The mythology of counter-insurgency

Counter-Insurgency is the most political form of warfare. Unlike other forms of war the political or ideological proclivities of entire populations are at stake. Counter-Insurgency has, due this, confounded and bewildered practitioners, academics and policy makers alike for the longest time. Only in the latter quarter of the 20th century, after the visceral war fought for South-Vietnam’s soul, did military officers, academics and government officials feel they had broken the code of counter-insurgency. The problem was, it was determined, that counter-insurgency’s code was primarily political and not military or a combination of both, as previously thought. The key to waging counter-insurgency then lay on the political plane, through a plan revolving around compelling one’s adversary to negotiate and reach a political accord as an end to the conflict. As such the popular understanding of counter-insurgency has become that to be successful a plan of action to quell insurrection must be more politically than militarily based. But is this correct, has the code truly been cracked? The following thesis aims to examine this claim, proffer a counter-point, analyse supporting evidence to the riposte and draw conclusions based on this evidence. The following thesis then is less thesis and more anti-thesis, aiming to undercut the popular thesis of the field by positing a radical assertion for the field of counter-insurgency analysis, particularly in today’s political climate. That assertion can be summed thusly - counter-insurgency wars can indeed be resolved favourably for counter-insurgent practitioners by nought but military means alone, without support from or regard for political considerations vis a vis insurgent elements. To accomplish this the thesis will examine the current literature and schools of thought in the field within the introduction, conduct two case studies on the American Civil War and Chechen Wars to illuminate insurrectionary conflicts resolved by military might, and finally posit conclusions based on the analysis this approach permits. The drive train for the following theoretical enquiry thus is the review of the field’s very core, an analysis of its most basest nature and the questioning of the current understanding of the phenomena to better understand this most complex form of warfare and political/ideologically driven violence.