*BM*, §16, p. 143). In short, how can one act *altruistically*? Egoism is immense; it is the "natural standpoint" of mankind (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 332) to the extent that the explanation for any conduct must presuppose an egoistic incentive (*BM*, §14, p. 131). Moreover, egoism is explained and justified empirically. In the empirical world (the "world of representation"), the *a priori* forms of space and time— what Schopenhauer terms the *principium individuationis*— give rise to plurality and thus differentiation. Human beings are empirically distinct; one is separated from another. Consequently one is separated from another's suffering. One has access— "phenomenological ingress" so to speak— only to one's own will via self-consciousness; whilst others are known derivatively as mere representations in one's consciousness. One's own well-being takes precedence, and others, ontologically, are like mirages (*BM*, §14, p. 132). It is natural, therefore, that the egoist's motto "everything for me, and nothing for the others" (*BM*, §14, p. 132) is the order of the day. To employ Kant's vocabulary, it appears natural that one only ever— and can only ever— treat another as a *means*, never as an end. That is, one's conduct is driven entirely by hypothetical imperatives; human rationality is merely instrumental. The only conduct that seems possible, then, is egoistic or prudential conduct. This appears to deny the very possibility of ethics.

Schopenhauer does not accept this scenario. Quite the contrary, he is convinced that there still exist (extremely rare) cases of entirely altruistic conduct (*BM*, §15, p. 139). Such conduct is invariably motivated through the incentive of compassion. This allows for the possibility of ethics, yet creates Schopenhauer's second chief problem in *On the Basis of Morality*: how is it possible to will purely and solely for another? That is to say, how is *compassion* possible; and what is its *modus operandi*?

Compassion, Schopenhauer argues, necessarily presupposes that one *identifies* with another to the extent that this empirical separation between two beings is suspended in some manner, at least to some degree. That is, compassion presupposes that one recognizes that one shares something in common with another and that this "something" intimately connects the "I" and "not-I" together. However the limited way in which one knows another—as a representation in consciousness— does not seem sufficient to allow for the robust identification required by compassion. That is, it does not seem sufficient to allow one to feel another's suffering as one feel one's own suffering, yet this is exactly what compassion entails. This process, Schopenhauer thinks, is no doubt bona-fide, yet rationally one can make neither heads nor tails of it. Simply stated, compassion, a "mysterious inner occurrence" (*BM*, §18, p. 167), appears to defy empirical explanation (*BM*, §18, p. 166).

In §22 of *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer attempts to dispel this mystery by introducing his metaphysical explanation of compassion. Compassion, for Schopenhauer, manifests the unity present in all life; in fact, it manifests the unity present in all existence. Influenced by Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Schopenhauer argues that space and time have merely a phenomenal character (as mere representations)[9]; that is, they are transcendentally ideal. As such, they belong to appearance, not to the substrate undergirding appearance.[10] Individuation, resulting from space and time, is necessarily appearance, and undergirding this appearance, independent of the subject, and thus of space and time, is one identical will. Individuation, then, is necessarily foreign to this will.

With these premises in hand, Schopenhauer concludes that all individuals in the empirical world are manifestations of one identical essence— the will qua *thing-in-itself* (*Ding an sich*).

Compassionate agents, Schopenhauer thinks, intuitively recognize this metaphysical unity of will when they engage in compassionate action. They lance what the Hindus call the "veil of Maya" (*BM*, §22, p. 209) — the phantasmagoria of individuation imposed by space and time. The metaphysical unity of will, then, provides for the robust identification that compassion requires. When one participates in another's suffering one fundamentally participates in this underlying unity of will. One is able to feel another's suffering since one shares in the same essence as another. The feeling of compassion issues from a metaphysical awareness into the unity of all life. Compassion, considered fully, is necessarily a metaphysical phenomenon, and without its metaphysical grounding there would simply be no adequate explanation for its existence.

In this thesis I address the principal criticisms of this metaphysical conception of compassion. It has been claimed that this conception is incoherent, and even if it *were* acceptable, it creates substantive problems for Schopenhauer's ethics as a whole. The general consensus amongst scholars is that Schopenhauer's theory of compassion furnishes many valuable insights into the nature of compassion, yet his metaphysical grounding of the phenomenon is its Achilles' heel. Indeed, one might think, it is precisely due to the metaphysical component that Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is not a functioning theory in contemporary ethics. As Colin Marshall points out, Schopenhauer's metaphysics is something which "few contemporary philosophers would take seriously" (Marshall, 2017, p. 294). Similarly, Christopher Janaway states, "many will agree with Nietzsche that Schopenhauer's doctrines about the One Will and the illusoriness of the individual are an excess and a mystical embarrassment" (Janaway, 2007, p. 63). Finally, Barbara Hannan states "What may strike some readers as least satisfying about Schopenhauer's ethics is the appeal to extrarational mystical insight" (Hannan, 2009, p. 94).

Although a few scholars have argued that Schopenhauer's theory is relevant to contemporary theory (Cartwright, 1999; Fox, 2006; Wolf, 2014; Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015), minimal efforts have been made to remedy this situation. Moreover, efforts to incorporate Schopenhauer's theory into contemporary ethics typically do not include a defence of the metaphysical conception.

Since its inception, Schopenhauer's theory of compassion has been subject to numerous criticisms. Some of these criticisms do not appear to hinge on, or appear only to relate peripherally to, Schopenhauer's metaphysics. For my purposes, it is not necessary to delineate such criticisms. In what follows, I will focus exclusively on criticisms of the metaphysical conception of compassion which can be generally categorized into the three following groups.

First, there is a group of commentators who claim that Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of participation is incoherent. Chief amongst these commentators is prominent modern-day Schopenhauer scholar David E. Cartwright, who has written several articles dedicated exclusively to Schopenhauer's theory of compassion (1982; 1999; 2008; 2012a; 2012b). Although he is generally supportive of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion— to the extent that he claims that "Schopenhauer deserves to be considered a first-rate moral philosopher because of his analysis of the ethical significance of compassion (Mitleid)" (Cartwright 1982, p. 60) — he nevertheless finds Schopenhauer's metaphysical grounding for compassion deeply troubling. This is principally due to Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of participation. Swedish philosopher Peter Nilsson shares Cartwright's sentiments, finding Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of participation to be nonsensical (Nilsson, 2010, p. 134). Closely related to this claim, is the claim that there exists little, or no, evidence or explanation for Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion. This claim has also been advanced by Cartwright (Cartwright 1982, pp. 66-67; 2008, p. 301; 2012, p. 61; 1999, p. 60; 2002b, pp. 32-33). Schopenhauer scholar Julian Young likewise states that Schopenhauer's metaphysical argument for compassion "is as full of holes as a piece of Gruyere

cheese" (Young, 2012, p. 182). Finally, Mathijs Peters states "many of Schopenhauer's metaphysical claims indeed are highly speculative and not very convincing" (Peters, 2014, p. 50).

Second, there is a group who claim that Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of compassion creates *internal inconsistencies* within his wider ethical philosophy. That is to say, Schopenhauer's ethical philosophy, as a whole, is said to be internally inconsistent, since his metaphysical notion of compassion is inconsistent or incompatible with other elements (or theories) within his ethical edifice. For my purposes, this group can be viewed in terms of making two disparate criticisms. On the one hand, there is the criticism that Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of participation is inconsistent with his theory of the cardinal virtue of justice. Cartwright has advanced this criticism numerous times (1982; 2008; 2012a, 2012b). Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of participation, Cartwright claims, entails an *immediate* participate in another's suffering, yet in the cardinal virtue of justice, compassion functions by preventing a *future* instance of suffering. Insofar as Schopenhauer's theory of the virtue of justice entails that one participates in a future suffering, one participates immediately in a non-existent suffering. Cartwright thus concludes that the notion of participating in a non-existent event is unintelligible (Cartwright, 1982, p. 67). On the other hand, there is the criticism that Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion is inconsistent with his theory of salvation (soteriology). These two theories are said to be inconsistent since compassion generally requires some type of activity of the will, whilst salvation requires total renunciation of the will. This criticism has been advanced by a significantly large group of commentators (Cartwright, 1989, pp. 61-61; Atwell, 1990, p. 183; Magee, 1997, p. 243; Reginster, 2012, pp. 171-172; Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, pp. 51-69; Pesce, 2014, p. 252).

The third and final chief group of critics are those who level *external criticisms* against Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion. By external criticisms, I mean those criticisms levelled against his theory that appeal to principles Schopenhauer himself would not have accepted.

Prime amongst such criticisms, is the criticism that Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion reduces to a form of egoism. Schopenhauer explicitly rejects egoism as a principle that is incompatible with his criterion of actions of moral worth. Like the previous criticism, this is a classic criticism levelled against Schopenhauer by several commentators (Hübscher, 1987, p. 221; Nietzsche, 1987, pp. 83-84, Scheler, 1973, pp. 63-64; von Hartmann, 2006, p. 99, n.; Gardiner, 1963, pp. 276-277; Hamlyn, 1980, pp. 139 & 145; Janaway, 1994, p. 101; Young, 1987, p. 107; 2005, pp. 182-183). In essence, such commentators, who seize upon Schopenhauer's appropriation of the Sanskrit phrase "This art thou!" (*Tat tvam asi*), claim that Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion reduces to a form of egoism since, in the processes of compassion, one ultimately identifies with one's own real being— the will. One is therefore stimulated through compassion to act primarily for one's own benefit. Schopenhauer accuses Kant of betraying his own moral principle by allowing egoism to "creep" back into his ethical system (*BM*, §4, p. 56), yet, apparently, he does the very same.

Of course, there are further criticisms of Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion,[11] but the examination of all these criticisms is beyond the scope of this thesis. My purpose in this thesis is to address the strongest and most persistent criticisms levelled against the metaphysical conception. Each criticism has been selected on the basis of its ostensible soundness, its dissemination, and its notable and enduring influence.

In light of all the problems with the metaphysical conception some commentators attempt to extirpate the metaphysics from Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. Chief amongst these commentators are Cartwright and Young. My thesis will also address these attempts.

When one examines the totality of Schopenhauer scholarship one finds minimal work dedicated to defending Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion against its critics. Those who have

made attempts of some type must be noted. Richard Reilly attempts to undermine Cartwright's criticism that Schopenhauer's notion of participation is incoherent (Reilly, 2008, pp. 28-29) while Gerard Mannion highlights problems with Cartwright's argument regarding the inconsistency between Schopenhauer's conceptions of compassion and the cardinal virtue of justice (Mannion, 2003, p. 209). Cartwright himself has attempted to defend Schopenhauer from the charge of egoism (Cartwright, 2012, p. 63; 1995, pp. 153-161), as has Fox (Fox, 2006, pp. 376-377). Bernard Reginster has attempted to temper both Nietzsche's and Young's charge of egoism (Reginster, 2015, p. 274). Finally, Paul Downes has recently worked at defending Schopenhauer from the charge of egoism by conceptualizing Schopenhauer's compassion as a concentric structure of relation (Downes, 2017, pp. 81-98).

Such works are the exceptions, rather than the rule. I believe that my thesis is unique in that it defends Schopenhauer against criticisms of the metaphysical conception of compassion. I proceed as follows:

In chapter one I reject Cartwright's claim that Schopenhauer's conception of compassion is incoherent. Building on material I have thus far presented, I provide a detailed exegesis of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. I outline Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion paying particular attention to his metaphysical notion of participation. I also critique Cartwright's attempt at naturalizing Schopenhauer's theory.

In chapter two I address the criticism that Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of compassion creates internal inconsistencies within his ethical philosophy. I examine the two most formidable criticisms: (i) the putative internal inconsistency between Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion and his theory of the cardinal virtue of justice, and (ii) the putative inconsistency between Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion and his theory of salvation. Both of these

claims, I argue, misrepresent Schopenhauer's position: they target an interpretative model of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion that Schopenhauer himself would not accept.

In chapter three I examine the most formidable external criticism to Schopenhauer's theory of compassion: the criticism that Schopenhauer's theory, by virtue of its metaphysical component, reduces to egoism. In my chapter I focus on a recent articulation of this criticism: Julian Young's critique in his 2005 book *Schopenhauer*. I demonstrate that Young's criticism is flawed insofar as it is misconstrues Schopenhauer's understanding of the relationship between human subjects and the will. Moreover, Young fails to account for all the nuances in Schopenhauer's theory and misconstrues the rationale for Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. Finally, I demonstrate how Young's attempt to naturalize Schopenhauer's theory, like Cartwright's, conflates compassion with empathy.

On the whole, I intend for this thesis to contribute towards the wider rehabilitation of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. My hope is that Schopenhauer's theory of compassion will in time find its rightful place in contemporary ethical theory.

Chapter 1:

The Metaphysical Interpretation of Compassion

§1. Introduction

Compassion, for Schopenhauer, is a phenomenon that requires a metaphysical explanation. In order to fully understand his theory of compassion, then, one must fully understand Schopenhauer's metaphysical commitments. More specifically, one must understand his metaphysics of the will and how his notion of the will relates to his notion of compassion. My first aim in this chapter is to outline fully Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, that is, Schopenhauer's theory that compassion allows for, and explains, moral conduct. Second, I will elaborate on my provisional account in the Introduction by further outlining the details of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion; that is, I will outline Schopenhauer's theory of compassion with respect to his metaphysics of will**.** In undertaking this second task, it will become evident that Schopenhauer makes what appear to be very counter-intuitive claims regarding the metaphysical status of compassion. According to some critics, these claims are unsubstantiated and not only involve conceptual tension, but are patently contradictory. In particular, Schopenhauer states that in feeling compassion, one ultimately participates in a unifying metaphysical essence. This claim has been interpreted to imply that one feels a numerically identical suffering to another since both individuals— the compassionate agent and his suffering patient— are "metaphysically identical". This interpretation has been advanced most forcibly by Cartwright who maintains that Schopenhauer's metaphysics undermine his whole theory of compassion. Instead, Cartwright proposes a psychological alternative in lieu of Schopenhauer's metaphysical grounding for compassion. My third aim in this chapter is to defend Schopenhauer from Cartwright's interpretation. I will argue that, when read charitably, Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion is conceptually coherent and that Cartwright's objections spring from a fundamentally flawed reading of Schopenhauer's metaphysical-ethical thesis— a reading that overlooks the nuances and complexities in

Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of compassion and the participative experience. I will also demonstrate that any psychological or empirical grounding for compassion is profoundly at odds with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion.

§1.1 Schopenhauer's theory of compassion

Let us briefly recall Schopenhauer's conception of compassion. Schopenhauer views compassion as a feeling which involves an "immediate participation in another's *suffering*" (*BM*, §16, p. 144; Schopenhauer's emphasis).[12] Compassion has two chief components: an immediate (direct) feeling of another's suffering and a desire to prevent or eliminate another's suffering. These are the individual necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for one to feel compassion (the second component—the conative element— is, strictly speaking, the incentive of compassion). When one feels both of these components, one participates in another's suffering. To illustrate, a man named David witnesses an elderly lady named Dorothy walking in the neighbourhood. Dorothy's walk, once full of vigour, is so strained that every step she takes, even though supported by a walking-frame, is an immense burden. Dorothy subsequently stumbles to the ground and grimaces in pain. Upon witnessing this, David himself feels a suffering with Dorothy. However, David additionally feels the desire to alleviate Dorothy's suffering. David then participates in Dorothy's suffering.

I will now delineate Schopenhauer's theory of compassion. In so doing, I will refer predominately to Schopenhauer's text *On the Basis of Morality*. When outlining Schopenhauer's metaphysical argument for compassion, I will additionally make recourse to his *The World as Will and Representation*. As I have mentioned, in *On the Basis of Morality* Schopenhauer could not elucidate extensively on his metaphysics since a condition of the texts entry was that it be a self-contained monograph. Moreover, this monograph had to be submitted incognito.

From the outset of *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer presupposes that an agent's action is devoid of moral worth if it is motivated purely by a desire for the agent's own well-being. This presupposition pervades Schopenhauer's entire ethical philosophy. Schopenhauer's central task in *On the Basis of Morality* can be seen simply as a response to four interrelated questions:

1. Is there such a thing as moral conduct (that is, conduct not engendered by egoistic incentives)?
2. If there is such a thing as moral conduct, what is its source (the incentive underlying it)?
3. How exactly does this incentive explain moral conduct?
4. What is the metaphysical basis of this incentive?

Schopenhauer identifies three fundamental "incentives" (*Triebfeder*)[13] that stimulate human action. Compassion acts as one of these incentives. The other two are egoism and malice. Egoism, Schopenhauer thinks, is the innermost essence of every human being and animal (*BM*, §14, p. 131); it is the fundamental anti-moral incentive in both human beings and non-human animals. The egoist takes into consideration only his own well-being and in so doing often impairs another's. He has an inextinguishable desire to preserve and further his well-being at all costs. Egoism, which is "colossal" (*BM*, §14, p. 132), is a type of reflexive relation: all others exist for, and are subordinate to, the egoist. The egoist "makes himself the centre of the world, and refers everything to himself" (*BM*, §14, p. 131); his motto is "everything for me, and nothing for the others" (*BM*, §14, p. 132). The egoist sees a wide gulf—a distinction— amongst all beings: "I am I, others are others". By virtue of this distinction, he can cause immense harm to another to attain a small benefit for himself.

Malice (*Bosheit*), the second incentive, is the desire for another's suffering.[14] Malice motivates conduct that is not only malicious, but can also be extremely cruel. Malice is exemplified through the maxim "Injure all people as much as you can" (*BM*, §14, p. 136). Malice results from either

envy (*Neid*) (a type of "ill-will" aroused by the "happiness, possessions, advantages, [and/or] personal qualities" of others) or from *Schadenfreude*— pleasure engendered through witnessing another's misfortune. Whilst "to feel envy is human", *Schadenfreude*, Schopenhauer thinks, is "fiendish and diabolical" (*BM*, §14, p. 135); that is, *Schadenfreude* comprises a higher degree of moral depravity than does envy. Envy and *Schadenfreude* are themselves theoretical or abstract; in practice, they manifest as malicious and cruel conduct (*BM*, §14, p. 135). Like the egoist, the malicious character sees a distinction amongst all beings, yet he sees it to such a profound degree that it justifies him in revelling in another's suffering. By causing suffering for another, he himself can even suffer.

Any given individual, Schopenhauer thinks, is susceptible to all three incentives—compassion, egoism, and malice— in varying degrees, and all three incentives can operate in isolation or in combination (*BM*, §16, p. 145). So why does Schopenhauer think that compassion, and compassion alone, is the moral incentive?

Schopenhauer demonstrates that compassion is the moral incentive by using two primary strategies. First, he employs an argument by elimination. This argument is based on nine explanatory premises, all of which, except the last two, he regards as axiomatic. The premises paraphrased are:

1. No action can take place without a sufficient motive being present.
2. When a sufficient motive is present the action necessarily takes place (unless the presence of a stronger countermotive necessarily prevents the action).
3. The will is moved only by well-being and woe (*Wohl und Wehe)* (well-being signifies what is in agreement with one's will; woe signifies what is in disagreement with one's will). Thus, any motive must have reference to well-being and woe.

4. Every action stands in relation to, and has as its object, a being susceptible or predisposed to (the experience) of well-being and woe.

5. Such a being is either the doer of the action himself, or the passive recipient of such an action.

6. Every action that has as its ultimate object the well-being and woe of the doer is an egoistic action.

7. The foregoing propositions regarding actions undertaken, apply equally to the nonperformance of such actions where motive and counter-motive are present.

8. Egoism and the moral worth of an action wholly exclude one another.

9. The moral significance of an action— whether it has moral worth, or is morally neutral or morally reprehensible— can be found only in its relation to others.[15]

(*BM*, §16, pp. 140-142).

From these premises Schopenhauer thinks it is evident that well-being and woe, either that of the agent's or another's, are the ultimate objects of all conduct. If any action is undertaken with an agent's own interest— *any* interest, "either in this world or the next"— as the ultimate object of action, then such an action has no moral worth. Such an action is necessarily egoistic, insofar as the incentive of egoism—the desire for one's own well-being— accounts for it (*BM*, §16, p. 142). Conversely, the only conduct that has moral worth is that which is done purely and solely to benefit another (*BM*, §16, p. 143).

Since the absence of all egoistic motivation is the criterion of an action of moral worth, and since moral conduct aims at the prevention or removal of another's suffering, moral conduct cannot be due to the incentive of egoism. It must then be stimulated by compassion, the only incentive that aims at the prevention or removal of another's suffering. In other words, Schopenhauer eliminates the incentives of egoism and malice as being possible candidates for actions of moral worth. Now

Schopenhauer anticipates the objection that malicious and cruel conduct, since they do not function to preserve or further one's own well-being, satisfy the criterion of actions of moral worth; that is, they are non-egoistic. However, he argues that they are necessarily excluded from this criterion since they are antithetical to morality: malicious and cruel conduct aim at the suffering of others, whereas morality aims at the preservation or furtherance of another's well-being (*BM*, §15, p. 140); *ipso facto* the incentive of malice has no moral worth. In fact, malicious and cruel conduct constitute a greater degree of "moral depravity" than egoism[16] since the latter generally only entails disregard for another's well-being (*BM*, §14, pp. 135-136). As Cartwright points out, Schopenhauer (in anticipating the objection regarding malicious and cruel conduct) appears to forget (or disregard) the difference between a necessary and sufficient condition (Cartwright, 2012, p. 30; *BM*, Introduction xxiii). That is to say, "the absence of all egoistic motivation" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral conduct. "The absence of all egoistic motivation" *and* "the absence of all malicious motivation" are the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for moral conduct; that is, these two conditions are the *criteria* for actions of moral worth. Or, more simply as Cartwright states, the criterion for actions of moral worth should be "the absence of all non-altruistic motivation" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 30).

The second chief method Schopenhauer uses to demonstrate that compassion is the moral incentive is to show how it is responsible for all moral virtues. As Cartwright states, this method contains Schopenhauer's "positive arguments for the claim that compassion is the basis of morally worthwhile conduct" (*BM*, Introduction, p. xxvii). Corresponding to Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle— "Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can" (*BM*, §6, p. 70) — Schopenhauer posits two cardinal virtues: the virtue of voluntary justice (*freie Gerechtigkeit*), and the virtue of disinterested loving-kindness (*Menschenliebe*). Both cardinal virtues are grounded in compassion.

In the virtue of justice, compassion functions negatively— as an inhibiting incentive— by preventing one from acting on the incentives of egoism or malice (*BM*, §17, p. 149). The virtue of justice accounts for the first degree, or effect, of compassion and the first clause— "injure no one"— of Schopenhauer's moral principle. Specifically, in the virtue of justice, compassion functions indirectly insofar as it supplies the reservoir or foundation from which moral principles are abstracted. The incentive of egoism principally opposes the cardinal virtue of justice (*BM*, §14, p. 134); egoism often seeks the satisfaction of one's own desires at the expense of another and hence often violates the injunction to "injure no one".

In the second cardinal virtue, the virtue of loving kindness, compassion stimulates one to act positively: to love one's neighbours is not only to refrain from injuring them, but also entails helping them (*BM*, §18, p. 163). The virtue of loving-kindness, then, accounts for the second clause of Schopenhauer's moral principle— "help everyone as much as you can" — and involves a higher degree of compassion than the virtue of justice. Schopenhauer thinks that this higher degree of compassion is due to a more pronounced participation in another's suffering. The incentive of malice, Schopenhauer thinks, will, more often than not, oppose the virtue of loving kindness; malice directly seeks the suffering of another and hence is diametrically opposed to the moral principle to "help everyone as much as you can".

