Founding an ethics on Being and Nothingness: the incompatibility of Sartre's ontology and his proposed ethics

Working from the premise that Sartre's ontology from Being and Nothingness is accurate; the question is raised as to whether an ethics compatible with that ontology is possible. Three separate attempts to formulate an ethics coherent with Being and Nothingness are examined and shown to have flaws. These are third party attempts at Sartre's 'early ethics', an ethics that Sartre left incomplete. Although each attempt is different and each has its individual problems, there are issues raised that are pertinent to any attempt to formulate an ethics from the ontology of Being and Nothingness. Due to the problems that are observed, it is demonstrated that, for those wishing to remain true to this ontology, Sartre's ethics is incoherent as it is incompatible with his ontology.