The operation of strategic culture in the Russian campaign of the 1994-1996 Chechen war : culture and Clausewitz

Strategic culture literature identifies political and military cultures’ important, enduring influence over an actor’s strategic behaviour. However, it has not provided an understanding of how these factors relate to an actor’s unique social dynamics, and how, in tandem, national identity, political culture and military culture interact during a conflict to influence an actor’s strategic behaviour. To address this gap in the literature, this dissertation examines strategic culture’s influence on Russia’s campaign during the 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen War. Examining strategic behaviour within a conflict requires consideration of the complex influence of multiple variables. Any analysis is potentially distorted when these variables are considered in isolation. To address this matter, this thesis utilizes an original strategic culture model, inspired by Clausewitz’s Trinity of ‘passions’ (national identity), ‘chance’ (military culture) and ‘subordination’ (political culture). The model applies the Trinity’s operating characteristics to generate an understanding of how political, military and social structures interact and impart varying degrees of influence on an actor’s wartime behaviour. The thesis finds that both rational calculations and cultural factors influenced the Russian campaign’s ‘passions’, ‘chance’ and ‘subordination’. Furthermore, many of Russia’s supposedly rational calculations, such as the need to restore legality and maintain territorial integrity, were found to be underpinned by Russian cultural factors. This thesis argues that the post-Soviet transition’s uncertainty and disruption, particularly its impact on the conception of a stable, coherent Russian national identity greatly influenced Russian strategic culture in the First Chechen War. The resulting social upheaval, and fragmentation of nationality created ‘a disconnect’ between the model’s identity, and the political and military culture components. This ambiguous national identity produced dysfunctionality within Russian strategic culture. Without consensus on identity, neither Russian political nor military culture could function properly. As a result, the government failed to mobilise popular support, as it conducted an obsolete information campaign, and relied on an entrenched, but inappropriate, approach to military operations. These findings indicate that developing a more nuanced appreciation of the social, intangible factors that influence an actor’s strategic behaviour complements studies on strategic behaviour’s complexity, and provides a more enhanced, comprehensive understanding of an actor's strategic culture.