In §19 of *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer offers various "confirmations" to substantiate his claim that compassion is the foundation of morality. However, it should be now clear that, for Schopenhauer, compassion is the necessary and sufficient incentive for morality since the non-egoistic (and non-malicious) prevention and elimination of suffering (through the moral virtues) is the sole objective of morality, which, in turn, is the sole objective of the incentive of compassion.[17] Compassion stimulates one to act simply and solely for another's sake; that is, to behave *altruistically* according to the virtues of justice and loving-kindness. Compassion, then, engenders

altruistic behaviour even though compassion itself is a feeling, not an action. As noted, for any action (or its omission) to have moral worth *any* interest that an agent has in this doing or omission of this action must be excluded. That is to say, Schopenhauer has a stringent criterion for what qualifies as altruistic conduct. Recall my example of David who witnesses Dorothy fall to the ground in pain. David feels Dorothy's suffering and desires her well-being; that is, he feels *compassion* for her. As a consequence of feeling compassion for Dorothy, David participates in her suffering and forthwith goes to Dorothy's aid and attempts to alleviate her suffering by whatever means he can. In so doing, David acts according to the virtue of loving-kindness. Now, according to Schopenhauer, the following motives must be excluded in order for David's conduct to flow from the incentive of compassion and hence to have the stamp of moral worth (see *BM*, §16, p. 142):

1. David is motivated to act in order to receive esteem, or avoid social disapprobation, from onlookers.
2. David is motivated to act through a desire to uphold religious dogma, and thus receive future reward.
3. David is motivated to act because the country he resides in has "duty to rescue" legislation and David wants to avoid possible legal sanction.
4. David is motivated to act through a desire to expiate his past wrongdoings.
5. David is motivated to act by the desire to receive a positive affective state, a feeling of approbation or "good conscience" through his act (even though, according to Schopenhauer, this is a consequence of such an action (*BM*, §15, p. 140)).

Each and every one of these motivations is fundamentally egoistic. In genuine compassion, according to Schopenhauer, David feels Dorothy's pain as he feels his own, desires her well-being as he does his own, and is stimulated to act for the sole purpose of alleviating Dorothy's pain.

Given Schopenhauer's stringent criterion for what qualifies as altruistic conduct, naturally he thinks that most conduct termed "moral" is merely apparently moral. The institution of law, religious dogma, conscience, and the preservation of civil honour can often account for just conduct. However, just conduct stimulated through these sources is ultimately based on the individual either receiving punishment or reward, and hence on the incentive of egoism. Moreover, Schopenhauer acknowledges that, empirically, we can only ever see another's conduct, and not the incentive that lies beneath this conduct. For any conduct which appears just or benevolent there may be, at base, an egoistic incentive that accounts for it, and hence belies its moral worth. This view, as Cartwright notes, is that of "psychological egoism" (Cartwright, 2008, pp. 139-140); that is, the view that every act of every human being is ultimately motivated solely by egoism. Schopenhauer even acknowledges that the actions of the Swiss hero Arnold von Winkelried— Winkelried sacrificed his life in the battle of Sempach (1386) by "clasping in his arms as many hostile spears as he could grasp" (*BM*, §13, p. 139) — could be, for some, explained in terms of an egoistic incentive. Schopenhauer can offer no ultimate refutation of this view— it is essentially an impasse— and simply states that he "believe(s) there [are] very few who question the matter" of the existence of a moral incentive (*BM*, §15, p. 138). For those who will not admit of this possibility, Schopenhauer is "at an end"; ethics, for such people, would be "like astrology and alchemy", "a science without any real object", and to discuss its foundation further would be altogether futile. However, Schopenhauer is convinced, and believes he has sufficiently demonstrated, that there is wholly selfless conduct—albeit rare—due exclusively to the incentive compassion (*BM*, §15, p. 139).

Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, then, solves the problem of how moral conduct is possible: the incentive of compassion provides a natural foundation for morality— a foundation independent of human institutions that is grounded in the nature of man; "natural compassion" is "inborn and indestructible in everyone" (*BM*, §22, p. 203). In *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer provides an empirical grounding for ethics (the fact of compassion); his theory of compassion is empirically

complete and need not require a metaphysical foundation to be intelligible and consistent. However, compassion itself is an *urphenomenon* (the prefix "ur" in the word "urphenomenon" denotes something primordial or original)— it explains all moral conduct, yet is itself, when considered merely empirically, ultimately unexplained. That is, there is no empirical ground for compassion. As Atwell states, for Schopenhauer:

> Compassion has to be explained nonphenomenally, that is, metaphysically. Derivative ethical phenomena like justice and philanthropy can be explained by the "original phenomena" of compassion; having then reached the limits of phenomenality, with compassion, any further explanation must be metaphysical (Atwell, 1990, p. 115).

As we saw in the Introduction, Schopenhauer is baffled by compassion; that is, he is baffled by how one can will exclusively for another and be stimulated to act wholly independently of one's own desires (*BM*, §16, p. 143). The fact of compassion, Schopenhauer thinks, demands an explanation.

Compassion, Schopenhauer thinks, "obviously" necessitates that another becomes the decisive object of one's will, just as one's own will is usually one's decisive object (that is, one's own will is usually egoistic, being moved only by one's own desires). In compassion, one directly desires another's well-being just as immediately as one normally desires only one's own well-being (*BM*, §16, p. 143). This "necessarily presupposes" that one suffers directly with another to the extent that one feels another's suffering as one normally feels only one's own, and therewith directly desires another's well-being as one normally desires only one's own (*BM*, §16, p. 143). Schopenhauer's presupposition here is uncontroversial insofar as it posits compassion to be constituted by the two components outlined above. Now for one to suffer with another, and directly desire another's well-being as one normally does only one's own, requires, Schopenhauer thinks, that the compassionate agent in some way *identifies* with his beneficiary. And for one to identify with another implies that

the separation between beings, which underlies the egoistic and malicious tenor, is eliminated in some way "at least to an extent" (*BM*, §16, pp. 143-144). However, one can identify with another only in a very limited sense:

> Since I do not exist *inside the other man's skin*, then only by the means of the *knowledge* I have of him, that is, of the representation of him in my head, can I identify with him to such an extent that my deed declares the difference abolished (*BM*, §16, p. 144; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

Schopenhauer's problem, stated simply, is that individuals, considered merely empirically, know one another only in a very limited and superficial manner, and this manner is inconsistent with, and thus does not seem to allow for, the type of robust identification that compassion requires. Human beings are empirically distinct; each individual is a discrete spatio-temporal object. One individual is clearly not inside the body or the mental state of another individual. As such, one has no phenomenological ingress to another's will. The only knowledge one has of another is by means of perceptual representation. That is to say, we know another person as an object wholly conditioned by, and limited to, our own empirical experience. One has direct access to one's own being (one's feelings) — one is immediately aware of one's own self as will via self-consciousness— yet has indirect access to another's. Consequently, only through the *idea* that one has of another, can one identify with another. However, identifying with another through means of a mere idea seems insufficient to engender the type of identification that compassion requires; that is, it seems insufficient to engender an identification which suspends the difference between beings.

It is only compassionate action, then, that attests to the fact that the difference between two beings has been suspended through a process of identification; that is, the identification between beings in compassion, and subsequent diminution of the gulf between them, is evidenced in the empirical

world merely through compassionate *action*. Compassionate identification is not seen, only its result. Yet Schopenhauer assures his audience that "the process here analysed is not one that is imagined or invented"; rather, "it is perfectly real and indeed by no means infrequent" (*BM*, §16, p. 144).

Compassion cannot be fully explained empirically; however, egoism is explained *and* justified empirically. There appears to be no rational basis for anyone to be anything other than egoistic; compassion appears to be *contra naturum*. As Janaway states "action motivated by pure concern for the wellbeing of others should be not only rare, but so contrary to our nature as to be impossible" (Janaway, 1994, pp. 81-82).

Since any individual is separated from another in every respect, one is necessarily separated from another's *suffering*: another's suffering is merely known indirectly through external perception (*BM*, §18, p. 165). The empirical separation amongst individuals implies a corresponding moral separation: one's desires, well-being, and sufferings are exclusively one's own; another's are exclusively another's. To illustrate: why should David feel Dorothy's suffering along with the impulse to aid her, independent of any of his desires? Why should he expend his time and effort exclusively for Dorothy? David and Dorothy are strangers. Dorothy constitutes a mere representation in David's head, as does her apparent suffering. Empirically, David has direct access only to his own sufferings and desires, and so David cannot feel Dorothy's suffering and desire for well-being.

Perhaps, then, compassion is a deceptive notion, or some type of illusory experience. This was the view held by the Italian philosopher Ubaldo Cassina in his *Analytic Essay on Compassion* (1788). In compassion, Cassina thinks, one imaginatively puts oneself in the place of the sufferer and then believes one is suffering *another's* pain inside one's own body: that is, one *identifies* with another

through the faculty of imagination. In this scenario one merely feels *one's own* suffering and *one's own* desire to relieve this suffering. For example, David does not feel Dorothy's suffering at all; rather, through his imagination he places himself in Dorothy's perilous position and consequently thinks he is experiencing Dorothy's pain inside his own being. Yet he is being duped: the *sight* of Dorothy suffering engenders a suffering *in* and *for* David. Naturally, David then desires to relieve this suffering; after all, it is *his* suffering in *his* body. On this view, compassion is an emotional contagion— one's feeling of suffering is stimulated by another's feeling of suffering, yet one is not feeling another's suffering *per se*. Compassion, in this sense, is described psychologically.

Schopenhauer explicitly rejects this "simple" empirical explanation and suggests that in compassion one experiences the suffering of another, not in one's own body, but, somehow, in that of the other's— we experience the suffering "in *his* person, not in ours" (*BM*, §16, p. 147; Schopenhauer's emphasis). One *literally* participates in another's suffering, so to speak. In Cassina's account, by contrast, one merely participates in one's own suffering and is psychologically deluded into thinking one suffers, in any sense, another's pain. Yet, in Schopenhauer's account, the compassionate agent is fully aware that the other is the sufferer, not himself; likewise, he is aware that the pain is the sufferer's pain, not his: "we feel his pain as *his*, and do not imagine that it is ours" (*BM*, §16, p. 147; Schopenhauer's emphasis). However, the compassionate agent "shares[s] the suffering *in him*, in spite of the fact that his skin does not enclose [his] nerves" (*BM*, §18, p. 166; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

David, then, is in the clutch of no delusion; he is fully conscious that Dorothy is the sufferer and that the pain is Dorothy's, not his. David does not experience his own suffering, he experiences, in some capacity, and to some degree, Dorothy's suffering, and, apparently, he somehow experiences it inside Dorothy's body. This counter-intuitive notion of the process of compassion, Schopenhauer thinks, can only be explained metaphysically. I now turn to the metaphysical explanation.

§1.2 Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion

Schopenhauer believes he adequately answers the question advanced by the Royal Society since it "is directed at the foundation of ethics" and does not require a metaphysical system that supports this foundation (*BM*, §21, p. 199). However, his empirical foundation for ethics, he thinks, will not provide "satisfaction and peace" (*BM*, §21, p. 199) since it does not explain compassion *itself*; compassion remains an urphenomenon. Schopenhauer, then, puts forth a "final explanation" for compassion— a metaphysical explanation "only as a supplement to be given and taken at our discretion" (*BM*, §16, p. 145).

As noted in my Introduction, in §22 of *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer argues that plurality and thus individuation, rest on space and time; the concept of "many" necessarily implies position (in space) or succession (in time). Accordingly, space and time account for all plurality and numerical distinction amongst beings; for this reason Schopenhauer terms them the *principium individuationis*. To elaborate on this claim, Schopenhauer cites Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*: the pure forms of intuition, space and time, are *a priori* conditions for the possibility of experience without which phenomenal objects cannot be known. Yet, space and time belong merely to our faculty of sensibility, not to the objects known through this faculty; we intuit a table, and that table must necessarily occupy a portion of space and perdure through time. However, space and time do not belong to the table itself. To put it somewhat crudely, space and time are only "us"; they are not "out there", they are *ideal*. Schopenhauer concludes, then, that space and time are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for experience of plurality. However, they are merely aspects of appearance and do not characterise the inner essence of things. If space and time have this merely phenomenal character, Schopenhauer argues, then so must plurality; plurality is something foreign to the in-itself of the world. Hence, the countless individuals evident in the phenomenal world must, fundamentally, be manifestations of one identical essence— the will qua *thing-in-itself* (*BM*, §22, p.

206). That is to say, that which cannot be directly represented must necessarily be a unity. In a literal sense, then, human beings (and all else), fundamentally and essentially, manifest a unitary essence; a unity of being. Compassion, Schopenhauer thinks, is an expression of the metaphysical truth that plurality and separateness belong only to appearance, and that all living things are manifestations of one identical essence:

> That a man gives alms without having, even remotely, any other object than that of lessening the want that oppresses another, is possible only insofar as he…recognizes again *his own inner being-in-itself* in the phenomenal appearance of another (*BM*, §22, p. 212; my emphasis).

Compassion, Schopenhauer states, is "the empirical emerging of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical multiplicity of the will's appearance" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 602). The metaphysical conception is simply an understanding that, at the metaphysical level of will, one is connected to all others by virtue of the unifying essence of will.[18] This understanding is illustrated empirically through the altruistic deeds the compassionate subject undertakes. Schopenhauer's argument for this metaphysical notion of compassion has been expressed succinctly by Daniel Came:

> since the intuitions of space and time are merely the forms of our experience and do not have any application at the level of the thing-in-itself, noumenal reality must be one. It is only in our spatio-temporally structured experience, that the world *appears* divided into separate individuals. Hence although we ordinarily think of ourselves in terms of our private egos, this is an illusion. An awareness of this has dawned on the person who identifies with the interests of others (Came, 2012, pp. 244-245; Came's emphasis).

Schopenhauer's metaphysical argument for compassion might be interpreted as an "indispensability argument". That is to say, according to Schopenhauer, a belief in the existence of compassion entails an ontological commitment to the existence of the metaphysical will since compassion depends *indispensably* on the metaphysical will. The will is indispensable for compassion insofar as one cannot feel compassion unless compassion entails feeling the unitary essence of will. This argument can be expressed thus:

1. One ought to have an ontological commitment to that which is indispensable for compassion.
2. The will *qua* thing-in-itself is indispensable to compassion.

Therefore:

3. One ought to have ontological commitment to the existence of the will *qua* thing-in-itself.[19]

There is compassion, if and only if, there is metaphysical will. The metaphysical will, as such, has an ontological "right".

Let us examine, even more finely, Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion. Specifically, let us examine Schopenhauer's notion of *participation*. In my opinion, Schopenhauer's notion of participation, and its relationship to compassion, has been a neglected topic in the literature. Understanding Schopenhauer's notion of participation, to the extent that it can be understood, will allow for a deeper understanding of his metaphysical conception of compassion.

Although Schopenhauer sometimes appears to treat compassion, the incentive of compassion and participation as interchangeable expressions and hence as identical phenomena (*salva veritate* identity) (*BM*, §16, p. 144; §18, p. 163), he does not always regard them as such.[20]

Compassion appears to be the source of, or gives rise to, participation. That is, the immediate participation in another's suffering is prompted by the experience of compassion, but is not identical to it. This is most clearly evidenced when Schopenhauer states that "a direct *participation* in the weal and woe of others, *whose source* we recognized as *compassion*, is that from which the virtues of justice and philanthropy arise" (*BM*, §22, p. 204; my emphasis). Compassion here is the source of participation. By virtue of this participation, one then has the moral virtues and acts justly and philanthropically. Moreover, when Schopenhauer talks about the *disposition* of loving-kindness, which he equates with a higher degree of compassion than the disposition of justice (*BM*, §18, p. 163), he states that "the *expressions* of that pure, disinterested, objective *participation* in the lot and condition of another are the *effect of loving-kindness* (*BM*, §19, p. 174; my emphasis). "The expressions" Schopenhauer mentions are instances of altruistic conduct. These instances of altruistic conduct are born of the participation in another's suffering, which is, in turn, the effect of— something caused by—compassion ("loving-kindness" here is synonymous with compassion in its "second degree"). In light of this textual evidence, compassion and participation are not identical phenomena, but rather, compassion engenders participation. Altruistic conduct is born of participation, which is in turn born of compassion.

As compassion is a distinctly metaphysical concept for Schopenhauer, so must it be the case with participation. This conception is by no means unique: since the time of Plato, participation has often been often viewed in this way;[21] that is, participation generally entails that one thing (a sensible object) has its reality due to something other than itself (its transcendent source); sensible objects *participate* in this transcendent source.[22] However, let us now examine what participation means for *Schopenhauer*.

As I have said, participation in another's suffering, for Schopenhauer, certainly *involves* one feeling the suffering of another and the desire to prevent or eradicate the other's suffering. That is,

participation involves the feeling of compassion. However, in light of the textual evidence, participation itself is not a feeling, but rather it is an *event* (*activity* or *process*). The feeling of compassion makes way for, or is the entry point to, this "astonishing event" (*BM*, §16, p. 144). In the *metaphysical* event of participation, one identifies with another as being of the same unitary essence as oneself. The suffering of both the compassionate agent and his patient, and the desire the compassionate agent has for the welfare of his patient, fuse at the metaphysical level of will. At this level, the suffering is neither the benefactor's nor the beneficiary's. Rather, it is a product of the unitary will which transcends individuality and thus the notions of "benefactor" and "beneficiary". In participating in another's suffering on the metaphysical plane, one participates in the unifying essence of will since any two individuals are objectifications of this unifying essence.

We can now expand on Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion, which was provisionally defined as "the expression of the metaphysical truth that plurality and separateness belong only to appearance, and that all living things are manifestations of one identical essence". Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion is simply *the participation, born of the feeling of compassion, in the metaphysical will qua thing-in-itself*. The individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition for such participation is the feeling of compassion. And the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for altruistic conduct are (i) the feeling of compassion, and (ii) the metaphysical event of participation. Without this metaphysical conception of compassionate participation, one could not actually feel another's suffering and desire another's well-being in any sense, since, empirically, as has been demonstrated, there is no necessary ethical connection between any two individuals.

One further example will help illustrate Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion:
Dorothy, old and frail, is walking at a slow pace in her neighbourhood. As she walks the road's curb she fails to hear the engine of a parked truck in a nearby residence; the truck's driver is preparing to

reverse the truck from his driveway. Dorothy is oblivious to the truck's presence, and continues her laboured walk. Only at the last minute, does she become aware of the truck and realize she is directly in its path. She attempts to remove herself from harm's way, yet falters with her walking-frame and stumbles to the ground. She feels overwhelming fear, a sense of dread; she is *suffering*. She screams for help, yet the truck driver cannot hear her and continues reversing. She summons all her energy to attempt to rise and move out of the truck's way; however, this effort is in vain. Fortunately, David, who lives nearby, hears Dorothy's screams, and is aware of the truck's presence. It is immediately apparent to him that Dorothy is about to get struck by the truck. David has never spoken to Dorothy before, they are strangers. However, upon cognizing thoughts to the effect of "this woman is in trouble, she is suffering, and could die", David experiences an acute physiological reaction: he hyperventilates, and his heart races; like Dorothy, he feels a sense of overwhelming fear; a sense of dread. His very next thought is: "I must save this woman!" and he feels an irresistible desire to help Dorothy. David *feels compassion* for Dorothy. He is then moved in a profound way that he has never experienced before— yet he cannot really articulate this experience. He feels, or intuits, that *his*, or perhaps *both* his own and Dorothy's life, is on the line. It is like his consciousness expands to all of existence and he travels outside his body. But he does not, and he knows he does not, and is fully aware that it is Dorothy, not he, who is in the perilous situation. This profound experience is the metaphysical event of *participation.* David *participates* in Dorothy's suffering. Shortly after this experience, David runs immediately to Dorothy's aid and attempt, by force, to veer her body from the trucks' path. David *acts altruistically*. David's reaction throughout this process appears to be instinctual[23] insofar he has no more thoughts other than those that relate directly to Dorothy's suffering and concern for Dorothy's plight; there is no deliberation on the consequences of his impending action; no concern for his own safety. In fact, the above events occur within in a split-second— it almost feels as if time stands still— and David cannot even remember precisely what he thought, or even if he did think at all. Now David is an atheist and does not expect any recompense for his impeding action. Moreover, there is no "duty of care"

legislation impelling his action. Finally, he has no wish to obtain the esteem of either Dorothy or the truck driver, both of whom he believes to be the only witnesses to his impending deed. In short, there are no prudential reasons that account for David's impending deed.

Now how can such a phenomenon be explained, asks Schopenhauer, other than metaphysically? Any psychological explanation would necessarily fall short; that is, if one tried to account for this action by appealing to pity, empathy (emotional or cognitive), or sympathy, as defined in my Introduction, such an account would be inaccurate, or at minimum incomplete, insofar as all three lack the conative element inherent in compassion: in all such cases we may feel *for* another (sympathy and pity), or *with* another (emotional empathy), however, there is no impulse to actually *aid* another through taking action. In short, if David had merely pity, empathy, or sympathy for Dorothy, he may very well experience acute emotional and physical reactions, yet he would not have, and consequently act on, a desire to help her. According to Schopenhauer, the only explanation for David's conduct is metaphysical: Dorothy and David are manifestations of, and connected by virtue of, one essence; this essence, in turn, connects Dorothy's suffering with David, which he, via the feeling of compassion, metaphysically participates in. This participation accounts then for his altruistic action.

I will now consider some significant objections to Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion.

§1.3 Cartwright's objections

Cartwright conceptualizes Schopenhauer's conception of compassion in the following analytical model, where the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for *A* to have compassion for *B* are:

i) A and B are sentient beings;

ii) A cognizes that B will be or is suffering;

iii) A feels sorrow for B;

iv) A participates immediately in B's suffering;

v) A desires B's well-being; and

vi) A is disposed to prevent or eliminate B's suffering, and other things being equal, A will act to prevent or eliminate B's suffering.

(Cartwright, 2012, p. 259)[24]

Cartwright states that, excluding condition (iv), this model is "relatively uncontroversial and straightforward" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 259). He supports each of the propositions in the following ways: first, compassion is a relationship that can subsist only between sentient beings; that is, between human beings and non-human animals. It makes no sense to claim that a human being can have compassion for a mountain, or a rose, and vice versa. Compassion necessarily requires cognitive and affective qualities which are non-existent in non-sentient beings.

Second, compassion requires recognition of another and the fact that this other is currently, or will be in the future, suffering. This, like the first proposition for Cartwright, is "relatively uncontroversial" (Cartwright, 2008, p. 296). Cartwright qualifies this claim further by noting that, for Schopenhauer, there is no such thing as compassion for another's happiness given Schopenhauer's negative ontology of happiness; that is, all happiness is the mere cessation of suffering, where suffering is positive in character. As such, for Schopenhauer, the desire to assuage another's suffering is commensurate with the desire to advance another's welfare, and compassion functions necessarily with respect to both (Cartwright, 1982, p. 63).

Cartwright's third condition, "A feels sorrow for B", is a necessary condition for compassion in that compassion must be differentiated from the mere detached or disengaged recognition of suffering in another. Such detachment would contradict the emotive component— the sense of sadness for another's plight— inherent in the nature of compassion. Furthermore, and related to this, Cartwright notes that one's response necessarily "must be negative in tone" (Cartwright, 2012, pp. 259-260) — one must feel something akin to sorrow, otherwise an emotive response such as *Schadenfreude* may be possible. Such a response would clearly not be a compassionate one, but rather its converse.

Fourthly, condition (v.), "A desires B's well-being", which Cartwright believes is Schopenhauer's very own "description of the incentive of compassion" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 260), encapsulates the conative aspect in compassion. This condition, in turn, explains why condition (vi.) — "A is disposed to prevent or eliminate B's suffering, and other things being equal, A will act to prevent or eliminate B's suffering" — is as such: "It is because compassion involves the desire for another's well-being that a compassionate agent is disposed to prevent or relieve suffering" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 260). Cartwright astutely notes that these last two conditions differentiate compassion from either sympathy (*Sympathie*) or empathy (*Einfühlung)* in that both sympathy and empathy do not have the conative element inherent in compassion, and, additionally, both can be felt with respect to another's pain *or* happiness.[25]

It is the fourth condition of Cartwright's interpretive model of Schopenhauer's concept of compassion— "A participates immediately in B's suffering" — that Cartwright finds to be "highly problematic" (Cartwright, 2008, p. 296). Moreover, it is precisely the one for which Schopenhauer "sought a metaphysical foundation" (Cartwright, 2008, p. 296). Cartwright does not criticize Schopenhauer's metaphysics directly, but states that "[i]f one does not share Schopenhauer's metaphysical commitments, one will not find his explanation of this phenomenon very convincing"

(Cartwright, pp. 66-67, 1982). In relation to this condition, he mentions both Schopenhauer's apparent resistance to explain this phenomenon psychologically, and Schopenhauer's brusque dismissal of Cassina's account, a dismissal which, for Cartwright, stimulates Schopenhauer's metaphysical account (Cartwright, 2008, p. 302).

