Indifference and Determination: Kant's Concept/Intuition Distinction and Hegel's Doctrine of Being
thesisposted on 06.06.2019, 00:35 by GENE EDWARD FLENADY
This thesis considers Kant’s concept/intuition model of objective determination [Bestimmung] as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87) and Hegel’s critical transformation of that model in “The Doctrine of Being,” the first book of the Science of Logic (1812-16/32). I argue that Hegel’s Doctrine of Being provides a logical corrective to Kant’s tendency to present the respective cognitive contributions of concepts and intuitions as independently determinate, as well as to “two-stage” interpretations of Kant that argue for some form of concept/intuition separability. Instead, Hegel’s Being Logic constitutes a systematic derivation and ontological generalisation of Kant’s togetherness principle.