Cartwright advances significant problems regarding this fourth condition. First, in his view, it entails a conceptually incoherent notion of participation since it involves two individuals experiencing a numerically identical mental state. Second, even if one were to allow for this notion, Schopenhauer does not explain how it is possible: Schopenhauer does not put forth any substantive support for his metaphysical claim that compassion entails feeling another's pain in the other's body. Third, and as a consequence of Cartwright's preceding two criticisms, there is no support for Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion. Fourth, to the extent that the fourth condition is inconsistent with the conditions that "make reference to future mental states" (Cartwright, 1982, p. 66) Schopenhauer cannot accurately derive the virtue of justice from compassion. I will now examine each of the first three problems in turn; Cartwright's final problem will be dealt with in my next chapter.

First, Cartwright argues that Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of participation involves an "extraordinary experience": one person experiences another's suffering inside another's body. It is due to this experience that Schopenhauer calls compassion "the great mystery of ethics" and believes it to require a metaphysical explanation (Cartwright, 2012, p. 260). Implicit in Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer's notion of participation is that two individuals experience a numerically identical suffering; *one* individual has a mental state that is qualitatively indiscernible from *another's*. Cartwright thinks this is the implicit premise in Schopenhauer's notion of participation and cites the following passage as evidence for his interpretation:

> [In the participative process of compassion] it is precisely in *his* person, not in ours (*in seiner* Person, nicht in unserer), that we feel the suffering, to our grief and sorrow. We suffer with him and hence *in* him (Wir Leiden mit ihm, also *in* ihm): we feel his pain as *his*, and do not imagine that it is ours (*BM*, §16, p. 147; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

Such a notion, Cartwright thinks, is conceptually incoherent:

> How is it possible to experience another's pain in the other's body? It would seem that what makes the experience of pain *my* experience of pain is that I alone immediately experience it, and, if this is the case, I cannot have the experience of another's pain (Cartwright, 2012, p. 260; Cartwright's emphasis).

Reformulating Cartwright's passage in terms of Schopenhauer's claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering", Cartwright's argument can be seen as follows: since *A* alone immediately experiences *A's* pain (inside *A's* body), it is *A's* pain. *A* cannot experience *B's* pain, since any pain *A* experiences is necessarily *A's* (inside *A's* body). Implicit in Cartwright's argument, is an appeal to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Leibniz's Law): "two things are identical if and only if they have all of the same properties." Or more fully stated: necessarily, for any entity, *a*, and any entity, *b*, *a* is identical to *b* if and only if for any property *a* has, *b* has, and for any property *b* has, *a* has. On Cartwright's reading, Schopenhauer's notion of participation is conceptually incoherent since it contravenes this principle. In the participative activity, according to Cartwright, Schopenhauer claims that *A* and *B* have qualitatively indiscernible (numerically identical) mental states: *A's* mental state has all of the same properties as *B's*. Therefore, according to the stated principle, *A's* mental state and *B's* mental state must be identical. Yet, in point of fact, Cartwright argues, *A* and *B* necessarily experience distinct (discernible) mental states since *A* and *B* are distinct beings; *A* and *B* occupy different spatial locations: that is why they are <u>*A*</u> and <u>*B*</u>.

Cartwright concedes it to be possible for two individuals to have qualitatively similar mental states, yet each individual has a *fundamentally* distinct mental state exclusively confined to that particular individual's body:

> What makes a mental state mine is my feeling or immediate consciousness of it. We can have mental states which are qualitatively similar to those of others, e.g., Joe and I feel grief for the loss of a friend, but we each feel our own mental states– Joe feels his grief and I feel mine. How can I feel his grief, have his immediate consciousness of this grief, in his person like I have mine? If I feel his grief like I feel my own, it is mine. It is my immediate consciousness of a mental state, my feeling of it, which makes it mine and no longer Joe's (Cartwright, 1982, p. 67).

If one's mental state was qualitatively indiscernible from another's, then those "two" mental states would be the same state. Yet one cannot have a qualitatively indiscernible mental state from another's, since human beings are empirically distinct. Therefore, no two mental states are the same. Schopenhauer's notion of participation, for Cartwright, is aporia; that is, it is a irresolvable contradictory notion: it is not logically (and hence physically) possible for *two* numerically identical states to exist.

Cartwright's second problem with respect to Schopenhauer's claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering" is that, even if one *somehow* (*per impossibile*) allows for Schopenhauer's conceptually incoherent notion of participation, Schopenhauer, in *On the Basis of Morality*, does not explain how it is possible. That is, he does not put forth any substantive support for his claim that compassion entails feeling another's pain in the other's body; the claim is thus "not very convincing" (Cartwright, 1982, p. 66). This is admittedly an awkward formulation in that Cartwright has *implicitly* ruled out this claim can be explained in any manner; it entails something

which is logically impossible and something which is logically impossible cannot have any mode of explanation. However, I will briefly examine this criticism as it is intimately connected to Cartwright's first criticism.

Cartwright claims that Schopenhauer does not so much as explain the participative experience of compassion, but rather "only seems to tell us how this experience is possible" (Cartwright, 1982, p. 67).[26] That is, the experience of feeling another's pain in another's body is only possible due to the metaphysical unity of being (that is, through the unitary will):

> His basic metaphysical explanation of this phenomenon is that we can have this direct experience of another's mental state because ultimately it is also mine. It is also mine because both the other and myself are really the same entity— the metaphysical will (Cartwright, 1982, p. 66).

I interpret Cartwright here to mean that Schopenhauer does not explain the participative phenomenon *per se*, sufficiently clarifying its metaphysical cause through rationally compelling argumentation, but, rather, merely asserts a possibility for its occurrence:

> [In "On the Metaphysical Explanation of the Primary Ethical Phenomenon in On the Basis of Morality"] Schopenhauer does not return to his earlier claim that compassionate agents feel another's pain in the other's body. One would imagine that he might have argued that this extraordinary experience is possible because each individual is metaphysically identical— twangs of pain reverberate through the connecting metaphysical substrate. Instead, he returns to claims found in his first metaphysics of compassion (Cartwright, 2008, p. 301).

Schopenhauer's "first metaphysics of compassion" for Cartwright:

> appears to claim that compassionate agents participate immediately in another's suffering, because they realize that others are metaphysically identical to themselves. Consequently, they are moved to prevent or relieve others' misery because they perceive others' woes as their own (Cartwright, 2008, p. 297).

Thus, in *On the Basis of Morality,* Cartwright claims that Schopenhauer, instead of providing an explanation as he vows to, rather

> [M]oves on to consider whether the behavior of good or evil characters is metaphysically warranted. He then argues that the conduct of good or compassionate characters is warranted, since their conduct expresses what the philosopher demonstrated as the unity of being. Conversely, individuals who treat others as nonegos engage in conduct inconsistent with the metaphysical unity of the will and, for that reason, are said to engage in a delusion; the veil of *maya* has not been lifted from their eyes (Cartwright, 2008, p. 302).

Hence, for Cartwright, Schopenhauer's "explanation" of the "extraordinary experience" of immediately participating in another's suffering in another's body, does not amount to an actual account of the nature or character of the participative experience in compassion:

> If we accept this view [that the metaphysical unity of will accounts for the experience of another's pain in one's own body], it does not really explain this phenomenon (Cartwright, 1982, p. 67).

Schopenhauer, then, according to Cartwright, does not properly explain the metaphysics of compassion insofar as he does not properly explain the participative experience.

§1.4 Cartwright's psychological explanation for compassion

Cartwright contends that Schopenhauer's conception of compassion can be made more credible by a reformulation of the metaphysical claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering". Compassion, for Cartwright, appears to operate in a psychological way here, that is, through the faculty of the imagination. So Cartwright attempts to amend Schopenhauer's model of compassion by reformulating the claim "A participates immediately in B's suffering" as "A participates imaginatively in B's suffering" (Cartwright, 2008, p. 303). Given that such a reformulation involves no appeal to metaphysics and is, ultimately, empirically grounded, this reformulation entails a "naturalized" account of the process of compassion. Most importantly, for Cartwright, it is not attended with the problems inherent in Schopenhauer's metaphysical claim— it is accounted for sufficiently through the cognitive process of imagination. To legitimize his own argument, Cartwright notes that Schopenhauer himself acknowledges the phenomena of "compassion at a distance" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 261) — that is, compassion for others reaching beyond one's own immediate experience, such as compassion for victims of a natural disaster in foreign lands. Likewise, in his examination of weeping, which he views as the response of "compassion for ourselves" (*WWR* Vol. 1, p. 377), Schopenhauer, according to Cartwright, identifies the function of imagination in eliciting compassion. Finally, Cartwright notes that in *On the Basis of Morality* (§19, p. 175), Schopenhauer states that one can reawaken compassion by following principles that entail the use of imagination.

To conclude this section, Cartwright puts forth what appears to be a reasonably compelling argument by demonstrating that Schopenhauer's notion of participation, insofar as it entails that one experiences a numerically identical pain to another, is conceptually incoherent. Moreover, he outlines Schopenhauer's apparent lack of a clear-cut explanation of his metaphysical notion of

participation. Schopenhauer's critique of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of participation comports with our common intuitions regarding the empirical demarcation between individual selves, and, as a corollary, the separation between our sufferings. At first glance, Schopenhauer's view is so counter-intuitive that most would dismiss this contention without reflection. Peter Nilsson, who cites Cartwright's psychological conception of compassion as an alternative to Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception, appears to sum up what most people believe when he states:

> The claim that we literally feel the other's instance of suffering is unreasonable. Firstly, it is not physically possible to feel another's instance of suffering. Secondly, if it were possible, it is hard to see how one could do this without suffering oneself (Nilsson, 2011, p. 134).

As we have seen, Cartwright offers an alternative explanation of the participatory process in compassion— "A participates imaginatively in B's suffering" — which does not appeal to any metaphysics and is thus wholly empirically grounded, which, for many, is undoubtedly sound insofar as it coheres with their intuitions regarding the phenomenon of compassion.

§1.5 Response to Cartwright's psychological model and objections

In response, first I would like to note that both textual and philosophical considerations oppose Cartwright's purely imaginative reconstruction of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer is adamant that a *mere* imaginative participation in another's suffering is not sufficient to stimulate compassionate conduct. It cannot impel one to prevent a potential suffering, or thwart an actual suffering. This is evidenced in his refutation of Cassina. Moreover, Schopenhauer expressly states, prior to, and hence independently from, his refutation of Cassina, that the process of compassion "is not one that is imagined or invented" (*BM*, §16, p. 144). Cartwright's imaginative participation would not involve a compassionate response, but, rather, it would constitute an empathic or sympathetic

response: the response would be bereft of the conative element inherent in compassion; one may feel for, or with, another, yet one would have no desire to help the other. Consequently, the response would not engender participation and compassionate action. Gerard Mannion is right to state that "to participate in the suffering of another in an imaginative sense is surely more akin to *empathy* than to *Mitleid*" (Mannion, 2002, p. 209). Cartwright's proposal, as he himself recognizes, would greatly compromise the spirit of Schopenhauer's ethics. That is, Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is distinctly metaphysical, and Cartwright wants to extirpate the metaphysics in Schopenhauer's theory by rendering the participative process in compassion a wholly imaginative phenomenon:

> [T]his reformulation eliminates the very phenomenon that leads Schopenhauer to call compassion 'the great mystery of ethics' and which led him to claim that compassion required a metaphysical rather than a psychological explanation (Cartwright, 2008, p. 304).

Cartwright himself even concedes this process of "naturalizing" compassion is "a move that would not please Schopenhauer" (Cartwright, 2008, p. 209, n. 23). Mathijs Peters states:

> Cartwright too easily assumes that Schopenhauer would sacrifice the metaphysical nature of Will and of the phenomenon of compassion to psychological and scientific observations. This would not do justice to the specific nature of Schopenhauer's understanding of compassion, or to the fundamental role that it plays within his philosophy as a whole (Peters, 2014, p, 271, n. 71).

Furthermore, it is not clear that Cartwright's psychological account of the participative process gives the satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon that he thinks it does. Cartwright's psychological conception of compassion outlines what it entails to be a psychological agent

participating in another's suffering: that is, one simply uses one's psychological process of imagination. However, it does not then follow that the psychological process of imagining another's pain does not *itself* require a metaphysical basis. That is to say, we might ask: what ultimately accounts for this psychological process? Or, why do we psychologically imagine another's pain given we are empirically distinct and, by default, egoistic creatures? Telling us, for example, that the psychological process of compassion is somehow accounted for by a neurobiological process does not explain the phenomenon of compassion *per se*. That is, stating that compassion results from a wave of depolarization moving down serotonergic, dopaminergic, and/or noradrenergic neurons merely states that compassion is a physical phenomenon. Furthermore, it certainly does not answer the question of why our neurons should operate in such a manner in the first place. Imaginative participation *preserves* a mystery, while Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception answers the "How possible?" question and in so doing provides (or at least attempts to provide) a satisfying *final* explanation. Thus, by putting forth his psychological alternative, Cartwright does not make any significant advancement on Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of compassion. In reducing the participative process in compassion to a psychological phenomenon Cartwright has rendered the notion of participation somewhat feasible (or more amenable to our intuitions), without explaining why it is feasible other than saying it is an empirical phenomenon. In short, Cartwright's explanation is itself in need of an explanation.

Now this is not to say that Schopenhauer thinks imagination plays no part in compassion. Imagination *is* involved in compassion for Schopenhauer, yet it has an auxiliary role, not the central role Cartwright wants to ascribe to it. At times Cartwright clearly misconstrues the role that the imagination plays in Schopenhauer's theory. For example, he thinks Schopenhauer's notion of weeping is an instance where the imagination functions to elicit compassion. In the phenomenon of weeping, Schopenhauer thinks one never weep over directly felt pain, but rather "only over its repetition in reflection" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 376); that is, the pain, lodged in one's memory, is a

representation of a prior instance of suffering one has endured. In the process of weeping, the imagination works by cleaving an individual's sense of self into two: the subject imagines himself as an individual separate from, and observing, his suffering self as "another" individual. His imagined self subsequently feels compassion for this "another". He then realizes that he *is* this suffering self:

> [In weeping] We feel that we endure more than we could see another endure, and in this peculiarly involved frame of mind, in which the directly felt suffering comes to perception only in a doubly indirect way, pictured as the suffering of another and sympathized with as such, and then suddenly perceived again as directly our own; in such a frame of mind nature finds relief through that curious physical convulsion (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 376).

The imagination does not function to elicit compassion in the phenomenon of weeping; rather, it allows an individual, by viewing himself from psychological distance, to be cognizant of his own suffering. Once cognizant of his suffering, he then has compassion for himself. Compassion requires identification with another. In weeping, the imagination does not function to allow for, or even expediate, such identification.

Nevertheless, my chief problem with Cartwright's argument is that he misrepresents Schopenhauer's notion of participative experience born of compassion. To demonstrate this point, let us now juxtapose Schopenhauer's conception of participation with Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer's conception of participation. For Schopenhauer, the metaphysical event of participation involves somehow feeling another's pain in the other's body: "We suffer *with* him, and hence *in* him: we feel his pain as *his*, and do not imagine that it is ours" (*BM*, §16, p. 147). Cartwright claims that Schopenhauer "attempts" to explain this metaphysically by arguing that

> compassionate agents participate immediately in another's suffering, because they realize that others are *metaphysically identical to themselves* (Cartwright, 2008, p. 297; my emphasis).

That is, Cartwright thinks Schopenhauer believes that I can have

> direct experience of another's mental state because ultimately it is also *mine*. It is also mine because *both the other and myself are really the same entity— the metaphysical will* (Cartwright, 1982, p. 66; my emphasis).

Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer's concept of participation depends on the fact that, in compassion, two individuals have indiscernible mental states. One has an immediate state of consciousness that is absolutely qualitatively commensurate with another's immediate state of consciousness: the two states are numerically identical. For example, Dorothy tells David that she feels an "ennui and an associated sadness" upon reflecting on her stifled dreams and perceived lack of achievement. In participating immediately in Dorothy's suffering, according to Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer, David immediately feels Dorothy's "ennui and an associated sadness" (in *Dorothy's* body or consciousness) to the exact same degree (in fact David and Dorothy are morphed into one entity).

However, it is not sufficiently clear that, for Schopenhauer, participation requires this numerical identity. Nothing Schopenhauer states entails that, in order to participate in another's suffering, one must experience the *exact same* mental state, to the *exact same* degree, as another.

Schopenhauer's notion of participation as encapsulated in his sentence "I suffer *with* him, and hence *in* him" and his phrase "feel his pain as *his*", to be strict, does not entail that one experiences a numerically identical feeling to another. The phrase "feel his pain as *his*" simply means we feel his

pain, not our own pain; we have an emotive state greatly influenced, and wholly engendered, by another's. As Raymond B. Marcin states, Schopenhauer here distinguishes compassion from "the shallow, ephemeral feeling that some had held it to be" (Marcin, 2006, pp. 137-138) — most notably Cassina. The phrase does not refer to the quality, or extent, of the pain we experience in the other. Schopenhauer is not committed to a numerical identity thesis by virtue of saying that one feels another's pain as the other's pain. When compassion is stimulated:

> the weal and woe of another are nearest to my heart in exactly the same way, although not always in the same degree, as otherwise only my own are (*BM*, §16, p. 144).

The subordinate clause "although not always in the same degree" is pertinent here in that it directly challenges Cartwright's insistence on numerical identity. For, if the phenomenon of participation was wholly dependent on numerical identity, as Cartwright holds, it would then follow that we would feel such suffering *always* in the *exact same degree.*

In Schopenhauer's notion of participation, it appears that one feels a suffering that resonates with another's, yet is different from another's:

> the happier *our* state, and hence the more the consciousness of it is contrasted with the *other mans fate*, the more susceptible we are to compassion (*BM*, §16, p. 147; my emphasis).

It could be argued that with respect to this particular passage, one that Cartwright frequently omits when advancing his interpretation, Schopenhauer means that one's own happiness, as contrasted with another's suffering, is used as a springboard, or gives impetus to an individual, to *then* feel compassion for another. However, by all accounts, and most pertinently Cartwright's own account, compassion is instantaneous (an *immediate* participation not requiring reflection), and need not

require any springboard. Moreover, when refuting Cassina, Schopenhauer suggests that two subjects feel distinct feelings, and, additionally, and as a corollary, he makes it clear that compassionate participation always involves two subjects: not a single subject as Cartwright implies.

> at every moment we remain clearly conscious that *he **is the sufferer**, **not** we*; and it is precisely in *his* person, not in ours, that we feel the suffering, to ***our*** grief and sorrow (*BM*, §16, p. 147; Schopenhauer's emphasis; bold emphasis mine).

How can there be one numerically identical suffering, when Schopenhauer contrasts the feelings of the compassionate ("our grief and sorrow") with the suffering of his beneficiary? And given the fact that "*he is the sufferer, not we*" it is clear, as I have sufficiently demonstrated, that compassion, at the empirical level, involves two individuals. Schopenhauer recognizes that compassion presupposes individuation; the very concept of participation asserts the existence of more than one entity. As Irwin states, Schopenhauer

> Rejects the account of compassion offered by Cassina, because it denies the evident fact that when we feel compassion for others, we recognize that we are different from them (Irwin, 2007, Vol. 3, p. 273).

That is, Schopenhauer "affirms that compassion does not require the denial of the distinction between persons" (Irwin, 2007, Vol. 3, p. 273). As another author states:

> Schopenhauer takes special pains in *On the Basis of Morality* to prevent the misconception that seeing through the principles of individuation entails that they are no longer there, for we

> cannot exist, he says, inside another's skin, but we can act *as though* our respective individualities were unimportant (Berger, 2007, pp. 31-32).

In order to make further sense out of this notion of the experiencing of another's pain in another's body, let us consider an analogous notion, the notion of olfactory experience or smell. This will provide us with an intuitive insight into the phenomenon. In this case, both David and Dorothy are exposed to a particularly nice-smelling fragrance. Exposed to this fragrance, they both literally smell the same thing, and have very similar— but not identical— responses to it. Now, to extend this example to Schopenhauer's notion of the experiencing of another's pain in another's body, the sensory experience of the perfume here is analogous to the experience of pain. David and Dorothy smell one and the same fragrance yet have different experiences of the fragrance. Similarly, David and Dorothy experience one and the same pain which is a product of the metaphysical will, but have different experiences of this pain. Pain (the participatum) is ultimately the product of the will; it *is* the will, and David and Dorothy are participants in this pain. David and Dorothy participate in the same event. David experiences the same pain that Dorothy experiences in her body, but he does not have a numerically identical experience of it. The metaphysical unity of will explains the pain two individuals experience, and also the way in which one's experience of pain can resonate with another's. The explanation does not eliminate the differences that exist between any two individuals at the empirical level.[27]

Accordingly, it follows that Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of compassion is likewise contentious: Cartwright states that Schopenhauer thinks compassionate beings participate in another's suffering since they realize that the "other" is "*metaphysically identical to themselves*": that is to say, "*the other* and *myself* are really *the same entity— the metaphysical will*". Cartwright is not the only commentator who holds this view. For instance, Bryan Magee states:

> Empathy and compassion are possible, [Schopenhauer] tells us, by the fact that each of us is, in his inmost nature, at one with the noumenal, and the noumenal is one and undifferentiable…I am not merely *similar* to other human beings…at the very bottom *they and I are literally one and the same thing* (Magee, 1997, p. 199; Magee's emphasis; 2nd emphasis mine).

This interpretation also appears to be upheld by Jacquette:

> Moral agents are spatiotemporally physically individuated one from another only phenomenally within the world of representation as distinct objectifications of Will. In reality, they are *metaphysically numerically identical*, the single unitary pure willing that is deep within every willing subject (Jacquette, 2005, p. 229; my emphasis).

Finally, Terrence Irwin appears committed to this view that any two individuals are ultimately "metaphysically identical" (Irwin, 2003, p. 279), as is Young (Young, 2005, p. 173 & p. 180).

Although these views are not without *any* ground,[28] they do not accurately reflect what Schopenhauer consistently states with regards to the relationship between compassion and the will. Schopenhauer states that the will "as thing-in-itself, free from the *principium individuationis*, is really *the same identical thing in all individuals*, whether they exist side by side or one after another" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 559; my emphasis). He says the will is the "universal fundamental essence of all phenomena" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 318) and that "*the inner essence* of all things is at bottom *identical*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 610; my emphasis). "The holiness" connected to all moral actions "springs from the immediate knowledge of the *numerical identity of the inner nature of all living things*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 609; my emphasis). Moreover, the deep joy we feel when we undertake an act of moral worth (or even witness another undertake) is testimony to the fact that:

> Beyond all plurality and diversity of individuals presented to us by the *principium individuationis*, there is to be found *their unity*, which truly exists, in fact which is accessible to us, for there it showed itself as an actual fact (*BM*, §22, p. 211; my emphasis).

There is a *unity behind all individuals* ("It is one and the same essence that manifests itself in all living things" (*BM*, §22, p. 209)); all individuals are *not identical*. The cardinal virtues are "a reminder of *that respect* in which we are all one and the same entity" (*BM*, §22, pp. 210-211). Schopenhauer does not say "we are all one and the same entity"; the phrase "of that respect" means in that respect of us all being manifestations of the unitary will. Finally:

> in all [empirical] phenomena the *inner essence*, that which manifests itself, that which appears, *is one and the same thing* standing out more and more distinctly. Accordingly, that which exhibits itself in a million forms of endless variety and diversity, and thus performs the most variegated and grotesque play without beginning and end, is this one *essence* (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 318; my emphasis).

As Robert Wicks rightly states, compassion involves "recognizing at a more universal level that the *inner nature* of another person is of the *same metaphysical substance as oneself*" (Wicks, 2017; my emphasis).

These statements illustrate that, for Schopenhauer, the *inner essence* of all individuals is identical, which is not to say that *all individuals* are numerically identical.[29] He is only committed to saying that plurality (and hence individuation) is merely apparent and does not belong to "the same truly existing essence, present and identical in all [individuals]" (*BM*, §22, p. 207). This essence, of course, is the will. All living things constitute one ocean (the will); I am one wave, and you are another

wave yet we both participate in the same ocean. There is a unity— a numerically identical essence— that we all share in; we participate in another's suffering since we share the same essence as this other person.

§1.6 Conclusion

Schopenhauer's account of compassion is extremely nuanced and complex. Cartwright's interpretation of Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion does not sufficiently take these nuances and complexities into account. As we have seen, Schopenhauer's notion of participation does not commit him to the obviously incoherent idea that the compassionate agent is metaphysically identical to his suffering patient; rather Schopenhauer is careful to note that the agent and the patient participate in the same metaphysical essence. For this reason, I do not believe that Cartwright's objections are justified. I have cited the textual evidence that raises difficulties for Cartwright's critique, and I believe that if one interprets Schopenhauer's claims charitably his metaphysical conception of compassion, although retaining an air of mystery, does not give rise to incoherencies.

Chapter 2:

Internal inconsistencies

§2 Introduction

> If one reads Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung [*The World as Will and Representation*] as a work of literature, one certainly finds…passages of striking beauty…it has a certain impressiveness and appears to possess a simple consistency: but, if studied from the strictly philosophical standpoint, internal inconsistencies very soon reveal themselves and the total system appears bizarre and fantastic in the extreme (Copleston, 1975, p. 190).

We have seen that Schopenhauer's metaphysics is inextricably linked to his theory of compassion. Indeed, the metaphysics is the defining feature without which there would be no distinctly Schopenhauerian theory of compassion. However, this feature has been objected to repeatedly. In fact, the metaphysics is the most frequently cited problem with his theory of compassion, to the extent that some commentators have even attempted to excise this essential component from his theory. Cartwright's objection to Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of participation, and his consequent naturalization of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, exemplify this. I have responded to Cartwright by showing how he misinterprets Schopenhauer's notion of "immediate participation". However, my work is by no means done. If one upholds the metaphysical interpretation of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion further problems arise. Schopenhauer's metaphysics, we are told, ineluctably gives rise to internal inconsistencies in his metaphysical-ethical theory. Thus, the most important and far-reaching component of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is, for some, its most significant weakness. Consequently, my intention in this chapter is to address two substantive and long-standing objections to Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion, both of which point to internal inconsistencies in Schopenhauer's metaphysical-

ethical edifice. *Prima facie* these objections, born of the metaphysical interpretation I have defended, appear to undermine both his theory of compassion and his ethics as a whole. They are very serious objections that require a response.

My chief objectives in this chapter are, first, to outline and respond to Cartwright's criticism that Schopenhauer's notion of participation renders his derivation of the virtue of justice from compassion illegitimate (Cartwright, 1982; 2008; 2012a; 2012b). The criticism I am here outlining has been evident in Cartwright's work since 1982. In terms of a rebuttal, however, there appears to be little by way of sustained critique. In view of this objective, I will first provide an exegesis of Schopenhauer's theory of the cardinal virtue of justice. I will then present Cartwright's objection. Finally, I will respond to Cartwright, demonstrating that his objection arises from a misinterpretation of both Schopenhauer's notion of participation and his theory of the cardinal virtue of justice.

My second chief objective in this chapter is to outline and respond to the objection that there is an incompatibility between Schopenhauer's theory of salvation, which requires renunciation of the will, and his theory of compassion, which requires stimulation of the will. This criticism has been put forth by a numerous commentators (Cartwright, 1989, pp. 61-61; Atwell, 1990, p. 183; Magee, 1997, p. 243; Reginster, 2012, pp. 171-172; Pesce, 2014, p. 252; Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, pp. 51-69). Shapshay and Ferrell's articulation of this objection is not only the most recent, but also the most probative. For this reason, I will respond here to Shapshay and Ferrell's articulation of this problem. It will become clear that, like Cartwright, Shapshay and Ferrell misrepresent Schopenhauer's position, failing to take note off all the nuances in Schopenhauer's theories of compassion and salvation.

§2.1 Schopenhauer on the cardinal virtue of justice

The concept of justice, according to Schopenhauer, is inextricably linked to the concepts of right and wrong. The concept of wrong is prior to the concept of right. Moreover, the concept of wrong is positive in the sense that it entails an actual "wrong" or an "injustice" being done to another; it refers to conduct in which others suffer injury (physically, mentally, or otherwise). More precisely, "wronging someone" consists in denying the expression of the other's will. One subordinates another's will to one's own; one injures another, or makes another "serve" one's own will:

> since the will manifests that *self-affirmation* of one's own body in innumerable individuals beside one another, in one individual, by virtue of the egoism peculiar to all, it very easily goes beyond this affirmation to the *denial* of the same will appearing in another individual. The will of the first breaks through the boundary of another's affirmation of will, since the individual either destroys or injures this other body itself, or compels the powers of that other body to serve *his* will, instead of serving the will that appears in that other body….This breaking through the boundary of another's affirmation of will has at all times been distinctly recognized, and its concept has been denoted by the word *wrong* (*Unrecht*) (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 334; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

Conversely, the concept of right is negative in that it refers to conduct which can be performed without injury to others: "without *wrong* being done" (*BM*, §17, p. 152; Schopenhauer's emphasis).[30] As such, it is the mere negation of the concept of wrong. Included in the concept of right is all conduct that functions to prevent harm from being done to oneself; that is, all conduct which aims to thwart an attempted wrong at one's own expense, since:

> no participation in the interests of another, no sympathy for him, can require me to let myself be injured by him, that is to say, to suffer wrong (*BM*, §17, p. 153).

To buttress his claims regarding the conceptual primacy of injustice, Schopenhauer cites "the father of philosophical jurisprudence", Hugo Grotius: "Justice…denotes nothing but what is just, indeed more in the negative sense than the positive, insofar as justice is that which is not unjust" (*BM*, §17, p. 153). Although this appears to be a tautology, it highlights the fact that, for Schopenhauer, injustice is the primary datum from which the concept of justice is extrapolated. Justice is inherently and fundamentally a negative concept:

> The negative nature of justice is established even in the trite definition, "Give to each his own". If a man has his own, there is no need to give it to him; and so the meaning is, "Take from no one what is his own" (*BM*, §17, p. 153).

Justice thus entails the first clause— *Neminem laede* (the injunction to "injure no one") — in Schopenhauer's fundamental principle of ethics, which to recall is "Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can" (*BM*, §6, p. 70). Owing to its inherently negative nature, justice can be constrained through the state; legislation can demand that others do not commit an injustice; that is, to not injure another (by infringing on another's negative or positive rights). However, just conduct that is compelled is self-regarding and thus fundamentally egoistic. Indeed, any motives that fall under the rubric of evading punishment or obtaining reward (either in this life or another) are egoistic, and just conduct engendered through such motivations is properly termed "counterfeit justice" (*BM*, §17, p. 152). In other words, justice grounded in egoistic motivations has no moral worth; it is the mere appearance of justice. Hence Schopenhauer is properly concerned not with justice, but, rather, with "voluntary justice" (*freie Gerechtigkeit*), where just conduct issues from the virtuous disposition to act just merely for the sake of justice. That is, voluntary justice is a pure species of justice that is motivated solely by an intrinsic desire for justice; genuine justice entails the unadulterated desire to prevent another's suffering— compassion. As a corollary to this, voluntary

justice is distinguished by the fact that one's concern is not only not to suffer from harm, but, rather not to *cause* harm. In this sense, voluntary justice is active, not merely passive. To have a merely passive attitude with respect to justice entails that one's "egoism decides for justice and philanthropy not because it desires to practice these virtues, but because it wants to experience them" (*BM*, §7, p. 89). Thus the passive attitude is characterised by the incentive of egoism, whilst the active is characterised by disinterested concern for others.

Voluntary justice arises from the first degree of compassion, since compassion operates negatively in voluntary justice by inhibiting egoistic or malicious conduct. Originally, one is prone to injustice and violence since one's own needs and desires (and feelings of anger and hatred) have *jus primi occupantis*— right of first occupancy (*BM*, §17, p. 149). That is, they take precedent since they are given immediately in one's experience. However, the suffering that one causes to others through one's injustice is known only mediately (as mere representation). Hence:

> [In voluntary justice] compassion will prevent me from seeking to satisfy my desires at the expense of women's happiness or from seducing another man's wife, or even from ruining youths morally and physically by tempting them to commit pederasty (*BM*, §17, p. 150).

For Schopenhauer, the virtue of voluntary justice can be defined as "the noble disposition inhered in one's character to *not* inflict a harm or injury on others [to "injure no one"] proportional to the circumstances at hand."

§2.2 Cartwright's objection

Before considering Cartwright's objection, first let us recall that he conceptualizes Schopenhauer's theory of compassion in the following analytical model, where the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for *A* to have compassion for *B* are:

> i) A and B are sentient beings;
>
> ii) A cognizes that B will be or is suffering;
>
> iii) A feels sorrow for B;
>
> iv) A participates immediately in B's suffering;
>
> v) A desires B's well-being; and
>
> vi) A is disposed to prevent or eliminate B's suffering, and other things being equal, A will act to prevent or eliminate B's suffering.
>
> (Cartwright, 2012, p. 259)

As noted, Cartwright states that, excluding condition (iv), this model is "relatively uncontroversial and straightforward" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 259). Cartwright advances two problems relating to this fourth condition: firstly, Schopenhauer does not put forth any substantive support or evidence for his metaphysical claim that compassion entails feeling another's pain in the other's body; this metaphysical claim is thus "not very convincing" (Cartwright, p. 66, 1982). Secondly, Cartwright argues that due to the metaphysical claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering", Schopenhauer cannot accurately derive the cardinal virtue of justice from compassion.

Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception of compassion, for Cartwright, is inconsistent with his conception of the virtue of justice; specifically, the claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering"[31] is inconsistent with the claims that "A cognizes that B will be or is suffering" (condition iii) and that "A is disposed to prevent or eliminate B's suffering, and other things being

equal, A will act to prevent or eliminate B's suffering" (condition vi). Cartwright's argument is as follows: with regard to justice, compassion functions to impede one from causing another harm, yet this harm is in the future and thus non-existent; hence, Cartwright concludes, if this harm is non-existent it is not possible for one to feel it in another's body. Thus one cannot immediately participate in a suffering that does not exist.

> Future or possible sufferings are mental states which do not exist. If they do not exist, how can we have immediate participation in another's non-existent mental state? It does not make sense to speak of participating in something that does not exist (Cartwright, p. 67, 1982).

Cartwright repeats this claim in a later article:

> [Schopenhauer's] account of the virtue of justice emphasizes how compassion restrains individuals' self-regarding behavior, due to the recognition of the suffering it would cause others. This suffering, however, does not exist, and this is what compassion seeks to prevent. But, since this suffering does not exist, it is not possible here for any person to feel another's pain in the other's body. (Cartwright, 2008, p. 304)

For Cartwright, if we uphold the literal metaphysical interpretation of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, we find an incompatibility between Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of immediate participation, and his conception of voluntary justice. That is, Schopenhauer makes two seemingly inconsistent claims: (i) in compassion, we literally (metaphysically) participate immediately in another's suffering, and (ii) in exercising the virtue of justice we participate in a suffering that is non-existent.

§2.3 Response to Cartwright's objection

I will now respond to Cartwright's objection by demonstrating that the inconsistency he outlines is merely apparent. However, firstly it should be noted that Schopenhauer himself is aware of the temporal limitation inherent in the immediate participation in another's suffering, which, for him, at least in terms of the virtue of justice, is inconsequential:

> [In justice]…it is immaterial whether that suffering is instantaneous or comes later, whether it is direct or indirect, or effected through intermediate links (*BM*, §17, p. 149).

What *is* important is only that my disposition is susceptible to the incentive of compassion to the extent that compassion will "restrain me, wherever and whenever I feel inclined to use another's sufferings as a means to the attainment of my ends" (*BM*, §17, p. 149). Furthermore, Schopenhauer is aware that in the virtue of justice, compassion, by checking egoistic and malicious incentives, generally functions to prevent a suffering that does not yet exist:

> [In the virtue of justice] compassion prevents me from causing suffering to another and hence from becoming myself the cause of another's pain, and thus from bringing about something that does not yet exist (*BM*, §17, p. 148).

To illustrate, in line with my egoistic tendencies, I intend to sell my drum kit at an exorbitant price to a greenhorn named Ralph who is particularly naïve with respect to the market price of used drum kits. I can exploit Ralph's naivety and receive more remuneration than I am due. I am fully aware, that when the man inevitably realises he has been exploited, he will suffer (regret, indignation, financial problems, and so on). Moreover, and in line with my malicious tendencies (to the degree that they entail *Schadenfreude*), I realise that I can feel a perverse sense of glee in knowing that he will suffer through my exploitative act. However, compassion intercedes, bidding me to renounce

my egoistic and malicious plans and thus to prevent Ralph from suffering in the future. In such a way, I act according to the virtue of justice: the noble disposition to abstain from inflicting harm or injury on others, relevant to the circumstances at hand. Let us now look closer at how compassion functions to achieve this end, all the while juxtaposing Cartwright's objection against Schopenhauer's conception of the virtue of justice.

For Schopenhauer, the virtue of justice is produced from *prior* occasions of experiential compassion. In this sense, that one *immediately* feels compassion for another in each instance of just conduct, as Cartwright states, is not a necessary condition for just conduct to be genuinely moral. Yet compassion *per se* is still a necessary condition. As Schopenhauer states:

> [I]t is by no means necessary for compassion to be stirred in each individual case, for it would often come too late. On the contrary, the maxim *Neminem laede* [i.e., "injure no one"]..., arises in noble dispositions from the knowledge, gained once for all, of the suffering which every unjust action necessarily brings to others and which is intensified by the feeling of enduring wrong, that is, of someone else's superior strength (*BM*, §17, p. 150).

Thus, to act according to the virtue of justice, and therewith refrain out of compassion from exploiting Ralph, does not require that I immediately feel compassion for him. Indeed, compassion may come after the fact; that is, after I have followed my egoistic and/or malicious incentives, I then, upon observing Ralph's suffering, feel compassion for him (and thus have an urge to alleviate his suffering, possibly by admitting my nefarious stratagem and then returning his money). However, I am acutely aware that my initial designs on Ralph were unscrupulous, and moreover, I am aware, from the numerous occasions in my own past, and of my observation of others in a similar plight to Ralph's, that such unscrupulous conduct necessarily results in suffering (either my

own suffering, when I am exploited; or another's suffering, when they are exploited) and, upon witnessing this suffering in others, elicits a robust feeling of compassion.

Now, for Schopenhauer, these prior experiences of compassion are subsequently moulded, via the faculty of reason, into abstract principles that help to guide moral conduct and solidify the resolution to act justly at all times. Rationality, for Schopenhauer, plays an important, yet subordinate, role in the virtue of justice (and distinguishes it from that of the second, and more pronounced degree of compassion, the virtue of loving-kindness):

> For although *principles* and abstract knowledge are by no means the original source or first foundation of morality, they are nevertheless indispensable to a moral course of life: they are the receptacle or reservoir which stores the habit of the mind that has sprung from the font of all morality, a habit that does not flow at every moment, but when the occasion for its application arises, flows along the proper channel (*BM*, §17, p. 150; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

And again, Schopenhauer states in *The World as Will and Representation* that,

> it cannot be denied that the application of reason is necessary for the pursuit of a virtuous way of living; yet it is not the source of this, but its function is a subordinate one; to preserve resolutions once formed, to provide maxims for withstanding the weakness of the moment, and to give consistency to conduct (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 58).

Thus, to use my prior example, to act justly towards Ralph— to refrain from causing him to suffer in the future— I need not have an immediate feeling of compassion for Ralph. Rather, upon feeling the drive, or pull, to act on my egoistic and/or malicious tendencies, I summon a rational principle

that is grounded in the feeling of compassion and steadfastly glued to my heart to "Injure no one". Given that this principle is a "habit of mind" it may very well be summoned unconsciously. Although this rational principle itself does not exist in a vacuum, and thus has an existence independent from compassion, it is still born of compassion (and will only function given that I am, by virtue of my innate character, already susceptible to the motive of compassion). Thus in the virtue of justice compassion generally functions potentially and indirectly— as the fount of, and through, moral principles:

> [C]ompassion operates in the individual actions of the just man only indirectly, by means of principles, and not so much *actu* as *potentia* (*BM*, §17, p. 150).

These principles themselves are not the basis of morality and thus of the virtue of voluntary justice. One must necessarily be disposed to compassion in order to act justly; the mere presence of rationality is certainly not a sufficient condition for one to act justly. Indeed, a man can be exceedingly rational yet be thoroughly wicked:

> [Rationality] by no means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary, a man can go to work very rationally, and methodically, and yet act upon the most selfish, unjust, and even iniquitous maxims (*BM*, §6, p. 83).

Furthermore, in justice, if rationality falters, direct compassion is always available to compensate for such a failure:

> Compassion always remains ready to come forward *actu*. Therefore, when, in individual cases, the established maxim of justice shows signs of breaking down, no motive (egoistic motives excluded

> of course) is more effective for supporting it and putting new life into it than that drawn from the fountainhead itself, namely, compassion (*BM*, §17, pp. 151-152).

The individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for one to have the virtue of justice, then, are the ability to feel compassion— not necessarily an immediate feeling of compassion— and the aptitude to rationalize. Schopenhauer's metaphysical claim that "A participates immediately in B's suffering" is not, then, as Cartwright claims, fundamentally inconsistent with Schopenhauer's doctrine of the virtue of justice. Schopenhauer's doctrine of the virtue of justice, rather, is inconsistent with Cartwright's interpretation of it. As demonstrated, Schopenhauer is aware of the temporal constraints on the immediate participation in another's suffering, and, additionally, he is aware of the fact that in the virtue of voluntary justice, compassion generally functions indirectly to prevent a suffering that does not yet exist. To have the virtue of justice does not, for Schopenhauer, ineluctably require that one immediately participates in another's suffering; that is one does not have to have an immediate feeling of compassion for another. In short, there is no inconsistency between these two aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

§2.4 Shapshay and Ferrell's criticism.

Sandra Shapshay and Tristan Ferrell put forth a more comprehensive objection to Schopenhauer's metaphysical-ethical view, asserting that there is an inconsistency between Schopenhauer's theory of compassion and his theory of salvation (*Erlösung*). They believe that the "traditional view" of Schopenhauer's ethical theory belies a "fundamental conflict at the heart" of his ethics (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 51). The traditional view is the view in which "renunciation from the will-to-life [is] the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours in which suffering is tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 51). On this view, compassion, for Schopenhauer, has value only insofar as it leads to renunciation from the will-to-life (Shapshay &

Ferrell, 2015, p. 52); that is, the traditional view posits compassion, as epitomized in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle "injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can" (*BM*, §6, p. 69),[32] to be subordinate to renunciation of the will. This view itself—compassion being subordinate to renunciation— they term "the 'instrumental view' of the morality of compassion" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 52)[33] which, for all intents and purposes, is identical with the "traditional view" of Schopenhauer's ethics. Throughout their paper, Shapshay and Ferrell appear to use the expressions "the will-to-life" [*Wille zum Leben*] and "the will" interchangeably, as Schopenhauer himself does. The expressions "renunciation", "renunciation from the will-to-life", "resignation" and "negation of the will-to-life" are all used in a likewise manner.

Shapshay and Ferrell think that there is a substantial amount of textual evidence in support of the instrumental view of compassion, and they cite several passages from chapter XLVIII ("On the Doctrine the Denial of the Will-to-Live") from the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* as examples. Such passages, Shapshay and Ferrell believe, highlight two reasons "for the almost inevitable transition from moral virtue to renunciation" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 53). First, acting in accordance with the cardinal virtues of justice and loving kindness (the moral virtues) "will come to seem rather futile" insofar as these virtues provide only a negligible decrease in the world's suffering. Second, "serious exercise of these virtues" severely attenuates one's pleasures in life thereby "leading to greater detachment from [one's] own will-to-life" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 53).

Notwithstanding the large body of evidence for the instrumental view of Schopenhauer's ethics, Shapshay and Ferrell think that "some of its entailments create tensions within [Schopenhauer's] thought approaching the level of paradox" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 53). Citing text exclusively from *The World as Will and Representation*, Shapshay and Ferrell argue that there are two fundamental tensions in Schopenhauer's ethics which most commentators have hitherto failed to

acknowledge (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 54). The first tension lies in the relationship between the two clauses in Schopenhauer's fundamental proposition of morality "Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can". Shapshay and Ferrell think that, since affirmation of the will-to-life, for Schopenhauer, ineluctably engenders suffering, one can only respect the first, negative maxim by wholly renouncing the will-to-live:

> the injunction to "harm no one" is impossible to respect *insofar as one continues to participate in the will-to-life at all*. Thus, it seems that the only way to strictly live up to the "harm no one" part of the principle is to give up willing altogether through renunciation (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55; Shapshay & Ferrell's emphasis).

Shapshay and Ferrell think that the second, positive maxim in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle— the clause "help everyone as much as you can"— is clearly not facilitated by renunciation of the will, since someone who has renounced the will "no longer actively helps anyone" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55); Schopenhauer's "resigned saint seems to have achieved an existence that is beyond all caring and *ipso facto* beyond all compassion" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55).

Regarding this first tension—a dilemma never recognized by Schopenhauer— Shapshay and Ferrell conclude that, for one to fully comply with the negative maxim one must necessarily renounce the will, yet if one renounces the will one cannot comply with the positive maxim. Hence, by all appearances, one cannot simultaneously comply with both maxims in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle, even though the principle's wording, Shapshay and Ferrell think, implies that one can. In short: "Schopenhauer's ethics requires that we choose between two mutually exclusive parts of an ethical principle. And what is more, choosing either entails violating the other!" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55).

Essentially, for Shapshay and Ferrell, the ethical ideals of compassion and renunciation are inconsistent, and this inconsistency is manifested in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. Shapshay and Ferrell's argument is similar to— perhaps a more sophisticated version of— Bryan Magee's argument. Magee says:

> On the one hand…[Schopenhauer]…tells us that all morality is based on compassion: on the other hand he says that the most ethically desirable state for an individual is to attain is the renunciation of all willing. But clearly, it is impossible to be compassionately concerned for another without activity of will…if I have renounced all willing then I must be as indifferent to the good or harm of another as I am to my own. If it really is true that all morality is based on compassion, then the cessation of willing must be accompanied by an indifference to moral considerations (Magee, 1997, p. 243).

The second tension that Shapshay and Ferrell identify in the "standard view" of Schopenhauer's ethics is an inconsistency in Schopenhauer's claim that compassionate conduct is beneficial to the recipient(s) of such conduct. Briefly stated, since most individuals require personal suffering in order to reach salvation,[34] and compassionate conduct prevents or alleviates this suffering, compassionate conduct may actually *impede* an individual's quest to procure salvation (through renunciation). As such, it is *not* beneficial for the recipient(s). However, the beneficiary may never in fact procure salvation, and in this case compassionate conduct *is* beneficial for the beneficiary, yet Shapshay and Ferrell rhetorically question how one can "know that the person one 'helps' through compassionate action is not thereby being hindered on his or her path to salvation?" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 57).[35] Now since this second tension does not *directly* concern the metaphysics of compassion, but rather, entails an "epistemic paradox" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 57), I will omit it from my discussion.

In light of the aforementioned tensions in Schopenhauer's ethics, Shapshay and Ferrell, by way of a solution, provide a reconstruction of Schopenhauer's ethics that demonstrates his ethics can provide a "hybrid Kantian/moral sense theory". It is beyond the scope of my thesis to critically consider Shapshay and Ferrell's reconstruction here. For the purposes of my discussion, it is enough to address the internal inconsistency that Shapshay and Ferrell identify in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. Broadly speaking, the metaphysics of compassion, Shapshay and Ferrell think, depends on a conception of the will that is apparently incompatible with the conception required by renunciation of the will. This incompatibility is manifested in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle.

§2.5 Response to Shapshay and Ferrell.

Let us now consider Shapshay and Ferrell's criticism regarding the tension in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. In this principle there is a set of two maxims: (i) "harm no one" and (ii) "help everyone to the extent that you can". Shapshay and Ferrell argue that adherence to the first maxim necessitates renunciation of the will, whilst adherence to the second maxim necessitates stimulation of the will. This principle, then, is inconsistent, implying a contradiction. That is, one must cease movement of the will (in order to satisfy the first maxim), and one must exercise movement of the will (in order to satisfy the second maxim). One clearly cannot satisfy the first and second maxims simultaneously. The two maxims, as Shapshay and Ferrell point out, are "mutually exclusive parts of an ethical principle". Moreover, "choosing either entails violating the other" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55). So it turns out that the *prima facie* unproblematic maxims in Schopenhauer's moral principle, when taken together, yield a contradiction. However, let us look closer at Shapshay and Ferrell's argument and then compare our analysis to Schopenhauer's considered views.

Two implicit claims are present in Shapshay and Ferrell's argument. First, the virtue of loving-kindness is intrinsically connected to an active and engaged will; it necessarily requires affirmation of the will-to-live: the individual who exercises this virtue, Shapshay and Ferrell state, is "*move[d] actively* to sacrifice something" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 56; my emphasis). Exercising this virtue requires "non-egoistic" yet "compassionate *affirmation of the will-to-life*" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55; my emphasis). The second implicit claim is that renunciation of the will or will-to-live (recall Shapshay and Ferrell use the terms interchangeably) entails the cessation of *all* willing: "those saintly few who can resign themselves from willing" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 52). This claim is explicit at times: "[the moral virtues] are valuable only as a step along the path to 'salvation' from the will-to-life in *complete renunciation*" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 52; my emphasis); "it seems that the only way to strictly live up to the 'harm no one' part of the principle is to give up willing *altogether* through *renunciation*" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55; my emphasis).

In response, one must first remember that compassion, according to Schopenhauer, involves self-denial or self-renunciation. That is to say, in compassion (and specifically, as per Shapshay and Ferrell's argument, during periods of philanthropic conduct born of compassionate participation) one's individual will— one's instrumental or egoistic will— is denied or renounced. As Ken Gemes and Janaway point out, the compassionate subject is "anti-egoistic or self-negating" (Gemes & Janaway, 2012, p. 282). Compassionate conduct, exercising the virtue of loving-kindness, contra Shapshay and Ferrell's claim, does not require "[non-egoistic] compassionate affirmation of the will-to-life" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55) to any extent.

The affirmation of the will (*Die Bejahung Des Willens*),[36] is inextricably connected to *individuality*; "the affirmation of the will-to-life presupposes the restriction of consciousness to one's own

individuality" (*PP*, Vol. 2, p. 316). It presupposes one has knowledge entirely conditioned by the *principium individuationis* (the *individuating* principle); that is, in affirming the will-to-live one has knowledge merely of "particular things". Individuality, bound to the affirmation of the will, is inextricably connected to egoism or "egocentric consciousness", a consciousness whereby all objects act as potential motives for the subject (Atwell, 1995, p. 154).

In compassionate participation, individuality ultimately ceases since one no longer affirms, or participates in, the will-to-live. As such, one no longer identifies with one's individuated body (and seeks the satisfaction of the desires and requirements inseparable from it). Rather, one sees through the *principium individuationis* and identifies with the metaphysical unity of will; one identifies with an indivisible unity which, accordingly, transcends individuality. In compassion, one therefore transcends the egoism or egocentric consciousness that is inextricably bound to the affirmation of the will-to-live. Exercising the virtue of loving-kindness manifests this transcendence of the affirmation of the will-to-live. Hence to say, as Shapshay and Ferrell do, that an individual who exercises the virtue of loving-kindness "compassionately, yet non-egoistically, affirms the will-to-life" makes no sense. In fact, on Schopenhauer's view, *this* claim is a contradiction: the affirmation of the will-to-live presupposes egoism; egoism "is the form of the will-to-live" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 320).

In compassion, and compassionate conduct, then, there is no egoistic affirmation of, or participation in, the will-to-live. As such, there is no *egoistic willing*: one does not act in the service of one's own will. However, willing does not altogether cease. Compassion, and the exercise of the virtue of loving-kindness born of compassionate participation, involve some type of stimulation, or activity, of the will and thus involve some type of willing, as Atwell rightly points out (Atwell, 1990, p. 183). Now the question inevitably arises: what type of willing endures in compassion and compassionate conduct? While noting the difficulty in this question, Atwell characterizes such

willing as being an "impartial" or "objective" (Atwell, 1990, p. 183) type of willing. This type of willing, as I have noted, "is not individual or egoistic" and hence is a type "that transcends the will-to-live" (Atwell, 1990, p. 184). I will return to this issue shortly.

The second implicit claim in Shapshay and Ferrell's argument is that renunciation of the will or will-to-live entails the cessation of all willing. All suffering, Schopenhauer thinks, arises from— is the necessary concomitant of— the affirmation of the will-to-live.[37] To be liberated from this suffering requires, as an ultimate solution, the denial of the will-to-live (*die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben*).[38] Schopenhauer believes that asceticism— "[the] deliberate breaking of the will by refusing the agreeable and looking for the disagreeable" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 392) — provides such a denial. Asceticism ideally leads to salvation (complete denial of the will-to-live), yet does not itself constitute it.[39] As Andrew King points out "denial is constitutive of an activity— so far as asceticism aims at denial of the will, it is a manifestation of striving itself" (King, 2005, p. 262).

Now, *complete* denial of the will-to-live— salvation— does not entail the cessation of all willing; rather, it entails the cessation of all willing-to-live: the cessation of all *egoistic*, *individual* willing. The "salvific" who has reached salvation still has a body, and insofar as this body is an objectification of the will, and continues to endure, willing must necessarily continue. The body necessarily binds the salvific to the ever-active will, yet he does not affirm the will-to-live by entertaining its (egoistic) desires. This likewise applies to the ascetic who is on the path to salvation: in his commitment to voluntary chastity "his body, healthy and strong, [still] expresses the sexual impulse through the genitals"; that is, he continues to will. However, "he denies the will, and gives the lie to the body; he desires no sexual satisfaction on any condition" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 380); that is, he denies the will-to-live. As Atwell points out:

> denial of the will can apparently never reach the stage of complete extinction…for even the most extreme ascetic remains embodied, and in his or her body a trace of will, however faint, persists (Atwell, 1995, p. 160).[40]

Schopenhauer himself never states that the total extinction of all willing-to-live— much less the extinction of all willing— is possible. The ascetic may occasionally lapse back into periods of willing-to-live intermittent between respites from it:

> we must not imagine that, after the denial of the will-to-live has once appeared through knowledge that has become a quieter of the will, such denial no longer wavers or falters, and that we can rest on it as on an inherited property. On the contrary, it must always be achieved afresh by constant struggle. For as the body is the will itself only in the form of objectivity, or as phenomenon in the world as representation, that *whole will-to-live exists potentially so long as the body lives*, and is always striving to reach actuality and to burn afresh with all its intensity (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 391; my emphasis).

As Auweele points out: "even in the will-less state of the saint, there remains a residue of willpower that can possibly rise up again" (2017, p. 221, n. 28).

Atwell argues that in Schopenhauer's thesis of human salvation, the distinction between the concepts of "willing" and "willing-to-live"— a distinction that I have made— is permitted, and despite appearances to the contrary, the difference between the two concepts harmonizes almost "perfectly" with almost everything Schopenhauer states regarding the paths to salvation (Atwell, 1990, p. 182). That is, in compassion (a path to salvation)[41] "*willing goes on*, though willing-to-live does not" (Atwell, 1990, p. 182; Atwell's emphasis). Willing-to-live, as demonstrated, is a type of willing that engages the individual ego, making all objects potential motives for the individual. In

willing-to-live, one freely indulges in one's desires, and wills to preserve one's existence. Willing-to-live engages the instincts— the "decided impulse[s] of the will" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, 342) — which dominate the ego and lead to all manner of suffering. Willing, on the other hand, involves the will infinitely striving, yet this striving is not subordinate to the will-to-live; that is to say, it is not subordinate to the affirmation of the will-to-live. Or, stated otherwise, affirmation is not *super-imposed* on the will's striving. One is detached from the will's striving, looking at it from a distance, so to speak. In compassion, compassionate conduct and renunciation, there is no willing-to-live, only willing remains.[42]

To summarize what I have thus far argued: first, compassion and compassionate conduct (specifically, the exercise of the cardinal virtue of loving-kindness), do not require affirmation of, or participation in, the will to-live. Both involve a type of non-egoistic willing in which one transcends the will-to-live. Second, renunciation, at the very most, entails temporary cessation of all willing-to-live, not all willing. Let us now juxtapose Schopenhauer's concepts of compassion, the conduct born of compassionate participation, and renunciation.

Compassion, compassionate conduct and renunciation all arise from the same *source*: "the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings" (*WWR*, Vol, 2, p. 601) [43] and result in (and manifest) the same the denial of the individual, egoist will-to-live. Conversely, affirmation of the will-to-live, individuality and egoism all arise from the same source: perception wholly subordinate to the *principium individuationis* and result in egoistic and malicious conduct.[44]

Salvation can only be attained "by the denial of one's own self" (*WWR*, Vol, 2, p. 625). This denial of one's own individuated self (one's own will-to-live) is precisely what compassion, and the cardinal virtues born of compassionate participation, entails. As one author states, "the disinterested

exercise of compassion [is] bound up with an ultimate denial of the will" (Rubens, 2010, p. 26), and, as Mannion states: "the *denial of the will* is sought via virtue and *morally right conduct*, holiness and *asceticism* (Mannion, 2003, p. 17; my emphasis). Mannion also states, "Schopenhauer speaks of salvation [as] involving the *transcendence of the principle of individuation* and hence the *defeat of egoism*" (Mannion, 2003, pp. 16-17; my emphasis). Again, this is precisely what compassion and compassionate conduct involve.

Compassion, compassionate conduct, and renunciation express denial of the will-to-live in different degrees. That is, they express different degrees of the same intuitive knowledge, not a different type of knowledge.[45] As Cartwright states, denial of the will-to-live merely signifies a "deeper [not qualitatively different] metaphysical insight."[46] Compassion, compassionate conduct and renunciation via ascetic practice provide the same kind of reprieve from the affirmation of the will-to-live: liberation from perception subject to the *principium individuationis*; liberation from knowledge entirely in service of the will. Denying the will-to-live through ascetic practice, rather than through compassion and compassionate conduct, merely provides a more enduring reprieve, or as Wicks states, asceticism represents the "most effective way to overcome suffering and to achieve long-term tranquillity" (Wicks, 2008, p. 127). Both the ascetic and the compassionate subject tread the same ethical path, and differ only to the extent that they express denial of the will-to-live in different degrees at different points in time. Both compassion and renunciation express the same type of non-egoist willing, and both express the denial of individuation upon which egoism rests.

Let us now recall Shapshay and Ferrell's criticism: the traditional view of Schopenhauer's ethics, in which compassion is valuable only insofar as it leads to renunciation from the will-to-life, masks a fundamental conflict in Schopenhauer's ethics. Schopenhauer offers two mutually antagonistic ethical ideas: compassion and renunciation. This mutual antagonism is manifested in the two clauses in Schopenhauer's ethical principle: the first requires renunciation of the will-to-live, whilst

the second requires compassionate, non-egoistic affirmation of the will-to-live. Shapshay and Ferrell's interpretation of Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle entailed a contradiction: one must cease movement of the will (in order to satisfy the first maxim "harm no one"), and one must exercise movement of the will (in order to satisfy the second maxim "help everyone to the extent that you can").

In light of my above analysis, this contradiction is merely apparent because compassion, compassionate conduct, and renunciation all involve denial of the will-to-live. More specifically, the exercise of the cardinal virtue of loving-kindness does not involve a type of willing opposed to the type involved in renunciation or the exercise of the cardinal virtue of justice. That is, in order to satisfy both maxims in Schopenhauer's moral principle one need only renounce the will-to-live. In the case of both just and philanthropic conduct there is a cessation of willing-to-live. Hence, the metaphysics of compassion depend on a conception of the will that is wholly compatible with the conception required by renunciation of the will and there is no incompatibility in Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle.

Notwithstanding the fact that this contradiction or theoretical difficulty is now removed, a practical question still remains. That is, does the "salvific" or the ascetic, who is "careful not to let his will attach itself to anything" and who "tries to steel himself with the greatest indifference toward all things" refrain from exercising the virtue of loving-kindness (and practice merely the virtue of justice)? Does he exhibit an indifference to another's *suffering* (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 407), as Shapshay and Ferrell claim?

Unfortunately, I cannot answer this question definitively, but I do not believe there is any substantial evidence for this claim. I can say that most of the ascetic saints Schopenhauer talks of in *The World as Will and Representation*— Jesus Christ, Buddha Gautama Siddhartha, Saint Francis

of Assisi, for example— all exhibit a high degree of compassion; indeed, such saints are remembered primarily for their compassionate conduct. Such saints do exhibit "the greatest indifference toward all things" yet this greatest indifference is directed toward all things regarding *their own egos*. Contrary Shapshay and Ferrell, these saints do not appear "to have achieved an existence that is beyond all caring and *ipso facto* beyond all compassion" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 55). In his last chief work, Schopenhauer states:

> Whoever has fully accepted the· teaching of my philosophy and thus knows that our whole existence is something which had better not have been, and to deny and reject which is the highest wisdom, will not cherish great expectations of anything or any condition; he will not *ardently aspire* to anything in the world, nor will he complain very much if *he fails in any undertaking* (*PP*, Vol. 1, p. 409; my emphasis).

This does not sound like a description of an ascetic who is completely indifferent to all things, much less indifferent to the sufferings of others, for which the world is "nothing". Such an individual aspires to things, yet not ardently; such an individual has undertakings, yet does not lament if such undertakings are unsuccessful.

§2.6. Conclusion

Schopenhauer's theory of compassion need not be interpreted as leading to internal inconsistencies in his wider metaphysical-ethical thesis. Firstly, Cartwright's claim that Schopenhauer cannot legitimately derive the virtue of voluntary justice from compassion has been demonstrated to be based on a misreading of Schopenhauer's actual stance toward compassion and voluntary justice. To have the virtue of justice does not require one to have an immediate participation in another's suffering. Secondly, Shapshay and Ferrell's objection that compassion and renunciation are

incompatible ethical ideals has been demonstrated to be based on a reading which does not fully account for the nuances in Schopenhauer's metaphysical-ethical thesis. When viewed in terms of the nature of willing that takes place, compassion and renunciation of the will appear to manifest the same fundamental activity of will. Hence there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of compassion and the doctrine of salvation.

Chapter 3:

External criticisms: the charge of egoism

§3 Introduction

I have so far defended Schopenhauer against the criticisms that his metaphysical conception of participation is incoherent, and that his metaphysical theory of compassion gives rise to internal inconsistencies in his wider ethical theory. However, there still remains a substantive criticism, one that has endured for almost two centuries. In this chapter I examine the external criticism that Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion reduces to a form of *egoism*. This criticism is external insofar as Schopenhauer himself explicitly rejects egoism as being incompatible with his criterion for conduct of moral worth. As we saw in the Introduction, he censures Kant for tacitly introducing egoism into his ethical system. My chief objective in this chapter is to defend Schopenhauer from the charge of egoism.

§3.1 The charge of egoism

In contrast to egoistic subjects, who desire only their own well-being— "everything for me and nothing for others" (*BM*, §14, p. 132) — compassionate subjects participate in another's suffering, exclusively desiring another's well-being. They penetrate the *principium individuationis*, transcending the empirical cognition that binds them to a dream-like world of distinction, separation, and, consequently, strife. They see through (*Durchschauen*) the "veil of *mäyä"*, intuitively recognizing that all life is connected at a profoundly fundamental level: at the metaphysical level of will. Glimpsing into this unitary will, they recognize that they are intimately connected to all others. This intuitive recognition explains their altruistic conduct: conduct that is wholly other-regarding, "actions of voluntary justice, pure philanthropy, and real magnanimity" (*BM*, §13, p. 130).

It is claimed that the intuitive recognition involved in compassion implies a form of egoism. It gives rise not to altruistic conduct, but rather to egoistic conduct. This claim is generally premised on the idea that the intuitive recognition of the metaphysical unity of will implies self-reflexivity: in compassion, one recognizes that one's own self is the object of one's compassion. Conduct springing from the participative process of compassion is consequently egoistic. Within the context of this charge, many commentators implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, hold Schopenhauer to the view that all empirical individuals are metaphysically identical.

The charge of egoism was initially levelled against Schopenhauer by his "apostle" Johann August Becker (1803-1881) in 1844 (Hübscher, 1987, p. 221) and has since been echoed by several others (Nietzsche, 1997, pp. 83-84; Scheler, 1973, pp. 63-64; von Hartmann, 2006, p. 99; Hamlyn, 1980, pp. 139 & 145; Gardner, 1963, pp. 276-277; Janaway, 1994, p. 101). Julian Young puts forth this charge twice: first, in his book *Unwilling and Willing: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer* (1987, p. 107), and, more recently, in his 2005 book *Schopenhauer* (pp. 182-183). In this chapter I will focus on Young's recent version of this charge as it is the more sustained critique. Young's articulation of the charge of egoism encapsulates the general sentiment behind all versions of the charge.

As will become evident, the charge of egoism is somewhat *prima facie* understandable. As Cartwright notes, Schopenhauer himself (in many respects) invites the charge (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263), and Schopenhauer did anticipate it. Nevertheless, I maintain that the charge of egoism results from a fundamentally flawed reading of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion in which the full complexities of his views are overlooked. To support this view, first I will detail Young's interpretation of Schopenhauer's metaphysical-ethical thesis. Second, I will outline Young's version of the charge of egoism within its context. Third, I will explain Young's resolution to the putative

problem. Finally, I will defend Schopenhauer from Young's charge and highlight problems with Young's resolution.

§3.2 Young's interpretation

In chapters seven and eight of *Schopenhauer*, Young provides an exegesis of Schopenhauer's ethical system, detailing (amongst many other things) Schopenhauer's theories of compassion, eternal justice, bad conscience, and salvation through denial of the will. Throughout his exegesis, Young underscores the primacy metaphysics play in Schopenhauer's ethical system. It is this very primacy, Young thinks, that accounts for the problems in Schopenhauer's explanation for altruism as born of compassionate participation. Schopenhauer was "gripped by the will to create a grand metaphysical system" (Young, 2005, p. 183); almost by a force of circumstance he employed his metaphysics to explain ethics. After identifying the specific difficulties with Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of altruism, Young posits his own phenomenological explanation for the phenomenon. This explanation is bereft of Schopenhauer's "metaphysical baggage"; it is Young's "naturalized" version of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion.

Young begins his discussion of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy *vis-à-vis* Schopenhauer's metaphysics by introducing Schopenhauer's conception of egoism: "the condition in which the only interests that count for anything are my own" (Young, 2005, p. 174).[47] Young observes that, for Schopenhauer, egoism is the natural human standpoint, and as a corollary, action born of egoism ("egoistic action") "is the norm of human behaviour" (Young, 2005, p. 177). Young interprets Schopenhauer as saying that egoistic action is "very often wrong" (Young, 2005, p. 175), and notes that Schopenhauer thinks egoism results from the epistemological condition in which "the only will I know about directly is my own" (Young, 2005, 174). In light of this epistemological condition, Young further defines Schopenhauer's concept of egoism as

> a natural disposition to see and treat others as mere things: to treat them as mere pieces of equipment to be manipulated without scruple in whatever way suits one's own interests (Young, 2005, p. 174).

Notwithstanding the predominance of egoism, Young points out that, for Schopenhauer, there is undoubtedly "genuinely altruistic actions and genuinely altruistic people" (Young, 2005, p. 178). Citing *On the Basis of Morality* (§16, p. 144), Young thinks that Schopenhauer believes altruism to be "an astonishing, indeed mysterious phenomenon" (Young, 2005, p. 178).

Young defines "altruism" as "virtue" (Young, 2005, pp. 158 &178). Virtue, Young thinks, is conduct which is bereft of self-interest. It follows, Young thinks, that Schopenhauer's concept of virtue can be defined according to his criterion of actions of moral worth:

> Virtue is simply action which has as its 'ultimate object' the welfare of someone *else.* In a word, virtue is simply altruism (Young, 2005, p. 178).

Throughout the remainder of his exegesis, Young uses the terms "altruism" and "virtue" interchangeably (at one point he uses "*id est*" to describe their relationship (Young, 2005, p. 187)). Schopenhauer, Young thinks, "wants us to grasp the extra-ordinariness of altruism" (Young, 2005, p. 178). Virtue (like art) "is an extraordinary transcendence of consciousness"; altruism (like art) is "a matter of 'genius'" (Young, 2005, p. 187). Schopenhauer, Young thinks, wants to render the phenomenon of altruism intelligible (Young, 2005, p. 187).

Young thinks that altruism, for Schopenhauer, requires that one feels another's suffering just as one ordinarily feels only one's own, and that one identifies with another (Young, 2005, p. 187). In light

of these requirements, he concludes that "[v]irtue is, therefore, 'sympathy (*Sympathie*)' – or, as we would say, 'empathy'" (Young, 2005, p. 187). Young then modifies this description

> Combined, however, with Schopenhauer's pessimism— there is a very great deal of suffering and very little joy in life— a more specific description of the virtuous character can be given. Virtue is, says Schopenhauer, 'compassion (*Mitleid*)'. 'All love (*agape, caritas*) is compassion' (Young, 2005, pp. 178-179).[48]

Young reiterates the extraordinariness that he believes altruism holds for Schopenhauer, and thinks that, for Schopenhauer, altruism can only be explained metaphysically:

> with egoism as it were mandated by the human epistemological situation, altruism presents itself as an *übermenschlich* transcendence of the human situation as astonishing as that of the artistic genius. It is, therefore, something that demands an explanation. Only metaphysics can provide one (Young, 2005, p. 179).

Throughout his exegesis, Young employs the terms "altruism" and "virtue" far more frequently than the term "compassion". However, altruism should not be confused with compassion. The abstract noun "altruism"[49] denotes "disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of others" (*OED*, 2010, p. 48). In philosophical parlance, altruism is juxtaposed with (as the inverse of) egoism (the desire for one's own welfare) (Russell, 1999, p. 255; Schramme, 2017, p. 203). Altruism, unlike compassion, is not a feeling, although certain feelings (or emotions) may be said to possess an "altruistic quality". In a similar way, one's motives may be characterised as altruistic (Sober, 2002, p. 18) and altruism may constitute a "psychological basis" for one's actions (Schramme, 2017, pp. 203-204). However, all things considered, altruism is generally understood in terms of behaviour;

that is, altruism is a quality manifested through conduct that advances the well-being of others, purely for the sake of others.

As demonstrated, Schopenhauer thinks compassion is a feeling. The conative element of compassion functions as an incentive for human conduct. The incentive of compassion propels participation which then engenders moral conduct: actions of voluntary justice and disinterested loving-kindness. These actions generally accord with what is now termed altruistic actions. To clarify, altruism is not born of sympathy[50] or empathy, but rather, compassionate participation since compassion, unlike sympathy and empathy, has the element of conation: a feeling of desire for another's welfare. Moreover, altruism is not the "astonishing, indeed mysterious phenomenon" that Schopenhauer refers to, as Young believes. It is evident from the original source that Young cites (*BM*, §16, p. 144) that the phenomenon Schopenhauer refers to is the participative "event" or "process" involved in compassion. Compassion, not altruism, is what demands a metaphysical explanation, although altruism, as demonstrated, is born of compassionate participation or is the *result* thereof. Schopenhauer thinks virtue is a "goodness of disposition" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 368) in one's character that stems from intuitive knowledge. Virtue is not altruism, yet it "directly calls forth" altruistic conduct (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 77). In short, many of Young's observations regarding "altruism" or "virtue" pertain to Schopenhauer's conception of compassion.

Young notes that Schopenhauer thinks altruism, as born of compassionate participation, can be explained only in a metaphysical way. This explanation purports that one partly sees "through the veil of Maya" (Young, 2005, p. 179) and intuitively realises that the *principium individuationis* "characterise the realm of appearance merely" (Young, 2005, p. 179). One thus realises that "individuality, plurality and otherness are foreign to reality as it is in itself, [and] that the distinction between ego and non-ego is an illusion" (Young, 2005, p. 180). In short, Schopenhauer's thesis of the metaphysical unity of will explains altruism and compassion.

Young later equates Schopenhauer's thesis of the unitary will with "metaphysical solipsism". Specifically, Young defines metaphysical solipsism as "the doctrine that the real self is non-empirical, not an object in the world of experience, and that it is identical with all other real selves" (Young, 2005, p. 180). In qualifying his definition, he contrasts metaphysical solipsism with Schopenhauer's concept of "theoretical egoism", the view that, empirically, "I alone exist"; that is, the view that I am the only empirically existing being. Accordingly, Young terms "theoretical egoism" "empirical solipsism" and states that metaphysical solipsism is "the view that only the metaphysical 'I' exists" (Young, 2005, n. 14, p. 260).

Young formulates Schopenhauer's argument for metaphysical solipsism as follows: "[since] space and time are the conditions of plurality, they characterise only appearance, therefore reality in itself is 'one'" (Young, 2005, p. 182). Young's term metaphysical solipsism corresponds not only to Schopenhauer's concept of the metaphysical unity of will, but can also be understood to refer to Schopenhauer's thesis of transcendental idealism; that is, the thesis that posits, amongst other things, "a real distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and a recognition that only the phenomenon is accessible to us" (*PP*, Vol. 1, p. 11). Ultimately, metaphysical solipsism corresponds to Schopenhauer's concept of the will; that is, the most fundamental hypostasis (where everything phenomenal is a reflection, or appearance, of this hypostasis). Of course, these three things— Schopenhauer's concept of the metaphysical unity of will, Schopenhauer's thesis of transcendental idealism, and Schopenhauer's will itself— are inextricably related (the concept of the will presupposes the concept of non-empirical unity). Young's use of the phrase "real self" (in his above definition), appears to correspond to Schopenhauer's "intelligible character", the latter itself understood as will.[51] I will have more to say about the relationship between Young's notion of "metaphysical solipsism" and Schopenhauer's concept of will later.

Young thinks that metaphysical solipsism explains altruism, as born of compassion, insofar as metaphysical solipsism purports that all beings are metaphysically one; "the knowledge of metaphysical solipsism" provides the incentive for altruism (Young, 2005, p. 186). Early in chapter eight Young states that "the distinction between self and others as illusory" is "the insight in which virtue— that is to say, altruism— is grounded" (Young, 2005, p. 165). Finally, he thinks that "the explanation and justification of virtue as consisting in the dissolution of the I-you dichotomy" allows one to see some purpose in Schopenhauer's monistic metaphysics (Young, 2005, p. 180).

Young thinks Schopenhauer's metaphysical solipsism has a "momentous weight to bear" (Young, 2005, p. 182), presumably since it explains (amongst other things) Schopenhauer's concepts of altruism (through compassion), bad conscience (to an extent), and eternal justice (Young, 2005, p. 180).

§3.3 Young's criticism

Young believes that there are "at least two serious criticisms that have to be made of Schopenhauer's 'metaphysical explanation' of virtue [that is, of compassion]" (Young, 2005, p. 182).[52] The first criticism concerns Schopenhauer's argument for metaphysical solipsism. This argument, he claims, "is as full of holes as a piece of Gruyere cheese" (Young, 2005, p. 182). This claim is based on five premises: first, the argument is "too short" or "trite" to hold much weight. *If* this defect is overlooked, and the argument is then considered critically, it presents with four additional problems. One, it is possible that the forms of space and time do not characterise only representations, but may also exist in-themselves.[53] Two, even if space and time characterize merely representation, it is contentious that they comprise the only way of understanding plurality. Three, the spatio-temporal nature of representation does not imply that the thing-in-itself is "one", "[s]ince

that treats what is supposed to be beyond the realm of objects as itself an object" (ibid). Four, if reality is indeed "one" it need not necessarily be a "self".

The other serious criticism Young has regarding Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of virtue (compassion) is that his explanation renders altruism illusory. In fact, Young thinks that Schopenhauer's altruist, when considered from the perspective of metaphysical solipsism, is an egoist:

> Schopenhauer asserts, first, that the difference between the egoist and the altruist is that while the former acts for his own interests the latter acts for the sake of another's. This is why the latter's actions possess 'moral worth' while those of the former do not. As the discussion proceeds, however, it becomes clear that, after all, the altruist *does* act for the sake of his own interest, the only difference between him and the egoist being that he acts for the sake of the interests of his *metaphysical* rather than his empirical self. So, as we might put it, the empirical altruist turns out to be a metaphysical egoist (Young, 2005, pp. 182-183; Young's emphasis).[54]

Young then cites the incompatibility of this conception with Schopenhauer's criterion for acts of moral worth:

> given that egoism excludes 'moral worth', it is entirely unclear why [Schopenhauer's altruist's] moral status should be any different from that of the common-or-garden egoist (Young, 2005, p. 183).

The conclusion of Young's argument—"the empirical altruist turns out to be a metaphysical egoist"— is further supported when he later argues:

> What makes it look as though Schopenhauer's account of altruism just reduces it to a weird kind of egoism is that he seems to represent the altruist as reasoning ('intuitively'):
>
> I love me.
>
> I see that you = me (*tat twam asi*).
>
> Therefore, I must love you (ibid).

The first premise— the empirical altruist has self-love— is (for Young at least) analytically connected to the concept of egoism. That is, the predicate "self-love" is contained in the concept "egoism".

The second premise— "I see that you = me" — essentially represents Young's interpretation of Schopenhauer's solution *vis-à-vis* the problem of altruism. Altruistic conduct is born of compassionate participation. Such participation is the identification of another with oneself as being intimately connected to oneself. However, empirically there seems to be no grounds for this identification. Compassionate participation, as a metaphysical phenomenon, provides this identification (through "metaphysical solipsism"): one sees oneself and another as ultimately subsumed in the oneness of the metaphysical will. Compassionate participation, then, allows for altruism. Young uses the Sanskrit phrase *Tat Tvam Asi* (which Schopenhauer himself uses) to express this idea. Schopenhauer additionally formulated this idea using the compound sentence "others are not a non-ego, but an 'I once more'" (*BM*, §22, p. 211). The pertinent phrase in this sentence— 'I once more'— will be discussed shortly.

Young's conclusion— "therefore, I must love you"— necessarily follows from his first two premises (if "I love me" and "you are me", then it is certain that "I love you") and makes clear his objection: the metaphysical unity of will reduces Schopenhauer's concept of altruism— as manifested in the empirical world and engendered by compassionate participation— to a "weird

kind of egoism" (Young, 2005, p. 183). The "empirical altruist", by intuitively seeing his metaphysical self in another, reasons prudentially and is a "metaphysical egoist". "I love you only on the basis that you are metaphysically me", the metaphysical egoist says, "since loving 'you' benefits *me*".

In his argument, Young implicitly claims that altruism necessarily presupposes a distinction between self and other, yet at the level of metaphysical solipsism no such distinction obtains. At the level of metaphysical solipsism there is no *other* to be altruistic towards; there is only the *self*. One can only act altruistically towards another; one cannot act altruistically to oneself. "Self-altruism" is a *contradictio in adjecto*. Schopenhauer's monistic metaphysics, Young thinks, precludes altruism. The will, like egoism, is self-reflexive, and all empirical subjects are modifications of the will's self-reflexivity. Egoism is the only conduct possible.

Young's argument resembles Scheler's insofar as Scheler believes that compassion— that which undergirds altruism— "presupposes a distinction between individuals, and if this is an illusion, compassion[55] itself must be another" (Scheler, 1973, p. 55). Additionally, Young's argument resembles Janaway's:

> [Schopenhauer's view] seems so extreme as to expunge the possibility of compassion altogether. If I really believed that you were not distinct from me, the attitude with which I regarded you could only be a strange kind of egoism. Genuine compassion, on the other hand, surely presupposes belief in distinctness as a minimum condition (Janaway, 1994, p. 101).

§3.4 Young's phenomenological account

Young does not deny the possibility of altruism, yet he thinks that a more intuitive explanation of its existence is available— a wholly empirical explanation. Schopenhauer "forces what is essentially a non-metaphysical insight into ill-fitting metaphysical clothing" (Young, 2005, p. 183). Consequently, Young offers a phenomenological-type account of altruism which he thinks evades the egoism implicit in Schopenhauer's metaphysical conception:

> [S]uppose that what really moves the altruist is that she loves *us*, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the 'us', for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a non-ego. Notice that an 'us', a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence (Young, 2005, p. 183; Young's emphasis).

In Young's account, the empirical world is the only world: "no appeal to metaphysics" is needed to account for his concept of community. Hence, all individuals in his community are strictly empirical (they have no corresponding intelligible character). Young explains Schopenhauer's concept of altruism, as engendered through compassionate participation, in terms of an individual's subjective first-person experience. One recognizes that one belongs to a community — "I see that you = us" — as opposed to having the intuitive recognition that another empirical self is metaphysically oneself ("I see that you= me (*tat twam asi*)") (Young, 2005, p. 183). In Young's account, the altruist's incentive is love for community (a community which includes the altruist). Hence altruistic conduct is predicated on the recognition that one belongs to, and has love for, this community. Young's concept of community (the non-ego) is intended to cleave the self-reflexivity of the metaphysical will.

Clearly Young's phenomenological explanation for altruism is a significant departure from Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of compassion (and altruism), yet Young hastens to add that his account is evidenced, to some extent, in Schopenhauer's work (Young, 2005, pp. 183-184).

In light of Young's interpretation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of virtue, it appears we have again reached an impasse. At the empirical level, Schopenhauer thinks, there is merely instrumental reason, and egoism predominates. Altruism appears chimerical insofar as no individual has any rationally compelling ground to act purely and wholly for another. However, Schopenhauer thinks he solves this problem by providing a non-egoistic incentive. This incentive— compassion— *allows for* altruism. Schopenhauer, of course, explains compassion metaphysically. Yet, according to Young's interpretation, at the metaphysical level there is only one thing— the will— such that genuine altruism is not possible. There is no "other" that one can relate to morally. There is only the "metaphysical self", who is perforce an egoist. Schopenhauer's metaphysical solution to the problem of egoism— to the very problem of ethics— is, Young thinks, no solution at all. It renders Schopenhauer's conception of altruism, as born of compassionate participation, egoistic. Any conduct flowing from the insight "*tat twam asi*" is quasi-altruism or covert egoism. Young attempts to solve this problem by explaining altruism in a phenomenological way. In so doing, he extirpates the very metaphysical ground upon which Schopenhauer's theory stands. Consequently, Young, like Cartwright, revises Schopenhauer's theory to such an extent that what remains bears little resemblance to Schopenhauer's original theory. I will now critically consider both Young's charge of egoism and his phenomenological account of altruism.

§3.5 Response to Young's criticism

In critiquing Schopenhauer's argument for metaphysical solipsism, Young claims that Schopenhauer posits the will— "reality in itself"— to be a *self* (Young, 2005, p. 182). This claim is

a misinterpretation of Schopenhauer's concept of will, and also underlies his charge of metaphysical egoism: the altruist "acts for the sake of the interests of his *metaphysical* rather than his empirical ***self***" (Young, 2005, p. 182; Young's original emphasis; bold emphasis mine). In my response, I will briefly address the first point (Young's misinterpretation of Schopenhauer's will), and then discuss the notion of a "self" *vis-à-vis* Young's charge of egoism.

Young does not offer any definition of "self" yet one may be (at least partly) inferred in light of a dispute he has with other Schopenhauer commentators. Such commentators, he thinks, mistakenly accept Schopenhauer's characterization of the will as "blind" (Young, 2005, p. 83); that is, they accept Schopenhauer's characterization of the will as a being that is devoid of knowledge (*Erkenntniss*). Young thinks this characterization is mistaken for at least two reasons: first, Schopenhauer treats the will "as a suitable object of moral evaluation and condemnation which a blind, 'knowledge-less' being could not possibly be"[56] (Young, 2005, p. 83), and second, the will, as "world-will" is "very clearly a *designer* of things, a being equipped with the full range of the human faculties, with reason as well as will" (Young, 2005, p. 83; Young's emphasis).[57] Hence, for Young, a "self" is, at minimum, something that can be evaluated morally and something which possesses all human faculties (since it is capable of designing things). Young imputes both characteristics to Schopenhauer's will.

Nevertheless, in my view, Schopenhauer's will qua thing-in-itself— the will considered purely in itself— is neither good nor bad. As Wicks states, it is "beyond good and evil" (Wicks, 2008, p. 59). That is, the will is amoral. Insofar as the will objectifies itself in the natural world (the world of representation) as the will-to-live, and insofar as one affirms this will-to-live, it necessarily engenders suffering in the world of representation. Hence, Schopenhauer condemns (morally evaluates) the will's *phenomenal effects*, not the will in itself. In addition, that the will objectifies itself in the natural world does not imply that it is a designer that possesses rationality (or any

human faculty). Such a belief only arises when one mistakenly attributes human characteristics (rationality, purposiveness, and so on) to the will; that is, when one anthropomorphizes the will. Schopenhauer explicitly cautions against this practice (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 327).[58] There is no textual evidence for the claim that the will is a self, and this interpretation, to my knowledge, is advanced solely by Young. Cartwright sees no evidence for Young's claim that the will is any kind of self (or a designer). He thinks that the will is clearly *not* a self, and believes that Young's misinterpretation may be due in part to some of the teleological holdovers of Schopenhauer's early works, which were motivated (to an extent) by Friedrich Schelling's philosophy of nature.[59]

Undergirding Young's charge of metaphysical egoism is the belief that a "self" or an "I" exists at the level of the metaphysical will: the altruist "acts for the sake of the interests of his *metaphysical* rather than his empirical *self*" (Young, 2005, pp. 182-183; my emphasis). Young's charge is similar to the very first charge of egoism levelled against Schopenhauer's theory of compassion—Becker's. Becker claimed that Schopenhauer's theory entails egoism insofar as the compassionate character ultimately acts for his own interests (Cartwright, 1999, p. 510). That is to say, the compassionate character sees another as an "I once more", and on the basis of this *self*-identification necessarily acts egoistically.[60] In Young's charge of egoism, the quasi-altruist acts egoistically on the basis of the recognition "I see you = me [*tat twam asi*]" (Young, 2005, p. 183). These two phrases— "I once more" and "*tat twam asi*"— are, for all intents and purposes, equivalent. We have the unique opportunity of seeing Schopenhauer's response to Becker's (and by extension Young's) charge. Schopenhauer says:

> [Your charge of egoism] rests solely on your wanting to take the phrase, 'I once more' (*Ich noch ein Mal*), literally, while it is simply a figurative turn of expression. For 'I' in the proper sense of the term refers exclusively to the individual and not to the metaphysical thing in itself which *appears* in individuals, but which is directly unknowable…[W]ith regard to this,

> therefore, the individual ceases and by *egoism* is understood the exclusive interest in one's own individuality (Hübscher, 1987, p. 221; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

According to Schopenhauer's response, the expression "I once more" denotes only empirical phenomena. That is to say, "I" refers literally only to an embodied individuated human subject; to a "David" or a "Dorothy" situated in space and time (and subject to causality). In short, "I" refers only to an *empirical character*, the "shadow" of one's intelligible character. The forms of space and time— the forms that allow for individuation; that is, for an "I"— are applicable only at the phenomenal level.

At the metaphysical level— the level of will— the forms of space and time do not exist. Thus at this level there is no individuation (no empirical character). As per Schopenhauer's response to Becker, "the individual ceases" at this level. There simply is no empirical character "David" or "Dorothy". As Cartwright states: "the metaphysical will is neither the agent nor the patient. It is where individuality ceases" (Cartwright, 2010, p. 298), and similarly Georg Simmel says: "the absolute unity of essence dissolves not only independent 'thou', but also the 'I'" (Simmel, 1991, p. 111). John Atwell makes a similar point: in recognizing the will in another, "what I 'see' is the will-to-live—which is neither *my* will-to live nor *the other's* will-to-live" (Atwell, 1990, p 123; Atwell's emphasis).[61]

At the metaphysical level of will, the expression "I once more" can only be used metaphorically, as "a figurative turn of expression". The pronoun "I" does not, as Colin Marshall states, "refer to the subject-matter of the insight [that takes place in compassion]" (Marshall, 2017, p. 306). As a metaphor, the expression "I once more" refers to the unity of will in which the "David-Dorothy" *essence* ultimately exists.

Schopenhauer's argument can now be made explicit: since the concept of egoism depends on the existence of individuality, and since individuality, as it is *empirically* understood, does not exist at the metaphysical level— the level at which compassion ultimately takes place—compassion cannot be an egoistic phenomenon. Consequently, altruistic conduct, born wholly of compassionate participation, cannot be reduced to egoism, as Young contends.

In his charge, Young employs the pronoun "I"[62] (as synonymous with "self") in a denotative sense to refer not only to the empirical character (the "empirical self/empirical altruist"), but also to the metaphysical will (the "metaphysical self/metaphysical egoist"). By expanding the use of the pronoun "I" in this manner, Young contravenes Schopenhauer's characterization of the will as a unity beyond individuation. Paul Downes notes:

> Young's framing of the question in terms of a metaphysical self already runs into a conflict with Schopenhauer, as for Schopenhauer if one means by metaphysical self, one's substance as the will that underlies everything, then there is no personality or self involved at all, since individuality is completely dissolved at the basic metaphysical level (Downes, 2017, p. 83).

In essence, Young disregards Schopenhauer's contention that his metaphysics remain immanent.[63] According to Schopenhauer, he uses "the forms of the phenomenon…as a jumping pole" so as to "leap over the phenomenon itself". Yet the phenomenon itself "alone gives those forms meaning" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, pp. 272-273). Consequently, Young's notion of an egoistic "metaphysical self", according to Schopenhauer, is a claim that "lands in the boundless sphere of empty fictions" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p, 273).

Some commentators accept Schopenhauer's argument against Becker's charge. Dale Jacquette, for example, states:

> [If] the word ego does not apply to the intelligible character or thing-in-itself, but only to the superficial phenomenal psychological willing subject also known as the empirical or acquired character…then his metaphysics of compassion as a moral motivation for helping others in need clearly transcends egoism (Jacquette, 2005, p. 230).

Additionally, Fox states:

> "The world as will" exists beyond the phenomenal, beyond the reach of intellect, and beyond individuation, as it is not subject to the *principium individuationis* and the explanatory categories of sufficient reason. Therefore, there is no "metaphysical self," as Julian Young claims—or at least not in the sense that an ego can be present therein.

Fox believes that if individuals have a "metaphysical self", this can only mean that at a more fundamental or (perhaps "higher") "level of analysis" all individuals are an "allotment of will". However, this "metaphysical allotment" is not equivalent to a "self"; it is only when this allotment is viewed via the structure and principles of empirical knowledge—when it manifests itself in the world—that it becomes appropriate to speak of a "self."

Fox concludes that "compassion is born beyond the limits of ego, and hence is well characterized in ordinary discourse as a 'selfless' impulse."[64] Hence insofar as Schopenhauer's metaphysics posit that compassion is literally a selfless phenomenon, Young's charge of egoism is unintelligible.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that Schopenhauer's argument against Becker's charge is not contained in his work, but only in his personal correspondence. And as Cartwright points out, Schopenhauer continued to employ the phrase "I once more" in editions of *On the Basis of Morality*

and *The World as Will and Representation* released subsequent to Becker's charge (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263). Schopenhauer did not issue a caveat that the phrase should not be understood in a literal sense with respect to the metaphysics.

As Cartwright further points out, Schopenhauer's solution— positing that the phrase "I once more" and pronoun "I" are mere metaphorical expressions at the level of the metaphysical will— seems to constitute a "break from Schopenhauer's usual stance as always writing in a literal sense, a strict and proper sense" and demonstrates that he "used a variety of means to increase our cognitive stock" (Cartwright, 2016, p. 56). To talk of compassion (and the intelligible character) "requires the use of an intuitive schema that has space and times as its forms. But neither of these *a priori* forms literally applies to [compassion] and the intelligible character" (Cartwright, 2010, p. 510).[65]

There is a further point I wish to make. Implicit in Young's charge of metaphysical egoism is the mistaken numerical identity thesis that I discussed in my first chapter. Young believes that in Schopenhauer's ethics, two individuals, although empirically distinct, are metaphysically identical. Metaphysical solipsism, Schopenhauer's explanation for altruism, apparently purports that one's real self is non-empirical, and is "*identical* with all other real selves" (Young, 2005, p. 180; my emphasis). Young states this belief elsewhere:

> the real self [is] a transcendent entity, [and] it is also the case that *there is only one* real self. In other words, ***everyone's real self is identical with everyone and everything else's real self***: *tat tvam asi* (this art thou) as the *Upanishads* puts it, is a formula Schopenhauer never tires of repeating (Young, 2005, p. 173; Young's original emphasis; bold emphasis mine).

In Young's conception, the compassionate subject intuitively recognizes the empirical "Not-I" to be metaphysically identical to himself. By virtue of this recognition the distinction between the "I" and

the "Not-I" is severed. Thereafter, only the "I" remains— that is, only Young's "metaphysical egoist" remains. Yet, as I have demonstrated in chapter one, Schopenhauer thinks only one's *essence* is identical with that of another, not that *one is identical with another*. This is a fine, yet important, distinction. Furthermore, in light of Schopenhauer's response to Becker, there can be no numerical identity with a self (an "I") that does not exist. There certainly is identification, yet this identification is ultimately with the unitary essence of will.[66]

Congruent with what I have thus far argued—namely, there is no "self" and "other" at the level of will, and that Young's charge is based on the mistaken numerical identity thesis— I have a further point to add. That is, Young misconstrues the *raison d'être* that virtue has for Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's conception, he tells us, reduces to egoism since the compassionate individual intuitively extends the sphere of his own self and self-interests to include that of his suffering patient (his "metaphysical self"): "I intuitively see that you are metaphysically me, I am thus obliged to love (have compassion for) you, and act altruistically towards you". The "empirical altruist" ultimately desires his own well-being; essentially, he is an empirical egoist at the metaphysical level.

Schopenhauer, contrary to Young, thinks that compassionate individuals "see through" the *principium individuationis* and forthwith transcend the illusion that there exists an immutable chasm between "self" and "other"; they intuitively grasp that there is no "self" and "other". For Schopenhauer, compassion is normatively preferred to egoism not because it extends the sphere of one's own interest *à la* Young, but rather, because it implies a more accurate understanding of reality than does the egoistic tenor. Granted Schopenhauer's phrase "I once more" is (at least *prima facie*) a clumsy formulation of this idea— it invites the charge of egoism— Schopenhauer's conception of compassion does not entail that one should compassionately identify with another in order to benefit oneself. Compassion is where one "recognizes, immediately, and without reasons

or arguments" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 352) the unity of will in which the essence of all phenomenal beings ultimately reside. Compassion is a primitive response, an intuitive knowledge of the will, not an intuitive effort to enhance one's own well-being. Simmel states:

> It is surely not the meaning of Schopenhauer's doctrine that I would harm myself if I harm the other, and that I would promote myself if I promote the other. His meaning is that altruistic actions radically dissolve the difference between "I" and "Thou", and that it benefits an impersonal and absolute being which exists undivided beyond the phenomenality of "I" and "thou" (Simmel, 1991, p. 111).

On Schopenhauer's view, the egoist labours through life steeped in self-deception failing to appreciate the fundamental nature of reality. He perceives the world merely subjectively, through the *principium individuationis*, in which the world is a battlefield full of suffering. Egoism, as we know, is the only rational motive for such an individual. Conversely, the compassionate individual perceives the world objectively, and this objective perception implies amity and tranquillity. Amity and tranquillity are a consequence of objective perception, not the rationale for it. Compassion, for Schopenhauer, embodies a true judgment that the distinction between individuals in the phenomenal world is chimerical.

§3.6. Response to Young's phenomenological account

Finally, let us now turn to Young's phenomenological account of altruism. Young's account is similar to Cartwright's psychological account of compassion, and can also be seen as a psychological account. Young provides neither a lexical nor stipulative definition of "phenomenology" and appears to use the terms "phenomenological" and "psychological" synonymously. For example, he states "in spite of [the] defects [of Schopenhauer's metaphysics]

"Schopenhauer's *psychology* of virtue…contain[s], as Iris Murdoch puts it, a depth of 'humane wisdom'" and (for Young) "the insight they contain is, in reality, *phenomenological* rather than metaphysical" (Young, 2005, p. 183; my emphasis). Elsewhere he states that Schopenhauer's "radical monism is unconvincing" yet still contains "great insight into the *psychology* of altruism" (Young, 2005, p. 187; my emphasis). Nevertheless, I will appraise Young's account insofar as one can understand it to be a broadly phenomenological account.

For Schopenhauer, compassion and the altruistic conduct associated with it cannot be explained in any purely phenomenological way. In Young's account, first-person *consciousness* is the sole factor in determining virtue (altruistic feelings or conduct); one participates in a community via one's consciousness. Yet to participate in another's suffering (or in Young's community) in this manner would not be sufficient to stimulate altruistic feelings (compassion) or altruistic conduct for Schopenhauer. Phenomenological participation in a community would entail mere empathy in the sense that one *thinks* (or imagines or reflects upon) oneself as a constituent of a community. As such, one would not have the desire to prevent or to end another's suffering. In Schopenhauer's account, one must participate literally— metaphysically— in another's suffering exclusively desiring the other's welfare; one must participate in the metaphysical unity of will which is, ultimately, independent of all consciousness or thought.

Recall from chapter one that Schopenhauer has stringent criterion for actions of moral worth: one's conduct must not be predicated on *any* interest or desire that one's own self has. In Young's community, the "I" is a constituent of the "us" (the community), and the "us" is "the fundamental object of love" (Young, 2005, p. 183). The altruist himself participates in the community. Young thinks this conception of the altruist involves "no egoism of any sort…since the fundamental object of love is a non-ego" (Young, 2005, p. 183). Now that may be the case for Young, but it is certainly not the case for Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer, this conception of altruism would entail egoism

since the altruist's love (as synonymous with compassion) is dependent on the fact that he himself is a constituent of this community. Young's altruist *ipso facto* has an interest in loving (feeling compassion or acting altruistically towards) this community. So while the metaphysics of Schopenhauer's account preserves genuine compassion and altruism, Young's phenomenological account implies egoism.

As with Cartwright's psychological account, it is not entirely clear why Young's account does not require a metaphysical grounding. That is to say, what does it *ultimately* mean to participate phenomenologically in a community, and why does one do so given the fact that one is empirically individuated (and disposed to egoism)? What is the metaphysical basis of a phenomenology of altruism? One may attempt to reduce a phenomenological account to a psychological one explaining altruism through psychological factors (such as, in Cartwright's account, the imagination), yet what then explains these psychological factors? I have pointed out in chapter one that neurobiological explanations of psychological factors are insufficient and highly speculative. These factors, as Schopenhauer would state, are *qualitas occulta*; "[e]very explanation of natural science must ultimately stop at such a *qualitas occulta*, and thus at something wholly obscure" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 80). Young implicitly believes his account is superior to Schopenhauer's since it is more amenable to human intuition— "no appeal to a non-temporal unity is required to explain its existence" (Young, 2005, p. 183) — and on the basis of this purported intuitiveness, he regards his account as true and thus explanatory. Yet he overestimates the explanatory power of his own model. In short, Young's account ultimately depends on unexplained phenomena. And even if the phenomena were explained physically, the physical explanation would still require a metaphysical grounding.

One final thing must be addressed. Young claims that Schopenhauer describes altruism in a phenomenological-type way "entirely independent of the shaky mechanism of metaphysical

solipsism" (Young, 2005, p. 185).[67] In *The World as Will and Representation*,[68] Young thinks Schopenhauer "compares the '*particular* viewpoint' from which the individual is 'all in all' with the '*universal* viewpoint' (the "us" viewpoint) from which the individual is 'nothing'" (Young, 2005, pp. 183-184; Young's emphasis). In this account, Young thinks Schopenhauer's conception of virtue is explained essentially through "vision" (Young, 2005, p. 184), [69] and consequently altruism and egoism have new meanings for Schopenhauer. Young cites two passages from *The World as Will and Representation* to exemplify this. Yet in the second of these passages altruism (Schopenhauer is specifically describing the "good conscience") is predicated on the knowledge that "our true self exists not only in our own person, in this particular phenomenon, but in everything that lives" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 373); that is, it "aris[es] from the direct recognition of our own inner being-in-itself in the phenomenon of another" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 373). This is a clear reference to Schopenhauer's concept of the unity of will. Consequently, it subverts Young's contention that Schopenhauer has a phenomenological-type account of altruism wholly independent from his metaphysics. Schopenhauer has no such phenomenological account. His commitment to a metaphysical explanation of virtue (compassion) is unwavering.[70]

What Young calls Schopenhauer's "phenomenological-type" account of altruism corresponds to what Cartwright calls "Schopenhauer's second metaphysical justification of ethics" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263). Cartwright thinks this second metaphysical justification "eludes the charge of grounding his moral philosophy in some form of metaphysical egoism" since it "does not entail that virtuous people are moved by some deep cognition into the metaphysical unity of the will" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263). Cartwright elsewhere states that Schopenhauer "distances himself from the claim that [compassionate] agents are moved by a cognition that others are themselves" (Cartwright, 2010, p. 301). Instead, their conduct merely manifests the ultimate nature of reality; that is, of the metaphysical unity. The compassionate agent expresses (as in Young's notion of Schopenhauer's "phenomenological-type" account of altruism) insight or practical wisdom through

their conduct. For Cartwright, this "second metaphysical justification of ethics" is exemplified through Schopenhauer's pronouncement that:

> the just, righteous, beneficent, and magnanimous person, would express by deed that knowledge only which is the result of the greatest intellectual depth and the most laborious investigation of the theoretical philosopher (*BM*, §22, p. 210).

By treating others in a benevolent way, compassionate agents live in a manner that is "metaphysically warranted" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263), a way that "correlates to the best findings of philosophy and the insight had by mystics" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 263). Cartwright substantiates this view by claiming that in *On the Basis of Morality*, when Schopenhauer explicitly proposes to examine the metaphysical grounding of compassion, he does not so much explain it as illustrate it through what he asserts to constitute the character of the morally good and the morally reprehensible. As I stated in chapter one, I do not believe that Schopenhauer thinks compassionate agents are moved by "a cognition" that "others are themselves". And I would like to point out here that Cartwright's notion of a "second metaphysical justification of ethics" still entails that the compassionate agent has an intuitive understanding of the metaphysical unity of will since such conduct "spring[s] from… intuitive knowledge" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 368) of this unity.

§3.7. Conclusion

Young's charge of egoism is based on a simplistic reading of Schopenhauer's metaphysical thesis. To support this view, I have demonstrated that (i) in Schopenhauer's conception, there is ultimately no self and other and hence there is no metaphysical self that can *be* an egoist. Furthermore, I have argued that (ii) Young's account is based on the mistaken numerical identity thesis, and that (iii) he misconstrues the rationale that virtue or compassion has for Schopenhauer. Finally, I have

demonstrated that Young's phenomenological-type account of altruism or virtue, as a substitute for Schopenhauer's metaphysical account of compassion, presents as no edification.

Conclusion

Throughout my thesis, I have aimed to demonstrate that Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion is not as vulnerable to criticisms as many commentators claim. In so doing, I have examined Schopenhauer's theory both macroscopically and microscopically. Kerstin Behnke observes:

> Schopenhauer has often been accused of self-contradiction. However, a thinker of his acumen and clarity, who has made it his duty to point out faulty assumptions and conflicting statements in the works of others, and whose habit of self-referencing indicates an unusual degree of intellectual self-consciousness, would not as easily and on as many counts contradict himself as his critics would have it (Behnke, 2004, p. 39).

I believe my work has borne out Behnke's view. That is, I believe my thesis has demonstrated that Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion, far from involving self-contradiction, is neither unintelligible nor fraught with inconsistencies. In reaching this conclusion, we have looked at many objections to Schopenhauer's theory. Let us now recall our main steps.

In chapter one I dismissed Cartwright's claim that Schopenhauer's conception of compassion is incoherent. I demonstrated that Cartwright misinterprets Schopenhauer's concept of participation insofar as he claims that this concept involves two individuals experiencing a numerically identical suffering. Contra Cartwright, I demonstrated that the compassionate agent and his suffering patient experience a similar, but not identical, suffering by participating in the unity of will. Moreover, I defended Schopenhauer from Cartwright's related claim that Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of compassion implies human beings are metaphysically identical. I showed that, for Schopenhauer, human beings are a manifestation of one identical essence, not "metaphysically

identical". Finally, I rejected Cartwright's attempt at naturalizing Schopenhauer's theory; that is, I rejected Cartwright's "psychological model" of compassion. I demonstrated that such a model resembles not compassion, but rather, empathy. Most importantly, this model, although it *prima facie* seems the more intuitive, does not offer any additional advantages than Schopenhauer's.

In chapter two I dismissed two criticisms that claimed Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of compassion creates internal inconsistencies in his wider ethics. First, Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion was said to be inconsistent with his theory of the cardinal virtue of justice since, in this virtue, compassion impedes one from causing harm yet this harm is in the future and is thus non-existent. It is not possible to immediately participate in a suffering that does not exist. I responded to this claim by demonstrating that exercising the cardinal virtue justice, for Schopenhauer, does not require immediate participation in another's suffering. On the contrary, the virtue of justice, Schopenhauer argues, is produced from prior occasions of experiential compassion and requires the use of rationality. Second, Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion was said to be inconsistent with his theory of the salvation since compassion requires stimulation of the will while salvation requires renunciation of the will. I dismissed this claim by demonstrating that both compassion and salvation come from the same source and both require disengagement from the will-to-live.

In chapter three I rejected the external criticism that Schopenhauer's theory of compassion, by virtue of its metaphysical basis, reduces to a type of egoism since one recognizes that one's own metaphysical self is the object of one's compassion. I demonstrated that Young's criticism is flawed insofar as he claims that individuation, as empirically understood, obtains at the level of will. Moreover, I demonstrated that Young misconstrues the rationale that compassion has for Schopenhauer. That is, compassion, for Schopenhauer, is not about extending the sphere of one's own interest, but rather, it is about one having a more accurate understanding of reality (an

understanding that is not present in either egoism or malice). Finally, I demonstrated how Young's attempt to naturalize Schopenhauer's theory, like Cartwright's, was unsuccessful insofar as his model resembles something akin to empathy, not compassion. Most importantly, I showed how it does not offer a superior alternative to Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of the phenomenon of compassion.

As we know, Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of compassion has been dismissed by many as "incoherent", "inconsistent", and "unreasonable". The metaphysics, we are told, is something that few people would take "seriously". It is "nonsense", a "mystical embarrassment", and "the least satisfying element" of his ethics. These pejorative epithets are seemingly endless. To use Schopenhauer's terminology, for many critics, the metaphysics appear to be from "cloud-cuckoo-land" (*Wolkenkuckucksheim*). In closing, I believe that I have now demonstrated that these highly critical views are not entirely warranted or justified. And I believe that I have done so while retaining the spirit of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and hence, while keeping an ever-vigilant eye on Truth: that is, "whatever encounter[ed] *me* [was] also confronted with *her*" (*BM*, §1, p. 43).

Endnotes

[1] The question read as follows: "Is the source and foundation of morality to be looked for in an idea of morality which lies immediately in consciousness (or conscience), and in the analysis of the other principal notions of morality springing from this, or is it to be sought in another ground of knowledge?" (*BM*, p. 38).

[2] For Schopenhauer, the analytic approach is more correctly known as the inductive method (it proceeds from consequent to ground), whilst the synthetic, the deductive method (it proceeds from ground to consequent) (*WWR*, Vol 2, p. 122).

[3] Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's ethics has been influential, particularly for many contemporary virtue ethicists. Elizabeth Anscombe, in her seminal paper "Modern Moral Philosophy", draws directly on many of Schopenhauer's anti-Kantian ethical sentiments. Similarly, Philippa Foot's 1972 paper "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" can be viewed as echoing Schopenhauer's claim that Kant's moral laws are hypothetical, not categorical. Schopenhauer scholar John Atwell states that Schopenhauer "enumerates most of the criticisms that have been urged against Kant's ethics over the past two centuries" (Atwell, 1990 p. 91), and Barbara Hannan recently states that Schopenhauer's "criticisms of Kantian ethics are the best and most penetrating I have ever seen" (Hannan, 2009, p. 94). For further discussion regarding the influence of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's ethics see Cartwright, 1999, pp. 287-288, n. 10 & n. 11. For further reading on Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's ethics see Caldwell, 1891, pp. 355-374; Tsanoff, 1910, pp. 512-534; Young, 1984, pp. 191-212.

[4]Although frequently used interchangeably, I am sensitive to the fact that the concepts of "feeling" and "emotion" likely refer to distinct states of being. Substantive attempts have been made to delineate the subtle differences between the two, yet the precise nature of these differences is highly contentious. However, this need not concern us here since Schopenhauer consistently views compassion as a feeling and appears to view feelings and emotions as identical phenomena (he frequently uses the verb "feel" and the noun "compassion" collocatively (*BM*, §8, p. 96; *WWR*, Vol. 1, §59, p. 324; §67, p. 377; Vol. 2, p. 592; *PP*, Vol. 2, p. 229, 297, 300, 592), or describes compassion as something that is "felt" (*BM*, §20, p. 192; *WWR*, Vol. 1, §67, 376) or simply as a feeling (*BM*, §18, p. 165)). Only once does he appear to refer to compassion as an "emotion of the heart" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 526)). I will henceforth use the terms "feeling" and "emotion" synonymously.

[5] The German *Mitleid* can be translated not only as "compassion", but also as "sympathy" or "pity". English translators of Schopenhauer's works have variously used all three terms for *Mitleid*. David Cartwright argues this practice has been due not to semantic issues, but rather to stylistic and grammatical ones. He concludes that "pity", "sympathy" and "compassion" have been erroneously employed as synonymous terms, and that Schopenhauer's notion of *Mitleid* is best understood as "compassion" (Cartwright, 1998, pp. 557-558). See also Mannion, 2003, p. 200. The primary text I will refer to in this thesis is E.F.J. Payne's translation of *On The Basis of Morality* in which *Mitleid* is almost always translated as "compassion".

[6] That sympathy can be felt with respect to another's happiness (or any other positive emotional state) is disputed (Wispé, 1991, pp. 69-70; Mercer, 1972, p. 5).

[7] Pity, unlike compassion, may be extended towards someone who is not actually suffering. Such suffering may be perceived only by the bearer of pity (Cartwright, 1988, p. 558). To use a similar example as Cartwright's, one witnesses a teenager abusing alcohol and extrapolates the long-term deleterious effects on teenager's health. One consequently feels pity for the teenager. However one's object of pity— the teenager— does not judge themselves to be suffering or in any way misfortunate.

[8] For Schopenhauer, an "incentive" is strictly speaking a characteristic of an individual's will. A motive is either an object of external perception (an intuitive representation) or a thought or concept (an abstract representation). Motives "stir" the will; they are causes operating through knowledge. As Cartwright notes, in *On the Basis of Morality* Schopenhauer does not always distinguish between incentive and motive (Cartwright, 2008, p. 307, n. 4.), appearing to frequently use the two terms interchangeably. Unless otherwise stated, the terms "motive" and "incentive" should be henceforth understood as synonyms.

[9] In his 1813 doctoral dissertation *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, Schopenhauer argues that there are four classes of representation, all of which are objects for a subject. The principle of sufficient reason is that principle that states "Nothing is without a ground or reason why it is" (*FR*, §5, p. 6). This principle, Schopenhauer argues, is only applicable to the world of representation. All events in the world of representation can be explained with reference to an antecedent event which made the latter necessary. The world of representation, then, is deterministic. There are four "roots" of the principle of sufficient reason; that is, this principle governs four classes of representations, all of which are relative to the subject, in four ways. Material objects are governed by the law of causality. Concepts or abstract representations are understood through logical explanation. Space and time, both *a priori* intuitions, constitute mathematical objects and are governed by mathematical explanation. Finally, individual wills are explained through the law of motivation. Any action performed by an individual is to be understood in terms of a motive, thus motivation equates to "causality seen from within" (*FR*, §5, p. 6).

[10] Schopenhauer praises Kant's "*distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself*"(*WWR*, Vol. 1, pp. 417-418; Schopenhauer's emphasis) yet states that "the most important step of my philosophy [is] the transition from the phenomenon to the thing-in-itself, given up by Kant as impossible" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 191). While Kant declares the

thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) is beyond the scope of human knowledge (it signifies the boundaries (*die Grenzen*) of human knowledge or the unknown basis of experience), Schopenhauer argues that we can have knowledge of both the thing-in-itself and its nature. The thing-in-itself is known to human beings via self-consciousness: "[the thing-in-itself] can come into consciousness, only quite directly, namely by *it itself being conscious of itself*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 195; Schopenhauer's emphasis). Specifically, one knows the thing-in-itself through self-awareness of one's body. One's body, like all other representations, is an object for a subject (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 99) and hence "liable to the laws of this objective corporeal world" (*FR*, §23, p. 124); we experience our body, through the senses, as an object in space and time subject to causality. However, one has "inside access" to, or phenomenological awareness of, one's own body. This inside access affords non-representational knowledge of one's own essence; that is, the body is "a subterranean passage" — "a way *from within"*— in which we know the *"*real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate *from without*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 195; Schopenhauer's emphasis). This inner essence—the thing-in-itself—Schopenhauer calls "the will": a blind, restless, infinite striving or pulsing which is uncaused, non-temporal and non-spatial. The "double-knowledge" that one has of one's body— as being both will qua thing-in-itself and representation— can be extended to all objects in the world. That is to say, by means of an analogical inference, Schopenhauer argues that all objects in the world are both representation and will. Evidence to support the view that Schopenhauer thinks the thing-in-itself is the will can be found at *WWR* Vol. 1, p. 110, p. 128, p. 153, p. 154, p. 162, p. 184, p. 275, p. 279, p. 280, p. 286, p. 287, p. 290, p. 292, p. 301, p. 366, p. 370, p. 402, p. 501, p. 503, p. 504, pp. 504-5, p. 506, p. 534; *WWR* Vol. 2, p. 14, p. 16, p. 18, p. 136, p. 201, p. 206, p. 245, p. 307, p. 309, p. 320, p. 443, p. 484, p. 530, p. 559, p. 579, p. 589, p. 600, p. 601. For alternative interpretations to this view see Cartwright, 2001, pp. 31-54; Jacquette, 2007, pp. 76-108; Shapshay, 2008, pp. 211-229.

[11] Some, for example, argue that Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion is inconsistent with his theory of will: it is not plausible for compassion to be the foundation of morality given Schopenhauer's alleged characterization of the will as "evil", "self-devouring" and "torn by conflict" (Magee, 1987, p. 224); identification with the metaphysical unity of will (compassionate identification) would result in the discovery of "a wild horrible beast" which would engender "horror" rather than compassion (Atwell, 1990 pp. 122-123). Max Scheler puts forth a further external criticism by arguing that insight into the metaphysical unity of being, for Schopenhauer, is due merely to "emotional infection and identification" (Scheler, 1973, p. 55). This precludes true understanding of another's condition: Schopenhauer's compassionate reaction to suffering is not a reaction to another *as another*, but, rather, is an involvement, through identification, in a blind striving metaphysical will. Scheler thinks that this type of identification (along with psychological types of identification) precludes genuine compassion, and Schopenhauer's theory hence confuses compassion with vulnerability to emotional infection and identification. Moreover, due to Schopenhauer's metaphysical monism, the dissolution of individuation, *ipso facto*, entails that compassion cannot be something which is felt solely for another (Scheler, 1973, p. 55).

[12] Compassion involves participation primarily in another's suffering, since, for Schopenhauer there is no *positive* state of well-being or happiness to promote. Well-being is a negative state (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 319); that is, it consists merely in the cessation of suffering, that is, the cessation of want, need, privation, desire, and so on (*BM*, §16, p. 146). As such, well-being has no existence in its own right. Suffering is only directly and positively felt (*BM*, §16, p. 146). Consequently, the well-being of others (and our own well-being) is not felt by us in the same manner as the suffering of others (and our own suffering). Generally, another person's well-being leaves us with a feeling of indifference due to its negative character (*BM*, §16, p. 146).

[13] The fourth unnamed incentive, the desire for one's own woe, is excluded from Schopenhauer's discussion in *On the Basis of Morality* due to the fact that "In that essay…[it]…had to be passed over in silence, since the prize-question was stated in the spirit of the philosophical ethics prevailing in Protestant Europe" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 607).

[14] Julian Young argues that malice, as promulgated by Schopenhauer in *The World as Will and Representation*, is in fact a species of egoism (Young, 2005, p. 176). Cartwright also states that it appears that "the malicious character is motivated by egoism" (Cartwright, 1999, p. 277). Additionally, in another article, Cartwright states that Schopenhauer's treatment of malice is "unusual" in that Schopenhauer views malice as non-egoistic yet "never worries about the existence of actions resulting from malice like he did of those resulting from compassion" (Cartwright, 2012, p. 255).

[15] Schopenhauer states that this premise results from his refutation (in Section II of *On the Basis of Morality*) of Kant's claim that we have moral duties to ourselves. Such duties, he thinks, have been "eliminated".

[16] It has been argued that Schopenhauer believes egoism is, in general, morally neutral or morally ambivalent. For instance, Cartwright believes egoism merely reflects the "natural standpoint" of mankind and "there is nothing that logically ties it to wrongful or rightful conduct" (Cartwright, 1999, p. 272). Richard Taylor also agrees with this assessment (Taylor, 2000, p. 197). However, like Gerard Mannion, I share the opinion that egoism, for Schopenhauer, is generally to be understood as morally reprehensible. Mannion aptly states "what is antimoral cannot also be described as morally neutral" (Mannion, 2002, pp. 91-92). However, Schopenhauer does identify a more pronounced type of egoism; "extreme egoism" (*äußerster Egoismus*), the motto of which is "Help no one; on the contrary, injure all people if it brings you any advantage" (*BM*, §14, p. 136).

[17] Michael Maiden states that Schopenhauer, by positing compassion to be the necessary and sufficient condition for morality, is "plainly erroneous". He illustrates this claim by noting that when Don Quixote, motivated out of compassion, frees the chained prisoners, he commits a wrong against the State and against the further (potential) victims

of the prisoners he set free. Maiden concludes "from a consequentialist view his act was an immoral one". See Maiden, 1988, p. 266. In response to Maiden, it should be noted that rules of the State, for Schopenhauer, are rules borne out of egoism; the State itself is a product of the common egoism inherent in all human beings, and, paradoxically, functions to serve this egoism (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 345). That is to say, the State stems from common fear (of common violence and aggression); hence it is in everyone's own interests that the State exists. Recall too that Schopenhauer is looking for a "natural morality…independent of human institution"; specifically a foundation for morality "based merely on the nature of things or of man". The State is any artificial construct— a "human institution" intended merely to circumvent the selfishness and maliciousness of mankind. Thus, by acting out of compassion and freeing the prisoners, Quixote commits no moral wrong; in fact, his conduct is moral since it is accounted for by a "natural morality" (that is, by compassion) rather than by egoistic rules ordained by a "human institution". Maiden also fails to mention that Quixote was deceived by the prisoners, and that Quixote thought the prisoner's situation constituted a gross injustice. Schopenhauer, implying that there are no absolute wrongs, explicitly argues that violence and cunning are permissible when used to offset a potential injustice against an individual (*BM*, pp. 158-162.) We can extend this notion with regards to Quixote and the prisoner's plights. Finally, Schopenhauer, like Kant, rejects consequentialist ethical theories.

[18] Schopenhauer substantiates this claim— plurality is merely apparent, and the multiplicity of individuals in this world merely manifest "one and the same truly existing essence, present and identical in all of them" (*BM*, §22, p. 207) — by noting that it has been incorporated into every philosophical and religious tradition; this doctrine certainly precedes Kant, and, in fact, may have existed since time immemorial; it is the doctrine of the world's oldest book— the *Vedas*— and is present in the ancient Greeks, Christianity and Islam; it is in Spinoza's pantheism as well (*BM*, §22, p. 207).

[19] Adapted from Mark Colyvan's indispensability argument for Platonism (mathematical realism) (Colyvan, 2001, p. 11). Very generally, this argument states that since mathematics plays an indispensable role in science, a scientific realist has an ontological commitment to the existence of mathematical entities. That is, a scientific realist ultimately has a commitment to mathematical realism.

[20] Such a view would be odd, particularly in terms of compassion considered purely as an incentive (the conative element). For example, David may have a desire to play tennis with his friends on a particular day. Now that desire *could* motivate David to participate in the tennis match. But the desire itself does not generate the activity of, or participation in, the tennis match. For example, David may have decided that he must spend more time with his wife, and hence refrains from playing tennis. The desire does not entail a participation (behaviour) in the tennis match.

[21] Plato, Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and Thomas Aquinas all have metaphysical notions of participation; see: Fotta, 2006, pp.107-118.

[22] In Plato's conception of participation (*methexis*) a beautiful object (a sensible object or "particular") is said to be beautiful since it participates in the Form of Beauty (Plato, 1975, *Phaedo*, 100c4-6, p. 52). The Form of Beauty is self-predicated; that is, it is itself its own essence: it *is* beauty and exists independently (non-spatio-temporally) from the particular participating in it. However, a particular only has its reality through its participation in the Form. The Form (unlike a particular) is "one", permanent (unchangeable), and is perfect (the perfect example of itself). Plato's general formula for participation can be stated as "a thing (x) is *F* because x participates in the Form *F*". For further discussion see Allen, 1960, pp. 147-164.

[23] Note that Schopenhauer at one point defines compassion as a "wholly direct and even instinctive participation in another's suffering" (*BM*, §18, p. 163).

[24] Cartwright advances these conditions in slightly different forms in his articles "Compassion" (1982) and "Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers: The Metaphysics of Mitleid" (2008). The essential difference is that in both of these articles, as contrasted with his 2012 article I cite above, conditions (iii) and (iv) are inverted. Furthermore, in his 1982 article Cartwright states that the conditions therein account for an "analytical model of Schopenhauer's *theory* of compassion" (p. 63), not for an analytic model of "Schopenhauer's *conception* of compassion" (2008, p. 296; 2012, p. 258). Needless to say, there is a significant different between a theory and a conception of something. At all times in what follows, I take Cartwright's conditions to refer to Schopenhauer's conception of compassion.

[25] For a discussion between compassion, sympathy, and empathy please refer to my introduction.

[26] Again, the assertion that Schopenhauer "only seems to tell us how this experience is possible" blatantly contradicts Cartwright's own thesis on its impossibility.

[27] This view is supported by Michael Allen Fox. Fox also states that "perhaps Schopenhauer helps himself to more than he's entitled to here, but I see him as saying that when I experience compassion for your suffering, my apprehension of your mental states is of a stronger kind than what philosophers have been pleased to call "knowledge of other minds," which seems to be a kind of inference or projection by analogy. Instead, compassion is "fellow-feeling" in the truest sense; but it somehow preserves our separate individualities while at the same time signifying a very deep empathy that leaps the barrier of otherness, at least temporarily. It's a kind of interface between ordinary feeling and a direct grasp of willing (or will-in-action)". Personal correspondence, Fox, 10 May 2017.

[28] In his 1835 work *On the Will in Nature*, Schopenhauer explains paranormal phenomena such as clairvoyance, magic, and animal magnetism via the metaphysical unity of will. That is, he posits there is a (non-spatio and non-temporal) "*nexus metaphysicus*" (metaphysical connection) by which "phenomenon (can) act upon phenomenon by means of that being in itself, which is one and the same in all phenomena" (*WN*, p. 340); "it is possible to act upon things from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual" (*WN*, p. 340). This *nexus metaphysicus* is in contrast to a *nexus physicus*: a causal

connection pertaining only to the world as representation. Cartwright opines that the *nexus metaphysicus* not only explains phenomena such as "sharing dreams, hypnotism, the presence of those absent, telekinesis", and (most astonishingly), the fact that "one person [can] think… through another person's brain" (Cartwright, 2012b, p. 35) but also explains the "extraordinary experience" of compassion, that is, the feeling of another's suffering in the other's body. Cartwright argues that Schopenhauer does not employ this explanation in *On the Basis of Morality* for both "strategic and philosophical reasons" (Cartwright, 2012b, p. 29): in this essay he could not detail his metaphysics to any great degree, and "the idea of compassion as moral clairvoyance would just needlessly trouble the spirit of the essays contest's sponsor, the Royal Danish Society of Sciences" (Cartwright, 2012b, pp. 36-37). Also, explaining compassion through his "metaphysics of magnetism and magic", Cartwright thinks, would contravene Schopenhauer's own conviction that philosophy must remain immanent (Cartwright, 2012b, pp. 37-38). Certainly, such views *prima facie* substantiate Cartwright's argument, yet I don't believe these points undermine my argument since paranormal phenomena can still be explained through this *nexus metaphysicus* without requiring entities to experience identical mental states or to be metaphysically identical. Even in the most extreme example—thinking through another's brain—the *nexus metaphysicus* allows one to *intuit* what another is thinking, not have an identical mental state to another. Finally, to temper Schopenhauer's belief in paranormal and occult phenomena, it should be noted that he eschews any suggestion of posthumous consciousness (*PP*, Vol. 1, p. 487), and regards as a "strange illusion" the feeling that, when one sees the possessions of eminent people who have died ("Kant's old hat", for example), one has "the *mistaken notion* that with the object they bring back also the subject, or that something of him must cling to the object" (*PP*, Vol. 2, pp. 84-85; my emphasis).

[29] Further instances can be found at *WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 111; Vol. 2, p. 477.

[30] Schopenhauer, implying that there are no absolute wrongs, states there to be circumstances in which one can use cunning or force to ward off potential wrongs committed against oneself. See *BM*, pp. 158-162.

[31] Cartwright, in the earlier version of his "analytical model of Schopenhauer's theory of compassion", states that the third condition, once again, "A participates immediately in B's suffering", is inconsistent "with conditions two, five, and six, all of which make reference to future mental states" (Cartwright, 1982, p. 66).

[32] Shapshay and Ferrell employ Christopher Janaway's translation of *On The Basis of Morality*, in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (Janaway, 2009). In this translation Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle reads "Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can". Henceforth, I will use Janaway's translation when talking of Schopenhauer's moral principle.

[33] Shapshay and Ferrell quote Janaway who they think encapsulates the instrumental view: "morality has value ultimately, not in its own right, but as a step towards this self-denial of the will" (Janaway, 2009, p. xxxviii).

[34] Shapshay and Ferrell first identify the two ways in which Schopenhauer believes one can reach "negation of the will-to-live" (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 56): either from knowledge of the suffering that inevitably befalls others or "by suffering immediately felt by ourselves" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 397). They then point out that Schopenhauer thinks the first way is extremely rare, whilst the second is far more common.

[35] Compounding this second tension, Shapshay and Ferrell note that, in view of Schopenhauer's "commitment to the normative primacy of renunciation", egoistic or malicious conduct could ironically be more salutary to rational beings insofar as such conduct would increase ("ratchet up") their amount of suffering. Such an increase in suffering could, in turn, potentially induce such beings to "unchain their will-to-life" and hence make progress towards salvation (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 57).

[36] "*The affirmation of the will*", Schopenhauer writes, "is the persistent willing itself as it fills the life of man in general" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 326; Schopenhauer's emphasis). Since Schopenhauer links the individual human will, or the will as it is objectified in human beings, with the human body (*WWR*, Vol. 1, pp. 326–27), affirmation of the will— an expression that can be used interchangeably with "affirmation of the body" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 327) — entails subordination to bodily desires and requirements, and most chiefly, the drive to procreate (Schopenhauer thinks the strongest objectification of the will-to-live is seen in the genitals. The sexual impulse is the "most decided affirmation of the will-to-live" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 328)). One wills incessantly in the hopes of satiating such desires and requirements; motives flicker before the individual pledging "complete satisfaction, the quenching of the thirst of the will" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 327).

[37] As creatures who affirm the will-to-live, we can never attain lasting satisfaction. Willing itself has its genesis in an inner sense of privation: "all willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 196). One pursues endless goals attempting to thwart this sense of privation, yet none of these goals— *if* any are to be realized— affords lasting satisfaction in view of the will's infinite striving. One obtains a single goal, and, immediately thereafter, one is seized by boredom (a form of suffering) (*WWR*, Vol. 1, pp. 313-314), or the desire for a new goal. That is, one is seized by "a lifeless longing without a definite object, a deadening languor" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 164) or the motive that pledged "complete satisfaction, the quenching of the thirst of the will" forthwith "appears in a different form, and therein moves the will afresh" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 327). The satisfaction of any goal or desire reveals it to be a chimera (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 196), and when obtained it is "always laid aside as [a] vanished illusion" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 164). Moreover, for every desire consummated, there is "at least ten that are denied" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 196). In affirming the will-to-live, "*all life is suffering*" (*alles Leben Leiden ist*) (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 310; Schopenhauer's emphasis).

[38] Schopenhauer also advocates aestheticism as another means to overcome the suffering inherent in affirming the will-to-live. Briefly, the aesthetic, or "pure subject of knowing" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 234), in contemplating works of art (paintings, symphonies), natural objects (landscapes, trees, rivers), and certain man-made objects, apprehends the Platonic Ideas (*Platonische Idee*) as instantiated in such objects. The Ideas are universal ("general") and timeless; they are the eternal archetypes of the diverse forms that exist in nature and are "the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in- itself, the will" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 184) The Ideas "not themselves entering into time and space, the medium of individuals…remain fixed, subject to no change, always being, never having become" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 129). As Magee states, when we see "something as beautiful we are literally seeing the universal in the particular… we are catching a cognitive glimpse of the Platonic Idea of which the object of our contemplation is an instantiation" (Magee, 1997, p. 165). The Platonic Ideas themselves are not subject to the principle of sufficient reason. Hence the aesthetic experience provides a kind of knowledge that is "concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which is subject to no change, and therefore is known with equal truth for all time" (*WWR*, Vol 1, p. 184) Knowledge, then, in the aesthetic experience is not in service of the will: the Ideas do not operate as motives on the individual will. The aesthetic subject temporarily suspends the activity of willing losing himself "in the object of perception so that [he is] no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception". Rather, "the two have become one since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of perception." (*WWR*, Vol 1, pp. 178-179) Hence, the subject that comprehends the Ideas embraces a "will-less" mode of perception. He is no longer an individual subject of willing. However, although subjective willing is renounced, willing of some sort still exists. If the will was wholly extinguished, there would then be no knowledge of Ideas (as objectifications of the will): the "pure subject of knowing" knows "pure" Ideas. For a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer's aesthetics see Vandenabeele, B. 2008, pp. 194-210; 2015.

[39] Asceticism appears to involve four steps towards salvation: first, there is "voluntary and complete chastity" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 381); secondly, there is "voluntary and intentional poverty" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 381); thirdly, there is self-mortification: the ascetic welcomes "every injury, every ignominy, every outrage" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 382). Finally, the ascetic "cheerfully accepts[s]" death, which is "a longed-for deliverance" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 382).

[40] Atwell also notes Schopenhauer use of the French quietist and mystic Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte-Guyon (also known as Madam Guyon, 1648-1717) as an exemplar of denial of the will-to-live. Guyon states "everything is indifferent to me; I *cannot* will anything more; often I do not know whether I exist or not" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 391). Yet, as Atwell notes, clearly she was "able to will a bit" insofar as she could "write or dictate her *Autobiography*" (Atwell, 1990, p. 251, n. 97).

[41] Atwell includes "aesthetics…scholarship, and (to a much lesser extent) religion" as a "road to salvation" (Atwell, 1990, p. 182).

[42] Regarding this distinction between "willing" and "willing-to-live", I believe that one can draw a corresponding distinction between "the will" and "the will-to-live" (notwithstanding the fact that Schopenhauer uses the expressions "the will" and "the will-to-live" interchangeably). "The will" can be understood to refer to the blind striving entity that exists independently from human cognition; that is, it is *the will qua thing-in-itself* while the "will-to-live" can be understood as the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in all spatio-temporal objects in the world of representation. As Raymond B. Marcin states "because of the way in which it manifests itself in the world of appearances… the world as represented to us through the structures of our perceiving mind (structures such as time, space, causality, and plurality), the 'will'…at the human level…[is] the 'will-to-live'" (Marcin, 1994, p. 848). Since, on this understanding, the will-to-live is the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in spatio-temporal objects, it can also be termed the "individual will". The individual will is driven by the will qua thing-in-itself (the will qua thing-in-itself is "present, whole and undivided" in each individual (*WWR* Vol. 1, p. 332), and, by default, involves the affirmation of the will-to-live; that is to say, by default, it is egoistic.

[43] "The world as thing-in-itself, the identity of all beings, *justice*, *righteousness*, *philanthropy*, *denial of the will-to-live* spring from *one root*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 610; my emphasis); denial of the will-to-live ultimately arises "from the *same source* from which all goodness, affection, virtue, and nobility of character spring" (*WWR*, Vol 1., p. 378; my emphasis). That is, compassion, compassionate conduct, and renunciation spring from the "penetration of the *principium individuationis*". It is "this penetration alone" that "abolishes the distinction between our own individuality and that of others" (*WWR*, Vol 1., p. 378). This penetration constitutes a type of knowledge; not an "abstract knowledge [concerning the faculty of reason] expressing itself in words", but rather, a "living [intuitive] knowledge expressing itself in deed and conduct alone" (*WWR*, Vol 1., p. 285). It is a type of knowledge that does not "serve the will for the achievement of its aims"; a type of knowledge not subordinate to the will's service (*WWR*, Vol 1., p. 152).

[44] "*Affirmation of the will-to-live*, the phenomenal world, diversity of all beings, *individuality*, *egoism*, hatred, wickedness, all spring from *one root*" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 610; my emphasis); that is, they spring from perception wholly conditioned by, or dependent on "knowledge being entangled in", the *principium individuationis* (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 610). This knowledge is "almost throughout entirely subordinate" to the will's service; "the *principium individuationis*…is the form of knowledge wholly in the service of the will" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 342).

[45] "Modes of conduct" express affirmation and denial "in its different degrees" (*WWR*, Vol 1., p. 285).

[46] Personal correspondence, Cartwright, 23 February 2017.

[47] Young also provides a detailed discussion of the incentive of malice, which, as we know, he thinks (at least as presented in *The World as Will and Representation*) is an "unobvious species of egoism" (Young, 2005, p. 176). It is not necessary for me to here elaborate further on Young's discussion of malice.
[48] To textually substantiate the claim that Schopenhauer thinks virtue is compassion, Young cites *WWR*, Vol. 1, pp. 375-6; Vol. 2, p. 601. That Schopenhauer thinks love is compassion, he cites *WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 374.
[49] The word altruism (*altruisme*) was coined in 1851 by French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857); Comte defined altruism as conduct displayed by "a sincere and habitual desire of doing good" (Comte, 1973, p. 11).
[50] In Young's defence, Schopenhauer does state that "all love (*agape*, *caritas*) is compassion *or sympathy*" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 374) (my emphasis).
[51] To be sure, Schopenhauer's concept of the intelligible character is complex. The specific relationship it has to the will is not altogether clear. Sometimes Schopenhauer speaks of it as an objectification of the will qua thing-in-itself (as the entire phenomenal body and life of an individual) (See, for example, *WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 289), and, at other times, as the will itself (See, for example, *WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 287). Wicks states "intelligible characters occupy an uneasy place within Schopenhauer's metaphysical arrangement, for they inconsistently stand midway between the world as will and the world as representation, and squarely in neither" (Wicks, 2008, p. 118). Shapshay believes that "the intelligible character is not to be identified with the will qua thing in itself, but rather, is something metaphysically intermediate between the world of representation and the thing in itself: It is a special Idea, which is itself an objectivation of a *particular act* of the metaphysical will [*Willensakt*]" (Shapshay, 2016, p. 94) (Shapshay's emphasis).
[52] To be strict, I interpret Young to advance one criticism regarding Schopenhauer's argument for the metaphysical foundation of virtue (compassion). The second criticism is directed at virtue (compassion) itself (what *results* from the metaphysical foundation).
[53] To substantiate this claim, Young directs the reader to earlier material presented in his book. The later claim here— space and time may exist in-themselves— is presented in this earlier material.
[54] Young's criticism here is essentially the same as that stated in his prior work: "Virtue, in other words, altruism, remains possible since the altruist acts in the interests of a higher, transcendental self. The difference, that is, between altruism and egoism is not between acting out of self- and other-interest, but between, rather, acting out of the interests of one's higher and lower self" (Young, 1987, p. 107).
[55] I take the liberty here of translating *Mitleid* as compassion (as opposed to "pity").
[56] Young states that "The world-will is the perpetrator of all this horror. So it is evil" (Young, 2005, p. 82).
[57] By "world-will" Young means "nature" (Young, 2005, p. 80) or "the world" (Young, 2005, p. 79): "Over and above the will in this and that body there is what I shall call, to avoid confusion, the 'world-will'" (Young, 2005, p. 76) . Young substantiates his claim that the "world-will" is a designer by citing Schopenhauer's discussion of the instinctual behaviour of organisms: "the [desire to break out of the] hard egg-shell, holding the chicken a prisoner, is certainly the motive for the horny point with which its beak is provided, in order with it to break through that shell; after this the chicken casts it off as of no further use" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 332). Young thinks that this example demonstrates that "the metaphysical will (a) *knows* that the chicken will be imprisoned in the egg, (b) wills that it should escape (c) *knows* that horny points are good tools for breaking egg-shell and so (d) provides it with such a tool" (Young, 2005, p. 83;Young's emphasis).
[58] Moreover, Schopenhauer contrasts his concept of the will with those who posit the "inner-being" of the world as a "world-soul (*Weltseele*)" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 349). "World-soul", Schopenhauer thinks, is an incorrect notion of this inner being since it entails an "*ens rationis*" — a being with reason: "'soul' signifies an individual unity of consciousness which obviously does not belong to that inner being" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 349) (the will, for Schopenhauer, "in itself it is without consciousness*"* (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 201)). Specifically, the concept of soul "supposes knowing and willing to be in inseparable connexion, and yet independent of the animal organism" (*WWR*, Vol. 2, p. 201. Schopenhauer's will— as the inner being of the world— is devoid of knowledge, and has no intellect. Schopenhauer elsewhere states "knowledge and the determination by motives which is conditioned by this knowledge…belongs not to the inner nature of the will, but merely to its most distinct phenomenon as animal and human being" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 105). Finally, "the will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a blind, irresistible urge, as we see it appear in inorganic and vegetable nature and in their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life" (*WWR*. Vol. 1, p. 275).
[59] Personal correspondence, 20 August 2017.
[60] Becker's charge of egoism appears to be based on Schopenhauer's conception of the good (compassionate) character: "the good character… lives in an external world that is homogenous with his own true being. The others are not a non-ego for him, but an "I once more" (*BM*, §22, p. 211). However, Cartwright believes Becker's charge is based on text in the final book of *WWR*, Vol. 1 (Cartwright, personal correspondence, 27 July 2017). Becker raised a similar objection to Schopenhauer's notion of the intelligible character, which has since been raised by others (Simmel, 1991, p. 127; Magee, 1997, p. 206; Janaway, 1989, p. 244) including Young (Young, 2005, p. 164). Schopenhauer believes the intelligible character is an "extra-temporal and thus indivisible and unchanging act of will (*Willensakt*)" (*WWR*, Vol. 1, p. 316). That is, he believes that one chooses one's character in an extra-temporal (timeless) act of will. Now since an act of will is an event (a willed action or a "deed"), and events require the existence of time, the notion an extra-temporal act of will (choice taking place in the will), appears incoherent. Schopenhauer responds to this Becker's charge thus: "I present [that fact that the intelligible character is an extra-temporal act of will] not as an objective truth

or as an adequate notion of the relation between the thing in itself and appearance; rather I present it merely as a metaphor and simile, as a figurative expression of the matter…in order to make the matter comprehensible" (Cartwright, 2010, p. 510). See also Cartwright, 2016, p. 56.

[61] However, Atwell concludes that although this recognition cannot stimulate one to altruism, it likewise cannot stimulate one to compassion: In facing the metaphysical will "I am facing something that I am more likely to shrink from in horror than I am to sympathize with" (Atwell, 1990, pp. 122-23; Atwell's emphasis).

[62] To be strict, Young uses the third-person personal pronoun "he" and third-person determiner (possessive adjective) "his": "*he* acts for the sake of the interests of his metaphysical rather than *his* empirical self." Yet these are clearly equivalent to the first-person personal pronoun "I" and first-person possessive determiner "my": "*I* act for the sake of the interests of *my* metaphysical rather than empirical self".

[63] Schopenhauer repeatedly declares his philosophy to be immanent — that is, like Kant, he offers no argument regarding that which transcends the possibility of experience. Rather, his philosophy provides an account of that which is given in experience (that which appears in experience), be it of the external world or self-consciousness.

[64] Personal correspondence, Fox, 12 October 2016.

[65] For further discussion on how Schopenhauer's employs metaphor and metonymy with respect to the metaphysical realm see Shapshay, 2008, pp. 212-229 and Neeley, 1997, pp. 47-67.

[66] Reginster states that Schopenhauer's response to Cassina can be interpreted in a way that undermines the claim that Schopenhauer's conception of compassion— as interpreted as involving a type of numerical identification— entails a type of metaphysical egoism similar to empirical egoism. In this interpretation, the "deception" the compassionate subject suffers is a psychological process whereby he extends his empirical self so as to include his beneficiary's empirical self. For example, when David feels compassion for Dorothy he suffers from the delusion that Dorothy, insofar as she is an object of his compassion, becomes a part of his own self. David internalizes Dorothy along with her suffering. Since David's perception is conditioned wholly by the *principium individuationis*— he recognizes Dorothy to be empirically distinct and has no understanding of the metaphysical unity— and since he fundamentally acts out of a desire for his own well-being (he is duped into thinking that he really acts for Dorothy's benefit), he is necessarily an *empirical* egoist. This is in stark contrast to Schopenhauer's account where compassion (and hence altruism) is grounded in the annihilation of individuation. Through the altruist's "magnanimous deeds [the distinction between beings] appears to be abolished, since here the weal of another is protected and supported at the expense of the good man, and thus another's ego is treated as equal with his own" (*BM*, §22, p. 205). The distinction between David and Dorothy has been annihilated: there is *no* David and Dorothy. Contrary to Cassina, in Schopenhauer's account no "deception of the imagination" cajoles one into subsuming the object of one's compassion into one's own self since metaphysically there is no "I" and "You". One is always aware that, empirically, the other is the sufferer, not oneself. Yet at the metaphysical level, this distinction does not obtain. David "remains clearly conscious that [Dorothy] is the sufferer, not [David]" yet understands that both Dorothy and himself, as empirical individuated subjects, cease to be *vis-à-vis* the unity of will. Reginster notes this process is akin to one experiencing a perceptual illusion: one knows something to be amiss with one's perception if one does not perceive a stick in water as being bent, yet one knows this percept is ultimately illusory (being due to the refraction of light in water). Likewise, one knows it is incorrect to mistake another's empirical suffering with one's own, yet one knows the empirical distinction between oneself and the others to be ultimately chimerical (due to the unity of the will) (Reginster, 2015, p. 285). In light of this interpretation of Schopenhauer's refutation of Cassina, Reginster concludes that "there is something fundamentally wrong in the suggestion" that "compassion is a kind of 'metaphysical egoism', which is nothing more than 'empirical egoism' under a different guise" (Reginster, 2015, p. 273).

[67] To be strict, he states that Schopenhauer sometimes describes "the egoism/altruism contrast" in a manner similar to his own phenomenological-type account of altruism (Young, 2005, p. 183).

[68] In *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer first talks about the metaphysical unity of will while discussing his concept of justice. He only discusses compassion five sections subsequent when analysing the cardinal virtue of loving-kindness. That compassion is not mentioned in his treatment of justice seems to intimate that, for Young and others, Schopenhauer has an explanation of compassion independent of his metaphysical unity of will argument.

[69] To elaborate on this Young relies on Wittgenstein's texts, which he believes demonstrate a debt to Schopenhauer. He Wittgenstein states "'see[ing] the world aright'"

[70] Janaway also suggests that Schopenhauer's theory can be interpreted in a non-metaphysical way; a way which involves a "universal standpoint" whereby "all individuals can be treated as prima facie of equal worth, and that one attains this standpoint on seeing that we are all equally organic sentient beings that must strive to satisfy the same ineliminable ends and desires and must suffer from not fulfilling them" (Janaway, 2007 pp. 62-63). However, as Shapshay and Ferrell rightly point out, such an interpretation still fundamentally involves Schopenhauer's metaphysics (Shapshay & Ferrell, 2015, p. 59).

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